CAR_Public/181123.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, November 23, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 235

                            Headlines

60-10 BAKERY INC: Capir's Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ACT INC: Court Denies Class Certification in TCPA Suit
ADVANCED MICRO: Amended Complaint in Hauck Suit Due Nov. 28
AETNA INC: Plaintiffs to Drop UCR Litigation
AIR BENGAL: Sacerdotal Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA

ALTICE USA: Shenwick Trust Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
AMERICAN HONDA: 1st Cir. Reverses Findings on Notice Compliance
APOLLO GLOBAL: Agreement in Principle Reached in Arizona Suit
APOLLO GLOBAL: Continues to Defend McEvoy Class Action
APPLE BUS: Hibdon Sues Over Unpaid Regular, Overtime Wages

ASCENT CAPITAL: Unit Continues to Seek Recovery From Insurers
AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES: Class of Tenants/Occupants in Katz Certified
BANNER BANK: Partly Compelled to Produce E-mail Accounts in Bolding
BIZQUALIFY LLC: Hu et al. Seek to Certify Class & Collective Action
BRISTOL MYERS: Klein Moynihan Discusses Jurisdiction Ruling

CAESARS ENTERPRISE: Workers Seek OT Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
CAPITALA FINANCE: Bid to Dismiss Amended Paskowitz Suit Underway
CERTIFIED CREDIT: Golubchik Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
CHARTER COMM: Jimenez Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
CHASER NEW YORK: Faces Garey ADA Suit in New York

CHEF DRIVEN: Violates ADA, Garey Suit Asserts
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Claims in Bellwether Data Breach Suit Narrowed
CHONG QING: Basurto Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premiums
CINEMARK USA: Faces Silken Brown Class Action
CIRCLE K: Court OKs Leave to File FAC in ADA Suit

COAST PROFESSIONAL: Kaykov Files FDCPA Class Action
COMPUTER CREDIT: Golubchik Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
COVERALL NORTH: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in Richardson Suit
CTAC HOLDINGS: Garey Suit Asserts ADA Violation
CUMMINS PACIFIC: Court Denies Class Certification in Towle Suit

DEFY MEDIA: Guinane Sues Over WARN Act Violation
DOMINO'S PIZZA: Blanton Sues Over Employee No-poach Policy
EMILIO PUCCI: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Court Certifies Class in Volkman FDCPA Suit
ETRADE FINANCIAL: 2d Cir. Affirms Schwab Securities Suit Dismissal

EVA'S 8TH STREET: Delivery Staff Hit Tip Credit Deductions From Pay
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Suit vs. Reliance Trust Company Still Ongoing
FITBIT INC: Pursues Private Arbitration in PurePulse(R) Suit
FITBIT INC: Securities Suits in California Concluded
FLEX PHARMA: Amended Complaint in Rumaldo Suit Due Dec. 10

FRONTLINE ASSET: Dow Appeals E.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
GDS HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Firm to Lead Securities Class Suit
GOOGLE LLC: Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Cy Pres Dispute
H&R BLOCK: Griffith Sues Over Sherman Act Violation
HAECO AMERICAS: $150K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Linnis Suit

HCP INC: Bid to Dismiss Boynton Beach Pension Fund Suit Pending
HEALTHPORT TECH: Dismissal of Ciox from Kuchenmeister Suit Affirmed
HERBALIFE NUTRITION: Rodgers Suit Transferred to California
HERTZ CORP: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Kurth Suit
IRSA INVESTMENTS: Plaintiffs Appeal Case Dismissal

JONATHAN NEIL: Brown Class Settlement Has Preliminary Approval
KEYVIEW LABS: Pannell Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: 9th Cir. Remands Proceedings on Attorney's Fees
LEXINGTON INSURANCE: Ezell Appeals Order in RICO Suit to 1st Cir.
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Deal in Formaldehyde & Abrasion Litig. Okayed

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Steele Class Suit in Canada Ongoing
MARATHON PETROLEUM: Andeavor Merger-Related Suits Dismissed
MASTERCARD INC: Damage Class Seeks Settlement Approval
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Chicago Bridge & Iron Securities Suit Ongoing
MEDICAL SOLUTIONS: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Dittman FLSA Suit

MESA LABORATORIES: Records $3,300 as Potential Loss in TCPA Suits
MOTEL 6: Settles Hispanic Guests' Class Action for $7.6MM
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Garcia Settlement Has Final Court Approval
NEIMAN MARCUS: Court Rules on Individual Claims Settlement Notice
NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS: Mulquin Sues over Misleading Financial Report

NEXTGEN HEALTHCARE: $19 Million Accord Wins Final Approval
NOVAN INC: Bid to Dismiss SB204-Related Suit Still Pending
ONEMAIN HOLDINGS: Galestan Class Suit in New York Still Ongoing
OPUS BANK: Schwartz Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
PENTAGON FEDERAL: Court Throws Out Disabled Veteran's TILA Claim

PERRY FUNERAL: Judge Allows Class Action to Proceed
PRA GROUP: Placeholder Bid to Certify Class Sought in Woods Suit
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Court Narrows Claims in Takano Suit
PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: 3rd Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Class Action
PROSPECT MEDICAL: Class in Gauzza Suit Conditionally Certified

RICHMOND ORGANIZATION: Court Won't Review Award of $352 Attys' Fees
RIOT GAMES: Employees File Gender Discrimination Class Action
RISTORANTE LA BUCA: Court Conditionally Certifies Wright FLSA Class
RYANAIR HOLDINGS: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in New York
SCANA CORP: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Securities Suit Pending

SCANA CORP: Continues to Defend Glibowski Class Suit
SCANA CORP: Corporation Securities Suit Underway
SCANA CORP: Metzler Lawsuit Held in Abeyance
SCANA CORP: Turner Class Action Settled for Under $100,000
SCANA CORP: West Palm Beach Firefighters' Suit Consolidated

SEATTLE CITY: Law Firm Mulls Class Action Over Electric Bills
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Passengers Set to Get Settlement Payout
TBC CORPORATION: Hamilton Appeals C.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Circuit
TREVENA INC: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in Pennsylvania
TWO OCEAN: Teachers File Class Action Over Compulsory Union Fees

UNITED STATES: EFF Urges Court to Keep Spying Class Action Alive
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Ct. Grants $570K Attorney's Fees in Wage Suit
UPMC JAMESON: Faces Class Action Over Ultrasound Equipment
USANA HEALTH: Rumbaugh Securities Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
VERIZON COMMS: Getz's TCPA Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration

VOLKSAGEN GROUP: CalSTRS Securities Fraud Class Action Pending
WALGREENS BOOTS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Hering Suit Granted
WILKES-BARRE, PA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Slavish Suit
WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Summary Judgment Bid in Rushing Suit Denied
XANITOS INC: Faces Class Action in Illinois Over BIPA Violation


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Amtico Loses Summary Judgment Bid
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Claims Tied to Laundered Clothes Beaten
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Bathurst Tennis Clubhouse
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Builder Dies From Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Conn. High Ct. to Tackle Asbestos Coverage Suit

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Had 29,323 Pending Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: DOJ Increases Scrutiny of Asbestos Trusts
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fla. Supreme Ct. Reinstates Ruling in DeLisle
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Mechanic Sues Borg-Warner Over Lung Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Had $1.7BB Bendix Claims at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Had $2.6-Bil. Liabilities at Sept.30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Records $908MM NARCO Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll-Rand Still Defends Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Inmate's Asbestos Suit Proceed vs NJ Officials
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kramer Levin Comments on WR Grace Plan Ruling

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ky. Teacher Wins Workers' Compensation Benefits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lennox Int'l Paid $1.4MM for Lawsuits in 3Q 2018
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maersk Line Bid for Summary Judgment Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Part-Time DJ Dies of Asbestos-related Disease
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pentair Plc Had 600 Pending Claims at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Faces Wrongful-Death Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: PPG Industries Had 440 Open Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Cumbria PC Diagnosed with Asbestos Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Reynolds' Appeal in Steiner Suit Quashed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scottish MoD Pressed Over Asbestos in Choppers

ASBESTOS UPDATE: SCOTUS Hears Arguments in Bare-Metal Defense Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Travelers Had $1.3-Bil. Net Reserves at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Victims Unable to Trace Employers Can Recover
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wash. Cos. Fined $140K for Asbestos Violations


                            *********

60-10 BAKERY INC: Capir's Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Celso Tecon Capir, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 60-10 Bakery, Inc. and Sumnder
Singh, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-05746, (E.D. N.Y., October 15,
2018), seeks to recover damages for egregious violations of New
York State labor laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act;
compensatory and liquidated damages; interest; attorneys' fees,
costs and all other legal and equitable remedies.

Defendants operate as "Tost Cafe" where Plaintiffs worked as
delivery person, cleaner and food preparer. Capir claims to have
worked in excess of 60 hours per day without overtime premium.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
      HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
      69-12 Austin Street
      Forest Hills, NY 11375
      Telephone: (718) 263-9591
      Fax: (718) 263-9598
      Email: HFDalton6912@Gmail.com


ACT INC: Court Denies Class Certification in TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, Plaintiff, v. ACT, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 12-40088-TSH (D. Mass.), Judge Timothy
S. Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify two
classes.

The Plaintiff brought the putative class action against the
Defendant alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act ("TCPA") for faxing unsolicited advertisements without an
opt-out provision.

The Defendant is a company that provides student assessment
services, including the ACT test, a college admissions exam.  The
Plaintiff received fax advertisements from the Defendant on March
5, 2012, April 22, 2012, and May 13, 2012.  It contends that it
never provided the Defendant express invitation or permission to
send these fax advertisements and that none contained an opt-out
provision.  Further, the Defendant admits that it sent more than
10,000 faxes that are the same or substantially similar to the
advertisements sent to the Plaintiff.  The Defendant argues that it
has active, ongoing relationships with high schools around the
country.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's conduct violated the
TCPA.  It argues that under the FCC's Solicited Fax Rule, both
solicited and unsolicited faxes are subject to the "opt-out" notice
requirement of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(C)(iii).  Therefore, the
Plaintiff argues that whether or not recipients gave consent is
irrelevant to the Court's inquiry.  It argues that all faxes sent
by the Defendant without an opt-out notice violate the statute.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify these two classes:

      i. Class A comprises all persons in the United States from
July 30, 2008 through July 30, 2012 to whom the Defendant sent or
caused to be sent an unsolicited facsimile advertisement,
advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property,
goods, or services, which contained no opt-out notice.  

      ii. Class B includes all persons in the United States from
July 30, 2008 through July 30, 2012 to whom the Defendant sent or
caused to be sent a facsimile advertisement, advertising the
commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or
services, which contained no opt-out notice.

Judge Hillman finds that determining consent would not be as simple
as looking for a checked box, it would be a highly individualized
inquiry into the Defendant's relationship with each school.
Therefore, he finds that the Defendant has proffered sufficient
evidence to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the need for
individual inquiries.  This showing precludes a finding of
predominance of common questions and bars class certification for
Class B.

The Judge also finds that Class A comprises those who received an
unsolicited fax without an opt-out provision.  Thus, the class fits
squarely within the definition of a "fail-safe class" because class
membership is defined by whether or not members have a valid claim.
Further, while the Court must exercise caution when dismissing a
"fail-safe" class, the problem in the case cannot be remedied by
refining the class definition.  If class membership were expanded
to not only include those that received unsolicited facsimiles, the
refined class would encounter the same predominance defeating
individual inquiries of Class B.  Thus, this class is a "fail-safe
class" and is incapable of refinement such that it is appropriate
for classwide adjudication.

For these reasons, Judge Hillman denied the Plaintiff's motion to
certify class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order and Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/HOJVcp from Leagle.com.

Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by  Aytan Y. Bellin,
Esq. -- aytan.bellin@bellinlaw.com -- BELLIN & ASSOCIATES LLC --
Matthew P. McCue, Esq. -- mmccue@massattorneys.net -- LAW OFFICE OF
MATTHEW P. MCCUE.

ACT, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert A. Burgoyne --
RBurgoyne@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, pro hac vice &
Robert L. Leonard -- Rleonard@dwpm.com -- Doherty, Wallace,
Pillsbury & Murphy.


ADVANCED MICRO: Amended Complaint in Hauck Suit Due Nov. 28
-----------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 29, 2018, that the
plaintiffs in Diana Hauck et al. v. AMD, Inc., have until November
28, 2018, to file another amended complaint.

Since January 19, 2018, three putative class action complaints have
been filed against the Company in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California: (1) Diana Hauck et al. v.
AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-0047, filed on January 19, 2018; (2)
Brian Speck et al. v. AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-0744, filed on
February 4, 2018; and (3) Nathan Barnes and Jonathan Caskey-Medina,
et al. v. AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-00883, filed on February 9,
2018.

On April 9, 2018, the court consolidated these cases and ordered
that Diana Hauck et al. v. AMD, Inc. serve as the lead case.

On June 13, 2018, six plaintiffs (from California, Louisiana,
Florida, and Massachusetts) filed a consolidated amended complaint
alleging that the Company failed to disclose its processors'
alleged vulnerability to Spectre. Plaintiffs further allege that
the Company's processors cannot perform at its advertised
processing speeds without exposing consumers to Spectre, and that
any "patches" to remedy this security vulnerability will result in
degradation of processor performance.

The plaintiffs seek damages under several causes of action on
behalf of a nationwide class and four state subclasses (California,
Florida, Massachusetts, Louisiana) of consumers who purchased AMD
processors and/or devices containing AMD processors. The plaintiffs
also seek attorneys' fees, equitable relief, and restitution.

Pursuant to the court's order directing parties to litigate only
eight of the causes of action in the consolidated amended complaint
initially, the Company filed a motion to dismiss on July 13, 2018.
On October 29, 2018, after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed one
of their claims, the court granted the Company's motion and
dismissed six causes of action with leave to amend. The plaintiffs
have until November 28, 2018 to file another amended complaint.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. It operates in two segments, Computing and Graphics; and
Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


AETNA INC: Plaintiffs to Drop UCR Litigation
--------------------------------------------
Aetna Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the lead plaintiffs in the
case entitled, In re: Aetna UCR Litigation, informed the New Jersey
District Court that they would voluntarily dismiss their claims
with prejudice.

A class action case was commenced on July 30, 2007. The federal
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (the "MDL Panel") has
consolidated these class action cases in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey (the "New Jersey District Court")
under the caption In re: Aetna UCR Litigation, MDL No. 2020 ("MDL
2020").   

In addition, the MDL Panel has transferred the individual lawsuits
to MDL 2020. On May 9, 2011, the New Jersey District Court
dismissed the physician plaintiffs from MDL 2020 without prejudice.
The New Jersey District Court's action followed a ruling by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(the "Florida District Court") that the physician plaintiffs were
enjoined from participating in MDL 2020 due to a prior settlement
and release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has dismissed the physician plaintiffs’ appeal of the
Florida District Court's ruling.

On December 6, 2012, the company entered into an agreement to
settle MDL 2020. Under the terms of the proposed nationwide
settlement, the company would have been released from claims
relating to its out-of-network reimbursement practices from the
beginning of the applicable settlement class period through August
30, 2013. The settlement agreement did not contain an admission of
wrongdoing. The medical associations were not parties to the
settlement agreement.

Under the settlement agreement, the company would have paid up to
$120 million to fund claims submitted by health plan members and
health care providers who were members of the settlement classes.
These payments also would have funded the legal fees of plaintiffs'
counsel and the costs of administering the settlement. In
connection with the proposed settlement, the Company recorded an
after-tax charge to net income attributable to Aetna of $78 million
in the fourth quarter of 2012.

The settlement agreement provided the company the right to
terminate the agreement under certain conditions related to
settlement class members who opted out of the settlement. Based on
a report provided to the parties by the settlement administrator,
the conditions permitting the company to terminate the settlement
agreement were satisfied. On March 13, 2014, the company notified
the New Jersey District Court and plaintiffs' counsel that the
company was terminating the settlement agreement. Various legal and
factual developments since the date of the settlement agreement led
the company to believe terminating the settlement agreement was in
its best interests. As a result of this termination, the company
released the reserve established in connection with the settlement
agreement, net of amounts due to the settlement administrator,
which reduced first quarter 2014 other general and administrative
expenses by $103 million pretax.

On June 30, 2015, the New Jersey District Court granted in part the
company motion to dismiss the proceeding. The New Jersey District
Court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' RICO and federal
antitrust claims; their ERISA claims that are based on the
company's disclosures and the company's purported breach of
fiduciary duties; and certain of their state law claims. The New
Jersey District Court also dismissed with prejudice all claims
asserted by several medical association plaintiffs. The plaintiffs'
remaining claims are for ERISA benefits and breach of contract. On
June 30, 2018, the New Jersey District Court denied the plaintiffs'
request for class certification of the plaintiffs' remaining
claims. On October 4, 2018, the lead plaintiffs informed the New
Jersey District Court that they would voluntarily dismiss their
claims with prejudice. The New Jersey District Court and the
parties will address any claims that remain after these
dismissals.

Aetna Inc. operates as a health care benefits company in the United
States. It operates through three segments: Health Care, Group
Insurance, and Large Case Pensions. Aetna Inc. was founded in 1853
and is based in Hartford, Connecticut.

AIR BENGAL: Sacerdotal Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
YLDA SALCEDO and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C.
216(B), the Plaintiff, vs. AIR BENGAL CORP d/b/a SUNNY'S MART and
JAHOR ROY, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02890-N (N.D. Tex.,
Oct. 30, 2018) alleges violations against Defendants under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, from April 2015 to August 30, 2018, the
Plaintiff worked often approximately 90 hours per week and was paid
an average of regular wage of $8.75 to $9.50 per hour, but
Plaintiff was never paid the extra halftime overtime premium rate
for hours worked above 40 hours in a week as required by the FLSA
by Defendants.

The Defendants willfully and intentionally refused to pay
Plaintiff's overtime wages as required by the FLSA as Defendants
knew of the overtime requirements of the FLSA and recklessly failed
to investigate whether Defendants' payroll practices were in
accordance with the FLSA. Defendants knowing underreported hours
worked by Plaintiff, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Thomas J. Urquidez, Esq.
          URQUIDEZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          5440 Harvest Hill, Suite 145E
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: 214 420-3366
          Facsimile: 214-206-9802
          E-mail: tom@tru-legal.com

ALTICE USA: Shenwick Trust Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Altice USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Doris Shenwick Trust individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Altice USA, Inc.,
Altice Europe N.V., Patrick Drahi, Dexter Goei, Michel Combes,
Dennis Okhuijsen, Jeremie Bonnin, Raymond Svider, Mark Mullen,
Charles Stewart, Victoria Mink, Abdelhakim Boubazine, Lisa
Rosenblum, David Connolly, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Goldman Sachs &
Co. LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenne, Defendants, Case No.
610261/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., Nov. 13, 2018).

The case type is stated as "Commercial Division".

Altice USA, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides
broadband communications and video services in the United States.
The company operates in two segments, Cablevision and Cequel. It
delivers broadband, pay television, telephony services, Wi-Fi
hotspot access, proprietary content, and advertising services to
approximately 4.9 million residential and business customers.

Altice Europe N.V. operates as a telecom, content, media,
entertainment, and advertising company in France and
internationally. It delivers customer-centric products and
solutions that connect and unlock of its approximately 30 million
customers over fiber networks and mobile broadband.

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC offers security brokerage services. The
firm provides cash and wealth management; stock and options
management; and education and retirement planning services.

Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC is a boutique investment banking firm that
offers financial advisory and security brokerage services.

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. provides investment banking and
financial advisory services. The firm offers equity and debt
financing, asset transaction, private equity, underwriting,
institutional sales and trading, and mergers and acquisitions
advisory services.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC focuses on the distribution of Goldman
Sachs Funds. The company provides services that include securities
brokerage, dealership, and underwriting; investment banking;
commodity trading; and investment consulting.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     WESTERMAN BALL EDERER MILLER
     1201 RXR Plaza
     Uniondale, NY 11556
     Phone: (516) 622-9200

The Defendant is represented by:

     SHEARMAN & STERLING
     Phone: (212) 848-4000

          - and -

     ABRAHAM FRUCHTER & TWERSKY
     1 Penn Plazasuite, Suite 200
     New York, NY 10049
     Phone: (212) 379-5050

          - and -

     PAUL,WEISS,RIFKIND,WHARTON
     1285 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10029
     Phone: (212) 373-3000


AMERICAN HONDA: 1st Cir. Reverses Findings on Notice Compliance
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RACHEL C. WILLIAMS, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE
CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee, Case No. 16-1275 (1st Cir.),
Judge William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed the district court's findings that
Honda's notices were compliant with Massachusetts law, vacated its
dismissal of Williams' claims under chapter 93A and Massachusetts'
version of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), challenging the
adequacy of Honda's notices, and otherwise affirmed its judgment.


Williams brought the putative class action, alleging that Honda
violated Massachusetts consumer protection laws by affording her
inadequate loan-deficiency notifications after she fell behind on
her automobile-loan payments.  The appeal followed the district
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Honda.  

Williams purchased a Honda Accord in 2007, which she partly
financed through a retail-installment-sale contract with Honda.
After Williams failed to make her loan payments, Honda repossessed
the automobile and sent her a post-repossession notice that advised
her of Honda's intent to sell the car at auction.

At auction, Honda fetched $8,900 for the automobile.  Honda then
sent Williams a second notice that apprised her of the sale and of
her deficiency balance, calculated in accordance with the
post-repossession notice by subtracting the price obtained at
auction from her outstanding loan balance plus the additional costs
associated with repossessing and selling the automobile.

Williams claims that Honda's notices violate provisions of the
Massachusetts version of the UCC, and the Massachusetts consumer
protection statute, by telling Williams that her deficiency
liability would be calculated using the automobile's sale price
obtained at auction (rather than its fair market value).

The district court rejected this challenge to Honda's notices for
two reasons.  First, it noted that Honda's pre-sale notice
track[ed] the safe harbor language in section 9-614(3), which uses
auction-sale proceeds as the measure of a debtor's deficiency.
Further, the court concluded that Williams had presented no
evidence that the auction proceeds were less than the automobile's
fair market value.

On appeal, Williams argues that summary judgment dismissing her
challenges to Honda's notices was improper.  She maintains that
Massachusetts law requires a lender to give credit for the fair
market value of the car -- determined using a car's estimated
retail-market value -- when calculating deficiencies owed, and she
therefore challenges the district court's conclusion that Honda's
use of the auction-sale price in its deficiency notices was
accurate and reasonable under the circumstances.  

Acknowledging that a resolution of Williams's claims would require
this court to reconcile Massachusetts's Motor Vehicle Retail
Installment Sales Act ("MVRISA"), with provisions of the
Massachusetts UCC, the First Circuit certified the following three
questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:

     1. Whether the fair market value of collateral under
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 255B, section 20B, is the fair
market retail value of that collateral?

     2. Whether, and in what circumstances, a pre-sale notice is
sufficient under UCC section 9-614(4) and (5), and reasonable under
UCC section 9-611(b), where the notice does not describe the
consumer's deficiency liability as the difference between what the
consumer owes and the fair market value of the collateral, and the
transaction is governed by MVRISA?
     
     3. Whether, and in what circumstances, a post-sale deficiency
explanation is sufficient under UCC section 9-616 where the
deficiency is not calculated based on the fair market value of the
collateral, and the transaction is governed by MVRISA?

In June, the Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion that
addressed the questions.  In brief, it answered the first question
in the negative, concluding that the Legislature did not dictate
the creditor's market choice in the first instance.  Nevertheless,
the court opined that, in disputed cases, a rebuttable presumption
exists that the estimated retail-market value of the repossessed
collateral is its fair market value in MVRISA-governed
transactions.  As to the second and third questions, the Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that notices provided under sections 9-614
and 9-616 must describe the debtor's deficiency as the difference
between the fair market value of the collateral and the debtor's
outstanding balance.

After the Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion responding to
the questions, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the
ramifications of those answers.

Applying the answers, Judge Kayatta addresses the merits of
Williams's appeal.  He first addresses the district court's
conclusion that Williams failed to offer any evidence to show that
Honda sold her vehicle for less than fair market value in violation
of MVRISA Section 20B.  He sees no reason to upset the district
court's conclusion concerning the adequacy of Williams's proof.  On
appeal, Williams offers no argument at all that the court abused
its discretion in finding that Williams did not authenticate the
sole exhibit -- a National Automobile Dealers Association values
printout -- that she offered to support her claim that Honda sold
her vehicle for less than fair market value.  Her challenge to the
court's ruling that Honda sold the car for fair market value is
therefore waived.

The Judge turns now to the main issue in the case: Williams's
challenge to the district court's determination that the
post-repossession and post-sale notices Honda sent to Williams
complied with the requirements of Massachusetts law.  He finds that
the entry of summary judgment on Williams's UCC notice and chapter
93A claims was improper.  Whether and to what extent Honda acted in
good faith and whether and to what extent good faith provides any
defense or mitigation in connection with any claims or remedies, he
leaves to the district court to determine on remand.

Costs are awarded to Williams.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/58gmZY from Leagle.com.

John Roddy -- jroddy@baileyglasser.com -- with whom Elizabeth Ryan
-- eryan@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP, Steven R.
Striffler and Law Office of Steven R. Striffler were on brief, for
appellant.

Stuart T. Rossman, National Consumer Law Center and Jennifer P.
Nelson on brief for National Consumer Law Center amicus curiae in
support of appellant.

Eric S. Mattson -- EMATTSON@SIDLEY.COM -- with whom Daniel R.
Thies, Sidley Austin LLP, Tracy M. Waugh --
tracy.waugh@wilsonelser.com -- and Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman &
Dicker, LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Frederick S. Levin -- flevin@buckleysandler.com -- John C. Redding
-- jredding@buckleysandler.com -- Ali M. Abugheida --
aabugheida@buckleysandler.com -- and Buckley Sandler LLP on brief
for American Financial Services Association, amicus curiae in
support of appellee.


APOLLO GLOBAL: Agreement in Principle Reached in Arizona Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Apollo Global Management, LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties
in the case, Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi v.
Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc., have reached an agreement in
principle to settle the matter.

On March 4, 2016, the Public Employees Retirement System of
Mississippi filed a putative securities class action against
Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. ("SFM"), several SFM directors
(including Andrew Jhawar, an Apollo partner), AP Sprouts Holdings,
LLC and AP Sprouts Holdings (Overseas), L.P. (the "AP Entities"),
which are controlled by entities managed by Apollo affiliates, and
two underwriters of a March 2015 secondary offering of SFM common
stock.

The AP Entities sold SFM common stock in the March 2015 secondary
offering. The complaint, filed in Arizona Superior Court and
captioned Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi v.
Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. (CV2016-050480), alleges that SFM
filed a materially misleading registration statement for the
secondary offering that incorporated alleged misrepresentations in
SFM’s 2014 annual report regarding SFM's business prospects, and
failed to disclose alleged accelerating produce deflation.

Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against the AP Entities for
violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933,
seeking compensatory damages for alleged losses sustained from a
decline in SFM's stock price.

Defendants moved to dismiss the action, and the court dismissed the
Section 11 claim against the AP Entities but not the Section 15
claim. On September 4, 2018, Sprouts filed (i) a notice that the
parties have reached an agreement in principle to settle the
matter; and (ii) a joint motion to stay the case deadlines. On
September 13, 2018 the court stayed the case until November 6,
2018, pending the filing of plaintiff's motion to approve the
settlement.

Apollo Global Management, LLC is a publicly owned investment
manager. The firm primarily provides its services to endowment and
sovereign wealth funds, as well as other institutional and
individual investors. It manages client focused portfolios. The
firm launches and manages hedge funds for its clients. Apollo
Global Management, LLC was founded in 1990 and is headquartered in
New York City, with additional offices in New York City; Bethesda,
Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Purchase, New
York; Houston, Texas; London, United Kingdom; Frankfurt, Germany;
Central, Hong Kong; Singapore; and Luxembourg.


APOLLO GLOBAL: Continues to Defend McEvoy Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Apollo Global Management, LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a putative class action suit filed
by Michael McEvoy.

On August 3, 2017, a putative class action was commenced in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
against Apollo Global Management, LLC (AGM), Gareth Turner (an
Apollo Partner) and Mark Beith (a former Apollo Principal) by
Michael McEvoy on behalf of a class of current and former employees
of subsidiaries of CEVA Group, LLC ("CEVA Group") who purchased
restricted Class A shares in CEVA Investment Limited ("CIL"), the
former parent company of CEVA Group.  

The complaint alleges that the defendants breached fiduciary duties
to and defrauded the plaintiffs by inducing them to purchase shares
in CIL and subsequently participating in a debt restructuring of
CEVA Group in which shareholders of CIL did not receive a recovery.
The complaint purports to seek damages in excess of €14 million.


On October 18, 2017, the bankruptcy trustee for CIL filed a motion
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to
prevent McEvoy and his counsel from continuing to prosecute the
Florida action on the basis that the relevant claims belong to the
CIL bankruptcy estate. On November 21, 2017, the Florida court
granted the parties' joint motion to stay the case pending
resolution of the CIL bankruptcy trustee's motion to enforce the
automatic stay, staying the case until further Order.  

On February 9, 2018, the bankruptcy court granted the CIL trustee's
motion to enforce the automatic stay and enjoined further
prosecution of the McEvoy Action (the "February 9 Order"). On
February 23, 2018, Mr. McEvoy filed a motion for leave to appeal
the February 9 Order. On May 4, 2018, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied McEvoy's appeal of the
February 9 Order, but permitted McEvoy to file a motion in the
bankruptcy court to clarify the scope of the injunction or to
modify the order to permit him to amend the complaint.  

On May 24, 2018, McEvoy filed a motion with the bankruptcy court
seeking clarification or modification of the February 9 Order,
which the CIL Trustee and Mr. Turner opposed. On June 1, 2018, the
Florida court entered an order continuing the stay in the case
pending the bankruptcy court's ruling on McEvoy's motion for
clarification. The bankruptcy court held a hearing on McEvoy's
motion for clarification on June 28, 2018, at which it directed
McEvoy to file a reply and proposed amended complaint. The reply
and proposed amended complaint were filed on July 10, 2018. The
proposed amended complaint no longer asserts claims against Messrs.
Turner and Beith but adds Apollo Management VI, L.P. and CEVA Group
as proposed defendants.  

The proposed amended complaint purports to seek damages of
approximately €30 million and asserts, among other things, claims
for violations of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, breach of
fiduciary duties, and breach of contract. On July 26, 2018, CEVA
Group, AGM, and Apollo Management VI, L.P. filed a reservation of
rights with respect to the proposed amended complaint.

On October 16, 2018, the bankruptcy court granted McEvoy's motion
for clarification, permitting him to file the proposed amended
complaint in the Florida action, to the extent he asserts direct
claims against the proposed defendants. To date, McEvoy has not
filed the proposed amended complaint. The parties have until
November 6, 2018 to file a joint status report with the Florida
court.  

Apollo Global said, "Based on the allegations in the complaint,
Apollo believes that there is no merit to the claims.
Additionally, as the case is in its early stages, no reasonable
estimate of possible loss, if any, can be made at this time."

Apollo Global Management, LLC is a publicly owned investment
manager. The firm primarily provides its services to endowment and
sovereign wealth funds, as well as other institutional and
individual investors. It manages client focused portfolios. The
firm launches and manages hedge funds for its clients. Apollo
Global Management, LLC was founded in 1990 and is headquartered in
New York City, with additional offices in New York City; Bethesda,
Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Purchase, New
York; Houston, Texas; London, United Kingdom; Frankfurt, Germany;
Central, Hong Kong; Singapore; and Luxembourg.


APPLE BUS: Hibdon Sues Over Unpaid Regular, Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Lora Hibdon and Cathy Cassidy on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Apple Bus Company, Case
No. 4:18-cv-00897-DGK (W.D. Mo., November 13, 2018) is an action
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Missouri
Minimum Wage Law, and also assert common law claims for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment and fraud.

The Defendant willfully and flagrantly violated the FLSA and the
MMWL by, among other things, manipulating payroll to conceal the
true hours worked by its employees and forcing employees to perform
work-related tasks without pay, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are seeking unpaid regular wages, overtime compensation,
liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs.

Plaintiff Hibdon is a resident of Peculiar, Missouri and a former
hourly non-exempt employee of Defendant Apple Bus within the
meaning of FLSA.

Plaintiff Cassidy is a resident of Harrisonville, Missouri and a
former hourly non-exempt employee of Defendant Apple Bus within the
meaning of FLSA.

Apple Bus is a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Missouri, with its principal place of business
at 230 E. Main Street, Cleveland, MO 64734.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew V. Bartle, Esq.
     David L. Marcus, Esq.
     BARTLE & MARCUS LLC
     116 W. 47th Street, Suite 200
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     Phone: 816.285.3888
     Fax: 816.222.0534
     Email: Mbartle@bmlawkc.com
            Dmarcus@bmlawkc.com

          - and -

     M. Blake Heath, Esq.
     M. BLAKE HEATH TRIAL ATTORNEY LLC
     917 W. 43rd Street, Suite 100
     Kansas City, MO 64111
     Phone: (816) 931-0048
     Fax: (816) 931-4803
     Email: blake@heathinjurylaw.com


ASCENT CAPITAL: Unit Continues to Seek Recovery From Insurers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ascent Capital Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that Brinks Home
Security continues to seek to recover additional funds under its
insurance policies from the remaining carriers in relation to the
settled consolidated class action suit.

Brinks Home Security was named as a defendant in multiple putative
class actions consolidated in U.S. District Court (Northern
District of West Virginia) on behalf of purported class(es) of
persons who claim to have received telemarketing calls in violation
of various state and federal laws.

The actions were brought by plaintiffs seeking monetary damages on
behalf of all plaintiffs who received telemarketing calls made by a
Brinks Home Security Authorized Dealer, or any Authorized Dealer's
lead generator or sub-dealer. In the second quarter of 2017, Brinks
Home Security and the plaintiffs agreed to settle this litigation
for $28,000,000 ("the Settlement Amount").

In the third quarter of 2017, Brinks Home Security paid $5,000,000
of the Settlement Amount pursuant to the settlement agreement with
the plaintiffs. In the third quarter of 2018, Brinks Home Security
paid the remaining $23,000,000 of the Settlement Amount. Brinks
Home Security is actively seeking to recover the Settlement Amount
under its insurance policies held with multiple carriers.  

On November 1, 2018, Brinks Home Security settled its claim against
one such carrier in which the carrier agreed to pay Brinks Home
Security $9,750,000 in the fourth quarter of 2018.  

Ascent Capital said, "This amount will be recognized in the
consolidated statement of operations at such time. Brinks Home
Security continues to seek to recover additional funds under its
insurance policies from the remaining carriers."

Ascent Capital Group, Inc., through its subsidiary, Monitronics
International, Inc., provides security alarm monitoring services to
residential and commercial customers in the United States, Canada,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The company provides
monitoring services for alarm signals arising from burglaries,
fires, medical alerts, and other events through security systems at
customers' premises. Ascent Capital Group, Inc. was incorporated in
2008 and is based in Greenwood Village, Colorado.


AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES: Class of Tenants/Occupants in Katz Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHERINE KATZ and YUDENIA MESA, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AVALONBAY
COMMUNITIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-2740
(JLL) (D. N.J.), Judge Jose L. Linares of the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification.

The purported class action arises out of a January 2015 building
fire that occurred in a dual-building residential complex known as
the Avalon in Edgewater, New Jersey, owned and operated by the
Defendant, a real estate investment and development company.  The
Avalon was composed of two adjacent four-story luxury apartment
buildings -- the Russell Building and the River Building (also
referred to as the River Mews Building).

On Jan. 21, 2015, a fire swept through the Russell Building,
growing large enough to be seen across the Hudson River from
Manhattan.  According to a Cause and Origin Report by investigators
at the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, maintenance workers
employed by the Defendant started the fire while soldering pipes
with a blow torch inside a wall in a first-floor apartment bathroom
in the Russell Building.  In the hours that followed, the fire grew
so large that approximately 500 firefighters and other emergency
personnel from over thirty neighboring areas were needed to
extinguish it.  The fire destroyed the Russell Building, rendering
it "uninhabitable" and permanently displacing all of its
approximately 500 residents.  There were no human fatalities, but
two residents were treated for minor injuries, and many Russell
Building residents lost pets in the fire.

On Dec. 6, 2016, the Defendant settled with a class of residents
and occupants of the Russell Building.  That class was defined as
all residents and occupants of the Russell Building at Avalon at
Edgewater as identified on the operative lease agreements as of
Jan. 21, 2015, whose property in a Russell Building apartment or
storage unit was destroyed by The Fire.  The Defendants did not
oppose certification of the Russell Building class for purposes of
the settlement.  The Court granted final approval of the Russell
Building class settlement on July 11, 2017.  The AvalonBay fire is
the subject of at least 22 additional individual lawsuits against
the Defendant.

The action, brought on behalf of tenants and occupants of the
adjacent River Building, had been consolidated with the DeMarco
action but was severed when that action settled.  Now, Plaintiffs
Katz and Mesa seek to proceed as a class against the Defendant on
behalf of River Building occupants.  Although the fire did not
cause as much structural damage to surrounding buildings as it did
to the Russell Building, tenants and occupants of the River
Building were nevertheless affected by the fire.  The Plaintiffs
allege that they were displaced from their homes for four days
following the fire, during which time they were forced to pay for
lodging, food, clothing, and other basic necessities, as they had
little or no time to collect any possessions before evacuating.

The Plaintiffs further allege that a "pervasive odor," "water and
smoke damage," as well as "an accumulation of soot," have rendered
the River Mews Building uninhabitable.  The Defendant claims that
it took steps to clean River Building apartments, eliminate odors,
and ensure that the premises were safe for its residents.  The
Defendant further claims that it offered tenants certain
concessions and credits to cover losses related to the four-day
displacement.

The Plaintiffs raise additional allegations concerning the
decreased rental value of their apartments.  River Building
residents lost the use of certain luxury amenities located in the
Russell Building that were damaged or destroyed in the fire.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant consequently charges lower
rent for new residents in the River Mews Building, but has not
reduced the Plaintiffs' rent to reflect the same decrease in rental
value.  The Defendants have allegedly offered to allow the
Plaintiffs to cancel their leases and move out, but the Defendant
has not offered to compensate the Plaintiffs for any moving
expenses or losses related to increased rent payments at more
expensive alternative accommodations.  The Plaintiffs are faced
with the unenviable choice between: a) moving out of the area
altogether, b) moving into a similarly priced, but smaller
residence in the area, or c) moving into a similarly sized, but
significantly more expensive residence in the area.

The Plaintiffs therefore seek to recover for the the loss of use or
deprivation of property; reimbursement of any rent payments made
for the time in which the Avalon was uninhabitable; reimbursement
of any excess rent payments incurred by former River Mews tenants
as a result of their displacement; recovery for any improvements
made by any River Mews tenants; and other expenses incurred as a
direct result of the fire, including for food, clothing, housing,
relocation, transportation, medicine, medical treatment, and such
other items as are necessary to continue one's activities of daily
living.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify claims for common law negligence,
private nuisance, and breach of contract.  They allege that the
Defendant is liable for the losses caused by the fire because,
inter alia, the Defendant used a lightweight wood known to be
flammable in the construction of the Avalon buildings, the
Defendant failed to install adequate sprinklers in certain areas of
the buildings, the Russell Building lacked adequate fire walls,
fire dampers, and fire doors, and the maintenance workers who
started the fire did not promptly call 9-1-1, nor did any other
employee of the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs now seek to certify a class pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of tenants and
occupants of the River Building, or, alternatively, one subclass of
tenants and one subclass of occupants.

The Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of their Motion for Class
Certification defines the proposed unified class as all persons who
were, as of Jan. 21, 2015, tenants of any apartment in the River
Building in the complex known as Avalon at Edgewater or were
occupying any apartment in the River Building.

Alternatively, they propose two subclasses, defined as follows:

     a) All persons who were, as of Jan. 21, 2015, tenants of any
apartment in the River Building in the complex known as Avalon at
Edgewater; and

     b) All persons, who were as of Jan. 21, 2015, occupying any
apartment in the River Building under the rights of any tenant.

The Defendant opposes certification, arguing that the Plaintiffs
fail to meet the requirements of Rule 23 under any proposed class
definition.

Judge Linares finds that the Plaintiffs have established both the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  He also determines
that the two tenants can fairly and adequately represent the
interests of a class of tenants and occupants, and finds no other
reason to conclude that Plaintiffs Katz and Mesa do not have the
ability and the incentive to represent the claims of the class
vigorously.  The proposed class representatives are therefore
adequate for purposes of Rule 23(a)(4).  

The Judge finds that the Class Counsel -- Ralph P. Ferrara, Aaron
L. Peskin, and Joshua H. Beisler of Ferrara Law Group PC -- are
adequate.  The counsel have decades of experience practicing
complex litigation and has already invested considerable time and
resources litigating the claims.  The Judge is confident in the
counsel's capacity and willingness to continue doing so.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Linares granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  He certified
the class of all persons who were, as of Jan. 21, 2015, tenants or
occupants of any apartment in the River Building in the complex
known as Avalon at Edgewater as identified on the operative lease
agreements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/ZK7PbZ from Leagle.com.

JACQUELINE VORONOV, KATHERINE KATZ, on their behalf and on behalf
of others similarly situated & YUDENIA MESA, Plaintiffs,
represented by AARON LOUIS PESKIN -- info@ferraralawgp.com --
Ferrara Law Group, P.C. & RALPH P. FERRARA, Ferrara Law Group,
P.C.

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC., Defendant, represented by RONALD A.
GILLER -- rgiller@grsm.com -- GORDON & REES LLP, DANIEL JASON
DIMURO -- ddimuro@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & YAO XIAO, GORDON
& REES LLP.

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC., Counter Claimant, represented by
RONALD A. GILLER, GORDON & REES LLP, DANIEL JASON DIMURO, Gordon &
Rees LLP & YAO XIAO, GORDON & REES LLP.

KATHERINE KATZ, on their behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated & JACQUELINE VORONOV, Counter Defendants, represented by
AARON LOUIS PESKIN, Ferrara Law Group, P.C. & RALPH P. FERRARA,
Ferrara Law Group, P.C..


BANNER BANK: Partly Compelled to Produce E-mail Accounts in Bolding
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KELLY BOLDING, et al., Plaintiff, v. BANNER BANK,
Defendants, Case No. C17-0601RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert S.
Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, (i) granted in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Discovery Responses; and (ii) denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing.

The Plaintiffs served interrogatories and requests for production
on the Defendant in October 2017 seeking, in part, copies of
mortgage or residential loan officers' work-related calendars and
schedules ("Outlook calendars") and any training materials related
to the recording and payment of overtime.  In June 2018, the
Plaintiffs requested production of email accounts of the named and
the opt-in Plaintiffs.

After two meet and confers and numerous promises that production
would be made, the Plaintiffs requested that the Defendant
prioritize the production of Outlook calendars and email accounts
related to four individuals who were to be deposed in the near
future.  On July 6, 2018, the Defendant notified the Plaintiffs
that they had not retained calendars or email accounts of mortgage
or residential loan officers ("MLOs") who had left their employ
before joining the litigation with the exception of Kelly Bolding.
Her email account had been saved as part of a 2015 employment
discrimination lawsuit filed by another employee.  The Outlook
calendars and email accounts of Rick Clark, who was employed by the
Defendant when he opted into the lawsuit, have been produced.

Judge Lasnik finds that there is no serious dispute regarding the
relevance of the MLO's work-related calendars and email accounts.
The calendars and email accounts would help establish the hours
kept by MLOs and, when compared with the employee timesheets and
pay records, help ascertain whether all hours were reported and/or
paid.  The Defendant shall, therefore, produce any and all
work-related calendars, schedules, and email accounts for all class
members and any Idaho MLOs who join the action.  If it has not
already done so, the Defendant will immediately take whatever steps
are necessary to preserve the records of Idaho MLOs who may yet
join the litigation.

