CAR_Public/181112.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, November 12, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 226

                            Headlines

600 WEST: Reyes Class Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval
AARON'S INC: Made Unsolicited Calls, Mahaffey and Bryant Claim
ACCENTCARE INC: Fifth Cir. Appeal Filed in Trammell FLSA Suit
AGWAY ENERGY: Brown Appeals Suit Dismissal Ruling Suit to 3rd Cir.
AGWAY ENERGY: Court Approves Confidential Settlement in Gonzalez

AIRE ANCIENT: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in New York
ALDEN SHOE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Figueroa Suit Alleges
ALLIED WORLD: Court Sets Pre-Filing Conference in Marcus Suit
ARSTRAT LLC: Jeger Sues Over Unfair Debt Collection Practices
BANK OZK: Dec. 26 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set

BASF SE: Rhino Linings Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania
BCA FINANCIAL: Ferrulli Appeals FDCPA Suit Dismissal to 3rd Circuit
BETTENDORF ENTERPRISES: Faces Palmer Class Action in Sacramento
BFT LP: Court Won't Review Judgment in AMP's TCPA Suit
BURGER KING: Blanchard Sues Over Sherman Act Violation

CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces Cinelli FDCPA Class Action
CAREER ADVANTAGE: Robert Carr Sues Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
CASPER SLEEP: Paul Good Alleges Wiretapping of Web Site Visitors
CATTOIRA MONTESSORI: Hernandez Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
CEC ENTERTAINMENT: Sinohui Class Settlement Has Final Court OK

CHANCELLOR HOUSE: Johnson Files Discrimination Class Action
CNNA INC: Walker Suit Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
CNU ONLINE: Karon Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
DENNY'S INC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages Under FLSA, Rafferty Says
DEVIALET INC: Violates Disabilities Act, Dominguez Suit Asserts

DUNKIN' BRANDS: Chen Appeals Order and Judgment to Second Circuit
E & K DELI: Ortiz Suit Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
EI DU PONT: Sued by Roberts Over PFOA and PFOS Contamination
EI DUPONT: Harrison Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
EW MYERS LLC: Fails to Pay Wages to Barista, Crow Suit Alleges

FLIS MANAGEMENT: Underpays Restaurant Workers, Hill Suit Alleges
FOSCARINI INC: Dominguez Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
FXI INC: Underpays Machine Forklift Operators, King Suit Claims
GC SERVICES: 7th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in F. Smith Suit
GOOGLE INC: Faces Olson Suit in N.D. Calif. Over Data Breach

HAWAII: Court Dismisses Williams' Prisoner’s Civil Rights Suit
HERNO USA: Dominguez Sues for ADA Breach
HI-TECH CONSTRUCTION: 60 Guilders Sues for Breach of Contract
HOMETOWN AMERICA: Removes Craw Suit to District of Massachusetts
LANCER ORTHODONTICS: Rowan Seeks Damages Under TCPA, Junk Fax Act

LEONID POGORILER: Court Denies Bid to OK Non-Monetary Settlement
LLOYD PEST CONTROL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Miranda Suit Says
LOAN PAYMENT: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Krogstad Suit
LOS ANGELES CITY: Cooley et al. Suit Transferred to Another Judge
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Kerpen Suit

MULLARKEY ASSOCIATES: Gerlikovski Files Labor Suit v. VP
NASHVILLE MANAGEMENT: Jointly Seek Approval of Notice in Cabot
NAVY FEDERAL: Court Approves $24.5MM Settlement in Lloyd Suit
NEW YORK: Disability Commissioner Faces Hills et al. Suit
NORTHBROOK BANK:  Praither Files Suit Over Ponzi Scheme

PLY GEM: Court Dismisses Suit Over Defective Vinyl Sliding
POSHMARK INC: Kiler Files ADA Suit in New York
PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Removes William South Suit to M.D. Florida
QUICKEN LOANS: Court Grants Bid to Amend Mattson TCPA Suit
RESCAP LIQUIDATING: Court Precludes Sole Responsibility Argument

RESTAURANT BRANDS: Michel Sues Over No-Poach Clause in Franchise
RESTAURANT LEADERSHIP: Underpays Housekeepers, Craig Suit Alleges
RUSSIAN TEA: Faces Lawsuit in New York for ADA Breach
SANTA CLARA, CA: Fails to Pay OT to Firefighters, Gaffney et al Say
SELIP & STYLIANOU: Goldklang Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation

SENOMYX INC: Richner Suit Seeks to Enjoin Merger With Firmenich
SIDEPOINT INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Carlson Suit Alleges
SPRINT CORP: Muehlgay Suit Challenges Merger With T-Mobile US
STAR ACQUISITIONS: Faces Cox Suit in Sacramento
STERIGENICS U.S.: Removes Cannell et al. Suit to N.D. Illinois

STREETTREND LLC: Violates ADA, Crosson Suit Alleges
TRI-STATE ADJUSTMENTS: Loveland Moves for Certification of Class
TRU FORCE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Technicians, Sims Alleges
UNITED AIRLINES: Beier Files Suit for Breach of Contract
UNITED STATES: Vietnamese Refugees Classes Certified in Trinh

US AIRWAYS: Court Won't Stay Hickcox-Huffman TCPA Suit
US FOODS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Drivers, Gomez Suit Claims
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS: Jacobs Class Suit Underway
WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: 7th Cir. Vacates $10MM Arbitration Award
YALE UNIVERSITY: Andrew Mason Sues over Data Breach

ZADIG & VOLTAIRE: Figueroa Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
ZUMPER INC: Melo Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Virginia

                            *********

600 WEST: Reyes Class Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, New York County, issued a Decision and Order
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement
in the case captioned NOEL REYES, MATIAS RIVERA, CHARLES RESNICK
and JONATHAN HERNANDEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. 600 WEST 169TH REST, INC., d/b/a
COOGAN'S, PETER WALSH, DAVID HUNT, VINCENT WALSH, and THERESA
McDADE Defendants. Docket No. 159303/2016, Motion Seq. No. 001.
(N.Y. Sup.).

The matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Conditional Certification of
the Settlement Class, Appointment of Lee Litigation Group, PLLC as
Class Counsel, and Approval of the Proposed Notice of Settlement
and Class Action Procedure (Motion for Preliminary Approval).

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

The Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is
within the range of possible settlement approval, such that notice
to the Class is appropriate.

The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the result of
extensive, arm's length negotiations by counsel well-versed in the
prosecution of wage and hour class and collective actions, and that
the proposed settlement has no obvious deficiencies.

CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS

The Court provisionally certifies the following class under Article
9 of the CPLR, for settlement purposes only (Settlement Class):

All current and former employees of the Defendants who performed
work as non-exempt employees at Defendants' restaurant, at any time
from October 20, 2011 through April 17, 2018.

APPOINTMENT OF PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL AS CLASS COUNSEL

The Court appoints Lee Litigation Group, PLLC (LLG) as Class
Counsel because they did substantial work identifying,
investigating, litigating, and settling Plaintiffs and the class
members' claims, have years of experience prosecuting and settling
wage and hour class actions, and are well-versed in wage and hour,
law and in class action law.

The work that LLG has performed both in litigating and settling
this case demonstrates their commitment to the class and to
representing the class's interests.

CLASS NOTICE

The Court approves the proposed Amended Notice of Settlement of
Class Action Lawsuit and Fairness Hearing (Notice), attached as
NYSCEF Document Number 36, exhibit A, and directs its distribution
to the Class.

CPLR Section 908 requires that notice of proposed compromise of a
class action shall be given to members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.

The content of the Notice fully complies with due process. The
Notice describes the terms of the settlement, informs the class
about the allocation of attorneys' fees and costs, and provides
specific information regarding the date, time, and place of the
final approval hearing.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's October 22, 2018
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7lom88y
from Leagle.com.


AARON'S INC: Made Unsolicited Calls, Mahaffey and Bryant Claim
--------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES MAHAFFEY, and LATIA BRYANT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AARON'S, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04859-AT (N.D. Ga., Oct. 19, 2018) seeks to stop
the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Aaron's, Inc. operates as an omnichannel provider of lease-purchase
solutions. It operates through three segments: Progressive Leasing,
Aaron’s Business, and DAMI. The company engages in the sale,
lease ownership, and specialty retailing of furniture, consumer
electronics, home appliances, and accessories. As of February 15,
2018, it operated approximately 1,726 company-operated and
franchised stores in 47 states and Canada, as well as its
e-commerce platform, Aarons.com. Aaron's, Inc. was founded in 1955
and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth S. Canfield, Esq.
          Everette L. Doffermyre, Esq.
          DOFFERMYRE SHIELDS CANFIELD & KNOWLES, LLC
          1355 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1900
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 881-8900
          Facsimile: (404) 920-3246
          E-mail: kcanfield@dsckd.com
                  edoffermyre@dsckd.com

               - and –

          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          David Stein, Esq.
          Aaron Blumenthal, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  ds@classlawgroup.com
                  ab@classlawgroup.com


ACCENTCARE INC: Fifth Cir. Appeal Filed in Trammell FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Estella Lynn Trammell filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit styled Estella Trammell v. AccentCare, Incorporated,
Case No. 1:17-CV-1129, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas, Austin.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
asked the Court to conditionally certify a class of:

    "all current and former employees of Defendant who were
     treated by Defendant as FLSA non-exempt and were paid
     straight time for their intra-workday travel in the last
     three years."

The appellate case is captioned as Estella Trammell v. AccentCare,
Incorporated, Case No. 18-50872, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ESTELLA LYNN TRAMMELL, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Daniel Anthony Verrett, Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          700 W. Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee ACCENTCARE, INCORPORATED, is represented by:

          Kimberly Rives Miers, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2001 Ross Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 880-8189
          E-mail: kmiers@littler.com


AGWAY ENERGY: Brown Appeals Suit Dismissal Ruling Suit to 3rd Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff James Brown filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled James Brown v. Agway Energy Services, LLC, Case
No. 2-18-cv-00321, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 3, 2018, the
District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant Agway
Energy Services, LLC's motion to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Agway is an electric generation supplier (EGS) that purchases
energy directly or indirectly from energy production companies and,
in turn, sells that energy to consumers.  The Plaintiff brings this
suit individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
alleging that Agway uses improper pricing practices with respect to
its variable rates, resulting in its consumers paying considerably
more for their electricity than they otherwise should pay under the
Customer Contract.  According to the Plaintiff, Agway lures
customers into switching energy suppliers by offering initial
teaser rates and then promising a variable rate based on
market-related factors.

Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for breach of contract has three
elements: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential
terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3)
resultant damages.

The appellate case is captioned as James Brown v. Agway Energy
Services, LLC, Case No. 18-3285, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JAMES BROWN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 238-1700
          E-mail: klaukaitis@kohnswift.com
                  jshub@kohnswift.com

               - and -

          Tiasha Palikovic, Esq.
          WITTELS LAW
          240 Lexington Avenue, Unit 2
          Brooklyn, NY 11216
          Telephone: (646) 266-2630
          E-mail: tpalikovic@wittelslaw.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Wittels, Esq.
          WITTELS LAW
          18 Half Mile Road
          Armonk, NY 10504
          Telephone: (914) 319-9945
          E-mail: slw@wittelslaw.com

               - and -

          D. Aaron Rihn, Esq.
          ROBERT PEIRCE & ASSOCIATES
          707 Grant Street
          2500 Gulf Tower
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-7229
          E-mail: arihn@peircelaw.com

Defendant-Appellee AGWAY ENERGY SERVICES LLC is represented by:

          John D. Coyle, Esq.
          Jesse C. Ehnert, Esq.
          William J. Mosca, Jr., Esq.
          BEVAN MOSCA, GIUDITTA & ZARILLO PC
          222 Mount Airy Road, Suite 200
          Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
          Telephone: (908) 848-5922
          E-mail: jcoyle@bmg.law
                  jehnert@bmg.law
                  wmosca@bmg.law

               - and -

          Sydney R. Normil, Esq.
          Stanley Yorsz, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          301 Grant Street
          One Oxford Centre, 20th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 562-1545
          E-mail: sydney.normil@bipc.com
                  stanley.yorsz@bipc.com


AGWAY ENERGY: Court Approves Confidential Settlement in Gonzalez
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued Memorandum and Decision-Order granting Joint Motion to
Approve the Confidential Settlement Agreement in the case captioned
NAOMI GONZALES, Plaintiff, v. AGWAY ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant. No. 5:18-cv-235 (MAD/ATB). (N.D.N.Y.).

The instant action presents a bona fide dispute over FLSA
provisions, including whether the plaintiffs can prove how many
hours they actually worked, whether the plaintiffs were already
paid overtime hours, whether the defendant's alleged violations
were made in good faith and on reasonable grounds and whether the
defendant's alleged FLSA violations were willful.

In determining whether a settlement is fair, adequate and
reasonable, the Court should consider the following six factors:
(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2)
the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3)
the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed;
(4) the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits; (5) the
range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of the class
counsel, class representatives, and absent class members.

There is no evidence of any fraud or collusion behind the
settlement. The Court may presume that no fraud or collusion
occurred between counsel, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. The first factor favors approval of the settlement as
fair, adequate and reasonable.

With regard to the inquiries set forth in the second factor, the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation, this
FLSA action presented multiple complex legal issues which have been
zealously litigated by experienced counsel, at significant expense
particularly as it involved the highly contested issues of
insurance coverage.   

Accordingly, the second factor weighs in favor of finding that the
settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.

The third factor, the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed, likewise supports a finding that the
settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, and accordingly,
should be approved. This case has been pending for over two and a
half years. During its pendency, the parties have conducted
discovery, extensive motion practice as well as factual and legal
investigations.  

The fourth factor, probability of plaintiff's success on the
merits, supports a finding that the settlement is fair, adequate
and reasonable. This case has been litigated by competent lawyers
on each side who enjoy great respect in their field from both sides
of the aisle. Counsel for the plaintiffs has appeared multiple
times in this Court with success on most, if not all, occasions.
Lead counsel for Sher, Garner is well known to this Court and the
legal community as a skilled litigator in complex insurance
coverage litigation.   

Thus, based upon the uncertainty of the eventual outcome of this
litigation, the fourth factor weighs in favor of finding that the
settlement of this action is fair, adequate and reasonable.

The fifth factor, the range of possible recovery, weighs in favor
of a finding that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.
Each eligible class member will receive a sum representing a
percentage of back pay due for overtime violations, plus an equal
amount as liquidated damages and interest. The Court therefore
finds the total amount offered to each eligible plaintiff is
adequate, fair and reasonable and within range anticipated by the
Court.

The final factor, the opinions of the class counsel, class
representatives, and absent class members, also mandates a finding
that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. Class counsel
and the class representative, as well as the defendants and their
counsel, have approved the terms of the Settlement Agreement and
have joined in asking this Court for approval. There has been no
objections to the settlement whatsoever and all agree that the
proposed settlement is in the best interests of the parties
involved. The settlement was arrived at after extensive negotiation
by counsel. The Court is entitled to rely on the judgment of
experienced counsel in its evaluation of the merits of a class
action settlement.

The Court finds no evidence that plaintiffs' counsel has not worked
in good faith to secure a good settlement.

The Court recommends that the proposed settlement be approved, and
accordingly, that the Court grant the Joint Motion to Approve
Confidential Settlement Agreement on the terms and conditions set
forth in the Confidential Settlement Agreement filed under seal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7p5u8rl from Leagle.com.

Naomi Gonzales, Plaintiff, represented by Todd S. Garber --
tgarber@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson &
Garber LLP, Chantal Khalil -- ckhalil@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber LLP & Douglas G. Blankinship --
gblankinship@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson
& Garber LLP.

Agway Energy Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brendan M.
Sheehan -- bsheehan@bsk.com -- Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, John D.
Coyle -- jcoyle@bmg.law -- Bevan, Mosca & Giuditta, Sharon M.
Porcellio -- sporcellio@bsk.com -- Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC &
William K. Mosca, Jr. -- wmosca@bmg.law -- Bevan, Mosca & Giuditta,
P.C.


AIRE ANCIENT: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aire Ancient Baths
UES, LLC. The case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aire
Ancient Baths UES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10162 (S.D.
N.Y., Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

AIRE provides a combination of Ancient Thermal Baths, Special
Rituals, and Signature Experiences. The facility was designed in
the style of Roman baths further emphasized by the decor
immediately apparent upon entry. AIRE lets guests experience
various different pools in a tranquil spa-like atmosphere.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal



ALDEN SHOE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Figueroa Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE FIGUEROA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ALDEN SHOE COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-05942 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 24, 2018) alleges violation of
the Americans with Disability Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons. The Defendants' denial of full and equal
access to its website, and therefore denial of its products and
services offered thereby and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Alden Shoe Company, Inc. designs and manufactures men's shoes and
orthopedic shoes in New England. It offers moccasins, oxfords,
slip-ons, flex welts, walkers, and dress casual footwear, as well
factory restoration service kits. The company also provides
accessories, such as belts, leather products, and shoe care
products. Alden Shoe Company, Inc. was founded in 1884 and is based
in Lakeville, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
          SHALOM LAW, PLLC
          124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 971-9474
          Facsimile: (718) 865-0943
          E-mail: Jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


ALLIED WORLD: Court Sets Pre-Filing Conference in Marcus Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maine issued a
Report of Pre-filing Conference Under Local Rule 56 in the case
captioned GEORGE J. MARCUS, Plaintiff, v. ALLIED WORLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant. Civil No. 2:18-CV-253-DBH. (D. Maine).

The plaintiff asserts two Counts in his Complaint against his
insurance company, challenging its refusal to defend him in a civil
suit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Both parties request summary judgment without discovery on Count I,
the duty-to-defend claim, because the insurance policy and the
Complaint in the underlying lawsuit are all that is required for
deciding the duty to defend question under Maine law.

The insurance company also seeks summary judgment on Count II, an
unfair claims and claims settlement practices claim. At the
conference, the Court ruled that both parties could amend their
pleadings to encompass a second class-action lawsuit recently
brought against the plaintiff, without filing motions to amend,
thereby mooting the defendant's motion.

On the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count II, the
Court will consider any argument the plaintiff makes under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d) that he needs discovery before the Court can rule on
that claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Report is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7fmtoce from Leagle.com.

GEORGE J MARCUS, Plaintiff, represented by ELIZABETH A. GERMANI,
GERMANI MARTEMUCCI & HILL.

ALLIED WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by PAMELA L.
SIGNORELLO -- psignorello@wileyrein.com -- WILEY REIN LLP, RICHARD
A. SIMPSON -- rsimpson@wileyrein.com -- WILEY REIN LLP, pro hac
vice & JOHN S. WHITMAN -- jwhitman@rwlb.com -- RICHARDSON, WHITMAN,
LARGE & BADGER.


ARSTRAT LLC: Jeger Sues Over Unfair Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ilana Jeger, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ARStrat, LLC and John Does 1-25, Case No. 2:18-cv-06284
(E.D. N.Y., November 5, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or
alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household
purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal
Service, telephone and internet, allegedly using deceptive,
misleading and unfair debt collection practices.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of
Nassau, residing at 487 Cedarhurst Avenue, Cedarhurst, NY 11516.

