CAR_Public/181130.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, November 30, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 240

                            Headlines

ADIENT PLC: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
ALLIANCE COLLECTION: Judgment on Pleadings in Maloney Partly Okayed
ANGEL EYES: Maslin Suit Seeks to Recover for Infringement
ARENA PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement Payments Made in Calif. Suit
ARS NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Helmuth Suit Denied

BLENDTEC INC: Suit Over Under-Powered Blender Dismissed
BOIRON INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Strike Expert Witness
BOIRON INC: Denial of Bid to Strike Expert Testimony Affirmed
CASHCRATE LLC: Faces Kloss Suit over Information Data Breach
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Pet Foods Contain Harmful Metals, Says Vado

CITIGROUP NA: Court Approves $2.3-Bil. Settlement in Forex Suit
DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Rehman Sues Over FCRA Breach
DANIEL E. SMITH: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Shareholders Suit
DAVITA INC: Bid to Dismiss Peace Officers' Fund Suit Pending
DEOLEO USA: Court Dismisses Bertolli EVOO Consumer Fraud Suit

DIGITAL FEDERAL: Court Narrows Claims in B. Salls' EFTA Suit
ENDOCYTE INC: Lareau Files Securities Suit Over Novartis Merger
EVOQUA WATER: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
FACEBOOK INC: Lundy Suit Alleges Unfair Competition Law Violations
FACEBOOK INC: To Drop Forced Arbitration in Harassment Cases

FAMILY DOLLAR SERVICES: Flournoy Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
FCA US: Court Won't Reconsider Tomassini Class Certification Denial
FIRST BANCORP: Oriental Bank Files 2nd Bid for Reconsideration
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: $4MM Settlement in Atis Suit Has Prelim Approval
GAP INC: Simpkins Sues Over Missed Breaks, Unpaid Wages

GGMJ LLC: Figueroa Sues Over Illegal Text Ad Blasts
GODIVA CHOCOLATIER: Carlton Fields Discusses Settlement Approval
GREENSKY INC: Schall Law Firm Probes Securities Violations Claims
H&R BLOCK: Maurella Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violations
HARLEYSVILLE PREFERRED: Court Narrows Claims in Halloran Suit

HOME CARE ASSISTANCE: Underpays Caregivers, Jones Suit Alleges
HOMESITE GROUP: Acklin Sues Over Unpaid OT Wages
HOPELE OF FORT: Eleventh Cir. Appeal Filed in Ramos TCPA Suit
IKEA INDUSTRY: Powell Claims Overtime for Off-the-Clock Work
IMPAC MORTGAGE: Court Declines to Review Decision in Baker Suit

IMPAC MORTGAGE: Court Stays Timm Class Suit
IMPAC MORTGAGE: Nguyen Suit Goes to Arbitration
IMPAC MORTGAGE: Unit Continues to Defend Marentes Class Suit
IMPAC MORTGAGE: Unit Continues to Defend McNair Class Suit
IMT PAVILION: Seeks Tex. Appeals Ct. Review of Ruling in "Mendez"

INDIANA: Court Dismisses Allen County Jail Prisoner's Suit
INSIGHT SERVICE: Underpays Investigators, Jhones Suit Claims
LAND AND SEA RESTAURANT: Servers Sue Over Illegal Tip Credit
MACY'S RETAIL: Davis Appeals Ruling Compelling Arbitration
MASTRO'S RESTAURANTS: Appeals Ruling in Camara FLSA Suit

MDL 2545: Bid to Intervene in Settlement Allocation Denied
MDL 2819: Court Narrows Claims in Restasis(R) Antitrust Suit
MERCURY SYSTEMS: Securities Complaint in Massachusetts Underway
METLIFE INC: Continues to Defend Owens Class Action in Georgia
METLIFE INC: Still Defends Westland Police & Fire Retirement Suit

MICROCHIP TECH: Expects Consolidation of Jackson & Maknissian Suits
MINNESOTA: Karsjens Appeals D. Minn. Decision to Eighth Circuit
MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER: Court Affirms Dismissal of Agnew Suit
MYRIAD GENETICS: Bid to Dismiss Amended Kessman Complaint Underway
NEW YORK TIMES: Court Strikes Race, Age-Based Claims

NEW YORK: Gilkeson Class Certification Denial Affirmed
NEW YORK: PBA of NYS Appeals N.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeals Filed in Roberts Class Suit
NRG ENERGY: Continues to Defend Griffoul Class Suit
NRG ENERGY: Dropped as Defendant from Rice Class Suit

OHIO: Court Narrows Claims in RCI Inmates' Suit
OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss N.Y. Consolidated Suit Underway
PACESETTER PERSONNEL: Castilla Seeks OT Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
PACIFIC GAS: Court Grants Final Approval of Greer Settlement
PAPA MURPHY'S: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in Lennartson Class Suit

PETER A. KLC: Cannon Sues Over Dues Despite Cancelled Membership
PLANTRONICS INC: Answer in Shin Class Suit Due Today
PNC MERCHANT: Customers Sue Over Excessive Service Charges
QUALCOMM INC: Bid to Drop Calif. Consolidated Suit Still Pending
QUALCOMM INC: Continues to Defend 226701 Canada, Inc. Class Suit

QUALCOMM INC: Continues to Defend Camp Securities Class Suit
QUALCOMM INC: Discovery in Consumer Class Suit to Close Dec. 28
QUALCOMM INC: Has Yet to Answer Canadian Class Suits
QUIKTRAK INC: Denied Wallace Overtime Pay, Wages Statements
RAINBOW PIZZA: Cortez Shortchanged on Vehicle Reimbursements

RAYMOND JAMES: Seeks 11th Cir. Review of Ruling in Brink Suit
RECKITT BENCKISER: Carrigan Disputes Joint Meds' Health Benefits
RIOT BLOCKCHAIN: Motley Rice to Lead in Securities Suit
RYANAIR HOLDINGS: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
SAM'S EAST: Court Denies Conditional Class Certification in Freeman

SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Court OKs Dismissal of Gernandt Suit
SANOFI AVENTIS: Castillo Appeals Order in Lantus Antitrust Suit
SAVANNAH LAW SCHOOL: Appeals Ruling in Cliff Suit to 11th Cir.
SCHMECHTIG LANDSCAPE: Lazcon Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
SNAP-ON EQUIPMENT: Frazier Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime

SOBEKIDS INC: Fails to Pay OT to Cooks, Fernandez Suit Alleges
SONUS NETWORKS: Levi & Korsinsky Files Securities Class Action
STITCH FIX: Court Vacates Initial CMC in Weismann Suit
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
TALMER BANORP: Court Stays Bid to Dismiss Livonia's Federal Claims

UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Injunction Against DACA Rescission
VISIONQUEST NATIONAL: Williams Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
W.E. BANQUETS: Workers Seek $51K Judgment in FLSA Suit
WELBILT INC: Kahn Swick Files Class Action Lawsuit
XANITOS INC: Faces Latest Potential Class Action Suit

ZIMMER BIOMET: Calif. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Karl FLSA Suit
ZUFFA LLC: Plaintiffs Postpone December Information Session

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 330 Cases vs. AK Steel Still Pending at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 43,700 Claims v. Goodyear Tire Pending at Sept.30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AIG Must Defend Cos. Against WTC Asbestos Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defends 3,673 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Allstate Had US$882MM Claim Reserves at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-Caused Cancer Increases in Australia
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Beccles Man Dies of Asbestos-related Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: BorgWarner Inc. Had 8,987 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: BorgWarner Records $791.5MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Defends 7,708 Claims at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Calif. Jury Clears J&J of Liability in Allen Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECONY Accrues $7MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Spent US$10MM for Manhattan Incident
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cox Claims vs. Arvinmeritor Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cox Claims vs. McCord Dismissed With Prejudice

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Had $305MM Accrual at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Still Defends Suits at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: EBC Estopped From Relitigating Causation in Filosi
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$80MM Reserves at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Family Seeks Answer on Trawlerman's Asbestos Death

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Tire Records $176MM Liability at Sept.30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Had 17,287 PI Suits at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hobart Brothers Don't Owe McKinney Duty to Warn
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Husch Blackwell Discusses Take-Home Ruling
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ill. App. Affirms Denial of Bid to Transfer Claims

ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Faces Securities Suits Over Asbestos Talc
ASBESTOS UPDATE: John Crane Defeats Asbestos Claim in Ohio
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Had 3,469 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Oliver Couple Sues AO Smith for Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Fitter Awarded GBP46,750 Payout

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Window Surveyor Dies of Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had $35.3MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had 1,450 Fibro Cases at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tucker Couple Sues BMW, Cos. for Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at Sept.29

ASBESTOS UPDATE: UTC Records $341MM Asbestos Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wife Sues GE, Cos. Over Husband's Asbestos Death


                            *********

ADIENT PLC: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Adient plc (NYSE: ADNT).  If
you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to
request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

Adient plc (NYSE: ADNT)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: December 3, 2018
Class Period: October 31, 2016 and June 11, 2018

Get additional information about ADNT:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/adient-plc-loss-submission-form?wire=3

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Telephone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


ALLIANCE COLLECTION: Judgment on Pleadings in Maloney Partly Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBRA MALONEY, ELAINE BONIN, and DEBORAH OZIER,
Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ALLIANCE COLLECTION AGENCIES, INC., Case No.
17-CV-1610 (E.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (i) granted in
part and denied in part the Defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings; and (ii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

On Nov. 20, 2017, Maloney, Bonin, and Ozier filed a class action
complaint against Alliance, alleging that Alliance sent debt
validation notices that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") and the Wisconsin Consumer Act ("WCA").

The Plaintiffs allege that between December 2016 and September
2017, they each received two debt validation notices from Alliance
within a 30-day period.  In every case, the second notice listed
the same debts as the first notice.  The second notices sent to
Plaintiffs Bonin and Ozier also listed other debts and
corresponding new totals.

The Plaintiffs allege that receiving two such notices for the same
debts within a 30-day period was confusing or would be confusing to
a consumer, leaving recipients unsure of how many days remained to
dispute the debt.  Plaintiffs Bonin and Ozier further allege that
the second notices left them unsure of whether the 30-day
validation period applied to all the debts listed or only those for
which they had not received prior validation notices.  Plaintiffs
Bonin and Ozier also allege that the second notices were or would
be confusing as to the amounts owed.  All the Plaintiffs allege
that they had to spend time and money investigating these notices
and their consequences.

On Feb. 1, 2018, Alliance submitted its answer.  It filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c).  Alliance argues that the validation notices described by
the Plaintiffs did not violate either the FDCPA or the WCA, and
therefore the complaint should be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs then filed their own motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

Judge Joseph finds that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
show that the notices might confuse an unsophisticated consumer.
Therefore, she will deny the Defendant's motion with respect to
Counts I and III.  However, because the Plaintiffs appear to have
abandoned their claims in Count II, she will grant the Defendant's
motion with respect to Count II.

The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because the facts in the pleadings show that Alliance
violated the FDCPA and the WCA.  Alliance responds to the
Plaintiffs' criticisms of its answers by noting deficiencies in the
Plaintiffs' complaint.  But typographical errors and other
apparently unintentional errors in the Plaintiffs' complaint do not
justify the glaring deficiencies in Alliance's answer.  Neither
does some degree of vagueness in the complaint exempt Alliance from
making a good-faith effort to reasonably interpret and answer it.
While certainly other interpretations of that statement are
possible, both the plain language of the allegation and the context
of the complaint suggest that the Plaintiff means that this was the
first letter Alliance sent to Maloney, and Alliance must answer
that allegation in good faith.

The Judge will grant Alliance leave to file an amended answer
within 15 days of the order.  Because she is allowing Alliance to
amend its answer, the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the
pleadings will be dismissed as moot.

For these reasons, Judge Joseph granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The counsel
for the Defendant will file an amended answer within 15 days of
the.  The Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment
on the pleadings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/rSjWtM from Leagle.com.

Debra Maloney, Elaine Bonin & Deborah Ozier, Plaintiffs,
represented by Ben J. Slatky -- bslatky@ademilaw.com --  Ademi &
O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter -- jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi &
O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin -- jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi &
O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge -- meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi
& O'Reilly LLP.

Alliance Collection Agencies Inc, Defendant, represented by David
M. McDorman, McDorman Law Office.


ANGEL EYES: Maslin Suit Seeks to Recover for Infringement
---------------------------------------------------------
Andy Eugene Maslin aka Andy Eugene Maslin, III, and Brooks Alan
Washburn, on behalf of themselves and all other shareholders of
Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. similarly situated, and in the right of
Angel Eyes Produce, Inc., Masbro LLC, and Waslin LLC v. Angel Eyes
Produce, Inc., James P. Massa, and Sustainable Essentials
Enterprises LLC, Case No. 8:18-cv-01309 (N.D. N.Y., November 7,
2018), seeks to recover for infringement of a certain patent
belonging to the Plaintiffs and AEP, including seeking injunctive
relief to prevent additional acts of infringement.

The Plaintiffs also seek declaratory judgments regarding the
ownership of the said patent; the validity or invalidity of certain
purported assignments of said patent; the effectiveness of Massa's
termination as CEO of AEP and legitimacy of acts undertaken by
Massa purportedly as CEO of AEP after his termination; and claims
for unjust enrichment and conversion in connection with the
fraudulent inducement of a purported assignment of said patent. All
monetary damages are sought as against the Defendants James P.
Massa and Sustainable Essential Enterprises LLC only.

The Plaintiffs Maslin and Washburn developed a certain
container-based plant husbandry apparatus and horticultural
environment designed to optimize growth of plants.  The Plaintiffs
applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for a patent with
respect to the Invention, and on or about February 14, 2012 the PTO
granted a patent, number 8,112,936, to the Plaintiffs with respect
to the Invention.

The Plaintiffs are shareholders of Angel Eyes Produce.

The Defendant Angel Eyes Produce, Inc. is in the business of
growing and selling organic produce.

The Defendant James P. Massa is a resident of 723 Central Avenue,
Lexington, Kentucky 40502-1709.

The Defendant Sustainable Essentials Enterprises LLC is a company
located at 16192 Coastal Highway Lewes, Delaware 19958-3608. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Kimberly A. Steele, Esq.
      THE STEELE LAW FIRM, P.C.
      949 County Route 53
      Oswego, NY 13126
      Tel: (315) 216-4721
      Fax: (315) 216-6065
      E-mail: ksteele@thesteelelawfirm.com


ARENA PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement Payments Made in Calif. Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Arena Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company and its
insurer made settlement payments in cash to the class members and
their attorneys to settle the company's liability according to a
Stipulation.

Beginning in September 2010, a number of complaints were filed in
the US District Court for the Southern District of California, or
District Court, against the company and certain of its current and
former employees and directors on behalf of certain purchasers of
our common stock.

The complaints were brought as purported stockholder class actions,
and, in general, include allegations that the company and certain
of its current and former employees and directors violated federal
securities laws by making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the company's BELVIQ program, thereby
artificially inflating the price of the company's common stock.

The plaintiffs sought unspecified monetary damages and other
relief. In August 2011, the District Court consolidated the actions
and appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel. In November 2017,
the company and the lead plaintiff signed a stipulation and
agreement of settlement, or Stipulation, to resolve the
consolidated class action.

Under the terms of the Stipulation, and in exchange for a release
of all claims by class members and a dismissal of the consolidated
class action with prejudice, the company have agreed that (i) that
the company's insurers would pay class members and their attorneys
a total of approximately $12.025 million and (ii) Arena would pay
class members and their attorneys approximately $11.975 million in
either shares of the company's common stock or cash at the
company's election.

Arena Pharmaceuticals said, "Accordingly, in the third quarter of
2017, we recognized $11.975 million of net expense for the portion
of the settlement that we agreed to pay in either common stock or
cash. On April 12, 2018, the District Court entered its final
approval order approving the settlement and the plan of allocation
and request for attorneys' fees and expense. In the second quarter
of 2018, we and our insurer made settlement payments in cash to the
class members and their attorneys to settle our liability under the
Stipulation."

Arena Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses
on developing novel small molecule drugs for various therapeutic
areas in the United States and Switzerland. Arena Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. was founded in 1997 and is based in San Diego, California.


ARS NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Helmuth Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned BERNADETTE M.
HELMUTH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ARS NATIONAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant. Case No.
11-81044-CIV-MARRA. (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff Bernadette Helmuth filed a two-count Amended Complaint
against ARS National Services, Inc., for violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendant failed to disclose its status as a debt collector in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(11) (count one) and failed to
make a meaningful disclosure of identity in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692d(6) (count two).

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when no issues of material fact
exist, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
judgment on the pleadings only has utility when all material
allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the
pleadings and only questions of law remain to decided by the
district court.

Section 1692d(6) requires a meaningful disclosure of the caller's
identity. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the identity of a
caller is meaningfully disclosed when both the name of the debt
collection company and the nature of the company's business are
disclosed. This Court has already determined that a message similar
to the one alleged here violates section 1692d(6) because it does
not state the nature of Defendant's business.  

Section 1692e(11) of the FDCPA prohibits the failure to disclose
that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that
any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the
failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the
communication is from a debt collector. The Eleventh Circuit has
held that telephone messages are communications and when those
messages fail to disclose they are from a debt collector, it is a
violation of FDCPA.  

The Court finds that the Defendant's argument to the contrary are
not persuasive. The Defendant relies upon cases from outside this
Circuit, a proposal by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
that has not yet been enacted and materials outside of the
pleadings. This Court, however, must follow Eleventh Circuit
precedent and the law as it stands today.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 12, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yclqfrf7 from
Leagle.com.

Bernadette M. Helmuth, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer M.
Spiegel Colson & Donald A. Yarbrough.

ARS National Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Capri Trigo
-- ctrigo@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & Sean P. Flynn --
sflynn@gordonrees.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, pro
hac vice.


BLENDTEC INC: Suit Over Under-Powered Blender Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dee Benson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Utah granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case, ALEJANDRO
CALLEGARI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BLENDTEC, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-308-DB (D. Utah).

The Defendant sells a series of blenders, which it markets under
its Blendtec trademark.  On its website, marketing materials, and
product packaging, Blendtec makes representations about the
"horsepower" -- or "HP" -- of its blenders.  Blendtec claims the
horsepower of each blender falls between 3 and 3.8 HP.

Prior to filing the Complaint, the Plaintiff retained electrical
and mechanical engineers to conduct power tests on Blendtec's
blenders in their laboratories.  None of the blenders tested by the
Plaintiff's consultants exceeded more than 25% of the power output
claimed by Blendtec.

The named Plaintiff, Mr. Callegari, purchased a "Blendtec Classic
475 120v Blender" "online" in July of 2017.  Mr. Callegari relied
on Blendtec's horsepower representations when making the purchase.
Upon using the blender, Mr. Callegari believed, based on his
observations that the blender was under-powered as compared to the
horsepower claims made by Blendtec.  Had Mr. Callegari known that
the blender was not as powerful as advertised, he would not have
purchased it, or would not have paid as much for it as he did.

The Plaintiff brought the suit on behalf of himself and
similarly-situated purchasers of Blendtec blenders.  In his first
cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged that Blendtec misrepresented
the "performance characteristics", "standard", and "grade" of its
blenders, in violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
("UCSPA").  In his second cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged
that Blendtec's horsepower representations were express warranties,
which Blendtec breached pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 70A-2-313 and
70A-2A-210.  In his third cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged
that Blendtec's blenders did not conform to the representations on
their packaging, thus breaching the implied warranty of
merchantability pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 70A-2-314 and
70A-2A-212.  In his fourth cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged a
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, premised on Blendtec's
breach of express written warranties.  In his fifth and sixth
causes of action, the Plaintiff alleged a breach of express and
implied warranty, presumably pursuant to common law principles.

Judge Benson granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  The Judge
finds that (i) the Plaintiff's class action claim for damages under
the UCSPA is dismissed for failure to plead an act or practice
specified as violating the UCSPA by a rule adopted by the enforcing
authority; (ii) even assuming that the Plaintiff could satisfy the
class action pleading requirements of the UCSPA, his UCSPA claim is
properly dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b); (iii) the
Plaintiff's claims for breach of express and implied warranty under
the Utah UCC are dismissed for failure to comply with the notice
requirements of Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-2-607(3); (iv) the
common law breach of warranty claims pled by Plaintiff are barred
by the Utah UCC; and because the Jugde has dismissed the
Plaintiff's breach of warranty claims, the Plaintiff's MMWA must be
dismissed as well.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/t5rkN7 from Leagle.com.

Alejandro Callegari, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bonner C. Walsh --
bonner@walshpllc.com -- WALSH PLLC, Jon V. Harper --
jharper@jonharperlaw.com -- HARPER LAW PLC, Jon M. Herskowitz,
BARON & HERSKOWITZ, pro hac vice & M. Denise Dalton, HARPER LAW
PLC.

Blendtec, Defendant, represented by Milo Steven Marsden --
marsden.steve@dorsey.com -- DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP & Kristen E. Olsen
-- olsen.kristen@dorsey.com -- DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP.


BOIRON INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Strike Expert Witness
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum affirming the District Court's order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Expert Testimony in the case captioned CHRISTOPHER
LEWERT, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOIRON INC. and BOIRON USA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-56607. (9th Cir.).

Christopher Lewert, the named plaintiff in a class action on behalf
of a group of California consumers, challenges the district court's
refusal to strike testimony by an expert witness for
Defendant-Appellees Boiron Inc. and Boiron USA, Inc. (Boiron).  

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lewert's
motion to strike the trial testimony of Boiron's expert, Dr. Neil
Spingarn. The crux of Dr. Spingarn's testimony remained consistent
from his initial written report through trial. That the basis of
that opinion and his confidence in it may have evolved as Dr.
Spingarn learned more about how Boiron made Oscillo does not change
its basic character, so the district court acted within its
discretion by allowing him to testify.

Boiron presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that Oscillococciuum (Oscillo) actually treats the flu
and is not a sugar pill. Because Lewert did not move for judgment
as a matter of law at the close of evidence under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a), we review only for plain error.
  
It appears that the jury believed Dr. Spingarn, Boiron's clinical
studies, and its anecdotal evidence more than it believed Lewert's
expert. Because neither expert actually tested Oscillo to see if it
contained any therapeutic ingredient, this was a battle of the
experts for the jury and not one that Lewert can relitigate on
appeal.  

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's November 8, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybanb5yu from Leagle.com.


BOIRON INC: Denial of Bid to Strike Expert Testimony Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER LEWERT, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOIRON INC. and
BOIRON USA, INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-56607 (9th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to strike testimony by an expert witness
for the Defendant-Appellees.

The named Plaintiff in a class action on behalf of a group of
California consumers, challenges the district court's refusal to
strike testimony by an expert witness for Boiron.  He further
appeals verdicts for Boiron after bifurcated jury and bench trials
on his claims under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA") and Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

First, the Court declines to dismiss the appeal due to Lewert's
failure to comply with Ninth Circuit Rule 10-3.1, which requires an
appellant (1) to serve appellees with notice specifying which
portions of the district court transcript the appellant intends to
order within ten days of filing a notice of appeal, and (2) to
order the transcript within 30 days.  Although Lewert's procedural
violation may have caused inconvenience, the record available to
the Court contains all relevant information necessary to evaluate
his assertions of error.

Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Lewert's motion to strike the trial testimony of Boiron's expert,
Dr. Neil Spingarn.  The crux of Dr. Spingarn's testimony remained
consistent from his initial written report through trial.  That the
basis of that opinion and his confidence in it may have evolved as
Dr. Spingarn learned more about how Boiron made Oscillo does not
change its basic character, so the district court acted within its
discretion by allowing him to testify.

Third, the Court finds that Boiron presented sufficient evidence
from which the jury could have concluded that Oscillococciuum
actually treats the flu and is not a sugar pill.  It appears that
the jury believed Dr. Spingarn, Boiron's clinical studies, and its
anecdotal evidence more than it believed Lewert's expert.  Because
neither expert actually tested Oscillo to see if it contained any
therapeutic ingredient, this was a battle of the experts for the
jury and not one that Lewert can relitigate on appeal.

Fourth, Lewert's sole theory why Boiron's packaging was misleading
or deceptive was that Oscillo was a sugar pill and ergo could not
treat flu symptoms.  When the jury found explicitly that Boiron's
representations were not false, it must have implicitly rejected
Lewert's argument that Oscillo was just sugar.  The Court therefore
holds that the district court did not err in treating that factual
finding as having preclusive effect on the UCL claims.

Because Lewert offered no theory as to how Oscillo's packaging
might be misleading if indeed it treats flu symptoms -- regardless
of the mechanism by which it does so -- he presented no evidence
that would allow him to prevail under the UCL after the jury
rejected his CLRA claims.  The district court's factual finding
that Boiron's claims were not misleading or deceptive was therefore
supported by sufficient evidence and not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 8, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/XbLsDW from Leagle.com.


CASHCRATE LLC: Faces Kloss Suit over Information Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
SHANICE KLOSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CASHCRATE, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2018CH13520 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Oct. 30, 2018) is an action
against the Defendant as a result of its conduct concerning a data
breach that compromised private personal information of the
Plaintiff and the class due to the Defendant's failure to implement
a reasonably adequate cybersecurity prevention, detection and
response protocol.

CashCrate, LLC is a Nevada limited liability company and is a Get
Paid To (GPT) website that pays money for watching videos,
referring sites, taking surveys, completing offers, and shopping
online. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          William Kingston, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
          Chicago, FL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: jsheikali@mcgpc.com
                  wkingston@mcgpc.com


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Pet Foods Contain Harmful Metals, Says Vado
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jesika Vado, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc. and Champion
Petfoods LP, Defendants, Case No. 18-925598, (Cal. Super., October
22, 2018), brings claims for fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of
implied and express warranty under California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, California's Unfair Competition Law and California's
False Advertising Law.

Champion sells a variety of premium-priced dog foods throughout the
United States. Its dry dog food products are sold under the
"Orijen" and "Acana" brand names. Its packaging prominently states
that its products are "biologically appropriate" and contain
"fresh, regional ingredients" featuring fresh, raw or dehydrated
ingredients from minimally processed poultry, fish and eggs.
However, Plaintiff claims that they contain excessive levels of
harmful heavy metals, including arsenic, lead, cadmium, and
mercury. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
      Joshua Anaya, Esq.
      FINKELSTETN & KRINSK LLP
      550 West C St., Suite 1760
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Fax: (619) 238-5425
      Phone: (619) 238-1333
      Email: jrk@classactionlaw.com
             jca@classactionlaw.com


CITIGROUP NA: Court Approves $2.3-Bil. Settlement in Forex Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Approval of Settlement Agreements in the case captioned IN RE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARK RATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION. No. 13 Civ.
7789 (LGS). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs moved for final approval of 15 settlement
agreements, which together create a settlement fund totaling
$2,310,275,000.

This case involves an alleged conspiracy among banks to fix prices
in the foreign exchange market. The docket sheet reflects the vast
quantity of legal work produced to date. Several hundred attorneys
worked on this matter over the course of five years, culminating in
15 settlements and a settlement fund of $2,310,275,000, the third
largest antitrust class action settlement in history, according to
the Plaintiffs.

Class Counsel requests an attorneys' fee award of $381,353,830.27,
plus interest,  the equivalent of 16.51% of the settlement fund.

Comparison to Court-Approved Fees in Other Common Fund Settlements

In support of their proposed fee award, Class Counsel submitted a
declaration from Geoffrey P. Miller, a professor at the New York
University School of Law. Professor Miller coauthored a recent
study which found that in the Southern District of New York, the
mean fee in reported class action settlements was 27% and the
median fee was 31%. The study also found that, nationwide, the mean
fee for antitrust settlements was 27% and the median fee was 30%.
Professor Miller notes in his declaration that the fee requested in
this case, 16.51% is well below each of these figures.

But this comparison, according to the Court, is not entirely
germane. The 78 cases comprising the data set for the Southern
District of New York had a median recovery of only $3.7 million.
As for the antitrust cases, the median recovery was $37.3 million a
fraction of the $2.3 billion settlement in this case. Given that a
smaller fee percentage is appropriate as the size of the settlement
increases, these figures do not provide an adequate basis for
comparison.

Class Counsel also submitted the declaration of Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, a professor of law at Vanderbilt University. Professor
Fitzpatrick notes that in the five antitrust class actions with
settlements of $1 billion or more, "the average fee percentage
awarded was 14.43%. Class Counsel subsequently filed an exhibit
detailing the fee awards in those five settlements, and in a sixth
settlement which, as here, was comprised of several smaller
settlements.

These six settlements provide a more relevant basis for comparison
on account of their similarities with this case in terms of size,
complexity and subject matter. Although there are notable
limitations, namely, the small sample size and high standard
deviation (above 8%) these data points still provide useful
guidance, especially when situated within the sliding scale
framework. The three cases with the smallest settlement amounts ($1
billion to $1.18 billion) are the three cases with the highest fee
percentages (14% or higher, with an average of 21.97%).The case
with the settlement amount closest to this case ($1.86 billion) had
a fee percentage of 13.61%. And the two cases with settlements
exceeding $3 billion had the smallest fee percentages under 10%.

In view of the approved fee awards in similar common fund
settlements, and mindful that the Court acts as a fiduciary that
must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members,  a
reasonable baseline fee for an antitrust class action of this size
is 13%.

Consideration of Risk, Result and Policy Considerations

Litigation Risk

Without question, Class Counsel faced substantial litigation risks
risks far beyond those in a typical federal lawsuit. But logic
dictates that for litigation risks to warrant an upward deviation
from the baseline, the risks must be compared not to a typical
case, but to a case of similar size, complexity and subject matter.
Otherwise, the substantial litigation risks inherent in megafund
class actions would all but guarantee a self-reinforcing cycle of
higher and higher fee awards.

Class Counsel point to several aspects of the case that they argue
warrant a fee award enhancement. First, Class Counsel argue that
they incurred significant risks given that Defendants would likely
have denied the existence of an overarching conspiracy to fix
prices and, if such a conspiracy had been established, would have
argued they were not a participant in that agreement. But it is
hardly unique that an antitrust defendant would deny participation
in an illicit price-fixing conspiracy. This litigation risk does
not warrant an upward deviation from the baseline reasonable fee.

Second, Class Counsel argue that they would have had to prove both
class-wide impact and that damages could be computed on a common,
formulaic basis. But these challenges are inherent in class action
litigation. And for purposes of determining a settlement allocation
formula, Class Counsel have managed to compute damages based on a
common formula. The risks of having to prove class-wide impact and
damages do not warrant a deviation from the baseline fee.

Third, Class Counsel argue that they incurred a significant risk of
non-payment due to their working on a contingency basis. But,
again, this is a common risk in most class actions, including cases
of this size, complexity and subject matter and thus does not
warrant an upward adjustment of the baseline fee.

In summary, the risk level in this case was not substantially
higher or lower than that in a typical case of the same size,
complexity and subject matter. Consequently, no increase or
decrease in the baseline percentage is warranted.

Quality of Representation

Class Counsel state that they are among the most experienced and
skilled antitrust and commodities litigation attorneys in the
country. Whether or not this accurately characterizes each of the
369 attorneys listed as Class Counsel, it is clear from the results
in this case that Plaintiffs were well-served by their
representation.  

Undoubtedly, the $2.31 billion settlement achieved in this case is
an exceptional result in the aggregate. The settlement is also
commendable from the point of view of the class members. The
estimated participation rate by number of claimants is 30%, based
on approximately 60,000 submitted claims. The estimated
participation rate by claim volume is 32% to 35%. Assuming a 35%
participation rate by volume, claimants are projected to recover
94% to 123% of estimated single damages. Yet, there is no
indication that the result is exceptional compared to other cases
of a similar size, complexity and subject matter. On the record
before the Court, quality of representation does not warrant an
adjustment to the baseline fee.

Public Policy Considerations

Attorneys' fees should reflect the important public policy goal of
providing lawyers with sufficient incentive to bring common fund
cases that serve the public interest. If attorneys' fees are
routinely set too low, it may create poor incentives to bringing
large class action cases.  

Antitrust class actions serve the public interest by protecting
consumers from exploitation. As Class Counsel correctly note: it is
important to encourage top-tier litigators to pursue challenging
antitrust cases. Indeed, in some of the related criminal cases, the
government has expressly declined to seek restitution in light of
the availability of relief in the civil litigation.  

As no particular public policy concern differentiates this case
from other cases of a similar size, complexity and subject matter,
there is no reason to deviate from the baseline fee.

The Lodestar Cross-Check

The last step of the analysis is to cross-check the fee award
against the lodestar multiplier. This step ensures that an
otherwise reasonable percentage fee would not lead to a windfall
for class counsel. The lodestar multiplier is calculated by
dividing the fee award by the lodestar (the reasonable hours billed
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate).

A fee award equivalent to 13% of the settlement fund results in a
lodestar multiplier of 1.72. This is within the typical range for
megafund cases.   Moreover, some of these hours relate to work in
the ongoing litigation against Credit Suisse, which has not
settled. In view of the Court's application of the Goldberger
factors, increasing the fee award percentage just so the multiplier
can be larger is not merited.

Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees of $300,335,750, which
equates to 13% of the settlement fund. Class Counsel's request for
interest is denied.

Unless the Court orders otherwise upon application of Class
Counsel, the payment of attorneys' fees shall take place as
follows: half of $300,335,750 shall be payable upon the initial
distribution to confirmed claimants who fall within the de minimis
and automatic payment categories, as well as certain pro rata
Option 1 claimants, as described in Class Counsel's letter to the
Court dated August 14, 2018. The other half of the $300,335,750
shall be payable upon the substantial distribution of the
settlement fund to the remaining claimants, as described in the
same letter.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycrlposz from
Leagle.com.

Haverhill Retirement System, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher M. Burke
-- CBURKE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP,
Donald A. Broggi -- DBROGGI@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott Scott, L.L.P.,
Joseph Peter Guglielmo -- JGUGLIELMO@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott +
Scott, L.L.P., Kristen M. Anderson  -- kanderson@scott-scott.com --
Scott+Scott, Attorneys At Law, LLP, Michael E. Klenov
-mklenov@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery, LLC, Robert E. Litan
-- rlitan@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery LLC, Walter W. Noss
-- WNOSS@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott+ Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, pro
hac vice, William P. Butterfield -- wbutterfield@hausfeld.com --
Hausfeld LLP, Aaron M. Zigler -- azigler@koreintillery.com --
Korein Tillery, Alexander Dewitt Singh Kullar --
akullar@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez &
Smith LLP, Allan Steyer -- asteyer@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer
Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, C. Moze Cowper --
mcowper@cowperlaw.com -- Cowper Law.

Citigroup, N.A., Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman --
awiseman@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew
D. Lazerow -- alazerow@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac
vice & Andrew Arthur Ruffino -- aruffino@cov.com -- Covington &
Burling LLP.

Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC & Credit
Suisse AG, Defendants, represented by Charles Matthew Miller --
memiller@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, David George
Januszewski -- djanuszewski@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel
LLP, Elai E. Katz -- ekatz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel
LLP, Herbert Scott Washer -- hwasher@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP, Jason Michael Hall -- jhall@cahill.com -- Cahill
Gordon & Reindel LLP, Richard Carl Schoenstein --
rschoenstein@tarterkrinsky.com -- Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP &
Sheila Chithran Ramesh -- sramesh@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert Alexander
Lawner -- rlawner@cgsh.com -- Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
LLP.


DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Rehman Sues Over FCRA Breach
-------------------------------------------------
Oneeb Rehman, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Dania Entertainment Center, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-62481 (S.D. Fla., October 16, 2018), seeks damages
resulting from violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act, amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
specifically limiting the maximum printed credit or debit card
digits on transaction receipt to five.

Dania Entertainment Center operates as "The Casino at Dania Beach,"
where Rehman used his personal credit card to perform a
transaction. The electronically-printed receipt bore the first four
and last four digits of his credit card account number, his
complete first and last name and initialed signature as well as the
card issuer, notes the complaint.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott D. Owens, Esq.
      SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.
      3800 S. Ocean Dr., Ste. 235
      Hollywood, FL 33019
      Tel: (954) 589-0588
      Fax: (954) 337-0666
      Email: scott@scottdowens.com


DANIEL E. SMITH: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Shareholders Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an Order
affirming the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned JONATHAN MARCUS, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
GRACE PREFERRED LITIGATION TRUST, LLOYD I. MILLER TRUST A-4, MILFAM
II L.P., LENADO PARTNERS, SERIES A OF LENADO CAPITAL PARTNERS,
L.P., LENADO DP, SERIES A OF LENADO DP, L.P., SPV UNO, LLC, NIKOS
HECHT, INDIVIDUALLY, THE HECHT CHILDREN'S TRUST II, BROADBILL
PARTNERS, LP, BROADBILL PARTNERS II, LP, COSTA BRAVA PARTNERSHIP
III LP, KURT LAGESCHULTE, IRRA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DANIEL E.
SMITH, W2007 GRACE ACQUISITION I, INC., PFD HOLDINGS, LLC, GOLDMAN
SACHS REALTY MANAGEMENT, L.P., FORMERLY KNOWN AS ARCHON GROUP,
L.P., TODD P. GIANNOBLE, BRIAN T. NORDAHL, GREGORY M. FAY, MARK
RICKETTS, Defendants-Appellees, No. 17-3314. (2nd Cir.).

Plaintiffs-Appellants, a litigation trust and numerous former
holders of preferred stock in a real estate investment trust,
appeal the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissing with prejudice their
action against that real estate trust and various of its directors,
officers, and controlling shareholders for failure to state a
claim.

Between 2003 and 2006, the plaintiffs acquired shares of preferred
stock in Equity Inns, Inc. In 2007, Equity Inns merged into W2007
Grace Acquisition I, Inc. (Grace), and the Equity Inns preferred
stock was converted to preferred stock in Grace on a one-to-one
basis. The Plaintiffs allege that, in the years following the
merger, defendants engaged in various deceitful maneuvers and
self-interested transactions that were designed to depress the
value of the plaintiffs' preferred shares.