The Judge is concerned regarding the Defendant's document
preservation activities and its seeming inability to explain or
describe its efforts to search for and produce the requested
information.  Most troubling, it appears that the Defendant
continued deleting the putative class members' calendars and
accounts not only after it was put on notice of potential wage and
hour claims in July 20162 and after the class action was filed in
April 2017, but even after the Plaintiffs served their initial
discovery requests.  The Judge deems an evidentiary hearing
premature at this juncture, but will require more specific
information and supplemental discovery responses so that the record
is clear.

The Defendant asserts that it has produced all of its written
training materials related to the recording and payment of overtime
and has checked with MLO managers to determine whether they have
produced or disseminated such materials.  The Judge will direct the
Defendant to amend its discovery responses to affirmatively state
whether all responsive documents have been produced.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Lasnik granted in part the
Plaintiffs' motion to compel.  The Defendant shall, within 21 days
of the date of the Order: (i) produce all responsive work-related
calendars and schedules (generally referred to as Outlook
calendars) for all class members; (ii) produce all responsive email
accounts for all class members; (iii) search current employees'
email accounts and produce all emails or Outlook invitations
written to or from class members from April 17, 2014, forward; (iv)
describe in detail the efforts that resulted in the production; (v)
state whether any other types of documents or electronic files
exist that could substitute for missing Outlook calendars and email
accounts as the Plaintiffs attempt to determine when each MLO was
actually working; (vi) state when each class members' Outlook
calendars and email accounts were destroyed or otherwise rendered
inaccessible; (vii) preserve the Outlook calendars and email
accounts of any Idaho MLOs who have not yet joined this litigation;
and (viii) amend its discovery responses to affirmatively state
that all Outlook calendars, email accounts, and training materials
in its possession have been produced (any caveats to that statement
must be set forth in great detail).

The Judge denied the Plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cqYGIt from Leagle.com.

Kelly Bolding, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated & Michael Manfredi, individually and on behalf
of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Charlotte Sanders -- blf@blankenshiplawfirm.com --
BLANKENSHIP LAW FIRM PS, Richard E. Goldsworthy, THE BLANKENSHIP
LAW FIRM & Scott Crispin Greco Blankenship --
sblankenship@blankenshiplawfirm.com -- THE BLANKENSHIP LAW FIRM.

Sarah Ward, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott Crispin Greco
Blankenship, THE BLANKENSHIP LAW FIRM.

Banner Bank, a Washington Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Kenneth E. Payson -- kenpayson@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE,
Laura-Lee S. Williams -- lauraleewilliams@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE, Ryan Coby Hess -- ryanhess@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE & Sheehan H. Sullivan Weiss -- sulls@dwt.com -- DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE.


BIZQUALIFY LLC: Hu et al. Seek to Certify Class & Collective Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
QIUZI HU, an individual, EDWIN RAMIREZ, an individual, IVAN
RONCERIA, an individual, WENZHI FEI, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
JOSE M. PLEHN-DUJOWICH, a.k.a. JOSE M. PLEHN, an individual;
BIZQUALIFY LLC, a California limited liability company; and
POWERLYTICS, INC., a Delaware corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-01791-EDL (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court
on December 18, 2018, for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the case as a collective action
      under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

      "all persons who enrolled in the Global Financial Data
      Project while residing in, or who performed work for the
      project in, the United States or any territory or possession

      of the United States (Fair Labor Standards Act Collective);

   2. certifying the case as a class action, pursuant to Rules
      23(a) and 23(b)(3);

      Class:

      "all persons who enrolled in the Global Financial Data
      Project.

      Excluded from the Class are Defendants Jose M. Plehn-
      Dujowich, BizQualify LLC, and Powerlytics, Inc.'s
      ("Defendants") officers and directors and the immediate
      families of the Defendants’ officers and directors. Also
      excluded from the Class are the Defendants" legal
      representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any
      entity in which Defendants have or have had a controlling
      interest (the "Class'); and

      California Subclass:

      "all members of the Class who resided in California during
      any portion of their participation in the Global Financial
      Data Project, and/or who performed work in California for
      the Global Financial Data Project, at any point (the
      "California Subclass").

    3. certify Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class and FLSA

      Collective;

   4. certify Plaintiffs Hu, Ramirez, and Fei as representatives
      of the California Subclass;

   5. appointing Plaintiffs' counsel of record, Dhillon Law Group
      Inc., to serve as counsel to the FLSA Collective, Class, and
      California Subclass, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Rule 23(g);

   6. authorizing notice to be provided by email, and by hyperlink

      sent by WeChat, a Chinese social media and messaging
      platform, where counsel receives notification that an email
      failed to deliver to any particular email address, to the
      FLSA Collective of their right to opt in under 29 U.S.C.
      section 216(b); and

   7. authorizing notice to be provided by email, and by hyperlink

      sent by WeChat where counsel receives notification that an
      email failed.[CC]

Attorneys for Qiuzi Hu, Edwin Ramirez, Ivan Ronceria, Wenzhi Fei,
Proposed Class and Subclass, and Collective Action:

          Harmeet K. Dhillon, esq.
          Krista L. Baughman, Esq.
          Gregory R. Michael, esq.
          DHILLON LAW GROUP INC.
          177 Post Street, Suite 700
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 433-1700
          Facsimile: (415) 520-6593
          E-mail: harmeet@dhillonlaw.com
                  kbaughman@dhillonlaw.com
                  gmichael@dhillonlaw.com

BRISTOL MYERS: Klein Moynihan Discusses Jurisdiction Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
David O. Klein, Esq. -- dklein@kleinmoynihan.com -- of Klein
Moynihan Turco LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that a
judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois recently issued a Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") ruling that will make it harder for fax TCPA class actions
to succeed.

How has the court made fax TCPA class actions more problematic for
plaintiffs?

In an all too familiar tale for those operating in the
telemarketing space, this case involved a plaintiff whose alleged
receipt of two unsolicited facsimile advertisements was used as the
basis for bringing a nationwide class action lawsuit against the
business whose services were advertised in the subject faxes. The
defendant was not a resident of Illinois. The defendant argued that
there was a jurisdictional defect with respect to any putative
class member asserting a TCPA claim for receipt of a fax outside of
Illinois. For this reason, the defendant moved to strike the class
definition to dismiss those claims.

The Court ultimately agreed with defendant and granted the request.
Relying on the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco City, the Court struck the class definition to the extent
that the plaintiff sought to assert claims on behalf of
non-residents that did not receive faxes in Illinois. As a matter
of constitutional due process, the Court concluded, it would be
improper for a court to assert personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant in connection with the claims of
non-resident class members when the subject claim has no connection
with the state in which the lawsuit is pending.

Klein Moynihan Turco previously blogged about TCPA-related
liability resulting from non-compliant fax marketing practices. The
TCPA regulatory mandates applicable to fax marketing are both
nuanced and technical. While this case represents a positive,
perhaps even momentous, development in the law insofar as limiting
the potential financial exposure of fax-related TCPA violations,
those operating in the marketing industry have learned that the
cost of non-compliance with these mandates can be devastating. As
such, it is imperative for businesses operating in this space to
work closely with knowledgeable counsel prior to engaging in any
fax marketing campaign. [GN]


CAESARS ENTERPRISE: Workers Seek OT Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael D'Amore, Adam Bycina and Richard D'Hondt, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Caesars Enterprise Services, LLC, Caesars Entertainment
Corporation, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-01990, (D. Nev., October 15, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid
overtime, interest, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses for breach
of employment contract and for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Nevada Revised Statutes 608.040.

Defendants operate a hotel and casino where Plaintiffs worked as
table games service personnel. They claim to have rendered
off-shift work without being compensated. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David R. Markham, Esq.
      Michael J. Morphew, Esq.
      Maggie K. Realin, Esq.
      THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM
      750 B Street, Suite 1950
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 399-3995
      Fax: (619) 615-2067
      Email: dmarkham@markham-law.com
             mrealin@markham-law.com
             mmorphew@markham-law.com

             - and -

      Leon M. Greenberg, Esq.
      Dana Sniegocki, Esq.
      LEON GREENBERG, P.C.
      2965 South Jones Boulevard, Suite E–3
      Las Vegas, NV 89146
      Tel: (702) 383-6085
      Fax: (702) 385-1827
      Email: leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com
             dana@overtimelaw.com


CAPITALA FINANCE: Bid to Dismiss Amended Paskowitz Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Capitala Finance Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the defendants in
Paskowitz v. Capitala Finance Corp., et al., have moved to dismiss
the amended complaint.

On December 28, 2017, an alleged stockholder filed a putative class
action lawsuit complaint, Paskowitz v. Capitala Finance Corp., et
al., in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California (case number 2:17-cv-09251-MWF-AS) (the "Paskowitz
Action"), against the Company and certain of its current officers
on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the
Company's common stock between January 4, 2016 and August 7, 2017.


On January 3, 2018, another alleged stockholder filed a putative
class action complaint, Sandifer v. Capitala Finance Corp., et al.,
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (case number 2:18-cv-00052-MWF-AS) (the "Sandifer
Action"), asserting substantially similar claims on behalf of the
same putative class and against the same defendants.

On February 2, 2018, the Sandifer Action was transferred, on
stipulation of the parties, to the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. The Sandifer Action was
voluntarily dismissed on February 28, 2018.

On March 1, 2018, the Paskowitz Action was transferred, on
stipulation of the parties, to the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina (case number
3:18-cv-00096-RJC-DSC). On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs in the
Paskowitz Action filed their amended complaint.

The complaint, as currently amended, alleges certain violations of
the securities laws, including, inter alia, that the defendants
made certain materially false and misleading statements and
omissions regarding the Company's business, operations, and
prospects between January 4, 2016 and August 7, 2017. The
plaintiffs in the Paskowitz Action seek compensatory damages and
attorneys' fees and costs, among other relief, but did not specify
the amount of damages being sought.  Defendants have moved to
dismiss the amended complaint.  

Capitala Finance said, "While the Company intends to vigorously
defend itself in this litigation, the outcome of these legal
proceedings cannot be predicted with certainty."

Capitala Finance Corp. is a Business Development Company
specializing in traditional mezzanine, senior subordinated and
unitranche debt, first-lien and second-lien loans, equity
investments in sponsored and non-sponsored lower and traditional
middle market companies. The company is base in Charlotte, North
Carolina.


CERTIFIED CREDIT: Golubchik Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Certified Credit &
Collection Bureau, et al. The case is styled as Yosef Golubchik,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Certified Credit & Collection Bureau, John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-16114 (D. N.J., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Certified Credit & Collection Bureau, Inc. is a legitimate
collection agency founded and incorporated in 1971. CCCB
specializes in collecting medical debt and has over 40 years of
experience in medical collections and accounts receivable
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


CHARTER COMM: Jimenez Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Carla Jimenez filed an appeal from a court ruling in her
lawsuit entitled Carla Jimenez v. Charter Communications, Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:18-cv-06480-DOC-RAO, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case
(assigned Case No. BC709676) was removed from the Superior Court of
the State of California to the District Court.

Ms. Jimenez alleges that the broadband company promises residential
internet service at speeds it cannot reliably deliver.  She paid
for the company's internet package for her and her family on the
premise that the "blazing fast" Internet speeds were just the thing
needed for work and play.  However, she contends, Charter fails to
say that only customers plugging their devices directly into the
modem can expect to get that service.

The appellate case is captioned as Carla Jimenez v. Charter
Communications, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-80152, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner CARLA JIMENEZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Doug Mahaffey, Esq.
          MAHAFFEY LAW GROUP
          20162 SW Birch Street, Suite 300
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 833-1400
          E-mail: Dougm@mahaffeylaw.com

               - and -

          Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.
          SODERSTROM LAW PC
          3 Park Plaza, Suite 100
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 667-4700
          E-mail: jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com

Defendants-Respondents CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, are represented by:

          Matthew Brill, Esq.
          Andrew Prins, Esq.
          Daniel Scott Schecter, Esq.
          Nicholas L. Schlossman, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20004-1304
          Telephone: (202) 637-2200
          E-mail: matthew.brill@lw.com
                  andrew.prins@lw.com
                  daniel.schecter@lw.com
                  nicholas.schlossman@lw.com


CHASER NEW YORK: Faces Garey ADA Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chaser New York, Inc.
The case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Chaser New York, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10561 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Chaser is a contemporary clothing line dedicated to the evolution
of style.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Jonathan Shalom
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


CHEF DRIVEN: Violates ADA, Garey Suit Asserts
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chef Driven, LLC. The
case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Chef Driven, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-10516 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Chef Driven, LLC is a privately held company in Minnetonka, MN and
is a Single Location business, categorized under Caterers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Jonathan Shalom
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Claims in Bellwether Data Breach Suit Narrowed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BELLWETHER COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, on behalf of itself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN
GRILL, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-cv-1102-WJM-STV (D.
Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado (i) granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims; and
(ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Exhibits A-C Attached
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The case arises out of a 2017 data breach of Chipotle computer
system and point of service terminals which resulted in the theft
of customers' credit card and debit card data.  Plaintiffs
Bellwether and Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union are financial
institutions whose members patronized Chipotle during that period
and whose data were compromised, forcing the Plaintiffs to cancel
and replace members' credit and debit cards and refund any
fraudulent payment resulting from the data breach.

The Plaintiffs bring the lawsuit against Chipotle on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated alleging 11 causes of
action: negligence, negligence per se, misappropriation of trade
secrets, a claim for declaratory judgment, and violation of the
unfair competition laws of Arkansas, California, Florida, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

Bellwether filed a complaint on May 4, 2017 in the District.  On
Sept. 1, 2017, Judge Martinez granted Bellwether and Chipotle's
motion to consolidate the action with Alcoa Community Federal
Credit Union v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No.
17-cv-1283-RM-STV (D. Colo. filed May 26, 2017).  Thereafter, the
Plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint.  Bellwether and
Alcoa both allege claims of negligence, negligence per se,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and a claim under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.

The Plaintiffs jointly assert their misappropriation and
Declaratory Judgment Act claims on behalf of a putative nationwide
class of financial institutions, and their negligence claims on
behalf of a putative statewide class in each of Arkansas,
California, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont.  Bellwether asserts violations of state unfair competition
laws on behalf of itself and putative state-wide classes in
California, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont.  Alcoa asserts a similar putative class claim under
Arkansas's unfair competition law.

Each proposed statewide class is defined as all Financial
Institutions—including, but not limited to, banks and credit
unions -- that either (a) are located in Arkansas, California,
Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont that
issue payment cards, including credit and debit cards, or perform,
facilitate, or support card-issuing services, whose customers made
purchases from Chipotle stores from March 1, 2017 to the present;
or (b) have customers located in Arkansas, California, Florida,
Main, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont that were issued
payment cards used at Chipotle stores from March 1, 2017 to the
present.

Chipotle moves to dismiss all claims in the amended complaint,
attaching excerpts of Visa and MasterCard's rules for issuing
banks.  The Plaintiffs filed a separate Motion to Strike.  Chipotle
filed two notices of supplemental authority in support of its
Motion.

Judge Martinez denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike.  He finds
that the Plaintiffs' challenge to the authenticity of the documents
does not impact the Court's decision to consider the contracts.
Chipotle explains the genesis of the documents.  One of the
attachments was produced by MasterCard in responses to the
Plaintiffs' subpoenas.  The other documents are or were publicly
available.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs, as signatories to the
agreements, should be able to determine whether the documents are
accurate or whether they are inauthentic, and have asserted nothing
that would make the Court doubt the authenticity of the agreements.
The Judge will consider the documents as evidence of the existence
of a network of contracts that govern the payment card system, and
thus denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike.

The Judge granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
Motion.  He dismissed with prejudice Claim 1 (Negligence), Claim 3
(Misappropriation of Trade Secrets), Claim 6 (Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act), Claim 7 (Maine Unfair Trade Practices
Act), Claim 8 (Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act), and Claim 10
(Vermont Consumer Fraud Act).  He dismissed without prejudice Claim
2 (Negligence per se) and Claim 4 (Arkansas Deceptive Trade
Practices).  The Judge denied the remainder of the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

In the instant proceeding, Bellwether contends that it continues to
suffer injury as additional fraudulent charges are being made on
payment cards issued to Chipotle customers.  The Judge finds that
Bellwether plausibly claims that it could be injured in the future
as a result of the breach.  Thus, Bellwether has stated a claim for
relief under the UCL.  He thus denied Chipotle's Motion with
respect to Claim 5.

As to Claim 9, the Judge finds that Bellwether has sufficiently
alleged that Chipotle, at a minimum, recklessly disregarded risks
to its data security systems when it decided not to upgrade its POS
systems.  Such a failure could "raise an eyebrow," as required by
New Hampshire's rascality test.  Thus, he finds that Bellwether has
stated a claim under NHCPA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/nhAVxD from Leagle.com.

Bellwether Community Credit Union, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan L.
Bleichner -- #bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com -- Chestnut &
Cambronne, P.A., Arthur Mahony Murray -- amurray@murray-lawfirm.com
-- Murray Law Firm, Brian C. Gudmundson --
brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, P.L.L.P., Carey
Alexander -- CALEXANDER@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM  -- Scott & Scott,
Attorneys at Law, LLP, Caroline Thomas White --
CThomas@murray-lawfirm.com -- Murray Law Firm, Erin Green Comite --
ecomite@scott-scott.com -- ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP, Gary
F. Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela
& Carpenter LLP, Karen Hanson Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Kate M. Baxter-Kauf --
kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.,
Kenneth Joseph Wink -- kwink@murray-lawfirm.com -- Murray Law Firm,
Rachel M. Bohman, Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Stephen John
Teti, Scott & Scott, LLP & Joseph Peter Guglielmo --
jguglielmo@scott-scott.com -- ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP.

Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union, Consol Plaintiff, represented
by Karen Sharp Halbert, Roberts Law Firm, P.A., Erin Green Comite ,
ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP & Joseph Peter Guglielmo,
ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Paul
Gregory Karlsgodt -- pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler,
LLP & Sam Anthony Camardo -- scamardo@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler, LLP.


CHONG QING: Basurto Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premiums
-------------------------------------------------------
Francisco Basurto, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Chong Qing Xiao Mian Inc., Chong Qing Xiao
Mian I, Inc., Chong Qing Noodle House, Lina Wang and Xiu Lan Huang,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-09393 (S.D. N.Y., October 15, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and unpaid "spread
of hours" premium pursuant to New York Labor Law and the New York
State Wage Theft Prevention Act.

Defendants own and operate a Chinese restaurant known as "Chong
Qing Noodle House" located at 796 Ninth Avenue, New York NY where
Basurto worked as a food preparer/kitchen worker, dishwasher and
food delivery worker. He did not receive written wage notices
identifying his regular hourly rate of pay and corresponding
overtime rate of pay. He claims to have worked over forty hours per
week without a designated break and was not paid proper overtime
compensation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Justin Cilenti, Esq.
      Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
      CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
      708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
      New York, NY 10017
      Tel. (212) 209-3933
      Fax. (212) 209-7102
      Email: info@jcpclaw.com


CINEMARK USA: Faces Silken Brown Class Action
---------------------------------------------
Cinemark USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company is
defending a putative class action suit entitled, Silken Brown v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., Case No. 3:13cv05669, in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco Division.

The case presents putative class action claims for penalties and
attorney's fees arising from alleged violations of the California
wage statement law. The claim is also asserted as a representative
action under the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) for
penalties. The Court granted class certification.

The company denies the claims, denies that class certification is
appropriate, denies that the plaintiff has standing to assert the
claims alleged and is vigorously defending against the claims.  The
company denies any violation of law and plans to vigorously defend
against all claims.

Cinemark USA said, "The Company is unable to predict the outcome of
this litigation or the range of potential loss."

Cinemark USA, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates in the
motion picture exhibition industry. The company operates in two
segments, U.S. Markets and International Markets. The company was
founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Plano, Texas. Cinemark USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Cinemark Holdings, Inc.


CIRCLE K: Court OKs Leave to File FAC in ADA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File His First Amended Class Action
Complaint in the case captioned WILLIE MOODY, JR., Plaintiff, v.
CIRCLE K STORES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-00435-RDP. (N.D.
Ala.).

Plaintiff Willie Moody, Jr. commenced this action against Circle K
Stores, Inc. (Circle K), asserting a single claim under Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Circle K claims the Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint is
futile because it is moot and thus urges the court to deny the
Plaintiff leave to amend. In particular, Circle K contends that the
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is rendered moot by the settlement of
a previous ADA lawsuit against Circle K: Badger v. Circle K Stores,
Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01185-DSC-RCM (W.D. Pa. filed Aug. 8, 2016). The
Badger Agreement required Circle K to spend up to $500,000 per year
to maintain or achieve substantial compliance with the ADA related
to accessibility of common areas, parking lots, and access routes,
as well as, interior accessibility features, of its Retail Stores
in the United States.

This case is controlled by Haynes v. Hooters of Am., LLC, 893 F.3d
781 (11th Cir. 2018). There, a visually impaired plaintiff who used
software to read and navigate internet websites sued Hooters
restaurants under the ADA because its website was not compatible
with the plaintiff's software.

The plaintiff sought an injunction requiring Hooters to (1) alter
its website to make it accessible to, and usable by, individuals
with disabilities to the full extent required by the ADA and (2)
continually update and maintain its website to ensure that it
remains fully accessible to, and useable by, visually impaired
individuals.

Hooters argued the plaintiff's case was moot because of a prior
settlement agreement that resolved an earlier lawsuit against
Hooters. The settlement agreement required Hooters to place an
accessibility notice on its website within six months and to
improve access on its website within twelve months to conform to
the recognized industry standard for website accessibility. Based
on the prior settlement agreement, the district court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint as moot.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the case was not moot
for three separate reasons.

First, though Hooters may well have been in the process of updating
its website to comply with the ADA, there was nothing in the record
demonstrating that Hooters [had] successfully done so.

The court thus concluded that it cannot be said that the issues are
no longer live or that the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome. Second, some of the relief the plaintiff
sought in the instant lawsuit was different from the relief
afforded by the prior settlement.

Nothing in the prior settlement required Hooters to continually
update and maintain its website to ensure that it remains fully
accessible, as the injunction the plaintiff sought would have.

Thus, even if the prior settlement supplied the plaintiff with much
of the relief he sought, there was still a live controversy about
whether the plaintiff could receive an injunction to force Hooters
to make its website ADA compliant or to maintain it as such. Third
and finally, the plaintiff was not a party to the prior settlement
agreement and thus could not enforce the agreement if Hooters chose
not to remediate its website in accordance with the agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y79nyxjx
from Leagle.com.

Willie Moody, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by John Allen Fulmer, II,
FULMER LAW FIRM, Andrew C. Allen -- aallen@burkeharvey.com -- Burke
Harvey, LLC & Peter H. Burke -- pburke@burkeharvey.com -- BURKE
HARVEY LLC.

Circle K Stores Inc, Defendant, represented by Christopher W.
Deering -- christopher.deering@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS
NASH SMOAK & STEWART PC & Mary O'Keefe O'Neill --
mary.oneill@ogletreedeakins.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, PC.


COAST PROFESSIONAL: Kaykov Files FDCPA Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Coast Professional,
Inc. The case is styled as David Kaykov, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Coast Professional,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06442 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 13,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Coast Professional, Inc. offers educational receivable collection
services. The company provides loan consolidation, default account
rehabilitation, contingency collection, borrower tracing, password
assistance, and online account management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
     Marcus Zelman LLC
     701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
     Asbury Park, NJ 07712
     Phone: (732) 695-3282
     Fax: (732) 298-6256
     Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


COMPUTER CREDIT: Golubchik Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Computer Credit Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Yosef Golubchik, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Computer
Credit Inc., John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-16116 (D.
N.J., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Computer Credit Inc. integrates with most patient accounting
systems and leverages the power inside for a comprehensive solution
for self-pay revenue cycle management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


COVERALL NORTH: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in Richardson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Sujol LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Ericka Richardson, et al. v. Coverall North America
Inc., et al., Case No. 3-18-cv-00532, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey.

The nature of suit is stated as contract action.

The appellate case is captioned as Ericka Richardson, et al. v.
Coverall North America Inc., et al., Case No. 18-3393, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees ERICKA RICHARDSON and LUIS A. SILVA, On behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, are
represented by:

          Anthony S. Almeida, Esq.
          Ravi Sattiraju, Esq.
          THE SATTIRAJU LAW FIRM
          116 Village Boulevard
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (609) 365-9335
          E-mail: rsattiraju@sattirajulawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee COVERALL NORTH AMERICA INC. is represented by:

          David S. Sager, Esq.
          SEDGWICK
          101 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 300
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 597-2500

Defendant-Appellant SUJOL LLC, DBA Coverall of Southern NJ, is
represented by:

          R. Scott Fahrney, Jr., Esq.
          Jaime R. Placek, Esq.
          Mark J. Semeraro, Esq.
          KAUFMAN SEMERARO & LEIBMAN LLP
          Two Executive Drive, Suite 530
          Fort Lee, NJ 07024
          Telephone: (201) 947-8855
          E-mail: sfahrney@northjerseyattorneys.com
                  jplacek@northjerseyattorneys.com
                  msemeraro@northjerseyattorneys.com


CTAC HOLDINGS: Garey Suit Asserts ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CTAC Holdings LLC.
The case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CTAC Holdings LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10568-VSB (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Ctac Holdings LLC is a privately held company in Brooklyn, NY and
is a Single Location business, categorized under Chocolate.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Jonathan Shalom
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


CUMMINS PACIFIC: Court Denies Class Certification in Towle Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned JUAN TOWLE, on behalf of
himself and all other aggrieved non-exempt employees, Plaintiff, v.
CUMMINS PACIFIC, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 18cv83-LAB
(JLB). (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Juan Towle sued Defendant Cummins Pacific, LLC (CP) on
behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated employees,
alleging that it maintained a meal and rest break policy that was
facially unlawful under California law.

Towle seeks to certify the following class and subclasses, defined
as:

   Unlawful Meal Period Policy Subclass: All of Defendant's
non-exempt California employees who were subject to Defendant's
Meal and Rest Breaks policy and who were not relieved of all duties
for a first meal period by the end of the fifth hour of work and/or
a second meal period by the end of the tenth hour of work between
December 4, 2013 and May 31, 2016.

   Unlawful Meal Period Premium Pay Practice Subclass: All of
Defendant's non-exempt California employees who were not relieved
of all duties for a first meal period by the end of the fifth hour
of work and/or a second meal period by the end of the tenth hour of
work, and who were not compensated with one hour of pay for all
such instances between December 4, 2013 and the date of judgment.

   Unlawful Rest Period Policy Subclass: All of Defendant's
non-exempt California employees who were subject to Defendant's
Meal and Rest Breaks policy and who did not receive a first, paid
10-minute rest period during work shifts of 3.5 but less than 4
hours, a second rest period during shifts greater than 6 hours but
less than 8 hours, or a third rest period during shifts greater
than 10 hours but less than 12 hours, any time between December 4,
2013 and May 31, 2016.

   Unlawful Rest Period Premium Pay Practice Subclass: All of
Defendant's non-exempt California employees who were not
compensated with one hour of pay for all instances where they did
not receive a first, paid 10 minute rest period during work shifts
of 3.5 but less than 4 hours, a second rest period during shifts
greater than 6 hours but less than 8 hours, or a third rest period
during shifts greater than 10 hours but less than 12 hours, any
time between December 4, 2013 and the date of judgment.

   Unlawful Derivative Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All of
Defendant's former non-exempt California employees who were not
provided timely payments of all final wages as required by the
California Labor Code upon separation of employment during any time
between December 4, 2013 and the date of judgment.

CP's opposition focuses primarily on what it sees as Towle's
inability to prove commonality and the related requirement of
predominance. However, CP also argues that even if commonality were
satisfied, Towle is a uniquely ill-suited class representative and
that typicality is therefore also lacking.  

Numerosity, Adequacy, Superiority

The parties agree that there are approximately 600 putative class
members, and Towle argues that this meets the requirements of
numerosity. CP does not contest this point. The Court finds that
the putative class meets the numerosity requirement.

Adequacy is similarly met here. Here, the Plaintiff's counsel
represent that they have significant expertise and experience in
the area of wage-and-hour class actions. CP does not dispute this,
and the Court finds that adequacy is satisfied.

Likewise with superiority. CP does not contest superiority, and the
Court is not aware of any other pending litigation that would
render a class action an inferior method for adjudicating
Plaintiffs' claims. The Court finds superiority is met.

Commonality and Predominance

Commonality is the heart of this motion for class certification.
Boiled down, Towle argues that CP for years maintained a meal and
rest break policy that was facially unlawful under California law.
In Towle's view, the facially unlawful policy standing alone is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of commonality because it
applied to all CP employees.

CP counters that the policy at issue was contained in a handbook
intended only to highlight the company's various policies, and that
the break policies of CP's twelve California offices varied
significantly.  

Towle views CP's written break policy as unlawful because
California law requires that employee meal breaks be taken prior to
the fifth hour of work not the sixth hour of work, as provided in
CP's policy, and rest breaks be taken every four hours or major
fraction thereof not simply every four hours.

Towle submits expert testimony to try to support an argument that
CP violated California law in practice as well as on paper. His
expert, Dr. Fountain, purported to analyze time cards from a sample
of 55 class members and, in doing so, found a variety of meal and
rest break violations. For example, Dr. Fountain found that a Meal
Period Event, i.e., a violation occurred on over one-half of all
Relevant Shifts. And, 100% of the Sample Class Members incurred one
or more Meal Period Events.

But even in this, CP points out significant methodological flaws.
Fountain's analysis counts only the number of shifts in which no
rest break was taken. It does not account for the differences
between offices and positions that might explain why a rest break
was not taken on a given day.

CP's expert, by contrast, found that meal periods were recorded in
94.2% of shifts and that the variety of positions helps explain why
breaks were not recorded in the remaining 5.8% of shifts.

The Court cannot conclude from this evidence that there was a
common pattern of violations in practice. The Court, of course,
does not dispute that CP may (or may not) have violated
California's rest break requirements. That's not the question
before the Court. The question before the Court is whether it did
so in a way that is common to the class and would permit litigation
on a class-wide basis. The Court cannot conclude that it did.

Finally, permitting certification in a situation like this would
run afoul of the policy rationales underlying class certification.
Not only do the twelve offices each have differing break policies,
many of the offices have both union and non-union employees, each
of which are governed by other distinct rules. As the Supreme Court
has noted, dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.

In this case, the dissimilarities make it unlikely that there will
be common answers. For example, affirmative defenses applicable to
employees in one office are likely to be entirely distinct from
those applicable to employees in another office or even from those
applicable to other employees in the same office. These types of
differences are likely to impede the resolution of otherwise-common
issues.

Even if the Court could find commonality, it could not find
predominance. It is not enough simply that common questions of law
or fact exist; predominance is a comparative concept that calls for
measuring the relative balance of common issues to individual ones.
Here issues specific to each office would predominate over the
class-wide and company-wide questions.

Predominance is therefore not satisfied.

Typicality

CP contends that even if commonality were satisfied, Towle is
uniquely ill-suited to be the class representative. The Court
agrees.

The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the
interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of
the class. Where a Plaintiff's unique background and factual
situation require him to prepare to meet defenses that are not
typical of the defenses which may be raised against other members
of the proposed class, certification should be denied.

Towle worked for CP as a field technician. In this capacity, he
functioned mostly autonomously and outside the office, taking
breaks when appropriate. Towle's claims would bear little
resemblance to, for example, the claims of an administrative
assistant in the Sacramento office, whose work schedule and breaks
might be more regimented and dictated by her office's management.

The Court therefore finds Towle's claims atypical of the class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ot9a39 from Leagle.com.

Juan Towle, on behalf of himself and all other aggrieved non-exempt
employees, Plaintiff, represented by Erik Dos Santos --
edossantos@hoguebelonglaw.com -- Hogue & Belong, Jeffrey L. Hogue
-- jhogue@hoguebelonglaw.com -- Hogue & Belong & Tyler Jay Belong
-- tbelong@hoguebelonglaw.com -- Hogue & Belong APC.

Cummins Pacific, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,
Defendant, represented by Damien Delaney, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
and Feld, John Paul Nordlund -- john.nordlund@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Mia Farber  -- Mia.Farber@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis LLP.


DEFY MEDIA: Guinane Sues Over WARN Act Violation
------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned Georgina Guinane, on behalf
ofherself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Defy
Media, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-09584 (C.D. Cal., November
13, 2018) brings this action on behalf of herself and the other
similarly situated former employees who worked for Defendant and
who were terminated without cause, as part of, or as the result of,
the mass layoffs or plant closings ordered by Defendant on or about
November 6, 2018, and within 30 days of that date and who were not
provided 60 days advance written notice of their terminations by
Defendant, as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.

The Defendant unlawfully terminated the employment of the members
of the Class without cause on their part and without giving them 60
days advance written notice in violation of the WARN Act, the
complaint asserts. Defendant is liable for Plaintiff and all
similarly situated employees to recover 60 days wages benefits,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and worked at the Defendant's
facility located at 8750 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 200, Beverly Hills,
California until her termination on or about November 6, 2018.

Defy Media, Inc. operates a media company that creates and
distributes digital content, including gaming and other
entertainment. It is a New York corporation with its headquarters
located at 1001 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 701, New York, New York
10001.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gail Lin, Esq.
     OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
     601 S. Figueroa St, Ste 4050
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Phone: (323) 673-9900
     Fax: (646) 509-2073
     Email: gl@outtengolden.com

          - and -

     Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
     Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
     Robert N. Fisher, Esq.
     OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
     685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 245-1000
     Email: rsr@outtengolden.com
            jar@outtengolden.com
            rfisher@outtengolden.com


DOMINO'S PIZZA: Blanton Sues Over Employee No-poach Policy
----------------------------------------------------------
Harley Blanton, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, Domino's
Pizza Master Issuer LLC, Domino's Pizza LLC and Domino's Pizza,
Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-13207, (E.D. Mich., October 15,
2018) seeks to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for
injuries caused under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Domino's is a pizza company with stores in all 50 U.S. states and
in multiple international markets with approximately 93% of its
5,646 U.S. stores as franchise restaurants.

Blanton was employed by a Domino's franchisee-owned restaurant in
Port Orange, Florida, beginning in January 2017 as a delivery
driver and an in-store employee, and was trained and acted as a
store morning manager.

Domino's franchisees have agreed not to compete with each other
with respect to manager hiring in explicit contractual terms
contained in franchisees' contracts. Because Blanton was unable to
transfer to a competing Domino's franchise restaurant, his only
options were to stay at the Dunlawton Avenue store, or quit and
start over at an entry job and wage in another setting. The
no-poach and no-hire agreement among Domino's franchisees
suppressed Plaintiff's wages, inhibited his employment mobility and
lessened his professional work opportunities, contends the
complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     E. Powell Miller, Esq.
     Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
     Dennis A. Lienhardt, Esq.
     THE MILLER LAW FIRM, PC
     950 W. University Dr., Suite 300
     Rochester, MI 48307
     Tel: (248) 841-2200
     Fax: (248) 652-2852
     Email: epm@millerlawpc.com
            ssa@millerlawpc.com
            dal@millerlawpc.com

            - and -

     Derek Y. Brandt, Esq.
     MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
     P.O. Box 487
     Edwardsville, IL 62025
     Tel: (618) 307-6116
     Fax: (618) 307-6161
     Email: dyb@mccunewright.com

            - and -

     Richard D. McCune, Esq.
     MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
     3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
     Ontario, CA 91761
     Tel: (909) 557-1250
     Fax: (909) 557-1275
     Email: rdm@mccunewright.com
            dcw@mccunewright.com

            - and -

     Walter W. Noss, Esq.
     Stephanie A. Hackett, Esq.
     Sean C. Russell, Esq.
     SCOTT + SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Tel: (619) 233-4565
     Email: wnoss@scott-scott.com
            shackett@scott-scott.com
            sean.russell@scott-scott.com

            - and -

     Michelle E. Conston, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     The Helmsley Building, Esq.
     230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
     New York, NY 10169
     Tel: (212) 223-6444
     Email: mconston@scott-scott.com


EMILIO PUCCI: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Emilio Pucci, LTD.
The case is styled as Edwin Diaz on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Emilio Pucci, LTD.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-10507 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Emilio Pucci S.r.l. designs and markets ready-to-wear, handbags,
shoes, and eyewear. The company's products include skirts, hats,
gowns, dresses, trousers, sportswear, and hand-painted or
embroidered folkloric motifs. It sells its products through its
store network and an online store. Emilio Pucci, Ltd operates as a
subsidiary of LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton S.E.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Court Certifies Class in Volkman FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DERICK VOLKMAN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC,
d/b/a ERC, Defendant, Case No. 18-C-91 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William
C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin (i) granted Volkman's motion for class certification, and
denied Volkman's Civil L.R. motion to seal an exhibit attached to
the Declaration of Philip D. Stern.

Volkman alleges that the Defendant violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") by mailing initial template
collection letters to Wisconsin residents that fail to
unambiguously identify the creditor.  His allegations arise from a
letter he received from ERC dated Jan. 17, 2017.  Volkman alleges
that the letter is a computer generated template form letter used
by ERC to collect debts from Wisconsin residents.

The letter states, "Your recently disconnected Time Warner Cable
Account has been forwarded to us to assist you in the resolution of
your balance due."  Volkman asserts that ERC violated the FDCPA by
mailing letters that fail to identify a creditor, the name of the
entity to whom the debt is owed, or the name of the entity who
placed the accounts for collection.  He seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and the proposed class for the purported
violation.

Volkman filed a motion for class certification on May 30, 2018,
seeking to represent the class of all persons with addresses in the
State of Wisconsin to whom Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC mailed an
initial written communication to collect a debt between Jan. 17,
2017 and Feb. 7, 2018, which was not returned as undeliverable, and
which stated your recently disconnected Time Warner Cable account
has been forwarded to us to assist you in the resolution of your
balance due.

Volkman also filed a Civil L.R. motion to seal an exhibit attached
to the Declaration of Philip D. Stern.

Judge Griesbach holds that Volkman has fulfilled the requirements
of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  He also finds that Volkman's motion to seal does not
analyze the applicable legal criteria or contend that any document
contains a protectable trade secret or otherwise legitimately may
be kept from public inspection despite its importance to the
resolution of the litigation.

For these reasons, the Judge granted Volkman's motion for class
certification, and denied Volkman's motion to seal.

He certified the class of all persons with addresses in the State
of Wisconsin to whom Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC mailed an
initial written communication to collect a debt between Jan. 17,
2017 and Feb. 7, 2018, which was not returned as undeliverable, and
which stated your recently disconnected Time Warner Cable account
has been forwarded to us to assist you in the resolution of your
balance due.

The Judge appointed the counsel of record for Volkman as the class
counsel.  Within 30 days of the date of the Order, the class
counsel will provide the Court with a proposed notice to be
provided to the potential class members consistent with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B).  The class counsel will
consult with ERC before submitting the proposed notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qcHWz4 from Leagle.com.

Derick Volkman, Plaintiff, represented by Francis R. Greene, Stern
Thomasson LLP, Philip D. Stern -- philip@sternthomasson.com --
Stern Thomasson LLP & Andrew T. Thomasson --
andrew@sternthomasson.com -- Stern Thomasson LLP.

Enhanced Recovery Company LLC, doing business as ERC, Defendant,
represented by Daniel L. Polsby -- dpolsby@clausen.com -- Clausen
Miller PC, Paige M. Neel -- pneel@clausen.com -- Clausen Miller PC,
Patrick L. Breen -- pbreen@clausen.com -- Clausen Miller PC & Scott
S. Gallagher -- ssgallagher@sgrlaw.com -- Smith Gambrell & Russell
LLP.


ETRADE FINANCIAL: 2d Cir. Affirms Schwab Securities Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CRAIG L. SCHWAB, Individually and on Behalf of All
others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E*TRADE
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, E*TRADE SECURITIES LLC, PAUL T. IDZIK, DAVID
HERBERT, ROGER A. LAWSON, and KARL A. ROESSNER,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-461 (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's Jan.
22, 2018 opinion and order granting the Defendants-Appellees'
motion to dismiss Schwab's Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

The TAC was brought under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.
Sections 78j(b) and 78t, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5.

The Defendants-Appellees are: (1) E*TRADE Financial, a Delaware
corporation with executive offices in New York City; (2) E*TRADE
Securities LLC ("E*TRADE"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of E*TRADE
Financial; (3) Paul T. Idzik, who was CEO and a director at E*TRADE
Financial from 2013 to 2016; and (4) Karl A. Roessner, who was the
Executive VP and General Counsel at E*TRADE from 2009 up until
2016, at which point he became CEO.  

E*TRADE Financial is a financial services company that provides
brokerage and related products and services to retail investors.
Its subsidiary, E*TRADE, is a registered broker-dealer and the
primary provider of brokerage products and services to E*TRADE
Financial's customers.  These customers submit orders for the
purchase or sale of securities which are then routed for execution
to various "venues," such as stock exchanges, market makers, and
other alternative trading systems.

Schwab was a customer of E*TRADE.  He alleges that between July 12,
2011 and July 22, 2016, E*TRADE violated the duty of best
execution, which requires broker-dealers to use reasonable
diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and
buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the
customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market
conditions.  Schwab's allegations of misconduct center on two main
points: (1) that E*TRADE entered into agreements with third parties
that resulted in E*TRADE's failing to deliver best execution; and
(2) that E*TRADE focused on the maximization of revenues rather
than on delivering best execution to its clients.

The district court dismissed Schwab's Section 10(b) claim because
it determined that Schwab had failed adequately to plead reliance.
Schwab relies exclusively on Affiliated Ute to argue that the TAC
adequately pleads reliance.

The Appellate Court is not persuaded.  The Affiliated Ute
presumption of reliance under the Court's precedent is appropriate
in cases involving primarily a failure to disclose, where a
defendant both (1) had a duty to disclose and (2) omitted a
material fact.  It agrees with the district court that Schwab has
failed to allege such circumstances.

Both in the TAC and in his briefing before the Court, Schwab
acknowledges that E*TRADE made many statements during the Class
Period affirming its commitment to executing orders in compliance
with the duty of best execution.  Schwab argues that the case
nevertheless involves primarily E*TRADE's alleged omission of
information about its abusive order routing practices.  But such an
argument is contrary to the Court's decision in Waggoner v.
Barclays PLC.

The Waggoner Court concluded that the purported "omissions" were
simply the inverse of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation
allegations, because the only thing they omitted was the truth that
the statement misrepresents. Thus, the plaintiffs' case was one
primarily about misrepresentations, not omissions, and the
Affiliated Ute presumption did not apply.

Just as the Waggoner defendant stated that its alternative trading
system was protected from abusive trading practices, E*TRADE
repeatedly and specifically affirmed that it complied with the duty
of best execution.  Moreover, Waggoner determined that Affiliated
Ute applies only when the original rationale for Affiliated Ute is
present: when there are "no positive statements," and "reliance as
a practical matter is impossible to prove.  Schwab therefore failed
adequately to plead reliance and his Section 10(b) claim was
properly dismissed.  Because Schwab's Section 10(b) claim was
properly dismissed, moreover, Schwab's Section 20(a) claim also
necessarily fails and was properly dismissed.

The Court has considered Schwab's remaining arguments and finds
them to be without merit.  Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of
the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Summary Order
is available at https://is.gd/9FSqz8 from Leagle.com.

NICHOLAS I. PORRITT -- nporritt@zlk.com -- CHRISTOPHER J. KUPKA --
ckupka@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, New York, NY., For
Plaintiff-Appellant.

MARC L. GREENWALD -- marcgreenwald@quinnemanuel.com -- COREY
WORCESTER -- coreyworcester@quinnemanuel.com -- JULIA M. BESKIN --
juliabeskin@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, New York, NY; FAITH GAY -- fgay@selendygay.com -- Selendy &
Gay PLLC, New York, NY., For Defendants-Appellees.