The Defendant is a "debt collector" with an address at 9800 Centre
Parkway, Suite 1100, Houston, TX 77036. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel Kohn, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com



BANK OZK: Dec. 26 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until December 26, 2018 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against Bank OZK
(NasdaqGS: OZK), if they purchased the Company's securities between
February 19, 2016 and October 18, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). This action is pending in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

What You May Do

If you purchased securities of Bank OZK and would like to discuss
your legal rights and how this case might affect you and your right
to recover for your economic loss, you may, without obligation or
cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at
1-877-515-1850 or via email ( lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com ), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-ozk/ to learn more. If
you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you
must petition the Court by December 26, 2018.

                        About the Lawsuit

Bank OZK and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
the Company failed to disclose that it lacked sufficient credit
risk assessment controls creating an increased risk of loss and
charge-offs, and as a result of the foregoing, the Company's
statements were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

On October 18, 2018, the Company disclosed that it had "incurred
combined charge-offs of $45.5 million on two Real Estate
Specialties Group credits" that it previously had classified as
substandard.

On this news, the price of Bank OZK's shares plummeted.

                  About Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is a law firm focused on securities,
antitrust and consumer class actions, along with merger &
acquisition and breach of fiduciary litigation against publicly
traded companies on behalf of shareholders. The firm has offices in
New York, California and Louisiana. [GN]


BASF SE: Rhino Linings Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled RHINO LININGS CORPORATION,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. BASF SE; BASF CORP.; BAYER CORP.; COVESTRO AG;
COVESTRO LLC; DOWDUPONT INC.; DOW CHEMICAL CO.; HUNTSMAN CORP.;
HUNTSMAN INERNATIONAL LLC; MCNS POLYURETHANES USA INC.; MCNS
POLYURETHANES, INC.; WANHUA CHEMICAL GROUP CO., LTD.; WANHUA
CHEMICAL (AMERICA) CO LTD.; and WANHUA CHEMICAL US HOLDING, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-12864, was removed from the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 19, 2018.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01420 to the
proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Lisa Pupo
Lenihan. The Rhino Linings suit is a member case in the
multi-district litigation proceeding, MDL 2862.

BASF SE operates as a chemical company worldwide. It operates
through five segments: Chemicals, Performance Products, Functional
Materials & Solutions, Agricultural Solutions, and Oil & Gas. The
company also offers surfactants, emulsifiers, polymers, emollients,
chelating agents, cosmetic active ingredients, and UV filters for
personal care, hygiene, home care, industrial and institutional
cleaning, and technical applications. BASF SE was founded in 1865
and is headquartered in Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Germany. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason L. Lichtman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          Facsimile: (212) 355-9592
          E-mail: jlichtman@lchb.com

               - and -

          Jason S. Hartley, Esq.
          Jason M. Lindner, Esq.
          HARTLEY LLP
          550 West C Street, Suite 1750
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 400-5822
          Facsimile: (619) 400-5832
          E-mail: hartley@hartleyllp.com
                  lindner@hartleyllp.com


BCA FINANCIAL: Ferrulli Appeals FDCPA Suit Dismissal to 3rd Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Gino Ferrulli filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Gino Ferrulli v. BCA Financial Services Inc., Case
No. 2-17-cv-13177, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 8, 2018, Judge
Katherine S. Hayden granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
case.

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion to
dismiss Ferrulli's class action complaint in which he alleges that
BCA sent him and others similarly situated a debt collection letter
that violates two provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.  Mr. Ferrulli incurred a $780 debt to Saint Barnabas Medical
Center, which was referred to BCA for collection purposes.  BCA
proceeded by sending Ferrulli a collection letter dated May 2,
2017.

Mr. Ferrulli claims the collection letter uses false, deceptive, or
misleading representations or means in connection with the
collection of a debt, and fails to provide the consumer-recipient
with a proper notice.

The appellate case is captioned as Gino Ferrulli v. BCA Financial
Services Inc., Case No. 18-3308, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant GINO FERRULLI, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          JONES WOLF & KAPASI LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com
                  bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee BCA FINANCIAL SERVICES INC. is represented by:

          Andrew M. Schwartz, Esq.
          MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PC
          2000 Market Street, Suite 2300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 575-2765
          E-mail: amschwartz@mdwcg.com


BETTENDORF ENTERPRISES: Faces Palmer Class Action in Sacramento
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bettendorf Enterprises Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit in
California state court. The case is styled as Derrick Palmer on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bettendorf
Enterprises Inc., Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
34-2018-00243675-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Nov.
1, 2018).

Bettendorf Enterprises, Inc. provides transportation services. The
Company offers truck transportation of wood by-products, lumber,
flatbed freight cargo, and waste material. Bettendorf serves
customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Shaun Setareh, Esq.


BFT LP: Court Won't Review Judgment in AMP's TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying the Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
in the case captioned AMP AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, v. B F T, LP d/b/a GREAT
AMERICAN BUSINESS PRODUCTS, Section "A" (5). Civil Action No.
17-5667. (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) filed by Plaintiff
AMP Automotive, LLC (AMP).

Plaintiff AMP alleges that Great American violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited faxes
advertising Great American products and services.  

The Act makes it unlawful to use a fax machine to send an
unsolicited advertisement. It also provides a private right of
action, which permits any person or entity to bring an action
seeking (1) to enjoin a violation of the Act, (2) to recover for
actual monetary loss from such a violation or to receive statutory
damages of $500 per violation, whichever is greater, or (3) to
pursue both injunctive and monetary relief.  

AMP also seeks to bring this suit as a class action. Moreover, AMP
seeks to be named representative of the Plaintiff Class and seeks
an incentive award for its efforts as class representative.

This Court issued an order denying AMP's request for class
certification. AMP now requests this court to reconsider and/or
amend the judgment.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for
reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has treated a motion for
reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to
Rule 59(e) of th Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when filed
twenty-eight days after entry of the judgment from which relief is
being sought.  

AMP argues that this Court committed manifest legal error because
it applied a heavier burden on the issue of typicality than is
utilized under the law. Alternatively, AMP argues that this Court
committed legal error by basing its ruling regarding typicality on
a meritless defense of consent and associated non-existent issues
of agency and authority. AMP and Great American both cite Fifth
Circuit long standing precedent that establishes great discretion
in this Court to grant or deny motions for reconsideration and that
the motion should not be used to re-litigate old matters.
Considering the legal standard and the arguments presented by the
parties, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) for
the reasons set forth in the Order and Reasons.  

The Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/yafbdv92 from
Leagle.com.

AMP Automotive, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by George Brian Recile,
Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC,
Matthew Arthur Sherman, Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray,
Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC, Patrick R. Follette, Chehardy,
Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC, Preston
Lee Hayes, Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum &
Hayes, LLC & Ryan Paul Monsour, Chehardy, Sherman, Williams,
Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC.

B F T, LP, doing business as Great American Business Products,
Defendant, represented by Kimberley M. Spurlock, Spurlock &
Associates, PC, pro hac vice, Katharine Rachael Colletta --
colletta@chaffe.com -- Chaffe McCall LLP & Misty A. Hataway-Cone,
Spurlock & Associates, PC, pro hac vice.


BURGER KING: Blanchard Sues Over Sherman Act Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Geneva Blanchard and Tiffany Miller, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Burger King
Corporation a Florida corporation, and Burger King Worldwide, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-24576-RNS
(S.D. Fla., October 31, 2018) challenges under the Sherman Act, an
employee no-poach and no hiring agreement orchestrated by
Defendants between and among Burger King restaurant franchisees,
pursuant to which the franchisees agreed not to solicit, poach, or
hire each other's employees.

The practice at issue reflects a naked restraint of competition and
per se violation of anti-trust laws, says the complaint. Plaintiffs
suffered reduced wages and benefits and diminished employment
opportunities as a result of the unlawful contract, combination, or
conspiracy, adds the complaint.

Geneva Blanchard is a citizen and resident of New Orleans,
Louisiana. Tiffany Miller is a resident of Allentown, Pennsylvania.
Both are employees of Burger King franchise restaurants.

Burger King Corporation is a Florida corporation with its principal
place of business at 5505 Blue Lagoon Drive, Miami, Florida 33126.
BKC is the current franchisor of Burger King brand franchise
restaurants in the United States. BKC is a wholly owned indirect
subsidiary of Burger King Worldwide, Inc.

Burger King Worldwide, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business at 5505 Blue Lagoon Drive, Miami,
Florida 33126.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     PAUL J. GELLER, Esq.
     STUART A. DAVIDSON, Esq.
     JASON H. ALPERSTEIN, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500
     Boca Raton, FL 33432
     Phone: 561/750-3000
     Fax: 561/750-3364
     Email: pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
            sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com
            jalperstein@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     DAVID W. MITCHELL, Esq.
     CARMEN A. MEDICI, Esq.
     XAN BERNAY, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: 619/231-1058
     Fax: 619/231-7423
     Email: davem@rgrdlaw.com
            cmedici@rgrdlaw.com
            xanb@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     DEREK Y. BRANDT, Esq.
     McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
     100 North Main Street, Suite 11
     Edwardsville, IL 62025
     Phone: 618/307-6116
     Email: dyb@mccunewright.com

          - and -

     RICHARD D. MCCUNE, Esq.
     MICHELE M. VERCOSKI, Esq.
     McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
     3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
     Ontario, CA 91761
     Phone: 909/557-1250
     Email: rdm@mccunewright.com
            mmv@mccunewright.com

          - and -

     WALTER W. NOSS, Esq.
     STEPHANIE A. HACKETT, Esq.
     SEAN C. RUSSELL, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: 619/233-4565
     Email: wnoss@scott-scott.com
            shackett@scott-scott.com
            sean.russell@scott-scott.com

          - and -

     MICHELLE E. CONSTON, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     The Helmsley Building
     230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
     New York, NY 10169
     Phone: 212/223-6444
     Email: mconston@scott-scott.com

          - and -

     DEAN M. HARVEY, Esq.
     ANNE B. SHAVER, Esq.
     LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &
     BERNSTEIN, LLP
     275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Phone: 415/956-1000
     Email: dharvey@lchb.com
            ashaver@lchb.com


CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces Cinelli FDCPA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Capital Resource Management, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  

The case is Anthony Cinelli individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Capital Resource
Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06128 (E.D. N.Y.,
Nov. 1, 2018).

Capital Resource Management Inc. (CRM) specializes in pre and post
business succession planning, retirement planning, investment
strategy development and implementation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


CAREER ADVANTAGE: Robert Carr Sues Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
-----------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT CARR INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated v. CAREER ADVANTAGE OF MAHONING
VALLEY, INC., CAREER ADVANTAGE, INC. OF LAWRENCE COUNTY, CAREER
ADVANTAGE, INC. OF MERCER COUNTY, KIMBERLY ANGELO-GABRIEL, and JOHN
DOES 1-12, Case No. 2:18-cv-01393-DSC (W.D. Pa., October 17, 2018),
challenges the Defendants' alleged practice of faxing unsolicited
advertisements, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Career Advantage of Mahoning Valley, Inc., is an Ohio corporation,
with its principal place of business in Youngstown, Mahoning
County, Ohio.  Career Advantage Inc. of Lawrence County is a
Pennsylvania corporation, with its principal place of business in
New Castle, Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.

Career Advantage Inc. of Mercer County is a Pennsylvania
corporation, with its principal place of business in Hermitage,
Mercer County, Pennsylvania.  Kimberly Angelo-Gabriel is a resident
of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.  The identities of the Doe
Defendants are unknown.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          Taylor E. Gillan, Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          429 Fourth Avenue
          Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com
                  tgillan@fdpklaw.com

               - and -

          Nyran Rose Rasche, Esq.
          Anthony F. Fata, Esq.
          Christopher P.T. Tourek, Esq.
          CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
          150 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 3000
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-4880
          E-mail: nrasche@caffertyclobes.com
                  afata@caffertyclobes.com
                  ctourek@caffertyclobes.com


CASPER SLEEP: Paul Good Alleges Wiretapping of Web Site Visitors
----------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL GOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CASPER SLEEP INC., and NAVISTONE, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-at-01637 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for wiretapping visitors' access to
Casper.com.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants'
wiretaps, which are secretly embedded in the computer code on
Casper.com, are used by the Defendants to scan the user's computer
in search of files that can be used to de-anonymize and identify
the user, and also to observe visitors' keystrokes, mouse clicks,
and other electronic communications in real time for the purpose of
gathering Personally Identifiable Information ("PII") to
de-anonymize those visitors – that is, to match previously
unidentifiable website visitors to obtain their names and home
addresses, along with detailed data concerning their browsing
habits. These wiretaps enable Defendants to immediately,
automatically, and secretly observe the keystrokes, mouse clicks,
and other electronic communications of visitors regardless of
whether the visitor ultimately makes a purchase from Casper.

Casper Sleep Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells mattresses,
sheets, and pillows. It also offers waterproof mattress protectors,
dog mattresses, and foundation support products for mattress. The
company offers its products through retail shops, as well as online
in the United States. Casper Sleep, Inc. was formerly known as
Providence Mattress Company. The company was incorporated in 2013
and is based in New York, New York with retail shops in New York
City and Los Angeles; and a pop-up store in Toronto, Canada. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          Frederick J. Klorczyk III, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
                  jsmith@bursor.com
                  fklorczyk@bursor.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 989-9113
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com


CATTOIRA MONTESSORI: Hernandez Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Victoria Hernandez, and all others similarly situated v. Cattoira
Montessori Inc., Denise Catoira and Lorena Catoira, Case No.
1:18-cv-24633 (S.D. Fla., November 5, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants have unlawfully deprived Plaintiff, and all other
employees similarly situated, of federal overtime compensation
during the course of their employment.

The Plaintiff worked as a teacher for the Defendants from on or
about September 2015 until she was terminated by Defendants on or
about December 2016.

The Defendants own and operate a private school that has been
offering private education to children and operating in the State
of Florida since 2002. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jordan Richards, Esq.
      USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
      JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
      805 East Broward Blvd. Suite 301
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 871-0050
      E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com


CEC ENTERTAINMENT: Sinohui Class Settlement Has Final Court OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued an Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned RICHARD SINOHUI, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, v. CEC
Entertainment, Inc., a Kansas corporation; DOES 1-100, inclusive,
Defendants. Case No. 5:14-CV-02516-JLS-KK. (C.D. Cal.).

The Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

Richard Sinohui will receive a Class Representative Service Payment
of $3,000.00.

Rust Consulting will receive $8,000 for costs of settlement
administration.

Class Counsel will receive $82,500.00 in attorneys' fees and
$20,000.00 in costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd733jlp from Leagle.com.

Richard Sinohui, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brennan S. Kahn, Perona Langer
Beck Serbin and Mendoza Harrison APC, James M. Trush, Trush Law
Office APC & Todd H. Harrison, Perona Lander Beck Serbin Mendoza
Harrison APC.

CEC Entertainment Inc, a Kansas corporation, Defendant, represented
by Aaron H. Cole -- aaron.cole@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, Alexandra Bodnar -- abodnar@volt.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC & Patricia Ann Matias --
patricia.matias@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
and Stewart PC.


CHANCELLOR HOUSE: Johnson Files Discrimination Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Tamatha D. Johnson, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated v. Chancellor House LLC dba Chancellor's House dba
Chancellor's Grill and ABC Corps., Case No. 3:18-cv-00237 (N.D.
Miss., November 5, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Plaintiff sought damages for hostile work environment, sexual
discrimination and race discrimination against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants as a pastry chef - a
kitchen job - in March 2017.

The Defendant Chancellor House LLC is a foreign corporation
incorporated in Texas and operating a hotel plus restaurant in
Oxford, Mississippi. The hotel is doing business as "Chancellor's
House" and the restaurant is doing business as "Chancellor's
Grill." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joel Dillard, Esq.
      JOEL F. DILLARD, PA
      775 N. Congress St.
      Jackson, MS 39202
      Tel: 601-487-7369
      E-mail: joel@joeldillard.com


CNNA INC: Walker Suit Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALISHA WALKER, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similar situated v. CNNA, INC., and MARY CHARLES, in her individual
and professional capacities, Case No. 520986/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Kings
Cty., October 18, 2018), seeks redress for Defendants' non-payment
of minimum wage and overtime and for unjust enrichment in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York State Human Rights
Law, New York Executive Law, the New York City Human Rights Law,
New York Administrative Code and the New York Labor Law.

CNNA is a New York corporation doing business in New York with a
registered address for service of process in Brooklyn, New York.
Mary Charles is an owner and/or officer of CNNA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Glendoval J. Stephens, Esq.
          CASTILLO STEPHENS LLP
          305 Broadway, Suite 1200
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 835-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 835-1401
          E-mail: firm@castillostephens.com


CNU ONLINE: Karon Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
----------------------------------------------
Daniel Karon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CNU Online Holdings LLC dba CashNetUSA and John Doe
Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-07360 (N.D. Ill., November 5, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff brought the class action complaint against the
Defendants to stop their practice of placing calls using "an
artificial or prerecorded voice" to the telephones of consumers
nationwide without their prior express written consent; and obtain
redress for all persons injured by their conduct.

The Plaintiff Daniel Karon is a natural person and resident of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

The Defendant CashNet is a state-licensed online lender that offers
payday loans, installment loans and line of credit products to
consumers.

The Defendant John Doe Corporation is a vendor of CashNet that did
not identify itself. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Katrina Carroll, Esq.
      LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
      111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 750-1265
      Fax: (312) 212-5919
      E-mail: kcarroll@litedepalma.com

          - and -

      Adam T. Savett, Esq.
      SAVETT LAW OFFICES LLC
      2764 Carole Lane
      Allentown, PA 18104
      Tel: (610) 621-4550
      Fax: (610) 978-2970
      E-mail: adam@savettlaw.com


DENNY'S INC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages Under FLSA, Rafferty Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lindsay Rafferty on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated, known and unknown v. Denny's Inc., an Ohio
corporation, Case No. 5:18-cv-02409-SL (N.D. Ohio, October 17,
2018), arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act for the
Defendant's alleged failure to pay the Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees all earned minimum wages.

Denny's, Inc., is a South Carolina corporation duly licensed to
transact business in the state of Ohio.  The Defendant does
business, has offices, and/or maintains agents for the transaction
of its customary business in Summit County, Ohio.

The Defendant owns and operates a chain of Denny's
restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
          Christopher J. Bendau, Esq.
          THE BENDAU LAW FIRM, PLLC
          P.O. Box 97066
          Phoenix, AZ 85060
          Telephone: (480) 382-5176
          Facsimile: (480) 304-3805
          E-mail: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com
                  chris@bendaulaw.com

               - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          Andrew J. Simon, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF SIMON & SIMON
          6000 Freedom Square Dr.
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 525-8890
          Facsimile: (216) 642-5814
          E-mail: jameslsimonlaw@yahoo.com
                  andrewjsimonlaw@yahoo.com


DEVIALET INC: Violates Disabilities Act, Dominguez Suit Asserts
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Devialet Inc. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Devialet Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-10174 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Devialet develops analogue/digital hybrid amplification technology
for audio devices. It offers D-Premier, an audio device; and
REACTOR, an ultra-compact speaker.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


DUNKIN' BRANDS: Chen Appeals Order and Judgment to Second Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Michelle Beattie, David A. Bucholtz, Chufen Chen, Eli
Evanson and Sherry L. Johnson filed an appeal from the District
Court's memorandum & order dated September 17, 2018, and judgment
dated September 18, 2018, entered in their lawsuit entitled Chen,
et al. v. Dunkin' Brands, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-3808, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed in June 2017.

