CAR_Public/181116.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, November 16, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 230

                            Headlines

212 SERVICES: Sanchez-Marin Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
AARGON AGENCY: Stone Class Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
ABC CORPORATION: Rubi et al. Seek Unpaid Wages under FLSA
ADVANCED MICRO: Bid to Dismiss Kim Class Suit Underway
AIR CANADA: Supreme Court Clears Way for Class-Action Lawsuit

ALABAMA: Court Clarifies ADOC Staffing Increases in Remedial Order
ALDEN SHOE: Website Not Accessible, Figueroa Suit Alleges
ALLERGAN PLC: All Claims in Botox(R) Litigation Dismissed
ALLERGAN PLC: Appeal Pending in Massachusetts Celexa/Lexapro Suit
ALLERGAN PLC: Asacol Litigation Remanded to Massachusetts Court

ALLERGAN PLC: Bid to Dismiss Suit vs. Warner Chilcott Pending
ALLERGAN PLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss in Restasis(R) Class Suit
ALLERGAN PLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss ERISA Complaint
ALLERGAN PLC: Discovery Still Ongoing in Loestrin(R) 24 Litigation
ALLERGAN PLC: Still Defends Namenda(R) Litigation

AMERICAN AIRLINES: Settles Travelers' Class Action
AMIGONE FUNERAL: Tonawanda Residents File Class Action Lawsuit
ANTHEM INC: Appeals Filed in 9th Cir. after Settlement Approval
ANTHEM INC: Still Defends Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litigation
ASPIRE MARKETING: Rivera Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages

ATLANTIC CREDIT: Vedernikov Sues over Debt Collection Practices
ATRIUM HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Hurtado Suit Says
BANK OF AMERICA: Ct. Narrows Claims in 2nd Amended Antitrust Suit
BARNSTORMERS BASKETBALL: Sued Over Ex-Coach's Sexual Exploitation
BASF CORP: Tri-Iso Tryline Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania

BAU OF ILLINOIS: Underpays Kitchen Staff, Rodriquez Alleges
BAY AREA: Montgomery Stayed Pending Kendrick/Kelly Appeal Ruling
BAYER A.G.: Finishing Solutions Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania
BHP BILLITON: Faces Class Action Over Samarco Disaster
BIRD RIDES: Faces Class-Action Lawsuit Over Gross Negligence

BIRNER DENTAL: David Pill Balks at Merger Deal with Mid-Atlantic
BLACKROCK: Employees Sue Over High Fees on 401(k)s
BLUE CROSS: Sued for Denying Mental Health Services Claims
BLUE LINE: Attorney Responds to Bid to Dismiss Speed-Camera Suit
BOK FINANCIAL: Unit Defending Against Oklahoma Class Suit

CALPERS: June 10 Trial Set for Insurance Plan Class Action
CAMPING WORLD: Dec. 18 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
CAMPING WORLD: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Action
CAMPING WORLD: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Action Suit
CARDIFF BAY: Nivelle Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay under FLSA

CEMEX CONSTRUCTION: Grigoryan Labor Suit Remains in District Court
CENTRE COUNTY: Removes Sheffer Suit to M.D. Pennsylvania
CEPHALON INC: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Granted
CHURCHILL DOWNS: Awaits Court Decision on Writ of Certiorari
CHURCHILL DOWNS: Continues to Defend Kater Class Suit

CITIGROUP INC: Bid for Approval of Settlement Filed in Libor Suit
CITIGROUP INC: Bid to Dismiss SSA-Related Suit Okayed
CITIGROUP INC: Contant Plaintiffs Seek Initial Settlement Approval
CITIGROUP INC: Court Affirms Order Denying Bid to Expand Class
CORIUM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Balks at Merger Deal with Gurnet

CRAFTWORKS RESTAURANTS: Court Compels Arbitration in FLSA Suit
CRAWFORD & CO: Court Determines Settlement Administrator's Role
CREDIT PROTECTION: Court Grants Filing of Amended FDCPA Complaint
DEVON ENERGY: 5th Cir. Flips Class Certification in Seeligson Suit
DJ KHALED: Faces Class Suit as Endorser of Crypto Scam

EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Appeal in 401(k) Plan-Related Suit Ongoing
EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Appeal in Securities Class Suit Underway
EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Faces 102 Suits Related to Thomas Fire
EMERY FEDERAL: Court Approves $9MM Settlement in Palombaro Suit
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Awaits Court Decision on Plaintiffs' Appeal

EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Bewley Suit Underway in District of New Jersey
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Claims in EpiPen ERISA Suit Narrowed
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Continues to Defend Beeman Suit
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Multiple Suits Related to Cigna Merger Underway
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Prescott Suit Underway in Dist. of New Jersey

EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Still Defends Securities Class Suit
F.H. CANN: Cosar Sues over Wrongful Debt Collection Practices
FACEBOOK INC: Juggling GBP500,000 Fine for Analytica Scandal
FACEBOOK INC: Wants Cambridge Analytica Class Action Tossed
FIRST RATE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Esparza de Perez Alleges

FORD MOTOR: Removes Payne Suit to Northern District of Ohio
FOUR SEASONS: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Mechanics, Perez Claims
FREDDIE MAC: Continues to Defend Jacobs and Hindes Suit
FREDDIE MAC: Suit Over Preferred Stock Purchase Deal Ongoing
FRITO-LAY INC: Sanchez Deal Prelim Approval Hearing Moved to Dec. 4

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Mahar Class Suit Underway
GENERAL ELETRIC: Bid to Dismiss 401(k) Plan-Related Suit Denied
GENWORTH FINANCIAL: Unit Faces TVPX ARX INC. Suit in Virginia
GMS REST: Pinguil Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay under FLSA
GOOGLE INC: Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Settlement Dispute

GOOGLE LLC: Weeks et al Seek to Certify Class
HAIN CELESTIAL: Faces Class Action Over Alba Botanica Sunscreen
HAIN CELESTIAL: Removes Lindquist et al. Suit to N.D. California
HERTZ TRANSPORTING: Class Certification Denied Without Prejudice
HOLLINGSWORTH LOGISTICS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Laqui Claims

HOLY SMOKE: Class Action Status Sought for Lawsuit
HONDA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Vehicle CVT Problems
HONEYWELL INT'L: Jan. 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
HOSOPO CORP: Loses Bid to Dismiss Keifer TCPA Suit
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: Dziura Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law

HUNTER TERRELL: Hernandez Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
INDIA GLOBALIZATION: Jan. 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Awaits Court OK on Bid to Dismiss Suit
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: Appeal in NY ERISA Suit Still Pending
JOHN HANCOCK: Faces Davydov Suit in Southern District of New York

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Arbitration in Remicade Antitrust Suit Junked
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Contact Lens-Related Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Glucose Test Strips Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Plaintiffs Refile Class Suit in Illinois
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Settlement in Blood Reagent Granted Initial OK

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Suits over Ethicon Pelvic Mesh Devices Pending
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: XARELTO Suit in Louisiana Court Still Ongoing
JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Grants Revised Settlement in FX-Related Suit
JPMORGAN CHASE: Seeks Initial Approval of Interchange Case Accord
JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Class Plaintiffs Can File Over-Length Motions

KPMG LLP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Jones Suit
LANDERS MCLARTY: Court Narrows Claims in Wilson Suit
LEGACY PARTNERS: Underpays Maintenance Technicians, Suit Says
LEGACY RESERVES: Court Approves Doppelt Settlement in Full
LJM PARTNERS: Owes for 80% Loss to Fund, Class Suit Says

LOUISIANA: Class Action Lawsuit Seeks Compensation
MARCUS & MILLICHAP: Cox Suit Remanded to State Court
MASSACHUSETTS: Trial Court Sued over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
MATIMEX CORPORATION: Walsh Sues over Unwanted Text Messages
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Unit Faces Cantrell Class Suit in Texas

MDL 1720: Approval of New Interchange Fee Case Settlement Pushed
MDL 2724: Court Disposes of Group 1 Dismissal Bids
MDL 2862: Emma vs. BASF AG et al. over Isocyanate Sales Moved
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER: Johnson Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
MONITRONICS INT'L: Pays Remaining $23,000,000 in Telemarketing Suit

MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Kathryn Hill Sues over Herbicide Roundup Sales
MSG HOLDINGS: Fraticelli FLSA/NYLL Suit Settlement Has Approval
NESTLE USA: Coffee-mate Has Unsafe Additive, Beasley Claims
NOBLE HOUSE: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Holt Suit

NOBLES COUNTY, MN: Making Unlawful Immigrant Arrests, Judge Rules
OKLAHOMA: Lawsuit Targets Medical Marijuana Registration
P.A.M. TRANSPORT: Bid to Strike Offer of Judgment in Browne Denied
PANERA BREAD: FLSA & DCMWA Classes in Meyer Conditionally Certified
PBF ENERGY: Continues to Defend Goldstein Class Action

PBF ENERGY: Faces Class Action by Michelle & Jim Kendig
PEACEHEALTH: Sued for Allegedly Overbilling Medicare Patients
POINT BLANK: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
PROVIDENT CAPITAL: Court Approves $28.5MM Class Action Settlement
RAYMOND JAMES: Judge Grants Former Client's Lawsuit Class Status

REMINGTON: Settlement in Class Suit Will Replace Defective Trigger
RIPPLE LABS: Consolidated Class Action Moves to Federal Court
SACRAMENTO CTY, CA: Protective Order Issued in Mays Prisoners Suit
SIERRA TRADING: Chen Suit Moved to Western District of Washington
SKAGIT REGIONAL: Faces McLean and Range Suit in W.D. Washington

SONIC CORP: Patrick Balks at Inspire Brands Merger Deal
SONY CORP: Supreme Court to Hear Antitrust Case on Dec. 11
SPAR GROUP: Clothier Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
ST. JOSEPHS: Court Approves $11.9MM Settlement
STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Henry Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections

STUCKY LAUER: Court Approves Settlement in Maloy FDCPA Suit
SUUNTO: Settles Class-Action Lawsuit for Certain Dive Computers
TENNESSEE: Prelim Injunction Bid in Robinson Suit Partly Okayed
TESLA INC: Class Action Settlement Obtains Final Court Okay
TEXAS: 5th Cir. Vacates Certification of 2 Classes in J. Ward Suit

TRANS EXPRESS: Fails to Pay OT to Drivers, Simmons Suit Claims
TRUNKETT & TRUNKETT: Wins Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
ULTRA SONIC: Underpays Car Wash Attendants, Blanco et al. Claim
UNITED KINGDOM: Court Rules in Favor of PSNI, Police Authority
UNITED STATES: Veterans File Class Action Over Benefits

UNLIMITED HEIGHTS: Govantes Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
US EDUC DEPARTMENT: Secretary Faces Quero et al. Suit in S.D.N.Y.
US METALS: Court Denies Filing of 2nd Amended Duarte Suit
VALLEY BROOK, OK: Attorneys File Class Action Lawsuit
VERMYCK LLC: Gomes et al. Sue over Rental Tax Incentives

WINS FINANCE: Opposition to Desta Class Cert. Bid Due Dec. 1
YMCA: Class Action Over Evictions Thwarted by Missing Agreement
ZOAN MANAGEMENT: Or. High Court Remands Arbitration Matters
[*] ALRC Chief Takes Aim at "Trafficking" of Class Actions
[*] IMF Bentham to Fund Property Owners' Cladding Class Action

[*] JND Bags Settlement Service Contracts with Federal Agencies
[*] Langlois Lawyer Discusses Steps to Minimize Privacy Class Suit
[*] Opting Out of Class Action Makes More Sense in Some Situations
[*] US Chamber of Commerce Urges Reform for Securities Law

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $29MM Aearo-Related Costs at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Accrues $600MM for Respirator Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Still Faces 2,255 Claimants at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5th Cir. Dismisses Williams Consolidated Appeals
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carlisle Cos. Still Faces Claims at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had $54.6MM Accrued Liability at Sept. 28
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had 16,269 Unresolved Claims at Sept. 28
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Equity LifeStyle, DAs Still in Talks at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll-Rand Had $561MM Liabilities at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lopez P.I. Claims vs. McDermott Dismissed

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Michel P.I. Suit Remains in District Court
ASBESTOS UPDATE: MSA Safety Unit Has 1,517 Exposure Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Norfolk Southern Still Defends Asbestosis Claims


                            *********

212 SERVICES: Sanchez-Marin Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
ELVIA SANCHEZ-MARIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. 212 SERVICES, LLC and
ADESANOLA OLADIRAN, as an individual, Case 1:18-cv-06050-DLI-SJB
(E.D.N.Y., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks compensatory damages and
liquidated damages in an amount exceeding $100,000.00, interest,
attorneys' fees, costs, and all other legal and equitable remedies
this Court deems appropriate, as a result of Defendants violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal and New York State
labor laws.

According to the complaint, although Plaintiff worked approximately
90 or more per week during her employment by Defendants from in or
around March 2017 until in or around April 2018, the Defendants did
not pay Plaintiff time and a half (1.5) for hours worked over 40, a
blatant violation of the overtime provisions contained in the FLSA
and NYLL. The Defendants willfully failed to post notices of the
minimum wage and overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous place
at the location of their employment as required by both the NYLL
and the FLSA, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Roman Avshalomuv, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          69-12 Austin Street
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598

AARGON AGENCY: Stone Class Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminarily
Approving Class Action Settlement in the case captioned Gregory
Love Stone, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Aargon Agency, Inc., d/b/a Aargon Collection Agency,
Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-02314-KMM. (D. Minn.).

The Court, having held a Final Approval hearing, notice of the
hearing having been duly given in accordance with this Court's
Order (1) Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement, (2)
Approving Class Action Notice, (3) Certifying a Settlement Class,
(4) Appointing Class Counsel and a Class Representative, and (5)
Setting Final Approval Hearing (Preliminary Approval Order), and
having considered all matters submitted to it at the Final Approval
Hearing and otherwise, and finding no just reason for delay in
entry of this Final Approval Order and good cause appearing
therefore,

The Court finally approves the Settlement and finds that the terms
constitute, in all respects, a fair, reasonable, and adequate
settlement as to all Settlement Class Members in accordance with
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court finally certifies the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes. The Court finds for settlement purposes that the Action
satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Court approves the plan of distribution for the Settlement
Award as set forth in the Agreement. The Settlement Administrator
is ordered to comply with the terms of the Agreement with respect
to distribution of Settlement Awards, and the disposition of any
remaining funds thereafter. Should any remaining funds be
distributed, the Court approves the University of Minnesota Law
School Consumer Law Clinic as the cy pres recipient.

This Court dismisses this Action, with prejudice, without costs to
any Party, except as expressly provided for in the Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc93pkou from Leagle.com.

Gregory Love Stone, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam R. Strauss, Tarshish Cody,
PLC, Scott Matthew Cody, Tarshish Cody, PLC & Thomas J. Lyons, Jr.
, Consumer Justice Center P.A.

Aargon Agency, Inc., doing business as Aargon Collection Agency,
Defendant, represented by Christopher R. Morris --
cmorris@bassford.com -- Bassford Remele, Jessica L. Klander --
jklander@bassford.com -- Bassford Remele & Michael A. Klutho --
mklutho@bassford.com -- Bassford Remele.


ABC CORPORATION: Rubi et al. Seek Unpaid Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSE RUBI, EDUAR ALMENDAREZ, and REYNALDO REYES, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. "ABC
CORPORATION" D/B/A RIVER HOUSE GRILLE, name of the corporation
being fictitious and unknown to Plaintiffs, and GENNARO VILLANI and
ANTHONY VILLANI, as individuals, the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-06040-JMA-AKT (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks compensatory
damages and liquidated damages in an amount exceeding $100,000.00,
interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all other legal and equitable
remedies this Court deems appropriate, as a result of Defendants'
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal and New
York State labor laws.

According to the complaint, although the Plaintiff worked
approximately 78 hours per week from in or around April 2013 until
in or around October 2015, during his employment with Defendants,
they did not pay Plaintiff 1.5 times for hours worked over 40, a
blatant violation of the overtime provisions contained in the FLSA
and NYLL.  Furthermore, although Plaintiff worked approximately 13
or more hours per day. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff an extra
hour at the legally prescribed minimum wage for each day worked
over 10 hours, a blatant violation of the spread of hours
provisions contained in the NYLL.

ABC Corporation manufactures and markets housekeeping, janitorial,
and engineering products for the cleaning industry.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Roman Avshalomuv, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          69-12 Austin Street
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598


ADVANCED MICRO: Bid to Dismiss Kim Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 29, 2018, that company is
awaiting a ruling on its motion to dismiss the Kim et al. v. AMD,
et al. class action complaint.

On January 16, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit captioned Kim
et al. v. AMD, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-00321 was filed against the
Company in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.

The complaint purports to assert claims against the Company and
certain individual officers for alleged violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act. The plaintiff seeks to represent a proposed class of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common
stock during the period February 21, 2017 through January 11, 2018.


The complaint seeks damages allegedly caused by alleged materially
misleading statements and/or material omissions by the Company and
the individual officers regarding a security vulnerability
(Spectre), which statements and omissions, the plaintiff claims,
allegedly caused the Company's common stock price to be
artificially inflated during the purported class period. The
complaint seeks unspecified compensatory damages, attorneys' fees
and costs.

On August 3, 2018, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with
similar allegations and shortening the class period to June 29,
2017 through January 11, 2018. The Company filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims on September 25, 2018.

Based upon information presently known to management, the Company
believes that the potential liability, if any, will not have a
material adverse effect on its financial condition, cash flows or
results of operations.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. It operates in two segments, Computing and Graphics; and
Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


AIR CANADA: Supreme Court Clears Way for Class-Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Reynolds, writing for The Globe And Mail, reports that
the Supreme Court of Canada has cleared the way for a class-action
lawsuit against Air Canada and British Airways to proceed by
dismissing an appeal by Canada's largest airline.

Air Canada had sought to overturn a 2017 Ontario Court of Appeal
ruling that provincial courts could hear the class-action case even
though it includes foreign claimants.

The decade-old lawsuit from three companies alleges price fixing on
international cargo shipments by major airlines between 2000 and
2006.

Linda Visser, Esq. -- linda.visser@siskinds.com -- a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, says they have reached settlements totalling more than
$29-million with all 14 defendants except Air Canada and British
Airways.

"From an access to justice perspective it's a significant decision,
because there are few jurisdictions that actually have class action
regimes. And often these types of claims are not economical to
bring on an individual basis," Visser said.

The lawsuit involves up to tens of thousands of class members, many
of them exporters and freight forwarders that handle shipments
ranging from flowers to fruits to zoo animals, she said.

The plaintiffs are Ontario's Airia Brands Inc., Britain's
StarTech.com Ltd. and Germany's Quick Cargo Service.

Air Canada declined to comment, saying the case is before the
courts.

"The case confirms that the Ontario courts are a place where
foreign claimants from around the world can come and start class
actions," said Ranjan Agarwal, Esq. -- agarwalr@bennettjones.com --
a class-action defence lawyer at Bennett Jones.

"It's been going on a long time, and it could still go on a lot
longer. But now that the defendants have lost their big fight over
jurisdiction, and given that the case has been certified" --
green-lighted by a lower court judge -- "most people would believe
that this would lead to a settlement."

In 2012, Air Canada paid $8-million in a U.S. class-action
settlement agreement following allegations of anti-competitive air
freight pricing, though the company did not admit liability.

In March 2017, the European Commission fined Air Canada $30-million
-- 11 airlines were fined about $1.2-billion in total -- for
allegedly running a price-fixing cartel on cargo fuel and security
surcharges between 1999 and 2006.

An appeal to the General Court of the European Union is pending.

Investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice and Canada's
Competition Bureau into alleged price fixing wrapped up without
charges.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, Air Canada had set aside $17-million "relating
to outstanding claims," according to a management document on the
company's finances.

"This provision is an estimate based upon the status of
investigations and proceedings at this time and Air Canada's
assessment as to the potential outcome for certain of them," the
document states.

October 25 dismissal by the Supreme Court orders Air Canada and
British Airways to pay the three respondents' costs.

Of the defendants that have settled, Air France -- KLM and Deutsche
Lufthansa AG paid the most, shelling out $6.5 million and $6.2
million respectively, according to Siskinds law firm, which
represents the plaintiffs.

Appeal court justice Sarah Pepall's ruling from October of last
year states Ontario courts have jurisdiction in the class action
because there is a "substantial connection" between the claims and
the province and the "absent foreign claimants" share "common
issues" with the plaintiffs. [GN]


ALABAMA: Court Clarifies ADOC Staffing Increases in Remedial Order
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, Northern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion for Clarification in the case captioned EDWARD
BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections,
et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 2:14cv601-MHT. (M.D. Ala.).

At the contempt hearing, the defendants orally moved for
clarification as to what staffing increases the remedial order
required.

The Plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit include a group of
mentally ill prisoners in the custody of ADOC. Defendants are
Alabama Department of Correction (ADOC) Commissioner Jefferson Dunn
and ADOC Associate Commissioner of Health Services Ruth Naglich,
who are both sued in only their official capacities. This court
found that ADOC's mental-health care for prisoners in its custody
was, simply put, horrendously inadequate.

The court issued an Understaffing Remedial Order that established
deadlines by which the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) was
to increase its mental-health staffing.  Subsequently, in a motion
to require defendants to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt, plaintiffs alleged that defendants have failed to meet
these deadlines.

The dispositive question here is what staffing increases the
Understaffing Remedial Order required defendants to make by the
third deadline.

The Plaintiffs contend that the contract and court order require
263.2 FTE (full-time equivalent) mental-health staff by July 1,
2018. The route to this conclusion is straightforward. The contract
mentioned in the order refers to the Healthcare Services Agreement
that ADOC signed with its vendor Wexford Health Sources, Inc. for
the latter to provide healthcare services to inmates in ADOC's
custody. This contract expressly incorporates the Request for
Proposal for Comprehensive Inmate Healthcare Services (RFP) issued
by ADOC in July 2017, pursuant to which ADOC ultimately selected
Wexford.   

Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, the order to "fill the
mental-health staffing positions consistent with the contract"
meant that defendants had to ensure that all 263.2 mental-health
FTEs, by position types and locations as set forth in Appendix F,
were filled by July 1, 2018.

By contrast, defendants invoke a staffing paybacks provision in the
contract to argue that the order did not require them to fill all
of the 263.2 mental-health FTEs by July 1, 2018. Under the
staffing-paybacks provision, Wexford must pay a penalty to ADOC if
it fails to fill at an 85 % rate certain staff positions enumerated
in the Minimum Staffing Requirements. Defendants claim that the 85
% threshold for triggering penalties on their vendor Wexford means
that the order does not require filling 100 % of the 263.2
mental-health FTEs.

The Plaintiffs' interpretation is correct and defendants' is
unreasonable.

The Order Requires Defendants to Ensure that All of the
Mental-Health Positions Are Filled

To start, a plain reading of the term Minimum Staffing Requirements
in the contract shows that the order requires filling all 263.2
FTEs listed for the 25 positions. As discussed above, Appendix F of
the contract, titled Minimum Staffing Requirements, ists how many
FTE staff for each of the 25 positions must be placed at the
central office and each facility. The word minimum means the
smallest acceptable or possible quantity in a given case. The word
requirement" means something that must be done an imperative
command.

Therefore, by providing in the Minimum Staffing Requirements the
specific numbers of FTEs needed for each position at each facility,
the contract creates an imperative command that the number of FTEs
listed for each position at each facility amounting in total to
263.2 FTEs is the smallest acceptable  quantity of FTEs. Failing to
fill all 263.2 of the FTEs listed for the 25 types of positions is
unacceptable.

Perhaps more importantly, defendants' argument that the staffing
payback provision's 85 % threshold means that the order requires
less than 100 % and as low as 85 % of the 263.2 FTEs to be filled
conflicts in two fundamental ways with how the contract says the
staffing-payback provision actually functions.

First, the contract establishes that payback penalties are imposed
based on whether the required FTEs for a particular position at a
particular facility are filled at an 85 % rate during a set period,
not on whether globally 85 % of all 263.2 FTEs are filled.  

Second, the contract explicitly states and Associate Commissioner
Naglich confirmed that whether Wexford meets the 85 % threshold is
calculated based on the number of hours worked during a period, not
the number of FTE staff that are employed to fill the positions at
each facility. This fact is fatal to defendants' argument: the
order to fill the mental-health staffing positions consistent with
the contract" cannot mean to fill 85 % of the FTEs required for the
25 types of positions, given that the contract's 85 % threshold
refers to the percentage of hours worked, not the percentage of
required staff that is employed.

To summarize, defendants' contention that the order to fill the
mental-health staffing positions consistent with the contract
allows Wexford to fill fewer than 263.2 FTEs is belied by a plain
reading of the term Minimum Staffing Requirements in the contract,
as well as the fact that the contract provides and Naglich
confirmed that the 85 % threshold (1) is assessed on a
position-by-position rather than global basis and (2) measures
hours worked not the number of FTE staff that are employed to fill
the positions at each facility.

Accordingly, the court formally declares that the Understaffing
Remedial Order required that, by July 1, 2018, defendants were to
have filled all 263.2 of the mental-health FTEs.

Measuring Compliance

The next question is how to determine whether all 263.2
mental-health FTEs for the 25 types of positions are filled, in
compliance with the order.  

First, in assessing compliance, the inquiry is not whether 263.2
mental-health FTEs of any kind are employed; rather, it is whether
the FTE requirements for each position at each facility are met. In
other words, defendants are not in compliance if Wexford employs
263.2 FTE mental-health clerks. To comply, Wexford must employ 0.50
FTE psychiatrists and 2.80 FTE licensed MHPs at the Easterling
facility, and 2.0 FTE observers for the Bibb facility, and so
forth, as enumerated by the Minimum Staffing Requirements.

Second, determining whether Wexford employs all 263.2 FTEs is not a
head count, that is, does not mean 263.2 individual employees.
Instead, the contract indicates that one FTE equals 40 hours worked
per week. Therefore, to determine whether Wexford is employing the
2.0 FTE psychiatrists at the Bullock facility (excluding
outpatient) that the contract requires, the court assesses whether,
adding together all the hours per week (or month) specified in
Wexford's contracts with psychiatrists hired to work at Bullock,
they amount to 2.0 FTEs.  That is, the court evaluates whether
Wexford has entered into contracts with psychiatrists to work at
Bullock 80 (2 x 40) hours per week, or 320 (2 x 160) hours per
month, etc., depending on what the appropriate measuring time
period is.

Accordingly, the Court ordered that the defendants' oral motion to
clarify, made in open court on September 19, 2018, is granted to
the extent that it is declared that the Phase 2A Understaffing
Remedial Order and the ADOC contract referred to in it required
that defendants were to ensure that all 263.2 mental-health FTEs
listed in the contract's minimum staffing requirements were filled
by July 1, 2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 29, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yan92852 from
Leagle.com.

Edward Braggs, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Tedrick Brooks, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Gary Lee Broyles, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Chandler Clements, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Christopher Gilbert, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Dwight Hagood, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Sylvester
Hartley, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Christopher Jackson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Brandon Johnson, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, John Maner, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Rick Martin, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Willie McClendon, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Roger McCoy, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Jermaine Mitchell, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Tommie Moore,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Matthew
Mork, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Bradley Pearson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Leviticus Pruitt, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Turner Rogers, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Timothy Sears, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Brian Sellers, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Augustus Smith, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Hubert Tollar, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Daniel Tooley, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Joseph Torres,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Donald Ray
Turner, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Jamie Wallace, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Robert Myniasha Williams, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Roger Moseley, Quang Bui, Charlie
Henderson, Sheila Allen, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, William Sullivan, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Serena English, Valerie Wheeler, Justin
Hall, Raymond Bosarge, Cordara Dunner, Karen Norris, Cherritha
Harris, Brittany Ellis & Tomas Snyder, Plaintiffs, represented by
Andrew Philip Walsh -- awalsh@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard Cohen --
Richard.cohen@splcenter.org -- Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha
Lanette McCrary -- Latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org -- Southern
Poverty Law Center, Maria Viette Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter -- pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com --
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C.
Brownstein -- Rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org -- Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III --
wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr. -- wvanderpoljr@adap.ua.edu --
Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.  

Ruth Naglich, in her official capacity as Associate commissioner of
health Services for the Alabama Department of Corrections &
Jefferson S. Dunn, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendants, represented by David
Randall Boyd -- dboyd@balch.com -- Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth
Anne Sees, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Division, John
Garland Smith -- jgsmith@balch.com -- Balch & Bingham LLP, Joseph
Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of Corrections, Luther Maxwell
Dorr, Jr. -- rdorr@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
P.C., Matthew Reeves -- mreeves@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper
& Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah -- mshah@maynardcooper.com --
Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, Steven C. Corhern -- scorhern@balch.com
-- Balch & Bingham, William Richard Lunsford --
blunsford@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Alyson Lee
Smith -- asmith@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Gary
Lee Willford, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections Legal
Division, Melissa K. Marler -- mmarler@maynardcooper.com --
Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Melissa Neri -- mneri@maynardcooper.com
-- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, pro hac vice & Stephen Clarence Rogers
-- srogers@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper and Gale PC.


ALDEN SHOE: Website Not Accessible, Figueroa Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSE FIGUEROA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. ALDEN SHOE COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-05942 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 24, 2018) alleges violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act

The Plaintiff allege in the complaint that the Defendants' failed
to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website,
www.aldenshoe.com and www.aldenmadison.com, to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons. The Defendants' denial of full and equal
access to its website, and therefore denial of its products and
services offered thereby and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Alden Shoe Company, Inc. designs and manufactures men's shoes and
orthopedic shoes in New England. It offers moccasins, oxfords,
slip-ons, flex welts, walkers, and dress casual footwear, as well
factory restoration service kits. The company also provides
accessories, such as belts, leather products, and shoe care
products. It sells its products through retail stores and dealers
in North America, Europe, and the Asia Pacific, as well as directly
to consumers. Alden Shoe Company, Inc. was founded in 1884 and is
based in Lakeville, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
          SHALOM LAW, PLLC
          124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 971-9474
          Facsimile: (718) 865-0943
          E-mail: Jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


ALLERGAN PLC: All Claims in Botox(R) Litigation Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that a court has dismissed with
prejudice all claims against Allergan in Botox(R) Litigation.

A class action complaint was filed in federal court in California
on February 24, 2015, and amended May 29, 2015, alleging unlawful
market allocation in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 1, agreement in restraint of trade in violation of
15 U.S.C. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, unlawful maintenance of
monopoly market power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, violations of California's
Cartwright Act, Section 16700 et seq. of Calif. Bus. and Prof.
Code, and violations of California's unfair competition law,
Section 17200 et seq. of Calif. Bus. and Prof. Code. In the
complaint, plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of treble damages.
  

On November 30, 2017, the parties reached a tentative settlement.
On March 8, 2018, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of class action settlement and set a final
fairness hearing for August 24, 2018. On August 27, 2018, the court
granted plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of class
settlement. On September 10, 2018, the court dismissed with
prejudice all claims against Allergan.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Appeal Pending in Massachusetts Celexa/Lexapro Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that plaintiffs appeal in
Celexa(R)/Lexapro(R) Class Actions, is still pending.

Forest and certain of its affiliates were named as defendants in
multiple federal court actions relating to the promotion of
Celexa(R) and/or Lexapro(R) all of which were consolidated in the
Celexa(R)/Lexapro(R) MDL proceeding in the federal district court
in Massachusetts.

Actions were filed in the federal district courts in Minnesota and
Washington in November 2013 and August 2014, respectively, seeking
to certify a nationwide class of third-party payor entities and
consumers that purchased Celexa(R) and Lexapro(R) for pediatric
use.

The complaints each assert claims under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, alleging that
Forest engaged in an off-label marketing scheme and paid illegal
kickbacks to physicians to induce prescriptions of Celexa(R) and
Lexapro(R).  

The court denied both plaintiffs' class certification motions and
entered summary judgment in favor of the Company in both actions.
Plaintiffs in both cases have filed a Notice of Appeal of the
summary judgment order and the order denying class certification.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Asacol Litigation Remanded to Massachusetts Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the appellate court in
Asacol(R) Litigation, issued its decision reversing the lower
court's decision on class certification and remanding the case back
to the Massachusetts federal district court.

Two class action complaints were filed on June 22, 2015, and three
more on September 21, 2015, in federal court in Massachusetts on
behalf of a putative class of indirect purchasers. Complaints were
also filed on behalf of a putative class of direct purchasers of
Asacol(R) making similar allegations to the complaints filed by the
indirect purchaser plaintiffs.  

Those matters have been consolidated with the indirect purchaser
cases. In each complaint plaintiffs allege that they paid higher
prices for Warner Chilcott's Asacol(R) HD and Delzicol(R) products
as a result of Warner Chilcott's alleged actions preventing or
delaying generic competition in the market for Warner Chilcott's
older Asacol(R) product in violation of U.S. federal antitrust laws
and/or state laws.

Plaintiffs seek unspecified injunctive relief, treble damages
and/or attorneys' fees.  

The Company has settled the claims brought by the direct purchaser
plaintiffs. The court granted the indirect purchaser plaintiffs'
motion for class certification. The Company filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal of the indirect purchaser
plaintiffs' claims which the court denied on November 9, 2017.    

Trial was set to being on January 22, 2018. However, on January 17,
2018, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued an order
granting the Company's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f) to appeal
the district court's decision to certify the proposed class. The
appellate court thereafter issued a decision staying the trial in
the district court.  

On October 15, 2018, the appellate court issued its decision
reversing the lower court's decision on class certification and
remanding the case back to the district court.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Bid to Dismiss Suit vs. Warner Chilcott Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the motion to dismiss in
Warner Chilcott Marketing Practices Litigation is pending.

On February 13, 2018, a class action complaint was filed against
Warner Chilcott and certain of its affiliates in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. The Complaint asserts
claims under the federal RICO statute, violations of number of
state consumer protection statutes, common law fraud, and unjust
enrichment with respect to the sale and marketing of certain
products.

The complaint seeks to certify a nationwide class of private payer
entities, or their assignees, that paid Medicare benefits on behalf
of their beneficiaries. On April 9, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint, adding certain other Allergan subsidiaries as
defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint on June 11, 2018.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.

ALLERGAN PLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss in Restasis(R) Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that a New York court has denied
the company's motion to dismiss in Restasis(R) Class Action
Litigation.  

Between November 7, 2017, and February 26, 2018, 17 putative class
actions were filed in federal district courts against Allergan
alleging that the company unlawfully harmed competition by engaging
in conduct to delay the market entry of generic versions of
Restasis(R).  

Twelve of the complaints were filed on behalf of putative classes
of end-payors, and five were filed on behalf of putative classes of
direct purchasers. One direct purchaser complaint and two end-payor
complaints were later voluntarily dismissed.   

The cases have all been consolidated in a multidistrict litigation
in the federal court in the Eastern District of New York. The
complaints challenge Allergan(R)s conduct in prosecuting and
obtaining patents covering Restasis(R), listing those patents in
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) Orange Book,
asserting those patents against potential generic competitors in
patent-infringement litigation, filing citizens petitions with the
FDA concerning generic companies' drug applications for generic
Restasis(R), and transferring patents to the sovereign Native
American Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.  

Both the end-payors and the direct purchasers allege that these
actions violated federal antitrust laws, and the end-payors further
allege violations of state antitrust and consumer-protection laws
and unjust enrichment. All plaintiffs seek damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.   Plaintiffs have filed a
consolidated amended complaint which the Company has since moved to
dismiss. On September 18, 2018, the court denied Allergan's motion
to dismiss the complaint.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss ERISA Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that a court has granted the
Company's motion to dismiss the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) complaint in its entirety in Generic Drug Pricing
Securities and ERISA Litigation.

On November 4, 2016, a class action was filed by a putative class
of Allergan shareholders in federal court in California against the
Company and certain of its current and former officers alleging
that the Company and certain of its current and former officers
made materially false and misleading statements.  

Additional similar class action complaints and one complaint by an
individual defendant have been filed and these cases have been
consolidated in the federal district court in New Jersey.  The
complaints allege generally that between February 2014 and November
2016, Allergan and certain of its officers made materially false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's internal controls
over its financial reporting and failed to disclose that its
Actavis generics unit had engaged in illegal, anticompetitive
price-fixing with its generic industry peers.  

The complaint seeks unspecified monetary damages. After the Company
filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs filed a second amended
consolidated complaint on November 28, 2017.  The Company's motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint, filed on January 22, 2018,
is still pending. A complaint was filed in California state court,
premised on the same underlying allegations, by an individual
opt-out plaintiff on February 2, 2018. Two complaints were filed,
one in the federal district court in California and one in the
federal district court in New Jersey, that are premised on the same
alleged underlying conduct that is at issue in the securities
litigation but that assert claims under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). These complaints also have
been consolidated in the district court in New Jersey.   

The ERISA complaints assert claims on behalf of a putative class of
individuals who participated in the Company's retirement plans and
seek an unspecified amount of damages and other injunctive relief.
On October 23, 2017, the ERISA litigation Plaintiffs filed an
amended consolidated complaint which the Company moved to dismiss
on February 2, 2018.  Only July 3, 2018, the court granted the
Company's motion to dismiss the ERISA complaint in its entirety.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Discovery Still Ongoing in Loestrin(R) 24 Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties in Loestrin(R) 24
Litigation are currently engaged in discovery.

On April 5, 2013, two putative class actions were filed on behalf
of putative classes of end-payors in the federal district court
against Warner Chilcott and certain affiliates alleging that Warner
Chilcott's 2009 patent lawsuit settlements with Watson Laboratories
and Lupin related to Loestrin(R) 24 Fe were unlawful.

The complaints generally allege that Watson and Lupin improperly
delayed launching generic versions of Loestrin(R) 24 in exchange
for substantial payments from Warner Chilcott in violation of
federal and state antitrust and consumer protection laws.

The complaints each seek declaratory and injunctive relief and
damages. Additional complaints making the same types of allegations
have been filed by different plaintiffs, including a class of
direct payors and by direct purchasers in their individual
capacities.   

All the cases have been consolidated in the federal court for the
District of Rhode Island. The parties are currently engaged in
discovery.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Still Defends Namenda(R) Litigation
-------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the company still defends
itself from the Namenda(R) Litigation.

In September 2014, the State of New York, through the Office of the
Attorney General of the State of New York, filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
alleging that Forest was acting to prevent or delay generic
competition to Forest's immediate-release product Namenda(R) in
violation of federal and New York antitrust laws and committed
other fraudulent acts in connection with its commercial plans for
Namenda(R) XR.

The district court granted the state's motion for a preliminary
injunction which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Forest and the New York Attorney General reached a
settlement on November 24, 2015.

On May 29, 2015, a putative class action was filed on behalf of a
class of direct purchasers in the federal district court in New
York. Since that time, additional complaints have been filed on
behalf of putative classes of direct and indirect purchasers.

The class action complaints make claims similar to those asserted
by the New York Attorney General and also include claims that
Namenda(R) patent litigation settlements between Forest and generic
companies also violated the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment on two of the counts of their complaint.    

The Court granted plaintiffs' motion in part as to the collateral
estoppel effect of a prior finding of anti-competitive conduct and
denied the motions on whether the Company's obtaining pediatric
exclusivity was anti-competitive conduct. On August 2, 2018, the
court denied the Company's motion for summary judgment.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. It operates through
US Specialized Therapeutics, US General Medicine, and International
segments. Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in
Dublin, Ireland.


AMERICAN AIRLINES: Settles Travelers' Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
ABC5 Eyewitness reports that if you have flown a major airline in
the past seven years, you could be cashing in as part of a
lawsuit.

The class action lawsuit was filed against American, Delta,
Southwest and United, where passengers allege the airlines
improperly worked together to limit the number of seats available
on domestic flights to drive up ticket prices.

"I'm not surprised," said Blaine resident Sally Anderson ,who was
leaving from Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport on Nov. 5.
"The airlines are not doing stuff for us to make it more convenient
or more comfortable. They're doing it for the money."

Emails are popping up in passengers' inboxes telling them a
settlement agreement might possibly mean they will get some money
back. A notice of the class action suit is also spreading through
social media outlets.

But even with millions being offered in settlement, the millions of
flyers in the last seven years make a big payday very unlikely.

"It's important to remember there are millions and millions of
people who've flown American Airlines, who have flown Southwest
Airlines" said Charles Moore -- moore@halunenlaw.com -- a class
action attorney with Halunen Law in Minneapolis.

So far, reports say American and Southwest have agreed to pay a
total of $60 million in the settlement, while denying they did
anything wrong. Southwest will pay $15 million. American has agreed
to pay $45 million.

The lawsuits are continuing against Delta and United.

People who purchased flights within the United States from
American, Delta, Southwest, United, Continental or US Airways at
any time between July 1, 2011 and Dec. 20, 2017 for the Southwest
settlement; and between July 1, 2011 and June 14, 2018 for the
American settlement could be eligible.

"And what one individual may recover, it might be somewhat small,"
Moore said.

The website also said it's possible that ticket buyers will never
get any money from the lawsuit.

"After deductions for any attorneys' fees, litigation expenses,
settlement administration expenses, and class representative
incentive awards approved by the Court, the remaining amount will
be distributed to charities, governmental entities or other
beneficiaries approved by the Court," the website states.

In order to get a possible payment, airline passengers will have to
file a claim. However, claims are not being accepted yet. [GN]


AMIGONE FUNERAL: Tonawanda Residents File Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fadia Patterson, writing for Spectrum News Buffalo, reports that
word about Amigone Funeral Home's crematory being back in business
traveled fast.

"You're stuck with staying indoors which I don't think is fair,"
said Robin Stein, who lives close to the business in Tonawanda.

Even faster, according to Paul Siepierski, is the smell of death
leaving the stacks and circulating in the air.

"There are children living in this neighborhood and they this stuff
coming into their lungs."

Residents like Ron Iabuda have complained about the ghastly odor,
difficulty breathing and eye irritation.

Amigone had stopped operating its crematory in 2012, after
neighbors complained of dust and ash. However, in 2014, the
business was sold to a new owner, who set about improving and
modifying its equipment. The company resumed offering cremation
services this past summer.

Now people who live close to the business are filing a class-action
lawsuit against the funeral home, seeking to cease this practice
again.

"They're fighting for their community's health and their quality of
life," said attorney Kevin Stockey, Esq. who represents the
residents.

He said the suit also will challenge New York's law that prevents
grandfathered combinations of funeral homes and crematories from
moving out of residential areas.

"We think the permit that has been issued is unlawful in the sense
that what was grandfathered is 778 bodies a year now we're up over
2,900," he said. "Their grandfather status, in our opinion, has
been violated."

A representative from Amigone said the company has no comment at
this time.

"We're getting rid of Tonawanda Coke and now we're not going to
have someone come in here and turn this neighborhood into 1950s
Lackawanna," Siepierski said. "We have a right to good air."[GN]


ANTHEM INC: Appeals Filed in 9th Cir. after Settlement Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Anthem, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that a number of appeals have
since been filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by
class-member objectors challenging the final approval of a
litigation settlement granted by the U.S. District Court in August
2018.

In February 2015, the company reported that it was the target of a
sophisticated external cyber attack. The attackers gained
unauthorized access to certain of the company's information
technology systems and obtained personal information related to
many individuals and employees, such as names, birth dates,
healthcare identification/social security numbers, street
addresses, email addresses, phone numbers and employment
information, including income data.

To date, there is no evidence that credit card or medical
information, such as claims, test results or diagnostic codes, were
targeted, accessed or obtained, although no assurance can be given
that we will not identify additional information that was accessed
or obtained.

Upon discovery of the cyber attack, the company took immediate
action to remediate the security vulnerability and retained a
cybersecurity firm to evaluate its systems and identify solutions
based on the evolving landscape. The company have provided credit
monitoring and identity protection services to those who have been
affected by this cyber attack. The company have continued to
implement security enhancements since this incident. The company
have incurred expenses subsequent to the cyber attack to
investigate and remediate this matter and expect to continue to
incur expenses of this nature in the foreseeable future. The
company recognize these expenses in the periods in which they are
incurred.

Federal and state agencies, including state insurance regulators,
state attorneys general, the Health and Human Services, or HHS,
Office of Civil Rights and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are
investigating, or have investigated, events related to the cyber
attack, including how it occurred, its consequences and our
responses. In connection with the resolution of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners' multistate targeted market
conduct and financial exam in December 2016, the company agreed to
provide a customized credit protection program, equivalent to a
credit freeze, for its members who were under the age of eighteen
on January 27, 2015.

No fines or penalties were imposed on the company. In October 2018,
the company resolved the investigation by the HHS Office of Civil
Rights. The resolution included a monetary settlement along with an
agreement to a two-year Corrective Action Plan. Additionally, an
ongoing investigation by a multi-state group of Attorneys General
remains outstanding. Although the company is cooperating in these
investigations, the company may be subject to additional fines or
other obligations, which may have an adverse effect on how the
company operates its business and an adverse effect on ouits
results of operations and financial condition.

Civil class actions were filed in various federal and state courts
by current or former members and others seeking damages that they
alleged arose from the cyber-attack. In June 2015, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation entered an order transferring the
consolidated civil actions to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, or the U.S. District Court in a
matter captioned In Re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation.

The parties agreed to settle plaintiffs' claims on a class-wide
basis for a total settlement payment of $115. In August 2017, the
U.S. District Court issued an order of preliminary approval of the
settlement. The U.S. District Court held hearings on plaintiffs'
motion for final approval and class counsel's fee petition in
February and June 2018 and appointed a special master to review
class counsel's fee petition.

Final approval of the settlement was granted by the U.S. District
Court in August 2018.

A number of appeals have since been filed with the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals by class-member objections challenging that
approval, several of which have been resolved. The three state
court cases related to the cyber attack that were proceeding
outside of this multidistrict litigation have been resolved and
dismissed with prejudice.

Anthem said, "We have contingency plans and insurance coverage for
certain expenses and potential liabilities of this nature and will
pursue coverage for all applicable losses; however, the ultimate
outcome of our pursuit of insurance coverage cannot be presently
determined. We intend to vigorously defend the remaining regulatory
actions related to the cyber attack; however, their ultimate
outcome cannot be presently determined."

Anthem, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a health
benefits company in the United States. It operates through three
segments: Commercial & Specialty Business, Government Business, and
Other. Anthem, Inc. was founded in 1944 and is headquartered in
Indianapolis, Indiana.


ANTHEM INC: Still Defends Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Anthem, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend itself from a consolidated class action suit entitled, In Re
Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litigation.

The company is a defendant in a class action lawsuit that was
initially filed in June 2016 against Anthem, Inc. and Express
Scripts, which has been consolidated into a single multi-district
lawsuit captioned In Re Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litigation, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The consolidated complaint was filed by plaintiffs against Express
Scripts and the company on behalf of all persons who are
participants in or beneficiaries of any ERISA or non-ERISA
healthcare plan from December 1, 2009 to the present in which the
company provided prescription drug benefits through the PBM
Agreement with Express Scripts and paid a percentage based
co-insurance payment in the course of using that prescription drug
benefit.

The plaintiffs allege that the company breached its duties, either
under ERISA or with respect to the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in the health plans, (i) by failing to
adequately monitor Express Scripts' pricing under the PBM Agreement
and (ii) by placing the company's own pecuniary interest above the
best interests of the company's insureds by allegedly agreeing to
higher pricing in the PBM Agreement in exchange for the purchase
price for our NextRx PBM business, and (iii) with respect to the
non-ERISA members, by negotiating and entering into the PBM
Agreement with Express Scripts that was allegedly detrimental to
the interests of such non-ERISA members.

Plaintiffs seek to hold the company and Express Scripts jointly and
severally liable and to recover all losses suffered by the proposed
class, equitable relief, disgorgement of alleged ill-gotten gains,
injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs and interest.

In April 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the claims
brought against it, and it was granted, without prejudice, in
January 2018. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which was heard in
October 2018.

Anthem said, "We intend to vigorously defend this suit; however,
its ultimate outcome cannot be presently determined."

Anthem, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a health
benefits company in the United States. It operates through three
segments: Commercial & Specialty Business, Government Business, and
Other. Anthem, Inc. was founded in 1944 and is headquartered in
Indianapolis, Indiana.


ASPIRE MARKETING: Rivera Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------
MISMA RIVERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ASPIRE MARKETING ENTERPRISES, LLC, the
Defendant, Case 0:18-cv-62603-WPD (S.D. Fa., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks
injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, and
statutory damages on behalf of herself and members of the class,
and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from
the illegal actions of Defendant under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant owns and operates a
medical practice that specializes in cosmetic surgery and
procedures. In efforts to inject a new stream of revenue into its
business, Defendant would often send marketing text messages
providing various types of promotional offers and savings for
future purchases of nutritional supplements to consumers without
first obtaining express written consent to send such marketing text
messages as required to do so under the TCPA.  These messages were
sent using mass-automated technology through a third-party company
hired by Defendant to send marketing text messages on its behalf en
masse. In sum, Defendant knowingly and willfully violated the TCPA,
causing injuries to Plaintiff and members of the putative class,
including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI , PLLC.
          110 SE 6th Street
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com


ATLANTIC CREDIT: Vedernikov Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
IGOR VEDERNIKOV, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ATLANTIC CREDIT & FINANCE INC.; MIDLAND
FUNDING LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-15273-MAS-TJB (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Judge Michael A. Shipp and referred to
Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni.

Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. purchases and manages unsecured and
consumer-distressed assets. Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. was
founded in 1996 and is headquartered in Roanoke, Virginia with
branch offices in Roanoke and Richmond, Virginia; and Phoenix,
Arizona. As of August 6, 2014, Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          Stein Saks, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


ATRIUM HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Hurtado Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
RAMIRO HURTADO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ATRIUM HOSPITALITY, L.P.; and DOES 1 to 100,
Defendants, Case No. 18STCV02036 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
Oct. 23, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to
pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit rest
periods, provide accurate wage statements and pay sick days.

The Plaintiff Hurtado was employed by the Defendants as exempt
employee.

Atrium Hospitality LP owns and operates hotels in the United
States. The company was founded in 2015 and is based in Alpharetta,
Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Preston H. Urn, Esq.
          LIM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2350
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 900-3000
          Facsimile: (213)204-3000
          E-mail: phl@limlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Kyle Todd, Esq.
          Shelby Miner, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF KYLE TODD
          1055 West Seventh Street, Suite 1920
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (323) 208-9171
          Facsimile: (323) 693-0822
          E-mail: kyle@kylctodd.com
                  shelby@kyletodd.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Ct. Narrows Claims in 2nd Amended Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part the Plaintiffs' Proposed Second Consolidated Class Action
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) in
the case captioned JAMES CONTANT, et al., the Plaintiffs, v. BANK
OF AMERICA CORPORATION, et al., the Defendants. No. 17 Civ. 3139
(LGS). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs move for leave to file their Proposed Second
Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Proposed Complaint) pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).

The Plaintiffs, a group of individuals and businesses that
purchased foreign exchange (FX) instruments from retail foreign
exchange dealers (Retail Dealers), filed this putative class action
against 18 banks and their affiliates2 seeking injunctive relief
under the Sherman Antitrust Act and damages under certain state
antitrust and consumer protection laws. The Plaintiffs allege that
they paid inflated prices for various financial instruments because
of the Defendants' alleged conspiracy to fix prices in the FX spot
market.

The Proposed Complaint claims that the Defendants' price-fixing
agreements violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; the
state antitrust statutes of Arizona, California, Illinois,
Minnesota, New York and North Carolina and the consumer protection
statutes of California, Florida and Massachusetts.

Sherman Act Claim

The Proposed Complaint's Sherman Act claim once again fails for
lack of Article III standing. The irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements.

The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.

The Plaintiffs assert three arguments why the Proposed Complaint
pleads a sufficient threat of future harm; none are persuasive.

First, the Plaintiffs point to recent developments in government
investigations into the price fixing conspiracy. This argument
fails, because the Government's uncovering of further details with
respect to the the Defendants' past misconduct does not imply that
the misconduct is continuing or likely to recur.

Second, the Plaintiffs argue that allegations that the same market
conditions that facilitated the Conspiracy continue today are
sufficient, because if the Defendants continue to be able to
manipulate FX prices, those the Plaintiffs will continue to be
harmed. This argument assumes without reason that, despite being
caught and punished for manipulating the market, the Defendants
will continue to manipulate the market simply because they
allegedly still can.  

Third, as evidence of an ongoing threat, the Plaintiffs point to a
paragraph in the Proposed Complaint that alleges ongoing regulatory
violations that included failing to segregate client funds, failing
to report FX transactions, failure to report Credit Suisse's short
positions, selling risky investment products to clients, and the
charging of incorrect rates and commissions to FX clients.

But this allegation does not describe an ongoing threat from the
same FX-related misconduct that catalyzed the present lawsuit i.e.,
collusion amongst the Defendants to rig FX benchmarks.

Because the Plaintiffs cannot obtain damages or injunctive relief
under the Sherman Act, their alleged injury is not likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision and leave to amend is
denied.

State Law Claims - Proximate Cause

Proximate cause is required for all of the Plaintiffs' state law
claims, which are unchanged in the Proposed Complaint. Proximate
cause under the rubric of directness is also n effect a requirement
for antitrust standing for at least the California, Illinois and
New York antitrust claims.  

A proximate cause determination does not require a jury to identify
the liable party as the sole cause of harm, it only asks that the
identified cause be a substantial factor in bringing about the
injury. The harm alleged need have only a sufficiently close
connection to the conduct the statute prohibits, proximate
causation does not demand total causation.

Accepting the Proposed Complaint's allegation that retail FX prices
move in nearperfect correlation with FX benchmarks, because FX
benchmarks constitute the predominant component of FX retail
prices, a direct link connects the alleged anticompetitive conduct
and the Plaintiffs' injury; any engineered increase in FX benchmark
rates galvanized an equivalent increase in the price paid by retail
consumers.  

The Defendants argue that the Proposed Complaint does not
sufficiently plead proximate cause or directness because the
Plaintiffs' purchases cannot be traced to the Defendants.

Contrary to the Defendants' argument, these transactions are not
impossible to identify because of the fungible nature of currency.
By mirroring the "Direct Settlement Class" in FOREX, the putative
class in this case does not include the Plaintiffs who purchased
fungible currency notes from a Retail Dealer to use in buying goods
and services. It includes only the Plaintiffs who purchased a
traceable FX instrument from a Retail Dealer. The Proposed
Complaint alleges that every FX instrument the Plaintiffs purchased
from a Retail Dealer is traceable back to a Defendant liquidity
provider, which is plausible given the recordkeeping requirements
imposed on Retail Dealers by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.   

Accordingly, the Proposed Complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs'
losses were proximately caused by, and flowed directly from, the
Defendants' misconduct.

State Law Claims - Due Process Requirements

The Proposed Complaint pleads consumer and antitrust claims under
the law of 8 different states (New York, Arizona, California,
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina), in
each case on behalf of one or more named the Plaintiffs who both
reside in that state and purchased FX instruments in that state,
and on behalf of a putative class of those who purchased an FX
Instrument from a Defendant or co-conspirator in that state and/or
while domiciled in that state.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a state law may
not be applied unless that state has a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.

The Proposed Complaint satisfies these due process requirements by
alleging facts relevant to the first three factors. Factor (d) is
inapplicable because, as alleged, the Plaintiffs did not transact
with the Defendants and had no relationship with them. The Proposed
Complaint alleges that at least one Plaintiff lives in each of the
states in question, and that Plaintiff purchased an FX instrument
while physically located in their respective states of residence.
The Plaintiffs were therefore injured in their home states.  The
Proposed Complaint alleges that the the Defendants each maintain a
significant corporate presence in each of the states.

Accordingly, application of the laws of each Plaintiff's home state
to that Plaintiff's claims comports with due process.  

State-Specific Arguments

The Defendants raise arguments specific to the antitrust laws of
six of the states. For the reasons below, leave to replead the
Florida and Illinois claims is denied with respect to Bank of
America, N.A., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Leave to amend is otherwise granted.
Arizona

The Proposed Complaint asserts a claim under Arizona's Uniform
State Antitrust Act (AUSAA), on behalf of an Arizona resident and
an Arizona putative class. The Defendants argue that the Proposed
Complaint fails to state a claim under the AUSAA, because the
Plaintiffs did not serve Arizona's Attorney General with a copy of
the CCAC contemporaneously with its filing, as required by the
statute.  

Even those courts that have held that service requirements are
substantive, and hence enforceable in federal court, have dismissed
without prejudice to renewal after proper service. The Plaintiffs
have already served the Arizona Attorney General the CCAC, which in
any event was dismissed, and presumably they will timely serve the
new complaint filed pursuant to this Opinion. No reason exists to
deny leave to file an amended complaint that includes the AUSAA
claim.

California

The Proposed Complaint asserts two claims for violation of the
Cartwright Act and California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL),
respectively, on behalf of the California the Plaintiffs and a
California putative class. The Defendants argue that the Proposed
Complaint is deficient as to these claims because it pleads no
specific intrastate conduct within California.

This argument fails because it misstates the law. To state a valid
Cartwright Act or UCL claim, a plaintiff must allege either (1)
that the antitrust misconduct occurred within California or (2)
that the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury in California.  

Here, the Proposed Complaint alleges that the California the
Plaintiffs were injured in California when they purchased
overpriced FX instruments while in California. Accordingly, the
Proposed Complaint's California claims are adequately pleaded.

Florida

The Proposed Complaint pleads a cause of action under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), on behalf of the
Florida residents in the purported class. The Defendants argue that
the Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim under the FDUTPA
because (1) the Plaintiffs are not consumers within the meaning of
the statute and (2) the FDUTPA does not apply to federally
regulated banks. Neither argument merits denial of leave to amend.

Consumers

The Defendants argue that, for purposes of FDUTPA, consumers are
those who purchased goods and services for personal, family or
household use.  

This argument misstates the law.   

FDUTPA defines the terms consumer and trade or commerce as:
"Consumer means an individual; child, by and through its parent or
legal guardian; business; firm; association; joint venture;
partnership; estate; trust; business trust; syndicate; fiduciary;
corporation; any commercial entity, however denominated; or any
other group or combination.Trade or commerce means the advertising,
soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing, whether by sale,
rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, or any property,
whether tangible or intangible, or any other article, commodity, or
thing of value, wherever situated. Trade or commerce shall include
the conduct of any trade or commerce, however denominated,
including any nonprofit or not-for-profit person or activity."

Given these broad definitions, Florida courts have clarified that
the FDUTPA is not limited to contracts for personal, family or
household purposes as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Plaintiffs' purchase of FX instruments falls within these
definitions because the Plaintiffs are individuals, businesses or
associations; and the Plaintiffs purchased FX instruments, which
are, at minimum, a thing of value.