EVA'S 8TH STREET: Delivery Staff Hit Tip Credit Deductions From Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Armando Calderon Caralampio, Byron Alirio Ramos Baten and Martin
Mejia Canan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Eva's 8th Street Food, LLC, Steve Ayala,
George Ayala, Jack E. Jacobs, Nicholas Doe, Lisardo Doe and Jose
Doe, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-09385 (S.D. N.Y., October 15,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum, overtime and
spread-of-hours wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a healthy foods restaurant,
located at 11 W 8th Street, New York, NY 10011 under the name
"Eva's Kitchen" where Plaintiffs were employed as delivery workers.
However, they were required to spend a considerable part of their
work day performing non-tipped duties, thus Defendants were not
entitled to take a tip credit because their non-tipped duties
exceeded 20% of each workday. They worked for Defendants in excess
of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage and overtime
compensation for the hours that they worked. Defendants also failed
to maintain accurate record-keeping of the hours worked, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Suit vs. Reliance Trust Company Still Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October
30, 2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that
the class action lawsuit against Reliance Trust Company, is still
ongoing.

Reliance Trust Company ("Reliance"), the Company's subsidiary, is
named as a defendant in a class action arising out of its provision
of services as the discretionary trustee for a 401(k) Plan (the
"Plan") for one of its customers.

Plaintiffs in the action seek damages and attorneys' fees, as well
as equitable relief, on behalf of Plan participants for alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The action also
makes claims against the Plan's sponsor and record-keeper.

Reliance is vigorously defending the action and believes that it
has meritorious defenses. Pre-trial discovery has now been
completed. Reliance contends that no breaches of fiduciary duty or
prohibited transactions occurred and that the Plan suffered no
damages. Plaintiffs allege damages of approximately $125 million.

Fidelity National said, "While we are unable at this time to
estimate more precisely the potential loss or range of loss because
of unresolved questions of fact and law, we believe that the
ultimate resolution of the matter will not have a material impact
on our financial condition. We do not believe a liability for this
action is probable and, therefore, have not recorded a liability
for this action."

Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. operates as a
financial services technology company in the United States and
internationally. It operates through Integrated Financial Solutions
and Global Financial Solutions segments. The company was founded in
1968 and is headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.


FITBIT INC: Pursues Private Arbitration in PurePulse(R) Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitbit, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 29, 2018, that parties in PurePulse(R) heart
rate tracking device related suit are moving forward in private
arbitration with Kate McLellan.

On January 6, 2016 and February 16, 2016, two purported class
action lawsuits were filed against the Company in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the
PurePulse(R) heart rate tracking technology does not consistently
and accurately record users' heart rates.

Plaintiffs allege common law claims, as well as violations of
various states' false advertising, unfair competition, and consumer
protection statutes, and seek class certification, injunctive and
declaratory relief, restitution, an award of unspecified
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages, and
statutory penalties and damages, an award of reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as
the Court may deem just and proper.

On April 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Master Class
Action Complaint and, on May 19, 2016, filed an Amended
Consolidated Master Class Action Complaint. On January 9, 2017, the
Company filed a motion to compel arbitration. On October 11, 2017,
the Court granted the motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs
filed a motion for reconsideration, and that motion was denied on
January 24, 2018.

On February 20, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Consolidated Master Class Action Complaint ("SAC") on behalf of
plaintiff Rob Dunn, the only plaintiff not ordered to arbitration,
as a purported class action. The SAC alleges the same common law
claims, as well as violations of false advertising, unfair
competition, and consumer protection statutes of California and
Arizona, and also seeks class certification, injunctive and
declaratory relief, restitution, an award of unspecified
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages, and
statutory penalties and damages, an award of reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as
the Court may deem just and proper.

On March 13, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and separately moved to strike the class
allegations. The Court dismissed the claims for revocation of
acceptance, violation of California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, and unjust enrichment, and allowed the remaining
claims pending amendment to the complaint with further details.

Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on June 19, 2018. The
Court granted the motion to strike and ordered the plaintiff to
amend to make clear that he is seeking to represent a class of
opt-outs only, but that plaintiff would be free to amend in the
event Fitbit's arbitration agreement was found to be
unenforceable.

In response to an April 3, 2018 arbitration demand from Kate
McLellan, one of the original plaintiffs who was compelled to
arbitration, the Company attempted to resolve the individual claim
with Ms. McLellan. At the May 31, 2018 hearing, the Court expressed
concern that the Company was "picking off" McLellan and thereby
undermining the arbitration option and the Court's prior order on
arbitration, and ordered additional briefing.

On July 24, 2018, the Court awarded the plaintiffs their attorneys'
fees on the motion practice, but denied plaintiffs' request that
the arbitration right should be waived as a sanction. The parties
are moving forward in private arbitration with Ms. McLellan.

The Company believes that the plaintiffs' allegations are without
merit, and intends to vigorously defend against the claims. Because
the Company is in the early stages of this litigation matter, the
Company is unable to estimate a reasonably possible loss or range
of loss, if any, that may result from this matter.

Fitbit, Inc., a technology company, provides health solutions in
the United States and internationally. The company offers a line of
devices, including Fitbit Surge, Fitbit Blaze, Fitbit Charge 2,
Alta HR, Alta, Fitbit Flex 2, Fitbit One, and Fitbit Zip activity
trackers; Fitbit Ionic smartwatches; Fitbit Aria 2 Wi-Fi smart
scales; and a range of accessories, such as bands and frames for
its devices, as well as Fitbit Flyer, a wireless headphone designed
for fitness. Fitbit, Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered
in San Francisco, California.


FITBIT INC: Securities Suits in California Concluded
----------------------------------------------------
Fitbit, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 29, 2018, that the federal and class action
cases have been dismissed with prejudice.

On January 11, 2016, a putative securities class action was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
naming as defendants the Company, certain of its officers and
directors, and the underwriters of the Company's initial public
offering (the "IPO"). On May 10, 2016, the Court appointed the
Fitbit Investor Group (consisting of five individual investors) as
lead plaintiff, and an Amended Complaint was filed on July 1, 2016.


Plaintiffs allege violations of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the "Securities Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, based on alleged materially false and misleading
statements about the Company's products between October 27, 2014
and November 23, 2015. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
securities (i) on the open market between June 18, 2015 and May 19,
2016; and/or (ii) pursuant to or traceable to the IPO.

Plaintiffs seek class certification, an award of unspecified
compensatory damages, an award of reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper. On July 29, 2016, the Company filed a
motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion on October 26, 2016.
On April 26, 2017, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment,
which is still pending.

On April 28, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit alleging
violations of the Securities Act was filed in the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, naming as defendants the Company,
certain of its officers and directors, the underwriters of the IPO,
and a number of its investors.

Plaintiffs allege that the IPO registration statement contained
material misstatements about the Company's products. Plaintiffs
seek to represent a class of persons who purchased the Company's
common stock in and/or traceable to the IPO and/or the November
2015 follow-on public offering (the "Secondary Offering").
Plaintiffs seek class certification, an award of unspecified
compensatory damages, an award of reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees, and other further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper.

On May 17, 2016, a similar class action lawsuit was filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco. The cases
have now been consolidated in the County of San Francisco. On April
7, 2017, the Court granted a motion to dismiss the Section 11 claim
based on the Secondary Offering and stayed the cases.

On January 8, 2018, the plaintiffs in the federal and class action
cases filed their motion for preliminary approval of settlement of
the putative federal and state class actions for $33.3 million,
which the Company accrued for as of December 31, 2017. On January
19, 2018, the court entered an order preliminarily approving the
proposed settlement, and on April 20, 2018, the court approved the
final settlement. The federal and class action cases have been
dismissed with prejudice.

Fitbit, Inc., a technology company, provides health solutions in
the United States and internationally. The company offers a line of
devices, including Fitbit Surge, Fitbit Blaze, Fitbit Charge 2,
Alta HR, Alta, Fitbit Flex 2, Fitbit One, and Fitbit Zip activity
trackers; Fitbit Ionic smartwatches; Fitbit Aria 2 Wi-Fi smart
scales; and a range of accessories, such as bands and frames for
its devices, as well as Fitbit Flyer, a wireless headphone designed
for fitness. Fitbit, Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered
in San Francisco, California.


FLEX PHARMA: Amended Complaint in Rumaldo Suit Due Dec. 10
----------------------------------------------------------
Flex Pharma, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court-appointed
lead plaintiff in Teofilina Rumaldo v. Flex Pharma, Inc., et al.,
has until December 10, 2018, to file an amended complaint.

On June 19, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the company and certain of its current executive officers in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
captioned Teofilina Rumaldo v. Flex Pharma, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-05493.

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of stockholders who
purchased the company's common stock between November 6, 2017 and
June 12, 2018. The complaint generally alleges that the company and
certain of its current officers violated Sections 10(b) and/or
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder by making allegedly false and
misleading statements or omissions regarding the company's
business, operational and compliance policies.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that the company overstated the
viability and approval prospects for its product candidate FLX-787
for the treatment of MND and CMT and, as a result, the company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages, attorneys' fees, and other
costs. The court-appointed lead plaintiff has until December 10,
2018 to file an amended complaint.

Flex Pharma said, "We deny any allegations of wrongdoing and intend
to vigorously defend against this lawsuit. We are unable, however,
to predict the outcome of this matter at this time. Moreover, any
conclusion of this matter in a manner adverse to us and for which
we incur substantial costs or damages not covered by our directors'
and officers' liability insurance would have a material adverse
effect on our financial condition and business. In addition, the
litigation could adversely impact our reputation and divert
management's attention and resources from other priorities,
including the execution of business plans and strategies that are
important to our business, any of which could have a material
adverse effect on our business."

Flex Pharma, Inc., a biotechnology company, develops and
commercializes products for the treatment of muscle cramps, spasms,
and spasticity associated with neurological conditions and exercise
in the United States. It operates in two segments, Consumer
Operations and Drug Development. Flex Pharma, Inc. was founded in
2014 and is headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.


FRONTLINE ASSET: Dow Appeals E.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Marlyn Dow filed an appeal from the District Court's
order dated September 24, 2018, and judgment dated September 26,
2018, issued in the lawsuit styled Dow v. Frontline Asset
Strategies, LLC, et al., Case No. 17-cv-6888, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central Islip).

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Dow v. Frontline Asset
Strategies, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-3107, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Marlyn Dow, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Benjamin Wolf, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          1 Grand Central Place
          60 East 42nd Street
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (646) 459-7971
          E-mail: bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC, is represented
by:

          Peter George Siachos, Esq.
          GORDON & REES, LLP
          18 Columbia Turnpike
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 549-2500
          E-mail: psiachos@gordonrees.com


GDS HOLDINGS: Rosen Law Firm to Lead Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HAMZA RAMZAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED, WILLIAM
WEI, HUANG, and DANIEL NEWMAN, Defendants, Civil Action No.
4:18CV539-ALM-KPJ (E.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest
Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, Sherman Division, (i) granted Yuanli He's unopposed Motion
for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Lead Plaintiff's
Selection The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., as the Lead Counsel, and
Steckler Gresham Cochran PLLC, as the Liaison Counsel; (ii) denied
Maria M. Queri's Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and
Approval of Counsel; and (iii) granted parties' Joint Unopposed
Motion to Set a Deadline for Lead Plaintiff to Identify and Serve
the Operative Complaint and for An Extension of Time to Respond to
Operative Complaint.

On Aug. 2, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the present complaint
("Complaint") against the Defendants as a putative class action
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

The Complaint alleges that between March 29, 2018, and July 31,
2018, the Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) GDS overstated the value of certain
data centers it had acquired; (2) GDS failed to maintain adequate
internal controls; and (3) as a result, the Defendants' statements
about its business, operations and prospects were materially false
and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant
times.  When the true details entered the market, the lawsuits
claim that investors suffered damages.  

On July 31, 2018, Blue Orca Capital published a report stating,
among other things, that GDS was inflating the purchase price of
undisclosed related party transactions of various data centers.  On
this news, shares of GDS fell $12.92 per share, or over 37%, to
close at $21.83 per share on July 31, 2018.

On Oct. 5, 2018, the Plaintiff served Defendant GDS with the
Complaint.  Absent an extension of time, Defendant GDS's response
to the Complaint is due on Oct. 26, 2018.  Defendants William Wei
Huang and Daniel Newman have not yet been served with the
Complaint, but their counsel, who also represent GDS, agreed to
accept service of the Complaint.

On Aug. 2, 2018, the Plaintiff caused a public notice to be filed
pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Reform Act, publicizing
the existence of the lawsuit and the putative class, and notifying
putative class members of their right to move for the Lead
Plaintiff status by Oct. 1, 2018.

Two lead plaintiff motions, Yuanli He's Motion and Queri's Motion
are currently pending before the Court.  Yuanli He is represented
by the same counsel representing the Plaintiffs in the action.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), the Court must
appoint a Lead Plaintiff no later than Nov. 1, 2018.  Once
selected, the Lead Plaintiff will appoint the Lead Counsel, subject
to the Court's approval, and identify an operative complaint or
file an amended complaint.

The Joint Scheduling Motion represents that the parties have
agreed, subject to the Court's approval, that in the interests of
judicial economy, conservation of time and resources, and orderly
management of the action: (1) the Defendants should not be required
to respond to the current Complaint; (2) the Lead Plaintiff should
have 60 days upon its appointment as the Lead Plaintiff to file and
serve an amended complaint (or to designate the current complaint
as the operative complaint); (3) the Defendants should have 60 days
thereafter to respond to the operative complaint; and (4) if the
Defendants move to dismiss the operative complaint, the Lead
Plaintiff should have 60 days to file its opposition, the
Defendants should have 30 days to file their reply, and that no
further briefing will be permitted absent agreement by the parties
or approval of the Court upon good cause shown.

Magistrate Judge Johnson finds that Yuanli He's claims will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.  Yuanli He has
selected The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., as the Lead Counsel, and
Steckler Gresham Cochran PLLC, as the Liaison Counsel.  Both firms
are experienced in the area of securities litigation and class
actions, and have successfully prosecuted securities litigations
and securities fraud class actions on behalf of investors.  The
Judge is satisfied that the selected counsel possess the skill and
knowledge to prosecute the action effectively and expeditiously and
to ensure that the members of the class will receive the best legal
representation available.

Furthermore, Yuanli He's significant loss provides a sufficient
interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous advocacy,
which squarely aligns with the interests of the class.  Based on
the foregoing, the Judge finds Yuanli He has satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23 at this stage of litigation.

With respect to the deadline for responsive pleadings, the
Magistrate Judge finds there is good cause to enlarge the period of
time within which a defendant must serve its responsive pleading.
The competing lead plaintiff motions are pending before the Court
until entry of the Order.  Now that the Magistrate has appointed
Yuanli He as the Lead Plaintiff, Yuanli He may either designate the
operative pleading or file and serve an amended complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Johnson (i) granted
Yuanli He's Motion, (ii) denied Queri's Motion, and (iii) granted
the Joint Scheduling Motion.  Yuanli He is designated as the Lead
Plaintiff, and the Magistrate Judge approved Yuanli He's selection
of the Lead Counsel.

No Defendant is required to respond to the Complaint already filed
in the action.  Within 60 days of the Order, the Lead Plaintiff
will identify an operative complaint or file an amended complaint
that becomes the operative complaint.  The time for all the
Defendants to answer, move, or otherwise plead in response to any
complaint filed in the matter is extended to 60 days following
service of the operative complaint by the Lead Plaintiff.

Should any Defendant move to dismiss the operative complaint, the
Lead Plaintiff will have 60 days to file its opposition to any
motion to dismiss, and the Defendants will have 30 days to file any
reply.  No additional submission is permitted absent agreement by
the parties or approval by the Court upon good cause shown.

Nothing in the Order will be deemed to constitute a waiver of any
rights, defenses, objections or any other application to any court
that any party may have with respect to the claims set forth in the
Complaint already filed in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Order and
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/bYFsuq from Leagle.com.

Hamza Ramzan, Plaintiff, represented by R. Dean Gresham --
dean@stecklerlaw.com -- Steckler Gresham Cochran LLP, Yu Shi --
yshi@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, PA & Laura Kirstine
Rogers -- krogers@stecklerlaw.com -- Steckler Gresham Cochran LLP.

GDS Holdings Limited, William Wei Huang & Daniel Newman,
Defendants, represented by James G. Kreissman --
jkreissman@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Alan C. Turner
-- aturner@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett & Clyde Moody
Siebman -- clydesiebman@siebman.com -- Siebman Forrest Burg & Smith
LLP.

Yuanli He, Movant, represented by Laura Kirstine Rogers, Steckler
Gresham Cochran LLP, Phillip Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The
Rosen Law Firm, PA & Yu Shi, The Rosen Law Firm, PA.

Maria M. Queri, Movant, represented by Willie Charles Briscoe --
wbriscoe@thebriscoelawfirm.com -- The Briscoe Law Firm.


GOOGLE LLC: Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Cy Pres Dispute
------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Cox, Esq. -- jcox@ficlaw.com -- of Faruki Ireland Cox
Rhinehart & Dusing PLL, in an article for Lexology, reports that
all Hallow's Eve proved a fitting date for oral argument in the
Supreme Court of the United States in Frank v. Gaos, (S. Ct. No.
17-961), a case exploring the often-mysterious component to class
action settlements known as "cy pres."  The specific question
before the Court asked:

"Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action
proceeds that provide no direct relief to class members supports
class certification and comports with the requirement that a
settlement binding class members must be ‘fair, reasonable, and
adequate.'"

While the Court certainly examined this question, it became evident
early on that the Justices sought a broader discourse on Rule 23
practice; whether class action settlements were adequately
addressing class members' grievances; and whether it was a
legislative or judicial responsibility to attempt to clarify the
acceptable bounds of class action cy pres awards.

The case, on appeal from the 9th Circuit (869 F.3d (2017)), arose
from a 2010 class action filed by Paloma Gaos and a few other class
representatives against Google, Inc. alleging multiple counts,
including fraud and invasion of privacy related to Google's sharing
of plaintiffs' search terms with websites that the named plaintiffs
had visited.  That class action (on behalf of the then-129 million
Google search users) was contested by Google as meritless, but in
order to resolve the lawsuit, Google agreed to an $8.5 million
settlement.  $5.3 million would be allocated to six cy pres
recipients, with the remaining $3.2 million dedicated to
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, class administration costs and
incentive payments to the named plaintiffs.  Individual class
members, meanwhile, would receive no direct payment or benefits.

The six cy pres beneficiaries, it was agreed, would each "receive
anywhere from 15 to 21% of the money, provided that they agreed
‘to devote the funds to promote public awareness and education,
and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related
to protecting privacy on the Internet.'"  The cy pres recipients
were chosen after submitting proposals, but as objectors were quick
to point out, several of the cy pres beneficiaries had ties to
class counsel or to the Defendant, Google.

Class Objectors Ted Frank and Melissa Holyoak of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute challenged whether the settlement (which
besides awarding $5.3 million to several third-parties, would pay
plaintiffs' counsel $2.125 million, while affording class members
no recovery) was consistent with the mandates of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 -- that a class action settlement be "fair,
reasonable, and adequate."  While in similar circumstances at least
three other federal appellate courts previously held otherwise, the
9th Circuit affirmed the trial court's approval of the settlement.
The 9th Circuit acknowledged that "cy pres-only settlements are
considered the exception, not the rule"[4] but affirmed the
district court's ruling that the cost of verifying and ‘sending
out very small payments to millions of class members would exceed
the total monetary benefit obtained by the class,'" and also agreed
with the lower court that the class action was "the superior means
of adjudicating this controversy" contrary to Objectors' argument
that the case was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3).

The 9th Circuit wrote extensively on the adequacy of the cy pres
recipients and the process of their selection, and affirmed the
district court's finding that class counsel sufficiently supported
their loadstar rationale for the award of over $2.125 million in
attorneys' fees.  The Objectors then sought review from the Supreme
Court ("SCOTUS").

The extensive briefing of the parties earlier this year, not to
mention the appearance of over 30 amici curiae proved a harbinger
of the interest in SCOTUS' review of the class action issues.  The
October 31, 2018 argument featured lengthy questioning from every
member of the bench besides Justice Thomas.  Argument was heard
from Petitioner Frank; Respondents Google, Inc., and the class
representatives; and from amicus curiae United States.   What
proved most striking was the scope of the Justices' inquiries
ranging from constitutional standing (the jurisdictional inquiry
seemed to trouble many of the Justices); to Rule 23 class action
practice generally (not just the superiority requirements of Rule
23(b)(3)) such as class notice, administration and claims
processing; the nature of cy pres settlements, and how that aspect
of class settlements varies between cases (a) with payouts to class
members with residual to cy pres recipients, and (b) settlements
resolved exclusively via cy pres payments to third-parties but with
no relief to class members.

The Court also pondered its role in sorting out these various
questions, as opposed to leaving the legislating of clarifications
to Rule 23 practice to Congress.  On this question, interestingly,
several Justices openly pondered the Court's role vis-a-vis
Congress ranging from Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor to Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, representing ideological opposites.

The Supreme Court's treatment of cy pres class settlement inquiries
are of great consequence, with the potential to significantly
re-frame class action litigation.  Writing in a blog posted on the
ABA Journal's website a day prior to the oral argument,
constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky raised several "what
ifs":

"An underlying question is what will be done with the funds if the
Supreme Court were to disapprove such settlements?  Would they go
back to the defendants?  That would be a windfall for defendants
and undermine the function of class actions in enforcing the law
and deterring wrongdoing.  Would the money go to the government?
But if so, on what basis and for what purposes?  Or might the
[C]ourt go even further and accept the petitioner's argument that
cy pres-only class actions cannot be certified at all, providing a
great benefit to defendants and making it much harder to enforce
the law where the class members will not directly benefit from the
settlement."[7]

Class actions have long been an area of contentiousness in legal
and corporate circles.  An important device for protecting consumer
and civil rights or a grossly-abused tool of the plaintiff's bar to
line attorneys' pockets resulting in expensive defense costs but
little behavioral change by class defendants?  As with most things,
the answer lies not in the polar extremes, but rather in the
confounding middle ground.  The Halloween hearing on Frank v. Gaos
served to highlight and frame many of these difficult issues the
nine Justices must consider, but afforded little preview of how the
Court may resolve or guide lower courts as to the "fair, reasonable
and adequate" means of resolving large multi-party class
litigation.  The Court's opinion will be anxiously awaited by the
class action plaintiff and defense bars, as well as the many
institutions and not-for-profits which have been beneficiaries of
cy pres awards.

           Justices Call for Additional Briefs

Ronald Mann, writing for SCOTUS Blog, reports that the justices
called for additional briefing in Frank v. Gaos.

Discussion on the merits was in large part superseded by the
justices' concern that the plaintiffs in this case may not have
"standing" to bring the class action under the Supreme Court's 2016
decision in Spokeo v. Robins. The Spokeo court held that a
plaintiff in federal court cannot establish standing by alleging a
violation of a federal statute; the plaintiff must identify some
cognizable real-world harm. The district court's order approving
the settlement in this case was issued before the decision in
Spokeo; the court found that the plaintiffs had standing solely
because of the allegation that the defendants had violated a
federal statute. Thus, the district court did not identify any
cognizable harm that would make the case justiciable in a
post-Spokeo regime.

Although the parties did not raise the problem, the solicitor
general's amicus brief emphasized it and suggested that the
justices might wish to send the case back to the court of appeals
for consideration of the issue. At the argument, all seemed to
agree that the district court's reasoning could not withstand
scrutiny under Spokeo. The point of disagreement seemed to be
whether there was any prospect that the plaintiffs could identify
some new argument that would satisfy Spokeo at this late date. Some
of the justices (including Justice Samuel Alito, the author of the
court's opinion in Spokeo) seemed to think the allegations could
not possibly satisfy Spokeo, and that the Supreme Court might
dismiss the case on that basis. Others (including Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg) suggested that the lack of briefing made the
question sufficiently doubtful to warrant sending the case back to
the lower courts for further consideration.

The Nov.5 brief order (issued without dissent) suggests that the
justices compromised: They will neither dismiss the case out of
hand nor send it back to the lower courts for further deliberation.
Rather, they decided to call for additional briefs on the question
of justiciability, which would help to ensure that they are fully
informed before addressing the question in the first instance. They
did not call for reargument, though, as they did in Knick v
Township of Scott. That means that the case will be ripe for
decision as soon as the new briefs arrive. Because the new round of
briefing will be complete before Christmas, the justices should
have plenty of time to come to a decision before the end of the
term next June. [GN]

H&R BLOCK: Griffith Sues Over Sherman Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the case captioned Colleen Griffith, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. H&R
Block, Inc., H&R Block Tax Services LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-07520 (N.D. Ill., November 13, 2018) brought this class
action on behalf of herself and the proposed class of all other
similarly-situated current and former H&R Block employees against
Defendants for H&R Block's anticompetitive policy enforced on both
its franchised and company-owned tax offices that prevented any H&R
Block franchise from hiring or soliciting current employees of any
other H&R Block franchise or company-owned tax office, and
prevented H&R Block company-owned tax offices from hiring or
soliciting current employees of H&R Block franchises.

Plaintiff alleges that this no-hiring and no-solicitation agreement
was an illegal conspiracy between H&R Block and its franchises in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeks treble damages
and injunctive relief, demanding a trial of jury of all issues so
triable, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Colleen Griffith is a resident of Media, Pennsylvania.
Ms. Griffith was employed at an H&R Block location during the Class
Period.

H&R Block, Inc. (HRB) is a Missouri corporation that provides
consumer tax services in the United States and certain other
countries, including 10,000 retail offices in the United States
that offer professional tax preparers that assist consumers in
preparing tax returns. Its headquarters are at One H&R BlockWay in
Kansas City, Missouri. HRB has several wholly-owned subsidiaries in
the United States.

H&R Block Tax Services LLC is a Missouri limited liability company.
It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant HRB. Its headquarters
are also at One H&R Block Way in Kansas City, Missouri.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kenneth A. Wexler, Esq.
     Mark R. Miller, Esq.
     WEXLER WALLACE LLP
     55 West Monroe St., Suite 3300
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (312) 346-2222
     Email: kaw@wexlerwallace.com
            mrm@wexlerwallace.com

          - and -

     John Radice, Esq.
     Daniel Rubenstein, Esq.
     April Lambert, Esq.
     Natasha Fernandez-Silber, Esq.
     Rishi Raithatha, Esq.
     RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
     34 Sunset Blvd.
     Long Beach, NJ 08008
     Phone: (646) 245-8502
     Fax: (609) 385-0745
     Email: jradice@radicelawfirm.com
            drubenstein@radicelawfirm.com
            alambert@radicelawfirm.com
            nsilber@radicelawfirm.com
            rraithatha@radicelawfirm.com

          - and -

     Eric L. Young, Esq.
     Paul V. Shehadi, Esq.
     McELDREW YOUNG, Attorneys-at-Law
     123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2250
     Philadelphia, PA 19109
     Phone: (215) 367-5151
     Fax: (215) 367-5143
     Email: eyoung@mceldrewyoung.com
            paul@mceldrewyoung.com


HAECO AMERICAS: $150K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Linnis Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID LINNINS, KIM WOLFINGTON, and CAROL BLACKSTOCK,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. HAECO AMERICAS, INC. (f/k/a TIMCO AVIATION SERVICES,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:16CV486 (M.D. N.C.), Judge N. Carlton
Tilley, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina (i) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses; and (ii) granted the Consent
Motion to Substitute Renamed Corporate Defendant.

The case involves the alleged 2016 disclosure of the personal
identifying information of employees of HAECO and copies of their
W-2 statements in response to an email phishing scheme.  The
Plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and
violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act which included an alleged violation of the North
Carolina Identity Theft Protection Act.

On May 31, 2018, a hearing was held on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, which was granted, and
the instant motion for attorneys' fees and costs, the ruling on
which was reserved until the Class Counsel filed their supplement
in further support of the Plaintiffs' motion.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the members of
the class who had not previously registered for two years of
Experian ProtectMyID Elite were given another opportunity to
enroll.  The members of the class who purchased identify theft
protection at their own expense were able to seek reimbursement up
to $350.  A Claim Fund was established in the amount of $312,500 to
compensate the class members for damages, expenses, and
inconveniences they incurred.  Finally, HAECO agreed to take data
and cyber security steps, including mandatory cyber security
training for all employees, for at least three years.

For their work to achieve these results and as part of the
Settlement Agreement, the Class Counsel seek $150,000 inclusive of
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, to be paid separate and apart
from any payments made to the class members.  No putative class
member filed objections to the Settlement Agreement when afforded
the opportunity to do so.

Judge Tilley holds that the Plaintiffs' request for $150,000 in
attorneys' fees and expenses is reasonable.  First, there were no
objections to the Class Counsel's proposed request for attorneys'
fees and expenses.  In addition, not only are the Class Counsel
experienced in complex consumer protection class actions, but their
experience in W-2 data disclosure class actions is unique.  They
took the case on a contingent basis at a time when the law applying
to such cases was unsettled and developing.  Even today, results in
W-2 data disclosure class actions are mixed.  Yet, in the case, the
Class Counsel succeeded in obtaining a positive result for their
clients despite the Defendant's pending motion to dismiss.  The
total of $150,000 for attorneys' fees and expenses represents a
lodestar multiplier of 1.16 not out of the norm.  All of these
factors support granting the Plaintiffs' motion.

For the reasons stated above, the Judge granted (i) the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses, and
(ii) the Consent Motion to Substitute Renamed Corporate Defendant.
HAECO is substituted for TIMCO Aviation Services, Inc.  The case
caption will be amended to reflect that HAECO Americas, Inc. (f/k/a
TIMCO Aviation Services, Inc.) is the Defendant, and all current
filings be deemed amended to reflect the substitution.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Memorandum
Order is available at https://is.gd/4GtXpV from Leagle.com.

DAVID LINNINS, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, KIM WOLFINGTON, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED & CAROL BLACKSTOCK, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by JOHN A.
YANCHUNIS, MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP & JEAN SUTTON
MARTIN -- jean@jsmlawoffice.com -- Law Office of Jean Sutton Martin
PLLC.

HAECO AMERICAS, INC., formerly known as TIMCO AVIATION SERVICES,
INC., Defendant, represented by JASON M. BEACH --
jbeach@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, NEIL K. GILMAN --
ngilman@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP & RACHEL SCOTT
DECKER -- rsd@crlaw.com -- CARRUTHERS & ROTH, PA.


HCP INC: Bid to Dismiss Boynton Beach Pension Fund Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
HCP, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the parties in the case,
Boynton Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. HCP, Inc., et al., are
still awaiting court's decision on the motion to dismiss the
complaint.

On May 9, 2016, a purported stockholder of the Company filed a
putative class action complaint, Boynton Beach Firefighters'
Pension Fund v. HCP, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-01106-JJH, in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against
the Company, certain of its officers, HCR ManorCare, Inc.
("HCRMC"), and certain of its officers, asserting violations of the
federal securities laws.

The suit asserts claims under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"),
and alleges that the Company made certain false or misleading
statements relating to the value of and risks concerning its
investment in HCRMC by allegedly failing to disclose that HCRMC had
engaged in billing fraud, as alleged by the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DoJ") in a suit against HCRMC arising from the False
Claims Act that the DoJ voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.

The plaintiff in the class action suit demands compensatory damages
(in an unspecified amount), costs and expenses (including
attorneys' fees and expert fees), and equitable, injunctive, or
other relief as the Court deems just and proper. On November 28,
2017, the Court appointed Societe Generale Securities GmbH (SGSS
Germany) and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief Systems
(Birmingham) as Co-Lead Plaintiffs in the class action.

The motion to dismiss was fully briefed on May 21, 2018 and oral
arguments were held on October 23, 2018. The Company believes the
suit to be without merit and intends to vigorously defend against
it.

HCP, Inc. is a fully integrated real estate investment trust (REIT)
that invests in real estate serving the healthcare industry in the
United States. The company is based in Irvine, California.


HEALTHPORT TECH: Dismissal of Ciox from Kuchenmeister Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEON KUCHENMEISTER, CINDY A. HUGGER-GRAVITT, BETH A.
BRETOI, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HEALTHPORT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, d.b.a. IOD
Incorporated, d.b.a. Healthport Technologies, LLC, IOD
INCORPORATED, CIOX HEALTH, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
18-10468 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
complaint against Ciox.

The Defendant, a health information management services provider,
contracts with healthcare providers to process patient requests for
medical records.  Aspects of its business are governed by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), and
by implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS").

Each named Plaintiff requested copies of his or her medical records
from a healthcare provider that had a contract ("Business Associate
Agreement") with the Defendant.  Pursuant to the terms of those
Business Associate Agreements, Defendant processed and fulfilled
Plaintiffs' medical records requests.  After providing each
Plaintiff with the requested medical records, the Defendant sent
each Plaintiff an invoice for the amount owed to the Defendant for
having processed the request.  Briefly stated, the Plaintiffs
contend that the Defendant charged them more for processing their
medical record requests than the amount permitted under HIPAA and
under DHHS regulations.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action against the
Defendant, alleging state law claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and for money had and received.  The district court
dismissed for lack of standing the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of
contract, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  The district court
also dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and
for money had and received.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant breached the Business
Associate Agreements between the Defendant and their healthcare
providers by overcharging them for copies of their medical records,
in violation of HIPAA and DHHS regulations.  The district court
concluded that, because Plaintiffs were no third-party
beneficiaries to the Business Associate Agreements, they lacked
standing to sue for breach of contract.

The Appellate Court finds that the Business Associate Agreements
involved in the case each contain a contract provision establishing
unambiguously that the contracting parties intended no third party
to have a legally enforceable right under the contract.  Given the
clear and unambiguous contract language, the district court
concluded properly that the Plaintiffs had no legally protected
rights under the pertinent Business Associate Agreements.  The
Plaintiffs, thus, lacked standing to pursue a claim based on an
alleged breach of those contracts.  The Appellate Court holds that
the district court committed no error in dismissing the Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

The Plaintiffs next challenge the district court's dismissal of
their claims for unjust enrichment and for money had and received.
The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.  The Appellate Court
agrees.  It finds that the Plaintiffs made their payments "under
protest" is insufficient to avoid application of the voluntary
payments doctrine.  It also rejects the Plaintiffs' contention that
the voluntary payments doctrine is inapplicable based on equitable
concerns: the Defendant's alleged bad faith and as a matter of
public policy.  It folds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show
that the voluntary payments doctrine is inapplicable to the case.
The thus district court committed no error in concluding that the
Plaintiffs were barred from seeking recovery of payments made
voluntarily to the Defendant.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/OHixWG from Leagle.com.

Jennifer B. Dempsey -- jennifer.dempsey@bryancave.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jay P. Lefkowitz -- lefkowitz@kirkland.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

James Marvin Feagle -- jfeagle@skaarandfeagle.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kris Skaar -- krisskaar@aol.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William V. Custer, IV -- bill.custer@bryancave.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Nathaniel J. Kritzer -- nathaniel.kritzer@kirkland.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Justin Tharpe Holcombe -- jholcombe@skaarandfeagle.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Clifton Dorsen -- cdorsen@skaarandfeagle.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Donald Sawyer -- dsawyer@keoghlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Keith J. Keogh -- Keith@Keoghlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amy L. Wells -- AWells@KeoghLaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher Adam Johnston -- cjohnston@jm-legal.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher Peter Martineau -- cmartineau@jm-legal.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alexandra Strang -- allie.strang@kirkland.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Marquel P. Reddish --  marquel.reddish@kirkland.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Thomas Artaki -- thomas.artaki@kirkland.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


HERBALIFE NUTRITION: Rodgers Suit Transferred to California
-----------------------------------------------------------
Herbalife Nutrition Ltd. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the Court in
Rodgers, et al. v Herbalife Ltd., et al., issued an order
transferring the action to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California as to four of the putative class plaintiffs
and ordering the remaining four plaintiffs to arbitration, thereby
terminating the Company defendants from the Florida action.

On September 18, 2017, the Company and certain of its subsidiaries
and Members were named as defendants in a purported class action
lawsuit, titled Rodgers, et al. v Herbalife Ltd., et al. and filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
which alleges violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices statute and federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statutes, unjust enrichment, and negligent
misrepresentation.

On August 23, 2018, the Court issued an order transferring the
action to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California as to four of the putative class plaintiffs and ordering
the remaining four plaintiffs to arbitration, thereby terminating
the Company defendants from the Florida action. The plaintiffs seek
damages in an unspecified amount.

The Company believes the lawsuit is without merit and will
vigorously defend itself against the claims in the lawsuit.

Herbalife Nutrition Ltd. develops and sells nutrition solutions in
North America, Mexico, South and Central America, Europe, the
Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific. It provides
science-based products in the areas of weight management; targeted
nutrition; energy, sports, and fitness; and outer nutrition. The
company was formerly known as Herbalife Ltd. and changed its name
to Herbalife Nutrition Ltd. in April 2018. Herbalife Nutrition Ltd.
was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Los Angeles,
California.


HERTZ CORP: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Kurth Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHRYNE ANNE KURTH, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 18 C 2785 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, (i) granted Hertz's motion to compel arbitration with
regard to the first four transactions, and (ii) granted Hertz's
partial motion to dismiss with prejudice regarding claims stemming
from Kurth's fifth transaction with Hertz.

After Kurth discovered that Hertz allegedly charged her a
"concession fee recovery" at a location where it incurred no
concession fee on five separate occasions when she rented a car
from Hertz, she filed the putative class action against Hertz for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("ICFA"), and other state consumer fraud statutes.
She also brings an unjust enrichment claim.  In response, Hertz now
brings a motion to compel arbitration and a partial motion to
dismiss.

Between December 2017 and March 2018, Kurth rented cars on five
separate occasions from Hertz at its location at 401 North State
Street in Chicago, Illinois.  Each time, Hertz charged her a
"concession fee recovery."  Hertz defines "concession fee recovery"
as a fee to reimburse Hertz for concession/commission fees paid to
the airport (hotel, train station, base, or agent) for each rental.
However, the State Street Location is not located at a facility
where Hertz would incur a concession fee.

Hertz operates a loyalty program called the Hertz Gold Plus Rewards
Program.  Kurth enrolled in this program and signed an agreement
regarding the Gold Program that provides that the agreement may be
revised or supplemented from time to time by Hertz sending Kurth
notice of such changes, and that making a Program rental after the
effective date of such changes will constitute Kurth's acceptance
of such changes.

Hertz updated the Gold Agreement in 2016, including an arbitration
provision that provides that the parties agree to arbitrate any
disputes between the parties, other than claims for property
damage, personal injury or death.  Hertz provided Kurth with notice
of this change.  Although it allows customers to opt out of the
provision, Kurth did not choose to do so for the first four
transactions at issue in the case.  She did, however, opt out of
the arbitration provision with regard to the fifth transaction,
which occurred on March 15, 2018.

Judge Ellis finds that Kurth did not submit any response to Hertz's
motion to compel, effectively waiving any argument in opposition to
its motion.  However, even had Kurth challenged the delegation
provision, she would not have prevailed.  The delegation provision
in the Gold Agreement clearly demonstrates the parties' agreement
to send the threshold matter of arbitrability to the arbitrator.
Another court within the circuit, when presented with the exact
delegation provision present in the instant case decided that the
delegation provision was clear and it must send the matter to an
arbitrator.  In light of the valid delegation clause, Judge Ellis
granted Hertz's motion to compel arbitration with regard to the
first four transactions at issue.

As to its motion to partially dismiss Kurth's amended complaint,
Hertz argues that the Court should dismiss Kurth's claims regarding
the fifth transaction because Kurth was aware of the deception when
she entered the fifth transaction.  The Judge finds that Kurth
fails to state a claim for violation of ICFA or unjust enrichment
regarding the fifth transaction because she was aware of the
alleged deception when she entered into the fifth transaction.
Judge Ellis theregore partially granted Hertz's motion to dismiss.
Because Kurth cannot amend her claim to fix this deficiency, the
Judge dismissed her ICFA claims based on the fifth transaction with
prejudice.

The case is stayed pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/AQ0del from Leagle.com.

Kathryne Anne Kurth, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated,, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher M. Hack --
chris@krislovlaw.com -- Krislov & Associates, Ltd., Clinton A.
Krislov -- clint@krislovlaw.com -- Krislov & Associates, Ltd. &
Kenneth Todd Goldstein -- ken@krislovlaw.com -- Krislov &
Associates, Ltd.

The Hertz Corporation, Defendant, represented by John Fee Ward --
jward@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Lauren J. Hartz --
lhartz@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice & Michelle R.
Singer -- msinger@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block Llp, pro hac vice.


IRSA INVESTMENTS: Plaintiffs Appeal Case Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------
IRSA Investments and Representations Inc. said in its Form 20-F
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
October 31, 2018, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2018, that
plaintiffs have taken an appeal from the court's order granting
IRSA and Cresud's motion to dismiss a class action lawsuit.

On February 23, 2016, a class action was filed against IRSA, Cresud
Sociedad Anonima Comercial, Inmobiliaria, Financiera y Agropecuaria
and some first-line managers and directors at the District Court of
the USA for the Central District of California. The complaint was
amended on February 13, 2017. As amended, the complaint, on behalf
of people who purchased or otherwise acquired American Global
Depositary Receipts of IRSA between November 3, 2014 February 11,
2015 and December 30, 2015, claims presumed violations to the US
federal securities laws. In addition, it argues that defendants
have made material misrepresentations and made some omissions
related to the Company's investment in IDBD.

Such complaint was voluntarily waived on May 4, 2016 by the
plaintiff and filed again on May 9, 2016 with the US District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Furthermore, the Companies and some of its first-line managers and
directors are defendants in a class action filed on April 29, 2016
with the US District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The complaint was amended on February 13, 2017. As
amended, the complaint, on behalf of people holding who purchased
or otherwise acquired American Global Depositary Receipts of Cresud
between May 13, 2015 February 11, 2015 and December 30, 2015,
presumes violations to the US federal securities laws. In addition,
it argues that defendants have made material misrepresentations and
made some omissions related to the investment of the Company's
subsidiary, IRSA, in IDBD.

Subsequently, the Companies requested the transfer of the claim to
the district of New York, which was accepted.

On December 8, 2016, the Court appointed the representatives of
each presumed class as primary plaintiffs and the lead legal
advisor for each of the classes. On February 13, 2017, the
plaintiffs of both classes filed a document containing certain
amendments. The companies filed a petition requesting that the
class action brought by shareholders should be dismissed.

On April 12, 2017, the Court suspended the class action filed by
Cresud shareholders until the Court decides on the petition of
dismissal of such the IRSA shareholder class action. Filing
information on the motion to dismiss the collective remedy filed by
shareholders of IRSA was completed on July 7, 2017.  On September
10, 2018, the Court issued an order granting IRSA and Cresud's
motion to dismiss in its entirety. Plaintiffs have appealed such
order.

The companies hold that such allegations are meritless and will
continue making a strong defense in both actions.

IRSA Investments and Representations Inc. or IRSA Inversiones y
Representaciones Sociedad Anonima engages in the diversified real
estate activities in Argentina. The company was founded in 1943 and
is headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina. IRSA Inversiones y
Representaciones Sociedad Anónima is a subsidiary of Cresud
Sociedad Anonima Comercial, Inmobiliaria, Financiera y
Agropecuaria.


JONATHAN NEIL: Brown Class Settlement Has Preliminary Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of California
issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Class Action Settlement in the case captioned TERI
BROWN, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NEIL AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 1:17-cv-00675-SAB. (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Teri Brown filed this action on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated against Defendant Jonathan Neil and
Associates, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (FDCPA).