Dunkin' Brands is an American restaurant holding company, which
runs two chains of fast-food restaurants: Dunkin' Donuts and
Baskin-Robbins.  The Company is headquartered in Canton,
Massachusetts.

The appellate case is captioned as Chen, et al. v. Dunkin' Brands,
Inc., Case No. 18-3087, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Chufen Chen, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Eli Evanson, Sherry L. Johnson, David A.
Bucholtz and Michelle Beattie are represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          JOHN TROY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324
          E-mail: johntroy@troypllc.com

Defendant-Appellee Dunkin' Brands, Inc., (a Delaware Corporation),
DBA Dunkin' Donuts, is represented by:

          Kyle D. Gooch, Esq.
          HARRIS BEACH PLLC
          99 Garnsey Road
          Pittsford, NY 14534
          Telephone: (585) 419-8844
          E-mail: kgooch@harrisbeach.com


E & K DELI: Ortiz Suit Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN ORTIZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
v. E & K DELI GROCERY CORP., AND 342 RIDGEWOOD REALTY CORP. (d/b/a
RIDGEWOOD MINI MARKET) and EDWARD LEONARDO, Case No. 1:18-cv-05853
(E.D.N.Y., October 18, 2018), seeks to recover alleged unpaid
minimum wages and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

E & K Deli Grocery Corp., and 342 Ridgewood Realty Corp. are
domestic corporations organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York and maintains their principal place of business
in Brooklyn New York.  Edward Leonardo is an owner, officer or
agent of the Defendant Corporations.

The Defendants own, operate, and/or control a Deli Mini Market
located at 342 Ridgewood Avenue, in Brooklyn New York, under the
name Ridgewood Mini Market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lina M. Franco, Esq.
          LINA FRANCO LAW, P.C.
          42 Broadway, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 203-2417
          E-mail: Lina@LinaFranco.com


EI DU PONT: Sued by Roberts Over PFOA and PFOS Contamination
------------------------------------------------------------
GEOFFREY I. ROBERTS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, THE
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, AND 3M COMPANY, Case No.
1:18-cv-15059-RBK-KMW (D.N.J., October 17, 2018), arises from the
Defendants' alleged reckless and negligent acts in connection with
the contamination of the Plaintiff's property with
perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid
("PFOS").

For over 100 years DuPont owned and operated the Chambers Works
chemical manufacturing plant located in Pennsville and Carneys
Point Townships, in Salem County, New Jersey.  During that time,
DuPont released over 100 million pounds of hazardous waste into the
soil and groundwater, which has now migrated to the Delaware River
to the west, the Salem Canal to the south, environmentally
sensitive areas to the north and residential neighborhoods to the
east as far away as 5 miles from the Site, according to the
complaint.

The contamination at issue occurred in connection with DuPont's
manufacturing, production, processing, recycling, use, release,
discharge and/or disposal of PFOA and PFOS at and/or otherwise
attributable to the Chambers Works Plant, including releases into
the air.  This action is brought on behalf of the named Plaintiff
and on behalf of all individuals who, as of the time a class is
certified in this case have an ownership interest in a private well
within a two to a five-mile radius of the Chambers Works Plant,
which contains drinking water containing PFOS and/or PFOA.

Headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. and The Chemours Company FC, LLC, are Delaware corporations and
do business throughout the United States, including conducting
business in New Jersey.  Chemours is a multinational chemical
manufacturer.  Chemours, including its assets and liability, was
wholly owned by DuPont when Chemours acquired the Chambers Work
site from DuPont on or about July 2015, when it separated from
DuPont.

3M Company, formerly known as Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the state of Delaware and does business throughout the United
States, including conducting business in New Jersey.  3M has its
principal place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota.  3M marketed,
developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users,
produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used PFOS that is the subject of this Complaint, including
in New Jersey and this District, in such a way as to result in the
contamination of Plaintiff's property and drinking water
supplies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. London, Esq.
          Rebecca G. Newman, Esq.
          DOUGLAS & LONDON, PC
          59 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 566-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 566-7501
          E-mail: mlondon@douglasandlondon.com
                  rnewman@douglasandlondon.com

               - and -

          Albert I. Telsey, Esq.
          MEYNER AND LANDIS LLP
          One Gateway Center Suite 2500
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 624-2800
          Facsimile: (973) 624-0356
          E-mail: atelsey@meyner.com


EI DUPONT: Harrison Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned JAN HARRISON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. E.I DUPONT DE
NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et al., Defendants. Case No. 13-cv-01180-BLF.
(N.D. Cal.).

In this indirect purchaser class action, the Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendants conspired to and did fix the price of titanium
dioxide sold in the United States in violation of federal and state
laws. Titanium Dioxide is one of the most important inorganic
chemicals used in the production of goods.

The Plaintiffs assert the following claims individually and on
behalf of others who purchased Architectural Paint for personal use
in the United States: (1) violation of state antitrust statutes;
(2) violation of state consumer protection statutes; (3) unjust
enrichment; and (4) injunctive and equitable relief under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1.

In order to grant final approval of the class action settlement,
the Court must determine that (a) the class meets the requirements
for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and (b)
the settlement reached on behalf of the class is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.  

The Class Meets the Requirements for Certification under Rule 23

A class action is maintainable only if it meets the four
requirements of Rule 23(a):
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and(4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Turning first to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the Court has no
difficulty in concluding that, in light of the 32,884 valid claims
received by the Settlement Administrator, joinder of all class
members would be impracticable.  

The commonality requirement is met because the key issue in the
case is the same for all class members whether Defendants conspired
to fix the price of titanium tioxide.

The named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as
they purchased Architectural Paint.  

Finally, to determine the Plaintiffs' adequacy, the Court must
resolve two questions: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their
counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and
(2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the
action vigorously on behalf of the class?

The Court has no reservations regarding the abilities of Class
Counsel or their zeal in representing the class, and the record
discloses no conflict of interest which would preclude the named
Plaintiffs from acting as class representatives.

With respect to Rule 23(b)(3), the predominance inquiry tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. The common question in this case
whether Defendants conspired to fix the price of titanium dioxide
predominates. Given that commonality, and the number of class
members, the Court concludes that a class action is a superior
mechanism for adjudicating the claims at issue.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the requirements of Rule 23
are met and thus that certification of the class for settlement
purposes is appropriate.

The Settlement is Fundamentally Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

A district court's only role in reviewing the substance of that
settlement is to ensure that it is fair, adequate, and free from
collusion. In making that determination, the district court is
guided by an eight-factor test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp (Hanlon factors). Those factors include:

the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Notice was Adequate

The Court previously approved Plaintiffs' plan for providing notice
to the class when it granted preliminary approval of the class
action settlement.  

Plaintiffs have provided declarations of counsel and the Settlement
Administrator describing implementation of the notice plan. Based
on those declarations, it appears that at least 70% of the targeted
Internet users were reached, and that in fact millions of
households were reached by the class notice. The Court is satisfied
that the class members were provided with the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, and that such notice was
adequate.

Presumption of Correctness

Before discussing the Hanlon factors, the Court notes that a
presumption of correctness is said to `attach to a class settlement
reached in arm's-length negotiations between experienced capable
counsel after meaningful discovery. The settlement in this case
occurred after more than four years of litigation, which included
substantial discovery and motion practice, and Class Counsel
represents that it was the result of arms-length negotiations.  

The Court therefore concludes that on this record a presumption of
correctness applies to the class action settlement.

Hanlon Factors

Turning to the Hanlon factors, the Court first considers the
strength of the plaintiff's case, weighing the likelihood of
success on the merits and the range of possible recovery (factor
1).

While the Plaintiffs' claims survived motion practice, the
Defendants have articulated significant defenses in this case and
have brought to the Court's attention the decision of another
district court granting a defense motion for summary judgment on
similar claims, which was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.   

Thus, there is no guarantee that the Plaintiffs would prevail at
trial. With respect to the risk, expense, complexity, and duration
of litigation (factor 2), the Plaintiffs would have faced
significant hurdles, including opposition to class certification.
Litigation likely would have been protracted in light of the nature
of the claims and the number of states' laws at issue.

Given the common questions of fact and law in this case, it is
likely that the subclasses would have been certified had the case
progressed (factor 3). The settlement recovery is substantial
(factor 4), as a class member who submits a claim for a single can
of paint likely will recover more than five dollars, and a class
member who submits a claim for ten gallons likely will recover more
than fifty dollars.  

Extensive discovery had been completed at the time of settlement,
and the case has been litigated since 2013 (factor 5). The Court is
satisfied that the parties are sufficiently familiar with the
issues in the case to have informed opinions regarding its
strengths and weaknesses (factor 6). Class Counsel and Defendants
are represented by well-respected law firms.

Their views that the settlement is a good one is entitled to
significant weight.  

There is no government participant (factor 7). However, the class
reaction to the settlement is favorable (factor 8). There were no
objections, and only one opt-out.  

Based on these reasons, and after considering the record as a whole
as guided by the Hanlon factors, the Court finds that notice of the
proposed settlement was adequate, the settlement is not the result
of collusion, and the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yabbqgju from Leagle.com.

Morgan Tanner, Plaintiff, represented by Ben F. Pierce Gore --
pgore@prattattorneys.com -- Pratt & Associates, Brian K.
Herrington, Herrington Law, P.A., Jonathan W. Cuneo, Cuneo Gilbert
& LaDuca, LLP, Katherine Van Dyck, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP &
Sandra Watson Cuneo, Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca, LLP.

Jan Harrison, Lee Ranalli, Spencer Hathaway, Todd Turley, Debbie
Hale, Kelli Anno, Christopher Kuan-Tsen Lee, Jim Buckingham, Tanda
Saxton, John Wozniak, Jerome Sherman, Beverly Jenkins, David
Petersen, Tom Stever, Ransome Foose, Brian Bawol & Stacey Franklin,
Plaintiffs, represented by Ben F. Pierce Gore, Pratt & Associates,
Jonathan W. Cuneo , Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP & Katherine Van
Dyck , Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP.

E.I DuPont De Nemours and Company, Defendant, represented by
Beatrice B. Nguyen --   bbnguyen@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring
LLP, Lucy Grace Dearce Noyola, Crowell and Moring LLP, pro hac vice
& Shari Ross Lahlou -- slahlou@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP,
pro hac vice.

Huntsman International, LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
Walter James -- cjames@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP, Erica L.
Krennerich -- ekrennerich@velaw.com -- Vinson Elkins LLP, pro hac
vice, James A. Reeder, Jr. -- jreeder@velaw.com -- Vinson and
Elkins LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew J. Jacobs -- mjacobs@velaw.com --
Vinson & Elkins LLP & Michael L. Charlson -- mcharlson@velaw.com --
Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.


EW MYERS LLC: Fails to Pay Wages to Barista, Crow Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
SARAH CROW, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EW MYERS, LLC; LOFTY COFFEE, INC.; LOFTY
COFFEE CEDAR, LLC; LOFTY COFFEE CEDROS, LLC; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00053199-CU-OE-NC (Cal. Super., San
Diego Cty., Oct. 19, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and
permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and
reimburse necessary business expenses.

Ms. Crow was employed by the Defendants as barista.

EW Myers, LLC is a California limited liability company engaged as
a specialty coffee roaster. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan S. Anderson, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Mason, Esq.
          ANDERSON HAYES, P.C.
          P.O. Box 752
          Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067
          Telephone: (858) 756-5558
          Facsimile: (858) 756-8844
          E-mail: Ryan@andcrsonhayes.com
                  Jeff_mason@stanfordalumni.org


FLIS MANAGEMENT: Underpays Restaurant Workers, Hill Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
STACEY HILL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. FLIS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., and FLIS
ENTERPRISES, INC., Case No. 4:18-cv-00786-SWW (E.D. Ark., Oct. 24,
2018) seeks to recover from the Defendant unpaid overtime
compensation, prejudgment interest, maximum liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff employed by the Defendants as hourly-paid restaurant
team workers.

Flis Management Company, Inc. is a fast food eatery company
headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          Chris Burks, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


FOSCARINI INC: Dominguez Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit asserting breach of the Americans with
Disabilities Act has been filed against Foscarini Inc.

The case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Foscarini Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10168 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 1, 2018).

Foscarini is an Italian decorative lighting design company boasting
an innovative collection of over 60 models, more than 20 materials
and 30+ designers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


FXI INC: Underpays Machine Forklift Operators, King Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
DONTAYE KING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FXI, INC.; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 18925417 (Cal. Super., Alameda Cty., Oct. 19,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff King was employed by the Defendants as machine
forklift operator from October 9, 2017 and April 27, 2018.

FXI, Inc. produces and sells foam products worldwide. It offers
polyurethane foam and polymer products for the healthcare and
electronics sectors. The company was founded in 1990 and is
headquartered in Media, Pennsylvania with a facility in Baldwyn,
Mississippi. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP, LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333

                - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq,
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554


GC SERVICES: 7th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in F. Smith Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court denying
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
FRANCINA SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, Defendant-Appellant. No. 18-1361. (7th Cir.).

The district court denied the motion after holding that GC Services
could not enforce the arbitration agreement on Synchrony Bank's
behalf and finding that GC Services waived any right to
arbitration.

Synchrony Bank hired GC Services Limited Partnership to collect a
debt Francina Smith purportedly owed on her Sam's Club credit card.
In response, Smith sued GC Services for alleged violation of the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA). Eight months later, GC
Services notifiled Smith that she signed an arbitration agreement
with Synchrony Bank when she obtained the credit card. GC Services
demanded arbitration.

The district court denied the motion on two independent grounds.
First, the court held that, as a nonsignatory, GC Services could
not enforce the arbitration agreement. Second, the court found that
GC Services had waived any right to arbitrate by not diligently
asserting that right.

GC Services frames this appeal as one involving the novel issue of
whether GC Services can bind Smith to the arbitration agreement as
a nonsignatory. But that question of state law need be reached only
if the district court erred in finding that the company waived any
right to arbitrate.

Smith does not contend that GC Services expressly waived any right
to arbitrate. The question is whether we should infer that
forfeiture occurred, which requires us to determine that,
considering the totality of the circumstances, a party acted
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Many factors are
relevant to this analysis, but diligence or the lack thereof is
particularly important. Did the party seeking arbitration do all it
could reasonably have been expected to do to make the earliest
feasible determination of whether to proceed judicially or by
arbitration?  

The Court also considers whether the allegedly defaulting party
participated in litigation, substantially delayed its request for
arbitration, or participated in discovery. The Court need not find
that the nonmoving party was prejudiced by the delay in seeking
arbitration.  Where it is clear that a party has forgone its right
to arbitrate, a court may find waiver even if that decision did not
prejudice the non-defaulting party. An election to proceed before a
nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is
a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.

GC Services Acted Inconsistently with the Right to Arbitrate

The district court found that GC Services did not act diligently
because the company did not mention the arbitration agreement in
its answer, provided an inadequate explanation for the five-month
delay in seeking arbitration after learning of the agreement, and
prejudiced Smith by unsuccessfully engaging in motions practice.

GC Services did not privately demand that Smith arbitrate her claim
until eight months after she filed suit. After Smith's prompt
refusal, the company waited another five months before moving to
compel. GC Services' explanation for these delays is entirely
inadequate. The company contends that the initial eight-month delay
occurred because the arbitration agreement was in Synchrony Bank's
possession and so GC Services was unaware of its existence.

The initial suggestion that GC Services a sophisticated debt
collection agency would be unaware that credit card agreements
routinely include arbitration agreements is suspect. Such
provisions are commonplace, and GC Services should have
investigated whether Smith's contract contained one. What's more,
federal regulations require credit card issuers to post their
credit card agreements online. Even if Synchrony Bank was
nonresponsive to inquiries, GC Services could have found the
agreement through a routine internet search.

On these facts, the district court's conclusion that GC Services
waived its right to arbitration was not erroneous.

Smith Would be Prejudiced by Arbitration

The company attempts to buttress its inadequate explanations for
the delay by asserting that the district court erred in finding
that Smith would be prejudiced by proceeding to arbitration.

In this case, GC Services' motion to dismiss framed an integral
perhaps dispositive issue: whether 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(3)
requires that debts be disputed in writing. The Third Circuit has
held that a written dispute is required; the Second, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits have held that no writing requirement exists.  

If the district court had rejected Smith's fundamental legal
theory, GC Services would have both prevailed on the merits and
strengthened the intra-circuit precedent supporting an
interpretation of Section 1692g(a)(3) favorable to debt collectors.
GC Services' decision to submit that question to the district court
was not consistent with a desire to arbitrate. And an attempt to
compel arbitration after losing on a central legal issue is suspect
because a party may not normally submit a claim for resolution in
one forum and then, when it is disappointed with the result in that
forum, seek another forum.

Thus, the district court's determination that Smith was prejudiced
when GC Services sought arbitration after Smith had defeated a
motion to dismiss, obtained class certification, and litigated
several discovery issues was not erroneous. In essence, GC Services
sought to erase Smith's successes including her victory on the
pivotal legal issue of whether Section 1692g(a)(3) contains a
writing requirement. This attempt to play heads I win, tails you
lose is the worst possible reason for delay. GC Services' argument
that Smith would suffer no prejudice from proceeding to arbitration
is not only wrong but beside the point.

GC Services did not discover the existence of the arbitration
agreement for eight months, and then the company did not notify the
court or move to compel arbitration for another five months. None
of the explanations offered for the delays are adequate. And GC
Services' decision to litigate the merits of Smith's legal theory
and request for class certification was inconsistent with a desire
to arbitrate. Because we affirm the district court's conclusion
that GC Services waived any right to arbitrate, we need not explore
whether GC Services could have enforced the arbitration agreement
as a nonsignatory.

The Court affirms the district court's denial of GC Services'
motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's October 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yckbfobu from Leagle.com.

William S. Helfand -- Bill.Helfand@lewisbrisbois.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

David J. Philipps, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Leah M. Nicholls -- lnicholls@publicjustice.net -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.


GOOGLE INC: Faces Olson Suit in N.D. Calif. Over Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES OLSON, AN INDIVIDUAL AND COLORADO RESIDENT, AND EILEEN M.
PINKOWSKI, AN INDIVIDUAL AND COLORADO RESIDENT v. GOOGLE, INC. AND
ALPHABET, INC., Case No. 5:18-cv-06365-NC (N.D. Cal., October 17,
2018), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and all other
similarly situated users arising from a data breach.

The case involves the data breach Google and Alphabet knew about
for months before announcing on October 8, 2018, that the personal
information of up to 500,000 users was exposed due to a software
glitch that gave third-party application developers access to
private Google+ profile data between 2015 and March 2018.

Google is a Delaware corporation with its principal headquarters in
Mountain View, California.  Alphabet, Inc., is a Delaware
corporation with its principal headquarters also in Mountain View.
Alphabet is a public holding company formed in a corporate
reorganization by Google.  Through the corporate restructuring,
Google is now a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet.