Banking Exception

The Plaintiffs argue that this statutory exception to FDUTPA only
applies where the specific activities at issue were subject to
federal banking laws.

The Parties dispute which the Defendants are banks within the
meaning of the exemption. The Defendants fall into three
categories: (1) three the Defendants are federally chartered
national associations (NAs); (2) twenty-four the Defendants are
bank holding companies (BHCs) or their subsidiaries and (3)
twenty-four the Defendants are foreign banks, foreign banking
organizations or subsidiaries thereof (the Foreign the
Defendants).

All of the NAs are banks within the meaning of the FDUTPA, and the
Plaintiffs concede as much. But ambiguity exists with respect to
what non-NA entities constitute banks for the purposes of the
FDUTPA exemption.  

In light of this definition, and lacking any other, leave to amend
is granted with respect to both the BHCs and the Foreign the
Defendants. Accepting the facts pleaded in the Proposed Complaint,
and drawing all inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor, it is
plausible that the BHCs do not qualify as banks under this
definition because a a substantial part of their business does not
consist of receiving deposits and making loans and discounts or of
exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national
banks. Likewise, it is plausible to infer that some of the Foreign
the Defendants will not qualify as banks because they do not
operate in Florida pursuant to chapter 663.

Determining which, if any, of the BHCs and Foreign the Defendants
qualify as banks will require discovery and need to be resolved at
a later stage. Leave to amend is therefore granted in substantial
part with respect to the FDUTPA claim, except that the Proposed
Complaint shall not include the NAs as the Defendants in the
Florida cause of action.

Illinois

The Proposed Complaint asserts violations of the Illinois Antitrust
Act (IAA), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/1, et seq., on behalf of the
Illinois Plaintiff and an Illinois putative class. The Defendants
argue that the Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim under the
IAA because (1) the IAA does not allow for class actions and (2)
the IAA does not apply to banks. Neither argument merits denial of
leave to amend.

Class Actions

The IAA states, no person shall be authorized to maintain a class
action in any court of this State for indirect purchasers asserting
claims under this Act, with the sole exception of this State's
Attorney General, who may maintain an action parens patriae as
provided in this subsection.

If, as the Defendants argue, this provision is substantive under
the doctrine of Shady Grove, 599 U.S. at 397-406, then it must be
applied in federal court. But if, as the Plaintiffs argue, the
provision is procedural under the doctrine of Shady Grove, 599 U.S.
at 397-406, then only the dictates of Rule 23 would apply. District
courts have reached conflicting conclusions about whether indirect
purchasers' class action claims raised under the IAA in federal
court can proceed.  

For two reasons, the IAA allows for class actions in federal court.
First, it is unnecessary to reach the Shady Grove question, because
the statute, by its terms, does not apply in federal court; the
statute states, no person shall be authorized to maintain a class
action in any court of this Statefor indirect purchasers asserting
claims under this Act.

Second, even if it is necessary to reach the Shady Grove analysis,
the statute is procedural, not substantive, and does not apply in
federal court. In Shady Grove, the New York statute, which the
Supreme Court held to be procedural, stated that an action to
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.

Banking Exemption

The Defendants next argue that they are exempt under the IAA's
banking exemption, which states, No provisions of this Act shall be
construed to make illegal the activities of any state or national
bank to the extent that such activities are regulated or supervised
by officers of the state or federal government under the banking
laws of this State or the United States. It appears that no court
has ever applied the IAA banking exemption as the parties have not
cited any case, nor has the Court found one.

For purposes of interpreting the IAA's banking exemption, this
Opinion uses the definition of national bank from the Illinois
Banking Act (IBA), 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2, which is
specifically referenced in the IAA exemption, i.e., the banking
laws of this State.

Under the IBA, National bank' means a national banking association
without regard to its location. State bank' means any banking
corporation that has a banking charter issued by the Banking
Commissioner of Illinois under this Act.

This reading of the IAA comports with the Illinois Bar Committee's
1967 comments to the IAA exemptions, which state. It is assumed
that all of the provisions of Section 5 will be strictly construed
and narrowly applied. Furthermore, unlike the FDUTPA, which exempts
banks, the IAA exempts any state or national bank. The modifiers
state or national are presumed to carry significance and limit the
definition of bank. Leave to amend is denied with respect to the
NAs, which clearly are within the definition of national bank, but
granted with respect to the BHCs and the Foreign the Defendants.

Massachusetts

The Plaintiffs assert a claim under Chapter 9 of the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), on behalf of the Massachusetts
Plaintiff and a putative Massachusetts class. The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiffs are not consumers entitled to bring a claim
under Chapter 9 of the MCPA, because trading in foreign currency
instruments is not a consumer-oriented activity.

This argument fails for two reasons.

The definitions chapter of MCPA states in broad terms:

Trade and commerce shall include the advertising, the offering for
sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any
services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal
or mixed, any security and any contract of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, and any other article, commodity, or thing of
value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth.

Accordingly, the purchase of FX instruments is not automatically
outside of Chapter 9 of the MCPA simply because it is an
investment.  If the Plaintiffs purchased investment instruments for
their personal portfolios, then FX instruments are, at minimum, a
thing of value within the ambit of Chapter 9.

Second, the Plaintiffs here are not billion dollar hedge funds that
trade directly with liquidity providers on the FX spot market. They
are individuals who purchased FX instruments from a Retail Dealer.
The Plaintiffs use FX instruments for a variety of purposes,
including long and short-term investing, portfolio diversification,
and to hedge their foreign investments against risks of foreign
currency fluctuations. This small-scale purchasing of FX
instruments in the retail market qualifies as a consumer activity.

North Carolina

The Proposed Complaint asserts a claim under the North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practice Act (NCUTPA), on behalf of the North Carolina
Plaintiff and a putative North Carolina Class. The Defendants seek
dismissal of the NCUTPA claim on the grounds that (1) application
of the NCUTPA is precluded by the statute's regulatory scheme
exception and (2) the Proposed Complaint does not plead a
sufficient effect on North Carolina in state business. Both
arguments fail.

In State Effects

The Defendants also argue that the proposed NCUTPA claim does not
plead an adequate effect on in state business. This argument fails
because the Proposed Complaint alleges that the the Plaintiffs, who
are North Carolina residents, were injured in North Carolina when
they purchased FX instruments at inflated prices while located in
North Carolina.12 This in state injury is sufficient to state a
claim under the NCUTPA.  

Both of the cases cited by the Defendants illustrate that an injury
that occurs in North Carolina is sufficient to sustain a NCUTPA
claim.  Leave to amend the NCUTPA claim is granted.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to amend is denied with respect
to the Sherman Act claim. The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend
is granted with respect to all state law claims, except to the
extent that the Proposed Complaint raises claims against the NAs
under Florida and Illinois law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybxjeuop from
Leagle.com.

James Contant, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Frank Burton Ulmer, McCulley
Mccluer PLLC, Michael C. Dell'Angelo -- mdellangelo@bm.net --
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, R. Bryant McCulley, McCulley
McCluer PLLC, Stuart Halkett McCluer, McCulley Mccluer PLLC &
Joshua Ripley --  jripley@bm.net -- Berger Montague PC, pro hac
vice.

Martin-Han Tran, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Carlos Gonzalez, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Ugnius Matkus, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Jerry Jacobson, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Paul Vermillion, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Sandra Lavender,
Victor Hernandez, FX Primus Ltd., Charles Hitchcock, III & Tina
Porter, the Plaintiffs, represented by Michael C. Dell'Angelo,
Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, R. Bryant McCulley, McCulley
McCluer PLLC, Stuart Halkett McCluer, McCulley Mccluer PLLC &Joshua
Ripley, Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice.

Bank Of America Corporation, Bank of America, N.A. & Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., the Defendants, represented by Adam
Selim Hakki -- ahakki@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP,
Jeffrey Jason Resetarits -- jeffrey.resetarits@shearman.com --
Shearman & Sterling LLP & Richard Franklin Schwed --
rschwed@shearman.com -Shearman & Sterling LLP.

The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd., Defendant, represented by
Kenneth Anthony Gallo -
kgallo@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, Michael E. Gertzman -
mgertzman@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss, Anand Sithian --
asithian@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss & Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman
-- mkosman@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison.


BARNSTORMERS BASKETBALL: Sued Over Ex-Coach's Sexual Exploitation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Gruber-Miller, writing for Des Moines Register, reports
that a class-action lawsuit has been filed against a former Iowa
youth basketball coach who admitted to secretly recording nude
videos of hundreds of boys.

Greg Stephen, a founder and former head coach of the Iowa
Barnstormers youth basketball club, pleaded guilty on Oct. 18 to
five counts of sexual exploitation of a child as well as
transportation and possession of child pornography.

Guy Cook, a Des Moines attorney, said he filed the class-action
lawsuit on Nov. 2 in Johnson County District Court. The documents
were not available in the state's online court system on Nov. 2,
but a copy was provided to the Register.

The plaintiff is identified only as John Doe, and includes "all
others similarly situated." In addition to Stephen, John Doe is
suing Barnstormers Basketball of Iowa and the Amateur Athletic
Union of the United States.

The lawsuit accuses Stephen of intrusion on his victims' seclusion
and says the Barnstormers and AAU were negligent in their duty to
protect the safety and privacy of their athletes and to implement
procedures that would have stopped Stephen's behavior.

Stephen was cut off from the Barnstormers program when news of an
investigation became public in February. He was arrested in March.

The class definition includes all Barnstormers players who have
traveled with the team from 2005 to the present who stayed in rooms
that were reserved by or accessible by Stephen, or who shared rooms
with Stephen.

John Doe played on several Barnstormers teams from March 2014
through July 2016 and attended a basketball tournament in Las Vegas
in 2016. He stayed in a hotel room for seven nights with four or
five other members of the team, where he says Stephen secretly
recorded them, including when they were dressing and showering.
Doe's father was told by the U.S. Attorney's office for the
southern district of Iowa that Doe was one of Stephen's victims,
the lawsuit states.

Mr. Cook said in a statement that the case is about getting justice
for hundreds of youth athletes who were victimized by Stephen's
"despicable conduct."

He was set hold a news conference at 10 a.m. Monday, Nov. 5, in Des
Moines to discuss the lawsuit in more detail.

According to the copy of the lawsuit provided to the Register,
Stephen was responsible for booking hotel rooms for Barnstormers
players when they traveled out of state for games and tournaments.
He regularly arrived at the hotel rooms early, allowing him to
place hidden cameras in the hotel room bathrooms, pointed towards
the shower. He often shared a room and a bed with Barnstormer
student athletes, the suit alleges.

None of those boys were aware they were being recorded, the suit
states.

Many of the details in the lawsuit cite information in Stephen's
19-page signed plea agreement in his criminal case. In that
agreement, Stephen admitted to possessing a hard drive with more
than 400 folders labeled with boys' names that contained nude
images and videos of the boys' genitalia. Many of the videos show
the boys masturbating.

The victims include players from as recently as 2018, as well as
players and friends of players going back several years and minors
involved in other sports, according to the plea agreement.

Other videos show Stephen touching the genitals of his unconscious
victims, the lawsuit states.

In one August 2017 case, Stephen admitted to giving an 11- or
12-year-old boy medication to make him drowsy, then recording
himself touching the boy's penis with his hand while his mouth was
on or near the boy's penis.

Stephen admitted to using the identities of three teenage girls to
send nude and clothed photos and videos to boys over social media
sites like Snapchat and Facebook and encourage the boys to send
explicit images in return.

Stephen will be sentenced on his criminal charges at a later date,
but he faces a minimum of 15 years in federal prison and a maximum
of 180 years in prison if Judge C.J. Williams chooses to run the
sentences for each crime consecutively.

On Oct. 31, U.S. District Judge C.J. Williams denied a motion from
Stephen to reconsider an earlier decision allowing prosecutors to
use evidence from a seized USB device in Stephen's criminal case.

Stephen's guilty plea was conditional on his ability to appeal the
use of the evidence from the device, which his former
brother-in-law, Vaughn Ellison, discovered in a bathroom when he
was remodeling Stephen's Monticello home and later gave to police.

His lawyers have argued police violated his rights by holding the
device for two days before getting a warrant and that Ellison was
acting as a government agent when he took the device. [GN]


BASF CORP: Tri-Iso Tryline Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled TRI-ISO TRYLINE, LLC, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BASF
CORP.; BASF SE.; BAYER AG; BAYER CORP.; COVESTRO AG; COVESTRO LLC;
DOWDUPONT INC.; DOW CHEMICAL CO.; HUNTSMAN CORP.; HUNTSMAN
INTERNATIONAL LLC.; MCNS POLYURETHANES USA INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS,
INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS AMERICA, INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS & SKC
POLYURETHANES, INC.; WANHUA CHEMICAL GROUP CO., LTD.; WANHUA
CHEMICAL (AMERICA) CO. LTD.; and WANHUA CHEMICAL US HOLDING, INC.,
Defendants,, Case No. 2:18-cv-14043, was removed from the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 25, 2018.
The Western District of Pennsylvania Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01417 to the proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon.
Donetta W. Ambrose and referred to Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan.

BASF Corporation manufactures and supplies basic chemicals and
intermediates ranging from solvents, plasticizers, and monomers to
glues and electronic chemicals, as well as raw materials for
detergents, plastics, textile fibers, paints and coatings, plant
protection, and pharmaceuticals. The company was founded in 1865
and is headquartered in Florham Park, New Jersey. BASF Corporation
operates as a subsidiary of BASF SE. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven N. Williams
          JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
          601 California Street, Suite 1000
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 500-6800
          Facsimile: (415) 395-9940
          E-mail: swilliams@saverilawfirm.com


BAU OF ILLINOIS: Underpays Kitchen Staff, Rodriquez Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
YUNIOR RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BAU OF ILLINOIS, INC. d/b/a
BLUEBERRY HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; O.T.M. RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a
BLUEBERRY HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; D.S.B. RESTAURANTS, INC. d/b/a
BLUEBERRY HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; L.T.D. RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a
BLUEBERRY HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; K.O.W. RESTAURANTS, INC.; BLUEBERRY
HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; M.I.H. RESTAURANT GROUP, INC. d/b/a BLUEBERRY
HILL BREAKFAST CAFE; C.I.K. RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a BLUEBERRY HILL
BREAKFAST CAFE; D.I.R. RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a BLUEBERRY HILL
BREAKFAST CAFE; STEVENN ZERVAKIS; and GEORGE NIKOLOPOULOS,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-07131 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 24, 2018) seeks
to recover from the Defendant unpaid overtime compensation,
prejudgment interest, maximum liquidated damages, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Rodriquez was employed by the Defendants as kitchen
staff.

Bau of Illinois, Inc. d/b/a Blueberry Hill Breakfast Cafe is
engaged in the restaurant business in Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carlos G. Becerra, Esq.
          BECERRA LAW GROUP, LLC
          11 E. Adams St., Suite 1401
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312)957-9005
          Facsimile: (888)826-5848
          E-mail: cbecerra@law-rb.com


BAY AREA: Montgomery Stayed Pending Kendrick/Kelly Appeal Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, Oakland Division, stayed the case, WILLIAM
MONTGOMERY, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BAY AREA TOLL AUTHORITY; GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, HIGHWAY
AND TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT; XEROX STATE AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC.;
and DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-05518-RS (N.D. Cal.),
pending final resolution of the Ninth Circuit Appeal in the
Kendrick/Kelly Action (including a stay of the Defendants'
deadlines to respond to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and
Motion to Remand).

The Plaintiff filed the matter on July 13, 2018 in San Francisco
Superior Court and Conduent timely removed the matter to Federal
Court on Sept. 7, 2018.  Bay Area Toll Authority ("BATA") contends
it was not properly served by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the matter on Oct. 5,
2018.  He filed a Motion to Remand Action To The San Francisco
Superior Court on Oct. 8, 2018, and set the matter for hearing on
Nov. 15, 2018.

Sumatra Kendrick and Michelle Kelly filed a putative class action
on Nov. 21, 2017 in San Francisco County Superior Court against the
same Defendants.  Both Kendrick/Kelly and the Plaintiff assert a
claim under California Street & Highway Code Section 31490.  The
Kendrick/Kelly Action was also removed to the Northern District of
California by Conduent, and was assigned federal case number
3:18-cv-00213-RS.  Kendrick/Kelly and the Plaintiff are represented
by the same attorneys.

Kendrick/Kelly filed a motion to remand the case to San Francisco
Superior Court, which was granted by Hon. Richard Seeborg on April
3, 2018.  Conduent State and Local Solutions, Inc. filed a Petition
to the Ninth Circuit to hear an appeal on the order granting
Kendrick/Kelly's motion to remand to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which was assigned appellate case number 18-80047.

The Ninth Circuit Petition remains pending and the Ninth Circuit
has not decided whether it will allow an appeal to be heard.

The Parties stipulated and Judge Seeborg granted that the counsel
for BATA accepted service of the Amended Complaint on BATA's behalf
as of the date the Stipulation is filed with the Court.  For
purposes of judicial economy and to preserve the Parties'
resources, the action is stayed pending final resolution of the
Ninth Circuit Appeal in the Kendrick/Kelly Action (including a stay
of the Defendants' deadlines to respond to the Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint and Motion to Remand).

Within 30 days of a final resolution of the Ninth Circuit Petition
and/or decision by the Ninth Circuit Appeal, the Parties will file
a joint brief in the Court to inform the Court of the final
decision and explain how the decision should impact the case, if at
all.  The Parties' joint filing will also set forth the Defendants'
deadline for responding to the Amended Complaint and a proposed
briefing schedule for the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RLhCol from Leagle.com.

William Montgomery, Plaintiff, represented by Helen I. Zeldes --
helen@coastlaw.com -- Coast Law Group LLC, Andrew J. Kubik, Coast
Law Group LLP, Ben Travis -- ben@coastlaw.com -- Coast Law Group
LLP & S. Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners, LLP.

Bay Area Toll Authority, Defendant, represented by Samantha D.
Wolff -- swolff@hansonbridgett.com --  Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District, Defendant,
represented by Alexandra V. Atencio -- aatencio@hansonbridgett.com
-- Hanson Bridgett LLP & Samantha D. Wolff, Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Barbara Louise Lyons -- blyons@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette and Kumagai
LLP & Gary T. Lafayette -- glafayette@lkclaw.com -- Lafayette &
Kumagai LLP.


BAYER A.G.: Finishing Solutions Suit Moved to W.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled FINISHING SOLUTIONS, LLC,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. BAYER A.G.; BAYER CORPORATION; COVESTRO LLC; BASF SE;
BASF CORPORATION; DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY; HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL LLC;
HUNTSMAN CORPORATION; WANHUA CHEMICAL GROUP CO., LTD.; WANHUA
CHEMICAL AMERICA CO. LTD.; MITSUI CHEMICALS, INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS
AMERICA, INC.; MCNS; and MCNS POLYURETHANES USA INC., Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-01391-RDP (N.D. Ala., Aug. 29, 2018), was removed
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
on October 25, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01439 to the proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon.
Donetta W. Ambrose and referred to Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan.

Bayer Aktiengesellschaft operates as a life science company
worldwide. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft has a collaboration agreement
with The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center to develop
cancer treatments, as well as Haplogen GmbH. The company was
founded in 1863 and is headquartered in Leverkusen, Germany. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris T. Hellums, Esq.
          Jonathan S. Mann, Esq.
          PITTMAN DUTTON & HELLUMS, P.C.
          2001 Park Place North, Suite 1100
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 322-8880
          Facsimile: (205) 328-2711
          E-mail: chrish@pittmandutton.com
                  jonm@pittmandutton.com

               - and -

          James F. Barger, Jr., Esq.
          Ben Bucy, Esq.
          FROHSIN BARGER & WALTHALL
          100 Main Street
          St. Simons Island, GA 31522
          Telephone: (205) 933-4006
          Facsimile: (205) 933-4008
          E-mail: jim@frohsinbarger.com
                  ben@frohsinbarger.com

               - and -

          J. Elliott Walthall, Esq.
          FROHSIN BARGER & WALTHALL
          402 Office Park Drive, Suite. 270
          Birmingham, AL 35223
          Telephone: (205) 933-4006
          Facsimile: (205) 933-4008
          E-mail: elliott@frohsinbarger.com


BHP BILLITON: Faces Class Action Over Samarco Disaster
------------------------------------------------------
Press Association reports that mining giant BHP Billiton is facing
a multibillion-pound lawsuit over the Samarco dam catastrophe in
Brazil in one of the largest claims in British legal history.

The class action, which is being handled by SPG Law, counts more
than 240,000 claimants including several Brazilian municipalities,
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Mariana and members of the Krenak
indigenous community.

SPG said that it is filing the suit at the High Court in Liverpool
because FTSE 100 listed BHP is a UK registered company.

The case is being brought for damages both on behalf of
individuals, communities, foundations and indigenous peoples
collectively, SPG said on Nov. 5.

SPG Law partner Tom Goodhead said: "Three years on from the
tragedy, nearly a million Brazilian citizens affected by the
disaster have either not been compensated at all or have received
low financial settlements.

"In essence they have been ignored and forgotten. The process of
compensation has so far been in the hands of the defendants. This
is about putting the claimants in control."

In 2015, BHP's Samarco iron-ore mine in the Minas Gerais state in
south eastern Brazil saw a dam collapse, killing 19 people and
displacing 700.

A torrent of mud unleashed by the burst also wiped out a small
village, Bento Rodrigues, and contaminated the Atlantic Ocean.

The deadly stain of red mud, water and debris flowed downstream
into the Doce River, where it devastated wildlife and compromised
the drinking water source for hundreds of thousands of people.

The stain flowed through the neighbouring Espirito Santo state,
before it reached the Atlantic.

BHP has already paid out millions to bankroll compensation and
remediation programmes.

It is also facing legal action in Australia on behalf of
shareholders.

SPG Law's US partner Glenn Phillips added: "BHP Billiton PLC are
liable for the massive damage caused by the Bento Rodrigues dam
disaster because Brazil's laws provide both for strict liability
for environmental torts and for parent companies to be liable for
the acts and omissions of their subsidiaries".[GN]


BIRD RIDES: Faces Class-Action Lawsuit Over Gross Negligence
------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Holley, writing for The Washington Post, reports that the
nation's electronic-scooter companies are facing more blowback as
concerns rise about the safety of these devices -- this time in the
form of a class-action lawsuit filed on October 19 in California.

The lawsuit, filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court, accuses
two of the largest e-scooter companies, Lime and Bird, as well as
other e-scooter firms, of "gross negligence" and "aiding and
abetting assault."

The lawsuit, filed on behalf of eight initial plaintiffs, says the
companies' practices have contributed to injuries in multiple ways.
By "dumping" scooters on public streets without an appropriate
warning, the suit alleges e-scooter companies acted negligently and
should have known that their devices would become a dangerous
"public nuisance."

Three plaintiffs claim they were walking when e-scooter riders
crashed into them from behind, resulting in severe injuries. The
suit alleges that e-scooter companies knew their riders were
injuring pedestrians and -- by failing to stop the collisions from
occurring -- assisted and encouraged scooter riders as they
committed "assaults."

The suit also states that both companies' scooters contain
defective electronics and mechanical parts, as well inadequate
safety instructions for riders and that they have "a wanton
disregard for the safety of others." The risks posed by the
devices, the suit states, "were known and/or knowable" based on
"professional knowledge" known within the transportation
community.

The suit makes numerous claims about scooters' mechanical issues,
but does not provide concrete evidence for those claims.

The suit also names scooter manufacturers Xiaomi United States and
Segway as defendants.

"While acting under the guise of the commendable goals of
furthering personal freedom and mobility and protecting the
environment, the Defendants, and each of them, are endangering the
health, safety and welfare of riders, pedestrians and the general
public," the suit states.

The suit adds that "scores (if not hundreds) of riders and
pedestrians and members of the public have suffered, are continuing
to suffer and will to continue to suffer egregious and avoidable
injuries and damage to their person and property."

Spokespersons for Segway and Xiaomi United States did not respond
to a request for comment.

A Lime spokesperson said the company is in the process of reviewing
the complaint.

"While we don't comment on pending litigation, safety has always
been at the very core of everything we do at Lime -- as is our
mission of reducing cars from city streets and making them safer
and greener for pedestrians, bike and scooter riders alike," the
spokesperson said, adding that the company "prides itself on taking
proactive steps relating safety wherever we have a presence."

In a statement released by Bird, the company pointed out that the
complaint has been brought "against the entire e-scooter industry"
and said shared e-scooters have become an important transportation
mode "for hundreds of thousands of people in 100 cities
worldwide."

"We believe that the climate crisis and our car dependency demand a
transportation mode shift, and clean energy vehicles like
e-scooters are already replacing millions of short car trips," the
statement said. "There is no evidence that riding an e-scooter
presents a greater level of danger to riders than riding a bike.
Cars remain the greatest threat to commuters, killing over 40,000
people in the US yearly."

Since their sudden arrival in recent months, e-scooters have been
linked to an uptick in severe injuries in hospitals around the
country, according to emergency-room physicians. As the value and
popularity of companies such as Bird and Lime have soared, a
growing number of critics -- including doctors, former riders and
scooter mechanics -- claim that e-scooter fleets are poorly
maintained and prone to dangerous mechanical failures.

Two e-scooter riders -- one in Dallas and another in the District
-- have been involved in accidents that led to their deaths,
authorities say.

The class-action suit adds a new category of people to the list of
those fiercely opposed to the latest form of controversial
transportation sweeping the country: pedestrians.

Among the plaintiffs is David Petersen, a 62-year-old street
performer known as "Davy Rocks," who alleges that he was severely
injured after being struck by an e-scooter rider in June.

Dancing for onlookers near the Santa Monica pier in California,
Petersen, clad in his trademark "gladiator outfit," told The
Washington Post that he was hit from behind by a man on a Bird
scooter; the man fled the scene. Petersen said the force of the
collision knocked him down, but he managed to lessen the impact by
catching himself with his right hand. Had he been an elderly person
or a small child, he said, he could've been killed.

Petersen said he suffered a fractured arm and a severed biceps, an
injury that caused him to miss weeks of work. The muscle had to be
surgically reattached using a cadaver graft, he said.

"My arm is never going to be the same, not to mention the
five-inch-long scar it's got now," he said, noting that his arm has
lost rotation and feels stiff. "If Bird is going to profit off the
human meat grinder they've created in Santa Monica, they should be
held responsible for the suffering they've caused."

Additionally, the lawsuit accuses Bird and Lime of multiple
breaches of each company's warranty and alleges that their vehicles
were "not suitable" for repeated use in public places.

Stating that the deployment of e-scooters is unlawful, the suit
claims that each company should be prohibited from continuing to
deploy scooters in California. Beyond seeking damages, the suit
claims that scooter companies should be required to include
"adequate warnings and/or instructions" to their apps and
vehicles.

Catherine Lerer, Esq. -- clerer@mcgeelerer.com -- a personal-injury
lawyer from Santa Monica who is representing the plaintiffs with
lawyer Jeffrey Lee Costell, Esq. -- jlcostell@costell-law.com --
said she has received more than 100 calls from people injured by
scooters in recent months. Whether they involve riders or
pedestrians, she said, the injuries are consistent: broken noses,
legs, arms, wrists, hands and ribs, as well as head injuries and
tears to anterior cruciate ligaments and rotator cuffs that require
surgery.

"We filed this class-action lawsuit against Bird and Lime and the
manufacturers of their electric scooters to address the terrible
injuries they have inflicted on their riders and pedestrians, and
the continuing harm they are causing," Lerer said.[GN]


BIRNER DENTAL: David Pill Balks at Merger Deal with Mid-Atlantic
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID PILL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BIRNER DENTAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC., FREDERIC W.J. BIRNER, JOSHUA S. HOROWITZ, BURTON J. RUBIN,
BRADLEY TIRPAK, GREGORY GALE FULTON, JOHN M. CLIMACO, and THOMAS D.
WOLF, the Defendants, Case 1:18-cv-02757 (D. Colo, Oct. 29, 2018),
seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking any steps to consummate a
proposed acquisition transaction or, in the event the proposed
transaction is consummated, to recover damages resulting from
Defendants' conduct.

The proposed transaction was announced on October 3, 2018, pursuant
to which Birner Dental Management Services, Inc. will be acquired
by Mid-Atlantic Dental Service Holdings LLC through its wholly
owned subsidiary, Bronco Acquisition, Inc.

According to the complaint, on October 3, 2018, the Company's Board
of Directors caused the Company to enter into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger with Mid-Atlantic Dental and Bronco. Pursuant to the
Merger Agreement, Mid-Atlantic Dental will acquire all of the
outstanding shares of Birner for (i) $10.62 per share in cash, and
(ii) one contractual Contingent Value Right per share of Birner
common stock, which will entitle shareholders to an additional cash
payment of up to $0.13 per share under certain circumstances
following the closing of the Proposed Transaction, for a total
enterprise value of approximately $38.4 million. Upon completion of
the Merger, Birner will be integrated into Mid-Atlantic Dental as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Mid-Atlantic Dental.

On October 25 2018, Defendants filed a proxy statement on a
Schedule 14A with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Proxy omits certain material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders it false and
misleading, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. sections 78n(a), 78t(a),
and SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 140.14a-9 ("Rule 14a-9") promulgated
thereunder, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Jeffrey A. Berens, Esq.
          BERENS LAW LLC
          2373 Central Park Boulevard, Suite 100
          Denver, CO 80238
          Telephone: (303) 861-1764
          Facsimile: (303) 395-0393
          E-mail: jeff@jberenslaw.com

               - and -

          Carl L. Stine, Esq.
          Fei-Lu Qian, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 486-2093
          E-mail: cstine@wolfpopper.com
                  fqian@wolfpopper.com


BLACKROCK: Employees Sue Over High Fees on 401(k)s
--------------------------------------------------
Leslie Albrecht, writing for Market Watch, reports that employees
at big fund companies say they're being charged excessive fees on
their 401(k) plans and that the plans are loaded with expensive,
underperforming funds, Barron's reported.

Big firms including Fidelity, Blackrock, T. Rowe Price, and
Invesco, are facing class-action lawsuits from their own workers
accusing them of putting the firms' financial interests ahead of
employees when it comes to their retirement investments. The suits
allege that the firms are using their employees' 401(k) retirement
plans as money makers for their own funds. They're falling short on
picking out the best funds for the plans and not overseeing them
properly, the suits charge.

The firms say they're following regulatory rules. The funds are
selected by committees with a fiduciary duty to do right by
employees. "At financial institutions, it's a matter of pride that
they put people like their chief economist, chief financial
officer, and treasurer on the benefits committees that are making
these decisions," David Tetrick, Esq. -- dtetrick@kslaw.com -- a
partner at law firm King & Spalding, which specializes in 401(k)
defense cases, told Barron's.[GN]



BLUE CROSS: Sued for Denying Mental Health Services Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Morgan Haefner, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts is facing a class-action
lawsuit that claims the health insurer systematically denied
hundreds of members' claims for mental health services.

The complaint, filed Oct. 31 in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, accused BCBSMA of violating the
terms of its insurance policies and self-funded medical benefit
plans by denying claims for inpatient intermediate mental health
residential treatment.

BCBSMA covers intermediate inpatient treatment for mental health
and substance use disorders, which may include acute residential
treatment, according to the lawsuit. However, the plaintiffs argue
BCBSMA's "restrictive interpretation" of what an intermediate
treatment is leads to the exclusion of sub-acute residential
treatment that is medically necessary.

The plaintiffs argue this reading violates contract terms as well
as federal mental health parity laws and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act. The lawsuit projects 100 BCBSMA members have
had residential treatment claims improperly denied and that
thousands others could face similar denials in the future.

Becker's requested comment from BCBSMA on the allegations. [GN]


BLUE LINE: Attorney Responds to Bid to Dismiss Speed-Camera Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Phillips, writing for The Vindicator, reports that Marc
Dann, Esq., argued in a court document Blue Line Solution's claim
it doesn't issue citations to speeding drivers is invalid because
court documents show BLS cashes checks from drivers and provides
customer service regarding the citations.

BLS is the Tennessee-based speed-camera company that operates the
cameras for Girard and a handful of other municipalities in the
Mahoning Valley.

Dann's arguments, filed in Trumbull County Common Pleas Court, were
in response to Blue Line's motion to dismiss a class-action suit
filed against the company.

The company claimed it should not be included in Dann's lawsuit,
filed on behalf of six drivers, because "the city issued the
citations, not BLS."

The litigation against the city and Blue Line revolves around the
contested speed limit on a portion of Interstate 80 between Dec. 7,
2017, and Jan. 8, 2018, after construction ended. The city enforced
the temporary reduced speed limit, and Dann contends people who
were driving at the normal speed limit were wrongfully issued
citations.

In Dann's response, he called Blue Line's dispute over which entity
issued the citations "an evasive argument."

Attached to the documents were excerpts from the website
www.violationpayment.net, which allows drivers to pay their
speeding citations. A section on the website states, "All
transactions are processed by Blue Line Solutions, located in
Athens, Tenn., on behalf of governmental agencies."

Blue Line argued last month that Girard's logo and contact
information were on the citations, not the company's information.

But a check from a driver paying her citation had Blue Line's stamp
on the back, and it was attached to the court documents.

The Vindicator's calls to Blue Line and Robert Yallech, Esq. --
ryallech@reminger.com -- of Youngstown-based Reminger Co., who is
serving as legal counsel for the company, were not returned on
October 19.

The documents also pointed out that Blue Line "generates, mails,
collects and provides customer services relating to the citations
on behalf of the city of Girard."

"It is disingenuous for BLS to even attempt to argue or suggest
that it was not involved in this revenue-generating scheme," Dann's
response stated.

In last month's motion to dismiss, BLS responded to a section of
the lawsuit's complaint that claimed Girard and BLS formed a
conspiracy to collect the tickets by saying BLS didn't collect the
money.

Dann maintained, however, "The city of Girard and BLS formed a
conspiracy by combining the city of Girard's status as a
governmental entity with BLS' technology and logistics to issue the
improper citations."

Girard filed its motion to dismiss the suit in August. Attorneys
with the Cleveland-based firm Sutter O'Connell Co. working as legal
counsel for the city argued Dann's claims had no legal basis. City
Law Director Brian Kren said the Ohio Department of Transportation
didn't take down the reduced-speed signs until a month after
construction ended, so he believes the city enforcing the lower
limit with speed cameras was legitimate.[GN]


BOK FINANCIAL: Unit Defending Against Oklahoma Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
BOK Financial Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that BOKF NA faces a
putative class action suit in Oklahoma District Court for Tulsa
County Oklahoma alleging that BOKF NA breached its Demand Deposit
Agreements.

On July 6, 2018, a plaintiff served a petition in a putative class
action in the Oklahoma District Court for Tulsa County Oklahoma
alleging BOKF NA breached its Demand Deposit Agreements by charging
overdraft and not sufficient funds fees to deposit accounts on the
day of the transaction triggering the fee and by the bank's debit
hold process causing overdraft fees. Management is advised by
counsel that a loss is not probable and that the loss, if any,
cannot be reasonably estimated.

BOK Financial Corporation operates as the financial holding company
for BOKF, NA that provides various financial products and services
in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Northwest Arkansas, Colorado,
Arizona, and Kansas/Missouri. It operates through three segments:
Commercial Banking, Consumer Banking, and Wealth Management. BOK
Financial Corporation was founded in 1910 and is headquartered in
Tulsa, Oklahoma.


CALPERS: June 10 Trial Set for Insurance Plan Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Sacramento Bee reports that a class-action lawsuit that could cost
CalPERS $1 billion is headed to trial in June, and many of the
122,000 retirees who bought an insurance plan at the center of the
case are receiving small checks from an agreement that settled a
portion of the claims. . . . Michael Bidart, the attorney
representing CalPERS members who allege the pension fund carried
out a contract-breaking rate hike on their long-term health care
plans five years ago, anticipates that the trial will go forward as
scheduled. [GN]


CAMPING WORLD: Dec. 18 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
--------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until December 18, 2018 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against Camping
World Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: CWH), if they purchased the Company's
Class A shares between March 8, 2017 and August 7, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). This action is pending in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

What You May Do

If you purchased Class A shares of Camping World and would like to
discuss your legal rights and how this case might affect you and
your right to recover for your economic loss, you may, without
obligation or cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn
toll-free at 1-877-515-1850 or via email
(lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-cwh/ to learn more. If you
wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you must
petition the Court by December 18, 2018.

About the Lawsuit

Camping World and certain of its executives are charged with
failing to disclose material information during the Class Period,
violating federal securities laws.

On August 7, 2018, the Company disclosed a wide range of
disappointing results for the quarter ended June 30, 2018 including
a decline in same-store revenue, adjusted EBITDA 9% below guidance,
a continuing decline in its adjusted EBITDA margin of 250 basis
points year-over-year, and additional complications with its Gander
Mountain Co. operations.

On this news, the price of Camping World's Class A shares plummeted
14%, to close at $19.04 per share on August 8, 2018.

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
         New Orleans, LA 70163
         Telephone: 1-877-515-1850
         Email: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


CAMPING WORLD: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that a shareholder class action lawsuit
has been filed against Camping World Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: CWH)
("Camping World" or the "Company") on behalf of purchasers of the
Company's Class A common stock between March 8, 2017 and August 7,
2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Camping World investors who suffered financial losses in excess of
$100,000 are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (D. Seamus
Kaskela, Esq.) at (888) 715-1740, or skaskela@kaskelalaw.com, for
information about this action and their legal rights and recovery
options.  Additional information about this action may also be
found at http://kaskelalaw.com/case/camping-world-holdings-inc/.

IMPORTANT DEADLINE:  Investors who purchased Camping World's Class
A common stock during the Class Period may, no later than December
18, 2018, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative
of the class.

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and misleading statements during the Class Period,
and failed to disclose to investors: (i) that the Company's
disclosure controls and controls over financial reporting suffered
from a host of material weaknesses; (ii) that the Company's
historical financial results had been materially misstated; (iii)
that the Company's Gander Mountain Co. ("Gander") stores had
encountered integration setbacks, adversely impacting the Company's
earnings growth and profit margins; and (iv) that the Company's
core RV business was experiencing decelerating growth as the
Company lagged industry trends and was losing market share to
competitors.  The complaint further alleges that, as a result of
the foregoing, investors purchased Camping World's Class A common
stock at artificially inflated prices as high as $47.19 per share
during the Class Period, and suffered significant investment losses
as a result of defendants' alleged misconduct.

On May 8, 2018, Camping World reported disappointing First Quarter
Fiscal 2018 financial and operational results, and revealed adverse
trends in its core RV business indicating that the Company had lost
significant market share to its competitors. On this news, shares
of the Company's Class A common stock fell $4.60 per share, or
nearly 17%, to close on May 8, 2018 at $23.02 per share.

Then, on August 7, 2018, Camping World reported disappointing
Second Quarter Fiscal 2018 financial and operational results and
revealed that problems in its Gander operations were more extensive
than previously disclosed.  On this news, shares of the Company's
Class A common stock fell an additional $3.17 per share, or over
14%, to close on August 8, 2018 at $19.04 per share.

Camping World investors who suffered financial losses in excess of
$100,000 are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC for information
about this action and their legal rights and recovery options.
Additional information about this action may also be found at
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/camping-world-holdings-inc/.

         D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
                    (888) 715-1740
         Website: www.kaskelalaw.com
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


CAMPING WORLD: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Action Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP disclosed that a class action has
been commenced on behalf of purchasers of Camping World Holdings,
Inc. (NYSE:CWH) Class A common stock during the period between
March 8, 2017 and August 7, 2018 (the "Class Period"). This action
was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and is captioned
Ronge v. Camping World Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 18-cv-7030.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased Camping World Class A common stock during
the Class Period to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead
plaintiff acts on behalf of all other class members in directing
the litigation. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its
choice. An investor's ability to share in any potential future
recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later
than 60 days from today. If you wish to discuss this action or have
any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact plaintiff's counsel, Darren Robbins of Robbins
Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at
djr@rgrdlaw.com. You can view a copy of the complaint as filed at
http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/campingworld/.

The complaint charges Camping World, certain of its officers and
directors and controlling shareholders with violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Historically, the Company
specialized in selling recreational vehicles ("RVs") and related
services. In October 2016, Camping World went public in a $261
million initial public offering. In the months that followed,
Camping World engaged in a number of strategic acquisitions. Most
significantly, in May 2017, Camping World announced that it would
be expanding its operations to include retail stores for outdoor
sporting supplies and accessories by acquiring certain assets of
Gander Mountain Co. ("Gander") from bankruptcy.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose adverse
information regarding Camping World's business, operations and
financial condition. Specifically, the complaint alleges defendants
failed to disclose, among other things, that the Company's
disclosure controls and controls over financial reporting suffered
from a host of material weaknesses; that the Company's historical
financial results had been materially misstated; that the Gander
stores had encountered integration setbacks, adversely impacting
the Company's earnings growth and profit margins; and that the
Company's core RV business was experiencing decelerating growth as
the Company lagged industry trends and was losing market share to
competitors. As a result of this information being withheld from
the market, the price of Camping World Class A common stock was
artificially inflated to a high of $47.19 per share during the
Class Period.

On February 27, 2018, the Company issued a release revealing that
the Company had "recently identified material weaknesses in [its]
internal control over financial reporting." The release also
revealed that Camping World would need to revise prior reporting
periods due to various "errors." The cumulative impact of these
misstatements required the Company to restate and reduce its 2016
basic earnings per share from $0.11 per share to $0.08 per share,
as the prior reported basic earnings per share had been overstated
by more than 37%. Thereafter, on March 1, 2018, Camping World
announced that it would be unable to timely file its 2017 Form 10-K
due to expected material weaknesses in its internal control over
financial reporting. On this news, between February 26, 2018 and
March 2, 2018, the price of Camping World Class A common stock
dropped $4.63 per share, or more than 10%.

On May 8, 2018, Camping World reported disappointing financial
results for the quarter ended March 31, 2018, including a decrease
in adjusted EBITDA and adjusted EBITDA margin. In addition, the
Company revealed adverse trends in its core RV business indicating
that it had lost significant market share to its competitors. On
this news, the price of Camping World Class A stock fell 17%. On
May 22, 2018, Camping World announced it had replaced its auditor
of 13 years, causing the price of the stock to decline another
10%.

Then, on August 7, 2018, Camping World reported disappointing
financial results for the quarter ended June 30, 2018, including
adjusted EBITDA of only $140.2 million for the quarter, 9% below
its previous guidance. In addition, Camping World revealed that its
adjusted EBITDA margin had continued to deteriorate and had fallen
250 basis points year-over-year, while its same-store revenues had
experienced a "modest decline," again underperforming the broader
market. In addition, the Company revealed that problems in its
Gander operations were more extensive than previously disclosed. On
this news, the price of Camping World Class A stock fell $3.17 per
share, or 14%, to close at $19.04 per share on August 8, 2018.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
Camping World Class A common stock during the Class Period (the
"Class"). The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has
extensive experience in prosecuting investor class actions
including actions involving financial fraud.

         Robbins Geller, Esq.
         Darren Robbins, Esq.
         Telephone: 800/449-4900
                    619/231-1058
         Email: djr@rgrdlaw.com [GN]


CARDIFF BAY: Nivelle Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
Ceela Nivelli, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Cardiff Bay Center, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06028 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks
to recover unpaid wages from Defendant for working more than 40
hours in a week and not being paid an overtime rate of at least 1.5
times the regular rate for each and all such hours over 40 in a
week, and maximum liquidated damages and attorneys' fees pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Minimum Wage Act, and
the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by Defendant
to provide care and assistance to its elderly residents and
patients -- a variety of manual work involved in handling elderly
and physically-challenged residents. In fact, given the significant
manual aspects of her work, Plaintiff was seriously injured while
helping to lift and move one of the residents while working for
Defendant.

The Plaintiff was paid at her straight regular rate for each and
all hours worked in a week including some overtime hours worked
(hours over 40 in a week), except that Plaintiff was not paid at
all for about 5-8 hours weekly. For example, for the bi-weekly pay
period ending December 16, 2017, Plaintiff worked more than 81
hours but was paid at her straight regular hourly rate of $43.59 an
hour for 81 hours by Defendant. This example is reflective of
Defendant's payment pattern throughout Plaintiff's employment and
the Class periods, the lawsuit says.

Cardiff Bay Center LLC is a skilled nursing facility.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Abdul Hassan, Esq.
          215-28 Hillside Avenue
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: 718 740-1000
          Facsimile: 718 355-9668
          E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


CEMEX CONSTRUCTION: Grigoryan Labor Suit Remains in District Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Manuel L. Real of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the
case, KAREN GRIGORYAN; et al., Plaintiffs, v. CEMEX CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS PACIFIC, LLC; et al., Defendants, Case No. CV 18-1563-R
(C.D. Cal.).

On Dec. 1, 2017, the Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a purported Class Action Complaint
against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of San Bernardino.  On Feb. 5, 2018, she filed a
First Amended Class Action Complaint against the Defendants.

On March 26, 2018, the San Bernardino County Superior Court granted
the Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.  The
Plaintiff's Second Amended Class Action Complaint alleges claims of
failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit
rest periods, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
unfair competition, and penalties under the Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004.

On July 20, 2018, the Defendants filed a Notice of Removal,
alleging jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
("CAFA").  The Plaintiff now moves to remand for lack of
jurisdiction under CAFA.

The Plaintiff does not contest that the parties are diverse or that
there is sufficient numerosity for the putative Class under CAFA.
The Plaintiff specifically challenges removal jurisdiction alleging
that the Defendants have failed to satisfy CAFA's amount in
controversy requirement.  She argues that the Defendants'
contention that the aggregate amount to be recovered by the
Plaintiff and the other putative class members exceeds the sum of
$5 million is an inaccurate assumption based on erroneous
calculations which are supported by conclusory and speculative
assertions.

Judge Real is not persuaded by the Plaintiff's argument.  However,
he agrees with the Defendants that the Defendants' Notice of
Removal established the amount in controversy to total at least an
estimated $5,276,960, based on the allegations pled in the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for the First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action.  The Plaintiff contends that Defendants'
amount in controversy falls short of the excess of $5 million
threshold by, at most, $56,631.40.

He concludes that the Second Amended Complaint does not state an
amount in controversy for the first four causes of action except to
state in its Prayer for Relief for the Fourth Cause of Action that
the Plaintiff seeks an amount according to proof, but not less than
$3 million.  Thus, the pleading does not reveal on its face that
the amount in controversy met CAFA's threshold.  Accordingly, he
denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/MgJny3 from Leagle.com.

Karen Grigoryan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Amaras Zargarian, Law Offices
of Erica A. Boyajian APC, Eric Albert Boyajian, Law Offices of Eric
A. Boyajian APC, Gregory E. Mauro -- greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com --
James Hawkins APLC, James R. Hawkins -- james@jameshawkinsaplc.com
-- James Hawkins APLC & Michael J.S. Calvo --
michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins APLC.

Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company & Cemex, Inc., a Louisiana Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Emily Jane Leahy --
ELeahy@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP, Jennifer M.
Martinez -- jmartinez@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP &
Dorothy Sheng-Ing Liu -- dliu@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett
LLP.

Max Pina, Defendant, represented by Dorothy Sheng-Ing Liu, Hanson
Bridgett LLP & Jennifer M. Martinez, Hanson Bridgett LLP.


CENTRE COUNTY: Removes Sheffer Suit to M.D. Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of MATTHEW JOHN SHEFFER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CENTRE
COUNTY; KATHERINE V. OLIVER, Common Pleas Judge; BRIAN K. MARSHALL,
Common Pleas Judge; PAMELA A. RUEST, Common Pleas Judge; THOMAS
KING KISTLER, Common Pleas Judge; CARMINE W. PRESTIA, Magisterial
District Judge; THOMAS JORDAN, Magisterial District Judge; CRYSTAL
HUNDT, Assistant District Attorney; JEFFERY EBECK, PA State
Trooper; and STEPHANIE L. COOPER, Defendants, filed a notice to
remove the lawsuit from the Centre County Court of the State of
Pennsylvania (Case No. 2018-cv-2276) to the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania on October 24, 2018. The clerk
of court for the District of Pennsylvania assigned Case No.
4:18-cv-02080-MWB-KM. The case is assigned to Honorable Matthew W.
Brann and referred to Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick.

Centre County is a county in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Robert Allen Mix, Esq.
          LEE GREEN & REITER, INC.
          115 E. High Street
          Lock Drawer 179
          Bellefonte, PA 16823
          Telephone: (814) 355-4769
          Facsimile: (814) 355-5024
          E-mail: bmix@lmgrlaw.com

               - and -

          Keli M. Neary, Esq.
          Office of Attorney General
          15th Floor, Strawberry Square
          Harrisburg, PA 17120
          Telephone: (717) 787-1180
          Facsimile: (717) 772-4526
          E-mail: kneary@attorneygeneral.gov


CEPHALON INC: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned PHYSICIANS HEALTHSOURCE,
INC., individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, v. CEPHALON, INC., et al., Defendants,
and SCIMEDICA GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants/Third Party
Plaintiffs, v. BLITZ RESEARCH, INC., Third Party Defendant. Civil
Action No. 12-3753. (E.D. Pa.).

Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Cephalon, Inc., Cephalon Clinical Partners, L.P., and
Cephalon Development Corporation (Cephalon).

Plaintiff, Physicians Healthsource, Inc. (PHS), has brought this
putative class action pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991 (TCPA), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act
(JFPA), asserting that it was damaged by its receipt of two
unsolicited advertisements sent to it by facsimile transmission
(fax) on behalf of Cephalon, Inc. in 2009.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An issue is genuine if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.

The JFPA

The JFPA bans the faxing of unsolicited advertisements. An
advertisement is unsolicited if it advertises the commercial
availability or quality of any property, goods, or services and is
transmitted to any person without that person's prior express
invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.

There is one exception to the JFPA's ban on unsolicited faxes. The
exception applies only if the following three elements are present:
(1) the sender has an established business relationship with the
recipient (2) the recipient voluntarily provided the number of its
telephone facsimile machine to the sender in the context of their
established business relationship or voluntarily made its facsimile
telephone number available for public distribution through a
directory, advertisement, or site on the internet and (3) the
unsolicited advertisement contains an opt-out notice that meets
certain requirements.  

PHS argues that we should deny the Motions for Summary Judgment
even if the faxes at issue were solicited advertisements because
Bais Yaakov is not binding in this Circuit and the Solicited Fax
Rule consequently applies here until the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit finds that it is unlawful.  

The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected a
similar argument in Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. ASD Specialty
Healthcare, Inc., 863 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S.Ct. 1284 (2018), because the D.C. Circuit's decision in Bais
Yaakov did not only decide the administrative petition filed by
Bais Yaakov, but also decided administrative petitions challenging
the Solicited Fax Rule that had been filed by other parties
including Cephalon, which were assigned to the D.C. Circuit by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  

The Sixth Circuit explained that once the Multidistrict Litigation
Panel assigned petitions challenging the Solicited Fax Rule to the
D.C. Circuit, that court became the sole forum for addressing the
validity of the FCC's rule. The Sixth Circuit further explained
that this result is in keeping with the intent of Congress in
regulating the procedure for challenging FCC rules pursuant to the
Hobbs Act, stating that by consolidating petitions into a single
circuit court, the statute promotes judicial efficiency and ensures
uniformity nationwide.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also
rejected an argument similar to PHS's in True Health Chiropractic,
Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 896 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2018), explaining
that, when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidates challenges to an agency regulation and transfers them
to a court of appeals, the court to which they are transferred
becomes the sole forum for addressing the validity of the FCC's
rules. The decision of that court is then binding on all circuits.


Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit and [held] that it is bound by Bais Yaakov. District Courts
in the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have also considered
this issue and determined that they are bound by the decision of
the D.C. Circuit in Bais Yaakov. The KHS Court also found the
reasoning of Bais Yaakov to be sufficiently persuasive that it
adopted that reasoning.  

The are persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in
Sandusky, the Ninth Circuit in True Health Chiropractic, and by the
district court opinions listed above, and we conclude that the
decision of the D.C. Circuit invalidating the Solicited Fax Rule in
Bais Yaakov is binding in this case. Accordingly, the Court
conclude that the Solicited Fax Rule does not apply in this case.

Burden of Proof

Since the Solicited Fax Rule does not apply in this case, Cephalon
and SciMedica assert that PHS can only survive the instant Motion
for Summary Judgment as to its JFPA claim if it can establish that
the January 16 and August 27, 2009 faxes were sent without its
consent. A faxed advertisement is unsolicited if it is transmitted
to any person without that person's prior express invitation or
permission, in writing or otherwise.

PHS maintains, however, that it does not have the burden of proving
that the faxes were sent without its consent, because the existence
of prior express permission is as an affirmative defense to a claim
brought pursuant to Section 227(b)(1)(C).5 PHS relies on a decision
of the Third Circuit that concluded that a similar exception to the
application of Section 227(b)(1)(A) of the TCPA is an affirmative
defense.  

Section 227(b)(1)(A) prohibits the use of an automatic telephone
dialing system or artificial prerecorded voice in specific
circumstances unless the call is made for emergency purposes or
made with the prior express consent of the called party. In
Evankavitch, the Third Circuit considered which party has the
burden of proof with respect to whether a telephone call that was
subject to Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) was made with the recipient's
prior express consent. The Third Circuit concluded that, while the
TCPA is silent about the burden of proving the exceptions to the
restrictions provided by 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A), the
exceptions should be treated as affirmative defenses because, to
the extent a caller seeks to avail itself of an exemption to a
general ban on a certain category of calls, the caller is in the
best position to generate and maintain records of those
communications. Thus, the defendant, as the party claiming that the
plaintiff provided prior express consent to receive autodialed or
prerecorded calls, would have the burden of proving that prior
express consent at trial.  

Prior Express Permission

Cephalon and SciMedica argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Cephalon had prior express permission to fax to
PHS the two advertisements at issue in this case and, thus, the
faxes were not unsolicited and are not subject to Section
227(b)(1)(C).  

Here, Cephalon and SciMedica rely on Dr. Martinez's deposition
testimony regarding his contacts with representatives of Cephalon
to establish that he gave prior permission to Cephalon to send him
information by fax. As we mentioned above, Dr. Martinez was
employed by PHS as a primary care physician in the area of pain
management. Dr. Martinez testified that PHS encouraged its doctors
to meet with drug company representatives to obtain information
about the drug companies' products.  

Representatives from Cephalon generally met with doctors at PHS's
office once a month. Dr. Martinez met with approximately half of
the representatives that Cephalon sent to PHS and primarily
discussed muscle relaxers for musculoskeletal pain syndromes,
diuretics, and narcotic drugs for chronic pain.

They discussed both Cephalon's established drugs and new product
and services offered by Cephalon.

Dr. Martinez specifically recalls talking to representatives of
Cephalon about Amrix, Fentora, Provigil, Actiq, and Gabatril.
Cephalon's representatives left product information with Dr.
Martinez and also obtained his permission to follow up by sending
him additional information. At the same time, PHS left business
cards containing its office fax number on its receptionist's desk,
so that patients and drug company representatives could use that
number to contact Dr. Martinez.   

Approximately once a month, Dr. Martinez received a follow-up fax
from Cephalon's representatives. In addition to providing Dr.
Martinez with information about Cephalon's products, Cephalon's
representatives also gave product samples to Dr. Martinez,
including samples of Amrix.

The Court finds that the Defendants have submitted undisputed
evidence that establishes that Dr. Martinez gave Cephalon's
representatives permission to send him additional information about
the subject matters they discussed. The Court further finds that
Defendants have submitted undisputed evidence that establishes that
PHS provided business cards containing its fax number to drug
company representatives to enable those representatives to fax
information to Dr. Martinez.

Because the Defendants have established that the two faxed
advertisements at issue in this case were sent with the prior
express permission of an employee of PHS, the Court concludes that
the faxes were not unsolicited and that the provisions of Section
227(b)(1)(C) requiring the inclusion of opt-out information did not
apply to those faxes. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
Defendants are entitled to the entry of judgment in their favor as
a matter of law as to PHS's claim for violation of Section
227(b)(1)(C) and the Court grants Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 29, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y83gxcmu from
Leagle.com.

PHYSICIANS HEALTHSOURCE, INC., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY-SITUATED PERSONS, Plaintiff,
represented by ANN M. CALDWELL, CALDWELL LAW OFFICE LLC, BRIAN J.
WANCA -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- ANDERSON & WANCA & RYAN M.
KELLY -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- ANDERSON & WANCA.

CEPHALON, INC., CEPHALON CLINICAL PARTNERS, L.P. & CEPHALON
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by JOSEPH E.
WOLFSON -- jwo@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE & NICHOLAS H.
PENNINGTON -- nhp@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE PC.

SCIMEDICA GROUP, LLC & SCIMEDICA GROUP MARKETING RESEARCH AND
CONSULTING, LLC, Defendants, represented by JEFFREY S. DOWNS &
SHERYL S. LEVY, Halpern & Levy, P.C.


CHURCHILL DOWNS: Awaits Court Decision on Writ of Certiorari
------------------------------------------------------------
Churchill Downs Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties
in Louisiana Horsemens' Purses Class Action Suit are awaiting the
court's decision on the Fair Grounds Defendants' petition for Writ
of Certiorari.

The Fair Grounds Defendants filed a Writ of Certiorari to the
Louisiana Supreme Court seeking review of a Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision. Briefing is complete and a decision is pending.
The parties participated in unsuccessful non-binding mediation on
October 18, 2018.

On April 21, 2014, John L. Soileau and other individuals filed a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and
Damages-Class Action styled John L. Soileau, et. al. versus
Churchill Downs Louisiana Horseracing, LLC, Churchill Downs
Louisiana Video Poker Company, LLC (Suit No. 14-3873) in the Parish
of Orleans Civil District Court, State of Louisiana (the "District
Court").

The petition defined the "alleged plaintiff class" as quarter-horse
owners, trainers and jockeys that have won purses at the "Fair
Grounds Race Course & Slots" facility in New Orleans, Louisiana
since the first effective date of La. R.S. 27:438 and specifically
since 2008. The petition alleged that Churchill Downs Louisiana
Horseracing, L.L.C. and Churchill Downs Louisiana Video Poker
Company, L.L.C. ("Fair Ground Defendants") have collected certain
monies through video draw poker devices that constitute monies
earned for purse supplements and all of those supplemental purse
monies have been paid to thoroughbred horsemen during Fair Grounds'
live thoroughbred horse meets. La. R.S. 27:438 requires a portion
of those supplemental purse monies to be paid to quarter-horse
horsemen during Fair Grounds' live quarter-horse meets.