Reasonableness, Adequacy, and Fairness of Settlement to Class
Members

The parties have been conducting arm's length settlement
negotiations while adjudicating the class certification of this
action. The parties have exchanged discovery which has identified
approximately 281 class members and two depositions of the
defendant have been taken.  

Discovery has been conducted and two motions for class
certification have been filed, as well as a previous motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement.

Counsel for the parties have analyzed the legal and factual issues
that are presented in this action, the likelihood of recovering
damages in excess of those obtained by this settlement, the
protracted nature of the litigation and the potential costs and
outcome of further litigation and have determined that settlement
of this action is appropriate.

The FDCPA caps a class recovery at the lesser of one percent of the
debt collector's net worth or $500,000.00. Therefore, financial
statements provided during discovery have led counsel for Plaintiff
to conclude that the settlement amount is the maximum that the
class can receive under the statute. Based on the number of class
members, each class member who does not opt out of the class is
expected to receive approximately $35.50 and courts have found
lesser amounts reasonable in similar FDCPA class action cases.
Further, attorney fees and the class representative payments will
not be deducted from the settlement fund. The benefit that the
class members will receive is not insubstantial. The Court finds
that the settlement falls within the reasonable range.

Notice

The notice must also clearly and concisely state in plain, easily
understood language:
(i) the nature of the action (ii) the definition of the class
certified (iii) the class claims, issues, or defences (iv) that a
class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the
member so desires (v) that the court will exclude from the class
any member who requests exclusion (vi) the time and manner for
requesting exclusion and(vii) the binding effect of a class
judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Here, the Court previously expressed concern because the plaintiff
is receiving her full statutory damage award of $1,000.00 as well
as an enhancement award of $1,500.00 while the class members are
receiving only a fraction of the statutory damage amount they could
receive.  

As the Plaintiff is receiving a benefit beyond that of the other
class members by receiving her full statutory benefit award, this
factor will weigh heavily against granting an incentive award in
this matter. Further, in Staton, the Ninth Circuit found it was an
abuse of discretion to approve a settlement where the class
representatives received an incentive award that was, on average
sixteen times greater than the award that the unnamed class members
would receive.

The district court must evaluate the fairness of the incentive
award by considering relevant factors including the actions the
plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the
degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions the
amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the
litigation and reasonable fears of workplace retaliation. Should
Plaintiff seek an enhancement payment she will be expected to
address the factors that the court considers in issuing such an
award.

At the final approval hearing, the Court will employ the lodestar
method to the request for attorney fees as a cross check on the
percentage method to ensure a failure and reasonable result.
Therefore, counsel is advised that in submitting the final approval
of class action settlement they will be required to provide a
thorough fee award petition that details the hours reasonably spent
representing the class in this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8b2qfdg from Leagle.com.

Teri Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac vice,
Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman,
LLC, pro hac vice & Tammy L. Hussin -- Tammy@HussinLaw.com --
Hussin Law.

Jonathan Neil and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Michael Egan -- cegan@porterscott.com -- Porter Scott,
APC, Derek Joseph Haynes -- dhaynes@porterscott.com -- Porter
Scott, PC & Lynette Mary Komar -- lynette.komar@cdpr.ca.gov --
Porter Scott.


KEYVIEW LABS: Pannell Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
EVELYN PANNELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs KEYVIEW LABS, INC. and DOES 1-10, the
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-02508 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 30, 2018),
seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies, for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, resulting from the illegal
actions of Defendants, in negligently, knowingly and/or willfully
placing through their agent(s), automated, sales, solicitation,
and/or other telemarketing calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone,
in violation of the TCPA and related regulations, specifically the
National Do-Not-Call and internal do-no-call provisions of 47
C.F.R. 64.1200(c) and (d), thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy.

According to the complaint, on or about February 6, 2010, Plaintiff
successfully registered her residential telephone number ending in
-2602 with the National Do-Not-Call Registry. During or about
March, 2018, Defendants began placing unsolicited automated
telemarketing telephone calls to Plaintiff. When Plaintiff would
answer Defendants' telephone calls, she experienced a long pause
before a live representative would begin speaking, which is
indicative of an automatic telephone dialing system.

Plaintiff has not previously sought out Keyview's services nor has
Plaintiff attempted to retrieve information from Keyview about its
services. Despite Plaintiff's unequivocal request that Defendants
cease placing telephone calls to her telephone number ending in
-2602, Defendants continued to place unsolicited, automated
telemarketing telephone calls to the telephone number. As a result
of Defendants' acts and omissions outlined above, Plaintiff has
suffered concrete and particularized injuries and harm, the lawsuit
says.

KeyView Labs, Inc. researches, develops, and tests brain health and
fitness supplements.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff:

          David B. Levin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          333 Skokie Blvd., Suite 103
          Northbrook, IL 60062
          Telephone: (224) 218-0882
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: dlevin@toddflaw.com

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: 9th Cir. Remands Proceedings on Attorney's Fees
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum reversing in part and affirming in part District Court's
judgment granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Class Action
Settlement Agreement in appeals cases captioned STEVEN RUSSELL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and
DONNA CAFFEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, ANNE CARD, Objector-Appellant,
v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES,
1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees. SARAH MCDONALD,
Objector-Appellant, BARBARA COCHRAN; et al., Objectors, v. STEVEN
RUSSELL, an individual; DONNA CAFFEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee, and DOES, 1-100, inclusive, Defendant. STEVEN
RUSSELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated and DONNA CAFFEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, BOBBI CECIO,
Objector-Appellant, v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., a Delaware
Corporation and DOES, 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees. STEVEN RUSSELL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated and DONNA CAFFEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, BARBARA S. COCHRAN, Objector-Appellant, v.
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES, 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 16-56493,
16-56650, 16-56696, 16-56764. (9th Cir.).

When the parties settled this class action regarding alleged false
advertising by Kohl's Department Stores, several objectors raised
concerns about the settlement challenging Plaintiffs' Article III
standing, the notice to class members, the overall fairness of the
settlement, and the award of attorney's fees to class counsel.

The district court overruled the objections and approved the
settlement and attorney's fees, and four objectors appealed. The
Court concludes that Plaintiffs had Article III standing and that
the district court properly approved the class notice and
settlement. But we vacate the award of attorney's fees and remand
for the district court to consider objections to the fee award and
provide a renewed opportunity for Objector Cecio to raise such
objections.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Plaintiffs were typical members of the settlement class they sought
to certify under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Only one
named plaintiff must be a typical class member to satisfy the
requirements for class certification. In moving for class
certification for the purposes of settlement, Plaintiffs submitted
evidence that Russell was a typical member of the class that would
receive gift cards because he had made several purchases at Kohl's
that would place him in the class. And it appears that Caffey was
probably a member of the class as well, even though she may have
received refunds for some of her purchases.

The district court did not err in holding that this was not a
coupon settlement. Several Objectors asserted that the district
court should have treated the settlement in this case as a coupon
settlement under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).  

And the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
that the overall settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
Court have explained that district courts deciding whether a
settlement submitted for approval is fair, reasonable, and adequate
should discuss their application of several factors:

The strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Under the circumstances of this case, however, and particularly
given the comprehensive objections that Cecio filed in the briefing
on appeal, the In re Mercury error is harmless so long as Cecio's
objections are addressed on remand. Cecio identified new,
substantial objections to the fees request on appeal, several of
which raise serious concerns about the fee awarded here. Plaintiffs
did not respond to many of Cecio's objections on appeal, and
because McDonald's objections in the district court did not
encompass all of Cecio's objections, the district court did not
address them either.  

The district court's approval of the settlement can otherwise
stand, however, because vacating the award of attorney's fees will
not render the overall settlement unfair, unreasonable, or
inadequate. The settlement agreement in this case specifically
separated the approval of fees from the rest of the settlement. And
the district court originally awarded the maximum available fees
under the settlement agreement. Any fees not awarded to counsel on
remand will go to the class, so the remand in this case can only
benefit the class. The Court therefore affirms the district court's
approval of the settlement while remanding for further proceedings
on attorney's fees.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's November 5, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydc5od8g from Leagle.com.


LEXINGTON INSURANCE: Ezell Appeals Order in RICO Suit to 1st Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Erica Biddings, Norma Ezell and Leonard Whitley filed an
appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit titled Ezell, et al. v.
Lexington Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-10007-NMG, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 16, 2018, the
District Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
amended complaint in the case.

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against 10 insurance
companies and subsidiaries alleging that certain commissions
charged in connection with annuity payments are unlawful.

The appellate case is captioned as Ezell, et al. v. Lexington
Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 18-2064, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants NORMA EZELL, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated; LEONARD WHITLEY, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated; and ERICA BIDDINGS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          Craig R. Spiegel, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  craig@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Kristen A. Johnson, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Pkwy., Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142-0000
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          E-mail: kristenj@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Richard B. Risk, Jr., Esq.
          RISK LAW FIRM PA
          6964 S Shore Dr. S
          South Pasadena, FL 33707
          Telephone: (918) 494-8025
          E-mail: dick@risklawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC., AIG ASSURANCE COMPANY, AIG PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY, AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN GENERAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, PA, AGC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN GENERAL
ANNUITY SERVICE CORPORATION and AIG CLAIMS, INC., f/k/a AIG
Domestic Claims, Inc., are represented by:

          James L. Hallowell, Esq.
          Nancy E. Hart, Esq.
          Adam H. Offenhartz, Esq.
          Peter M. Wade, Esq.
          GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          200 Park Avenue, 47th Floor
          New York, NY 10166-0193
          Telephone: (212) 351-3804
          E-mail: jhallowell@gibsondunn.com
                  nhart@gibsondunn.com
                  aoffenhartz@gibsondunn.com
                  pwade@gibsondunn.com

Defendants-Appellees LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC., AIG ASSURANCE COMPANY, AIG PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY, AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN GENERAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, PA, AGC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN GENERAL
ANNUITY SERVICE CORPORATION, AIG CLAIMS, INC., f/k/a AIG Domestic
Claims, Inc., and AIG INSURANCE COMPANY are represented by:

          William T. Hogan, III, Esq.
          Patrick Thomas Uiterwyk, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP
          1 Post Office Sq., 30th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 217-4701
          E-mail: bill.hogan@nelsonmullins.com
                  patrick.uiterwyk@nelsonmullins.com


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Deal in Formaldehyde & Abrasion Litig. Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30,
2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
Court has granted final approval on the settlement entered by the
company in the Formaldehyde and the Abrasion multi-district
litigation.

Beginning on or about March 3, 2015, numerous purported class
action cases were filed in various U.S. federal district courts and
state courts involving claims of excessive formaldehyde emissions
from the Company's Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring products.
The purported classes consisted of all U.S. consumers that
purchased the relevant products during certain time periods.

Plaintiffs in these cases challenged the Company's labeling of its
products as compliant with the California Air Resources Board
Regulation and alleged claims for fraudulent concealment, breach of
warranty, negligent misrepresentation and violation of various
state consumer protection statutes. The plaintiffs sought various
forms of declaratory and injunctive relief and unquantified
damages, including restitution, actual, compensatory, consequential
and, in certain cases, punitive damages, as well as interest, costs
and attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs and other purported
class members in connection with the alleged claims.

In a series of orders, the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (the "MDL Panel") transferred and
consolidated the federal cases to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia (the "Virginia Court"). The
consolidated case in the Virginia Court is captioned In re: Lumber
Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Products Marketing,
Sales, Practices and Products Liability Litigation (the
"Formaldehyde MDL").

Beginning on or about May 20, 2015, multiple class actions were
filed in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and other district courts located in the place of
residence of each non-California plaintiffs consisting of U.S.
consumers who purchased the Company's Chinese-manufactured laminate
flooring products challenging certain representations about the
durability and abrasion class ratings of such products.

These plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent concealment, breach
of warranty and violation for various state consumer protection
statutes. The plaintiffs did not quantify any alleged damages in
these cases; however, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs,
they did seek an order (i) certifying the action as a class action,
(ii) adopting the plaintiffs' class definitions and finding that
the plaintiffs are their proper representatives, (iii) appointing
their counsel as class counsel, (iv) granting injunctive relief to
prohibit the Company from continuing to advertise and/or sell
laminate flooring products with false abrasion class ratings, (v)
providing restitution of all monies the Company received from the
plaintiffs and class members and (vi) providing damages (actual,
compensatory and consequential), as well as punitive damages.

On October 3, 2016, the MDL Panel issued an order transferring and
consolidating the abrasion class actions to the Virginia Court. The
consolidated case is captioned In re: Lumber Liquidators
Chinese-Manufactured Laminate Flooring Durability Marketing and
Sales Practices Litigation (the "Abrasion MDL").

On March 15, 2018, the Company entered into a settlement agreement
to jointly settle the Formaldehyde MDL and the Abrasion MDL. Under
the terms of the settlement agreement, the Company has agreed to
fund $22 million (the "Cash Payment") and provide $14 million in
store-credit vouchers for an aggregate settlement amount of $36
million to settle claims brought on behalf of purchasers of
Chinese-made laminate flooring sold by the Company between January
1, 2009 and May 31, 2015.  

The Company may fund the $22 million through a combination of cash
and/or common stock. On June 16, 2018, the Virginia Court issued an
order that, among other things, granted preliminary approval of the
settlement agreement. Following the preliminary approval and
pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the Company, in
June, paid $0.5 million for settlement administration costs, which
is part of the Cash Payment, to the settlement escrow account. On
October 3, 2018, at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing the
Court approved the settlement.  

Lumber Liquidators said, "To date, insurers have denied coverage
with respect to the Formaldehyde MDL and Abrasion MDL.  The $36
million aggregate settlement amount was accrued in 2017."

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hardwood
flooring, and hardwood flooring enhancements and accessories.
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1994 and is
headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Steele Class Suit in Canada Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit in Canada by Sarah Steele against Lumber
Liquidators Holdings, Inc. remains pending, the Company said in its
Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on October 30, 2018, for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2018.

On or about April 1, 2015, Sarah Steele ("Steele") filed a
purported class action lawsuit in the Ontario, Canada Superior
Court of Justice against the Company. In the complaint, Steele's
allegations include strict liability, breach of implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraud by concealment, civil negligence, negligent
misrepresentation and breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.  Steele did not quantify any alleged damages in her
complaint, but seeks compensatory damages, punitive, exemplary and
aggravated damages, statutory remedies, attorneys' fees and costs.


Lumber Liquidators said, "While the Company believes that a further
loss associated with the Steele litigation is possible, the Company
is unable to reasonably estimate the amount or range of possible
loss."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hardwood
flooring, and hardwood flooring enhancements and accessories.
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1994 and is
headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


MARATHON PETROLEUM: Andeavor Merger-Related Suits Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marathon Petroleum Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that all the
actions related to the merger of the company with Andeavor have
been dismissed as moot, and the parties reserved their rights in
the event of any dispute over attorneys' fees and expenses.

On April 29, 2018, the Company ("MPC") and Andeavor ("ANDV")
entered into a definitive merger agreement under which MPC has
agreed to acquire all of ANDV's outstanding shares.

Between June 20 and July 11, 2018, six putative class actions (the
"Actions") were filed against some or all of Andeavor, the
directors of Andeavor, and MPC, Mahi Inc. ("Merger Sub 1") and Mahi
LLC (n/k/a Andeavor LLC) ("Merger Sub 2" and, together with MPC and
Merger Sub 1, the "MPC Defendants"), relating to the Andeavor
merger.

Two complaints, Malka Raul v. Andeavor, et al., and Stephen
Bushansky v. Andeavor, et al., were filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas.

Four complaints, captioned The Vladimir Gusinsky Rev. Trust v.
Andeavor, et al., Lawrence Zucker v. Andeavor, et al., Mel Gross v.
Andeavor, et al., and Hudson v. Andeavor, et al. were filed in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.

The Actions generally alleged that Andeavor, the directors of
Andeavor and the MPC Defendants disseminated a false or misleading
registration statement regarding the merger in violation of Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the “Exchange
Act") and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. Specifically, the
Actions alleged that the registration statement filed by MPC
misstated or omitted material information regarding the parties'
financial projections and the analyses performed by Andeavor's and
MPC's respective financial advisors, and that disclosure of
material information was necessary in light of preclusive deal
protection provisions in the merger agreement, the financial
interests of Andeavor's officers and directors in completing the
deal, and the financial interests of Andeavor's and MPC's
respective financial advisors.

The Actions further alleged that the directors of Andeavor and/or
the MPC Defendants were liable for these violations as "controlling
persons" of Andeavor under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The
Actions sought injunctive relief, including to enjoin and/or
rescind the merger, damages in the event the merger is consummated,
and an award of attorneys' fees, in addition to other relief.

On July 5 and July 20, 2018, MPC filed amendments to its
Registration Statement on Form S-4, which included certain
supplemental disclosures responding to allegations made by the
plaintiffs. On August 3, 2018, Andeavor filed its proxy statement,
and after that date, the parties had numerous discussions regarding
the adequacy of disclosures.

The parties ultimately reached an agreement in principle to resolve
the Actions in exchange for the supplemental disclosures.
Consistent with that agreement, Andeavor and MPC each filed a
Current Report on Form 8-K on September 14, 2018 that included
certain additional disclosures in response to plaintiffs'
allegations. Between September 21 and September 28, 2018, all the
Actions were dismissed as moot, and the parties reserved their
rights in the event of any dispute over attorneys' fees and
expenses. The Company does not believe the ultimate resolution of
these fee issues will be material.

Marathon Petroleum Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
engages in refining, marketing, retailing, and transporting
petroleum products primarily in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Refining & Marketing, Speedway, and
Midstream. The company was incorporated in 2009 and is
headquartered in Findlay, Ohio.


MASTERCARD INC: Damage Class Seeks Settlement Approval
-------------------------------------------------------
Mastercard Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the Damages Class
plaintiffs in the Interchange Fees-related suit have filed a motion
with the court seeking preliminary approval of the settlement
agreement.

In June 2005, the first of a series of complaints were filed on
behalf of merchants (the majority of the complaints were styled as
class actions, although a few complaints were filed on behalf of
individual merchant plaintiffs) against Mastercard International,
Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Service Association and a
number of financial institutions. Taken together, the claims in the
complaints were generally brought under both Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, which prohibit monopolization and attempts or
conspiracies to monopolize a particular industry, and some of these
complaints contain unfair competition law claims under state law.

The complaints allege, among other things, that Mastercard, Visa,
and certain financial institutions conspired to set the price of
interchange fees, enacted point of sale acceptance rules (including
the no surcharge rule) in violation of antitrust laws and engaged
in unlawful tying and bundling of certain products and services.

The cases were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in MDL No.
1720. The plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint
that seeks treble damages.

In July 2006, the group of purported merchant class plaintiffs
filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Mastercard's initial
public offering of its Class A Common Stock in May 2006 (the "IPO")
and certain purported agreements entered into between Mastercard
and financial institutions in connection with the IPO: (1) violate
U.S. antitrust laws and (2) constituted a fraudulent conveyance
because the financial institutions allegedly attempted to release,
without adequate consideration, Mastercard’s right to assess them
for Mastercard's litigation liabilities. The class plaintiffs
sought treble damages and injunctive relief including, but not
limited to, an order reversing and unwinding the IPO.

In February 2011, Mastercard and Mastercard International entered
into each of: (1) an omnibus judgment sharing and settlement
sharing agreement with Visa Inc., Visa U.S.A. Inc. and Visa
International Service Association and a number of financial
institutions; and (2) a Mastercard settlement and judgment sharing
agreement with a number of financial institutions. The agreements
provide for the apportionment of certain costs and liabilities
which Mastercard, the Visa parties and the financial institutions
may incur, jointly and/or severally, in the event of an adverse
judgment or settlement of one or all of the cases in the merchant
litigations. Among a number of scenarios addressed by the
agreements, in the event of a global settlement involving the Visa
parties, the financial institutions and Mastercard, Mastercard
would pay 12% of the monetary portion of the settlement. In the
event of a settlement involving only Mastercard and the financial
institutions with respect to their issuance of Mastercard cards,
Mastercard would pay 36% of the monetary portion of such
settlement.

In October 2012, the parties entered into a definitive settlement
agreement with respect to the merchant class litigation (including
with respect to the claims related to the IPO) and the defendants
separately entered into a settlement agreement with the individual
merchant plaintiffs. The settlements included cash payments that
were apportioned among the defendants pursuant to the omnibus
judgment sharing and settlement sharing agreement described above.
Mastercard also agreed to provide class members with a short-term
reduction in default credit interchange rates and to modify certain
of its business practices, including its "no surcharge" rule. The
court granted final approval of the settlement in December 2013,
and objectors to the settlement appealed that decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In June 2016, the court of appeals vacated the class action
certification, reversed the settlement approval and sent the case
back to the district court for further proceedings. The court of
appeals' ruling was based primarily on whether the merchants were
adequately represented by counsel in the settlement. As a result of
the appellate court ruling, the district court divided the
merchants' claims into two separate classes - monetary damages
claims (the "Damages Class") and claims seeking changes to business
practices (the "Rules Relief Class"). The court appointed separate
counsel for each class.

Prior to the reversal of the settlement approval, merchants
representing slightly more than 25% of the Mastercard and Visa
purchase volume over the relevant period chose to opt out of the
class settlement. Mastercard had anticipated that most of the
larger merchants who opted out of the settlement would initiate
separate actions seeking to recover damages, and over 30 opt-out
complaints have been filed on behalf of numerous merchants in
various jurisdictions. Mastercard has executed settlement
agreements with a number of opt-out merchants.

Mastercard believes these settlement agreements are not impacted by
the ruling of the court of appeals. The defendants have
consolidated all of these matters in front of the same federal
district court that approved the merchant class settlement. In July
2014, the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss
the opt-out merchant complaints for failure to state a claim.

In September 2018, the parties to the Damages Class litigation
entered into a class settlement agreement to resolve the Damages
Class claims. The Damages Class plaintiffs have filed a motion with
the court seeking preliminary approval of the settlement agreement.


Mastercard previously increased its reserve during the second
quarter of 2018 by $210 million to reflect both its expected
financial obligation under the Damages Class settlement agreement
and the filed and anticipated opt-out merchant cases. The
settlement agreement does not relate to the Rules Relief Class
claims. Separate settlement negotiations with the Rules Relief
Class are ongoing.

As of September 30, 2018, Mastercard had accrued a liability of
$912 million as a reserve for both the merchant class litigation
and the filed and anticipated opt-out merchant cases. As of
September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, Mastercard had $550
million and $546 million, respectively, in a qualified cash
settlement fund related to the merchant class litigation and
classified as restricted cash on its consolidated balance sheet.

Mastercard believes the reserve for both the merchant class
litigation and the filed and anticipated opt-out merchants
represents its best estimate of its probable liabilities in these
matters at September 30, 2018. The portion of the accrued liability
relating to both the opt-out merchants and the merchant class
litigation settlement does not represent an estimate of a loss, if
any, if the matters were litigated to a final outcome. Mastercard
cannot estimate the potential liability if that were to occur.

Mastercard Incorporated, a technology company, provides transaction
processing and other payment-related products and services in the
United States and internationally. It facilitates the processing of
payment transactions, including authorization, clearing, and
settlement, as well as delivers related products and services. The
company was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Purchase, New
York.


MCDERMOTT INT'L: Chicago Bridge & Iron Securities Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the case captioned: In re Chicago Bridge & Iron
Company N.V. Securities Litigation, No. 1:17-cv-01580-LGS, are
engaged in the discovery process, McDermott International, Inc.
said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 30, 2018, for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

On March 2, 2017, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking class
action status on behalf of purchasers of CB&I common stock and
alleging damages on their behalf arising from alleged false and
misleading statements made during the class period from October 30,
2013 to June 23, 2015. The case is captioned: In re Chicago Bridge
& Iron Company N.V. Securities Litigation, No. 1:17-cv-01580-LGS
(the "Securities Litigation").

The defendants in the case are: CB&I; Philip K. Asherman, CB&I's
former chief executive officer; Westley S. Stockton, CB&I's former
controller and chief accounting officer; and Ronald Ballschmiede,
CB&I's former chief financial officer. On June 14, 2017, the court
named ALSAR Partnership Ltd. as lead plaintiff.  

On August 14, 2017, a consolidated amended complaint was filed
alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, arising out of alleged
misrepresentations about CB&I's accounting for the acquisition of
The Shaw Group, CB&I's accounting with respect to the two nuclear
projects being constructed by The Shaw Group, and CB&I's financial
reporting and public statements with respect to those two projects.


On May 24, 2018, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and
the parties are currently engaged in the discovery process.  

McDermott International said, :We are not able at this time to
determine the likelihood of loss, if any, arising from this matter
and, accordingly, no amounts have been accrued at September 30,
2018. We believe the claims are without merit and intend to defend
against them vigorously."

McDermott International, Inc. provides engineering, procurement,
construction and installation, front-end engineering and design,
and module fabrication services for upstream field developments. It
operates through three segments: the Americas, Europe and Africa;
the Middle East; and Asia. McDermott International, Inc. was
founded in 1923 and is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


MEDICAL SOLUTIONS: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Dittman FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRYON DITTMAN, an individual on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL SOLUTIONS,
L.L.C.; and DOES 1 to 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-01851-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr.
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted Dittman's motion to (1) certify a California-wide class
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and (2)
conditionally certifying a nationwide Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify a
California-wide class pursuant to Rule 23.  

With respect to the state Labor Code claim for unpaid overtime, as
well as the derivative state law claims for unlawful business
practices, and waiting time penalties, he certified the class
consisting of all non-exempt hourly healthcare professionals
employed by Medical Solutions who, at any time from Sept. 7, 2013
through the date of certification, worked in California pursuant to
a Travel Assignment Agreement during which they received housing
and/or meal and incidental benefits, received overtime pay, and had
the value of their housing and/or meals and incidental benefits
excluded from their regular rate for purposes of calculating
overtime pay.

He appointed the Plaintiff as the representative of the certified
class; and Hayes Pawlenko LLP, Matthew B. Hayes, and Kye D.
Pawlenko as the class counsel for the certified class.

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification of a FLSA collective action.  He conditionally
certified, for purposes of disseminating notice and setting an
opt-in deadline, the collective action of all non-exempt hourly
healthcare professionals employed by Medical Solutions in the
United States who, at any time within the three years preceding
certification, worked pursuant to a Travel Assignment Agreement
during which they received housing and/or meal and incidental
benefits, worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more workweeks,
and had the value of their housing and/or meals and incidental
benefits excluded from their regular rate for purposes of
calculating overtime pay.

However, the Notices provided as Exhibits A and B to the
Plaintiff's Motion are not yet approved, and the Judge ordered that
they be modified to include the following section:

     Will I owe taxes if Plaintiff prevails?

          Possibly. You may wish to consult a tax professional
about any potential tax implications raised by this lawsuit.  A tax
professional can also assess your potential economic benefit or
loss that might result if you choose to participate in this
lawsuit.

          If there is a decision that the per diem allowances in
question are wages instead of reimbursements, as Plaintiff asserts
in this Lawsuit, there is a possibility that the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) will no longer permit Medical Solutions to treat the
per diems as a tax-free benefit.  This is because the per diem
allowances will no longer meet accountable plan rules under the
Internal Revenue Code (See 26 C.F.R. Section 1.362-2, 26 U.S.C.
Section 162).  In this situation, all future per diem allowances
provided by Medical Solutions will become taxable wages, subject to
withholding and employment taxes.  Under these circumstances, the
IRS might also take the position that all class members are
personally liable for all federal and income taxes that were not
withheld on any past per diem amounts received.  As a result, you
may owe the IRS retroactive taxes on any per diem amounts you have
previously received from Medical Solutions if you choose to
participate in the Lawsuit.

Not later than 10 days following the date the Order is
electronically filed, the parties will file Final Proposed Notices
and a proposed order for the Court's signature approving those
notices and setting forth the relevant deadlines.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vhzre8 from Leagle.com.

Bryon Dittman, Plaintiff, represented by Kye Douglas Pawlenko --
kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes, Pawlenko, LLP & Matthew Bryan
Hayes -- mhayes@helpcounsel.com  -- Hayes Pawlenko LLP.

Medical Solution, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by David A.
Yudelson -- david.yudelson@koleyjessen.com -- Koley Jessen PC,
L.L.O., pro hac vice, Margaret C. Hershiser --
margaret.hershiser@koleyjessen.com -- Koley Jessen PC, L.L.O., pro
hac vice, Sarah Kroll- Rosenbaum -- skrollrosenbaum@constangy.com
-- Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete & Kenneth Dawson Sulzer --
ksulzer@constangy.com -- Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP.


MESA LABORATORIES: Records $3,300 as Potential Loss in TCPA Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mesa Laboratories, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
recorded an expense of $3,300 as an estimate of its potential loss
associated with the class actions suits initiated by Dr. James L.
Orrington II and Rowan Family Dentistry, Inc.

In February 2018, Dr. James L. Orrington II filed a purported civil
class action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the company
sent unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines.  

The complaint includes counts alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,
Conversion, Nuisance, and Trespass to Chattels. The plaintiff seeks
monetary damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees.  

Additionally, in June 2018, Rowan Family Dentistry, Inc. filed a
purported class action complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado making substantially the same
claims as Dr. James L. Orrington II and seeking substantially the
same relief.

During the three months ended September 30, 2018, the company
recorded an expense of $3,300 as an estimate of its potential loss
associated with the matter. The expense is recorded in estimated
legal settlement on the company's condensed consolidated statements
of income and a corresponding liability is included in estimated
legal liability on the company's condensed consolidated balance
sheets.

Mesa Laboratories said, "We intend to vigorously defend the
aforementioned cases; however, we may ultimately be subject to
liabilities greater or less than the amount accrued."

Mesa Laboratories, Inc. designs, manufactures, and markets quality
control instruments and disposable products. Mesa Laboratories,
Inc. was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in Lakewood,
Colorado.


MOTEL 6: Settles Hispanic Guests' Class Action for $7.6MM
---------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stempel, writing for Reuters, reports that Motel 6 will
pay up to $7.6 million to Hispanic guests to settle a proposed
class-action lawsuit claiming that it violated their privacy by
regularly providing guest lists to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents.

Terms of the preliminary settlement with eight Hispanic plaintiffs
-- seven from Arizona and one from Washington state -- were
disclosed in a Nov. 2 filing with the federal court in Phoenix.

Motel 6 also agreed to a two-year consent decree barring it from
sharing guest data with immigration authorities absent warrants,
subpoenas, or threats of serious crime or harm.

Court approval is required. Motel 6 did not admit liability, and
denied engaging in unlawful conduct.

The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF)
filed the lawsuit after the Phoenix New Times said ICE agents had
arrested 20 people over six months at Motel 6s in Arizona, using
guest lists to target people by national origin.

Motel 6 had no immediate comment. MALDEF did not immediately
respond to requests for comment. A settlement had been reached in
July but no terms were disclosed.

The terms were announced shortly before the U.S. midterm elections,
in which President Donald Trump has made immigration a central
issue.

Up to $5.6 million will go to Motel 6 guests who faced immigration
removal proceedings after their personal information was shared.
They are eligible to receive at least $7,500 each.

Another $1 million was set aside for guests who were questioned or
interrogated by immigration authorities, with each guest receiving
$1,000.

The remaining $1 million will go to guests whose information was
turned over to immigration authorities from Feb. 1, 2017 to Nov. 2,
2018. They will receive $50 each.

Motel 6 will also pay up to $1.3 million for the plaintiffs' legal
fees and administrative costs.

The chain is controlled by the private equity firm Blackstone Group
LP, which bought the brand in 2012.

Motel 6's management company, G6 Hospitality, has said it ordered
its more than 1,400 U.S. and Canadian locations in September to
stop voluntarily giving guest lists to ICE agents.

The case is Jane V. et al v Motel 6 Operating LP et al, U.S.
District Court, District of Arizona, No. 18-00242. [GN]


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Garcia Settlement Has Final Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUANITA GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all
others similar situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. C15-1808
TSZ (W.D. Wash.), Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval to Class Action Settlement.

On May 25, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement in the case,
appointed Plaintiff Garcia as the Class Representative, and
appointed Rafey S. Balabanian of Edelson PC and D. Frank Davis of
Davis & Norris, LLP as the Class Counsel.  The Court also approved
the Class Notice, including Direct Notice and the creation of the
Settlement Website, and appointed Heffler Claims Group as the
Settlement Administrator.

As of Oct. 24, 2018, Heffler has received 6,596 timely Claim Forms
submitted via postcard, email, or fax and 8,443 timely Claim Forms
submitted via the claims website.  As of the same date, Heffler has
received 40 Exclusion Requests and no notice of objection by any
Class Member.  As of the date, class member Sherlie Charlot has
indicated she has no objection as to the scope of the proposed
settlement release.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b), the counsel for the
Defendant sent notices of the Settlement to the United States
Attorney General and the Attorneys General of all the states in
which Class Members reside on July 27, 2018.  The Court is
satisfied that the notice requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b)
were substantially met, and that the 90-day period described in 28
U.S.C. Section 1715(d), between service of the notice and the date
of issuance of the Order, has elapsed.

Forty-one individuals have requested exclusion from the class and
the settlement of this matter: Priscilla R. Hunsaker, Darren
Ellerbee, Doris Turner, Jose Acevedo, Tonietta Coit, James R. Mock,
Jimmie White, Beryl Thomas, Joe Cabrera, David Hose, Sherry Brooks,
James Kennedy, Maria Vide, Starline Dixon, Mary McCammon, Daniel
Brooks, Chester Lempitsky, Jacqueline White, Charles Engle, Dale
Smith, Alfredo Caracena, Michelle Jackson, Robert Ridgeway, Tamara
Slutskaya, Timothy Tuck, Carols Capo, Herbert Lubitz, Richard
Rutkowski, Jr., Hazel Henry, Dennis Butz, James Davis, Robin
Johnson, Stacie Hedley, Marilyn Sangmeister, Brian O'Neill, Veva
Johnson, Floy Johnson, Sherly Cisrow, Garland Groom, Devin Dilay,
and Sherlie Charlot.  Only 34 of the exclusion requests match names
on the class list.

The matter came before the Court for hearing on Oct. 17, 2018.
Judge Zilly has considered the Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval to Class Action Settlement.  He finally approved the
Settlement in all respects, and directed the Parties to implement
and consummate the Settlement Agreement according to its terms and
provisions.

The Judge has also considered the Plaintiff's Motion for attorneys'
fees of $968,750 and expenses of $16,383.53 to the Class Counsel
and adjudged that these payments are fair and reasonable.  He has
also considered the Plaintiff's Motion and supporting declarations
for a Case Contribution Award to the Named Plaintiff.  He adjudged
that the payment of a service award in the amount of $5,000 to the
Plaintiff, to compensate her for her efforts and commitment on
behalf of the Settlement Class, is fair, reasonable, and justified
under the circumstances of the case.

The Judge entered judgment for purposes of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 58 and 79, and the time period for filing any notice of
appeal will commence on the date of entry of the Final Order and
Judgment.  He directed the Clerk to send a copy of the Final Order
and Judgment to all the counsel of record and to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Final Order and
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/dhnw5u from Leagle.com.

Juanita Garcia, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, D. Frank Davis --
fdavis@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP, pro hac vice, Rafey
S. Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac
vice, Wesley W. Barnett -- wbarnett@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS &
NORRIS LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford A. Cantor.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Erik Kemp -- ek@severson.com -- SEVERSON
& WERSON, pro hac vice, Kalama M. Lui-Kwan -- kml@severson.com --
SEVERSON & WERSON, pro hac vice, Mary Kate Kamka -- kk@severson.com
-- SEVERSON & WERSON, pro hac vice & John Alan Knox --
jknox@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS.

Sherlie Charlot, Interested Party, represented by Dean N. Kawamoto
-- dkawamoto@KellerRohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK LLP, Derek W.
Loeser -- dloeser@KellerRohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK LLP,
Gretchen S. Obrist -- gobrist@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK
LLP & Ian J. Mensher -- imensher@KellerRohrback.com -- KELLER
ROHRBACK LLP.


NEIMAN MARCUS: Court Rules on Individual Claims Settlement Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, F.A., by and through his parents and guardians on
behalf of similarly situated individuals and on behalf of THE
NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP LLC HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN, Plaintiff,
v. THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP LLC HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN and
THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP LLC, Defendants, Case No. C17-1571RSL (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, held that notice of F.A.'s
individual claims settlement need not be sent to the putative class
members.

The parties seek to resolve F.A.'s individual claims through
settlement without prejudice to the claims of putative class
members.  No notices have been sent to putative class members, nor
has a class been certified.  The parties maintain that notice of
the settlement need not be sent to putative class members in these
circumstances, either by force of the 2003 amendments to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e) or under the analysis set forth in Diaz v. Trust
Territory of Pacific Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir.1989).

Judge Lasnik explains that prior to 2003, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)
required approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or
compromise of any class action.  The rules were amended, however,
to require court approval of any settlement, voluntary dismissal,
or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class.  Thus, resolution of only F.A.'s individual claims does not
require Court review and approval.  Because there are no class
members who would be bound by the settlement proposal, the
procedures for class notice are not triggered.  The same result is
reached if one were to apply the pre-2003 Diaz analysis.

Based on the Court's review of the unopposed motion and the
remainder of the record, the Judge finds that the Diaz factors pose
no hurdle to dismissal of the action without notice.  There is no
indication that Plaintiffs improperly utilized the class action
mechanism, and dismissal of F.A.'s individual claims is without
prejudice to the putative class members' ability to seek any and
all available relief.  With regards to the prejudice factor, there
is little reason to believe that the putative class members are
aware of this nascent litigation or, if they were, that dismissal
would preclude them from pursuing their claims.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Lasnik finds that notice of
the proposed settlement need not be given to putative class
members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vtZ9mE from Leagle.com.

F. A., by and through his parents and guardians, P.A. and F.A.,
individually, on behalf of similarly situated individuals, and on
behalf of The Neiman Marcus Group LLC Health and Welfare Benefit
Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Richard E. Spoonemore --
info@sylaw.com -- SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER & Eleanor
Hamburger, SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER.

The Neiman Marcus Group LLC Health and Welfare Benefit Plan & The
Neiman Marcus Group LLC, Defendants, represented by Gwendolyn C.
Payton -- gpayton@kilpatricktownsend.com -- KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &
STOCKTON LLP & John R. Neeleman -- jneeleman@kilpatricktownsend.com
-- KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP.


NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS: Mulquin Sues over Misleading Financial Report
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN MULQUIN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS, HOWARD W. ROBIN,
and GIL M. LABRUCHERIE, the Defendants, Case 4:18-cv-06607-HSG
(N.D. Cal., Oct. 30, 2018), seeks to recover damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue
remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, the case is a federal securities class
action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Nektar securities
between November 11, 2017 5 through October 2, 2018, both dates
inclusive. Nektar purports to leverage its proprietary and proven
chemistry platform to discover and design new drug candidates.
These drug candidates utilize the Company's advanced polymer
conjugate technology platforms, which are designed to enable the
development of new molecular entities that target known mechanisms
of action. NKTR-214, is the Company’s lead immune-oncology
("I-O") candidate, is a biologic with biased signaling through one
of the IL-2 receptor subunits (CD 122) that can stimulate
proliferation 21 and growth of tumor-killing immune cells in the
tumor micro-environment and increase expression of 22 PD-1 on these
immune cells.

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) prior studies which
attempted to pegylate IL-2 failed; (ii) NKTR-214’s extended
half-life was unlikely to result in efficacy and created additional
high-dosing safety concerns; (iii) NKTR-2 214 was less effective
than IL-2 alone; (iv) the combination of NKTR-214 with nivolumab
has not yet demonstrated significant positive results; and (v) as a
result, Nektar's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On October 1, 2018, Plainview LLC published a report entitled
"NKTR-214: Pegging the Value at Zero". The report addressed the
efficacy of Nektar’s lead clinical-stage drug NKTR-214, which the
Company has touted as "a promising treatment for cancer,
particularly in combination with checkpoint inhibitors."The
Plainview report stated that "Nektar hypothesized that IL-2 [a
naturally occurring cytokine] could be improved by adding
polyethylene glycol molecules to it (pegylating it) to extend the
half-life and block interaction with” a specific receptor, but
that "unfortunately, the anticipated benefits did not materialize
and pegylation has proved to be a drag on efficacy." The Plainview
report asserted that the core concept of Nektar's plan to develop
NKTR-214 15 into "a new universal cancer treatment" "has never
worked in practice", and further asserted that Nektar's decision to
only disclose certain trial results represented “an unprecedented
level of data opacity."

Following publication of the Plainview report, Nektar's stock price
fell $5.63 per share, or 9.24%, over the following two trading
sessions, closing at $55.33 per share on October 2, 2018. As a
result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.

Nektar is a research-based biopharmaceutical company that discovers
and develops innovative medicines in areas of high unmet medical
need. Nektar’s research and development pipeline of new
investigational drugs includes treatments for cancer, autoimmune
disease and chronic pain.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood, II, Esq.
          Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          468 North Camden Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (818) 532-6499
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
          Marshall P. Dees, Esq.
          HOLZER & HOLZER, LLC
          1200 Ashwood Parkway, Suite 410
          Atlanta, GA 30338
          Telephone: (770) 392-0090
          Facsimile: (770) 392-0029
          E-mail: cholzer@holzerlaw.com
                  mdees@holzerlaw.com

NEXTGEN HEALTHCARE: $19 Million Accord Wins Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Quality Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered
a final order on November 20, 2018, granting final approval to the
$19 million cash settlement of the case.

NextGen Healthcare, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that on November 19,
2013, a putative class action complaint was filed on behalf of the
shareholders of the Company other than the defendants against the
company and certain of its officers and directors in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California by one
of the company's shareholders.

After the Court appointed lead plaintiffs and lead counsel for this
action, and recaptioned the action In re Quality Systems, Inc.
Securities Litigation, No. 8:13-cv-01818-CJC-JPR, lead plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint on April 7, 2014. The amended complaint,
which is substantially similar to the "Hussein Litigation,"
generally alleges that statements made to the company's
shareholders regarding the company's financial condition and
projected future performance were false and misleading in violation
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act"), and that the individual defendants are liable
for such statements because they are controlling persons under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The complaint seeks compensatory
damages, court costs and attorneys' fees.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on June
20, 2014, which the Court granted on October 20, 2014, dismissing
the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order, which the Court denied on
January 5, 2015. On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
captioned In re Quality Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation, No.
15-55173.

On July 28, 2017, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision reversing and
remanding the District Court's order on the company's motion to
dismiss. On September 5, 2017, the company filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, which was denied on September 29, 2017. On
January 26, 2018, the company filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme
Court ordered the plaintiffs to file a response to the petition,
which they filed on March 22, 2018.

On May 10, 2018, the parties reached an agreement-in-principle to
resolve the action for $19 million, and on May 11, 2018, the
parties requested that the Supreme Court stay any decision
regarding whether to hear the Company's petition for a writ of
certiorari, pending the parties' ongoing settlement negotiations.
On July 16, 2018, the parties signed a definitive settlement
agreement resolving the matter and submitted it to the Court for
approval.  

On July 30, 2018, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement and scheduled a final approval hearing for November 19,
2018. Under the terms of this agreement, the settlement will be
partially funded by certain of the Company's insurance carriers,
and defendants will continue to deny any liability or wrongdoing.  


The settlement does not resolve the Hussein Litigation or the
Shareholder Derivative Litigation. The $19 million settlement of
the Federal Securities Class Action complaint, which was partially
funded by certain of our insurance carriers, was tendered to a
court-supervised settlement account during the three months ended
September 30, 2018.

Additional information on the settlement is available at:

          http://www.qsisecuritiessettlement.com/

NextGen Healthcare, Inc. provides a range of software, services,
and analytics solutions to medical and dental group practices. The
company's portfolio delivers foundational capabilities to empower
physician success, enrich the patient care experience, and enable
the transition to value-based healthcare. The company is based in
Irvine, California.