Google develops technology products and provides services to
organize the information.  The Company offers Google Search that
provides information online; Google Now that offers information to
users; AdWords, an auction-based advertising program; among other
things.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ivy Ngo, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES
          14426 East Evans Ave
          Aurora, CO 80014
          Telephone: (303) 757-3300
          Facsimile: (720) 213-5131
          E-mail: ngoi@fdazar.com


HAWAII: Court Dismisses Williams' Prisoner’s Civil Rights Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
an Order dismissing the Complaint in the case captioned ANTHONY
WILLIAMS, BOP, #05963-122, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN KOBAYASHI, et al.,
Defendants. CIV. No. 1:18-cv-00336 DKW-RLP. (D. Haw.).

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Anthony Williams' prisoner
civil rights complaint.
Williams is a federal pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Federal
Detention Center, Honolulu (FDC-Honolulu).Williams brings this suit
on behalf of himself and all inmates housed in FDC Honolulu. He
alleges that FDC-Honolulu officials violated his civil rights
regarding his placement in administrative segregation on two
occasions pending investigation for disciplinary charges.

SCREENING

Because Williams is a prisoner seeking relief against government
officials, the court must screen his Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A(a). Claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail
to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who
are immune from suit must be dismissed.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983

Williams brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. To
establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) that an
individual acting under color of state law accomplished the
deprivation.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), recognized an implied cause of action against
federal actors in their individual capacity for violating a
plaintiff's civil rights that is analogous to 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. To state a Bivens claim for damages, a plaintiff must allege
facts showing that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation
was committed by a federal actor.

Official Capacity Claims

Bivens provides a cause of action against individual officers
acting under color of federal law who are alleged to have acted
unconstitutionally. Williams cannot allege colorable claims against
Defendants in their official capacity under Bivens.

Vicarious Liability

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and Section
1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.

Williams alleges Warden Kobayashi is legally responsible for the
operation of FDC and for the welfare of all inmates of the FDC and
Associate Warden Card and Captain Dixon were overseers and
supervisors over the welfare of all inmates of the FDC. The only
Defendant Williams specifically identifies as personally involved
with his claims is Associate Warden Olsen, who issued Williams'
first disciplinary charge, regarding the allegedly threatening
email. Williams' Complaint lacks any factual content showing that
Kobayashi, Card, or Dixon personally participated in, directed, or
caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. That is, he fails to
explain what Kobayashi, Card, or Dixon were purportedly aware of,
how they came about that knowledge, or how they personally violated
his constitutional rights through their own misconduct.

Williams' claims against Kobayashi, Card, and Dixon are based
solely on their supervisory position, and he therefore fails to
state a colorable Bivens claim against them.

Expansion of Bivens Remedies is Disfavored

Bivens recognized an implied cause of action for damages against
individual federal officials for violation of the plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.  

The Court has recently made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy
is now a disfavored judicial activity. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct.
1843, 1857 (2017), cautioning against recognizing Bivens claims in
new contexts not already recognized by the Supreme Court.

Ziglar established a two-step test to determine whether a Bivens
claim should proceed.

First, a court must consider whether the claim at issue extends
Bivens in a new context from previously established Bivens cases. A
case presents a new context if it is different in a meaningful way
from previous Bivens cases" decided by the Supreme Court.  

Second, if the claim at issue presents Bivens in a new context, a
court must then undertake a special factors analysis to determine
whether special factors counsel hesitation before expanding Bivens
to that new context. The special factors analysis must concentrate
on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional
action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits
of allowing a damages action to proceed.  

First Amendment Claims

Williams alleges without any factual support that Defendants'
actions of depriving inmates of the practice of their religion is a
violation of the inmates First Amendment rights. Even if Bivens
could be expanded to this claim post-Ziglar and Vega, which is
doubtful, Rule 8 requires more than this completely unsupported,
conclusory accusation to state a claim.  

And, to the extent that Williams suggests he has a right-of-access
to the court claim, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that
Bivens does not apply to such claims.  

Fifth Amendment Claims

Williams alleges Defendants violated his right to due process
pursuant to his two disciplinary charges and his resulting
confinement in the SHU, and invokes the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as the source of these claims. Williams' due process
claims arise under the Fifth, not the Fourteenth Amendment.

a. Procedural Due Process

On June 1, prison officials notified Williams that they would
respond on or about June 24, 2018, which complies with the 20-day
extension allotted by ARP Section 542.18. Williams, however,
completed and signed his Complaint on June 6, 2018, well before
this response was due. It is unclear whether Williams received a
response after that date and pursued the ARP remedies to their
conclusion before he filed this action. It is clear, however, that
Williams has an alternative remedy, initiated that remedy, and
prematurely raised these claims in this court.

Williams cannot state a colorable Bivens claim for damages
regarding the alleged denial of procedural due process at his
disciplinary hearings.

Substantive Due Process: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Williams alleges Defendants violated his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment by holding him in solitary confinement
in the SHU for more than thirty days. As a pretrial detainee, these
claims arise under the substantive due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.  

The facts as alleged here do not show that Defendants punished
Williams arbitrarily, without purpose, and without a legitimate
penological goal when they housed him in administrative
segregation. Williams was moved to administrative segregation while
prison officials investigated two serious disciplinary charges:
first, for threats Williams allegedly made to correctional
officers, and second, for fighting with another inmate, causing
that inmate serious injury. Prison officials must have discretion
to decide that in some instances temporary, solitary confinement is
a useful or necessary means to impose discipline and to protect
prison employees and other inmates.

The Defendants made an intentional decision to house Williams in
segregation, but it is not evident that doing so put Williams at
substantial risk of suffering a serious harm of which they were
aware and disregarded. The lack of newspapers, television, and
extra commissary supplies for the relatively short periods alleged
here do not support an inference of cruel and unusual punishment.
Similarly, a sink with a moldy spigot that abuts a toilet in a
prison cell, bugs in the shower, and stale food, without more, does
not objectively support an inference of cruel and unusual
punishment.

Williams May Not Represent Other Inmates

Williams brings his claims on behalf of himself and all inmates
housed in FDC Honolulu. A pro se litigant may not bring a class
action on behalf of others. This prohibition becomes almost
absolute when, as here, the putative class representative is
incarcerated and proceeding pro se.

Williams cannot assert claims on behalf of other FDC-Honolulu
inmates.

Williams' Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8e27xn5 from Leagle.com.

Anthony Williams, on behalf of himself and all inmates housed in
FDC Honolulu, Plaintiff, pro se.


HERNO USA: Dominguez Sues for ADA Breach
----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Herno USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Herno USA, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-10175 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Herno manufactures outerwear garments, made for modern consumers.
Stylistic coherence and garments that result from that exquisitely
Italian ability to create products of the highest quality are the
distinctive traits of the Herno clothing brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


HI-TECH CONSTRUCTION: 60 Guilders Sues for Breach of Contract
-------------------------------------------------------------
60 GUILDERS, LLC on behalf of itself and all other persons
similarly situated as trust fund beneficiaries of Lien Law Trusts
of which Hi-Tech Construction, Windows & Doors, Inc., is Trustee v.
HI-TECH CONSTRUCTION, WINDOWS & DOORS, INC., ADI KURTI, and JOHN L.
GJONI, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, and ABC-XYZ CORPORATIONS
1-10, Case No. 655180/2018 (N.Y. Sup., New York Cty., October 18,
2018), alleges that the Defendants breached their obligations under
a construction contract.

On May 4, 2018, Hi-Tech entered into a construction contract with
60 Guilders.  Pursuant to the Contract, Hi-Tech agreed to perform
certain construction services at 119 Spring Sheet, in New York
City, for a total sum of $132,000.  Hi-Tech requested a $35,928.75
initial deposit to purchase materials for the project.  On May 22,
2018, 60 Guilders paid Hi-Tech the requested and invoiced amount of
$35,928.75.

In breach of its obligations under the Contract, Hi-Tech failed,
refused and/or neglected to perform any work on the Project, the
Plaintiff alleges.

On July 26, 2018, 60 Guilders sent a Notice of Termination to
Hi-Tech for substantial breaches of provisions of the Contract and
requesting that Hi-Tech refund to 60 Guilders its $35,928.75
deposit.  Hi-Tech did not respond and Hi-Tech has failed and
refused to return the $35,928.75 deposit to 60 Guilders, says the
complaint.

Hi-Tech is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the state of New York with its
principal place of business located in Maspeth, New York.  Adi
Kurti is the owner and an executive of Hi-Tech.  John L. Gjoni is a
general manager of Hi-Tech.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eugene Zaydfudim, Esq.
          DREIFUSS BONACCI & PARKER, PC
          Five Penn Plaza, 23rd Floor
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 835-1514


HOMETOWN AMERICA: Removes Craw Suit to District of Massachusetts
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of BARBARA CRAW, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HOMETOWN
AMERICA, LLC; HOMETOWN AMERICA MANAGEMENT, LLC; HOMETOWN OAKHILL,
LLC; HOMETOWN OAKPOINT I, LLC; and HOMETOWN OAKPOINT II, LLC,
Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior
Court of the State of Massachusetts, County of Plymouth (Case No.
1883CV01017) to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on October 15, 2018. The clerk of court for the
District of Massachusetts assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-12149-MPK (D.
Mass., Oct. 15, 2018). The case is assigned to Magistrate Judge M.
Page Kelley.

Hometown America LLC provides real estate management services. The
Company offers recreational facilities such as swimming pools,
clubhouses, basketball courts, as well as online payment, green
mission, and insurance services. Hometown America markets services
for home financing and insurance sectors in the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ethan R. Horowitz, Esq.
          NORTHEAST JUSTICE CENTER
          50 Island Street, Ste. 203B
          Lawrence, MA 01840
          Telephone: (781) 599-7730
          E-mail: ehorowitz@njc-ma.org

The Defendants are represented by:

         Tristan P. Colangelo, Esq.
         SUGARMAN, ROGERS, BARSHAK & COHEN, P.C.
         101 Merrimac Street, 9th Floor
         Boston, MA 02114
         Telephone: (617) 619-3423
         E-mail: colangelo@srbc.com

              - and -

         Lisa C. Goodheart, Esq.
         SUGARMAN, ROGERS, BARSHAK & COHEN, P.C.
         101 Merrimac Street
         Boston, MA 02114-4737
         Telephone: (617) 227-3030
         Facsimile: (617) 523-4001
         E-mail: goodheart@srbc.com


LANCER ORTHODONTICS: Rowan Seeks Damages Under TCPA, Junk Fax Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROWAN FAMILY DENTISTRY, INC., a Mississippi corporation v. LANCER
ORTHODONTICS, INC., a corporation, Case No. 3:18-cv-00221-MPM-JMV
(N.D. Miss., October 18, 2018), is brought on behalf of the
Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seeking damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.

Lancer is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
California and is headquartered in Vista, California.  The
Defendant's primary activities involve advertising to persons and
entities in an effort to generate sales leads for their orthodontic
and dental products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L.N. Chandler Rogers, Esq.
          ROGERS LAW GROUP
          201 E Bankhead Street
          New Albany, MS 38652
          Telephone: (662) 538-5990
          Facsimile: (662) 538-5997
          E-mail: chandler@rogerslawgroup.com

               - and -

          Winston B. Collier, Esq.
          THE COLLIER FIRM
          2090 Old Taylor Road
          Oxford, MS 38655
          Telephone: (870) 347-2100
          Facsimile: (870) 347-1164
          E-mail: winston@thecollierfirm.com

               - and -

          Gregory M. Zarzaur, Esq.
          ZARZAUR MUJUMDAR & DEBROSSE - TRIAL LAWYERS
          2332 2nd Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 983-7985
          Facsimile: (888) 505-0523
          E-mail: gregory@zarzaur.com


LEONID POGORILER: Court Denies Bid to OK Non-Monetary Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Approving
a Settlement Agreement in the case captioned JAVIER ESPINAL, XAVIER
ROSARIO, LUIGI DORTONO, SABUHAN AIROV, AND MANUEL DELGADO, and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. LEONID POGORILER, PETER
CREUS, ONE OF KIND TRANSPORTATION, INC., ALL AROUND MANAGEMENT,
INC., ALL POINTS TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC., YAN MOSHE, NAZAR
NIKSON, MNBT CORP., EXCEL SURGERY CENTER, LLC, HEALTH PLUS SURGERY
CENTER, LLC AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendant(s). Civ. No.
18-738 (KM)(MAH). (D.N.J).

This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion for an
order approving a settlement agreement under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiffs claim that Moshe operated two surgical centers
through Excel and Health Plus. They further allege that Moshe and
the surgical centers employed plaintiffs through transportation
companies, including All Points, All Around, One of Kind, and MNBT,
which were operated by Pogoriler, Creus and Nikson. Plaintiffs
claim that they were misclassified as independent contractors, and
as a result, were underpaid.

The settlement agreement is a non-monetary settlement. Under the
terms of the agreement, the Pogoriler defendants agreed to the
Mull, complete and truthful cooperation with Plaintiffs'
prosecution of" the action; to produce all documents related to
this action; and to be available for trial preparation and trial,
depositions, and posttrial proceedings.  In exchange, plaintiffs
agreed to dismiss the Pogoriler defendants without prejudice, and
to execute releases at the conclusion of the action. After
execution of the settlement agreement, this motion to approve the
settlement was filed.

In Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156-157 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third
Circuit identified nine factors that a court should consider in
evaluating whether a proposed class action settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. The nine Girsh factors are as follows:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation;
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement (3) stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed (4) risks of
establishing liability; (5) risks of establishing damages; (6)
risks of maintaining the class action through the trial (7) ability
of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible
recovery and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund
to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of
litigation.

Based on the record, the terms and conditions of the settlement,
and the applicable law, the Court finds that the settlement
agreement does not reflect a fair and reasonable resolution at this
time. In exchange for a release of all claims, defendants are
simply required to cooperate with the civil lawsuit, an obligation
already imposed upon the Pogoriler defendants by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Even though Pogoriler claims a net worth of not
more than $200,000 (seventh Girsh factor), the proposed agreement
contains no compensation for any unpaid wages owed, despite
plaintiffs' claims that they each worked more than forty-hours per
week and were paid less than minimum wage. Plaintiffs also argue
that the Pogoriler defendants' truthful cooperation will streamline
the litigation (first Girsh factor), and enhance their ability to
establish joint-employer liability against the non-settling
defendants (fourth, fifth, and sixth factors).

However, the settlement does not advance these interests to any
degree beyond the the fact that the Pogoriler defendants are named
parties and will be obligated to respond truthfully to discovery
demands. Given that the Pogoriler defendants have offered no
settlement funds, factors eight and nine do not weigh in favor of
granting plaintiffs' motion. In sum, the Court finds that the
settlement agreement is not fair or reasonable at this time.

In short, the Court cannot assess the fairness of this settlement
without the context of a certified class and/or a more global
resolution of the claims in this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y76bgxtm from Leagle.com.

JAVIER ESPINAL, XAVIER ROSARIO, LUIGI DORTONO, MANUEL DELGADO &
SABUHAN AZIROV, Plaintiffs, represented by CHRISTOPHER MARLBOROUGH,
The Marlborough Law Firm, P.C.

Yan Moshe, Excel Surgery Center, LLC & Health Plus Surgery Center,
LLC, Defendants, represented by JACOB ELY LEWIN --
astein@steinadlerlaw.com -- STEIN ADLER LLP & JONATHAN L. ADLER,
STEIN ADLER DABAH & ZELKOWITZ LLP.

Nazar Nikson & MNBT Corp., Defendants, represented by ANTHONY M.
RAINONE -- arainone@bracheichler.com -- Brach Eichler LLC & LUCAS
A. MARKOWITZ -- lmarkowitz@bracheichler.com -- BRACH EICHLER LLC.

SABUHAN AZIROV, MANUEL DELGADO, LUIGI DORTONO, JAVIER ESPINAL &
XAVIER ROSARIO, Counter Defendants, represented by CHRISTOPHER
MARLBOROUGH, The Marlborough Law Firm, P.C.

Health Plus Surgery Center, LLC, Yan Moshe & Excel Surgery Center,
LLC, Cross Claimants, represented by JACOB ELY LEWIN , STEIN ADLER
LLP & JONATHAN L. ADLER , STEIN ADLER DABAH & ZELKOWITZ LLP.


LLOYD PEST CONTROL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Miranda Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
EMILIO MIRANDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE LLOYD PEST CONTROL CO.; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00052510-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 15,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff Miranda was employed by the Defendants as a
non-exempt employee from July 2016 to July 2018.

The Lloyd Pest Control Co. Inc. provides pest control services in
San Diego, Riverside, and Orange County. It offers protection
against ants, fleas, roaches, spiders, carpet beetles, rats, mice,
termites, wasps, bed bugs, and bees. The company was founded in
1931 and is based in San Diego, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Drew Koning, Esq.
          Blake Zollar, Esq.
          KONING ZOLLAR LLP
          2210 Encinitas Blvd, Ste. S
          Encinitas, CA 92024
          Telephone: (858) 252-3234
          Facsimile: (858) 252-3238

               - and -

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
          DE BLOUW LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232


LOAN PAYMENT: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Krogstad Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's BMO's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case
captioned  DEAN KROGSTAD, Plaintiff, v. LOAN PAYMENT ADMINISTRATION
LLC, Defendant, v. NATIONWIDE BIWEEKLY ADMINISTRATION, INC.,
Third-party-plaintiff-Appellant, v. BMO HARRIS BANK NA,
Third-party-defendant-Appellee. No. 17-15964. (9th Cir.).

After being named as a defendant in a putative class action,
Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. (NBA) filed a third-party
complaint against BMO Harris Bank (BMO), alleging that any
potential harm to the putative class was caused by BMO's breach of
a contract with NBA.

BMO in turn sought to enforce an arbitration clause in its contract
with NBA.

The district court granted BMO's motion to compel arbitration and
dismissed the third-party complaint.  

Arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.

NBA argued that the arbitration provision in its agreement with BMO
was invalid because it (1) prohibited the parties from bringing
class or representative actions against each other and (2) also
included a blow provision, mandating that if a court decides that
this paragraph's prohibition of class or representative actions
and/or consolidation is invalid or unenforceable, then the entirety
of this arbitration provision will be null and void.

The district court correctly rejected these arguments.

The blow provision only applies if a court finds that this
paragraph's prohibition of class or representative actions is
invalid. No court has done so; indeed, albeit in different
contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that
class action waivers are invalid.   

Moreover, the arbitration clause in the NBA-BMO agreement provides
only that the parties will not bring class action or representative
claims against each other. NBA's third-party complaint against BMO,
although filed in a case initiated by the filing of a putative
class complaint, is not itself a class or representative action.
There was thus no warrant for the district court in this case to
consider the enforceability of the class action waiver.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's October 22, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y99ypq3z from Leagle.com.


LOS ANGELES CITY: Cooley et al. Suit Transferred to Another Judge
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled REBECCA COOLEY, BENJAMIN HUBERT,
and CASIMIR ZARODA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-07670-CAS-(PLAx), was transferred
October 24, 2018, from Judge John A. Kronstadt and Magistrate Judge
Alka Sagar to Judge Christina A. Snyder and Magistrate Judge Paul
L. Abrams. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-09053
CAS(PLAx) (C.D. Cal., Oct. 19, 2018).

