CAR_Public/181207.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, December 7, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 245

                            Headlines

ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT: Scheduling Order Dates in "Myers" Extended
ALL SAINTS: Roseborough Moves for Certification of Workers Class
ALTMAN SPECIALTY: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Whitmark Suit Claims
AMERICAN DG: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Vardakas Suit Granted
ARMADA SKILLED: Valencia Seeks OT Pay for Home Health Clinicians

ATTENDING HOME CARE: Faces Teshabaeva Suit in New York
BAXTER HEALTHCARE: Removes De Vega Suit to C.D. California
BERGEN COUNTY GYNECOLOGY: Ozdermirci Sues for Invasion of Privacy
BIG PICTURE: Jurisdictional Discovery Allowed in Cummings
BLUESTEM BRANDS: Williams Seeks Prelim. OK of $1-Mil. Settlement

BRITISH AIRWAYS: Fails to Secure Customer Data, Pena Claims
CANADIAN FUNDING: Hutchens Appeals Order in CGC Suit to 10th Cir.
CARFAX INC: Sued over Alleged False Vehicle History Reports
CHICAGO: Court Narrows Claims in Water Dept. Employees' Suit
CIOX HEALTH: Eighth Circuit Appeal Filed in Graham Class Suit

CIOX HEALTH: Henderson Appeals Order in Graham Suit to 8th Cir.
CLAY COUNTY, AK: Court Conditionally Certifies Olsen Suit
COATES ELECTRIC: I.B.E.W. Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Wages
COMCAST CABLE: California Court Stays Hodges Suit
CONTRACT CALLERS: Goldberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Johnson Suit over Drop in Share Price
CYLCOMM LLC: Sent Unwanted Fax Ads, Lehman Suit Says
DATAMAX CORPORATION: Amons Sues over Debt Collection Practices
DOORDASH INC: Magana Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
ENVIROPLUS INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Chavez Suit Alleges

FIVE GUYS OPERATIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Franco Claims
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Ramnauth Sues Over Illegal, Undisclosed Charges
G6 HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cummings Suit Claims
GC SERVICES: Certification of FDCPA Class Sought in O'Boyle Suit
GEICO: Vukovic Sues over Insurance Services Advertisements

GENCO I: Court Orders Joint Written Response in Ortiz
GENERAL MOTORS: AARC Appeals Ruling in Royalty Suit to D.C. Cir.
GREENSKY INC: Mustafin Sues Over False Company Reports
GUARANTEED RATE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Gilmor Suit Claims
HAYTI, MO: Hamilton Appeals E.D. Mo. Ruling to Eighth Circuit

HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Removed Soranno Case to District of New Jersey
HORTONWORKS INC: Victor Sues over Misleading Financial Report
IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM: PI Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
KEYVIEW LABS: Jamara Sues Over Unauthorized Auto-dialed Calls
LET'S EAT OUT: Bid to Exclude Expert Testimony in Cope Suit Denied

MARKETPLACE 41: Ramirez Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
MARYLAND: Court Dismisses Suit Over SB-707
MDL 2672: Changes to Tribal Trust Allocation Formula Approved
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER: Johnson Appeals Ruling in Bond Films Suit
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Court Dismisses Pilots' Insurance Suit

MIDLAND CREDIT: Sued Over Deceptive Debt Collection Practices
MISSISSIPPI: Court Reinstates Hinton Inmate Suit
NAVARRE CORPORATION: Kurth et al. Seek Minimum & OT Pay for Drivers
NEW JERSEY: Wahab Appeals D.N.J. Ruling to Third Circuit
NRG ENERGY: Tejero Wage & Hour Suit Remanded to State Court

ORLANS PC: Garland FDCPA Suit Held in Abeyance
OVERLAND SOLUTIONS: Parducci Sues Over Excessive Insurance Premiums
PALMER ADMINISTRATIVE: Karon Sues over Prerecorded Voice Calls
PANDORA MEDIA: Faces Kapela Suit Over Sale to Sirius
PANDORA MEDIA: Thompson Balks at Merger Deal with Sirius XM

PAWN SHOP: Tupitsyn Seeks Damages for Retaliatory Discharge
PETCO ANIMAL: $1.2MM Settlement in Feist FCRA Suit Has Final OK
PRINSTON PHARMACEUTICAL: Kaplan Sues Over Contaminated Valsartan
PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: 3d Cir. Vacates Dismissal of CFA Suit
PROMEDICA HEALTH: Hires Files Suit Asserting Equal Pay Act Breach

RUBY RECEPTIONISTS: Faces McKenzie Lawsuit in D. Oregon
RW DIRECT: Claims in Patterson Suit Under Moss Warranty Act Trimmed
S.W. CORP: Garcia Seeks Minimum Wage for Sales Reps
SAFEMARK SYSTEMS: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Granted
SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION: Cockrell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

SANTA ROSA CONSULTING: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Jones Says
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Hinkle Settlement Has Final Court Approval
SHO-ME POWER: Barfield Class Settlement Has Prelim. Court Approval
SMITH TURF: Langley et al. Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
SPECIALIZED LOAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss Erk FDCPA Suit

STORED VALUE: Court Certifies 3 Classes in Humphrey Suit
SUNRISE SENIOR: Heredia Suit Removed to C.D. California
SWITCH INC: Seeks Approval of Bid to Strike Briefing Sched in Cai
TRINITY HEATING: Court Denies Bid to Deposit Check in Boger Suit
UNIQLO USA: Removed Jacobs Case to Central District of California

UNITED RESTAURANT: Chin et al Seek Minimum Wages & OT under FLSA
UNITED STATES: Bid for Preliminary Injunction in Hamama Granted
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Suit Over Oct. 13 Memo
VACATION RESORTS: Hall Sues over Debt Collection Practices
VALBIN CORP: Court Approves $30K Saleh Class Settlement

WAL-MART STORES: Prado Moves to Certify Classes of Managers
WALMART INC: Edwards Sues over Sale of EquateTM Gelcaps
WELTMAN & WEINBERG: Appeals Ruling in Gibbons Suit to 3rd Cir.
WELTMAN WEINBERG: Certification of Class Sought in Bitzko Suit
WESTERN REGIONAL: Court Separates Prisoners' Section 1983 Suit

WICHITA, KS: Suit Over Remington GO Remanded to State Court
WILMINGTON TRUST: Court OKs $200MM Settlement in Securities Suit
WURTH LOUIS: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Craftwood Class Suit

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aerojet Rocketdyne Faces 54 Cases at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Still Faces Mount Vernon Mills Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Revives Airborne Asbestos Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Company's Expert Witness Request Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: CBS Corp. Had 31,500 Claims Pending at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: CertainTeed Corp. Can't Shake Asbestos Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Claims vs. Special Electric Dismissal Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Records $5.9MM Liability
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Accrues $8MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Flips $1.6MM Asbestos Jury Award

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Had 55,500 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Decision Tossing $11MM Asbestos Verdict Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $27.6MM Asbestos Coverage at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Footballer From Asbestos-Related Disease
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Gardner Denver Had $98.3MM Reserve at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Magnetek Has $1MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Says Wife Had Secondary Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: McDermott Int'l Still Defends Suits at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Md. Spec. App. Vacates Judgments vs. Vitale
ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Faces 568 Lawsuits at Sept. 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: NASSCO Colorable Defense in Morton's Suit Fails
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NSW Gov't Imposes $2MM Fine for Asbestos Dumping
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY Asbestos Court to Hear Baby Power Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Owens-Illinois Defends 1,065 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Oxford Building Vacated After Asbestos Find

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pepco's Buzzard Point ARO Reveals Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Real Estate Developer Obtains Victory in Court
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Estimates $38MM Liability at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Had 718 Pending Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Simmons Hanly Wins $30MM Asbestos Verdict

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Unit Had 141 PI Suits at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Units Faces 9 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Had 390 Pending Cases at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Faces 12,845 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.3BB Liability at Sept. 30



                            *********

ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT: Scheduling Order Dates in "Myers" Extended
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Laurie J. Michelson grants the Plaintiff's Motion to
Extend Scheduling Order Dates in the lawsuit titled EMILY G. MYERS
v. ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., and PATRICK SOMMERVILLE, Case
No. 2:17-cv-13964-LJM-EAS (E.D. Mich.).

The lawsuit is a putative class action alleging violation of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and related state statutes based
on the Defendants alleged sending collection letters in envelopes
with a glassline window that allegedly resulted in the disclosure
of debt-related information.

According to the Court's order, the Plaintiff's Motion is granted
such that the dispositive motion deadline will be extended as
follows: the case will be referred to the Magistrate Judge for
another settlement conference.  If the case does not settle, any
dispositive motions, including a motion for class certification,
shall be filed no later than 21 days after the unsuccessful
settlement conference.

Judge Michelson further ordered that the pending motion for class
certification is dismissed as premature.[CC]


ALL SAINTS: Roseborough Moves for Certification of Workers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Parties in the lawsuit styled MONICA ROSEBOROUGH, individually
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals v. ALL SAINTS
HOME CARE, INC., ALL SAINTS HEALTH CARE, LLC, and ALL SAINTS HEALTH
HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-02122-KHV-JPO (D. Kan.), move the
Court for an order granting conditional certification of this FLSA
Collective:

     All current and former workers who provided in-home care
     services to one or more self-directed participants in a
     Medicaid Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) program
     and who used All Saints Home Care, Inc. as a Financial
     Management Services (FMS) provider ("Self-Directed Client")
     and who both: (1) worked either (a) more than 40 hours
     during any work week for one Self-Directed Client or (b)
     more than 38 hours for a combination of one Self-Directed
     Client and any other client(s), and (2) was not paid
     overtime at the rate of one and one-half times the regular
     rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 at any time between
     March 12, 2015 and the date of judgment ("FLSA Collective").