The petition requested that the District Court declare that Fair
Grounds Defendants violated La. R.S. 27:438, issue a permanent and
mandatory injunction ordering Fair Grounds Defendants to pay all
future supplements due to the plaintiff class pursuant to La. R.S.
27:438, and to pay the plaintiff class such sums as it finds to
reasonably represent the value of the sums due to the plaintiff
class. On August 14, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amendment to
their petition naming the Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective
Association 1993, Inc. ("HBPA") as an additional defendant and
alleging that HBPA is also liable to plaintiffs for the disputed
purse funds.

On October 9, 2014, HBPA and Fair Grounds Defendants filed
exceptions to the suit, including an exception of primary
jurisdiction seeking referral to the Louisiana Racing Commission.
By Judgment dated November 21, 2014, the District Court granted the
exception of primary jurisdiction and referred the matter to the
Louisiana Racing Commission. On January 26, 2015, the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' request for
supervisory review of the Judgment.

On August 24, 2015, the Louisiana Racing Commission ruled that the
plaintiffs did not have standing or a right of action to pursue the
case. On September 18, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a Petition for
Appeal of Administrative Order Dismissing Case for No Right of
Action in the District Court seeking a reversal of the Louisiana
Racing Commission’s ruling. On July 13, 2016, the plaintiffs
filed their brief with the District Court and Fair Grounds
Defendants filed its brief on August 12, 2016. A hearing was held
at the District Court on September 15, 2016 and the District Court
affirmed the Louisiana Racing Commission's ruling.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals on December 7, 2016. By Order dated August 23,
2017, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
plaintiffs' appeal without prejudice because the District Court's
Judgment did not contain the necessary decretal language. To
correct this deficiency, the District Court entered an Amended
Judgment on September 19, 2017.  

On December 11, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the Amended Judgment
to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 13, 2018,
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Louisiana Racing Commission's ruling and remanded the matter to the
Louisiana Racing Commission for further proceedings. On June 27,
2018, the Fair Grounds Defendants filed a Motion for Rehearing with
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which was denied on
July 12, 2018.

On August 10, 2018, the Fair Grounds Defendants filed a Writ of
Certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court seeking review of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision. Briefing is complete and
a decision is pending. The parties participated in unsuccessful
non-binding mediation on October 18, 2018.

Churchill Downs Incorporated operates as a racing, gaming, and
online entertainment company in the United States. It operates
through Racing, Casinos, TwinSpires, and Other Investments
segments.  Churchill Downs Incorporated was founded in 1928 and is
headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky.


CHURCHILL DOWNS: Continues to Defend Kater Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Churchill Downs Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a purported class action suit
entitled, Cheryl Kater v. Churchill Downs Incorporated.

On April 17, 2015, a purported class action styled Cheryl Kater v.
Churchill Downs Incorporated (the "Kater litigation") was filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington (the "District Court") alleging, among other claims,
that the Company's "Big Fish Casino" operated by the Company's
then-wholly owned mobile gaming subsidiary Big Fish Games violated
Washington law, including the Washington Consumer Protection Act,
by facilitating unlawful gambling through its virtual casino games
(namely the slots, blackjack, poker, and roulette games offered
through Big Fish Casino), and seeking among other things, return of
monies lost, reasonable attorney’s fees and injunctive relief.

On November 19, 2015, the District Court dismissed the case with
prejudice and, on December 7, 2015, Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on
January 5, 2016 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

On January 9, 2018, the Company sold Big Fish Games to Aristocrat
Technologies, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Purchaser"), an
indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Aristocrat Leisure Limited, an
Australian corporation pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement,
dated as of November 29, 2017, by and among the Company, Big Fish
Games and the Purchaser. Pursuant to the terms of the Stock
Purchase Agreement, the Company agreed to indemnify the Purchaser
for the losses and expenses associated with the Kater litigation
for Big Fish Games, which is referred to in the Stock Purchase
Agreement as the "Primary Specified Litigation."

On February 6, 2018, oral arguments on Plaintiff's appeal of the
dismissal of the Kater litigation took place before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 28, 2018,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded the District Court's dismissal of the complaint
against the Company. On June 12, 2018, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the Company's Petition for
Rehearing En Banc filed by the Company on May 11, 2018. On July 13,
2018, the parties filed a Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan in
the District Court. On July 20, 2018, the Company filed a Motion to
Compel Arbitration in the District Court.

Churchill Downs said, "In accordance with the terms of the Stock
Purchase Agreement, the Company is working closely with the
Purchaser to vigorously defend this matter in both the District
Court and in any further appellate proceedings, and the Company
believes that there are meritorious legal and factual defenses
against Plaintiff's allegations and requests for relief."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Churchill Downs Incorporated operates as a racing, gaming, and
online entertainment company in the United States. It operates
through Racing, Casinos, TwinSpires, and Other Investments
segments.  Churchill Downs Incorporated was founded in 1928 and is
headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky.


CITIGROUP INC: Bid for Approval of Settlement Filed in Libor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that investors who
transacted in Eurodollar futures or options on exchanges are
seeking court approval of a settlement to resolve their class
action lawsuit.

On July 19, 2018, in IN RE LIBOR-BASED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, the court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement between a putative class of plaintiffs (lending
institutions with interests in loans tied to USD LIBOR) and
Citigroup and Citibank.

On August 1, 2018, the court granted final approval of the
settlement between the largest plaintiffs' class (investors who
purchased over-the-counter derivatives from USD LIBOR panel banks)
and Citigroup and Citibank.

On September 8, 2018, a putative class of plaintiffs (investors who
transacted in Eurodollar futures or options on exchanges) filed
motions for approval of a settlement with Citigroup, Citibank, CGMI
and other settling defendants.

Additional information concerning these actions and related actions
and appeals is publicly available in court filings under the docket
numbers 11 MD 2262 (S.D.N.Y.) (Buchwald, J.) and 16-1189 (2d
Cir.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The company operates in North
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is based in New York, New
York.


CITIGROUP INC: Bid to Dismiss SSA-Related Suit Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that defendants' motion
to dismiss the consolidated putative class action complaints
related to the supranational, sub-sovereign and agency (SSA) bond
market was granted on August 24, 2018.  Plaintiffs may file a
second amended complaint by November 6, 2018.

Additional information relating to this action is publicly
available in court filings under the docket number 16 Civ. 3711
(S.D.N.Y.) (Ramos, J.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The company operates in North
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is based in New York, New
York.


CITIGROUP INC: Contant Plaintiffs Seek Initial Settlement Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the plaintiffs in
CONTANT, ET AL. v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ET AL., moved on
August 21, 2018, for preliminary approval of a proposed class
settlement with Citigroup, Citibank, Citicorp and CGMI.

Additional information concerning this action is publicly available
in court filings under the docket number 17 Civ. 3139 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Schofield, J.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The company operates in North
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is based in New York, New
York.


CITIGROUP INC: Court Affirms Order Denying Bid to Expand Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that in NYPL v. JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO., ET AL., the court on June 20, 2018, denied plaintiffs'
request to expand their class to include credit card, wire and ATM
transactions with a foreign currency exchange component. On
September 6, 2018, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration.

Additional information concerning this action is publicly available
in court filings under the docket numbers 15 Civ. 2290 (N.D. Cal.)
(Chhabria, J.) and 15 Civ. 9300 (S.D.N.Y.) (Schofield, J.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The company operates in North
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is based in New York, New
York.


CORIUM INTERNATIONAL: Wang Balks at Merger Deal with Gurnet
-----------------------------------------------------------
ELAINE WANG, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CORIUM INTERNATIONAL, INC., ERIC H.
BJERKHOLT, BHASKAR CHAUDHURI, PH.D., RONALD EASTMAN, PHYLLIS
GARDNER, M.D., IVAN GERGEL, M.D., PAUL GODDARD, PH.D., DAVID L.
GREENWOOD, PETER D. STAPLE, ROBERT W. THOMAS, the Defendants, Case
4:18-cv-06590-JSW (N.D. Cal., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks to enjoin
Defendants from taking any steps to consummate a proposed
transaction unless, and until, all material information is
disclosed to Corium stockholders sufficiently in advance of the
expiration of the tender offer period or, in the event the Proposed
Transaction is consummated without corrective disclosures, to
recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the
Exchange Act.

According to the complaint, the case is a shareholder class action
brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated public shareholders of Corium to enjoin the Proposed
Transaction whereby the Board has agreed to sell Corium to Gurnet
Merger Sub, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Gurnet, for (i)
$12.50 in cash for each share of Corium stock owned plus (ii) one
contingent value right per share ("CVR"), which shall represent the
right to receive $0.50 per share upon the approval of the New Drug
Application for the Company's lead product candidate, the drug
Corplex Donepezil by the United States Food and Drug Administration
on or prior to March 31, 2020. The Proposed Transaction is at an
unfair price and on grossly unfair and inadequate terms. The total
equity value of the Proposed Transaction is approximately $504
million. The Board has unanimously recommended to the Company's
stockholders that they vote for the Proposed Transaction. The
Defendants expect to complete the Proposed Transaction in the last
quarter of 2018. The tender offer is scheduled to expire at one
minute after 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time, on November 26, 2018, unless
extended or earlier terminated in accordance with the terms of the
merger agreement. The Proposed Transaction is the product of a
hopelessly flawed process that is designed to ensure the sale of
Corium to Gurnet on terms preferential to Defendants and other
Corium insiders and to subvert the interests of Plaintiff and the
other public stockholders of the Company. The Proposed Transaction
is being driven by the Company's current Board and management, who
collectively hold 30.8% of Corium's outstanding shares. The Board
and other Company insiders seek liquidity for their illiquid
holdings in Corium stock, and the Proposed Transaction offers
significant liquidity for their illiquid shares. If the Proposed
Transaction closes, the Board and the Company management will
receive $121,803,437.50 plus $4,872,137.50 in cash pursuant to the
CVR Agreement. In addition, the Board and management will receive
golden parachute and severance payments in the event of a
qualifying termination, in 11 addition to acceleration of unvested
stock. Corium's largest stockholder, Essex Woodlands Health
Ventures Fund VII, L.P., has entered into a Tender and Support
Agreement to tender its shares into the tender offer. EW Fund owns
26% of the outstanding shares of the Company. Its sole partner is
Essex Woodlands Healthcare Partners, where defendant Eastman is one
of its Managing Directors.

To convince Corium stockholders to tender their shares, on October
26, 2018, the Board authorized the filing of a materially
incomplete and misleading 14D-9. Defendants have failed to disclose
certain material information necessary for Corium stockholders to
properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Transaction, thereby
violating SEC rules and regulations and rendering certain
statements in the 14D-9 materially incomplete and misleading. In
particular, the 14D-9 contains materially incomplete and misleading
information concerning the financial forecasts for the Company and
Gurnet that were both prepared and relied upon by the Board in
recommending the Company's stockholders to tender their shares. The
same forecasts were used by Corium’s financial advisor,
Guggenheim Securities, LLC, in conducting its valuation analyses in
support of its fairness opinions. Also omitted and/or misleading is
information regarding Guggenheim's financial analysis, and the
background of the 28 Proposed Transaction. The material information
that has been omitted from the 14D-9 must be disclosed prior to the
tender offer in order to allow the stockholders to make an informed
decision regarding whether to tender their shares, the lawsuit
says.

Corium is a commercial-stage biopharmaceutical company.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Rachele R. Byrd, Esq.
          Marisa C. Livesay, Esq.
          Brittany N. Dejong, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
          FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          750 B Street, Suite 2770
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 239-4599
          Facsimile: (619) 234-4599
          E-mail: byrd@whafh.com
                  livesay@whafh.com
                  dejong@whafh.com

               - and -

          Gloria Kui Melwani, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
          FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 686-0114

CRAFTWORKS RESTAURANTS: Court Compels Arbitration in FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting in part Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned VASILIKI MITCHELL, Individually
and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
v. CRAFTWORKS RESTAURANTS & BREWERIES, INC., d/b/a GORDON BIERSCH
BREWERY RESTAURANT, Defendant. Civil Action No. 18-879 (RC).
(D.D.C.).

Plaintiff Vasiliki Mitchell has filed a collective action complaint
against her former employer, Defendant Craftworks Restaurants &
Breweries Group, Inc., alleging that Craftworks violated the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act (D.C. Minimum Wage
Act).

Craftworks argues that the digitally signed Arbitration Agreement
and these other personnel documents, when viewed in light of the
online security procedures employed, prove that Ms. Mitchell agreed
to sign the onboarding documents electronically and assented to the
terms of the Arbitration Agreement.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) reflects a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. By providing
that arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon any grounds as exist at law or in equity,
the Act places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts and requires courts to enforce them according to
their terms.

The Formation of the Arbitration Agreement

As noted above, when a party moves to compel arbitration under the
FAA, that moving party bears the initial burden of presenting
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the formation of an agreement to
arbitrate under applicable state law, which the parties here agree
is D.C. law. To meet this burden, Craftworks originally submitted a
declaration by its Director of Human Resources, Ms. Fulmer, which
states that, based on Ms. Fulmer's personal review of business
records. Plaintiff Vasiliki Mitchell entered into a written Mutual
Arbitration Agreement with CraftWorks.

The submitted Arbitration Agreement containing Ms. Mitchell's
electronic signature is  a one-page, standalone document, which
greatly reduces the risk that she could have electronically signed
unwittingly. If the Court was presented with an agreement to
arbitrate that was one inconspicuous provision of an extended form
contract, the Court's view might be different, particularly because
the DCUETA cautions that a party that agrees to conduct a
transaction by electronic means may refuse to conduct other
transactions by electronic means.

This case does not present that concern, though, and given the
simplicity of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court thinks that Ms.
Mitchell's electronic signature, in and of itself, shows that she
consented to conduct this particular transaction electronically.
Thus, Craftworks's evidence, while not exhaustive, is alone
sufficient to demonstrate the formation of an agreement to
arbitrate and shift the burden to Ms. Mitchell.  

Turning to Ms. Mitchell's evidence, it does little to challenge the
idea that she agreed to conduct this transaction by electronic
means and that she electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement.
She states that she does not remember signing an authorization to
sign documents electronically, but as explained above, an express
agreement to conduct transactions electronically is not necessary
under the DCUETA. She also acknowledges that, in October and early
November 2016, she signed many `onboarding' forms in order to
initiate her employment and that she signed certain of these
onboarding documents electronically. Instead of creating doubt,
this admission only lends further support to the Court's initial
conclusion that Ms. Mitchell agreed to conduct the transaction by
electronic means.

Critically, Ms. Mitchell does not outright deny that she
electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement either; she merely
states that she has no recollection of signing, reading, or
negotiating it. Given the evidence that Craftworks submitted, this
qualified denial is not enough to create a genuine dispute
regarding her assent to the Agreement. Rather, to defeat
Craftworks's motion, Ms. Mitchell must make an unequivocal denial
that an arbitration agreement exists and must also show sufficient
facts in support.

She has done neither.

In sum, then, regardless of whether the Court considers
Craftworks's reply evidence, it finds that Craftworks has met its
burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
formation of an agreement to arbitrate. Ms. Mitchell, meanwhile,
may not remember signing the Arbitration Agreement, but she has not
produced any evidence that casts doubt on the Agreement's
existence.

Thus, the Court concludes that she has failed to establish a
genuine dispute as to the Agreement's formation.

The Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement

Ms. Mitchell also argues that the terms of the Agreement are
unenforceable. As alluded to above, this contention focuses on
Craftworks's Team Member Handbook, which includes an
Acknowledgement of Receipt form providing that Craftworks retains
the sole right to modify, suspend, interpret, or cancel in whole,
or in part, any of its published or unpublished company guidelines
or practices without advance notice and without having to give
justification.

The executed Arbitration Agreement, meanwhile, is, on its face, a
standalone, enforceable document that does not reference the
Handbook. Ms. Mitchell does not allege that the Agreement was
provided to her at the same time that she was presented the
Handbook or that Craftworks treated the two documents as
interdependent. The Agreement provides that Craftworks and Ms.
Mitchell each agree to resolve [the covered] disputes through
binding arbitration before an arbitrator experienced in employment
law. And nowhere in the Agreement does Craftworks retain the right
to modify or revoke its half of this promise. That each party takes
on reciprocal obligations is sufficient consideration to make the
Agreement an enforceable contract.  Craftworks's performance under
the Agreement therefore is not optional, and its promise is not
illusory.

Taking all of this together, the Handbook advises employees of
Craftworks's general practices and policies without obligating
Craftworks to maintain those practices in the future. But
Craftworks's right to modify, suspend, interpret, or cancel its
policies does not override its preexisting, independent contractual
obligations. Thus, though Craftworks may, for instance, suddenly
decide to stop presenting its new hires with arbitration
agreements, it still must perform under all of the arbitration
agreements it has already executed including the Arbitration
Agreement with Ms. Mitchell.

Regardless of what the Handbook says, Craftworks is bound by its
promise to arbitrate under the Arbitration Agreement, and the
Agreement is enforceable.

Craftworks's Litigation Conduct and the Issue of Waiver of
Arbitration Rights

Ms. Mitchell makes one other argument as to why the Court should
not enforce the Arbitration Agreement an argument that has thus far
gone unmentioned. She contends that Craftworks has waived its right
to arbitration by asking this Court to strike her collective action
claim and force her to proceed on an individual basis.  

The only question for the Court is whether Craftworks's error of
initially asking for judicial action on class availability
constitutes conduct that waives its right to arbitration. The Court
has little trouble concluding that no waiver occurred. A party
waives its right to arbitration by acting `inconsistently with the
arbitration right. When determining whether a party has so acted,
the inquiry is "inherently fact-bound and involves few bright-line
rules.   

Rather, courts look at the totality of the circumstances . They
assess, among other things, whether a party timely sought
arbitration; whether the party now moving for arbitration engaged
in litigation activity that induced the other party and `the
district court to expend time and effort on disputes, the
resolution of which would not' move the dispute toward arbitration;
and whether the party opposing arbitration would suffer prejudice
from the movant's delay in seeking arbitration.

None of these considerations weigh in favor of waiver in this case.
Notwithstanding its initial error regarding class availability,
Craftworks still sought to compel arbitration promptly; it filed
its motion to compel in place of filing an answer to Ms. Mitchell's
complaint. Though its erroneous request for relief may have caused
Ms. Mitchell to expend some time and effort responding in her
memorandum in opposition, any such time and effort was surely
minimal. And given that Craftworks has withdrawn the erroneous
request, it has not caused the Court to devote time and resources
to an issue that does move the dispute toward arbitration.

In short, Craftworks did not substantially invoke the litigation
machinery before communicating its intention to arbitrate. Thus,
taking into account the totality of the circumstances, Craftworks
has not waived its right to arbitration, and, for the reasons
provided above, it is entitled to enforcement of the Arbitration
Agreement.

The Court's Authority to Compel Arbitration Outside of the District
of Columbia

Having concluded that an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists,
the Court is required under Section 3 of the FAA to stay all
proceedings related to Ms. Mitchell's lawsuit until arbitration has
completed.

Under Section 4 of the FAA, the Court also has the general
authority to issue an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration
Agreement. But Section 4 includes an important limitation on that
authority: it provides that the resulting arbitration proceedings
shall be within the district in which the petition for an order
directing such arbitration was filed.  

Here, this limitation is relevant because the Arbitration Agreement
between Craftworks and Ms. Mitchell contemplates arbitration taking
place outside the District of Columbia. The Agreement states that
arbitration will be conducted in Denver County, Colorado or
Hamilton County, Tennessee, unless otherwise mutually agreed.

In other words, if the Court were to enforce the Arbitration
Agreement by its terms and order arbitration in one of the
designated forums, the Court would potentially exceed its statutory
authority. The D.C. Circuit has not yet confirmed this concern, but
multiple other courts of appeals have, holding that where parties
have agreed to arbitrate in a particular forum only a district
court in that forum has authority to compel arbitration under
Section 4. The Court agrees that this is the correct
interpretation. The relevant part of Section 4 uses mandatory
language, and any other construction renders that language
meaningless.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8ehchda
from Leagle.com.

VASILIKI MITCHELL, Plaintiff, represented by Nicholas A. Migliaccio
-- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP, Seth
Richard Lesser , BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN, LLP, Bethany
A. Hilbert , HEAD LAW FIRM, LLC, pro hac vice, Charles Andrew Head
, HEAD LAW FIRM, LLC, 8730 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 210, Beverly
Hills, California 90211, pro hac vice & Jason Samuel Rathod --
jrathod@classlawdc.com -- MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP.

CRAFTWORKS RESTAURANTS & BREWERIES, INC., doing business as GORDON
BIERSCH BREWERY RESTAURANT, Defendant, represented by Joshua B.
Waxman -- arobinson@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. & Sarah
Elizabeth Henninger -- lhenninger@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C..


CRAWFORD & CO: Court Determines Settlement Administrator's Role
---------------------------------------------------------------
Epiq, in an article for JDSupra, reports that settlement
administrators often play a crucial role in reaching and finalizing
class action settlements. These administrators can help efficiently
manage settlements by ensuring precision and thoroughness. If a
firm has not retained an administrator to help with a class action,
there is a good chance that the court will appoint one. A court in
Canada recently determined what obligations a class action
settlement administrator has when evaluating an individual Class
Member's claim. The court concluded that the settlement agreement
terms will play the biggest part in establishing an administrator's
role. (DePagie v Crawford & Company Inc., 2018 ABCA 326)

Summary of DePagie Decision Affecting Class Action Settlement
Administration
The DePagie decision stems from a class action lawsuit centered on
blood transfusions that transmitted Hepatitis-C to several
individuals treated in Canada. The class action spanned over
multiple jurisdictions for several years, yielding a number of
settlements. The settlement in question listed six disease levels
where compensation increased at each level. The Class Member
submitted a claim seeking compensation, which the court approved in
May 2010 at level 2 based on his physician's evaluation.

The claimant passed away in March 2012. His son, as the estate's
personal representative, asked the court for leave to sue the
settlement administrator based on improper evaluation. The estate
argued that the claimant should have received compensated at a
level 3 and that the administrator had a duty under the settlement
agreement to delve further into the claim. The chambers judge
analyzed the request for leave based on whether the estate would
have a "reasonable possibility of success" if the action proceeded.
The judge denied the petition for leave and the estate appealed to
the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The estate maintained that the court should have evaluated the
petition under the "actionable wrong" test, which was a much lower
standard. The appellate judge dismissed the appeal and concluded
that the chambers judge applied the correct test, explaining:

The "reasonable possibility of success" test is consistent with the
purposes that are served by class action settlement agreements;
namely certainty and finality. Pretrial settlement of class
proceedings is in the public interest, as it reduces legal costs
and enables efficient use of court resources.

Applying a lesser test would defeat the gate-keeping function for
class action settlements, the purpose of which is to maintain the
integrity of settlements and ensure conclusiveness. The court also
agreed with the chambers judge, who concluded that the settlement
administrator fulfilled their duties under the agreement. In short,
the claimant's physician was the party who was responsible under
the settlement agreement for determining disease level, and the
administrator was not required to challenge this qualified and
complete determination or independently investigate.

How This Decision Affects Future Class Action Settlement Disputes
This decision will significantly affect Canadian litigators and
settlement administrators who deal with class actions. In the
present case, the estate pointed out that a Canadian court has
never decisively determined what an administrator's duties are
under settlement agreements. Even though the petition was denied,
the court still offered guidance about the extent of these duties.
The important takeaways are:

    1. When determining whether to authorize suit against an
administrator, courts should give significant weight to the
underlying objective of maintaining finality for class action
settlement agreements.
   2. Courts should look to the text of the specific settlement
agreement at issue to ascertain an administrator's duties. If the
settlement agreement does not impose certain obligations on the
administrator, courts should not hold them responsible for
performing these additional duties.
   3. Courts should continue to analyze challenges against
administrators under a stricter standard so only claims with merit
will be approved for further litigation.

After a class action ensues, the members, parties, administrator,
and court have the same goal: reaching a favorable conclusion in
order to remedy any wrongdoings in a fair and just manner.
Administrators are an important element to the class action process
that help carry out this objective. Since there are so many moving
parts in class action proceedings, it makes sense that the court
would confine an administrator's duties to what the parties agreed
upon in the written agreement. Placing extra duties requiring
settlement administrators to essentially doubt the role of others
(here, the physician) would open the floodgates for endless
challenges and never provide finality for the Class Members and
defendants. [GN]


CREDIT PROTECTION: Court Grants Filing of Amended FDCPA Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion granting in part Plaintiffs' Motion
to File a First Amended Complaint in the case captioned ELIZABETH
McROBIE, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
No. 5:18-cv-00566. (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff filed a Motion to File a First Amended Complaint together
with a proposed Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff Elizabeth McRobie alleges that Defendant Credit
Protection Association sent her and similarly situated people a
mailer that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
in numerous ways.

The proposed Amended Complaint adds additional factual allegations
learned during discovery and includes two new counts not present in
the original Complaint that allege violations of two additional
provisions of the FDCPA. Additionally, the proposed Amended
Complaint contains a narrowed class definition which restricts the
class membership to residents of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or
Delaware.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendment of pleading.
Under Rule 15(a), a court should grant a party's motion for leave
to amend where justice so requires. In determining if justice
requires that the court allow the amendment, the court may consider
undue delay, bad faith, prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility.

Undue Delay/Bad Faith

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's proposed amendment is
unduly delayed because Plaintiff moves to add claims that she could
have brought at the beginning of this litigation. However,
Plaintiff has sought leave to amend her complaint within the window
this Court set to allow amendment of pleadings. Thus, her motion
for leave to amend is not unduly delayed.  

Nor has the Defendant shown any evidence of bad faith or improper
motive on the Plaintiff's part. Although the Defendant argues that
the Plaintiff knew of all the facts underlying her proposed amended
claims at the outset of the litigation, the Plaintiff explains that
her new claims only became viable after certain details became
clear during discovery. Specifically, the Plaintiff states that she
confirmed during discovery that the numerical code displayed on the
mailer corresponded to the creditor on whose behalf the Defendant
sent the particular mailer and that the Defendant did not send the
mailer on behalf of any government entity. This explanation is at
least plausible, and previous courts have accepted similar
explanations for delayed requests for leave to amend.  This Court
can discern no improper motive on the Plaintiff's part that would
justify denying leave to amend.

Prejudice to Defendant

Prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial
of an amendment. When evaluating prejudice, the Third Circuit
considers whether amendment would impair the non-moving party's
ability to present its case. Specifically, courts consider whether
the amendment would force the opponent to expend significant
additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, as
well as whether it would significantly delay resolution of the
action. Defendant offers no argument as to how amended pleadings
would impair its ability to present its case, nor can this Court
discern any way that amendment would prejudice the Defendant.

This factor favors granting leave to amend.

Futility

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a
consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the
defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a
debt as the FDCPA defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a
provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.  

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not alleged
sufficiently that the Defendant violated the FDCPA and therefore
has not satisfied the fourth element. The Plaintiff responds that
she has stated claims for violations of two separate provisions of
the FDCPA.

Amendment is futile with respect to Count III of the Plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint because she has not stated a claim under
Section 1692e(9).

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of a debt and lists specific examples of prohibited
conduct.  Among these examples is the use or distribution of any
written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to
be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court,
official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which
creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or
approval.

In Count III of her proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims
that Defendant violated this section by sending Plaintiff a mailer
with OFFICIAL NOTICE written on the front exterior in red, white,
and blue font, together with the phrase IMPORTANT INFORMATION
ENCLOSED. Plaintiff contends that this language and font simulates
and/or falsely represents that the mailers were authorized, issued,
or approved by a court, official, or agency of the United States or
a State.

By contrast, the mailer Plaintiff received does not look like a
government document. Although it bears the designation Official
Notice and uses red, white, and blue font, the mailer contains no
features that suggest it was sent by a government agency or that
resemble official court documents. Nor does it suggest in any way
that Defendant sent it on behalf of a specific government entity.

Moreover, the mailer bears the Defendant's logo, a return address
listing the return addressee as Credit Protection Association, LP
and a logo stating that Defendant is a member of the International
Association of Credit and Collections Professionals. Despite the
mailer's patriotic color scheme, even the least sophisticated
consumer would recognize it as coming from a collections agency and
not the government.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim under Section 1692e(9). Amendment is futile and will
be denied with respect to Count III of Plaintiff's proposed Amended
Complaint.

Amendment is not futile with respect to Count II of Plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint because Plaintiff has stated a claim
under Section 1692f(8).

The Plaintiff also seeks leave to add a claim under Section
1692f(8), which prohibits using any language or symbol, other than
the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating
with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram. Plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint asserts that Defendant violated this
section by including on the front of its mailer a numerical code
that corresponds to the creditor on whose behalf Defendant sought
to collect the debt.  

The Defendant argues that the numerical code on the mailer in this
case is benign. The Defendant contends that the numeric code does
not disclose Plaintiff's financial predicament or invade her
privacy and emphasizes that a third party viewing the mailer would
not understand the numeric code or conclude that the mailer was a
debt collection letter.
  
Nor does Defendant offer a persuasive reason to depart from
Douglass. It is doubtful whether, even if the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals did adopt a benign language exception, it would sweep
broadly enough to include the text at issue here. Indeed, Douglass
recognized that courts should not interpret Section 1692f(8) to
create absurd results. 765 F.3d at 306 n.9. The Supreme Court has
long recognized the canon against absurdities as a necessary
accommodation of the fact that laws operate in the real world, and
has cautioned courts not to adopt statutory constructions that
would put a stop to the ordinary business of life. If a literal
construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be
so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the
words.

However, courts should employ the canon only where the result of
applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd,
i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have
intended the result and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as
to be obvious to most anyone.

This Court, too, can only construe the law, and is bound by the
language of the statue and the Third Circuit's decision in
Douglass. Applying Section 1692f(8) in this case does not yield an
absurd result, so this Court will enforce the plain language of the
statute, which prohibits Defendant from printing the numerical
code. Plaintiff has stated a FDCPA claim under Section 1692f(8), so
amendment is not futile and will be permitted with respect to Count
II of the proposed Amended Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 29, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8x5n7mq from Leagle.com.

ELIZABETH MCROBIE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by JOSHUA MARKOVITS , LEMBERG LAW
LLC & SERGEI LEMBERG, LEMBERG LAW LLC.

CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Defendant, represented by JUSTIN M.
PENN -- jpenn@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP, ERICK V.
VIOLAGO -- eviolago@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS
LEDVA & MEYERS, LLP,GEORGE W. VOKOLOS --
gvokolos@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA &
MEYERS & JASON G. WEHRLE -- jwehrle@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER
SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA & MEYERS, LLP.


DEVON ENERGY: 5th Cir. Flips Class Certification in Seeligson Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HENRY SEELIGSON; JOHN M. SEELIGSON; SUZANNE SEELIGSON
NASH; SHERRI PILCHER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P., Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 17-10320
(5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's order granting the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.

The Plaintiffs-Appellees in the class action case are royalty
owners who allege that Defendant-Appellant, Devon Energy Production
Company, L.P. ("DEPCO"), breached its royalty obligations by
violating the duty to market implied in the class members' mineral
leases.  According to the Plaintiffs, DEPCO breached this duty by
selling the raw, unprocessed gas to its corporate affiliate at the
wellheads at a price artificially reduced by an unreasonably high
processing fee.  They aver that DEPCO then passed this processing
fee on to the royalty owners.

The Plaintiffs sought to certify a class comprising royalty owners
who claim that their royalty payments were reduced by DEPCO's
pricing scheme.  

The district court held an evidentiary hearing, then certified the
Class of all person or entities who, between Jan. 1, 2008 and Feb.
28, 2014, (i) are or were royalty owners in Texas wells producing
natural gas that was processed through the Bridgeport Gas
Processing Plant by Devon Gas Services, LP (DGS); (ii) received
royalties from Devon Production Company, L.P. (DEPCO) on such gas;
and (iii) had oil and gas leases that were on one of the specific
forms.

DEPCO now appeals the district court's certification decision.

The Appellate Court finds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the Plaintiffs satisfied Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23's commonality requirement.  Because the court
failed to address whether the applicable statute of limitations and
potential tolling questions would raise individual issues, it
abused its discretion in certifying the class as written.  The
Fifth Circuit therefore reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DaLPvG from Leagle.com.

Craig A. Haynes -- Craig.Haynes@tklaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

George L. McWilliams, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jeffrey Charles King, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Pervis Jefferson Ballew, Jr. -- Jeff.Ballew@tklaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Brad E. Seidel, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard Barrett Phillips, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.

David J. Drez, III -- david.drez@wickphillips.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Edward W. Ciolko, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Geoffrey C. Jarvis, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elizabeth L. Tiblets, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Julie Christine Abernethy -- Julie.Abernethy@tklaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Britton Dale McClung, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Joshua L. Hedrick, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Donald Mattson Keil -- mkeil@kglawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brian L. Cramer -- brian@mroklaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Tyler Shoop , for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Melissa L. Troutner , for Plaintiff-Appellee.


DJ KHALED: Faces Class Suit as Endorser of Crypto Scam
------------------------------------------------------
XBT Network reports that according to news published by TMZ, DJ
Khaled and Floyd Mayweather face a class action lawsuit resulting
from their role as high-profile endorsers of the multi-million
dollar crypto scam.

Both celebrities were on the forefront of trumping up support for
the coin on social media, allegedly taking advantage of their
massive influence and millions of fans to get people investing in
the token sale.

At the time of the 2017 ICO, DJ Khaled (in a post that has since
been deleted shown below) reached out to about 12 million Instagram
fans and referred to the Centra ICO as a "game changer."

In a September tweet, DJ Khaled touted Centra's debit card and
wallet app, writing on Instagram that Centra Card was the"ultimate
winner in Cryptocurrency debit cards."

Mayweather, then an undisputed boxing champion, advertised Centra
Coin on Twitter and Instagram. He told about 8 million of his
Twitter followers to "get" the token before missing out.

He wrote:

"Centra's ICO starts in a few hours. Get yours before they sell
out, I got mine."

The U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then issued a
warning to celebrities from endorsing ICOs, saying that such
actions could be liable for court action if deemed "unlawful."

The SEC said at the time that ICO endorsements by celebrities could
violate federal securities laws where those involved failed to
disclose any arrangements regarding the nature, source, and amount
of money paid as compensation.

CENTRA TECH - A CRYPTO SCAM

The class-action lawsuit follows on an earlier indictment where the
founders Sohrab Sharma and Robert Farkas faced charges of
committing securities fraud, wire fraud, and intentionally
misleading investors.

The SEC accusation against the ICO team was that its promoters
touted "nonexistent relationships" between the ICO and some
well-known financial institutions. These actions were calculated
towards hoodwinking the public.

While promoting Centra before the token sale, the founders had
claimed partnerships were in place with both Visa and Mastercard,
and that they would soon launch a crypto debit card.

Sharma had reportedly said at the time:

"Internationally we currently have our license with Mastercard to
service international clients; domestically we have a Visa
partnership, so we're able to issue Visa cards domestically."

Visa later refuted the claims, going on to issue a cease-and-desist
letter to the startup's founders.

In its filing, the SEC said that both Sharma and Farkas were
"reckless" or "negligent," essentially saying they knew there was
no relationship between their ICO and either of Visa or
Mastercard.

The Centra Tech team had even put up a fake front, appointing a
non-existent CEO to lend the project more credibility. In June, a
magistrate's report that declared the CTR token was a securities
token under federal laws.

Investors in the ICO filed a lawsuit against the crypto platform,
claiming that Centra Tech had violated federal securities laws. The
lawsuit sought compensation for the losses, which at the time was
over $67 million.

The Centra Tech founders face a jail term for the fraud, while the
lawsuit's details indicate that investors want DJ Khaled and Floyd
Mayweather to pay for damages.

CENTRA TECH REFUTES FRAUD CHARGES IN AUGUST BLOG POST

In a post titled Dear Centra Community -- Let the Truth be known,
the author claims that the SEC's charges were bogus:

"We allege, think, and/orbelieve that the comments from SEC Chief
of Enforcement, Robert Cohen, regarding our technology are down
right wrong. "

The author explains that Centra was, in fact, working with the SEC
and intended to refund ICO investors. The company was ordered by
the SEC that they couldn't spend the funds raised during the ICO,
which they claim they didn't.

With regards to the false claims about fake contracts with credit
card processors, the company explained:

"One processor who was supposed to issue our branded Visa cards
domestically, and one processor that was going to issue our
white-label MasterCard worldwide (the black cards that ICO
contributors have gotten since Dec 2017..that actually worked
unlike the false statements made). The processor we had to issue
our branded US based Visa cards had told us since on or around
August of 2017 we were "all good to go," sent us contracts and term
sheets, etc."

We will keep monitoring the situation and the outcome of the
class-action lawsuit against the two high-profile celebrities.
[GN]


EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Appeal in 401(k) Plan-Related Suit Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Edison International said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the plaintiff in
the Edison 401(k)Savings Plan-related suit has appealed the
judgment of the federal court.

In November 2015, a purported class action lawsuit was filed in
federal court against Edison International, its then Chief
Executive Officer and its Treasurer by an Edison International
employee, alleging claims under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act. The complaint purports to be filed on behalf of a
class of Edison International employees who were participants in
the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan and invested in the Edison
International Stock Fund between March 27, 2014 and June 24, 2015.


The complaint alleges that defendants breached their fiduciary
duties because they knew or should have known that investment in
the Edison International Stock Fund was imprudent because the price
of Edison International common stock was artificially inflated due
to Edison International's alleged failure to disclose certain ex
parte communications with California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) decision-makers related to the San Onofre OII.

In July 2016, the federal court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the lawsuit with an opportunity for the plaintiff to amend
her complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in July 2016,
which dismissed Edison International as a named defendant and the
remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss in August 2016. In
June 2017, the federal court again granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the lawsuit with an opportunity for the plaintiff to amend
her complaint.

Plaintiff filed another amended complaint in July 2017. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and, in May 2018,
the federal court again granted defendants' motion to dismiss the
lawsuit with an opportunity for the plaintiff to amend her
complaint. Plaintiff elected not to amend her complaint and the
federal court granted judgment in favor of the defendants in August
2018. Plaintiff has appealed the judgment.

Edison International, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the
United States. It generates electricity through hydroelectric,
diesel/liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, nuclear, and photovoltaic
sources. Edison International was founded in 1886 and is based in
Rosemead, California.


EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Appeal in Securities Class Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------------------
Edison International said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the plaintiff in
the purported securities class suit has appealed the dismissal of
its complaint.

In July 2015, a purported securities class action lawsuit was filed
in federal court against Edison International, its then Chief
Executive Officer and its then Chief Financial Officer. The
complaint was later amended to include Southern California Edison
Company's (SCE's) former President as a defendant.

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants violated the securities
laws by failing to disclose that Edison International had ex parte
contacts with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
decision-makers regarding the San Onofre OII that were either
unreported or more extensive than initially reported. The complaint
covers a class of persons who acquired Edison International common
stock between March 21, 2014 and August 10, 2015.

In September 2016, the federal court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint, with an opportunity for plaintiff to amend
the complaint. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in
October 2016, which the federal court dismissed again with an
opportunity for the plaintiff to amend the complaint. Plaintiff
filed a third amended complaint in May 2017.

In March 2018, the federal court dismissed the third amended
complaint with prejudice and entered judgment in defendants' favor.
Plaintiff has appealed the dismissal.

Edison International, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the
United States. It generates electricity through hydroelectric,
diesel/liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, nuclear, and photovoltaic
sources. Edison International was founded in 1886 and is based in
Rosemead, California.


EDISON INTERNATIONAL: Faces 102 Suits Related to Thomas Fire
------------------------------------------------------------
Edison International said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company,
together with Southern California Edison Company (SCE), is facing
102 lawsuits related to Thomas Fire.

As of October 26, 2018, Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
was aware of at least 102 lawsuits, representing approximately
2,000 plaintiffs, related to the Thomas Fire naming SCE as a
defendant. Thirty-eight of these lawsuits also name Edison
International as a defendant and at least four of the lawsuits were
filed as purported class actions. The lawsuits, which have been
filed in the superior courts of Ventura, Santa Barbara and Los
Angeles Counties allege, among other things, negligence, inverse
condemnation, trespass, private nuisance, and violations of the
public utilities and health and safety codes.

By order of the Chair of the California Judicial Council, the
lawsuits have been coordinated in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

Edison International, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the
United States. It generates electricity through hydroelectric,
diesel/liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, nuclear, and photovoltaic
sources. Edison International was founded in 1886 and is based in
Rosemead, California.

EMERY FEDERAL: Court Approves $9MM Settlement in Palombaro Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of Emery Federal Credit Union Class Action
Settlement in the case captioned Frank A. and Shelly Palombaro,
Jr., Plaintiffs, v. Emery Federal Credit Union, Defendant. Case No.
1:15-cv-792. (S.D.Ohio).

This case involves an alleged mortgage kickback scheme in which
Genuine Title, LLC (Genuine Title) by itself and through sham
companies, provided cash payments, marketing materials, and other
benefits to mortgage brokers employed by Emery Federal Credit Union
(Emery). In return, the Emery mortgage brokers referred clients to
Genuine Title for title and settlement services. This scheme is
alleged to violate the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA)

Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement

Settlement Agreement Terms

The Settlement Agreement establishes a $9,000,000 common fund of
which the Emery Class will receive a proportionate share after the
deduction for payment of a settlement administrator, payment of
class counsel's costs, expenses, and fees, and payment of class
representatives' service awards.

Class counsel may petition the court for approval of attorneys'
fees and expenses not to exceed 30% of the common fund and for
expenses actually incurred, and class representatives may petition
the Court for service awards not to exceed $5,000 per award.
Plaintiffs estimate that taking all the deductions into
consideration, class members are projected to recover approximately
$1,160 per loan.

Final Approval Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)

In determining whether the terms of the settlement are fair,
reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23, the Court considers several
factors, including: (1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the
amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood
of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and
class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members;
and (7) the public interest.  

The Court finds that all of these criteria are met here, for the
reasons set forth by class counsel in their brief and as stated on
the record at the final approval hearing.

First, the risk of fraud or collusion is low, as the parties'
negotiations were at arms-length and preceded by adversarial
litigation, including disputed briefing over dismissal and class
certification. Plaintiffs spent months investigating Genuine
Title's practices and developing their claims through extensive
discovery practice. Settlement was reached after a full-day
conference with Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman, which reflect
the arms-length nature of such negotiations.  

Second, the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
underlying litigation supports approval as well. Taking this case
to trial presented serious risks to both class members and Emery.

Discovery and motion practice have been contentious, and Emery
raised limitations and other affirmative defenses. In addition,
both parties faced the complexity and logistical difficulty of
trying a 5,000-member class action to a jury. Emery's petition to
the Sixth Circuit also was pending at the time the parties reached
settlement. Plaintiffs' expert advised that if Plaintiffs succeeded
on appeal and recovered a judgment greater than the settlement
amount, such a judgment would have likely resulted in Emery's
involuntary liquidation by its regulator, the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), and rendered the judgment uncollectible.

Thus, this Settlement Agreement secures a tangible recovery while
avoiding the significant regulatory risk Plaintiffs faced if they
succeeded at trial. In addition, the settlement avoids the
additional fees, costs, and delay of an appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, which likely would have added years to recovery.

Third, the discovery engaged in by the parties to date has been
extensive and weighs in favor of final approval. Discovery involved
tremendous efforts to uncover the size and scope of the alleged
scheme, which was detailed at length at the final fairness hearing.
Class counsel represent that they served 39 third-party records
subpoenas, reviewed tens of thousands of bank records and loan
documents, conducted thirteen depositions, and conducted land
records research across more than twenty-five states. This
discovery was instrumental in allowing Plaintiffs to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses to make an
informed decision regarding settlement.

Fourth, the settlement provides relief to class members and
eliminates the risks of trial. Although success at trial could have
yielded treble damages, class members faced a risk of not being
able to recover any potential judgment, as previously noted.

Fifth, class counsel and class representatives find the settlement
to be fair and favorable, which weighs in favor of approval.

Sixth, there have been no objections to the settlement, and one
exclusion request has been submitted by Dean and Dolores Bakken.
The class members on 5,289 out of 5,290 class loans have sought to
participate in the settlement, which the Court interprets as
demonstrating satisfaction among class members.

Thus, factors four, five, and six weigh in favor of approval.

Finally, seventh, the settlement serves the public interest by
ensuring a real recovery to the maximum number of affected
consumers, conserving resources of the parties and the Court,
eliminating the risk of non-recovery, and protecting consumers from
the harm of unnecessarily high settlement charges and abusive
practices. This factor, too, weighs in favor of approval.

In all, the Court is satisfied that the settlement is certainly
fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23.

Notice and Objections

The Court concludes that the settlement administrator has timely
completed the notice plan described in the Settlement Agreement by
the timely mailing of the Court-approved mailed notice to the
members of the Emery Class and by establishing the settlement
website. Further, Emery has complied with 28 U.S.C.  Section 1715
and Section 17.2 of the Settlement Agreement by sending a Notice of
Proposed Class Action Settlement to all required agencies under the
Class Action Fairness Act, and none of the notice recipients have
filed objections to the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yalro9ww from Leagle.com.

Edward J. Fangman, Vickie Fangman, Damon M. Oliver, Betty M.
Howard, Clayton J. Anthony, Janice M. Manuel, Eric L. Haynes,
Joseph J. Quinn, Deloris F. Woods, Jameson Cooper, Katherine
Cooper, Geraldine R. Walters, Rose A. Lease, James Pipp, Dana Pipp,
Lawrence Crupi, Concetta Crupi, Charles Milburn, Frank Cherry,
Sammie Cherry, Helen L. Householder, Barbara J. Boyd, Preston
Johnson, Beatrice Johnson, Gerald Jones, Ann Jones, John Mahoney,
Tinna Mahoney, Patricia Gibson, Bruce Eisenstein, Margaret
Eisenstein, Claude Monegeon, Carol J. Shaw, Lusetha Rolle, Patricia
M. Marshall, Ruby B. Coggins, John H. Reinheimer, Jamie B.
Reinheimer, Jill Monegeon & Gerald F. Coggins, Plaintiffs,
represented by Gregory Michael Utter -- gmutter@kmklaw.com --
Keating Muething & Klekamp, Melissa L. English --
menglish@sgs-law.com -- pro hac vice, Michael Paul Smith --
mpsmith@sgs-law.com -- Smith Gildea and Schmidt LLC, pro hac vice,
Sarah A. Zadrozny -- szadrozny@sgs-law.com -- Smith, Gildea &
Schmidt, LLC, pro hac vice, Timothy Francis Maloney --
tmaloney@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA, pro hac vice
& Veronica Byam Nannis -- vnannis@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald
and Laake PA, pro hac vice.

Frank A. Palombaro, Jr., David Alvarado, Shelly Palombaro & Melinda
Alvarado, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory Michael Utter ,
Keating Muething & Klekamp, Melissa L. English , pro hac vice,
Melissa Schaub Matthews , Keating Muething & Klekamp, PLL, Michael
Paul Smith , Smith Gildea and Schmidt LLC, pro hac vice, Sarah A.
Zadrozny , Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC, pro hac vice, Timothy
Francis Maloney , Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA, pro hac vice
&Veronica Byam Nannis , Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA, pro hac
vice.

Emery Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Carolyn Ann
Taggart -- ctaggart@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris &
Arthur, LLP, David M. Souders -- souders@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner
Brodsky Kider PC, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Paul Blackwood --
blackwood@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, pro hac vice &
Michael Yaakov Kieval -- brodsky@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner Brodsky
Kider PC, pro hac vice.

Jennifer L McAlpin, Defendant, represented by Gregory Michael Utter
, Keating Muething & Klekamp.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Awaits Court Decision on Plaintiffs' Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
is awaiting the court's decision in the plaintiffs' appeal in the,
In re Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litigation (consolidating John
Doe One and John Doe Two v. Express Scripts, Inc. and Karen
Burnett, Brendan Farrell, and Robert Shullich v. Express Scripts,
Inc. and Anthem, Inc.).

Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint on behalf of health plan beneficiaries who are enrolled
in health care plans that are insured or administered by Anthem.
Plaintiffs allege that the Company and Anthem breached fiduciary
duties and otherwise violated their legal obligations under ERISA,
that the Company engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud and other
racketeering activity through its invoicing system with Anthem,
that the Company breached its contract with Anthem, that plaintiffs
are entitled to equitable relief under theories including unjust
enrichment, that the Company violated unfair and deceptive trade
practices statutes, that Anthem breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in health plans, and that ESI violated the
anti-discrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act.

Plaintiffs adopt many of Anthem's Allegations in support of their
claim. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, declaratory relief,
equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company's motion to dismiss was granted on January 5, 2018. On
April 11, 2018, plaintiffs filed an appellate brief. On May 2,
2018, an amicus brief in support of appellants was filed by the
American Association of Retired Persons and National Employment
Lawyers Association. On May 30, 2018, appellees' briefs were filed.


On June 20, 2018, an amicus brief in support of appellees was filed
by Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Association of
Health Insurance Plans, and the Chamber of Commerce. On July 5,
2018, appellants filed a reply brief, and the appeal is now fully
briefed.

Express Scripts said, "The court held oral argument on October 19,
2018 and we await the court's decision."

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Bewley Suit Underway in District of New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court
granted defendants' motion to transfer the Michael Bewley, et al.
v. CVS Health Corporation, et al. action to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, where it remains
pending.

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the defendants entered into
"exclusionary" agreements that granted exclusive formulary
placement for certain glucagon products in return for higher rebate
payments. The complaint alleges that these agreements had the
effect of driving up the costs of such products for the putative
class members and violated Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act,
RICO, ERISA and the competition and consumer protection laws of
various states, U.S. territories and the District of Columbia.

Plaintiffs seek treble damages, equitable relief and attorneys'
fees and costs.

On November 7, 2017, the court granted defendants' motion to
transfer this action to the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.  No further updates were provided in the
Company's SEC report.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Claims in EpiPen ERISA Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
defendants' motion to dismiss in the case, In re: EpiPen ERISA
Litigation, has been granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint on April 2,
2018, alleging that defendants violated legal obligations under The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by
negotiating increasingly large rebates from Mylan, which allegedly
caused an increase in the price of EpiPen products. Plaintiffs
further allege that defendants retained a significant portion of
rebates, rather than passing them on to class members (who are
participants in, or beneficiaries of, health insurance plans
governed by ERISA who purchased EpiPen products).

On June 1, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted in part and denied in part on October 26, 2018.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Continues to Defend Beeman Suit
------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Jerry Beeman, et
al. v. Caremark, et al.  

Plaintiffs allege that the Company and the other defendants failed
to comply with statutory obligations to provide California clients
with the results of a bi-annual survey of retail drug prices.

On November 14, 2016, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion
for class certification, holding that the proposed class
representatives and counsel were inadequate to represent a class.
On October 6, 2017, defendants moved for sanctions against
plaintiffs for destroying evidence, requesting the case be
dismissed with prejudice, which the court granted on January 4,
2018.

On August 21, 2018, plaintiffs filed an appellate brief. On October
22, 2018, appellees’ brief was filed.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Multiple Suits Related to Cigna Merger Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
is facing securities class actions suits related to its merger with
Cigna Corporation.

On March 8, 2018, the company entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger, as amended by Amendment No. 1, dated as of June 27, 2018,
and as it may be further amended from time to time (the "Merger
Agreement"), with Cigna Corporation ("Cigna") and certain
subsidiaries of Cigna whereby Cigna will acquire Express Scripts
Holding Company ("Express Scripts" or the "Company") in a cash and
stock transaction valued on announcement at approximately $67.0
billion, including Cigna's assumption of approximately $15.0
billion in Express Scripts debt.

The company is the subject of shareholder securities cases relating
to the proposed merger with Cigna, including:

Abraham Neufeld, et al, v. Express Scripts Holding Company, et al.;
Lawrence Zucker, et al. v. Express Scripts Holding Company, et al.;
Walter Stern, et al. v. Express Scripts Holding Company, et al.;
Kurt Wilson, et al. v. Express Scripts Holding Company, et al.;
Phillip Buckingham, et al. v. Express Scripts Holding Company, et
al.; and Robert Wolfe, et al. v. Express Scripts Holding Company,
et al.

Plaintiffs filed putative class action complaints against Express
Scripts and the members of its board of directors alleging the
registration statements filed in connection with the mergers of
Express Scripts and Cigna omitted material information in violation
of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, rendering the
registration statements false and misleading.

Among other remedies, the complaints seek to enjoin the Express
Scripts special meeting and the closing of the mergers, as well as
damages, costs and attorneys' fees.

On August 29, 2018, plaintiff in the Stern action filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal, and the court closed the case on August 30,
2018. On October 17, 2018, plaintiff in the Wilson action filed a
notice of voluntary dismissal, and the court closed the case on
October 17, 2018.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Prescott Suit Underway in Dist. of New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court
has granted the motion of certain defendants, including the
Company, to transfer the Jeanine Prescott, et al. v. CVS Health
Corporation, et al. action to the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, where it remains pending.

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the defendants entered into
"exclusionary" agreements that granted exclusive formulary
placement for certain blood glucose test strips in return for
higher rebate payments.

The complaint alleges that these agreements had the effect of
driving up the costs of such test strips for the putative class
members and violated RICO, ERISA and the competition and consumer
protection laws of various states. Plaintiffs seek treble damages,
equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs.

On November 28, 2017, the court granted the motion of certain
defendants, including the Company, to transfer this action to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  No
further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Still Defends Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Express Scripts Holding Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a securities class action suit entitled, In re
Express Scripts Holding Company Securities Litigation.

Plaintiff filed this putative securities class action complaint on
behalf of all persons or entities that purchased or otherwise
acquired the Company's publicly traded common stock between
February 24, 2015 and March 21, 2016, and alleges the Company and
named individuals violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
thereunder by carrying out a scheme to defraud the investing
public.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in favor of plaintiff and
other class members, attorneys' fees and costs, and equitable
relief. Plaintiff adopts many of Anthem's Allegations in support of
their claim. On August 1, 2017, the court granted the Company's
motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

On August 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging
similar claims, and defendants moved to dismiss. On May 22, 2018,
the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On September 10,
2018, plaintiffs filed an appellate brief.

Express Scripts Holding Company operates as a pharmacy benefit
management (PBM) company in the United States and Canada. Express
Scripts Holding Company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in
Saint Louis, Missouri.


F.H. CANN: Cosar Sues over Wrongful Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
YASIN COSAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. F.H. CANN & ASSOCIATES, INC.; and JOHN DOES
1-25, Case No. 2:18-cv-15229-WJM-MF (D.N.J., Oct. 23, 2018) seeks
to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect
a debt. The case is assigned to Judge William J. Martini and
referred to Magistrate Judge Mark Falk.

F.H. Cann and Associates Inc., a receivables management company,
provides account receivables and debt collection services. The
company was founded in 1999 and is based in North Andover,
Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben A. Kaplan, Esq.
          280 Prospect Ave. 6G
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 803-6611
          Facsimile: (866) 596-4973
          E-mail: benkap232@aol.com


FACEBOOK INC: Juggling GBP500,000 Fine for Analytica Scandal
------------------------------------------------------------
Nathaniel Mott, writing for Tom's Hardware, reports that Facebook
brings in GBP500,000 easily. At this point, even if everyone at the
company disappeared via technological rapture, its ad platform
would still churn out cash. That makes the UK Information
Commissioner's Office (ICO) GBP500,000 ($641,878) fine against the
company over the Cambridge Analytica incident seem inconsequential,
but that's actually the highest fine the regulator can levy. And on
top of that, Facebook also has a class-action lawsuit on its hands.


Here's a quick recap: Cambridge Analytica was revealed to have
collected information about 50 million people in the U.S. by
exploiting Facebook's laissez-faire data policies. This in turn
raised questions about those policies and how Facebook planned to
make sure researchers weren't gathering -- and using -- people's
information without oversight.

Regulators around the world quickly criticized Facebook over this
failure. ICO announced in July that it planned to levy the maximum
GBP500,000 fine against Facebook over the scandal; now it's
actually issued that fine. While that may seem low, especially in
light of the stricter GDPR rules that went into effect in May, the
regulator noted that it issued the highest fine it could based on
the previous Data Protection Act legislation.

That's because the incidents that provoked the fine occurred
between 2007 and 2014. Instead of retroactively applying GDPR,
which would incur a much higher fine, ICO had to rely on a
decade-old law.

Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham explained:

"We considered these contraventions to be so serious we imposed the
maximum penalty under the previous legislation. The fine would
inevitably have been significantly higher under the GDPR. One of
our main motivations for taking enforcement action is to drive
meaningful change in how organisations handle people's personal
data. . . . . Our work is continuing. There are still bigger
questions to be asked and broader conversations to be had about how
technology and democracy interact and whether the legal, ethical
and regulatory frameworks we have in place are adequate to protect
the principles on which our society is based."

             Class-Action Lawsuit Against Facebook

But there are signs that Facebook users aren't content to wait
around for regulators to manage Facebook and other companies' data
practices. A class-action lawsuit filed complains that Facebook
continued to track users' location via its smartphone apps and
share it with advertisers even if they disabled that feature.
Claiming Facebook violated the U.S. Federal Stored Communications
Act, the lawsuit, in part, seeks $1,000 per violation of that act,
an explanation of how affected users were impacted, destruction of
user data accumulated and a commitment to not do these acts again.
This is the latest in a long series of lawsuits; maybe they'll help
nudge things in the direction of privacy reform. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Wants Cambridge Analytica Class Action Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Davis, writing for MediaPost, reports that policy questions
stemming from the Cambridge Analytica debacle, including questions
concerning how Facebook explains data sharing to users, should be
settled in "robust public discourse" as opposed to the courts,
Facebook says.

"The Cambridge Analytica events drew public attention to the policy
implications of sharing data on the Internet, sparking an important
and ongoing discussion about the ways in which people's data can be
used (and misused)," the company writes in papers asking U.S.
District Court Judge Vince Chhabria in the Northern District of
California to dismiss a class-action privacy complaint . . "But
Facebook's role in these events does not give rise to a viable
cause of action."

The social networking service adds that the broad questions raised
by the lawsuit shouldn't be decided "on a piecemeal basis in
courts."

"The very kind of policy and social issues raised in the complaint
. . . are the subject of Congressional hearings, regulatory
inquiries, and robust public discourse. That is where those
discussions belong," Facebook writes in its new papers, filed late
on Nov. 2.