Los Angeles, officially the City of Los Angeles and known
colloquially by its initials LA, is the second-most populous city
in the United States, after New York City, and the largest and most
populous city in the Western United States.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carol A. Sobel, Esq.
          Avneet Singh Chattha, Esq.
          Monique Amanda Alarcon, Esq.
          CAROL A. SOBEL LAW OFFICES
          725 Arizona Avenue, Suite 300
          Santa Monical, CA 90401
          Telephone: (310) 393-3055
          Facsimile: (310) 451-3858
          E-mail: carolsobel@aol.com
                  avneet.chattha7gmail.com
                  monique.alarcon8@gmail.com


METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Kerpen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned PHIL KERPEN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; AUSTIN
RUSE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;
CATHY RUSE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated; CHARLOTTE SELLIER, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated; JOEL SELLIER, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated; MICHAEL GINGRAS, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY; ELAINE L. CHAO, in
her official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendants-Appellees. DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Intervenor-Appellee. KARL ANTHONY RACINE,
Intervenor/Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-1735. (4th Cir.).

The Appellants here have raised a variety of constitutional and
statutory challenges to Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority's
(MWAA) ability to use toll revenues to fund projects enhancing
access to Dulles airport.

The Appellants here bring a putative class action by users of the
toll road and other airport facilities. Their lawsuit presented a
bouquet of statutory and constitutional claims. Important for this
appeal are the assertions that MWAA is a federal instrumentality,
that MWAA violated Article I, Article II, and the Guarantee Clause
of the Constitution, that MWAA violated the Administrative
Procedures Act, and that MWAA violated the terms of the Transfer
Act and the Lease by using toll revenues to build the Silver Line.


The district court dismissed all claims.

Applying Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513
U.S. 374 (1995), the court concluded that MWAA was not a federal
instrumentality and it did not exercise federal power. Kerpen, 260
F.Supp.3d at 580.

In the view of the district court, this was fatal to the
non-delegation, Appointments Clause, and APA claims. The court also
dismissed the claims based on the Lease and the Transfer Act,
reasoning that metro from Washington to Dulles was a permissible
airport-related expenditure.

In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation the Court
concludes that it is not. 513 U.S. 374(1995), the Supreme Court
explained that entities that are both created and controlled by the
federal government may be considered federal entities that are
subject to the limitations of the Constitution.

This first prong of Lebron is satisfied by an entity that was
created by a special statute, explicitly for the furtherance of
federal governmental goals. The second is satisfied only when an
entity's operations are controlled by federal government
appointees.

MWAA does not satisfy either prong. In the first place, MWAA was
not created by the federal government. The federal government never
passed a special law to create it. Rather, Virginia and the
District of Columbia, acting on a recommendation from a commission
appointed by the Secretary of Transportation, created MWAA when
they passed reciprocal laws in 1985.

Lebron's second condition is unsatisfied as well: MWAA is not
controlled by the federal government. The Board of Review, which
provided for on-going federal control over MWAA, was invalidated in
the early 1990's. The federal government appoints just three out of
seventeen members of MWAA's Board of Directors. Because these
appointees are a distinct minority of the Board, they alone cannot
control MWAA.

The Appellants' failure to meet the threshold of establishing MWAA
as a federal entity is fatal to their claims under the Appointments
Clause and the Administrative Procedures Act. Both these provisions
apply to federal entities Officers of the United States, U.S.
Const. Art II. Section 2, and authorities of the Government of the
United States, respectively. Accordingly, they have little
relevance when, as here, the entity in question is not a federal
one.

The Appellants argue that MWAA's structure violates the
non-delegation principle because it has been wrongly delegated
legislative power, government power or federal power.

The principle of non-delegation requires that core governmental
power must be exercised by the Department on which it is conferred
and must not be delegated to others in a manner that frustrates the
constitutional design. Pittston v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 394
(4th Cir. 2004).

MWAA has not been delegated legislative power from the federal
government. Under the text of MWAA's reciprocal organic state laws
and the Transfer Act, MWAA exercises only those powers conferred on
it by its state creators, not the federal government. And even if
some of MWAA's powers did come from the federal government,
whatever policymaking discretion the Authority wields would be
amply constrained by Congress' passage of the Transfer Act.

That Act requires that leased property be used only for airport
purposes, defined by Congress to mean aviation business or
activities, activities necessary or appropriate to serve passengers
or cargo in air commerce or nonprofit, public use facilities that
are not inconsistent with the needs of aviation. The strictures of
the Transfer Act are sufficiently detailed as to more than satisfy
the requirement of an intelligible principle.

The Constitution also forbids delegation of core governmental power
to a private entity. Unlike the executive and judicial Departments,
the Constitution recognizes no governmental powers vested in
private entities.

There has been no unlawful delegation of government power to a
private entity in this case for the simple reason that MWAA is not
a private entity. It is an interstate compact, constituted by the
states.

The Appellants argue that MWAA violates the non-delegation
principle by exercising federal power. But there is nothing
inherently federal about the operation of commercial airports. In
fact, federal operation of a commercial airport is the exception,
not the rule: National and Dulles are the only major commercial
airports that have been federally operated.

The Appellants next claim that MWAA violates the Guarantee Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. Their claim fails because MWAA does not
deny any state a republican form of government.

The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that the
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government. U.S. Const. Art. IV Section 4.

MWAA does not deny the people of Virginia, Washington, Maryland, or
any other state or subdivision, a republican form of government.
The distinguishing feature of a republican form of government is
the right of the people to choose their own officers for
governmental administration, and pass their own laws. The Guarantee
Clause is not violated when States retain the ability to set their
legislative agendas and when state government officials remain
accountable to the local electorate.

The Appellants claim that MWAA's use of toll road funds to build
metro service to Dulles violates the command that funds only be
spent on capital and operating costs of the Metropolitan Washington
Airports.

MWAA leases Dulles and National from the federal government under
terms specified by the Transfer Act. The Act and the Lease allow
MWAA to levy certain fees but require that all revenues generated
by the Metropolitan Washington Airports shall be expended for the
capital and operating costs of the Metropolitan Washington
Airports. MWAA also has responsibility for the airports' Master
Plan, which, since MWAA was created, contemplated the extension of
metro service to Dulles. In 2006, MWAA took over the operation of
the toll road leading to Dulles so that it could use the revenues
from the road to finance construction of a metro line connecting
the airport to Washington, D.C. The question presented by this suit
is whether the Act and the Lease allow MWAA to spend those funds
for that purpose.

The Court concludes they do.

The expenditures in no way violate the Lease terms. The Secretary
of Transportation determined as much in 2008 when she certified
MWAA's actions as compliant with the Lease. Her certification
expressly contemplated improvements both on and off MWAA's property
and concluded that these actions do not conflict with any terms in
the lease. The Secretary's approval in this case is entitled to
great weight. Consol. Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 745 F.2d 281, 291
(4th Cir. 1984).

As the D.C. Circuit explained, an agency, when interpreting
contracts that it is authorized to approve or disapprove, is
entitled to just as much benefit of the doubt in interpreting such
an agreement as it would in interpreting its own orders, its
regulations, or its authorizing statute.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's October 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7cqjdvf from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Gene C. Schaerr -- gschaerr@schaerr-duncan.com --
SCHAERR|DUNCAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Stuart Alan Raphael -- sraphael@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON & WILLIAMS
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority. Lewis Yelin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees Elaine Chao and United
States Department of Transportation.

ON BRIEF: Robert J. Cynkar, Patrick M. McSweeney, Christopher I.
Kachouroff, McSWEENEY, CYNKAR & KACHOUROFF PLLC, S. Kyle Duncan  --
KDuncan@Schaerr-Duncan.com -- Stephen S. Schwartz --
sschwartz@schaerr-duncan.com -- Michael T. Worley, SCHAERR|DUNCAN
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Philip G. Sunderland, Office of General Counsel, METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY, Washington, D.C.; Sona Rewari,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee Washington
Metropolitan Airports Authority. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Mark B. Stern, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Steven G. Bradbury,
General Counsel, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel for
Litigation and Enforcement, Joy K. Park, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, Washington, D.C.; Tracy McCormick, Acting United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Federal Appellees.

Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Stephen A. Cobb, Deputy Attorney
General, Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor General, Matthew R. McGuire,
Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.


MULLARKEY ASSOCIATES: Gerlikovski Files Labor Suit v. VP
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Michael Mullarkey.
The case is styled as Mark Gerlikovski, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Michael Mullarkey,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-07308 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Michael Mullarkey serves as Vice President at Mullarkey Associates,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

     Mark Gerlikovski, Esq.
     444 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 3270
     Chicago, IL 60611
     Phone: (312) 784-2400
     Status: (312) 784-2410
     Email: ddevassy@askounisdarcy.com
     c/o Askounis & Darcy, PC




NASHVILLE MANAGEMENT: Jointly Seek Approval of Notice in Cabot
--------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit titled ALEXANDER CABOT, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated persons, known and unknown
v. NASHVILLE MANAGEMENT, INC. d/b/a CHARLIE'S CHICAGO, Case No.
1:18-cv-02569 (N.D. Ill.), jointly move the Court to approve and
authorize their stipulated form of notice of collective action
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

On behalf of himself and all other past and present similarly
situated employees of the Defendant, the Plaintiff filed the
instant suit, alleging that the Defendant failed to pay the
required minimum wage by requiring bartenders/bar backs to pay
"tip-outs" to ineligible employees, including doormen and
management, in violation of the FLSA.  Additionally, the Plaintiff
alleges that Charlie's violated the FLSA by failing to properly pay
bartenders/bar backs for attending mandatory meetings.

The parties have agreed, among other things, that the Defendant
will consent to the distribution of their proposed notice and
consent form.  The Defendant's consent to distribute the Notice and
Consent is made without prejudice to its right later to assert
defenses, including inter alia, to argue that the Plaintiff and any
opt-in Plaintiffs are not "similarly situated" under applicable
law.  The Defendant does not, by consenting to the distribution of
the Notice and Consent, admit that the Plaintiff and any opt-in
Plaintiffs are "similarly situated."

The parties will file a Joint Report to the Court about the status
of the action within 14 days after the expiration of the stay, that
is, on or before January 24, 2019.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradley Manewith, Esq.
          James Rogers, Esq.
          SIEGEL & DOLAN LTD.
          150 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 878-3210
          Facsimile: (312) 878-3211
          E-mail: msiegel@msiegellaw.com
                  jrogers@msiegellaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jason C. Kim, Esq.
          Alexis M. Dominguez, Esq.
          NEAL, GERBER, & EISENBERG LLP
          2 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1700
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 269-8000
          E-mail: jkim@ngelaw.com
                  adominguez@ngelaw.com


NAVY FEDERAL: Court Approves $24.5MM Settlement in Lloyd Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement
in the case captioned JENNA LLOYD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NAVY
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-1280-BAS-RBB. (S.D.
Cal.).

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Jenna Lloyd and Jamie Plemon's
unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class action
Settlement Agreement (Agreement) between Plaintiffs and Defendant
Navy Federal Credit Union (Navy Federal).

The Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) largely
identical to the original complaint, alleging that Navy Federal
improperly assessed and collected Optional Overdraft Protection
Fees (OOPS Fees) from the Plaintiffs and a putative class of Navy
Federal accountholders on certain debit card transactions.

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

As part of their agreement, the Parties seek certification of a
Settlement Class defined as:

     All current and former Navy Federal members who were charged
an OOPS Fee on a transaction that was authorized into a positive
available balance during the Class Period, excluding individuals
who enrolled in OOPS for the first time after February 13, 2017.

The Settlement provides for Navy's Federal's commitment to
establish a Settlement Fund of $24,500,000.00 for the benefit of
Settlement Class members, as well as Navy Federal's separate
commitment to pay up to $500,000.00 toward Settlement
Administration Costs.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Ninth Circuit maintains a strong judicial policy that favors
the settlement of class actions. Nonetheless, a class action may
not be settled without court approval.  When the parties to a
putative class action reach a settlement agreement prior to class
certification, courts must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify
both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the
settlement.

Class Certification for Settlement Purposes

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

No specific number of class members is required to satisfy the
numerosity requirement, although there is a presumption that a
class with more than 40 members is impracticable to require
joinder.   

In this case, the exact size of the class is unknown. However, the
Parties represent that the Settlement Class will include thousands
of members, with the exact number to be identified in order to
complete the Notice Program. Accepting the Parties' representation
and in light of general knowledge and common sense regarding the
likely size of the class, the Court finds that the numerosity
requirement is satisfied. Plaintiffs' motion for final approval,
however, must identify the size of the class in a more concrete
manner and explain the basis for the specific class size or range
provided.

Commonality

The commonality requirement requires that there be questions of law
or fact common to the class.

In this case, there is a core common question of law and fact that
pervades the claims of the Settlement Class. The core common
factual question concerns the meaning of the provisions in Navy
Federal's agreements regarding OOPS fees. The core common legal
question is whether Navy Federal breached its agreements with
accountholders when it assessed OOPS Fees on certain debit card
transactions that were authorized into a positive balance. Because
members of the Settlement Class are alleged to have been subjected
to the same unlawful practice based on a similar factual scenario,
Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the representative party's claim be
typical of the claim of the class.

The Plaintiffs claim that they were improperly charged OOPS Fees on
transactions authorized into a positive balance but which settled
into a negative balance. These claims are typical of absent
settlement class members because they were allegedly subjected to
the same Navy Federal practice leading to the assessment of OOPS
Fees and have suffered the same injuries, specifically the improper
assessment of additional OOPS Fees.

Rule 23(a)(3) is therefore satisfied.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

In this case, there is no clear indication at this stage that the
Plaintiffs or their counsel have conflicts of interest with other
class members. The Plaintiffs brought this case as a class action
and have vigorously pursued the claims in this case and appear to
be capable of continuing to do so. Although Class Plaintiffs seek a
service award in addition to their portion of the Settlement Fund
as Settlement Class Member, this fact does not mean they have a
conflicting interest with the remaining members of the Settlement
Class.   Finally, Class Counsel appear to be qualified, competent,
and experienced in class-action lawsuits. Rule 23(a)(4) thus
appears to be satisfied. Because Rule 23(a)'s four requirements are
satisfied at this stage of the proceedings, the Court proceeds to
assess the type of class action that may be maintained for
settlement purposes.

Rule 23(b)(3) Class

Rule 23(b)(3) requires762 Page 11 of 29 the Court to find that: (1)
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members and (2) a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

A Rule 23(b)(3) analysis is guided by the following considerations:
(A) the class members' interest in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

First, the predominance requirement is satisfied.  In this case,
liability questions common to all members of the Settlement Class
substantially outweigh any possible issues that are individual to
each member of the Settlement Class. For example, each Settlement
Class member's relationship with Navy Federal arises from an
account agreement that is the same or substantially similar in all
relevant respects to other Settlement Class members' account
agreements.  

Second, a class action is superior to having the individual members
of the Settlement Class file multiple if not potentially thousands
separate lawsuits. Such individual litigation would be impractical
and inefficient given that the OOPS Fees at issue are $20 fees
assessed on multiple transactions. The Settlement Class is also
alleged to have suffered the same injury, thus lessening the
interests of any given class member in controlling the prosecution
of separate actions.

Accordingly, the Court finds a class action is superior to other
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy
between the parties.

Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of Proposed Settlement

To determine whether a proposed settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, "a district court must consider a number
of factors, including: the strength of plaintiffs' case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the
amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed,
and the stage of proceedings; the experience and views of counsel;
the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

Although the Plaintiffs believe their case has merit, they and
Class Counsel recognize that Navy Federal has potentially strong
legal and factual grounds available to them for defending this
action.  Navy Federal has consistently contended that its account
agreements unambiguously informed Plaintiffs that OOPS Fees would
be assessed on the transactions at issue.  In its prior dismissal
order, the Court noted that it could not say that the Account
Agreements clearly foreclose either interpretation.

Despite its view that the case lacks merit, Navy Federal's data
analysis prior to mediation estimated that the Settlement Class'
most likely recoverable damages at trial would have been roughly
$60 million. The proposed settlement amount of $24.5 million,
resulting from the evaluation of a private and neutral mediator,
represents a 30-40% recovery of this estimation.

Given the disagreement between the Parties and the neutral
third-party evaluation of the dispute, the Court finds that this
factor weighs in favor of the $24.5 million settlement being fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation

If this case were to proceed through further litigation rather than
settlement, the Parties would bear substantial risk and a strong
likelihood of protracted and contentious litigation. Recovery by
means other than settlement would likely require additional years
of litigation in this Court and before the Ninth Circuit. The risk
of future motions for summary judgment, for class certification and
eventual appeals weighs in favor of settlement at this stage of the
proceedings.   

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial

The Court had not yet certified a class before the parties settled.
Nevertheless, given Navy Federal's vigorous defense of this case,
it is likely that Navy Federal would have opposed Plaintiffs'
certification motion, and would surely have challenged class
certification on appeal in the event a class had been certified
outside of a settlement class.   
This factor weighs in favor of approval.

The Amount Offered in Settlement

Navy Federal has agreed to provide a Settlement Fund of
$24,500,000.00 and to separately pay up to $500,000.00 of
Settlement Administration Costs.  Although the amount is less than
the $60 million Navy Federal estimated and will be reduced for
attorneys' fees, costs, administrative fees, and Service Awards for
the Plaintiffs, the recovery is not obviously deficient,
particularly when the OOPS Fees at issue are $20.00 fees. Indeed,
the very essence of a settlement is a compromise, a yielding of
absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.

The Court finds that the amount offered to be reasonable at this
stage of the proceedings.

Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings

In this case, the parties extensively briefed the viability of the
Plaintiffs' claims and, in particular, Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim and the applicable law, followed by informal
discovery utilizing an experienced expert, to prepare the Parties
for an all-day mediation with the Honorable Walter D. Kelley, Jr.
(Ret.) at which they arrived at an agreement to the material terms
of the Settlement.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor
of approval.

Experience and Views of Counsel

Class Counsel are experienced in class action lawsuits, having lead
or participated in numerous class-action lawsuits involving
financial institutions around the country, with several cases
centering on the same overdraft fee theory at issue in this case.
Class Counsel considered the risks and the arms-length negotiations
with Navy Federal, causing them to believe this Settlement is in
the best interests of the Settlement Class based on their
investigations, negotiations, and their knowledge of the overdraft
fee practice at issue in this case. The recommendations of Class
Counsel in this case are presumed to be reasonable, particularly
because of their experience and knowledge.

This factor favors approval.

Settlement Attorneys' Fees Provision

The Plaintiffs' counsel has not provided the Court adequate
information at this time which would show that an attorneys' fee
award of 35% of the Settlement Fund, or even above 25%, would be
warranted. Under these circumstances, which indicate that the
percentage recovery would be either too small or too large in light
of the hours devoted to the case or other relevant factors," the
benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar
calculation. At the very least, the Court should employ the
lodestar method as a cross-check on the percentage method in order
to ensure a fair and reasonable result.