NOVAN INC: Bid to Dismiss SB204-Related Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
Novan, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the motion to dismiss the
consolidated SB204-related suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, is still pending.

The Company is subject to putative stockholder class action
lawsuits that were filed in November 2017 in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against
the Company and certain of its current and former directors and
officers, which have been consolidated under the case name In re
Novan, Inc. Securities Litigation. A lead plaintiff has been
designated, and on April 30, 2018, the lead plaintiff filed a
consolidated amended complaint.

The consolidated amended complaint asserts claims for violation of
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, in connection with statements related to the Company's
Phase 3 clinical trials of SB204. The consolidated amended
complaint seeks, among other things, an unspecified amount of
compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of the
putative class.

On June 14, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.

The Company believes that the claims lack merit and intends to
defend the lawsuits vigorously.

Novan said, "However, there can be no assurance that a favorable
resolution will be obtained in such lawsuits, and the actual costs
may be significant. The Company is unable to estimate the amount of
a potential loss or range of potential loss, if any."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Novan, Inc., a clinical-stage biotechnology company, focuses on the
development and commercialization of nitric oxide-based therapies
to treat dermatological and oncovirus-mediated diseases. Novan,
Inc. was founded in 2006 and is headquartered in Morrisville, North
Carolina.


ONEMAIN HOLDINGS: Galestan Class Suit in New York Still Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
OneMain Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit entitled, Galestan
v. OneMain Holdings, Inc., et al.

On February 10, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit, Galestan v.
OneMain Holdings, Inc., et al., was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, naming as defendants
the Company and two of its officers.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Exchange Act for allegedly
making materially misleading statements and/or omitting material
information concerning alleged integration issues after the OneMain
Acquisition in November 2015, and was filed on behalf of a putative
class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the
Company’' common stock between February 25, 2016 and November 7,
2016. The complaint seeks an award of unspecified compensatory
damages, an award of interest, reasonable attorney's fees, expert
fees and other costs, and equitable relief as the court may deem
just and proper.

On March 23, 2017, the court appointed a lead plaintiff for the
putative class and approved the lead plaintiff's selection of
counsel. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 13, 2017
challenging statements regarding the Company's projections of
future financial performance and certain statements regarding
integration after the OneMain Acquisition.

On September 29, 2017, pursuant to the Court's Individual Rules and
Practices, the company sought permission to file a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. The Company believes that the
allegations specified in the amended complaint are without merit,
and intends to vigorously defend against the claims.

OneMain Holdings said, "As the lawsuit is in the preliminary
stages, the Company is unable to estimate a reasonably possible
range of loss, if any, that may result from the lawsuit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

OneMain Holdings, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides consumer
finance and insurance products and services. The company operates
in two segments, Consumer and Insurance, and Acquisitions and
Servicing. OneMain Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1920 and is based
in Evansville, Indiana.


OPUS BANK: Schwartz Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Central District of California
issued an Order and Final Judgment in the case captioned NANCY
SCHWARTZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. OPUS BANK, STEPHEN H. GORDON, and MICHAEL
L. ALLISON, Defendants. Civil No. 2:16-cv-07991-AB-JPR. (C.D.
Cal.).

This matter came before the Court for hearing to determine (i)
whether the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement and the proposed settlement embodied therein are
fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be approved by the Court;
and (ii) whether a Judgment providing, among other things, for the
dismissal with prejudice of this Action against Defendants as
provided for in the Settlement.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for
purposes of settlement only, this Court finally certifies this
Action as a class action with the Class defined as:

     all persons or entities who purchased shares of Opus common
stock between January 26, 2015 and January 30, 2017, inclusive.

Excluded from the Class are: (1) Defendants and members of the
immediate family of any Defendant (2) any entity in which any
Defendant has, or had during the Class Period, a controlling
interest (3) the officers and directors of Opus during the Class
Period and (4) the legal representatives, agents, executors, heirs,
successors, or assigns of any of the foregoing excluded persons or
entities who assert an interest in Opus common stock through or on
behalf of any such excluded persons or entities.

Also excluded from the Class are any putative Class Members who
exclude themselves by filing a request for exclusion in accordance
with the requirements set forth in the Notice.

The Court finds and concludes, for purposes of settlement only,
that the prerequisites for a class action under Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied in
that: (1) the number of Class Members is so numerous that joinder
of all Class Members is impracticable (2) there are questions of
law and fact common to Class Members (3) Lead Plaintiff's claims
are typical of the Class's claims (4) Lead Plaintiff and Lead
Counsel have and will fairly and adequately represent and protect
the interests of the Class (5) the questions of law and fact common
to Class Members predominate over any individual questions; and (6)
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
for purposes of settlement only, the Court affirms its
determinations in the Preliminary Approval Order and finally
appoints Lead Plaintiff as class representative for the Class, and
finally appoints Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, previously
appointed as Lead Counsel, as counsel for the Class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc86pqwe from Leagle.com.

Nancy Schwartz, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Henry Linehan , Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP, Lesley F. Portnoy , Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy , Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP &
Robert Vincent Prongay , Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System, Lead Plaintiff,
Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy , Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy , Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP,Robert Vincent Prongay , Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Daniel
S. Sommers , Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice,
Stephen Douglas Bunch , Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, pro
hac vice & Steven J. Toll , Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC,
pro hac vice.

Opus Bank, Stephen H. Gordon & Michael L. Allison, Defendants,
represented by Alexandra Rex Mayhugh , Cooley LLP, Caitlin B.
Munley , Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice, Eric A. Kuwana ,
Cooley LLP, pro hac vice & Samantha A. Strauss , Cooley LLP.


PENTAGON FEDERAL: Court Throws Out Disabled Veteran's TILA Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in case
captioned TIFFANY NEAL Plaintiff, v. PENTAGON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant. Civil Action No. ELH-18-451. (D. Md.).

Plaintiff Tiffany Neal, a disabled veteran, filed a class action
suit against Pentagon Federal Credit Union (PenFed), defendant. In
a First Amended Class Action Complaint, she alleges that PenFed
unlawfully withdrew disability benefits from her PenFed deposit
account to cover overdue loan payments.

Neal asserts the proverbial kitchen sink of claims. She contends
that PenFed's seizure of her benefits violated her federal rights
under 38 U.S.C. Section 5301, which statutorily protects disability
benefits owed to veterans; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA); and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA). In addition, she asserts State
claims for breach of contract, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, constructive trust, accounting, unjust
enrichment, conversion, as well as a violation of the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA).

The Amended Complaint contains eleven causes of action: Violation
of 38 U.S.C. Section 5301 (Count I); Breach of Contract (Count II);
Negligence (Count III); Negligent Misrepresentation (Count IV);
Constructive Trust (Count V); Accounting (Count VI); Unjust
Enrichment (Count VII); Conversion" (Count VIII); Violation of the
EFTA, (Count IX); Violation of the TILA (Count X); and Violation of
the MCPA (renumbered as Count XI).

The Court grants the Motion with respect to Count I, for violations
of Section 5301; Count V, for constructive trust; Count VI, for an
accounting; Count VII, for unjust enrichment; Count VIII, for
conversion; Count X, for violations of the TILA; Count XI, for
violations of the MCPA. Otherwise, the Motion is denied.

Count II: Breach of Contract

In Count II, Neal contends that PenFed wrongfully withdrew funds
from Neal's deposit accounts, and that there was [no] disclosure by
PenFed that plaintiff's future disability benefits would be taken
from her deposit account to pay any delinquencies. Further, she
asserts: At the time of signing the loan agreement, plaintiff knew
and believed that the agreement would not affect any veterans
disability benefits she would receive in the future.

Conversely, PenFed maintains that Neal's subjective beliefs about
the terms of her agreements with PenFed are irrelevant. In
addition, PenFed argues that the contracts at issue the Promissory
Note, the Membership Agreement, and the Cardholder Agreement
expressly authorize it to take statutorily protected funds without
notice. And, according to the contracts' express terms, PenFed
asserts that it could not have breached the contracts by taking
statutorily protected benefits.

Indeed, Neal's subjective beliefs about the terms of the agreements
do not inform the Court’s analysis here. In construing an
unambiguous contract, the written language embodying the terms of
an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties,
irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered
into the contract. At this juncture I cannot consider the terms of
the contracts at issue. Indeed, the Court must accept, as true,
Neal's factual allegations as to the terms of the contracts.  

Therefore, the Court will deny PenFed's Motion with respect to
Count II.

Count III: Negligence

Neal asserts a negligence claim against PenFed. She contends that
her loan agreement with PenFed created a duty to treat plaintiff
fairly and in good faith. Specifically, she claims that PenFed owed
a duty to Plaintiff to inform her that in the event of default her
veterans disability benefits would be taken from her deposit
accounts.

In its Motion, PenFed argues, inter alia, that this claim must fail
because it did not owe a tort duty to Neal, which is an essential
element of a negligence claim under Maryland law.  
In Maryland, to assert a claim in negligence, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the
plaintiff from injury (2) that the defendant breached that duty (3)
that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss and (4) that the
loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of
the duty.

Notably, when the dispute is over the existence of any valid
contractual obligation covering a particular matter, or where the
defendant has failed to recognize or undertake any contractual
obligation whatsoever, the plaintiff is ordinarily limited to a
breach of contract remedy. In contrast, when the defendant has
proceeded on the basis that a contractual obligation exists, has
undertaken that obligation, and has undertaken it in violation of
the appropriate standard of care, the plaintiff may, in some
circumstances, maintain a tort action.

The Court agree with PenFed. As defendant points out, the only
extra services Neal identifies are savings accounts, mortgages,
auto-loans, and deposit accounts.  Accordingly, no special
circumstances existed to impose a duty of care on PenFed.

Count IV: Negligent Misrepresentation

Neal alleges a claim of negligent misrepresentation against PenFed.
Plaintiff maintains that when she signed the loan agreement, she
was misled as a result of PenFed's vague statements in the loan
agreements. She claims that she was not aware that her veterans
disability benefits would be deducted were a default to happen in
the future.

Again, PenFed contends, inter alia, that this claim is subject to
dismissal, because no special circumstances give rise to an
independent tort duty, an essential element of negligent
misrepresentation under Maryland law.  

The the Maryland Court of Appeals set forth the elements of a claim
for negligent misrepresentation under Maryland law: (1) the
defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently
asserts a false statement; (2) the defendant intends that his
statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff (3) the defendant has
knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statement,
which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; (4) the plaintiff,
justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and (5) the
plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.

Even assuming PenFed owed such a duty, PenFed contends that it
could not have known that Neal would probably rely on the alleged
omission, PenFed's alleged failure to disclose that it would
withdraw veterans' benefits from Neal's deposit account in the
event of a default. And, at the time of signing the loan
agreements, Neal admits that she was not receiving any veterans
disability benefits. As a result, PenFed maintains, it could not
possibly have guessed that Neal would receive such benefits in the
future.  Accordingly, PenFed lacked knowledge that plaintiff would
rely on the alleged omission.

This argument is persuasive. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to
allege facts to support the elements of a negligent
misrepresentation claim. As such, the Court shall grant PenFed's
Motion as to Count IV.

Count IX: EFTA

In 1978, Congress enacted the EFTA as part of the comprehensive
Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA). The EFTA was enacted to
provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of participants in electronic fund and remittance
transfer systems.

In her Amended Complaint, Neal insists that PenFed violated Section
1693e(a) because Neal was never provided a copy of any
authorization that stated PenFed would take her veterans disability
benefits incase [sic] of a default in loan repayment.

PenFed argues that the transactions at issue fall within the
exception laid out in 12 C.F.R. Section 1005.3(c)(5)(iii),
involving automatic transfers between a consumer's account and an
account of the financial institution. According to PenFed, Neal was
provided a copy of, and in fact signed, the Promissory Note, which
preauthorized the transactions. And, even assuming the transactions
are covered under the EFTA, PenFed contends that the Promissory
Note provided adequate notice of the transactions.  

PenFed's contentions hinge on whether the Promissory Note
preauthorized the transfers between Neal's deposit account and an
account of PenFed. And, as indicated, the Court may not consider
the Promissory Note as evidence at this stage. Therefore, the Court
must deny PenFed's Motion as to Neal's EFTA claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018
Memorandum and Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybsjvfzy
from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Neal, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Nyombi, KNA PEARL.

Pentagon Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Michael A.
Graziano -- mgraziano@eckertseamans.com -- Eckert Seamans Cherin
and Mellott LLC.


PERRY FUNERAL: Judge Allows Class Action to Proceed
---------------------------------------------------
George Hunter, writing for The Detroit News, reports that a Wayne
County judge granted class-action status on Nov. 5 to a lawsuit
filed by a woman who alleges Perry Funeral Home, Harper-Hutzel
Hospital and others mishandled her daughter's remains, with her
attorneys claiming the bodies of "well over 200" fetuses and babies
could have met similar fates.

Attorneys for Rachel Brown in July sued the funeral home, the
hospital, Wayne State University and Knollwood Park Cemetery in
Canton Township, alleging the remains of her daughter,
Alayah Davis, were not handled properly after Ms. Brown requested
the baby's body be donated to the Wayne State medical school for
research.

The allegations made in Ms. Brown's lawsuit prompted Detroit police
last month to launch a criminal investigation into the matter.
Detroit police had already initiated an investigation into Cantrell
Funeral Home after 10 fetuses and one infant's remains were found
hidden in a ceiling compartment during an Oct. 12 raid.

A joint task force involving Detroit police, Michigan State Police,
the FBI and the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory
Affairs was formed to investigate the case. Gov. Rick Snyder also
assembled a multi-disciplinary team to investigate funeral homes
statewide.

Ms. Brown's attorneys Peter Parks and Daniel Cieslak on Nov. 5 told
Judge Sheila Ann Gibson of Wayne County Circuit Court that more
than 200 remains of infants and fetuses may have been mishandled by
the defendants, based on entries in the Wayne State Mortuary
Science log book.

The attorneys also alleged during the Nov. 5's hour-long hearing
that Perry employees filed false death certificates indicating
they'd buried Alayah and other infants and fetuses in Knollwood
Park Cemetery. At least two sets of remains that Perry claimed to
have buried turned up in a box on Oct. 19, when Detroit police and
state officials raided Perry's facility on Trumbull Avenue, Parks
told the judge.

A source familiar with the investigation told The Detroit News the
remains of Alayah Davis and Rasheed Noble, whose parents are also
represented by Parks and Cieslak -- and who also had a death
certificate filed by Perry indicating she'd been buried in
Knollwood Park -- were among the 63 fetuses found in an
unrefrigerated box during the raid.

"People handle graham crackers with more dignity than that," Parks
said during the Nov. 5 hearing.

Mr. Parks said that on Dec. 19, 2016, Perry employees filed at
least seven delayed death certificates with the state, indicating
they'd buried infant and fetal remains at Knollwood Park.

After the Nov. 5 hearing, Brown said: "Justice will prevail. And
I'm glad that not only can I represent other women ... (hopefully)
everybody else's child will get the same justice as mine."

Attorneys for Wayne State and Knollwood Park were not present
during the Nov. 5 hearing. Wayne State spokesman Matt Lockwood said
the school's part of the lawsuit was transferred to the Michigan
Court of Claims, "so we're not part of the class-action lawsuit,"
he said.

Knollwood Park General Manager Dennis Herman said on Nov. 5, "we
don't file death certificates, and we never charged anyone for
burials we didn't perform."

Attorneys for Perry and the Detroit Medical Center/Harper-Hutzel
Hospital insisted there are too many variables with the different
sets of remains involved in the case to justify a class action, and
that not all of the parents involved likely suffered emotional
distress.

DMC attorney Carlos Escora argued on Nov. 5: "They've not provided
the evidence that anyone suffered actual injury. The plaintiff is
asking the court to assume the 200 (remains) in the Wayne State
mortuary (morgue), and the 63 fetuses (removed from Perry by police
during the Oct. 19 raid) all suffered actual injury.

"There are 263 individuals who have 263 different circumstances,"
Mr. Escora said. "Not all of them are likely to have suffered the
same injury."

The judge said she would deal with that issue when it comes up.

Parks said HIPAA laws prevent him and Mr. Cieslak from obtaining
records without parental permission that could show there are "well
over 200 babies and fetuses similarly situated," which is why he
said he wanted the court to name Brown as a representative in the
class-action suit.

"Appointment of Rachel Brown as a class representative will allow
us access to crucial information that will allow these families to
find out what happened to their babies," Mr. Parks said. "One
subclass will complain how the hospital handled the remains. A
second subclass could be babies who had false death certificates
filed. What's unique about Rachel Brown is, she fits all
categories."

On April 30, 2015, Harper-Hutzel's Chief Medical Officer Patricia
Wilkerson-Uddyback sent a letter to Perry saying the parents of 37
fetuses and dead infants had abandoned them at the hospital.

"We have called and left messages, as well as sending Certified
Letters in an attempt to have the Parents come in and sign off on
the Final Dispositions," the letter said. "Unfortunately, no
responses were received."

Mr. Parks said during the Nov. 5 hearing that Ms.
Wilkerson-Uddyback was unable to provide proof during an April 18
deposition that the hospital had sent out the certified letters or
made phone calls to the parents.

DMC attorney Josh Arnkoff told the judge Brown's lawsuit shouldn't
be given class-action status because "none of the elements for a
class action are met."

"The plaintiffs all came from the April 30, 2015, letter to Perry,"
Mr. Arnkoff said. "There are already differences among those 37
remains; there are live births and stillbirth; and even within
those there are differences."

Mr. Arnkoff said some of the parents of those 37 infants and
fetuses didn't ask for the remains to be returned to them, which he
said means "their rights (to proper disposition) were waived. And
of the 63 (fetuses and babies police removed from Perry), we don't
know how many were abandoned."

The judge said: "It's a known fact that 63 remains were found
improperly kept at Perry," to which Mr. Arnkoff replied, "no, it's
an allegation that they were improperly stored."

Ms. Brown, along with other clients of Messrs. Parks and Cieslak,
insist they thought their children's remains were going to the
Wayne State medical school for research.

"It's just hurtful to say that we . . . just tossed our babies
away," Ms. Brown said. "That was never the case. It was to help
other women not experience the pain . . . to find out what's wrong
with these children and . . . prevent it from happening again."

Messrs. Parks and Cieslak said they deduced at least 200 infant and
fetal remains are involved because of entries in the logbook at the
Wayne State mortuary science school morgue, which had an agreement
with Perry going back more than 50 years allowing the funeral home
to store remains there. The agreement was terminated last year.

"There were a number of entries that said 'fetuses,' and that's all
it said," Mr. Parks said. "Several others listed '48 fetuses,' '37
fetuses' and 'eight fetuses.' But when it just said 'fetuses,' it
didn't say how many."

Some of the log book entries contained names of the fetuses and
their death dates, while others were marked simply "fetus" or
"fetuses" with no number or any other information provided. Parks
said if the plural entries of 'fetuses' contained only two sets of
remains, the number of infants and fetuses involved is more than
200.

"It's troubling when they say 'fetuses,' but they don't say how
many," Parks said.

Mark Evely, director of Wayne State's Mortuary Science program,
said there's no law requiring the university to keep a log book of
remains brought into the school morgue.

"We were able to identify all those remains while they were in our
facility," he said.

"I don't know why (entries weren't made in the log book), but we
could have identified any one of those individual remains while
they were in our facility," Mr. Evely said. "A log book is not
required by law. The funeral home fills out the log when they bring
in remains and when they take them out." [GN]


PRA GROUP: Placeholder Bid to Certify Class Sought in Woods Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Leticia Woods, et al., move the Court to certify the class
described in the complaint of the lawsuit titled LETICIA WOODS,
ELAINE BONIN, MANDY CERVENY, JEFFREY MERKOVICH, WENDY UNTERSHINE,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PRA
GROUP INC. and PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No.
2:18-cv-01724 (E.D. Wisc.), and further ask that the Court both
stay the motion for class certification and to grant them (and the
Defendants) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiffs assert, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiffs tell the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiffs assert that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiffs are obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, according to the
Motion.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs argue.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Court Narrows Claims in Takano Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, TOM TAKANO and TRACY MCCARTHY, individuals and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE PROCTER
& GAMBLE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00385-TLN-AC (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are named representatives of a proposed nationwide
class of individuals and entities who have purchased products
within the Herbal Essences Wild Naturals line by the Defendant
within the past four years.  The Plaintiffs contend at least nine
different Herbal Essences Products labeled "Wild Naturals" contain
synthetic, unnatural, and dangerous ingredients, which in their
view renders the "Wild Naturals" label false, misleading, and
designed to deceive consumers into paying a price premium, since
the products are not entirely natural.  They contend the labels on
the Defendant's Products contain a host of misrepresentations
including the "Wild Naturals" statement on both the front and back
of the Products, the assertion that the Products allow consumers to
"strengthen your hair naturally with the nurturing properties of
Cassia," and at least one additional use of the word "naturally" on
each of the labels.

The Plaintiffs assert these alleged misrepresentations creates the
impression amongst reasonable consumers that the Products are
natural without adequately informing consumers that the Products
contain numerous synthetic, unnatural, and dangerous ingredients.
They maintain that the Defendant's ingredient list is insufficient
in part because it is on the back of the Product packaging in
small, hard-to-read print and, even then, fails to inform consumers
that many of the ingredients listed are synthetic and unnatural.

The Plaintiffs allege that due to Defendant's allegedly false and
misleading "natural" claims, they purchased the Products at a price
premium over other similar products. Absent these deceptive
marketing practices, the Plaintiffs allege that they would not have
purchased Wild Naturals Products nor paid a price premium over and
above other products had they known the Products contain synthetic
ingredients.

The Plaintiffs bring 10 causes of action alleging violations of
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), multiple sections of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"), New York Gen. Bus. Law. ("NY GBL") Section
349, and NY GBL Section 350, as well as claims for negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of express warranty.

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss before filing an
answer.  It moves to dismiss all counts arguing (1) the Plaintiffs
lack standing to sue for several claims, (2) the Plaintiffs failed
to state a claim under 12(b)(6), and (3) the Court must strike
their request for punitive damages.

Judge Nunley granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.  He (i) granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims based on the Defendant's website with
leave to amend; (ii) denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims to Products they have not purchased; (iii)
denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, V,
VI, VII, IX, and X; (iv) granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Count VIII with prejudice as to the Plaintiffs' New York Negligent
Misrepresentation Claim, but denied as to the Plaintiffs'
California Negligent Misrepresentation Claim; and (v) denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' punitive damages claims.

Among other things, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs could not
have actually relied on any website statements and lack standing
under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA to challenge the statements on
herbalessences.com.  He finds that any claims under the UCL, FAL,
and CRLA regarding representations on the Defendant's website are
dismissed for lack of standing.

The Plaintiffs concede that their New York negligent
misrepresentation claim fails for lack of privity.  Thus, Judge
Nunley did not discuss this claim and granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' New York negligent misrepresentation
claim.

Should the Plaintiffs elect to do so, the Plaintiffs are granted 30
days from the date of the Order to file a first amended complaint.
The Defendant is afforded 21 days from the date the Plaintiffs file
an amended complaint to answer the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Goln2C from Leagle.com.

Tom Takano & Tracy McCarthy, Plaintiffs, represented by Yeremey
Olegovich Krivoshey -- ykrivoshey@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher,
P.A.

Procter & Gamble Company, Defendant, represented by Raymond A.
Cardozo -- rcardozo@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: 3rd Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In a victory for personal injury victims and insureds, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a consumer fraud
class action brought against Progressive Garden State Insurance
Company, alleging that the insurer engaged in a scheme to defraud
policyholders after they were injured in motor vehicle accidents.


In Alpizar-Fallas v. Progressive Garden Insurance Company, et al.,
the complaint alleges that Plaintiff, Ana Lidia Alpizar-Fallas, a
Progressive insured, suffered a motor vehicle accident with another
Progressive insured, Frank E. Favero, on December 14, 2014.  The
next morning, Progressive claim adjuster Brian Barbosa contacted
Ms. Alpizar-Fallas, told her he was a Progressive agent, and asked
if he could come to her home so that he could inspect her car and
have her sign some "paperwork" that would expedite the processing
of her property damage claim.  Unbeknownst to Ms. Alpizar-Falls,
the "paperwork" that Barbosa had her sign did not merely involve
her property damage claim; it included a broadly-worded,
comprehensive general release of all claims against Favero and
Progressive, including any and all personal injuries resulting from
the accident.  Of course, Barbosa did not alert her to the release,
did not explain its legal significance, did not tell her to seek
legal counsel and did not communicate to her in Spanish, her native
language.  On behalf of all similar situated policyholders, the
complaint alleges that this incident is part of wide-ranging scheme
by Progressive to defraud its policyholders of insurance benefits
in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

In the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Progressive filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things,
that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to claims
involving the denial of insurance benefits.  In a three-page letter
opinion, the District Court accepted Progressive’s argument and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, relying upon a recent New
Jersey state appellate court decision while refusing to follow
settled Third Circuit precedent.

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.  After discussing the
history of the Consumer Fraud Act and its broad application to
combat fraud, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Weiss v.
First Unum Life Insurance Co., 482 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2007), which
held that the Consumer Fraud Act applies not only to the initial
sale of an insurance policy, but also to the insurer’s subsequent
performance of that policy.  The Third Circuit concluded that the
facts alleged in the complaint, when taken together, "amount to an
allegation of fraud in connection with the subsequent performance
of a consumer contract, a situation explicitly covered by the
language of the CFA, sanctioned by this Court in Weiss, and
supported by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s broad statements
regarding the application of the CFA."

This decision is a triumph for personal injury victims and
insureds, as it reaffirms that an insurance carrier will be subject
to CFA liability if it fraudulently performs its obligations under
an insurance policy, or employs deceptive practices aimed at
defrauding insureds of their benefits.  Insurance carriers have
long used deceptive practices such as those alleged in
Alpizar-Fallas to limit their liability both in New Jersey and
nationwide.  Now, they will face the CFA’s extensive remedies --
including treble damages and counsel fees -- if they persist.

Charles X. Gormally, Esq., Thomas Kamvosoulis, Esq. and Kent D.
Anderson, Esq. from Brach Eichler, LLC, handled the appeal on
behalf of the Plaintiff.


PROSPECT MEDICAL: Class in Gauzza Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NANCY GAUZZA, MELISSA McCLOSKEY, Plaintiffs, v.
PROSPECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC., DELAWARE COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-3599 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Wendy
Beetlestone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to conditionally certify the case as a collective action
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and to authorize the dissemination
of a Notice to the members of the putative collective.

In this putative collective and class action, Gauzza and McCloskey
contend that Defendants Prospect Medical Holdings and Delaware
County Memorial Hospital ("DCMH") violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act by failing to adequately
pay certain employees for interrupted meal breaks.

Defendant Prospect operates 20 hospitals in several states, one of
which is Defendant DCMH.  Plaintiff Gauzza has worked as a
Registered Nurse at DCMH for 34 years.  Plaintiff McCloskey has
worked as a CAT Scan Technician at DCMH for 16 years.  They claim
that the Defendants did not compensate them and other
similarly-situated caregivers for interrupted meal breaks, thereby
depriving them of overtime premiums.  More specifically, they
allege that putative members of the collective action were promised
one unpaid 30-minute break per shift, that the Defendants
automatically deducted pay for that 30-minute break (known as an
"auto-deduct" policy), and that the Defendants did not maintain
policies for employees to prevent or reverse that automatic pay
deduction when breaks were interrupted by work duties.

Pending now is the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify the
case as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and to
authorize the dissemination of a Notice to the members of the
putative collective consisting of all persons who worked as a
full-time hourly employee with hands-on patient care
responsibilities at a Prospect hospital in Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, or Texas in any workweek during the past three
years.

The Defendants contend that the collective action should not be
conditionally certified, and that if it is, the Notice is
deficient.  They argue that that conditional certification should
be denied because the Plaintiffs have not yet secured any
additional members of the collective action.  They also argue that
because some employees who fall within the described collective
group may have signed arbitration agreements as a condition of
their employment and others may not have, it would be inefficient
for the case to proceed as a collective action given the need to
determine which agreements are enforceable and which are not.

Judge Beetlestone opines that requiring the Plaintiffs to secure
those opt-in Plaintiffs' participation before notice is issued
would entirely defeat the purpose of the conditional certification
process by requiring putative members to opt in without having
received notice.  And whether an employee has signed anarbitration
agreement does not speak to the dispositive legal question at the
conditional certification stage: whether the putative members have
claims with a factual nexus to the Plaintiffs' claims.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify the
class is granted.

The Plaintiffs submit for approval a proposed notice to be mailed
to all the potential members of the collective action.  With one
minor tweak, the Judge finds that the proposed notice is accurate
and informative.  Specifically, the notice suggests that putative
collective members can only pursue their claims through the
collective action and through the Plaintiffs' counsel.  The
putative members of the collective are not so restricted.  Thus, he
holds that the Plaintiffs must amend the notice to state that
potential opt-ins have the right to retain their own counsel.

Following the line on the second page that reads "However, if this
lawsuit recovers money for the Class, you will not receive a
payment," the Plaintiffs will add an additional sentence that
states: "Regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit, if you do not
join, you are free to seek an attorney to represent you on any
claims that may or may not be related to those resolved in this
lawsuit."

In conclusion, Judge Beetlestone granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiffs' motion.  She conditionally certified the collective
action, and the proposed Notice is approved subject to the single
modification noted.  An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/bOFyEq from Leagle.com.

NANCY GAUZZA & MELISSA MCCLOSKEY, FOR THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO --
aficzko@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN --
dcohen@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JAMES B. ZOURAS --
jzouras@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN
-- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

PROSPECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC. & DELAWARE COUNTY MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, Defendants, represented by SYLVIA JEANINE CONLEY --
jconley@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, DENISE M. MAHER --
dmaher@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, MATTHEW J. HANK --
mhank@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. & WENDY SUE BUCKINGHAM
-- wbuckingham@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON PC.


RICHMOND ORGANIZATION: Court Won't Review Award of $352 Attys' Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WE will OVERCOME FOUNDATION and BUTLER FILMS, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. THE RICHMOND ORGANIZATION, INC. (TRO INC.) and
LUDLOW MUSIC, INC., Defendants, Case No. 16cv2725 (DLC) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of Court' $352,000 award in attorneys' fees plus
certain expenses and costs to the Plaintiffs pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
Section 505.

The case centers on the validity of two copyrights in the musical
composition "We will Overcome."  The Plaintiffs, We will Overcome
Foundation and Butler Films, LLC, brought the action on April 14,
2016, challenging through a putative class action the validity of
the Defendants' copyrights in the Song.  The Song is a well known
anthem of the American civil rights movement, although its precise
origin is unknown.  The Defendants obtained copyrights for the Song
in 1960 and 1963 and have described their motive for doing so as to
prevent the Song from being commercially abused.

On Nov. 21, 2016, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law claims but denied their motion to
dismiss the copyright claims.  On Sept. 8, 2017, the Court issued a
Summary Judgment Opinion holding that the Plaintiffs had carried
their burden of showing that verses one and five of the Song lacked
the originality required for protection as a derivative work, and
that the defendants had not offered evidence of originality
sufficient to raise a material question of fact requiring a trial.
The Summary Judgment Opinion denied the Plaintiffs' remaining
claims on the issues of authorship, divestment, and fraud.

Following a series of other motions, trial was set for Feb. 5,
2018, but the parties entered into a settlement, which was filed on
Jan. 26, 2018, and so ordered by the Court.  Following settlement,
the Plaintiffs moved for an award of attorneys' fees, in the amount
of over $1 million, under Section 505 of the Copyright Act.  On
July 31, 2018, the Court issued an opinion awarding fees in the
amount of $352,000.

On Aug. 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the motion for
reconsideration or reargument of the Attorneys' Fee Opinion.  Their
motion boils down to their contention that the Court erred in
finding that a reasonable, hourly-fee paying client would have paid
significantly less than the fee now sought by the Plaintiffs'
counsel because it did not consider the Plaintiffs' actual
difficulties finding counsel to represent them in the case.

Judge Cote concludes that the Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration is without merit.  They have not presented new
evidence that merits adjustment to the attorneys' fee calculation
and do not argue that a change in law has occurred or that a clear
error in the Opinion must be corrected.  Finally, no manifest
injustice requires reconsideration.  The fees awarded further the
aims of copyright law and no further award against the Defendants
is merited.  Therefore, she denied the Aug. 8, 2018 motion for
reconsideration of the July 31, 2018 attorneys' fee award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/cuHonZ from Leagle.com.

We will Overcome Foundation, On behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark C. Rifkin --
rifkin@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP,
Gloria Kui Melwani -- melwani@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler
Freeman & Herz LLP & Randall Scott Newman -- Newman@whafh.com --
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz.

Butler Films, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Mark C. Rifkin, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP & Randall Scott Newman, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz.

The Richmond Organization, Inc. & Ludlow Music, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Paul V. LiCalsi -- PLiCalsi@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan, LLP & Ofer Reger -- OReger@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan LLP.


RIOT GAMES: Employees File Gender Discrimination Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cecilia D'Anastasio, writing for Kotaku reports that on Nov. 5, one
current and one former employee of Riot Games filed a class action
lawsuit against the League of Legends publisher, accusing it of
endemic gender-based discrimination and fostering a "men-first"
environment. The lawsuit comes three months after a Kotaku
investigation into the sexist culture at Riot Games.

The lawsuit alleges that, "like many of Riot Games' female
employees, Plaintiffs have been denied equal pay and found their
careers stifled because they are women. Moreover, Plaintiffs have
also seen their working conditions negatively impacted because of
the ongoing sexual harassment, misconduct, and bias which
predominate the sexually-hostile working environment of Riot
Games." Riot violated California's Equal Pay Act and law against
gender-based discrimination at the workplace, the complaint
argues.

The plaintiffs are asking for compensation on unpaid wages,
damages, and other penalties, with an exact amount to be determined
at trial. They also ask the court to certify the suit as class
action.

In August, Kotaku detailed Riot Games' culture of sexism in an
investigative report that cited experiences from 28 current and
former employees, most of whom described Riot's working environment
as sexist. One of those sources, Jessica Negron, is one of the two
plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Kotaku's report revealed that Riot's
so-called "bro culture" inspires and, in some instances, rewards
behavior that disadvantages women. The 2,500-employee games
company, which is 80% male, regularly turned down female applicants
for not fitting the company's image of "core gamers," sources said.
Women interviewed also said that Riot's obsession with "culture
fits" reinforced a culture that hired and promoted aggressive male
personalities and disadvantaged and harmed female recruits and
employees. When sources called out their colleagues' sexist
behavior, many said, their complaints were brushed aside or used to
thwart their careers.

After Kotaku's report, Riot posted a blog post apologizing to
current and former employees and promising sweeping changes to the
company culture. One month later, in September, Riot still employed
several of the key alleged perpetrators of abusive behavior,
including COO Scott Gelb, who was said to have grabbed colleagues'
genitals, another man who allegedly stifled several women's careers
and verbally harassed them, and one other who was said to have had
a history of making sexually charged comments or advances toward
unwilling female employees. (Mr. Gelb did not respond to a request
for comment last month.) Riot also brought on Seyfarth Shaw, a law
firm that, in the past, was known for its history busting unions.

Riot has, however, purged many of the people who were accused of
facilitating a toxic culture, several current and former employees
have told Kotaku.

The plaintiffs bringing the complaint against Riot say they want to
stop Riot's alleged practice of paying men more than women who are
fulfilling the same job role, promoting men into more superior
roles more frequently than women, and demoting women who had
similar qualifications as well-compensated men. The lawsuit
complaint also says it wants to prevent Riot from "creating,
encouraging, and maintaining a work environment that exposes its
female employees to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on
the basis of their gender or sex." Riot did not immediately respond
to Kotaku's request for comment about the lawsuit.

[Update—7:20 pm ET]: Riot sent the following statement to Kotaku:
"While we do not discuss the details of ongoing litigation, we can
say that we take every allegation of this nature seriously and
investigate them thoroughly. We remain committed to a deep and
comprehensive evolution of our culture to ensure Riot is a place
where all Rioters thrive."

Ms. Negron says in the lawsuit (and has told Kotaku) that soon
after she was hired, her manager quit and she took on her job
duties without adequate compensation or a change in job title.
Although she asked her superiors about making her title official,
she was never interviewed for the position and, instead, three men
were hired into the role one after another. Later, after her third
supervisor left, the lawsuit says Negron was offered to perform the
role again, still without proper compensation or a job title
change.

The lawsuit includes details previously unknown to Kotaku as well,
like Ms. Negron's claim that in just one month, she counted that
her male colleagues at Riot used the word "dick" over 500 times.
The lawsuit also says Negron's third supervisor had told her that
"diversity should not be a focal point of the design of Riot Games'
products because gaming culture is the last remaining safe haven
for white teen boys."

Current Riot employee Melanie McCracken, who is the second
plaintiff in the lawsuit, says she has been working at Riot since
2013 and observed "discrimination based on her sex/gender." She
believes she was denied promotions, punished by male leadership and
refused proper compensation as part of a trend in discrimination
against women. Her initial supervisor, the lawsuit says, "did not
hire females to fill vacancies in senior employment positions." The
complaint says he told Ms. McCracken that he would "feel weird
having a male" as an assistant. She told her supervisor she wanted
a more senior role, which he apparently responded to negatively.
When
Ms. McCracken complained to HR about his response and gender-based
discrimination at Riot, the complaint says that HR failed to keep
the meeting confidential and leaked the information to her
supervisor.

Ms. McCracken took a new position in 2015 as an office manager in
the North America region. Her former supervisor, the complaint
said, was promoted in a senior position there in 2016. Then, the
complaint says, she was apparently "given a five-month countdown to
find a new position or 'be fired.'"

In 2017, Ms. McCracken took on yet another position that had her
working with Riot Games' top three employees, COO Scott Gelb, CEO
Nicolo Laurent and president Dylan Jadeja. One year later, Ms.
McCracken says she received a video of two of her colleagues,
including Gelb, "at a dance club with scantily-clad women in
Shanghai." Later, after making a veiled joke about it to
colleagues, the complaint says McCracken was pulled into a
one-on-one with Gelb in which Ms. McCracken was asked to "clean up"
rumors spread about him in his absence (in part because Kotaku's
report was close to publication). McCracken implies she was
partially blamed for the Shanghai story leaking out into the
workplace at some point later. Afterward, Ms. McCracken, whom the
complaint says was close to getting promoted, was reportedly
prevented from attending meetings with senior leadership and that
some of her current projects were cut off at the knees. When
SeyFarth Shaw investigated, the complaint says, Ms. McCracken was
simply moved to another building and away from her team. [GN]


RISTORANTE LA BUCA: Court Conditionally Certifies Wright FLSA Class
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICHOLAS J. WRIGHT, v. RISTORANTE LA BUCA INC., et al,
Civil Action No. 18-2207 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Mark E. Kearney of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (i)
granted the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify a Fair
Labor Standards Act collective action, but denied Plaintiffs'
motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action under Pennsylvania
Law.

The Judge conditionally certified the action to proceed as a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of
all tipped employees who worked for Defendants during the last
three years.  He finds that the Plaintiff makes a modest factual
showing Ristorante La Buca's tipped employees are "similarly
situated."  The Plaintiff adduced evidence Ristorante La Buca
failed to provide him sufficient notice of its utilization of the
tip credit.  

He ordered the Defendants to produce, no later than Nov. 2, 2018, a
list of all persons they employed at Ristorante La Buca utilizing a
tip credit during the last three years, including their name, job
title, address, email address, telephone number, dates of
employment, date of birth, and last four digits of their Social
Security number.

The Plaintiff will provide the Defendants' counsel with a draft
court-facilitated notice and protocol no later than Nov. 2, 2018.
The Defendants will offer comments upon the draft and protocol to
the Plaintiffs counsel by Nov. 6, 2018, and the Plaintiff will move
for approval of his proposed Court-facilitated notice with a
memorandum not exceeding 10 pages identifying all areas of
disagreement on the notice in an attached black-lined version of
the proposed Notice on Nov. 9, 2018.  The Defendants may file
memoranda not exceeding 10 pages explaining their dispute with the
proposed protocol or proposed black-lined notice on Nov. 13, 2018.

Jude Kearney denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) class action under Pennsylvania Law.  He finds that the
Plaintiff has not, by a preponderance of the evidence, shown
joinder of 20 or 22 employees known to him and who already enjoy
the right to opt into the Federal Law claims and be represented by
the same counsel cannot practically join into his Pennsylvania
state law claims.

The Plaintiff may move for class certification with additional
evidence meeting his burden under Rule 23(b)(3) consistent with the
Court's Policies and July 6, 2018 Order no later than Nov. 30, 2018
with a response, if warranted by the Law, no later than Dec. 10,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 26, 2018, 2018 Order is
available at https://is.gd/IJr53V from Leagle.com.

NICHOLAS J. WRIGHT, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ARKADY ERIC RAYZ --
erayz@kalraylaw.com -- KALIKHMAN & RAYZ LLC, GERALD D. WELLS, III
-- gwells@cwglaw.com -- CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY, LLP & STEPHEN EDWARD
CONNOLLY -- sconnolly@cwglaw.com -- CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY LLP.

RISTORANTE LA BUCA INC., doing business as RISTORANTE LA BUCA,
JEANIE GIULIANI, DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10 & ANTHONY GIULIANI,
Defendants, represented by RICHARD J. GIULIANI, THE BELL ATLANTIC
TOWER.


RYANAIR HOLDINGS: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP on Nov. 6 disclosed that a class
action has been commenced by an institutional investor on behalf of
purchasers of Ryanair Holdings plc (NASDAQ: RYAAY) American
Depositary Shares ("ADSs") during the period between May 30, 2017
and September 28, 2018 (the "Class Period"). This action was filed
in the Southern District of New York and is captioned City of
Birmingham Firemen's and Policemen's Supplemental Pension System v.
Ryanair Holdings plc., et al., No. 18-cv-10330.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased Ryanair ADSs during the Class Period to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf of
all other class members in directing the litigation. The lead
plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from
November 6, 2018. If you wish to discuss this action or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact plaintiff's counsel, Samuel H. Rudman or Brian E.
Cochran of Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via
e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. You can view a copy of the complaint as
filed at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/ryanair/.

The complaint charges Ryanair and its Chief Executive Officer,
Michael O'Leary, with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Ryanair is a Dublin-based airline operator.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose adverse
information regarding Ryanair's business and operations as a result
of its aggressive anti-employee practices and opposition to
employee collectivization efforts. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose,
among other things, that Ryanair's labor relations had deteriorated
in 2017 and 2018. As a result, the Company was experiencing
increased employee turnover and was threatened with massive strikes
and other disruptions across its operations, and its historical
operating model and profit growth were not sustainable.

On September 14, 2017, it was reported that Ryanair had lost a key
ruling in the European Court of Justice that cast doubt on the
legality of the Company's use of Irish employment contracts to
evade local labor laws throughout Europe. The next day, Ryanair
announced that it would need to cancel up to 50 flights a day for
the next six weeks due to pilot "schedul[ing]" issues. Reports
began to circulate that the disruption was not due to scheduling
issues, as the Company had claimed, but rather to widespread
defections by disgruntled employees. Then, according to the
complaint, in December 2017, Ryanair reversed its earlier position
and conceded its need to recognize unions, but continued to
downplay the extent of the labor unrest and conceal the expected
impact to the Company's operations and financial results. However,
in the summer of 2018, discontent among Ryanair's workers continued
to spill out into the open, belying defendants' public claims
regarding improved labor relations and forcing workers into
threatening collective action. The resulting flight cancellations
damaged the Company's brand and forced it to pay millions in
compensation costs or to re-route fliers.