The SAC alleged twelve causes of action, including (1) breach of
contract under New York law by PFD, for failure to pay the
Additional Purchase Price following the ARC Transaction and the
MOU; (2) breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
under New York law by PFD for delaying the execution of the MOU
until after the one-year anniversary of the execution of the SPAs;
and (3) rescission of the Release.

In a Memorandum Decision and Order filed on August 24, 2016, the
district court dismissed the case in its entirety, holding that the
breach of contract claim failed because neither the ARC Transaction
nor the MOU triggered an obligation to pay the Additional Purchase
Price, that the implied duty of good faith claim was duplicative of
the contract claim, and that the remaining claims were barred by
the Release.

The Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in dismissing
its breach of contract claim because the sale of hotels to ARC had
the effect of a liquidation, and so triggered PFD's obligation to
pay the Additional Purchase Price under the SPAs.

This argument fails. First, the plaintiffs did not allege that
Grace agreed to distribute the proceeds of the sale to
shareholders, claiming only that that Grace determined that the
proceeds could be distributed to holders of the Preferred Stock as
a result of the ARC Transaction. Thus, regardless of whether the
asset sale was effectively a liquidation, it would not trigger an
obligation to pay the Additional Purchase Price. Second, the sale
of assets was not in fact a liquidation under the SPAs. The
certificate of incorporation in effect on the date the SPAs were
executed specified that a voluntary or involuntary liquidation,
dissolution or winding up of Grace shall not include a sale or
transfer of all or substantially all of Grace's assets.  

The Plaintiffs next appeal the district court's dismissal of their
state law claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing under New York law. In the SAC, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants purposefully delayed entering into the MOU with
the class plaintiffs to ensure the settlement would not trigger an
obligation to pay the Additional Purchase Price. But, as Judge
Daniels correctly held, the MOU was not binding and so would not
have triggered an obligation to pay the Additional Purchase Price,
even if the defendants had entered into it within a year of the
SPAs.  

Last, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in
holding that their claims regarding conduct that predated the SPAs
were barred by the Release. The parties disagree about whether the
defendants owed the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty at the time the
SPAs were executed and as to whether the law of New York or
Tennessee applies. However, even assuming there was a fiduciary
relationship, the plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law under
both New York and Tennessee law.

Under New York law, a sophisticated principal is able to release
its fiduciary from claims at least where the fiduciary relationship
is no longer one of unquestioning trust so long as the principal
understands that the fiduciary is acting in its own interest and
the release is knowingly entered into. When the plaintiffs entered
into the SPAs, any relationship of trust had clearly dissolved, as
the plaintiffs had already sent defendants a demand letter alleging
fraud and other misconduct.  

The district court therefore did not err in concluding that the
Release was valid, and these claims were properly dismissed.

Finally, the Court turns to the plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of
their motion to vacate the judgment based on the alleged conflict
of interest of the district court's law clerk, which we review for
abuse of discretion.  The Plaintiffs have pointed to no risk that
denial of this relief would lead to injustice in other cases, and
our de novo review of the viability of the Second Amended Complaint
alleviates any risk that the public's confidence in the judicial
process will be undermined by the alleged conflict. The motion to
vacate was properly denied.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9whg9x8 from Leagle.com.

MICHAEL J. LANG (Chelsea Hilliard -- chelseah@bellnunnally.com --
on the brief), Gruber Hail Johansen Shank LLP, Dallas, TX, for
Appellants.

SHARON L. NELLES (Darrell S. Cafasso -- cafassod@sullcrom.com --
Ann-Elizabeth Ostrager -- ostragerae@sullcrom.com -- on the brief),
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, NY., for Appellees.


DAVITA INC: Bid to Dismiss Peace Officers' Fund Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
DaVita Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that the motion to dismiss a
securities class action lawsuit by the Peace Officers' Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Georgia remains pending.

On February 1, 2017, the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund
of Georgia filed a putative federal securities class action
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
against the Company and certain executives.

The complaint covers the time period of August 2015 to October 2016
and alleges, generally, that the Company and its executives
violated federal securities laws concerning the Company's financial
results and revenue derived from patients who received charitable
premium assistance from an industry-funded non-profit organization.
The complaint further alleges that the process by which patients
obtained commercial insurance and received charitable premium
assistance was improper and "created a false impression of DaVita's
business and operational status and future growth prospects."

In November 2017, the court appointed the lead plaintiff and an
amended complaint was filed on January 12, 2018. On March 27, 2018,
the Company and various individual defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. Briefing on the motion is complete. The plaintiffs filed
an opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 6, 2018. The Company
filed a reply in support of the motion on July 19, 2018.

DaVita said, "Company disputes these allegations and intends to
defend this action accordingly."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

DaVita Inc. provides kidney dialysis services for patients
suffering from chronic kidney failure or end stage renal disease
(ESRD). The company operates kidney dialysis centers and provides
related lab services in outpatient dialysis centers. DaVita Inc.
was founded in 1994 and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado.


DEOLEO USA: Court Dismisses Bertolli EVOO Consumer Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned KEVIN FAHEY, On behalf of the general public of the
District of Columbia, Plaintiff, v. DEOLEO USA, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 18-cv-2047 (CRC). (D.D.C.).

Plaintiff Kevin Fahey contends that Defendant Deoleo USA, Inc.'s
Bertolli Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) is not actually extra
virgin. He brings this putative class action on behalf of himself
and the general public of the District of Columbia, under the
private attorney general provision of the District of Columbia
Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA).

Deoleo moves to dismiss Fahey's suit for of two reasons, first
because Fahey has failed to plead facts that could give rise to a
right to relief and second because a settlement in a separate class
action suit involving similar claims precludes this one.

The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act makes
it unlawful to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice,
whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged
thereby. Illustrative unfair or deceptive practices include
representing that goods or services have characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have
and representing that goods or services are of a particular
standard, quality, grade, style or model, if in fact they are of
another.

On Deoleo's motion to dismiss, therefore, the question is whether
Fahey has alleged facts that support an inference that the
particular bottle of Bertolli EVOO he purchased in April 2018
contained something other than extra virgin olive oil. The Court
concludes that he has not. Despite the complaint's lengthy catalog
of the olive oil industry's purported scandals, Fahey marshals but
one fact to substantiate his claim that this defendant deceptively
mislabeled the bottle of extra virgin olive Fahey purchased in
2018: the results of a 2010 study on olive oil quality by the
University of California, Davis. This meager factual content is not
enough for the court to draw the reasonable inference that Deoleo
is liable for the misconduct alleged.

As it sees things, the Court would have to indulge at least three
major and dubious assumptions to draw the inference Fahey asks for
here: one methodological, one temporal, and one geographic. Start
with the methodological assumption: is there good reason to think
the methods used in the UC Davis study can support general
conclusions about the quality of Bertolli olive oil?

Not really. The sample size was small only three bottles of
Bertolli EVOO were tested and none of them came from the same lot,
which is the testing protocol called for by the United States
Department of Agriculture. As Deoleo points out, olive oil is not a
mass produced plastic object, but a living, breathing organic
product that is produced in individual lots with slight variations
between the lots.   

What is more, the results were inconclusive. The Bertolli EVOO
samples satisfied the chemical criteria needed to be considered
extra virgin but a taste test concluded the samples were merely
virgin. Yet taste tests, by their nature, are subjective; that is
why the international body that establishes olive oil quality
standards the very same standards used in the UC Davis study
concluded that the UC Davis study should have convened a new panel
of testers to verify the impression of the first.

In sum, to hold that Fahey has pled facts that suggest a plausible
right to relief would require the Court to entertain not one, not
two, but all three of these assumptions. Unconvinced that any
single one of them is warranted, the Court will grant Deoleo's
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybsafgoj
from Leagle.com.

A. KEVIN FAHEY, On behalf of the General Public of the District of
Columbia, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas C. Willcox --
tinglima@wilsav.com -- THOMAS C. WILLCOX, ATTORNEY AT LAW.

DEOLEO USA, INC., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Brian Margulies
-- jeff.margulies@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
US LLP, pro hac vice & Matthew H. Kirtland --
matthew.kirtland@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
US LLP.


DIGITAL FEDERAL: Court Narrows Claims in B. Salls' EFTA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned BRANDI SALLS,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION and DOES 1 through 100,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 18-11262-TSH. (D. Mass.).

Brandi Salls brings a putative class action challenging the
practice of Digital Federal Credit Union and DOES 1 through 100 to
charge overdraft fees when members accounts have sufficient funds
to cover the transactions. She brings claims for breach of contract
(Counts I and II), breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing (Count III), unjust enrichment (Count IV), money had
and received (Count V), and violation of Regulation E, of the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA).

Breach of Contract

When an agreement between the parties is contained in more than one
document, the separate documents must be read together to
effectuate the intentions of the parties.

Here, although the Agreements are separate, they are arguably
linked with respect to an account holder's overdraft protection.
Because the Plaintiff has not laid out any facts supporting the
inference that the agreements should not be construed together even
though they are arguably linked with respect to overdraft
protection, The Court will consider the overdraft agreement in the
context of the Account Agreement for the purposes of this motion.


Members opt in to the Defendant's overdraft service by checking a
box on their checking and savings account application.  The Opt In
Agreement is accompanied by an overdraft disclosure form. The
disclosure provides, in relevant part: "An overdraft occurs when
you do not have enough money in your account to cover the
transaction, but we pay it anyway." The overdraft disclosure does
not provide any information clarifying that enough money is to be
construed as available balance and therefore the Court finds that a
reasonable person could construe enough money to mean ledger
balance.

The Defendant argues that these passages clearly demonstrate that
the overdraft service utilizes members' available balance. The
Defendant next contends that available balance' is a well-known
banking term that has long been understood to mean the money in an
account minus holds placed on funds to account for uncollected
deposits and for pending debit transactions. Finally, the Defendant
argues that The Funds Availability Policy in the Account Agreement
provides explicit guidance for members of various scenarios in
which funds will not be immediately available.

For two reasons the Defendant's argument fails. First, the
Defendant did not properly define available balance and its meaning
is therefore ambiguous. The Plaintiff contends that her account
balance was artificially low not only because there was a hold
placed on deposits into her account but also because the Defendant
subtracted pending transactions from the ledger balance. Indeed,
this is how the Defendant calculates available balance. Nowhere,
however, does the Funds Availability Policy mention this second
scenario or clarify how it might affect a member's balance.

Instead, the Funds Availability Policy only explains how there may
be a delay on funds coming into a member's account. Despite not
sufficiently defining the term, Defendant argues that available
balance nonetheless a well-known term that reasonable members would
understand. The Court finds, however, that the meaning of the term
as used in the Account Agreement is ambiguous. Indeed, several
courts, have found similar contractual arraignments ambiguous when
they used the term available balance.

Second, even if it was clear that the Defendant subtracted pending
transactions to calculate available balance, neither of the Account
Agreement sections pertaining to over-drafting nor the Opt In
Agreement refer members to the Funds Availability Policy to find
explanations of how their balance is calculated for purposes of
overdrafts. Likewise, the Funds Availability policy makes no
reference of how it might be related to overdrafts. Thus, it is not
at all clear that Defendant would use the available balance when
determining if an account was overdrawn even if that term were
defined adequately.  

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly argued
that the contracts, even when construed together, are ambiguous as
to whether they use the available balance method to determine
whether an account has been overdrafted. This ambiguity presents a
factual dispute not appropriate for resolution on this motion.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim survives the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff states a claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when one party violates
the reasonable expectations of the other. For the reasons stated
above, the Court finds that a reasonable person could have
construed the contracts to mean that Defendant would use the ledger
balance method when calculating overdrafting fees. Thus, Plaintiff
plausibly states a claim that her reasonable expectations were
violated, and that Defendant therefore breached the implied
covenant.

Unjust Enrichment and Money Had and Received

The Defendant argues that because a contractual relationship
exists, there can be no claims for unjust enrichment and money had
and received. The Defendant is correct that Massachusetts law does
not allow litigants to override an express contract by arguing
unjust enrichment.

Here, the Plaintiff asserts that she entered into binding contracts
with Defendant and uses the same theories to support both her
breach of contract and equitable claims. The Plaintiff does not
allege that the Defendant was enriched because it received a
benefit outside the scope of the contracts between the parties.
Rather, the Plaintiff alleges that the benefit was conferred upon
the Defendant because it breached the contract. As such, the
Plaintiffs equitable claims must fail.

EFTA

Violation of Regulation E

The Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Regulation E of EFTA,
because it did not accurately describe its overdrafting practices
in the Opt-In Agreement. Regulation E provides, in relevant part:

"A financial institution shall not assess a fee or charge on a
consumer's account for paying an ATM or one-time debit card
transaction pursuant to the institution's overdraft service, unless
the institution:(i) Provides the consumer with a notice in writing,
or if the consumer agrees, electronically, segregated from all
other information, describing the institution's overdraft
service;(ii) Provides a reasonable opportunity for the consumer to
affirmatively consent, or opt in, to the service for ATM and
one-time debit card transactions;(iii) Obtains the consumer's
affirmative consent, or opt-in, to the institution's payment of ATM
or one-time debit card transactions; and(iv) Provides the consumer
with confirmation of the consumer's consent in writing, or if the
consumer agrees electronically, which includes a statement
informing the consumer of the right to revoke such consent."

The Defendant's Opt In Agreement states that an overdraft occurs
"when you do not have enough money in your account to cover a
transaction."  The Plaintiff argues that this description does not
accurately describe the Defendant's practice. The Defendant
contends that when read in conjunction with the Agreement, the
Opt-In Agreement sufficiently and accurately describes Defendant's
policies. For the reasons stated above in the context of the breach
of contract claim, the language Defendant uses is ambiguous.

Therefore, the Court do not find that enough money accurately
describes Defendant's policy of using the available balance method
such that a member could meaningfully provide affirmative consent.

Defenses

Safe Harbor

The Defendant alternatively argues that it is protected from
liability under the EFTA safe harbor provision. Financial
institutions are protected from liability under EFTA for any
failure to make disclosure in proper form if a financial
institution utilized an appropriate model clause issued by the
Bureau or the Board.

The Defendant relies on Tims v. LGE Community Credit Union, 2017 WL
5133230 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2017).

The court in that case found that the safe harbor provision applied
because enough money could mean either balance calculation method.
Therefore, the court held that LGE cannot be said to have
explicitly misled the Plaintiff or inaccurately described its
overdraft program. The only thing LGE can be said to be guilty of
is a lack of precision.

The Court agrees that the reasoning in Tims is unpersuasive and
hold that the safe harbor does not protect Defendant from liability
in this case.

Statute of Limitations

Individual and class actions for damages for failure to comply with
the EFTA may be brought "within one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation. According to Plaintiff, she was
wrongly charged overdraft fees on December 18, 2014, December 19,
2014, and upon information and belief at least one other time
within twelve months of filing her complaint on June 15, 2018."

Claims from June 15, 2017 to Present

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's claim accrued as soon
as the first fee was charged. None of the Circuit Courts have
directly addressed this issue. In Wike v. Vertrue, Inc., 566 F.3d
590, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2009), a cardholder verbally preauthorized
monthly charges to a debit card. The Sixth Circuit concluded that
"the one-year limitations period began when the first recurring
transfer took place. All the transfers at issue in that case,
however, were made within the one-year period. As a result, the
court did not determine whether, had the first transfer been made
outside that period, all claims based on later transfers would have
been barred.

The Plaintiff alleges that on information and belief, at least one
such instance has occurred within twelve months of filing this
complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiff's EFTA claims, insofar as they
occurred within one year of filing her complaint are not time
barred.

Claims before June 15, 2017

The discovery rule allows a claim to accrue when the litigant first
knows or with due diligence should know facts that will form the
basis for an action. Whether a litigant should have known is
evaluated against the objective standard of what a reasonable
person similarly situated to the plaintiff would have known. In
order to apply, the factual basis for the cause of action must have
been inherently unknowable that is, not capable of detection
through the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of
injury.

The Plaintiff claims that she could not have discovered the facts
which form the basis of her claim because Defendant concealed its
practice of using the available balance method from its customers.


The Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. The Plaintiff alleges in
her complaint that she was charged an overdraft fee when her
account had a positive ledger balance. Therefore, had the Plaintiff
checked her bank statements, she should have known when she was
charged her first overdraft on a positive ledger balance that the
Defendant was not using the ledger balance method to assess
overdraft fees.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claim was not inherently unknowable.
Indeed, had she used reasonable diligence, she could have easily
discovered the factual foundation of her claim. She is therefore
not entitled to rely on the discovery rule for her EFTA claims that
occurred more than one year before she filed her complaint.

Accordingly, the Defendants motion is granted in part and denied in
part. Claims IV and V are dismissed. Claims I, II, and III survive
Defendant's motion to dismiss. Finally, Claim VI survives
Defendant's motion only for claims that occurred on or after June
15, 2017.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8mq4bkx
from Leagle.com.

Brandi Salls, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christine M. Craig --
ccraig@shaheengordon.com -- Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., Richard D.
McCune -- rdm@wmtrial-law.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro
hac vice, Sean T. O'Connell -- soconnell@shaheengordon.com --
Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., pro hac vice, Taras Kick --
Taras@kicklawfirm.com -- The Kick Law Firm, APC, pro hac vice &
Emily J. Kirk, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice.

Digital Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Demko -- andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,
pro hac vice, Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com --
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLLP, pro hac vice & John A. Mavricos,
Christopher, Hays, Wojcik & Mavricos.


ENDOCYTE INC: Lareau Files Securities Suit Over Novartis Merger
---------------------------------------------------------------
George A. Lareau, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Endocyte, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-10392 (S.D. N.Y., November 8, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
in connection with the proposed merger between Endocyte and
Novartis AG.

On October 17, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement of plan of merger with Novartis, pursuant to which,
Endocyte shareholders will receive $24.00 in cash for each share of
Endocyte stock they own.

The Plaintiff alleged that on, October 31, 2018, the Board
authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading
preliminary proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in violation of the Exchange Act that recommends
shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed Merger. While the
Defendants are touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to
the Company's shareholders in the Proxy, they have failed to
disclose material information that is necessary for shareholders to
properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Merger, thereby
rendering certain statements in the Proxy incomplete and
misleading, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Endocyte common stock.

The Defendant Endocyte is a Delaware corporation with principal
executive offices located at 3000 Kent Avenue, Suite A1-100, West
Lafayette, Indiana 47906. The Company is a biopharmaceutical
company developing targeted therapies for the treatment of cancer.
Endocyte's common stock trades on the Nasdaq under the symbol
"ECYT."

The Individual Defendants are Endocyte's board of directors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
      New York, NY 10118
      Tel: (212) 971-1341
      Fax: (212) 202-7880
      E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


EVOQUA WATER: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Evoqua Water Technologies
Corp. (NYSE: AQUA).  If you suffered a loss you have until the lead
plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead
plaintiff.

Evoqua Water Technologies Corp. (NYSE: AQUA)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 7, 2019
Class Period: November 6, 2017 and October 30, 2018

Get additional information about AQUA:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/evoqua-water-technologies-corp-loss-submission-form?wire=3


         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Telephone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Lundy Suit Alleges Unfair Competition Law Violations
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brendan Lundy and Myriah Watkins, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. Facebook, Inc., Google, LLC, Alphabet,
Inc., and Apple Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-06793 (N.D. Calif., November
8, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law.

This case involves Facebook's clandestine access to, and collection
of, detailed location data from its users' mobile and tablet
devices who have never explicitly opted in, or specifically opted
out of, Facebook's access to location tracking, aided and abetted
by various misrepresentations and omissions by operating system
developers Google and Apple.

The Plaintiff Brendan Lundy is a citizen of the State of Colorado.
Since at least 2014, and continuously to the present, Plaintiff
Lundy has owned and used an Apple iPhone6, powered by iOS, with the
third-party Facebook application downloaded onto the device.

The Plaintiff Myriah Watkins is a citizen of the State of Colorado.
Since at least 2013 and continuously to the present, Plaintiff has
owned and used a mobile device powered by Android's operating
system, developed by Google. The Plaintiff has the third-party
Facebook application downloaded onto her Android mobile device.
Since 2013, the Plaintiff has owned and used a Samsung Galaxy S6,
Samsung Galaxy S7, and Samsung Galaxy S8. She currently owns and
uses a Samsung Galaxy S8.

The Defendant Facebook, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
principal executive offices located at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo
Park, California 94025.

The Defendant Google, LLC is a Delaware corporation with its
principal headquarters in Mountain View, California.

The Defendant Alphabet, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
principal headquarters in Mountain View, California. Alphabet is a
public holding company formed in a corporate reorganization by
Google. Through the corporate restructuring, Defendant Google is
now a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Alphabet.

The Defendant Apple Inc. is a California corporation with its
principal place of business in Cupertino, California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Ivy T. Ngo, Esq.
      FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      14426 E. Evans Avenue
      Aurora, CO 80014
      Tel: (303) 757-3300
      Fax: (720) 213-5131
      E-mail: ngoi@fdazar.com


FACEBOOK INC: To Drop Forced Arbitration in Harassment Cases
------------------------------------------------------------
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, writing for The
New York Times, report that Facebook said on November 9 that it
would no longer force employees to settle sexual harassment claims
in private arbitration, making it the latest technology company to
do away with a practice that critics say has stacked the deck
against victims of harassment.

Facebook acted one day after Google announced similar plans. Last
week, 20,000 Google employees staged a walkout from the company's
offices around the world to demand that it change the way it
handled sexual harassment incidents. Microsoft changed its
arbitration policy about a year ago, as did the ride-hailing
company Uber six months ago.

The technology industry, known for its groundbreaking products as
well as its trendsetting office culture, has gone to considerable
lengths in recent years to keep work-force disputes out of the
court system. Forcing employee complaints into arbitration has
become as common as free lunches and shuttle buses to the office.

In arbitration, employment experts say, the playing field shifts
toward businesses. Cases are decided by arbitrators instead of
judges, and the more cases that companies take to arbitration, the
better they fare, according to a 2011 analysis by Alexander J. S.
Colvin, a professor at the Cornell University School of Industrial
and Labor Relations.

"This is a pivotal moment for our industry and corporate America
more broadly," Lori Goler, a Facebook vice president, said in a
statement. "We think this is the right thing to do and hope other
companies do, too."

The use of arbitration clauses, embedded in the fine print of
contracts, has soared in the last decade, as corporations try to
keep disputes away from public scrutiny.

Chris Baker, Esq. -- cbaker@bakerlp.com -- an employment lawyer and
partner at the law firm Baker Curtis & Schwartz, said arbitration
cases were often heard by a retired judge who may not be as
empathetic as a jury to a harassment victim. They are often
shrouded in confidentiality, and arbitration awards tend to be less
than those in a jury trial.

Mr. Baker said the moves by the tech firms could chip away at
arbitration in all kinds of employee disputes because it would be
hard for companies to draw the line at sexual harassment.

"I think it's the pebble that starts the avalanche," he said. "This
is very meaningful."

The tech industry is reacting, at least in part, to anger among
employees that harassment has often gone unpunished, particularly
when powerful executives are involved. The walkout at Google was
prompted by a New York Times article last month that revealed the
company had paid out millions in exit packages to executives even
after it found that they had been credibly accused of sexual
harassment.

Because the claims are often kept under wraps in confidential
arbitration hearings, critics say harassers often move easily to
other jobs without warning to future victims.

It has become a significant issue in Silicon Valley, where gender
imbalance is stark and tales of sexual harassment are rampant.
Critics of arbitration requirements have pushed companies to do
away with arbitration and confidentiality clauses that often help
companies keep the public and their own employees in the dark about
bad behavior.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has noted that forced
arbitration "can prevent employees from learning about similar
concerns shared by others in their workplace."

Facebook said it would now make arbitration an option, but not a
requirement, for employees reporting a sexual harassment claim.
Facebook said it had been planning to make the changes to its
arbitration policy for "a while" but did not specify a time frame.
There is no indication the company was facing specific pressure to
alter its policies.

In May, Uber announced that it was eliminating the practice for
employees, riders and drivers who make such claims against the
company. Uber took the step after 14 women who have accused Uber
drivers of sexually assaulting them wrote a letter to the company's
board, urging it to waive the requirement and allow them to proceed
with a lawsuit in open court.

Lyft, Uber's top competitor, made a similar policy change around
the same time.

In December, as Microsoft faced a proposed class-action lawsuit by
female technical staff claiming discrimination, it vowed to end the
arbitration requirement for harassment claims. The women lost the
case and are appealing.

Microsoft's policy change was largely symbolic because the company
rarely used arbitration clauses in its employment agreements.
However, Microsoft also said it would support federal legislation
making the requirement of arbitration in harassment cases
unenforceable.

Apple has never arbitrated a harassment or discrimination claim,
said Kristin Huguet, a company spokeswoman. It had a forced
arbitration requirement for new employees until earlier this year,
but it made arbitration optional and then eliminated the clause
from employment contracts altogether. She did not specify when. Ms.
Huguet said that even Apple employees who had agreed to such an
agreement were no longer bound by it.

Companies large and small have figured out how to use arbitration
to prevent employees from taking disputes to court and to prevent
others, including customers, from banding together in a class
action. Some state judges have called the ban on class actions --
one of the few ways that ordinary citizens can fight deep-pocketed
corporations over unfair business and employment practices -- a
"get out of jail free" card for employers.

In recent years, it has become tough to apply for a credit card,
get cable service, rent a car or shop online without agreeing to
settle any disputes in arbitration. The same is true for getting a
job.

The use of arbitration clauses can be traced back to a coalition of
credit card companies and retailers that came up with a plan to
shield themselves from expensive lawsuits. Starting around 1999,
the group's legal teams began discussing how to use the fine print
of contracts to stop class actions. Bank of America, Chase,
Citigroup, Discover, Sears, Toyota and General Electric all
attended.

Arbitration clauses that don't allow class-action suits are used by
a wide variety of companies, including Macy's and Kmart. In 2016,
when Gretchen Carlson sued Roger E. Ailes, her former boss at Fox
News, over allegations of sexual harassment, his lawyers pushed for
the case to move into arbitration.

Google Walkout for Real Change, the group behind last week's
employee protest, responded to Facebook's decision on Twitter:
"When we said this is a global movement, we didn't just mean within
Google -- it's inspiring to see the effects of #GoogleWalkout
spread past our company." [GN]


FAMILY DOLLAR SERVICES: Flournoy Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shonda Flournoy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. Family Dollar Services, LLC and Family Dollar Stores
of Arkansas, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00777, (E.D. Ark.,
October 19, 2018) seeks monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees
as a result of failure to pay lawful overtime compensation for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Defendant owns and operates a retail store in Hot Springs County
where Flournoy worked as an hourly-paid employee from around March
of 2018 until May of 2018. She claims to have regularly worked in
excess of forty hours per week without overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      Chris Burks, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      One Financial Center
      650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
             chris@sanfordlawfirm.com


FCA US: Court Won't Reconsider Tomassini Class Certification Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration in the case captioned ROBERT TOMASSINI,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
FCA US LLC, Defendant. No. 3:14-cv-1226 (MAD/DEP). (N.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Robert Tomassini commenced this putative class action in
state court, and Defendant FCA US LLC (Chrysler) removed to the
Northern District of New York. This Court denied the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification and denied its evidentiary motion as
moot.  

As under the federal rules, the local rule recognizes only three
possible grounds upon which motions for reconsideration may be
granted; they are (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2)
the availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3)
the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice. A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a
losing party to advance new arguments to supplant those that failed
in the prior briefing of the issue.

The Plaintiffs argues that the Court committed clear error in its
decision to deny class certification. Specifically, the Plaintiff
argues that denial of class certification because a small portion
of the proposed class members do not have standing is not
consistent with Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263 (2d
Cir. 2006).

The Plaintiff has marshaled neither new law nor new facts in
support of their motion for reconsideration. The Court does not
find its application of Denny to be a clear error of law. To the
extent that the Plaintiff believes that Denny conflicts with the
law of other circuits, it is not within the purview of this Court
to resolve such issues.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybnvqyq5 from Leagle.com.

Robert Tomassini, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Calvert --
dcalvert@yourlawyer.com -- Parker Waichman LLP, pro hac vice, Elmer
R. Keach, III, Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C., Jason
S. Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro
hac vice, Jennifer S. Goldstein -- jgoldstein@wbmllp.com --
Whitfield Bryson & Mason, LLP, pro hac vice, Jordan L. Chaikin,
Parker, Waichman Law Firm, pro hac vice, Gary S. Graifman --
ggraifman@kgglaw.com -- Goldhammer & Graifman, P.C., Gary E. Mason
-- gmason@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson Law Firm, Jay I. Brody --
jbrody@kgglaw.com -- Kantrowitz, Goldhammer & Graifman, P.C. &
Nicholas A. Migliaccio -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio
& Rathod LLP.

David R. Homer, Mediator (Mandatory Program), pro se.

FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, Defendant,
represented by Alan J. Pope, Pope, Schrader & Pope, LLP, Kathy A.
Wisniewski -- kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson, Coburn
Law Firm, pro hac vice, Sharon B. Rosenberg , Thompson, Coburn LLP,
pro hac vice & Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson, Coburn Law Firm, pro hac vice.


FIRST BANCORP: Oriental Bank Files 2nd Bid for Reconsideration
--------------------------------------------------------------
First BanCorp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that Oriental Bank has
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration on the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court's issuance of Resolutions denying all writs of
Certiorari in the case entitled, Ramirez Torres, et al. v. Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico, et al.  

FirstBank Puerto Rico has been named Defendant in this Class Action
Complaint, filed of February 17, 2017 at the Court of First
Instance in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Complaint seeks damages and
preliminary injunctive relief on behalf of the purported class
against Banco Popular de Puerto Rico and other financial
institutions with insurance agency subsidiaries in Puerto Rico.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have been unjustly enriched by
failing to reimburse them  for "good experience" commissions
allegedly paid by Antilles Insurance Company and Puerto Rico Home
Insurance Company. On March 30, 2017, FirstBank Puerto Rico filed a
Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Third
Party Complaint against Antilles Insurance Company and the
Insurance Commissioner's Office. All other Defendants filed Motions
to Dismiss.  

Antilles Insurance Company filed a Motion against the Third Party
Complaint filed by FirstBank Puerto Rico, which FirstBank Puerto
Rico opposed. The Insurance Commissioner's Office filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment. On July 28, 2017, the Court issued a Judgment
granting the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants, dismissing the
Complaint with prejudice, except the Third Party Complaint filed by
FirstBank Puerto Rico which was dismissed without prejudice.

On August 30, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Appeal before the Puerto
Rico Court of Appeals and FirstBank Puerto Rico filed its
Opposition to Plaintiffs Appeal. On March 20, 2018, the Court of
Appeals entered a Judgment revoking the lower court judgment.
Oriental Bank filed for Reconsideration, which was denied.

All other Defendants filed writs of Certiorari before the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court on May 29, 2018. On June 26, 2018, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court issued Resolutions denying all writs of
Certiorari filed by Defendants. Oriental Bank and Banco Popular
were the only two banks that filed for reconsideration. Motions for
Reconsideration were denied on October 10, 2018. Oriental Bank
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration on October 12, 2018.
Therefore, the case will not be remanded to the Court of First
Instance for the continuation of proceedings until Puerto Rico
Supreme Court issues resolution regarding Oriental Bank's Second
Motion for Reconsideration.

First BanCorp. operates as a bank holding company for FirstBank
Puerto Rico that provides a range of financial products and
services to retail, commercial, and institutional clients. It
operates through six segments: Commercial and Corporate Banking,
Consumer (Retail) Banking, Mortgage Banking, Treasury and
Investments, United States Operations, and Virgin Islands
Operations. The company was founded in 1948 and is headquartered in
Santurce, Puerto Rico.


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: $4MM Settlement in Atis Suit Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID ATIS, et al., on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et
al., Defendants, Civil No. 15-03424 (RBK/JS) (D. N.J.), Judge
Robert B. Kugler of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted in part the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and Provisional
Certification of Settlement Class.

The matter began with the Complaint of Named Plaintiff Atis, who
filed a collective and class action lawsuit against Defendant
Freedom Mortgage Corp., alleging that the Defendant violated the
FLSA and New Jersey law by failing to pay certain overtime.  After
three years of litigation and several Amended Complaints, the
matter now involves Atis, as well as Kathryn Hertzog and Joseph
Koeberlein, who sue on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated.

Atis asserts claims on behalf of himself and New Jersey Plaintiffs;
Hertzog on behalf of herself and Pennsylvania plaintiffs; and
Koeberlein on behalf of himself and Indiana Plaintiffs.  The
Representative Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant violated the
FLSA, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, the Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act, and the Indiana Minimum Wage Law by misclassifying
Assistant Vice Presidents of Sales as exempt employees and not
paying them overtime for working more than 40 hours in a workweek
between May 20, 2013 and June 30, 2016.

During the three-year litigation, the Court granted Atis' motion
for conditional collective action certification under the FLSA and
conditionally certified the class on behalf of all persons who are
or were employed by Freedom Mortgage Corporation as an Assistant
Vice President of Sales in any of its offices during the three
years prior to the date of notice, classified as exempt, and not
paid overtime compensation for each hour worked beyond 40 hours in
a workweek.  

The Court also granted Atis' motion for class action certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and certified the
class on behalf of all persons who are or were employed by Freedom
Mortgage Corp. as an Assistant Vice President of Sales in New
Jersey on or after May 15, 2013, classified as exempt, and not paid
overtime compensation for each hour worked beyond 40 hours in a
workweek.

On Feb. 13, 2018, the parties reached a settlement during the
mediation with Mark B. Epstein, retired New Jersey Superior Court
Judge.  Although the Defendant denies liability, it agreed to pay
$4 million, inclusive of the Class Counsel's fees and costs, any
service payments, payroll taxes, and the Claims Administrator's
fees and expenses, to settle all claims in this action.

Under the Agreement, the Defendant will pay $4 million into an
escrow account controlled by the Claims Administrator, who the
parties propose should be Angeion Group, LLC.  Angeion will then
distribute payments to members of the Rule 23 and FLSA collective
action classes—which the parties now ask to be provisionally
certified for settlement purposes only.

All settlement class members will receive a flat $1,000 payment
plus an additional prorated amount for each week worked.  The
Opt-in Plaintiffs will receive an additional amount equal to this
amount in liquidated damages.  The Class Counsel's requested fee of
33.33%, Angeion's fees, and service payments will be paid from the
settlement fund.  The participating class members will then release
the Defendant from any and all state and federal law-based
wage-and-hour claims from May 20, 2013, through the date of entry
of the Court's Preliminary Approval Order.  The Agreement also
contains limited confidentiality clauses regarding select parties'
statements to the press and about settlement negotiations.

The Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of the parties' Joint
Stipulation of Settlement and Release Agreement, settling wage and
hour class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the
FLSA.  They also seek appointment of the Class Representatives, the
Class Counsel, a Third Party Administrator, and preliminary
approval of certain fees and costs.

Finding that the FLSA settlement is preliminarily acceptable, Judge
Kugler preliminarily approved the parties' Agreement settling the
Rule 23 class claims and the FLSA collective action claims.

For substantially the same reasons as the Rule 23 standards are
met, the Judge finds that the FLSA collective action meets the
standard to be finally certified on a provisional basis for
settlement purposes only.  The issues are common to the class
members and not based on a disparate factual and employment
setting.  The defenses do not appear individual to each Plaintiff
and procedural or fairness issues are not apparent at this
juncture.  In light of the general benefits of collective actions
in lowering costs to the Plaintiffs and limiting the controversy to
one proceeding, as well as the public interest in settling class
action litigation, the Judge finally certified the FLSA collective
action for settlement purposes only.

However, the Judge declined to preliminarily approve any service
payments to the individuals listed and the Class Counsel's fees and
costs.  These determinations are more appropriately made at the
final fairness hearing, which is scheduled for Feb.26, 2019 at 9:30
a.m.  A motion for final approval of the Agreement should be filed
by Dec. 28, 2018.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Kugler granted in part the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlement and Provisional Certification of Settlement Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/P3XACW from Leagle.com.

DAVID ATIS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by JOSHUA S. BOYETTE --
jboyette@swartz-legal.com -- SWARTZ SWIDLER LLC, JUSTIN L. SWIDLER,
SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC, RICHARD STEVEN SWARTZ --
rswartz@swartz-legal.com -- SWARTZ LEGAL LLC & DANIEL ARI HOROWITZ
-- dhorowitz@swartz-legal.com -- SWARTZ SWIDLER LLC.

KATHRYN HERTZOG, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated
& JOSEPH KOEBERLEIN, on behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by JUSTIN L. SWIDLER, SWARTZ
SWIDLER, LLC.

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by DANIEL H.
AIKEN -- daniel.aiken@dbr.com -- DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH, LLP &
DAVID J. WOOLF -- david.woolf@dbr.com -- DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH,
LLP.


GAP INC: Simpkins Sues Over Missed Breaks, Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
Brittani Simpkins, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GPS Consumer Direct, Inc., GPS Services,
Inc., The GAP, Inc., GAP Services, Inc. and Does 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-570781 (Cal. Super., October
22, 2018), seeks redress for Defendants' failure to provide meal
and rest breaks, or provide compensation for such, as required by
California Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders, failure to
provide required sick leave, failure to timely pay employees for
all hours worked, all wages owed at termination of employment,
failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, and failure to maintain
and provide accurate wage statements.