Out of caution regarding the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees
Class Counsel may seek, the Court instructs Class Counsel to file a
thorough fee award motion prior to the Final Approval Hearing that
details the hours reasonably spent representing Plaintiffs in this
action, which will permit the Court to conduct a cross-check on the
ultimate percentage of the common fund Class Counsel will seek in
attorneys' fees. In addition, Class Counsel must address in the
motion each of the factors identified above which would permit the
Court to adjust upward or downward any award of attorneys' fees
from the 25% benchmark.

Class Representative Service Award Provision

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that named plaintiffs in class action
litigation are eligible for reasonable incentive payments. The
Settlement Agreement provides that the Class Representatives will
receive $5,000.00 each for a total of $10,000.00 to be paid from
the Settlement Fund. This amount of the incentive award for each
representative is presumptively reasonable.   

Accordingly, the Court finds that the service award provision of
the Settlement Agreement should not bar preliminary approval.

Final Approval Hearing and Required Notice to Parties

Notice Requirements

Under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), the court must direct to class members the
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.

The proposed Settlement anticipates the retention of a third-party
Settlement Administrator. The Settlement Administrator will be
provided with names and email or mailing addresses needed to send
direct notice to each member of the Settlement Class. The Court has
reviewed the proposed Notice Program and the Notices and finds that
they generally satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

The Court grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary
approval.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6lrwst from Leagle.com.

Jenna Lloyd, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Gold  --
agold@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew
Silver  -asilver@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac
vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -,, Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel -- jdkaliel@gmail.com --
Kaliel PLLC, Jeffrey M. Ostrow -- ostrow@kolawyers.com --
Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice,
Jonathan M. Streisfeld -- streisfeld@kolawyers.com -- Kopeloiwtz
Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice, Chiharu Sekino --
csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP,
James C. Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller &
Shah, LLP & Taras Kick .

Jamie Plemons, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byAndrea Gold, Tycko & Zavareei
LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew Silver, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac
vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas
Kaliel, Kaliel PLLC,Jeffrey M. Ostrow, Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson
Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice, Jonathan M. Streisfeld,
Kopeloiwtz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice,
Chiharu Sekino, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP & James C.
Shah, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP.

Navy Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Jason J. Kim
-- kimj@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP & Neil K. Gilman
-- ngilman@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice.


NEW YORK: Disability Commissioner Faces Hills et al. Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Samuel D. Roberts, as
Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistant. The case is captioned as TOIYA HILLS,
FREDRICKA WASHINGTON, and RUPA DHAKAL, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v., SAMUEL D. ROBERTS,
as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01240-BKS-CFH
(N.D.N.Y., Oct. 19, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Brenda K.
Sannes and referred to Magsitrate Judge Christian F. Hummel.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Susan C. Antos, Esq.
          EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER-ALBANY
          119 Washington Avenue, 3rd Floor
          Albany, NY 12210
          Telephone: (518) 462-6831
          Facsimile: (518) 462-6678
          E-mail: santos@empirejustice.org


NORTHBROOK BANK:  Praither Files Suit Over Ponzi Scheme
-------------------------------------------------------
JOHN PRAITHER and MARCELLO CALIVA, and on behalf of the class
members v. NORTHBROOK BANK & TRUST COMPANY, an Illinois chartered
state bank, And TAMER MOUMEN, Case No. 2018CH12935 (Ill. Cir., Cook
Cty., October 17, 2018), is brought on behalf of a proposed class
of approximately 42 investors that are victims of a Ponzi scheme,
which raised a least $9 million since 2014.

The orchestrator of this scheme -- Tamer Moumen -- duped the
victims using fraudulent and deceptive marketing and registration
materials under the pretense that their funds deposited at
Northbrook Bank & Trust ("Northbrook Bank"), would be invested in
hedge funds that he managed, the Plaintiffs allege.  They contend
that the investments were a sham and in classic Ponzi-scheme
fashion, Mr. Moumen used new investor money to pay off previous
investors and then stole whatever was left to trade options in his
personal brokerage accounts and to fund his lifestyle which
included buying a Tesla Model S.

Northbrook Bank is a bank chartered under the laws of the state of
Illinois and a resident of Cook County, Illinois.  Northbrook
Bank's principal place of business is located in Northbrook, Cook
County, Illinois.

The Plaintiffs and the Class invested in purported "hedge funds"
offered by Crescent Ridge Capital Partners, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company.  CRCP offered two purported investment funds to
the Class, namely the Crescent Ridge Volatility Fund and the
Crescent Ridge Energy Fund.  Both funds were founded and operated
by Tamer Moumen of Leesburg, Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Alexander N. Loftus, Esq.
          Joseph R. Wojciechowski, Esq.
          Ryan F. Moore, Esq.
          STOLTMANN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          Willis Tower
          233 S. Wacker Dr., 84th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 332-4200
          E-mail: alex@stoltlaw.com
                  joe@stoltlaw.com
                  ryan@stoltlaw.com


PLY GEM: Court Dismisses Suit Over Defective Vinyl Sliding
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned CLEMENT GAZZILLO, STEVEN
WU, JAMES RENSLAND, and BARBARA MORRIS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PLY GEM INDUSTRIES,
INC., d/b/a "Ply Gem" and PLY GEM HOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a "Ply Gem,"
Defendants. No. 1:17-CV-1077 (MAD/CFH). (N.D.N.Y.).

Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs commenced this proposed putative class action
against Ply Gem Industries, Inc. and Ply Gem Holdings, Inc.,
alleging that the Defendants manufactured and distributed defective
vinyl siding. The Plaintiffs bring causes of action for breach of
an express warranty and implied warranties in violation of New
York, Pennsylvania and Delaware law and other similar statutes.

Standard of Review

A prima facie showing of jurisdiction does not mean that plaintiff
must show only some evidence of jurisdiction; it means that
plaintiff must plead facts which, if true, are sufficient in
themselves to establish jurisdiction. Pleadings that assert only
conclusory non-fact-specific jurisdictional allegations or state a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation do not meet this
burden.

There are two types of personal jurisdiction that a court may
exercise over a foreign
corporation.   First, there is general or all-purpose jurisdiction,
which permits a court to adjudicate any cause of action against the
corporate defendant, wherever arising, and whoever the plaintiff.
Second, there is specific or case-linked jurisdiction, which is
available when the cause of action sued upon arises out of the
defendant's activities in a state.

General Jurisdiction

A court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
only where the corporation's affiliations with the State are so
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in
the forum State.

Here, the Defendants are incorporated in Delaware and share a
principal place of business in North Carolina. The Plaintiffs do
not argue that this Court has general jurisdiction over the
Defendants, and there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that
the Defendants are at home in New York.

Therefore, the Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over
Defendants.

Specific Jurisdiction

New York's long-arm statute allows for personal jurisdiction by
acts of non-domiciliaries where the non-domiciliary (1) transacts
any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods
or services in the state or (2) commits a tortious act within the
state or (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state if he (i) regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or
should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state
and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce.

The Plaintiffs do not specify which provisions of the long-arm
statute grant them specific jurisdiction over their claims. In
fact, the Plaintiffs do not actually provide the Court with an
argument for why the Court has personal jurisdiction in this case,
beyond making the conclusory statement that defendants conduct
substantial business in this District, have caused harm to Class
Members in this District, one or more of the Plaintiffs reside in
this District, and defendants are subject to this court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to this action. Even the Plaintiffs'
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss does not make a proper personal
jurisdiction analysis.

In spite of these deficiencies, the Court has reviewed the facts
alleged in the Complaint and the relevant CPLR provisions, and has
concluded that it does not have specific jurisdiction over
Defendants.

CPLR Sections 302(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two
requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted
business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise
from that business activity.

The Plaintiffs broadly allege that defendants conduct substantial
business in this District and defendants are subject to this
court's personal jurisdiction with respect to this action. This
conclusory allegation does not provide the Court with facts that
show the Defendants' purposeful availment of New York.
Additionally, the Complaint cites to numerous marketing materials
and warranties that are available on the Defendants' website. These
materials provide information to a national audience; they do not
show that the Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of conducting activities within New York State
specifically.  

The mere fact that the Plaintiffs may have viewed these promotional
materials in New York is insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 302(a)(1).

As such, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over
Defendants under Section 302(a)(1).

CPLR Section 302(a)(2)

Under CPLR Section 302(a)(2), the court has personal jurisdiction
if the defendant commits a tortious act within the state. A
defendant's physical presence in New York is a prerequisite to
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2).

The Complaint does not make any allegations that Defendants were
physically present in New York when Plaintiffs' causes of action
arose, and the Court will not draw argumentative inferences in
Plaintiffs' favor. Therefore, the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction under CPLR Section 302(a)(2).  

CPLR Section 302(a)(3)

To establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR Section 302(a)(3), a
plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant committed a tortious act
outside New York; (2) the cause of action arose from that act; (3)
the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New
York; and (4) the defendant (a) regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in New York or (b) expects or should reasonably expect the
act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce.  

The Plaintiffs have not alleged exactly how they ended up with Ply
Gem vinyl siding on their homes. Without more information, the
Court cannot determine where the situs of injury took place. The
Court is particularly skeptical that out-of-state Plaintiffs Morris
and Rensland were injured in New York, since they do not allege a
New York injury or that their claims arise from any business
activity conducted in New York.   

Without more, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction under
CPLR Section 302(a)(3).

(d) Due Process

The Complaint's bare jurisdictional facts fall far short of showing
that Defendants' suit-related conduct creates a substantial
connection with New York. However, since the Court does not have
personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, it does
not reach the issue of whether jurisdiction would comport with due
process.

Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Plaintiffs' Claims

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss focus their jurisdictional analysis on how
Bristol-Myers Squibb and its progeny apply to this case. Thus, the
Court will now address Bristol-Myers Squibb specifically.

As the Plaintiffs point out, Bristol-Myers Squibb concerns the due
process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State
and the Supreme Court explicitly left open whether the same logic
would extend to federal courts under the Fifth Amendment.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783-84. Still, Bristol-Myers
Squibb is instructive on the issues here. The Complaint alleges
that Rensland and Morris reside outside of the state of New York,
and Defendants are incorporated in Delaware with their corporate
headquarters in North Carolina.

The Complaint contains neither (1) facts demonstrating Defendants'
contacts with New York, nor (2) facts showing a connection between
New York and the out-of-state Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, in light of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the
Court does not have jurisdiction over the out-of-state Plaintiffs'
claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y933gyut from Leagle.com.

Clement Gazzillo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Steven Wu, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, James Rensland, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & Barbara Morris, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alex M.
Nelson -- anelson@bensonpc.com -- Benson, Kerrane, Storz & Nelson,
PC, pro hac vice, Donald W. Boyajian, Dreyer, Boyajian Law Firm,
James R. Peluso, Jr., Dreyer, Boyajian Law Firm & Michael J. Lowder
-- mlowder@bensonpc.com -- Benson, Kerrane, Storz & Nelson, PC.

Ply Gem Industries, Inc., doing business as Ply Gem & Ply Gem
Holdings, Inc., doing business as Ply Gem, Defendants, represented
by Cynthia E. Neidl -- neidlc@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
Donald R. Frederico -- dfrederico@pierceatwood.com -- Pierce Atwood
LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Swift Kayatta, Pierce, Atwood Law Firm
- Portland Office, pro hac vice, Cheryl Lorraine Allen-Ricciardi,
Pierce Atwood & Katharine E. Kohm, Pierce Atwood.


POSHMARK INC: Kiler Files ADA Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Poshmark, Inc. The
case is styled as Marion Kiler individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff
v. Poshmark, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06116 (E.D. N.Y.,
Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Poshmark Inc. operates a platform where women come together to buy
and sell clothing and accessories from each other's closets. It
allows users to sell or buy new and gently used products, such as
bags, jeans, shoes, jewelry, accessories, and dresses from their
smartphones or on the Web.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     Shaked Law Group, P.C.
     44 Court Street, Suite 1217
     Brooklyn, NY 11217
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Fax: (718) 504-7555
     Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Removes William South Suit to M.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of WILLIAM SOUTH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE
SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, filed a notice to remove the
lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the State of Florida, County of
Hillsborough (Case No. 18-CA-009116) to the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida on October 19, 2018. The clerk of
court for the Middle District of Florida assigned Case No. Case No.
8:18-cv-02567-MSS-JSS. The case is assigned to Judge Mary S.
Scriven and referred to Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed.

Progressive Select Insurance Company operates as a subsidiary of
Progressive Direct Holdings Inc. The Company provides property and
casualty insurance services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Casim Adam Neff, Esq.
          NEFF INSURANCE LAW, PLLC
          PO Box 15063
          St. Petersburg, FL 33733-5063
          Telephone: (727) 342-0617

               - and –

          Craig E. Rothburd, Esq.
          CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, PA
          320 W Kennedy Blvd, Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 251-8800
          Facsimile: (813) 251-5042
          E-mail: crothburd@e-rlaw.com

               - and –

          Scott R. Jeeves, Esq.
          JEEVES LAW GROUP, PA
          954 First Ave N
          St Petersburg, FL 33705
          Telephone: (727) 894-2929
          Facsimile: (727) 822-1499
          E-mail: sjeeves@jeeveslawgroup.com

               - and –

          Stephen B. Murray , Jr.
          MURRAY LAW FIRM
          650 Poydras St Ste 2150
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-8100
          Facsimile: (504) 584-5249

The Defendant is represented by:

          Marcy Levine Aldrich, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          98 Southeast Seventh St., Suite 1100
          Miami, FL 33131-1714
          Telephone: (305) 374-5600
          E-mail: marcy.aldrich@akerman.com

               - and –

          Bryan T. West, Esq.
          Akerman LLP
          Three Brickell City Centre
          98 Southeast Seventh St., Suite 1100
          Miami, FL 33131-1714
          Telephone: (305) 982-5504
          Facsimile: (305) 374-5095
          E-mail: bryan.west@akerman.com


QUICKEN LOANS: Court Grants Bid to Amend Mattson TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
Portland Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend Complaint in the case captioned ERIK MATTSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. QUICKEN LOANS, Inc., Defendant. Case No.
3:18-CV-00989-YY. (D. Or.).

Mattson has moved to amend the complaint to add the second claim.

Plaintiff Erik Mattson (Mattson) brings this putative class action
against Quicken Loans, Inc. (Quicken Loans) for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). Mattson amended
his complaint to add a second TCPA count for violation of 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200(d) without first seeking leave of court. Quicken
Loans has filed a Motion to Strike or Dismiss the Second Cause of
Action.

The decision to grant or deny leave to amend is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Rule 15 advises that leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there
is strong evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of
amendment, etc. Sonoma County Ass'n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma
County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Foman, 371
U.S. at 182)

Futility

The test for futility is the same as the standard used for a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Section 64.1200(d) prescribes procedures for maintaining internal
do-not-call lists for entities that place telemarketing calls. In
particular, subsection (d)(3) provides that an entity making calls
to a residential phone for telemarketing purposes must honor a
residential subscriber's do-not-call request within a reasonable
time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed
thirty days from the date of such request.

In the June 7, 2018 order, this court found that Mattson had failed
to plead facts to support a claim under 47 U.S.C. Section
64.1200(d). In the FAC, Mattson alleged only that he was on the
national do-not-call registry, a fact that is sufficient for a
section 227(c) claim but not a section 64.1200(d) claim. However,
the complaint filed in this action includes additional allegations
that cure the deficiency. In paragraphs 33 and 48 of the new
complaint, Mattson specifically alleges that he told Quicken Loans
to stop calling. With the additional fact that he was repeatedly
called beyond 30 days after a specific request not to be called,
this court can infer the lack of adequate internal procedures and
sustain a 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d) claim.

As discussed above, the repeated calls suggest there was some
breakdown in the internal procedures, and Mattson therefore should
be permitted relevant discovery.

Additional Foman Factors

This court cannot find sufficiently strong evidence of undue delay,
bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue
prejudice to overcome the presumption in favor of granting leave to
amend. While Mattson could have brought his claims earlier, this
alone does not warrant denying leave to amend." Nextdoor.com, Inc.
v. Abhyanker, 2013 WL 6512480, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2013).

Courts have declined to find the requisite delay where, as here,
discovery is just beginning. Moreover, this court is not persuaded
that Mattson delayed in order to gain an unfair advantage.

Mattson alleges that while preparing the severed complaints, he had
the opportunity to evaluate the facts against Quicken Loans
specifically, as distinct from the other defendants, and to review
the decision in Orsatti v. Quicken Loans, 2016 WL 7650574, at *7-8
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016). It was after this review that he
realized he could state a claim under 47 C.F.R Section 64.1200(d).
The claim was not pursued in the other severed cases, where it was
not factually supported. Although Mattson could have pleaded this
claim in his initial complaint, there is nothing in the record to
indicate bad faith or a wrongful motive.  

Accordingly, Mattson's motion for leave to amend the complaint,
made orally at the hearing and asserted in his briefing, is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yczxz7r9 from
Leagle.com.

Erik Mattson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory K. Zeuthen, Gregory K.
Zeuthen, Attorney at Law PC.

Portland, OR 97204, Jarrett L. Ellzey , Hughes Ellzey LLP, pro hac
vice & John P. Kristensen, Kristensen Weisberg, LLP.

Quicken Loans, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brooks R. Brown --
bbrown@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice, James
P. Laurick, Kilmer Voorhees & Laurick, PC, & W. Kyle Tayman --
ktayman@goodwinprocter.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice.


RESCAP LIQUIDATING: Court Precludes Sole Responsibility Argument
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued an Order precluding Sole Responsibility Argument in the case
captioned In Re: RFC and RESCAP Liquidating Trust Action. This
document relates to: ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Home Loan Center,
Inc., Case No. 14-cv-1716 (SRN/HB).(D. Minn.).

The Court addresses the admissibility, at trial, of HLC's sole
responsibility argument, as well as the evidence offered by HLC in
support of this argument.

ResCap sued HLC for, inter alia, contractual indemnification. When
HLC answered this complaint in July 2015, it asserted various
causation defenses, including that the harm or damages complains of
or seeks were caused by RFC's own acts or omissions. As best the
Court can tell, the only expert evidence HLC and the other
similarly situated originator defendants developed during discovery
directly in support of this RFC sole cause defense was that of
Steven Schwarcz, a professor at Duke Law School.

In one section of his expert report, Professor Schwarcz opined that
some of RFC's breaches of the R&Ws [representations and warranties]
it made to the Trusts and Monoline Insurers do not overlap with
Defendants' breaches of the R&Ws they made to RFC and that ResCap's
damages expert, Dr. Karl Snow, did not take this gap into
consideration when allocating originator liability for the
Bankruptcy Settlements.   

In other words, if a gap existed between the R&Ws HLC made to RFC,
and the R&Ws RFC made to the Trusts or Monoline Insurers, HLC's
R&Ws could not be considered even a contributing cause of" that
portion of RFC's losses and liabilities.

HLC Proffers Its Sole Responsibility Evidence at the October 9
Pre-Trial Hearing

At the October 9 hearing, HLC's counsel proffered the factual
evidence it planned to introduce in support of its sole
responsibility argument, by way of a PowerPoint presentation. At
this hearing, HLC primarily described sole responsibility as an
allocation argument, rather than as a causation argument.
Specifically, HLC argued that ResCap's damages expert, Dr. Snow,
does not attempt to analyze what portion of RFC's settlements with
the Trusts and Monolines were solely caused by RFC's own breaches.
Therefore, HLC argued, it should be allowed to present evidence to
the jury that, in performing his allocation analysis, Dr. Snow
overlooked a major source of potentially non-indemnifiable
liability.