On July 23, 2018, Ryanair disclosed a 20% decrease in quarterly
profits, due in part to a 34% increase in staff costs. Then, on
October 1, 2018, the Company revealed that it could not meet its
annual profit guidance due to the lost fares and ballooning costs
related to the strikes and flight cancellations. By market close on
October 1, 2018, the price of Ryanair ADSs had fallen to $80.93 per
ADS, 36% below the Class Period high of more than $126 per ADS.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
Ryanair ADSs during the Class Period (the "Class"). The plaintiff
is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive experience in
prosecuting investor class actions including actions involving
financial fraud.

Robbins Geller -- http://www.rgrdlaw.com-- is a law firms
representing investors in securities litigation. With 200 lawyers
in 10 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of the largest
securities class action recoveries in history. For five consecutive
years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has ranked the Firm in
its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top law firms in both
amount recovered for shareholders and total number of class action
settlements. Robbins Geller attorneys have helped shape the
securities laws and recovered tens of billions of dollars on behalf
of aggrieved victims. Beyond securing financial recoveries for
defrauded investors, Robbins Geller also specializes in
implementing corporate governance reforms, helping to improve the
financial markets for investors worldwide. [GN]


SCANA CORP: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Securities Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the defendants'
motions to dismiss the consolidated class action lawsuit entitled,
In re SCANA Corporation Securities Litigation, is pending.

On September 27, 2017, a purported class action was filed against
SCANA, Kevin B. Marsh, Jimmy E. Addison, and Stephen A. Byrne by
plaintiff Robert L. Norman, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, in the District Court (the "Norman Lawsuit").

The plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the defendants
violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, and that the individual named defendants are liable
under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The plaintiff seeks
compensatory and consequential damages, attorneys' fees, and any
other relief the court deems proper.

On January 23, 2018, the District Court granted consolidation of
the Norman Lawsuit, the Evans Lawsuit, the Fox Lawsuit, and the
West Palm Beach Lawsuit, (as such terms are hereinafter defined),
and granted plaintiffs' requests for appointment of lead counsel.
The consolidated case is captioned In re SCANA Corporation
Securities Litigation. The plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint on March 30, 2018. At September 30, 2018, the defendants'
motions to dismiss were pending.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Continues to Defend Glibowski Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a purported class action suit
initiated by Timothy Glibowski.

On January 31, 2018, a purported class action was filed by Timothy
Glibowski, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
in the District Court (the "Glibowski Lawsuit").

The action, as subsequently amended on April 23, 2018, is against
SCANA, SCE&G, Kevin Marsh, Jimmy Addison, Stephen Byrne, Martin
Phalen, Mark Cannon, Russell Harris, Ronald T. Lindsay, James
Micali, and Lonnie Carter. The plaintiff alleges, among other
things, that the Company, SCE&G and the individual defendants
participated in an unlawful racketeering enterprise in violation of
RICO 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq., and conspired to violate RICO
18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c) by fraudulently inflating utility bills
to generate unlawful proceeds.

Plaintiff seeks treble damages, attorneys' fees, and any other
relief the court deems proper.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Corporation Securities Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation continues to defend against the case captioned
as, In re SCANA Corporation Securities Litigation, the Company said
in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 5, 2018.

On October 5, 2017, a purported class action was filed against
SCANA, Kevin B. Marsh, and Jimmy E. Addison by plaintiff Kenneth
Evans on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated in the
District Court (the "Evans Lawsuit"). The plaintiff makes
substantially similar allegations as those alleged in the Norman
Lawsuit, and seeks substantially similar relief.

As noted, on January 23, 2018, this case was consolidated and is
captioned In re SCANA Corporation Securities Litigation.  No
further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Metzler Lawsuit Held in Abeyance
--------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that motions to stay and
to consolidate the Metzler Lawsuit with the City of Warren Lawsuit
have been held in abeyance.

On February 8, 2018, a purported class action was filed against
Gregory Aliff, James Bennett, John Cecil, Sharon Decker, Maybank
Hagood, Lynne Miller, James Roquemore, Maceo Sloan, Alfredo
Trujillo, Dominion Energy, and Sedona by plaintiffs Metzler Asset
Management GmbH and Joseph Heinz in the Richland County Court (the
"Metzler Lawsuit").

The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that defendants violated
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by executing a merger
agreement that would unfairly deprive plaintiffs of the true value
of their SCANA stock, and that Dominion Energy and Sedona aided and
abetted these actions.

Among other remedies, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin and/or rescind
the proposed merger, as well as unspecified monetary damages,
attorneys' fees, and any other relief the court deems proper.

On February 21, 2018, Dominion Energy removed the case to the
District Court, and filed its Motion to Dismiss on March 9, 2018.
On August 1, 2018, the case was remanded back to the Richland
County Court. Dominion Energy and Sedona appealed the decision to
remand to the Court of Appeals, where the appeal has been
consolidated with a appeal from the City of Warren Lawsuit and
remains pending at September 30, 2018.

Motions to stay and to consolidate this case with the City of
Warren Lawsuit were being held in abeyance at September 30, 2018.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Turner Class Action Settled for Under $100,000
----------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the purported class
action suit initiated by Mary Turner has been settled in September
2018 for an amount that was less than $100,000

On March 15, 2018, a purported class action was filed against
SCANA, Dominion Energy, Sedona, Jimmy E. Addison, Gregory E. Aliff,
James A. Bennett, John F.A.V. Cecil, Sharon A. Decker, D. Maybank
Hagood, Lynne M. Miller, James W. Roquemore, Maceo K. Sloan, and
Alfredo Trujillo by plaintiff Mary Turner, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated in the District Court.

The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants
violated provisions of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 14a-9 by allowing or causing misleading proxy statements to be
issued. The plaintiffs alternatively sought to enjoin the merger,
monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the court
deemed proper.

This lawsuit was settled in September 2018 for an amount that was
less than $100,000, and the plaintiff released all of her claims
with respect to material facts and omissions that were brought or
could have been brought in the lawsuit.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: West Palm Beach Firefighters' Suit Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the class action
suit initiated by West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund has
been consolidated and is now captioned as In re SCANA Corporation
Securities Litigation.

On November 17, 2017, a purported class action was filed against
SCANA, Kevin B. Marsh, Jimmy E. Addison, and Steve B. Byrne by
plaintiff West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated in the District Court (the
"West Palm Beach Lawsuit").

The plaintiff makes substantially similar allegations as those
alleged in the Norman Lawsuit, and seeks substantially similar
relief.

As noted, on January 23, 2018, this case was consolidated and is
captioned In re SCANA Corporation Securities Litigation.  No
further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
owns nuclear, coal, hydro, natural gas, oil, biomass, and solar
generating facilities. The company was founded in 1924 and is based
in Cayce, South Carolina.


SEATTLE CITY: Law Firm Mulls Class Action Over Electric Bills
-------------------------------------------------------------
Deedee Sun, writing for KIRO7, reports that another batch of
Seattle City Light customers are seeing sticker shock from their
latest electric bills. They say their bills have doubled -- even
tripled.

This comes as a Seattle law firm McNaul Ebel gathers customer
complaints to potentially file a class-action suit against the city
for overcharging customers.

Most of the customers in the latest round of bill spikes say they
saw a spike in their bills after transitioning "advanced metering"
or getting smart meters.

Now many of those customers say they believe they're being
overcharged, and some are considering signing up to participate in
the potential class-action lawsuit.

"Very shocked, sticker shock you would say. So we contacted Seattle
City Light and basically we got no response," said Rick Rowell, who
lives in Magnolia.

His most recent electric bill shows a usage chart that says his
September usage this year has tripled compared to last year.

"See, consistent usage, then boom. The anomaly is just crazy," Mr.
Rowell said. [GN]


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Passengers Set to Get Settlement Payout
-----------------------------------------------------------
Svilen Petrov, writing for Wings Journal, reports that if you have
flown on an airplane within the past 7 years, then you may be
entitled to compensation. A class action lawsuit has been filed
against Southwest Airlines, Delta Airlines, United Airlines and
American Airlines. These airlines have been accused of limiting the
number of available seats on the flights so that they could raise
the ticket prices.

Sally Anderson is a resident of Blaine, Minnesotta. She flew out of
Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. She stated that she is
not surprised that the airline decided to hike up the prices. She
said that airlines do not do things to make things convenient and
comfortable for customers. They are just doing it for the money.

Passengers are being notified about the class action lawsuit via
email. Information about the class action lawsuit is also being
spread on social media. There are millions of people being
contacted. That is why if a person does get a payout, then it will
likely be very small.

Charles Moore is an attorney who works in Minneapolis. He stated
that it is important to remember that millions of people have flown
with these airlines. American Airlines and Southwest have agreed to
a settlement of $60 million. However, they have denied any
wrongdoing.

United Airlines and Delta have not agreed to a settlement yet. If
you purchased a ticket anytime between July 1, 2007 and December
31, 2017, then you qualify for compensation. Mr. Moore confirmed
that any amount that you get will be small. He also stated there is
a possibility that you will not get any money from the lawsuit.

People will get a portion of the settlement after all of the fees
for settlement administration, attorneys, government entities and
charities are deducted. You will have to file a claim in order to
get compensated. [GN]


TBC CORPORATION: Hamilton Appeals C.D. Cal. Ruling to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Julie Hamilton, Lyle Mclean, Sam Flowers and Nestor Diaz
filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Julie
Hamilton, et al. v. TBC Corporation, et al., Case No.
2:17-cv-01060-DMG-JEM, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon. Judge
Dolly M. Gee certified:

   1. the Colorado Class with respect to Plaintiffs' claims under
      Colorado law:

      "all persons who reside in Colorado who purchased or
      acquired a Power King Towmax STR trailer tire, from
      February 9, 2014 to the present."

   2. the Florida Class with respect to the Florida Deceptive and
      Unfair Trade Practices Act claim:

      "all persons who reside in Florida who purchased or
      acquired a Power King Towmax STR trailer tire, from
      February 9, 2013 to the present."

The appellate case is captioned as Julie Hamilton, et al. v. TBC
Corporation, et al., Case No. 18-80151, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners JULIE HAMILTON, individually and behalf of
all others similarly situated, LYLE MCLEAN, SAM FLOWERS and NESTOR
DIAZ are represented by:

          Stephen M. Fishback, Esq.
          Daniel L. Keller, Esq.
          KELLER, FISHBACK & JACKSON, LLP
          28720 Canwood Street, Suite 200
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 342-7442
          Facsimile: (818) 342-7616
          E-mail: sfishback@kfjlegal.com
                  dkeller@kfjlegal.com

Defendants-Respondents TBC CORPORATION and DYNAMIC TIRE CORPORATION
are represented by:

          Kent R. Christensen, Esq.
          Delavan Dickson, Esq.
          John Thomas Egley, Esq.
          CALL & JENSEN, APC
          610 Newport Center Drive, Suite 700
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 717-3000
          E-mail: kchristensen@calljensen.com
                  ddickson@calljensen.com
                  jegley@calljensen.com


TREVENA INC: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP on Nov. 6 disclosed that a class
action has been commenced on behalf of purchasers of Trevena, Inc.
(NASDAQ:TRVN) common stock during the period between May 2, 2016
and October 9, 2018 (the "Class Period"). This action was filed in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and is captioned Louis v.
Trevena, Inc., et al., No. 18-cv- 4779.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased Trevena common stock during the Class Period
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. A lead plaintiff acts on
behalf of all other class members in directing the litigation. The
lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from
October 11, 2018. If you wish to discuss this action or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact plaintiff's counsel, Samuel H. Rudman or David A.
Rosenfeld of Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via
e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. You can view a copy of the complaint as
filed at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/trevena-inc/.

The complaint charges Trevena and certain of its officers and
directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Trevena is a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company. The
Company's most advanced drug under development during the Class
Period was Olinvo, an intravenous pain reliever that was undergoing
a Phase III clinical trial for the treatment of moderate-to-severe
postoperative-pain after surgery. According to Trevena, its Phase
II clinical trial for Olinvo had demonstrated that the drug was
superior to the standard of care for post-surgery pain reduction,
morphine.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose adverse
information regarding the prospects for Olinvo. Specifically,
defendants failed to disclose that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") had expressly warned Trevena, prior to the
start of the Class Period, that there were many defects in the
design of its Phase III clinical trial – design defects Trevena
refused to remedy – that threatened to render the data derived in
the Phase III clinical trial worthless. As a result, the Company's
prospects for obtaining FDA approval for commercial distribution of
Olinvo, and its eventual commercial success, were much lower than
defendants had led the market to believe throughout the Class
Period. Based on defendants' material misleading statements and
omissions concerning the strength of its clinical development
program, the design of its Phase III Olinvo clinical trial and its
prospects for obtaining FDA approval to commercially distribute
Olinvo, the price of Trevena common stock was artificially inflated
during the Class Period to more than $8 per share.

On February 21, 2017, when the Company disclosed the results of the
Phase III clinical trial of Olinvo, the data failed to show that
Olinvo caused any meaningfully less adverse effects than morphine.
On this news, the price of Trevena common stock declined 40%, or $3
per share. On October 9, 2018, the FDA made public its prior
criticisms of the design of the Phase III clinical trial and
disclosed that its Advisory Committee was recommending that the FDA
reject the Company's New Drug Application for Olinvo. On this news,
the price of Trevena common stock fell another 64%, or almost $2
per share, on October 9, 2018.

Then on October 11, 2018, trading in Trevena common stock was
halted on pending news. Later that day, the Company disclosed that
the FDA Advisory Committee had voted against approving Olinvo.
While Trevena contended that "[t]he FDA [was] not bound by the
Advisory Committee's recommendations" that day, it also
acknowledged that the FDA "takes its advice into consideration when
making its decision." When trading recommenced on October 12, 2018,
the stock price dropped another 7%, closing below $1 per share.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
Trevena common stock during the Class Period (the "Class"). The
plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud.

Robbins Geller -- http://www.rgrdlaw.com-- is a law firm
representing investors in securities litigation. With 200 lawyers
in 10 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of the largest
securities class action recoveries in history. For five consecutive
years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has ranked the Firm in
its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top law firms in both
amount recovered for shareholders and total number of class action
settlements. Robbins Geller attorneys have helped shape the
securities laws and recovered tens of billions of dollars on behalf
of aggrieved victims. Beyond securing financial recoveries for
defrauded investors, Robbins Geller also specializes in
implementing corporate governance reforms, helping to improve the
financial markets for investors worldwide. [GN]


TWO OCEAN: Teachers File Class Action Over Compulsory Union Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Oglesby, writing for Asbury Park Press, reports that two New
Jersey teachers, backed by a national group, are suing their local
and state unions to stop the labor groups from collecting fees
without teachers' consent.

Susan G. Fischer, a Italian teacher in the Township of Ocean
Intermediate School, and Jeanette Speck, a seventh-grade social
studies teacher in the same school, claim in a class action lawsuit
that New Jersey is violating a U.S. Supreme Court ruling from June
that allows them to stop paying dues.

They argue that New Jersey law is defying a recent U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling that says states and unions cannot compel public
employees to pay union dues.

New Jersey gives teachers only 10 days following the anniversary of
their employment each year to withdraw from paying union dues,
according to the lawsuit filed on Nov. 2.

"Contrary to the wishes of New Jersey union bosses and their allies
in the state legislature, First Amendment rights cannot be limited
to just 10 days out of the year," Mark Mix, president of the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, said in a news
release. The lawsuit also seeks to recoup fees paid by the
teachers.

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, a group that
has fought compulsory union membership across the nation, is
assisting Ms. Fischer and Ms. Speck with the lawsuit.

The New Jersey Education Association (NJEA) charges annual
membership dues for the 2018-19 school year of $928 for full-time
teachers, administrators, counselors, nurses and contracted
substitutes. School secretaries, clerks, custodians, bus drivers
and cafeteria staff dues are $451 annually, according to the
association's website.

The state union has more than 203,000 members.

The association's website said the union gives its members legal
services, discounts on products, access to special events, and
special offers that save teachers thousands of dollars each year.

"This is another attack funded by wealthy anti-union groups seeking
to undermine the rights of working people to form strong, effective
unions," Steven Baker, a spokesman for the NJEA, said in an email
to the Press.

Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, New Jersey was one of 22 states
that required public employees to pay union dues, according to the
New Jersey School Boards Association. Even if an employee decided
not to join the union, state statue still compelled them to pay 85
percent of the union's fee, called a "representation fee."

Ms. Speck and Ms. Fischer, in their lawsuit, argued that compulsory
union dues violated their First Amendment rights, and given the
choice, they would not have subsidized the union.

On June 27, the Supreme Court ruled against unions in Janus vs.
AFSCME and found fee requirements unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.

In July, Ms. Speck and Ms. Fisher notified the NJEA and their local
teaches' union that they were resigning from their union membership
and each revoked their dues authorizations, according to the
lawsuit. Yet, the unions failed to stop collecting the dues, and
referenced New Jersey's law that their notice was not filed within
the 10-day window following the anniversary of their employment,
the lawsuit alleges.

An attorney for Ms. Speck and Ms. Fischer did not immediately
return a call for comment on Nov. 5.

Ms. Fischer and Ms. Speck are seeking to have New Jersey's law
overturned, be reimbursed for the union dues taken from their
wages, and block the NJEA and local teachers' unions from
collecting dues from employees without consent.

In June, a Gloucester County teacher filed a similar lawsuit
against the New Jersey Education Association over "representation
fees" charged to non-union members. The case was voluntarily
dismissed in October, according to court records. [GN]


UNITED STATES: EFF Urges Court to Keep Spying Class Action Alive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sophia Morris, writing for Law360, reports that the Electronic
Frontier Foundation continues to urge a California federal court to
keep alive its long-running class action against the National
Security Agency over its alleged unlawful mass surveillance of
Americans. [GN]


UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Ct. Grants $570K Attorney's Fees in Wage Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees
in the case captioned DANIEL SMALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. Case No.
2:13-cv-0298-APG-PAL. (D. Nev.).

The court awards total attorneys' fees in the amount $570,885.00
and costs of $248,830.00 for a total monetary sanction against UMC
in the amount of $819,715.00.

This case involves a dispute over unpaid wages and overtime
compensation. Three named plaintiffs filed the case, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees of
defendant University Medical Center (UMC). The case was filed as a
collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards (FLSA), and
initially as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Defendants argue that Mr. O'Mara's declaration is the only
evidence in the record the court should rely upon in determining a
reasonable hourly rate in this case. The Defendants agree that his
rate of $350/hr. is reasonable in Nevada for a lawyer of his
experience and expertise. The Defendants also cite Judge Pro's
award of attorneys' fees and costs in the Tallman case as evidence
of reasonable hourly rates approved in this district for partners,
senior associates and paralegals. The Plaintiffs argue the rates
sought in this case are reasonable market rates for employment
lawyers in the District of Nevada, citing Lucas v. Bell Trans,
where Judge Dorsey approved an hourly rate of $795/hr. for partners
and $525/hr. for senior associates.

The declarations of Messrs. Godino, Tostrud, and O'Mara do not
address reasonable market rates in this district. Rather, they
state what their respective usual and customary rates are. Rate
determinations in other cases in the District of Nevada around the
time fees were incurred at issue in this application have found
hourly rates as much as $450 for a partner and $250 for an
experienced associate to be the prevailing market rate in this
forum.  

Four partners from three law firms seek reimbursement for
attorneys' fees expended in connection with the sanctions order.
The only information plaintiffs' counsel provided concerning the
experience, background and expertise of partners, associates and
staff members are attached firm bios and resumes. Plaintiffs do not
claim that local counsel were unavailable because they lacked the
degree of experience, expertise or specialization required to
properly handle a case of this nature.

To the contrary, both sides cite FLSA and wage and hour cases
prosecuted and defended by Nevada counsel to support their
respective positions. In the court's experience, there are many
Nevada lawyers and firms who can, and do, practice competently in
this field. The court has had ample opportunity to observe the
experience, expertise and professionalism of Mssrs. Godino and
Tostrud.

The court finds that Messrs. Godino and Tostrud should be
compensated at the rate of $450/hr., which judges in this district
have found is reasonable for experienced lawyers practicing in this
district during the time frame for which fees are sought. The court
finds a reasonable hourly rate for partners Wolke and O'Mara is
$350.00/hr.  

The Defendants argue that plaintiffs' fee application should not be
approved because the case was overstaffed and because four partners
performed most of the work in this case rather than delegating
70-75% of the work to associates and paralegals at lower rates.

The affidavits of Messrs. Godino, Tostrud, and O'Mara do not
explain the staffing decisions made which resulted in the
application for attorneys' fees for 4 partners, 4 associates, and 7
paralegals and miscellaneous staff from the initial motion to
compel through the conclusion of Special Master proceedings and
hearings before the court. The application states that staffing
decisions were made based on when people were available to do the
work in a timely and professional manner over a 20-month period
which included 20 weeks of nearly continuous hearings and work
throughout Special Master proceedings. The court rejects
defendants' arguments that the court should correct a perceived
imbalance based on the asserted expectations of defense counsels'
clients.

The declarations of Messrs. Godino, Tostrud and O'Mara do not
attest that the complexity of this case or other factors required
staffing by 15 timekeepers which include 4 partners, 4 associates,
a research analyst, 4 paralegals, and 2 staff members whose
positions are not disclosed. However, plaintiffs' initial and
revised application and reply advance arguments why this case,
especially during Special Master proceedings, required a team
effort, a team of lawyers, and a team approach to participation.
The court understands and agrees that a team structure and
collaborative efforts by multiple attorneys and supporting staff
often accomplish efficiencies in complex cases. The court does not
doubt that all of the attorneys and staff members for whom
attorneys' fees are sought actually performed work on this case.
However, the court is assessing reasonable costs and attorneys'
fees in the context of a sanction for discovery violations. The
court is not assessing reasonable attorney's fees and costs arising
out of a fee-shifting statute at the end of the case to a
prevailing party.

The court reviewed and approved the Special Master's fees and costs
during Special Master proceedings. The parties agreed Special
Master Garrie had the expertise as a litigator with special
expertise in ESI technology. He agreed to accept an appointment at
the rate of $385/hr which the parties agreed was reasonable. The
Order appointing the Special Master set his hourly rate at $385/hr.
The order also authorized reimbursement for reasonable expenses
including amounts incurred in employing other persons to provide
clerical, secretarial, and stenographic assistance.

The Special Master submitted invoices on April 14, 2014, June 13,
2014, July 16, 2014, and August 18, 2014, in the total amount of
$481,212.32. The parties filed Joint Statements accepting the
Special Master's invoices as reasonable. Defendants response to the
application for sanctions urges the court to award a maximum of
$461, 906.13, or more than $20,000 less than they agreed was
reasonable for special master service at a lower rate over a much
shorter time-period. Plaintiffs ask for monetary sanctions of more
than four times the amount they agreed was reasonable to pay to the
special master. Of course the plaintiffs incurred substantial
unnecessary costs and fees prior to the appointment of the special
master, and also incurred fees after his report and recommendation
was filed litigating his findings and recommendations and
appropriate sanctions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9zatgoh from Leagle.com.

Daniel Small, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony M. Carter --
acarter@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice,
Joseph Nathan Mott -- Joey@SJPlawyer.com -- Law Offices of Steven
J. Parsons, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Raymond B. Walton, pro hac
vice, Andrew L. Rempfer -- Andrew@SJPlawyer.com -- Law Offices of
Steven J. Parsons, Jon A. Tostrud -- jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com --
Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice, Kara M. Wolke  --
kwolke@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Kevin F. Ruf
-- kevinruf@yahoo.com -- Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP, Marc L.
Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro
hac vice, William M. O'Mara, The O'Mara Law Firm, PC & David C.
OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C.

University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, Defendant,
represented by Cayla Witty, Nevada Court of Appeals, Danielle
Miller -- Danielle.Miller@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Robert W. Freeman, Jr. --
Robert.Freeman@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP & Joseph M. Ortuno, Edward M. Bernstein & Associates.

Clark County, Defendant, represented by Cayla Witty, Nevada Court
of Appeals.

John Espinoza, Defendant, represented by Cayla Witty, Nevada Court
of Appeals, Danielle Miller, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP &
Robert W. Freeman, Jr., Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


UPMC JAMESON: Faces Class Action Over Ultrasound Equipment
----------------------------------------------------------
Brent Addleman, writing for New Castle News, reports that a
class-action lawsuit claims a medical facility put patients at risk
of sexually-transmitted diseases after hospital staff failed to
sterilize equipment used in ultrasounds.

UPMC Jameson is the defendant named in the suit filed on Nov. 2 in
Lawrence County by attorney Dallas Hartman Jr. The suit alleges the
hospital put more than 200 patients at risk of being infected with
HIV, Hepatitis A, B, and C, gonorrhea and chlamydia as proper
disinfection and sterilization techniques for ultrasound probes
were not followed from October 2017 to October 2018.

"On Nov. 1, we decided to file a class-action lawsuit," Mr. Hartman
said on Nov. 5. "We got a good amount of calls in the office and we
were able to get a better picture of what happened.

"We felt this was the best way to proceed. We did an interview with
one of our proposed lead plaintiffs, and we decided to file on Nov.
2."

Contacted by email, Lisa Lombardo, senior public relations manager,
said the hospital had no comment beyond the statement it released.

That statement noted that an internal review had found that "the
proper cleaning process was not followed for some ultrasound probes
used in internal prostate, obstetrical and gynecological exams. Any
related health risks are extremely low." It added that "corrective
measures were immediately implemented."

The statement want on to say that UPMC had reported the situation
to both the Department of Health and The Joint Commission, and that
"appropriate education and disciplinary measures were taken to
ensure the highest level of quality and patient safety."

UPMC Jameson also contacted all potentially affected patients with
additional information, offering free precautionary blood and urine
testing to ensure patient safety.

The plaintiff in the suit alleges that in "June/July 2018" an
ultrasound procedure was performed while the plaintiff was two
months pregnant.

In the court filing, the plaintiff claims, "on our about Oct. 30"
the plaintiff "received a phone call from a representative of UPMC
Jameson, warning for the need to obtain testing to determine if the
patient contracted an infectious disease from exposure during the
ultrasound." Patients were tested using a blood draw or urine
sample.

The suit alleges that ultrasound probes used in internal prostate,
obstetrical, and gynecological exams must undergo high-level
disinfection between usage, and UPMC Jameson was not following the
procedures.

The filing reads, "It is believed that in or around the summer/fall
of 2018 an internal quality assurance review at UPMC Jameson found
that the proper cleaning process was not documented or followed for
some ultrasound probes used in internal prostate, obstetrical and
gynecological exams."

The suit claims the plaintiff "as a result of UPMC Jameson's
negligence, carelessness, and/or recklessness will continue to
endure emotional distress, suffering, inconvenience, humiliation,
embarrassment, and loss of life's pleasures."

Mr. Hartman is seeking a jury trial and is requesting monetary
damages outside of current arbitration limits. [GN]


USANA HEALTH: Rumbaugh Securities Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, APRIL RUMBAUGH, Individually and On Behalf of Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC.,
DAVID A. WENTZ and PAUL A. JONES, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:17-CV-106 (D. Utah), Judge Dee Benson of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division, dismissed with
prejudice the Plaintiff's Consolidated Amended Action Complaint.

The case is a federal securities class action lawsuit filed on
behalf of all persons, other than the Defendants, who purchased or
acquired USANA securities between March 14, 2014 and Feb. 7, 2017,
seeking damages for the alleged violation of federal securities
laws.

USANA is a publicly traded Utah company that develops, manufactures
and sells nutritional and personal care products worldwide.  To
distribute and sell its products, USANA has traditionally employed
a multi-level marketing business model, relying on its existing
distributors to recruit new distributors by paying the existing
distributors a percentage of their recruits' sales.  The recruits
are known as a distributor's "downline" while the distributor is
known as the recruits "upline."  The Distributors also make money
through direct sales of products to customers.

China has an absolute prohibition on multi-level marketing (i.e.,
payment to promoters based on the recruitment of other promoters
rather than based on sales to customers).  Accordingly, companies
such as USANA who do business in China are required to modify their
business models to focus on direct sales to consumers rather than
distributor recruitment.

The Plaintiff alleges that during the years leading up to the class
period in the case, the Defendants created a "scheme" of illicit
sales in China.  According to the Plaintiff, part of that scheme
involved circumventing Chinese laws banning multi-level marketing
by recruiting Chinese nationals and having them register using a
fictitious address in Hong Kong.  According to the Plaintiff, this
resulted in an "explosion" of Hong-Kong based revenue between 2009
and 2012.

In the midst of those years, in 2010, USANA acquired Baby Care, a
People's Republic of China-based manufacturing company that
develops and sells nutritional products primarily for infants.  The
Plaintiff asserts that BabyCare's direct selling license provided a
means for USANA to establish a "behind-the-scenes" presence in
China.  As a result of acquiring BabyCare, over the next several
years, USANA was able to obtain Chinese government approval for
"hard to obtain" direct selling licenses in multiple Chinese
provinces.

The Plaintiff alleges that Hong Kong sales began to decline in
direct proportion to the rise in mainland China sales, as sales
once attributed to USANA's Hong Kong market appeared to be reported
in BabyCare in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  She
also claims that even though USANA had acquired multiple direct
selling licenses, USANA nonetheless continued to engage in banned
multi-level marketing practices.

After setting forth these historical underpinnings, the Plaintiff
alleges that during the relevant class period -- March 14, 2014
through Feb. 7, 2017 -- USANA made numerous false statements and
misleading omissions when speaking about its business in China.
Specifically, she alleges that USANA misled investors by purporting
to be in compliance with Chinese regulations prohibiting
multi-level marketing, when in actuality USANA was continuing to
knowingly engage in the prohibited practice, and that USANA's China
sales "exploded" as a result of improperly "redirected Hong Kong
sales."

She further alleges that in September 2016, during the class
period, local police opened an investigation into illegal
multi-level marketing by BabyCare/USANA.  The Plaintiff claims that
the local investigation turned into a full-blown national
investigation, and that in November 2016, USANA received a warning
from authorities concerning its compliance with Chinese law.  She
complains that neither the investigation nor the warning were
communicated to USANA investors.

Finally, the Amended Complaint alleges that on Feb. 7, 2017, the
Class Period ended with USANA's disclosure that the company is
voluntarily conducting an internal investigation of its China
operations, BabyCare Ltd focusing on the compliance with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and certain conduct and policies at
BabyCare, including BabyCare's expense reimbursement policies.
USANA advised investors that the company had retained outside
counsel to conduct the investigation and had notified both the SEC
and the U.S. Department of Justice of the investigation.  On this
news, USANA's share price fell 11.57% to close at $55.40 on Feb. 8,
2017.

Based on these allegations, on Aug. 4, 2017, the Plaintiff filed
the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint asserting claims
for (1) securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act;
and (2) control person liability against the individual Defendants
pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The Defendants have
moved to dismiss, contending that the Plaintiff's complaint fails
to meet the pleading requirements of Rules 8, 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, and otherwise fails to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.

Judge Benson granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and
dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's Consolidated Amended
Action Complaint.  

The Judge finds that the Amended Complaint violates the pleading
standards in several respects.  As a general matter, the complaint
is voluminous, containing 98 substantive pages and 298 paragraphs
of allegations, significant portions of which are dedicated to
unnecessary summaries, history and boilerplate.  Additionally, the
complaint's falsity allegations consist largely of lengthy,
single-spaced block quotations from a variety of USANA's public
statements.  It is not until paragraph 144 that the Plaintiff sets
forth the first paragraph attempting to explain how any statement
by USANA was materially false and misleading.

Given the foregoing, the Judge is inclined to dismiss the action in
its entirety on that basis alone.  However, given the preference
for deciding cases on the merits, he has done its best to sort
through the Amended Complaint to determine whether it states a
viable claim for relief.

He finds that it does not.  With regard to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the Plaintiff never alleges any charge or even a
warning by United States authorities, and she has failed to state
any disclosure obligation.  The Plaintiff also fails to adequately
allege any misstatement with regard to the Company's growth or
financials.  Viewing all of the allegations in the Amended
Complaint collectively, the Judge is simply not persuaded that the
allegations give rise to a "cogent and compelling" inference of
scienter.

Finally, because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act for securities fraud against the
defendants, the Plaintiff's control person liability claim also
fails.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/nev9Wz from Leagle.com.

April Rumbaugh, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Louis C. Ludwig
--lcludwig@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Zane L.
Christensen -- zane@christensenyounglaw.com -- CHRISTENSEN YOUNG &
ASSOCIATES & Steven A. Christensen --
steven@christensenyounglaw.com -- CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES
PLLC.

Chi Wah On, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Louis C.
Ludwig, POMERANTZ LLP.

USANA Health Sciences, David A. Wentz & Paul A. Jones, Defendants,
represented by Catherine E. Moreno -- cmoreno@wsgr.com -- WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice, Erik A. Christiansen --
echristiansen@parsonsbehle.com -- PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, Gideon
A. Schor -- gschor@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI &
Steven M. Schatz -- SSchatz@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI, pro hac vice.

Kevin G. Guest & G. Douglas Hekking, Defendants, represented by
Catherine E. Moreno, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, Erik A.
Christiansen, PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER & Steven M. Schatz, WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice.


VERIZON COMMS: Getz's TCPA Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the SOuthern
District of New York stayed the case, DANIEL GETZ, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VERIZON
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No.
18cv4652 (DLC) (S.D. N.Y.), pending the outcome of arbitration
proceedings.

The case is a putative class action brought by Getz, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, against Verizon,
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").

On Oct. 19, 2016, Getz visited a Verizon Wireless retail store in
Coral Gables, Florida, where he purchased a new Apple iPhone SE and
subscribed to a Verizon plan for data, talk, and text services for
that iPhone.  Getz signed a receipt which confirmed that he
consented to the Verizon Customer Agreement, including the
settlement of disputes by arbitration instead of jury trial.

On Oct. 27, 2017, Getz received two text messages from Verizon on
his Verizon cell phone, advertising a promotion for the new iPhone
X.  Getz alleges that Verizon used an automatic telephone dialing
system to send the unsolicited text messages to large numbers of
consumers.

On May 25, 2018, Getz commenced thes putative class action
asserting that Verizon's actions violated the TCPA.  Specifically,
he alleges that Verizon sent text messages to his cell phone and
those of other class members using automated telephone equipment
without the recipients' consent, in violation of 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

On July 23, 2018, Verizon moved to compel arbitration and stay the
action pursuant to the Arbitration Clause and the Federal
Arbitration Act.  The motion became fully submitted on Aug. 31,
2018.  Getz concedes that he consented to arbitration when he
signed the Customer Agreement.  The only disputed issue is the
scope of the Arbitration Clause.

Judge Cote finds that the language of the Arbitration Clause is
sufficiently broad to create a strong presumption of arbitrability.
Getz contends that the phrase "advertising for any such products
or services" refers to products or services that the customer has
already received.  Because he did not purchase the iPhone X that
was advertised to him, he contends that the advertising was not for
a product he has received, and therefore it is outside the scope of
the Arbitration Clause.

The Judge holds that this construction is insufficient to escape
the broad reach of the Arbitration Clause.  This dispute relates to
or arises from the services Getz received.  The text messages in
question were received on a Verizon phone and sent using Verizon's
wireless service.  Moreover, the purpose of the advertising was to
make Getz aware of an available upgrade to his existing Verizon
phone, to be used with his existing Verizon wireless service.

Because the parties have consented to a broad agreement to
arbitrate and Getz has failed to overcome the strong presumption of
arbitrability that attaches to such agreements, Judge Cote granted
Verizon's motion to compel arbitration.  The action is stayed
pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/grobra from Leagle.com.

Daniel Getz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Avi Kaufman --
kaufman@kaufmanpa.com -- Kaufman P.A. & Ross Howard Schmierer --
rscmierer@dentittislaw.com -- Denittis Osefchen Prince PC.

Verizon Communications, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Gavin J. Rooney -- grooney@lowenstein.com --
Lowenstein Sandler LLP.


VOLKSAGEN GROUP: CalSTRS Securities Fraud Class Action Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Segal, writing for Institutional Investor, reports that that
soon after news that Volkswagen had cheated on emissions tests
became public in September 2015, cutting the German carmaker's
stock almost in half, Brian Bartow, the general counsel for the
California State Teachers' Retirement System, called Irwin
Schwartz, a litigation lawyer.

"How badly did we get hurt?" asked Mr. Bartow from his Sacramento
office.

He wasn't concerned only about the losses from the 330,000
Volkswagen shares the plan owned. Bartow wanted to understand
CalSTRS' options for getting involved in a legal action against VW
to hold the carmaker accountable for the scheme that had allowed
diesel cars to fraudulently pass strict emissions tests. The
general counsel was asking because CalSTRS believes it's one
challenge to buy stocks according to environmental standards, and
another to do the dirty work of holding a company responsible for
violating the pension plan's investment principles.

Pensions and other institutions have a hard time overseeing their
exposure to securities fraud cases domestically. But VW common
shares were traded outside the U.S., making it even more
complicated for investors to figure out cost-effective options for
recovering losses stemming from the scandal.

A few years before, CalSTRS had started using a Schwartz-founded
company called Dividex to identify and evaluate potential fraud
claims from stocks purchased outside the U.S., as well as to
collect more from settlements in domestic class action cases.

VW was one of the company's first big tests.

After Mr. Bartow's call on the scandal, Dividex handled everything
from identifying multiple options for CalSTRS to sue VW in Germany
to negotiating fee agreements for lawyers outside the United
States. CalSTRS ultimately became a proposed lead plaintiff against
VW and chair of the steering committee for its group suing the
automaker.

Now CalSTRS' chief lawyer wants other public pension plans to stop
relying on outdated and conflicted practices to monitor and recover
losses from securities fraud -- when a company falsifies
information to persuade investors to buy its stock. Bartow, with a
full-on white beard and bachelor's and law degrees from the
University of California, says public plans have a fiduciary duty
to better manage securities litigation. A critical mass of
investors will ultimately encourage more competition among lawyers
and drive down legal costs for beneficiaries.

Crucially, Mr. Bartow believes, pensions need to start treating
securities litigation claims as an asset of their plans, just like
any other portfolio holding.

Pension funds, endowments, asset managers, and other investors have
generally relied on class action plaintiffs' lawyers to monitor
their portfolios and alert them if any of the U.S. securities they
hold are involved in fraud. Plaintiffs' lawyers are happy to
provide the work for free, hoping to be hired if an investor
chooses to be the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit.

Mr. Bartow says the practice is riddled with conflicts of interest
-- conflicts that, historically, have maintained a dangerous status
quo.

"The plaintiffs' securities class action bar has an obvious
economic incentive to bring cases to us. It's a Darwinian
principle," notes Mr. Bartow.

"I appreciate that, but there's always an underlying question of
bias," he explains. "This is even more pronounced because we are a
large institutional investor, and merely adding our name and losses
increases the potential value of a case to the plaintiffs' lawyers.
As the portfolio manager, if you will, of litigation recoveries as
an asset, I can't rely on that profit motive, Darwinian or not, to
make me aware of and evaluate what's out there."

It gets even trickier when foreign companies like Volkswagen
deceive investors. In 2010 the Supreme Court ruled in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank that securities traded outside the U.S. are
no longer under U.S. jurisdiction. Pensions interested in
recovering any of their plans' international losses need to find,
evaluate, and join cases filed in foreign jurisdictions. Investors
face a long list of very different legal practices and potential
risks as a result. For one thing, lawyers outside the U.S. can't
work on a contingency basis. That means litigation funders will pay
legal costs, but in exchange for that service they take exhorbitant
chunks of any settlement. (Litigation funder Bentham IMF is owned
by Paul Singer's Elliott Management, a clear signal that the
business is extremely profitable.)

Not long after Bartow became CalSTRS' general counsel in 2010, he
learned of a major new case and wanted to determine whether the
California pension would want to seek lead plaintiff status, as the
named party in a class action suit. Only one of the law firms that
CalSTRS dealt with on securities litigation at the time would
evaluate the merits of the case. The rest refused because they
wanted a chance to represent CalSTRS if it decided to go ahead with
the case. This was because CalSTRS -- the second-largest U.S.
pension fund -- prevents law firms from doing both because of the
inherent conflicts.

In addition, law firms were interested only if the plan wanted to
be the lead plaintiff. There's little profit in going after
settlements from class action suits that take years to work their
way through courts.

"That experience made me realize that this model is not working,"
Bartow says.

He believes that the majority of institutional investors still use
a free monitoring service and wait for so-called portfolio loss
recovery opportunities to be brought to them by the plaintiffs'
counsel. For cases overseas, plaintiffs' lawyers that are also
litigation funders are the ones that bring cases to the attention
of many pension plans.

Institutional investors have a lot at stake. In 2017 a record 432
cases were filed in federal courts, many of them driven by
objections to mergers, according to Securities Class Action
Services. So far, 350 cases have been filed in the U.S. in 2018, on
pace to be another record year. In 2016 and 2017, SCAS, which is
part of Institutional Shareholder Services, filed 2.4 million
claims for clients. In 2018 the top 15 settlements totaled $10
billion in shareholder recoveries.

Once Mr. Bartow decided to upend CalSTRS' model, he looked for an
independent service that could identify and evaluate potential
cases and help the pension recover more losses. But there wasn't
one. Custodian banks and a number of vendors, including Financial
Recovery Technologies and ISS, only track litigation and provide
claims-filing services.

Securities lawsuits involving foreign companies plagued Bartow.
Unlike in the U.S., in foreign cases investors can't be passive and
still recover a share of a class action settlement. They need to
opt into a case.

"What drove me early on to get involved in these foreign cases was
the simple fact that if CalSTRS didn't participate, we would get
nothing," Mr. Bartow says.

Litigation outside the U.S. is on the rise. Eleven non-U.S. cases
have been settled this year through August, including Petrobras,
the fifth-largest securities class action settlement to date, and
Fortis, the biggest settlement ever in Europe, according to ISS.

Foreign cases also bring new risks. In the U.S. institutional
investors can hire lawyers on contingency, meaning they don't pay
legal fees unless they win. Many foreign jurisdictions don't allow
contingency fee agreements, and some require losers to pay legal
fees.

"For CalSTRS to get involved, it was important to find a risk-free
model analogous to the U.S. class action system," explains Mr.
Bartow.

As he looked for solutions to manage litigation as an asset of the
plan, Mr.  Bartow met Mr. Schwartz.

Mr. Schwartz had seen the problems firsthand at Massachusetts
Pension Reserve Investment Management. He had been hired after the
Boston-based investment fund stopped solely using plaintiffs'
lawyers to monitor its portfolios. To be an independent adviser to
PRIM, Schwartz needed to establish processes from scratch,
developing a system with Bloomberg Analytics, for example, to
detect large losses in the portfolio that could signal a coming
lawsuit.

But not everybody cared about fixing the problem.

Mr. Schwartz says settlements of securities litigation are similar
to dividends. Investors may get two cents a share, which sounds
measly but can add up to significant amounts of money.

"When on Earth would you sue somebody if you thought you would get
back two cents on a dollar? That's the mind-set of many investors
on this asset class, if you call it that," Mr. Schwartz says

Mr. Bartow drafted a wish list of capabilities to help Schwartz
build a system that could help the pension plan manage its
securities litigation claims. In 2013, Schwartz created Dividex to
meet CalSTRS' needs and later registered it as an investment
adviser.

Now an increasing number of investors want independent advice on
securities litigation. Last year the Teacher Retirement System of
Texas started a search for what it calls investment-related
litigation claims services, according to a public filing.

Dividex helps institutional investors identify and manage potential
fraud claims for securities purchased outside the U.S., and it
helps them do a better job of collecting on class action
settlements in the U.S. Schwartz went a step further and formed a
risk insurance company to provide what's called before-the-event
adverse party cost insurance to protect clients that wanted to join
cases in jurisdictions that required losers to pay all legal fees.