The Gap, Inc. is a clothing and accessories retailer offering
apparel, accessories and personal care products for men, women and
children with company-operated stores and franchise stores. GPS and
GAP Services operate as its subsidiaries. Simpkins was employed by
the Defendants as a customer service representative. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Graham S.P. Hollis, Esq.
      Vilmarie Cordero, Esq.
      Rita Leong, Esq.
      GRAHAMHOLLIS APC
      3555 Fifth Avenue, Suite 200
      San Diego, CA 92103
      Telephone: (619) 692-0800
      Facsimile: (619) 692-0822
      Email: ghollis@grahamhollis.com
             vcordero@grahamhollis.com
             rleong@grahamhollis.com


GGMJ LLC: Figueroa Sues Over Illegal Text Ad Blasts
---------------------------------------------------
Benny Figueroa, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GGMJ, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-62515
(S.D. Fla., October 19, 2018), seeks statutory damages and any
other available legal or equitable remedies for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

GGMJ, LLC operates as Massage Luxe, a business specializing in
massage, facial and waxing services. To promote its services, it
engages in unsolicited SMS advertisements sent en masse. At no
point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express
written consent to be contacted using an automated dialer, notes
the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

             - and -

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


GODIVA CHOCOLATIER: Carlton Fields Discusses Settlement Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Lang Jr., Esq., at Carlton Fields, in an article for JD
Supra, wrote that on October 3, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's approval of a class
settlement, an award of attorney's fees to class counsel, and the
provision of an incentive award for the class representative. The
court affirmed in the face of objections to the class
representative's Article III standing, the notice pursuant to Rule
23(h), the award of attorney's fees, and the incentive award to the
class representative.

The basic background is as follows. This class action alleged
violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA). Dr. Muransky filed his class action against Godiva
Chocolatier, Inc. for allegedly violating FACTA by giving him a
receipt that showed his credit card number's first six and last
four digits (FACTA prohibits merchants from printing "more than the
last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any
receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or
transaction.")

The case settled. Dr. Muransky moved for preliminary approval,
explaining that the parties agreed to a settlement fund of $6.3
million from which all fees, costs, and class members would be paid
and that no settlement funds would revert to Godiva. Dr. Muransky
indicated he intended to apply for an incentive award of up to
$10,000 and that class counsel would move for an award of
attorney's fees of up to one-third of the settlement fund, which
would be $2.1 million. The district court preliminarily approved
the settlement.

Only 15 class members opted out of the class that encompassed
318,000 class members (approximately 47,000 people submitted
claims). Five class members, including Mr. Price and Mr. Isaacson,
objected to the settlement. In their objections, Mr. Price and Mr.
Isaacson said they were members of the settlement class and that
they timely submitted claim forms. The district court approved the
settlement. The objectors appealed. The Eleventh Circuit's
affirmance is notable for two jurisdictional discussions.

First, the Eleventh Circuit examined whether objectors to a Rule
23(b)(3) settlement, who can opt out of the settlement, are
"parties" with the right to appeal from the district court's
judgment when they do not opt out. It held that they are, falling
in line with the only circuit courts of appeal to have decided this
issue since Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (similar
holding in a mandatory class setting). "[W]e know that actual class
members who object but do not opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class
settlement are still bound by the judgment approving the class
settlement."

Second, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether Dr. Muransky had
Article III standing in the first instance. On this point, it is
not clear that Godiva would agree that Dr. Muransky had standing
and it is very clear that Godiva would have preferred that the
Eleventh Circuit not address the issue in determining the fairness
of the settlement. But, as a somewhat bitter part of an otherwise
sweet affirmance for Godiva, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the
issue and expressly decided the Article III standing issue in Dr.
Muransky's favor.

In its answer brief, Godiva made the following observation:

"Mr. Isaacson's objection that Dr. Muransky lacks standing will not
benefit the Class in any way. It may benefit Mr. Isaacson
personally, if he can extract a payoff from his objection. But the
District Court was looking to the Class's interests and, in doing
so, was exercising its discretion wisely, not abusively. More to
the point, Mr. Isaacson's eleventh-hour interjection of standing
obscures the real issue: whether the settlement was "fair,
reasonable, and adequate." Mr. Isaacson has no argument against the
settlement itself -- indeed, has waived any argument that the
settlement was not fair, reasonable, and adequate -- so he repairs
to a jurisdictional issue. But regardless of whether Dr. Muransky
and the Class had standing for their underlying claims, they
certainly have a vested interest in the settlement into which they
have entered with Godiva, and that standing should be sufficient
under article III. At least one decision has held that a federal
court's authority "to review and approve" a class-action settlement
that compromises a disputed jurisdictional question exists
independently of how the jurisdictional question would have played
out -- that is, a plaintiff's "standing to bring the FCRA claims
underlying this settlement is irrelevant to whether she has
standing to enforce the parties' settlement agreement."

Godiva also emphasized that, "[a]t the time of the negotiations,
there was significant uncertainty regarding whether federal courts
would have jurisdiction over cases such as this, and the settlement
allowed both sides to manage any resulting risk." It stressed that
the Eleventh Circuit need not reach the issue of Article III
standing: "Though Objector-Appellant Isaacson raises the issue of
standing and would have this Court assess the implications of
Spokeo, in fact this Court need not reach that issue."

It remains only to note that Judge Jordan wrote a separate
concurrence questioning whether the objector himself had standing
to challenge Dr. Muransky's standing: "I write separately to note
that Mr. Isaacson, a class member and one of the appellants, may
lack Article III standing to challenge the Article III standing of
Dr. Muransky, the named plaintiff and class representative."

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., Nos. 16-16486; 16-16783, 2018
WL 4762434 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2018).[GN]


GREENSKY INC: Schall Law Firm Probes Securities Violations Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces that it is investigating claims on behalf of investors of
GreenSky, Inc. ("GreenSky" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: GSKY) for
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The investigation focuses on whether the Company issued false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information
pertinent to investors. GreenSky lowered its full-year 2018
transaction volume guidance on November 6, 2018, from between $5.1
billion and $5.3 billion to between $4.9 billion and $5.1 billion.
It also lowered its full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance from between
$192 million and $199 million to between $165 and $175 million. The
Company blamed a general shortage of labor and an unfavorable loan
mix for the reduction. On this news, shares of GreenSky fell more
than 36% on the same day.

The class in this case has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: 310-301-3335
                    424-303-1964
         Email: brian@schallfirm.com.
                sherin@schallfirm.com [GN]


H&R BLOCK: Maurella Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violations
-------------------------------------------------------
Carmen J. Maurella III, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. H&R Block, Inc. and H&R Block Tax Services
LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-07435 (N.D. Ill., November 8, 2018), seeks to
obtain injunctive relief and recover damages, including treble
damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees arising from
the Defendants' violations of the Sherman Act.

This is an antitrust class action brought by and on behalf of
individuals who work or have worked for Defendants, a tax
preparation services company and franchisor. The Plaintiff brings
this action for the Defendants' unlawful conspiracy to suppress the
Plaintiff's and Class members' compensation, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Carmen J. Maurella III is an individual residing in
Homer Glen, Illinois. The Plaintiff worked as a tax preparer for
Defendant H&R Block in Lisle, Illinois.

The Defendant H&R Block, Inc., is a Missouri corporation with
headquarters at One H&R Block Way in Kansas City, Missouri. H&R
Block, Inc., is a leading tax preparation and assistance company
which provides services in-person, online, and through desktop and
mobile application software.

The Defendant H&R Block Tax Services LLC is a Missouri limited
liability company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant H&R
Block. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kenneth A. Wexler, Esq.
      Mark R. Miller, Esq.
      WEXLER WALLACE LLP
      55 West Monroe St., Suite 3300
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Tel: (312) 346-2222
      E-mail: kaw@wexlerwallace.com
              mrm@wexlerwallace.com


HARLEYSVILLE PREFERRED: Court Narrows Claims in Halloran Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued a Ruling granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL HALLORAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. HARLEYSVILLE PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants. No. 3:16-cv-00133 (VAB). (D. Conn.).

The Plaintiffs, homeowners in Hartford, Tolland, and Windham
Counties in Connecticut brought a Class Action Complaint against
their homeowners insurance companies (Defendants).  The Plaintiffs
allegedly bought their homes between 1984 and 2015. They allege
that each of these properties has basement walls that are crumbling
and/or exhibiting a pattern of cracking due to the oxidation of
certain minerals contained in the concrete. As a result of the
deteriorating concrete, the Plaintiffs claim that their basement
walls are in a state of collapse.

Following the filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint, the
Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss, as well as a motion
to strike class allegations.

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motions
to dismiss, ECF Nos. 497, 499, 502, 505, 508-510, 512, 514, 516,
518, 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 530, 533, without prejudice to
renewal following resolution by the Connecticut Supreme Court of
the pending certified questions.

The Court held that a subset of the counts in the Fourth Amended
Complaint contain policy language that, as a matter of law, is
unambiguous and does not support a claim for relief. The Court
dismisses each Plaintiff whose entire claim for relief rested on a
policy that unambiguously excluded coverage for abrupt or sudden
collapse: Kathy Noblet, Dawn L. Norris, and Steven and Colleen
Swart. Relatedly, the Court dismisses each Defendant whose entire
liability rested on a policy that unambiguously excluded coverage
for abrupt or sudden collapse: American Commerce Insurance Company,
Allstate Insurance Company, Metropolitan Property & Casualty
Insurance Company, Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, and Trumbull Insurance Company. The other Plaintiffs and
Defendants remain parties to this action.  The Court denies
Defendants' motion to strike class allegations.

A revised scheduling order with deadlines for the completion of
discovery relating to the class allegations only and for the
submission of a motion for class certification must be submitted
jointly, if possible, but if the various parties cannot agree,
separately.  The Court then will hold an in-person status
conference.

Consistent with the schedule and the Court's inherent authority to
manage cases on its docket, the Court will deny any further
amendments to the Fourth Amended Complaint, absent unforeseen
circumstances not now readily apparent.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pvejru from Leagle.com.

Michael Halloran, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Joyce Halloran, Individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Kenneth Masciovecchio, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Victoria Masciovecchio,
Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Steven
Brozek, Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Patricia Brozek, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Michael Dyer, Individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Phil Basquiat, Individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Donna Frankenberg, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Michael Furlong, Individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated, Sue Ann Furlong,
Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Jacqueline
Gribbon, Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Patricia Kandrysawtz, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Paula LaValley, Individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Peter LaValley, Individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Alfred Lesperance, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Alfred J. Lesperance, Trustee
of the Lesperance Family Living Trust, Individually and on behalf
of those similarly situated, Jeannette Lesperance, Individually and
on behalf of those similarly situated, Jeannette G. Lesperance,
Trustee of the the Lesperance Family Living Trust, Individually and
on behalf of those similarly situated, Deborah MacGlafin,
Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Scott
MacGlafin, Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Kathy Noblet, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Dawn L. Norris, Individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Felice Pawelcyzk, Individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Mark Pawelcyzk, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Colleen Swart, Individually and
on behalf of those similarly situated, Steven Swart, Individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated, Mary Lou Thieling,
Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Stanley
Zaremba, Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
David Kandrysawtz, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Geoffrey Luxenberg, Individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Kelly Luxenberg, Individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated & Amy Somerville, Individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Anthony Joseph Spinella -- Anthony@barryandbarall.com -- Barry &
Barall, LLC, Marilyn Beth Fagelson -- mfagelson@murthalaw.com --
Murtha Cullina, Ryan P. Barry -- rbarry@bbsattorneys.com -- Barry &
Barall, LLC & Sarah Michelle Gruber -- sgruber@murthalaw.com --
Murtha Cullina LLP.

Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company & Nationwide Property &
Casualty Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by Daniel
Michael Blouin -- dblouin@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP &
Wystan M. Ackerman -- wackerman@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP.

Homesite Ins. Co., Defendant, represented by Judy Y. Barrasso --
jbarrasso@barrassousdin.com -- Barrasso Usdin Kupperman Freeman &
Sarver, L.L.C., Stephen R. Klaffky -- sklaffky@barrassousdin.com --
Barrasso Usdin Kupperman Freeman & Sarver, L.L.C. & Wystan M.
Ackerman -- wackerman@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP.


HOME CARE ASSISTANCE: Underpays Caregivers, Jones Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
TERI JONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOME CARE ASSISTANCE OF CENTRAL OHIO, LLC;
and LORI WENGERD, Case No. 2:18-cv-01342-ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio, Oct.
30, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular
hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and
rest periods.

The Plaintiff Jones was employed by the Defendants as caregiver.

Home Care Assistance of Central Ohio, LLC, is an Ohio limited
liability company engaged as a home care company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Telephone: (216) 912-2221
          Facsimile: (216) 350-6313
          E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


HOMESITE GROUP: Acklin Sues Over Unpaid OT Wages
------------------------------------------------
Andrew Acklin, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Homesite Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-12183 (D. Mass., October 22, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys'
fees and costs and all other relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Acklin worked as a sales agent at Defendant's call center located
in Ohio, providing customer service and selling insurance policies
to potential customers. Plaintiff was not paid overtime
compensation at one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for
hours he worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, says the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Tamra Givens, Esq.
      LEMBERG LAW LLC
      43 Danbury Road
      Wilton, CT 06897
      Tel: 203.653.2250 Ext. 5500
      Fax: 203.653.3425
      Email: slemberg@lemberglaw.com


HOPELE OF FORT: Eleventh Cir. Appeal Filed in Ramos TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Katiria Ramos filed an appeal from a court ruling in her
lawsuit entitled Katiria Ramos v. Hopele of Fort Lauderdale, LLC,
et al., Case No. 0:17-cv-62100-FAM, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
sought to certify this Class:

     All persons within the United States who were sent Pandora
     Marketing Texts from Defendants or anyone on Defendants'
     behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number, without
     emergency purpose and without the recipient's prior consent.

Ms. Ramos asserts two claims for alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Katiria Ramos v. Hopele of Fort
Lauderdale, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-14456, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before December 3, 2018;
      and

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant KATIRIA RAMOS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO, PA
          401 E Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Joshua Robert Levine, Esq.
          Jeffrey Miles Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW, PA
          1 W Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          E-mail: levine@kolawyers.com
                  ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  streisfeld@kolawyers.com
                  edelsberg@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Angelica Marie Gentile, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: agentile@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Ignacio Javier Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH Law
          1200 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (786) 496-4469
          E-mail: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee HOPELE OF FORT LAUDERDALE, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company d.b.a. Pandora @ Galleria, is represented
by:

          Kristen Marie Fiore, Esq.
          AKERMAN, LLP
          106 E College Avenue, Floor 12
          Tallahassee, FL 32301-7741
          Telephone: (850) 224-9634
          E-mail: kristen.fiore@akerman.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Benjamin Pertnoy, Esq.
          AKERMAN, LLP
          777 S Flagler Drive, Suite 1100W
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6147
          Telephone: (561) 653-5000
          E-mail: jeffrey.pertnoy@akerman.com

               - and -

          Stacy Jaye Rodriguez, Esq.
          AKERMAN, LLP
          350 E Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1600
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 468-2454
          E-mail: stacy.rodriguez@akerman.com

               - and -

          Ian Matthew Ross, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, PA
          333 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 4400
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 579-7707
          E-mail: rossi@gtlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee PANDORA JEWELRY, LLC, a Maryland limited
liability company, is represented by:

          Ian C. Ballon, Esq.
          Nina Diana Boyajian, Esq.
          Lori Chang, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          1840 Century Park E, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-6575
          E-mail: Ballon@gtlaw.com
                  boyajiann@gtlaw.com
                  changl@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Hilarie Fran Bass, Esq.
          Brigid Finerty Cech Samole, Esq.
          Ian Matthew Ross, Esq.
          Elliot H. Scherker, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, PA
          333 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 4400
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 579-0500
          E-mail: bassh@gtlaw.com
                  cechsamoleb@gtlaw.com
                  rossi@gtlaw.com
                  scherkere@gtlaw.com


IKEA INDUSTRY: Powell Claims Overtime for Off-the-Clock Work
------------------------------------------------------------
Terri Powell, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Ikea Industry Danville, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 18-CV-00058 (W.D. Va., October 16, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs and all other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

IKEA is a Swedish furniture manufacturer with operations in
Ringgold VA where Powell worked as an hourly-paid pack team
captain. She claims that her off-shift hours were not counted in
the company's time-keeping and/or payroll systems. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
      ZIPIN, AMSTER, & GREENBERG, LLC
      8757 Georgia Ave., Suite 400
      Silver Spring, MD 20910
      Office: (301) 587–9373
      Fax: (240) 839-9142
      Email: ggreenberg@zagfirm.com

            - and -

      Christopher R. Strianese, Esq.
      STRIANESE, PLLC
      401 North Tryon St., 10th Fl.
      Charlotte, NC 28202
      Tel. (704) 998-2577
      Fax. (704) 998-5301
      Email: chris@strilaw.com
      Website: www.strilaw.com

             - and -

      Tracey F. George, Esq.
      DAVIS GEORGE MOOK LLC
      1600 Genessee, Ste. 328
      Kansas City, MO 64102
      Tel. (816) 569-2629
      Fax (816) 447-3939
      Email: brett@dgmlawyers.com
      Website: www.dgmlawyers.com


IMPAC MORTGAGE: Court Declines to Review Decision in Baker Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
Missouri Supreme court has declined to review the court of appeal's
decision in Baker, et al. v. Century Financial Group, et al.

In 2001, Baker, et al. v. Century Financial Group, et al., was
filed in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, as a putative
class action against the Company, Century Financial, and others
claiming violations of Missouri's Second Mortgage Loan Act.
Plaintiffs seek on behalf of themselves and the members of the
putative class, among other things, disgorgement or restitution of
all allegedly improperly-collected charges, the right to rescind
all affected loan transactions, the right to offset any finance
charges, closing costs, points or other loan fees paid against the
principal amounts due on the loans if rescinded, actual and
punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.

In April 2018, the court of appeals reversed the lower courts
dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds. In July
2018, the defendants filed a petition for Missouri's Supreme Court
to review the court of appeal's decision and on September 25, 2018,
the Missouri Supreme court declined to review the court of appeal's
decision.

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. operates as an independent
residential mortgage lender in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Mortgage Lending, Real Estate Services, and
Long-Term Mortgage Portfolio. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


IMPAC MORTGAGE: Court Stays Timm Class Suit
-------------------------------------------
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court
has granted the Company's motion to stay the purported class action
suit entitled, Timm, v. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc., and stayed
the election of two directors pending conclusion of any appeals.

On December 7, 2011, a purported class action was filed in the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, entitled Timm, v. Impac Mortgage
Holdings, Inc., purportedly on behalf of holders of the Company's
9.375 percent Series B Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock
(Preferred B) and 9.125 percent Series C Cumulative Redeemable
Preferred Stock (Preferred C) who did not tender their stock in
connection with the Company's 2009 completion of its Offer to
Purchase and Consent Solicitation.

The action sought the payment of certain quarterly dividends for
the Preferred B and C holders, the unwinding of the consents, and
reinstatement of all rights under the 2004 Preferred Stock Articles
Supplementary, including the cumulative dividend on the Preferred B
and C stock, and the election of two directors by the Preferred B
and C holders. The action also sought punitive damages and legal
expenses.

On July 16, 2018, the Court entered a Judgement Order whereby it
(1) declared and entered judgment in favor of all defendants on all
claims related to the Preferred C holders and all claims against
all individual defendants thereby affirming the validity of the
2009 amendments to the Series B Articles Supplementary; (2)
declared its interpretation of the voting provision language in the
Preferred B Articles Supplementary to mean that consent of
two-thirds of the Preferred B stockholders was required to approve
the 2009 amendments to the Preferred B Articles Supplementary,
which consent was not obtained, thus rendering the amendments
invalid and leaving the 2004 Preferred B Articles Supplementary in
effect; (3) ordered the Company to hold a special election within
sixty days for the Preferred B stockholders to elect two directors
to the Board of Directors pursuant to the 2004 Preferred B Articles
Supplementary (which Directors will remain on the Company's Board
of Directors until such time as all accumulated dividends on the
Preferred B have been paid or set aside for payment) and, (4)
declared that the Company is required to pay three quarters of
dividends on the Preferred B stock under the 2004 Articles
Supplementary (approximately, $1.2 million, but did not order the
Company to make any payment at this time).

The Court declined to certify any class pending the outcome of
appeals and certified its Judgment Order for immediate appeal. On
August 6, 2018, the Company filed its notice of appeal. On August
9, 2018, the Company filed a motion to stay the court's order for
the Company to hold an election of two directors to its Board of
Directors, and on August 20, 2018, plaintiff Timm filed a notice of
appeal.  

On September 7, 2018, the court granted the Company's motion to
stay and ordered the election of two directors stayed pending
conclusion of any appeals.

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. operates as an independent
residential mortgage lender in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Mortgage Lending, Real Estate Services, and
Long-Term Mortgage Portfolio. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


IMPAC MORTGAGE: Nguyen Suit Goes to Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the court
has granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in Nguyen v.
Impac Mortgage Corp. dba CashCall Mortgage et al.

On April 20, 2017, a purported class action was filed in the United
States District Court, Central District of California, entitled
Nguyen v. Impac Mortgage Corp. dba CashCall Mortgage et al.   

The plaintiffs contend the defendants did not pay purported class
members overtime compensation or provide meal and rest breaks, as
required by law. The action seeks to invalidate any waiver signed
by a purported class member of their right to bring a class action
and seeks damages, restitution, penalties, attorney's fees,
interest, and an injunction against unfair, deceptive, and unlawful
activities.  

On August 23, 2018, the court (1) granted the defendants motion to
compel arbitration as to all claims, except for the plaintiffs'
claims under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA); (2)
ordered the plaintiffs to submit their claims (other than PAGA
claims) to arbitration on an individual, non-class, non-collective,
and non-representative basis; (3) dismissed all class and
collective claims with prejudice to the plaintiffs and without
prejudice to putative class members; and (4) stayed all claims that
were compelled to arbitration, as well as the PAGA claims.

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. operates as an independent
residential mortgage lender in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Mortgage Lending, Real Estate Services, and
Long-Term Mortgage Portfolio. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


IMPAC MORTGAGE: Unit Continues to Defend Marentes Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
company's subsidiary, Impac Funding Corporation, continues to
defend a purported class action suit entitled, Marentes v. Impac
Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

On April 30, 2012, a purported class action was filed entitled
Marentes v. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc., alleging that certain
loan modification activities of the Company constitute an unfair
business practice, false advertising and marketing, and that the
fees charged are improper.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages, restitution, injunctive
relief, attorney's fees and prejudgment interest. On August 22,
2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Impac Funding
Corporation as a defendant and on October 2, 2012, the plaintiff
dismissed Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc., without prejudice. The
trial was originally bifurcated with phase 1 scheduled to determine
the proper measure of restitution, if the court later determines in
phase 2 that any relief is proper, and phase 2 scheduled to
determine whether the defendant is liable for any restitution and,
if so, the actual calculation of restitution under the formula
determined in phase 1.  

The phase 1 trial was held on June 29, 2018, and the court agreed
with the defendant and ruled that if liability is determined under
phase 2, the proper measure of restitution is the time value of the
fees paid by the plaintiffs from the time they were paid to the
time the fees were lawfully collected by the defendant.  

On August 31, 2018, the court ordered that the issues originally
scheduled to be determined in Phase 2 of the trial are to be
further divided. Phase 2, currently scheduled for November 5, 2018,
will now only determine whether the defendant is liable. If the
defendant is found liable in Phase 2, then a Phase 3 will be
scheduled to calculate restitution under the formula determined in
Phase 1.

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. operates as an independent
residential mortgage lender in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Mortgage Lending, Real Estate Services, and
Long-Term Mortgage Portfolio. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


IMPAC MORTGAGE: Unit Continues to Defend McNair Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the
company's subsidiary, Impac Mortgage Corp. continues to defend a
purported class action suit entitled, McNair v. Impac Mortgage
Corp. dba CashCall Mortgage.

On September 18, 2017, a purported class action was filed in the
Superior Court of California, Orange County, entitled McNair v.
Impac Mortgage Corp. dba CashCall Mortgage.   

The plaintiff contends the defendant did not pay the plaintiff and
purported class members overtime compensation, provide required
meal and rest breaks, or provide accurate wage statements. The
action seeks damages, restitution, penalties, interest, attorney's
fees, and all other appropriate injunctive, declaratory, and
equitable relief.

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. operates as an independent
residential mortgage lender in the United States. It operates
through three segments: Mortgage Lending, Real Estate Services, and
Long-Term Mortgage Portfolio. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


IMT PAVILION: Seeks Tex. Appeals Ct. Review of Ruling in "Mendez"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants IMT Pavilion III LP and Investors Management Trust Real
Estate Group, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Victor Mendez, for himself and all others
similarly situated v. IMT Pavilion III LP and Investors Management
Trust Real Estate Group, Inc. d/b/a IMT Residential, in the 269th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.

The appellate case is captioned as IMT Pavilion III LP and
Investors Management Trust Real Estate Group, Inc d/b/a IMT
Residential v. Victor Mendez, for himself and all others similarly
situated, Case No. 01-18-00980-CV, in the Texas Court of Appeals,
First Court of Appeals.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Victor Mendez, for himself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ronald Martin Weber, Jr., Esq.
          Richard E. Norman, Esq.
          CROWLEY NORMAN LLP
          3 Riverway, Suite 1775
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 651-1771
          Facsimile: (713) 651-1775
          E-mail: mweber@crowleynorman.com
                  rnorman@crowleynorman.com

Defendants-Appellants IMT Pavillion III LP and Investors Mangement
Trust Real Estate Group, Inc. d/b/a IMT Residential are represented
by:

          Dylan Benjamen Russell, Esq.
          HOOVER SLOVACEK LLP
          Galleria Tower II
          5051 Westheimer, Suite 1200
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 977-8686
          Facsimile: (713) 977-5395
          E-mail: russell@hooverslovacek.com

               - and -

          Thomas R. Phillips, Esq.
          Madeleine Dwertman, Esq.
          98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Austin, TX 78701-4078
          Telephone: (512) 322-2500
          E-mail: tom.phillips@bakerbotts.com
                  maddy.dwertman@bakerbotts.com


INDIANA: Court Dismisses Allen County Jail Prisoner's Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, issued an Opinion and Order
dismissing the complaint in the case captioned JASON J. GREEN,
Plaintiff, v. DAVID GLADIEUX, ALAN COOK, and CHARLESHART,
Defendants. Cause No. 1:18-CV-245-TLS-SLC. (N.D. Ind.).

The Court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Green alleges that while housed at the Allen County Jail, he was
fed dinner at 4:30 p.m. Because he had recently been sentenced to
the Indiana Department of Correction, he left the jail the next
morning on August 2, 2016, at 7:00 a.m. and was transported to the
Reception and Diagnostic Center where he arrived at 9:30 a.m.  He
sues the Defendants because he was not fed breakfast that morning
and claims that he went approximately 19 hours without food while
in the custody of Allen County Jail officers.

Inmates are entitled to adequate food. In evaluating an Eighth
Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective
inquiry. The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation
is sufficiently serious so that a prison official's act results in
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.

The court concluded that the plaintiff in that case had not
established a constitutional violation because he has not shown
that missing his meals or medicine caused serious harm or lasting
detriment. Thus, merely missing breakfast and going 17 hours
without food while in the custody of Allen County Jail officers was
not inherently a denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities and did not violate the 8th Amendment.

Green alleges, as a result of missing breakfast, he had a severe
throbbing headache, extreme faintness, and intense hunger pains. He
says going without food exacerbated the symptoms Plaintiff
experiences daily from chronic Hepatitis C. Green is suing three
defendants: Sheriff David Gladieux, Jail Commander Alan Cook, and
former Jail Commander Charles O. Hart. Green does not allege, and
it would not be plausible to infer, that he told any of them about
his symptoms or his specific medical need for food. There is no
general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Therefore, Green has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim against
any of the three named defendants.

Accordingly, the case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A because the complaint does not state a claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 12, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydgxfu5c from
Leagle.com.

Jason J. Green, individually and on behalf of all others similarily
situated, Plaintiff, pro se.


INSIGHT SERVICE: Underpays Investigators, Jhones Suit Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
LEONEL JHONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. INSIGHT SERVICE GROUP, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-24561-DPG (Oct. 30, 2018) is an action against the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Jhones was employed by the Defendant as
investigator.

Insight Service Group, Inc. was founded in 1995. The company's line
of business includes providing detective, guard, and armored car
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary A. Costales, Esq.
          GARY A. COSTALES, P.A.
          1200 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1440
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-9510
          Facsimile: (305) 375-9511


LAND AND SEA RESTAURANT: Servers Sue Over Illegal Tip Credit
------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffry Fisher, Kaitlyn Johns and Tiffany Davidson, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Land and
Sea Restaurant Company, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00512 (W.D.
Va., October 19, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages,
unlawfully retained tips, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and
costs and all such further relief pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Land and Sea operates as "Frankie Rowland's Steakhouse," a
restaurant located in Roanoke, Virginia where Plaintiffs worked as
servers. Land and Sea is accused of taking portions of its servers'
tips and applying an unlawful tip credit toward its minimum wage
obligation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     William C. Tucker, Esq.
     TUCKER LAW FIRM, PLC
     690 Berkmar Circle
     Charlottesville, VA 22901
     Tel: (434) 978-0100
     Fax: (434) 978-0101
     Email: bill.tucker@tuckerlawplc.com


MACY'S RETAIL: Davis Appeals Ruling Compelling Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Andrew Davis filed an appeal from a District order
granting the Defendant's motion to stay proceedings and compel
individual arbitration issued on September 19, 2018, in his lawsuit
titled Davis v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-1807,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (New
Haven).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 25, 2018, Judge
Janet Bond Arterton granted the Defendant's motion to stay all
claims and compel individual arbitration based on an arbitration
agreement to which the Plaintiff and the Defendant are parties.

Mr. Davis brings suit against his former employer Macy's
individually and as a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), alleging failure to properly compensate the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week (Count One), and as a class action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) alleging unlawful
classification of the Plaintiff and the members of the Class as
exempt employees and failure to pay proper overtime compensation
under the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (Count Two).

The appellate case is captioned as Davis v. Macy's Retail Holdings,
Inc., Case No. 18-3147, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew Davis, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Daniel Sobelsohn, Esq.
          THE SOBELSOHN LAW FIRM
          16027 Ventura Boulevard
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (310) 775-0504
          E-mail: dsobelsohn@sobelsohnlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., AKA Macy's, is
represented by:

          Michael C. Christman, Esq.
          MACY'S, INC.
          11477 Olde Cabin Road
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 342-6334
          E-mail: michael.christman@macys.com


MASTRO'S RESTAURANTS: Appeals Ruling in Camara FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Mastro's Restaurants LLC seeks review of a decision
issued by the District Court in the lawsuit styled Koly Camara v.
Mastro's Restaurants LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-00724-JEB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.

The Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Koly Camara v. Mastro's
Restaurants LLC, Case No. 18-7167, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that Application
for Admission is due on December 3, 2018.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Koly Camara, Individually, on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, and on Behalf of the General Public of
the District of Columbia, is represented by:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street, NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
          715 Twining Road, Suite 211
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone: (215) 884-2491
          E-mail: asantillo@winebrakelaw.com

Defendant-Appellant Mastro's Restaurants LLC is represented by:

          Gerald Leonard Maatman, Jr., Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 8000
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 460-5000
          E-mail: gmaatman@seyfarth.com


MDL 2545: Bid to Intervene in Settlement Allocation Denied
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued an Order denying Non-Party
Gemini Insurance Company's Motion to Intervene in Settlement
Allocation Proceedings in the case captioned IN RE: TESTOSTERONE
REPLACEMENT THERAPY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT
RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS. Case No. 14 C 1748, MDL No. 2545. (N.D.
Ill.)

The Plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation (MDL) proceeding
allege that they suffered either arterial cardiovascular injuries
or injuries related to blood clots in the veins as a result of
taking prescription testosterone replacement therapy (TRT) drugs.

Endo manufactures and sells two TRT products at issue in this MDL:
Fortesta and Delatestryl (the Endo Products). Endo acquired
Auxilium in January 2015. Auxilium manufactures and sells three TRT
products at issue in this MDL: Testim, Testopel, and Striant (the
Auxilium Products).  Gemini insures Endo under a primary liability
insurance policy. In relevant part, the policy requires Gemini, in
some circumstances, to cover claims for damages allegedly caused by
certain Endo pharmaceutical products and defense costs relating to
such claims. Gemini has a $10 million aggregate limit of liability
under the policy, which is subject to a $10 million per-event and
aggregate self-insured retention.

In its motion, Gemini contends that because of the $10 million
retention, Endo controlled all aspects of the MDL defense and, as a
result, is the gatekeeper of all information relevant to
settlement, liability, and damages.

Gemini argues that its motion to intervene is timely because it
filed the motion soon after September 26, 2018, when Gemini
contends it learned that allocations are scheduled to be released
in late 2018. Gemini also appears to argue that it could not have
filed its motion sooner because it lacked information necessary to
evaluate the terms of the settlement.  

On February 23, 2018, however, the Court issued a publicly
available order stating that plaintiffs and the Endo defendants had
entered into an MOU regarding a potential global settlement. Gemini
contends that it objected to the MOU around that time because Endo
allegedly (1) agreed to it without Gemini's knowledge or
participation and (2) umped together the low-value Endo claims with
the separate and distinct high-value Auxilium claims.

By Gemini's own admission, it knew eight months ago about the exact
risk it seeks to avert by intervening now. Even accepting as true
Gemini's allegations that Endo controlled all aspects of the
defense and has refused to provide relevant documents, the
timeliness scale does not tip in Gemini's favor. Among other
reasons, Gemini admits that it hopes to use intervention as a
discovery mechanism. But Gemini does not explain why it waited
eight months to test this strategy.

Allowing Gemini to intervene after its long delay would prejudice
the original parties to the MDL. After more than four years of
litigation that has required, among other things, voluminous fact
and expert discovery, complex motion practice, eight bellwether
trials, almost 140 case management orders, and more than a year of
collaboration with the settlement master, all parties have
finalized, or are in the process of finalizing, MSAs. Granting
Gemini's motion and effectively allowing it to conduct additional
discovery would delay, and could potentially derail, each of the
separate settlement efforts.

Either scenario would severely upset the progress made toward
resolving this dispute. By contrast, Gemini will not suffer
prejudice if it cannot intervene. If Gemini objects to the ultimate
settlement allocations, it can protect itself in a separate
proceeding against Endo regarding the scope of its coverage
obligations a proceeding that is now pending in Pennsylvania state
court, even though Gemini, for whatever reason, chose not to
initiate such a proceeding on its own.

The Court concludes that Gemini's motion to intervene is untimely.

In this case, despite representing in is motion that claims
regarding the Endo Products are insured, Gemini in fact notified
Endo more than three months ago that it intends to deny coverage
even for those claims. Because Gemini will deny coverage for any
settlement allocation, no matter the amount, it does not have a
direct, significant, and legally protectable interest in
participating in the allocation process.

Even assuming Gemini has a direct, legally protectable interest in
the allocation process, a ruling that keeps Gemini out of the
process does not threaten to impair it. The underlying issue in
this MDL, as it relates to the Endo defendants, is whether those
defendants are liable for claims arising from the alleged use of
their TRT products. Relatedly, the allocation process concerns the
apportionment of funds the Endo defendants have agreed to pay to
settle the claims. Gemini's obligations to Endo under its insurance
policy never have been, and never will be, litigated or decided in
this MDL. Accordingly, the allocation decisions in this MDL will
not have any res judicata effect on Gemini, nor will they establish
precedent that a different court determining Gemini's coverage
obligations will be compelled to follow under the doctrine of stare
decisis. In short, Gemini will be free bring a separate action
against Endo, or to assert counterclaims in Endo's declaratory
judgment action, to enforce its rights under the insurance policy.


Because Gemini has disclaimed any coverage of Endo for claims in
this MDL and has accused Endo of improperly seeking coverage for
claims relating to the Auxilium Products, Gemini and Endo have
conflicting interests. As a result, Endo cannot adequately
represent Gemini in the allocation process. Nor can the settlement
master, who by design does not represent any party in this MDL.

Gemini, therefore, has made a showing of inadequate representation.
But because Gemini has failed to satisfy the other Rule 24(a)(2)
requirements, the Court denies its motion to intervene.
  
Because Gemini has disclaimed any coverage of Endo for liability
arising out of this MDL, Gemini's claim does not share common
issues of law or fact with the MDL. Rather, it relates only the
scope, if any, of its insurance coverage obligations.  Gemini's
motion to intervene is untimely and unfairly prejudicial to the
original parties for reasons already discussed. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(3). Accordingly, the Court denies Gemini's motion for
permissive intervention.

Gemini did not provide a pleading but argues that the Court should
excuse this defect because the pleading requirement is routinely
waived. For this proposition, Gemini cites a single out-of-circuit
district court case. The Court will not waive the pleading
requirement in the circumstances presented here. For reasons
already discussed, Gemini has had more than enough time to prepare
a complaint.

Additionally, Gemini has misrepresented its proposed claim in
intervention by omitting from its motion even a hint that it
disclaimed all coverage of Endo more than three months ago.
Accepting Gemini's motion without the required pleading could cause
unfair prejudice because its stated reasons for intervention are
unreliable and largely inapplicable. And without a pleading that
sets forth its claim in detail, Gemini could move the goalpost
again.

The Court, therefore, denies Gemini's motion to intervene because
Gemini has not satisfied Rule 24(c).

The Court denies Gemini Insurance Company's motion to intervene in
settlement allocation proceedings.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc9kpano from Leagle.com.

In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, Plaintiff, represented by Norman E. Siegel --
siegel@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP.
Kenneth Aurecchia & Stephen Benn, Plaintiffs, represented by
Benedict P. Morelli -- bmorelli@morellilaw.com -- Morelli Alters
Ratner LLP, pro hac vice, David Stuart Ratner --
david@davidratnerlawfirm.com -- David Ratner Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David T. Sirotkin -- dsirotkin@morellialters.com -- Morelli
Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice & Trent B. Miracle --
tmiracle@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy.