The Parties enter into a Stipulation to memorialize their agreement
for conditional certification of this action as a collective action
under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The Parties
also move the Court for an order (1) approving the form of notice,
including the Notice and Consent, as well as the notice process;
and (2) requiring the Defendants to provide the Plaintiff's counsel
with contact information for FLSA Collective members.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George A. Hanson, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100
          Facsimile: (816) 714-7101
          E-mail: hanson@stuevesiegel.com

               - and -

          Laura E. Reasons, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY
          10 North Dearborn Street, 11th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          Facsimile: (312) 253-1443
          E-mail: lreasons@dlcfirm.com

               - and -

          Kenneth P. Abbarno, Esq.
          Mark M. Abramowitz, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY
          7556 Mentor Ave.
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888
          Facsimile: (440) 953-9138
          E-mail: kabbarno@dlcfirm.com
                  mabramowitz@dlcfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Mitchell L. Herren, Esq.
          Sean D. Walsh, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Kuhlman, Esq.
          Krystle M. Dalke, Esq.
          HINKLE LAW FIRM LLC
          1617 North Parkway, Suite 400
          Wichita, Kansas 67206
          Telephone: (316) 267-2000
          Facsimile: (316) 630-8466
          E-mail: mherren@hinklaw.com
                  swalsh@hinklaw.com
                  jkuhlman@hinklaw.com
                  kdalke@hinklaw.com


ALTMAN SPECIALTY: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Whitmark Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
TROY RICHARD WHITMARK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALTMAN SPECIALTY PLANTS, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00055889-CU-OE-NC (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Nov. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee.

Altman Specialty Plants Inc. produces and supplies plants and other
products for customers in the United States. Altman Specialty
Plants Inc. was founded in 1975 and is based in Vista, California.
It has locations in Lake Mathews and Salinas, California; Giddings,
Texas; Peyton, Colorado; and Loxahatchee, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel A. Wong, Esq.
          Kashif Haque, Esq.
          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC
          9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 379-6250
          Facsimile: (949) 379-6251


AMERICAN DG: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Vardakas Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEE VARDAKAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN DG ENERGY INC., JOHN N.
HATSOPOULOS, GEORGE N. HATSOPOULOS, et al., Defendants, Civil No.
17-10247-LTS (D. Mass.), Judge Leo T. Sorokin of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts (i) granted the Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and (ii) denied as moot May's
Motion for Class Certification.

The class action case, brought by and on behalf of William Chase
May and other similarly situated holders of the common stock of
American DG, arises out of the 2017 merger of American DG and
Tecogen, Inc.  The case essentially alleges that the merger was the
result of a conflicted sales process that undervalued the common
stock of American DG.

On March 2, 2018, the Court dismissed May's federal securities law
claims.  Remaining are Counts III, IV, and V, which allege that the
directors, co-CEOs, and certain controlling shareholders of
American DG and Tecogen breached their fiduciary duties in
connection with the merger (Counts III and IV); and that George
Hatsopoulos, former American DG chairperson and Tecogen director,
and certain entities aided and abetted in that breach (Count V).
Now, the Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to all
remaining counts.  The Plaintiffs have opposed.

American DG and Tecogen are energy companies with complementary
businesses.  Prior to the merger, the companies were "affiliated,"
they shared co-founders, brothers John Hatsopoulos and G.
Hatsopoulos; co-CEOs, J. Hatsopoulos and Benjamin Locke; certain
members of senior management, directors, and ownership; and office
space.  In 2014 and 2015, nearly 10% of Tecogen's total revenues
came from sales of cogeneration parts and services to American DG.

In July 2010, American DG established EuroSite Power, a subsidiary
of American DG.  As was the case with American DG and Tecogen, the
leadership and ownership of American DG and EuroSite overlapped.
Between 2011 and 2012, American DG issued convertible debentures to
J. Hatsopoulos and two other owners of Tecogen common stock in an
amount of $19.4 million, which remained outstanding until early
2016.

Discussions of a merger between the two companies began in early
2016.  The American DG and Tecogen independent committees continued
to meet discuss, evaluate, and negotiate the merger of American DG
and Tecogen until Oct. 31, 2016 when a merger agreement was
negotiated.  The agreement reflected the committees ultimately
negotiated purchase price of $0.38 per share of Tecogen, which the
parties settle upon after discussing prices ranging from $0.29 to
$0.41 per share.  Each committee of independent directors
recommended the merger to their respective boards of directors.
Following these recommendations, each company's board of directors
unanimously approved the merger.

On Nov. 1, 2016, the agreement of merger was executed by American
DG and Tecogen, and, on Nov. 2, 2016, American DG and Tecogen
announced their plan of merger, upon the consummation of which
Merger Sub, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tecogen formed for the
purpose of effecting the merger, merged with and into American DG,
with American DG continuing as the surviving corporation as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Tecogen.

At the time the merger was announced, co-founders J. and G.
Hatsopoulos each had leadership roles in the companies. J.
Hatsopoulos was the co-CEO of both companies and served as director
of each, while G. Hatsopoulos was a technical advisor to American
DG and had previously served as chairperson of the board of
directors for American DG and on the board of directors for
Tecogen.  The two brothers, together with their families, also
beneficially owned or controlled more than 34% of American DG stock
and more than 23 of Tecogen common stock.  As of March 9, 2017, the
Hatsopoulos brothers collectively held 17.4 million shares of
American DG common stock and 4.6 million shares of Tecogen common
stock.

The proxy statement issued to shareholders described the merger
agreement negotiation process and the two companies' overlapping
leadership and ownership.  Stockholders overwhelmingly voted in
favor of the merger, and, on May 18, 2017, the merger was executed.


Count IV alleges that J. and. G. Hatsopolous breached their
common-law fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith owed
to American DG's unaffiliated shareholders by placing their
personal interests ahead of the interests of May and similarly
situated shareholders and foisting an unfair transaction, both in
terms of process and price on them.  Judge Sorokin finds that May
offers no factual allegations to establish that the Hatsopolous
brothers had interests that conflicted with minority shareholders,
much less that they engaged in self-dealing with respect to the
merger terms.  May has not met his burden to demonstrate a conflict
of interest sufficient to merit such an inquiry.  Accordingly,
because American DG's other shareholders need no protection from
the Hatsopolous brothers' pursuit of interests shared by all
shareholders, application of the entire fairness standard serves no
purpose.

Count III alleges the director and officer Defendants breached
their common-law fiduciary duties owed to American DG shareholders
by failing to take steps to obtain the highest available value for
American DG consideration failing to adequately consider other
strategic alternatives, and by favoring their own interests rather
than protect the best interests of American DG's unaffiliated
shareholders.  The Judge finds that the acquisition at issue was
negotiated by special committees of each board and recommended to
the boards after evaluation, and the acquisition benefitted
shareholders, including the brothers, in like manner.  There is no
allegation that J. Hatsopolous received special benefit from the
merger as a result of his officer capacity.

Finally, Count V alleges that G. Hatsopolous, Tecogen, and Merger
Sub "knowingly aided and abetted" the director and officer
defendants' breach of their fiduciary duties.  The Judge finds that
because the primary claims of breach of fiduciary duty have failed,
the aiding and abetting claims also fail.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Sorokin granted the Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and denied as moot May's
Motion for Class Certification.  The Clerk will enter judgment
forthwith, with each side to bear its own fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Qvv513 from Leagle.com.

Lee Vardakas, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carl L. Stine --
cstine@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M.
Leviton -- jason@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Nathaniel L.
Orenstein -- NOrenstein@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco.

American DG Energy, Inc., John N. Hatsopoulos, George N.
Hatsopoulos, Benjamin Locke, Charles T. Maxwell, Deanne M.
Petersen, Christine M. Klaskin, John Rowe, Joan Giacinti & Elias
Samaras, Defendants, represented by Andrew T. Solomon --
ASolomon@solomoncramer.com -- Solomon & Cramer, LLP, pro hac vice &
Paul E. Summit -- psummit@sandw.com -- Sullivan & Worcester LLP.

Tecogen Inc. & Tecogen.Adge Acquisition Corp., Defendants,
represented by Andrew T. Solomon, Solomon & Cramer, LLP, Nathan B.
Roberts, Solomon & Cramer LLP & Paul E. Summit, Sullivan &
Worcester LLP.

Cassel Salpeter & Co., LLC, Defendant, represented by David G.
Thomas -- thomasda@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

William Chase May, Movant, represented by Adam J. Blander --
ablander@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP, pro hac vice &
Nathaniel L. Orenstein -- norenstein@bermantabacco.com -- Berman
Tabacco.