The company's argument comes in a lawsuit over this year's
revelations that President Trump's data consultancy, Cambridge
Analytica, obtained personal information for as many as 87 million
Facebook users. Cambridge Analytica, how defunct, received the data
from researcher Aleksandr Kogan, who obtained the information in
2014 through the personality quiz app "thisisyourdigitallife." Only
270,000 Facebook users downloaded Kogan's app, but he was able to
gather data about many of those users' contacts.

In April of 2015, Facebook stopped allowing developers to access
data about users' friends. But in 2014, when Kogan's app scraped
the data, Facebook allowed developers to glean information about
users' friends, subject to their privacy settings. Facebook's terms
of service prohibited developers from sharing that information.

News of Cambridge Analytica's data grab sparked an ongoing Federal
Trade Commission investigation, Congressional scrutiny and a
class-action privacy lawsuit on behalf of Facebook's users.

Facebook is now urging Judge Chhabria to dismiss the lawsuit for
numerous reasons. Among others, Facebook contends that users whose
data was taken agreed to share that data with developers.

"Facebook users consent to their data being shared with third-party
apps and have the option to limit such sharing or turn it off
entirely," the company writes. "The problem with Cambridge
Analytica . . . was that the app developer, Dr. Kogan, obtained the
user data (with consent) but then sold it to Cambridge Analytica in
violation of Facebook's policies. And even that risk was fully
disclosed."

Facebook also contends that the users shouldn't be able to proceed
in court because they weren't injured by the data sharing.

Judge Chhabria is expected to hold a hearing on the matter in
January. [GN]


FIRST RATE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Esparza de Perez Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARTHA SUSANA ESPARZA DE PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FIRST RATE STAFFING
CORPORATION; SUGARFINA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants,
Case No. 18STCV02057 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., Oct. 23, 2018)
is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum
wages, overtime compensation, and provide accurate wage
statements.

The Plaintiff Esparza de Perez was employed by the Defendants as an
hourly-paid, non-exempt employee.

First Rate Staffing Corporation provides recruiting and staffing
services for temporary positions in light industrial, distribution
center, assembly, and clerical businesses in California, Arizona,
and Nevada. The company was formerly known as Moosewood Acquisition
Corporation and changed its name to First Rate Staffing Corporation
in May 2012. First Rate Staffing Corporation was incorporated in
2011 and is based in Phoenix, Arizona. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zorik Mooradian, Esq.
          Haik Hacopian, Esq.
          MOORADIAN LAW, ARC
          5023 N. Parkway Calabasas
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 876-9627
          Facsimile: (888) 783-1030
          E-mail: zorik@mooradianUiw.com
                  haik@ni.ooradianIaw.com


FORD MOTOR: Removes Payne Suit to Northern District of Ohio
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of Kellie Payne, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kistler Ford;
and Ford Motor Company, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the
lawsuit from the Court of Common Pleas of the State of Ohio, County
of Lucas (Case No. G-4801-CI-020183708-000) to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio on October 23, 2018. The
clerk of court for the Northern District of Ohio assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-02451-JJH. The case is assigned to Judge Jeffrey J.
Helmick.

Ford Motor Company is a corporation organized and in existence
under the laws of the State of Delaware with a principal place of
business in Palo, Alto, California. Defendant was engaged in the
business of designing, manufacturing, constructing, assembling,
marketing, distributing, and selling automobiles and other motor
vehicles and motor vehicle components in Fresno, County. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael D. Portnoy, Esq.
          810 West South Boundary Road
          Perrysburg, OH 43551
          Telephone: (419) 874-2775
          Facsimile: (419) 874-2777
          E-mail: hawkport@aol.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Brianna W. Stuart, Esq.
          Conor A. McLaughlin, Esq.
          Elizabeth B. Wright, Esq.
          THOMPSON HINE – CLEVELAND
          3900 Key Tower 127 Public Square
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 566-5500
          Facsimile: (216) 566-5800
          E-mail: brianna.stuart@thompsonhine.com
                  conor.mclaughlin@thompsonhine.com
                  elizabeth.wright@thompsonhine.com


FOUR SEASONS: Fails to Pay Proper OT to Mechanics, Perez Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
HINBIR PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FOUR SEASONS TEMP CONTROL, INC.; and ASHER
PUTTER, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05918-DRH-ARL (E.D.N.Y., Oct.
23, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Perez was employed by the Defendants as mechanic from
August 2004 to March 26, 2018.

Four Seasons Temp Control Inc. is a privately held company in East
Meadow, NY and is a single location business. The Company is
engaged as air conditioning contractors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dong Phuong V. Nguyen, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City, New York 11530
          Telephone: (516) 248-5550
          Facsimile: (516) 248-6027


FREDDIE MAC: Continues to Defend Jacobs and Hindes Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31,
2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
company continues to defend itself from a putative class action
suit entitled, Jacobs and Hindes vs. FHFA and Treasury.

This case was filed on August 17, 2015 as a putative class action
lawsuit purportedly on behalf of a class of holders of preferred
stock or common stock issued by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. The case
was also filed as a shareholder derivative lawsuit, purportedly on
behalf of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as "nominal" defendants.

The complaint alleges, among other items, that the August 2012
amendment to the Purchase Agreement violated applicable state law
and constituted a breach of contract, as well as a breach of
covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs seek equitable
and injunctive relief (including restitution of the monies paid by
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to Treasury under the net worth sweep
dividend), compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, costs and
expenses.

On November 27, 2017, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice
after defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On December 21, 2017,
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. On September 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals
heard oral argument.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation operates in the secondary
mortgage market in the United States. The company purchases
residential mortgage loans originated by lenders, as well as
invests in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was founded in 1970 and is
headquartered in McLean, Virginia.


FREDDIE MAC: Suit Over Preferred Stock Purchase Deal Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31,
2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
company continues to defend itself from a consolidated class action
suit entitled, In re Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreement Class Action Litigations.

This case is the result of the consolidation of three putative
class action lawsuits: Cacciapelle and Bareiss vs. Federal National
Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), filed on July 29, 2013;
American European Insurance Company vs. Federal National Mortgage
Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and FHFA, filed
on July 30, 2013; and Marneu Holdings, Co. vs. FHFA, Treasury,
Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, filed on September 18, 2013. (The Marneu case
was also filed as a shareholder derivative lawsuit.)

A consolidated amended complaint was filed in December 2013. In the
consolidated amended complaint, plaintiffs allege, among other
items, that the August 2012 amendment to the Purchase Agreement
breached Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's respective contracts with
the holders of junior preferred stock and common stock and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in such contracts.
Plaintiffs sought unspecified damages, equitable and injunctive
relief, and costs and expenses, including attorney and expert
fees.

The Cacciapelle and American European Insurance Company lawsuits
were filed purportedly on behalf of a class of purchasers of junior
preferred stock issued by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae who held stock
prior to, and as of, August 17, 2012. The Marneu lawsuit was filed
purportedly on behalf of a class of purchasers of junior preferred
stock and purchasers of common stock issued by Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae over a not-yet-defined period of time.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation operates in the secondary
mortgage market in the United States. The company purchases
residential mortgage loans originated by lenders, as well as
invests in mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was founded in 1970 and is
headquartered in McLean, Virginia.


FRITO-LAY INC: Sanchez Deal Prelim Approval Hearing Moved to Dec. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIAZAR SANCHEZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FRITO-LAY, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:14-cv-00797-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California has
issued an order extending time for the Plaintiff's filing of a
motion for preliminary approval of the class action until Nov. 9,
2018, and continuing the hearing on the preliminary approval to
Dec. 4, 2018.

On Oct. 15, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation to extend time
for the Plaintiff's filing of a motion for preliminary approval of
the class action.  The Judge notes that it was almost 16 months ago
that the Plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement and conditional class certification was
denied.  Accordingly, no further extensions of time will be granted
for this purpose absent a compelling showing of good cause.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/kkdYg2 from Leagle.com.

Eliazar Sanchez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian D. Chase --
bchase@bisnarchase.com -- Bisnar Chase, LLP & Jerusalem F. Beligan
-- jbeligan@bisnarchase.com -- Bisnar Chase, LLP.

Frito-Lay, Inc., Defendant, represented by Samantha D. Hardy --
shardy@sheppardmullin.com -- Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Ashley
Teiko Hirano -- ahirano@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP & Daniel Francisco De La Cruz --
ddelacruz@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bid to Dismiss Mahar Class Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company has
filed a motion to dismiss a putative class action suit filed by
Kevin Mahar.

In July 2018, an additional putative class action (the Mahar case)
was filed in New York state court naming as defendants GE, Jeffrey
R. Immelt, Jeffrey S. Bornstein, Jan R. Hauser, John L. Flannery,
Douglas A. Warner III and KPMG.

It alleges violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 based on alleged misstatements related to insurance
reserves and performance of GE's business segments in GE Stock
Direct Plan registration statements and documents incorporated
therein by reference and seeks damages on behalf of shareowners who
acquired GE stock between July 20, 2015 and July 19, 2018 through
the GE Stock Direct Plan.

In October 2018, GE filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of all
defendants.

General Electric Company operates as a digital industrial company
worldwide. It operates through Power, Renewable Energy, Oil & Gas,
Aviation, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital
segments. General Electric Company was founded in 1892 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.


GENERAL ELETRIC: Bid to Dismiss 401(k) Plan-Related Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court has
denied the company's motion to dismiss the consolidated 401(k) Plan
class action suit.

On September 27, 2017, three individual plaintiffs filed a putative
class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California with claims regarding the oversight of GE's
401(k) plan (the GE RSP).

From October 30 to November 15, 2017, three similar class action
suits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. All four actions have been consolidated into a
single action in the District of Massachusetts.

The consolidated complaint names as defendants GE, GE Asset
Management, current and former GE and GE Asset Management employees
who served on fiduciary bodies responsible for overseeing the GE
RSP during the class period and current and former members of GE's
Board of Directors.

Like similar lawsuits that have been brought against other
companies in recent years, this action alleges that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) in their oversight of the GE
RSP, principally by retaining five proprietary funds that
plaintiffs allege were underperforming as investment options for
plan participants and charging higher management fees than some
alternative funds.

The plaintiffs seek unspecified damages on behalf of a class of GE
RSP participants and beneficiaries from October 30, 2011 through
the date of any judgment. In August 2018, the court issued an order
denying GE's motion to dismiss as to a majority of the counts and
taking GE's motion under further advisement regarding two counts.

General Electric said, "We believe we have defenses to the claims
and are responding accordingly."

General Electric Company operates as a digital industrial company
worldwide. It operates through Power, Renewable Energy, Oil & Gas,
Aviation, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital
segments. General Electric Company was founded in 1892 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.


GENWORTH FINANCIAL: Unit Faces TVPX ARX INC. Suit in Virginia
-------------------------------------------------------------
Genworth Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that Genworth Life and
Annuity Insurance Company is facing a putative class action suit
filed by TVPX ARX INC.

In September 2018, Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company was
named as a defendant in a putative class action lawsuit pending in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia captioned TVPX ARX INC., as Securities Intermediary for
Consolidated Wealth Management, LTD. on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated v. Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance
Company.

The Plaintiff is alleging unlawful and excessive cost of insurance
("COI") charges were imposed on policyholders. The complaint
asserts claims for breach of contract, alleging that Genworth
improperly considered non-mortality factors when calculating COI
rates and failed to decrease COI charges in light of improved
expectations of future mortality.

Genworth Financial said, "We intend to vigorously defend this
action."

Genworth Financial, Inc. provides insurance and homeownership
solutions in the United States and internationally. It operates
through five segments: U.S. Mortgage Insurance, Canada Mortgage
Insurance, Australia Mortgage Insurance, U.S. Life Insurance, and
Runoff. Genworth Financial, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Richmond, Virginia.


GMS REST: Pinguil Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL PINGUIL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GMS REST. CORP. D/B/A HEIGHTS CAFE and
GREG S. MARKMAN and JOSEPH SECONDINO, as individuals, the
Defendants, Case 1:18-cv-06051-BMC (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks
compensatory damages and liquidated damages in an amount exceeding
$100,000.00, interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and all other legal
and equitable remedies this Court deems appropriate, as a result of
the Defendants violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Federal and New York State labor laws.

According to the complaint, although the Plaintiff worked
approximately 72 or more hours per week during his employment by
Defendants, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff 1.5 times for hours
worked over 40, a blatant violation of the overtime provisions
contained in the FLSA and NYLL.

The Defendants willfully failed to post notices of the minimum wage
and overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous place at the
location of their employment as required by both the NYLL and the
FLSA. The Defendants also willfully failed to keep accurate payroll
records.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          69-12 Austin Street
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Telephone: 718-263-9591

GOOGLE INC: Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Settlement Dispute
---------------------------------------------------------------
Natalie Rodriguez and Jimmy Hoover, writing for Law360, report that
the U.S. Supreme Court's look at a class action settlement with
Google could rock the world of legal aid funding, and while that
possibility went largely undiscussed during recent oral arguments,
the justices' skepticism of payouts from such deals to charities
raises concerns for legal aid providers.

In the Oct. 31 arguments for the case, Frank v. Gaos, several
justices criticized the fact that the $8.5 million deal settling
privacy claims against Google would pay millions to attorneys and
charities, but nothing to consumers. Attorneys from the underlying
Gaos v. Google case have argued that it would be infeasible to mete
out the award to a prospective 130 million-person size class, so
earmarked the money for six separate charities instead.

Such arrangements, called cy pres deals, involve class action
settlements in which a portion of the funds are allocated to
nonprofits when the parties and the judge have agreed the money
can't be feasibly distributed to class members. While the breadth
of the high court's ultimate ruling remains to be seen, the
scrutiny of these deals indirectly threatens a system that the
American Bar Association estimates sends approximately $15.5
million every year to legal aid service organizations.

In debating the designation of charities as the next best
recipients for the funds, several justices questioned whether the
indirect benefits of cy pres -- pronounced "sigh pray" --
settlements runs afoul of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that class action settlements be "fair,
reasonable, and adequate."

"And at the end of the day, what happens? The attorneys get money,
and a lot of it. The class members get no money whatsoever. And
money is given to organizations that they may or may not like and
that may or may not ever do anything that is of even indirect
benefit to them," Justice Samuel Alito said during arguments. "So
how can -- how can such a system be regarded as a sensible
system?"

Small But Valuable Funds

While often delivered in the form of small payouts from leftover
pots of settlement funds after a claims process, money from cy pres
deals can be windfalls for lean-operating legal aid organizations,
according to several amici briefs that had urged the high court to
preserve cy pres as a tool.

The amount of funding legal aid organizations receive from cy pres
deals varies widely from year to year. A review of tax return forms
from the last three years for several nonprofits that disclosed cy
pres contributions, including the Legal Aid Society of New York and
Greater Boston Legal Services, showed cy pres usually accounted for
less than 10 percent of an organization's budget. Last year, the
Legal Foundation of Washington used $321,900 in cy pres awards to
help close a budget shortfall, according to the organization's
annual report.

But at the Oct. 31 oral arguments, Chief Justice John Roberts
questioned whether it's appropriate to hand out funds to charities
-- which may make political or other speech -- that class members
have not approved. Justices Alito and Brett Kavanaugh also
questioned whether indirect benefits for third-party organizations
are better than direct benefits for at least some class members.

Justice Kavanaugh even chewed on petitioners' suggestion that a
lottery system would be preferable to not giving anything to
claimants just because the class size is so large.

"Isn't it always better to at least have a lottery system than that
one of the plaintiffs, one of the injured parties gets it, rather
than someone who's not injured? Why isn't that always more
reasonable?," Justice Kavanaugh said.

The plaintiffs in the underlying case, however, fought back against
the criticism of using charities to provide indirect relief to
class members.

"When you have a possibility of getting millions of dollars of
indirect relief, it is better, it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, to get that when the alternative is likely nothing or the
nominal equivalent of nothing," Jeffrey Lamken, a MoloLamken LLP
attorney representing the plaintiffs, told the justices.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor pointed out that the Google settlement at
issue is a rare all-cy pres deal and that there have only been a
handful of such deals in recent years. She also questioned
petitioner Theodore Frank, who represented himself, on claims that
cy pres is rampantly abused in class action deals.

"You do point to some potentially abusive situations, but in all
those situations, it's the cases where the circuit court rejected a
cy pres award. It seems like the system is working, not not
working," Justice Sotomayor said.

Frank argued that the Ninth Circuit's blessing of the Google
settlement creates a "perverse" incentive to divert money away from
clients and to third-parties and that courts' too-welcoming embrace
of cy pres have led to counsel making it too hard for class members
to file claims for their slice of the pie. He argued cy pres funds
should not be used in calculations for attorneys' fees.

In the Google deal, $2.15 million went to class counsel, $5.3
million to internet privacy nonprofits, and the rest was used for
administrative costs payments to the named plaintiffs.

High Potential for Narrow Ruling

Experts watching the case say they can't predict whether the high
court will ultimately use the fight over the settlement as a
vehicle to make a broad ruling on cy pres, or instead decide the
case based on other issues raised in the appeal.

Chief Justice Roberts previously expressed interest in weighing in
on the growing use of largely cy pres settlements when declining a
2013 appeal of a similar deal involving Facebook. Much of Oct. 31,
however, was spent, not on the question presented to the court
about whether cy pres deals violate Rule 23, but on whether the
plaintiffs in the underlying Gaos v. Google case have standing
following the high court's landmark decision in Spokeo Inc v.
Robins.

The standing issue might "muck up the case" and push the justices
to punt on the issue of whether cy pres violates Rule 23, said
Jonah Knobler -- jknobler@pbwt.com -- a Patterson Belknap Webb &
Tyler LLP attorney who regularly represents class action
defendants. Instead, the court could rule on the standing question,
remand the case to the lower court or decide the petition was
improvidently granted,
Mr. Knobler said.

The U.S. Solicitor General's office, which represents the interests
of the federal government before the U.S. Supreme Court, argued the
standing issue should be revisited given the court's 2016 Spokeo
decision holding that plaintiffs need to allege more than just the
violation of a statute to have standing to sue.

"It seems like there's a decent chance they won't decide the merits
here," Mr. Knobler said. "But I'm not that worried the issue will
continue to be unresolved, because there are other cases in the
pipeline."

Mr. Knobler expects that even if the court does rule on the cy pres
question, it will likely take the form of narrower resolution on
the all-cy pres award, rather than a broad stroke dismissal of the
use of cy pres to do away even with residuals.

"Generally, with exceptions, the court likes to rule in steps and
not cause earthquakes," Mr. Knobler said.

For now, many legal aid and advocacy groups are watching and hoping
that the court does not rein in the use of cy pres distribution as
the next best use of class action settlement funds.

"The cy pres doctrine provides courts with an indispensable
framework for distributing these funds in a way that benefits
absent class members and consumers as a whole while also
effectively serving the disgorgement and deterrence goals of
consumer protection statutes," said Stuart Rossman, director of
litigation at the National Consumer Law Center.

While all rules can be abused, Mr. Rossman believes existing
guidelines governing the use of cy pres in the courts have been
working.

"In deciding this case, we believe that the court should be mindful
of the implications for low-income consumers of unduly hampering
class actions, which constitute the most effective -- and very
often the sole -- means of vindicating their rights as enshrined in
consumer protection statutes," Mr. Rossman said. [GN]


GOOGLE LLC: Weeks et al Seek to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Patricia Weeks, Alicia
Helms, Brian McCloy, and Adrian Alcaraz, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GOOGLE LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00801-NC (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiffs will move the Court on March 13, 2019, for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all individuals in the United States who purchased from
      Google or an authorized reseller, other than for resale, a
      Google Pixel or Pixel XL smartphone that was manufactured
      before January 5, 2017 ("Class Phones"); alternately --

      "all individuals in the United States who purchased from
      Google or an authorized reseller, other than for resale,
      directly from Google anywhere in the United States or from
      Google or an authorized retailer in California.

      Excluded from the class are Google, its officers, directors,

      employees, subsidiaries; the parties' counsel in this
      litigation; and any individuals who received a full cash
      refund or non-Class Phone as a replacement for the purchased

      Class Phone.

   2. appointing themselves as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Girand Sharp LLP and Chimicles & Tikellis LLP as
      class counsel.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.,
          Jordan Elias, Esq.
          Adam E. Polk, Esq.
          Simon S. Grille, Esq.
          GIRAND SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981 4800
          E-mail: dgirard@girardsharp.com
          jelias@girardsharp.com
          apolk@girardsharp.com
          sgrille@girardsharp.com

               - and -

          Benjamin F, Johns, Esq.
          Andrew W. Ferich, Esq.
          Zachary P. Beatty, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          One Haverford Center
          361 West Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 19041
          E-mail: bfj@chimicles.com
                  awf@chimicles.com
                  zpb@chimicles.com


HAIN CELESTIAL: Faces Class Action Over Alba Botanica Sunscreen
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jenie Mallari-Torres, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a
Lake Forest, Illinois consumer alleges the maker of the Alba
Botanica sunscreen brand failed to represent that consumers should
shake the product 10 seconds before applying and that improper
application would result in inadequate sun protection.

Katy Manley filed a complaint individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated on Oct. 23 in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division against The
Hain Celestial Group alleging violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant's Alba Botanica Very Emollient Mineral Spray Sunscreen
has less protection than advertised and that the defendant made
misleading claims regarding the proper application of the product.


The plaintiff alleges the product is now sold in new packaging as
Alba Botanica Refreshing Mineral Spray and has updated directions
that consumers should shake the product for 10 seconds before use
and blend well into the skin with their hands. The plaintiff
alleges the Alba Botanica Very Emollient Mineral Spray Sunscreen
does not include these instructions, and as a result she suffered
sunburn.

The plaintiffs hold The Hain Celestial Group responsible because
the defendant allegedly falsely represented the product provided
sun protection.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek judgment against
the defendant, certify the class action, actual and treble damages,
interest, disgorgement, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
further available relief and any other relief the court deems just.
She is represented by William M. Sweetnam and Natasha Singh of
Sweetnam LLC in Chicago, Illinois.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern
Division case number 18-cv-07101 [GN]


HAIN CELESTIAL: Removes Lindquist et al. Suit to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ERIN LINDQUIST, DAVID SWARTZ, and
MARTHA VALENTINE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco (Case No.
CGC-18-569306) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California on October 23, 2018. The clerk of court for the
Northern District of California assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-06465-EDL
(N.D. Cal., Oct. 23, 2018).

The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. manufactures, markets, distributes,
and sells organic and natural products. The company sells its
products through specialty and natural food distributors,
supermarkets, natural food stores, mass-market and e-commerce
retailers, food service channels and clubs, and drug and
convenience stores in approximately 80 countries worldwide. The
Hain Celestial Group, Inc. was founded in 1993 and is headquartered
in Lake Success, New York. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kenneth K. Lee, Esq.
          Christina A. Aryafar, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 239-5100
          Facsimile: (213) 239-5199
          E-mail: klee@jenner.com
                  caryafar@jenner.com

               - and -

          Dean N. Panos, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          353 N. Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60654-3456
          Telephone: (312) 222-9350
          Facsimile: (312) 527-0484
          E-mail: dpanos@jenner.com


HERTZ TRANSPORTING: Class Certification Denied Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Janice Dawson, the
Plaintiff, vs. Hertz Transporting, Inc., et al., the Defendants,
Case 2:17-cv-08766-GW-JEM (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge George H. Wu
entered an order Nov. 5, 2018, denying Plaintiff's motion for class
certification without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file an
amended motion, she must do so within 45 days of the ruling,
according to the civil minutes.

The Court denied certification of the following class and four
subclasses: (1) a class of all hourly, non-exempt Hertz employees
in California from October 16, 2013 through the date of
certification ("Class Members"); (2) all Class Members who were not
provided compliant and lawful meal periods; (3) all Class Members
who were not provided timely and uninterrupted rest periods in
which they were free to leave the premises; (4) all Class Members
for whom Hertz automatically deducted 30 minutes from employee
timecards; and (5) all current and former non-exempt or hourly
employees who worked for Hertz in California at any time from
October 16, 2016 through certification.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Vincent Calderone, Esq.
          CALDERONE LAW FIRM
          2321 Rosecrans Ave Ste 1265
          El Segundo, CA 90245-4991
          Telephone: (424) 348-8290
          E-mail: vcalderone@calemploymentattorney.com

               - and -

          Ashley Allison Davenport, Esq.
          Patricia T. Barrera, Esq.
          BARRERA & ASSOCIATES
          2298 E Maple Ave,
          El Segundo, CA 90245-6507
          Telephone: (310) 802-1500
          Facsimile: (310) 802-0500
          E-mail: davenport@baattorneys.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Robert A. Dolinko, Esq.
          Irene S. Tatevosyan, Esq.
          NIXON PEABODY LLP
          San Francisco, CA
          Telephone: 415 984-8494
          Facsimile: 866 464-8397

HOLLINGSWORTH LOGISTICS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Laqui Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN LAQUI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOLLINGSWORTH LOGISTICS GROUP; HOLLINGSWORTH
LOGISTICS GROUP-MTESC, LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. STK-CV-KUVE-2018-13252 (Cal. Super., San
Joaquin Cty., Oct. 23, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize
and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements,
and reimburse necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Laqui was employed by the Defendants as an
hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from June 2017 to February 2018.

Hollingsworth Logistics Group, LLC (HLG) provides transportation
services. The Company contract packaging, light assembly, quality
testing, modular build-up and sequencing, procurement,
distribution, program management, freight management, and logistics
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021


HOLY SMOKE: Class Action Status Sought for Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Doran, writing for Syracuse.com, reports that a lawsuit
seeking class-action status has been filed in state Supreme Court
against a caterer who provided food for a wedding reception in 2015
where numerous guests became violently ill.

A judge is scheduled to decide Dec. 6 if the case warrants
class-action status, said Thomas Cerio, Esq. who represents the
bride, Melissa Conarton, and the guests.

The class-action suit comes on the heels of an earlier lawsuit
filed in July by the bride -- against the caterer, Holy Smoke BBQ &
Catering LLC. The bride would be excluded from the class-action
suit, Cerio said.

"The class-action is not about her -- it was never about her,"
Cerio said. "It's about what she wants to get for her wedding
guests who were sick."

The bride's father, James Conarton, would be the lead plaintiff in
the class action lawsuit.

Melissa Conarton said only that wants her wedding guests' bills
paid, which she has estimated to be about $12,000.

A Holy Smoke's owner declined comment when contacted by
Syracuse.com

Matthew E. Whritenour, Esq. -- mew@knychwhritenourlaw.com -- of
Knych & Whritenour, lawyers for Holy Smoke, did not return a call
from Syracuse.com.

Both lawsuits allege that Holy Smoke, of Earlville in Madison
County, provided food -- specifically macaroni and cheese -- for
the July 31, 2015 wedding reception of Melissa Conarton and Jesse
Abbott that allegedly caused numerous wedding guests to become
violently ill.

Nine ambulances were called, and numerous guests were taken to the
hospital.

The case attracted national attention on television and other media
outlets.

The class-action suit names the macaroni cheese as the food
allegedly causing the food-poisoning. According to the papers filed
in the suit, at least 45 guests (and potentially more than 100)
suffered food poisoning after consuming the dish.

The health department investigated and determined there was an
outbreak of staphylococcus aureus, including 45 primary cases,
according to the lawsuit.

At least 40 people vomited and at least 32 people had diarrhea, the
papers said, and all the people who were sick after eating the
macaroni and cheese represent the proposed class, the lawsuit
says.

Lawyers for Holy Smoke in court papers deny it was the caterer's
macaroni and cheese that caused the food poisoning.

Instead, they allege that the investigating health departments
didn't have "sufficient data or proof" that the illnesses were
linked to any of the caterer's food, including the mac and cheese.

They said while the investigating health departments may have
suspected the mac and cheese might have been linked to the
illnesses, they never made that conclusion.

The lawyers for Holy Smoke also say the health departments were
unable to rule out any of the food, beverages or ice brought to the
reception by guests as the cause of the outbreak.

The Onondaga and Chenango county health departments confirmed the
outbreak,  and determined the macaroni and cheese was statistically
significant - no other foods at at the reception were implicated,
the lawsuit filed by the bride says.

The bride's lawsuit alleges it was the second container of macaroni
and cheese served to guests that made them ill. The mac and cheese
was pre-cooked and then transported to the wedding reception an
hour away, the papers say. The temperature of the mac and cheese -
and any other food - on the buffet line was not taken, the suit
alleges.

Because there weren't enough bathrooms at the venue, "guests were
forced to vomit in public areas and and had diarrhea in their
pants, in plain view of other guests,'' the bride's lawsuit says.

Nine ambulances were called, and took guests to various hospitals,
the papers say.

Holy Smoke's lawyers also dispute the number of wedding guests
(estimated at 220) and also disputes the need for a class-action
suit. The lawyers allege that only eight of the wedding guests
tested positive for the staphylococcus aureus, pathogen, while the
cause of illness in others who got sick is unknown.

In addition, they allege the lead plaintiff, James Conarton,
doesn't meet the minimum requirement of damages of at least
$25,000. His bill, after insurance, was $35 - and stacking the
others' claims isn't proper, the lawyers allege.

Cerio said class-action lawsuits are "judicially economic'' because
it prevents numerous individual lawsuits from being filed and
instead groups them together.

Holy Smoke originally agreed to cover the cost of the co-pays of
the guests, according to court papers. [GN]


HONDA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Vehicle CVT Problems
---------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that Honda
Civic CVT problems have caused a lawsuit that alleges the cars roll
away even though the gear shifters indicate the cars are in PARK.

The Honda Civic proposed class-action lawsuit includes consumers in
the U.S. who purchased or leased 2016-2018 Civics equipped with
continuously variable transmissions (CVTs).

Plaintiffs Sheryl Tenzyk and Larry Allen claim the CVTs fool
drivers into believing the cars are in PARK and are safe to exit.
In addition, the Civics fail to automatically activate the electric
parking brakes when drivers exit or when the doors are opened.

Owners complain they knew their cars were in PARK only to cope with
the aftermath of the cars rolling away.

"I was in the back seat . . .the car rolled down my driveway,
across my street and into a tree on my neighbors property. I was
thrown around the vehicle before being flung backwards out of the
door that was still open. Once I came to, I thought I was crazy and
had maybe neglected to put the car in Park, but when I checked
inside the vehicle, the car was still sitting in Park." - 2017
Honda Civic owner

In 2016, Honda recalled about 350,000 model year 2016 Civics after
the automaker found if the "EPB (electric parking brake) isn't
properly set and a parking gear is not selected by the driver, the
vehicle could potentially roll away, increasing risk of a crash."

Honda said dealers would update software to ensure the parking
brakes engaged when the Civics were parked and before drivers
exited the cars. However, the plaintiffs claim the recall did
nothing to fix the CVT problems or the rollaway dangers.

The lawsuit alleges Honda didn't do enough with the recall
considering only model year 2016 Civics were included, even though
owners also were complaining about 2017 models.

"My new car will let you turn off (push button) and get out and
walk away while still being in gear. I exited my vehicle in this
situation and it rolled down the drive and hit a tree. It was 3
feet from rolling into a highway that could have resulted in
serious injury or death." - 2017 Honda Civic owner

"When pulling into a parking spot I put the car into park but the
car kept moving forward, over a sidewalk and into a building. I put
the car in reverse and could not stop the car until it hit another
object. Had damage to the front bumper and grill." - 2017 Honda
Civic owner

Sheryl Tenzyk says she leased a 2016 Honda Civic and in November
2017 she started the car in her driveway and then went inside her
home. She came back outside only to see the Civic had rolled down
her driveway, then across the street and into another yard.

She says she ran to the Civic to find it still running and in
NEUTRAL. The plaintiff alleges the car hit a cable pole and damaged
the front part of the bumper, causing her to take the Civic to a
body shop.

The plaintiff says she paid about $700 to repair the bumper and
couldn't figure out how the Civic had rolled away because she knew
it was in PARK when she exited the car.

In May 2018, she drove the car to a business and when she left the
business she noticed the Civic had rolled backward into a
handicapped parking spot.

Ms. Tenzyk says she called Honda corporate and was assigned a case
number, but the automaker allegedly never contacted her other than
by a letter that said her case was closed. She then contacted a
Honda dealer and described both rollaway incidents, but the
technician allegedly told her nothing was wrong with her car.

Additionally, the plaintiff claims she was told the problem was
likely caused by "user error," but she was never asked to bring in
the car for inspection.

According to the plaintiffs, they wouldn't have purchased the cars
or would have paid less for them if Honda would have told them
about the gear shift and CVT problems.

The Honda Civic lawsuit alleges Honda knew there were better gear
shifter designs that included safeguards such as automatically
putting the vehicle in park when the driver's door opens or when
the ignition is turned off.

According to the lawsuit, nearly a million 2016-2018 Honda Civics
contain the gear shift and CVT problems.

The Honda Civic gear shift and CVT lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York - Sheryl Tenzyk
and Larry Allen, et al., v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

The plaintiffs are represented by Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, Greg
Coleman Law, and Whitfield, Bryson & Mason LLP.

CarComplaints.com has complaints from drivers of the 2016 Honda
Civic, 2017 Civic and 2018 Honda Civic. [GN]


HONEYWELL INT'L: Jan. 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP on Nov. 5
disclosed that a securities fraud class action lawsuit has been
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey against Honeywell International Inc. (NYSE:  HON)
("Honeywell" or the "Company") on behalf of purchasers of Honeywell
securities between February 9, 2018 through October 19, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

Important Deadline: Investors who purchased Honeywell securities
during the Class Period may, no later than January 2, 2019, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class. For
additional information or to learn how to participate in this
action please visit www.ktmc.com/honeywell-securities-class-action

According to the complaint, Honeywell is a multinational
conglomerate that makes a variety of commercial and consumer
products, engineering services, and aerospace systems. Honeywell
previously owned Bendix Friction Materials ("Bendix"), a
manufacturer of automotive, truck and industrial brakes. Despite
known health hazards, Bendix used asbestos in its brake- and
clutch-pad products until 2001. Honeywell sold Bendix in 2014.

The Class Period commences on February 9, 2018, when Honeywell
filed an annual report on a Form 10-K with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), announcing the Company's financial and
operating results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2017,
and reported asbestos related liabilities attributable to Bendix of
$616 million as of December 31, 2017.

On August 23, 2018, Honeywell disclosed that "the Company's Bendix
asbestos-related liability is estimated to be $1,693 million as of
June 30, 2018. This is $1,083 million higher than the Company's
prior estimation."

According to the complaint, on October 19, 2018, Honeywell issued a
press release announcing its third quarter 2018 earnings, and filed
its quarterly report with the SEC for the quarter ended September
30, 2018. In its quarterly report, Honeywell disclosed that the
SEC's Division of Corporate Finance had reviewed Honeywell's prior
accounting for liability for unasserted Bendix-related asbestos
claims, and that "on September 13, 2018, following completion of
Corporation Finance's review, the SEC Division of Enforcement
advised that it has opened an investigation related to this
matter." Further, Honeywell revised its Bendix-related asbestos
liability, disclosing that "the Company's revised estimated
asbestos-related liabilities are now $2,610 million as of December
31, 2017, which is $1,087 million higher than the Company's prior
estimate."

Following this news, Honeywell's stock price fell $1.72 per share,
or 1.11%, to close at $153.47 per share on October 19, 2018. Over
the following three trading sessions, Honeywell's stock price fell
by an additional $7.87, or 5.3%, to close at $140.72 per share on
October 24, 2018.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Honeywell's Bendix asbestos-related liability
was greater than initially reported; (ii) Honeywell maintained
improper accounting practices in connection with its Bendix
asbestos-related liability; and (iii) as a result, Honeywell's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

If you wish to discuss this securities fraud class action or have
any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check (James Maro, Jr., Esq. or Adrienne Bell, Esq.) at (888)
299–7706 or (610) 667–7706, or via e-mail at info@ktmc.com.

Honeywell investors may, no later than January 2, 2019, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation. In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class. Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check -- http://www.ktmc.com-- prosecutes
class actions in state and federal courts throughout the country
involving securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties and other
violations of state and federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check
is a driving force behind corporate governance reform, and has
recovered billions of dollars on behalf of institutional and
individual investors from the United States and around the world.
The firm represents investors, consumers and whistleblowers
(private citizens who report fraudulent practices against the
government and share in the recovery of government dollars). The
complaint in this action was not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check. [GN]


HOSOPO CORP: Loses Bid to Dismiss Keifer TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned MICHAEL KEIFER, individually and on behalf of
all others individually situated, Plaintiff, v. HOSOPO CORPORATION
d/b/a HORIZON SOLAR POWER; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendant. Case No. 3:18-cv-1353-CAB-(KSC). (S.D. Cal.).

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant HOSOPO
Corporation's (HOSOPO) motion to dismiss.

The FAC alleges that the Plaintiff received at least 14 unsolicited
calls from the Defendant to his cellular phone. The Plaintiff
contends that these calls were made using an automatic telephoned
dialing system (ATDS) and that on one or more occasions an
artificial or prerecorded voice was utilized during these calls.

Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on
the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as
failing to allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

The Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds
that all of Plaintiff's claims have not been pled with the
requisite specificity. Alternatively Defendant moves to strike
under Rule 12(f) the request for treble damages and the class
allegations.

The TCPA violations

To successfully plead a TCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege
defendant (1) called a cellular telephone number; (2) using an ATDS
or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (3) without the recipient's
prior express consent.  

To make a call under the TCPA the person must either (1) directly
make the call, or (2) have an agency relationship with the person
who made the call. An ATDS is equipment which has the capacity to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant called his cell
phone without his prior consent. He also alleges that the Defendant
used an automatic telephone dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C.
Section 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff in an attempt to
solicit Plaintiff to purchase HOSOPO's services.  

The Defendant's contention that the Plaintiff has failed to
establish that it, or any agent, made any of the alleged 14 calls
is unavailing. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court
accepts as true the factual allegations of the FAC that Defendant
placed multiple calls to Plaintiff trying to solicit his business
and that it owned the telephone number from which Plaintiff was
contacted.

Furthermore, since the FAC alleges that the purpose of the calls
was to sell HOSOPO's services, the Court also finds it reasonable
at this stage of the proceedings to infer that if the calls were
not made by Defendant, they were made by entities utilized by
Defendant, acting as its agents, to place the calls on its behalf.


Thus, the Plaintiff has met the first element of the TCPA claim and
adequately allegedly that Defendant called his cellular number.

Turning to the question of whether an ATDS was used, the Defendant
dedicates five pages of briefing to discussing the case law and
history surrounding the definition of an ATDS. The Defendant argues
that in light of the case law, the Plaintiff's claims should be
dismissed because he does not allege that Defendant used equipment
that had the ability to generate numbers randomly or sequentially.
But, the Defendant's position that the dialing system at issue must
create or develop numbers on its own is not supported by a recent
Ninth Circuit decision published after briefing was submitted.

The Court has concluded that the Plaintiff has either adequately
alleged the elements necessary to state a TCPA claim, or stated
enough facts from which a plausible inference can be drawn the
Defendant was responsible for the calls being made to the
Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the first and third
causes of action is denied.

Knowing and Willfull Violation of the TCPA Claims

The Defendant also argues that the knowing and/or wilful
violations of the TCPA must be dismissed because all that is
offered are bare conclusory allegations with insufficient facts to
suggest the Defendant willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA.

In support the Defendant has cited Blikken v. Risen Capital, LLC,
No. 8:15-cv-1693-T-27MAP, 2016 WL 7423411 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2018)
, the magistrate judge did, as Defendant contends, find the
complaint failed to allege facts showing that defendant acted
knowingly or willingly and therefore concluded an award treble
damages was inappropriate and only recommended entry of default on
the TCPA violations in the amount of $15,000.  

In contrast, courts within this circuit have held allegations
similar to those made in the FAC, regarding the knowing and
willfulness on the part of defendant, sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.  

The Defendant's motion to strike the request for treble damages
from the FAC is DENIED.

Class Allegations Claims

Defendant asks the Court to strike the class allegations in the FAC
claiming they create impermissible fail safe classes.  

Class allegations can be stricken or dismissed at the pleading
stage. However, dismissing class allegations at the pleading stage,
is rare because the parties have not yet engaged in discovery and
the shape of a class action is often driven by the facts of a
particular case.   The more appropriate vehicle for testing the
validity of class claims is a motion for class certification.  

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot say that the
class claims are unsuitable for class treatment. Accordingly, the
Defendant's motion to strike the class allegations in the FAC is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydadowgf from Leagle.com.

Michael Kiefer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Todd M. Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

HOSOPO Corporation, doing business as Horizon Solar Power,
Defendant, represented by Patrick J. Mulkern --
pmulkern@gordonrees.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & Thomas C. Blatchley
-- tblatchey@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP, pro hac vice.


HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: Dziura Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
------------------------------------------------------------
MARIANNA DZIURA, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated who were employed by HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATION, INC., HDA, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., and
H.D.A. Inc., the Plaintiffs, vs. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION,
INC., HDA, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., and H.D.A. Inc.,
the Defendants, Case No. 159998/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 29,
2018), seeks to recover minimum wages, overtime compensation,
"spread of hours" compensation, as well as damages arising from
Defendant's breach of contract, which they were deprived of, plus
interest, attorneys' fees, and costs pursuant to the New York Labor
Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs are citizens of the
State of New York and are presently or were formerly employed by
Defendant to provide personal care, assistance, health-related
tasks and other home care services to Defendant's clients within
the State of New York.

The Defendant has maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiffs to regularly work in excess of 10 hours per day, without
providing the proper hourly compensation for all hours worked,
overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in
any given week, and "spread of hours" compensation, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          LaDonna Lusher, Esq.
          Jack Newhouse, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943 9080

HUNTER TERRELL: Hernandez Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
ORLANDO HERNANDEZ, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HUNTER TERRELL SOLUTIONS,
LLC, the Defendant, Case 4:18-cv-00050 (W.D. Tex., Oct. 29, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages from the Defendant under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

According to the complaint, HTS violated the FLSA by employing
Plaintiff and other similarly situated nonexempt employees for a
workweek longer than forty hours but refusing to compensate them
for their employment in excess of 40 hours at a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which they are or were
employed. HTS violated the FLSA by failing to maintain accurate
time and pay records for Plaintiff and other similarly situated
nonexempt employees as required by 29 U.S.C. section 211(c) and 29
C.F.R. pt. 516.

HTS is liable to Plaintiff for his unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29
U.S.C. section 216(b). All flowback operators employed by HTS are
similarly situated to Plaintiff because they have similar job
duties; regularly work in excess of 40 hours per week; are not paid
overtime for the hours they work in excess of 40 per week as
required by 29 U.S.C. section 207(a)(1); and are entitled to
recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages and
attorneys' fees and costs from HTS pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section
216(b), the lawsuit says.

Hunter Terrell is in the steel wire and related products
business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          Bridget Davidson, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          Lyric Center
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739


INDIA GLOBALIZATION: Jan. 2 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Nov. 5 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against India Globalization Capital, Inc. ("India
Globalization" or the "Company") (NYSE: IGC) and certain of its
officers.   The class action, filed in United States District
Court, District of Maryland, and index under 18-cv-03408, is on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities, other
than Defendants and their affiliates, who purchased or otherwise,
acquired India Globalization securities between June 21, 2018
through October 29, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
against the Company and certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased India Globalization
securities between June 21, 2018, and October 29, 2018, both dates
inclusive, you have until January 2, 2019, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

India Globalization purports to be focused on the development and
commercialization of cannabinoid based alternative therapies for
indications such as Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, and
pain.  Its lead product is Hyalolex, an alternative oral therapy
for the treatment of symptoms associated with Alzheimer's disease.
The Company has filed several patents for its pipeline of products
including ones for the treatment of Parkinson's Central Nervous
System related disorders, eating disorders, and seizures in cats
and dogs. Since its inception, the Company operates a legacy
business that involves trading commodities and heavy equipment
rental.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) India
Globalization substantially discontinued the business that it
conducted at the time it began trading on the NYSE American; (ii)
the Company had become engaged in ventures or promotions which have
not developed to a commercial stage; (iii) consequently, the
Company is not an operating company for the purposes of continued
trading and listing on the NYSE American; and (iv) as a result,
India Globalization's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On Sunday, October 28, 2018, an article was published on the
financial news website Marketwatch, titled "All the potential red
flags for investors in IGC, the pot stock that jumped 1,000% in
three months." The article discussed the "alarming number of red
flags" it uncovered which "undermine" claims made by the Company.
Then, on October 29, 2018, the NYSE American announced "that the
staff of NYSE Regulation has determined to commence proceedings to
delist the common stock of India Globalization Capital, Inc. (NYSE:
IGC) -- ticker symbol IGC -- from the Exchange. Trading in the
Company's common stock on the NYSE American will be suspended
immediately." The NYSE American also said that the "Company or its
management have engaged in operations which, in the opinion of the
Exchange, are contrary to the public interest."

Following this news, the Company's common stock ceased trading on
the NYSE American, resulting in significant damages to the
Company's stockholders and the Class.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members. [GN]


INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Awaits Court OK on Bid to Dismiss Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties
are awaiting a decision on a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant exchanges.

The company's 2017 Form 10-K included a description of the
purported class action lawsuit against two of the company's
subsidiary NYSE exchanges, and other U.S. exchanges, by the City of
Providence, Rhode Island and other plaintiffs.  As reported in the
company's 2017 Form 10-K, the defendant exchanges filed a petition
for rehearing and/or rehearing en banc of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit's December 2017 decision vacating the
dismissal of the case and on March 13, 2018, the Second Circuit
denied the company's petition. On August 10, 2018, the defendant
exchanges filed a petition in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review
of the Second Circuit's December 2017 decision. On October 9, 2018,
the Supreme Court denied the petition.

Intercontinental Exchange said, "Additionally, the parties are
awaiting a decision on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
exchanges in the district court seeking dismissal on grounds other
than those considered by the Second Circuit in its December 2017
decision."

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. operates regulated exchanges,
clearing houses, and listings venues for financial and commodity
markets in the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental
Europe, Asia, Israel, and Canada. It operates through two segments,
Trading and Clearing; and Data and Listings. Intercontinental
Exchange, Inc. was founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Atlanta,
Georgia.


INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: Appeal in NY ERISA Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
International Business Machines Corporation  said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October
30, 2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that
the appeal made in the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act-related class action suit filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, is still pending.

In May 2015, a putative class action was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York related
to the company's October 2014 announcement that it was divesting
its global commercial semiconductor technology business, alleging
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). Management's Retirement Plans Committee and three
current or former IBM executives are named as defendants.

On September 29, 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the matter remains pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

International Business Machines Corporation operates as an
integrated technology and services company worldwide. International
Business Machines Corporation was founded in 1911 and is
headquartered in Armonk, New York.


JOHN HANCOCK: Faces Davydov Suit in Southern District of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against John Hancock Life
Insurance Company of New York. The case is captioned as YURIY
DAVYDOV, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK; and JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.A.), Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-09825-AKH (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 24, 2018). The case is
assigned to Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein and referred to Magistrate
Judge Stewart D. Aaron.

John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New York provides retirement
plan and life insurance products and services. John Hancock Life
Insurance Company of New York was formerly known as The
Manufacturers Life Insurance Company of New York and changed its
name to John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New York in 2005.
The company was founded in 1992 and is based in Valhalla, New York.
John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New York operates as a
subsidiary of John Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.). [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph R. Santoli, Esq.
          Stephen John Fearon , Jr.
          SQUITIERI & FEARON LLP
          32 East 57th Street, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 575-2092
          Facsimile: (212) 575-2184
          E-mail: josephsantoli@aol.com
                  stephen@sfclasslaw.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Arbitration in Remicade Antitrust Suit Junked
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum denying the Defendants' Motion to
Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in the case
captioned IN RE REMICADE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This document
relates to Direct Purchaser Actions. Civil Action No. 18-cv-00303
(consolidated). (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiff filed an action on behalf of themselves and a
proposed class of direct purchasers of infliximab products
asserting claims against the Defendants for violations of federal
antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. The Plaintiff
claims they sustained antitrust injury through overcharges they
paid as a result of the Defendants' monopolizing the biologic
infliximab drug market and artificially inflating infliximab prices
marketwide.

LEGAL STANDARD

When it is apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and
documents relied upon in the complaint, that certain of a party's
claims are subject to an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion
to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6)
standard without discovery's delay.

Scope of the Arbitration Clause

Whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause
depends upon the relationship between (1) the breadth of an
arbitration clause, and (2) the nature of the given claim.

Here, the Dispute Resolution section of the Agreement begins with
an arbitration provision directing that any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be resolved by
arbitration.

The Defendants argue first that the arbitration provision is broad
enough to encompass statutory claims, although they are not
mentioned, and second, that the jury waiver establishes there can
be no doubt that Rochester was aware it was giving up the right to
a jury trial.

The Restatement of Contracts Section 202 provides guidance that a
word changes meaning when it becomes part of a sentence, the
sentence when it becomes part of a paragraph. So the Court finds
that the word issue in the jury trial waiver does not broaden the
scope of arbitrable disputes, and applies only to those disputes
arising out of or relating to this agreement. The scope of the
class action waiver providing that there shall be no right or
authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis
is similarly limited to claims arising out of or relating to this
agreement.

The arbitration clause does not expressly exempt certain kinds of
claims, therefore, only claims arising out of this agreement are
subject to arbitration. The Court read the arbitration clause
within context, related to the relevant circumstances and the
apparent objects the parties were striving to attain and find no
intention to include statutory antitrust claims within the scope of
arbitrable disputes.

Whether Plaintiff's Antitrust Claims Arise Out Of the Agreement

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff's antitrust claims must be
arbitrated because they would not have standing to sue without
having entered the Distributor Agreement, while the Plaintiff
argues their statutory claims are not arbitrable because they arise
out of the Defendants' Biosimilar Readiness Plan, distinct from the
Agreement. It is settled that claims under the Sherman Act are
appropriate for arbitration.

Here, J&J argues that Rochester's statutory claims are arbitrable
because they will, according to the Defendants, need to reference
the Distributor Agreement in order to assert their status as direct
purchasers. However, the Court find Ford persuasive. The factual
relationship test for determining whether a statutory claim is
sufficiently related to an agreement to be arbitrable is not done
to identify whether the facts in support of the action will
implicate the agreement as an item of evidence but to uncover
whether an action formally labeled a statutory tort is in essence a
breach of contract claim or based on a breach of contract.

Neither party has alleged or claimed that the Distributor Agreement
is integral to the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct. As
Plaintiff argues, resolving the antitrust claims will not require
interpretation of the Distributor Agreement because the Agreement
is irrelevant to the allegations that Defendant undertook
anticompetitive conduct to maintain supracompetitive prices for
Remicade and block lower-priced competitor biosimilars. For these
reasons, the Agreement here is not like the agreement in Simula,
which was integral to the anticompetitive conduct at the heart of
the Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. It is more like the agreement in
CardioNet, separate and distinct from statutory claims. Thus the
statutory claims do not arise from the Distributor Agreement and
therefore are beyond the scope of arbitrable disputes.

The find that Plaintiff's antitrust claims do not arise from their
Distributor Agreement with Defendant.

J&J's Motion to Compel Arbitration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y99krky5 from
Leagle.com.

ROCHESTER DRUG COOPERATIVE, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID F.
SORENSEN -- dsorensen@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, ANDREW COYNE
CURLEY -- acurley@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, ARCHANA TAMOSHUNAS
-- atamoshunas@tcllaw.com -- TAUS CEBULASH & LANDAU LLP, BRADLEY J.
DEMUTH -- bdemuth@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, DANIEL J.
WALKER -- dwalker@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, KARISSA J. SAUDER
-- ksauder@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC., NEILL WILSON CLARK --
nclark@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI LLP, PETER R. KOHN --
pkohn@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP & ZACHARY D. CAPLAN --
zcaplan@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON & JANSSEN BIOTECH, INC., the Defendants,
represented by ADEEL A. MANGI --
aamangi@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP, ASHLEY E.
BASS -- abass@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, BENJAMIN F.
JACKSON -- bjackson@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB TYLER LLP,
GEORGE A. LOBIONDO -- globiondo@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB
& TYLER LLP, JONATHAN H. HATCH -- jhatch@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON
BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP, LESLIE E. JOHN -- JOHN BALLARDSPAHR.COM
-- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL LLP, MATTHEW VAHEY -- VAHEYM
BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR, SARA A. ARROW -sarrow@pbwt.com
-- PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP, THOMAS O. BARNETT --
tbarnett@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP & WILLIAM F. CAVANAUGH,
Jr. -- wfcavanaugh@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON, BELKNAP, WEBB AND TYLER.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Contact Lens-Related Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court in
Contact Lens-related suit held a hearing on the motion for class
certification in August 2018.

In March and April 2015, over 30 putative class action complaints
were filed by contact lens patients in a number of courts around
the United States against Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.
(JJVCI) and other contact lens manufacturers, distributors, and
retailers, alleging vertical and horizontal conspiracies to fix the
retail prices of contact lenses.

The complaints allege that the manufacturers reached agreements
with each other and certain distributors and retailers concerning
the prices at which some contact lenses could be sold to consumers.
The plaintiffs are seeking damages and injunctive relief.

All of the class action cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida in June 2015. The
plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint in November
2015. In June 2016, the Court denied motions to dismiss filed by
JJVCI and other defendants. Discovery is ongoing. In March 2017,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The court
held a hearing on the motion for class certification in August
2018.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Glucose Test Strips Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the Company has
retained liability involving the LifeScan business prior to the
closing of that unit's divestiture.

In May 2017, a purported class action was filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington
against LifeScan Inc., Johnson & Johnson, other diabetes test strip
manufacturers and certain Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).

The complaint alleges that consumers paid inflated prices for
glucose monitor test strips as a consequence of undisclosed rebates
and other incentives paid by manufacturers to PBMs. The complaint
includes RICO, ERISA, and state consumer protection claims. The
complaint seeks equitable relief and damages.

In November 2017, the case was ordered transferred to United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The LifeScan business was divested in October 2018 and Johnson &
Johnson retained liability that may result from these claims prior
to the closing of the divestiture.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Plaintiffs Refile Class Suit in Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the voluntarily
dismissed Illinois class action suit has been refiled.

In May 2014, two purported class actions were filed in federal
court, one in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California and one in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, against Johnson & Johnson
and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. (now known as
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.) (JJCI) alleging violations of
state consumer fraud statutes based on nondisclosure of alleged
health risks associated with talc contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby
Powder and JOHNSON'S(R) Shower to Shower (a product no longer sold
by JJCI).

Both cases seek injunctive relief and monetary damages; neither
includes a claim for personal injuries. In October 2016, both cases
were transferred to the United States District Court for the
District Court of New Jersey as part of a newly created federal
multi-district litigation. In July 2017, the Court granted Johnson
& Johnson's and JJCI's motion to dismiss one of the cases. In
September 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed this dismissal. In September 2017, the plaintiff
in the second case voluntarily dismissed their complaint. In March
2018, the plaintiff in the second case refiled in Illinois State
Court.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Settlement in Blood Reagent Granted Initial OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court in the
case entitled, In re Blood Reagent Antitrust Litigation, has
granted preliminary approval of the settlement.

In June 2009, following the public announcement that Ortho-Clinical
Diagnostics, Inc. (OCD) had received a grand jury subpoena from the
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, in
connection with an investigation that has since been closed,
multiple class action complaints were filed against OCD by direct
purchasers seeking damages for alleged price fixing.

These cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as
In re Blood Reagent Antitrust Litigation. OCD was divested in 2014
and Johnson & Johnson retained any liability that may result from
these cases.

Following the appeal and reversal of its initial grant of a motion
for class certification, on remand, the District Court in October
2015 again granted a motion by the plaintiffs for class
certification. In July 2017, the Court issued an opinion granting
in part and denying in part OCD's motion for summary judgment.

The Court granted summary judgment concerning allegations of price
fixing in 2005 and 2008, and denied summary judgment concerning
allegations of price fixing in 2001. In May 2018, OCD and the
plaintiffs reached a settlement on all claims. The court granted
preliminary approval of the settlement in July 2018.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Suits over Ethicon Pelvic Mesh Devices Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend multiple class action suits related to
Ethicon's pelvic mesh devices.

Claims for personal injury have been made against Ethicon, Inc.
(Ethicon) and Johnson & Johnson arising out of Ethicon's pelvic
mesh devices used to treat stress urinary incontinence and pelvic
organ prolapse. The Company continues to receive information with
respect to potential costs and additional cases.

Cases filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The
Company has settled or otherwise resolved a majority of the United
States cases and the costs associated with these settlements are
reflected in the Company's accruals.

In addition, class actions and individual personal injury cases or
claims have been commenced in various countries outside of the
United States, including claims and cases in the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Belgium, and class actions in Israel, Australia
and Canada, seeking damages for alleged injury resulting from
Ethicon's pelvic mesh devices. In Australia, a trial of class
action issues has been completed and a decision is expected in
2018.

Johnson & Johnson said, "The Company has established accruals with
respect to product liability litigation associated with Ethicon's
pelvic mesh products."

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: XARELTO Suit in Louisiana Court Still Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that

In August 2015, two third-party payors filed a purported class
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana against Janssen Research & Development, LLC, Janssen
Ortho LLC, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson (as well as certain
Bayer entities), alleging that the defendants improperly marketed
and promoted XARELTO(R) as safer and more effective than less
expensive alternative medications while failing to fully disclose
its risks. The complaint seeks damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Grants Revised Settlement in FX-Related Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
JPMorgan Chase & Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court has
granted final approval of the settlement agreement in Foreign
Exchange Investigations and Litigation.

The Firm previously reported settlements with certain government
authorities relating to its foreign exchange ("FX") sales and
trading activities and controls related to those activities.
FX-related investigations and inquiries by government authorities,
including competition authorities, are ongoing, and the Firm is
cooperating with and working to resolve those matters.

In May 2015, the Firm pleaded guilty to a single violation of
federal antitrust law. In January 2017, the Firm was sentenced,
with judgment entered thereafter and a term of probation ending in
January 2020. The Department of Labor has granted the Firm a
five-year exemption of disqualification that allows the Firm and
its affiliates to continue to rely on the Qualified Professional
Asset Manager exemption under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") until January 2023. The Firm will need to
reapply in due course for a further exemption to cover the
remainder of the ten-year disqualification period.