As for evidence, HLC pointed to:

   (1) MBIA's pre-petition allegations that RFC breached its
representation of substantial compliance with the Client Guide by
purchasing loans through negotiated commitments and bulk purchases
and RFC's response that such purchases did not breach its
representation;

   (2) repurchase correspondence between MBIA and RFC in which RFC
acknowledged that it allowed clients like HLC to underwrite to
different Loan-to-Value ratios than those stated in the Client
Guide;

   (3) one particular at-issue HLC loan, No. 11339503, in which (i)
HLC sold RFC the loan pursuant to an underwriting exception, and
(ii) RFC included the loan in a securitization in which RFC
represented that all of the Mortgage Loans have been underwritten
in substantial compliance with the criteria set forth in the
Program Guide and

   (4) analogous loans from two other originators.

ResCap Responds to HLC's Proffer

ResCap argued that the Court should exclude the sole responsibility
evidence offered in HLC's proffer for at least four reasons.

First, ResCap argued that HLC cannot, at this late date, rely on
its re-underwriting expert, Mr. Broeksmit, to provide factual
testimony about loans it now alleges are RFC's sole responsibility,
much less expert testimony, because he never analyzed these loans
with respect to this particular issue in his expert report. Nowhere
in Mr. Broeksmit's report, ResCap emphasizes, is any opinion about
sole cause liability.

Second, ResCap argues that the Court already considered
representative samples of the 47 repurchase correspondence
documents identified in HLC's follow-up letter in its October 1
Order, and found that they did not support HLC's sole
responsibility argument because the Client Guide expressly
contemplated that RFC would purchase loans that did not comply with
`one or more criteria stated in the standard Loan Program Chapters
of the Guide.

Third, ResCap argues that, to the extent HLC relies on sole
responsibility liability as an affirmative defense to causation,
HLC bears the burden of proof. Because HLC has not adduced evidence
supporting its affirmative sole-cause defense as to any of the HLC
at-issue loans for which Plaintiff is seeking indemnity, ResCap
asserts, that defense should be dismissed with prejudice.

The Court finds that, regardless of whether HLC's sole
responsibility argument is considered an affirmative defense on
causation, or a rebuttal to ResCap's allocation case, HLC cannot
present the evidence raised in its proffer for two, independent
reasons.

First, introducing complex evidence to the jury about such an
important issue in the case, without competent expert testimony to
guide them in analyzing this evidence, would improperly invite
speculation.

Second, in the absence of such expert analysis, the probative value
of this evidence is far outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice
and juror confusion.

Lack of Expert Guidance

As HLC conceded at its sole responsibility proffer, its argument is
not based on an analysis undertaken by either Professor Schwarcz or
Mr. Broeksmit. It is sheer speculation, therefore, that such an
analysis would support a challenge to the integrity of Dr. Snow's
damages model.

Here, the Court has already held that one of ResCap's proposed
damages analyses the Allocated Breaching Loss Model survived
summary judgment because it offered the jury a reasonably certain
basis for assessing and allocating damages that is not speculative,
remote, or conjectural.

Thus, although ResCap still must convince the jury that the
liability it allocates to HLC is, in fact, reasonably certain, the
Court will not allow HLC to respond at this late date, during
trial, with what is effectively an alternative damages model based
on attorney argument and conjecture.

Rule 403 Concerns

Especially in the absence of any alternative expert analysis,
handing the jury HLC's proffered sole responsibility evidence would
raise substantial Rule 403 concerns. As the Court elucidated in an
earlier opinion, given the complex factual and legal issues before
the jury, Rule 403 is of particular importance in this trial. And,
as the Court repeatedly noted at pre-trial hearings, it is very
challenging to distinguish HLC's sole responsibility argument, on
which summary judgment was deferred, from HLC's arguments related
to the non-indemnifiability of fraud claims against RFC and/or
HLC's knowledge and reliance-based affirmative defenses, both of
which did not survive summary judgment. If the Court has trouble
delineating these distinctions, it suspects a lay jury would as
well.

As such, introducing HLC's sole responsibility evidence, most of
which revolves around MBIA suing RFC for allegedly misrepresenting
the underwriting standards it held its originators to, would invite
the jury to find that ResCap failed to meet its burden on
allocation and damages, not because the Allocated Breaching Loss
Method does not prove allocation to a reasonable degree of
certainty, but because RFC engaged in allegedly fraudulent behavior
and should not be indemnified wholly or in part because of that.
This Rule 403 concern is only exacerbated by the absence of any
factual evidence, and accompanying expert testimony, to support
this theory beyond mere speculation.

All told, after carefully considering HLC's proffer in support of
Professor Schwarcz's purely hypothetical expert opinion, the Court
precludes Professor Schwarcz from speculating as to RFC-only
liability.  

Furthermore, for the reasons articulated in this Order, HLC is
precluded from arguing to the jury that RFC sole responsibility
claims constitute a significant potential source of
non-indemnifiable liability. As for the evidence proffered by HLC
in support of this argument, that evidence is not admissible on
this issue. Similarly, the testimony of the factual and expert
witnesses which HLC identified as solely relevant to RFC-only
liability in its Second Amended Witness List is inadmissible.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9l6zevo from Leagle.com.

Residential Funding Company, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M.
Abensohn -- adamabensohn@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice, Alexander J. Merton --
ajmerton@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP,
pro hac vice, Alexandria Deep Conroy --
alexeeconroy@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and
Sullivan, pro hac vice, Amroh Faisal Idris , Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan, pro hac vice, Anthony Paul Alden --
anthonyalden@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
pro hac vice, Bradley T. Smith -- bsmith@felhaber.com -- Felhaber
Larson, Christina Wu -- christinawu@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, pro hac vice, Claire Disston
Hausman -- clairehausman@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice

Ark-La-Tex Financial Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by James
M. Jorissen, Leonard, O'Brien, Spencer, Gale & Sayre, Ltd, & Mark
J. Carpenter, Carpenter Law Firm PLLC.

First Mortgage Corporation, Defendant, represented by Gene A. Hoff,
Minenko & Hoff, Michael J. Minenko, Minenko & Hoff, P.A., & Thomas
Michael Sullivan, Jr., Thomas M. Sullivan, Jr., pro hac vice.


RESTAURANT BRANDS: Michel Sues Over No-Poach Clause in Franchise
----------------------------------------------------------------
MONIQUE MICHEL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. RESTAURANT BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., BURGER KING
WORLDWIDE, INC., and BURGER KING CORPORATION, Case No.
1:18-cv-24304-JEM (S.D. Fla., October 18, 2018), arises from Burger
King's alleged anticompetitive clause in its franchise agreement
that prevents any Burger King franchise from hiring or soliciting
current employees of other Burger King franchises or former
employees, who have worked for any Burger King franchise in the
past six months (the "No-Poach Clause").

The Plaintiff alleges that this no-hiring and no-solicitation
agreement is an illegal conspiracy between the Defendants and
Burger King franchises in violation of the Sherman Act.

Restaurant Brands International, Inc. (RBI) is an Ontario
corporation based in Oakville, Ontario, Canada.  Restaurant Brands
International owns the Burger King brand through its subsidiaries
Burger KingWorldwide, Inc. and Burger King Corporation, and also
owns the brands Tim Hortons and Popeye's.

Burger King Worldwide, Inc. (BKW) is a Delaware corporation based
in Miami, Florida, and is a subsidiary of Restaurant Brands
International, Inc.  Burger King Corporation (BKC) is a Florida
corporation based in Miami, Florida, and is a subsidiary of Burger
King Worldwide, Inc.  BKC handles the day-to-day management of the
Burger King brand and its franchise relationships in the United
States, and also owns and operates approximately 50 Burger King
restaurants in the Miami area.

Burger King is America's fourth-largest fast-food chain by sales
and sixth-largest by number of restaurants, with about 7,000
restaurants in the United States and annual U.S. sales of
approximately $10 billion.  The Burger King Corporation, BKC, owns
only about 50 restaurants, all in the Miami area; the rest are all
owned and operated by franchisees.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          John Gravante, Esq.
          Matthew P. Weinshall, Esq.
          Alissa Del Riego, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          SunTrust International Center
          One S.E. Third Ave., Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com
                  jgravante@podhurst.com
                  mweinshall@podhurst.com
                  adelriego@podhurst.com

               - and -

          John Radice, Esq.
          Daniel Rubenstein, Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          34 Sunset Blvd.
          Long Beach, NJ 08008
          Telephone: (646) 245-8502
          Facsimile: (609) 385-0745
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com
                  drubenstein@radicelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Eric L. Young, Esq.
          Paul V. Shehadi, Esq.
          MCELDREW YOUNG, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
          123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2250
          Philadelphia, PA 19109
          Telephone: (215) 367-5151
          Facsimile: (215) 367-5143
          E-mail: eyoung@mceldrewyoung.com
                  paul@mceldrewyoung.com

               - and -

          Brett A. Datto, Esq.
          WEIR & PARTNERS LLP
          The Widener Building
          1339 Chestnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 665-8181
          Facsimile: (215) 665-8464
          E-mail: brett.datto@weirpartners.com


RESTAURANT LEADERSHIP: Underpays Housekeepers, Craig Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUDY CRAIG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RESTAURANT LEADERSHIP GROUP, LLC d/b/a JACK
IN THE BOX; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00052970-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 19,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as housekeeper.

Jack in the Box Inc. operates and franchises Jack in the Box
quick-service restaurants. As of April 15, 2018, it operated and
franchised 2,245 Jack in the Box restaurants primarily in the
western and southern United States and Guam. The company was
founded in 1951 and is headquartered in San Diego, California.
[BN]

The Plaintiff was represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FFIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (866) 598-5042
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


RUSSIAN TEA: Faces Lawsuit in New York for ADA Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Russian Tea Room
Corp. The case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Russian Tea
Room Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10150 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 1,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Russian Tea Room is a Russo-Continental restaurant, located at
150 West 57th Street (between Sixth Avenue and Seventh Avenue),
between Carnegie Hall Tower and Metropolitan Tower, in the
Manhattan borough of New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


SANTA CLARA, CA: Fails to Pay OT to Firefighters, Gaffney et al Say
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER GAFFNEY, ANDRE JEROME SOTO, JOHN C. O'LEARY, GUIDO
QUARTAROLI and JEFF PROVANCHER, individually and on behalf all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF SANTA CLARA,
Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-06500 (N.D. Cal., Oct 24, 2018) seeks
to recover unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as firefighters.

Santa Clara is a city in Santa Clara County, California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs were represented by:

          Dieter C. Dammeier, Esq.
          DAMMEIER LAW FIRM
          9431 Haven Avenue, Suite 232
          Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
          Telephone: (909) 240-9525
          Facsimile: (909) 912-1901
          E-mail: Dieter@DammeierLaw.com


SELIP & STYLIANOU: Goldklang Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Goldklang, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, Case No. 7:18-cv-10269 (S.D.
N.Y., November 5, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or
alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household
purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal
Service, telephone and internet, allegedly using deceptive,
misleading and unfair debt collection practices.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of
Rockland, residing at 80 Truman Avenue, Unit 111, Spring Valley,
NY, 10977.

The Defendant is a "debt collector" with an address at 199
Crossways Park, Woodbury, NY, 11797. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel Kohn, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com


SENOMYX INC: Richner Suit Seeks to Enjoin Merger With Firmenich
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALFRED RICHNER, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. SENOMYX, INC., KENT SNYDER, STEPHEN A. BLOCK, TOM
ERDMANN, MARY ANN GRAY, JOHN W. POYHONEN, DAN STEBBINS, and
CHRISTOPHER TWOMEY, Case No. 3:18-cv-02383-L-MDD (S.D. Cal.,
October 18, 2018), seeks to enjoin the expiration of a tender offer
on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Senomyx will be
acquired by Firmenich Incorporated through its wholly owned
subsidiary Sentry Merger Sub, Inc.

On September 17, 2018, Senomyx issued a press release announcing
that it had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger to sell
Senomyx to Firmenich.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger
Agreement, on October 4, 2018, Merger Sub commenced the Tender
Offer to purchase all outstanding shares of Senomyx for $1.50 in
cash per share of Senomyx common stock (the "Offer Price").  The
Tender Offer was scheduled to expire at 12:00 a.m., Eastern Time,
on November 2, 2018.

The Plaintiff contends that the Recommendation Statement, which
recommends that Senomyx stockholders tender their shares in favor
of the Proposed Transaction, omits or misrepresents material
information concerning, among other things, Senomyx management's
financial projections and potential conflicts of interest faced by
one of the Company's financial advisors, Conexus Capital Advisors,
Inc., and Company insiders.

Senomyx is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal
executive offices in San Diego, California.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Senomyx develops and commercializes flavor ingredients and natural
high intensity sweeteners, primarily for the packaged food,
beverage and ingredient supply industries.  The Company considers
flavor ingredients to include flavors that impart a taste, such as
savory and cooling, and flavors with modifying properties, such as
sweet and salt taste modifiers and bitter blockers.

Firmenich is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in
Geneva, Switzerland.  Firmenich is one of the world's largest
privately-owned companies in the fragrance and flavor business.
Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Firmenich.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 208-2800
          Facsimile: (310) 209-2348
          E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682-3010
          E-mail: racocelli@weisslawllp.com

               - and -

          Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 308-5858
          Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
          E-mail: fortunato@bespc.com


SIDEPOINT INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Carlson Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
THERESA CARLSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SIDEPOINT, INC. d/b/a CREDIT ASSIST; and
DOES 1 through 10, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02838-TLN-DB (E.D.
Cal., Oct. 24, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of
making unsolicited calls.

Sidepoint, Inc. d/b/a Credit Assist is a credit repair service
company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


SPRINT CORP: Muehlgay Suit Challenges Merger With T-Mobile US
-------------------------------------------------------------
HOWARD MUEHLGAY, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. SPRINT CORPORATION, GORDON BETHUNE, JULIUS GENACHOWSKI,
MARCELO CLAURE, STEPHEN KAPPES, MICHEL COMBES, ADM. MICHAEL MULLEN,
PATRICK DOYLE, MASAYOSHI SON, RONALD FISHER, AND SARA MARTINEZ
TUCKER, Case No. 1:18-cv-01622-UNA (D. Del., October 18, 2018),
alleges that the Defendants solicited shareholder votes in
connection with the proposed merger of the Company with T-Mobile
US, Inc., through a recommendation statement filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission that omits material facts
necessary to make the statements therein not false or misleading
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On April 29, 2018, the Company entered into a Business Combination
Agreement with T-Mobile, Huron Merger Sub LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company and a wholly owned subsidiary of T-Mobile
("T-Mobile Merger Company"), Superior Merger Sub Corporation, a
Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of T-Mobile
Merger Company ("Merger Sub"), Starburst I, Inc., a Delaware
corporation ("Starburst"), Galaxy Investment Holdings, Inc., a
Delaware corporation ("Galaxy," and together with Starburst, the
"SoftBank US Hold Cos") and for the limited purposes set forth
therein, Deutsche Telekom AG, organized and existing under the laws
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Deutsche Telekom Holding B.V.,
organized and existing under the laws of the Netherlands ("DT
Holding") and SoftBank Group Corp., a Japanese kabushiki kaisha
(the "Proposed Transaction").

The Company expects the Proposed Merger to close in the first half
of 2019.

Sprint is a Delaware corporation that maintains its principal
executive offices in Overland Park, Kansas.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  Sprint is an
American telecommunications company that provides wireless services
and is an internet service provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
          O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
          901 N. Market Street, Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 778-4000
          E-mail: rernst@oelegal.com

               - and -

          Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
          Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
          GAINEY McKENNA & EGLESTON
          440 Park Avenue South
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 983-1300
          Facsimile: (212) 983-0380
          E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                  gegleston@gme-law.com


STAR ACQUISITIONS: Faces Cox Suit in Sacramento
-----------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action has been filed against Star
Acquisitions Inc. The case is captioned as JOY COX, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STAR
ACQUISITIONS INC., Defendant, Case No. 34-2018-00243032-CU-OE-GDS
(Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., Oct. 19, 2018).

Star Acquisitions Inc. is engaged in the restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by William L. Marder, Esq., and Dennis
S. Hyun, Esq.


STERIGENICS U.S.: Removes Cannell et al. Suit to N.D. Illinois
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of JULIE CANNELL, and RUSS SHENOUDA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. STERIGENICS U.S., LLC; and GTCR LLC, Defendants,
filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the
State of Illinois, County of Cook (Case No. 2018L010183) to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on
October 19, 2018. The clerk of court for the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois assigned Case No.
1:18-cv-07034.

Sterigenics U.S., LLC provides contract sterilization and
ionization services for the medical device, pharmaceutical, food
safety, and high performance/specialty materials industries in the
United States The company was incorporated in 1997 and is based in
Oak Brook, Illinois. Sterigenics U.S., LLC operates as a subsidiary
of Sterigenics International, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Todd A. Smith, Esq.
          Brian LaCien, Esq.
          POWER ROGERS & SMITH, LLP
          70 West Madison Street, 55th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602-4212
          Telephone: (312) 236-9381
          Facsimile: (312) 236-0920
          E-mail: tsmith@prslaw.com
                  blacien@prslaw.com

               - and –

          John Libra, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          205 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1950
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 641-9750
          E-mail: JLibra@KoreinTiller.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Maja C. Eaton
          Gerard D. Kelly
          Elizabeth M. Chiarello
          Michael L. Lisak
          Stephanie C. Stern
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          Firm ID No. 42418
          One South Dearborn Street
          Chicago, Illinois 60603
          Telephone: (312) 853-7000
          Facsimile: (312) 853-7036
          E-mail: meaton@sidley.com
                  gkelly@sidley.com
                  echiarello@sidley.com
                  mlisak@sidley.com
                  sstern@sidley.com


STREETTREND LLC: Violates ADA, Crosson Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Streettrend LLC for
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
captioned Aretha Crosson individually and as the representative of
a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Streettrend
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06117 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 1, 2018).

StreetTrend, LLC designs and markets luxury Italian-made sneakers.
StreetTrend brands are available at luxury retailers across Europe
and North America, both online and in-store.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     Shaked Law Group, P.C.
     44 Court Street, Suite 1217
     Brooklyn, NY 11217
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Fax: (718) 504-7555
     Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


TRI-STATE ADJUSTMENTS: Loveland Moves for Certification of Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Loveland moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit captioned PETER LOVELAND, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. TRI-STATE
ADJUSTMENTS INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01662 (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant him (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules
setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and
supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


TRU FORCE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Technicians, Sims Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTIAN SIMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRU FORCE CALIFORNIA, INC. d/b/a TRUFORCE
PEST CONTROL; TRU FORCE INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00053239-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San
Diego Cty., Oct. 19, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Sims was employed by the Defendants as technician.