ARMADA SKILLED: Valencia Seeks OT Pay for Home Health Clinicians
----------------------------------------------------------------
GRETCHEN VALENCIA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ARMADA SKILLED HOME CARE OF
NM LLC, ARMADA HOME HEALTHCARE OF SOCORRO, LLC and CHRISTOPHER
TAPIA, the Defendants, Case 1:18-cv-01071-KK-KBM (D.N.M., Nov. 16,
2018), seeks to redress Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, and the New
Mexico Wage Payment Act, by knowingly classifying its home health
Clinicians as overtime exempt and knowingly failing to pay them any
overtime premium wages for the overtime work they performed despite
knowing they were paid pursuant to a hybrid wage scheme that is
plainly inconsistent with their classification as overtime exempt.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a resident of New
Mexico who resides in Albuquerque. From March of 2016 through the
present, the Plaintiff worked as a Registered Nurse for Defendants,
performing home health care services in this District. Since
Armada's inception in 2016, Defendants paid its Clinicians,
including Plaintiff, on a combined "per-visit" / hourly basis that
did not include the payment of any overtime premium wages for any
of the work she performed beyond 40 hours in any workweek, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Christopher M. Moody, Esq.
          Repps D. Stanford, Esq.
          MOODY & STANFORD, P.C.
          4169 Montgomery Blvd NE
          Albuquerque, NM 87109
          Telephone: (505) 227-8343
          Facsimile: (505) 944-0034 f
          stanford@nmlaborlaw.com
          moody@nmlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          Teresa M. Becvar, Esq.
          Catherine T. Mitchell, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  tbecvar@stephanzouras.com
                  cmitchell@stephanzouras.com

ATTENDING HOME CARE: Faces Teshabaeva Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Attending Home Care,
LLC. The case is captioned as MAKTUMMA TESHABAEVA, and FERUZA
RAKHIMOVA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ATTENDING HOME CARE, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 522421/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Nov. 5, 2018). The case is assigned to
Justice Debra Silber.

Attending Home Care, LLC is a home care agency in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by VIRGINA & AMBINDER, Telephone:
(212) 943-9080.

The Defendant is represented by:

          LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
          290 Broadhollow Rd.
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 247-4701


BAXTER HEALTHCARE: Removes De Vega Suit to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of IMELDA DE VEGA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BAXTER
HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Alameda (Case No.
RG18923256) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California on November 5, 2018. The clerk of court for the Northern
District of California assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-06710. The case is
assigned to Judge Richard Seeborg.

Baxter Healthcare Corporation develops, manufactures, and markets
healthcare equipment and instruments. Baxter Healthcare Corporation
was formerly known as Travenol Laboratories, Inc. and changed its
name to Baxter Healthcare Corporation in July 1987. The company was
incorporated in 1966 and is based in Deerfield, Illinois. Baxter
Healthcare Corporation operates as a subsidiary of Baxter
International Inc. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Evan R. Moses, Esq.
          Aaron H. Cole, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
          STEWART, P.C.
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 239-9800
          Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
          E-mail: evan.moses@ogletree.com
                  aaron.cole@ogletree.com


BERGEN COUNTY GYNECOLOGY: Ozdermirci Sues for Invasion of Privacy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lara Ozdermirci, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Bergen County Gynecology, P.C., a New
Jersey Professional Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-16475
(D. N.J., November 27, 2018) is an action against Defendant, Bergen
County Gynecology, P.C., to secure redress for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant is a medical office that provides various services
and medicines specific to women and girls. To promote its services,
Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of
consumers in the process. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, which has
resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and
disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. Plaintiff
also seeks statutory damages on behalf of herself and members of
the class, and any other available legal or equitable remedies.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Bergen County, New Jersey.

Bergen County Gynecology, P.C., is a New Jersey professional
corporation whose principal office is located at 106 Grand Avenue,
Suite #300, Englewood, NJ 07631. Defendant directs, markets, and
provides its business activities throughout the State of
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ross H. Schmierer, Esq.
     DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, P.C.
     525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
     Marlton, NJ 08053
     Phone: (856) 797-9951
     Email: rschmierer@denittislaw.com

          - and -

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: (305) 479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com



BIG PICTURE: Jurisdictional Discovery Allowed in Cummings
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Extend the Briefing Schedule and Allow for Jurisdictional
Discovery in the case captioned CHRISTINE CUMMING, on behalf of
herself and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BIG
PICTURE LOANS, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 5:18-cv-03476-EJD.
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff seeks a judgment: (1) declaring that the
choice-of-law and forum selection provisions in the Defendants'
loan agreement are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (2)
injunctive relief preventing Defendants from lending any more
loans, and (3) damages for the Defendants' RICO violations. The
Defendants subsequently filed multiple motions to dismiss.  

In lieu of responding to the Defendants' motions, the Plaintiff
moved to extend the time to file a response to allow for
jurisdictional discovery.

Discovery may be appropriately granted where pertinent facts
bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a
more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.

Here, the foundational argument underpinning the Defendants'
motions to dismiss is this: as alleged arms of the Native American
Tribe Lac Vieux Desert Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
(LVD), the Defendants contend they are entitled to tribal immunity,
which defeats federal subject matter jurisdiction.

For their part, the Plaintiffs claim the LVD merely serves as a
front for the Defendants who lend illegal high interest loans to
vulnerable consumers and evade state usury and licensing laws. The
Plaintiffs call this a rent-a-tribe operation.  

In order to respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss
meaningfully, the Plaintiffs argue they need jurisdictional
discovery to investigate the connection between the Defendants and
LVD.

In addition, Plaintiffs point out that Defendants are currently
involved in similar litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Plaintiffs argue the Virginia court's factual findings and
available evidence go directly to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants
are not an arm of LVD.
  
The Plaintiffs believe that production of the currently-sealed
jurisdictional information from the Virginia case could be equally
applied to the jurisdictional issue raised in this case. Further,
Plaintiffs argue the burden on Defendants is minimal because they
already provided at least this information to the plaintiffs in the
Virginia case.

Considering: (1) there is a critical factual controversy affecting
the court's subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the Breakthrough
factors require a particular factual showing beyond the typical
jurisdictional issue, (3) the information relevant to the
Breakthrough factors appears uniquely within Defendants' control
and not easily available from public sources, and (4) Defendants
have already been ordered to produce comparable information under
similar circumstances, the court finds that Plaintiffs have
satisfied their burden to demonstrate a need for jurisdictional
discovery. Accordingly, the court will grant Plaintiffs' motion,
but will refer the details of the discovery process to assigned
magistrate judge.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y724jj9v from Leagle.com.

Christine Cumming, Lamesha Kondo, Andrea Mendez & Tammy Wangeline,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew J. Silver -- asilver@tzlegal.com
-- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Anna C. Haac  -- ahaac@tzlegal.com --
Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Tanya Susan Koshy --
tkoshy@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei LLP & Hassan Ali Zavareei
-- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Freeman Revels & Kimberly Pool, Plaintiffs, represented by Anna C.
Haac, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice & Hassan Ali Zavareei --
hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Big Picture Loans, LLC & Ascension Technologies, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Anna Marek Bruty -- annambruty@yahoo.com -- Rosette,
LLP, David Neal Anthony -- david.anthony@troutman.com -- Troutman
Sanders LLP, Justin Gray -- jeffrey.gray@troutman.com -- pro hac
vice, Timothy James St. George -- tim.st.george@troutman.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice & Stacy R. Hovan --
stacy.hovan@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP.


BLUESTEM BRANDS: Williams Seeks Prelim. OK of $1-Mil. Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled WADDELL WILLIAMS, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated v. BLUESTEM BRANDS, INC.,
Case No. 8:17-cv-01971-JDW-AAS (M.D. Fla.), files his unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of $1 million class action
settlement.

After over a year of vigorously contested litigation and as a
result of mediation before the Hon. Diane M. Welsh (Ret.),
Plaintiff Waddell Williams and Defendant Bluestem Brands, Inc.
reached an agreement to resolve this class action case alleging
claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  Mr. Williams
alleges that Bluestem violated the TCPA by placing autodialed calls
to wrong or reassigned cellular telephone numbers.

The Agreement, which requires the creation of a non-reversionary
common fund amounting to $1 million, plus a separate payment by
Defendant, not to exceed $269,500, to satisfy the cost of class
notice and administration, for a total settlement fund of up to
$1,269,500.

The Agreement defines a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure comprised of:

     All persons and entities throughout the United States (1) to
     whom Bluestem Brands, Inc. placed a call in connection with
     a Fingerhut, Gettington, or PayCheck Direct account, (2)
     directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone
     service, (3) in connection with its efforts to collect an
     account balance, (4) via LiveVox, Inc.'s Quick Connect
     platform, (5) where Bluestem's records contain a
     notification of wrong phone, (6) from November 2, 2015
     through July 8, 2018.

Mr. Williams also asks the Court to appoint him as class
representative, and to appoint Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC as
class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          James L. Davidson, Esq.
          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com
                  jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com
                  jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          106 E. 6th Street, Suite 913
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 322-3912
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com


BRITISH AIRWAYS: Fails to Secure Customer Data, Pena Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
RALPH PENA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC (UK), Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-06278 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 5, 2018) is a class action
against the Defendants' failure to exercise reasonable care in
securing and safeguarding its account holders' Private Information,
specifically their names, billing addresses, email addresses, and
credit card information, including credit card numbers, expiry
dates and CVV codes.

British Airways Plc provides scheduled air services for passengers
and cargo in the United Kingdom, the United States, and
internationally. The company also offers airline marketing,
healthcare, aircraft leasing, engineering, bond, finance, trust,
call center, insurance, transport, and ground services, as well as
operates tours. It operates approximately 290 aircraft covering
approximately 200 destinations in 80 countries. The company was
founded in 1972 and is based in Harmondsworth, the United Kingdom.
British Airways Plc is a subsidiary of International Consolidated
Airlines Group S.A. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          Jay Brody, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER &
          GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Rd.
          Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356-2570
          Facsimile: (845) 356-4335
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
                  jbrody@kgglaw.com

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Ste. 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com


CANADIAN FUNDING: Hutchens Appeals Order in CGC Suit to 10th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Jennifer Hutchens, Sandy Hutchens and Tanya Hutchens
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled CGC
Holding Company, LLC, et al. v. Hutchens, et al., Case No.
1:11-CV-01012-RBJ-KLM, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Colorado - Denver.