Steven Myers, Plaintiff, represented by Benedict P. Morelli,
Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice, Brendan A. Smith, Simmons
Hanly Conroy, David Stuart Ratner, David Ratner Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David T. Sirotkin, Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice &
Trent B. Miracle, Simmons Hanly Conroy.

Eli Lilly and Company, Defendant, represented by Janet H. Kwuon --
jkwuon@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, David Edward Stanley --
dstanley@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Jennifer Lynn Saulino --
jsaulino@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, Margaret Grignon --
mgrignon@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith, Michael X. Imbroscio --
mimbroscio@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP & Timothy Robert
Carwinski -- tcarwinski@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


MDL 2819: Court Narrows Claims in Restasis(R) Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned IN RE
RESTASIS (CYCLOSPORINE OPHTHALMIC EMULSION) ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
THIS DOCUMENT APPLIES TO: ALL END-PAYOR PLAINTIFF CASES. No.
18-MD-2819 (NG) (LB). (E.D.N.Y.).

Allergan moves under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to dismiss certain claims brought under the laws of some
of the jurisdictions.

This multi-district litigation arises out of defendant Allergan's
alleged actions to improperly delay the market entry of generic
competitors to its dry-eye medication Restasis(R) (cyclosporine
ophthalmic emulsion). There are two groups of plaintiffs: those
that purchased Restasis(R) directly from Allergan and End-Payor
Plaintiffs (EPPs), health and welfare funds that purchased or
reimbursed members' purchases of) Restasis(R) from distributors or
retailers. Both groups contend that the price they paid for
Restasis(R) would have been lower if Allergan had faced competition
from generic manufacturers and that they were also deprived of the
opportunity to purchase lower-priced, generic versions of the
drug.

In their Consolidated Complaint, EPPs seek injunctive relief under
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 26, and declaratory relief under
28 U.S.C. Section 2201 for alleged violations of sections 1, 2, and
3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1-3. And plaintiffs bring
their claims for monetary damages only under the antitrust and
consumer protection laws of various states, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia.

Allergan's motion to dismiss EPPs' antitrust claims, in their
Second Claim for Relief in the Consolidated Complaint, brought
under Missouri and Puerto Rico law is granted, and those claims are
dismissed.  Allergan's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' antitrust
claim brought under Arkansas law is granted to the extent that the
claim includes purchases that occurred after August 1, 2017.
Allergan's motion to dismiss the remaining state law claims in the
Second Claim for Relief is denied.

Allergan's motion to dismiss EPPs' consumer protection law claims,
in their Third Claim for Relief in the Consolidated Complaint,
brought under Pennsylvania and Vermont law is granted, and those
claims are dismissed. Allergan's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
consumer protection claims brought under Arkansas law is granted to
the extent that the claim includes purchases that occurred after
August 1, 2017. Insofar as the plaintiffs allege a claim for an
unfair trade practice, as distinct from a claim for a deceptive
trade practice, under Colorado Law, such a claim is dismissed.
Allergan's motion to dismiss the remaining state law claims in the
Third Claim for Relief is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9wbwr39 from
Leagle.com.

In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust
Litigation, In Re, represented by Kathleen Marie Konopka, Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
District Council 37 Health & Security Plan, 1199SEIU National
Benefit Fund, 1199SEIU Greater New York Benefit Fund, 1199SEIU
National Benefit Fund for Home Care Workers & 1199SEIU Licensed
Practical Nurses Welfare Fund, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam
Gitlin -- agitlin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
pro hac vice, Bruce Leppla -- bleppla@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, pro hac vice, Dan Drachler --
ddrachler@zsz.com -- Zwerling, Schachter & Zwerling, LLP, David
Rudolph -- drudolph@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
pro hac vice, Eric B. Fastiff -- efastiff@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan D. Selbin
-- jselbin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Kelly Kristine McNabb -- kmcnabb@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann
& Bernstein, LLP, Robert S. Schachter -- rschachter@zsz.com --
Zwerling, Schachter & Zwerling, LLP, pro hac vice, Sona R. Shah --
sshah@zsz.com -- Zwerling, Schachter & Zwerling, LLP, Kathleen
Marie Konopka, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP &
Christina H.C. Sharp -- chc@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP.

Allergan, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jack Wesley Hill --
wh@wsfirm.com -- Ward, Smith & Hill, PLLC, Jason McKenney --
jmckenney@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac
vice, M. Sean Royall -- sroyall@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Cameron Parrott --
mparrott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Michael S.
Royall -- sroyall@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Richard
Hale Cunningham -- rhcunningham@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice & Eric J. Stock -- estock@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


MERCURY SYSTEMS: Securities Complaint in Massachusetts Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury Systems, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that a court has granted
plaintiff leave to amend and restate the complaint in the
securities class action suit pending before the the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.

On July 10, 2018, a securities class action complaint was filed
against the company, Mark Aslett, and Gerald M. Haines II in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The
complaint asserts Section 10(b) and 20(a) securities fraud claims
on behalf of a purported class of purchasers and sellers of the
company's stock from October 24, 2017 to April 24, 2018.

The complaint alleges that the company's public disclosures in SEC
filings and on earnings calls were false and/or misleading. On
September 27, 2018, The City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire Pension
Fund was designated as the lead plaintiff and Levi & Korsinsky was
designated as lead counsel in the matter.  

The Court granted plaintiff leave to amend and restate the
complaint, which is due on November 26th, 2018.

Mercury Systems said, "We believe the claims in the complaint are
without merit and intend to defend our self vigorously."

Mercury Systems, Inc. provides sensor and safety critical mission
processing subsystems for various critical defense and intelligence
programs in the United States. Its products and solutions are
deployed in approximately 300 programs with 25 defense contractors.
The company was formerly known as Mercury Computer Systems, Inc.
and changed its name to Mercury Systems, Inc. in November 2012.
Mercury Systems, Inc. was founded in 1981 and is headquartered in
Andover, Massachusetts.


METLIFE INC: Continues to Defend Owens Class Action in Georgia
--------------------------------------------------------------
MetLife, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a class action suit entitled, Owens
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (N.D. Ga., filed April 17,
2014).

Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of all persons
for whom Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MLIC) established a
Total Control Accounts (TCA) to pay death benefits under an
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") plan. The
action alleges that MLIC's use of the TCA as the settlement option
for life insurance benefits under some group life insurance
policies violates MLIC's fiduciary duties under ERISA. As damages,
plaintiff seeks disgorgement of profits that MLIC realized on
accounts owned by members of the class.

In addition, plaintiff, on behalf of a subgroup of the class, seeks
interest under Georgia's delayed settlement interest statute,
alleging that the use of the TCA as the settlement option did not
constitute payment.

On September 27, 2016, the court denied MLIC's summary judgment
motion in full and granted plaintiff's partial summary judgment
motion. On September 29, 2017, the court certified a nationwide
class. The court also certified a Georgia subclass.

The Company intends to defend this action vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

MetLife, Inc. engages in the insurance, annuities, employee
benefits, and asset management businesses. It operates through five
segments: U.S.; Asia; Latin America; Europe, the Middle East and
Africa; and MetLife Holdings. The company offers life, dental,
group short- and long-term disability, individual disability,
accidental death and dismemberment, vision, and accident and health
coverages, as well as prepaid legal plans; administrative
services-only arrangements to employers; and stable value products,
including general and separate account guaranteed interest
contracts, and private floating rate funding agreements. MetLife,
Inc. was founded in 1863 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


METLIFE INC: Still Defends Westland Police & Fire Retirement Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MetLife, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend City of Westland Police and Fire Retirement
System v. MetLife, Inc., et al. (S.D.N.Y., filed January 12,
2012).

Seeking to represent a class of persons who purchased MetLife, Inc.
common shares between February 2, 2010, and October 6, 2011, the
plaintiff alleges that MetLife, Inc. and several current and former
directors and executive officers of MetLife, Inc. violated the
Securities Act of 1933, as well as the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by
issuing, or causing MetLife, Inc. to issue, materially false and
misleading statements concerning MetLife, Inc.'s potential
liability for millions of dollars in insurance benefits that should
have been paid to beneficiaries or escheated to the states.

Plaintiff seeks unspecified compensatory damages and other relief.


On September 22, 2017, the Court granted plaintiff's motion to
certify its proposed class of persons who purchased or acquired
MetLife, Inc. common stock in the Company's August 3, 2010 offering
or the Company’' March 4, 2011 offering.

MetLife said, "The defendants intend to defend this action
vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

MetLife, Inc. engages in the insurance, annuities, employee
benefits, and asset management businesses. It operates through five
segments: U.S.; Asia; Latin America; Europe, the Middle East and
Africa; and MetLife Holdings. The company offers life, dental,
group short- and long-term disability, individual disability,
accidental death and dismemberment, vision, and accident and health
coverages, as well as prepaid legal plans; administrative
services-only arrangements to employers; and stable value products,
including general and separate account guaranteed interest
contracts, and private floating rate funding agreements. MetLife,
Inc. was founded in 1863 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


MICROCHIP TECH: Expects Consolidation of Jackson & Maknissian Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Microchip Technology Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
anticipates that the cases, Jackson v. Microchip Technology Inc.,
et al. and Maknissian v. Microchip Technology Inc., et al., will be
consolidated.

Beginning on September 14, 2018, the company and certain of its
officers were named in two putative shareholder class action
lawsuits filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona, captioned Jackson v. Microchip Technology Inc., et al.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-02914-JJT and Maknissian v. Microchip Technology
Inc., et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-02924-JJT.

The Jackson complaint is allegedly brought on behalf of a putative
class of purchasers of Microchip common stock between March 2, 2018
and August 9, 2018, and the Maknissian complaint is allegedly
brought on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of Microchip
securities between May 31, 2018 and August 9, 2018.  

The complaints assert claims for alleged violations of the federal
securities laws and generally allege that the defendants issued
materially false and misleading statements and failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the company's business, operations,
and prospects during the putative class periods.  

The complaints seek, among other things, compensatory damages and
attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of the putative classes.

Microchip Technology said, "We anticipate that the two actions will
be consolidated. We intend to vigorously defend this litigation."

Microchip Technology Inc. develops and manufactures semiconductor
products for various embedded control applications worldwide.
Microchip Technology sells to the automotive, communications,
computing, consumer, medical electronics, and industrial control
markets. The company, which was incorporated in 1989, is based in
Chandler, Arizona.


MINNESOTA: Karsjens Appeals D. Minn. Decision to Eighth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Kevin Scott Karsjens, et al., filed an appeal from a
court order dated August 23, 2018, and judgment dated August 25,
2018, in their lawsuit styled Kevin Scott Karsjens, et al. v. Emily
Johnson Piper, et al., Case No. 0:11-cv-03659-DWF, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Emily Piper is the commissioner of the Minnesota Department of
Human Services.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, a federal
judge ruled in 2015 that though Minnesota has the power to detain
mentally ill citizens, who pose a danger to the public, its
civil-commitment laws and sex-offender programs are
unconstitutional.

Kevin Scott Karsjens led the challenge as a class action in 2011
against seven senior managers of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(MSOP).  They are among 714 sex offenders whom the state has
detained indefinitely under the program, and the number is expected
to rise to 1,215 by 2022.

The appellate case is captioned as Kevin Scott Karsjens, et al. v.
Emily Johnson Piper, et al., Case No. 18-3343, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before December 11, 2018;

   -- Appendix is due on December 21, 2018;

   -- Brief of Appellants James Allen Barber, Craig Allen Bolte,
      Kaine Joseph Braun, Kenny S. Daywitt, Kevin John DeVillion,
      Bradley Wayne Foster, David Leroy Gamble, Brian K.
      Hausfeld, Kevin Scott Karsjens, Peter Gerard Lonergan,
      James Matthew Noyer Sr., James John Rud, Dennis Richard
      Steiner and Christopher John Thuringer is due on
      December 21, 2018;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant;

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 14 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Kevin Scott Karsjens, et al., are represented
by:

          Raina Borrelli, Esq.
          Karla M. Gluek, Esq.
          David A. Goodwin, Esq.
          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 S. Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-0000
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339-6622
          E-mail: rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com
                  kgluek@gustafsongluek.com
                  dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com
                  dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com

Defendants-Appellees Emily Johnson Piper Kevin Moser, Peter Puffer,
Nancy Johnston, Jannine Hebert and Ann Zimmerman, in their
individual and official capacities, are represented by:

          Scott Hiromi Ikeda, Esq.
          Adam H. Welle, Esq.
          Aaron Edward Winter, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          Bremer Tower
          445 Minnesota Street
          Saint Paul, MN 55101-2127
          Telephone: (651) 296-9412
          E-mail: scott.ikeda@ag.state.mn.us
                  adam.welle@ag.state.mn.us
                  aaron.winter@ag.state.mn.us


MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER: Court Affirms Dismissal of Agnew Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN AGNEW and MARY EMKE on Behalf of Themselves and
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v.
MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY and MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, Defendants/Respondents, Case No. ED106470 (Mo. App.),
Judge Sherri B. Sullivan of the Court of Appeals of Missouri for
the Eastern District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's
Jan. 29, 2018 Order and Judgment granting therespective Motions to
Dismiss of Missouri-American Water Co. ("MAWC") and Missouri Public
Service Commission ("PSC"), and dismissing the Appellants' Amended
Class Action Petition.

In 2003, the General Assembly passed legislation that permitted
water corporations, as defined in Section 393.1000, serving
counties with more than 1 million inhabitants, Section 393.1003, to
establish an infrastructure system replacement surcharge ("ISRS")
to recover costs associated with eligible system replacement
projects by applying to the PSC for the implementation of the
surcharge.  The PSC may hold a hearing on the petition and any
associated rate schedules, and will issue an order to become
effective not later than 120 days after the petition is filed.
After the PSC's initial approval of an ISRS, the water corporation
can file for permission to make periodic adjustments to the ISRS to
update the amount of the surcharge being collected.

MAWC is a water corporation subject to the jurisdiction and
supervision of the PSC.  MAWC serves St. Louis County.  St. Louis
County's population fell to under one million inhabitants in the
2010 decennial census.  The ISRSs being challenged in the case sub
judice were approved by orders of the PSC in 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, and 2015.  The Appellants did not challenge the ISRS amounts
in any of the respective years they were filed, considered,
approved, or approved as adjusted by the PSC, and implemented by
incorporation into the MAWC's general rate base.

The Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") represents and protects the
interests of the public in any proceeding before or appeal from the
PSC.  The OPC is served with all proposed tariffs, initial
pleadings, and applications in all proceedings before the PSC, as
well as a copy of all orders of the PSC.  The OPC by motion
challenged the PSC's decision approving the 2015 ISRS because,
among other reasons not pertinent to the instant appeal, the OPC
alleged St. Louis County did not meet the one-million population
requirement established for application of the ISRS statutes as of
the effective date of the results of the 2010 U.S. Census.  The PSC
denied the OPC's challenge and found in favor of MAWC.  The OPC
filed an application for rehearing with the PSC, which was denied.

After the PSC denied its application for rehearing, the OPC
appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.  The
Western District found in favor of the OPC and reversed the PSC's
order, finding a county whose population had fallen below one
million was not subject to increase in its ISRS.  However, the
Western District's opinion was vacated when the Missouri Supreme
Court took transfer of the case and held the issue of whether MAWC
could charge the 2015 ISRS in light of reduction in population of
its customers' county to fewer than one million inhabitants was
rendered moot once the ISRS was incorporated into MAWC's general
rate base during the pendency of appeal before the Court.

After the Western District opinion was issued but prior to the
transfer of the case to the Supreme Court, the Appellants filed the
instant case in the trial court as a class action against MAWC,
seeking reimbursement of all the purported overpayments MAWC
customers in St. Louis County paid in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and
2015 for the ISRSs which, applying the Western District's reasoning
and holding with regard to the 2015 ISRS, would have rendered
invalid those ISRSs as well.  The PSC moved to intervene in the
case and the Appellants filed an amended class action petition
adding the PSC as a Defendant.

The petition seeks damages in the form of overpaid ISRS payments
from consumers under six theories, each set forth in a separate
count: Count I - Violation of Sections 393.1003 and 393.130; Count
II - Unjust Enrichment; Count III - Money Had and Received; Count
IV - Violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA);
Count V - Declaratory Judgment, against MAWC and the PSC; and Count
VI - Injunctive Relief.

In their amended class action petition, the Appellants allege the
following: State law authorizes the PSC to approve a water ISRS
application in counties with a charter form of government and more
than 1 million inhabitants.  In 2011, MAWC petitioned the PSC for
authority to collect an ISRS from St. Louis County customers.  The
PSC approved MAWC's petition and authorized the ISRS.  The tariff
became effective Oct. 16, 2011, pursuant to which MAWC collected
ISRS charges from customers in St. Louis County, Missouri.  The
petition alleges essentially the same scenario for years 2012
through 2015.

Seeking reimbursement for these past charges, the Appellants
asserted Counts I through VI: Count I - Violation of Sections
393.1003 and 393.130; Count II - Unjust Enrichment; Count III -
Money Had and Received; Count IV - Violation of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA); Count V - Declaratory Judgment,
against MAWC and the PSC; and Count VI - Injunctive Relief. The PSC
and MAWC filed motions to dismiss the petition.

Once transfer of the Western District case was taken by the
Missouri Supreme Court, the trial court stayed the proceedings.
After the Supreme Court issued its opinion, the trial court lifted
the stay and after briefing and argument, granted the motions to
dismiss by MAWC and the PSC, dismissing the Appellants' petition
without stating a specific basis therefor.  

The appeal follows.  The Appellants claim the trial court erred in
granting the Respondents' motions to dismiss because its judgment
misapplied the law in that Appellants stated claims in their
amended class action petition upon which relief may be granted.

Judge Sullivan finds that the Supreme Court of Missouri accepted
transfer of the case on applications by the PSC and the MAWC and
then dismissed the case, finding the issue presented as to the 2015
ISRS was moot because during the pendency of the appeal, the ISRS
had become incorporated into the general rate.  Once incorporated
into the general rate base, the propriety of the ISRS no longer is
justiciable, and therefore moot.

Just as the Supreme Court found the 2015 ISRS had become
incorporated into the general rate, had the force and effect of
law, and was thus moot, so are the past ISRSs charged in 2011,
2012, 2013, and 2014.  Moreover, and in the same vein, prior
tariffs are superseded by later filed tariffs and are no longer
subject to consideration by the courts.  Hence, the Appellants'
claims are moot.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellants' Amended Class
Action Petition fails to state a claim because no matter under what
theory they frame their complaint, the trial court lacks the
authority to determine the rates MAWC should have charged.  That is
a function reserved solely for the PSC.  Retroactive rulemaking is
prohibited by the filed rate doctrine, and the allegations in the
petition are moot.  The trial court did not err in dismissing the
petition.  Judge Sullivan denied the Appellants' point on appeal,
and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7Q3t34 from Leagle.com.

Amy R. Jackson -- amy@williamsdirks.com -- and Matthew L. Dameron
-- matt@williamsdirks.com -- Attorneys for Appellants.

Erwin O. Switzer, III -- eos@greensfelder.com -- Attorney for
Respondent Missouri American Water Company.

Jennifer L. Heintz, Attorney for Respondent Missouri Public Service
Commission.


MYRIAD GENETICS: Bid to Dismiss Amended Kessman Complaint Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Myriad Genetics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company is
requesting dismissal of the amended complaint in a class action
suit initiated by Matthew Kessman.  

On April 20, 2018, Matthew Kessman, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a purported class action
complaint in the United States District Court, District of Utah,
No. 2:18-cv-0336-DAK-EJF, against the company, its President and
Chief Executive Officer, Mark C. Capone, its former President and
Chief Executive Officer, Peter D. Meldrum, its Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer, R. Bryan Riggsbee, and its
former Chief Financial Officer, James S. Evans (collectively the
"Defendants").  

This action is premised upon allegations that the Defendants
allegedly made false and misleading statements regarding the
company's business, operational and compliance policies,
specifically by allegedly failing to disclose that the Company was
allegedly submitting false or otherwise improper claims for payment
under Medicare and Medicaid for our hereditary cancer testing.

The plaintiff seeks certification as the purported class
representative and the payment of damages allegedly sustained by
plaintiff and the purported class by reason of the allegations set
forth in the complaint, plus interest, and legal and other costs
and fees.  

The District Court has designated Lead Plaintiffs for this matter,
and on August 31, 2018, Lead Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class
Action Complaint to seek recovery for compensable damages, as set
forth in the amended complaint, caused by the Defendants' alleged
violations of the federal securities laws, and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  

On October 30, 2018, the company filed its Motion to Dismiss
Amended Class Action Complaint requesting that the amended
complaint be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, for failure
to state a claim.  

Myriad Genetics said, "We intend to vigorously defend against this
action."

Myriad Genetics, Inc., a molecular diagnostic company, focuses on
developing and marketing novel predictive medicine, personalized
medicine, and prognostic medicine tests worldwide. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. was founded in 1991 and is headquartered in Salt Lake City,
Utah.


NEW YORK TIMES: Court Strikes Race, Age-Based Claims
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Strike the Race and Age-Based Class Claims in the case captioned
ERNESTINE GRANT and STEPHEN WALKER, as administrator of the estate
of MARJORIE WALKER, on behalf of themselves individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. THE NEW
YORK TIMES COMPANY, MARK THOMPSON, in his individual and
professional capacities, and MEREDITH LEVIEN, in her individual and
professional capacities, Defendants. No. 16-cv-3175(PKC).
(S.D.N.Y.).

The Defendants have moved to strike the race- and age-based class
claims brought under Title VII, Section 1981, and the corresponding
state and city law claims in the Second Amended Complaint (SAC)
pursuant to Rule 12(f), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Plaintiffs Stephen Walker, as administrator of the estate of
Marjorie Walker, and Ernestine Grant, on behalf of themselves and
all similarly situated persons, assert that defendants The New York
Times Company (Times), and two executives at the Times, Mark
Thompson and Meredith Levien, discriminated against them on the
basis of race, age, and, in Ms. Walker's case, disability, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
(Section 1981), the New York City Human Rights Law and the New York
State Human Rights Law.

The Defendants claim that the plaintiffs cannot meet the numerosity
requirement to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1), Fed. R.
Civ. P.

The Requirement of Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is satisfied when joinder of all class
members is impracticable.
In cases falling into the gray area between twenty-one and forty
class members, courts must consider factors other than class size.
Relevant considerations include judicial economy arising from the
avoidance of a multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of
class members, financial resources of class members, the ability of
claimants to institute individual suits, and requests for
prospective injunctive relief which would involve future class
members.

Plaintiffs Cannot Demonstrate Numerosity for the Proposed Race
Class

The Plaintiffs' counsel at oral argument all but conceded that the
number of potential individuals in the proposed Race Class cannot
be more than ten individuals, including the two named plaintiffs,
the employees who signed releases as part of voluntary buyouts, and
employees who signed releases as part of other separation packages.


Six, or ten, individuals does not reach the presumption of
numerosity, or the gray area in which additional factors must be
considered.  The Supreme Court, discussing class certification for
a proposed class with as few as fifteen employees, has stated that,
when judged by the size of the putative class in various cases in
which certification has been denied, this minimum would be too
small to meet the numerosity requirement. The Plaintiffs have cited
no cases where courts have certified classes as small as this. In
addition, at least four of the individuals who have not signed the
releases live or work in the vicinity of New York City.  Given
these considerations, the Court holds that, as a matter of law,
joinder for the Race Class is not impracticable. The Plaintiffs are
therefore directed to amend their SAC to remove claims with regard
to the proposed Race Class.

Plaintiffs Cannot Demonstrate Numerosity for the Proposed Age
Class

The Plaintiffs' putative Age Class contains twenty-four individuals
that have not signed releases relinquishing claims against the
Times. An additional twenty-two former employees who meet the
criteria of the Age Class have signed releases as part of a
voluntary buyout.

Plaintiffs argue that whether employees who signed the voluntary
buyouts are properly included within the class is a question of
fact that requires additional discovery. But employees who signed
buyouts releasing their claims against the Times under Title VII,
Section 1981, and the attendant state and city law claims have no
claims to assert as members of an Age Class. Plaintiffs state for
the first time in their Opposition Memorandum that class discovery
is necessary to determine whether voluntar buyouts were in fact
voluntary, rather than rising to the level of constructive
discharge or involuntary separation.

However, there are no allegations in the SAC that would call into
question the validity of the buyouts's contract terms and, as the
Court stated in its Order of September 14, 2017, there are no
specific allegations that defendants retaliated against individuals
for not accepting the buyouts.  

The SAC makes a disparate treatment claim on behalf of older
employees, claiming they were pushed out through buyouts at a
disproportionate rate. The Times has produced evidence
demonstrating that the voluntary buyouts were offered to all
Account Managers in the Advertising Department who were employed
for at least one year of service by the Times as of the date of the
offer. Plaintiffs do not dispute this evidence.  At a hearing on
the motion, plaintiffs' counsel stated that plaintiffs' allegations
concern whether or not the buyouts had a disproportionate impact on
the older employees. Yet there are no disparate impact claims in
the SAC. The SAC uses the term disparate impact one time with
respect to the proposed Age Class when summarizing questions of law
and fact common to the class.The description of plaintiffs' claims,
however, alleges that the Times was motivated in its buyout
policies by the illicit consideration of age.

First, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate why class certification, as
opposed to joinder, would better serve the interests of judicial
economy. This is not a case in which judicial economy is served by
the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions.  The number of
individuals in the class is smaller than that typically considered
necessary to join suits for reasons of judicial economy.  All
Account Managers are members of the same collective bargaining unit
as plaintiff Grant. Thus, plaintiffs already have at their finger
tips information sufficient to identify a large majority, if not
all, potential class members, which also weighs in favor of finding
joinder practicable because it eases the burden placed on them to
join others to this action.

Second, plaintiffs have not provided evidence to demonstrate that
the proposed class members are so geographically dispersed as to
make joinder impracticable. Eleven of the individuals in the
putative Age Class work in New York City, and an additional three
were employed by the Times during the pendency of this action.
Plaintiffs have offered no evidence on whether the remaining
potential class members are geographically dispersed, and, as
mentioned above, plaintiffs likely have relevant contact
information for all Account Managers as they are members of a
collective bargaining unit. Plaintiffs' conclusory assertions on
geographic dispersion are insufficient to satisfy their burden on
this issue.

Third, plaintiffs have not shown that the proposed class members
lack sufficient financial resources to join plaintiffs' lawsuit.
The Times has produced evidence, not contested by the plaintiffs,
showing that each member of the putative Age Class earned in excess
of $90,000 per year and, for those employees still actively
employed with the Times, have been earning in excess of $90,000 per
year for over five years. This is not a case where plaintiffs are
economically disadvantaged, making individual suits difficult to
pursue.  

Fourth, for similar reasons as those set forth with respect to
consideration of the proposed class members' financial resources,
plaintiffs also fail to show that the proposed class members are
otherwise incapable of bringing individual lawsuits should they
wish to do so. Plaintiffs advance claims for compensatory and
punitive damages that they admit are seeking something greater than
de minimis recovery. Plaintiffs seek damages for loss of past and
future income, wages, compensation, seniority, and other benefits
of employment for several years commencing in 2012, along with
compensation for emotional harms and punitive damages, which would
likely add up to tens of thousands of dollars per plaintiff. The
ability to recover more than de minimis damages weighs against a
finding of impracticability, as it is not the situation where it is
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages.


Fifth, plaintiffs bring claims seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief, which would involve future class members. Future class
members may make joinder more impracticable where a membership
class is fluid, such as classes of individuals that are eligible
for public housing or are incarcerated.

In this case, the potential class cannot be described as fluid or
fluctuating. There may be some small number of future employees at
the Times' Advertising Department that satisfy the Age Class
requirements and who would be affected by the conduct plaintiffs
claim has occurred and continues to occur at the Times, but those
few potential future members are not similar in kind or quantity to
the fluid or fluctuating classes that make joinder more
impracticable. Still, seeking an injunction that would affect all
potential class members, where individual suits could lead to
potentially inconsistent results, weighs slightly in favor of
plaintiffs under this Robidoux factor.  

Accordingly, the Defendants' requested relief to strike class
action allegations asserted on the basis of race and age is granted
pursuant to Rule 23(d)(1)(D), Fed. R. Civ. P.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yby3kehp from
Leagle.com.

Ernestine Grant, on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Hilary
Joy Orzick, Wigdor LLP, Kenneth Daniel Walsh, Wigdor LLP, Lawrence
Michael Pearson, Wigdor LLP, Moorea Lynn Katz, Wigdor LLP & Douglas
Holden Wigdor, Wigdor LLP.

Stephen Walker, Administrator of the Estate of Marjorie Walker,
Plaintiff, represented by Hilary Joy Orzick, Wigdor LLP, Kenneth
Daniel Walsh, Wigdor LLP, Lawrence Michael Pearson, Wigdor LLP &
Moorea Lynn Katz, Wigdor LLP.

The New York Times Company, Mark Thompson, in his individual and
professional capacities & Meredith Levien, in her individual and
professional capacities, Defendants, represented by Larissa Rae Boz
-- lboz@proskauer.com -- Proskauer & Mark W. Batten --
mbatten@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP.


NEW YORK: Gilkeson Class Certification Denial Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third
Department, issued a Memorandum and Order affirming the District
Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned In the Matter of JAMES GILKESON, Appellant,
v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, as Acting Commissioner of Corrections and
Community Supervision, Respondent. 2018 NY Slip Op 07514 (N.Y. App.
Div.).

While an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility, the
petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging
the denial of two grievances relating to the noise caused by use of
radio speakers by fellow inmates without headphones and to compel
respondent to revise and comply with the Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision directives regarding audio units
permitted into the prison through the facility package room.

The Petitioner also moved to have the proceeding certified as a
class action pursuant to CPLR article 9. The Respondent moved to
dismiss the petition on various grounds. Supreme Court denied
petitioner's motion for certification of a class action and granted
respondent's motion to dismiss the petition.  

The Court finds no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's denial of
petitioner's request for class action certification given the
conclusory and generalized assertions regarding the violation, on
either a local or statewide basis, of the directive of the
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision regarding the
distribution of audio units and radios that enter correctional
facility package rooms. Petitioner's remaining contentions have
been reviewed and found to be without merit.

A full-text copy of the N.Y. App. Div.'s November 8, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd8pah2g
from Leagle.com.

James Gilkeson, Ossining, appellant pro se.

Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, Albany (Martin A. Hotvet of
counsel), for respondent.


NEW YORK: PBA of NYS Appeals N.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Frank R. Delles, James McCartney, Police Benevolent
Association of New York State, Inc., Thomas D. Smith, Manuel M.
Vilar and Penelope Wheeler filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Police Benevolent Association of New York State,
Inc., et al. v. The State of New York, et al., Case No. 11-cv-1528,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
(Syracuse).

The nature of suit is stated as local question - constitutional.

The appellate case is captioned as Police Benevolent Association of
New York State, Inc., et al. v. The State of New York, et al., Case
No. 18-3183, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Police Benevolent Association of New York
State, Inc., by its President Manuel M. Vilar; Manuel M. Vilar,
individually; James McCartney, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; Thomas D. Smith, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; Frank R. Delles; and Penelope Wheeler,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Richard Charles Reilly, Esq.
          GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA
          40 Beaver Street
          Albany, NY 12207
          Telephone: (518) 432-7511
          E-mail: rreilly@gdwo.net

Defendants-Appellees Andrew M. Cuomo, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of New York; Patricia A. Hite, individually
and in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Civil Service; Caroline W. Ahl, in her official
capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Civil Service
Commission; J. Dennis Hanrahan, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the New York State Civil Service Commission; Robert
L. Megna, individually and in his official capacity as Director of
the New York State Division of the Budget; and Thomas P. DiNapoli,
in his official capacity as Comptroller of the State of New York,
are represented by:

          Barbara D. Underwood, Esq.
          NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          28 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 416-8000
          E-mail: barbara.underwood@ag.ny.gov


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeals Filed in Roberts Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Lillian Roberts, et al., filed an appeal from a District Court
judgment issued on September 24, 2018, in their lawsuit entitled
Roberts, et al. v. The State of New York, et al., Case No.
12-cv-46, in the in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Syracuse).

The nature of suit is stated as local question - constitutional.

The appellate case is captioned as Roberts, et al. v. The State of
New York, et al., Case No. 18-3172, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Lillian Roberts, as Executive Director of the
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; District Council 37, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO; Dennis Ifill, as President of the Rent Regulation Services
Unit Employees, Local 1359, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
Local 1359, Rent Regulation Services Employees; Clifford Koppelman,
as President of the Court, County and Department of Probation
Employees Unit, Local 1070; Local 1070, Court, County and
Department of Probation Employees; Mildred Brown, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated; Shanomae Wiltshire, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Norma
Galloway, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated;
Charmaine Hardaway, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated; Maurice Bouyea, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; and Steven Schwartz, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Erica C. Gray-Nelson, Esq.
          DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME
          125 Barclay Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 815-1450
          E-mail: ecg2001@hotmail.com

Defendants-Appellees Andrew M. Cuomo, as Governor of the State of
New York; Patricia A. Hite, as Acting Commissioner, New York State
Civil Service Department; Caroline W. Ahl, as Commissioner of the
New York State Civil Service Commission; J. Dennis Hanrahan, as
Commissioner of the New York State Civil Service Commission; Robert
L. Megna, as Director of the New York State Division of the Budget;
and Thomas P. DiNapoli, as Comptroller of the State of New York,
are represented by:

          Barbara D. Underwood, Esq.
          NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          28 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 416-8000
          E-mail: barbara.underwood@ag.ny.gov


NRG ENERGY: Continues to Defend Griffoul Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a purported class action suit entitled,
Griffoul v. NRG Residential Solar Solutions.  

On February 28, 2017, plaintiffs, consisting of New Jersey
residential solar customers, filed a purported class action lawsuit
in New Jersey state court. Plaintiffs allege violations of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Action and Truth-in-Consumer Contracts,
Warranty and Notice Act with regard to certain provisions of their
residential solar contracts. The plaintiffs seek damages and
injunctive relief as to the proper allocation of the solar
renewable energy credits.

On June 6, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration or dismiss the lawsuit. Plaintiffs filed their
opposition on June 29, 2017. On July 14, 2017, the court denied
NRG's motion to compel arbitration or dismiss the case. On July 25,
2017, NRG filed a motion for reconsideration of the appeal, which
was denied. On August 22, 2017, NRG filed a notice of appeal.

After oral argument on April 24, 2018, the Appellate Division
reversed the lower court on May 4, 2018, and ordered that the
plaintiff must arbitrate their claims against NRG. On May 23, 2018,
the plaintiff filed a petition for certification with the Supreme
Court of New Jersey seeking to overturn the Appellate Division
ruling. The petition and objection are fully briefed.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


NRG ENERGY: Dropped as Defendant from Rice Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company is no
longer a party in the purported class action suit entitled, Rice v.
NRG.

On April 14, 2017, plaintiffs filed a purported class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against NRG, First Energy Corporation and Matt
Canastrale Contracting, Inc. Plaintiffs generally claim personal
injury, trespass, nuisance and property damage related to the
disposal of coal ash from GenOn's Elrama Power Plant and First
Energy's Mitchell and Hatfield Power Plants.

Plaintiffs generally seek monetary damages, medical monitoring and
remediation of their property.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 14, 2017. On
October 20, 2017, NRG filed its answers and affirmative defenses.
On July 6, 2018, NRG filed a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion for summary
judgment on July 29, 2018.

On September 7, 2018, the court granted NRG's motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, NRG is no longer a party.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


OHIO: Court Narrows Claims in RCI Inmates' Suit
-----------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, issued a
Report and Recommendation granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned RAY SCOTT HEID,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. MARK HOOKS, et al., Defendants. Civil Action
No. 2:17-cv-650. (D. Ohio)

Plaintiffs, Ray Scott Heid and James E. Damron (Plaintiffs), state
prison inmates who are proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, bring this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against
Defendants, Mark Hooks, and Jeffrey Howard (Defendants), employees
of Ross Correctional Institution (RCI), in their individual and
official capacities.

Official Capacity Claims

The Court concludes that, to the extent the Plaintiffs seek
monetary damages against the Defendants in their official
capacities, their claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution operates as a
bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a
state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express
consent.  It is well established that Section 1983 does not
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, "an official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity. It is not a suit against the official
personally, for the real party in interest is the entity."

Thus, it is immaterial that the Plaintiffs named individual
employees of RCI rather than the state of Ohio; Ohio is the real
party in interest in the official capacity claim. Because Ohio has
not waived its sovereign immunity in federal court, it is entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for monetary damages.  

Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends it is RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities be DISMISSED.

Individual Capacity Claims

The undersigned finds the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiffs' individual capacity claims to be without merit. As an
initial matter, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity at this juncture because the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that the Defendants violated their clearly established
Eighth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct. Under this doctrine, government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.

The Plaintiffs have adequately pled that Defendants violated their
clearly established Eighth Amendment right to protection from
violence at the hands of other inmates.

Moreover, the Defendants' arguments for dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' individual capacity claims improperly require this to
Court accept as true their responses in the grievances that the
Plaintiffs attached to their Complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(c), a statement in a pleading may be adopted by
reference elsewhere in the same pleading or motion.

Here, the Plaintiffs attached the at-issue grievances to their
Complaint to demonstrate that Defendants had been made aware of the
telephone access tensions and the resulting risk of violence.
Nothing in their Complaint reflects that the Plaintiffs intended to
accept as true or adopt Defendants' responses to those grievances.