Dividex provides evaluations of potential securities fraud cases.
But to avoid conflicts it does not provide legal services and won't
represent a plan if it chooses to become the lead plaintiff in a
class action lawsuit.

Bartow is pushing big investors to become more active now, because
without them, lawyers and litigation funders -- which are needed to
fund legal costs for plaintiffs outside the U.S. -- have too much
pricing power. (The minimum price for litigation funders in London
is return of capital plus 300 percent.)

The general counsel for one of the ten largest asset managers
agrees that there's a lot of room for improvement. "There are real
opportunities for the institutional investor community to pursue
progress in how these cases are pursued. Because institutional
investors have been somewhat passive, I think an unreasonable
percentage of the recoveries [has] flowed to litigation funders and
law firms. There's an opportunity to put more money into individual
investors' pockets," he says.

"After the Morrison case was decided, there were very few
litigation funders that I was aware of -- and their
take-it-or-leave-it approach just got under my skin," Mr. Bartow
says. "Since our first experience we have successfully negotiated
with funders in this space, but I would like to see more
competition." [GN]


WALGREENS BOOTS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Hering Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JERRY HERING, Plaintiff, v. WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE,
INC., STEFANO PESSINA, and GEORGE R. FAIRWEATHER, Defendants, Case
No. 1:15-cv-2440 (M.D. Pa.), Judge John E. Jones, III of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (i) granted
the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and (ii)
denied Hering's Joint Motion to Intervene by Lead Plaintiff and
Putative Class Members Douglas S. Chabot, Corey M. Dayton, and Joel
M. Kling.

The case arises from the failed merger of Rite Aid and Walgreens.
Hering filed an Amended Complaint on Dec. 11, 2017, alleging
fraudulent misrepresentations made by Rite Aid and Walgreens
related to the merger from Oct. 27, 2015, to June 28, 2017.  These
statements, Hering alleged, violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, as well as Rule 10b-5 promulgated
by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

Rite Aid and Walgreens separately filed motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim on Feb. 14, 2018.  After providing the
parties additional time for briefing, the Court granted Rite Aid's
motion and denied Walgreens' motion.  With respect to statements
made by Walgreens, however, it noted that only the statements made
on and after Oct. 20, 2016, were actionable.

On Aug. 24, 2018, Walgreens filed the instant Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, arguing that the Court's limitation on which
statements were actionable removed Hering's standing, as his last
alleged purchase of Rite Aid stock occurred prior to the first
actionable statement of Walgreens.

In response, Hering, while not denying his sudden lack of standing,
argues that the preferred remedy is to proceed to the class
certification and the identification of a proper class
representative.  Nevertheless, Herring filed the Joint Motion to
Intervene on Sept. 6, 2018, as a protective measure.

Judge Jones finds that Hering's Amended Complaint plainly sets
forth class action allegations, and it does appear that his claims
were mooted before he could reasonably seek certification of a
class.  However, the mooting of his claims resulted from the
Court's dismissal of the non-actionable statements, not through any
conduct of Walgreens, such as "picking off" named Plaintiffs.  The
Judge finds that Hering's claims are not "inherently transitory,"
"capable of repetition, yet evading review," or "acutely
susceptible to mootness."  In short, none of the special class
action mootness exceptions applies, and the "general rule" controls
the case: the mooting of named a plaintiff's claims prior to class
certification moots the entire case."  Therefore, the Judge finds
that Hering has lost standing not only with respect to the merits
of his individual claim, but also with respect to seeking class
certification.

Walgreens does not challenge any particular element under either
mechanism.  Rather, it contends that Hering's lack of standing, and
the Court's consequent lack of jurisdiction, results in the
intervenors not having any Plaintiff with which to intervene.  The
Judge agrees.

First, he finds that the intervenors have failed to establish all
the required elements of intervention as of right.  Furthermore,
and more generally, a motion for intervention is not appropriate to
cure a lack of standing.  After dismissal, there is now no entity
remaining with which to intervene.  The Judge finds this rationale
counsels against granting permissive intervention. Therefore, he
will deny the Joint Motion to Intervene, but notes that the
intervenors are free to bring their allegations in a new action.

Consistent with the foregoing analysis, Judge Jones granted
Walgreens' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and denied
Hering's Joint Motion to Intervene.  The Judge will issue a
separate order in accordance with his Memorandum.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/w9Z1O1 from Leagle.com.

Jerry Hering, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin M. Mather --
bmather@kcr-law.com -- Kaufman, Coren & Ress, P.C., Christopher
Chagas Gold -- cgold@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, David T. Wissbroecker -- DWissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Mark J. Dearman -- mdearman@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Randall J. Baron --
randyb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Stuart A.
Davidson -- SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, David A. Knotts -- dknotts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Deborah R. Gross -- dgross@kcr-law.com --
Kaufman Coren & Ress PC & Howard J. Kaufman -- hkaufman@kcr-law.com
-- Kaufman, Coren & Ress, PC.

Don Michael Hussey & Joanna Pauli Hussey, Movants, represented by
Deborah R. Gross, Kaufman Coren & Ress PC.

Douglas Chabot, Corey Dayton & Joel Kling, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by Deborah R. Gross, Kaufman Coren & Ress PC.

Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., Stefano Pessina & George R
Fairweather, Defendants, represented by Caroline H. Zalka --
caroline.zalka@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Jonathan D.
Polkes -- jonathan.polkes@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP,
Robert S. Ruff -- robert.ruff@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP & Thomas G. Collins -- thomas.collins@bipc.com -- Buchanan
Ingersoll & Rooney PC.


WILKES-BARRE, PA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Slavish Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert D. Mariani of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the case, CATHERINE SLAVISH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA HOUSING AUTHORITY and DONNA KOZAK,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-1468 (M.D. Pa.).

On Aug. 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a class action Complaint
setting forth five counts: violations of the Plaintiffs' rights to
procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
against Defendant Kozak (Count I); negligence against Defendant
Housing Authority (Count II); breach of express warranty of
habitability against Defendant Housing Authority (Count III);
breach of implied warranty of habitability against Defendant
Housing Authority (Count IV); and unjust enrichment against
Defendant Housing Authority (Count V).

After Defendants filed their motions to dismiss, the Court
subsequently referred the motions to Magistrate Judge Carlson for
the preparation of a Report and Recommendation ("R&R").  On June
14, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued his R&R in which he
recommends that the motions to dismiss by the Defendants be denied.
The Defendants filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R and
briefs in support of the Objections, to which the Plaintiffs filed
responses.

Defendant Kozak argues that tge Plaintiffs failed to plead a
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim because there is
no recognized liberty or property interest in decent, safe, and
sanitary housing or access to statutory grievance procedures, and
thus Plaintiffs' due process claim should be dismissed.  Kozak also
cites to a number of cases involving civil litigation brought by
inmates to support her claim that the Plaintiffs, like prisoners,
do not have access to a grievance procedure.

Judge Mariani finds that the Plainitffs' procedural due process
claim is premised on an assertion that they were denied access to a
grievance procedure.  The Plaintiffs assert that Kozak denied them
access to the Housing Authority's grievance procedure under Section
1437d (k) by instructing residents not to discuss the bed-bug
infestation, and threatening to evict and/or retaliate against
residents who voiced concerns about the infestation.

The Judge also finds that contrary to Kozak's contention, the
Plaintiffs are entitled to a statutory grievance procedure under
the Housing Act.  Kozak rendered the grievance process meaningless
by refusing to attempt to informally or formally address the
Plaintiffs' complaints, something she is required to do under the
law.

For the aforementioned reasons, as well as those set forth in the
R&R, Judge Mariani rejects Kozak's Objection and adopts the
thorough analysis undertaken by the Magistrate Judge.  Thus, the
Plaintiffs' allegations with regard to Kozak are sufficient to
state a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendant Kozak's second Objection is that the Plaintiffs' due
process claim against her is barred by qualified immunity as such
liability has not been clearly established.  The Judge finds that
the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Kozak's actions are
violative of Section 1437 and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Whether
the constitutional rights invoked by the Plaintiffs are clearly
established as well as whether those rights have been violated
present questions which must be decided upon a fully developed
record and on a dispositive motion at the conclusion of discovery.

Finally, Defendant Housing Authority asserts in its Objection that
the Plaintiffs' pleaded and admitted in their Complaint that the
Housing Authority is a Commonwealth agency, and, as such, it is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  With respect to this
argument, the Judge adopts the Magistrate Judge's analysis that,
under the factors set forth in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., the limited record before the Court does not
allow for a determination of whether the Housing Authority is in
fact a Commonwealth agency.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Mariani, upon de novo review of
the R&R, adopted the R&R in its entirety.  A separate Order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/gajgpX from Leagle.com.

Catherine Slavish, Karima Ahmad, Kenneath Barnes, Ethel Carter
Farmer, Martha Corbett, Michele Hallock, Mary Kowalczyk, Donna
Linderman, Bettie Mangum, Victor Mariano, Gary Matthews, Charles
Maury, Alan Newton, David Smith, Debbra Smith, Lisa Stokes & Emily
Webster, Individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs, represented by Peter C. Wood, Jr. --
peter@pcwlawoffice.com -- Law Office of Peter C. Wood, Jr., PC,
Jeffrey M. Lipman -- info@lipmanlawfirm.com -- Lipman Law Firm, PC
& Matthew Mobilio, McCormick Law Firm.

The City of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania Housing Authority, (an
agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), Defendant, represented
by James A. Doherty, Jr. -- Jdoherty@shdlawfirm.com -- Scanlon,
Howley & Doherty, P.C. & James Andrew Doherty, III --
jadoherty@shdlawfirm.com -- Doherty Law, LLC.

Donna Kozak, Property Manager, Defendant, represented by Jennifer
Menichini, Joyce, Carmody & Moran, P.C., Joseph J. Joyce, III --
jjj@joycecarmody.com -- Joyce, Carmody & Moran, P.C. & Matthew John
Carmody -- mjc@joycecarmody.com -- Joyce, Carmody & Moran, P.C..


WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Summary Judgment Bid in Rushing Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM RUSHING, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-01421-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (i) denied WSI's motion for summary
judgment, except that Kentucky law applies to Rushing's claims; and
(ii) granted the Plaintiff's request for pre-certification
discovery, although that request is limited to California
purchasers.

In this putative class action case, Rushing, a resident and citizen
of Kentucky, seeks to represent a nationwide class of purchasers of
bed linens sold by Defendants Williams-Sonoma, Inc.,
Williams-Sonoma DTC, Inc., and Williams-Sonoma Advertising, Inc.
("WSI"), who allegedly advertised misleading and false thread
counts.

The operative Seventh Amended Complaint asserts the following
causes of action on behalf of Rushing and a putative nationwide
class: (1) Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (2) Misleading and
Deceptive Advertising; (3) Untrue Advertising; (4) Unlawful
Business Practices; (5) Unfair Business Practices; (6) Fraudulent
Business Practices; and (7) Unjust Enrichment.

WSI moves for summary judgment, arguing that Rushing's California
claims fail because his business purchased the sheets and,
therefore, he does not have standing to bring his consumer
protection claims.  It argues in the alternative that even if
Rushing has standing under California law, summary judgment is
nonetheless proper because Kentucky law applies to his claims.

In response, Rushing asks for relief under Rule 56(d), contending
that the Court should defer ruling on the defense motion because he
has not had the opportunity to take discovery that could weigh on
resolution of the motion.  He also opposes the motion for summary
judgment on its merits, arguing that he has standing under
California law and that the choice of law analysis is premature,
but if reached, mandates application of California law.

The Defendants sought leave to file to file a sur-reply, arguing
that Rushing's opposition to discovery subpoenas served by WSI show
that Rushing agrees that Kentucky law applies to his claims and
shows that his Rule 56(d) motion should be denied because of his
inequitable conduct that stalled WSI's discovery.

An oral argument was held on June 20, 2018.  As instructed, shortly
following the hearing the parties submitted a joint letter joining
the issue of whether the Plaintiff is entitled to discovery as to
the identity of absent class members.  During this same timeframe,
three discovery disputes arose in other districts as a result of
subpoenas issued by WSI seeking discovery related to Rushing's
purchase of the bed linens.  Those three matters were transferred
to the District and related to the underlying case.

Judge Orrick agrees that Kentucky law applies to Rushing's claims.
But WSI did not argue how Rushing's individual or class claims
should be resolved on their merits under Kentucky law, so its
motion for summary judgment cannot be granted.  As Rushing filed
the case with standing under California law and a good faith belief
that California law applied, the Judge concludes that he is
entitled to pre-certification discovery to attempt to locate a
California resident willing to join the case as a named Plaintiff
if he wants to pursue the claims under California law.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Orrick denied WSI's motion for
summary judgment, except that Kentucky law applies to Rushing's
claims.  He granted the Plaintiff's request for pre-certification
discovery, although that request is limited to California
purchasers.  Any dispute over the content of a Pioneer notice (if
required) and any remaining motions to quash will be resolved by
Judge Kim.

The previously scheduled Case Management Conference set for Dec. 4,
2018 remains on calendar.  Given the various elections required
above, the parties will be prepared to propose a new case schedule
setting deadlines for Rushing to amend (to substitute in a new
named Plaintiff to pursue claims under California law if he so
desires), for limited discovery to be taken as to any new named
Plaintiff, for the Plaintiff's amended motion for class
certification, and for trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/BsLM8C from Leagle.com.

William Rushing, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by George Richard Baker, Baker Law
PC, Amber Eck -- ambere@haelaw.com -- Zeldes Haeggquist & Eck,
Audra Petrolle -- apetrolle@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group, PC,
George Richard Baker  -- richard@bakerlawpc.com -- Baker Law PC &
Kathryn Honecker -- khonecker@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group,
pc.

Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Williams-Sonoma
Advertising, Inc., a California corporation & Williams-Sonoma DTC,
Inc., a California corporation, Defendants, represented by Benjamin
O. Aigboboh -- baigboboh@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton, LLP, Eric J. DiIulio --
ediiulio@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP, P. Craig Cardon --
ccardon@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP, Robert A. Guite -- rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, pro hac vice & Tanya Yarbrough Bowman
-- tbowman@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC.


XANITOS INC: Faces Class Action in Illinois Over BIPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Crawford, Esq., of King & Spalding, in an article for
JDSupra, reports that a proposed class action lawsuit filed in
Illinois against Xanitos Inc., a Pennsylvania-based hospital
housekeeping company, alleges that its employee timekeeping system
violates the Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), an
Illinois state law.

Passed in 2008, BIPA defines biometric information as "a retina or
iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face
geometry" and sets standards for private entities that possess or
store such information.  Companies must (i) obtain consent from the
individual if biometric information will be collected; (ii)
securely store biometric information; and (iii) destroy the
information in a timely manner.  BIPA allows individuals to file a
lawsuit for violations with damages allowed at $1,000 per violation
or $5,000 for each reckless or intentional violation.

The Illinois lawsuit claims that Xanitos requires employees to
utilize fingerprint scanning for timekeeping at the beginning and
end of each shift.  The case filings further allege that Xanitos
did not provide employees with notice or obtain written consent
authorizing the collection of biometric information, nor was a
retention schedule disclosed.  In addition to attorneys' fees and
costs, the plaintiff is seeking $1,000 per violation for each
proposed class member, which includes any Illinois resident who had
biometric information obtained by Xanitos.

A bill to amend BIPA, SB 3053, is pending before the Illinois
General Assembly and proposes to offer exemptions for private
entities if:

"(i) the biometric information is used exclusively for employment,
human resources, fraud prevention, or security purposes; (ii) the
private entity does not sell, lease, trade, or similarly profit
from the biometric identifier or biometric information collected;
or (iii) the private entity stores, transmits, and protects the
biometric identifiers and biometric information in a manner that is
the same as or more protective than the manner in which the private
entity stores, transmits, and protects other confidential and
sensitive information."

Since BIPA's passage a decade ago, only Washington and Texas have
passed similar laws. [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Amtico Loses Summary Judgment Bid
--------------------------------------------------
Mesothelioma.net reported that the Supreme Court of New York County
recently decided in favor of the family of a mesothelioma victim
and against the asbestos tile company that the family blames for
the death of their loved one. The decision means that the man's
survivors will be able to proceed with their mesothelioma lawsuit
seeking justice for the loss that they suffered.

The mesothelioma victim in the recently-hear case was Steven Hall,
who died in April of 2017 after having been diagnosed with the rare
and fatal form of cancer just 6 moths earlier. Mr. Hall had spent
more than a dozen years renovating homes, and during that time he
had multiple exposures to asbestos, the mineral that causes the
disease. One of those sources was Amtico floor tiles, which he
described using for ten years. He remembered the asbestos dust
residue that would lie on top of the tiles in the boxes that he
opened, as well as the dust raised by cutting, scoring, breaking
and sanding tiles so that they would fit in the rooms where he was
installing them. Despite the apparent connection between Mr. Hall's
exposure to their products and his illness, the company moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Hall's family members had not
provided evidence that established causation of his illness.

Legal News Line reported that Amtico said all exposures to the
deadly substance are not equal, using a 2015 state court decision
that favored companies sued in the long-running mass tort.  Amtico
was one of the six primary makers of flooring that contained
asbestos. But the company argues the specific type of asbestos used
in its products would not have been much of a factor in the
development of Mantovi's mesothelioma.

"Despite decades' worth of research into asbestos and
asbestos-related diseases, Plaintiffs' experts have failed to offer
ANY evidence in a methodology generally accepted in the scientific
community which demonstrates bystander work around floor tile,
containing encapsulated chrysotile asbestos as a component, can be
sufficient to cause pleural mesothelioma in the general population;
because NO such association exists," the company's motion says,
according to Legal News Line.

Legal News Line related that Mantovi's deposition took place over
four days in April 2017, and the parts relevant to American
Biltrite stated he inspected buildings for State Farm from 1967-72,
during which time he was exposed to Amtico floor tiles.  But he
also alleged exposure during various other jobs. He was a printing
assistant who worked with asbestos printing material from 1963-64
and then moved on to a service station where he worked near brakes,
mufflers and clutches.  He worked at an oil refinery as a clerk
around insulated pumps. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1965 and
worked around insulated piping, valves, boilers and other
equipment. American Biltrite says that when he worked for State
Farm, Mantovi did not actually work with the floor tile.

In Mantovi's case, plaintiffs attorneys at Weitz & Luxenberg have
not established the requisite causation standard required to
continue their case against American Biltrite, the company says.

"Faced with the lack of scientifically supported data showing
exposure to low dose encapsulated chrysotile products can cause
disease, plaintiffs rely on the 'single exposure,' 'any exposure'
or 'cumulative exposure' theories," the company wrote.

"Those theories are all manifestations of the same faulty premise:
that there is 'no safe dose' for a carcinogen. Those theories do
not attempt, and even disdain the need, to quantify or qualify dose
or exposure levels relating to individual types of products and
ignore the requirement that the product at issue, not asbestos
generally, be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or
that exposure cannot be slight or trivial."

In handing down its decision denying Amtico's motion for summary
judgment, the court points out that the law requires the plaintiff
to establish exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of
causing the harm suffered, and that the victim was exposed to
enough of the toxin to cause the harm suffered. The court reviews
the evidence that Amtico submitted in its own defense and point out
that even the company’s expert witness does not contest the
causal relationship between the asbestos in their product and
mesothelioma. They also ruled that the issues of fact that Amtico
raised needed to be decided at trial, as Mr. Hall's family had
shown "facts and conditions from which Amtico's liability may be
reasonably inferred."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Claims Tied to Laundered Clothes Beaten
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that John Crane Inc. isn't liable in
Maryland for asbestos claims brought by the estate of a woman who
allegedly developed mesothelioma and died from exposure to her
husband's work clothes, a state appeals court said.

The issue of "take home" asbestos exposure is much litigated these
days and several state top courts, including in California, New
Jersey and Virginia, have held recently that household members and
others may be pursue claims in some circumstances.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Bathurst Tennis Clubhouse
------------------------------------------------------------
Murray Nicholls of Western Advocate reported that work on Bathurst
Tennis Centre's new $800,000 clubhouse has come to a halt after
workers uncovered asbestos at the site.

Preparatory groundwork has been continuing at the site on Durham
Street since the start of September but was suspended when the
suspect material was found.

Bathurst Regional Council engineering services director Darren
Sturgiss said samples were sent for tests which confirmed the
material contained asbestos.

"Following advice of the discovery of suspected asbestos containing
material on site, the responsible council officer ordered that
works cease until testing was complete to confirm presence of
asbestos," Mr Sturgiss said.

"Testing has now confirmed that small fragments of non-friable
asbestos is present on-site.

"This was not expected at the time of commencement of this project,
however, all necessary precautions, in accordance with WHS
requirements, have been undertaken at each stage of the project to
date."

Mr Sturgiss said it was not yet known when would resume at the
site, nor what the asbestos removal might cost council.

"Council is currently seeking prices from qualified removal
contractors to clear the site," Mr Sturgiss said.

"Until this is finalised, definite time frames and costs for these
works cannot be determined."

The new two-storey clubhouse will feature amenities areas on the
lower ground floor and a clubroom, committee room and commercial
kitchen on the ground floor.

The project has been funded by council ($500,000), the state
government ($200,000) and the Carillon City Tennis Club
($100,000).


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Builder Dies From Asbestos Exposure
----------------------------------------------------
Stroud News and Journal reported that David Cox of Cotswold Terrace
worked at Elliots in Uley for a number of years from 1967 and was
exposed to asbestos on a regular basis as her ripped down garages,
the Gloucester inquest was told.

In 2017 Mr Cox was diagnosed with Mesothelioma, a lung cancer for
which the only known cause is asbestos exposure.

In January this year he was suffering increased shortness of breath
and his condition deteriorated. He was placed on palliative care,
passing away on September 7 this year.

Senior Gloucestershire Coroner Katie Skerrett recorded a conclusion
of industrial disease.

"His HMRC work history backs up that he was working as a builder,
the only time he believes he was exposed," she said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Conn. High Ct. to Tackle Asbestos Coverage Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Sistrunk of Law360 reported that Connecticut's high court is
poised to tackle multiple issues of first impression in Vanderbilt
Minerals LLC's asbestos injury coverage battle with its insurers.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Had 29,323 Pending Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Crane Co. has 29,323 pending asbestos-related claims as of
September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated October 22,
2018.

The Company states, "Of the 29,323 pending claims as of September
30, 2018, approximately 18,000 claims were pending in New York,
approximately 100 claims were pending in Texas, approximately 400
claims were pending in Mississippi, and approximately 200 claims
were pending in Ohio, all jurisdictions in which legislation or
judicial orders restrict the types of claims that can proceed to
trial on the merits.

"The Company has tried several cases resulting in defense verdicts
by the jury or directed verdicts for the defense by the court. The
Company further has pursued appeals of certain adverse jury
verdicts that have resulted in reversals in favor of the defense."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/joxGHc


ASBESTOS UPDATE: DOJ Increases Scrutiny of Asbestos Trusts
----------------------------------------------------------
Debra Cassens Weiss of the ABA Journal reported that the Department
of Justice has been increasing its scrutiny of trusts that are set
up to compensate victims of asbestos.

According to Asbestos.com, currently there are more than 60 trust
funds with an estimated $30 billion combined, stemming from
companies seeking bankruptcy protection and avoiding future
liabilities related to asbestos exposure.

Companies in bankruptcy court create the trusts to protect
themselves from lawsuits while creating a pot of money for victims.
The DOJ has expressed concern about fraudulent claims and a lack of
oversight, the Associated Press reports. The DOJ asserts it wants
to protect victims as well as federal coffers, which could be
paying Medicare claims even though trust funds have paid for
medical costs.

Critics, on the other hand, say there is little proof of widespread
fraud, and increased oversight could divert money from the
victims.

The DOJ got involved in September when it filed a statement of
interest in a bankruptcy case in the Western District of North
Carolina, according to Bloomberg Big Law Business and a press
release. The filing said the reorganization plans don't have
adequate safeguards.

Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio
explained why the DOJ got involved in the press release. "In recent
years, alarming evidence has emerged of fraud and mismanagement
inside asbestos trusts," he said. The case is In re Kaiser Gypsum
Co.

Later that same month, the DOJ challenged the appointment of a
lawyer who would act as claims representative in a different case
involving the Duro Dyne Corp. The department claimed the lawyer's
independence could be compromised because of close connections to
lawyers representing plaintiffs, according to a press release. A
judge rejected the request, according to AP.

Another trust, DII Industries, disclosed that it received an
administrative subpoena for records as part of a probe into
Medicare reimbursement.

"There is incredible irony in the fact that an industry that
covered up the dangers of a known carcinogen for decades, leading
to ongoing deaths of 15,000 Americans a year, is now claiming that
its victims are committing systemic fraud against the trusts --
even though no court has ever found evidence of such fraud," Peter
Knudsen, spokesman for American Association for Justice, a leading
plaintiff's lawyers group, said in a statement.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fla. Supreme Ct. Reinstates Ruling in DeLisle
--------------------------------------------------------------
In Richard DeLisle's asbestos case, the Supreme Court of Florida
has remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court's
judgment, according to Crane Co.'s Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission dated October 22, 2018.

The Company states, "On September 17, 2013, a Fort Lauderdale,
Florida state court jury in the Richard DeLisle claim found the
Company responsible for 16% of an US$8 million verdict.  The trial
court denied all parties' post-trial motions, and entered judgment
against the Company in the amount of US$1.3 million.

"The Company appealed and oral argument on the appeal took place on
February 16, 2016.  On September 14, 2016 a panel of the Florida
Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment in favor of the
Company.

"Plaintiff filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for rehearing
and/or certification of an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,
which the Court denied on November 9, 2016.  Plaintiffs
subsequently requested review by the Supreme Court of Florida.
Plaintiffs' motion was granted on July 11, 2017.  Oral argument
took place on March 6, 2018.

"On October 15, 2018, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed and
remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court's judgment.
The Company is considering its further appellate options."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/joxGHc


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Mechanic Sues Borg-Warner Over Lung Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Record reported that a former mechanic and sawmill
laborer alleges exposure to asbestos during his career caused him
to develop lung cancer.

Billy Coons filed a complaint on Oct. 29 in the St. Louis 22nd
Judicial Circuit Court against Borg-Warner Corp., Gardner Denver
Inc., Union Carbide Corp., et al. alleging strict liability,
negligence and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that at various
times during his career beginning in 1960, he was exposed to and
inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers emanating from certain products
manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by defendants. The
suit states that on or about Aug. 26, 2015, he first became aware
that he developed lung cancer, an asbestos-induced disease.

The plaintiff holds Borg-Warner Corp., Gardner Denver Inc., Union
Carbide Corp., et al. responsible because the defendants allegedly
negligently included asbestos fibers in their products when
adequate substitutes were available and failed to provide adequate
warnings and instructions concerning the dangers of working with or
around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages of more than
$50,000, costs, interest and all further relief as the court deems
just and equitable. He is represented by Benjamin R. Schmickle and
Matthew C. Morris of SWMW Law LLC in St. Louis.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1822-CC11519


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Had $1.7BB Bendix Claims at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Honeywell International Inc. recorded US$1,693 million at September
30, 2018 in asbestos-related liabilities involving predecessor
company Bendix Friction Materials (Bendix) business, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2018.  The Company also disclosed that it had 6,087 unresolved
Bendix-related claims at September 30.

The Company states, "Bendix manufactured automotive brake linings
that contained chrysotile asbestos in an encapsulated form.
Claimants consist largely of individuals who allege exposure to
asbestos from brakes from either performing or being in the
vicinity of individuals who performed brake replacements.

"It is not possible to predict whether resolution values for
Bendix-related asbestos claims will increase, decrease or stabilize
in the future.

"Our consolidated financial statements reflect an estimated
liability for resolution of asserted (claims filed as of the
financial statement date) and unasserted Bendix-related asbestos
claims and excludes the Company's legal fees to defend such
asbestos claims which will continue to be expensed by the Company
as they are incurred.  We have valued Bendix asserted and
unasserted claims using average resolution values for the previous
five years.  We update the resolution values used to estimate the
cost of Bendix asserted and unasserted claims during the fourth
quarter each year.

"Honeywell now reflects the inclusion of all years through 2059
rather than a subset of future years when estimating the liability
for unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims.  Such liability for
unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims is based on historic
claims filing experience and dismissal rates, disease
classifications, and resolution values in the tort system for the
previous five years.

"Our insurance receivable corresponding to the liability for
settlement of asserted and unasserted Bendix asbestos claims
reflects coverage which is provided by a large number of insurance
policies written by dozens of insurance companies in both the
domestic insurance market and the London excess market.  Based on
our ongoing analysis of the probable insurance recovery, insurance
receivables are recorded in the financial statements simultaneous
with the recording of the estimated liability for the underlying
asbestos claims.  This determination is based on our analysis of
the underlying insurance policies, our historical experience with
our insurers, our ongoing review of the solvency of our insurers,
judicial determinations relevant to our insurance programs, and our
consideration of the impacts of any settlements reached with our
insurers."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/qF4vyy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Had $2.6-Bil. Liabilities at Sept.30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Honeywell International Inc. recorded total liabilities of US$2,601
million related to asbestos matters at September 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Honeywell is a defendant in asbestos related
personal injury actions related to North American Refractories
Company ("NARCO"), which was sold in 1986, and Bendix Friction
Materials ("Bendix") business, which was sold in 2014.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/qF4vyy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Records $908MM NARCO Liabilities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Honeywell International Inc. recorded US$908 million at September
30, 2018, in asbestos-related liabilities involving predecessor
company North American Refractories Company (NARCO), according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2018.

The Company states, "Honeywell's predecessor, Allied Corporation
owned NARCO from 1979 to 1986.  When the NARCO business was sold,
Honeywell's predecessor entered into a cross-indemnity agreement
with NARCO which included an obligation to indemnify the purchaser
for asbestos claims.  Such claims arise primarily from alleged
occupational exposure to asbestos-containing refractory brick and
mortar for high-temperature applications.  NARCO ceased
manufacturing these products in 1980, and the first asbestos claims
were filed in the tort system against NARCO in 1983.  Claims
filings and related costs increased dramatically in the late 1990s
through 2001, which led to NARCO filing for bankruptcy in January
2002.  Once NARCO filed for bankruptcy, all then current and future
NARCO asbestos claims were stayed against both NARCO and Honeywell
pending the reorganization of NARCO.

"Following the bankruptcy filing, in December 2002 Honeywell
recorded a total NARCO asbestos liability of US$3.2 billion, which
was comprised of three components: (i) the estimated liability to
settle pre-bankruptcy petition NARCO claims and certain
post-petition settlements (US$2.2 billion, referred to as
"Pre-bankruptcy NARCO Liability"), (ii) the estimated liability
related to then unasserted NARCO claims for the period 2004 through
2018 (US$950 million, referred to as "NARCO Trust Liability"), and
(iii) other NARCO bankruptcy-related obligations totaling US$73
million.

As of September 30, 2018, our total NARCO asbestos liability of
US$908 million reflects Pre-bankruptcy NARCO liability of US$165
million and NARCO Trust Liability of US$743 million.  Through
September 30, 2018, Pre-bankruptcy NARCO Liability has been reduced
by approximately US$2 billion since first established in 2002,
largely related to settlement payments.  The remaining
Pre-bankruptcy NARCO liability principally represents estimated
amounts owed pursuant to settlement agreements reached during the
pendency of the NARCO bankruptcy proceedings that provide for the
right to submit claims to the NARCO Trust subject to qualification
under the terms of the settlement agreements and Trust Distribution
Procedures.  The other NARCO bankruptcy obligations were paid in
2013 and no further liability is recorded.

"As of September 30, 2018, Honeywell has not made any payments to
the NARCO Trust for Annual Contribution Claims as any Annual
Contribution Claims which have been paid since the Trust became
operational have been funded by cash dividends from HWI.

"Honeywell continues to evaluate the appropriateness of the US$743
million NARCO Trust Liability.  Despite becoming effective in 2013,
the NARCO Trust has experienced delays in becoming fully
operational.  Violations of the Trust Distribution Procedures and
the resulting disputes and challenges, a standstill pending dispute
resolution, and limited claims payments, have all contributed to
the lack of sufficient normalized data based on actual claims
processing experience in the Trust since it began operational.  As
a result, we have not been able to further update the NARCO Trust
Liability.  The US$743 million NARCO Trust Liability continues to
be appropriate because of the unresolved pending claims in the
Trust, some portion of which will result in payouts in the future,
and because new claims continue to be filed with the NARCO Trust.
When sufficiently reliable claims data exists, we will update our
estimate of the NARCO Trust Liability and it is possible that a
material change may need to be recognized.

"Our insurance receivable of US$311 million as of September 30,
2018, corresponding to the estimated liability for asserted and
unasserted NARCO asbestos claims reflects coverage which reimburses
Honeywell for portions of NARCO-related indemnity and defense costs
and is provided by a large number of insurance policies written by
dozens of insurance companies in both the domestic insurance market
and the London excess market.  We conduct analyses to estimate the
probable amount of insurance that is recoverable for asbestos
claims.  While the substantial majority of our insurance carriers
are solvent, some of our individual carriers are insolvent, which
has been considered in our analysis of probable recoveries.  We
made judgments concerning insurance coverage that we believe are
reasonable and consistent with our historical dealings and our
knowledge of any pertinent solvency issues surrounding insurers."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/qF4vyy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll-Rand Still Defends Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ingersoll-Rand Public Limited Company said in its Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that over 80 percent of the open
asbestos-related claims against the Company are non-malignancy or
unspecified disease claims.

The Company states, "Certain wholly-owned subsidiaries and former
companies of ours are named as defendants in asbestos-related
lawsuits in state and federal courts.  In virtually all of the
suits, a large number of other companies have also been named as
defendants.  The vast majority of those claims have been filed
against either Ingersoll-Rand Company or Trane U.S. Inc.  (Trane)
and generally allege injury caused by exposure to asbestos
contained in certain historical products sold by Ingersoll-Rand
Company or Trane, primarily pumps, boilers and railroad brake
shoes.  None of our existing or previously-owned businesses were a
producer or manufacturer of asbestos.

"The Company engages an outside expert to assist in calculating an
estimate of the Company's total liability for pending and
unasserted future asbestos-related claims and annually performs a
detailed analysis with the assistance of an outside expert to
update its estimated asbestos-related liability.  The methodology
used to project the Company's total liability for pending and
unasserted potential future asbestos-related claims relied upon and
included the following factors, among others:

   * the outside expert's interpretation of a widely accepted
forecast of the population likely to have been occupationally
exposed to asbestos;

   * epidemiological studies estimating the number of people likely
to develop asbestos-related diseases such as mesothelioma and lung
cancer;

   * the Company's historical experience with the filing of
non-malignancy claims and claims alleging other types of malignant
diseases filed against the Company relative to the number of lung
cancer claims filed against the Company;

   * the outside expert's analysis of the number of people likely
to file an asbestos-related personal injury claim against the
Company based on such epidemiological and historical data and the
Company's most recent three-year claims history;

   * an analysis of the Company's pending cases, by type of disease
claimed and by year filed;

   * an analysis of the Company's most recent three-year history to
determine the average settlement and resolution value of claims, by
type of disease claimed;

   * an adjustment for inflation in the future average settlement
value of claims, at a 2.5% annual inflation rate, adjusted downward
to 1.5% to take account of the declining value of claims resulting
from the aging of the claimant population; and

   * an analysis of the period over which the Company has and is
likely to resolve asbestos-related claims against it in the
future.

"At September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, over 80 percent of
the open claims against the Company are non-malignancy or
unspecified disease claims, many of which have been placed on
inactive or deferral dockets and the vast majority of which have
little or no settlement value against the Company, particularly in
light of recent changes in the legal and judicial treatment of such
claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/s55JoI


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Inmate's Asbestos Suit Proceed vs NJ Officials
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that a New Jersey state prisoner may proceed
with asbestos exposure claims against his local warden and the
state's top prison official.

David Wilson sufficiently alleged civil rights claims against
Warden John Powell of the Bayside State Prison in Leesburg, N.J.,
and Commissioner Gary Lanigan of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
said Oct. 31.

But the state Department of Corrections itself is immune from
suit.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kramer Levin Comments on WR Grace Plan Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Pollack, Esq., -- apollack@kramerlevin.com -- at Kramer
Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, in an article for JD Supra, wrote
that in the wake of asbestos bankruptcies brought on by mass tort
liabilities, reorganization plan structures, like that in
Johns-Mansville, often funneled asbestos-related claims into a
settlement trust, while a "channeling injunction" largely barred
claims against the debtor and, in some cases, against certain third
parties that had contributed funds to the trust. Congress enacted
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code in order to provide
additional clarity regarding the propriety of these channeling
injunctions, codifying the required elements for a valid channeling
injunction. In a recent Third Circuit decision arising out of the
W.R. Grace bankruptcy proceedings, In re W.R. Grace & Co.
(Continental Casualty Co. v. Carr), 900 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2018),
the Third Circuit has provided additional guidance regarding
statutory requirements that must be met in order to properly direct
claims pursuant to a channeling injunction in accordance with
Section 524(g), specifically with respect to insurance companies
that have provided insurance to a debtor.  The Court, in vacating
the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that certain asbestos claims
brought against W.R. Grace’s insurers may be enjoined, held that
the Bankruptcy Court must consider applicable state law principles
in connection with a determination as to whether claims fall within
the permissible scope of an injunction under Section 524(g)(4).

What Happened?

Following the bankruptcy filing of W.R. Grace, a settlement trust
(the "Asbestos PI Trust") was established to compensate asbestos
claimants, and a related injunction (the "Injunction") was approved
by the Bankruptcy Court that effectively funneled asbestos claims
to the trust and barred claimants from seeking compensation
directly from the debtor and certain other identified parties. In
connection with the W.R. Grace plan of reorganization, two of W.R.
Grace's insurance providers, Continental Casualty Company and
Transportation Insurance Company (referred to collectively as
"CNA") and W.R. Grace entered into a settlement agreement that
called for CNA to contribute $84 million over six years to the
Asbestos PI Trust, a portion of which could be reimbursed to CNA
for expenditures CNA makes on account of personal injury asbestos
claims that are not channeled to the Asbestos PI Trust.

By way of background, Section 524(g)(4) provides, among other
things, that in connection with a plan of reorganization, claims
against certain third parties, like insurers, may be enjoined if
certain specified conditions are met.  Specifically, Section
524(g)(4)(A)(ii) provides, in relevant part:

[A third-party-claims channeling] injunction may bar any action
directed against a third party who is identifiable from the terms
of such injunction . . . and is alleged to be directly or
indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims against, or demands on
the debtor to the extent such alleged liability of such third party
arises by reason of [ ] the third party’s provision of insurance
to the debtor or a related party.

In the instant case, the Injunction, which applied "only to the
extent[] provided by [S]ection 524(g)," stated in relevant part:

[T]he sole recourse of the Holder of an Asbestos [Personal Injury]
Claim . . . shall be to the Asbestos PI Trust . . .[,] and such
Holder shall have no right whatsoever at any time to assert its
Asbestos PI Claim . . . against . . . any other Asbestos Protected
Party . . . . [A]ll such Holders permanently and forever shall be
stayed, restrained, and enjoined from taking any and all legal or
other actions or making any Demand against any Asbestos Protected
Party . . . for the purpose of, directly or indirectly, claiming,
collecting, recovering, or receiving any payment, recovery,
satisfaction, or any other relief whatsoever on, of, or with
respect to any Asbestos PI Claims . . . other than from the
Asbestos PI Trust . . . .

A group of plaintiffs suffering from asbestos exposure (the
"Plaintiffs") sought to hold CNA liable under various Montana state
law negligence theories. Under the governing insurance documents,
CNA was granted the right to inspect certain of W.R. Grace's
facilities and the equipment and machinery housed in the
facilities. The Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that CNA
thereby undertook a duty of care, which it allegedly breached by
negligently failing to properly inspect Grace's Libby operations
and otherwise to provide proper warnings and other industrial
hygiene services to the Plaintiffs. CNA, in response, sought to bar
the Plaintiffs' claims through the enforcement of the channeling
injunction contained in the W.R. Grace plan of reorganization, as
CNA was effectively defined as an "Asbestos Protected Party" under
the Injunction.

Faced with the Plaintiffs' negligence claims, CNA filed a complaint
in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaration that the negligence
claims must be channeled to the Asbestos PI Trust on account of the
Injunction. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately ruled in favor of CNA,
denying the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss CNA’s complaint and
granting summary judgment in favor of CNA.

The Third Circuit, in analyzing the issues presented, focused its
attention on two primary questions: Whether the Injunction applied
to the Plaintiffs' negligence claims against CNA, and whether under
Section 524(g)(4), the negligence claims were barred by the
Injunction.

With respect to the issue whether the Injunction, by its terms,
applied to claims brought against CNA, the Plaintiffs argued that
the Injunction did not bar the negligence claims against CNA
because the CNA workers' compensation and employer's liability
policies were not expressly included among the policies identified
by the Injunction. The Court, however, looked to the applicable
catch-all provision providing that the Injunction covered all
"known and unknown policies" provided by CNA to W.R. Grace, and
determined that the Injunction did indeed apply to the negligence
claims.

Turning next to the issue whether under Section 524(g)(4) the
negligence claims were properly barred by the Injunction, the Court
looked to the three-pronged test set forth in its decision in
Combustion Engineering. In Combustion Engineering, the Court
determined that under Section 524(g), three prongs must be
satisfied in order to permit a channeling injunction to bar actions
against third parties. The three-prong test looks to (i) whether
the third party is identified as protected in the injunction, (ii)
whether the claims brought against the third party seek to hold
that third party "directly or indirectly liable for the conduct of,
claims against, or demands on" the debtor, and (iii) whether the
third party's alleged liability "arises by reason of" one of four
identified relationships in Section 524, including the provision of
insurance to a debtor.

The first prong (identification) was not contested by the parties,
as CNA was expressly identified in the Injunction as a covered
party.   

On the issue whether the negligence claims brought by the
plaintiffs seek to hold CNA "directly or indirectly liable" for
W.R. Grace's conduct, the Court looked to whether the insurer's
liability was "wholly separate" from W.R. Grace's liability or
instead "depends on it."  This question, according to the Third
Circuit, requires a court to analyze the relevant claims and
defenses under applicable state law.  Noting that the parties had
not submitted any briefing (either in the lower court or before the
Third Circuit) regarding which state’s law applied or what the
relevant examination should be under the applicable state law, the
Third Circuit remanded this issue back to the Bankruptcy Court for
further briefing and determinations regarding the applicable state
law principles on the direct-indirect liability of CNA.  The Third
Circuit, however, expressly recognized the underlying policy
embedded in Bankruptcy Code Section 524 of incentivizing insurers
to contribute to personal injury trusts in order to reduce
uncertainty about continuing liability and obligations regarding
future personal injury claimants.

With respect to the final prong, whether the insurer's alleged
liability "arises by reason of" its provision of insurance to W.R.
Grace, CNA argued that the Plaintiffs' must establish a "but-for"
causational relationship between the provision of insurance and the
Plaintiffs claims, whereas the Plaintiffs argued that they need
only establish that the liability arose from the "legal
consequence" of the insurers relationship with W.R. Grace (in other
words, that "the relationship, in light of the debtor's conduct or
the claims asserted against it, [is] a legal cause of or a legally
relevant factor to the third party's alleged liability").  Again,
the Third Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court is required
to look to applicable state law "to determine the relationship's
legal relevance to the third-party's alleged liability."
Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded this issue as well so that
the Bankruptcy Court may analyze, with the benefit of briefing, the
elements of the Plaintiffs' negligence claims, and determine
whether CNA's relationship with W.R. Grace, grounded in the
provision of insurance, is sufficient to meet the elements required
under state law.