The appellate case is captioned as CGC Holding Company, LLC, et al.
v. Hutchens, et al., Case No. 18-1444, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
arises from alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

The parties have previously filed various appeals seeking review of
rulings in the case.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CGC HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, a Colorado limited
liability company; HARLEM ALGONQUIN LLC, an Illinois limited
liability company; and JAMES T. MEDICK, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Michael F. Fried, Esq.
          Kevin Peter Roddy, Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER, P.A.
          90 Woodbridge Center Drive, Suite 900
          P.O. Box 10
          Woodbridge, NJ 07095-0000
          Telephone: (732) 636-8000
          E-mail: mfried@wilentz.com
                  kroddy@wilentz.com

               - and -

          Scott R. Shepherd, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLP
          Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah
          35 East State Street
          Media, PA 19063
          Telephone: (610) 891-9880
          E-mail: sshepherd@sfmslaw.com

Defendants-Appellants SANDY HUTCHENS, AKA Fred Hayes, AKA Moishe
Alexander, AKA Moshe Ben Avraham; TANYA HUTCHENS; and JENNIFER
HUTCHENS are represented by:

          Scott Gessler, Esq.
          Steven A. Klenda, Esq.
          KLENDA GESSLER AND BLUE LLC
          1624 Market Street, Suite 202
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (720) 432-5705
          E-mail: sgessler@klendagesslerblue.com
                  sklenda@klendagesslerblue.com


CARFAX INC: Sued over Alleged False Vehicle History Reports
-----------------------------------------------------------
ILENE R. SCHWARTZ, the Plaintiff, vs. CARFAX, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 8:18-cv-02822-SDM-AAS (M.D. Fla., Nov. 16, 2018), sues
over alleged defamation (libel), negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and tortious interference with a business
relationship.

According to the complaint, CARFAX publishes vehicle history
reports that include false allegations of "damage" to vehicles
without disclosing the reporting source, fails to provide consumers
with a meaningful dispute and verification process by refusing to
disclose the reporting source to the consumer, and causes
consumers' vehicle values to be artificially and substantially
lower.

CARFAX is the leading provider of vehicle history information in
North America and offers a variety of products and services to its
customers, including CARFAX Vehicle History Reports TM. Carfax is a
subsidiary of IHS Markit, Ltd, an international, publicly traded
information and analytics company based in the United Kingdom.

A VHR published by CARFAX allegedly provides consumers and
businesses with the vehicle's history based on the information that
CARFAX receives from data sources such as motor vehicle agencies in
the United States and Canada, auto auctions, police and fire
departments, auto body shops, rental and fleet management agencies,
as well as third-party vendors. VHRs typically include information
about a vehicle's title, number of owners, flood damage, total loss
accidents, odometer readings, structural damage, lemon history,
accident indicators, results for state emissions inspections, and
service records. CARFAX offers and publishes VHRs to consumers,
auto dealers, and other third CARFAX's representations on its
website invite consumers and businesses to place parties trust in
the company by stating that it has "the most comprehensive vehicle
history database" and that "millions of consumers trust CARFAX to
provide them with vehicle history information each year."CARFAX
assures consumers that they have “good reason” to trust CARFAX
because it "receives information from more than 100,000 data
sources." As of April 2, 2018, CARFAX reported that its database
contained 20 billion records and that it receives over 2.7 million
VHR requests each day. Through its successful advertising campaign,
CARFAX has made obtaining VHR essential step in the process of
purchasing a vehicle.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Katherine Earle Yanes, Esq.
          Brandon Kyle Breslow, Esq.
          KYNES, MARKMAN & FELMAN, P.A.
          P.O. Box 3396
          Tampa, FL 33601
          Telephone: (813) 229-1118
          Facsimile: (813) 221-6750
          E-mail: kyanes@kmf-law.com
                  bbreslow@kmf-law.com

               - and -

          Gus M. Centrone, Esq.
          Brian L. Shrader, Esq.
          Deirdre F. Aretini, Esq.
          DUNLAP, BENNETT & LUDWIG, PLLC
          612 W. Bay Street
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 360-1529
          Facsimile: (813) 336-0832
          E-mail: bshrader@dbllawyers.com
                  gcentrone@dbllawyers.com
                  daretini@dbllawyers.com

CHICAGO: Court Narrows Claims in Water Dept. Employees' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Norther District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) for failure to state a claim in
the case captioned DERRICK EDMOND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. No. 17-cv-04858. (N.D. Ill.).

The nine plaintiffs in this proposed class action are current or
former employees of the City of Chicago's Department of Water
Management (Water Department).  Each plaintiff is an African
American individual. The seven-count SAC pleads claims under 42
U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1983 for discrimination and for creating a
hostile work environment (Counts I-V); similar violations of the
Illinois Human Rights Act of 2003 (IHRA) (Count VI) and an
indemnification count against the City (Count VI).

The court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motions
to dismiss. The individual defendants are dismissed from Counts
I-IV, and Count V is dismissed insofar as it pleads a claim arising
exclusively under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The alternative claim
pleaded in Count V against the individual defendants in their
individual capacities is dismissed in part.

Here, the Court finds that Counts II and IV of the SAC expressly
disavow reliance on Section 1981 as creating a private right of
action. The SAC characterizes Counts I and II as hostile work
environment claims.The Counts differ on whether they arise under
the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.  The Plaintiffs
plead Count I under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause via Section 1983 and Count II via Section 1981 via Section
1983. Counts III and V follow the same pattern.  Respectively, they
plead discrimination claims under the Constitution via Section 1983
and under Section 1981 via Section 1983.

Thus, Counts II and IV arise under Sections 1981 and 1983, so
Campbell's holding, which governs claims that arise exclusively
under Section 1981, does not apply.

Counts II and IV of the SAC exceed the minimum required by federal
notice pleading standards by mentioning Sections 1981 and 1983
expressly. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Counts II and IV as
independent Section 1981 claims is denied. Counts II and IV remain
subject to dismissal to the extent plaintiffs fail to satisfy
Section 1983's requirements for bringing suit against a state
actor.

The Statute of Limitations

It is true that the SAC gives no dates for the incidents of alleged
discrimination but under the governing pleading rules, plaintiffs
need not plead the dates of alleged discriminatory conduct to avoid
dismissal based on the statute of limitations. A statute of
limitations provides an affirmative defense, and a plaintiff is not
required to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat
affirmative defenses. If the complaint nonetheless sets out all of
the elements of an affirmative defense, it may be dismissed.
Defendants do not argue that the SAC contains everything needed to
determine that any claim is untimely. Courts have granted motions
to dismiss where the complaint contained the dates needed to
conclude that the claims were time barred.  

In this case, the City defendants want the plaintiffs to plead
additional facts (dates) to negate the possibility that limitations
bars the SAC's claims. If some or all of the discrete acts about
which plaintiffs complain occurred outside the limitations period,
those facts should become readily apparent in discovery, but
dismissal of the SAC is unwarranted here because it would saddle
plaintiffs with the burden of negating an affirmative defense in
their complaint. The City defendants' motion to dismiss the SAC for
failing to negate their limitations defense is denied.

Official Capacity Claims Are Redundant of Same Claims Against The
City (Counts I-IV)

The Defendants argue that the individual defendants should be
dismissed from Counts I-IV because claims against the City and city
officials in their official capacities are duplicative.  

42 U.S.C. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue every person, who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
Bringing a Section 1983 suit against a government employee in his
official capacity is akin to suing the entity that employs him and
the standard for liability is the same.

Thus, naming the official capacity defendants in addition to the
government entity, the true party in interest, is redundant and
fails to state a separate claim for relief. Naming either is
sufficient. Naming both is redundant.

The court dismisses the individual defendants from Counts I-IV,
leaving the City as a defendant to those claims. The court does not
reach defendant Murphy's alternative argument for dismissal of
Count III and V.  

Count V: 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 Claim Against Individual State
Actors In Their Individual Capacities

The City defendants say that they are unclear whether Count V is
brought against the individual defendants in their official or
individual capacities. However, the SAC says in so many words that
plaintiffs bring the 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 claims in Count V in
the alternative to Counts I-IV. While Counts I-IV seek to impose
liability on the individual defendants in their official
capacities, Count V covers the possibility that they were exceeding
the scope of their authority as public officials, in which case
plaintiffs seek to hold them individually liable. The court
therefore analyzes Count V as it has been pleaded, an alternative
claim under Section 1981 against the individual defendants in their
individual capacities.

The City defendants and Bresnahan argue that allegations found
elsewhere in the SAC sink Count V because plaintiffs unequivocally
accuse them of acting in their official capacities on City time and
using City resources. Each claim pleaded in the alternative must
separately satisfy federal pleading requirements, so the fact that
Count V is pleaded in the alternative does not by itself save it
from dismissal if it fails to state a plausible claim.  

The court dismisses Count V to the extent it arises solely under
Section 1981 because the individual defendants concededly acted
under color of state law.

Hostile Work Environment Adequately Pleaded

To state a discrimination claim based on a hostile work
environment, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) She was subject to unwelcome harassment (2) the harassment was
based on her race, national origin, or another forbidden reason (3)
the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working
environment and (4) there is basis for employer liability.

The individual defendants nevertheless argue that plaintiffs have
not adequately alleged that they were personally involved in each
incident of alleged discrimination or that a sufficiently severe
and pervasive environment existed. When evaluating a hostile work
environment claim, the court reviews the totality of the
circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. A
complaint is not well-suited to this inquiry.  