It is therefore recommended that the Court decline rely upon the
Defendants' statements in the grievances the Plaintiffs attached to
their Complaint to disturb its earlier holding that Plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged an Eighth Amendment claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Report
and Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybsmm2fn
from Leagle.com.

Ray Scott Heid, Plaintiff, pro se.

James E. Damron, Plaintiff, pro se.

Mark Hooks, In his individual and official capacities & Jeffrey
Howard, In his individual and official capacities, Defendants,
represented by Byron D. Turner , Office of the Ohio Attorney
General.


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss N.Y. Consolidated Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that briefing on
the motion to dismiss a consolidated securities class action
complaint against the company is complete.

On November 16, 2017, a purported securities class action complaint
captioned Dror Gronich v. Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc., C.
Taylor Pickett, Robert O. Stephenson, and Daniel J. Booth was filed
against the Company and certain of its officers in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case
No. 1:17-cv-08983-NRB (the "Gronich Securities Class Action").  

On November 17, 2017, a second purported securities class action
complaint captioned Steve Klein v. Omega Healthcare Investors,
Inc., C. Taylor Pickett, Robert O. Stephenson, and Daniel J. Booth
was filed against the Company and the same officers in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case
No. 1:17-cv-09024-NRB (together with the Gronich Class Action, the
"Securities Class Action").  Thereafter, the Court considered a
series of applications by various shareholders to be named lead
plaintiff, consolidated the two actions and designated Royce Setzer
as the lead plaintiff.

Pursuant to a Scheduling Order entered by the Court, lead plaintiff
Setzer and additional plaintiff Earl Holtzman filed a Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint on May 25, 2018 (the "Amended
Complaint").

The Securities Class Action purports to be a class action brought
on behalf of shareholders who acquired the Company's securities
between May 3, 2017 and October 31, 2017.  The Securities Class
Action alleges that the defendants violated the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), by making materially
false and/or misleading statements, and by failing to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects, including the financial and operating results of one
of the Company's operators, the ability of such operator to make
timely rent payments, and the impairment of certain of the
Company's leases and the uncollectibility of certain receivables.


The Securities Class Action, which purports to assert claims for
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, as well as Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, seeks an unspecified amount of monetary damages, interest,
fees and expenses of attorneys and experts, and other relief.   The
Company and the officers named in the Amended Complaint filed a
Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2018. Briefing on the Motion to
Dismiss is complete.

Omega Healthcare said, "Although the Company denies the material
allegations of the Securities Class Action and intends to
vigorously pursue its defense, we are in the early stages of this
litigation and are unable to predict the outcome of the case or to
estimate the amount of potential costs."

Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. is a real estate investment trust
that invests in the long-term healthcare industry, primarily in
skilled nursing and assisted living facilities. Its portfolio of
assets is operated by a diverse group of healthcare companies,
predominantly in a triple-net lease structure. The assets span all
regions within the US, as well as in the UK.


PACESETTER PERSONNEL: Castilla Seeks OT Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
------------------------------------------------------------------
Rita C. Castilla, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, vs. Pacesetter Personnel Service of Florida,
Inc., Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc., Pacesetter Personnel
Services, LLC and Cesar Noriega, an individual, Defendants, Case
No. No. 18-cv-81431, (S.D. Fla., October 22, 2018) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' and
paralegal fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate a labor agency under the following names:
Pacesetter Personnel Services, FW Services, Pacesetter Personnel
Service and/o PPS Pacesetter. Castilla worked for Pacesetter from
their office in Palm Beach County, FL. She claims she was only paid
for the time she was working at the work locations and exclude the
time she would wait to obtain paperwork, wait for other employees
and the driver to arrive and the time she would wait to be driven
back to the Pacesetter Office. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Steven L. Schwarzberg, Esq.
     SCHWARZBERG & ASSOCIATES
     625 North Flagler Drive, Suite 600
     West Palm Beach, FL 33401
     Telephone: (561) 659-3300
     Facsimile: (561) 693-4540
     Email: mail@schwarzberglaw.com
            steve@schwarzberglaw.com

            - and -

     Barry S. Balmuth, Esq.
     BARRY S. BALMUTH, P.A.
     BARRY S. BALMUTH, B.C.S.
     The Oaks Center - 2505 Burns Road
     Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
     Telephone: (561) 242-9400
     Facsimile: (561) 366-2650
     Email: barryb@flboardcertifiedlawyer.com


PACIFIC GAS: Court Grants Final Approval of Greer Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motions
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
BECKY GREER, TIMOTHY C. BUDNIK, ROSARIO SAENZ, IAN CARTY, HALEY
MARKWITH, and MARCIA GARCIA PESINA, individually and as class
representatives, Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
IBEW LOCAL 1245, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. Case
No. 1:15-cv-01066-EPG. (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Becky Greer, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, and Ian
Carty, as individuals and on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, filed suit against PG&E alleging various claims
based on underpayment of wages for a purported class.

Final Fairness Determination

In its previous order granting preliminary approval, the Court
found that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). The Court also found that the
proposed class met the predominance and superiority requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which provides: A class
action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The Court further made a preliminary finding that the proposed
settlement was fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
Court noted that when settlement occurs before class certification,
the Court must also take extra care to ensure that the settlement
is not the product of collusion among the negotiating parties.
After balancing the relevant factors, the Court found the proposed
settlement to be fair and to meet the requirements of Rule
23(e)(2). The Court therefore granted preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement, but required changes to be made to the notice
packet. The required changes to the notice packet were subsequently
made and approved by the Court.  

The Defendants must pay Class Members pursuant to the procedure
described in the Settlement Agreement, with the following
exceptions:

   -- Class member Tony Sanchez will be paid $20,707.50.  Mr.
Sanchez will receive the $250 originally allocated to him as a
member of the non-qualifying group.

   -- The remaining $20,457.50 will be paid as follows: $500 of the
settlement funds originally allocated to opt-outs will be
re-allocated to satisfy a portion Mr. Sanchez's payout; $17,010.09
will be paid using the difference between Class maximum preliminary
proposed litigation costs ($275,000.00) and final proposed
litigation costs ($257,989.91); $2,338.00 will be paid using the
difference between Simpluris, Inc.'s preliminary proposed costs
($29,000.00) and Simpluris, Inc.'s final proposed costs
($26,662.00); and the remaining $609.41 will be paid through a
reduction in Class Counsel's attorneys' fees award.

   -- Class member Tanvir Amad Ahjaz will be paid $20,707.50.  Mr.
Ahjaz will receive the $175.49 originally allocated to him as a pro
rata share of the qualifying group award.

   -- The remaining $20,532.01 will be paid through a reduction in
Class Counsel's attorneys' fees award.

The Defendants will have no further liability for costs, expenses,
interest, attorneys' fees, or for any other charge, expense, or
liability, except as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court approves an award of reasonable attorneys' fees in the
amount of $1,978,858.58.

The Court approves an award of reasonable costs in the amount of
$257,989.91.

The Court approves claims administration expenses in the amount of
$26,662.00 to Simpluris, Inc.

Plaintiffs Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, Haley Markwith, Ian
Carty, and Maria Garcia Pesina are each awarded $5,000.00 in
enhancement awards for their time and effort representing the
class; and Plaintiff Becky Greer is awarded $10,000.00 in
enhancement awards for her time and effort representing the class.

The Plaintiffs' motions for final approval of the settlement and
for attorney fees, costs, and enhancement awards are granted as
modified and noted above.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybjozscb from Leagle.com.

Becky Greer, Individually and as Class Representatives, Timothy C.
Budnik, Individually and as Class Respresentatives, Rosario Saenz,
Individually and as Class Representatives, Ian Carty, Individually
and as Class Relpresentatives, Haley Markwith & Maria Garcia
Pesina, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Swanston, Fitzpatrick,
Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington --
ehuntington@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley PC, Michael S.
Helsley -- mhelsley@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole -- ptoole@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley
PC.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Robert
G. Hulteng -- rhulteng@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Aurelio J.
Perez -- aperez@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Joshua D.
Kienitz -- jkienitz@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.

IBEW Local 1245, Defendant, represented by Eileen B. Goldsmith --
egoldsmith@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP, Philip C.
Monrad -- pmonrad@leonardcarder.com -- Leonard Carder, LLP & Peder
J. Thoreen -- pthoreen@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon
LLP.

Tanvir Ahjaz, Claimant, pro se.

IBEW Local 1245 Union, Movant, represented by Alexander Jordan
Pacheco & Philip C. Monrad , Leonard Carder, LLP.


PAPA MURPHY'S: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in Lennartson Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Patrick S. Sweeney filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled John Lennartson, et al. v. Papa Murphy's
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-05307-RBL, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma.

The appellate case is captioned as John Lennartson, et al. v. Papa
Murphy's Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-35941, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court issued an order adjusting downward the Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Payment of Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs.
The class sought $2,050,000 in fees and costs, which it claims is
both far less than the lodestar amount (hours times rates) than it
spent on the case (more than $5,400,000), and far less than the
class action benchmark of 25% of the common fund created by the
settlement, which it claims is over $23,000,000.

The District Court agreed that the $23,000,000 potential total
value of the settlement is not a common fund, and the
reasonableness of the fee should not be measured against that
amount.  The question is whether a roughly $1.8 million fee is
reasonable in light of the effort it took to settle this case on
the terms that the parties agreed upon.

The District Court added that Papa Murphy's persuasively argues
that, based on the redemption rate so far, the benefit to the class
is quite unlikely to approach that amount: each class member got
two $5 vouchers that are not worth anything unless and until they
are redeemed at Papa Murphy's.  Including the agreed-upon $400,000
administrative fee, the class benefit is likely to be less than
$1,000,000.

The Court agreed that a downward adjustment is appropriate.  The
Court awarded $1,850,000 in fees and costs.  The requested Named
Plaintiff Service Awards ($15,000 each) are not opposed, and are
awarded as well.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by November 30, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on December 31, 2018;

   -- Appellant Patrick S. Sweeney's opening brief is due on
      February 8, 2019;

   -- Appellees Rita Andrews, Cassie Asleson, John Lennartson,
      Susan Shay Nohr, Papa Murphy's Holdings, Inc. and Papa
      Murphy's International LLC's answering brief is due on
      March 11, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant Patrick S. Sweeney, of Madison, Wisconsin,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees JOHN LENNARTSON, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, RITA ANDREWS, CASSIE ASLESON and SUSAN
SHAY NOHR are represented by:

          Mark Adam Griffin, Esq.
          Karin B. Swope, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: mgriffin@kellerrohrback.com
                  kswope@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Behdad G. Sadeghi, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, PLLP
          80 South Eighth Street
          1100 IDS Center
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 341-0400
          E-mail: behdad.sadeghi@zimmreed.com

Defendants-Appellees PAPA MURPHY'S HOLDINGS, INC., and PAPA
MURPHY'S INTERNATIONAL LLC are represented by:

          Jeffrey Bert DeGroot, Esq.
          Stellman Keehnel, Esq.
          Anthony Todaro, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          701 Fifth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 839-4800
          E-mail: jeffrey.degroot@dlapiper.com
                  stellman.keehnel@dlapiper.com
                  anthony.todaro@dlapiper.com


PETER A. KLC: Cannon Sues Over Dues Despite Cancelled Membership
----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Cannon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Peter A. KLC and Associates, PLLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00822, (D. Utah, October 22, 2018), seeks
injunctive relief, actual damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in this action, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest and such other and further relief pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Texas Debt Collection
Act.

Defendant provides a turnkey billing solution for gyms and other
similar membership-based businesses. On or around November 17,
2017, Plaintiff signed up for a thirty day, no obligation gym
membership with Fitness Now. Cannon was required to provide only a
payment card to Fitness Now at the gym location with no contract.
He cancelled the trial membership on or around the day after he
signed up. Despite this, Fitness Now billed him for his monthly
dues. Shortly thereafter, Defendant began placing collection calls
to his mobile phone, relates the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Curtis R. Hussey, Esq.
      Hussey Law Firm, LLC
      10 N. Section Street, No. 122
      Fairhope, AL 36532-1896
      Telephone: (251) 928-1423
      Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
      Email: chussey@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

             - and -

      THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLLC
      5235 E. Southern Ave D106-618
      Mesa, AZ 85206
      Tel: (888) 332-7252
      Email: TCLG@thompsonconsumerlaw.com


PLANTRONICS INC: Answer in Shin Class Suit Due Today
----------------------------------------------------
Plantronics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company's
answer to the purported class action complaint by Phil Shin is due
on November 30, 2018.

On September 13, 2018, Mr. Phil Shin filed on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, a purported Class Action Complaint in
the United States District Court of the Northern District of
California alleging violations of various federal and state
consumer protection laws in addition to unfair competition and
fraud claims in connection with the Company's BackBeat FIT
headphones.

The Company disputes the allegations.

The Companys answer to the complaint is due on November 30, 2018.

Plantronics, Inc. designs, manufactures, and markets lightweight
communications headsets, telephone headset systems, other
communication endpoints, and accessories for the business and
consumer markets under the Plantronics brand worldwide. The
company's enterprise products include headsets optimized for
unified communications and collaboration, other corded and cordless
communication headsets, audio processors, and telephone systems;
and consumer products comprise Bluetooth and corded products for
mobile device applications, personal computers, and gaming
headsets. Plantronics, Inc. was founded in 1961 and is
headquartered in Santa Cruz, California.


PNC MERCHANT: Customers Sue Over Excessive Service Charges
----------------------------------------------------------
Choi's Beer Shop, LLC and Abramoff Law Offices, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PNC
Merchant Services Company, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-05906,
(E.D. N.Y., October 22, 2018), seeks rescission of contracts,
restitution of all improper fees illegally charged, actual,
compensatory, general, nominal, punitive and exemplary damages,
pre-judgment interest and such other relief resulting from breach
of contract, fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment.

Merchant Services, a subsidiary of PNC Bank and First Data Corp.,
provide payment processing services.

Choi's Beer Shop is a small, family-owned and operated market in
Philadelphia that sells beer and sandwiches made to order. Abramoff
Law Offices is a solo practitioner law office that specializes in
divorce and family law. Both have been Merchant's customers since
2017 and 2014, respectively, and claim that Merchant Services' fees
have increased without their prior notice and have not been
stipulated in their contracts. They also claim to be charged fees
that were not mentioned when they signed up for their services.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      E. Adam Webb, Esq.
      WEBB, KLASE & LEMOND, LLC
      1900 The Exchange, S.E., Suite 480
      Atlanta, GA 30339
      Tel: (770) 444-0773
      Email: Adam@WebbLLC.com


QUALCOMM INC: Bid to Drop Calif. Consolidated Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the court has not
yet ruled on the company's motion to dismiss the consolidated class
action suit pending before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California.

On January 23, 2017 and January 26, 2017, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and certain of its current and
former officers and directors.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by making false and misleading
statements and omissions of material fact in connection with
certain allegations that we are or were engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees
and costs.

On May 4, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed lead plaintiffs. On July 3, 2017, the lead plaintiffs
filed a consolidated amended complaint asserting the same basic
theories of liability and requesting the same basic relief. On
September 1, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. The court has not yet ruled on the
company's motion to dismiss.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Continues to Defend 226701 Canada, Inc. Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a securities class action suit
entitled, 3226701 Canada, Inc. v. QUALCOMM Incorporated et al.

On November 30, 2015, a securities class action complaint was filed
by purported stockholders of the company in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California against the
company and certain of its current and former officers. On April
29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.

On January 27, 2017, the court dismissed the amended complaint in
its entirety, granting leave to amend. On March 17, 2017, the
plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, alleging that the
company and certain of its current and former officers violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, by making false and misleading statements regarding the
company's business outlook and product development between November
19, 2014 and July 22, 2015. The second amended complaint sought
unspecified damages, interest, attorneys’ fees and other costs.

On May 8, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint. On October 20, 2017, the court entered an order
granting in part the company's motion to dismiss, and on November
29, 2017, the court entered an order granting the remaining
portions of the company's motion to dismiss. On December 28, 2017,
the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No hearing date has been set. We
believe the plaintiffs' claims are without merit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Continues to Defend Camp Securities Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a securities class action suit entitled, Camp
v. Qualcomm Incorporated et al.

On June 8, 2018 and June 26, 2018, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of us in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California
against the company and two of its current officers.

The complaints allege, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by failing to disclose that the
company had submitted a notice to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in January 2018. The
complaints seek unspecified damages, interest, fees and costs.

QUALCOMM said, "Upon the appointment of lead plaintiff in the
action and the filing of a First Amended Complaint, we anticipate
filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, as we believe the
plaintiffs' claims are without merit."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Discovery in Consumer Class Suit to Close Dec. 28
---------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that discovery in a
consumer class action lawsuit against the company is scheduled to
close on December 28, 2018.

Since January 18, 2017, a number of consumer class action
complaints have been filed against the company in the United States
District Courts for the Southern and Northern Districts of
California, each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of
cellular phones and other cellular devices.

Twenty-two such cases remain outstanding. In April 2017, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
that had been filed in the Southern District of California to the
Northern District of California. On May 15, 2017, the court entered
an order appointing the plaintiffs' co-lead counsel.

On July 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint alleging that the company violated California and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by, among other things,
refusing to license standard-essential patents to the company's
competitors, conditioning the supply of certain of the company's
baseband chipsets on the purchaser first agreeing to license the
company's entire patent portfolio, entering into exclusive deals
with companies, including Apple Inc., and charging unreasonably
high royalties that do not comply with our commitments to standard
setting organizations.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and disgorgement and/or
restitution, as well as an order that the company be enjoined from
further unlawful conduct. On August 11, 2017, the company filed a
motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. On November
10, 2017, the court denied the company's  motion, except to the
extent that certain claims seek damages under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. On July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification, and the court granted that motion on September 27,
2018.

The case is currently in the discovery stage, with discovery
scheduled to close on December 28, 2018. Trial is scheduled to
begin on June 24, 2019. We believe the plaintiffs’ claims are
without merit.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Has Yet to Answer Canadian Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the company has not
yet answered any of the six consumer class action complaints in
Canada.

Since November 9, 2017, six consumer class action complaints have
been filed against the company in Canada (in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and the
Quebec Superior Court), each on behalf of a putative class of
purchasers of cellular phones and other cellular devices, alleging
various violations of Canadian competition and consumer protection
laws. The claims are similar to those in the FTC and U.S. consumer
class action complaints. The complaints seek unspecified damages.

QUALCOMM said, "We have not yet answered the complaints."

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUIKTRAK INC: Denied Wallace Overtime Pay, Wages Statements
-----------------------------------------------------------
Albert Wallace, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Quiktrak, Inc. and Does 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. RG18925519 (Cal. Super. October
22, 2018), seeks redress for Defendant's failure to pay overtime
and minimum wages, failure to provide proper wage statements,
failure to reimburse business-related expenses and failure to pay
earned wages upon discharge including waiting time penalties under
Unfair Business Practices statures of the California Business and
Professions Code, the California Labor Code and applicable
Industrial Welfare Commission Orders.

QuikTrak provides field inspection, audit, and inventory management
services to its customers in Oakland, Sacramento, Bakersfield, San
Francisco and Los Angeles. Wallace worked as an inspector. He was
required to sign an Independent Contractor Agreement, thus allowing
Quikway to deny him the basic benefits of employees.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kenneth H. Yoon, Esq.
      Stephanie E. Yasuda, Esq.
      Brian G. Lee, Esq.
      YOON LAW, APC
      One Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2200
      Los Angeles, CA 90017
      Telephone: (213) 612-0988
      Facsimile: (213) 947-1211

             - and -

      Helen U. Kim, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF HELEN KIM
      113435 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 2700
      Los Angeles, CA 90010
      Telephone: (323) 487-915l
      Facsimile: (866) 652-7819


RAINBOW PIZZA: Cortez Shortchanged on Vehicle Reimbursements
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Cortez, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. Rainbow Pizza, LLC and Fernando Salido,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00324 (S.D. Tex., October 22, 2018),
seeks to recover minimum wages, liquidated damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of
this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant operates Domino's Pizza franchise stores all over Texas.
Cortez was employed by Rainbow Pizza as a delivery driver. He used
his own vehicle to deliver pizzas and claims that the reimbursement
rates were unreasonably low thus causing their net wages to fall
below the federal minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J. Forester, Esq.
      FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
      1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
      Dallas, TX 75202
      Tel: (214) 210-2100 phone
      Fax: (214) 346-5909
      Website: www.foresterhaynie.com


RAYMOND JAMES: Seeks 11th Cir. Review of Ruling in Brink Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Raymond James & Associates, Inc., filed an appeal from a
court ruling in the lawsuit styled JYLL BRINK, on her own behalf,
and on behalf of those similarly situated v. RAYMOND JAMES &
ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No. 0:15-cv-60334-WPD, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 15, 2018, the Hon.
William P. Dimitrouleas granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification, and to Appoint Class Representative and Class
Counsel.

The Court certified a class consisting of:

     All former and current Customers of Raymond James and
     Associates, Inc. ("RJA") in the United States and its
     territories who executed a "Passport Agreement" and owned a
     Passport Account, and from whom RJA deducted, retained,
     and/or charged a per transaction "Processing Fee" or "Misc.
     Fee" on transactions involving "Fee Investments" at any time
     (a) within 4 years preceding the filing of this lawsuit for
     the negligence count; and/or (b) within 5 years of filing
     this lawsuit for the breach of contract count (the "Class
     Period").  Excluded from the Class are RJA, its parents,
     subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity
     in which RJA has a controlling interest, all Customers who
     make a timely selection to be excluded, any Customer whose
     financial advisor paid all or part of the Processing Fee on
     any of their trades, governmental entities, all judges
     assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as
     their immediate family members, and any of the foregoing's
     legal heirs and assigns.

The appellate case is captioned as Raymond James & Associates, Inc.
v. Jyll Brink, Case No. 18-90032, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent JYLL BRINK, on her own behalf, and on behalf
of those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Gary S. Betensky, Esq.
          RICHMAN GREER, PA
          250 S Australian Avenue S, Suite 1504
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5016
          Telephone: (561) 803-3500
          E-mail: gbetensky@richmangreer.com

               - and -

          Nathaniel M. Edenfield, Esq.
          Manuel A. Garcia-Linares, Esq.
          Mark A. Romance, Esq.
          RICHMAN GREER, PA
          396 Alhambra Cir. N Tower, Floor 14
          Miami, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 373-4000
          Facsimile: (305) 373-4099
          E-mail: nedenfield@richmangreer.com
                  mlinares@richmangreer.com
                  mromance@richmangreer.com

               - and -

          Darren Craig Blum, Esq.
          BLUM LAW GROUP
          110 E Broward Blvd., Suite 1700
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 255-8181
          E-mail: blum@stockattorneys.com

               - and -

          Sara Elizabeth Hanley, Esq.
          Randall Charles Place, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PLACE AND HANLEY PLLC
          1415 Panther Ln
          Naples, FL 34109-7874
          Telephone: (239) 455-1242
          Facsimile: (888) 876-6450
          E-mail: sara_hanley@placeandhanley.com
                  randall_place@placeandhanley.com

               - and -

          Lyle E. Shapiro, Esq.
          HERSKOWITZ SHAPIRO, PLLC
          9100 S Dadeland Blvd., Suite 908
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 423-1986
          E-mail: lyle@hslawfl.com

               - and -

          Eric Mathew Sodhi, Esq.
          Joshua Lee Spoont, Esq.
          SODHI SPOONT, PLLC
          1000 5th St., Suite 218
          Miami Beach, FL 33139
          Telephone: (305) 907-7573
          E-mail: esodhi@richmangreer.com
                  jspoont@richmangreer.com

Defendant-Petitioner RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., is
represented by:

          Samuel Wayne Braver, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC
          One Oxford Ctr.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15101
          Telephone: (412) 562-8800
          Facsimile: (412) 562-1041
          E-mail: samuel.braver@bipc.com

               - and -

          G. Calvin Hayes, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC
          401 E Jackson Street, Suite 2400
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 222-8180
          Facsimile: (813) 222-8189
          E-mail: calvin.hayes@bipc.com


RECKITT BENCKISER: Carrigan Disputes Joint Meds' Health Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maureen Carrigan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Reckitt Benckiser, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-07073, (N.D. Ill., October 22, 2018),
seeks redress for fraud and for violation of the Illinois Deceptive
Practices and Consumer Fraud Act.

Reckitt Benckiser LLC markets, sells and distributes a line of
glucosamine and chondroitin-based joint health dietary supplements
under the "Schiff Move Free Advanced" brand name. It purports that
the Move Free Advanced Products will support and promote joint
health, reduce joint pain and reduce joint stiffness of all persons
who ingest it. However, Carrigan contests their claim given the
amount of glucosamine and chondroitin present in them and claims
they have no significant and/or actual therapeutic effects. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ben Barnow, Esq.
      Erich P. Schork, Esq.
      BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      One North LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 621-2000
      Fax: (312) 641-5504
      Email: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
             e.schork@barnowlaw.com

             - and -

      Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
      Thomas J. O'Reardon, Esq.
      BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
      501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 338-1100
      Fax: (619) 338-1101
      Email: tblood@bholaw.com
             toreardon@bholaw.com

             - and -

      Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 762-1910
      Fax: (619) 756-6991
      Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

      Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
      Pittsburgh, PA 15222
      Tel: (412) 322-9243
      Fax: (412) 231-0246
      Email: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com


RIOT BLOCKCHAIN: Motley Rice to Lead in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CREIGHTON TAKATA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RIOT BLOCKCHAIN, INC.
F/K/A, BIOPTIX, INC., JOHN O'ROURKE, and JEFFREY G. McGONEGAL,
Defendants. JOSEPH J. KLAPPER, JR., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RIOT BLOCKCHAIN, INC.
F/K/A, BIOPTIX, INC., JOHN O'ROURKE, and JEFFREY G. McGONEGAL,
Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 18-2293 (FLW) (TJB), 18-8031 (FLW)
(TJB) (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey (i) consolidated the Related
Actions; and (ii) appointed Dr. Stanley Golovac as the Lead
Plaintiff and the law firm of Motley Rice, LLC as the Lead
Counsel.

Pending before the Court are two separate securities fraud class
action lawsuits filed against the Defendants.  Presently, three
separate Plaintiffs or groups of Plaintiffs move to seek
appointment as the Lead Plaintiff, and separately, appointment of
the Lead Counsel in the Related Actions.  The movants are:
Plaintiffs Simon Lee, Bryan Siegel, and Vivek Singhal ("Lee
Movants") who seek to appoint The Rosen Law Firm P.A. as the Lead
Counsel; Plaintiffs Joseph J. Klapper, Jr., Ashish Rana, and Sonia
C. Estoesta ("Klapper Movants") who seek to appoint Levi &
Korsinsky, LLP as the Lead Counsel; and Dr.Golovac, who seeks to
appoint Motley Rice as the Lead Counsel.  In addition, the Klapper
Movants separately move to consolidate the Related Actions.

Riot, a Nevada corporation with principle executive offices
purportedly in Colorado, builds and supports various blockchain
technologies, and invests primarily in Bitcoin and Ethereum
blockchains.  The Complaints allege that, in October of 2017, the
Company shifted its focus from animal healthcare and veterinary
products to being a strategic investor and operator in the
blockchain ecosystem, and concurrently changed its name from
Bioptix, Inc. to Riot.

The Related Actions allege that, after this name change, Riot
issued a pair of press releases adjourning scheduled annual
stockholder meetings that were set to take place in Boca Raton,
Florida.  Shortly thereafter, CNBC published an article regarding
questionable practices at Riot, reporting that, after its name
change, Riot's stock shot from $8 a share to more than $40, as
investors wanted to cash in on the craze of all things crypto, but
that Riot did not appear to have meaningful involvement in the
cryptocurrency business.

Based in large part on information in the CNBC article, the
Complaints accuse Riot of (1) failing to disclose that Riot's
principle executive offices were not in Colorado, but rather in
Florida, the same location as a large, influential shareholder,
Barry C. Honig, who had a previous working relationship with
Defendant O'Rourke; (2) failing to disclose that Riot never
intended to hold the two canceled annual stockholder meetings; and
(3) making material misstatements about Riot's business,
operations, and prospects.  The Related Actions assert claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On Feb. 17, 2018, the first of the Related Actions ("Takata
Action") was commenced against the Company and certain of its
officers, and/or directors, for violations under the Exchange Act
on behalf of all persons and entities, other than the Defendants
and their affiliates, who purchased publicly traded Riot securities
from Nov. 13, 2017 through Feb. 15, 2018.  That same day, an early
notice was issued, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA"), advising the class members of, inter alia,
the allegations and claims in the Complaint, the Class Period, and
advising class members of their option to seek appointment as the
Lead Plaintiff.  On April 18, 2018, the second of the Related
Actions ("Klapper Action") was filed in the Court, asserting the
same claims based on largely the same facts as in the Takata
Action.  Thereafter, each of the Moving Plaintiffs filed the
present motions.

The Klapper Movants have moved to consolidate the Related Actions
in the case.  No parties have opposed the consolidation motion, and
there is no dispute that these cases involve nearly identical
questions of law and fact.  Each action names the same Defendants,
asserts two counts alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, presents the same or similar theories for
recovery, and is based on the same allegedly wrongful course of
conduct.  Accordingly, Judge Wolfson consolidated both civil
actions for trial purposes.

As to motions to appoint the Lead Plaintiff, the Judge finds that
(i) based on these uncontested loss numbers, Lee Movants suffered
the largest financial loss; (ii) neither the Lee Movants nor the
Klapper Movants are entitled to presumptive Lead Plaintiff status;
and (iii) Dr. Golovac satisfies the typicality requirement because
his claims arise from the same events and course of conduct as the
the other class members.  Because none of the other Moving
Plaintiffs have presented any rebuttal evidence as to why Dr.
Golovac cannot fairly and adequately represent the proposed class,
Dr. Golovac is appointed as the Lead Plaintiff.

Dr. Golovac seeks approval of his counsel, Motley Rice, as the Lead
Counsel.  After reviewing the firm's resume, the Judge is satisfied
that the firm is competent to represent the proposed class, as it
has been selected as lead or co-lead counsel in multiple securities
class actions.  Furthermore, the opposing Plaintiffs do not dispute
the firm's competency.  Accordingly, he approved Dr. Golovac's
selection of Motley Rice as the Lead Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/TE8voB from Leagle.com.

Pao Kue, Movant, represented by DEBORAH R. GOUGH, THE GOUGH LAW
FIRM LLP.

Saroor Alam, Movant, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE
CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

Riot Investor Group, Movant, represented by MICHAEL BENJAMIN
EISENKRAFT -- meisenkraft@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN
SELLERS & TOLL PLLC.

Simon Lee, Bryan Siegel & Vivek Singhal, Movants, represented by
LAURENCE M. ROSEN -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM,
PA.

Dr. Stanley Golovac, Movant, represented by JOSEPH J. DEPALMA --
jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG, LLC.

Wai Lau, Movant, represented by SHERIEF MORSY --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI LLP.

JOSEPH J. KLAPPER, JR., ASHISH RANA & SONIA ESTOESTA, Movants,
represented by DONALD JAMES ENRIGHT , Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

CREIGHTON TAKATA, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN,
THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

JOSEPH J. KLAPPER, JR., Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by
DONALD JAMES ENRIGHT -- denright@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

RIOT BLOCKCHAIN, INC., formerly known as BIOPTIX, INC. & JOHN
O'ROURKE, Defendants, represented by CHAD JOHNSON PETERMAN --
chadpeterman@paulhastings.com -- PAUL HASTINGS LLP.


RYANAIR HOLDINGS: Vincent Wong Files Securities Fraud Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Ryanair Holdings plc
(NASDAQ: RYAAY).  If you suffered a loss you have until the lead
plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead
plaintiff.

Ryanair Holdings plc (NASDAQ: RYAAY)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 9, 2019
Class Period: Purchasers of American Depositary Shares May 30, 2017
- September 28, 2018

Get additional information about RYAAY:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/ryanair-holdings-plc-loss-submission-form?wire=3

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Telephone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


SAM'S EAST: Court Denies Conditional Class Certification in Freeman
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class
Certification of the Fair Labor Standards Act claims as a
collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) in the case
captioned TERRENCE FREEMAN and BRADLEY WARD, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SAM'S EAST INC., et al., Defendants. Civ. No. 2:17-1786 (WJM).
(D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Bradley Ward brings this putative wage and hour class and
collective action, on behalf of himself and all other Fresh
Assistant Managers similarly situated who were employed by
Defendants against Defendants Sam's East Inc., Sam's West, Inc.,
Sam's Club, an operating segment of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Sam's Club).Plaintiff alleges Defendants'
failure to pay overtime wages violates the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA).

The Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of
proof for conditional certification.

The Court agrees.

Use of Exempt Classification

The Plaintiff's reliance on a common exemption status among the
proposed collective members is misplaced. The mere classification
of a group of employees even a large or nationwide group as exempt
under the FLSA is not by itself sufficient to constitute the
necessary evidence of a common policy, plan, or practice that
renders all putative class members as similarly situated' for
Section 216(b) purposes.

The Plaintiff's own evidence demonstrates the need for
individualized inquiry to sustain the FLSA claims.

Use of a Common Job Description and Corporate Policies

The Plaintiff failed to make the requisite factual showing that he
is similarly situated to FAMs nationwide. Indeed, the Plaintiff's
claim rests on his own individualized work experience, in which he
never performed managerial responsibilities and frequently worked
more than forty hours per week.  

But the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that other FAMs
had similar experiences. He essentially asks the Court to assume
that because he performed non-managerial tasks and worked in excess
of forty hours in a workweek, then other FAMs did too.

The Plaintiff points to Defendants' common job description for FAMs
nationwide, but that too also fails to warrant granting
certification.If a uniform job description by itself was
sufficient, every business in corporate America would be subject to
automatic certification of a nationwide collective action on the
basis of the personal experiences of a single misclassified
employee.

The Plaintiff does not allege the tasks described in the FAM job
description themselves are non-exempt, such that performing the
described duties makes FAMs nonexempt employees. He argues instead
to have regularly performed non-exempt tasks, and therefore the
Court should assume other FAMs nationwide perform non-exempt tasks
most of the time. But as noted, such speculation is not proper.

The Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to produce some evidence,
beyond pure speculation of a factual nexus between the manner in
which the employer's alleged policy affected [him] and the manner
in which it affected other employees. Instead, the Plaintiff asks
this Court to infer that because his rights may have been violated,
the rights of thousands of FAMs at almost 600 Sam's Clubs
nationwide were violated. While the Plaintiff need not show that
FAMs nationwide performed mainly non-exempt duties not listed in
the job description, he has yet to provide modest evidence from
which the Court could infer that he and other FAMs were together
victims of a common policy or plan.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification
of the FLSA collective action is denied without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8nsvwan from Leagle.com.

BRADLEY WARD, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by MARC S. HEPWORTH,
HEPWORTH GERSHBAUM & ROTH PLLC & JOSEPH D. MONACO, III , THE LAW
OFFICES OF JOSEPH MONACO, PC.

SAM'S EAST INC., SAM'S WEST INC., SAM'S CLUB, An operating segment
of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. & WAL-MART STORES INC., Defendants,
represented by KRISTINE J. FEHER -- feherk@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG
TRAURIG, LLP, WENDY JOHNSON LARIO -- lariow@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG
TRAURIG, LLP & KELLY D. BUNTING -- buntingk@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig, LLP.


SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Court OKs Dismissal of Gernandt Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned BARTON GERNANDT, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. CIV-15-834-D,
(Consolidated with Case No. CIV-15-892-D, Case No. CIV-15-1001-D).
(W.D. Okla.).

The Plaintiffs are participants and beneficiaries of the SandRidge
Energy, Inc., 401(k) Plan. They allege the Defendants were
responsible for the Plan's investments and breached their fiduciary
duties by, inter alia, retaining SandRidge common stock as an
investment option in the Plan despite its decline and when a
reasonable fiduciary would have done otherwise.

The SandRidge Defendants contend the Plaintiffs have failed to cure
the defects in their original pleading, and again move to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

The Court will grant a motion to dismiss where the complaint lacks
a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts to support
a cognizable legal theory. To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Here, the SandRidge Defendants move to dismiss the amended
complaint on the grounds that (1) the Plaintiffs fail to state a
duty of prudence claim, (2) the Plaintiffs fail to state a duty of
loyalty claim, and (3) the Plaintiffs fail to state a duty to
monitor claim.

The SandRidge Defendants state that the allegations in the amended
complaint are insufficient to state a claim for breach of the duty
of prudence under the Supreme Court's decision in Fifth Third. As
previously noted by the Court, the Supreme Court held that where a
stock is publicly traded, allegations that a fiduciary should have
recognized from publicly available information alone that the
market was over- or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a
general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.
Fifth Third, 134 S.Ct. at 2471.

The Court reasoned that many investors take the view that they have
little hope of outperforming the market in the long run based
solely on their analysis of publicly available information and
accordingly they rely on the security's market price as an unbiased
assessment of the security's value in light of all public
information.

Because a fiduciary usually is not imprudent to assume that a major
stock market provides the best estimate of the value of the stocks
traded on it that is available to him, a plaintiff must point to a
special circumstance affecting the reliability of the market price
as an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all
public information' that would make reliance on the market's
valuation imprudent.

The amended complaint recites how the SandRidge stock ceased
trading on a major market while being held by the Plan, through its
January 2016 delisting, 2015 warnings regarding the imminent
delisting, and status as an unreliable penny stock; how SandRidge's
perilous financial condition caused SandRidge to trade on an
inefficient market; how SandRidge's assets were unproductive, or
minimally productive at current oil prices; how SandRidge's company
attributes were dependent upon oil prices and the precipitous
decline of oil prices; how SandRidge's perilous financial condition
caused its share price to fluctuate wildly; how investors sold
large blocks of shares; and that trading volumes were high.
  