Separately, in February 2017 the South Africa Competition
Commission referred its FX investigation of the Firm and other
banks to the South Africa Competition Tribunal, which is conducting
civil proceedings concerning that matter.

The Firm is also one of a number of foreign exchange dealers named
as defendants in a class action filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York by U.S.-based
plaintiffs, principally alleging violations of federal antitrust
laws based on an alleged conspiracy to manipulate foreign exchange
rates (the "U.S. class action"). In January 2015, the Firm entered
into a settlement agreement in the U.S. class action.

Following this settlement, a number of additional putative class
actions were filed seeking damages for persons who transacted FX
futures and options on futures (the "exchanged-based actions"),
consumers who purchased foreign currencies at allegedly inflated
rates (the "consumer action"), participants or beneficiaries of
qualified ERISA plans (the "ERISA actions"), and purported indirect
purchasers of FX instruments (the "indirect purchaser action").

Since then, the Firm has entered into a revised settlement
agreement to resolve the consolidated U.S. class action, including
the exchange-based actions. The Court granted final approval of
that settlement agreement in August 2018.

Certain members of the settlement class have filed requests to the
Court to be excluded from the class. The District Court has
dismissed one of the ERISA actions, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that dismissal in July
2018. The District Court has also dismissed the indirect purchaser
action, and the plaintiffs have sought leave to replead their
complaint. The consumer action and a second ERISA action remain
pending in the District Court.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. operates as a financial services company
worldwide. It operates through four segments: Consumer & Community
Banking, Corporate & Investment Bank, Commercial Banking, and Asset
& Wealth Management. JPMorgan Chase & Co. was founded in 1799 and
is headquartered in New York, New York.

JPMORGAN CHASE: Seeks Initial Approval of Interchange Case Accord
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JPMorgan Chase & Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties to the
class action seeking monetary relief have finalized an agreement
which amends and supersedes the prior settlement agreement, and the
plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking preliminary approval of the
modified settlement.

A group of merchants and retail associations filed a series of
class action complaints alleging that Visa and MasterCard, as well
as certain banks, conspired to set the price of credit and debit
card interchange fees and enacted respective rules in violation of
antitrust laws. The parties settled the cases for a cash payment, a
temporary reduction of credit card interchange, and modifications
to certain credit card network rules. In December 2013, the
District Court granted final approval of the settlement.

A number of merchants appealed the settlement to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which, in June 2016,
vacated the District Court's certification of the class action and
reversed the approval of the class settlement. In March 2017, the
U.S. Supreme Court declined petitions seeking review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with the appellate decision. The original class action
was divided into two separate actions, one seeking primarily
monetary relief and the other seeking primarily injunctive relief.


In September 2018, the parties to the class action seeking monetary
relief finalized an agreement which amends and supersedes the prior
settlement agreement, and the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking
preliminary approval of the modified settlement. This settlement
provides for the defendants to contribute an additional $900
million to the approximately $5.3 billion currently held in escrow
from the original settlement.

Upon preliminary approval by the District Court, $600 million of
that additional amount will be funded from the litigation escrow
account established under the Visa defendants' Retrospective
Responsibility Plan, and $300 million will be paid by Mastercard
and certain banks in accordance with an agreement among themselves
regarding their respective shares.

In June 2018, Visa deposited an additional $600 million into its
litigation escrow account, which in turn led to a corresponding
change in the conversion rate of Visa Class B to Class A shares. Of
the Mastercard-related portion, the Firm's share is approximately
$36 million. The class action seeking primarily injunctive relief
continues separately.

In addition, certain merchants have filed individual actions
raising similar allegations against Visa and Mastercard, as well as
against the Firm and other banks, and those actions are
proceeding.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. operates as a financial services company
worldwide. It operates through four segments: Consumer & Community
Banking, Corporate & Investment Bank, Commercial Banking, and Asset
& Wealth Management. JPMorgan Chase & Co. was founded in 1799 and
is headquartered in New York, New York.


JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Class Plaintiffs Can File Over-Length Motions
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re JUNO THERAPEUTICS, INC., Case No. C16-1069RSM
(W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted in part
Class Plaintiffs Gilbert Nguyen and Susan Tan's unopposed motion
pursuant to LCR 7(f) for leave to file two over-length motions.

The Plaintiffs seek 20 pages of briefing for both a motion for
final approval of the settlement and a motion for attorneys' fees.
Both motions would normally be limited to 12 pages under LCR
7(e)(4).  The Plaintiffs cite as good cause the following: first,
that the case involves complex facts involving alleged statements,
misstatements, and/or omissions concerning clinical trials for
cancer treatments; and second, because the Ninth Circuit case law
sets forth multi-factored tests for district courts to use in
evaluating whether to approve (1) class-action settlements, and (2)
fee requests.

Judge Martinez finds that the Plaintiffs have established good
cause to add pages to their motion for final approval of
settlement, but have failed to establish good cause for the
attorneys' fees motion.  Although the case may have an unusually
complex fact pattern, the standards for granting fees are not
particularly unique or onerous in the case, and it is the Court's
experience that skilled counsel can make the arguments they need to
make in 12 pages.

For these reasons, the Judge granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file two over-length
motions.  He granted the Plaintiffs leave to file up to 20 pages
for their forthcoming motion for final approval of the settlement
and plan of distribution.  He urged the Plaintiffs to stick as
close to the original 12 page limit as possible.  Any brief in
opposition is automatically allowed an equal number of pages.  The
Judge denied the motion to file an overlength motion regarding
attorney's fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/JvvwRP from Leagle.com.

Man Nguyen, Movant, represented by Clifford A. Cantor.

Gilbert Hoang Nguyen, Movant, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- POMERANATZ LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac
vice, Leigh Handelman Smollar -- lsmollar@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice, Omar Jafri -- ojafri@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford A. Cantor.

Goce Veljanoski, Plaintiff, represented by Janissa Ann Strabuk --
jstrabuk@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, pro hac vice, Joel
Fleming -- joel@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, pro hac vice &
Kim D. Stephens -- kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN
STEPHENS.

Liberata Paradisco, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Duncan Calvert Turner
-- duncanturner@badgleymullins.com -- BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC.

Gilbert Hoang Nguyen, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick V.
Dahlstrom -pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice &
Clifford A. Cantor.

Susan Tan, Plaintiff, pro se.

Juno Therapeutics Inc, Hans E Bishop, individually and on behalf of
the marital community, Steven D. Harr & Mark J. Gilbert,
Defendants, represented by Daniel Slifkin -- dslifkin@cravath.com
-- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac vice, Drew Liming --
dliming@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice,
Ignacio E. Salceda -- Isalcedo@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI, pro hac vice, Joni Ostler -- jostler@wsgr.com -- WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice, Karin A. DeMasi --
kdemasi@cravath.com -- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac vice, Lauren
M. Rosenberg -- lrosenberg@cravath.com -- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE,
pro hac vice, Morgan J. Cohen, CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac
vice, Nina F. Locker -- NLocker@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI, pro hac vice & Gregory Lewis Watts -- Gwatts@wsgr.com --
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI.


KPMG LLP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Jones Suit
------------------------------------------------
Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, denied KMPG's
Motion to Dismiss the case, THOMAS JONES, JOSEPH CHARLES LOHFINK,
SUE BEAVERS, RODOLFOA REL, and HAZEL REED THOMAS, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and MARTHA
EZELL LOWE, individually and on, behalf of a class of similarly
situated employees, Consolidated Plaintiff, v. KPMG LLP and
TRANSAMERICA RETIREMENT SOLUTIONS CORP., Defendants, Cause No.
1:17CV319-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss.).

The putative class action arose out of the alleged under-funding of
the Singing River Health System Employees' Retirement Plan and
Trust.  Lowe has sued KPMG, the company that audited the annual
financial statements of Singing River Health System ("SRHS") and
the Plan.  

Lowe alleges that KPMG was either aware of the fact that SRHS had
stopped contributing to the Plan, or in the alternative, it
recklessly disregarded the fact that SRHS had made no contribution
to the pension plan since 2009.  The Plaintiff alleges that despite
this knowledge, KPMG's audit report for 2011 attributed SRHS's
growing pension liability to a downturn in investment returns and a
change in actuarial assumptions rather than SRHS' failure to make
the required payments to the pension plan.  Lowe also alleges that
KPMG provided consulting services related to the $70 million
purchase of a new electronic record retention system that allegedly
contributed to SRHS' inability to fund the Plan.

The sole claim against KPMG is that it knowingly participated in
and/or aided and abetted in a breach of fiduciary duty by the
Individual Trustees in its 2010 and 2011 audit reports by allowing
or failing to correct misleading statements that attributed the
Trust's under-funding to returns on investments and changed
actuarial assumptions.

KPMG challenges the legal sufficiency of the claim, arguing that 1)
no Mississippi court has ever recognized a claim of aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty; 2) even if there were such a
claim, the plaintiff's allegations of KPMG's inaction do not rise
to the level of aiding and abetting liability; and 3) in any event,
the claim is barred by Mississippi's three-year statute of
limitations.

The Plaintiff responds that her claim should be construed as an
aiding and abetting breach of trust claim, which Mississippi common
law recognizes.  She further argues that the applicable limitations
period for her claim is one year from her receipt in November 2014
of a memo sent to plan participants, as set out in the Mississippi
Uniform Trust Code.

Judge Guirola has considered all of the parties' arguments.  He
finds that those not specifically addressed would not have changed
the outcome.  He assumes that Mississippi would recognize a cause
of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty under
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b).  Lowe has
sufficiently alleged a timely cause of action for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty against KPMG.  Therefore, the
Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/rKxNFW from Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Joseph Charles Lohfink, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Sue Beavers, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Rodolfoa Rel, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated & Hazel Reed Thomas, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by David G. Wirtes, Jr. -- DGW@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III -- GWF@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM
-- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr.,
REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts --
LET@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice,
Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Steven L. Nicholas --
SLN@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice &
Leilani Leith Tynes, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Martha Ezell Lowe, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated employees, Consol Plaintiff, represented by
Angelique M. Cooper, A. COOPER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, pro hac vice,
Joe R. Whatley, Jr. -- jwhatley@whatleykallas.com -- WHATLEY
KALLAS, LLP, Richard P. Rouco , QUINN, CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES &
ROUCO, LLP, pro hac vice, Roger K. Doolittle , ROGER K. DOOLITTLE,
ATTORNEY & James R. Reeves, Jr., REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

KPMG, LLP, Defendant, represented by Amelia Toy Rudolph --
amyrudolph@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US)
LLP, pro hac vice, Patricia Anne Gorham --
patriciagorham@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND
(US) LLP, pro hac vice, R. David Kaufman -- dkaufman@brunini.com --
BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC & Taylor B. McNeel --
tmcneel@brunini.com -- BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC.

Transamerica Retirement Solutions Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Armin J. Moeller, Jr. -- amoeller@balch.com -- BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP, Ashley Eley Cannady -- acannady@balch.com -- BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP, Marianne Hogan, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro
hac vice & William J. Delany, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro hac
vice.


LANDERS MCLARTY: Court Narrows Claims in Wilson Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Class
Action Complaint in the case captioned MELVIN WILSON, Plaintiff, v.
LANDERS McLARTY OLATHE KS, LLC d/b/a OLATHE DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP
RAM, et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-2051-JAR-GEB. (D. Kan.).

Plaintiff Melvin Wilson brings this putative class action against
Defendants Landers McLarty Olathe KS, LLC, d/b/a Olathe Dodge
Chrysler Jeep Ram (Olathe Dodge) and Hopkins and Raines, Inc.
(HRI), relating to advertising mailers Olathe Dodge sent to
Plaintiff and other similarly situated consumers. Plaintiff alleges
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA).

The Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: (1) Count One, for
deceptive acts and practices and for unconscionable acts and
practices, in violation of the KCPA; and (2) Count Two, for
violating RICO. He seeks damages in excess of $75,000.

Motion to Dismiss RICO Claim for Failure to State a Claim

Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations that,
assumed to be true, raise a right to relief above the speculative
level and must include enough facts to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Under this standard, the complaint
must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims.

RICO created a private right of action to vindicate a person's
right to avoid injury to business or property caused by a pattern
of racketeering activity. To maintain a private cause of action
under 18 U.S.C. Section1964(c), a plaintiff must plead and
ultimately prove, inter alia, that the defendant violated Section
1962. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person employed by or
associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity.

To maintain a private right of action based on a violation of
Section 1962(c), the plaintiff  must plausibly allege' that the
defendants each (1) conducted the affairs (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that under Section 1962(c), the
Defendants belong to an association-in-fact enterprise that has
engaged in a scheme to defraud consumers for purposes of enriching
themselves by sending out mailers purporting to guarantee prizes
and other consumer prizes on Olathe Dodge's property.

As to the pattern element of his RICO claim, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants engaged in an intentional scheme to defraud
consumers, most recently from July 13 to 22, 2017, by creating and
executing an advertising campaign with fraudulent and false
promises on a mailer for a sale at Defendant Landers as described
in specificity in Paragraphs 19-29 of this Amended Complaint.

The Defendants engaged in a series of similar schemes to defraud or
deceive consumers from at least March, 2010 (when the Johnson
County District Attorney sued Defendant Landers over a deceptive
mailer) to July 22, 2017, which establishes a pattern of
racketeering activity and mail fraud.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court may not address facts not
included in the operative pleading.

Therefore, the Court must disregard the Plaintiff's assertions
about the scale of Olathe Dodge's business, and its annual revenue.
But even if the Court considers the facts about Olathe Dodge's
commercial success, the Plaintiff fails to explain how they show a
threat of continuous conduct. The mail fraud alleged here occurred
over a closed period of time between June 13-22, 2017. By any
measure, this is not a substantial period of time, and the Supreme
Court was clear that such predicate acts without threats of future
conduct will not suffice. There are no facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint demonstrating a threat of repetition.

The Supreme Court has suggested that a Plaintiff may show
continuity by demonstrating that the predicate acts are a regular
way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business or of
conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO
enterprise. But the alleged facts do not show that the mailers,
which were sent over several days in June 2017, constitute a
regular way of conducting Olathe Dodge's business. At best, the
alleged facts show that on two occasions seven years apart, Olathe
Dodge used advertising mailers to promote its business. This falls
short of demonstrating a regular way of conducting business.

Moreover, the Plaintiff fails to plausibly explain how the Olathe
Dodge employee's alleged comment that the Attorney General approved
the mailer indicates a specific threat of future criminal conduct
Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim of continuity, his RICO claim must be dismissed.

Motion to Dismiss KCPA Claim for Lack of Jurisdiction

The Defendant contends that if the RICO claim is dismissed, only
supplemental jurisdiction would remain over the KCPA claim and the
Court should decline to exercise such jurisdiction. However, in the
Amended Complaint Plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction under 28
USC Section 1332(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete
diversity of citizenship between the parties, and an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity is lacking
when any of the plaintiffs has the same residency as even a single
defendant.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that he is domiciled in Kansas, HRI is
domiciled in Texas, and Olathe Dodge is domiciled in Arkansas. He
also alleges the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Because
Plaintiff asserts sufficient facts to support diversity
jurisdiction over the KCPA claim in this matter, the Court need not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim, and Defendants'
jurisdictional challenge is therefore denied.

Defendants Olathe Dodge and HRI's Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the
Complaint and to Strike Class Allegations  is granted in part and
denied in part. The motion to dismiss is granted as to Count 2
under RICO and denied as to Count 1 under the KCPA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 29, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb952u8q
from Leagle.com.

Melvin Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley Scott Waddell,
Waddell Law Firm, LLC & Paul H. Mose -- Pablo@moselaw.com -- Rebein
Brothers PA.

Landers McLarty Olathe KS, LLC, doing business as Olathe Dodge
Chrysler Jeep Ram, Defendant, represented by Hillary Hyde --
hhyde@mwcattorneys.com -- Morrow Willnauer Church, LLC, Jacob L.
Kurtz, Case Linden, PC, James Christian Morrow --
jmorrow@mwcattorneys.com -- Morrow Willnauer Church, LLC & Patric
S. Linden, Case Linden, PC.

Hopkins and Raines Inc., Defendant, represented by James Christian
Morrow.


LEGACY PARTNERS: Underpays Maintenance Technicians, Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
RAUL ACEVES, and FRANCISCO ALCAZAR, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LEGACY PARTNERS, INC.;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18CV336963
(Cal. Super., Santa Clara Cty., Oct. 24, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime
compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest periods, and
provide itemized wage statements.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as maintenance
technicians.

Legacy Partners, Inc. is a principal investment firm which provides
commercial and residential real estate services. It offers property
acquisition, development, and management. The company has offices
in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Irvine and San Diego, California;
Phoenix, Arizona; Denver, Colorado; and Seattle, Washington. It was
formerly known as Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. Legacy
Partners was founded in 1965 and is headquartered in Foster City,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ashley N. Pellouchoud, Esq.
          Robert W. Ottinger, Esq.
          THE OTTINGER FIRM, P.C.
          535 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 262-0096
          Facsimile: (212) 571-0505
          E-mail: ashley@ottingerlaw.com
                  robert@ottingerlaw.com


LEGACY RESERVES: Court Approves Doppelt Settlement in Full
----------------------------------------------------------
Legacy Reserves Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 1, 2018, that the Court overseeing
the Doppelt consolidated class action lawsuit has entered an order
and final judgment approving the Settlement Agreement in full.

On March 28, 2018, a purported holder of Legacy LP's Preferred
Units filed a putative class action challenging the Merger against
Legacy LP, the General Partner and Legacy Inc. (the "Doppelt
Action"). The Doppelt Action contained two causes of action
challenging the Merger, including breach of the Fifth Amended and
Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Legacy LP (the
"Partnership Agreement") and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

The plaintiff in the Doppelt Action sought injunctive relief
prohibiting consummation of the Merger or, in the event the Merger
is consummated, rescission or rescissory damages, as well as
reasonable attorneys' and experts' fees and expenses.

Additionally, on April 4, 2018, a motion to expedite was filed in
connection with the Doppelt Action, by which the plaintiff sought a
hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction prior to the close
of the Merger and requested that the court set an expedited
discovery schedule prior to any such hearing. The plaintiff in the
Doppelt Action also filed a lawsuit against Legacy LP and the
General Partner in 2017 for breach of the Partnership Agreement
based on the treatment of the accrued but unpaid preferred
distributions as "guaranteed payments" for tax purposes (the
"Doppelt Tax Action").

A second putative class action lawsuit challenging the Merger was
filed on April 3, 2018, against Legacy LP, the General Partner and
Legacy Inc. (the "Chammah Ventures Action"). The Chammah Ventures
Action contained the same causes of action and that plaintiff
sought substantially the same relief as the plaintiff in the
Doppelt Action.

On April 13, 2018, the Court issued an order consolidating the
Doppelt and Chammah actions (together, the "Consolidated Action")
and appointing Plaintiff Doppelt as lead plaintiff and his counsel
as lead counsel for the putative class action. On April 13, 2018,
the Court also granted the motion to expedite the consolidated
action. On April 23, 2018, Plaintiff Doppelt filed an Amended
Complaint, adding an additional count for breach of the Partnership
Agreement.

A hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and
Legacy's motion to dismiss occurred on June 4, 2018. A third
putative class action lawsuit challenging the Merger was filed
against Legacy LP, the General Partner, Legacy Inc. and Merger Sub
on April 27, 2018, by Patrick Irish in the District Court in
Midland County, Texas (the "Irish Action"). The Irish Action
contained the same general causes of action as the initial
complaint filed in the Consolidated Action and sought the same
relief.

On June 22, 2018, Legacy LP, Legacy Inc., the General Partner and
the plaintiff in the Consolidated Action reached an agreement in
principle to settle the Consolidated Action. The parties submitted
the Settlement Agreement to the Court on July 6, 2018.

On September 12, 2018, the Court held a settlement fairness
hearing, during which it considered (i) the fairness of the
Settlement Agreement; (ii) whether a judgment should be entered
dismissing the Consolidated Action with prejudice; (iii) the
plaintiff's counsel's application for fees and expenses; and (iv)
any objections to the Settlement Agreement.

Following the hearing, the Court entered an order and final
judgment (the "Final Order") approving the Settlement Agreement in
full. The Final Order granted holders of Series A Preferred Units
and Series B Preferred Units approximately 10,730,000 shares of
common stock in Legacy Inc. in addition to the approximately
16,913,592 shares those holders would collectively receive pursuant
to the exchange ratios that were included in the initial merger
agreement.

In exchange, the class of holders of Preferred Units (dating back
to January 21, 2016 through the consummation of the Merger) agreed
to release Legacy LP, the General Partner and Legacy Inc., and any
of their parent entities, controlling persons, associates,
affiliates, including any person or entity owning, directly or
indirectly, any portion of the General Partner, or subsidiaries and
each and all of their respective officers, directors, stockholders,
employees, representatives, advisors, consultants and other
released parties, from liability for any claims related to or
arising out of the rights inhering to the Preferred Units (subject
to limited exceptions related to tax liabilities), including all
claims brought in the Consolidated Action. As part of the
Settlement Agreement, the Doppelt Tax Action was also dismissed
with prejudice.

Each of the administrative agent for the Credit Agreement and the
majority lenders under the Term Loan Credit Agreement consented to
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as required pursuant to the
terms of the Credit Agreement and the Term Loan Credit Agreement,
respectively. The deadline for any appeal of the Final Order to be
filed expired on October 12, 2018.

Additionally, on September 20, 2018, the plaintiff in the Irish
Action voluntarily dismissed his action with prejudice as a result
of the entry of the Final Order.

Legacy Reserves Inc. operates as an energy company. The Company
focuses on development, production, and acquisition of oil and
natural gas properties. Legacy Reserves serves customers in the
United States. The company. is based in Midland, Texas.


LJM PARTNERS: Owes for 80% Loss to Fund, Class Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Bree Gonzales, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
Florida man alleges the trading strategy of a Chicago corporation
and an introducing broker caused an 80 percent loss in a
partnership earlier this year.

Barney C. Guttman filed a complaint on behalf of himself and all
persons similarly situated, on Oct. 10 in Cook County Circuit Court
against LJM Partners LTD, Pacific Futures and Capital LLC, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges he invested
$350,000 to acquire an interest in the PFC-LJM Fund LP and had a
total investment in the partnership of approximately $1 million as
of Jan. 31. The suit states defendant LJM and Pacific Futures and
Capital LLC are general partners and founders of the partnership.

The suit states on Feb. 5 and Feb. 6, the partnership lost 80
percent of its value. The plaintiff alleges the defendants employed
a highly aggressive trading strategy that exposed the partnership
of the risk of volatility. instead of a carefully hedged strategy
as marketed.

The plaintiff alleges the defendants misled the plaintiff as to the
actual trading strategy of the PFC-LJM Fund.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks certifying this
class action, awarded damages in favor of plaintiff and the class
jointly and severally and costs and expenses including counsel and
expert fees. He is represented by Michael J. Freed, Esq. --
mfreed@fklmlaw.com -- William H. London, Esq. --
blondon@fklmlaw.com -- and Brian M. Hogan, Esq. --
bhogan@fklmlaw.com -- of Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC in
Bannockburn.

Cook County Circuit Court case number 2018CH12701 [GN]


LOUISIANA: Class Action Lawsuit Seeks Compensation
--------------------------------------------------
Amber Smith, writing for brproud, reports that a class action
lawsuit filed in St. James Parish seeks financial compensation for
those affected by the Sunshine Bridge closure.

Last October 12, crane on top of a barge hit the Sunshine Bridge.
Upon further inspection, the Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development discovered the estimated cost for repairs to be
around $5 million. Crews are set to begin repair work.

In the meantime, the bridge remains closed. That has caused the
estimated 25,000 people who used to travel the bridge daily to find
an alternate route, often doubling or even tripling their
commutes.

White Castle resident Charles Jones was waiting in line for the
Plaquemine Ferry. He said it has been taking him two hours to get
from White Castle to Port Allen. That's a trip he said he needs to
take every morning. In addition to the extra commute time,
residents are complaining that the closure is costing them more
money for gas.

"I put $40 in this morning and $40 again this afternoon," Jones
said.

The Marvin Gros Law Firm filed a lawsuit on October 15  against the
companies involved. The owner of Donaldsonville Glass and Body
Works and the owner of First and Last Chance restaurant are listed
as plaintiffs on the lawsuit, as well as any and all persons and/or
businesses who use the Sunshine Bridge.

"We know that the officials here didn't cause the damage to the
bridge, but whoever did, they should be held responsible,"
Assumption Parish resident Mable Parker said.

Attorney Martin Maley, Esq. warns it will be an uphill battle. A
precedent set back in 1927 makes it difficult to win the case, but
Maley said he will try nonetheless. Robins Dry Dock Repair v. Flint
set the precedent that economic damages cannot be awarded without
physical evidence of damage to that plaintiff's personal property.


A spokesperson with the LaDOTD said the department will be seeking
legal action for the money the department will have to spend on
repairs.[GN]


MARCUS & MILLICHAP: Cox Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------
Judge William F. Jung of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division, remanded the case, THE ESTATE
OF SHIRLEY T. COX, by and through Betty M. Smith as personal
representative, JOHN E. BALLEW, by and through Judith A. Ballew as
attorney-in-fact, and THE ESTATE OF ROGER J. LAPP, by and through
Mark F. Lapp as personal representative, Plaintiffs, v. MARCUS &
MILLICHAP, INCORPORATED and MICHAEL BOKOR, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-381-T-02AAS (M.D. Fla.), to the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida.

The case was timely removed from state court on Feb. 14, 2018, by
Defendant Michael Bokor.  Defendant Marcus & Millichap, Inc.
("MMI") joined in the removal.  The removal was based on the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, ("CAFA").  The complaint alleges a
class of 3,000 members, actual losses in excess of $900 million,
and the class members' citizenship as Florida and Defendant MMI's
citizenship as Delaware or California.

The action alleges that both the Defendants were part of a scheme
to market and sell twenty-two skilled nursing facilities in Florida
that they knew were operating with invalid licenses.  MMI is a
highly sophisticated real estate and business broker with much of
its business directed to seniors housing investment properties.
Bokor has worked in the seniors housing industry for more than ten
years ranging from CFO in the Avante Group to an operator of
multiple nursing home management companies.  The facilities at
issue are marketed as a portfolio managed by TL Management, LLC, a
Florida LLC with its principal place of business in New York.  TL
Management is owned and managed by two individuals, Eliezer
Scheiner and Teddy Lichtschein.  The individuals owned, either
jointly or individually, the real and personal property of the
facilities.  The complaint refers to the facilities' ownership
structure by the individuals as the "landowner entities."

These landowner entities allegedly operated as a common enterprise,
together with Bokor's two management companies, SNF Management,
Inc. and Reliant Health Care Services, Inc., as well as TL
Management.  The common enterprise allegedly aimed to increase the
profit of the facilities at the expense of the health and welfare
of the residents, including Plaintiffs and the Class members.  The
residents suffered from substandard levels of daily care, which
placed their health at risk.  The facilities were allegedly each
operated by a licensed Medicaid provider.  The landowner entities,
however, controlled the licenses, certifications, and certificates
of need for the facilities through lease agreements.

As part of the various schemes, the Plaintiffs allege
undercapitalized shell entities were formed to evade reporting
requirements and obtain licenses.  The shell entity licensees used
either Bokor's two management companies or TL Managemen to run the
facilities without disclosing the companies to the Agency for
Health Care Administration.  The Plaintiffs claim the purpose of
concealment was to defraud residents to receive payments and
reimbursements from them and Medicaid or Medicare despite the
facilities' operating under void licenses.

The five-count complaint alleges two counts against MMI for aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duties to the residents and civil
remedies for criminal practices, two counts against Bokor for the
same two claims, and one count against both for civil conspiracy.
The facilities are located solely in Florida.

Although, as the Defendants point out, some of the studies may not
focus specifically on Florida, Judge Jung finds that the data
concerning nursing homes nationwide, together with the specific
Florida studies, is sufficient to attribute citizenship to the
putative class in Florida.  Faced with the persuasive submissions
of the Plaintiffs, who carry the burden of proof of the exception
to the CAFA, he finds that the Plaintiffs have shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that two-thirds of the class members
are citizens of Florida.

Comparing the relief sought between MMI and Bokor, the Florida
Defendant, the Jduge finds that there is no evidence that Bokor is
any less or more significant with respect to liability.  Indeed,
the alleged scheme was meted out by equal wrongdoers.  Nor is there
anything that would indicate that Bokor with his various entities
is any less capable of paying a potential judgment than MMI.
Whether Bokor forms a "significant basis" as opposed to MMI for the
Plaintiffs' claims, again, rests on the alleged scheme that
contemplates each Defendant as equally culpable.  Hence, remand is
warranted under the local controversy exception.

As to discretionary exception under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(3),
the Judge finds that the matter is purely local and is not one
considered of national importance.  The claims will be governed by
the laws of Florida and were not pled to avoid federal
jurisdiction.  There is a distinct nexus between the Florida action
involving only Florida facilities, and the alleged torts committed
and injuries sustained.  No the other class actions asserting these
claims have been brought in the preceding three years.

Finally, having already determined that the Plaintiffs met their
burden of proving an exception to CAFA applies, the Judge will deny
the motion for discovery.

For these reasons, Judge Jung (i) denied the Plaintiffs' Opposed
Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Jurisdictional Discovery; (ii)
granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand; (iii) denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay and to Extend the Time for Moving for
Class Certification.  4) The Clerk is directed to remand the case
to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County,
Florida, and to close the case after remand is effected.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jzjv5T from Leagle.com.

Betty M. Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Shirley
T. Cox, Judith A. Ballew, Attorney-in-Fact of John E. Ballew & Mark
F. Lapp, as personal representative of the estate of Roger J. Lapp,
Plaintiffs, represented by James L. Wilkes, II --
james@wilkesmchugh.com -- Wilkes & McHugh, PA & Rainey Cawthon
Booth, Jr. -- rbooth@wilkesmchugh.com -- Wilkes & McHugh, PA.

Marcus & Millichap, Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Allan
Joseph -- ajoseph@fidjlaw.com --  Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph,
PL, Christopher M. David -- cdavid@fidj.com -- Fuerst Ittleman
David & Joseph, PL & Michael B. Kornhauser --
mkornhauser@fidjlaw.com -- Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL.

Michael Bokor, Defendant, represented by Diana Nicole Evans --
dnevans@bradley.com -- Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Michael R.
Pennington -- mpennington@bradley.com -- Bradley, Arant, Boult &
Cummings, LLP & Zachary A. Madonia -- zmadonia@bradley.com --
Bradley, Arant, Boult & Cummings, LLP.


MASSACHUSETTS: Trial Court Sued over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM DONAHUE, on behalf of Himself and other similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. THE TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS (OR THE ADMINISTRATOR THEREOF), the Defendants, Case
No.: 18-3386G (Mass. Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Trial Court has not paid Mr.
Donahue and other court officers, associate court officers and
probation officers wages and overtime compensation. Such amounts
have been due but remain unpaid. The Trial Court has recorded the
overtime hours but simply has refused to pay. No plaintiff ever
consented in any way to the withholding of overtime or regular
compensation, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Christopher J. Trombetta, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER J. TROMBETTA
          121 North Main Street, Suite 12
          Mansfield, MA 02048
          Telephone: (508) 339-5900
          Telephone: (508) 339-3111
          E-mail: chris@trombettalaw.com

MATIMEX CORPORATION: Walsh Sues over Unwanted Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL WALSH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MATIMEX CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-24520-CMA (S.D. Fla.,
Oct. 29, 2018), seeks to stop Defendant's practice of sending
unauthorized and unwanted text messages to consumers promoting its
realty brokerage services, and to obtain redress for all persons
similarly injured by its conduct in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, Defendant's conduct caused Plaintiff
and putative members of the Class to suffer actual harm, including
the aggravation, nuisance, loss of time, and invasions of privacy
that result from the receipt of such text messages, lost value of
cellular services paid for, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of
their phones, including wear and tear to their phones' data,
memory, software, hardware, and battery components, among other
harms, the lawsuit says.

Matimex Corporation is engaged in real estate agents and managers
business.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff Michael Walsh and all others similarly
situated:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

MCDERMOTT INT'L: Unit Faces Cantrell Class Suit in Texas
--------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
company's subsidiary is facing a class action suit entitled,
Cantrell v. Lutech Resources, Inc.

A former employee of one of the company's subsidiaries commenced a
class action lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards ACT ("FLSA")
entitled Cantrell v. Lutech Resources, Inc., (S.D. Texas 2017) Case
No. 4:17-CV-2679 on or about September 5, 2017, alleging that he
and his fellow class members were not paid one and one half times
their normal hourly wage rates for hours worked that exceeded 40
hours in a work week.  

The company's subsidiary has yet to answer the allegations in the
complaint, as agreed by the parties, in order to allow mediation to
take place. The first mediation session commenced in October 2018
and is ongoing.

McDermott International said, "We do not believe a risk of material
loss is probable related to this matter, and, accordingly, our
reserves were not significant at September 30, 2018. While it is
possible that a loss may be incurred, we are unable at this time,
to estimate the range of potential loss, if any."

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, front-end engineering and design,
and module fabrication services for upstream field developments. It
operates through three segments: the Americas, Europe and Africa;
the Middle East; and Asia. McDermott International, Inc. was
founded in 1923 and is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MDL 1720: Approval of New Interchange Fee Case Settlement Pushed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the plaintiffs
purporting to act on behalf of the putative class primarily seeking
damages (the Damages Class) moved on September 18, 2018, for
preliminary approval of a proposed amended settlement agreement
that supersedes the original settlement agreement as of October 19,
2012 to resolve claims of the Damages Class in IN RE PAYMENT CARD
INTERCHANGE FEE AND MERCHANT DISCOUNT ANTITRUST LITIGATION.

Additional information regarding this matter is publicly available
under the docket number MDL 05-1720 (E.D.N.Y.) (Brodie, J.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The company operates in North
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is based in New York, New
York.


MDL 2724: Court Disposes of Group 1 Dismissal Bids
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: IN RE: CLOBETASOL CASES All
Direct Purchaser, End-Payer, and Indirect Reseller Actions IN RE:
DIGOXIN CASES All Direct Purchaser, End-Payer, and Indirect
Reseller Actions IN RE: DIVALPROEX ER CASES All Direct Purchaser,
End-Payer, and Indirect Reseller Actions IN RE: DOXYCYCLINE CASES
All Direct Purchaser, End-Payer, and Indirect Reseller Actions IN
RE: ECONAZOLE CASES All Direct Purchaser, End-Payer, and Indirect
Reseller Actions IN RE: PRAVASTATIN CASES All Direct Purchaser,
End-Payer, and Indirect Reseller Actions, Case Nos. MDL 2724,
16-MD-2724, Nos. 16-CB-27240, 16-CB-27241, 16-CB-27242,
16-CB-27243, Nos 16-DG-27240, 16-DG-27241,16-DG-27242, 16-DG-27243,
Nos. 16-DV-27240, 16-DV-27241,16-DV-27242, 16-DV-27243, Nos.
16-DX-27240, 16-DV-27241,16-DX-27242, 16-DX-27243, Nos.
16-EC-27240, 16-EC-27241,16-EC-27242, 16-EC-27243, Nos.
16-PV-27240, 16-PV-27241,16-PV-27242, 16-PV-27243 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Cynthia M. Rufe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania has issued an order disposing of Group 1 Motions to
Dismiss to the extent that they seek to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs ("DPPs"),
End-Payer Plaintiffs ("EPPs"), and Indirect Reseller Plaintiffs
("IRPs").

     A. Clobetasol Actions:

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the clobetasol EPPs' Class Action Complaint;

          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the clobetasol IRPs' Class Action Complaint;

          4. Defendants Wockhardt USA LLC's and Morton Grove
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs',
EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent
that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the
Group 1 clobetasol DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          5. Defendants Akorn, Inc.'s and Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co.,
Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs'
Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks to
dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 clobetasol
DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          6. Defendant Perrigo New York Inc.'s Individual Motion to
Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaintsis
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 clobetasol DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

          7. Defendants Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.'s and Actavis
Pharma, Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and
IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks
to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 clobetasol
DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

     B. Digoxin Actions

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the digoxin EPPs' Class Action Complaint;

          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied; to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the digoxin IRPs' Class Action Complaint;

          4. Defendant West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp.'s Individual
Motion to Dismiss the Class Action Complaints is denied to the
extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by
the Group 1 digoxin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          5. Defendant Impax Laboratories, Inc.'s Individual Motion
to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 digoxin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          6. Defendant Par Pharmaceutical Inc.'s Individual Motion
to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 digoxin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          7. Defendants Mylan Inc.'s and Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs'
Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks to
dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 digoxin DPPs,
EPPs, and IRPs.

     C. Divalproex ER Actions

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the divalproex ER EPPs' Class Action Complaint;
          
          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs'
Consolidated Class Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it
seeks to dismiss the first count of the divalproex ER IRPs' Class
Action Complaint;

          4. Defendants Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Inc.'s and Zydus
Pharmaceuticals [USA], Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the
DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the
extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by
the Group 1 divalproex ER DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          5. Defendants Mylan Inc.'s and Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs'
Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks to
dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 divalproex ER
DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

     D. Doxycycline Actions

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the doxycycline EPPs' Class Action Complaint;
     
          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the doxycycline IRPs' Class Action Complaint;

          4. Defendant Mayne Pharma Inc.'s Individual Motion to
Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 doxycycline DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          5. Defendant West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp.'s Individual
Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action
Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the
Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 doxycycline DPPs, EPPs,
and IRPs;

          6. Defendant Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.'s Individual Motion
to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 doxycycline DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          7. Defendants Mylan Inc.'s and Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs'
Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks to
dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1 doxycycline
DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs;

          8. Defendant Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.'s and Actavis
Pharma, Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and
IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent that it seeks
to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the Group 1
doxycycline DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

     E. Econazole Actions

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the econazole EPPs' Class Action Complaint;

          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the econazole IRPs' Class Action Complaint;

          4. Defendant Teligent, Inc.'s Individual Motion to
Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
granted.  The Sherman Act claims of the econazole DPPs, EPPs, and
IRPs against Defendant Teligent are dismissed without prejudice.
Econazole Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their Sherman Act
claims against Teligent pursuant to the provisions of Pretrial
Order No. 51.

     F. Pravastatin Actions

          1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the DPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied;

          2. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the EPPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the pravastatin EPPs' Class Action Complaint;

          3. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the IRPs' Class
Action Complaint is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss
the first count of the pravastatin IRPs' Class Action Complaint;

          4. Apotex Corp.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs',
EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent
that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the
Group 1 pravastatin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

          5. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Inc. USA's Individual Motion
to Dismiss the DPPs', EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is
denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act
claims brought by the Group 1 pravastatin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

          6. Sandoz Inc.'s Individual Motion to Dismiss the DPPs',
EPPs', and IRPs' Class Action Complaints is denied to the extent
that it seeks to dismiss the Sherman Act claims brought by the
Group 1 pravastatin DPPs, EPPs, and IRPs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bx3jrf from Leagle.com.

DEFENSE LIAISON COUNSEL, Defendant, represented by CHUL PAK --
cpak@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC, JAN P. LEVINE
-- levinej@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, LAURA S. SHORES --
laura.shores@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP,
SAUL P. MORGENSTERN -- saul.morgenstern@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD
& PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP & SHERON KORPUS -- skorpus@kasowitz.com
-- KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP.

DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS PSC, Plaintiffs, represented by DAVID
F. SORENSEN -- dsorensen@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., DIANNE
M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NASTLAW LLC, LINDA P. NUSSBAUM --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP PC, MICHAEL L.
ROBERTS -- mlr@alabamatortlaw.com -- ROBERTS LAW FIRM, ROBERT N.
KAPLAN -- rkaplan@kaplanfox.com -- KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER, LLP,
THOMAS M. SOBOL -- tom@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO
LLP & ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG -- mail@finekaplan.com -- FINE, KAPLAN
AND BLACK.

END-PAYER PLAINTIFFS PSC, Plaintiffs, represented by ADAM J. ZAPALA
-- azapala@cpmlegal.com -- COTCHETT PITRE & MCCARTHY LLP, BONNY
SWEENEY -- bsweeney@hausfeld.com -- HAUSFELD LLP, DENA C. SHARP --
Dena Sharp -- GIRARD GIBBS LLP, ELIZABETH JOAN CABRASER --
ecabraser@lchb.com -- LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP,
GREGORY S. ASCIOLLA -- gasciolla@labaton.com -- LABATON SUCHAROW
LLP, HEIDI M SILTON -- hmsilton@locklaw.com -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL
NAUEN PLLP, JAMES R. DUGAN, II, THE DUGAN LAW FIRM, JAYNE A.
GOLDSTEIN, SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLP, JOSEPH R. SAVERI
-- jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com -- JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, MICHAEL M.
BUCHMAN -- mbuchman@motleyrice.com -- MOTLEY RICE LLC & MINDEE J.
REUBEN -- mreuben@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC.

INDIRECT RESELLERS PSC, Plaintiffs, represented by DANIEL S. MASON,
FURTH SALEM MASON & LI LLP, ELIZABETH TIPPING --
info@nealharwell.com -- NEAL & HARWELL, PLC, FRANCIS O. SCARPULLA
-- fos@scarpullalaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF FRANCIS O. SCARPULLA &
JONATHAN W. CUNEO -- jonc@cuneolaw.com -- CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA
LLP.

INDIRECT RESELLERS PSC, plaintiffs represented by DON BARRETT --
donbarrettpa@gmail.com -- BARRETT LAW OFFICES.

STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, Plaintiffs, represented by W. JOSEPH
NIELSEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, LAURA JOHNSON MARTELLA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, MAX M. MILLER, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF IOWA, ROBERT L. HUBBARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK,
TIMOTHY M. FRASER, FL OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & WADE ELLIS
BEAVERS, OFFICE OF THE NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL.

DAVID H. MARION, Special Master, pro se.

BRUCE P. MERENSTEIN, Special Master, pro se.

LINDA D. PERKINS, Special Master, pro se.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor, represented by ANDREW J.
EWALT, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ELLEN R. CLARKE, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
JAY OWEN, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, JOSEPH C. FOLIO, III, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE & RYAN J. DANKS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITTRUST
DIVISION.


MDL 2862: Emma vs. BASF AG et al. over Isocyanate Sales Moved
-------------------------------------------------------------
EMMA CHEMICALS CO., INC., individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BASF AG; BASF CORP.; BAYER
AG; BAYER CORP., COVESTRO AG; COVESTRO LLC; DOWDUPONT INC.; DOW
CHEMICAL CO.; HUNTSMAN CORP.; HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL LLC.; LANXESS
AG, LANXESS CO.; MCNS POLYURETHANES USA INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS,
INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS AMERICA, INC.; MITSUI CHEMICALS & SKC
POLYURETHANES, INC.; WANHUA CHEMICAL GROUP CO., LTD.; WANHUA
CHEMICAL (AMERICA) CO. LTD.; WANHUA CHEMICAL US HOLDING, INC., the
Defendants, Case No.: 2:18-cv-02958, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to the
U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh).
The Western District of Pennsylvania Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01427-DWA-LPL to the proceeding on Oct. 14, 2018. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Donetta W. Ambrose.

The case is being consolidated with MDL 2862 in re: DIISOCYANATES
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Oct. 3, 2018.
The MDL Panel find that these actions involve common questions of
fact, and that centralization will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of
this litigation. All actions share complex factual questions
arising from allegations that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize the price of methylene diphenyl
diisocyanate (MDI) and toluene diisocyanate (TDI) sold in the
United States, from early 2015 or 2016 through the present,
including through 3 agreements to limit supply of MDI and TDI
through planned manufacturing shutdowns at plants worldwide and
implementing coordinated price increases. The record indicates that
discovery is likely to be international in scope and will include a
significant number of nonparties. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings,
especially with respect to class certification and Daubert motions;
and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the
judiciary.

In its Oct. 3 Order, the MDL Panel concludes that the Western
District of Pennsylvania is an appropriate transferee forum. One
defendant has its U.S. headquarters in this district, and five
other defendants have their headquarters in adjacent or nearby
districts. Relevant documents and witnesses therefore are likely to
be located in or close to this area. Nearly all responding
defendants agree that the Western District of Pennsylvania is an
appropriate venue, along with plaintiffs in one action on the
motion and one potential tag-along action. Judge Donetta W. Ambrose
is an experienced transferee judge with the ability and willingness
to manage this litigation efficiently.

"We are confident she will steer this matter on a prudent course,"
the Panel says.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff Emma Chemicals Co., Inc. and the Proposed
Class:

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
          Fred T. Isquith, Jr., Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9102
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com
                  fisquith@nussbaumpc.com

METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER: Johnson Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY L. JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER
STUDIOS INC., AND TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX HOME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. C17-541RSM (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S.
Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, (i) granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval of Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement and
Final Certification of the Settlement Class, and (ii) granted in
part the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses and Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award.

The Defendants marketed several James Bond DVD and Blu-ray boxsets
as containing "all the Bond films" and "every gorgeous girl,
nefarious villain and charismatic star."  However, the boxsets did
not include two James Bond movies -- Casino Royale and Never Say
Never Again.  The Plaintiff relied on the advertising, but did not
receive the product she was led to believe she purchased.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff instituted the action on behalf of a
nationwide class of consumers, alleging a violation of Washington's
Consumer Protection Act, breach of express warranties, and breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability.

The Plaintiff originally filed suit in Washington's King County
Superior Court and Defendants removed the action to the Court on
April 7, 2017.  Thereafter, the Court partially granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the claim for breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, dismissing the Defendants'
corporate parents, and granting the Plaintiff leave to amend.  The
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that re-alleged the dismissed
claims and claims against the corporate parents.  This prompted the
parties to mediate, stipulate to dismissal of the corporate
parents, and ultimately reach a preliminary settlement which the
Court approved.

The settlement entitles the approximately 300,000 class members to
digital copies of the two films that were omitted from the original
boxsets upon making a valid claim.  If a class member attests that
the class member does not have the capability to use digital
copies, physical DVDs will be provided.  To submit a valid claim,
the class members must fill out a claim form and submit proof of
purchase.

The Settlement Administrator approved relief for 6431 claims.  Of
those claims, 278 were initially submitted without valid proof of
purchase, but the Settlement Administrator was instructed to deem
the claims valid.  Under the settlement, the Defendants also agree
to alter their use of "all" and "every" with regard to future
marketing of James Bond movie collections.

The settlement agreement provides that the Defendants will not
oppose or submit any evidence or argument challenging or
undermining an application by the Class Counsel for attorneys'
fees, costs, or expenses in an amount not to exceed $350,000.  The
Class Counsel seeks attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of
$350,000 ($334,690.56 in fees and $15,309.44 in expenses).  The
Plaintiff also seeks approval of a $5,000 award to the class
representative.  No class members have opted-out of the settlement
or objected to the settlement or the Motion for Fees.

Judge Martinez concludes that the case demonstrates a common
dissatisfaction with class actions: small relief for the class and
big attorneys' fees for the class counsel.  He believes that basing
the Class Counsel's attorneys' fee award off of a portion of the
amount actually claimed by the class would better align the
interests of the class and the Class Counsel.  The interests of the
class and the Class Counsel were simply not aligned.  The Class
Counsel accepted compensation of an uncertain value and agreed to
claim procedures that likely resulted in fewer claims.  At the same
time, the Class Counsel removed any incentive they had to assure
high class participation by insulating their fee from the benefit
obtained for the class.

However, the Judge finds that the recovery provided for in the case
does not lend itself to a percentage-ofrecovery calculation and he
is left with the lodestar method to calculate attorneys' fees.
While reductions appropriately decreased the lodestar amount to
$184,665, the award still seems unreasonably large relative to the
relief obtained for the class.  But the case does not warrant
continued action and he takes solace in the hope that all things
being equal, it seems more defensible that the class attorneys,
rather than the Defendants, receive the excess, as they will likely
reinvest it in future class action cases.

Making adjustments to the amount requested by the Plaintiff, the
Judge will award total costs of $12,159.37.  And finding that some
award is appropriate on account of the Plaintiff's involvement with
the action, he will accordingly award the Plaintiff an incentive
payment of $1,500.

For all these reasons, Judge Martinez granted hte Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement and Final Certification of the Settlement Class.  He
approved the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.

The Judge certified, consistent with the Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement, the settlement class defined as all persons and
entities (and their successors-in-interest, assigns, and heirs) in
the United States that purchased one or more of the James Bond Sets
prior to Jan. 31, 2018.

He granted in part the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Attorneys'
Fees and Expenses and Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award.  He
awarded (i) attorneys' fees in the amount of $184,665; (ii) costs
in the amount of $12,159.37; (iii) the named plaintiff in the
amount of $1,500.  The matter is now closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/p0qb3k from Leagle.com.

Mary L. Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alan J. Statman --
ajstatman@statmanharris.com -- STATMAN, HARRIS & EYRICH, LLC, pro
hac vice, Alexander Sether Kleinberg --
akleinberg@eisenhowerlaw.com -- EISENHOWER & CARLSON & Sylvie
Derrien -- sderrien@statmanharris.com -- STATMAN, HARRIS & EYRICH,
LLC, pro hac vice.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc & Twentieth Century Fox Home
Entertainment, LLC, Defendants, represented by Ariel Green --
Ariel.Green@mto.com -- MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, pro hac vice, John S.
Devlin, III -- devlinj@lanepowell.com -- LANE POWELL PC & Tamerlin
J. Godley -- Tamerlin.Godley@mto.com -- MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, pro
hac vice.


MONITRONICS INT'L: Pays Remaining $23,000,000 in Telemarketing Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Monitronics International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that in the
third quarter of 2018, the Company paid the remaining $23,000,000
of the settlement amount in the consolidated telemarketing-class
action related suit.

The Company was named as a defendant in multiple putative class
actions consolidated in U.S. District Court (Northern District of
West Virginia) on behalf of purported class(es) of persons who
claim to have received telemarketing calls in violation of various
state and federal laws.

The actions were brought by plaintiffs seeking monetary damages on
behalf of all plaintiffs who received telemarketing calls made by a
Brinks Home Security Authorized Dealer, or any Authorized Dealer's
lead generator or sub-dealer.

In the second quarter of 2017, the Company and the plaintiffs
agreed to settle this litigation for $28,000,000 ("the Settlement
Amount"). In the third quarter of 2017, the Company paid $5,000,000
of the Settlement Amount pursuant to the settlement agreement with
the plaintiffs. In the third quarter of 2018, the Company paid the
remaining $23,000,000 of the Settlement Amount.

The Company is actively seeking to recover the Settlement Amount
under its insurance policies held with multiple carriers.  

On November 1, 2018, the company settled its claim against one such
carrier in which the carrier agreed to pay the company $9,750,000
in the fourth quarter of 2018.  

Monitronics International said, "This amount will be recognized in
the consolidated statement of operations at such time. We continue
to seek to recover additional funds under our insurance policies
from the remaining carriers."

Monitronics International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides security alarm monitoring and related services to
residential and commercial customers in the United States, District
of Columbia, Canada, and Puerto Rico. The company operates through
two segments, MONI and LiveWatch. The company was founded in 1994
and is headquartered in Farmers Branch, Texas. Monitronics
International, Inc. is a subsidiary of Ascent Capital Group, Inc.


MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
SARAH C. BRUNSON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01843 (E.D. Mo., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks
to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate
result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb #51236
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com



MONSANTO COMPANY: Kathryn Hill Sues over Herbicide Roundup Sales
----------------------------------------------------------------
KATHRYN L. HILL, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01852 (E.D. Mo., Oct. 29, 2018), seeks
to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate
result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb No. 51236
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MSG HOLDINGS: Fraticelli FLSA/NYLL Suit Settlement Has Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER FRATICELLI, individually and on behalf of
other persons similarly situated who were employed by MSG HOLDINGS,
L.P. and THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY and/or any other
entities affiliated with or controlled by MSG HOLDINGS, L.P. and
THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MSG HOLDINGS, L.P.
and THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, and/or any other entities
affiliated with or controlled by MSG HOLDINGS, L.P. and THE MADISON
SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 13 Civ. 6518 (HBP)
(S.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the parties'
joint application to approve their settlement.

Plaintiffs Oritt Blum, Scott Winter, Kristin Slattery, Fernando
Herrera and Chris Fraticelli commenced the action pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law
("NYLL"), to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime premium pay.
The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants as unpaid interns in
various departments and allege that they were uniformly
misclassified by defendants as exempt from the federal and state
minimum wage and overtime requirements.  The Plaintiffs seek to
recover, among other things, unpaid wages, attorneys' fees and
liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA and NYLL.

The Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' claims and maintain that the
Plaintiffs were properly classified as exempt under the trainee
exception to the FLSA and, thus, are not owed any damages.

The Plaintiffs moved three separate times for conditional
certification of the FLSA collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b); however, the Hon. Jesse M. Furman, United States District
Judge, denied this motion on May 7, 2014 and Magistrate Judge
Pitman signed denied it on Dec. 10, 2015 and again on July 2,
2018.

The parties thereafter reached a settlement with respect to named
Plaintiffs Blum, Winter, Slattery, Herrera and Fraticelli only.
The Named Plaintiffs' total alleged damages, exclusive of
attorneys' fees and costs, are $5,751.  The parties memorialized
the terms of the settlement in a written settlement agreement.

Under the proposed Settlement Agreement, the Defendants agree to
pay a net settlement amount of $5,414 -- $667 being paid to Blum,
$593 being paid to Winter, $542 being paid to Slattery, $209 being
paid to Herrera and $3,403 being paid to Fraticelli.  The
Settlement Agreement further provides that the Defendants will pay
to the Plaintiffs' Counsel such fees/expenses approved by the
Court, not to exceed $50,000.

The Magistrate Judge explains that in determining whether a
proposed FLSA settlement is fair and reasonable, a court should
consider the totality of circumstances, including but not limited
to the following factors: (1) the plaintiff's range of possible
recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the
parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing
their claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation
risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is
the product of arm's length bargaining between experienced counsel;
and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion.

He finds that the settlement satisfies these criteria.  First, Blum
and Winter will recover 48% of their individual alleged damages and
Slattery and Herrera will recover 37% of their individual alleged
damages.  These percentages are reasonable.  Second, the settlement
will entirely avoid the expense and aggravation of litigation.
Third, the settlement will enable the Plaintiffs to avoid the risk
of litigation.  Fourth, the counsel represents that the settlement
is the product of arm's-length bargaining between an experienced
counsel and that the counsel advocated zealously on behalf of their
respective clients during negotiations.  There is no evidence to
the contrary.  Fifth, there are no factors that suggest the
existence of fraud.

Moreover, the Magistrate he holds that despite the numerous
problematic entries, as well as, the small monetary amount
recovered by the Plaintiffs in the action, he is required to award
the Plaintiffs' counsel an appropriate lodestar figure based on
these remaining hours.  

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Pitman approved the Settlement
Agreement and awarded $50,000 in attorneys' fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/xmAxHs from Leagle.com.

Christopher Fraticelli, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated who were employed by MSG Holdings, L.P. and The
Madison Square Garden Company and/or any other entities affiliated
with or controlled by MSG Holdings, L.P. and The Madison Square
Garden Compan, Plaintiff, represented by Lloyd Robert Ambinder --
lambinder@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, Charles R.
Virginia -- cvirginia@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ambinder, LLP,
Daniel Harris Markowitz, Leeds Brown Law PC, Jeffrey Kevin Brown,
Leeds Morelli & Brown, LaDonna Marie Lusher -- llusher@vandallp.com
-- Virginia & Ainbinder, LLP, Michael Alexander Tompkins, Leeds
Brown Law PC & Suzanne Brooke Klein, Virginia & Ambinder, LLP.

Oritt Blum, Fernando Herrera, Scott H. Winter & Kristin Slattery,
Plaintiffs, represented by Lloyd Robert Ambinder, Virginia &
Ambinder, LLP.

MSG Holdings, L.P., The Madison Square Garden Company, and/or any
other entities affiliated with or controlled by MSG Holdings, L.P.
& The Madison Square Garden Company, Defendants, represented by Ira
G. Rosenstein -- ira.rosenstein@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis &
Bockius, LLP & Sam Scott Shaulson -- sam.shaulson@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


NESTLE USA: Coffee-mate Has Unsafe Additive, Beasley Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARK BEASLEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LUCKY STORES, INC., NESTLE USA, INC.,
SAVE MART SUPER MARKETS, THE KROGER COMPANY, and THE SAVE MART
COMPANIES, INC., the Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-570953 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Oct. 29, 2018), alleges that Nestle unlawfully made
Coffee-mate with the unsafe food additive known as partially
hydrogenated oil ("PHO").

According to the complaint, Nestle manufactures, markets, and sells
a line of coffee creamer products under the Coffee-mate brand name.
Lucky, Save Mart, SMCI, and Kroger unlawfully sold Coffee-mate at
their grocery stores throughout California. On June 16, 2015, the
Food and Drug Administration issued a final regulation and
declaratory order, after extensive public comment, declaring PHO
unsafe for any use in food. The FDA came to the same conclusion
when it initially proposed the regulation in 2013. The Defendants
were aware that PHO was unsafe even before this time, yet still
harmed their customers by manufacturing, distributing, and selling
Coffee-mate. During the entire class period, inexpensive and
commercially viable alternatives to PHO existed, and indeed were
even in used by the primary competitor to Coffee-mate,
International Delight.

In order to increase profits, Defendants instead sold an unsafe and
illegal product, and such behavior was an unfair business practice.
For much of the class period, Defendants also defrauded the class
by using the false and unauthorized "0 g Trans Fat" nutrient
content claim on Coffee-mate packaging. All PHO, however, contains
trans fat, and the amount in Coffee-mate was not "0 g," but a
substantial and dangerous amount, the lawsuit says.

Nestle is a Swiss transnational food and drink company
headquartered in Vevey, Vaud, Switzerland. It is the largest food
company in the world, measured by revenues and other metrics, since
2014. Lucky Stores is an American supermarket chain founded in San
Leandro, California, in 1935.

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Gregory S. Weston, Esq.
          Andrew C. Hamilton, Esq.
          THE WESTON FIRM
          1405 Morena Blvd., Suite 201
          San Diego, CA 92110
          Telephone: (619) 798-2006
          Facsimile: (619) 343-2789
          E-mail: greg@weston.firm.com
                  andrew@weston.firm.com

NOBLE HOUSE: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Holt Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHLEEN HOLT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NOBLE HOUSE HOTELS &
RESORT, LTD, Defendant, Case No. 17cv2246-MMA (BLM) (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

Holt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
filed the putative class action against the Defendant, alleging
causes of action for violations of California's False Advertising
Law, California Business and Professions Code sections 17500, et
seq.; California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business and
Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.; and California's
Consumers Legal Remedy Act ("FAC").