The cases cited by the individual defendants demonstrate the
advisability of this approach. As plaintiffs point out, the Seventh
Circuit has treated a supervisor's use of racial epithets, such as
nigger, directed at an employee as nearly per se hostile. Murphy
and Bresnahan cite Smith v. Northeastern Illinois University, 388
F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004), which affirmed the dismissal of a
hostile work environment claim at summary judgment. The record in
Smith showed that the plaintiff overheard the use of just one
racial epithet and heard second-hand reports of additional uses.
The court of appeals reasoned that while certainly relevant to the
determination of a hostile work environment claim, when harassment
is `directed at someone other than the plaintiff, the impact of
such second-hand harassment' is obviously not as great as the
impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff.

Nonetheless, the opinion's very next sentence reads and neither
individual defendant mentions this, the Court do not mean to hold
that a plaintiff can never demonstrate a hostile work environment
through second-hand comments or in situations where a plaintiff is
not the intended target of the statements. So defendants' arguments
that the SAC fails to allege that the plaintiffs were targeted by
the emails and statements described in the SAC or that they knew
about the emails and other alleged bad behavior of the individual
defendants "is certainly relevant" but not dispositive, even at
summary judgment.  

The motions to dismiss Count V's hostile environment claims are
denied.

The City's Liability Under Monell (Counts I-IV)

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities
can be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 caused by
constitutional violations but not under the doctrine of respondeat
superior theory: i.e., that the person who committed the violation
was acting in the course and scope of employment. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under Section 1983.

Widespread Custom or Practice

The Plaintiffs here allege that the City's mayor has acknowledged
that "a deeply engrained culture of racism" existed in the Water
Department. That is no threadbare allegation; it permits a
favorable inference for the plaintiffs that if the mayor knows
this, final policymakers may as well.  Each named plaintiff has
alleged specific experiences consistent with the mayor's
description of the Water Department and the SAC includes
well-pleaded allegations that the named plaintiffs were subjected
to racial epithets and regularly encountered hangman's nooses and
other badges of racism in Water Department facilities. Add to all
of this the allegations that, with favorable inferences, the City
received numerous grievances of these matters and a plausible
inference can be drawn that City policymakers knew of the
widespread practices in the Water Department and acquiesced in them
until 2017.

The City's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Monell claims against the
City is therefore denied. The court need not reach the parties'
alternative dispute over whether the individual defendants are
final policymakers under state law.

Illinois Human Rights Act Claim Against the City (Count VI)

The City argues that the IHRA claim pleaded in Count VI rises and
falls with the Section 1981 and 1983 claims against the City. To
quote the City's preferred case, the IHRA was not intended to
create new rights but merely created a new venue state court for
discrimination claims under federal law.Plaintiffs disagree. They
contend that the IHRA does not require a Monell finding to impose
liability on the City.  The court need not resolve this dispute
because even if the City is right, the motion to dismiss Count VI
would be denied because plaintiffs state plausible Monell claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8ufqeuw from Leagle.com.

Derrick Edmond, Katherine Ealy, Vicki Hill, Robert T Laws, Jr. &
Eddie Cooper, Jr., Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Robert
Watkins, Guin Stokes & Evans, LLC, Christopher W. Carmichael,
Henderson Parks, LLC, J. Bryan Wood, James Bryan Wood, The Wood Law
Office, LLC, Ryan Odell Estes, The Wood Law Office, LLC & Victor P.
Henderson , Henderson Parks, LLC.

Anton Glenn, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Robert Watkins ,
Guin Stokes & Evans, LLC, J. Bryan Wood , James Bryan Wood , The
Wood Law Office, LLC, Ryan Odell Estes , The Wood Law Office, LLC &
Christopher W. Carmichael , Henderson Parks, LLC.

The City of Chicago, John Pope, Deputy Commissioner of the
Department of Water Management, in his official and individual
capacity, Alan Stark, Deputy Commissioner of the Department of
Water Management, in his official and individual capacity & Joseph
Lynch, Chief Operating Engineer of the Department of Water
Management, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants,
represented by Melanie Patrick Neely , City of Chicago, Law
Department Corporation Counsel & Susan Margaret O'Keefe , City of
Chicago Law Department.


CIOX HEALTH: Eighth Circuit Appeal Filed in Graham Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Brandon Graham filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Brandon Graham, et al. v. CIOX Health, LLC, Case
No. 4:18-cv-00266-RWS, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri - St. Louis.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 19, 2018, Judge
Rodney W. Sippel (i) granted Defendants CIOX Health, LLC and SSM
Health Care St. Louis' motion to dismiss; and (ii) denied
Intervenors Lynn Henderson, Espire Concepcion, Tyrone Green-Smith,
and Antonio Jones' motion to intervene.

In the proposed class action lawsuit, Graham alleges that CIOX
Health and SSM Health (collectively, "CIOX") violated the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act by charging a fee to search for
Graham's medical records covering a specified time period.  CIOX
asserts that the fee was permitted even though the search revealed
that no records existed for that time period.  CIOX filed a motion
to dismiss for a failure to state a claim.

The appellate case is captioned as Brandon Graham, et al. v. CIOX
Health, LLC, Case No. 18-3467, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Brandon Graham, individually and also on behalf
of all similarly situated persons, is represented by:

          Matthew Dameron, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100
          E-mail: dameron@stuevesiegel.com

               - and -

          M. Blake Heath, Esq.
          BOUGH LAW FIRM
          917 W. 43rd Street, Suite 100
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 931-0048
          E-mail: blake@heathinjurylaw.com

               - and -

          William Charles Kenney, Esq.
          BILL KENNEY LAW FIRM
          1100 Main Street
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 842-2455
          E-mail: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Schultz, Esq.
          SCHULTZ AND ASSOCIATES, L.L.P.
          640 Cepi Drive, Suite A
          Chesterfield, MO 63005-1221
          Telephone: (636) 537-4645
          E-mail: rschultz@sl-lawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee CIOX Health, LLC, is represented by:

          Jonathan Barton Potts, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LLP
          3600 One Metropolitan Square
          211 N. Broadway
          Saint Louis, MO 63102-2186
          Telephone: (314) 259-2000
          E-mail: jonathan.potts@bryancave.com

               - and -

          Jena M. Valdetero, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LLP
          161 N. Clark Street, Suite 4300
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 602-5000
          E-mail: jena.valdetero@bryancave.com

Movants Lynn Henderson, Espire Concepcion, Tyrone Green-Smith and
Antonio Jones are represented by:

          William Charles Kenney, Esq.
          BILL KENNEY LAW FIRM
          1100 Main Street
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 842-2455
          E-mail: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com


CIOX HEALTH: Henderson Appeals Order in Graham Suit to 8th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Movants Lynn Henderson, Espire Concepcion, Tyrone Green-Smith and
Antonio Jones filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
styled Brandon Graham, et al. v. CIOX Health, LLC, Case No.
4:18-cv-00266-RWS, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri - St. Louis.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 19, 2018, Judge
Rodney W. Sippel (i) granted Defendants CIOX Health, LLC and SSM
Health Care St. Louis' motion to dismiss; and (ii) denied
Intervenors Lynn Henderson, Espire Concepcion, Tyrone Green-Smith,
and Antonio Jones' motion to intervene.

In the proposed class action lawsuit, Graham alleges that CIOX
Health and SSM Health (collectively, "CIOX") violated the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act by charging a fee to search for
Graham's medical records covering a specified time period.  CIOX
asserts that the fee was permitted even though the search revealed
that no records existed for that time period.  CIOX filed a motion
to dismiss for a failure to state a claim.

The appellate case is captioned as CIOX Health, LLC v. Lynn
Henderson, et al., Case No. 18-3468, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Movants-Appellants Lynn Henderson, Espire Concepcion, Tyrone
Green-Smith and Antonio Jones are represented by:

          William Charles Kenney, Esq.
          BILL KENNEY LAW FIRM
          1100 Main Street
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 842-2455
          E-mail: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com

Plaintiff Brandon Graham, individually and also on behalf of all
similarly situated persons, is represented by:

          Matthew Dameron, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100
          E-mail: dameron@stuevesiegel.com

               - and -

          M. Blake Heath, Esq.
          BOUGH LAW FIRM
          917 W. 43rd Street, Suite 100
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 931-0048
          E-mail: blake@heathinjurylaw.com

               - and -

          William Charles Kenney, Esq.
          BILL KENNEY LAW FIRM
          1100 Main Street
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 842-2455
          E-mail: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Schultz, Esq.
          SCHULTZ AND ASSOCIATES, L.L.P.
          640 Cepi Drive, Suite A
          Chesterfield, MO 63005-1221
          Telephone: (636) 537-4645
          E-mail: rschultz@sl-lawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee CIOX Health, LLC, is represented by:

          Jonathan Barton Potts, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LLP
          3600 One Metropolitan Square
          211 N. Broadway
          Saint Louis, MO 63102-2186
          Telephone: (314) 259-2000
          E-mail: jonathan.potts@bryancave.com

               - and -

          Jena M. Valdetero, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LLP
          161 N. Clark Street, Suite 4300
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 602-5000
          E-mail: jena.valdetero@bryancave.com


CLAY COUNTY, AK: Court Conditionally Certifies Olsen Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Jonesboro Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in
the case captioned JEFFREY OLSEN, Plaintiff, v. CLAY COUNTY,
ARKANSAS, Defendant. Case No. 3:18-CV-00129 BSM. (E.D. Ark.).