The Plaintiffs' amended complaint cites more of the same events and
circumstances sister courts have declared insufficient to
constitute special circumstances under Fifth Third. As the Court
noted in its order granting Reliance's motion, this result may seem
harsh under the circumstances, but absent further guidance from the
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit, the Court finds Plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and the
SandRidge Defendants' motion is granted on this issue.

Non-Public Information

The Plaintiffs allege that as of August 12, 2012, to minimize
losses to the Plan, the SandRidge Defendants could have taken the
alternate action of lessening the concentration of SandRidge stock
in the company's 401(k) plans and halting further purchases of
company stock based on inside information at the start of, or
during the relevant class period. The Plaintiffs conclude that had
the defendants done so, the market could have plausibly concluded
that the action to freeze further purchases of SandRidge Stock was
taken to diversify the Plan's over concentration in SandRidge
Stock. Accordingly, there would not have been a drop in SandRidge
Stock simply because the Plan's fiduciaries elected to freeze
further purchases of SandRidge Stock.

Likewise, the Court rejects the Plaintiffs' nonpublic-information
claim. The Plaintiffs offer the same alternative action that the
Supreme Court and other federal courts have rejected. The complaint
fails to plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary could not have
concluded that stopping purchases or publicly disclosing negative
information would do more harm than good. Therefore, the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted on this issue.

29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A) spells out the fiduciary duty of
loyalty in this context, and requires an ERISA fiduciary to
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits to participants and the beneficiaries and
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.

Based on its review of the amended complaint, the Court finds this
claim is derivative of the prudence claim discussed above. Absent
sufficient facts alleging an underlying breach of fiduciary duty,
the Court finds the amended complaint fails to state a claim for
breach of the duty of loyalty.  

Likewise, as the amended complaint fails to sufficiently allege a
breach of fiduciary duty, it does not state a breach of the duty to
monitor.  

Accordingly, the SandRidge Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yafjexv2 from
Leagle.com.

Barton Gernandt, Jr, individually and behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jason E. Roselius,
Mattingly & Roselius PLLC, Tanner W. Hicks, Mattingly & Roselius
PLLC, Brian L. Cramer, Cramer PLLC, Donna S. Moffa, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP, Edward W. Ciolko, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check LLP, Emmanuel E. Edem, Norman & Edem PLLC, James A. Maro,
Jr., Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Julie Eve Siebert-Johnson,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Mark K. Gyandoh, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP &Robert I. Harwood, Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, pro hac vice.

Sandridge Energy Inc, Jim J Brewer, Everett R Dobson, William A
Gilliland, Daniel W Jordan, Edward W Moneypenny, Roy T Oliver, Jr,
Jeffrey S Serota, J Michael Stice, Alan J Weber, Dan A Westbrook,
Mary L Whitson, Robert Scott Griffin, Cindy Green, The Employee
Benefits and Compensation Committee of Sandridge Energy Inc. & The
Investment Committee of Sandridge Energy Inc., Defendants,
represented by Alexander K. Talarides, Orrick Herrington &
Sutcliffe,Brandon P. Long, McAfee & Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick
Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D. Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F.
Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

Tom L Ward, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe,Christopher J. Fawal, Latham &
Watkins, David L. Johnson, Latham & Watkins, George S. Corbyn, Jr.,
Corbyn Hampton PLLC, James C. Word, Latham & Watkins, Kenneth P.
Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice, M. Todd
Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe,Margaret A. Tough, Latham &
Watkins, Stephen P. Barry, Latham & Watkins & Steven M. Bauer,
Latham & Watkins.

James D Bennett, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee & Taft,
Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice,
Mark D. Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee &
Taft.


SANOFI AVENTIS: Castillo Appeals Order in Lantus Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Cesar Castillo, Inc., and FWK Holdings LLC filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled In re LANTUS
DIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 1:16-cv-12652-JGD,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Boston.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Magistrate
Judge Judith Gail Dein granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action Complaint
without prejudice.

Plaintiffs FWK Holdings, LLC and Cesar Castillo, Inc., are
purchasers of the insulin glargine products Lantus and Lantus
SoloSTAR, which are used in the treatment of Type I and Type II
diabetes.  They brought a purported class action on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated against Sanofi, the
manufacturer of both products, alleging that Sanofi improperly
delayed the entry into the market of a competitive product
manufactured by Eli Lilly and Co.

In their Amended Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert two
claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Section 2) --
one for monopolization and one for attempted monopolization.  It is
the Plaintiffs' contention that Sanofi prolonged its monopoly for
insulin glargine by (1) improperly listing six patents in the U.S.
Federal Drug Administration's Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations ("Orange Book"); and (2)
pursuing sham litigation against Lilly in which Sanofi asserted
claims of patent infringement, allegedly without any basis.  The
litigation was settled by Sanofi and Lilly shortly before trial.

The appellate case is captioned as In re LANTUS DIRECT PURCHASER
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 18-2086, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CESAR CASTILLO, INC., on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Bradley J. Demuth, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 3rd Ave., 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: bdemuth@nussbaumpc.com

               - and -

          Kristie A. LaSalle, Esq.
          Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Pkwy., Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142-0000
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          E-mail: kristiel@hbsslaw.com
                  tom@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP PC
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9189
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com

Plaintiff-Appellant FWK HOLDINGS LLC, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          John Paul Bjork, Esq.
          David P. Germaine, Esq.
          Joseph M. Vanek, Esq.
          VANEK VICKERS & MASINI PC
          55 W Monroe St., Suite 3500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 404-9644
          E-mail: jbjork@vaneklaw.com
                  dgermaine@vaneklaw.com
                  jvanek@vaneklaw.com

               - and -

          Kristen A. Johnson, Esq.
          Kristie A. LaSalle, Esq.
          Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Pkwy., Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142-0000
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          E-mail: kristenj@hbsslaw.com
                  kristiel@hbsslaw.com
                  tom@hbsslaw.com

Defendant-Appellee SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S., LLC, is represented by:

          Alisha M. Crovetto, Esq.
          Rosanna K. McCalips, Esq.
          Julia E. McEvoy, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          51 Louisiana Ave NW
          Washington, DC 20001-2113
          Telephone: (202) 879-3867
          E-mail: acrovetto@jonesday.com
                  rkmccalips@jonesday.com
                  jmcevoy@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Laura Diss, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          100 High St., 21st Floor
          Boston, MA 02110-1781
          Telephone: (617) 449-6894
          E-mail: lgradel@jonesday.com


SAVANNAH LAW SCHOOL: Appeals Ruling in Cliff Suit to 11th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants JMLS 1422 LLC, John Marshall Law School, John Marshall
Law School LLC, John Marshall Online Inc., John Marshall University
and Savannah Law School, LLC, filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit styled Savannah Law School, LLC, et al. v. Caitlyn
Cliff, et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00104-RSB-JEG, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 15,
2018, Judge R. Stan Baker (i) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand this case to the State Court of Chatham County; (ii)
dismissed as moot the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and (iii)
denied the Plaintiffs' request for expenses including attorney
fees.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action in the State Court
of Chatham County, Georgia, against the Defendants on March 23,
2018, after Defendant Savannah Law School announced its closure.
The Plaintiffs defined their class as all persons, who are citizens
of Georgia and who were enrolled in classes at Savannah Law School
during the 2017-2018 academic year or had applied for admission to
Savannah Law School for the Fall 2018 semester.

The Plaintiffs allege numerous injuries caused by the closing of
the school and bring claims of negligence, breach of contract,
negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.

The Defendants are citizens of the state of Georgia and removed the
case to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441 and 1332 on
May 3, 2018.  In their Notice of Removal, the Defendants put forth
evidence that a named Plaintiff, Peter Leyh, is a citizen of New
Jersey, which they contend gave them a jurisdictional basis to
remove the case.

The appellate case is captioned as Savannah Law School, LLC, et al.
v. Caitlyn Cliff, et al., Case No. 18-90029, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents CAITLYN CLIFF, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; GEORGE DICKENS, III, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; MELANIE FENLEY,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
ZACHARY GRUBER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; PETER LEYH, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; MYLEE MCKINNEY, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; and CASEY TUGGLE, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Thomas Peyton Bell, Esq.
          Stephen G. Lowry, Esq.
          Madeline Elizabeth McNeeley, Esq.
          HARRIS LOWRY MANTON, LLP
          1201 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 900
          Atlanta, GA 30361
          Telephone: (404) 961-7650
          E-mail: peyton@hlmlawfirm.com
                  steve@hlmlawfirm.com
                  molly@hlmlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Robert Harris, Esq.
          HARRIS LOWRY MANTON, LLP
          410 E Broughton St.
          Savannah, GA 31401
          Telephone: (404) 961-7650
          E-mail: jeff@hlmlawfirm.com

Defendants-Petitioners SAVANNAH LAW SCHOOL, LLC, JOHN MARSHALL LAW
SCHOOL LLC, JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL, JOHN MARSHALL UNIVERSITY,
JOHN MARSHALL ONLINE INC. and JMLS 1422 LLC are represented by:

          Todd Michael Baiad, Esq.
          Lucas D. Bradley, Esq.
          BOUHAN FALLIGANT, LLP
          One West Park Ave.
          Savannah, GA 31401
          Telephone: (912) 232-7000
          E-mail: tmbaiad@bouhan.com
                  ldbradley@bouhan.com


SCHMECHTIG LANDSCAPE: Lazcon Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Sergio Armando Lazcon, on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated individuals v. Schmechtig Landscape Company, and Michael
Schmechtig, Case No. 1:18-cv-07428 (N.D. Ill., November 8, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants failed to pay employees
overtime wages for all time worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek in violation of the FLSA and IMWL, and failure to pay the
agreed rate of pay as final compensation under the IWPCA.

The Plaintiff Sergio Amando Lazcon worked as a laborer for the
Defendants, doing lawn maintenance, loading, unloading maintenance
equipment, and other support work for two seasonal periods.

The Defendant Schmechtig Landscaping Company, is a corporation
specializing in landscape design, maintenance, construction,
lighting, irrigation installation, garden services, seasonal
decorating, exterior designs and nursery care.

The Defendant Michael Schmechtig, is the owner and president of
Schmechtig Landscaping Company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Schorsch, Esq.
      DESPRES, SCHWARTZ & GEOGHEGAN LTD.
      77 W. Washington St., Suite 711
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 372-2511
      E-mail: mschorsch@dsgchicago.com

          - and -

      Alexandria Santistevan, Esq.
      FARMWORKER & LANDSCAPER
      ADVOCACY PROJECT
      33 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 900
      Chicago, IL, 60602
      Tel: (312) 784-3541
      E-mail: litigation@flapillinois.org


SNAP-ON EQUIPMENT: Frazier Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------
Frederick Frazier, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. Snap-On Equipment, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-00779, (E.D. Ark., October 19, 2018) seeks monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees as a result of failure to pay lawful
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours per
week under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act.

Defendant owns and operates an automotive repair company that
provides automotive wheel service and collision repair equipment to
its customers where Frazier most recently worked in the tire
changing department. He claims to have regularly worked in excess
of forty hours per week without being paid overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      Chris Burks, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      One Financial Center
      650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
             chris@sanfordlawfirm.com


SOBEKIDS INC: Fails to Pay OT to Cooks, Fernandez Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SOBEKIDS INC. d/b/a MARIO THE
BAKER; and SHALOM EINHORN, Defendants, Case No. 0:18-cv-62616-BB
(S.D. Fla., Oct. 30, 2018) is an action against the Defendant's
failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Fernandez was employed by the Defendants as cook.

Sobekids Inc. d/b/a Mario The Baker is a Florida corporation,
having its main place of business in Broward County, Florida. The
Company is a pizza and an Italian restaurant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


SONUS NETWORKS: Levi & Korsinsky Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Sonus Networks, Inc.
(NASDAQ: SONS).  Shareholders interested in serving as lead
plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the court and
further details about the cases can be found at the links provided.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

Sonus Networks, Inc. (NASDAQ: SONS) (as of October 30, 2017, now
Ribbon Communications, Inc. and trading as NASDAQ: RBBN)
Class Period: January 8, 2015 - March 24, 2015
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 7, 2019
Join the action:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/sonus-networks-inc-loss-form?wire=3

The lawsuit alleges: Sonus Networks, Inc. made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
the Company would fall materially short of its $74 million revenue
forecast; (2) defendants knew that unrealistic revenue and
profitability forecasts remained aspirational and largely
unreachable, a fact that senior sales personnel regularly
communicated to Defendants; (3) a number of 2015 sales had been
"pulled forward" to buoy sales numbers in Q4 2014, at management's
express direction, and (4) the "backlog" of sales expected to be
recognized in early 2015 was significantly lower than usual.

To learn more about the Sonus Networks, Inc. class action contact
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request the court
appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

To learn more about the Fitbit Inc. class action contact
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


STITCH FIX: Court Vacates Initial CMC in Weismann Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, issued an Order vacating the Initial
Management Conference in the case captioned STEVEN WEISMANN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. STITCH FIX, INC., KATRINA LAKE, PAUL YEE and MIKE C.
SMITH, Defendant. Case No. 4:18-cv-06565-HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws was filed in the action styled Weismann v.
Stitch Fix, Inc. et al., No. 4:18-cv-06565-HSG.
The Plaintiff has not yet served the Complaint on any Defendant.

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Defendants will be required to answer or otherwise respond to the
Plaintiff's Complaint within 21 days of service.

Another Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws concerning substantially the same parties and
events was filed in the action styled Sawicki v. Stitch Fix, Inc.
et al, No. 3:18-cv-06208-JD.

This Court issued an Order, scheduling an Initial Case Management
Conference for February 5, 2019 along with related Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) deadlines.

The parties agree that, in light of the deadline to file a motion
to appoint lead plaintiff and lead counsel, and in the interest of
judicial economy, the Defendants are not be required to, and will
not waive any rights, arguments, or defenses by not answering,
moving against, or otherwise responding to the pending Complaint in
the action styled Weismann v. Stitch Fix, Inc. et al., No.
4:18-cv-062565-HSG.

The Initial Case Management Conference currently scheduled for
February 5, 2019, along with any associated deadlines under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules (including ADR
deadlines), is vacated and reset after appointment of lead
plaintiff and lead counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycjef56k from Leagle.com.

Steven Weismann, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice,Jeremy A. Lieberman
-- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Jennifer
Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Stitch Fix, Inc., Katrina Lake, Paul Yee & Mike C. Smith,
Defendants, represented by Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria --
jvs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
disclosed the filing of a class action lawsuit against Synchrony
Financial ("Synchrony" or "the Company") (NYSE: SYF) for violations
of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between October 21,
2016 and November 1, 2018, inclusive (the ''Class Period''), are
encouraged to contact the firm before January 2, 2019.             
                     

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Synchrony falsely assured the public that
its strong underwriting practices had resulted in a portfolio of
loans that was of higher quality than that of its competitors. The
Company had actually relaxed standards and issued credit cards to
higher-risk borrowers in an effort to sustain growth. After the
Company disclosed poor loan performance on April 28, 2017,
Synchrony declared that it had tightened its credit standards, but
falsely represented those changes as minor. Synchrony had in fact
made significant changes to underwriting standards, and concealed
from the public that those changes damaged its relationship with
key retail partners, including Walmart. When the market learned the
truth about Synchrony, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: 310-301-3335
                    424-303-1964
         Email: info@schallfirm.com
                brian@schallfirm.com.
                sherin@schallfirm.com [GN]


TALMER BANORP: Court Stays Bid to Dismiss Livonia's Federal Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Northern Division, issued an Order holding in abeyance
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned CITY OF LIVONIA
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v TALMER BANORP, INC., et
al., Defendant. Case No. 16-12229. (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Livonia Employees' Retirement System (Livonia) filed a
Complaint against Defendants Talmer Bancorp (Talmer), individual
members of Talmer Bancorp's Board of Directors (Talmer Board), and
Chemical Financial Corporation (Chemical).  Livonia is a
shareholder of Talmer. Livonia brought suit challenging Chemical's
merger with Talmer. It alleges that Defendants are responsible for
a false and misleading proxy and thus violated Section14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 14a-9.

A pleading fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if it does
not contain allegations that support recovery under any
recognizable legal theory. In essence, the pleading must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face and the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Defendants argue that Livonia's claims are precluded by the prior
state court proceedings. They then argue that regardless of whether
Livonia's claims are precluded, Livonia has not stated a claim for
relief. Both arguments will be addressed in turn.

Preclusion prevents a previously adjudged claim or issue from being
decided again in a subsequent case. A right, question or fact
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit
between the same parties or their privies.

Defendants argue that Livonia's claims are precluded by res
judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue
preclusion). Both arguments will be addressed in turn.

Res judicata prevents a party from bringing a claim that has
already been resolved in a prior judgment. Under Michigan law, a
prior judgment will have preclusive effect upon a subsequent claim
when: (1) the first action was decided on the merits (2) the matter
at issue in the second case was or could have been resolved in the
first and (3) both actions involve the same parties.  

Livonia's claim is not precluded because it could not have raised
its 1934 Act claim in Michigan state court. 15 U.S.C. Section
78aa(a) grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims
brought under the 1934 Act. Livonia is bringing its claims under
Section14(a) and Section20(a) of the 1934 Act. Livonia could not
have brought these claims in the prior state court proceedings
because the claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. The state court would have lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to decide the claim.

Thus, the claim fails under the second element of Michigan's law of
claim preclusion and cannot be dismissed under this doctrine.

Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue of
law or fact that a prior case has already resolved.  Among other
things, this prevents parties from litigating an issue in federal
court that has already been resolved by a state court. However,
unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel may preclude a party from
litigating a claim that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts when a state court has already made a
determination on the same factual issues. This requires a careful
analysis to ensure that the issue is the same in both the prior
state court decision and the current federal court proceeding.  

Under Michigan law, issue preclusion applies when 1) there is
identity of parties across the proceedings, 2) there was a valid,
final judgment in the first proceeding, 3) the same issue was
actually litigated and necessarily determined in the first
proceeding, and 4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
earlier proceeding.

The first factor requires identity of parties across the
proceedings.

The parties are not precisely identical between the state court
proceedings and the current federal court proceeding. However,
substantial identity, not precise identity, is all that is
required. Substantial identity is achieved here. The plaintiffs in
all proceedings were Talmer shareholders. The defendants in all
proceedings were associated with Talmer, Chemical, KB, and the
merger at issue. Thus, there is an identity of parties across the
proceedings.

The second element requires a valid, final judgment in the first
proceeding. A ruling of summary disposition is usually deemed a
valid final judgment.   However, the ruling is not final for
purposes of collateral estoppel while it is under appeal.  In the
prior state court proceedings, Judge Potts granted summary
disposition in favor of Defendants. However, her judgments are not
final for purposes of collateral estoppel because they are
currently on appeal before the Michigan Court of Appeals.
  
For this reason, the case will be stayed pending appeal. As
explained above and below, the other elements of collateral
estoppel are fulfilled. However, it would be premature to conclude
that Livonia's claim is precluded by collateral estoppel when it
lacks the element of finality.

Under the third element, the same issue was actually litigated and
necessarily determined in the first proceeding. The key issue in
this case is whether the proxy statement contained misleading
information or omitted material information. This fact is essential
to resolving Count I of Livonia's amended complaint. In it, Livonia
alleges that Defendants violated 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14a-9, which
reads:

No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to
correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to
the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter
which has become false or misleading.

Livonia alleges that Defendants violated this provision by
including misleading information in the proxy statement and failing
to disclose material information.  

However, Judge Potts resolved these issues in her prior rulings.
During those proceedings, Livonia claimed that the members of the
Talmer Board breached their fiduciary duties and that KBW aided and
abetted them in this breach.  

On the issue of KBW's relationship with Chemical, Judge Potts
determined that KBW's potential conflicts of interest were fully
disclosed to the Talmer Board and shareholders. This was confirmed
by multiple sources, including the affidavit of James Harasimowicz,
managing director of KBW. He attested that Chemical never engaged
KBW to assist with the Talmer merger.  

Judge Potts also addressed the issue of the viability of KBW's
financial analysis. She found that Talmer's decision to cease its
prior acquisition strategy was disclosed in the supplemental proxy
statement. Furthermore, Livonia in its state court amended
complaint admitted that Talmer disclosed through the proxy
statement that its financial projections did not incorporate any
further acquisitions for Talmer.

In Count II of its complaint, Livonia alleges that Defendants,
acting as controlling persons, were responsible for the misleading
statements and material omissions in the proxy statement. However,
Judge Potts already determined that the proxy statement did not
contain any misleading statements or material omissions. Livonia
argues that this issue differs between the state court proceeding
and the current federal court proceeding because the standard of
liability is different.

Under Michigan law, the plaintiff must prove that defendants
intentionally inflicted harm on shareholders. Under the 1934 Act,
the plaintiff must prove only that defendants acted at least
negligently.  However, the level of liability is irrelevant because
Judge Potts already determined that the proxy statement did not
contain any misleading statements or material omissions. This
forecloses the need to determine liability because there were no
misstatements or omissions in the first place.

Livonia has advanced the same issues that it presented in state
court. In that instance, it raised the issues in the context of a
breach of fiduciary duties. Here, Livonia presents them in the
context of the 1934 Act. However, this does not change the fact
that they remain the same issues that Judge Potts already ruled
upon. This Court cannot pass judgment upon them a second time.

Under the fourth element, the parties must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. Livonia argues that it did not
have the opportunity to litigate the issues in this case because
Judge Potts did not address all of its allegations in her decision.
   

Livonia litigated its claims in the two prior state court
proceedings. Judge Potts gave Livonia the opportunity to file its
complaints and responses and to participate in hearings. Contrary
to its arguments, Livonia was given a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues of this case during the state court
proceedings.

The Defendants argue that regardless of whether the prior state
court judgments are preclusive, Livonia has failed to state a claim
for relief. This argument will not be addressed because but for the
appeal pending before the Michigan Court of Appeals, Livonia's
claims would be precluded at this time by collateral estoppel.  

The case will be stayed until the Michigan Court of Appeals has
addressed the pending appeals.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss, is held in abeyance
until the Michigan Court of Appeals has issued judgment on the
prior state court judgments.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd3s95an from Leagle.com.

Livonia Employees' Retirement System, Plaintiff, represented by
David T. Wissbroecker, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, & Marc L.
Newman -- mln@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm.

Talmer Bancorp, Inc., Gary Torgow, David T. Provost, Gary S.
Collins, Max A. Berlin, Jennifer M. Granholm, Paul E. Hodges III,
Ronald A. Klein, Barbara J. Mahone, Robert H. Naftaly, Albert W.
Papa, Thomas L. Schellenberg & Arthur A. Weiss, Defendants,
represented by Joni S. Jacobsen -- joni.jacobsen@dechert.com --
Dechert LLP, Matthew George Mrkonic -- mmrkonic@honigman.com --
Honigman Miller & Michael G. Brady -- mbrady@wnj.com -- Warner,
Norcross.

Chemical Financial Corporation, Defendant, represented by Michael
G. Brady, Warner, Norcross & Thomas M. Amon -- tamon@wnj.com --
Warner Norcross & Judd LLP.

City of Livonia Employees Retirement System, Movant, represented by
David T. Wissbroecker, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.


UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Injunction Against DACA Rescission
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction


This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court's
judgment granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

It is no hyperbole to say that Dulce Garcia embodies the American
dream. Born into poverty, Garcia and her parents shared a San Diego
house with other families to save money on rent; she was even
homeless for a time as a child. But she studied hard and excelled
academically in high school. When her family could not afford to
send her to the top university where she had been accepted, Garcia
enrolled in a local community college and ultimately put herself
through a four-year university, where she again excelled while
working full-time as a legal assistant.

Recognizing the cruelty and wastefulness of deporting productive
young people to countries with which they have no ties, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a policy in 2012 that
would provide some relief to individuals like Garcia, while
allowing American communities to continue to benefit from their
contributions.  Known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or
DACA, the program allows those non-citizens who unwittingly entered
the United States as children, who have clean criminal records, and
who meet various educational or military service requirements to
apply for two-year renewable periods of deferred action a revocable
decision by the government not to deport an otherwise removable
person from the country.

But after a change in presidential administrations, in 2017 the
government moved to end the DACA program. Why? According to the
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, upon the legal advice of the
Attorney General, DACA was illegal from its inception, and
therefore could no longer continue in effect.

The Court reviews the district court's decision to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.

The threshold question in this case is in many ways also the most
pivotal: is Acting Secretary Duke's decision to rescind the DACA
program reviewable by the courts at all?

The government contends that both the APA and the INA bar judicial
review.

Reviewability under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

The APA provides for broad judicial review of agency action: A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.

Moreover, allowing judicial review under these circumstances serves
the critical function of promoting accountability within the
Executive Branch not accountability to the courts, but democratic
accountability to the people. Accountability in this sense is
fundamental to the legitimacy of the administrative system:
although they are unelected bureaucrats, the heads of cabinet-level
departments like DHS are subject to the exercise of political
oversight and share the President's accountability to the people.
Indeed, the Constitution's Appointments Clause was designed to
ensure public accountability for the making of a bad appointment.

This democratic responsiveness is especially critical for agencies
exercising prosecutorial functions because, as Justice Scalia
explained in his oft-cited dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), under the American system
of government, the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a
political one. This check works because when crimes are not
investigated and prosecuted fairly, non-selectively, with a
reasonable sense of proportion, the President pays the cost in
political damage to his administration. In other words, when
prosecutorial functions are exercised in a manner that is within
the law but is nevertheless repugnant to the sensibilities of the
people, the unfairness will come home to roost in the Oval Office.

But public accountability for agency action can only be achieved if
the electorate knows how to apportion the praise for good measures
and the blame for bad ones. Without knowing the true source of an
objectionable agency action, the public cannot determine on whom
the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of
pernicious measures ought really to fall. In then-Professor Kagan's
words, the degree to which the public can understand the sources
and levers of bureaucratic action is a fundamental precondition of
accountability in administration.

The easy rejoinder to the government's insistence that the Acting
Secretary rescinded DACA due to litigation risks is that the Acting
Secretary did not mention litigation risks as a consideration.

And both considerations actually enumerated by the Acting Secretary
are most naturally read as supporting a rationale based on DACA's
illegality. The ongoing litigation referenced is of course Texas v.
United States, in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a preliminary
injunction against the related DAPA policy, and the Supreme Court
affirmed by an equally divided vote. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016);
Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).

The rulings in that case are propositions of law taken alone, they
are more readily understood as supporting a legal conclusion, DACA
is illegal, than a pragmatic one, DACA might be enjoined. The
pragmatic interpretation requires extra analytical steps (someone
might sue to enjoin DACA, and they might win that are entirely
absent from the list of factors that the Acting Secretary stated
she was taking into consideration in making her decision. Acting
Secretary Duke easily could have included the prospect of
litigation challenging DACA in her list of considerations; had she
done so, then perhaps the reference to the Texas litigation could
be read as supporting a practical worry about an injunction. Absent
that, however, the mention of the courts' rulings is best read as
referencing the courts' legal conclusions.

Attorney General Sessions's September 4, 2017, letter likewise
focuses on the supposed illegality of DACA, rather than any alleged
litigation risk. Its substantive paragraph states, DACA was
effectuated without proper statutory authority and with no
established end-date, after Congress's repeated rejection of
proposed legislation that would have accomplished a similar result.
Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an
unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.

These sentences unmistakably reflect the Attorney General's belief
that DACA was illegal and therefore beyond the power of DHS to
institute or maintain. The letter goes on to opine that because the
DACA policy has the same legal and constitutional defects that the
courts recognized as to DAPA in the Texas litigation, it is likely
that potentially imminent litigation would yield similar results
with respect to DACA. But in the context of the full paragraph, the
reference to similar results is best read not as an independent
reason for rescinding DACA, but as a natural consequence of DACA's
supposed illegality which is the topic of the paragraph as a whole.
In the words of Judge Garaufis of the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, that reference is too thin a reed to
bear the weight of Defendants' litigation risk' argument.

The Court agrees with the district court that the Acting Secretary
based the rescission of DACA solely on a belief that DACA was
beyond the authority of DHS.  

Jurisdiction under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)

The government contends that the INA stripped the district court of
its jurisdiction in a provision that states:

Except as provided in this section which sets out avenues of review
not applicable here no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Secretary of Homeland Security to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.

The Supreme Court has explicitly held that this section applies
only to three discrete actions that the Secretary may take: her
decision or action' to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders. AADC, 525 U.S. at 482

The government argues that AADC's reasoning and therefore Section
1252(g) applies to the rescission of DACA, which is itself in some
sense a no deferred action decision. It seems quite clear, however,
that AADC reads Section 1252(g) as responding to litigation over
individual no deferred action decisions, rather than a programmatic
shift like the DACA rescission.

The government cites no cases applying the Section 1252(g) bar to a
programmatic policy decision about deferred action; the two cases
it does cite were challenges to individual no deferred action
decisions that is, they fall exactly within Section 1252(g) as
interpreted by the Court in AADC.

Especially in light of the strong presumption in favor of judicial
review of administrative action' governing the construction of
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA, the Court holds that
Section 1252(g) does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to review
the DACA rescission order.

The district court held that plaintiffs satisfied the familiar
four-factor preliminary injunction standard with respect to their
claim under the APA that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.

Attorney General Sessions's September 4, 2017, letter expresses
several possible bases for the agency's ultimate conclusion that
DACA was unlawful. First, the Attorney General states that DACA was
effectuated by the previous administration through executive action
after Congress's repeated rejection of proposed legislation that
would have accomplished a similar result.

The Attorney General's primary bases for concluding that DACA was
illegal were that the program was effectuated without proper
statutory authority and that it amounted to an unconstitutional
exercise of authority.

The claim of constitutional defects is a puzzling one because as
all the parties recognize, no court has ever held that Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans  (DAPA) is unconstitutional. The
Fifth Circuit and district court in Texas explicitly declined to
address the constitutional issue. Indeed, the government makes no
attempt in this appeal to defend the Attorney General's assertion
that the DACA program is unconstitutional. The Court therefore do
not address it further.

With respect to DACA's alleged legal defects, the district court
explained in great detail the long history of deferred action in
immigration enforcement, including in the form of broad programs;
the fact that the Supreme Court and Congress have both acknowledged
deferred action as a feature of the immigration system; and the
specific statutory responsibility of the Secretary of Homeland
Security for establishing national immigration enforcement policies
and priorities. The government does not contest any of these
propositions, which themselves go a long way toward establishing
DACA's legality. Instead, the government argues that the Fifth
Circuit's reasons for striking down the related DAPA policy would
also apply to DACA.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA was unlawful on two grounds:
first, that DAPA was in fact a legislative rule and therefore
should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking;
and second, that DAPA was substantively inconsistent with the INA.


It is therefore no surprise that deferred action has been a feature
of our immigration system albeit one of executive invention for
decades; has been employed categorically on numerous occasions; and
has been recognized as a practical reality by both Congress and the
courts. In a world where the government can remove only a small
percentage of the undocumented noncitizens present in this country
in any year, deferred action programs like DACA enable DHS to
devote much-needed resources to enforcement priorities such as
threats to national security, rather than blameless and
economically productive young people with clean criminal records.

The Court therefore concludes thats DACA was a permissible exercise
of executive discretion, notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that the related DAPA program exceeded DHS's statutory
authority.

Having concluded that the district court was correct in its APA
merits holding, the Ninth Circuit now turns to the question of the
appropriate remedy. The district court preliminarily enjoined the
rescission of DACA with respect to existing beneficiaries on a
nationwide basis. The government asserts that this was error, and
that a proper injunction would be narrower.

The general rule regarding the scope of preliminary injunctive
relief is that it should be no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs before
the court.

In its briefing, the government fails to explain how the district
court could have crafted a narrower injunction that would provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs, including the entity plaintiffs.
Nor does it provide compelling reasons to deviate from the normal
rule in APA cases, or to disregard the need for uniformity in
national immigration policy. The one argument it does offer on this
latter point that deferred action is itself a departure from
vigorous and uniform enforcement of the immigration laws and that
enjoining the rescission of DACA on a nationwide basis increases
rather than lessens that departure is a red herring. DACA is a
national immigration policy, and an injunction that applies that
policy to some individuals while rescinding it as to others is
inimical to the principle of uniformity.

The Court therefore concludes that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's November 8, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycpg8kmk from Leagle.com.

The appeals cases are captioned REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA; JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as President
of the University of California, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her official
capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Defendants-Appellants. STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF
MAINE; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF MARYLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her
official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellants. CITY OF
SAN JOSE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the
United States, in his official capacity; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her
official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellants. DULCE
GARCIA; MIRIAM GONZALEZ AVILA; SAUL JIMENEZ SUAREZ; VIRIDIANA
CHABOLLA MENDOZA; JIRAYUT LATTHIVONGSKORN; NORMA RAMIREZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONALD J. TRUMP,
in his official capacity as President of the United States; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her official
capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Defendants-Appellants. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; SERVICE
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 521, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the
United States; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General;
KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, Defendants-Appellants. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA; JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as President
of the University of California; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF
MAINE; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF MARYLAND; CITY OF SAN JOSE;
DULCE GARCIA; MIRIAM GONZALEZ AVILA; SAUL JIMENEZ SUAREZ; VIRIDIANA
CHABOLLA MENDOZA; JIRAYUT LATTHIVONGSKORN; NORMA RAMIREZ; COUNTY OF
SANTA CLARA; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 521,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONALD J. TRUMP,
in his official capacity as President of the United States; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her official
capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Defendants-Appellants. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA; JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as President
of the University of California; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF
MAINE; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF MARYLAND; CITY OF SAN JOSE;
DULCE GARCIA; MIRIAM GONZALEZ AVILA; SAUL JIMENEZ SUAREZ; VIRIDIANA
CHABOLLA MENDOZA; JIRAYUT LATTHIVONGSKORN; NORMA RAMIREZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONALD J.
TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her
official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Defendants-Appellees. DULCE GARCIA; MIRIAM GONZALEZ
AVILA; SAUL JIMENEZ SUAREZ; VIRIDIANA CHABOLLA MENDOZA; NORMA
RAMIREZ; JIRAYUT LATTHIVONGSKORN; COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; SERVICE
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 521, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity
as President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, in her official capacity as Acting
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 18-15068, 18-15069, 18-15070, 18-15071,
18-15072, 18-15128, 18-15133, 18-15134. (9th Cir.)

Hashim M. Mooppan (argued), Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
Thomas Pulham, Abby C. Wright, and Mark B. Stern, Appellate Staff;
Alex G. Tse, Acting United States Attorney; Chad A. Readler, Acting
Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants.

Michael J. Mongan (argued), Deputy Solicitor General; Samuel P.
Siegel, Associate Deputy Solicitor General; James F. Zahradka II,
Deputy Attorney General; Michael L. Newman, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General; Edward C. DuMont, Solicitor General; Xavier
Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, San
Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee State of California.

Susan P. Herman, Deputy Attorney General; Janet T. Mills, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, Maine; for
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Maine.

Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General; Lori Swanson, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; for
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Minnesota.
Leah J. Tullin, Assistant Attorney General; Steven M. Sullivan,
Solicitor General; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General; Attorney
General's Office, Baltimore, Maryland; for Plaintiff-Appellee State
of Maryland.

Joan R. Li  -- jli@cooley.com -- Kara C. Wilson --
kwilson@cooley.com -- Monique R. Sherman  -- msherman@cooley.com --
and Maureen P. Alger – malger@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Palo
Alto, California, for Amici Curiae Legal Services Organizations.

Mary Kelley Persyn, Persyn Law & Policy, San Francisco, California,
for Amici Curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of
Children and California Professional Society on the Abuse of
Children.

Christopher J. Hajec, Immigration Reform Law Institute, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Immigration Reform Law Institute.


VISIONQUEST NATIONAL: Williams Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
JAKIA WILLIAMS, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), the Plaintiff, v.
VISIONQUEST NATIONAL, LTD., the Defendant, Case 3:18-cv-03000-N
(N.D. Tex., Nov. 8, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under Sections 207
and 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant employed Plaintiff and
Class Members for hours longer than 40 hours in a workweek. During
their employment, the Plaintiff and Class Members regularly worked
more than 40 hours in workweeks during the three-year period
preceding the filing of this lawsuit.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Drew N. Herrmann, Esq.
          Pamela G. Herrmann, Esq.
          HERRMANN LAW, PLLC
          801 Cherry St., Suite 2365
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: 817 479-9229
          Facsimile: 817 887-1878
          E-mail: drew@herrmannlaw.com
                  pamela@herrmannlaw.com

W.E. BANQUETS: Workers Seek $51K Judgment in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLARA DE LA ROSA, on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. W.E. BANQUETS, LLC,
and MARIO FERRARO, individually, Defendants, Case No. 17 CV 8448
(N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs request Judge John Robert Blakey of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, to enter an Order of Judgment jointly and severally
against the Defendants in the amount of $51,057.69 for unpaid
overtime, unlawful deductions, unpaid vacation, retaliation and
statutory damages and interest and in the amount of $8,195 for the
Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

The lawsuit arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act ("IWPCA"), and under Illinois common law for: 1) the
Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages for all
time worked in excess of 40 hours in individual work weeks in
violation of the FLSA and IMWL; 2) the Defendants' practice of
making unlawful deductions from the Plaintiff's wages; 3) the
Defendants' practice of failing to pay the Plaintiff for all
accrued vacation pay as part of their final wages; and 4) the
Defendants' unlawful retaliation against the Plaintiff.

The lawsuit was filed on Nov. 21, 2017 against W.E. Banquets.  On
Feb. 14, 2018, an Order of Default was entered against W.E.
Banquets.

The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the matter adding Mario
Ferraro as a Defendant on May 25, 2018.  As alleged in the
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Defendant Ferraro is a
principal officer of W.E. Banquets, as well as a principal manager
involved in W.E. Banquet's day to day operations.