On Aug. 6, 2017, the Plaintiff was charged a 3.5% surcharge of
$1.38 on her bill at Acqua California Bistro.  She contests the
legality of Noble House's 3.5% surcharge on menu items within three
Hilton hotel restaurants managed by Noble House in San Diego,
California: (1) Acqua; (2) Olive Bar; and (3) Fresco's.  The
Plaintiff alleges the surcharge practice is misleading and
deceiving because it advertises prices for food and drinks in its
menus and then adds the surcharge to the balance of the bill total
at checkout when it is too late for the consumer to make an
informed decision about the increased amount on the bill total.
The Plaintiff alleges Noble House adds the surcharge instead of
raising the prices on its menu.

Noble House contends the surcharge was added to help cover
increasing labor costs and in support of the recent increases in
minimum wage and benefits.  It places a notice on the bottom of its
menus, on signs throughout the premises, and at the bottom of all
bills stating that a 3.5% surcharge will be added to all Guest
checks to help cover increasing labor costs and in our support of
the recent increases in minimum wage and benefits for our dedicated
team members.

The Plaintiff filed a motion to certify a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2) class and a Rule 23(b)(3) class.  Noble House
filed its response in opposition, and the Plaintiff replied.

The classes that the Plaintiff seeks to certify are different from
the class alleged in the FAC.  In the FAC, she sought to represent
a class of all consumers who ate or drank at a restaurant in
California, owned, managed, or operated by Noble House, who were
charged a surcharge on their bill in addition to the costs of the
food or drinks.  However, the motion for class certification seeks
to represent a California-only Rule 23(b)(2) class consisting of
all persons who were charged a surcharge on their bill, between
Feb. 1, 2017 and present, at a restaurant in California managed by
Noble House," and a Rule 23(b)(3) class consisting of all residents
of California who were charged a surcharge on their bill at one or
more of the following three Hilton San Diego Resort and Spa
restaurants: (1) Acqua, (2) Olive Bar, or (3) Fresco's, between
Feb. 1, 2017 and Sept. 20, 2017, where payment was processed by
credit card.

Judge Anello finds that the Plaintiff's California-only Rule
23(b)(2) class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3).  Therefore he granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.   

The Judge certified the following Plaintiff's classes:

     a. Rule 23(b)(2) Class: All persons who were charged a
surcharge on their bill, between Feb. 1, 2017 and the present, at a
restaurant in California managed by the Defendant.

     b. Rule 23(b)(3) Class: All residents of California who were
charged a surcharge on their bill at one or more of the following
three Hilton San Diego Resort and Spa restaurants: (1) Acqua
California Bistro, (2) Olive Bar, or (3) Fresco's, between Feb. 1,
2017 and Sept. 20, 2017, where payment was processed by credit
card.

The Judge appointed Plaintiff Kathleen Holt as the Class
Representative, and Abbas Kazerounian and Jason A. Ibey of
Kazerouni Law Group, APC as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jyM07Z from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Holt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Lemieux --
kevin@westcoastlitigation.com -- The Law Office of Kevin Lemieux,
APC, Yana A. Hart -- yana@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde &
Swigart, Abbas Kazerounian -- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law
Group, APC, Clark Robert Conforti, Kazerouni Law Group APC, Joshua
B. Swigart -- josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart &
Robert Lyman Hyde -- bob@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde &
Swigart.

Noble House Hotels & Resort, LTD, doing business as Noble House
Hotels & Resort, LTD, LP, Defendant, represented by Darin Murl
Sands -- sandsd@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell PC & Heidi Brooks
Bradley -- bradleyh@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell PC.


NOBLES COUNTY, MN: Making Unlawful Immigrant Arrests, Judge Rules
-----------------------------------------------------------------
West Central Tribune reports that Minnesota District Court Judge
Gregory Anderson issued a temporary restraining order and
injunction on Oct. 19, against Nobles County Sheriff Kent Wilkening
in a class-action lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union of Minnesota on an issue of jailing immigrants, an ACLU press
release states.

The ACLU sued Nobles County in southwestern Minnesota this year
saying Wilkening and the county are violating Minnesota law by
refusing to release some immigrants from the county jail when they
post bond or otherwise should be released, then re-arresting them
for Immigrations and Customs Enforcement.

The ACLU said Wilkening doesn't have the authority to re-arrest
people and detain them on behalf of ICE.. The judge's order
requires Wilkening to release people when they are eligible for
release under Minnesota law and the Minnesota and U.S.
constitutions.

If they are re-arrested and placed in federal custody, an ICE
officer must do it, the judge ruled.

Nobles County, home to a high immigrant population, has a contract
to house ICE detainees.

"We are pleased the court acted quickly and decisively to issue
this temporary restraining order against the Nobles County
Sheriff," ACLU-MN Executive Director John Gordon said in the
release. "Every day immigrants have been at risk of unlawful arrest
because of the sheriff's egregious behavior.

"As courts have held over and over, Minnesotans have constitutional
rights regardless of their immigration status," Gordon said. "When
sheriffs flout the law and try to act as federal immigration
officials, it not only harms our community but it also violates the
law. This unlawful behavior needs to end immediately — not only
in Nobles County but across the state.

"This order sends a clear message that these actions will not be
tolerated, and provides immediate relief to all immigrants in
Nobles County. We look forward to making that relief permanent."

Anderson specifically held in his order that "there is a
substantial likelihood" that the plaintiffs will win when the case
comes to trial. That trial is anticipated to occur early next
spring.[GN]


OKLAHOMA: Lawsuit Targets Medical Marijuana Registration
--------------------------------------------------------
Meg Wingerter, writing for News OK, reports that a Tulsa medical
marijuana grower is suing the state over what it calls excessive
fees and taxes.

Caulfield Holdings Botanicals, a Tulsa company that intends to grow
marijuana for the medical market, and Alicia Vargas, a medical
marijuana patient from Weatherford, filed a lawsuit on October 19
and will ask an Oklahoma County district judge to make it a
class-action case.

In the suit, they argue the Oklahoma State Department of Health
overstepped its bounds when it required growers to register with
the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control.

A narcotics license for a grower costs $500, on top of the $2,500
that cannabis businesses must pay to the Oklahoma Medical Marijuana
Authority.

Ron Durbin, Esq. a Tulsa attorney representing Caulfield Holdings,
estimated the licenses will bring in about $1 million in revenue
for the Bureau of Narcotics, and said it was inappropriate to
require medical marijuana businesses to register with the bureau,
which publicly opposed legalizing medical marijuana through State
Question 788.

"There's a reason these businesses are being required to register
with the Bureau of Narcotics," he said. "One is to extract more
money. Another is to allow the OBN to go on a crusade when these
businesses start to take off."

The Oklahoma State Department of Health and the Oklahoma Attorney
General's office declined comment on October 19, saying they hadn't
seen the lawsuit. The Bureau of Narcotics didn't respond to a
request for comment before deadline.

Caulfield Holdings also took issue with the state's decision to
treat the 7 percent tax allowed under State Question 788 as an
excise tax, rather than sales tax. What that means in practice is
that everyone who buys medical marijuana will pay a 7 percent tax
plus the 4.5 percent state sales tax, but people who live in an
area with a local sales tax will pay more.

SQ 788 "doesn't say '7 percent in addition to any existing sales
tax,'" Durbin said. "It says '7 percent.'"

Paula Ross, spokeswoman for the Oklahoma Tax Commission, said that
as SQ 788 was written, it created a 7 percent excise tax on medical
marijuana. Sales tax applies to all products, unless the law
specifically states otherwise, she said.

"There's not an exemption in the law for medical marijuana sales,"
she said.

Lawsuits abound

The newest lawsuit is at least the fifth related to medical
marijuana implementation. Durbin's law firm is involved with four
of them.

Vargas, the medical marijuana patient involved in the newest
lawsuit, also filed a suit on October 17 against the city of
Weatherford with her husband, Michael Vargas, who wants to open a
dispensary. The lawsuit seeks to prevent the city from enforcing
two ordinances it passed that would restrict medical marijuana
businesses.

The ordinances would require dispensary owners to obtain a business
permit from the city, allow the city to conduct surprise
inspections, limit their hours and prohibit dispensaries from
opening on certain blocks of Main Street, within 500 feet of a
library or museum, or within 1,000 feet of a child care center or
another dispensary. They also ban businesses that grow or process
marijuana from city limits and forbid business signs that indicate
marijuana is available.

Another suit related to local ordinances came to an end on October
17. Austin Miller, owner of marijuana business Cloudi Mornings, had
sued the city of Broken Arrow over zoning restrictions and local
fees. Tulsa County District Court Judge Patrick Pickerell ruled
Broken Arrow couldn't enforce its ordinances, and Cloudi Mornings
agreed to dismiss its complaint that city officials had violated
the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act.

A second lawsuit relying on the Open Meeting Act is in a holding
pattern. Kenneth Wogoman, a Muskogee County man, sued the Oklahoma
State Department of Health and several Board of Health members in
July, after the board voted on amendments to proposed medical
marijuana rules that never had been discussed publicly. There's
been no action on that case since August, when Wogoman filed an
amended petition.

The amendments would have required dispensaries to hire pharmacists
and prohibited selling smokable forms of marijuana. The board voted
to scuttle both amendments after Attorney General Mike Hunter's
office said they likely exceeded the board's authority.

The fifth lawsuit, filed by 14 individuals and three businesses in
Cleveland County, argued the Board of Health exceeded its authority
and failed to follow proper procedures with the medical marijuana
rules passed in July. The Oklahoma Attorney General's office has
asked the court to dismiss the case, saying that the plaintiffs
haven't shown the rules will harm them. The case, which is the only
one not involving Durbin, is pending.[GN]


P.A.M. TRANSPORT: Bid to Strike Offer of Judgment in Browne Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BROWNE; ANTONIO CALDWELL; and LUCRETIA HALL, on
behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated Plaintiffs,
v. P.A.M. TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:16-CV-5366 (W.D.
Ark.), Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, denied the
named Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike or Otherwise Invalidate
Defendants' Attempted Rule 68 Offer of Judgment.

The Plaintiffs' operative complaint in the case asserts claims
against PAM under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Law ("AMWL").  The case was brought as a
putative collective action under the FMLA and a putative class
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See id.

In May of 2017, the Court conditionally certified the collective
action,and around 3,000 individuals subsequently opted in as
Plaintiffs in the collective action.  The deadline for the
Plaintiffs to move for class certification under Rule 23 is Oct.
19, 2018.

On May 31, 2018, PAM conveyed an offer of judgment to the
Plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.  The Plaintiffs contend that
PAM's May 31 offer of judgment is invalid, because it purports to
bind putative Rule 23 class members even though the Court has not
yet certified any Rule 23 class.  This contention rests on two
related arguments: first, that a putative class member is not an
adverse party as required by Rule 68, and second, that the Court
cannot enter judgment on behalf of absentee class members.  The
Court has been unable to find any binding authority that squarely
addresses these issues.  But Judge Brooks thinks the greater weight
of persuasive authority runs counter to the Plaintiffs' arguments.

The Plaintiffs cite five cases that explicitly or implicitly
recognize that Rule 68 offers of judgment are invalid when made
only with respect to individual claims (rather than to the claims
of the putative class as a whole) while the issue of class
certification is pending.  However, the Judge finds that none of
these cases say anything about the propriety of Rule 68 offers of
judgment that are made not only with respect to the individual
Plaintiffs but also to the putative classes they seek to represent.


PAM, for its part, cites several cases holding that it is not
improper to enforce Rule 68 offers of judgment that are made with
respect to an entire putative class (rather than only to the
individual Plaintiffs).  The reasoning provided in these cases is
that when an offer of judgment is made to an entire putative class,
any potential conflict between the mandates of Rules 23 and 68 is
eliminated so long as the court certifies a class, provides notice
to its members, and conducts a fairness analysis under Rule 23(e)
before accepting and entering the proposed judgment.

The Judge Court agrees with the reasoning of those cases.  In other
words, if the Plaintiffs were to accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment
from PAM that purports to bind putative class members, the Court
would not enter the agreed-to judgment unless and until it
certified the proposed class(es) and followed the procedures set
forth in Rule 23(e) for approval of class settlement agreements.

So as to the question of whether any putative class members will be
bound, unfairly or otherwise, by a judgment in their absence --
they will not be.  Similarly, as to the question of whether
putative class members are "opposing parties" for purposes of Rule
68 -- either they will have become "opposing parties" who are
actually-certified class members that received notice and an
opportunity to be heard by the time any class settlement is
approved under Rule 23(e), or otherwise they will not be bound the
judgment.

It seems, then, the Judge finds, that the real question lurking
beneath all of this might be whether it would be proper for the
Plaintiffs to be required to pay PAM's costs under Rule 68(d) if
they were ultimately to obtain a judgment that is less favorable
than PAM's preclass-certification Rule 68 offer.  However, he says
the Plaintiffs have not explicitly framed the matter that way, and
no motion for costs is presently before the Court.  Thus that issue
is not ripe at this time.  But on the issue that is presently ripe,
the Judge finds it would not be appropriate to strike or otherwise
invalidate PAM's Rule 68 offer of judgment.

For these reasons, Judge Brooks denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Strike or Otherwise Invalidate Defendants' Attempted Rule 68 Offer
of Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/HgLhWJ from Leagle.com.

David Browne, on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated, Antonio Caldwell, on behalf of himself and all those
similarly situated & Lucretia Hall, on behalf of herself and all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua S.
Boyette -- jboyette@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz Swudler LLC, pro hac
vice, Justin L. Swidler -- jswidler@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz
Swidler LLC, pro hac vice, Richard Swartz --
rswartz@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice &
Travis Martindale-Jarvis -- tmartindale@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz
Swudler LLC, pro hac vice.

PAM Transport Inc, Defendant, represented by Amber Prince --
aprince@cwlaw.com -- Conner & Winters, Martin D. Holmes --
mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson Wright PLLC, Morris Reid
Estes, Jr. -- restes@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson Wright PLLC,
Peter Fredrick Klett -- pklett@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson
Wright PLLC, Robert L. Jones, III -- bjones@cwlaw.com -- Conner &
Winters, K. Scott Hamilton -- khamilton@dickinsonwright.com --
Dickinson Wright PLLC & Kerri E. Kobbeman -- kkobbeman@cwlaw.com --
Conner & Winters, LLP.

John Does, Defendant, represented by Martin D. Holmes , Dickinson
Wright PLLC, Morris Reid Estes, Jr., Dickinson Wright PLLC, Peter
Fredrick Klett, Dickinson Wright PLLC & K. Scott Hamilton,
Dickinson Wright PLLC.


PANERA BREAD: FLSA & DCMWA Classes in Meyer Conditionally Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALAN MEYER and DAVID CORNELIUS, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PANERA
BREAD CO., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-2565 (EGS/GMH) (D. D.C.),
Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification and
Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the District of Columbia Minimum
Wage Act ("DCMWA").

The Plaintiffs, who were assistant managers at two restaurants
owned by the Defendant, claim that they and other assistant
managers employed by the Defendant were misclassified as exempt
employees under the FLSA and DCMWA and therefore were illegally
denied overtime wages for hours that they worked in excess of forty
hours per week.  The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendant
failed to keep accurate records of the time that they worked and
failed to keep required payroll records, and that all of these
violations were willful.

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on March 29, 2017.
On Jan. 30, 2018, they filed their original motion for conditional
certification and the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' original complaint.  On May 17, 2018, the Plaintiffs,
with the Defendant's consent, filed the operative Amended
Complaint, which substituted Panera, LLC, as the Defendant for
Panera Bread Co., and clarified the scope of the proposed
collectives.

According to the Amended Complaint, the Defendant is a Delaware
corporation operating hundreds of restaurants in the United States
and Canada, and which had an annual revenue of over $2.5 billion in
2015.  The Plaintiffs allege that they were employed as assistant
managers at two different Panera Bread restaurants: Mr. Meyer
worked at a location in Washington, D.C., from April 2015 until
October 2015; Mr. Cornelius worked at a location in Birmingham,
Alabama, from October 2013 until September 2015.  The Plaintiffs
assert that, as assistant managers of restaurants operated by the
Defendant, they predominantly performed non-managerial work but
were nevertheless classified as exempt from the overtime provisions
of the FLSA (and, in Mr. Meyers' case, the D.C. Wage Laws).  They
further contend that each of them regularly worked more than forty
hours per week and, as a consequence of their misclassification,
did not receive overtime pay.

The Amended Complaint alleges a collective under the FLSA
consisting of all similarly situated assistant managers whom the
Defendant classified as exempt from overtime requirements, who
worked more than 40 hours per week for the Defendant in the United
States.  It further alleges a collective under the DCMWA consisting
of all similarly situated assistant managers classified as exempt,
who worked more than 40 hours per week for the Defendant in
Washington, D.C., from March 25, 2014, through Feb. 27, 2015, and
who elect to join the action.

After the Amended Complaint was filed, the Court denied as moot the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the original complaint.  The
Plaintiffs' original motion for conditional certification was
similarly denied as moot.

The Plaintiffs thereafter filed a renewed Motion for Conditional
Certification on June 5, 2018.  That motion requests conditional
certification of the FLSA Collective and the DCMWA Collective, as
well as ancillary relief, including authorizing notice to potential
collective members.  The Court's denial of the Defendant's motion
to strike is the subject of a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed
contemporaneously with the Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Magistrate Judge Harvey finds that the Plaintiffs have presented
evidence that the assistant managers in the putative collective
were classified as exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions
although the bulk of the work that they performed was
non-managerial.  They have further presented evidence that
assistant managers regularly worked more than 40 hours per week.
The Plaintiffs have also presented evidence through declarations
that Panera's corporate headquarters exerted significant control
over the operations of its restaurants.  Therefore, he will
conditionally certify a collective pursuant to the FLSA.

With respect to the DCMWA Collective, the Magistrate finds that
because neither party has suggested that conditional certification
should be decided differently under the FLSA and D.C. law, he
assumes for the purposes of the decision that there is no material
difference between them.  Therefore, he will conditionally certify
a collective under the DCMWA.

The notice of the pendency of the FLSA action will be sent to
employees who worked at Panera restaurants operated by the
Defendant nationwide (with the exception of New York, New Jersey,
California, and Massachusetts) as assistant managers beginning on
March 25, 2014 -- which is three years plus 249 days prior to the
filing of the action -- and the date of the Opinion.  The notice of
the pendency of the DCMWA action will be sent to employees who
worked at Panera restaurants operated by Defendant in the District
of Columbia as assistant managers between March 25, 2014, and Feb.
27, 2015.

The Magistrate directs that the Defendant will produce only the
last known email addresses in its possession of potential
collective members.  And because the Plaintiffs have not explained
any particular need for the potential Plaintiffs' social security
numbers, the request for production of social security numbers is
denied at this time.  In the event that the Plaintiffs can show
that methods of direct communication are unsuccessful and the
parties are not able to agree on less intrusive means of handling
any such issues if they should arise, they may seek permission from
the Court to require production of more personal information.

The Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring the Defendant to
include notice in current assistant managers' pay envelopes and
authorization to create a stand-alone website through which
putative collective members could opt-in to the action by
submitting their forms electronically.  The Magistrate finds that
the Plaintiffs fail to respond to the concerns.  Therefore, at this
time, when there is no indication that more traditional opt-in
procedures will be insufficient, the request is denied.

The Plaintiffs are authorized to send a reminder notice via first
class mail and email to potential collective members 30 days after
the beginning of the opt-in period.  

For the foregoing reasons, Margistrate Judge Harvey granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification and Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section
216(b) of the FLSA and the DCMWA.

The Magistrate directed the parties to meet and confer to agree on
the form and content of the opt-in notice, reminder notice, and
consent-to-sue forms, and submit those proposed documents to the
Court within 14 days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.  If the parties are unable to agree on the form and content
of the noticed and consent to sue forms, within 14 days of the date
of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, they will submit a joint
filing to the Court presenting each side's positions on the
remaining disputes, which the undersigned will thereafter resolve
expeditiously.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/x81gbf from Leagle.com.

ALAN MEYER & DAVID CORNELIUS, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Sally Jasmine
Abrahamson -- sabrahamson@outtengolden.com -- OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP,
Justin M. Swartz -- jms@outtengolden.com -- OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP,
pro hac vice & Lucy Brierly Bansal -- lbansal@outtengolden.com --
OUTTEN & GOLDEN, LLP.

PANERA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alexander J. Passantino --
apassantino@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, Jade M. Gilstrap --
jgilstrap@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, pro hac vice, Brett
C. Bartlett -- bbartlett@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac
vice & Kevin M. Young -- kyoung@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP.


PBF ENERGY: Continues to Defend Goldstein Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
PBF Energy Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Arnold Goldstein,
et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al.

On February 17, 2017, in Arnold Goldstein, et al. v. Exxon Mobil
Corporation, et al., the company and PBF Energy Company LLC, and
the company's subsidiaries, PBF Energy Western Region LLC and
Torrance Refining Company LLC and the manager of our Torrance
refinery along with Exxon Mobil Corporation were named as
defendants in a class action and representative action complaint
filed on behalf of Arnold Goldstein, John Covas, Gisela Janette La
Bella and others similarly situated.

The complaint was filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles and alleges negligence, strict
liability, ultrahazardous activity, a continuing private nuisance,
a permanent private nuisance, a continuing public nuisance, a
permanent public nuisance and trespass resulting from the February
18, 2015 electrostatic precipitator ("ESP") explosion at the
Torrance refinery which was then owned and operated by ExxonMobil.


The operation of the Torrance refinery by the PBF entities
subsequent to our acquisition in July 2016 is also referenced in
the complaint. To the extent that plaintiffs' claims relate to the
ESP explosion, Exxon has retained responsibility for any
liabilities that would arise from the lawsuit pursuant to the
agreement relating to the acquisition of the Torrance refinery.

On July 2, 2018, the Court granted leave to plaintiffs' to file a
Second Amended Complaint alleging groundwater contamination.

PBF Energy said, "With the filing of the Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs' added an additional plaintiff. As this matter is in the
class certification phase, we cannot currently estimate the amount
or the timing of its resolution. We presently believe the outcome
will not have a material impact on our financial position, results
of operations or cash flows."

PBF Energy Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the
refining and supply of petroleum products. The company operates
through two segments, Refining and Logistics. PBF Energy Inc. was
founded in 2008 and is based in Parsippany, New Jersey.


PBF ENERGY: Faces Class Action by Michelle & Jim Kendig
-------------------------------------------------------
PBF Energy Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that PBF Energy Limited
is one of the defendants in the class action suit filed by Michelle
Kendig and Jim Kendig.

On September 18, 2018, in Michelle Kendig and Jim Kendig, et al. v.
ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, et al., PBF Energy Limited and Torrance
Refining Company LLC along with ExxonMobil Oil Corporation and
ExxonMobil Pipeline Company were named as defendants in a class
action and representative action complaint filed on behalf of
Michelle Kendig, Jim Kendig and others similarly situated.

The complaint was filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles and alleges failure to authorize
and permit uninterrupted rest and meal periods, failure to furnish
accurate wage statements, violation of the Private Attorneys
General Act and violation of the California Unfair Business and
Competition Law.

Plaintiffs seek to recover unspecified economic damages, statutory
damages, civil penalties provided by statute, disgorgement of
profits, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, interest,
attorney's fees and costs.

To the extent that plaintiffs' claims accrued prior to July 1,
2016, ExxonMobil has retained responsibility for any liabilities
that would arise from the lawsuit pursuant to the agreement
relating to the acquisition of the Torrance refinery and logistics
assets.

PBF Energy said, "As this matter was recently filed, we cannot
currently estimate the amount or the timing of its resolution. We
presently believe the outcome will not have a material impact on
our financial position, results of operations or cash flows."

PBF Energy Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the
refining and supply of petroleum products. The company operates
through two segments, Refining and Logistics. PBF Energy Inc. was
founded in 2008 and is based in Parsippany, New Jersey.


PEACEHEALTH: Sued for Allegedly Overbilling Medicare Patients
-------------------------------------------------------------
Morgan Haefner, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that
an Oregon man filed a lawsuit against Vancouver, Wash.-based
PeaceHealth, alleging the health system secretly overbilled
Medicare patients involved in accidents, according to The Lund
Report.

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon, claims PeaceHealth overbilled Donald Griffith nearly
$15,000 for treatment related to a car accident he was involved in
during November 2015.

Mr. Griffith, who is disabled and has insurance through Medicare,
claims after being treated at Eugene, Ore.-based PeaceHealth Sacred
Heart Medical Center University District, the hospital bypassed
billing Medicare and instead billed him for $14,574.83 in October
2017. A $98,691 settlement from his liability insurer for the
accident was finalized the same month, and he received it in
February 2018.

Under an exception to federal law that only applies to Oregon,
Medicare providers like PeaceHealth must bill a settlement only if
a health plan pays a member injured in an accident within 120 days
after the individual files a claim or is treated, whichever comes
first, according to the lawsuit.

"Since they didn't do that in this case, they cannot come back more
than 120 days later and try to collect from the settlement,"
Michael Fuller, a class-action specialist and lawyer in the case,
told The Lund Report.

A PeaceHealth spokesperson told The Lund Report the health system
does not comment on pending litigation. The lawsuit seeks
class-action status and three times the losses Mr. Griffith claims
he suffered. The complaint alludes to hundreds of others who could
join the case. [GN]


POINT BLANK: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
On October 29, 2018, The United States Federal Court, in the
southern district of Florida denied a motion for class
certification filed against Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., and
dismissed the case.  In the case (OSTA, et al. v. Point Blank
Enterprises, Inc., 0:17-cv-62051-UU, S.D. Fla.), a few individual
Ohio police officers and two law enforcement associations alleged
that a nationwide class should be certified to pursue claims that
Point Blank's Self-Suspending Ballistic System (SSBS) for shoulder
straps used on bulletproof vests were defective.  Notably, the
plaintiffs in the case did not claim that any wearer had been
injured because of the SSBS, and did not allege any deficiency with
the ballistics or bullet-stopping power of the vests.  Instead, the
plaintiffs' lawyers alleged a defect in the "hook and loop" closure
portion of the SSBS when a wearer used the SSBS in a certain way,
allegedly causing the shoulder straps to wear out prematurely.

The denial of the class motion, and the associated dismissal of the
claims asserted by the plaintiffs, enables Point Blank to continue
to design, manufacture, and sell its body armor utilizing the SSBS.


Point Blank has provided millions of vests to the U.S. military and
U.S. law enforcement and no officer has been injured as a result of
the manufacturing and/or design defect the plaintiffs allege, and
in fact many officers' lives have been saved. Over 100 law
enforcement officers' lives have been saved since 2012 and many
more as a result of wearing Point Blank Body Armor over the past
45-years.  Point Blank Body Armor is the most popular body armor
worn by Officers in America today with the largest agencies in the
country today using Point Blank Body Armor as the personal
protection of choice. Point Blank body armor with SSBS has been the
model of choice for American law enforcement over the past
10-years.

Executive Vice President, Hoyt Schmidt, stated, "We have been
committed to the law enforcement community for more than 45 years,
offering vast experience and expertise in saving and protecting the
lives of law enforcement officers, corrections officers, and first
responders. Point Blank provides high performance and quality body
armor products in many different models and styles.  The ruling
reaffirms Point Blank's position that the SSBS is a safe shoulder
strapping system for its ballistic vests, and underscores just one
more reason why Point Blank Body Armor is preferred by the majority
of law enforcement users. We stand behind the performance, the
durability and the safety of those products, and we appreciate and
value our end-users as they protect and defend the United States
and our communities.  Point Blank is committed to customer service,
and has a process in place for reviewing customer complaints and
warranty claims regarding Point Blank products and working directly
with its customers to resolve any issues in a timely manner.  We
appreciate your continued support of Point Blank products and
remain dedicated to customer satisfaction."

              About Point Blank Enterprises, Inc.

Point Blank Enterprises, Inc. --
http://www.pointblankenterprises.com-- is a provider of high
performance protective solutions, including bullet, fragmentation
and stab resistant apparel and related accessories. Through its key
brands, Point Blank Body Armor, Protective Apparel Corporation of
America (PACA), Protective Products, PARACLETE®, The Protective
Group (TPG), Advanced Technology Group (ATG), and First Tactical,
the Company ranks as the largest global supplier of ballistic armor
systems in the world. The Company's ballistic solutions have been
credited with saving countless lives for the most important
customers in the world, including the U.S. Armed Forces, Department
of Defense, Federal Government and law enforcement, corrections and
security personnel, both domestically and abroad. [GN]


PROVIDENT CAPITAL: Court Approves $28.5MM Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sol Dolor, writing for Austalasian Lawyer, reports that the Supreme
Court of New South Wales has approved the $28.5m settlement in the
class action brought by Slater and Gordon against the trustees of
Provident Capital Ltd.

Slater and Gordon brought the class action on a no-win, no-fee
basis on behalf of about 1,900 Australians financially hit by the
collapse of the debenture issuer. The settlement was first
confirmed by the firm on 31 July, the first day of trial, but
without details of the payout.

Slater and Gordon, which began investigating the case in 2012,
filed the class action in 2014 in the Federal Court and headed to
the Supreme Court in 2015.

The firm alleged that Australian Executor Trustees Ltd, the
trustees of Provident, failed to ensure that the company would have
enough property available to repay debenture holders. The suit
alleged that if the trustees acted sooner, substantial losses could
have been avoided for some investors and minimised for others.

"This was a unique case and there has only ever been one other
similar in terms of precedent. The length and complexity of this
case was compounded by numerous cross claims and third-party
claims, as well as a complex opt-out process ordered by the court
halfway through," said Ben Hardwick, Esq. Slater and Gordon head of
class actions.

Compensation from this settlement is in addition to that already
provided by receivers.

"We will now ensure that this compensation gets into the hands of
investors as soon as possible," Hardwick said. "We have a strong
record of getting compensation into the hands of claimants swiftly.
Indeed, the recent Manus Island distribution was one of the fastest
and most efficient settlement distribution processes ever."

Last year, the firm won $70 million in a conditional settlement for
Manus Island detainees. [GN]


RAYMOND JAMES: Judge Grants Former Client's Lawsuit Class Status
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Mathews, writing for Financial Planning, reports that a
legal fight over fees charged by Raymond James is moving to the
next round thanks in part to the firm's own detailed spreadsheets.

Judge William Dimitrouleas granted ex-client Jyll Brink's lawsuit
class action status, a motion Raymond James opposed, which could
reel in nearly 59,000 current and former clients of the firm.

Brink's lawsuit, which was filed in a federal court in Florida
mid-September against the St. Petersburg-based regional BD, accuses
Raymond James & Associates of overcharging its "processing fees,"
on certain accounts, sometimes by up to 10 times.

The judge's approval follows a recent effort by Raymond James to
keep the lawsuit out of the courtroom.

A spokeswoman at Raymond James declined to comment.

Brink will act as a representative for all current and former
Raymond James passport account holders that have been charged a fee
within the past four to five years, depending on whether the claim
is for breach of contract or negligence, according to the court
order.

A lawyer representing Raymond James argued that it was impossible
to identify whether a client or advisor had paid the processing
fee, according to the order.

However, Brink's attorney said the firm had executed over 1 million
trades for nearly 59,000 account holders, citing thorough
documentation from a Raymond James' excel spreadsheet.

Additionally, the attorney argued that the account holders paid for
the entire processing fee themselves 94% of the time, without the
help of their advisor, according to court documents.

Judge Dimitrouleas excluded a little over 2,800 of the passport
account holders from the class certification, determining that a
financial advisor had paid for all, or part, of the processing fee,
but will include the rest of the passport account clients in the
class certification.

The judge asked both sides to present proposals by Nov. 5 for a
notice to all clients deemed to be class members, according to
court documents.

Neither attorney in the case responded to a request for further
comment on the matter. [GN]


REMINGTON: Settlement in Class Suit Will Replace Defective Trigger
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Sakelaris, writing for UPI, reports that after several
accidental deaths and serious injuries, an estimated 7.5 million
Remington gun owners have 18 months to get a defective trigger
replaced.

A class-action lawsuit was filed against Remington saying the guns
went off without anyone pulling the trigger. The deadline for
Remington to appeal the case to the Supreme Court passed on October
23, meaning the settlement goes into effect, CNBC reported.

The settlement affects any gun owner who has a Model 700 or similar
rifle.

"Anyone with one of these guns should take advantage of this
opportunity to get the trigger fixed," said Eric Holland, Esq. --
eholland@allfela.com -- a lead attorney for the plaintiffs. "I've
encouraged everyone to put these guns away. Don't use these guns.
Make the claims now."

Remington set up a website and a hotline, 1-800-876-5940, with more
information.

The country's oldest gun maker has said its rifles are safe.

A CNBC investigation discovered that engineers have warned
Remington about problems with the trigger design since 1948.
Remington didn't modify the design or launch a recall while
accidents and complaints mounted.

This settlement comes 18 years after 9-year-old Gus Barber was
killed in a hunting accident when the trigger went off. The family
settled a wrongful death claim against Remington.

The boy's father, Richard Barber, has been critical of the
class-action lawsuit, saying it wasn't tough enough on Remington,
and he doesn't believe the settlement goes far enough. Still, he
encouraged rifle owners to send their guns in for repairs, even
though peak hunting season starts soon.

"Why would somebody take a chance endangering the lives of their
family members and friends, just because it may inconvenience them,
that they may have to use a different rifle?" Barber asked.

Remington filed for bankruptcy in March after being weighed down
with leveraged buyout debt and public outcry over mass shootings
and the class action suit.

Survivors of the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting in
Newtown, Conn., in 2012 filed a lawsuit against Remington because
the shooter used one of its guns, a Bushmaster, in the massacre.
[GN]


RIPPLE LABS: Consolidated Class Action Moves to Federal Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nikhilesh De, writing for CoinDesk, reports that an ongoing legal
battle between XRP investors and payments startup Ripple is
entering its next phase.

Attorneys for Ripple Labs and its affiliated defendants filed to
move a consolidated class-action lawsuit from its previous venue at
the San Mateo Superior Court to the U.S. District Court, Northern
District of California, according to court documents published on
Nov. 7.

The defendants argued that the consolidated suit matches the
requirements for a case to be brought before the higher, federal
court.

In addition to the request to change the venue, Ripple's attorneys
hinted at the company's defense against the suit, which alleges
that the XRP token is a security issued by Ripple. As part of the
removal process, they wrote:

"Plaintiffs do not allege that they lacked information about the
nature of these transactions. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that
they were somehow injured because the Defendants were allegedly
required to register XRP as a 'security' with the Securities &
Exchange Commission ('SEC') but failed to do so."

The consolidated class action combines previous class-action
lawsuits filed by plaintiffs Avner Greenwald, David Oconer and
Vladi Zakinov, according to the document. A fourth suit filed by
Ryan Coffey was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff in August,
though Ripple's attorneys later filed to have it related to
Zakinov's suit.

The defendants now include Ripple Labs and its subsidiary XRP II,
as well as Bradley Garlinghouse, Christian Larsen, Ron Will,
Antoinette O'Gorman, Eric van Miltenburg, Susan Athey, Zoe Cruz,
Ken Kurson, Ben Lawsky, Anja Manuel and Takashi Okita.

Why the move?
Ripple's attorneys argue that, under the U.S. Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA), the case can now be shifted to federal court.
Specifically, they cite the fact that there are more than 100
members of the suing class, at least one plaintiff is a citizen of
a different state than the defendants and the total amount being
sued for exceeds $5 million.

One of the lawsuits, originally brought by Israeli resident Avner
Greenwald, states that there are "thousands" of individuals who
lost money after buying XRP. The plaintiffs are also asking for
Ripple to pay $167.7 million in damages.

Simply the act of seeking to move the case to district court means
the case is now before that federal court, said Stephen Palley --
spalley@andersonkill.com -- a partner at the D.C.-based law firm
Anderson Kill.

Mr. Palley told CoinDesk that plaintiffs can try to move the case
back before a state-level court by filing a motion to remand. And
indeed, a subsequent filing entered on Nov. 8 indicates that the
plaintiffs will file a motion to remand the case back to the San
Mateo Superior Court.

As such, the next deadline for Ripple to respond to the complaint
itself will either be two weeks from the date the motion to remand
is denied (if it is denied) or two weeks from when the San Mateo
court receives the case (if the motion to remand is approved).

Speaking about class-action lawsuits in general, Mr. Palley
explained that "the conventional wisdom is that state court juries
and judges tend to be more sympathetic to plaintiffs," possibly in
part because state-level courts will draw from a more local jury
pool.

"There's also a perception that sometimes a state court judge …
may be more political," he said, noting that some state-level
judges are elected.

"Defendants, on the other hand, have a perception that they'll get
a more fair shake in federal court." [GN]


SACRAMENTO CTY, CA: Protective Order Issued in Mays Prisoners Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Nemwan of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California has issued a Stipulated
Protective Order in the case, LORENZO MAYS, RICKY RICHARDSON,
JENNIFER BOTHUN, ARMANI LEE, LEERTESE BEIRGE, and CODY GARLAND, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02081 TLN KJN
(PC) (E.D. Cal.).

The action is likely to involve sensitive information for which
special protection from public disclosure and from use for any
purpose other than prosecution of the action is warranted.  Such
confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of
protected health information and otherwise sensitive personal
information pertaining to Plaintiffs and members of the purported
class and other information otherwise generally unavailable to the
public, or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure under state or federal statutes, court rules, case
decisions, or common law.

Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the
prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery
materials, to adequately protect information the parties are
entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are
permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation
for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the
end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective
order for such information is justified in the matter.

The Defendant asserts that it will only designate materials as
"Confidential" under the Protective Order if they contain sensitive
health or other personal information, or if they contain
information that has been deemed confidential by the Sacramento
County Sheriff's Department or other relevant agency for safety and
security reasons and has been restricted from general distribution,
including but not limited to inmates and the public.  It agrees
that the Plaintiffs may request, and it will provide, inmate
custody and/or health records upon such request.

Documents and information provided to Disability Rights California
("DRC") pursuant to DRC's statutory access authority during the
course of its investigation preceding the litigation may be
submitted to the Court.  Such materials will be presumed to be
"Confidential" pursuant to the Agreement and Protective Order,
except to the extent that the Parties agree the materials do not
warrant such designation or where a Party disputes the designation,
in which case that Party must employ the dispute resolution
procedure outlined.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by a separate agreement or
order.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.  Unless a prompt challenge to a Designating
Party's confidentiality designation is necessary to avoid
foreseeable, substantial unfairness, unnecessary economic burdens,
or a significant disruption or delay of the litigation, a Party
does not waive its right to challenge a confidentiality designation
by electing not to mount a challenge promptly after the original
designation is disclosed.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with the
case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this
litigation.  Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Order.  

The Counsel of Record are entitled to retain an archival copy of
all documents, pleadings, motion papers, trial, deposition, and
hearing transcripts, legal memoranda, correspondence, deposition
and trial exhibits, expert reports, attorney work product, and
consultant and expert work product, even if such materials contain
Protected Material.  The Counsel of Record is not required to
destroy or return copies of Protected Material that may be stored
on back-up tapes created in the Receiving Party's normal course of
business and retained for disaster-recovery purposes.  Any such
archival or back-up tape copies that contain or constitute
Protected Material remain subject to the Protective Order.

Any violation of the Order may be punished by appropriate measures
including, without limitation, contempt proceedings and/or monetary
sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Protective Order is
available at https://is.gd/L8XdvV from Leagle.com.

Armani Lee, Leertese Beirge, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Cody
Garland, Lorenzo Mays & Jennifer Bothun, Plaintiffs, represented by
Donald Specter, Prison Law Office, Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria --
jvs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Addison Mills Litton --
alitton@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Anne Hadreas --
anne.Hadreas@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Kathlyn Anne Querubin -- kquerubin@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Margot Knight Mendelson -- mmendelson@prisonlaw.com -- Prison
Law Office, Mark Anthony Zambarda -- mzambarda@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Sophie Jedeikin Hart -- sophieh@prisonlaw.com -- Prison Law
Office, Tifanei Ressl-Moyer --
Tifanei.Ressl-Moyer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California & Aaron Joseph Fischer --
Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California.

County of Sacramento, Defendant, represented by Todd Holton Master
-- tmaster@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley LLP & Shawn
M. Ridley -- sridley@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley.


SIERRA TRADING: Chen Suit Moved to Western District of Washington
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Weimin Chen, for himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Sierra Trading Post, Inc., vs. Does 1-20, inclusive
, the Defendants, Case No.: 18-00002-25019-6-SEA, was removed from
the King County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for
District of Western District of Washington (Seattle) on Oct 29,
2018. The Western District of Washington Court Clerk assigned Case
No.: 2:18-cv-01581 to the proceeding.

Sierra Trading is an online, brick-and-mortar, and catalog retailer
of off-price merchandise operated by the TJX Companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Sierra Trading Post, Inc.:

          Erin M Wilson, Esq.
          Rudy Albert Englund, Esq.
          LANE POWELL PC
          1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4200
          Seattle, WA 98101-2338
          Telephone: (206) 233-7432
          E-mail: wilsonem@lanepowell.com
                  englundr@lanepowell.com

SKAGIT REGIONAL: Faces McLean and Range Suit in W.D. Washington
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Skagit Regional
Health. The case is captioned WILLA MCLEAN, and DANETTE RANGE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. SKAGIT REGIONAL HEALTH; and CASCADE VALLEY HOSPITAL,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01567-RSL (W.D. Wash., Oct. 24, 2018).
The case is assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik.

Skagit Regional Health operates as multi-specialty medical group
that provides a range of medical specialties and services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC
          2633 E Indian School Road, Suite 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Joshua Swigart, Esq.
          HYDE & SWIGART (CA)
          2221 Camino del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233-7770
          Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
          E-mail: josh@westcoastlitigation.com

               - and -

          Ryan Lee McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC
          2633 E Indian School Road, Suite 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 900-1288
          E-mail: ryan@kazlg.com


SONIC CORP: Patrick Balks at Inspire Brands Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH PATRICK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SONIC CORP., STEVEN A. DAVIS, S. KIRK
KINSELL, KATE S. LAVELLE, TONY D. BARTEL, R. NEAL BLACK, LAUREN R.
HOBART, J. CLIFFORD HUDSON, FEDERICO F. PENA, JEFFREY H. SCHUTZ,
KATHRYN L. TAYLOR, and SUSAN E. THRONSON, the Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-01063-G (W.D. Okla, Oct. 29, 2018), seeks to enjoin
Defendants from holding shareholder vote on a proposed merger
transaction and from taking any steps to consummate the proposed
transaction unless, and until, the material information is
disclosed to Sonic shareholders sufficiently in advance of the vote
on the proposed transaction or, in the event the proposed
transaction is consummated, to recover damages resulting from the
Defendants’ violations of the Exchange Act. The proposed
transaction is in connection with proposed acquisition of Sonic by
Inspire Brands, Inc.

According to the complaint, on September 24, 2018, the Sonic Board
caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger,
pursuant to which Sonic's stockholders will receive $43.50 in cash
for each share of Sonic common stock they hold. On October 22,
2018, to convince Sonic shareholders to vote in favor of the
Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the filing of a
materially incomplete and misleading Proxy Statement on Schedule
14A with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

While Defendants are touting the fairness of the Merger
Consideration to the Company's shareholders in the Proxy, they have
failed to disclose certain material information that is necessary
for shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby rendering certain statements in the Proxy
false and/or misleading. In particular, the Proxy contains
materially incomplete and misleading information concerning the
financial projections for the Company, which were developed by the
Company's management and utilized by the Company's financial
advisor, Guggenheim Securities, LLC in rendering its fairness
opinion, both of which were relied upon by the Board in
recommending shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction. Additionally, the Proxy contains materially incomplete
and misleading information regarding the sale process leading up to
the Proposed Transaction.

It is imperative that the material information that has been
omitted from the Proxy is disclosed to the Company's shareholders
prior to the forthcoming shareholder vote, so that they can
properly exercise their corporate suffrage rights, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Jack L. Brown, Esq.
          C. Michael Copeland, Esq.
          JONES GOTCHER
          3800 First Place Tower
          15 East Fifth Street
          Tulsa, OK 74103-4309
          Telephone: (918) 581-8200
          E-mail: mcopeland@jonesgotcher.com
                  jbrown@jonesgotcher.com

               - and -

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com


SONY CORP: Supreme Court to Hear Antitrust Case on Dec. 11
----------------------------------------------------------
Mohsen Seddigh, writing for Law360, reports that on Dec. 11, 2018,
the Supreme Court of Canada will hear Godfrey v. Sony Corporation,
an appeal that could be one of the most important antitrust cases
to ever come before. [GN]


SPAR GROUP: Clothier Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA J. CLOTHIER, on behalf of herself, and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SPAR GROUP, INC.; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. RG18926494 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Oct. 29, 2018), alleges that Defendants are engaging in unlawful,
unfair, deceptive and/or fraudulent business practices including,
but not limited failure to pay all wages, including overtime and
minimum wage; failure to provide itemized wage statements; failure
to pay all wages at time of discharge; and failure to reimburse
business expenses pursuant to the California Labor Code.

As a direct and proximate result of those acts and practices,
Defendants have received and continue to hold ill-gotten gains and
property belonging to Plaintiff and the proposed class, the lawsuit
says.

SBS provided onsite merchandising services throughout California.
SBS employed merchandisers who travel to various client locations
to provide merchandising services, such as placing coupons on
retail products, setting up in-store displays, and stocking movie
kiosks with new releases while removing old releases.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Eric A. Grover, Esq.
          Robert W. Spencer, Esq.
          KELLER GROVER LLP
          111965 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94103
          Telephone: (415) 543-1305
          Facsimile: (415) 543-7861

               - and -

          Kenneth S. Gaines, Esq.
          Daniel F. Gaines, Esq.
          Alex P. Katofsky, Esq.
          GAINES & GAINES
          Agoura Road, Suite 101
          Calabasas, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 703-8985
          Facsimile: (818) 703-8984

ST. JOSEPHS: Court Approves $11.9MM Settlement
----------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of Rhode Island, PROVIDENCE, SC, issued a
decision granting Plaintiffs' Petition for Approval of Proposed
Settlement Agreement in the case captioned ST. JOSEPH HEALTH
SERVICES OF RHODE ISLAND, INC. v. ST. JOSEPHS HEALTH SERVICES OF
RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT PLAN, as amended. C.A. No. PC-2017-3856.
(R.I. Super.).

Stephen Del Sesto, Permanent Receiver (Receiver) for the St.
Josephs Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan (Plan),
petitions this Court (Petition) for approval of a proposed
settlement agreement (PSA) regarding claims asserted by the
Receiver in a federal lawsuit (Federal Court Action), pending in
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

SJHSRI, owner and operator of Our Lady of Fatima Hospital (Fatima),
sponsored the Plan as a retirement benefit for its employees. After
years of financial distress and in the pursuit of operational
efficiencies, SJHSRI entered into an affiliation agreement with
RWH, a corporation that formerly owned and operated Roger Williams
Hospital.

The Objectors contest various terms and assignments contained in
the PSA. The PSA contemplates the following pertinent terms:

   1. An immediate payment of a lump sum (Lump Sum) of at least
$11,150,000, which represents 95% of the Settling Defendants'
combined liquid operating assets, up to a maximum of $11,900,000 if
the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training agrees to
release, prior to the due date for payment of the Lump Sum, the
entirety of certain funds held in escrow (approximately $750,000);

   2. An assignment of CCCB's rights in CCF9;

   3. An assignment to the Receiver the beneficial interest in
CCCB's interest in PCC,10 including the right to request CCCB
exercise the put option11;

   4. An obligation that the Settling Defendants not object to the
Plaintiffs' intervention in the Cy Pres proceedings;

   5. An admission by the Settling Defendants regarding some of the
claims asserted in the Complaint, including an admission that the
Plaintiffs' damages are at least $125,000,000;

   6. An obligation that the Settling Defendants, upon the
Receiver's request, petition the Rhode Island Superior Court for
judicial liquidation;

   7. A provision providing the Settling Defendants and the
Receiver will execute a security agreement and file a UCC-1
financing statement to secure payment of the Lump Sum and the
Settling Defendants' other obligations under the PSA.

Standard of Review

In considering a motion to compromise under Rule 9019(a), a
bankruptcy judge must assess and balance the value of the claims
being compromised against the value of the compromise proposal. A
bankruptcy judge must consider the following factors:

(i) the probability of success in the litigation being compromised
(ii) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of
collection (iii) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the
expense, inconvenience and delay attending it and, (iv) the
paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their
reasonable views in the premise.

Whether the Receiver Acted Within his Authority

To determine whether the Receiver exceeded his authority, this
Court must consider the concept of receivership generally. The use
of receivers originated in the English chancery court and was
considered an important inherent power of the equity courts.

The Appointment Order, which controls the Receiver's duties in this
case, gives the Receiver broad authority to prosecute and
compromise claims on the Plan's behalf: said Receiver is
authorized, empowered, and directed to collect and receive the
debts, property and other assets and effects of said Respondent
(the Plan), with full power to prosecute, defend, adjust and
compromise all claims and suits of, by, against or on behalf of
said Respondent.

In light of the Appointment Order's breadth, this Court can find no
usurpation of authority on the Receiver's part. The Prospect
Entities argue that the Receiver has presented the PSA to this
Court as a fait accompli; however, the terms of the PSA express an
agreement to the contrary. Paragraph 2 of the PSA best illustrates
the point where it states the PSA will be null and void and the
Settling Parties will return to their respective positions absent
this Court's approval.

Because the Receiver has the authority to settle claims on the
Plan's behalf and the terms of the PSA dictate the agreement is
contingent upon this Court's approval, the Receiver did not exceed
the scope of his authority by conditionally entering into the PSA.
In a recent bankruptcy case, the First Circuit held that the
failure to seek bankruptcy-court approval for a settlement pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) does not render the settlement agreement
nonbinding; rather, sidestepping court approval merely renders the
agreement unenforceable.  

The implication of the Manuel Court's ruling is that merely
executing a settlement without court approval is perfectly
permissible; however, if either of the parties later wishes to
enforce the settlement, the failure to seek bankruptcy court
approval would preclude that party from doing so.

Accordingly, this Court can find no usurpation of authority on the
Receiver's part by merely executing the PSA in advance of this
Court's approval.

Whether the Objectors' Claims Are Presently Justiciable

Standing

Standing is a threshold inquiry into whether a party is properly
before a court. When standing is at issue, the focal point shifts
to the claimant, not the claim and a court must decide if the party
whose standing is in question is a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself
is justiciable.

Turning to the present context, a nonsettling defendant does not
ordinarily have standing to object to a court order approving a
partial settlement since the nonsettling defendant is generally not
affected by the settlement and therefore, suffers no injury. The
weight of authority suggests a non-settling defendant can only
object to a partial settlement where it can demonstrate that it
will sustain some formal legal prejudice as a result of the
settlement.

Ripeness

Much like the standing requirement that a party must suffer an
injury in fact, ripeness requires that a party present a dispute
evidencing a real adverseness. A claim is not ripe when it rests
upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.

The ripeness doctrine is peculiarly a question of timing. The
concept of ripeness is grounded in the idea that a court will not
render advisory opinions or function in the abstract.

The Objectors' Ability to Contest the PSA

Prospect Entities

Here, the Prospect Entities argue in chief that they are injured by
the PSA's provisions assigning to the Receiver CharterCARE
Community Board (CCCB)’s beneficial interest in PCC sufficient to
confer standing as such an assignment violates PCC's LLC agreement.


Clearly, the Prospect Entities are not parties to the PSA.
Therefore, Rhode Island law dictates that the Prospect Entities
would only have standing to object to the PSA's substantive terms
in the homeowner context.  Unlike in the foreclosure cases where
banks actually instituted foreclosure proceedings and homeowners
faced a present threat of eviction, here, the PSA does not even
mandate CCCB exercise the put option or take any other action
arising out of CCCB's interest in Prospect CharterCARE, LLC, (PCC);
thus, the Prospect Entities suffer from no comparably imminent
threat.   

As stated, whether a party has or has not suffered an injury in
fact is a black-and-white proposition,  the Prospect Entities
cannot possibly point to any injury in fact, much less legal
prejudice, because CCCB has not even attempted to exercise any
rights in favor of the Receiver.

Ripeness is the underlying defect with the Prospect Entities'
claims: any potential injury to the Prospect Entities depends on
future contingent events. This Court understands that the Receiver,
if granted Rule 23(e) approval by the federal court, might request
that CCCB exercise the put, for instance. However, for strategic
reasons, the Receiver might choose not to do so. Further, if the
Receiver is successful in the Federal Court Action in asserting
that PCC received the subject assets in a fraudulent transfer, then
the base of assets under PCC's charge may change significantly a
put option in PCC might have considerably less value. Unless and
until the Receiver attempts to enforce any rights in PCC (through
CCCB), this Court does not have the luxury of rendering advisory
opinions whereas here, the points are of an academic nature only.
The Prospect Entities have not suffered formal legal prejudice that
would justify this Court engaging in the non-traditional task of
dissecting a settlement agreement like the PSA.

Thus, the Prospect Entities do not have standing to object to the
PSA; their objections to the PSA are not ripe; and the Prospect
Entities do not have party in interest status sufficient to
interject themselves into this receivership proceeding.

CharterCARE Foundation (CCF)

Turning to CCF's alleged basis for standing, this Court is
similarly unpersuaded. CCF argues that the PSA impairs CCF's rights
because it would require its purported sole member, CCCB, to
discharge all CCF's directors and irrevocably assign CCF's
Foundation Interest to the Receiver.  The weakness of CCF's
argument is that CCCB's rights in CCF are heavily disputed. Once
unpacked, it appears logically impossible for CCF to suffer injury
from the PSA, either now or anytime in the future.

Assuming without deciding that CCCB abandoned or never had a
membership interest in CCF then, by definition, CCCB cannot elect a
new CCF board or liquidate the Foundation Interest.  On the other
hand, if CCCB did not abandon its membership interest, as
succinctly stated by the Receiver, then whoever is objecting to the
PSA under the name of CCF clearly will suffer no legally cognizable
impact of the PSA because they have no lawful interest in CCF.

Because CCF has not alleged an injury in fact or legal prejudice,
it has no standing to object to the PSA.

Attorney General (AG)

Turning first to standing, it is well-settled that the AG has a
unique role as overseer of public charities. Some courts have gone
so far as to say an Attorney General is a necessary party to
proceedings affecting the disposition of the assets of a charitable
trust.  

In terms of the party in interest analysis, at least one bankruptcy
court was more inclined to afford party in interest status to an
attorney general where the state had a statutory basis for
involving itself in reorganization. As a practical matter, allowing
a single governmental body, the AG, to interject in receivership
proceedings would hardly frustrate the efficiency of this Court's
receivership process. In other words, this Court can contain its
narrow inquiry into whether a settlement is in the best interest of
a receivership estate while allowing the AG to raise objections.  

Nevertheless, for the same reasons explained above regarding CCF
and the Prospect Entities' objections, the AG prematurely
anticipates the distribution of charitable trust funds to Plan
participants. Granting the Petition would not give the Receiver
carte blanche to liquidate CCF in favor of the Plan; the AG even
recognized the prematurity issue, which is why counsel for the AG
proposed that this Court delay its ruling on the Petition before
hearing the Receiver's arguments on the motion to vacate the Cy
Pres Order. Therefore, even assuming the AG has standing to object
to the distribution of charitable trust funds to Plan participants
and satisfies the party in interest analysis, the AG's underlying
objections are not ripe for dispute in this Petition.

Whether the PSA is in the Best Interest of the Plan's Estate

Probability of Success

This Court need not even engage in the typical balancing of
strengths and weaknesses of the Receiver's underlying claims to
assess whether they raise a serious question. The only reason to
engage in such a balancing test, weighing the pros and cons of
proceeding to trial or compromising a claim, is to determine
whether a receiver is satisfying his or her obligation to realize
the largest possible amount of money/assets for a receivership
estate.  The PSA presents the rare settlement agreement where the
terms are so favorable to the Plan's estate that the Receiver is
unlikely to recover a higher sum by proceeding to, and prevailing
at, trial. Pursuant to the PSA, the Settling Defendants have agreed
to pay to the Receiver 95% of the Settling Defendants' liquid
assets in exchange for a release.

Further, the PSA obligates the Settling Defendants to seek judicial
liquidation with the hope that the remaining, non-liquid assets can
be distributed in the Plan's favor. Hence, even assuming this Court
was to conclude the Receiver had a 100% chance of prevailing in his
claims against the Settling Defendants, in all likelihood, the
Receiver could not net a higher sum by proceeding to judgment at
trial. The probability factor weighs in favor of approving the
PSA.

Difficulties in Collection

In addition to balancing the probable outcome of a claim, courts
should consider any attendant difficulties that might complicate
collection of a judgment. Although not contested in most cases, the
principal inquiry under this prong is whether the defendant has the
ability to satisfy a judgment.

In this case, the difficulty of collection turns in favor of
approving the PSA. As explained, the Defendant's ability to pay is
a key consideration, and here, the Settling Defendants have a
limited pool of assets that will only continue to deteriorate as
litigation wears on. The PSA obligates the Settling Defendants to
remit the bulk of their assets in favor of the Plan's estate and,
therefore, it appears every dollar the Settling Defendants spend in
continuing to litigate is a dollar less available to the Plan for
the ultimate benefit of the Plan's beneficiaries. Stated
differently, the Receiver would jeopardize the Plan's recovery by
continuing to litigate against the Settling Defendants in lieu of
accepting the PSA's terms. The Settling Defendants' solvency has
always been a real and concrete concern, which is why the Settling
Defendants entered into the 2014 Sale in the first place. Thus, the
collection factor weighs in favor of approving the PSA.

Complexity of the Litigation

In terms of complexity whether involving expense, delay, or
inconvenience courts consider the likelihood that any recovery
would be offset by the fees and costs incurred in pursuing
litigation.

Here, the Federal Court Action is highly complex as it involves
fourteen related entities, most, if not all, of which were involved
in the 2014 Sale. At a minimum, the Federal Court Action presents
many of the same complications underlying any multi-party suit.
Many of the underlying counts involve allegations of bad intent and
issues of first impression, which are necessarily difficult to
establish. At the very least, the 139-page Complaint filed in the
Federal Court Action will take a great deal of time to unwind, and
protracted litigation is all but guaranteed. The Federal Court
Action's associated complexity suggests settlement via the PSA is
an approach that favors the Plan's estate. This way, even if the
Receiver is unable to prevail against the remaining non-settling
entities, the Receiver ensures some source of recovery for the
underfunded Plan.