Olsen brings claims against the defendants for overtime
compensation violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA).  Olsen seeks conditional
certification of a class of all jailers for the Defendant at any
time since July 17, 2015.

Defendant Clay County, Arkansas (Clay County) opposes certification
because it disputes whether Olsen is similarly situated with
members of the proposed class. Clay County argues that many
potential class members have already released their claims against
Clay County and that, according to an investigation by the
Department of Labor, Olsen has been properly compensated contrary
to his assertion otherwise.

At the notice stage, however, the evidence submitted by Clay County
need not be considered because it does not bear on whether Olsen
has made a modest factual showing entitling him to conditional
certification.   Courts are not to resolve contradictory evidence
presented by the parties or make any credibility determinations at
this stage.  

Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Olsen's pleadings and
affidavits demonstrate that he is similarly situated to the
potential collective action members. Because Clay County's exhibits
essentially refute Olsen's declaration, their arguments invite an
improper resolution of contradictory evidence. Clay County will
have an opportunity to move for decertification at a later stage,
and their evidence may be properly considered at that time.

Based on Olsen's motion and his declaration, the proposed
collective action members are, like Olsen, jailors for Clay County
who were allegedly not paid overtime wages. At this stage, he
appears similarly situated to the proposed collective action
members. Accordingly, conditional certification is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb4wyen6 from Leagle.com.

Jeffery Olsen, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Wesley Burks ,
Sanford Law Firm, Joshua Sanford, Sanford Law Firm & Stacy Gibson,
Sanford Law Firm.

Clay County, Arkansas, Defendant, represented by Jason E. Owens ,
Rainwater, Holt & Sexton P.A. & Kaylen Suzanne Lewis , Rainwater,
Holt & Sexton P.A.


COATES ELECTRIC: I.B.E.W. Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------
I.B.E.W. Local No. 494, Terrance Faust, Robert Kaschak, Douglas
Carter, Ty Jeranek, Joseph Gehring, Nick Gehring, Erik Jacobi, Jeff
Roblee, Michael Helt III, Ben Fischer, Chad Stewart, Daniel
Anderson, James Wilkinson, James Gaertner, Terese Jesinski, Tim
McPhail, Pete Kohl, Don Starzman, Samuel Uttech, Cal Falkenberg,
Bruce Howard, on behalf of themselves and all others sharing a
question of common interest, Plaintiffs v. Coates Electric, LLC,
Brody Coates Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01849-NJ (E.D. Wis.,
November 26, 2018) is an action to recover unpaid wages by current
and former employees of Coates Electric, and is pled in two
components: A claim for minimum wages and overtime pay pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Wisconsin wage payment laws; and a
claim to enforce an arbitration award to recover contractually
required straight time wages, overtime pay, and penalties in
addition to those provided by federal and state wage laws.

Coates Electric is signatory to, and bound by the Inside Wiremen
Agreement, Milwaukee Chapter between Local 494 and the Milwaukee
Chapter of N.E.C.A, which is a multiemployer association of
employers in the electrical industry. The Inside Wiremen Agreement
that Coates Electric is bound to requires Coates Electric to pay
contractually required wage rates to its journeymen and
apprentices, as well as to pay overtime pay equal to time and a
half that wage rate if covered employees worked in excess of eight
hours per day, and to pay overtime pay equal to two times that wage
rate if covered employees worked on weekends or holidays.

For the vast majority of employees and workweeks during October and
November of 2018, Coates Electric has failed to pay any wages to
its employees by either not issuing a paycheck at all to its
employees, by issuing paychecks to its employees and then
instructing them to not cash them, or by issuing to its employees
paychecks that it had insufficient funds in its designated bank
accounts to pay for, says the complaint. Upon information and
belief, there were also instances in which Coates Electric either
paid to the Plaintiffs less wages than they were entitled to
receive under the contractual rates and overtime rules specified by
the Inside Wiremen Agreement; or paid wages to the Plaintiffs after
deadline specified by the Inside Wiremen Agreement, the complaint
asserts.

I.B.E.W. Local 494 is a labor organization. It is the collective
bargaining representative of the named plaintiffs and other Coates
Electric employees.

Individual named plaintiffs are adult residents of the State of
Wisconsin who were employed by Coates Electric, LLC in October
and/or November of 2018.

Coats Electric is a Wisconsin limited liability corporation with a
principal place of business in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Coates Electric
is also a business engaged in interstate commerce in that it would
regularly utilize tools and materials originating from outside the
State of Wisconsin, would perform work for customers from outside
the State of Wisconsin, and would occasionally itself perform work
outside the State of Wisconsin.

Brody Coates is the owner, principal officer in charge of, and
registered agent of Coates Electric.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Yingtao Ho, Esq.
     Christopher Ahrens, Esq.
     The Previant Law Firm S.C.
     1555 North RiverCenter Drive, Suite 202
     P. O. Box 12993
     Milwaukee, WI 53212
     Phone: 414-271-4500
     Fax: 414/271-6308
     Email: vh@previant.com


COMCAST CABLE: California Court Stays Hodges Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California stayed the case, BRANDON HODGES,
Plaintiff, v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-01829-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Comcast removed the putative class action from Alameda County
Superior Court on March 23, 2018.  On March 30, 2018, it filed a
motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation pending
arbitration, based on an allegedly binding arbitration provision
requiring resolution of all claims related to Comcast through an
individual arbitration proceeding.  Comcast further claims the
Court should stay the action pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").  The Plaintiff filed an opposition
to the motion on April 13, 2018.  The Defendant replied to that
opposition on April 20, 2018, and the Court held a hearing on the
motion on Sept. 6, 2018.

The central dispute on the Defendant's motion is whether the
Supreme Court of California's recent holding in McGill v. Citibank,
N.A., 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017), precludes enforcement of the
contested arbitration provision.  The Plaintiff argues the
arbitration clause constitutes a waiver of his right to seek public
injunctive relief in any forum, which is unenforceable under
McGill.  The Defendant argues that McGill's holding is preempted by
the FAA.

But this precise dispute is pending on appeal before the Ninth
Circuit in McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, Blair v. Rent-A-Ctr.,
Inc., Tillage v. Comcast Corp., and Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC.

As to the first factor, Judge Gilliam finds it unlikely that a stay
would cause harm to either party.  At the hearing on the
Defendant's motion, neither party's counsel identified any concrete
prejudice to their respective clients from a stay pending guidance
from the Ninth Circuit, other than the generalized prospect that
resolution of this case could be delayed somewhat.

With respect to the second factor, neither party asserts hardship
or inequity in being required to go forward.  

Most significantly, as to the third factor, given that the central
dispute before the Court is identical to issues presented in
McArdle, Blair, Tillage, and Roberts, guidance from the Ninth
Circuit would aid in the orderly, just resolution of the case.
Moreover, it would be inefficient for the Court and the parties to
invest resources in litigating a legal issue that may be
substantially affected by the decisions in the pending appeals.

Taking all of these factors into account, the Judge finds in its
discretion that staying the case pending guidance from the Ninth
Circuit in McArdle, Blair, Tillage, and Roberts best serves the
efficient use of party and judicial resources.  Therefore, he
stayed the case.  He ordered the parties to provide the Court
notice in a joint submission when the Ninth Circuit issues an
opinion or memorandum disposition in McArdle, Blair, Tillage, or
Roberts.  If no disposition has issued in any of the four appeals
by Feb. 16, 2017, the parties are directed to submit a joint report
of no more than two pages on that date regarding the status of the
appeals.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/jbBWmw from Leagle.com.

Brandon Hodges, for himself, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Ray Edwin Gallo -- rgallo@gallo.law --
Gallo LLP, Dominic R. Valerian -- dvalerian@gallo.law -- Gallo LLP
& Hank Bates -- hbates@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC.

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by Michael James Stortz --
Michael.Stortz@dbr.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP,
Matthew Jacob Adler -- matthew.adler@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle
Reath LLP, Meredith Connie Slawe -- mslawe@akingump.com -- Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP & Michael W. McTigue, Jr. --
mmctigue@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.


CONTRACT CALLERS: Goldberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
BASHEVA GOLDBERG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CONTRACT CALLERS, INC.; JH
PORTFOLIO DEBT EQUITIES, LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case
No. 7:18-cv-10268 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 5, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Contract Callers, Inc. provides collection, call center, and field
services primarily to the utility industry in the United States.
The company has a strategic alliance with Detectent, Inc. Contract
Callers, Inc. was formerly known as Commerce Service Corporation.
The company was founded in 1926 and is based in Augusta, Georgia.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Kohn, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Johnson Suit over Drop in Share Price
-------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION; W. CRAIG
JELINEK; and RICHARD A. GALANTI, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01611
(W.D. Wash., Nov. 5, 2018) is class action against the Defendants,
on behalf of all investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
Costco common stock between June 6, 2018, and October 25, 2018,
seeking remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, on June 6, 2018, when after the market
close, Costco filed a Form 10-Q with the SEC announcing the
Company's financial and operating results for the third fiscal
quarter and nine months ended May 13, 2018, which was signed and
certified under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by the Individual
Defendants.

On October 4, 2018, Costco issued a press release, announcing the
Company's financial and operating results for the fourth fiscal
quarter and year ended September 2, 2018. The press release stated
that while the Company is still completing its assessment of the
effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting as
of September 2, 2018, in its upcoming fiscal 2018 Annual Report on
Form 10-K, it expects to report a material weakness in internal
control. The weakness relates to general information technology
controls in the areas of user access and program change-management
over certain information technology systems that support the
Company's financial reporting processes. The access issues relate
to the extent of privileges afforded users authorized to access
company systems. On this news, the price of the Company's common
stock declined $12.86 from a close on October 4, 2018 at $231.68
per share of Costco common stock, to a close on October 5, 2018 at
$218.82 per share of Costco common stock, a drop of approximately
5.55%.