Why This Case Is Interesting

The Third Circuit's decision addresses a relatively unusual
situation: a suit against a debtor's insurer not to recover from
its insurance policies for the debtor's liability, but instead to
hold the insurer independently liable for its own misconduct.
Claims of this sort, the court of appeals ruled, require careful
consideration of the law (usually state law) governing Plaintiffs'
claims against the insurer. Only by determining whether the
insurer's alleged liability is "wholly separate" from the debtor's
liability or instead at least partly "depends on it" can the court
determine whether the claims sought to be enjoined meet the
requirements of Section 524(g) -- in particular, the requirements
that these claims (i) seek to hold the insurer "directly or
indirectly liable" for the debtor's conduct and (ii) "arise[] by
reason of" the provision of insurance to the debtor.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ky. Teacher Wins Workers' Compensation Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mesothelioma.net reported that when Roger Hall was diagnosed with
malignant mesothelioma in 2015, he knew exactly how he got the
deadly asbestos-related disease. Hall had been a teacher at the
Letcher County High School from 1976 through his retirement in
2003. He remembered when the old high school building was replaced
with a newly constructed one in 1992, and that even after the new
building was completed the teachers used the boiler room in the old
building as their break and lunch room. That boiler had tested
positive for asbestos in the late 1980s, and though the asbestos
containing materials were removed from the boiler in 1990, the
asbestos tiles on the floor were not removed until each one broke
down and needed to be repaired individually. Many of them were
still in place at the time of his retirement. As a result, he filed
a workers' compensation claim against the school board, which
denied his claim as time barred based on the boiler's removal in
1990. The Workers' Compensation Board in Kentucky reversed the
board's decision and the Board of Education appealed. Now the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky has upheld the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board and said that Mr. Hall deserves his workers'
compensation benefits.

The issue of workers' compensation can be particularly trick for
people diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma because of the
condition's long latency period. In many parts of the country,
workers' compensation claims have shorter time limitations than
personal injury claims do, and that means that workers diagnosed
with diseases like mesothelioma have to prove that their last
exposure to the carcinogenic material was as close to their
retirement date as possible, even if their initial exposure was
decades before they left their company. In Mr. Hall's case, the
issue was whether or not his exposure to asbestos ended in 1990 or
whether it continued until the time of his retirement. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the Workers' Compensation Board and Mr. Hall
that the presence of the asbestos tiles on the floor at the time of
his retirement meant that his exposure continued until his
retirement, and that the evidence supporting it was overwhelming.

Though it would seem that people and organizations should try to
accommodate the needs of people diagnosed with mesothelioma, that
is unfortunately not the case. If you are encountering roadblocks
in your mesothelioma journey, the Patient Advocates at
Mesothelioma.net can help. Contact us today at 1-800-692-8608 to
learn more.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lennox Int'l Paid $1.4MM for Lawsuits in 3Q 2018
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lennox International Inc. recorded US$1.4 million expense for
asbestos-related litigation for the three months ended September
30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We are involved in a number of claims and
lawsuits incident to the operation of our businesses.  Insurance
coverages are maintained and estimated costs are recorded for such
claims and lawsuits, including costs to settle claims and lawsuits,
based on experience involving similar matters and specific facts
known.

"Some of these claims and lawsuits allege personal injury or health
problems resulting from exposure to asbestos that was integrated
into certain of our products.  We have never manufactured asbestos
and have not incorporated asbestos-containing components into our
products for several decades.  A substantial majority of these
asbestos-related claims have been covered by insurance or other
forms of indemnity or have been dismissed without payment.  The
remainder of our closed cases have been resolved for amounts that
are not material, individually or in the aggregate.  Our defense
costs for asbestos-related claims are generally covered by
insurance; however, our insurance coverage for settlements and
judgments for asbestos-related claims varies depending on several
factors and are subject to policy limits, so we may have greater
financial exposure for future settlements and judgments.  For the
nine months ended September 30, 2018 and 2017, expense for
asbestos-related litigation was US$3.3 million and US$3.9 million,
respectively, net of probable insurance recoveries, for known and
future asbestos-related litigation and is recorded in Losses and
other expenses, net in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

"For the three months ended September 30, 2018 and 2017, expense
for asbestos-related litigation was US$1.4 million and US$1.5
million, respectively, net of probable insurance recoveries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/c8ebTL


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maersk Line Bid for Summary Judgment Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Robert J. Bryan of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington has entered an order denying
without prejudice the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Maersk Line, Limited, the alleged successor-in-interest
to Decedent's employer and owner of Royal Rotterdam Lloyd ("RRL")
vessels.

Plaintiff filed the case in Superior Court for Thurston County on
October 27, 2017 which arises from the allegation that Rudy
Klopman-Baerselman, Decedent, was exposed to asbestos during two
timeframes: from 1955 through 1959, while working as a merchant
mariner assigned to several vessels, and from 1966 through 1967,
while performing vehicle maintenance.

One month after the case was filed, counsel to Defendant by letter
informed Plaintiff of two defects: (a) Plaintiff had named the
wrong company, because "Defendant Maersk Line has no connection,
whatsoever to either Royal Dutch Lloyd or [RRL]," has no knowledge
of an entity by the name Royal Dutch Lloyd, and is aware that RRL
"ceased operations in 1970, and retained its own liabilities under
a different name until liquidated in 2000;" and (b) Defendant
warned, even if Decedent worked on a vessel of either entity from
1955 through 1959, "it is our understanding such service was as a
foreign seaman aboard foreign vessels, and certainly not in
Washington State."

In the Superior Court, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. The motion was re-noted after Plaintiff filed served
written discovery requests and scheduled the deposition of
Defendant's corporate designee, Mr. Steven Hadder. Prior to
reaching the merits of Defendant's motion, another defendant
removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. Defendant filed the instant Motion
for Summary Judgment in on July 10, 2018.

Again, the Court re-noted Defendant's motion and invited Plaintiff
to file a Supplemental Response to address several arguments raised
by Defendant. Said Order identified three primary arguments and
noted that only the first argument was directly addressed in
Plaintiff's Response: (1) Defendant should be dismissed as an
improper party, because Defendant is not a successor-in-interest to
RRL; (2) the Amended Complaint does not state a claim, because RRL
never manufactured, sold or distributed asbestos-containing
products; and (3) the Court lacks jurisdiction, because Decedent
was a foreign seaman aboard foreign vessels in foreign waters.

However, Plaintiff did not file a Supplemental Response. Instead
Plaintiff elected to address the first two arguments identified in
the August 15, 2018 Order by filing the Second Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint. The Proposed Second Amended Complaint names
Defendant as successor-in-interest to "Royal Rotterdam Lloyd
(Employer Defendant)." The proposed pleading adds a new claim for
employer negligence, alleged against Defendant only, that Defendant
caused Decedent's asbestos harm by, inter alia, failing to provide
a reasonably safe work place with adequate training equipment, and
warnings.

While the Proposed Second Amended Complaint may resolve one or both
of Defendant's first two arguments, the Court does not reach their
merits. Thus, the Court considers that Defendant's motion should be
denied without prejudice because Defendant may raise them again
after the motion for leave to amend is resolved.

The Court finds that Plaintiff opted to ignore the third argument
-- that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because Decedent was a
foreign seaman aboard foreign vessels in foreign waters. The Court
comments that Plaintiff's failure to respond could be an admission
by Plaintiff that the argument has merit but Defendant's argument
was raised in a motion for summary judgment. However, under
W.D.Wash. LCR 7(b)(2), the failure to respond should not be deemed
an admission by Plaintiff.

The Court notes that Defendant has not brought a forum non conviens
motion to dismiss, but rather raises dismissal as a "jurisdiction"
issue. Defendant appears to challenge subject matter jurisdiction,
not personal jurisdiction, because the motion references the Jones
Act and federal maritime jurisdiction. However, the Court finds
this case differs from the line of cases discussing a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Jones Act or federal maritime
law, because this case was removed on diversity grounds.

Assuming that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on
diversity, the prima facie showing of which Defendant has not
challenged, it may be unnecessary to also make findings regarding
other grounds for subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
Court denied Defendant's motion without prejudice as to Defendant's
third argument.

The case is Eric Klopman-Baerselman, as Personal Representative for
the Estate of Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Air
& Liquid Systems Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-05536-RJB, (W.D. Wash.)

Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, deceased & Muriel Klopman-Baerselman,
husband and wife, Plaintiffs, represented by Alexandra B. Caggiano
, Weinstein Couture PLLC, Benjamin Robert Couture , Weinstein
Couture PLLC & Brian Weinstein , Weinstein Couture PLLC.

Eric Klopman-Baerselman, as Personal Representative for the estate
of Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra B.
Caggiano , Weinstein Couture PLLC, Benjamin Robert Couture ,
Weinstein Couture PLLC, Brian Weinstein , Weinstein Couture PLLC &
Benjamin H. Adams -- badams@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar & Branham, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation,
individually & Ingersoll-Rand Company, a New Jersey corporation,
Defendants, represented by Kevin J. Craig -- kcraig@grsm.com --
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Mark B. Tuvim -- mtuvim@grsm.com
-- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP & Trevor J. Mohr --
tmohr@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP.

Borg Warner Morse Tec, LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Richard D. Ross , Bennett Bigelow & Leedom.

CBS Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Christopher S. Marks -- cmarks@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP,
Erin P. Fraser -- efraser@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP &
Malika Johnson -- mjohnson@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP.

Cost Less Auto Parts, Inc., a Washington corporation, Defendant,
represented byHoward Terry I. Hall -- thall@foleymansfield.com --
Foley & Mansfield & Diane Catherine Babbitt --
dbabbitt@foleymansfield.com -- Foley & Mansfield.

Crane Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by G.
William Shaw -- bill.shaw@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP.

Crosby Valve, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation & Viad Corporation,
a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Ronald C.
Gardner -- rgardner@gandtlawfirm.com -- Gardner Trabolsi & Assoc.
PLLC.

DAP Products, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendant, represented
by Diane Catherine Babbitt -- dbabbitt@foleymansfield.com -- Foley
& Mansfield & J. Scott Wood -- swood@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield.

Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust, sued as successor in
interest Felt-Products Manufacturing Co., Defendant, represented by
Christine E. Dinsdale -- dinsdale@sohalang.com -- Soha & Lang PS,
Frances Lopez -- flopez@hptylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell Thackston &
Young LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel A. Rubin -- rubin@sohalang.com --
Soha & Lang PS.

Flowserve US Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Marc Marshall Carlton -- Marc.Carlton@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Randy J. Aliment --
Randy.Aliment@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP.

Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation, a Delaware corporation & General
Electric Company, a New York corporation, Defendants, represented
by Christopher S. Marks -- cmarks@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale
LLP & Erin P. Fraser -- efraser@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale
LLP.

Genuine Parts Company, a Georgia corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jeanne F. Loftis -- jeanne.loftis@bullivant.com --
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC.

Henry Company LLC, a California corporation, Defendant, represented
by Daira S. Waldenberg -- dwaldenberg@selmanlaw.com -- Selman
Brietman LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Kristine E. Kruger -- KKruger@perkinscoie.com --
Perkins Coie & Mary P. Gaston -- MGaston@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins
Coie.

Maersk Line, Ltd., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Carey M.E. Gephart -- cgephart@legros.com -- LeGros Buchanan &
Paul, Daniel J. Park -- dpark@legros.com -- LeGros Buchanan & Paul
& Markus B.G. Oberg -- moberg@legros.com -- LeGros Buchanan &
Paul.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of other MetLife Inc., Defendant,
represented by Richard G. Gawlowski -- gawlowski@wscd.com -- Wilson
Smith Cochran & Dickerson.

National Automotive Parts Association, a Georgia corporation,
Defendant, represented by Megan Uhle -- megan.uhle@bullivant.com --
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC.

O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc, an Ohio corporation, Defendant,
represented byStephen Garrett Leatham , Heurlin Potter Jahn,
Leatham, Holtman & Stoker PS.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation, an Ohio corporation & Standard Motor
Products, Inc., a New York corporation, Defendants, represented by
Nicole R. MacKenzie -- nmackenzie@williamskastner.com -- Williams
Kastner & Gibbs, Ryan W. Vollans -- rvollans@williamskastner.com --
Williams Kastner & Gibbs & Edward M. Silverman --
esilverman@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs.

Pneumo Abex, LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Diane J. Kero -- dkero@gth-law.com -- Gordon Thomas Honeywell.

Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., a Washington corporation, Defendant,
represented by Timothy Kost Thorson -- thorson@carneylaw.com --
Carney Badley Spellman PS.

Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation,
Defendant, represented byJohn Michael Mattingly --
mmattingly@rizzopc.com -- Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth PC & Kevin
Clonts -- kclonts@rizzopc.com -- Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth PC.

Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc, a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jose Edward Gaitan , The Gaitan Group & Virginia
Leeper , The Gaitan Group.

Viking Pump, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Todd M. Thacker -- tthacker@wfbm.com -- WFBM LLP.

Weir Valves & Controls USA, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation,
individually, Defendant, represented by Dana C. Kopij --
dkopij@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs.

William Powell Company, an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented
by Brian Bernard Smith -- bsmith@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield & James D. Hicks -- jhicks@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Part-Time DJ Dies of Asbestos-related Disease
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lynn Hughes of Biggleswade Today reported that the family of a
much-loved Sandy man who died of asbestos-related disease have
teamed up with lawyers to call on his local community to come
forward and help them gain justice.

Richard Smith, who was a well-known figure in the town due to his
part-time DJ-ing at events ranging from school discos to birthday
parties, died aged 64 in January 2016, just three months after he
was first diagnosed with mesothelioma -- a cancer of the lining of
the lung associated with asbestos exposure.

Following his death, his family instructed specialist
asbestos-related disease lawyers at Irwin Mitchell to investigate
how he came into contact with the material and help them gain
answers regarding his illness.

The legal experts are keen to gain more information regarding
whether Richard may have come into contact with asbestos during his
time working at Potton Timber and Engineering in the 1960s and
1970s.

Alexia Kapranos, at Irwin Mitchell's London office, said: "Richard
was a huge personality who had a great impact on his local
community and two years on from his death his family remain
devastated by their loss.

"They are desperate for answers as to how he came into contact with
asbestos and we would be hugely grateful to anyone who may have
information regarding the material in relation to Potton Timber and
Engineering. Any detail no matter how small could make a major
difference to this case."

As well as being a father-of-four, Richard was a grandfather to 14
and a great grandfather of one.

Around 300 people attended his funeral. His daughter Paula, said:
"The whole family miss Dad so much every day and the lack of
answers regarding how he developed mesothelioma has made our
efforts to come to terms with the loss much harder.

"Mum always referred to him as the life and soul of the party and
he truly was, with so many people across Sandy and beyond enjoying
his DJ-ing and general work within the community.

"We would be incredibly grateful to anyone in the local area or
further afield who may have information regarding the working
conditions at Potton Timber and Engineering and could help us in
our search for answers.

"We are determined to get justice in Dad's memory."

Anyone with information is asked to contact Alexia Kapranos at
Irwin Mitchell's London office on 0207 421 3903 or email
alexia.kapranos@irwin
mitchell.com


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pentair Plc Had 600 Pending Claims at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pentair plc's subsidiaries continue to face approximately 600
claims related to asbestos matters as of September 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Our subsidiaries and numerous other companies
are named as defendants in personal injury lawsuits based on
alleged exposure to asbestos-containing materials.  These cases
typically involve product liability claims based primarily on
allegations of manufacture, sale or distribution of industrial
products that either contained asbestos or were attached to or used
with asbestos-containing components manufactured by third-parties.
Each case typically names between dozens to hundreds of corporate
defendants.  While we have observed an increase in the number of
these lawsuits over the past several years, including lawsuits by
plaintiffs with mesothelioma-related claims, a large percentage of
these suits have not presented viable legal claims and, as a
result, have been dismissed by the courts.  Our historical strategy
has been to mount a vigorous defense aimed at having
unsubstantiated suits dismissed, and, where appropriate, settling
suits before trial.  Although a large percentage of litigated suits
have been dismissed, we cannot predict the extent to which we will
be successful in resolving lawsuits in the future.

"As of September 30, 2018, there were approximately 600 claims
outstanding against our subsidiaries.  This amount is not adjusted
for claims that are not actively being prosecuted, identified
incorrect defendants, or duplicated other actions, which would
ultimately reflect our current estimate of the number of viable
claims made against us, our affiliates, or entities for which we
assumed responsibility in connection with acquisitions or
divestitures.  In addition, the amount does not include certain
claims pending against third parties for which we have been
provided an indemnification."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Ej1md2


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Faces Wrongful-Death Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that Pfizer Inc. will face asbestos
wrongful-death claims based on a subsidiary's cement product
bearing Pfizer's name.

The Washington Supreme Court adopted the "apparent manufacturer"
doctrine for product liability claims based on subsidiary
activities, like asbestos exposure, that occurred before 1981.

The doctrine allows claims against a company when a reasonable
consumer would believe it made the product because of such
marketing-related actions as putting its logo on the product's
label.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PPG Industries Had 440 Open Claims at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
PPG Industries, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended September
30, 2018, that it is aware of approximately 440 open and active
asbestos-related claims pending against the Company and certain of
its subsidiaries as of September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "These claims consist primarily of non-PC
Relationship Claims and claims against a subsidiary of PPG.  The
Company is defending the remaining open and active claims
vigorously.

"Since April 1, 2013, a subsidiary of PPG has been implicated in
claims alleging death or injury caused by asbestos-containing
products manufactured, distributed or sold by a North American
architectural coatings business or its predecessors which was
acquired by PPG.  All such claims have been either served upon or
tendered to the seller for defense and indemnity pursuant to
obligations undertaken by the seller in connection with the
Company's purchase of the North American architectural coatings
business.  The seller has accepted the defense of these claims
subject to the terms of various agreements between the Company and
the seller.  The seller's defense and indemnity obligations in
connection with newly filed claims ceased with respect to claims
filed after April 1, 2018.

"PPG has established reserves totaling approximately US$180 million
for asbestos-related claims that would not be channeled to the
Trust which, based on presently available information, we believe
will be sufficient to encompass all of PPG's current and potential
future asbestos liabilities.  These reserves include a US$162
million reserve established in 2009 in connection with an amendment
to the PC plan of reorganization.  These reserves, which are
included within "Other liabilities" on the accompanying condensed
consolidated balance sheets, represent PPG's best estimate of its
liability for these claims.  PPG does not have sufficient current
claim information or settlement history on which to base a better
estimate of this liability in light of the fact that the Bankruptcy
Court's injunction staying most asbestos claims against the Company
was in effect from April 2000 through May 2016.  PPG will monitor
the activity associated with its remaining asbestos claims and
evaluate, on a periodic basis, its estimated liability for such
claims, its insurance assets then available, and all underlying
assumptions to determine whether any adjustment to the reserves for
these claims is required.

"The amount reserved for asbestos-related claims by its nature is
subject to many uncertainties that may change over time, including
(i) the ultimate number of claims filed; (ii) the amounts required
to resolve both currently known and future unknown claims; (iii)
the amount of insurance, if any, available to cover such claims;
(iv) the unpredictable aspects of the litigation process, including
a changing trial docket and the jurisdictions in which trials are
scheduled; (v) the outcome of any trials, including potential
judgments or jury verdicts; (vi) the lack of specific information
in many cases concerning exposure for which PPG is allegedly
responsible, and the claimants' alleged diseases resulting from
such exposure; and (vii) potential changes in applicable federal
and/or state tort liability law.  All of these factors may have a
material effect upon future asbestos-related liability estimates.
As a potential offset to any future asbestos financial exposure,
under the PC plan of reorganization PPG retained, for its own
account, the right to pursue insurance coverage from certain of its
historical insurers that did not participate in the PC plan of
reorganization.  While the ultimate outcome of PPG's asbestos
litigation cannot be predicted with certainty, PPG believes that
any financial exposure resulting from its asbestos-related claims
will not have a material adverse effect on PPG's consolidated
financial position, liquidity or results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/vC2w1X


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Cumbria PC Diagnosed with Asbestos Cancer
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Cumbria Crack reported that a retired police constable from Cumbria
who was diagnosed with asbestos-related cancer has joined forces
with legal experts to call on his former colleagues to come forward
and help him gain answers regarding how the illness emerged.

Douglas Darby, 69, from Millom, first developed symptoms including
shortness of breath and fatigue in September 2016 and following a
range of tests it was confirmed in late 2016 that he had developed
mesothelioma -- a cancer of the lining of the lung linked to
asbestos exposure.

After receiving the news, he instructed asbestos-related disease
lawyers at Irwin Mitchell to investigate how he developed the
illness and help him secure justice regarding the problems.

Now, as part of their ongoing work, the legal experts are appealing
for information about the working conditions Douglas would have
faced when he was a postal worker at the General Post Office in
Millom between 1965 and 1979, as well as during his time as a
police constable at Sellafield Power Station from 1979 up until his
retirement in 2009.

Kirstie Devine, the legal expert and asbestos-related disease
specialist at Irwin Mitchell's Newcastle office who represents
Douglas, said: "Our client is understandably devastated by his
diagnosis but remains determined to do everything he can to learn
more regarding how he came to develop the illness.

"We would be hugely grateful to anyone who may be able to provide
information regarding the presence of asbestos at these two sites,
as any such detail could be vital as we aim to secure funds which
will support him in the coming months.

"Asbestos has had a terrible impact on so many lives and it is only
right those affected by the material through no fault of their own
are able to gain justice."

Douglas's role at the General Post Office involved a host of tasks
including going to the boiler house at the rear of the building to
rake the boiler and stock it up with coke.

He recalled: "I remember that it was a tight squeeze to get into
the room and that the boiler and pipework was all lagged with
asbestos. The lagging was always in poor condition and I would have
disturbed asbestos fibres while going about my jobs in the room."

After leaving the General Post Office, Douglas then went on to work
as a police officer for the UK Atomic Energy Authority at
Sellafield Power Station. During his time there the organisation's
name changed to Civil Nuclear Constabulary and then the Civil
Nuclear Police Authority.

He added: "My role at Sellafield involved undertaking various
shifts in different parts of the power station and there was
asbestos present both across the site and also within the Police
Control Centre where we worked out of.

"Having to battle this illness has been incredibly difficult and it
is hard to take that it may have been caused by my work. I would be
grateful to anyone who may be able to provide information which
will help me gain justice regarding what I am going through."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Reynolds' Appeal in Steiner Suit Quashed
---------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has quashed the appealed case
Bernice M. Steiner, Individually and as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Samuel E. Steiner, v. Hollingsworth & Vose Company,
Lorillard Tobacco Company, Individually and as Successor in the
Interest to P. Lorillard Co. Appeal of: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, as Successor-By-Merger to Lorillard Tobacco Company, No.
563 EDA 2018, (Pa. Super. Ct.).

Plaintiff filed suit against Hollingsworth & Vose Company, a
manufacturer of asbestos-containing bulk filter media.
Hollingsworth sold that product to Reynolds, which used it to make
"micronite filters," which were used in Kent cigarettes from 1952
to 1956. Plaintiff claims neither Hollingsworth nor Reynolds
provided warnings of the health hazards associated with asbestos
exposure and that Samuel Steiner ("Decedent") was a consumer of
Kent cigarettes.

On January 8, 2018, the court of common pleas entered an order
granting Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, ordering Reynolds
to produce two lists: Kent Mesothelioma Actions (like the instant
consumer/smoker claim); and Kent Worker Mesothelioma Actions
(workers who allege making the filters and cigarettes caused
asbestos-related disease).

The lists were created in 2011 by counsel for Lorillard Tobacco
Company, Reynolds' predecessor, by order of court in another
lawsuit brought by an individual who worked at a Lorillard
facility, which action was pending in Kentucky state court.
Reynolds contends those lists were subject to a protective order.

Reynolds filed a motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2018. In
that motion Reynolds sought, in the alternative, that the court
amend the order and certify it for immediate appeal. On February 6,
2018, the court denied the motion for reconsideration and it also
denied certification of the order for immediate appeal.

In the appeal, Reynolds claims that the documents are privileged
and producing them would violate "privacy and confidentiality
rights of former Lorillard employees" as well as the protective
order of the Kentucky court. Reynolds further claims that the Court
can decide whether the documents are sufficiently
sensitive/personal so as to preclude production, separate and apart
from the issue of liability for Plaintiff's injuries. Reynolds also
claims the documents contain medical information and implicate
certain constitutional concerns, including the right to privacy.

The Court is not convinced that Reynolds' claim of privilege
outweighs the need to consider the judicial inefficiency and waste
of resources in piecemeal litigation. The Court finds Reynolds'
mere assertion that the documents are privileged because they
implicate medical issues does not, without more, render those
documents privileged.

Although at first glance the reference to "confidential medical
information" and "privacy rights" is appealing, the Court finds
that Reynolds failed to support these bare assertions. The Court
finds Reynolds' claim that the litigation lists rise to the level
of constitutional or statutory privilege is unsupported. Plaintiff
is not seeking sensitive medical health records or histories, nor
is Plaintiff seeking settlement information subject to
confidentiality agreements. Plaintiff seeks only claimants' names,
attorneys' names and disposition of those claims, all of which
could "lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."

The Court concludes that the documents sought are litigation
documents. Additionally, the Court concludes that Reynolds has
failed to establish that they are in fact subject to a protective
order. In the transcript of the May 2, 2011 discovery hearing in
the Kentucky case, which Reynolds has included as part of the
certified record, the Court finds no indication that the lists are
subject to a protective order. Furthermore, even if they were, the
Court sustains Plaintiff's argument that the Kentucky state court
cannot determine the discoverability or admissibility of evidence
in an unrelated action in Pennsylvania.

Howard Michael Klein -- hklein@conradobrien.com -- Aya Salem --
asalem@conradobrien.com -- Conrad O'Brien P.C., Brendan Fanzoni ,
James Berger -- james.berger@hugheshubbard.com -- Hughes, Hubbard &
Reed, for Appellant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., as
successor-by-Merger to Lorillard Tobacco Co.

Howard Michael Klein -- hklein@conradobrien.com -- Conrad O'Brien
P.C., Sarah P. Kelly -- skelly@nutter.com -- Nutter, McClnnen &
FIsh, LLP, for Appellee, Hollingsworth & Vose.

Jonathan Daniel Rubinstein -- jrubinstein@cprlaw.com -- Jacqueline
Patricia Gruhler , Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C., for Appellee,
Bernice M. Steiner, Ind. and as Personal Rep. of the Estate of
Samuel E. Steiner.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scottish MoD Pressed Over Asbestos in Choppers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Clydebank Post reported that Martin Docherty-Hughes has tabled a
series of questions in the House of Commons on the presence of the
minerals in the choppers.

The MoD has recently announced it is investigating concerns that
staff working on Sea King helicopters between 1969 and 2016 could
be at risk from asbestos related illnesses due to exposure to the
deadly fibres from component parts.

It's unclear how many former and current MoD workers are affected,
but it is likely to be thousands as it covers a period of almost 50
years from when the aircraft first came into service.

Mr Docherty-Hughes, who sits on the Commons Defence Select
Committee, raised concerns about the investigation with defence
minister Stuart Andrew during defence questions in parliament last
week.

He said: "Asbestos kills, and it is a silent killer. As an MP
representing a constituency with the highest rates of asbestos
related disease in Europe, I know all too well the devastating and
deadly impact it can have.

"The MoD has a duty of care to its current and former employees and
must ensure that a thorough investigation is completed as quickly
as possible.

"Important questions remain over the number of military and
civilian personnel put at risk over the past 50 years, and why it
is has taken so long for the MoD to take action."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: SCOTUS Hears Arguments in Bare-Metal Defense Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com reported that the Supreme Court is considering a
consolidated action presenting questions of liability for asbestos
injuries caused by bare-metal products. "Bare-metal" in the
products liability context describes products sold without
asbestos-containing materials, such as insulation, but which depend
upon those materials for safe and proper operation. The court may
avoid making waves in the realm of products liability, however, as
it is dealing with claims arising under maritime law. The court
will determine whether, under maritime law, manufacturers can be
held liable for injuries caused by asbestos-containing products
that they did not make, sell or distribute but that were necessary
additions to their products.

Manufacturers often rely on the "bare-metal" defense. They assert
that manufacturers who produced "bare-metal" products that relied
on later-added materials for proper operation are not liable for
injuries caused by those secondary products. The court will decide
if the defense should be applied as a bright-line rule or through a
fact-specific analysis.

These actions began in state court in Philadelphia, but they were
removed to federal court. The claims were brought by the widows of
former sailors who suffered asbestos-related injuries due to
exposure to insulation on naval ships in the 1950s and 1960s. The
problematic insulation was added onto the Navy's ships in places
like the engines, pumps, boilers, blowers and switchboards. The
families of the late sailors, respondents before the Supreme Court,
brought actions against dozens of manufacturers alleging, among
other claims, negligence.

The manufacturer-petitioners produced, distributed and sold
bare-metal products which required the addition of insulation in
order for their products to work properly. They did not produce any
asbestos-containing products. They designed products in such a way,
however, that their functioning was dependent on the addition of
the insulation. When the bare-metal products were in use and heated
to extreme degrees, the insulation material released asbestos.

The federal courts in Philadelphia disagreed on the proper test to
apply. Judge Eduardo Robreno of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied the bare-metal defense as
bright-line rule and granted summary judgment in the manufacturers'
favor. The u.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however,
remanded. That court held that manufacturers would have had a duty
to warn about the dangers of later-added materials if their use was
"reasonably foreseeable."

The manufacturers sought a ruling from the Supreme Court that the
defense should be applied as a bright-line rule. Maritime law is a
unique body of judge-made federal law that applies when injuries
occur at sea and not within the bounds of any state or territory.
The Supreme Court is the ultimate authority of maritime law and,
thus, it is guided by its prior maritime decisions.  Prior Supreme
Court decisions addressing negligence under maritime law have
focused on the foreseeability of harm.

The sailors argued that the manufacturers had a duty to warn
because it was expected that the intended use of their products
would present hazards. The manufacturers knew that their products
would be used, and indeed must be used, with insulation containing
asbestos; therefore, the sailors' injuries were reasonably
foreseeable.

The manufacturers argued that a foreseeability test would be
impracticable because ships' settings vary greatly. On a ship, all
products are essentially connected because all are attached to the
vessel. If manufacturers were responsible for providing warnings
for other products, an excess of warnings would result (with
diminished effect). Also, if a manufacturer of a product on a ship
could be liable for injuries caused by other products, there would
be a tremendous increase in prices to compensate for the risk of
"open-ended liability."

Both the manufacturers and sailors relied on the distinct nature of
maritime law to support their arguments. The sailors asserted that
the body of law favors sailors' safety and protection —and thus a
standard that would afford deserving servicemen the ability to
recover for their damages should be adopted. The manufacturers
focused on the connectedness of maritime products and the potential
for diluting the effect of warnings for truly dangerous products.

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in early October. For the
manufacturers, the justices' questioning focused on the nature of
their product and its reliance on the later-added materials.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg acknowledged that, without the
insulation, the bare-metal products would be useless. Likewise,
Justice John Roberts added that it was only when the bare-metal
products were in use and heated that the asbestos dangers presented
themselves. Justice Sonia Sotomayor drew an analogy to a more
relatable situation: when a spark in a gas tank causes an
explosion, the injured party would bring an action against the car
manufacturer, not the gasoline company.

Given the uniqueness of maritime law, the court could issue a
narrow opinion. Nonetheless, it is likely that an analysis of the
bare-metal defense by the Supreme Court could influence the
treatment of asbestos cases outside of the maritime setting.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Travelers Had $1.3-Bil. Net Reserves at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Travelers Companies, Inc. , had net asbestos reserves of
US$1,345 million at September 30, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

Travelers Companies states, "The Company believes that the property
and casualty insurance industry has suffered from court decisions
and other trends that have expanded insurance coverage for asbestos
claims far beyond the original intent of insurers and
policyholders.  The Company has received and continues to receive a
significant number of asbestos claims from the Company's
policyholders (which includes others seeking coverage under a
policy).  Factors underlying these claim filings include continued
intensive advertising by lawyers seeking asbestos claimants and the
continued focus by plaintiffs on defendants who were not
traditionally primary targets of asbestos litigation.  The focus on
these defendants is primarily the result of the number of
traditional asbestos defendants who have sought bankruptcy
protection in previous years.  In addition to contributing to the
overall number of claims, bankruptcy proceedings may increase the
volatility of asbestos-related losses by initially delaying the
reporting of claims and later by significantly accelerating and
increasing loss payments by insurers, including the Company.  The
bankruptcy of many traditional defendants has also caused increased
settlement demands against those policyholders who are not in
bankruptcy but remain in the tort system.  Currently, in many
jurisdictions, those who allege very serious injury and who can
present credible medical evidence of their injuries are receiving
priority trial settings in the courts, while those who have not
shown any credible disease manifestation are having their hearing
dates delayed or placed on an inactive docket.  Prioritizing claims
involving credible evidence of injuries, along with the focus on
defendants who were not traditionally primary targets of asbestos
litigation, contributes to the claims and claim adjustment expense
payment patterns experienced by the Company.  The Company's
asbestos-related claims and claim adjustment expense experience
also has been impacted by the unavailability of other insurance
sources potentially available to policyholders, whether through
exhaustion of policy limits or through the insolvency of other
participating insurers.

"The Company continues to be involved in coverage litigation
concerning a number of policyholders, some of whom have filed for
bankruptcy, who in some instances have asserted that all or a
portion of their asbestos-related claims are not subject to
aggregate limits on coverage.  In these instances, policyholders
also may assert that each individual bodily injury claim should be
treated as a separate occurrence under the policy.  It is difficult
to predict whether these policyholders will be successful on both
issues.  To the extent both issues are resolved in a policyholder's
favor and other Company defenses are not successful, the Company's
coverage obligations under the policies at issue would be
materially increased and bounded only by the applicable
per-occurrence limits and the number of asbestos bodily injury
claims against the policyholders.  Although the Company has seen a
reduction in the overall risk associated with these lawsuits, it
remains difficult to predict the ultimate cost of these claims.

"Many coverage disputes with policyholders are only resolved
through settlement agreements.  Because many policyholders make
exaggerated demands, it is difficult to predict the outcome of
settlement negotiations.  Settlements involving bankrupt
policyholders may include extensive releases which are favorable to
the Company but which could result in settlements for larger
amounts than originally anticipated.  There also may be instances
where a court may not approve a proposed settlement, which may
result in additional litigation and potentially less beneficial
outcomes for the Company.  As in the past, the Company will
continue to pursue settlement opportunities.

"In addition to claims against policyholders, proceedings have been
launched directly against insurers, including the Company, by
individuals challenging insurers' conduct with respect to the
handling of past asbestos claims and by individuals seeking damages
arising from alleged asbestos-related bodily injuries.  It is
possible that the filing of other direct actions against insurers,
including the Company, could be made in the future.  It is
difficult to predict the outcome of these proceedings, including
whether the plaintiffs would be able to sustain these actions
against insurers based on novel legal theories of liability.  The
Company believes it has meritorious defenses to any such claims and
has received favorable rulings in certain jurisdictions.

"The Company's quarterly asbestos reserve reviews include an
analysis of exposure and claim payment patterns by policyholder
category, as well as recent settlements, policyholder bankruptcies,
judicial rulings and legislative actions.  The Company also
analyzes developing payment patterns among policyholders in the
Home Office and Field Office, and Assumed Reinsurance and Other
categories as well as projected reinsurance billings and
recoveries.  In addition, the Company reviews its historical gross
and net loss and expense paid experience, year-by-year, to assess
any emerging trends, fluctuations, or characteristics suggested by
the aggregate paid activity.  Conventional actuarial methods are
not utilized to establish asbestos reserves and the Company's
evaluations have not resulted in a reliable method to determine a
meaningful average asbestos defense or indemnity payment.

"The completion of these reviews and analyses in the third quarters
of 2018 and 2017 resulted in a US$225 million increase in the
Company's net asbestos reserves in each period.  In both 2018 and
2017, the reserve increases were primarily driven by increases in
the Company's estimate of projected settlement and defense costs
related to a broad number of policyholders in the Home Office and
Field Office category.  The increase in the estimate of projected
settlement and defense costs resulted from payment trends that
continue to be higher than previously anticipated due to the impact
of the current litigation environment surrounding mesothelioma
claims.  Over the past decade, the property and casualty insurance
industry, including the Company, has experienced net unfavorable
prior year reserve development with regard to asbestos reserves,
but the Company believes that over that period there has been a
reduction in the volatility associated with the Company's overall
asbestos exposure as the overall asbestos environment has evolved
from one dominated by exposure to significant litigation risks,
particularly coverage disputes relating to policyholders in
bankruptcy who were asserting that their claims were not subject to
the aggregate limits contained in their policies, to an environment
primarily driven by a frequency of litigation related to
individuals with mesothelioma.  The Company's overall view of the
current underlying asbestos environment is essentially unchanged
from recent periods and there remains a high degree of uncertainty
with respect to future exposure to asbestos claims.

"Net asbestos paid loss and loss expenses in the first nine months
of 2018 and 2017 were US$161 million and US$193 million,
respectively.  Net asbestos reserves were US$1.35 billion at
September 30, 2018, compared with US$1.36 billion at September 30,
2017."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/BmXD61


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Victims Unable to Trace Employers Can Recover
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hartlepool Mail reported that there were 2,595 mesothelioma deaths
in 2016. Besides this, a similar number of deaths were also
estimated as a result of asbestos-related lung cancer.

Asbestos victims can still recover damages where insurers cannot be
traced, however, as Tilly Bailey & Irvine's specialist solicitors
can vouch for.

Victims of the fatal asbestos-induced cancer, mesothelioma, who are
unable to trace their employers or an employer's liability insurer,
are now able to apply for compensation packages worth on average
GBP123,000 under the government legislation known as the "Diffuse
Mesothelioma Payments Scheme."

This means that thousands of victims can now apply for compensation
when previously, if an employer or liability insurer could not be
traced, they would not have been able to recover any compensation
for their injuries.

Symptoms of mesothelioma can take anything up to 40-50 years to
present following exposure to asbestos, and as a result hundreds of
people every year struggle to locate a relevant party to sue for
damages because their former employers have become insolvent and/or
insurance records have gone missing.

This has created years of injustice for mesothelioma victims and
their families who have had to endure this terrible disease with
little hope of recovering any compensation from the insurance
industry.

The new scheme allows victims to recover damages when they would
not have previously been able to do so if information was not
traceable, or no assets were available to settle any damages. The
scheme also makes provision for payment of legal costs which means
that, in most cases, recovery of damages and costs will result in
families receiving all the compensation they deserve.

I have successfully made applications for individuals who suffer
from mesothelioma and where the employers that caused their injury
either no longer exist, have no assets or the insurers cannot be
traced. This has resulted in clients receiving payments in excess
of GBP100,000.

This has meant those suffering from mesothelioma and their families
have compensation which can assist in the most difficult of times.

I myself have had more than 30+ years experience dealing with
Industrial Disease claims, including mesothelioma, asbestosis and
pleural thickening cases.

If you or a loved one has recently been diagnosed with an
asbestos-related illness, it may be possible to pursue a
compensation claim. If you have any queries regarding mesothelioma
and/or claiming damages for any asbestos related injury, please
don't hesitate to contact us or visit us via York Road,
Hartlepool.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wash. Cos. Fined $140K for Asbestos Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Spokesman-Review reported that three companies renovating the
Otis Hotel in downtown Spokane have been cited for violating state
health and safety rules, receiving fines totaling nearly $140,000,
the first round of financial penalties stemming from the companies'
mishandling of cancer-causing asbestos material in the historic
hotel.

One of the companies cited by the Washington state Department of
Labor and Industries is owned by Curtis Rystadt, a former mortgage
broker who purchased the building for $1.4 million in June 2017.
Rystadt's company, Portland-based Hos and Boz LLC, was fined
$24,500 for eight "serious" and three "general" violations of
worker safety rules. The company also was fined $45,000 for 16
"serious" violations of state rules regulating hazardous
materials.

Santiago's Handyman Services, also of Oregon, received the same
fines as Rystadt's company, totaling $69,500. A third company, 4
Aces Restoration, based in Kent, Washington, received a $200 fine
for not informing the state of when it would be handling asbestos.

Rystadt and Abundio Santiago have appealed the fines, beginning a
potentially lengthy process that could lead to the state's Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals and Spokane County Superior Court.

The Spokane Regional Clean Air Agency is preparing its own notice
of violations, which also will come with monetary fines. The agency
would not discuss the violations since they have not yet been
issued.

The citations and fines follow inspections in March, when air
quality inspectors found signs of improper handling and disposal of
asbestos-laden material from the 107-year-old downtown building.
The state labor agency issued an "order of immediate restraint" on
March 9, and construction was delayed for three months while local
and state inspectors investigated the handling and removal not just
of asbestos, but also lead, which is in the aged building's paint.

Rystadt denies any wrongdoing and says he has documentation to
prove his innocence. Instead, he blames "incompetency" and
"bureaucracy" for failing to recognize he's done nothing wrong.

"First of all, I'm not an employer. I don't employ anybody,"
Rystadt said, pointing to two specific violations that use the word
"employee."

"They were not my employees," he said. "Even though I'm not the
employer and I'm not responsible for that stuff, I do not want
people working in unsafe conditions."

Beyond that, Rytstadt said he hired 4 Aces Restoration to properly
dispose of the asbestos material and left it to them to follow the
rules. The company, which received a substantially smaller fine
than Rystadt, did not return calls seeking comment. Rystadt said he
spent more than $50,000 disposing of the asbestos and had 4 Aces
Restoration in the building "three or four times" to dispose of
floor tiles, popcorn ceiling and insulated pipes embedded in the
walls. Each time, he said, workers wore masks and used a
negative-pressure enclosure.

Rystadt also denied that the workers did not properly handle
lead-based paint in the building.

The real issue, Rystadt said, was "incompetent" inspectors. He
called one inspector with the state Department of Ecology a
"bonehead."


"It's incompetency," he said. "It is a bureaucracy that's sad to
deal with. I can see why people get frustrated with government."

Lisa Woodard, spokeswoman with the local air agency, said 105
dumpsters were removed from the Otis by the time inspectors came to
the site. At that point, debris in the building tested positive for
asbestos. Similar debris was in two dumpsters outside the
building.

Asked if people who live or work near the Otis should be concerned
about exposure, Woodard said exposure is "predominantly" dangerous
"if somebody is digging through and working in the piles" and
suggested the "ambient" exposure did not jeopardize the health of
people passing by.

"There have been a lot of problems with this project from the
get-go," Woodard said. "There's going to be a lot involved in this
entire project when we get to assessing the violations."

Lori Rodriguez, compliance section manager with the clean air
agency, said "many corrective actions have been issued" for Rystadt
and the other companies, but the agency is preparing a list of
violations, which will be issued by the end of November.

"Our violations usually carry monetary fines," Rodriguez said, but
she said it's too early to say how much they may be. "Until we put
all the information together … we really don't know."

Brook Beeler, spokeswoman with the Department of Ecology, said her
agency was asked to look into the Otis project after inspectors
with the Spokane Regional Clean Air Agency found lead paint.

"In Washington, it's our responsibility to make sure dangerous
waste is handled properly," Beeler said. "We did some spot
sampling. Those samples contained two times the allowable limit of
lead."

Following the discovery, the Department of Ecology and Rystadt
formulated a sample plan, which has since shown safe limits of
lead, and the state agency is no longer involved.

Whether his appeal is successful or not, Rystadt said he would
finish his project to transform the Otis into Hotel Indigo Spokane,
part of the global hospitality chain InterContinental Hotels Group.
The hotel will have 112 rooms, a restaurant and a bar. It will open
in spring 2019, according to a statement from the hotel group.

He likened his determination to "the spirit of Spokane" after the
Great Fire of 1889.

"We'll get the job done. We're going to have a fantastic hotel," he
said.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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