Paramount Interest of Creditors

The creditors' perspective also sheds light on the soundness of a
proposed settlement, and courts afford deference to creditors'
reasonable views. This does not mean a trustee is required to
demonstrate a settlement agreement operates to the satisfaction of
every individual creditor.

This Court has received no objection to the PSA by any creditors
with claims against the Plan, suggesting the PSA does an adequate
job of sweeping assets into the Plan's estate for those parties
ultimately entitled to possess them. Moreover, this Court has
received widespread support of the PSA from the Plan's
participants. In particular, Attorney Arlene Violet, lead counsel
for over 285 participants in the Plan, stated the PSA is an
excellent first step in attempting to secure additional funds to
bolster the Plan. Similarly, Attorney Jeffrey W. Kasle,
representative for over 200 Plan participants, wrote that he
represents wholeheartedly and unequivocally his support for the
PSA. Attorney Christopher Callaci, counsel for about 400 Plan
participants, expressed similarly unwavering support for the PSA.
The creditors' perspective favors approving the PSA for purposes of
this proceeding.

After canvassing the issues presented by the PSA, this Court can
definitively say that the PSA falls well within a range of
reasonableness and therefore, the Receiver did not abuse his
discretion in entering into the settlement.  

Therefore, this Court hereby approves the PSA for purposes of this
proceeding, subject to the following two conditions: (1) the
Receiver refrains from exercising any rights under the PSA prior to
the federal-court's determination of whether to approve the PSA;
and (2) prior to implementing, or directing that CCCB implement,
any rights, whatsoever, in favor of the Receiver or the Plan
derivative of CCCB's rights in CCF or PCC, the Receiver provides
all parties, including but not limited to the Objectors, with
twenty (20) days written notice. These two conditions are designed
to ensure the Objectors have an appropriate opportunity in an
appropriate proceeding to contest objectionable terms prior to
their implementation by the Receiver.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's October 29, 2018 Decision
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxwovag from Leagle.com.


STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Henry Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
---------------------------------------------------------
CONSTANTINE HENRY, individually on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. STEPHEN EINSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; and
JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-15192-BRM-TJB (D.N.J.,
Oct. 23, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt. The case is assigned to
Judge Brian R. Martinotti and referred to Magistrate Judge Tonianne
J. Bongiovanni.

Stephen Einstein & Associates, P.C. is a debt collection company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben A. Kaplan, Esq.
          280 Prospect Ave. 6G
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 803-6611
          Facsimile: (866) 596-4973
          E-mail: benkap232@aol.com


STUCKY LAUER: Court Approves Settlement in Maloy FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
in part Parties' Joint Motion to Certify Class and Final Approval
of Class Settlement in the case captioned SAMUEL MALOY (on behalf
of Himself and others similarly situated), Plaintiff, v. STUCKY,
LAUER & YOUNG, LLP, Defendant. Cause No. 1:17-CV-336-TLS. (N.D.
Ind.).

This matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Motion for
Final Approval, resolving the Plaintiff's claims under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
filed suit against Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP on August 9, 2017.
The Plaintiff stated that the Defendant sent a letter in connection
with an alleged debt owed, which violated the FDCPA because it
failed to disclose the Plaintiff's rights under  Section
1692g(a)(4).

Pursuant to Rule 23, the Court will evaluate the notice provided to
the class members, the adequacy of the settlement agreement, the
additional payment to the Named Plaintiff, and the propriety of the
attorney's fees.

Notice

Rule 23 requires that the Class Members receive "the best notice
that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. Reasonable notice is required to all class members who
would be bound by a proposed settlement.  

Of the 925 notices sent, 879 were successfully delivered in the
first instance, 10 were forwarded to a new address, and 36 were
returned to Class Counsel without any known forwarding address.
Class Counsel states that all reasonable efforts were made to
locate current addresses for all class members, in particular, by
searching for such addresses using the National Change of Address
Database. Individual notice, by mail, to all reasonably known class
members is sufficient in the usual case.   The parties identified
925 class members through discovery, made concerted efforts to
identify current addresses for these individuals, and distributed
the notice accordingly.

Thus, the Court finds that due process and the notice requirements
of Rule 23 have been satisfied.

Adequacy of the Settlement Agreement

A district court must scrutinize and evaluate a class action
settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

In making these determinations, a court considers the strength of a
plaintiff's case compared to the defendants' offered settlement
amount; the likely complexity, length, and expense of the
litigation; the amount of opposition to settlement among affected
parties; the opinion of competent counsel and the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of
settlement.  

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(2)(B), the FDCPA imposes a
limit on the amount of damages a debt collector may pay in a class
action.  In the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each
named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and
(ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class
members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of
the debt collector. The Seventh Circuit holds that the statutory
term net worth means book net worth or balance sheet net worth.  

The Defendant has represented to Class Counsel and produced
business records demonstrating that its net worth is minimal or
negative. Additionally, Class Counsel has determined that the
Defendant's net worth does not and could not conceivably be found
to exceed $500,000. Additional litigation over the Defendant's net
worth is likely futile. The current settlement, which provides
$5,000 for distribution among the class, likely represents the most
damages available.

The Court agrees that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.

Attorney's Fees and Payment to the Named Plaintiff

Additional Payment to the Named Plaintiff

Class Counsel requests that the Named Plaintiff be given $1,000
from the settlement fund, which is the maximum amount he can
recover under the FDCPA. Incentive awards are justified when
necessary to induce individuals to become named representatives.

The Named Plaintiff testified in a declaration that he was an
active participant in the litigation since before the initial
complaint was filed. He stated that he reviewed a draft version of
the complaint, discussed edits and revisions to the complaint with
counsel, and regularly communicated with Class Counsel. Id. Given
the contribution of the Named Plaintiff, the Court finds that the
$1,000 payment is appropriate and within statutory bounds.

Attorney's Fees

Under Rule 23(h), the Court may award reasonable attorney's fees
and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties'
agreement. Here, the parties have agreed that the Defendant will
not object to up to $30,000 in attorney's fees and $3,000 in fees
and expenses that Class Counsel requests, payments entirely
separate from those made to class members. Courts favor the
settlement of attorney's fees by the parties.  Nevertheless, the
Court must evaluate this amount to determine its reasonableness.

As noted during the Fairness Hearing, the Court requested
additional briefing on attorney's fees, due thirty days after the
hearing. Accordingly, until the Court receives additional briefing
regarding the calculation of attorney's fees, the Court WITHHOLDS
its ruling regarding Class Counsel's requests for attorney's fees
and expenses.

The Court grants, in part, the parties' Joint Motion to Certify
Class and Final Approval of Class Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 25, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya3e4e3b from
Leagle.com.

Samuel Maloy, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Russell S. Thompson, IV --
rthompson@thompsonconsumerlaw.com -- Thompson Consumer Law Group
PLLC.

Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP, Defendant, represented by Briane M.
House -- bhouse@skilesdetrude.com -- Skiles DeTrude.


SUUNTO: Settles Class-Action Lawsuit for Certain Dive Computers
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Liang, writing for Deeper Blue, reports that Suunto has
settled a class-action lawsuit in the United States regarding
certain dive computer models that plaintiffs alleged were
defective.

The models in question were built between January 1st, 2006 and
August 10th, 2018, and include the Cobra, Cobra 2, Cobra 3, Cobra 3
Black, Vyper, Vyper Novo, Vyper 2, Vyper Air, HelO2, Gekko, Vytec,
Vytec DS, Zoop, Zoop Novo, Mosquito, D4, D6, D9, D4i, D6i, D4i
Novo, D6i Novo, D9tx, and DX.

The lawsuit claimed that those models that Suunto built and sold
and Aqua Lung distributed and sold were defective, and the readings
for depth and temperature were inaccurate.

While both Suunto and Aqua Lung denied that any wrongdoing was done
and that any defect with respect to the depth pressure sensors
existed, "The parties agreed to resolve these matters before these
issues were decided by the Court."

So if you bought a new dive computer (not a used one) in the USA
(and not another country) in the specified time frame and it turns
out that the depth pressure sensor doesn't work properly, under the
settlement you're entitled to a free inspection and repair or even
getting your dive computer replaced.

To find out if you qualify for the settlement, go to
suuntodivecomputersettlement.com. [GN]


TENNESSEE: Prelim Injunction Bid in Robinson Suit Partly Okayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRED ROBINSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAVID W. PURKEY,
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland
Security, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-01263 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Aleta Trauger of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division, granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs Robinson,
Ashley Sprague, and Johnny Gibbs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.

The case is the second of two challenging Tennessee's practice of
rescinding the driver's licenses of qualified Tennessee drivers who
are unable, due to their indigence, to pay the fines, costs, and/or
litigation taxes assessed against them in criminal cases or cases
involving certain quasi-criminal civil offenses.  In the first
case, Thomas v. Haslam, a plaintiff class challenged the
Commissioner's statutorily-mandated revocation of the driver's
licenses of indigent debtors who, for a period of a year or more,
were unable to pay the fines, costs, and/or litigation taxes
assessed against them related to a criminal conviction.  The Court
concluded that the challenged statute ran afoul of a long line of
Supreme Court precedents invalidating criminal procedures that, in
effect, imposed harsher consequences on the defendants based on
their indigence.  The Court, therefore, granted summary judgment to
the Thomas plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the statute.
The Court's decision in Thomas is currently on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit.

The statute at issue in the case, Tenn. Code Ann. Section
55-50-502(a)(1)(H), also empowers the Commissioner to take away the
driver's licenses of some Tennessee drivers who, because of their
indigence, cannot pay fines, costs, and/or litigation taxes against
them.  This statute differs from the statute at issue in Thomas,
however, in that (1) the statute at issue here applies only to
fines, costs, and litigation taxes related to convictions for
traffic offenses—also known as "traffic debt"; (2) this statute
does not require a year of nonpayment before a debtor's driver's
license is taken away but, rather, empowers TDSHS to rescind the
license as soon as it receives notice of nonpayment; (3) this
statute merely authorizes the Commissioner to take the debtor's
license but does not require him to do so—although, in practice,
the Commissioner appears to treat the suspensions as automatic; and
(4) the loss of the debtor's driver's license is classified as a
"suspension" rather than a "revocation."

Although the case has not advanced to the point where either party
has moved for a final judgment, the Plaintiffs have sought a
preliminary injunction to halt the suspensions at issue and provide
relief to those whose licenses have already been suspended.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to determine whether (1)
these Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the
rule that this court applied in Thomas would also prevail in the
case; and, (2) if so, whether any other factors counsel against
providing preliminary relief.

Plaintiffs Robinson, Sprague, and Gibbs are among the thousands of
Tennesseans who have had their driver's licenses suspended for
failure to pay traffic debt.  On Sept. 13, 2017, they filed the
Class Action Complaint in the case against the Commissioner and a
few representative local government Defendants involved in imposing
traffic debt and informing TDSHS of drivers' eligibility for
suspension.  The Plaintiffs raised three constitutional challenges
to the state's laws governing suspension of driver's licenses for
nonpayment of traffic debt:

     1. Count I alleges that the Defendants' effecting and
continuing the suspension of people's driver's licenses for
nonpayment of traffic debt without any inquiry into, or
consideration of, the license holder's ability to pay violates the
right to fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment;

     2. Count II alleges that the Defendants' effecting the
suspension of driver's licenses -- either with no notice or right
to an ability-to-pay hearing, or with notice but only a right to a
hearing on whether the license holder has failed to pay the
relevant traffic debt -- violates the right to procedural fairness
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and

     3. Count III alleges that the Defendants' effecting and
continuing the suspension of driver's licenses from indigent people
who owe traffic debt to the state and its counties and
municipalities, but not imposing similar sanctions on other
judgment debtors, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including
reinstatement of the driver's licenses of Robinson, Sprague, and
all members of the putative class, other than those facing
additional legal barriers to having a driver's license, such as a
suspension or revocation for a reason other than the failure to pay
traffic debt.

On Sept. 21, 2017, Robinson, Sprague, and Gibbs filed a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, as well as a contemporaneous, more narrowly
tailored Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") focusing on
Robinson and Sprague.  On Oct. 5, 2017, the court granted the
requested TRO, ordering the Commissioner to restore Robinson's and
Sprague's licenses.

The Court set a hearing regarding whether the TRO should be
converted to a preliminary injunction, but the parties came to an
agreement to allow the TRO to remain in place until the resolution
of the broader Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

On Dec. 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint,
followed shortly thereafter by a Corrected Amended Complaint.  The
Plaintiffs' constitutional theory of the case remained the same,
although they revised some facts and added a fourth Plaintiff,
Brianna Booher, who has since voluntarily withdrawn from the case.


Additional motions were filed, and, on June 11, 2018, the court
issued a Memorandum and Order resolving several motions to dismiss,
certifying a statewide class, and concluding that the Court could
not resolve the Motion for Preliminary Injunction without an
evidentiary hearing.

The local government Defendants have since filed Motions to Dismiss
as Moot, to which they attached affidavits, suggesting that their
respective local government entities have adopted procedures
consistent with the protections to which the Plaintiffs argue
drivers are entitled.  As a result of the new factual issues raised
by the local government Defendants, the Plaintiffs have withdrawn
their request for a preliminary injunction with regard to those
Defendants, and a separate briefing schedule has been established
with regard to those Defendants' motions.

The Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction only against the
Commissioner.   Because the Commissioner's policies affect all
Tennesseans, the Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction
against the Commissioner is unaffected by changes in policies by
any isolated local government or governments.

With regard to the Commissioner, they ask the Court to grant a
preliminary injunction providing for the following relief:

     a. On behalf of all the Named Plaintiffs and the  Statewide
Class, enjoining Defendant Purkey from suspending or permitting the
suspension of any driver's license pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
Section 55-50-502(a)(1)(H) or (I) without either notice to the
licensee that includes the offer of a fact-based inquiry, with
participation by the licensee, as to the licensee's ability to pay
and, if such inquiry is requested, a factual determination, prior
and as a prerequisite to license suspension, that the amount sought
is within the licensee's ability to pay, or certification from the
reporting county that notice containing such offer has been
afforded and (if inquiry is requested) such factual determination
has been made.

     b. On behalf of Plaintiffs Robinson and Sprague and the
Statewide Class except for the members of the Multi-Barrier
Subclass, enjoining Defendant Purkey to einstate all driver's
licenses that were suspended for nonpayment of Traffic Debt prior
to the date of entry of the preliminary injunction, at no cost to
the license holders; waive all reinstatement fees; and notify all
persons whose licenses were suspended of the reinstatement.

A preliminary injunction hearing was set for Sept. 5, 2018, but,
after the parties submitted the written and documentary materials
on which they intended to rely, they concluded that an in-person
hearing would be unnecessary and agreed to submit the question to
the court on the written record.

Judge Truager finds that the Plaintiffs have set forth a plausible
legal framework pursuant to which they would succeed with regard to
Counts I and III of their Corrected Amended Complaint, and the
Commissioner has not articulated any affirmative defense or
jurisdictional bar that would prevent the plaintiffs from
prevailing on those claims.  Moreover, if the Plaintiffs are
correct with regard to Counts I and III, their theory would likely
also entitle them to judgment on Count II.  The Plaintiffs'
arguments, however, are contingent on factual premises about the
importance of driving to economic life in Tennessee that are
amenable to corroboration or refutation.

Because the Judge finds a high likelihood of success with regard to
the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, she finds a low
likelihood that the injunctive relief would intrude on any powers
legitimately retained by the Commissioner.  The possibility of
injury to the public interest based on intrusion on the
Commissioner's authority, therefore, weighs, at most, slightly
against granting the Plaintiffs relief.  Any such consideration,
moreover, would be outweighed by the public interest in vindicating
the constitutional rights guaranteed to Tennesseans, not merely by
the drafters of the Constitution, but by the State of Tennessee
itself.

The Judge acknowledges that operating with large troves of
sometimes years-old government data is often more difficult in
practice than it would seem, to an outsider, that it should be in
the abstract.  Even if reinstatements went as smoothly as could
possibly be hoped, it would still create at least some strain on
TDSHS' resources.  The administrative costs related to the
Plaintiffs' requested relief regarding existing suspensions,
therefore, weigh against granting the relief.

As to lost revenue, the Judge it clear that the Plaintiffs'
requested relief would, at least over the short term, disrupt a
revenue stream on which TDSHS expected it could rely.  Those lost
revenues, therefore, weigh against granting injunctive relief under
both the third and fourth preliminary injunction prongs.

Finally, in light of the Plaintiffs' concession that they only seek
retrospective relief with regard to individuals who currently
cannot pay their traffic debt, the Judge will revise the relief
requested regarding existing suspensions to permit TDSHS to
continue to charge reinstatement fees to drivers if it, through its
own auspices or in coordination with local authorities, adopts a
system for identifying which applicants for reinstatement are
indigent and which are not.  She, moreover, will not, at this
juncture, require TDSHS to engage in any ongoing efforts to
affirmatively restore licenses en masse.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Trauger granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  The
Commissioner is ordered to grant the relief as set out in the
accompanying order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/kQZGVa from Leagle.com.

Fred Robinson, Ashley Sprague & Johnny Gibbs, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,, Plaintiffs,
represented by Claudia Wilner -- wilner@nclej.org -- National
Center for Law and Econimic Justice, Edward P. Krugman --
krugman@nclej.org -- Civil Rights Corps, Eric Halperin, Civil
Rights Corps, Jonas Wang -- jonas@civilrightscorp.org -- Civil
Rights Corps, Jonathan Jacob Cole, Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Josh Spickler -- josh@justcity.org --
Just City, Matthew G. White --  mwhite@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Premal Dharia --
premal@civilrightscorps.org -- Civil Rights Corps, Tara
Mikkilineni, Civil Rights Corps & Theresa Lau, National Center for
Law and Econimic Justice.

David W. Purkey, Commisssioner of the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security, in his official capacity, Defendant,
represented by Alexander Stuart Rieger, Tennessee Attorney
General's Office, Andrew B. Campbell, Tennessee Attorney General's
Office, Sara Ohlman, Tennessee Attorney General's Office & Scott C.
Sutherland, Tennessee Attorney General's Office.

Debby Moss, Circuit Court Clerk of Wilson County, Tennessee, in her
official capacity, & Wilson County, Tennessee, Defendants,
represented by Kristin Ellis Berexa, Farrar & Bates, Mark Ennis
McGrady, Farrar & Bates & Michael Ray Jennings .

Lebanon, Tennessee & Kim Chambers, Lebanon Municipal Court Clerk,
Defendants, represented by Kristin Ellis Berexa, Farrar & Bates,
Mark Ennis McGrady, Farrar & Bates & Phillip Andrew Wright, Jr.,
City of Lebanon.


TESLA INC: Class Action Settlement Obtains Final Court Okay
-----------------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Telsa Inc.
and car owners won final approval Nov. 2 of a $5.4 million
settlement resolving claims that advanced Model S and Model X
features appeared later than promised.

Each of the 33,000 class members who submits a valid claim will
receive between $25 and $280.

"Given those figures, the recovery obtained under this settlement
is significant," Judge Beth Labson Freeman wrote for the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. [GN]


TEXAS: 5th Cir. Vacates Certification of 2 Classes in J. Ward Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH WARD, by his next friend Frances Bourliot;
MICHAEL ANDERSON, by his next friend Phil Campbell; ISAAC LEMELLE,
by his next friend Mark Westenhover; CECIL ADICKES, by his next
friend Elsie Craven; MICHAEL GIBSON, by his next friend Mark
Westenhover; MARC LAWSON, by his next friend Krista Chacona;
JENNIFER LAMPKIN, by her next friend Elsie Craven,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DR. JOHN HELLERSTEDT, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health
Services, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 17-50899 (5th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district
court's class certification order and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

Under Texas law, criminal defendants adjudged incompetent to stand
trial and individuals acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity
may, under certain circumstances specified by statute, be committed
to facilities for inpatient mental health treatment, restoration
services, evaluation and/or observation.  The State of Texas does
not have enough beds in its hospitals, which generally operate at
full capacity, to accommodate at once all persons who have been
committed for inpatient services.  To equitably allocate available
hospital beds, the State generally uses a "first-come,
first-served" approach.  Individuals who are awaiting admission to
a state hospital are generally detained in county jails pending
their transfer, sometimes for months.

Joseph Ward, Michael Anderson, and Isaac Lemelle, the original
Plaintiffs in the 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit, amended their
complaint twice, adding Marc Lawson, Jennifer Lampkin, Cecil
Adickes, and Michael Gibson as Plaintiffs.  In the Plaintiffs'
second amended complaint, Ward, Anderson, Lemelle, Lawson and
Lampkin allege that, though they had been ordered committed for
inpatient competency restoration services by Texas courts, they had
been detained in county jails awaiting admission to state hospitals
for periods ranging from 15 to 27 weeks.  Adickes and Gibson allege
that, though they had been acquitted of criminal charges by reason
of insanity and ordered committed to maximum security unit ("MSU")
facilities for evaluation and treatment, they had been detained in
county jails awaiting admission to such facilities for two weeks
and ten weeks, respectively.

The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has violated their Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights by confining them in county jails for
unreasonable periods of time without criminal convictions and
failing to provide them with the appropriate mental health
treatment and/or services during their confinement.  They have
further requested that the court certify two classes of similarly
situated Plaintiffs; issue an order declaring that the Defendant
has violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and
issue preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting
Defendant from violating such rights.

On Nov.r 28, 2016, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification.
The Defendant initially opposed Plaintiffs' motion under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23").  Without
responding to the Plaintiffs' request for guidance on how to
proceed, on Sept. 1, 2017, over nine months after the Plaintiffs
filed their motion for class certification, the district court
entered an order purporting to certify the following two classes of
Plaintiffs:

     (1) All persons who are now, or will be in the future, charged
with a crime in the State of Texas, and (a) who are ordered to a
Texas Department of State Health Services facility where they are
to receive competency restoration services; and (b) for whom the
Texas Department of State Health Services receives the court order;
but (c) who remain detained in a Texas county jail ("Incompetent
Detainee(s)"; and

     (2) All persons who are now, or will be in the future, charged
with a crime in the State of Texas and who are found not guilty by
reason of insanity, and (a) who are ordered to receive
evaluation-and-treatment services at a Texas Department of State
Health Services facility; (b) for whom the Texas Department of
State Health Services receives the court order; but (c) who remain
detained in a Texas county jail for more than 14 days ("Insanity
Acquittee(s)".

The district court did not, however, explicitly appoint the named
Plaintiffs as the class representatives as they had requested.
Instead, it ordered the Plaintiffs to file yet another amended
complaint including the named Plaintiffs to be appointed as the
class representatives for the two classes.

On September 29, 2017, while the Defendant's Rule 23(f) request for
permission to appeal the district court's class certification order
was pending, the Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, in
which they added the following named Plaintiffs: Kenneth Jones, a
criminal defendant adjudged to be incompetent to withstand trial;
and Mary Sapp, who had been acquitted of criminal charges due to
insanity.

On Oct. 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the
district court appoint not only Jones and Sapp as the class
Representatives, but also Lawson, Lampkin, Adickes, and Gibson,
which the Defendant opposed.  On the same date, the Defendant
requested that the district court stays proceedings pending his
appeal of the class certification order.  The Plaintiffs agreed to
the stay request.  On Nov. 2, 2017, without ruling on the
Plaintiffs' motion to appoint the class representatives, the
district court entered an order staying all proceedings.

While the Defendant appeals the district court's class
certification order on multiple grounds, his primary arguments are
that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter its class
certification order because the Plaintiffs' claims, and therefore,
the entire action, became moot prior to the district court entering
such order; and (2) even if this case is not moot, the district
court's class certification order is deficient under Rule 23.

The Fifth Circuit holds that the district court failed to conduct a
rigorous analysis of any of the Rule 23(a) factors and, therefore,
erred in certifying the Incompetent Detainee and Insanity Acquittee
classes.  

It finds that the district court's unsupported conclusion that
typicality and adequacy are satisfied, coupled with its failure to
identify specific class representatives and meaningfully analyze
their fitness to serve in such capacity, defies the mandate to
conduct a rigorous Rule 23(a) analysis including detailed written
reasons that reference the facts and claims at hand.  Thus, the
district court erred on this basis also in certifying the
Incompetent Detainee and Insanity Acquittee classes.

In addition, the Court finds that while the plaintiffs seeking
class certification are not required to spell out every jot and
tittle of injunctive relief at the class certification stage, they
must be able to explain how a court could define or enforce
meaningful injunctive relief.  It notes, therefore, that to comply
with Rule 23(b)(2), the Plaintiffs will, at minimum, have to
describe in some kind of detail from what actions or inactions the
Defendant should be restrained.  A general request that the
Defendant be restrained from violating the Plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment protections is insufficient.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's
class certification order and remanded the matter to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/aMawTF from Leagle.com.

Thomas A. Albright, for Defendant-Appellant.

Peter Thomas Hofer, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rance Craft, for Defendant-Appellant.

Beth L. Mitchell, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Michael Gaddis -- mgaddis@winston.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Abrams -- mabrams@lathropgage.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Lisa Snead, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


TRANS EXPRESS: Fails to Pay OT to Drivers, Simmons Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLENE SIMMONS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRANS EXPRESS INC., Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05938-ENV-RLM (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 24, 2018) is an
action against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the
class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week.

The Plaintiff Simmons was employed by the Defendant as driver.

Trans Express Inc. is a bus shuttle and charter rental company in
New York City. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
          ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          215-28 Hillside Avenue
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: (718) 740-1000
          Facsimile: (718) 740-2000
          E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


TRUNKETT & TRUNKETT: Wins Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Gabriel Neves, writing for Cook County Record, reports that U.S.
District Judge Ruben Castillo issued a 12-page ruling Oct. 10 in
the lawsuit filed by Katrina Jennings, on her and other customers'
behalf, against law firm Trunkett & Trunkett PC. Castillo granted
Trunkett & Trunkett's motion to dismiss the suit without
prejudice.

Jennings sued the firm in 2017 on allegations of abusing provisions
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when it attempted to
collect debt of credit accounts from her issued by Maroon Financial
Credit Union.

In his ruling, Judge Castillo stated Jennings' claims were barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which "'prevents lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced,'" the ruling
states.

The firm filed a suit on behalf of Maroon Financial last October
against Jennings in an attempt to collect a debt. As stated in the
ruling, "on Feb. 21, 2018, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered
a default judgment against plaintiff of $3,182.53," as a result of
the credit union's complaint, which alleged that "principal,
interest, and attorneys' fees were 'presently due'" to the
creditor.

Two days after the state court ruling, Jennings filed the suit in
federal court alleging the creditor violated the FDCPA in regards
to how the creditor was stated in the summons (as Maroon Financial
C.) and on the complaint (as Maroon Financial Credit Union), as
well as the allegation it attempted to collect attorneys' fees that
it had no right to, and misrepresented amount of the alleged debt.

In April, Trunkett & Trunkett filed the motion to dismiss the
lawsuit on the grounds the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
for relief and that her claims were barred by res judicata, meaning
that the matter has previously been handled by another court and
may not be pursued further, and Rooker-Feldman.

Jennings is represented by attorneys Celetha Chatman, Esq. --
cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com -- and Michael J. Wood, Esq. of
Community Lawyers Group Ltd., of Chicago.

Trunkett & Trunkett is represented by attorneys James J. Sipchen,
Esq. -- jsipchen@pretzel-stouffer.com -- and Thomas Vincent-Paul
Draths, Esq. -- tdraths@pretzel-stouffer.com -- of Pretzel &
Stouffer Chtd., of Chicago.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois case
number 1:18-cv-01413 [GN]


ULTRA SONIC: Underpays Car Wash Attendants, Blanco et al. Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
SELVIN BLANCO, and LEA CALEDONIO MORALES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ULTRA SONIC
RVC, INC., and DONALD GELESTINO, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-05962-SJF-GRB (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 24, 2018) seeks to recover
from the Defendants unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs Blanco and Morales were employed by the Defendants
as car wash attendants.

Ultra Sonic RVC, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.
The Company offers car wash services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Neil H. Greenberg, Esq.
          NEIL H. GREENBERG & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          4242 Merrick Road
          Massapequa, NY 11758
          Telephone: (516) 228-5100
          E-mail: nhglaw@nhglaw.com


UNITED KINGDOM: Court Rules in Favor of PSNI, Police Authority
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the PSNI and the Police Authority face a
holiday pay bill of up to GBP30m after a tribunal ruled in favour
of a class action brought by a group representing more than 3,700
officers and staff.

A judge said staff were owed money as their holiday pay had been
based on basic working hours, not the actual hours worked including
overtime.

He said the pay issue was "extremely serious" and breached European
law.

The PSNI has been contacted for comment by BBC News NI.

The case was brought by a group of 14 lead claimants, 11 police
officers and three civilian staff members.

The group represents police constables and sergeants, to whom Chief
Constable George Hamilton is answerable -- and civilian support
workers, to whom the Northern Ireland Policing Board is
answerable.

The industrial tribunal's decision could result in the two bodies
facing an estimated bill of GBP30m in relation to the unlawful
deductions dating back 20 years.

Solicitor John McShane, from McCartan Turkington Breen, represented
11 of the claimants.

"The issue in question was whether these groups should have their
overtime and other allowances included in the calculation of their
normal pay, in order to work out their holiday pay entitlements,"
he said.

"Up until now, holiday pay has been based on working basic
contracted hours and has not taken into account the often extensive
additional hours required by their work."

He said the legal claim was based on a case in Britain in 2014 in
which the Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that overtime should be
included in holiday pay.

Legislation was introduced in England and Wales to limit backdated
claims to two years, but Mr McShane said no equivalent legislation
was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

'Extremely serious'
Delivering the industrial tribunal's decision, Judge Kelly said
that overtime is often a requirement of working for the police
service.

But he said that the failure to provide the correct annual leave
"is an extremely serious matter going to the heart of one of the
fundamental rights of the European Union".

In reaching his decision he said: "The present claims appear to
highlight a situation where a clear entitlement under the Working
Time Directive has been effectively ignored and avoided for a
significant period of time and continues to be avoided.

"It is particularly concerning that this has been done by a public
authority."

Mr McShane said the chief constable had previously written to
claimants, proposing that in future staff would receive holiday
pay, including overtime, averaged out over the year.

"This offer was too little too late by the chief constable and we
are therefore delighted on behalf of our clients that the tribunal
has expressly stated that that there is no limit on the amount of
deductions which can be ordered to be paid by the employer," said
Mr McShane.

"We will now be entering into negotiations to bring a financial
conclusion to the matter." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Veterans File Class Action Over Benefits
-------------------------------------------------------
RJ Vogt, writing for Law360, reports that for decades, a quirk of
America's legal system has blocked veterans from banding together
in class action lawsuits over benefits. But after a string of
recent court rulings leveled that hurdle, a newly proposed class
suit is challenging the denial of medical reimbursements to
veterans under a controversial new rule.

The case, filed Oct. 30 by the National Veterans Legal Services
Program on behalf of U.S. Coast Guard veteran Amanda Wolfe, takes
aim at a regulation the Department of Veterans Affairs enacted
earlier this year to forbid refunds for some costs incurred by
those with third-party insurance when they receive emergency
treatment at non-VA hospitals.

Up until the past two years, such an ambitious suit -- seeking to
keep billions of dollars in expenses from being pushed onto
veterans -- could not have been filed with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims. In August, however, the CAVC issued a
"watershed" decision, reversing its long-standing opposition to
entertaining class actions and opening the door to Ms. Wolfe's
case.

According to her petition, the VA's new regulation violates the
Emergency Care Fairness Act of 2010 by forcing veterans with health
insurance to pay for expenses that veterans without health
insurance would get refunded. If Wolfe is able to obtain class
action certification, her suit could represent "hundreds of
thousands of veterans" affected by the new rule.

While the suit isn't the first putative class action filed in the
wake of the CAVC decision, it's further proof of a new front in the
fight for veterans' medical rights, some advocates suggest.
Attorney Bart Stichman, executive director and co-founder of NVLSP,
said the ability to file Wolfe's suit as a class action is a
crucial change in the way veterans benefits claims are handled.

"If our class is certified by the court, then all of these veterans
who've been, we believe, wrongly denied, will have access to the
lawyers serving as class counsel, whereas now they don't have
access," he said. "We don't know who they are and they don't know
who we are."

Without class actions, veterans must navigate the complex legal
system surrounding their benefits claims on a person-by-person
basis — often without a lawyer.

The lack of legal access for veterans has its roots in a Civil
War-era statute that barred a lawyer from charging veterans more
than $10 in legal fees for a benefits claim. Mr. Stichman said it
was a fair price back in 1862 but eventually became an economic bar
to attorneys representing veterans.

In their stead, major veterans organizations like the American
Legion and the Disabled American Veterans began providing free
nonlawyers to represent veterans before the VA. Congress eventually
began allowing attorneys to charge fees of up to 20 percent of
past-due benefits in 2007, but according to the Board of Veterans'
Appeals' most recent report to Congress, only 15.3 percent of the
52,000 cases the board handled in 2017 involved attorney
representation -- as compared to 49 percent represented by the
American Legion or Disabled American Veterans.

"Class actions ensure that these veterans, the majority of whom are
not represented by lawyers, have representation on a common legal
issue that affects of a lot of similarly situated people," Mr.
Stichman said.

The CAVC, however, has refused to handle class actions for most of
its 30-year history. Its 1991 decision in Harrison v. Derwinski
concluded that it lacked authority for such cases due to statutory
constraints that limited its jurisdiction to reviewing Board
decisions on an individual basis.

That ruling held until April 2017, when Vietnam War veteran Conley
Monk's proposed class action over decision delays at the VA made it
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There, a trio
of circuit judges found "no persuasive indication that Congress
intended to remove class action protection for veterans" when it
created the CAVC, remanding the case.

Although the CAVC denied Monk's bid to represent himself and a
class of similarly situated vets in its August ruling, it did note
that it would begin entertaining class actions in accordance with
the Federal Circuit's findings.

"This holding is a seismic shift in our precedent," wrote Chief
Judge Robert N. Davis. "The Court's decision will shape our
jurisprudence for years to come and, I hope, bring about positive
change for our Nation's veterans and ensure that justice is done
more efficiently and timely."

Mr. Stichman estimated around 10 proposed class actions have been
filed at the CAVC since it decided to start accepting them, but
none has yet been certified.

He hopes to change that with Wolfe's suit, which represents the
latest salvo in a long-running fight over emergency medical care
reimbursements. The battle dates back to 2014, when NVLSP filed
suit on behalf of Air Force vet Richard Staab after he was denied
reimbursement for $48,000 in emergency care costs because secondary
insurance had covered part of the bill.

That lawsuit, Staab v. McDonald , led the CAVC to invalidate the VA
regulation blocking reimbursement. The court's April 2016 decision
found that Congress intended the VA to step in as a "secondary
payer" when other insurers covered only a portion of the cost of a
veteran's emergency treatment.

For the next 21 months, the VA put a moratorium on deciding tens of
thousands of pending reimbursement claims. It didn't begin deciding
the backlog until early this year, after issuing a new regulation
in January to replace the one struck down in the Staab case.

The amended rule expanded the Emergency Care Fairness Act's
nonreimburseable expenses from only copayments or "similar
payments" to include deductibles and coinsurance as well.

When Wolfe needed an emergency appendectomy in September 2016 that
cost $22,348.25, her employer-sponsored health insurance covered
everything except $2,558.54, which she paid out of her own personal
savings.

After she filed a reimbursement claim with the VA, the department
denied her bid because the remaining money owed fell under the
category of copayments, deductibles and coinsurance. Had she not
signed up for employer-sponsored health insurance in the first
place, however, the VA would have paid the entire $22,348.25
without trouble.

In a statement, Wolfe said "there's power in numbers."

"This is not right, and many of the veterans who need this help
from the VA are old and sick and not able to fight this battle,"
she added.

A representative for the VA declined to comment on the case.

Ms. Wolfe is represented by Barton F. Stichman and Patrick A.
Berkshire of the National Veterans Legal Services Program and Mark
B. Blocker, Kara L. McCall, Emily M. Wexler, Lindsay K. Eastman and
Eric T. O'Brien of Sidley Austin LLP.

Counsel for Secretary of Veterans Affairs' Robert Wilkie is not yet
available.

The case is Wolfe et al. v. Wilkie, number 18-6091 in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. [GN]


UNLIMITED HEIGHTS: Govantes Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSE ANTONIO GOVANTES and all others similarly situated under 29
U.S.C. 216(b), the Plaintiff, vs. UNLIMITED HEIGHTS SCAFFOLD
SERVICES, LLC, RICARDO MARTINEZ, and JANETTE MARTINEZ, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-24532-MGC (S.D. Fla., Oct., 29, 2018),
seeks to recover overtime and minimum wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have employed several
other similarly situated employees, like Plaintiff, who have not
been paid overtime and/or minimum wages for work performed in
excess of 40 hours weekly.

The Defendants willfully and intentionally refused to pay
Plaintiff's overtime wages as required by the FLSA as Defendants
knew of the overtime requirements of the FLSA and recklessly failed
to investigate whether Defendants' payroll practices were in
accordance with the FLSA, the lawsuit says.

Unlimited Heights is is in rigging and scaffolding business.[BN]

Attorney For Plaintiffs:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71 st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167
          E-mail: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


US EDUC DEPARTMENT: Secretary Faces Quero et al. Suit in S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the United States
Department of Education. The case is captioned as CHRISTOPHER
QUERO, COURTNEY FRANCIS, and KELLIN RODRIGUEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ELISABETH
DEVOS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of Education, Case No. 1:18-cv-09509-GBD (S.D.N.Y., Oct.
17, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge George B. Daniels.

The United States Department of Education operates as a government
agency which promotes student achievement and preparation for
global competitiveness. The Agency establishes policies on federal
financial aid for education, prohibits discrimination and ensures
equal access to education, and collects data on America's schools
and disseminating research. DE is based out of Washington, DC.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Danielle Feldman Tarantolo, Esq.
          NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
          7 Hanover Square
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 613-5000
          Facsimile: (212) 714-7589
          E-mail: dtarantolo@nylag.org

               - and -

          Jane Greengold Stevens, Esq.
          NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
          7 Hanover Square
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 613-5031
          Facsimile: (212) 750-0820
          E-mail: jstevens@nylag.org

               - and -

          Jessica Grace Ranucci, Esq.
          NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
          7 Hanover Square
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (617) 834-0769
          E-mail: jranucci@nylag.org


US METALS: Court Denies Filing of 2nd Amended Duarte Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN DUARTE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES
METALS REFINING COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
2:17-CV-01624-ES-SCM (D. N.J.), Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied
the  Plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint.

The class action arises from an environmental contamination dispute
where the Juan Duarte, Betsy Duarte, N.D., Leroy Nobles, and Betty
Nobles (the "Duarte Plaintiffs") allege that United States Metals,
Freeport Mineral Corp. ("FMC"), Freeport Minerals Inc. ("FMI"), and
AMAX Realty Development, Inc. released hazardous waste from their
smelting operations located in Carteret, New Jersey.  The release
of hazardous waste included toxic levels of arsenic, copper, and
lead, among other contaminants, allegedly contaminating the air in
the community surrounding the smelting operation, including the
Duarte Plaintiffs' persons and property.  Although one or more of
the Dsfendants took steps to remediate the contamination under the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Supervised
Off-site Environmental Investigation and Remediation Program in
2012,  the Duarte Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants downplayed
the extent of the environmental contamination resulting in
insufficient remediation of the environmental contamination.

FMI, seeking to show that it played no part in the remediation
program, provided an affidavit authored by Mr. Douglas N. Carrault
II, Corporate Secretary for FMI.  Mr. Carrault asserted that FMI
did not direct, manage, or provide technical services for the
environmental contamination remediation of the Duarte Plaintiffs'
homes.  Given Mr. Carrault's assertions, the Duarte Plaintiffs
discontinued their class action lawsuit against FMI on Dec. 18,
2017.

In May of 2018, the Duarte Plaintiffs received Mr. Joseph Brunner's
custodian file.  The Duarte Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Brunner's
file contained new information regarding FMI's involvement in the
remediation.  At his deposition on June 6 and June 7, 2018, Mr.
Brunner identified himself as the Project Manager for the
contamination remediation and testified that he and his superior
officers were FMC employees.  However, the Duarte Plaintiffs
alleged that Mr. Brunner and his superiors were listed or
self-identified as FMI employees based on the contents of various
social media pages, corporate websites, and businessrelated email
addresses with FMI domains.

Mr. Brunner's custodian file and his testimony at the June
Deposition led the Duarte Plaintiffs to believe that the Carrault
affidavit was misleading in that FMI, the parent of United States
Metals, FMC, and AMAX, actually directed, managed, and controlled
the remediation.  The Duarte Plaintiffs subsequently asked for, and
the Court granted, leave to move to amend.

On July 10, 2018, the Duarte Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend
seeking to rejoin FMI as a Defendant to the class action.  United
States Metals, FMC, and AMAX filed their opposition on July 24,
2018, and the Duarte Plaintiffs filed their reply on July 31,
2018.

United States Metals, FMC, and AMAX argued in their reply that Mr.
Brunner's and his superior's FMI email addresses were corporate
branding and the Duarte Plaintiffs had access to their social media
pages for months.  Further, they argue that Mr. Brunner's emails,
produced in November 2017, had the same email address information
as his business card, and the Duarte Plaintiffs could have
discovered the alleged misinformation earlier with proper
diligence.  They contend that preparation for additional
depositions and theories of liability is prejudicial.

Magistrate Judge Mannion finds that the Duarte Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that the FMC employee's Linkedln pages and employee
biographies on FMI's website were not available at the start of
litigation.  Additionally, they have not shown that Mr. Brunner's
FMI email address listed on his business card was newly discovered
at the June Deposition or when they received his custodian file.
The Duarte Plaintiffs did not exercise the necessary diligence in
reviewing information readily available at the start of litigation,
including information available on the internet or already in their
possession.  Thus, the Duarte Plaintiffs have provided insufficient
justification for seeking leave to amend and have not met the Rule
16 "good cause" standard.

In addition, the Magistrate finds that the Duarte Plaintiffs would
not meet the Rule 15 standard because their claims are futile. T he
Duarte Plaintiffs stated in their Motion to Amend that they
received Mr. Brunner's custodian file in May 2018.  However,
nowhere in their Motion to Amend did the Duarte Plaintiffs identify
what documentation within Mr. Brunner's custodian file was new and
led them to suspect that the Carrault affidavit was misleading.  

The Duarte Plaintiffs also point to newly discovered LinkedIn pages
and website biographies with FMC employees identifying themselves
as FMI employees.  First, the Duarte Plaintiffs do not show that
the LinkedIn pages were created after the start of litigation.
Second, they do not show that the FMI website or the website
biographies were unavailable to them at the start of litigation.
Third, the Duarte Plaintiffs do not identify the new documents in
Mr. Brunner's custodian file.  

The Magistrate holds that their assertions are naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement, and are insufficient to
satisfy the 12(b)(6) standard.  The Duarte Plaintiffs' assertions
do not allow the Court to infer that FMI controls United States
Metals, FMC, and AMAX and is, therefore, responsible for the
contamination remediation.

For the forgoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Mannion denied the
Duarte Plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/JmnFJr from Leagle.com.

JUAN DUARTE, BETSY DUARTE, N.D., infant, by Parents and Natural
Guardians Juan Duarte, and Betsy Duarte, LEROY NOBLES & BETTY
NOBLES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.,
Plaintiffs, represented by STEVEN J. GERMAN --
SGerman@germanrubenstein.com -- GERMAN RUBENSTEIN, BORIS SHMARUK,
VLASAC & SHMARUK L.L.C. & JOHN M. VLASAC, JR., VLASAC & SHMARUK,
LLC.

UNITED STATES METALS REFINING COMPANY, FREEPORT MCMORAN COPPER &
GOLD, INC., AMAX REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. & FREEPORT MINERALS
CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by DAVID R. KOTT --
dkott@mccarter.com -- MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP.


VALLEY BROOK, OK: Attorneys File Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Steve Shaw, writing for News 9, reports that an Oklahoma County
Judge will determine whether a class action lawsuit against the
town of Valley Brook can continue.

Attorneys Marvel Lewis, Esq. and Jeff Box, Esq. filed the lawsuit
on September 10. The attorneys claim that dozens, maybe even
hundreds of motorists, have been pulled over on a stretch of
roadway that is technically not in Valley Brook's jurisdiction. But
instead is considered to be in Oklahoma City.

Lewis represents a man who was arrested for a DUI there in January.
Last month, an Oklahoma County Judge tossed out that conviction,
because Lewis and Box argued that Valley Brook lacked
jurisdiction.

October 24 night, both attorneys argued in front of Valley Brook's
Municipal Court Judge that a careless driving charge against their
client should also be thrown out.

"Since the DUI has been dismissed in Oklahoma County, we believe
that this case here should be dismissed," Lewis said.

Municipal Court Judge Steve Haynes though rejected Lewis' argument.
Lewis and Box say they will just appeal Haynes' ruling to the
district court as well. [GN]


VERMYCK LLC: Gomes et al. Sue over Rental Tax Incentives
--------------------------------------------------------
JACOBUS GOMES, and KATHRYN GOMES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VERMYCK LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 713219/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Queens Cty., Aug. 27, 2018)
alleges violation of the Rent Stabilization Law and the Rent
Stabilization Code.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant received
certain tax abatements and exemptions pursuant to the J-51 tax
benefits program. The Defendant is required by the Rent
Stabilization Law and the Rent Stabilization Code to provide the
Plaintiff with rent-stabilized leases as a condition of receiving
tax benefits. However, the Plaintiffs did not receive a
rent-stabilized lease at the time they moved into their apartment
at the Building, and have been provided with non-rent stabilized
lease renewals by the Defendant.

Vermyck LLC is a company engaged in real estate property
management. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lucas A. Ferrara, Esq.
          Jarred I. Kassenoff, Esq.
          Roger A. Sachar Jr.,
          NEWMAN FERRARA LLP
          1250 Broadway, 27th Floor
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 619-5400
          E-mail: lferrara@nfllp.com
                  jkasseno@nfllp.com
                  rsachar@nfllp.com


WINS FINANCE: Opposition to Desta Class Cert. Bid Due Dec. 1
------------------------------------------------------------
Wins Finance Holdings Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 1, 2018, that the company's
opposition to the motion for class certification in the case
entitled, Desta v. Wins Finance Holdings, Inc., et al., is due on
December 14, 2018.

On April 20, 2017, Michel Desta filed a securities class action
complaint in the District Court for the Central District of
California seeking monetary damages against the company, Jianming
Hao, Renhui Mu, Peiling (Amy) He, and Junfeng Zhao (entitled Desta
v. Wins Finance Holdings, Inc., et al.; C.D. Cal. Case No.
2:17-cv-02983) (hereafter, the "California Action").

On June 26, 2017, the Court issued an Order appointing lead
plaintiffs and lead counsel, and on August 25, 2017 lead plaintiffs
filed an Amended Class Action Complaint. The Amended Complaint
(which did not name Peiling (Amy) He as a defendant), alleges a
claim against the company for securities fraud purportedly arising
from alleged misrepresentations concerning Wins' principal
executive offices (which alleged misrepresentations resulted in
Wins being added to, and then removed from, the Russell 2000
index).

On October 24, 2017, the company moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim as against uits. On March 1,
2018, the District Court for the Central District of California
issued an Order denying the Company's motion to dismiss. Thus, the
civil action has proceeded to the fact gathering "discovery" stage
in respect to the Company.

On August 31, 2018, defendants Renhui Mu and Junfeng Zhao moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in the California Action for
failure to state a claim as against them. That motion is scheduled
for hearing on November 5, 2018.

Separately, on September 17, 2018, lead plaintiffs in the
California Action filed a motion seeking class certification. The
Company's opposition to that motion is currently due on December
14, 2018.

On October 9, 2018, the Court entered an Order in the California
Action dismissing the action as against Jianming Hao, without
prejudice, for lead plaintiffs' failure to timely serve him with
the Summons and Amended Complaint.

Wins Finance said, "The Amended Complaint does not specifically
allege the damages purportedly suffered by the class, and we are
not yet able to provide a reliable estimate of any such damage
claim. We believe that the claims from this proceeding are without
merit and we are vigorously defending this proceeding.

Wins Finance Holdings Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides
financing solutions for small and medium enterprises in the
People's Republic of China. It provides financial guarantee and
leasing services, as well as financial advisory, consultancy, and
agency services in Jinzhong City, Shanxi Province, and Beijing. The
company is headquartered in New York, New York. Wins Finance
Holdings Inc. is a subsidiary of Freeman FinTech Corporation
Limited.


YMCA: Class Action Over Evictions Thwarted by Missing Agreement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a man
who participated in a Chicago city program for the homeless failed
to prove he was a YMCA tenant under Chicago's landlord ordinance,
losing the opportunity to continue a class action suit against the
Y over evictions, a state appeals panel has ruled.

Sopuruchi Okeke Ewo filed a class action complaint in 2015 against
the YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago, which he said didn't renew a
lease he arranged through the Chicago Department of Family and
Support Services, then wrongfully evicted him. The YMCA moved to
dismiss, arguing that because the city paid Ewo's rent as part of a
grant program, he doesn't have the same legal protections as an
individual tenant, as defined in the Chicago Residential Landlord
and Tenant Ordinance. Cook County Circuit Court Judge David Atkins
had granted the dismissal.

A three-justice panel of the Illinois First District Appellate
Court ruled on Ewo's appeal of that ruling in an order issued Oct.
18. Justice Jesse Reyes wrote the decision; Justices Bertina
Lampkin and Mary Rochford concurred. The order was issued under
Supreme Court Rule 23, which restricts its use as precedent, except
under very limited circumstances permitted by the Supreme Court
rule.

In arguing against the dismissal, Ewo noted he had a written
program agreement with the city and an oral lease with the YMCA.
But the YMCA said its only contract is with the city, which gives
the YMCA a block grant to set aside 11 rooms for program
participants, each of whom have six months to live in the space.
The city determines each participant's exit date and communicates
it directly through a case manager, Reyes noted in the
decision.[GN]


ZOAN MANAGEMENT: Or. High Court Remands Arbitration Matters
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Oregon issued an Opinion reversing the Court
of Appeals' judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' appeal of the Trial
Court's Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in
the case captioned Jeff GIST, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated, Petitioner on Review, v. ZOAN MANAGEMENT, INC.;
Senvoy, LLC; and Driver Resources, LLC, a domestic limited
liability company, Respondents on Review. Nos. (CC 131115916) (CA
A159509) (SC S064925).  (Or.).

This case requires the state Supreme Court to determine whether the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed plaintiff's appeal of a
judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice on the grounds
that the appeal was barred by this court's decision in Steenson v.
Robinson, 236 Or. 414, 385 P.2d 738 (1963).

The Plaintiff worked as a driver for defendant Driver Resources,
LLC. The other two defendants are related companies. The Plaintiff
filed a class-action complaint against defendants, on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated drivers. At issue was
defendants' compliance with Oregon's wage and hour laws, as set out
in ORS chapters 652 and 653.  

The Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, on the basis
of an agreement that the plaintiff had signed with one defendant.
Plaintiff responded to the petition by arguing that the agreement
was unconscionable, and therefore that arbitration should not be
compelled.

The trial court granted defendants' petition, requiring plaintiff
to proceed to arbitration.
Plaintiff filed an appeal from that judgment in the Court of
Appeals. Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on two grounds.

First, defendants argued that this court's decision in Steenson
prevented appeal of a voluntary dismissal.

Second, defendants argued that plaintiff's attempt to appeal an
order granting a motion to compel arbitration is barred by ORS
36.730, which governs certain appeals in cases involving
arbitration.

They contended that that statute creates an exception to ORS
19.205(1), which generally permits appeal of a general judgment.

The Appellate Commissioner rejected defendants' second argument,
determining that ORS 19.205(1), in combination with ORS 19.245,
provided a statutory basis allowing plaintiff to appeal the general
judgment of dismissal. However, the Appellate Commissioner held
that Steenson prevented plaintiff from taking an appeal and entered
an order dismissing the appeal on that ground. Plaintiff petitioned
for reconsideration of the Appellate Commissioner's decision by the
Court of Appeals.

That petition was denied. Plaintiff then filed a petition for
review of the dismissal of the appeal in this court, which the
Court allowed.

As they did before the Court of Appeals, defendants argue that two
separate legal rules bar plaintiff's appeal in this case.

First, defendants argue that this court's decision in Steenson
prevents plaintiff from appealing. Steenson announced a common law
rule that a party may not appeal from a judgment which he
voluntarily requested.

Second, defendants argue that a provision of the Oregon Uniform
Arbitration Act, ORS 36.730, bars plaintiff's appeal.

The flaw in plaintiff's argument is that there is no material
difference between the text of the statutes that plaintiff relies
upon and the text of the equivalent statutes when Steenson was
decided. Former 19.020 (1963), the analogous provision to ORS
19.245, stated that any party to a judgment or decree, other than a
judgment or decree given by confession or for want of an answer,
may appeal therefrom. And  former  ORS 19.010(1) (1963), the
predecessor of ORS 19.205(1), provided that a judgment or decree
may be reviewed on appeal as prescribed in this chapter.

Plaintiff's second argument is that, even if Steenson does apply
generally, it has an exception that is applicable to this case. In
Steenson, this court suggested that the rule against appeal of a
voluntary nonsuit might not apply if the plaintiff takes a nonsuit
because of a ruling which precludes recovery.

Having examined the Court cases, the Court turn to the task of
clarifying the exception to the Steenson rule. That exception was
initially articulated, very briefly and in a hypothetical
statement, as one that would apply if the plaintiff takes a nonsuit
because of a ruling which precludes recovery. That statement,
however, was made in a case in which res judicata did notbar the
plaintiff from refiling his claim and in the context of statutes
that did not provide for voluntary dismissals with prejudice, or
the equivalent, in actions at law.

Read literally, as defendants propose, Steenson's articulation of
the exception would suggest that we should examine the record to
discern whether, as a factual matter, plaintiff still had some
possibility of recovery on the claims that he moved to dismiss. But
that is not how our subsequent cases have applied the exception,
and that literal reading cannot be squared with the reasoning in
Taylor or the result in Sheets. Nor is defendants' limited view of
the exception necessary to advance the purpose of the Steenson
rule. That rule was imposed only to prevent a plaintiff from both
obtaining appellate review of a preliminary issue and retaining the
ability to refile the same claim, should the plaintiff lose on
appeal. A dismissal of all claims with prejudice fully prevents
plaintiffs from employing that strategy.

For those reasons, the Court holds that Steenson does not bar
appeal when there is a judgment on all claims and any voluntarily
dismissed claims were dismissed with prejudice.

Applying that rule to these facts is straightforward. This case
involves a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff cannot refile those claims after this appeal. To the
contrary, having voluntarily foregone the possibility of recovery
through arbitration, plaintiff's action is at an end if he does not
prevail on appeal. He is in a similar position to the plaintiffs in
Taylor,who were willing to accept nonsuit of another, related,
claim in order to obtain an appeal. In this case, had plaintiff not
dismissed his claims with prejudice, he could have pursued them in
arbitration. Plaintiff gave that up. Plaintiff's acceptance of that
cost his willingness to forego litigation, Taylor, 279 Or at 144,
distinguishes this case from an interlocutory appeal.

For that reason, any dispute over whether plaintiff correctly
judged that he would be unable to prevail on his claims through
arbitration, or would actually have been unable to afford
arbitration, is irrelevant. Plaintiff's appeal falls within the
exception because, as in Taylor and Sheets, plaintiff's only
opportunity to obtain relief is on appeal; plaintiff dismissed his
claims with prejudice and cannot refile them if he is unsuccessful
on appeal.

The Court turns to defendants' second argument, that ORS 36.730
creates an exception to the general rule of ORS 19.205(1) that a
party can appeal a general judgment and prohibits plaintiff from
pursuing his appeal. ORS 36.730(1) allows the interlocutory appeal
of orders denying a petition to compel arbitration or granting a
petition to stay arbitration. But ORS 36.730(1) contains no
provision permitting an interlocutory appeal of an order granting a
petition to compel arbitration. Defendants argue that because of
that omission, plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed.

The Court disagrees. As the Court have discussed above, this case
does not involve an interlocutory appeal. Instead, the trial court
entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice and
plaintiff appealed that judgment. This appeal is therefore from a
general judgment and is statutorily authorized by ORS 19.205(1) and
ORS 19.245(1). Nothing in ORS 36.730(1) prevents plaintiff from
appealing the final, general judgment in his case.

The Court allowed review to consider only whether plaintiff's
appeal was correctly dismissed, and the Court have concluded that
it was not. The learned Appellate Commissioner pointed out in his
order, however, that certain of defendants' arguments may more
appropriately be directed to what issues the Court of Appeals may
properly review on appeal rather than the appealability of the
judgment. Those arguments, as well as the merits of plaintiff's
assignments of error, are properly considered in the first instance
by the Court of Appeals.

The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's October 25, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydegnaxf from
Leagle.com.

Lisa T. Hunt -- lthunt@lthuntlaw.com -- Law Office of Lisa T. Hunt,
LLC, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the
petitioner on review.

Charles J. Paternoster -- cpaternoster@pfglaw.com -- Parson Farnell
& Grein, LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
the respondents on review.


[*] ALRC Chief Takes Aim at "Trafficking" of Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Pelly, writing for AFR News, reports that Australian Law
Reform Commission president Sarah Derrington sprang a couple of
surprises this week at a conference put on by a group of litigation
funders.

With the commission's class actions report in its final stages,
Derrington -- a non-sitting judge of the Federal Court -- took aim
at those who sell shares in the proceeds of any settlement.

She cited the example of Burford Capital which recently sold off 25
per cent of its funding of a claim in the USA against the
Argentinian government for nationalisation of an oil company for
$106 million. Its original investment was $18 million.

Burford, which is backing one of the five claims against AMP, has
been talking up the development of a secondary market for
litigation and arbitration risk.

Derrington isn't so keen.

Litigation trafficking

The ALRC chief said Burford-style deals "might just meet the
description of trafficking in litigation . . . the unjustified
buying and selling of rights to litigation where the purchaser has
no proper reason to be concerned with the litigation".

In Australia, she said, such deals "won't render the proceedings
liable to be dismissed or stayed but at the very least the
securitisation agreement itself is likely to be unenforceable".