On October 26, 2018, Costco filed a Form 10-K with the SEC
announcing the Company's financial and operating results for the
fiscal fourth quarter and fiscal year ended September 2, 2018,
which was signed and certified under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
by the Individual Defendants. The Company announced that "based on
this material weakness, the Company's management concluded that at
September 2, 2018, the Company's internal control over financial
reporting was not effective." On this news, the price of the
Company's common stock declined $8.21 from a close on October 25,
2018 at $226.40 per share of Costco common stock, to a close on
October 26, 2018 at $218.19 per share of Costco common stock, a
drop of approximately 3.63%.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. The company was formerly known as
Costco Companies, Inc. Costco was founded in 1976 and is based in
Issaquah, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roger Townsend, Esq.
          BRESKIN JOHNSON TOWNSEND, PLLC
          1000 Second Avenue, Suite 3670
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 652-8660
          E-mail: rtownsend@bjtlegal.com

               - and -

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          55 Broadway, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          E-mail: ek@zlk.com


CYLCOMM LLC: Sent Unwanted Fax Ads, Lehman Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------
Sherelynn Lehman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Cylcomm LLC, dba Direct Lodging.Com, Case No.
1:18-cv-02599 (N.D. Ohio, November 12, 2018), is brought against
the Defendant for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff seeks to stop the Defendant's practice of sending
unauthorized and unwanted fax advertisements and obtain redress for
all persons and entities injured by its conduct.

The Plaintiff Lehman is a natural person and resident of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio.

The Defendant Direct Lodging is a national company that offers
vacation and travel packages to consumers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Adam T. Savett, Esq.
      SAVETT LAW OFFICES LLC
      2764 Carole Lane
      Allentown, PA 18104
      Tel: (610) 621-4550
      Fax: (610) 978-2970
      E-mail: adam@savettlaw.com


DATAMAX CORPORATION: Amons Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
WANDA AMONS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DATAMAX CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-00925-UA-J (M.D.N.C., Nov. 5, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case was referred to Magistrate Joi Elizabeth Peake.

Datamax Corporation is in the business processing outsource
solutions, credit collections services, accounts receivable
management projects and back-office information processing. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig M. Shapiro, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JOHN T. ORCUTT, P.C.
          1738 Hillandale Rd., Suite D
          Durhan, NC 27705
          Telephone: (919) 286-1695
          E-mail: cshapiro@johnorcutt.com


DOORDASH INC: Magana Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Manuel Magana filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Manuel Magana v. Doordash, Inc., Case No.
4:18-cv-03395-PJH, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, Oakland.

The nature of suit is stated as other labor litigation.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, class action
lawsuit (assigned Case No. CGC-18-56404) was removed from the
Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, to District
Court on June 8, 2018.

DoorDash Inc. is an on-demand restaurant delivery service founded
in 2013 by Stanford students Andy Fang, Stanley Tang, Tony Xu and
Evan Moore.

The appellate case is captioned as Manuel Magana v. Doordash, Inc.,
Case No. 18-17232, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MANUEL MAGANA, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee DOORDASH, INC., is represented by:

          Theane Evangelis, Esq.
          Michael J. Holecek, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229 7726
          E-mail: tevangelis@gibsondunn.com
                  mholecek@gibsondunn.com

               - and -

          Joshua S. Lipshutz, Esq.
          Austin Schwing, Esq.
          Peter C. Squeri, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          555 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 393-8210
          E-mail: jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
                  aschwing@gibsondunn.com
                  psqueri@gibsondunn.com

               - and -

          Andrew Michael Spurchise, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
          900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 583-2684
          E-mail: aspurchise@littler.com


ENVIROPLUS INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Chavez Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOSE CHAVEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ENVIROPLUS, INC.; SALVADOR GARCIA; and
RODOLFO MORENO, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-07358 (N.D. Ill., Nov.
11, 2018) is an action against the Defendants' failure to pay the
Plaintiff and the class minimum wages, and overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an hourly paid, non
exempt employee.

Enviroplus, Inc. was founded in 1989. The company's line of
business includes providing special trade contracting services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 840
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone:(312) 853-1450


FIVE GUYS OPERATIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Franco Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE FRANCO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FIVE GUYS OPERATIONS, LLC; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18STCV03868 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., Nov. 5, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, and provide accurate
wage statements.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt,
hourly employee in California.

Five Guys Operations, LLC was founded in 2012. The company's line
of business includes the retail sale of prepared foods and drinks
for on-premise consumption. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Otkupman, Esq.
          Meghan Maertz, Esq.
          OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, A LAW CORPORATION
          28632 Roadside Dr., Suite 203
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 293-5623
          Facsimile: (888) 850-1310
          E-mail: Roman@Ol.FLA.com
                  Meghan@OLFLA.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Ramnauth Sues Over Illegal, Undisclosed Charges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mahase Ramnauth, Lisa N. Deosingh, and Kungbihari Ramkissoon, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation, and American Security Insurance
Company, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-16477 (D. N.J., November 27,
2018) seeks to recoup monetary damages that were suffered by the
customers of mortgage lender and servicer Freedom which worked
exclusively with Assurant's subsidiary ASIC to impose illegal and
undisclosed charges to Plaintiffs and the proposed class during the
relevant time periods.

Freedom has had an arrangement with ASIC and its affiliates for
many years whereby ASIC performs many of Freedom's
mortgage-servicing functions and is the exclusive provider of FPI
coverage for homeowners with mortgage loans owned or serviced by
Freedom. In exchange for providing ASIC with the exclusive right to
monitor Freedom's mortgage loan portfolios and force-place its own
insurance coverage, ASIC pays Freedom gratuitous kickbacks that are
mischaracterized to borrowers as legitimate compensation. These
kickbacks include, but are not limited to, one or more of the
following: (1) unearned "commissions" paid to an affiliate of
Freedom for work purportedly performed to procure individual
policies; (2) "expense reimbursements" allegedly paid to reimburse
Freedom for expenses it incurred in the placement of FPI coverage
on homeowners; (3) payments of illusory reinsurance premiums that
carry no commensurate transfer of risk; and (4) free or below cost
mortgage-servicing functions that ASIC performs for Freedom. These
kickbacks effectively constitute a rebate to Freedom on the cost of
the FPI.

Defendants' self-dealing and collusion in the FPI market has caused
substantial harm to Plaintiffs and the proposed class they seek to
represent, says the complaint. This class action seeks to redress
that harm on behalf of Plaintiffs and the proposed class members
and to recover all improper charges they have incurred related to
the forced placement of insurance by Freedom and ASIC.

Plaintiffs Mahase Ramnauth, Lisa N. Deosingh, and Kungbihari
Ramkissoon were charged for FPI by Defendant Freedom. The Ramnauth
Plaintiffs are citizens of the State of Florida, residing at 3401
Paris Place, Orlando, Florida 32818.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation is a mortgage lender and servicer.
Freedom is a New Jersey corporation with its headquarters in Mt.
Laurel, New Jersey. Freedom conducts business throughout the United
States, including in this District.

American Security Insurance Company is a Delaware corporation and
an indirect subsidiary of Assurant Inc., writing FPI policies in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia with its principal
address in Atlanta, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Kyle Tognan, Esq.
     BATHGATE, WEGENER & WOLF, P.C.
     One Airport Road
     P.O. Box 2043
     Lakewood, NJ 08701
     Phone: 732-363-0666


G6 HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cummings Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA CUMMINGS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G6 HOSPITALITY, LLC; MOTEL 6
OPERATING, L.P.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00056207-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Nov. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee from August 2018 to September 2018.

G6 Hospitality LLC owns, operates, and franchises economy lodging
locations in the United States and Canada. It also provides various
support services for its franchisees, including property
management; call center; distribution, marketing, and sales
programs; procurement; training; and in-house technical expertise.
The company was founded in 1985 and is based in Carrollton, Texas.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shani O. Zakay, Esq.
          ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC
          3990 Old Town Avenue, Suite C204
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 255-9047
          Facsimile: (858) 404-9203

               - and –

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
          DE BLOUW LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232


GC SERVICES: Certification of FDCPA Class Sought in O'Boyle Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara O'Boyle asks the Court to enter an order determining that
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act action entitled BARBARA
O'BOYLE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Case No.
2:16-cv-01384-LA (E.D. Wisc.), may proceed as a class action
against the Defendant.

The class is defined as:

     All natural persons in the State of Wisconsin, who were sent
     a collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A to
     the complaint in this action, seeking to collect a debt for
     personal, family or household purposes, between October 14,
     2015 and October 14, 2016, inclusive, that was not returned
     by the postal service.

The case concerns the legality of standard form collection letters
used by Defendant GCS to collect consumer debts owed to third
parties.

The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as class representative, and
for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


GEICO: Vukovic Sues over Insurance Services Advertisements
----------------------------------------------------------
DARKO VUKOVIC, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY
and DOES 1 – 10, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-02963-PAB (D. Colo. Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to stop
Defendant's practice of falsely advertising its insurance services,
and to obtain redress for a Colorado class of consumers who changed
position, within the applicable statute of limitations period, as a
result of Defendant's false and misleading advertisements.