Tru Force California, Inc. d/b/a Truforce Pest Control owns,
operates, and maintains a pest control company servicing in Los
Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard E. Quintilone II, Esq.
          George A. Aloupas, Esq.
          QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES
          22974 El Toro Road Suite 100
          Lake Forest, CA 92630-4961
          Telephone: (949) 458-9675
          Facsimile: (949) 458-9679

               - and –

          Roger Carter, Esq.
          Bianca A. Sofonio, Esq.
          THE CARTER LAW FIRM
          23 Corporate Plaza Drive, Suite 150
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 629-2565


UNITED AIRLINES: Beier Files Suit for Breach of Contract
--------------------------------------------------------
Harry J. Beier, an individual, John R. Scholz, an individual, Kevin
E. Bybee, an individual; on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, a labor organization; TEAMSTERS SFO LOCAL 856/986, a
labor organization; JAMES HOFFA, in his official capacity as
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS President and
Representative; PETER FINN, in his official capacity as TEAMSTERS
SFO LOCAL 856/986 Principal Officer; UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware
corporation; Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-06632-DMR (N.D. Cal.,
October 31, 2018) was brought under the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 involving a dispute arising under the terms of the
Joint Collective Bargaining Agreement between United Airlines and
the Airlines Technicians and Related Employees in the service of
United Airlines collective bargaining agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement at issue concerns United
Airlines Mechanics and related employees.

The Plaintiffs are members of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters. They are suing their employer, United Airlines and its
parent company, United Continental Holdings, for breach of contract
on account of their breaching the 2010-2013 CBA and other ERISA
violations. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs assert breach of the duty
of fair representation on account of the Unions' failure to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and
fraudulent concealment.  The Plaintiffs assert the breaches by the
Defendants have cost the Plaintiffs hundreds of millions of dollars
in lost pension benefits and profit-sharing revenues.

The Plaintiffs were UAL employees members in good standing with the
Unions, and worked out of the San Francisco International Airport
facility, which is within this district.

IBT is a labor organization and regularly represents employees in
collective bargaining, serving as the representative for all
unionized UAL Mechanics, including those covered by the 2010-2013
CBA.

SFO Local is a labor organization, serving as the local
representative for all unionized UAL Mechanics covered by IBT's
CBA's, including the 2010-2013 CBA.

UAL is, and at all times material times, a corporation, duly
organized and operating pursuant to the laws of the State of
California, and engaged in providing airline services and as such
maintains airports throughout the world, including San Francisco
International Airport, in unincorporated San Mateo County,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jane C. Mariani, Esq.
     Law Office of Jane C. Mariani
     584 Castro Street, #687
     San Francisco, CA 94114
     Phone: (415) 203-2453
     Email: mariani.advocacy@gmail.com


UNITED STATES: Vietnamese Refugees Classes Certified in Trinh
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Cormac J. Carney granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit styled
HOANG TRINH, VU HA, LONG NGUYEN, NGOC HOANG, DAI DIEP, BAO DUONG,
and SIEU NGUYEN, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated v. THOMAS D. HOMAN, KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, JEFFERSON B.
SESSIONS III, DAVID MARIN, SANDRA HUTCHENS, and JOHN DOE, Case No.
8:18-cv-00316-CJC-GJS (C.D. Cal.).

Judge Carney also designates the Plaintiffs' counsel as class
counsel and appoints the named Plaintiffs as class
representatives.

The Court grants certification of the 90-Day Class as to the
isolated issues of whether the Class has overcome the six-month
presumption of reasonableness and met its burden under Zadvydas v.
Davis.

The putative class action challenges the U.S. Government's practice
of subjecting Vietnamese immigrants to post-removal order detention
despite the remote possibility of their removal to Vietnam.  The
named Plaintiffs assert that they, along with thousands of other
Vietnamese refugees, who immigrated to the United States before
July 12, 1995 ("pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants"), have been or will
be subjected to this practice.

The Plaintiffs bring two causes of action for habeas relief,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.  In Count One, the
Plaintiffs assert that their post-removal order detention violates
federal immigration law, and constitutional due process where
removal is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.  In Count
Two, the Plaintiffs assert that even where removal is reasonably
foreseeable, their prolonged detention violates Section 1231 and
constitutional due process when it is "without any individualized
determination that they pose a danger or flight risk."

The Plaintiffs sought to certify three putative classes of pre-1995
Vietnamese immigrants who, like them, received removal orders,
faced varying periods of immigration detention, and either remain
detained or face redetention by the Government.  The Plaintiffs'
three putative classes consist of (1) all pre-1995 Vietnamese
immigrants who have been or will be detained by ICE for more than
90 days after receiving removal orders ("90-Day Class"), (2) all
pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants who have been or will be detained by
ICE for more than 180 days after receiving removal orders ("180-Day
Class"), and (3) all pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants who have been
or will be detained by ICE for more than 180 days in total without
a bond hearing ("Prolonged Detention Class").[CC]


US AIRWAYS: Court Won't Stay Hickcox-Huffman TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued a Memorandum and Order
denying Defendant's Motion to Stay in the case captioned HAYLEY
HICKCOX-HUFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. US AIRWAYS, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 10-cv-05193-VKD. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Tracey Baum (Plaintiff) brings this action against
Defendant ADT LLC (Defendant) alleging one count for violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has relied on a
four-factor test for determining whether a district court should
stay a case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.  

Those factors are: (1) Whether the question at issue is within the
conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical
or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of
expertise (2) Whether the question at issue is particularly within
the agency's discretion; (3) Whether there exists a substantial
danger of inconsistent rulings and (4) Whether a prior application
to the agency has been made.

Because the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is currently
reviewing the regulations surrounding the definitions of ATDS and
reasonable reliance, Defendant urges this Court to stay the
litigation pending the FCC's review of these issues.

Plaintiff opposes the stay, arguing an indefinite stay will not
impact Plaintiff's factual allegations and any future FCC rules
will not significantly alter fact discovery.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

The Court concludes that Defendant has not demonstrated the
applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to this case.

Here, the first factor presents the biggest obstacle to abstention
under primary jurisdiction. The first factor focuses on the
competence of the court and the agency to address the matter.

The Defendant urges this Court to reject the Plaintiff's argument
that because the forthcoming rulings are not matters of first
impression the Court should not stay the litigation because
Baykeeper did not explicitly list matters of first impression among
the factors. But whether courts have tackled the issue before goes
directly to whether this judicial court could competently address
the same matter in the case before it now.

The Court finds support for this premise in the Third Circuit's
recent decision in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., in which the Third
Circuit simply interpreted the statute as it had prior to the 2015
Declaratory Ruling. 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018). District
courts and the Third Circuit continue to adjudicate whether a
certain device constitutes an ATDS.   

The Court sees no reason why it cannot do likewise.

The second factor supports application of the doctrine. The
question at issue what exactly is an ATDS is one within the FCC's
discretion. Congress authorized the FCC to implement rules and
regulations enforcing the TCPA.

With respect to the third factor, there is a possibility that a
decision by this Court on the meaning of ATDS as it relates to the
facts here becomes inconsistent with the potential future rulings
of the FCC, after it resolves the matters before it. In Baykeeper,
the Third Circuit associated risk of inconsistent rulings with the
frequency of agency involvement, concluding that agency inaction in
recent years equates with minimal risk of inconsistent rulings. 660
F.3d at 692.

Here, the FCC has been very active in light of the ACA
International and Marksrulings, seeking multiple rounds of comments
on many aspects of the TCPA's auto-dialing scheme. Therefore, there
is a greater risk that TCPA case law developing now may become
inconsistent with future agency guidance. However, the Court has
not yet been asked to rule on a TCPA issue as Defendant has yet to
file a response to the Amended Complaint. Thus, there is also a
possibility that the FCC concludes its review by announcing rules
or guidance before there is an issue of statutory interpretation
presented to the Court, rendering any stay moot and calming
concerns about inconsistent rulings.

Court's Inherent Power to Control its Docket

The Defendant asks this Court to stay this case in an exercise of
its own discretion. Upon review of both parties' arguments and the
factors identified in the legal standard above, the Court declines
to stay the case.

First, an indefinite stay prior to discovery of an otherwise
straightforward case between just two parties would prejudice
Plaintiff. It is not clear when the FCC will issue any new guidance
relative to the issues here, especially in light of the FCC's most
recent notice just weeks ago seeking further comment.  

Second, the Defendant does not face any clear case of hardship or
inequity by moving forward with discovery and alternative dispute
resolution. The Defendant argues that a rush to judgment is no
substitute for reasoned decision-making with the benefit of the
expert agency's rulings, but this case is far from any judgment on
the merits.

The Defendant has yet to file an answer to the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint and no fact discovery has been conducted. The Defendant
will be able to reassert this issue in the future if anticipated
FCC guidance would benefit the Court in deciding the matters put
before it at that time. In other words, Defendant has not
sufficiently demonstrated that a stay prior to engaging in fact
discovery would simplify the case.

That is because the purpose of the stay would be to await guidance
from the FCC, but whatever that guidance may be does not materially
alter the facts of the case. Enabling the case to proceed to fact
discovery but allowing the motion to be re-asserted thereafter
quells Defendant's concern that it will have to defend this action
twice once before the FCC's rulings; once after.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that regardless of what the FCC's
future rules may say about the definition of an ATDS, Plaintiff is
entitled to discovery on Defendant's telecommunication devices.

The fact that Defendant's TCPA litigation in another district was
stayed has little weight in the Court's decision here for several
reasons.  

First, the Plaintiff chose to file her case as the sole plaintiff,
so whatever case management happens in the putative class action in
another district should carry no more weight in this Court than any
other case management decision by any other out-of-circuit district
court.

Second, this Court is unable to extrapolate much from the Southern
District of Florida's decision to stay that case because that court
granted the stay in a short text order. It is entirely unclear if
that court based its reasoning on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or its inherent power to control its docket. Based on
the Court's independent review of the parties' arguments, the Court
joins the large majority of district courts that have concluded
that it is appropriate for the parties to advance the case without
waiting for post-ACA International agency guidance.

In sum, the Court concludes that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is not applicable here because the issue likely to be
presented at a later time, a legal question of statutory
interpretation, is within the conventional experience of judges.
The Court also concludes that the entry of a stay prior to fact
discovery is inappropriate. Therefore, for the reasons set forth
above, Defendant's Motion to Stay is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y79f3w5k from Leagle.com.

Hayley Hickcox-Huffman, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Roger N. Behle, Jr.
-- rbehle@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP, Thomas
G. Foley, Jr. -- tfoley@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle &
Curtis, LLP, Justin Potter Karczag -- Justin@EncoreLaw.com --
Karczag and Associates PC, Kevin David Gamarnik --
kgamarnik@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle Curtis LLP, Robert A.
Curtis -- rcurtis@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP
& William Michael Aron -- bill@aronlawfirm.com -- Law Office of
William M. Aron.

US Airways, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kelly S. Wood --
kwood@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP, Michael Gerard McGuinness
-- mmcguninness@omm.com -- O'Melveny Myers LLP & Robert Alan Siegel
-- rsiegel@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP.

U.S. Airways Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kelly S. Wood,
O'Melveny and Myers LLP & Michael Gerard McGuinness, O'Melveny
Myers LLP.


US FOODS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Drivers, Gomez Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. US FOODS d/b/a U.S. FOODSERVICE, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 37-2018-00053248-CU-OE-CTL
(Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 19, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum
wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Gomez was employed by the Defendants as driver from 2002 to
June 15, 2018.

US Foods, Inc. operates as a foodservice distributor in the United
States It offers a range of fresh, frozen and dry food, and
non-food products with approximately 400,000 stock-keeping units.
The company was formerly known as U.S. Foodservice, Inc. and
changed its name to US Foods, Inc. in September 2011. US Foods,
Inc. was founded in 1853 and is headquartered in Rosemont,
Illinois. US Foods, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of US Foods
Holding Corp. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Chase, Esq.
          Jerusalem F. Beligan, Esq.
          Ian M. Silvers, Esq.
          BISNARJCHASE LLP
          1301 Dove Street, Suite 120
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752-2999
          Facsimile: (949) 752-2777
          E-mail: bchase@bisnarchase.com
                  jbeligan@bisnarchase.com
                  isilvers@bisnarchase.com


VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS: Jacobs Class Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Transfer Enforcement and Motion to
Transfer Subpoena on October 15, 2018, in the case captioned as
MELINA N. JACOBS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC;
VERIZON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CORP; VERIZON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
COMMITTEE; MARC C. REED; MARTHA DELEHANTY; ANDREW H. NEBENS; CONNIA
NELSON; SHANE SANDERS; ROBERT J. BARISH;  DONNA C. CHIFFRILLER;
DONNA C. HIFFRILLER, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-mc-00144-JDB (D.
Col., Oct. 15, 2018).

Judge Randolph D. Moss granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer
Enforcement on November 1, 2018.

Verizon Communications Inc., through its subsidiaries, offers
communications, information, and entertainment products and
services to consumers, businesses, and governmental agencies
worldwide. The company was formerly known as Bell Atlantic
Corporation and changed its name to Verizon Communications Inc. in
June 2000. Verizon Communications Inc. was founded in 1983 and is
headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Garrett Webster Wotkyns, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
          KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          8501 N Scottsdale Road, Suite 270
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253
          Telephone: (480) 428-0142
          Facsimile: (866) 505-8036
          E-mail: gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com


WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: 7th Cir. Vacates $10MM Arbitration Award
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned PAMELA
HERRINGTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WATERSTONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-3609. (7th Cir.).

The district court compelled arbitration pursuant to an agreement
between Herrington and Waterstone, but it struck as unlawful a
waiver clause that appeared to forbid class or collective
arbitration of Herrington's claims.

Pamela Herrington sued Waterstone Mortgage Corporation in federal
court, asserting two claims.

First, she alleged that Waterstone had failed to pay her minimum
wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

A recent Supreme Court decision has now put this award in doubt. In
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,  U.S., 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), the
Court upheld the validity of waiver provisions like the one in
Herrington's agreement with Waterstone.

But Herrington does not concede that the collective arbitration
violated the waiver. In an attempt to save her award, she insists
that her agreement with Waterstone affirmatively permits class or
collective arbitration of her claims despite the presence of a
valid waiver indicating otherwise.

While parties to class or collective arbitration accept reduced
efficiency, they continue to shoulder arbitration's primary
detriment: a drastically narrowed ability to seek error correction
through appellate review. The stakes of a class or collective
proceeding render the loss of appellate review particularly
significant for the defendant. A defendant willing to accept the
cost of error in a bilateral arbitration is not necessarily willing
to accept it when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of
potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once.

Here, for example, Waterstone's potential liability to Herrington
was a fraction of the $10 million that the arbitrator awarded to
the class as a whole. Transforming an individual dispute into a
class or collective action can turn a small claim into a whopping
one. When that whopping claim is arbitrated, the defendant might
find itself betting the company with no effective means of review
of either class certification or final judgment.  

Herrington's primary argument against our treating the availability
of class or collective arbitration as a question of arbitrability
is that our precedent precludes it. The Court have held that an
arbitrator may decide whether to consolidate multiple arbitrations
into a single proceeding. According to Herrington, certifying a
class or collective action is functionally the same as
consolidating proceedings; thus, we must treat them the same way.

Herrington misreads our precedent, which expressly recognizes the
difference between consolidating bilateral arbitrations and
authorizing class arbitration. The Court explained in Blue Cross
Blue Shield that class actions always have been treated as special
because of numerous characteristics not present in consolidated
arbitration. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 671 F.3d at 640. In class and
collective actions, a self-selected plaintiff represents others;
the rules entitle the represented parties to protection from the
representative's misconduct or incompetence; there is often a
costly process to notify individual class members; the lawyers are
effectively in charge of the process because of the representative
plaintiff's small stake in the suit; and the class nature of the
actions can dramatically increase the amount of money at stake.

The Court categorized the consolidation of suits that are going to
proceed anyway as procedural precisely because it poses none of
those same concerns. Blue Cross Blue Shield therefore strongly
supports rather than precludes our conclusion that the availability
of a class or collective proceeding is a question of
arbitrability.

Because the district court erred in invalidating the waiver clause
in the parties' arbitration agreement, the Court vacate the
district court's order enforcing the arbitration award.

On remand, the district court should conduct the threshold inquiry
regarding class or collective arbitrability to determine whether
Herrington's agreement with Waterstone authorizes the kind of
arbitration that took place. If the district court determines that
the agreement allows such an arbitration, our decision leaves the
district court free to confirm the award. If, however, the district
court determines that Herrington's agreement with Waterstone
requires single-plaintiff arbitration, it should vacate the award
and send the dispute to the arbitrator for a new proceeding.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's October 22, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y753gbd4 from Leagle.com.

David Lawrence Schenberg -- david.schenberg@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Spencer C. Skeen -- spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Dan Getman, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Dunn -- mdunn@cov.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Tim L. Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Jesse C. Ferrantella -- jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.


YALE UNIVERSITY: Andrew Mason Sues over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
ANDREW MASON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. YALE UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-01716-VLB (D. Conn., Oct. 15, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for failure to protect the Plaintiff's and the
Class's personal information.

Between April 2008 and January 2009, unauthorized persons gained
access to a database containing personal information of Yale
alumni, faculty, and staff that was stored on a Yale server.

The Breach affected thousands of individuals associated with Yale
located across the United States and internationally.

On June 16, 2018, Yale discovered the Breach. More than a month
later -- on or about July 26, 2018 and July 27, 2018 –Yale began
notifying Yale Victims of the Breach by sending notices via U.S.
Mail. Yale offered twelve months of free identity theft services to
persons receiving the Notification.

On July 30, 2018, the Plaintiff received the Notification from Yale
that his personal information was compromised as a result of the
breach. As a result, the Plaintiff must now closely monitor his
accounts to safeguard against fraud and theft, and to deal with
potential issues flowing from the breach.

Yale University is a higher educational institution that offers
undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral courses in the fields of
biological sciences, engineering, health and medicine, humanities,
and physical and social sciences. The institution was formerly
known as Yale College and changed its name to Yale University on
May 25, 1887. Yale University was founded in 1701 and is based in
New Haven, Connecticut. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER
          & SHAH, LLP
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                  lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Avenue NW | Ste 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 640-1168
          Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
          E-mail: gmason@wbmllp.com
                  dperry@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA
          One West Fourth Street, 18th Floor
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 345-8297
          Facsimile: (513) 345-8294
          E-mail: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com


ZADIG & VOLTAIRE: Figueroa Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE FIGUEROA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. ZADIG & VOLTAIRE-NEW YORK LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-09585
(S.D.N.Y., October 18, 2018), alleges that the Defendant's Web site
-- http://us.zadig-et-voltaire.com/-- is not equally accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Zadig is a New York Limited Liability Company doing business in New
York.  Zadig is a clothing and accessories retailer that operates
Zadig & Voltaire stores, as well as the Web site.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


ZUMPER INC: Melo Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Virginia
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zumper, Inc. The case
is styled as Ernest Melo, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Zumper, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-00756-REP (E.D. Va., Nov. 1, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Zumper, Inc. provides an online marketplace that enables renters to
find houses, condominiums, and apartments for rent in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Leonard Anthony Bennett, Esq.
     Consumer Litigation Associates
     763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
     Newport News, VA 23601
     Phone: (757) 930-3660
     Fax: (757) 930-3662
     Email: lenbennett@clalegal.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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