On Aug. 20, 2018, after multiple attempts by the Plaintiff to serve
Ferraro, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Serve Mr.
Ferraro by Alternative Means.   As set forth in the Court's Aug.
20, 2018 Order, by Sept. 11, 2018, Mr. Ferraro was served via by
U.S. regular mail and U.S. certified mail to 6839 N. Milwaukee
Ave., Niles, Illinois, 60714, and by email to Mr. Ferraro's email
address obtained by Special Process Server Mark Edds.

Mr. Ferraro's answer or other responsive pleading to the
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was due on Oct. 2, 2018.  Mr.
Ferraro did not file a responsive answer or other responsive
pleading.  To date, he has not appeared in the matter, either
directly or through a representative, and no one has contacted the
Plaintiff's counsel on his behalf.

Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
enters an Order of Default against Defendant Mario Ferraro in the
matter.  The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the total
amount of $51,057.69 broken down as follows: (i) $15,676.71 for
owed overtime wages and damages ($6,432.86 in unpaid overtime
wages, $6,432.86 as liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA,
$2,677.53 in statutory interest pursuant to the IMWL); (ii) $90 for
three unauthorized deductions of $30 each pursuant to the IWPCA;
(iii) $422.80 for one week of unpaid vacation; and (iv) $35,181.64
(the equivalent of 52 weeks of wages at her regular weekly earnings
of $676.57).  In addition, the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
for her reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,675 and
costs of $520.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order
of Judgment jointly and severally against the Defendants in the
amount of $51,057.69 for unpaid overtime, unlawful deductions,
unpaid vacation, retaliation and statutory damages and interest and
in the amount of $8,195 for the Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rGhUsw from Leagle.com.

Clara De La Rosa, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Alvar Ayala, Workers' Law
Office, P.C. & Christopher J. Williams -- cwilliams@airdberlis.com
-- Workers' Law Office, PC.


WELBILT INC: Kahn Swick Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until January 8, 2019 to file lead plaintiff applications
in a securities class action lawsuit against Welbilt, Inc. (NYSE:
WBT), if they purchased the Company's shares between February 24,
2017 and November 2, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").  This
action is pending in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.

If you purchased shares of Welbilt and would like to discuss your
legal rights and how this case might affect you and your right to
recover for your economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost
to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at
1-877-515-1850 or via email (lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-wbt/ to learn more. If you
wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you must
petition the Court by January 8, 2019.

About the Lawsuit

Welbilt and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On November 5, 2018, the Company disclosed that it would be
restating its YE December 31, 2016 financial statements and was
expecting to revise its statements for YE December 31, 2015 and
2017 because "During the third quarter of 2018, the Company
identified errors in the tax basis of a foreign subsidiary and
incorrect amortization of the intangible assets held by the same
entity…In addition, the Company discovered certain intercompany
transactions were not recorded on a timely basis."

On this news, the price of Welbilt's shares plummeted.

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
         New Orleans, LA 70163
         Telephone: 1-877-515-1850
         Email: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


XANITOS INC: Faces Latest Potential Class Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Stephen Mayhew, writing for Biometric Update.com, reports that
Pennsylvania-based hospital housekeeping company Xanitos Inc. is
the latest company hit with a potential class-action law suit under
Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) for alleged
violations relating to its employee timekeeping system, JD Supra
reports.

According to the suit, Xanitos required fingerprint scans for
employees clocking in and out of shifts, but did not provide
employees with notice or obtain the proper written consent for
collecting biometric data, or disclose a retention schedule for
that data. The plaintiff is seeking the $1,000 per violation
maximum plus attorney's fees and costs for each proposed member of
the class, which would include any Illinois resident who had
biometrics collected by Xanitos.

Allowable damages are up to $1,000 per violation, unless they are
considered reckless or intentional, in which case the limit rises
to $5,000 each.

SB 3053, a bill which would amend BIPA to exempt companies from
compliance under a range of circumstances, including biometric use
for employee time and attendance and fraud prevention, has
languished in the state legislature since being re-referred to
Assignments in April.

The Internet Association weighed in on Facebook's ongoing BIPA
lawsuit, saying it could have a chilling effect on biometrics
use.[GN]


ZIMMER BIOMET: Calif. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Karl FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES KARL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; ZIMMER US, INC., a Delaware corporation;
BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; and BIOMET, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendants, Case
No. C 18-04176 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied the
Defendants motions to transfer venue, dismiss and/or strike.

Karl is a resident of Novato, California.  The Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants misclassified him and other sales
representatives as independent contractors.  Based on this, he
raises claims for relief for violations of the FLSA, Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Order 4-2001, the California Labor Code for
unpaid wages and overtime premiums, and related California Labor
Code claims including: meal and rest period violations, failure to
provide itemized wage statements, failure to reimburse business
expenses, and related civil and statutory penalties.  Seeking to
represent a putative class, the Plaintiff filed the action in the
Northern District of California.

In August 2015, Karl signed a sales associate agreement with
Defendants Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation;
Zimmer US, Inc., a Delaware corporation; Biomet U.S.
Reconstruction, LLC, an Indiana limited liability company; Biomet
Biologics, LLC, an Indiana limited liability company; and Biomet,
Inc., an Indiana corporation.  He thereafter began working for the
Defendants as a sales representative in California.  The agreement
classified the Plaintiff and other California-based sales
representatives as independent contractors and included a
forum-selection clause identifying Indiana as the exclusive forum.

The Defendants now move to transfer, dismiss, and/or strike.

Among other things, Judge Alsup finds that the Plaintiff's argument
that his potential PAGA claim precludes transfer is incorrect as
California district courts routinely transfer PAGA actions to other
courts outside of California.  California's strong public policy,
however, shows that the local interest in adjudicating the action
is great.  Section 925 expresses California's interest in
preventing contractual circumvention of its labor law -- tipping
the scales against transfer.  Accordingly, the Defendants' motion
to transfer venue pursuant to Section 1404(a) is denied.

Because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred in and around San Francisco, the Northern
District of California is a proper venue under Section 1391(b)(2).
Since venue is proper, the Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(3) is also denied.

The Judge also finds that the factual allegations not only support
the inference that the Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours in
one specific week, but that he did so each work-week from 2015
through the present day and the Defendant failed to pay him
overtime in each of those weeks.  Under Landers, that allegation is
sufficient.  Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's first and second claims for relief is denied.

The Judge also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's
third and fourth claims for relief.  The Plaintiff alleges that no
meal breaks were provided at all.  That claim is adequately pled
under Brinker.  For the same reasons, the Plaintiff has adequately
pled that the Defendants did not provide him with the rest period
as required by the wage order.   And because the Plaintiff has
specifically identified particular expenses in his complaint, the
Judge denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
sixth claim for relief.

Finally, for now, at the pleading stage, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff has met his burden to plead with sufficient particularity
to put the Defendants on notice as required by Rule 9(g).
Accordingly, he denied the Defendants' motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9akAlv from Leagle.com.

James Karl, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a class of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alec Llewellyn
Segarich -- alec.segarich@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich
LLP, Denis S. Kenny -- denis@sfcounsel.com -- Scherer & Smith, LLP
& Jason Shelton Lohr -- jason.lohr@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti &
Segarich LLP.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Zimmer US,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Biomet Inc., an Indiana Corporation,
Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company & Biomet Biologics, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company, Defendants, represented by Eric Meckley --
eric.meckley@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP &
Joseph Raymond Lewis -- joseph.lewis@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis.


ZUFFA LLC: Plaintiffs Postpone December Information Session
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel in the pending class
action lawsuit against Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate Fighting
Championship ("UFC") have postponed the information session for
members of the proposed class (i.e., all fighters who competed in
UFC bouts or had their identity rights used or taken by the UFC,
after December 16, 2010) that was scheduled to take place in Las
Vegas on December 5, 2018, at the law offices of Wolf, Rifkin,
Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP. The session is being postponed
because the Court recently scheduled a hearing on Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment for December 14, 2018 at 2:00 PM, at the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada in Las Vegas, after which there
will be more information to share with members of the proposed
class.

Plaintiffs' Counsel will provide a new date for the class member
information session after the December 14 hearing.

The case -- Le, et al. v. Zuffa, LLC -- is pending before Judge
Richard Boulware in federal court in Nevada. The Named Plaintiffs
are Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, Jon Fitch, Brandon Vera, Luis Javier
Vazquez, and Kyle Kingsbury. The Court has appointed three interim
co-lead counsel to represent the class. Those firms are: Berger
Montague PC, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, and the Joseph
Saveri Law Firm, Inc. Other counsel for the Plaintiffs include
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP and Warner Angle
Hallam Jackson & Formanek PLC.

         Eric L. Cramer
         Managing Shareholder
         Berger Montague
         Telephone: 215-875-3009
         Email: ecramer@bm.net [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 330 Cases vs. AK Steel Still Pending at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AK Steel Holding Corporation had 330 asbestos-related cases pending
as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Since 1990 we have been named as a defendant
in numerous lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos.  The great majority of these lawsuits have
been filed on behalf of people who claim to have been exposed to
asbestos while visiting the premises of one of our current or
former facilities.  The majority of asbestos cases pending in which
we are a defendant do not include a specific dollar claim for
damages.  In the cases that do include specific dollar claims for
damages, the complaint typically includes a monetary claim for
compensatory damages and a separate monetary claim in an equal
amount for punitive damages and does not attempt to allocate the
total monetary claim among the various defendants.

"Since the onset of asbestos claims against us in 1990, five
asbestos claims against us have proceeded to trial in four separate
cases.  All five concluded with a verdict in our favor.  We
continue to vigorously defend the asbestos claims.  Based upon
present knowledge, and the factors, we believe it is unlikely that
the resolution in the aggregate of the asbestos claims against us
will have a materially adverse effect on our consolidated results
of operations, cash flows or financial condition.  However,
predictions about the outcome of pending litigation, particularly
claims alleging asbestos exposure, are subject to substantial
uncertainties.  These uncertainties include (1) the significantly
variable rate at which new claims may be filed, (2) the effect of
bankruptcies of other companies currently or historically defending
asbestos claims, (3) the litigation process from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from case to case, (4) the type and severity of
the disease each claimant alleged to suffer, and (5) the potential
for enactment of legislation affecting asbestos litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/XH4JjF


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 43,700 Claims v. Goodyear Tire Pending at Sept.30
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has 43,700 pending
asbestos-related claims as of September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in numerous lawsuits
alleging various asbestos-related personal injuries purported to
result from alleged exposure to asbestos in certain products
manufactured by us or present in certain of our facilities.
Typically, these lawsuits have been brought against multiple
defendants in state and federal courts.  To date, we have disposed
of approximately 146,300 claims by defending, obtaining the
dismissal thereof, or entering into a settlement.  The sum of our
accrued asbestos-related liability and gross payments to date,
including legal costs, by us and our insurers totaled approximately
US$546 million through September 30, 2018 and US$529 million
through December 31, 2017."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/2Oe1mV


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AIG Must Defend Cos. Against WTC Asbestos Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Business Insurance reported that a unit of American International
Group Inc. must defend the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey and several contractors against scores of asbestos claims
brought by construction workers on the original World Trade Center,
a panel of New York judges ruled.

In doing so, the appellate court upheld most of a lower court's
2017 ruling in American Home Assurance Co. v. The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey et al.

The case involves a dispute over a liability policy issued to the
Port Authority and other policyholders in connection with the
original World Trade Center, known as the Hudson Tubes Project.
Since the 1980s, the Port Authority and others have been the
subject of thousands of asbestos-related personal injury claims
allegedly arising from the World Trade Center site during its
construction.

AIG unit American Home Assurance Co. defended and settled World
Trade Center asbestos claims for more than 25 years, according to
court records. On Dec. 9, 1975, American Home sent the Port
Authority notice of cancellation effective Feb. 7, 1976, according
to records.

American Home held that certain claims against some of the
policyholders are not covered because the policyholders cannot
prove that the claimants' alleged injuries occurred during the
period covered under the policy.

The policyholders contended that the plain language of the American
home policy does not require that a personal injury occur during
the policy period for coverage to be triggered.

American Home also maintained that claims against some of the
defendants' spray-on asbestos fireproofing came from a single
occurrence and the applicable $10 million limit of liability has
been exhausted.

The ruling by a four-judge panel of Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, First Department upholds the 2017 ruling
by New York Supreme Court Judge Eileen Bransten.

Judge Bransten wrote that "it is clear, that contrary to American
Home's arguments, the plain language of the policy does not require
injury during the policy period for coverage to be triggered."

"Indeed under the plain language of the policy, coverage is
triggered if the injury 'arises out of' construction of the
project, regardless of when the injury itself began," she stated.

The appellate court agreed.

"The plain language of the subject insurance policy providing for
coverage for injuries arising out of the 'Premises -- Operations
Hazard' means that the policy covers injuries that result from
operations that occurred during the policy period," the appellate
panel stated. "Plaintiff's interpretation, which would limit
coverage to injuries themselves occurring during the policy period,
is not supported by that language and also is inconsistent with the
broad 'Insuring Agreement' that requires plaintiff to pay 'all
sums' that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
for personal injuries 'in connection with the construction of [the
WTC project].'  The foregoing does not render meaningless or
superfluous the coverage that the policy provides for injuries
arising out of the 'Products -- Completed Operations Hazard,' a
separate risk."

The appellate division held that the "Supreme Court correctly
concluded that, in the absence of a single event or accident, all
claims alleging exposure to asbestos from spray-on fireproofing at
the site over a three-year period did not arise from a single
occurrence under the policy."

The appellate court also held that Judge Bransten "incorrectly
concluded that plaintiff's duty to defend survives exhaustion of
the policy's liability limit. The policy explicitly provides that
defense costs are subject to that limit."

An AIG spokesperson could not be immediately reached for comment.

A copy of the decision dated November 15, 2018, is available at
https://is.gd/2au89R from Leagle.com.

The case is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent, ALCOA INC., ET AL.,
Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, MARIO & DiBONO PLASTERING CO.,
INC., ET AL., Defendants, 651096/12, 7628A, 7628 (N.Y. App. Div.).

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York (Michael J. Garvey, Esq.
-- mgarvey@stblaw.com -- of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

K & L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, PA (Michael J. Lynch, Esq. --
Mike.Lynch@klgates.com -- of the bar of the State of Pennsylvania,
admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for Alcoa, Inc.,
respondent-appellant.

Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, New York (Glenn A. Kaminska, Esq. --
glenn.kaminska@admlaw.com -- of counsel), for TTV Realty Holdings,
Inc., respondent-appellant.

Anderson Kill, P.C., New York (Robert M. Horkovich, Esq. --
rhorkovich@andersonkill.com -- of counsel), for respondent.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defends 3,673 Claims at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is defending 3,673 asbestos-related
claims as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Albany International Corp. is a defendant in
suits brought in various courts in the United States by plaintiffs
who allege that they have suffered personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing paper machine clothing synthetic
dryer fabrics marketed during the period from 1967 to 1976 and used
in certain paper mills.

"We anticipate that additional claims will be filed against the
Company and related companies in the future, but are unable to
predict the number and timing of such future claims.  Due to the
fact that information sufficient to meaningfully estimate a range
of possible loss of a particular claim is typically not available
until late in the discovery process, we do not believe a meaningful
estimate can be made regarding the range of possible loss with
respect to pending or future claims and therefore are unable to
estimate a range of reasonably possible loss in excess of amounts
already accrued for pending or future claims.

"While we believe we have meritorious defenses to these claims, we
have settled certain claims for amounts we consider reasonable
given the facts and circumstances of each case.  Our insurance
carrier has defended each case and funded settlements under a
standard reservation of rights.  As of September 30, 2018 we had
resolved, by means of settlement or dismissal, 37,726 claims.  The
total cost of resolving all claims was US$10.3 million.  Of this
amount, almost 100% was paid by our insurance carrier, who has
confirmed that we have approximately US$140 million of remaining
coverage under primary and excess policies that should be available
with respect to current and future asbestos claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2qWXTRn


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Allstate Had US$882MM Claim Reserves at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Allstate Corporation had US$882 million reserves for asbestos
claims net of reinsurance recoverables of US$423 million as of
September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Allstate's reserves for asbestos claims were
US$882 million and US$884 million, net of reinsurance recoverables
of US$423 million and US$412 million, as of September 30, 2018 and
December 31, 2017, respectively.  Reserves for environmental claims
were US$174 million and US$166 million, net of reinsurance
recoverables of US$40 million and US$33 million, as of September
30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, respectively.

"The Company establishes reserves for claims and claims expense on
reported and unreported claims of insured losses.  The Company's
reserving process takes into account known facts and
interpretations of circumstances and factors including the
Company's experience with similar cases, actual claims paid,
historical trends involving claim payment patterns and pending
levels of unpaid claims, loss management programs, product mix and
contractual terms, changes in law and regulation, judicial
decisions, and economic conditions.  In the normal course of
business, the Company may also supplement its claims processes by
utilizing third party adjusters, appraisers, engineers, inspectors,
and other professionals and information sources to assess and
settle catastrophe and non-catastrophe related claims.  The effects
of inflation are implicitly considered in the reserving process.

"Because reserves are estimates of unpaid portions of losses that
have occurred, including incurred but not reported ("IBNR") losses,
the establishment of appropriate reserves, including reserves for
catastrophes and reserves and reinsurance recoverables for the
Discontinued Lines and Coverages, is an inherently uncertain and
complex process.  The ultimate cost of losses may vary materially
from recorded amounts, which are based on management's best
estimates.  The highest degree of uncertainty is associated with
reserves for losses incurred in the current reporting period as it
contains the greatest proportion of losses that have not been
reported or settled.  The Company regularly updates its reserve
estimates as new information becomes available and as events unfold
that may affect the resolution of unsettled claims.  Changes in
prior year reserve estimates, which may be material, are reported
in property and casualty insurance claims and claims expense in the
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations in the period such
changes are determined.

"Management believes that the reserve for property and casualty
insurance claims and claims expense, net of reinsurance
recoverables, is appropriately established in the aggregate and
adequate to cover the ultimate net cost of reported and unreported
claims arising from losses which had occurred by the date of the
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position based on
available facts, technology, laws and regulations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2DOgjMB


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-Caused Cancer Increases in Australia
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marnie Banger of The Northern Daily Leader reported that at least
710 Australians were diagnosed with mesothelioma last year -- the
rare and fatal cancer caused by exposure to asbestos.

Western Australia had the highest rate of new mesothelioma cases in
the year (4.9 per 100,000 people), while Tasmania had the least
(1.5 per 100,000 people), according to new data.

The figures published by the Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare are based on diagnoses reported to the Australian
Mesothelioma Registry, which was established in 2010.

The institute has also drawn on data from an older authority to
make longer-term comparisons dating back to the early 1980s.

The number of mesothelioma cases has steadily risen since that
time, the AIHW says, with a far more modest 157 cases reported in
1982.

But so far the number of diagnoses has peaked in 2014 at 770.

Men are four times more likely to be diagnosed with the rare cancer
than women, the figures for 2017 show.

That is expected because the majority of cases are based on
exposure in the types of environments in which males are more
likely to work, the AIHW said.

Since 2010, 93 per cent of people who provided work and housing
information to the national register had some exposure to
asbestos.

"Occupational exposures were typically much higher and there was
more certainty around them, which is likely to be the cause of the
vast majority of cases," the institute's report states.

The national incidence rate of the cancer stood at 2.9 per 100,000,
consistent with what it has been in recent years.

Survival rates for the cancer remain very poor, the report found,
with the often slow diagnosis of the disease playing a role.

Between 1985-1989 and 2010-2014, the five-year relative survival
rate for mesothelioma was 5.4 per cent.

"The condition is often diagnosed once it has reached the advanced
stages, as early symptoms can go unnoticed or be mistaken as
symptoms for other, less serious conditions," the report said.

The average time between diagnosis and death is about 11 months.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Beccles Man Dies of Asbestos-related Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------
Eastern Daily Press reported that the partner of a Beccles man, who
died from an asbestos-related cancer, has issued an appeal for help
in tracking down former workmates.

Well-known and "a popular figure around Beccles and Lowestoft,"
Ernest 'Puddy' Dennington died aged 67 earlier this year.

Now, Lesley Hull -- Puddy's partner of 25 years -- is appealing to
former workmates to come forward if they can offer any evidence as
to how he may have contracted the disease.

Puddy died of mesothelioma in the James Paget University Hospital
in Gorleston in January this year. At an inquest into his death in
April, the coroner recorded a verdict of death through industrial
disease, and recommended Ms Hull to seek legal advice.

As there is a legal duty to pay damages to the families of those
who have died as a result of mesothelioma, the source of the
asbestos must firstly be accepted by a court of law.

So now, Ms Hull and her lawyers are trying to track down former
workmates of Puddy, who can recall the conditions they shared.

Asbestos is now prohibited, but it was widely used in cladding and
insulation during the 1970s and 80s.

After research, several local employers have been identified with
whom Puddy worked and who are understood to have used asbestos at
the time.

Now, Ms Hull and the family lawyer, Phoebe Osborne -- an industrial
disease specialist with Ashtons Legal -- is appealing for help.

Phoebe Osborne said: "Puddy was a well-known and popular figure
around Beccles and Lowestoft, and many people probably recall him
and their times together.

"But those we're looking for are his former workmates, who can
recall their own experience of working conditions at the time, when
probably nobody thought anything about the dangers of asbestos."

If you can help, information should be directed to Phoebe Osborne
on 01223 431159.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: BorgWarner Inc. Had 8,987 Claims at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
BorgWarner Inc. has 8,987 asbestos-related claims pending as of
September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Like many other industrial companies that have
historically operated in the United States, the Company, or parties
that the Company is obligated to indemnify, continues to be named
as one of many defendants in asbestos-related personal injury
actions.  We believe that the Company's involvement is limited
because these claims generally relate to a few types of automotive
products that were manufactured over thirty years ago and contained
encapsulated asbestos.  The nature of the fibers, the encapsulation
of the asbestos, and the manner of the products' use all lead the
Company to believe that these products were and are highly unlikely
to cause harm.  Furthermore, the useful life of nearly all of these
products expired many years ago.  

"The Company vigorously defends against these claims, and has
obtained the dismissal of the majority of the claims asserted
against it without any payment.  The Company likewise expects that
no payment will be made by the Company or its insurers in the vast
majority of current and future asbestos-related claims in which it
has been or will be named (or has an obligation to indemnify a
party which has been or will be named).

"Through September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, the Company
incurred US$565.4 million and US$528.7 million, respectively, in
indemnity (including settlement payments) and defense costs in
connection with asbestos-related claims.  During the nine months
ended September 30, 2018 and 2017, the Company paid US$36.7 million
and US$40.9 million, respectively, in indemnity and related defense
costs in connection with asbestos-related claims.  These gross
payments are before tax benefits and any insurance receipts.
Indemnity and defense costs are incorporated into the Company's
operating cash flows and will continue to be in the future."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Qs8naX


ASBESTOS UPDATE: BorgWarner Records $791.5MM Liability at Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
BorgWarner Inc. estimates US$791.5 million as of September 30, 2018
for asbestos-related claims and associated costs through 2067,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Like many other industrial companies that have
historically operated in the United States, the Company, or parties
the Company is obligated to indemnify, continues to be named as one
of many defendants in asbestos-related personal injury actions.
The Company has an estimated liability of US$791.5 million as of
September 30, 2018 for asbestos-related claims and associated costs
through 2067, which is the last date by which the Company currently
estimates it is likely to have resolved all asbestos-related
claims.  The Company additionally estimates that, as of September
30, 2018, it has aggregate insurance coverage available in the
amount of US$386.4 million to satisfy asbestos-related claims and
associated defense costs."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/Qs8naX


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Defends 7,708 Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp.'s subsidiary, Brandon Drying Fabrics,
Inc., had 7,708 asbestos-related claims as of September 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "The Company's subsidiary, Brandon Drying
Fabrics, Inc. ("Brandon"), is also a separate defendant in many of
the asbestos cases in which Albany is named as a defendant, despite
never having manufactured any fabrics containing asbestos.  While
Brandon was defending against 7,708 claims as of September 30,
2018, only ten claims have been filed against Brandon since January
1, 2012, and no settlement costs have been incurred since 2001.
Brandon was acquired by the Company in 1999, and has its own
insurance policies covering periods prior to 1999.  Since 2004,
Brandon's insurance carriers have covered 100% of indemnification
and defense costs, subject to policy limits and a standard
reservation of rights."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2qWXTRn


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Calif. Jury Clears J&J of Liability in Allen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jef Feeley of Bloomberg reported that Johnson & Johnson persuaded a
California jury to reject a woman's claims that asbestos in the
company's iconic baby powder caused her to develop cancer, its
latest win in litigation over the talc-based product.

Key Insights
J&J has used arguments focusing on alternative causes of women's
cancers to win several recent talc trials, including one in October
in its hometown of New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Jurors in state court in Eureka, California, found plaintiff Carla
Allen was exposed to asbestos-tainted baby powder, but that wasn't
a "substantial factor" in causing her mesothelioma, an
asbestos-linked cancer.

Plaintiffs contend J&J has known since the 1970s its talc products
contain asbestos and hid that from consumers to protect the brand.
J&J counters its baby powder has never been fouled with asbestos
and decades of testing have found it safe.

The company still faces more than 11,000 talc suits, many of which
accuse J&J's baby powder of causing ovarian cancer in women. It's
appealing a Missouri jury's finding in July that it must pay 22
women $4.69 billion for causing their ovarian cancers with
asbestos-tainted powder.

Kim Montagnino, a spokeswoman for J&J, said "the science and facts
show" that Allen's disease "was not caused by her use of our
talcum-based products." She added that "decades of clinical
evidence and scientific studies by medical experts around the world
support the safety of Johnson's Baby Powder."

The verdict sheet is available at https://is.gd/DEtPR9 from
Asbestos Case Tracker.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECONY Accrues $7MM Liability at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc.'s subsidiary Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc. (CECONY) had accrued liability of US$7 million
for asbestos suits at September 30, 2018, according to the
Companies' Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

CECONY also deferred US$7 million as asbestos-related regulatory
assets at September 30, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2zkHj2C


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Spent US$10MM for Manhattan Incident
----------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc. has incurred estimated operating costs of
US$10 million as of September 30, 2018, for property damage,
clean-up and other response costs related to the rupture of a steam
main owned by its subsidiary in Manhattan, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.  The
Company has also invested US$7 million in capital and retirement
costs as of September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In July 2018, a CECONY steam main located on
Fifth Avenue and 21st street in Manhattan ruptured.  Debris from
the incident included dirt and mud containing asbestos.  The
response to the incident required the closing of buildings and
streets for various periods.  The NYSPSC has commenced an
investigation.  As of September 30, 2018, with respect to the
incident, the company incurred estimated operating costs of US$10
million for property damage, clean-up and other response costs and
invested US$7 million in capital and retirement costs.  The company
has notified its insurers of the incident and believes that the
policies currently in force will cover the company's costs, in
excess of a required retention (the amount of which is not
material), to satisfy any liability it may have for damages to
others in connection with the incident.  The company is unable to
estimate the amount or range of its possible loss related to the
incident.  At September 30, 2018, the company had not accrued a
liability related to the incident."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2zkHj2C


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cox Claims vs. Arvinmeritor Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------
Upon the Joint Motion of Plaintiffs, Jack Howard Cox Sr., Executor
of the Estate of Percy Ray Cox, and Defendant, ArvinMeritor, Inc.,
the Hon. James C. Dever, III of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed with prejudice
all of Plaintiffs' claims against ArvinMeritor in the case styled
Jack Howard Cox, Sr., Executor of the Estate of Percy Ray Cox,
Plaintiffs, v. AGCO Corporation, et al., Defendants, Civil Action
No. 4:16-CV-00084-D, (E.D.N.C.).

A copy of the Order dated November 20, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yamqhdkf from Leagle.com.

Jack Howard Cox, Sr., Executor of the Estate of Percy Ray Cox,
Dec., Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin D. Braly --
bbraly@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham LLP, Sabrina G. Stone --
sstone@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham LLP, Kevin W. Paul --
kpaul@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham, LLP & Janet Ward Black ,
Ward Black Law.
Arvinmeritor, successor in interest to Rockwell International
Automotive Products & Maremont Corporation, Defendants, represented
by Carter T. Lambeth , Carter T. Lambeth Attorney, P.C. & William
P. Early , Pierce Herns Sloan and Wilson LLC.

Borg-Warner Morse Tec, Inc., successor in interest to Borg-Warner
Corporation, Defendant, represented by David L. Levy --
dlevy@hedrickgardner.com -- Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo,
LLP, Kelvin T. Wyles -- kelvin.wyles@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP,
Lisa L. Oberg -- Lisa.Oberg@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP & Jon S.
Player , Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP.

Caterpillar, Inc., Defendant, represented by William Michael Starr
-- bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP.

Deere & Company, Inc., doing business as John Deere, Defendant,
represented by Tracy E. Tomlin -- tomlin@nelsonmullins.com --
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Travis Andrew Bustamante
-- bustamante@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP & William Michael Starr --
bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Christopher R. Kiger
-- ckiger@smithlaw.com -- Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett,
Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, Kirk G. Warner -- kwarner@smithlaw.com --
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP & Addie
K.S. Ries -- aries@smithlaw.com -- Smith, Anderson, Blount,
Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., individually and as successor in
interest to the Bendix Corporation, Defendant, represented by H.
Lee Davis, Jr. -- ldavis@davisandhamrick.com -- Davis & Hamrick,
LLP.

Navistar, Inc., successor in interest to International Harvester
Company, Defendant, represented by Robert O. Meriwether , Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Tracy E. Tomlin --
tomlin@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP, Travis Andrew Bustamante -- bustamante@nelsonmullins.com --
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP & William Michael Starr --
bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation & Standard Motor Products, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Robert David Proffitt , Proffitt & Cox,
LLP, Ronald Brian Cox , Proffitt & Cox, LLP & David A. Shaw --
dshaw@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs.

Pneumo Abex LLC, successor in interest to Abex Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Timothy W. Bouch , Bouch McLeod LLC.

McCord Corporation, Defendant, represented by Allyson R. Twilley --
atwilley@gwblawfirm.com --  Gallivan, White & Boyd, P.A., Daniel B.
White -- dwhite@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan, White & Boyd, P.A.,
James M. Dedman, IV -- jdedman@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan, White &
Boyd, P.A. & Ronald G. Tate -- rtate@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan,
White & Boyd, P.A.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cox Claims vs. McCord Dismissed With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James C. Dever, III of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at eh behest of
Plaintiffs, Jack Howard Cox Sr., Executor of the Estate of Percy
Ray Cox, and Defendant, McCord Corporation, has dismissed with
prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims against McCord Corporation in
the case styled Jack Howard Cox, Sr., Executor of the Estate of
Percy Ray Cox, Plaintiffs, v. AGCO Corporation, et al., Defendants,
Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-00084-D, (E.D.N.C.).

A copy of the Order dated November 20, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydf5owu4 from Leagle.com.

Jack Howard Cox, Sr., Executor of the Estate of Percy Ray Cox,
Dec., Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin D. Braly --
bbraly@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham LLP, Sabrina G. Stone --
sstone@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham LLP, Kevin W. Paul --
kpaul@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar Branham, LLP & Janet Ward Black, Ward
Black Law.
Arvinmeritor, successor in interest to Rockwell International
Automotive Products & Maremont Corporation, Defendants, represented
by Carter T. Lambeth, Carter T. Lambeth Attorney, P.C. & William P.
Early, Pierce Herns Sloan and Wilson LLC.

Borg-Warner Morse Tec, Inc., successor in interest to Borg-Warner
Corporation, Defendant, represented by David L. Levy --
dlevy@hedrickgardner.com -- Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo,
LLP, Kelvin T. Wyles -- kelvin.wyles@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP,
Lisa L. Oberg -- Lisa.Oberg@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP & Jon S.
Player , Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP.

Caterpillar, Inc., Defendant, represented by William Michael Starr
-- bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP.

Deere & Company, Inc., doing business as John Deere, Defendant,
represented by Tracy E. Tomlin -- tomlin@nelsonmullins.com --
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Travis Andrew Bustamante
-- bustamante@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP & William Michael Starr --
bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Christopher R. Kiger
-- ckiger@smithlaw.com -- Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett,
Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, Kirk G. Warner -- kwarner@smithlaw.com --
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP & Addie
K.S. Ries -- aries@smithlaw.com -- Smith, Anderson, Blount,
Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., individually and as successor in
interest to the Bendix Corporation, Defendant, represented by H.
Lee Davis, Jr. -- ldavis@davisandhamrick.com -- Davis & Hamrick,
LLP.

Navistar, Inc., successor in interest to International Harvester
Company, Defendant, represented by Robert O. Meriwether , Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Tracy E. Tomlin --
tomlin@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP, Travis Andrew Bustamante -- bustamante@nelsonmullins.com --
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP & William Michael Starr --
bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation & Standard Motor Products, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Robert David Proffitt , Proffitt & Cox,
LLP, Ronald Brian Cox , Proffitt & Cox, LLP & David A. Shaw --
dshaw@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs.

Pneumo Abex LLC, successor in interest to Abex Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Timothy W. Bouch , Bouch McLeod LLC.

McCord Corporation, Defendant, represented by Allyson R. Twilley --
atwilley@gwblawfirm.com --  Gallivan, White & Boyd, P.A., Daniel B.
White -- dwhite@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan, White & Boyd, P.A.,
James M. Dedman, IV -- jdedman@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan, White &
Boyd, P.A. & Ronald G. Tate -- rtate@gwblawfirm.com -- Gallivan,
White & Boyd, P.A..


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Had $305MM Accrual at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Crown Holdings, Inc. (fka Crown Cork & Seal Co Inc.) had accrual
US$305 million for pending and future asbestos-related claims and
related legal costs as of September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Crown Cork has entered into arrangements with
plaintiffs' counsel in certain jurisdictions with respect to claims
which are not yet filed, or asserted, against it.  However, Crown
Cork expects claims under these arrangements to be filed or
asserted against Crown Cork in the future.  The projected value of
these claims is included in the Company's estimated liability as of
September 30, 2018.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company's accrual for pending and
future asbestos-related claims and related legal costs was US$305
million, including US$254 million for unasserted claims.  The
Company determines its accrual without limitation to a specific
time period.

"It is reasonably possible that the actual loss could be in excess
of the Company's accrual.  However, the Company is unable to
estimate the reasonably possible loss in excess of its accrual due
to uncertainty in the following assumptions that underlie the
Company's accrual and the possibility of losses in excess of such
accrual: the amount of damages sought by the claimant (which was
not specified for approximately 81% of the claims outstanding at
the end of 2017), the Company and claimant's willingness to
negotiate a settlement, the terms of settlements of other
defendants with asbestos-related liabilities, the bankruptcy
filings of other defendants (which may result in additional claims
and higher settlements for non-bankrupt defendants), the nature of
pending and future claims (including the seriousness of alleged
disease, whether claimants allege first exposure to asbestos before
or during 1964 and the claimant's ability to demonstrate the
alleged link to Crown Cork), the volatility of the litigation
environment, the defense strategies available to the Company, the
level of future claims, the rate of receipt of claims, the
jurisdiction in which claims are filed, and the effect of state
asbestos legislation (including the validity and applicability of
the Pennsylvania legislation to non-Pennsylvania jurisdictions,
where the substantial majority of the Company's asbestos cases are
filed)."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/dyQoJg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Still Defends Suits at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Curtiss-Wright Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2018, that to date, it has not been found
liable or paid any material sum of money in settlement in any
case.

The Company states, "We have been named in pending lawsuits that
allege injury from exposure to asbestos.  To date, we have not been
found liable or paid any material sum of money in settlement in any
case.  We believe that the minimal use of asbestos in our past
operations and the relatively non-friable condition of asbestos in
our products make it unlikely that we will face material liability
in any asbestos litigation, whether individually or in the
aggregate.  We maintain insurance coverage for these potential
liabilities and we believe adequate coverage exists to cover any
unanticipated asbestos liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/WNLudb


ASBESTOS UPDATE: EBC Estopped From Relitigating Causation in Filosi
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirms the decision of the
Compensation Review Board which determined that the Defendant
Electric Boat Corporation is collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of causation under the state act because the
record of the Longshore Act proceedings indicates that the
administrative law judge employed the substantial factor standard
that governs in the state forum.

The Defendant Electric Boat Corporation appeals from the decision
of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed the decision of
the Workers Compensation Commissioner for the Eighth District
dismissing the claims for benefits under the state act filed by the
Plaintiff, Katherine Filosi, as executor of the estate of the
decedent, Donald L. Filosi, Jr., and as the dependent widow of the
decedent.

On appeal, the Defendant claims that the board improperly
determined that the administrative law judge's decision to award
benefits under the Longshore Act collaterally estopped it from
challenging compensability because the federal forum employs a
lower standard of causation than the substantial factor standard
required by the state act and, therefore, that it should be allowed
to litigate its claims under the higher state standard.

The Court has considered whether an employer is collaterally
estopped from challenging an employee's eligibility for benefits
under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act because of an
earlier decision by a United States Department of Labor
administrative law judge awarding benefits to that employee under
the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

The record reveals that the decedent began working at the
Defendant's Groton shipyard in 1961 and, with some brief
exceptions, continued his work there until he retired in 1998.
During his employment with the Defendant, the decedent was exposed
to asbestos. The decedent was also a heavy smoker of cigarettes
from the age of fourteen until his death, with some pauses.

After he was diagnosed in 2012 with high grade neuroendocrine lung
cancer, the decedent filed a notice of claim for compensation with
the Workers' Compensation Commission, alleging that he had
sustained a lung injury from "exposure to dust and fumes." On
December 17, 2012, the decedent died as a result of his lung
cancer. The plaintiff, as his widow, subsequently filed a notice of
dependent's claim, and the two claims were assigned to the
commission's consolidated asbestos litigation docket.