Derrington was speaking at a half-day conference of the nascent
Association of Litigation Funders Australia in Sydney on Monday.
She will back up at another ALFA event in Melbourne.

She noted since the High Court's 2006 decision in Fostif, it has
been accepted that arrangements between funders and litigants are
enforceable and not contrary to public policy "even when they
yielded significant profit".

"What has not been settled unequivocally is the limit of the
consideration of public policy and illegality in the context of the
development of securitisation in already funded litigation,"
Derrington said.

Herbert Smith Freehills partner Jason Betts liked what he heard.

Conflicts of interest

"A secondary market trading in the outcome of a class action must
surely cross the red line of conflicts of interest; and even in the
post-Fostif 'free market' for class action funders, would be a
practice so patently entrepreneurial that the integrity of our
entire class action regime would be threatened," Betts said.

KWM partner Justin McDonnell, who was on a panel with Betts for one
session, said there was a legitimate concern that "funders,
especially the overseas ones, are simply going to use this as
another market to make money".

"Such a step does really go to trafficking in litigation and that
would offend public policy, so the judge's point is that Burford's
underlying agreement to fund the action would be valid but not the
on-sale of its share."

ALFA chairman and class actions veteran John Walker was more
interested in Derrington's suggestion the ALRC might propose a look
at whether consideration should be given to terminating the rights
of shareholders to sue by way of class action under the continuous
disclosure provisions of the Corporations Act.

"This seems an extraordinarily broad ambit to be proposing for an
inquiry that is outside the ALRC's terms of reference, particularly
in circumstances where no submissions calling for this have been
made," Walker said.

"It would mean ASX shareholders would be the only purchasers of
securities without a right to enforce market protection
regulations."

Derrington said funders had backed all shareholder class actions
since 2013 and 34 per cent of consumer protection and mass tort
claims. The average fee is 28.5 per cent on settlements -- no cases
have yet gone to trial in Australia – that have ranged from $6.75
million to $215 million.

Her sign-off lines suggest the final report, which is due on
December 21 but expected earlier, will have some bite.

"The legitimate use of the court's processes . . . should not be
undermined by proceedings that disproportionately benefit the
funder and solicitor rather than the litigants.

"Both the public function of class actions and the private
interests of the litigants must take priority over the interests of
those whose role it is to provide the services necessary to
participate in this system."

Indigenous law firm links with Norton Rose

Norton Rose Fulbright disclosed that it was forming a majority
Indigenous-owned commercial law firm -- known as Jaramer Legal --
in a joint venture with Mailman Law principals Bevan Mailman and
Brian Bero.

Bero said his firm wanted to "get involved in the larger
infrastructure and commercial work out there, but we don't have the
capacity". He cited the Develop the North initiative and the
Indigenous economic strategy as two opportunities for Jaramer to
take "a meaningful part in the development of wealth for our
nation".  

Mailman said 79 per cent of the north was under Indigenous title:
"It makes sense if we can help them better develop and steward
their land assets."

Norton Rose chief Wayne Spanner said he hoped it would help develop
commercial law careers for Indigenous lawyers, most of which have
gravitated to family law and criminal law.


[*] IMF Bentham to Fund Property Owners' Cladding Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Insurancenews.com.au reports that litigation funder IMF Bentham and
William Roberts Lawyers will launch a class action for property
owners who have been forced to pay for the removal of combustible
polyethylene-core cladding from their buildings.

The action will represent owners of residential, commercial and
other non-residential buildings.

Another class action is being put together by law firm Adley
Burstyner and building inspector Roscon Property Services,
targeting construction companies that have used combustible
cladding in residential buildings.

Losses may include premiums on house and contents cover, which have
increased dramatically for affected or potentially affected
buildings.

State governments are cracking down on the use of combustible
cladding.

The Victorian Government has shifted the cost of removing it to
residents. More than 800 companies and individuals have been
contacted under a state cladding audit. [GN]


[*] JND Bags Settlement Service Contracts with Federal Agencies
---------------------------------------------------------------
JND Legal Administration, a legal management and administration
company serving law firms, corporations and government entities, on
Nov. 14 disclosed that its government services business line has
been awarded two independent contracts from both the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Office of Claims and Refunds and the U.S.
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Office of Distributions
Division of Enforcement.

"It is a very proud moment for JND to be entrusted to administer
the enforcement actions of both the SEC and FTC," comments Neil
Zola, executive co-chairman and co-founder of JND Legal
Administration.  "Through these contracts, JND will deliver timely
and accurate settlement administration services for both federal
entities, allowing them to concentrate on their missions of
protecting consumers and investors."

JND's government services business line is run by Senior Vice
President Charles Lawson who was instrumental in securing the
contracts.  Under these contracts, JND will provide all personnel,
equipment, tools, supervision, and other services necessary to
ensure effective notice, claims administration, and funds
distribution.

"The Division of Enforcement's Office of Distributions ('OD') is
responsible for administering and coordinating the SEC's
distribution program," read the SEC statement of requirements for
submission.  "OD's objective is to return funds to eligible harmed
investors as expeditiously and efficiently as possible given the
circumstances of the particular matter."

"Distributing these funds is a major undertaking," read the FTC
statement of requirements for evaluation.  "The FTC relies on
private sector support for a portion of the administration of the
claims processing and fund distribution."

Federal agencies establish long-term contracts with settlement
administration firms to develop and implement the distribution
plan, including: developing a timeline for distribution;
determining economic harm or loss and retaining an expert if
needed; locating and identifying harmed investors; determining
whether claimants are eligible to receive payment; communicating
with potentially eligible claimants; and providing reporting and
recordkeeping services.

                About JND Legal Administration

JND Legal Administration -- http://www.jndla.com-- is a legal
management and administration company led by industry veterans who
are passionate about providing superior service to clients.  Armed
with decades of expertise and a powerful set of tools, JND has deep
experience expertly navigating the intricacies of multiple,
intersecting service lines including class action settlements,
corporate restructuring, eDiscovery, mass tort claims and
government services.  JND is trusted by law firms, government
agencies and Fortune 500 companies across the nation.  The company
is backed by Stone Point Capital and has offices in California,
Colorado, Minnesota, New York, Washington and Washington, D.C.


[*] Langlois Lawyer Discusses Steps to Minimize Privacy Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Deschenes, Esq. -- caroline.deschenes@langlois.ca -- of
Langlois Lawyers LLP, in an article for Canadian Lawyer, reports
that over the past decade, the number of privacy class actions has
increased dramatically. This is because privacy breaches often
affect a vast number of individuals who have suffered only a
modicum of damages. With the coming into force of new obligatory
notification regimes, such as that under the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act as of Nov. 1, this tendency
is not going to subside any time soon.

A class action can entail substantial costs, including defence fees
and negative publicity, not to mention the cost of settlement or
court-ordered compensation. So, what can organizations do to
minimize these risks?

The way an organization reacts to a privacy breach may be
determinative of its consequences and the chances of a class action
ensuing. A well-thought-out incident response plan is an
indispensable tool in such circumstances. An IRP should include the
following five steps.

Incident identification
Under the direction of the incident response team, the first step
is to identify, as far as possible, the kind of information
involved, the nature of the incident, whether the incident is
ongoing or occurred in the past and the cause of the incident. This
preliminary assessment will indicate the nature of the subsequent
actions necessary to minimize the negative effects.

Initial response and containment
Measures should be taken immediately to contain the effects of the
incident and prevent the loss of additional information or any
other negative impact on the organization or third parties. The
nature of these measures will depend on the type of breach that
occurred. For example, the reaction to a cyberattack using
ransomware will not be the same as that of an email erroneously
sent by a distracted employee.

Investigation
Once the incident has been identified and contained, a more
in-depth investigation is called for, in order to determine the
type of information involved, as well as:

   -- the persons affected by the incident;
   -- whether the information has been lost, stolen, etc.;
   -- whether the information can be recovered or not;
   -- who has accessed the information (in order to be able to take
steps to mitigate the risk of the information being more widely
distributed;
   -- the cause of the incident (in order to determine if security
measures can be implemented immediately).

Notification
Certain legislation, such as Alberta's Personal Information
Protection Act, and as of Nov. 1, PIPEDA, provides for mandatory
notification of privacy breaches to the privacy commissioner and/or
the individuals concerned. There could also be contractual
obligations to notify in the event of a breach. But even if not
mandated by a statute or contract, notification may be desirable in
order to allow affected individuals to mitigate their damages; for
example, by taking steps to prevent identity theft.

Under certain circumstances, affected organizations should offer
assistance to individuals whose information has been compromised
(such as free credit monitoring). If a class action ensues, the
organization's reaction to the incident will be closely
scrutinized, and if appropriate measures have been taken, this will
allow it to significantly reduce its exposure.

Communications
A communications plan should be drawn up in order to limit the
negative effects of the incident, particularly on the
organization's reputation. Any communication should be carefully
thought out, in order to ensure that (1) appropriate language is
used, so as to minimize risks in the event of litigation; (2)
sufficient information about the incident is provided; and (3)
privileged information is not disclosed.

Finally, the execution of all steps of the IRP should be recorded
-- while ensuring that privilege and evidence are preserved -- as
such information could prove to be useful in defending against a
class action.

While organizations have little control over developments in the
law, they can compensate by adopting measures aimed at obviating
the risk of privacy breaches and limiting the damages.


[*] Opting Out of Class Action Makes More Sense in Some Situations
------------------------------------------------------------------
Marg. Bruineman, writing for Law Times, reports that the
opportunity to opt out of a class action is offered in all Ontario
class-action proceedings, but lawyers say there are some fact
situations in which pursuing individual claims makes more sense
than being part of a class.

And while the law around certification has generally been tested
and clearly developed, the areas around those who opt out because
they don't want to be part of the class, along with settlement
approval and competing class actions, are continuing to be defined,
says Samaneh Hosseini -- shosseini@stikeman.com -- a partner in
Stikeman Elliott LLP's litigation and dispute resolution group in
Toronto.

In this continuing evolution, there are cases in which a lawyer
representing an individual seeks to opt out and not be part of the
class in a class action, deciding instead to launch their own
action, she says.

The concern, she says, is the risk too many opting out could have
on the actual class action.

If there are several deciding not to be part of the class, she
says, the defendant might feel the settlement will not adequately
resolve their exposure and refuse to come to a settlement
agreement.

"That raises challenges because the settlement will commonly have
an opt-out threshold," she says.

The threshold means that if a certain percentage of the class opts
out, the settlement may no longer be valid, which can "potentially
interfere with the settlement," she adds.

The ability to opt out is only available once, even if there are
several cases being advanced on the same issue, says
Linda Visser -- linda.visser@siskinds.com -- a plaintiff class
action lawyer and a partner at Siskinds LLP in London, Ont.

In price-fixing cases -- her particular area of concentration --
there is often more than one class action going on at once if the
issue is relevant in several jurisdictions. And if a potential
member of a class opts out, that person is opting out of all the
class actions that are launched for that particular product.

She points out that the window to opt out is only offered at a
prescribed period during the process for a limited amount of time.

"Typically, I would say, you would only really want to opt out if
you want to pursue the litigation on your own or if you're reaching
your own separate resolution with them," says
Ms. Visser.

Loretta Merritt -- lmerritt@torkinmanes.com -- of Torkin Manes LLP
says that distinction around injuries is an important one and can
make class actions inappropriate for some circumstances in which
there was harm. She says the process is flawed and, therefore, not
always adequate for those involving sexual assault, particularly
historical institutional abuse.

There have been several class actions certified for claims of
historical sexual abuse in institutions, which Merritt says she
finds troubling. She says the time restraints in class actions can
deny access to justice to many of those who have been harmed and
the damage awards end up being much smaller than those who pursue
individual claims.

Merritt says certifying institutional abuse cases as class actions
started with Rumley v. British Columbia in 2001, which landed
before the Supreme Court of Canada. Rumley involved abuse and
systemic negligence at a residential school for deaf and blind
children run by British Columbia.

A class action was certified after a government-established
compensation scheme was deemed inadequate, she says, and class
members were ultimately granted a maximum of $125,000 each.

Several institutional abuse cases have since been certified and
settled, including three involving the Huronia Regional Centre, the
Rideau Regional Centre and the Southwestern Regional Centre, which
were residential facilities in Ontario for those with developmental
disabilities. The maximum payout was $35,000 per class member.

She says there's a gross disparity in damage awards between what
members of a class are receiving in some settlements and the
limited number of people coming forward versus what they can get if
they pursue litigation individually.

"I can think of a reason why someone may want to opt out. They
might want $100,000 or $200,000 or $300,000 or $400,000 in damages,
as opposed to $3,711," she says, referring to what some class
members received in the Ontario residential facilities cases.

Merritt is also concerned that the limited timeline potential class
members have to opt out of a class action conflicts with
legislation that removes limitation periods for historical sexual
assaults.

She says if people don't come forward on the timetable set by the
lawyers and the court in class actions, they are deemed to be
included in the class and are prohibited from filing a claim in the
future and their rights to pursue a claim are extinguished.

"A small fraction of the fund is being paid out because a small
fraction of people are coming forward to collect their money and
settlements paid are shockingly low . . . when you look at
individual actions," she says.


[*] US Chamber of Commerce Urges Reform for Securities Law
----------------------------------------------------------
Hazel Bradford, writing for Pio Online, reports that the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce in a new paper is calling on Congress to reform
securities class-action law, its first legislative foray on the
issue since the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed
in 1995.

The PSLRA was passed in response to complaints from the Chamber and
others after a spike in filings in the 1990s that focused on
technology companies. Today, the new report said, "the securities
class-action system suffers from abuses eerily similar to those of
the 1990s," when companies tended to settle rather than defend
claims.

While Congress created a lead-plaintiff process to give
institutional investors more of a role in these types of lawsuits,
"many institutional investors have remained on the sidelines,"
while plaintiffs' lawyers and "professional plaintiffs" have
stepped up their involvement, said the report, "A Rising Threat:
The New Class-Action Racket that Harms Investors and the Economy."

In 2018, more than 8% of all public companies -- one out of 12 --
will be sued in a securities class action, according to the report.
While the previous trend was stock-drop lawsuits, the report states
"the trigger today is merger and acquisition deals valued over $100
million," with 85% of those deals resulting in a lawsuit. The bulk
of those lawsuits, 87%, now wind up in federal courts, following a
Delaware state court ruling in 2016 that limited settlements in
such cases, the report said.

Another trend noted in the report is "event-driven" lawsuits
triggered by consumer lawsuits on product liability or in data
breaches, followed by investor lawsuits alleging companies should
have known the potential impact on share values.

Annual filings of securities class-action lawsuits averaged 190 per
year from 2008 through 2016. In 2017, filings increased 122% to
412, and are expected to stay at that level in 2018, the report
said.

"Securities class-action lawsuits are spiraling out of control:
Plaintiffs' lawyers are filing more meritless lawsuits than ever
before," Lisa A. Rickard, president of the U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform, said in a statement.

"This litigation racket inflicts serious harm on investors,
companies and capital markets. Congress should enact reforms that
deter the filing of meritless claims and ensure that securities
cases actually benefit genuinely injured investors rather than the
lawyers who bring the lawsuits."


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $29MM Aearo-Related Costs at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company, through its Aearo Technologies subsidiary, had accruals
of US$29 million as of September 30, 2018, for product liabilities
and defense costs related to current and future Aearo-related
asbestos and silica-related claims, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "On April 1, 2008, a subsidiary of the Company
purchased the stock of Aearo Holding Corp., the parent of Aearo
Technologies ("Aearo").  Aearo manufactured and sold various
products, including personal protection equipment, such as eye,
ear, head, face, fall and certain respiratory protection products.

"As of September 30, 2018, Aearo and/or other companies that
previously owned and operated Aearo's respirator business (American
Optical Corporation, Warner-Lambert LLC, AO Corp.  and Cabot
Corporation ("Cabot")) are named defendants, with multiple
co-defendants, including the Company, in numerous lawsuits in
various courts in which plaintiffs allege use of mask and
respirator products and seek damages from Aearo and other
defendants for alleged personal injury from workplace exposures to
asbestos, silica-related, or other occupational dusts found in
products manufactured by other defendants or generally in the
workplace.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company, through its Aearo
subsidiary, had accruals of US$29 million for product liabilities
and defense costs related to current and future Aearo-related
asbestos and silica-related claims.  This accrual represents the
Company's best estimate of Aearo's probable loss and reflects an
estimation period for future claims that may be filed against Aearo
approaching the year 2050.  Responsibility for legal costs, as well
as for settlements and judgments, is currently shared in an
informal arrangement among Aearo, Cabot, American Optical
Corporation and a subsidiary of Warner Lambert and their respective
insurers (the "Payor Group").  Liability is allocated among the
parties based on the number of years each company sold respiratory
products under the "AO Safety" brand and/or owned the AO Safety
Division of American Optical Corporation and the alleged years of
exposure of the individual plaintiff.  Aearo's share of the
contingent liability is further limited by an agreement entered
into between Aearo and Cabot on July 11, 1995.  This agreement
provides that, so long as Aearo pays to Cabot a quarterly fee of
US$100,000, Cabot will retain responsibility and liability for, and
indemnify Aearo against, any product liability claims involving
exposure to asbestos, silica, or silica products for respirators
sold prior to July 11, 1995.  Because of the difficulty in
determining how long a particular respirator remains in the stream
of commerce after being sold, Aearo and Cabot have applied the
agreement to claims arising out of the alleged use of respirators
involving exposure to asbestos, silica or silica products prior to
January 1, 1997.  With these arrangements in place, Aearo's
potential liability is limited to exposures alleged to have arisen
from the use of respirators involving exposure to asbestos, silica,
or silica products on or after January 1, 1997.  To date, Aearo has
elected to pay the quarterly fee.  Aearo could potentially be
exposed to additional claims for some part of the pre-July 11, 1995
period covered by its agreement with Cabot if Aearo elects to
discontinue its participation in this arrangement, or if Cabot is
no longer able to meet its obligations in these matters."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Kwy850


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Accrues $600MM for Respirator Lawsuits
--------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company had an accrual of US$600 million as of September 30,
2018, for liabilities associated with respirator mask and asbestos
cases (excluding those related to Aearo Technologies), according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2018.

3M Co. states, "The Company regularly conducts a comprehensive
legal review of its respirator mask/asbestos liabilities.  The
Company reviews recent and historical claims data, including
without limitation, (i) the number of pending claims filed against
the Company, (ii) the nature and mix of those claims (i.e., the
proportion of claims asserting usage of the Company's mask or
respirator products and alleging exposure to each of asbestos,
silica, coal or other occupational dusts, and claims pleading use
of asbestos-containing products allegedly manufactured by the
Company), (iii) the costs to defend and resolve pending claims, and
(iv) trends in filing rates and in costs to defend and resolve
claims, (collectively, the "Claims Data").  As part of its
comprehensive legal review, the Company regularly provides the
Claims Data to a third party with expertise in determining the
impact of Claims Data on future filing trends and costs.  The third
party assists the Company in estimating the costs to defend and
resolve pending and future claims.  The Company uses these
estimates to develop its best estimate of probable liability.

"Developments may occur that could affect the Company's estimate of
its liabilities.  These developments include, but are not limited
to, significant changes in (i) the key assumptions underlying the
Company's accrual, including, the number of future claims, the
nature and mix of those claims, the average cost of defending and
resolving claims, and in maintaining trial readiness (ii) trial and
appellate outcomes, (iii) the law and procedure applicable to these
claims, and (iv) the financial viability of other co-defendants and
insurers.

"As a result of the Company's review of its respirator
mask/asbestos liabilities and as a result of the cost of resolving
claims of persons who claim more serious injuries, including
mesothelioma and other malignancies, the Company increased its
accruals in the first nine months of 2018 for respirator
mask/asbestos liabilities by US$56 million.  In the first nine
months of 2018, the Company made payments for legal fees and
settlements of US$64 million related to the respirator
mask/asbestos litigation.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company had an accrual for
respirator mask/asbestos liabilities (excluding Aearo accruals) of
US$600 million.  This accrual represents the Company's best
estimate of probable loss and reflects an estimation period for
future claims that may be filed against the Company approaching the
year 2050.  The Company cannot estimate the amount or upper end of
the range of amounts by which the liability may exceed the accrual
the Company has established because of the (i) inherent difficulty
in projecting the number of claims that have not yet been asserted
or the time period in which future claims may be asserted, (ii) the
complaints nearly always assert claims against multiple defendants
where the damages alleged are typically not attributed to
individual defendants so that a defendant's share of liability may
turn on the law of joint and several liability, which can vary by
state, (iii) the multiple factors that the Company considers in
estimating its liabilities, and (iv) the several possible
developments that may occur that could affect the Company's
estimate of liabilities.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company's receivable for insurance
recoveries related to the respirator mask/asbestos litigation was
US$4 million.  The Company continues to seek coverage under the
policies of certain insolvent and other insurers.  Once those
claims for coverage are resolved, the Company will have collected
substantially all of its remaining insurance coverage for
respirator mask/asbestos claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Kwy850


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Still Faces 2,255 Claimants at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company remains a defendant in numerous lawsuits in various
courts that purport to represent approximately 2,255 individual
claimants as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "The vast majority of the lawsuits and claims
resolved by and currently pending against the Company allege use of
some of the Company's mask and respirator products and seek damages
from the Company and other defendants for alleged personal injury
from workplace exposures to asbestos, silica, coal mine dust or
other occupational dusts found in products manufactured by other
defendants or generally in the workplace.  A minority of the
lawsuits and claims resolved by and currently pending against the
Company generally allege personal injury from occupational exposure
to asbestos from products previously manufactured by the Company,
which are often unspecified, as well as products manufactured by
other defendants, or occasionally at Company premises.

"The Company's current volume of new and pending matters is
substantially lower than it experienced at the peak of filings in
2003.  The Company expects that filing of claims by unimpaired
claimants in the future will continue to be at much lower levels
than in the past.  Accordingly, the number of claims alleging more
serious injuries, including mesothelioma and other malignancies,
will represent a greater percentage of total claims than in the
past.  The Company has prevailed in thirteen of the fourteen cases
taken to trial, including eleven of the twelve cases tried to
verdict (such trials occurred in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004,
2007, 2015, and the cases tried in 2016, 2017, and 2018), and an
appellate reversal in 2005 of the 2001 jury verdict adverse to the
Company.  The remaining case, tried in 2009, was dismissed by the
court at the close of plaintiff's evidence, based on the court's
legal finding that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict.  In August 2016, 3M received a
unanimous verdict in its favor from a jury in state court in
Kentucky, in 3M's first respirator trial involving coal mine dust.
The estate of the plaintiff alleged that the 3M 8710 respirator is
defective and caused his death because it did not protect him from
harmful coal mine dust.  The jury rejected plaintiff's claim and
returned a verdict finding no liability against 3M.  The verdict is
final as the plaintiff did not file an appeal.  In September 2017,
3M received a unanimous verdict in its favor from a jury in state
court in Kentucky in 3M's second respirator trial involving coal
mine dust.  The jury ultimately determined that the plaintiff's
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  In November
2017, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.  The
plaintiff did not file an appeal, thereby ending the litigation.
In February 2018, 3M received a verdict in its favor from a jury in
state court in California.  The plaintiff alleged that the 3M 8710
respirator was defective and caused his mesothelioma because it did
not protect him from asbestos fibers.  The jury rejected
plaintiff's claim and returned a verdict finding no liability
against 3M.  In April 2018, a jury in state court in Kentucky found
3M's 8710 respirators failed to protect two coal miners from coal
mine dust and awarded aggregate compensatory damages of
approximately US$2 million and punitive damages totaling US$63
million.  In August 2018, the trial court entered judgment and the
Company has appealed.  The Company believes liability in this case
is not probable and estimable.  In June 2018, the Company also
settled a number of coal mine dust lawsuits for an amount that was
not material to the Company.

"The Company has demonstrated in these past trial proceedings that
its respiratory protection products are effective as claimed when
used in the intended manner and in the intended circumstances.
Consequently, the Company believes that claimants are unable to
establish that their medical conditions, even if significant, are
attributable to the Company's respiratory protection products.
Nonetheless the Company's litigation experience indicates that
claims of persons with malignant conditions are costlier to resolve
than the claims of unimpaired persons, and it therefore believes
the average cost of resolving pending and future claims on a
per-claim basis will continue to be higher than it experienced in
prior periods when the vast majority of claims were asserted by
medically unimpaired claimants."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Kwy850


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5th Cir. Dismisses Williams Consolidated Appeals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has
dismissed four consolidated appeals for lack of jurisdiction when
the district court dismissed remaining defendants without prejudice
and did not enter an order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appealed case is styled Tarsia Williams; Breck Williams,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Incorporated,
Defendant-Appellee. Tarsia Williams; Breck Williams,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. McCarty Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
Tarsia Williams; Breck Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Boeing
Company, Defendant-Appellee. Tarsia Williams; Breck Williams,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, individually
and as successor-in-interest to Martin Marietta, Incorporated,
Defendant-Appellee, No. 16-31233, consolidated with Nos. 16-31236,
17-30230, 17-30231, (5th Cir.).

Decedent Frank Williams, Jr., a former employee of Lockheed Martin
Corporation's predecessor, Martin Marietta Corporation, allegedly
contracted malignant mesothelioma through exposure to asbestos.
Williams claimed that such asbestos exposure occurred during the
normal course of his employment as a mechanical engineer at the
NASA Michoud Assembly Facility, beginning prior to 1974.

In November 2008, Williams filed suit in Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans, asserting multiple liability theories, such
as negligence, intentional tort, fraud, strict liability and
absolute liability, against several defendants, including
Taylor-Seidenbach Incorporated, McCarty Corporation, Boeing
Company, and Lockheed Martin. Thereafter, Lockheed Martin removed
the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, alleging that federal subject matter exists
under the federal officer removal statute.

Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the action to the In re: Asbestos Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 875, pending in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. While the matter
was pending in the Asbestos MDL court, Williams' two children,
Tarsia Williams and Breck Williams, were substituted as plaintiffs
following their father's death. The Asbestos MDL court denied two
motions to remand filed by the Williamses, issued various orders
relevant to discovery matters, granted motions for summary judgment
as to several defendants, and ultimately remanded the entire case
(including the remaining claims) back to the E.D. La. for further
proceedings.

Following remand to the E.D. La., the Williamses moved to
voluntarily dismiss their claims against four remaining defendants.
The E.D. La. dismissed the claims against one remaining defendant
with prejudice. However, neither the Williamses' motion nor the
E.D. La.'s order of dismissal relevant to the other three
defendants stated whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. Thereafter, the Williamses filed several notices of
appeal with the Fifth Circuit relevant to various orders concerning
Boeing, TSI, McCarty, and Lockheed Martin.

Subsequently, the Williamses filed a motion in the E.D. La.,
seeking a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
While that motion was pending in the E.D. La. However, Lockheed
Martin and Boeing filed motions to dismiss the pending appeals in
the Fifth Circuit for lack of jurisdiction, which the Court
granted. In granting Lockheed Martin's motion, the Fifth Circuit
explained that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because
one of the orders of dismissal was silent as to whether the
dismissal of certain defendants was with or without prejudice, and
because the Williamses seemingly conceded that a Rule 54 order was
necessary to invoke appellate jurisdiction by filing for such
relief with the district court.

Despite their pending Rule 54 motion, the Williamses then filed a
"Motion to Request Final Judgment Under Rule 58" in the E.D. La.,
arguing that "judgments in favor of all Defendants be certified as
final and appealable under the provisions of Rule 58(b)(1)(C)"
because "all claims against all Defendants have been dismissed and
there are no defendants left before the court." The E.D. La.
granted the Williamses' Rule 58 motion and dismissed the Rule 54
motion as moot. Additionally, prior to the E.D. La.'s order on the
Williamses' Rule 58 motion, the court consolidated Tarsia Williams,
et al. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil Action No. 09-65, with
another civil action filed by the Williamses, which also concerned
their deceased's father alleged exposure to asbestos at the MAF.

The Williamses again filed notices of appeal relevant to various
discovery orders and the grant of summary judgment motions in favor
of Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The appellees now challenge whether
the Fifth Circuit possesses appellate jurisdiction, arguing that
the E.D. La. never rendered a final decision as contemplated by 28
U.S.C. Section 1291.

Appellees TSI, McCarty, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin seek dismissal
of the Williamses' appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Appellees argue that: (1) the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction
because the district court did not render a final decision as
contemplated by 28 U.S.C. Section 1291, and appellate jurisdiction
cannot be manufactured by dismissing remaining defendants without
prejudice; and (2) the consolidation of the Williamses' original
civil action with another civil action renders the matters a single
"judicial unit" for purposes of Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 "the court shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court." Prior to invoking the Fifth Circuit's
jurisdiction under Section 1291, generally "all claims and issues
in a case must be adjudicated in the district court, and a final
judgment or order must be issued." Thus, the "final judgment rule"
creates appellate jurisdiction only after a district court's
"decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment.'" Consequently, a
district court labeling a judgment final does not necessarily make
it so.

Moreover, well-settled is the rule that "appellate jurisdiction
over a non-final order cannot be created by dismissing the
remaining claims without prejudice," and for purposes of Section
1291, a dismissal without prejudice is not considered a "final
decision." Under these settled principles, the Fifth Circuit
determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeals. The
E.D. La.'s order dismissing three remaining defendants was silent
as to whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, and this
court presumes that a voluntary dismissal takes place without
prejudice, unless stated otherwise. Thus, the E.D. La.'s order of
dismissal, which did not indicate whether it was with or without
prejudice, was not a "final decision" under Section 1291 and did
not create appellate jurisdiction.

Moreover, the E.D. La.'s grant of the Williamses' Rule 58 motion
for entry of judgment similarly did not create appellate
jurisdiction, as such order did not alter the district court's
dismissal of multiple defendants without prejudice. While the
Williamses argue that a district court granting a motion that
requests final judgment under Rule 58(b)(1)(C) does in fact create
a final judgment, this assertion is incorrect. Rule 58(b)(1)(C)
only directs the clerk to "promptly prepare, sign, and enter the
judgment when . . . the court denies all relief," but the rule
specifically states that it is subject to Rule 54(b). Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit would have jurisdiction over the involuntary
dismissals if the E.D. La. had certified them under Rule 54(b).

A copy of the Per Curiam dated August 24, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7cqph9r from Leagle.com.

Caleb H. Didriksen, III -- caleb@dswplaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher Kelly Lightfoot , for Defendant-Appellee.

Anne Elizabeth Medo , for Defendant-Appellee.

Edward Lassus, Jr. , for Defendant-Appellee.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carlisle Cos. Still Faces Claims at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carlisle Companies Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the amount of "reasonably
possible" additional asbestos claims, if any, "is not material to"
its financial position and operations.

The Company states, "Over the years, the Company has been named as
a defendant, along with numerous other defendants, in lawsuits in
various state courts in which plaintiffs have alleged injury due to
exposure to asbestos-containing brakes, which Carlisle manufactured
in limited amounts between the late-1940s and the mid-1980s.  In
addition to compensatory awards, these lawsuits may also seek
punitive damages.  Generally, the Company has obtained dismissals
or settlements of its asbestos-related lawsuits with no material
effect on its financial condition, results of operations, or cash
flows.  The Company maintains insurance coverage that applies to
the Company's defense costs and payments of settlements or
judgments in connection with asbestos-related lawsuits.  At this
time, the amount of reasonably possible asbestos claims, if any, is
not material to the Company's financial position, results of
operations, or operating cash flows, although these matters could
result in the Company being subject to monetary damages, costs or
expenses, and charges against earnings in particular periods."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/dxLH70


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had $54.6MM Accrued Liability at Sept. 28
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colfax Corporation had accrued asbestos-related liability of
US$54,580,000 and long-term asbestos liability of US$288,689,000 as
of September 28, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 28, 2018.

The accrued liability represents current accruals for probable and
reasonably estimable asbestos-related liability costs that the
Company believes the subsidiaries will pay, and unpaid legal costs
related to defending themselves against asbestos-related liability
claims and legal action against the Company's insurers, which is
included in Accrued liabilities in the Condensed Consolidated
Balance Sheets.

The Company states, "Management's analyses are based on currently
known facts and assumptions.  Projecting future events, such as new
claims to be filed each year, the average cost of resolving each
claim, coverage issues among layers of insurers, the method in
which losses will be allocated to the various insurance policies,
interpretation of the effect on coverage of various policy terms
and limits and their interrelationships, the continuing solvency of
various insurance companies, the amount of remaining insurance
available, as well as the numerous uncertainties inherent in
asbestos litigation could cause the actual liabilities and
insurance recoveries to be higher or lower than those projected or
recorded which could materially affect the Company's financial
condition, results of operations or cash flow."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/VyYV6T


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colfax Had 16,269 Unresolved Claims at Sept. 28
----------------------------------------------------------------
Colfax Corporation had 16,269 unresolved claims related to asbestos
matters as of September 28, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 28, 2018.

The Company also disclosed that in the nine months ended September
28, 2018, there were 2,982 claims filed and 4,450 claims resolved.

The Company states, "Claims filed include all asbestos claims for
which notification has been received or a file has been opened.

"Claims resolved include all asbestos claims that have been
settled, dismissed or that are in the process of being settled or
dismissed based upon agreements or understandings in place with
counsel for the claimants."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/VyYV6T


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Equity LifeStyle, DAs Still in Talks at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that they continue to assess the
allegations and the underlying facts regarding to the alleged
asbestos-related violations on its properties in California.

The Company states, "In November 2014, we received a civil
investigative subpoena from the office of the District Attorney for
Monterey County, California ("MCDA"), seeking information relating
to, among other items, statewide compliance with asbestos and
hazardous waste regulations dating back to 2005 primarily in
connection with demolition and renovation projects performed by
third-party contractors at our California Properties.  We responded
by providing the information required by the subpoena.

"On October 20, 2015, we attended a meeting with representatives of
the MCDA and certain other District Attorneys' offices at which the
MCDA reviewed the preliminary results of their investigation
including, among other things, (i) alleged violations of asbestos
and related regulations associated with approximately 200
historical demolition and renovation projects in California; (ii)
potential exposure to civil penalties and unpaid fees; and (iii)
next steps with respect to a negotiated resolution of the alleged
violations.

"No legal proceedings have been instituted to date and we are
involved in settlement discussions with the District Attorneys'
offices.  We continue to assess the allegations and the underlying
facts, and at this time we are unable to predict the outcome of the
investigation or reasonably estimate any possible loss."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ozcckE


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll-Rand Had $561MM Liabilities at Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ingersoll-Rand Public Limited Company has total asbestos-related
liabilities of US$560.7 million as of September 30, 2018, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2018.

Ingersoll-Rand states, "The Company's asbestos insurance
receivables related to Ingersoll-Rand Company and Trane were
US$130.5 million and US$119.0 million at September 30, 2018,
respectively, and US$138.5 million and US$127.9 million at December
31, 2017, respectively.

"The receivable attributable to Trane for probable insurance
recoveries as of September 30, 2018 is entirely supported by
settlement agreements between Trane and the respective insurance
carriers.  Most of these settlement agreements constitute
"coverage-in-place" arrangements, in which the insurer signatories
agree to reimburse Trane for specified portions of its costs for
asbestos bodily injury claims and Trane agrees to certain
claims-handling protocols and grants to the insurer signatories
certain releases and indemnifications.

"In 2012 and 2013, Ingersoll-Rand Company filed actions in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, seeking a
declaratory judgment and other relief regarding the Company's
rights to defense and indemnity for asbestos claims.  The
defendants were several dozen solvent insurance companies,
including companies that had been paying a portion of
Ingersoll-Rand Company's asbestos claim defense and indemnity
costs.  The responding defendants generally challenged the
Company's right to recovery, and raised various coverage defenses.
Since filing the actions, Ingersoll-Rand Company has settled with
approximately two-thirds of the insurer defendants, and has
dismissed one of the actions in its entirety.

"The Company continually monitors the status of pending litigation
that could impact the allocation of asbestos claims against the
Company's various insurance policies.  The Company has concluded
that its Ingersoll-Rand Company insurance receivable is probable of
recovery because of the following factors:

   * Ingersoll-Rand Company has reached favorable settlements
regarding asbestos coverage claims for the majority of its recorded
asbestos-related insurance receivable;

   * a review of other companies in circumstances comparable to
Ingersoll-Rand Company, including Trane, and the success of other
companies in recovering under their insurance policies, including
Trane's favorable settlements;

   * the Company's confidence in its right to recovery under the
terms of its policies and pursuant to applicable law; and

   * the Company's history of receiving payments under the
Ingersoll-Rand Company insurance program, including under policies
that had been the subject of prior litigation.

"The amounts recorded by the Company for asbestos-related
liabilities and insurance-related assets are based on currently
available information.  The Company's actual liabilities or
insurance recoveries could be significantly higher or lower than
those recorded if assumptions used in the calculations vary
significantly from actual results.  Key variables in these
assumptions include the number and type of new claims to be filed
each year, the average cost of resolution of each such new claim,
the resolution of coverage issues with insurance carriers, and the
solvency risk with respect to the Company's insurance carriers.
Furthermore, predictions with respect to these variables are
subject to greater uncertainty as the projection period lengthens.
Other factors that may affect the Company's liability include
uncertainties surrounding the litigation process from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction and from case to case, reforms that may be made by
state and federal courts, and the passage of state or federal tort
reform legislation.

"The aggregate amount of the stated limits in insurance policies
available to the Company for asbestos-related claims acquired over
many years and from many different carriers, is substantial.
However, limitations in that coverage, primarily due to the
considerations, are expected to result in the projected total
liability to claimants substantially exceeding the probable
insurance recovery."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/s55JoI


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lopez P.I. Claims vs. McDermott Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Eldon E. Fallon of United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana has granted Defendant McDermott,
Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims
against McDermott in the case styled Federico Lopez et al., v.
McDermott, Inc. et al., Section "L" (5). Civil Action No. 17-8977.
(E.D. La.), with prejudice.

In June 2017, Plaintiff Federico Lopez brought strict
liability/negligence claims against the Defendants as
miners/manufacturers/sellers/suppliers distributors, premises
owners, contractors, or employers alleging that he was exposed to
asbestos by Defendants and contracted malignant mesothelioma. He
alleged that he was exposed to asbestos from 1971-1973 while
working as a gasket cutter for Defendant Lamons Gasket Company and
then again from 1973-1986 while working for Kellogg Brown & Root as
a welder/pipefitter. Following his death on November 9, 2017, his
surviving spouse, Maricela Lopez, and surviving child, Federico
Lopez III, assert a wrongful death claim on behalf of Plaintiff
Federico Lopez and also ask for damages for medical expenses, lost
earnings, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and loss of
quality of life.

In September 2017, Defendants removed the suit arguing that
Plaintiffs claims are based on Defendants' activities on the Outer
Continental Shelf. In October 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion to
remand which was denied by the Court on January 24, 2018.

Defendant McDermott, Inc. has filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that Plaintiffs have no facts supporting that Mr. Lopez was
exposed to asbestos by their actions or on their premises. Mr.
Lopez testified that he was only around McDermott employees on one
project and that those employees' activities did not generate
asbestos dust. Furthermore, Defendant asserts there are no records
indicating that Mr. Lopez was ever an employee of McDermott or at a
McDermott facility. Accordingly, Defendant McDermott argues that
Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim against it for exposure to
asbestos.

The Court explains that Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." If the moving party meets that burden, then
the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Because Defendant's motion is unopposed, the Court finds that there
are no genuine issues of material fact. By Plaintiff's own
testimony he was not exposed to asbestos at a McDermott facility or
because of the actions of McDermott employees. Accordingly, the
Court sustains that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant McDermott
should be dismissed.

Federico Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Lindsey A. Cheek & Ryan
M. Sweet , Flint Law Firm, LLC, pro hac vice.

Maricela Lopez & Federico Lopez, III, Plaintiffs, represented by
Ryan M. Sweet , Flint Law Firm, LLC, pro hac vice.

Shell Oil Company & Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, formerly
known as Tenneco Inc., Defendants, represented by Gregory M. Anding
-- greg.anding@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller, Alexandra E. Rossi --
alexandra.rossi@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller, Allison N. Benoit --
allison.benoit@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller, Anthony M. Williams
-- anthony.williams@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP, Bradley
Joseph Schlotterer -- brad.schlotterer@keanmiller.com -- Kean
Miller LLP, Gayla M. Moncla -- gayla.moncla@keanmiller.com -- Kean
Miller, Jay Morton Jalenak, Jr. -- jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com --
Kean Miller, Robert E. Dille -- RDille@maronmarvel.com -- Maron
Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy LLC, Sarah W. Anderson --
sarah.anderson@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller & Sean T. McLaughlin
-- sean.mclaughlin@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller LLP.

Boardwalk Petrochemical Pipeline LLC, formerly known as Chevron
Petrochemical Pipeline LLC, formerly known as Texaco Petrochemical
Pipeline LLC, Defendant, represented by Terrence Kent Knister --
tknister@gamb.law -- Gordon, Arata, Montgomery & Barnett, Ewell E.
Eagan, Jr. -- eeagan@gamb.law -- Gordon, Arata, Montgomery &
Barnett & James D. Rhorer -- jrhorer@gamb.law -- Gordon, Arata,
Montgomery & Barnett.

ExxonMobil Corporation, Incorrectly named Exxon Mobil Oil
Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Mark Bienvenu, Jr. --
David.Bienvenu@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator &
Holinga, APLLC, Erin Percy Tadie -- erin.tadie@bblawla.com --
Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC, Anthony John
Gambino , Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC, James
McClendon Williams -- JMW@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman,
Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC, John Allain Viator
-- John.Viator@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator &
Holinga, APLLC, Lexi T. Holinga -- lexi.holinga@bblawla.com --
Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC & Melissa Jade
Shaffer -- jade.shaffer@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco,
Viator & Holinga, APLLC.

Foster Wheeler, LLC, as the survivor to the merger with Foster
Wheeler Corporation & General Electric Company, Defendants,
represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III -- jhainkel@frilot.com --
Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin -- abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., James H. Brown, Jr. -- jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.,
Kelly L. Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan
-- keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

Goulds Pumps LLC & ITT LLC, formerly known as ITT Industries, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Lauren Ann McCulloch --
lauren.mcculloch@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius &
Mitchell F. Tedesco -- mitchell.tedesco@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius.

John Crane Inc, Defendant, represented by Kenan Slade Rand, Jr. --
krand@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP, Elizabeth
Attie Babin Carville -- acarville@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli,
Parkerson, LLP, Katelyn W. Harrell -- kharrell@pmpllp.com --
Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP, Lacey Sarver Goss , Lacey Sarver
Goss, Attorney at Law, Lauren B. Dietzen -- ldietzen@pmpllp.com --
Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP & Scott H. Mason --
smason@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP.

Marathon Oil Company, Defendant, represented by Tim Gray --
tim.gray@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, Amy
Louise Maccherone -- amy.maccherone@formanwatkins.com -- Forman,
Watkins & Krutz LLP, Etienne Francis Rene , Forman, Watkins & Krutz
LLP, Melissa Desormeaux Fuller , Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC, Michael
H. Abraham -- michael.abraham@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins
& Krutz LLP & Michelle Miller Roy -- michelle.roy@formanwatkins.com
-- Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP.

Otto Candies, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Rufus C. Harris,
III , Harris & Rufty, LLC, Alfred Jackson Rufty, III , Harris &
Rufty, LLC & Cindy Galpin Martin , Harris & Rufty, LLC.

Reilly-Benton Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Thomas L.
Cougill , Willingham Fultz & Cougill, LLP, Jamie M. Zanovec ,
Willingham Fultz & Cougill, LLP, Jennifer H. McLaughlin ,
Willingham Fultz & Cougill, LLP & Jennifer D. Zajac , Willingham
Fultz & Cougill, LLP.

Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher
Kelly Lightfoot -- klightfoot@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall,
Larmann & Papale, LLP, Edward J. Lassus, Jr. , Hailey, McNamara,
Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP & Richard J. Garvey, Jr. --
jgarvey@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale,
LLP.

Crosby Valves, LLC, A Wholly owned subsidiary of Emerson Electric
Co., Defendant, represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III --
jhainkel@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin --
abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell , Frilot
L.L.C., James H. Brown, Jr. -- jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.,
Kelly L. Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan
-- keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
lmccoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Defendant, represented by Tim Gray --
tim.gray@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, Amy
Louise Maccherone -- amy.maccherone@formanwatkins.com -- Forman,
Watkins & Krutz LLP, Melissa Desormeaux Fuller , Kuchler Polk
Weiner, LLC, Michael H. Abraham --
michael.abraham@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP &
Michelle Miller Roy -- michelle.roy@formanwatkins.com -- Forman,
Watkins & Krutz LLP.

John Crane Inc & Lamons Gasket Company, Third Party Plaintiffs,
represented by Kenan Slade Rand, Jr. -- krand@pmpllp.com --
Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP, Elizabeth Attie Babin Carville --
acarville@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson, LLP, Katelyn
W. Harrell -- kharrell@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson,
LLP, Lacey Sarver Goss , Lacey Sarver Goss, Attorney at Law, Lauren
B. Dietzen -- ldietzen@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli, Parkerson,
LLP & Scott H. Mason -- smason@pmpllp.com -- Plauche, Maselli,
Parkerson, LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Michel P.I. Suit Remains in District Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sarah S. Vance of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District Louisiana denies Plaintiffs' motion to remand the
case styled Victor Michel, et al., v. Ford Motor Company, et al.,
Section "R" (4), Civil Action No. 18-4738, (E.D. La.).

The case arises out of Victor Michel's alleged asbestos exposure as
a result of his work as a mechanic and generator service
technician. He filed this action in state court on July 28, 2017
after being diagnosed with mesothelioma. Michel named numerous
defendants in his complaint, including Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. and
Cummins, Inc. The only remaining defendant that is a citizen of
Louisiana is Taylor-Seidenbach.

In their state court petition, Plaintiffs make generic allegations
that Taylor-Seidenbach and the other named defendants manufactured,
supplied, or sold asbestos containing materials and were generally
negligent in failing to provide a safe workplace. Plaintiffs also
allege that Michel was exposed to asbestos from unspecified
Taylor-Seidenbach products at unspecified locations. Plaintiffs do
not assert specific fault allegations against Taylor-Seidenbach
individually. The state court pleadings do not contain discrete
facts that allow the court to determine the propriety of joining
Taylor-Seidenbach in particular.

On May 8, 2018, Cummins removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District Louisiana after receiving a
deposition transcript purportedly demonstrating that
Taylor-Seidenbach was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity
jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, Michel died, and the Court
substituted his survivors as plaintiffs. Two of the survivors are
also Louisiana citizens. Plaintiffs have now filed a motion to
remand asserting a lack of diversity jurisdiction.

Cummins opposes the motion relying on several pieces of evidence to
meet its burden. First, Cummins argues that plaintiffs have shaped
this case to focus on gasket and friction products. None of the
plaintiffs' experts reference products of the type produced by
Taylor-Seidenbach in their testimony. Plaintiffs' witness list
similarly does not contain witnesses who could establish a
reasonable possibility of proving liability against
Taylor-Seidenbach. Cummins also argues that the discovery deadline
has passed, as has the deadline to file witness lists. Thus, it
argues, plaintiffs cannot put forward new evidence that would
establish a reasonable possibility of recovery against
Taylor-Seidenbach.

In response, plaintiffs cite an affidavit from another case, given
by a former employee of Taylor-Seidenbach, Dwight Corcoran -- this
affidavit was not included in the discovery materials exchanged by
the parties in state court. It lists jobsites at which Corcoran
worked with asbestos containing products, some of which
Taylor-Seidenbach supplied. Michel testified that he visited sites
on Corcoran's list in the course of his employment for Menge Pump &
Machinery -- only occasionally to service standby generators
located in their own sheds away from other machinery. Plaintiffs
conclude that Corcoran's affidavit supplies a basis to find that he
suffered mesothelioma from asbestos exposure to Taylor-Seidenbach
products.

The Court determines Corcoran's affidavit inadmissible at trial
because the discovery deadline has passed. Even if it were
admissible, it is insufficient to establish a reasonable chance of
prevailing under state law, which requires a plaintiff to show that
the defendant's products were a substantial factor in causing his
injury. The Court finds instead Corcoran's affidavit (a) does not
provide evidence that Michel worked with or was exposed to
Taylor-Seidenbach's asbestos products; (b) does not establish that
Taylor-Seidenbach supplied asbestos-containing pipe insulation to
the sites on the list; and (c) merely states that Corcoran worked
with corrugated asbestos panels, trim, and grout, and separately
that he "worked closely with and next to the pipe insulators."

The Court finds no evidence on record that Michel worked as a pipe
insulator at these facilities, or that Taylor-Seidenbach provided
asbestos pipe insulation there. Indeed, Corcoran does not even
state that the pipe insulation at these facilities contained
asbestos. At most, the Corcoran affidavit shows that
Taylor-Seidenbach had asbestos products in the areas where Corcoran
worked at these facilities, and Michel only occasionally worked
somewhere on the premises at those same facilities. Thus, Cummins
has proven that Plaintiffs have no reasonable basis for recovery
and that it has met its burden and shown that Taylor-Seidenbach is
improperly joined as a defendant in this case.

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that, even if Taylor-Seidenbach is
improperly joined, the case must be remanded because removal was
untimely. Cummins had thirty days to remove from the date of
receipt of "other paper" that allowed it to first ascertain that
the case was removable. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should
start the 30-day clock at the end of Michel's deposition on October
4, 2017, because Cummins had an opportunity to cross-examine Michel
that day and could have determined the strength of the case against
Taylor-Seidenbach through their examination.

The Court explains that Michel's deposition is not determinative
because plaintiffs still had the opportunity at that time to obtain
evidence of Taylor-Seidenbach's liability through discovery. The
Court concludes that the removal was within the 30-day "other
paper" deadline because Plaintiffs' last opportunity to obtain
additional evidence was on April 5, 2018 when plaintiffs' final
witness, Dr. Brent Staggs, was deposed. The Court explains that
neither Staggs deposition nor any previous discovery provided
evidence raising a reasonable possibility of recovery against
Taylor-Seidenbach. Cummins received the transcript of the Staggs
deposition -- which constitutes "other paper" under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1446(b) -- on April 9, 2018. Therefore, Cummins removed
within the statute's 30-day deadline on May 8, 2018.

Keith Michel, On behalf of Victor Michel, Norbert Michel, On Behalf
of Victor Michel & Vickie Michel, On Behalf of Victor Michel,
Plaintiffs, represented by Alex S. Dunn, Jr. --
adunn@gorijulianlaw.com -- Gori, Julian & Associates, P.C. & Ashley
Lynette Page -- apage@gorijulianlaw.com -- Gori, Julian &
Associates, P.C.

Aurora Pump Company & Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC, As
successor-by-merger to Borg-Warner Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Glenn L.M. Swetman , MG+M The Law Firm, Bradley Adam
Hays -- ahays@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law Firm, Brandie Mendoza
Thibodeaux -- bthibodeaux@mgmlaw.com -- MG + M The Law Firm,
Christopher O. Massenburg -- cmassenburg@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law
Firm, Danielle Mikel Sczesny , MG+M The Law Firm, David R. Frohn --
dfrohn@mgmlaw.com -- MGM Law Firm,Helen Meredith Buckley --
hbuckley@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law Firm, Jeanette Seraile-Riggins
-- jriggins@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law Firm, Meghan B. Senter --
msenter@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law Firm, Natasha Amber Corb --
ncorb@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M The Law Firm & Quinn Kelcie Brown , MG+M
The Law Firm.

Certain-Teed Corporation, Dana Companies LLC, formerly known as
DCO, LLC & Pneumo Abex Corporation, Defendants, represented by
Barbara Bourgeois Ormsby -- bormsby@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch
Kerrigan LLP, William Claudy Harrison, Jr. --
wharrison@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Arthur
Wendel Stout, III -- wstout@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan
LLP, Jason P. Franco -- jfranco@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch
Kerrigan LLP & Jennifer E. Adams -- jadams@deutschkerrigan.com --
Deutsch Kerrigan LLP.

Crane Company, Defendant, represented by Lawrence G. Pugh, III --
lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Donna M. Young --
dyoung@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Jacqueline Romero --
jromero@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC & Shelley L. Thompson --
sthompson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC.

Cummins Inc, Defendant, represented by Joseph Henry Hart, IV --
jhart@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Daniel E. Oser --
doser@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC & Thomas A. Porteous --
tporteous@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC.

Dap, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kay Barnes Baxter , Cosmich
Simmons & Brown, PLLC, Ashley A. Edwards , Cosmich Simmons & Brown,
PLLC, Forrest Ren Wilkes -- ren@cs-law.com -- Cosmich Simmons &
Brown, PLLC, Georgia Noble Ainsworth -- georgia@cs-law.com --
Cosmich Simmons & Brown, PLLC, Jason K. Elam --
jason.elam@cs-law.com -- Cosmich Simmons & Brown, PLLC, Margaret
Adams Casey , Cosmich Simmons & Brown, PLLC & Martin James Dempsey,
Jr. -- jimmy@cs-law.com -- Cosmich Simmons & Brown, PLLC.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Deborah DeRoche
Kuchler -- dkuchler@kuchlerpolk.com -- Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC,
Amber B. Barlow -- abarlow@kuchlerpolk.com -- Kuchler Polk Weiner,
LLC, Janika D. Polk -- jpolk@kuchlerpolk.com -- Kuchler Polk
Weiner, LLC, Lee Blanton Ziffer -- lziffer@kuchlerpolk.com --
Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC & Monique M. Weiner --
mweiner@kuchlerpolk.com -- Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC.

General Electric Company & Genuine Parts Company, Defendants,
represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III -- jhainkel@frilot.com --
Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin -- abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell , Frilot L.L.C., James H. Brown, Jr. --
jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelly L. Long --
klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan --
keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

Honeywell International, Inc., in its capacity as successor to
Bendix and successor in Interest to AlliedSignal, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Eric Shuman -- eshuman@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey
Stafford, PLLC & Sarah Elizabeth McMillan --
semcmillan@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Jay
Morton Jalenak, Jr. -- jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller &
Patrick Dale Roquemore -- patrick.roquemore@keanmiller.com -- Kean
Miller.

Union Carbide Coporation, Defendant, represented by McGready Lewis
Richeson -- mricheson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker
& Carey, Ernest G. Foundas -- efoundas@pugh-law.com -- Pugh,
Accardo, LLC, Francis Xavier deBlanc, III -- fdeblanc@pugh-law.com
-- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, Kathleen Erin Jordan --
kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey,
Milele N. St. Julien -- mstjulien@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
Haas, Radecker & Carey & Perrey S. Lee , Pugh, Accardo, LLC.

Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher
Kelly Lightfoot -- klightfoot@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall,
Larmann & Papale, LLP, Edward J. Lassus, Jr. , Hailey, McNamara,
Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP & Richard J. Garvey, Jr. --
jgarvey@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale,
LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., in its capacity as Honeywell, Inc,
Defendant, represented by Glenn B. Adams -- gadams@phjlaw.com --
Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, Matthew Edward Simmons --
msimmons@phjlaw.com -- Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson & Nancy Lee
Cromartie -- ncromartie@phjlaw.com -- Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson.

Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael D.
Lonegrass -- mlonegrass@gallowaylawfirm.com -- Galloway, Johnson,
Tompkins, Burr & Smith & Rodger Gregory Green, Jr. --
rgreenjr@gallowaylawfirm.com -- Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr &
Smith.

Bridgestone Americas, Inc., Incorrectly named in the Plaintiff's
petition as Bridgestone-Firestone America's Holding, Inc,
Defendant, represented by Benjamin J. Guilbeau, Jr. --
bjguilbeau@ssvcs.com -- Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements &
Shaddock, LLP & John J. Simpson -- jjsimpson@ssvcs.com --
Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements & Shaddock, LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: MSA Safety Unit Has 1,517 Exposure Lawsuits
------------------------------------------------------------
MSA Safety Incorporated's subsidiary remains a defendant in 1,517
cumulative trauma lawsuits at September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarter ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Our subsidiary, Mine Safety Appliances
Company, LLC ("MSA LLC") was named as a defendant in 1,517
cumulative trauma lawsuits comprised of 2,392 claims at September
30, 2018.  Cumulative trauma product liability claims involve
exposures to harmful substances (e.g., silica, asbestos and coal
dust) that occurred years ago and may have developed over long
periods of time into diseases such as silicosis, asbestosis,
mesothelioma or coal worker's pneumoconiosis.  The products at
issue were manufactured many years ago and are not currently
offered by MSA LLC.  A reserve has been established with respect to
cumulative trauma product liability claims currently asserted and
estimated incurred but not reported ("IBNR") cumulative trauma
product liability claims.  Because our cumulative trauma product
liability risk is subject to inherent uncertainties, including
unfavorable trial rulings or developments, an increase in newly
filed claims, or more aggressive settlement demands, and since MSA
LLC is largely self-insured, there can be no certainty that MSA LLC
may not ultimately incur losses in excess of presently recorded
liabilities.  These losses could have a material adverse effect on
our business, operating results, financial condition and liquidity.
We will adjust the reserve relating to cumulative trauma product
liability claims from time to time based on whether the actual
numbers, types and settlement values of claims asserted differ from
current projections and estimates or there are significant changes
in the facts underlying the assumptions used in establishing the
reserve.  These adjustments may be material and could materially
impact future periods in which the reserve is adjusted."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/30thoG


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Norfolk Southern Still Defends Asbestosis Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Norfolk Southern Corporation still defends itself against
occupational claims, including asbestosis, by former or retired
employees, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Occupational claims (including asbestosis and
other respiratory diseases, as well as conditions allegedly related
to repetitive motion) are often not caused by a specific accident
or event but rather allegedly result from a claimed exposure over
time.  Many such claims are being asserted by former or retired
employees, some of whom have not been employed in the rail industry
for decades.  The independent actuarial firm provides an estimate
of the occupational claims liability based upon our history of
claim filings, severity, payments, and other pertinent facts.  The
liability is dependent upon judgments we make as to the specific
case reserves as well as judgments of the actuarial firm in the
quarterly studies.  The actuarial firm's estimate of ultimate loss
includes a provision for those claims that have been incurred but
not reported.  This provision is derived by analyzing industry data
and projecting our experience.  We adjust the liability quarterly
based upon our assessment and the results of the study.  However,
it is possible that the recorded liability may not be adequate to
cover the future payment of claims.  Adjustments to the recorded
liability are reflected in operating expenses in the periods in
which such adjustments become known."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/jMYMGh



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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