In addition to the claims seeking benefits under the state act, the
plaintiff also filed claims seeking benefits under the Longshore
Act. While the claims under the state act were pending, the
administrative law judge conducted a formal hearing on the
Longshore Act claims on August 5, 2013.

At the hearing, the plaintiff presented the opinions and testimony
of two physicians, Laura Welch and Arthur DeGraff. Welch, who is
board certified in internal medicine and occupational medicine,
testified that "smoking contributed to [the decedent's] lung
cancer, but his asbestos exposure was a substantial contributing
cause." DeGraff, who is board certified in internal medicine and
pulmonary disease, testified that the decedent's "death from lung
cancer is a direct result of his past smoking history combined with
past asbestos exposure."

On the basis of the documentary evidence presented by the
plaintiff, along with a concession by the defendant's medical
expert, Milo Pulde, an internist, the administrative law judge
found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under
the Longshore Act's burden shifting framework by showing that the
decedent had suffered harm, and that workplace conditions could
have caused, aggravated, or accelerated that harm, which then
triggered the Longshore Act's presumption of coverage.

Thereafter, the plaintiff submitted the order of the administrative
law judge awarding benefits under the Longshore Act to the
commissioner in the pending state workers' compensation proceeding,
and contended that the administrative law judge's order
collaterally estopped the defendant from litigating the state act
claims before the commissioner.

On February 13, 2015, the commissioner determined that the
defendant was not collaterally estopped from challenging causation
because the administrative law judge had neither defined the
"requisite causal connection" required to be proved under federal
law nor determined that "the plaintiff had proved the decedent's
employment and exposure to asbestos to be a significant factor, or
substantial contributing factor, in the development of his cancer."


The commissioner further concluded that the plaintiff had not
proved that the decedent's exposure to asbestos during his
employment was a factor in causing his lung cancer or death but,
rather, found that his "long-term tobacco abuse was a significant
factor in causing his lung cancer" and that the decedent's "smoking
history was more than sufficient to fully explain his development
of lung cancer." Accordingly, the commissioner dismissed the
plaintiff's claims for benefits under the state act.

On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the board
improperly gave the administrative law judge's decision awarding
benefits under the Longshore Act preclusive effect.

The Court concludes that the finding of compensability in the
Longshore Act proceeding has preclusive effect in the proceedings
under the state act because the administrative law judge applied a
substantial factor standard therein. The Court explains that
although the administrative law judge did not expressly state as a
matter of law that he was applying a substantial factor standard of
causation, he nevertheless specifically credited the opinion of
Welch, the plaintiff's medical expert, who stated in her report
that "it is my opinion with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the asbestos exposure sustained by the decedent in
his more than thirty years of work at the defendant's shipyard was
a substantial contributing cause to the development of his lung
cancer."

The Court determines that the federal administrative law judge
specifically credited an expert's testimony that the asbestos
exposure was a "substantial contributing cause," which is the same
causation standard required under the state act. The Court finds no
ambiguity in the administrative law judge's findings of fact and
conclusions of law indicating that he applied a different standard
of causation.

The Court concludes, therefore, that the board properly determined
that, "given that the administrative law judge relied on an opinion
sufficient to meet the standard of proving causation applicable
under the state act, it need not determine whether the difference
in the minimum standards of proof between the state act and the
federal Longshore Act would preclude the application of the
collateral estoppel doctrine.

The Court acknowledges that the administrative law judge's
discussion of the governing legal principles did not identify a
specific standard of causation that the plaintiff was required to
meet under the Longshore Act. The Court determines, however, that
the causation standard applied by the administrative law judge was
the same substantial factor standard that governs proceedings under
the state act. Accordingly, the board properly determined that the
defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of
causation before the commissioner with respect to the plaintiff's
claims under the state act.

The appealed case is Katherine Filosi, Executor (Estate of Donald
L. Filosi, Jr.), et al. v. Electric Boat Corporation et al., (SC
19990), (SC 19991), (Conn.).

A copy of the Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaappq2p
from Leagle.com.

Lucas D. Strunk -- lstrunk@ctworkcomp.com -- with whom was Peter D.
Quay , for the appellants (defendants).

Amity L. Arscott , for the appellees (plaintiffs).


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$80MM Reserves at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Corporation's subsidiary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
had reserved US$80 million at September 30, 2018 for
asbestos-related claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Generation maintains a reserve for claims
associated with asbestos-related personal injury actions in certain
facilities that are currently owned by Generation or were
previously owned by ComEd and PECO.  The estimated liabilities are
recorded on an undiscounted basis and exclude the estimated legal
costs associated with handling these matters, which could be
material.

"At September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, Generation had
recorded estimated liabilities of approximately US$80 million and
US$78 million, respectively, in total for asbestos-related bodily
injury claims.  As of September 30, 2018, approximately US$24
million of this amount related to 241 open claims presented to
Generation, while the remaining US$56 million is for estimated
future asbestos-related bodily injury claims anticipated to arise
through 2050, based on actuarial assumptions and analyses, which
are updated on an annual basis.  On a quarterly basis, Generation
monitors actual experience against the number of forecasted claims
to be received and expected claim payments and evaluates whether
adjustments to the estimated liabilities are necessary."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2S0TBUA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Family Seeks Answer on Trawlerman's Asbestos Death
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Grimsby Live reported that the family of a former Grimsby
trawlerman are seeking answers following his death from an asbestos
related disease.

Raymond Sargent was a very fit man who never smoked and only
occasionally drank alcohol.

He enjoyed walking and going out on his racing bike.

For his family, it was therefore something of a mystery, when
several years ago, he began to suffer from shortness of breath.
Over the following years his breathing difficulties worsened
rapidly. In addition, he started to lose a considerable amount of
weight.

It was only when Raymond was discharged after a period of
hospitalisation, just a few weeks before he died, that he and his
family became aware from the hospital discharge notes, that he was
suffering from asbestosis.

Raymond passed away on August 11, aged 70.

His daughter Nicola Treacher, said: "It came as a real shock to us
all to find that Dad was suffering from asbestos disease. He had
always been so healthy. His rapid deterioration in the last year or
so in particular was heart-breaking to witness."

Nicola went on to say: "Dad worked for approximately seven or eight
years as a deckhand on trawlers out of Grimsby docks on British
United Trawlers.

"That would have been in the 1970s and possibly even back into the
late 1960s.

"After that he worked on shore in the Cold Stores for Ross and also
ACS and T. He was a proud, hardworking man who never complained
about his working conditions although they must have been
difficult, particularly on the trawlers, when he was away from home
for days at a time.”

Asbestosis is a serious scarring condition of the lungs and is
caused by exposure to asbestos dust or fibres, usually over a
number of years.

The disease takes many years to develop which is why symptoms, such
as shortness of breath, often only start to affect the sufferer, as
many as 40 or 50 years after the initial exposure to asbestos.

James Burrell a specialist asbestos disease solicitor from Bridge
McFarland solicitors in Hull is helping Mr Sargent's family.

He said: "Raymond's family are obviously distraught about their
loss and the fact that he was suffering from an asbestos related
condition has come as a great shock to them. We know that Raymond
worked on trawlers as a deck hand for a number of years and that it
covered a period during the mid to late 60s through into the
mid-70s.

"We are aware from previous cases that we have worked on for
clients who were the families of former trawlermen, that asbestos
presented a danger to those who worked on the ships.

"As asbestos had heat resistant properties it was used, amongst
other things, to lag pipes and was therefore present in the engine
rooms, alleyways, in dry rooms and on the winches. On some ships,
asbestos lagged pipes would run over the bunks, where the men who
worked onboard slept.

"We are appealing to any former trawler fishermen who may remember
working on ships with Raymond Sargent, to contact us, so that we
can find out more about how Raymond came into contact with
asbestos. Any help that they can provide would be extremely
useful."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Tire Records $176MM Liability at Sept.30
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has recorded US$176 million
gross liabilities at September 30, 2018 for both asserted and
unasserted asbestos-related claims, inclusive of defense costs,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in numerous lawsuits
alleging various asbestos-related personal injuries purported to
result from alleged exposure to asbestos in certain products
manufactured by us or present in certain of our facilities.
Typically, these lawsuits have been brought against multiple
defendants in state and federal courts.

"We periodically, and at least annually, review our existing
reserves for pending claims, including a reasonable estimate of the
liability associated with unasserted asbestos claims, and estimate
our receivables from probable insurance recoveries.  We recorded
gross liabilities for both asserted and unasserted claims,
inclusive of defense costs, totaling US$176 million and US$167
million at September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, respectively.
In determining the estimate of our asbestos liability, we evaluated
claims over the next ten-year period.  Due to the difficulties in
making these estimates, analysis based on new data and/or a change
in circumstances arising in the future may result in an increase in
the recorded obligation, and that increase could be significant.

"We maintain certain primary and excess insurance coverage under
coverage-in-place agreements, and also have additional excess
liability insurance with respect to asbestos liabilities.  After
consultation with our outside legal counsel and giving
consideration to agreements with certain of our insurance carriers,
the financial viability and legal obligations of our insurance
carriers and other relevant factors, we determine an amount we
expect is probable of recovery from such carriers.  We record a
receivable with respect to such policies when we determine that
recovery is probable and we can reasonably estimate the amount of a
particular recovery.

"We recorded a receivable related to asbestos claims of US$121
million and US$113 million at September 30, 2018 and December 31,
2017, respectively.  We expect that approximately 70% of asbestos
claim related losses would be recoverable through insurance during
the ten-year period covered by the estimated liability.  Of these
amounts, US$15 million was included in Current Assets as part of
Accounts Receivable at September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017,
respectively.  The recorded receivable consists of an amount we
expect to collect under coverage-in-place agreements with certain
primary and excess insurance carriers as well as an amount we
believe is probable of recovery from certain of our other excess
insurance carriers."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/2Oe1mV


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Had 17,287 PI Suits at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Harsco Corporation is still facing 17,287 pending asbestos personal
injury actions at September 30, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

Harsco Corp. states, "The Company is named as one of many
defendants (approximately 90 or more in most cases) in legal
actions in the U.S. alleging personal injury from exposure to
airborne asbestos over the past several decades.  In their suits,
the plaintiffs have named as defendants, among others, many
manufacturers, distributors and installers of numerous types of
equipment or products that allegedly contained asbestos.

"The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit.
The Company has never been a producer, manufacturer or processor
of asbestos fibers.  Any asbestos-containing part of a Company
product used in the past was purchased from a supplier and the
asbestos encapsulated in other materials such that airborne
exposure, if it occurred, was not harmful and is not associated
with the types of injuries alleged in the pending actions.

"At September 30, 2018, there were 17,287 pending asbestos personal
injury actions filed against the Company.  Of those actions, 16,737
were filed in the New York Supreme Court (New York County), 113
were filed in other New York State Supreme Court Counties and 437
were filed in courts located in other states.

"The complaints in most of those actions generally follow a form
that contains a standard damages demand of US$20 million or US$25
million, regardless of the individual plaintiff's alleged medical
condition, and without identifying any specific Company product.

"At September 30, 2018, 16,704 of the actions filed in New York
Supreme Court (New York County) were on the Deferred/Inactive
Docket created by the court in December 2002 for all pending and
future asbestos actions filed by persons who cannot demonstrate
that they have a malignant condition or discernible physical
impairment.  The remaining 33 cases in New York County are pending
on the Active or In Extremis Docket created for plaintiffs who can
demonstrate a malignant condition or physical impairment.

"The Company has liability insurance coverage under various primary
and excess policies that the Company believes will be available, if
necessary, to substantially cover any liability that might
ultimately be incurred in the asbestos actions.  The costs and
expenses of the asbestos actions are being paid by the Company's
insurers.

"In view of the persistence of asbestos litigation in the U.S., the
Company expects to continue to receive additional claims in the
future.  The Company intends to continue its practice of vigorously
defending these claims and cases.  At September 30, 2018, the
Company has obtained dismissal in 28,007 cases by stipulation or
summary judgment prior to trial.

"It is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related actions in the U.S. due to the unpredictable
nature of this litigation, and no loss provision has been recorded
in the Company's condensed consolidated financial statements
because a loss contingency is not deemed probable or estimable.
Despite this uncertainty, and although results of operations and
cash flows for a given period could be adversely affected by
asbestos-related actions, the Company does not expect that any
costs that are reasonably possible to be incurred by the Company in
connection with asbestos litigation would have a material adverse
effect on the Company's financial condition, results of operations
or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2DPVVuN


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hobart Brothers Don't Owe McKinney Duty to Warn
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District reverses
the trial court's judgment, after finding that the industry to
which Defendant Hobart Brothers Company belonged had no knowledge
in the 1960s that welding rods could release asbestos fibers.

Plaintiff, Charles McKinney, has mesothelioma, a disease he
contracted by inhaling asbestos fibers. On February 21, 2012,
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against various defendants.
Initially, Defendant was not a party to this lawsuit.

On April 25, 2013, in two counts that Plaintiff added to his
complaint with the trial court's permission, he alleged that
Defendant, too, had caused his mesothelioma by willfully and
wantonly, or at least negligently, failing to warn of the
dangerousness of its product. Although, in these counts against
Defendant, Plaintiff did not identify the allegedly dangerous
product, it soon became evident that he meant Hobart 6010 welding
stick electrodes, which Defendant had manufactured for use in
shielded metal arc welding.

Defendant manufactures welding rods, which, when introduced into an
electrical arc, make the molten material necessary to bind two
pieces of base metal together. The welding rods are made up of two
parts: the steel core and the surrounding flux. Thirty years ago,
the flux of defendant's "6010" rods contained chrysotile asbestos,
a type of asbestos that can cause mesothelioma many years after one
inhales it.

A jury returned a verdict against Defendant and in favor of
Plaintiff. The Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court
should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Defendant argues that the record was devoid of any
evidence that any manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen that
the use of asbestos-containing welding rods in particular might
pose a risk of exposing coworkers in the same building to
respirable asbestos fibers. The Defendant asserts that the
existence of a duty is an essential element of Plaintiff's cause of
action.

Defendant's retained expert, John DuPont (a professor of materials
science and engineering) opined that, for two reasons, it was
"physically impossible" for respirable asbestos fibers to have
escaped from Defendant's welding rods: (a) the asbestos fibers were
encapsulated; and (b) the welding arc reached a temperature of
10,000 degrees Fahrenheit, and  the welding pool was at least 2700
degrees Fahrenheit. He said that no asbestos could have been
released from the welding fume because asbestos burned at 1500
degrees Fahrenheit.

Defendant disputed Arthur L. Frank's (Plaintiff's retained expert)
qualifications to opine on the capability of Defendant's welding
rods to release respirable asbestos fibers because Frank, by his
own admission, was not a materials scientist, industrial hygienist,
engineer, or mineralogist and had never performed, nor was
qualified to perform, any fiber testing on welding rods.

Frank admitted that "the asbestos content of a product was not
necessarily an indication of its relative health risk," given that,
"for many products, the fibers were tightly bound to the matrix or
were encapsulated." Even so, he noted, "a potential health risk
arose when asbestos fibers were set free, for example, during
drilling or sawing of asbestos cement sheets." Later in his
evidence deposition, Frank again testified: "I'm not aware of any
product that contained asbestos that, if manipulated, could not
give off fibers." The Court finds, however, that Frank's testimony
was substantive evidence that defendant's welding rods could have
released respirable asbestos fibers.

Frank testified: "To the extent that plaintiff worked with Hobart
6010 asbestos-containing rods or that co-workers were using them,
having had prior experience with them, knowing that they give up
asbestos fibers, that the exposures he had to asbestos from these
rods would have, in my opinion, been a substantial contributing
cause to his mesothelioma." He also testified that, in 1942, a
medical doctor, W.C. Hueper, warned of the toxicity of asbestos, in
his book Occupational Tumors and Allied Diseases.

Defendant notes that, in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d
26, 35 (1980), the supreme court imposed a knowledge requirement in
failure-to-warn cases: the plaintiff had to "prove that the
defendant manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger that
caused the injury." Thus, even if (as the jury impliedly found) it
was an objective fact that defendant's welding rods could release
respirable asbestos fibers by being stepped on or by being jostled
against one another in a box or a stub bucket, Defendant had a duty
to warn Plaintiff in 1962 and 1963 only if, during those years,
Defendant knew or should have known that its welding rods could
release respirable asbestos fibers by being so manipulated and that
someone could become ill as a result.

Timothy Hensley was Defendant's corporate representative. Hensley
testified that, "at least by 1971," Defendant knew that asbestos
was dangerous to breathe. He could not rule out that Defendant knew
of the dangerousness of asbestos as early as 1947.

The Court determines that the testimony by Hensley and Frank (along
with Hueper's book, referenced in Frank's testimony) as evidence
that, in 1962 and 1963, "knowledge existed in the industry of the
dangerous propensity of" raw asbestos. However, it must be
"established that knowledge existed in the industry of the
dangerous propensity of the manufacturer's product." In this case,
the manufacturer was Defendant, and Defendant's product was not
asbestos but welding rods, in which asbestos was encapsulated. The
record appears to contain no evidence of contemporaneous knowledge
in the industry that welding rods with asbestos encapsulated in the
flux were hazardous.

Thus, in 1962 and 1963, Defendant could not have owed Plaintiff a
duty to warn Plaintiff of a hazard that, at that time, was unknown
to the industry to which Defendant belonged, namely, the ability of
its welding rods to release encapsulated asbestos fibers if the
welding rods were simply rubbed together or stepped on. At most,
the evidence at trial showed that Defendant did not become aware of
the potential risk of asbestos until the early 1970s, nearly a
decade after Plaintiff's purported exposure, and that evidence
pertained to the potential risk posed to individuals working
directly with raw asbestos, not bystanders to the finished
welding-rod product like Plaintiff. Thus, the Defendant could not
have owed Plaintiff a duty to warn of a hazard of which Defendant
and the industry were unaware. Because of the lack of duty, the
trial court should have granted Defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.

Moreover, assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that industry
knowledge, in the early 1960s, that raw asbestos was dangerous to
breathe justifies imposing on defendant a contemporaneous duty to
warn of the asbestos encapsulated in its welding rods, the Court
finds the record contains no evidence that the welding rods were "a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing about"
plaintiff's mesothelioma.

Plaintiff must prove he actually inhaled respirable asbestos fibers
from Defendant's welding rods -- and that he inhaled enough of the
fibers that one could meaningfully say the welding rods were a
"substantial factor" in causing his mesothelioma.

Plaintiff argues he met the criteria of frequency, proximity, and
regularity. He claims the following facts are undisputed:
"Plaintiff worked for eight months at Portable Elevator; Stick
welders there used Defendant's asbestos-containing 6010 rods;
Plaintiff's workstation was below a grated mezzanine where the
welders worked -- he frequently walked past and sat next to the
welders while they worked; The welders did not keep a clean work
area; Defendant's asbestos welding rods littered the ground, where
Plaintiff and others stepped on them -- they fell through the
grates of the mezzanine into Plaintiff's work area; Portable
Elevator did not have any dust control measures -- nothing stopped
the asbestos dust generated on the mezzanine from drifting into and
circulating throughout Plaintiff's work area; and Plaintiff was
exposed continuously to asbestos dust from Defendant's welding rods
for almost eight months.

In the trial transcript, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified
that the "stubs from the arc welders on the third floor" fell
through the grates of the mezzanine and onto the second floor. The
Court did not find, however, that Plaintiff testified that the
stubs fell into his work area. The Court did not find in the
transcript any reference to dust, let alone asbestos dust.
Plaintiff never testified that the dirt was asbestos dust, and the
Court is not aware of any evidence that it was. Plaintiff never
testified to seeing clouds of dust in the workplace.

The appealed case is Charles Mckinney, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Hobart Brothers Company, Defendant-Appellant, Nos. 4-17-0333, (Ill.
App. Ct. 4d).

A copy of the Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y96pbwqe
from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Husch Blackwell Discusses Take-Home Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Paul Cranley, Esq. -- paul.cranley@huschblackwell.com -- at Husch
Blackwell LLP, in an article for JD Supra, wrote that in a recent
decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, the court held that the dangers of secondary asbestos
exposure were not foreseeable in and before 1955. Jack v.
Borg-Warner Morse TEC, LLC, et al., W.D. Wash., Case No. C:17-0537
JLR. In particular, the Court held that the evidence presented by
the plaintiffs in favor or their "take-home exposure" theory was
insufficient to allow a jury to find that prior to 1955, defendant
Union Pacific "knew or should have known of the risk that secondary
asbestos exposure posed to its employees' family members." Id.
Accordingly, the Court granted Union Pacific's motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff's take-home exposure claim. Id.

The plaintiff alleged he contracted mesothelioma as a result of
exposure to asbestos dust and fibers while he lived with his father
between 1946 and 1955. At that time, the plaintiff's father worked
for Union Pacific Railroad as a maintenance supervisor.  The
plaintiff testified that when his father came home from work, he
was dusty and dirty. He recalled that when his grandmother would
wash his father's clothes, she would shake them out, creating a
cloud of dust. The Court assumed, for purposes of the plaintiffs'
take-home exposure claim at the summary judgment stage, that the
plaintiff's father had, in fact, handled asbestos while at Union
Pacific. The question, therefore, was whether Union Pacific was on
notice of the dangers of secondary exposure to employees' family
members, and whether Union Pacific should have taken precautions to
prevent take-home exposure.

In opposing Union Pacific's summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs
presented a report from an expert who testified that as early as
1913, some industrial employers were aware that hazardous materials
could cling to employees' work clothes and contaminate their homes,
and that in the 1950s, experts on occupational cancer began
encouraging employers to take protective measures to prevent
carcinogenic materials from going home. Plaintiffs' expert also
relied on two documents: (1) a scientific article, published in
1946, that recommended that workers handling carcinogenic materials
such as asbestos be provided with showers and rooms for storing
street clothes, and (2) a United States Department of Labor
document, issued in 1952, requiring that federal contractors be
provided facilities to prevent the transfer of harmful substances
from work clothes to street clothes. Id. at 7. However, the Court
concluded that neither these documents, nor the plaintiffs'
expert's general opinions about the knowledge of carcinogenic
materials clinging to work clothes, addressed the risks of
secondary exposure to the families of asbestos exposed workers. In
addition, the Court found it significant that the plaintiffs'
expert admitted that if Union Pacific had researched the hazards of
secondary asbestos exposure in 1955, it would have found
"practically nothing in print."

Plaintiffs also argued that prior case law recognized the
foreseeability of take-home asbestos exposure. However, the Court
found these cases distinguishable in a case alleging exposure in
and before 1955. For example, in Kesner v. Superior Court of
Alameda County, 834 P. 3d 284 (Cal. 2016), the Court considered
allegations of take-home exposure dating after 1973; and, in Olivio
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A. 2d 1143 (N.J. 2006), the claims
implicated secondary exposure that stretched from the 1940s to the
1980s. The Court found that these authorities were not sufficient
to overcome its conclusion that the "weight of existing law"
provides that the dangers of secondary asbestos exposure were not
foreseeable in and before 1955.

This court joins a number of jurisdictions that use the
foreseeability test to determine whether a duty should be imposed.
Questions of whether or not a duty exists, to whom it extends, and
when it arises remain to be answered in several jurisdictions
across the country. This case will certainly offer support to
defendants who are handling take home exposure cases with exposure
prior to 1955.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ill. App. Affirms Denial of Bid to Transfer Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that an Illinois appellate court
has affirmed an order denying a motion to transfer asbestos claims,
concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion when
it found the conspiracy claim provided a sufficient connection to
the county in which the suit was filed.

In the Nov. 7 opinion, the Illinois Fourth District Court of
Appeals found that McLean County, Illinois, had "at least some
relevant interest in deciding this case."

The plaintiffs asserted that Don Ross had developed lung cancer as
a result of asbestos exposure. Ross specifically came into contact
with the asbestos-containing products.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Faces Securities Suits Over Asbestos Talc
--------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson disclosed in its Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that it is facing securities
lawsuits related to alleged asbestos contamination in body powders
containing talc.

The Company states, "In February 2018, a securities class action
lawsuit was filed against Johnson & Johnson and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that Johnson & Johnson violated the federal
securities laws by failing to adequately disclose the alleged
asbestos contamination in body powders containing talc, primarily
JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.  In October 2018, a shareholder
derivative lawsuit was filed against Johnson & Johnson as the
nominal defendant and its current directors as defendants in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties related to the alleged
asbestos contamination in body powders containing talc, primarily
JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder, and that Johnson & Johnson has suffered
damages as a result of those alleged breaches.  Plaintiffs are
seeking damages and an order for the Company to reform its internal
policies and procedures."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/1Edxr2


ASBESTOS UPDATE: John Crane Defeats Asbestos Claim in Ohio
----------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that John Crane Inc. won't have to defend an
asbestos exposure lawsuit in an Ohio court, even though it defended
the case for over seven years before it challenged the court's
jurisdiction.

The company's multi-year defense of the suit didn't waive its right
to challenge the court's jurisdiction, an Ohio appeals court said.

Richard Hall was allegedly exposed to asbestos from 1965 until 1996
while working for National Steel Corp. in Weirton, W.Va.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Had 3,469 Claims at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln Electric Holdings, Inc. is still facing cases alleging
asbestos-induced illness involving claims by approximately 3,469
plaintiffs as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In each instance, the Company is one of a
large number of defendants.  The asbestos claimants seek
compensatory and punitive damages, in most cases for unspecified
sums.  Since January 1, 1995, the Company has been a co-defendant
in other similar cases that have been resolved as follows: 54,922
of those claims were dismissed, 23 were tried to defense verdicts,
7 were tried to plaintiff verdicts (which were reversed or resolved
after appeal), 1 was resolved by agreement for an immaterial amount
and 794 were decided in favor of the Company following summary
judgment motions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/5mBstg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Oliver Couple Sues AO Smith for Asbestos Exposure
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Madison County Record reported that a couple accuse several
manufacturers of exposing them to asbestos.

Dan R. Oliver and Paula Oliver filed a complaint on Oct. 10 in St.
Clair County Circuit Court against A.O Smith Corporation,
Colgate-Palmolive Company, URS Corporation and other manufacturers.


According to the complaint, Dan Oliver was exposed to asbestos
fibers emanating from certain products manufactured by the
defendants. He was diagnosed with lung cancer last year, the
complaint states. The plaintiff alleges the defendants failed to
provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning the dangers
of working around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek damages of more
than $50,000. They are represented by Randy L. Gori of Gori, Julian
& Associates in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 18-L-664


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Fitter Awarded GBP46,750 Payout
--------------------------------------------------------
Hull Daily Mail reported that a retired maintenance fitter who was
exposed to asbestos while working for a Hull firm has been awarded
a whopping GBP46,750 payout.

Charles Johnson, 80, developed asbestosis -- a serious long-term
lung condition caused by prolonged exposure to asbestos -- after
being exposed to the toxic fibres while working with a Hull
manufacturer between 1975 and 1997.

The Hull pensioner's job role involved repairing leaks in pipework
often lagged with asbestos insulation, which would break away
causing deadly dust particles to form in the air.

"In my first job I was never once warned about asbestos," Charles
said.

"In my last few years of working before retirement my bosses
started to acknowledge that asbestos could be dangerous, but their
advice was very vague and didn’t lead to any changes in
procedure."

Charles, who also worked for a timber firm between 1963 and 1970,
instructed his union Unite to take on his claim through Thompsons
solicitors after he was left with a persistent cough and
breathlessness.

A CT scan confirmed that he had two lung conditions -- pleural
plaques and asbestosis -- caused by asbestos exposure.

Charles said: "I've had to accept my diagnosis but I still find it
distressing when I hear about asbestos, especially when it’s in
newspapers and on TV.

"My whole body aches and even walking around my house causes me a
lot of pain.

"There's been a lot of uncertainty for me and my family in recent
years, but thankfully the experts at Unite Legal Services and
Thompsons Solicitors were there for me from start to finish."

Charles is now receiving support from asbestos suffering groups and
the compensation ensured his family has financial security in the
future.

Karen Reay, Yorkshire and Humberside regional secretary at Unite
the Union, said: "Charles has had his life turned upside down
because of his asbestos disease. He was put at risk by his
employers for decades and he is now suffering as a result.

"We are pleased that we were able to support Charles and ensure he
secured the maximum compensation possible.

"Because he pursued his claim through his union membership, he was
able to keep 100 per cent of his compensation."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Retired Window Surveyor Dies of Mesothelioma
-------------------------------------------------------------
Keri Trigg of shropshirestar.com reported that John Dufty, 70, was
a retired window surveyor who had handled asbestos in his late
teens and twenties.

An inquest at Shirehall in Shrewsbury heard Mr Dufty, who lived at
Sandino Court, Stirchley, was first admitted to hospital in July
this year with shortness of breath. In October he began to
deteriorate and died at home on November 11.

The hearing was told that he handles asbestos working in his teens
as an apprentice at a factory in Walsall in the West Midlands. He
continued to be exposed to the substance as he began his career as
a window surveyor in his 20s.

The medical cause of death was given as mesothelioma and John
Ellery, senior coroner for Shropshire, Telford & Wrekin recorded a
conclusion of industrial disease.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had $35.3MM Liability at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard Motor Products, Inc.'s accrued asbestos liabilities
amounted to US$35,319,000 as of September 30, 2018, according to
the consolidated balance sheets in the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We are responsible for certain future
liabilities relating to alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products.  In accordance with our accounting policy, our most
recent actuarial study as of August 31, 2018 estimated an
undiscounted liability for settlement payments, excluding legal
costs, ranging from US$37.1 million to US$56.9 million for the
period through 2061.  Based on the information contained in the
actuarial study and all other available information considered by
us, we have concluded that no amount within the range of settlement
payments was more likely than any other and, therefore, in
assessing our asbestos liability we compare the low end of the
range to our recorded liability to determine if an adjustment is
required.

"Based upon the results of the August 31, 2018 actuarial study, in
September 2018 we increased our asbestos liability to US$37.1
million, the low end of the range, and recorded an incremental
pre-tax provision of US$3.5 million in earnings (loss) from
discontinued operations in the accompanying statement of
operations.  In addition, according to the updated study, future
legal costs, which are expensed as incurred and reported in
earnings (loss) from discontinued operations in the accompanying
statement of operations, are estimated to range from US$44.9
million to US$80.6 million for the period through 2061.

"We will continue to perform an annual actuarial analysis during
the third quarter of each year for the foreseeable future.  Based
on this analysis and all other available information, we will
continue to reassess the recorded liability and, if deemed
necessary, record an adjustment to the reserve, which will be
reflected as a loss or gain from discontinued operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/RnOGQH


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had 1,450 Fibro Cases at Sept. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately 1,450 cases were outstanding at September 30, 2018,
for which Standard Motor Products, Inc. may be responsible for any
related liabilities in connection to its former brake business,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In 1986, we acquired a brake business, which
we subsequently sold in March 1998 and which is accounted for as a
discontinued operation.  When we originally acquired this brake
business, we assumed future liabilities relating to any alleged
exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by the seller
of the acquired brake business.  In accordance with the related
purchase agreement, we agreed to assume the liabilities for all new
claims filed on or after September 2001.  Our ultimate exposure
will depend upon the number of claims filed against us on or after
September 2001 and the amounts paid for indemnity and defense
thereof.  At September 30, 2018, approximately 1,450 cases were
outstanding for which we may be responsible for any related
liabilities.  Since inception in September 2001 through September
30, 2018, the amounts paid for settled claims are approximately
US$25.2 million.

"In evaluating our potential asbestos-related liability, we have
considered various factors including, among other things, an
actuarial study of the asbestos related liabilities performed by an
independent actuarial firm, our settlement amounts and whether
there are any co-defendants, the jurisdiction in which lawsuits are
filed, and the status and results of settlement discussions.  As is
our accounting policy, we consider the advice of actuarial
consultants with experience in assessing asbestos-related
liabilities to estimate our potential claim liability.  The
methodology used to project asbestos-related liabilities and costs
in our actuarial study considered: (1) historical data available
from publicly available studies; (2) an analysis of our recent
claims history to estimate likely filing rates into the future; (3)
an analysis of our currently pending claims; and (4) an analysis of
our settlements to date in order to develop average settlement
values."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/RnOGQH


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tucker Couple Sues BMW, Cos. for Asbestos Exposure
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Madison County Record reported that a couple is suing BMW
Constructors Inc., Crown, Cork & Seal USA Inc. and Zurn Industries,
et al, for the husband's alleged exposure to products containing
asbestos.

Robert and Marietta Tucker filed a complaint on Nov. 1, in the St.
Clair County Circuit Court, alleging the defendants failed to use
reasonable care in protecting workers.

The plaintiffs allege that during Robert Tucker's career, beginning
in 1960, he was exposed to and inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers
from products manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by the
defendants.

In November 2016, he allegedly learned he had lung cancer, which
can be attributed to asbestos exposure, according to court
documents.

He experienced pain and suffering. He incurred large medical costs.
The couple holds BMW Constructors Inc., Crown, Cork & Seal USA Inc.
and Zurn Industries, et al, responsible because the defendants
allegedly negligently included asbestos fibers in products when
substitutes were available.

The defendants allegedly failed to warn and instruct employees
about the dangers of working with or around products containing
asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek compensatory and
punitive damages of more than $50,000. They are represented by
Randy L. Gori of Gori, Julian & Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 18-L-694


ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at Sept.29
------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc.'s subsidiaries still face lawsuits
involving claims for damages caused by installation of brakes that
contained asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 29, 2018.

The Company states, "A wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,
Automotive Specialty Accessories and Parts, Inc. and its
wholly-owned subsidiary Whitney Automotive Group, Inc.  ("WAG"),
are named defendants in several lawsuits involving claims for
damages caused by installation of brakes during the late 1960's and
early 1970's that contained asbestos.  WAG marketed certain brakes,
but did not manufacture any brakes.  WAG maintains liability
insurance coverage to protect its and the Company's assets from
losses arising from the litigation and coverage is provided on an
occurrence rather than a claims made basis, and the Company is not
expected to incur significant out-of-pocket costs in connection
with this matter that would be material to its consolidated
financial statements."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ZF32en


ASBESTOS UPDATE: UTC Records $341MM Asbestos Liability at Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
United Technologies Corporation (UTC) recorded approximately US$341
million as of September 30, 2018 for its estimated total liability
to resolve all pending and unasserted potential future asbestos
claims through 2059, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "...[L]ike many other industrial companies, we
and our subsidiaries have been named as defendants in lawsuits
alleging personal injury as a result of exposure to asbestos
integrated into certain of our products or business premises.
While we have never manufactured asbestos and no longer incorporate
it in any currently-manufactured products, certain of our
historical products, like those of many other manufacturers, have
contained components incorporating asbestos.  A substantial
majority of these asbestos-related claims have been dismissed
without payment or were covered in full or in part by insurance or
other forms of indemnity.  Additional cases were litigated and
settled without any insurance reimbursement.  The amounts involved
in asbestos related claims were not material individually or in the
aggregate in any year.

"Our estimated total liability to resolve all pending and
unasserted potential future asbestos claims through 2059 is
approximately US$341 million and is principally recorded in Other
long-term liabilities on our Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet
as of September 30, 2018.  This amount is on a pre-tax basis, not
discounted, and excludes the Company's legal fees to defend the
asbestos claims (which will continue to be expensed by the Company
as they are incurred).  In addition, the Company has an insurance
recovery receivable for probable asbestos related recoveries of
approximately US$156 million, which is included primarily in Other
assets on our Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September
30, 2018.

"The amounts recorded by UTC for asbestos-related liabilities and
insurance recoveries are based on currently available information
and assumptions that we believe are reasonable.  Our actual
liabilities or insurance recoveries could be higher or lower than
those recorded if actual results vary significantly from the
assumptions.  Key variables in these assumptions include the number
and type of new claims to be filed each year, the outcomes or
resolution of such claims, the average cost of resolution of each
new claim, the amount of insurance available, allocation
methodologies, the contractual terms with each insurer with whom we
have reached settlements, the resolution of coverage issues with
other excess insurance carriers with whom we have not yet achieved
settlements, and the solvency risk with respect to our insurance
carriers.  Other factors that may affect our future liability
include uncertainties surrounding the litigation process from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case, legal rulings
that may be made by state and federal courts, and the passage of
state or federal legislation.  At least annually, the Company
evaluates all of these factors and, with input from an outside
actuarial expert, makes any necessary adjustments to both our
estimated asbestos liabilities and insurance recoveries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/qg2SA6


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wife Sues GE, Cos. Over Husband's Asbestos Death
-----------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Record reported that a surviving spouse of a man who
worked at various locations in Missouri alleges that exposure to
asbestos caused his death from lung cancer.

LaRae M. Clark filed a complaint on Nov. 5 in the St. Louis 22nd
Judicial Circuit Court against General Electric Co., Fort Kent
Holdings Inc., et al. alleging negligence and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff is the surviving spouse
of James F. Clark. She alleges during his career life from 1956 to
2006 at various locations in Missouri, he was exposed to and
inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers emanating from certain products
manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by defendants. The
suit states that on or about March 12, 2014, he was diagnosed with
lung cancer, an asbestos-induced disease, and died on Nov. 15,
2015.

The plaintiff holds General Electric Co., Fort Kent Holdings Inc.,
et al. responsible because the defendants allegedly failed to
determine the health hazards of asbestos-containing materials to
humans and failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions
concerning the dangers of working with or around products
containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks damages of more
than $50,000, costs and all further relief that the court may deem
proper and just. She is represented by Andrew A. O'Brien,
Christopher J. Thoron, Bartholomew J. Baumstark, Gerald J.
FitzGerald and Adam J. Reynolds of O'Brien Law Firm PC in St.
Louis.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1822-CC11564



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