According to the complaint, the Defendant represents that its
insurance services will be billed at the price quoted and agreed
upon, when this is in fact false. Defendant misrepresented and
falsely advertised to Plaintiff and others similarly situated
consumers their insurance services. The Plaintiff and others
similarly situated purchased or attempt to purchase Defendant's
Class Products, and they did so on the basis that Defendant quoted
the pricing of the services and agreed to provide services in
exchange for premiums at the price quoted.

Defendant's misrepresentations to Plaintiff and others similarly
situated caused them to purchase or attempt to purchase Defendant's
insurance services, which Plaintiff and others similarly situated
would not have purchased or attempted to purchase absent these
misrepresentations by Defendant and their employees. In so doing,
Defendant have violated Colorado Consumer Protection Act statutes,
the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is engaged in the managing, advertising, marketing
and selling insurance services.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Kelsey L. Kuberka, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 877-206-4741
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  kkuberka@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


GENCO I: Court Orders Joint Written Response in Ortiz
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order directing Parties to File Joint Written
Response in the case captioned ADAN ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. GENCO I,
INC., Defendant. Case Nos. 16-cv-4601-YGR, 17-cv-03692-YGR  (N.D.
Cal.).

The Court orders that (1) The date for hearing on the Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses in the above-captioned actions should
not be Continued 120 days; (2) the deadlines to object, opt-out, or
submit a claim form, should not be extended 90 days from the date
of the Court's order on this OSC; and (3) the parties should not be
ordered to provide such additional notices as this Court may order
to ensure that the provisionally certified classes received
adequate notice and opportunity to opt-out, object, or make a claim
under the terms of the proposed class action settlements in these
actions.

The Court's Order of August 13, 2018, directed dissemination of the
Class Notice, Postcard Notice, Request for Exclusion; and FLSA
Opt-In Claim Form in the manner provided in the settlement
agreement, and on the timetable set forth therein. The Order
included a hearing date of December 11, 2018, for the Motion for
Final Approval and the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7v3bc2p from Leagle.com.

Adan Ortiz, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situtated
and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Alistair
Segal -- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Chaim Shaun
Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Genco I, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Jeremy T. Naftel -- jnaftel@cdflaborlaw.com -- Carothers DiSante &
Freudenberger LLP & Nicole A. Legrottaglie --
nlegrottaglie@cdflaborlaw.com -- Carothers DiSante Freudenberger
LLP.


GENERAL MOTORS: AARC Appeals Ruling in Royalty Suit to D.C. Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Alliance of Artists and Recording Companies, Inc., seeks
review of a decision issued by the District Court in the lawsuit
styled Alliance of Artists and Recording Companies, Inc., v. Denso
International America, et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-01271-KBJ, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The appellate case is captioned as Alliance of Artists and
Recording Companies, Inc., v. Denso International America, et al.,
Case No. 18-7172, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 8, 2018, the
Plaintiff filed an appeal from a court decision in its lawsuit.
That appellate case is titled Alliance of Artists and Recording
Companies, Inc. v. Denso International America, et al., Case No.
18-7141.

The lawsuit was filed in July 2014 on behalf of a proposed class of
tens of thousands of copyright owners and featured recording
artists and organizations that represent them, including the AARC,
which is a nonprofit organization that collects and distributes
royalties.  The complaint alleges the companies ran afoul of the
Audio Home Recording Act by distributing music-copying car devices
that aren't registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, aren't
equipped with the serial copy management system and for which they
hadn't paid royalties.

The devices at the heart of the litigation are marketed as a 10 GB
digital Jukebox that can hold up to 2,400 songs and an
"infotainment system" in which music from CDs can be recorded and
stored on a hard drive.  Michigan-based Denso manufactures the hard
drive device for General Motors LLC, and Clarion Corporation of
America, with headquarters in Japan, makes Ford's Jukebox
system.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Alliance of Artists and Recording Companies,
Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Richard Brian Dagen, Esq.
          AXINN VELTROP & HARKRIDER, LLP
          950 F Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 912-4700
          E-mail: rdagen@axinn.com

               - and -

          Russell Steinthal, Esq.
          AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP
          114 West 47th Street, 22nd Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 728-2200
          E-mail: rsteinthal@axinn.com

Defendant-Appellee Denso International America, Inc., is
represented by:

          Steven J. Routh, Esq.
          ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          Columbia Center
          1152 15th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20005-1706
          Telephone: (202) 339-8400
          E-mail: srouth@orrick.com

Defendant-Appellee Ford Motor Company is represented by:

          E. Desmond Hogan, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
          Columbia Square
          555 13th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20004-1109
          Telephone: (202) 637-5600
          E-mail: desmond.hogan@hoganlovells.com

Defendant-Appellee Clarion Corporation of America is represented
by:

          Paul J. Reilly, Esq.
          BAKER BOTTS LLP
          2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 600
          Dallas, TX 75201-0000
          Telephone: (214) 953-6849
          E-mail: paul.reilly@bakerbotts.com

Defendant-Appellee General Motors LLC is represented by:

          Andrew Phillip Bridges, Esq.
          FENWICK & WEST LLP
          555 California Street, Suite 1200
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 875-2300
          E-mail: abridges@fenwick.com

Defendant-Appellee Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America, Inc.,
14cv1920, is represented by:

          David Dwane Golden, Esq.
          Seth David Greenstein, Esq.
          Robert S. Schwartz, Esq.
          CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP
          1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1300N
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 204-3500
          E-mail: dgolden@constantinecannon.com
                  sgreenstein@constantinecannon.com
                  rschwartz@constantinecannon.com

Defendant-Appellee FCA US LLC, 14cv1920, is represented by:

          William Dean Coston, Esq.
          VENABLE LLP
          600 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 344-4000
          E-mail: wdcoston@venable.com


GREENSKY INC: Mustafin Sues Over False Company Reports
------------------------------------------------------
Rustam Mustafin, individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. GreenSky, Inc., David Zalik, Robert
Partlow, Joel Babbit, Gerald Benjamin, John Flynn, Gregg Freishtat,
Nigel Morris, Robert Sheft, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, SunTrust Robinson
Humphrey, Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Guggenheim Securities, LLC,
Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P., and Fifth Third Securities, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-11071 (S.D. N.Y., November 27, 2018)
is a federal securities class action on behalf of individuals who
purchased GreenSky Class A common stock pursuant or traceable to
the Company's false and misleading registration statement and
prospectus, who were damaged thereby, and who seek to pursue
remedies under the Securities Act of 1933.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's Offering Documents
indicate that GreenSky "actively reduced" solar panel transaction
volume while expanding into the elective healthcare sector. The
Offering Documents additionally assert that the elective healthcare
sector represents a growth opportunity.

The above-referenced statement is false and misleading because it
depicts the move toward healthcare as a means of increasing growth
while failing to disclose the markedly lower transaction fees
GreenSky charges to healthcare companies, says the complaint. The
Offering Documents failed to disclose the substantial change in the
composition of GreenSky's merchant business mix and the resulting
diminution in transaction-fee revenue.
The Offering Documents were also negligently prepared and contain
untrue statements of material fact as well as omissions of facts
necessary to render the statements made not misleading, the
complaint asserts.

Plaintiff Rustam Mustafin purchased 1,032 shares of GreenSky Class
A common stock on the day of GreenSky's initial public offering.

GreenSky, Inc. is a financial technology company incorporated in
Delaware.

David Zalik was, at all relevant times, the Chief Executive Officer
of the Company and Chairman of the Board of Directors, and signed
or authorized the signing of the Offering Documents.

Robert Partlow was, at all relevant times, the Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, and signed or authorized the signing of the
Offering Documents.

Joel Babbit, Gerald Benjamin, John Flynn, Gregg Freishtat, Nigel
Morris, Robert Sheft, were Directors of the Company and signed or
authorized the signing of the Offering Documents.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley
& Co. LLC, SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Guggenheim
Securities, LLC, Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P., and Fifth Third
Securities, Inc., were underwriters for the Company's IPO.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael B. Eisenkraft, Esq.
     COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
     88 Pine St. 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10005
     Phone: (212) 838-7797
     Fax: (212) 838-7745
     Email: meisenkraft@cohenmilstein.com

          - and -

     Steven J. Toll, Esq.
     S. Douglas Bunch, Esq.
     COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
     1100 New York Avenue, N.W. . Fifth Floor
     Washington, D.C. 20005
     Phone: (202) 408-4600
     Fax: (202) 408-4699
     Email: stoll@cohenmilstein.com
            dbunch@cohenmilstein.com


GUARANTEED RATE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Gilmor Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ZACH GILMOR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GUARANTEED RATE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:18-cv-01891-PGB-TBS (M.D. Fla., Nov. 5, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

Guaranteed Rate, Inc. provides mortgage lending services in the
United States. It offers fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgages;
jumbo loans; FHA loans; VA home loans; and interest only mortgages
for buying and refinancing homes. The company was founded in 1999
and is based in Chicago, Illinois. It has additional offices in the
United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
         EDELSBERG LAW, PA
         19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
         Aventura, FL 33180
         Telephone: (305) 975-3320
         E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

              - and -

         Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
         SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
         14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
         Miami, FL 33132
         Telephone: (305) 479-2299
         E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


HAYTI, MO: Hamilton Appeals E.D. Mo. Ruling to Eighth Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Henry Hamilton filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Henry Hamilton v. Calvin Ragland, et al., Case No.
1:16-cv-00054-RLW, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Henry Hamilton
filed a complaint against Defendants Amy Leeann Inman, Judge Calvin
Ragland, Glenda Overbey, and City of Hayti, alleging violation of
his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (count I) for
conspiring to deprive him of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The
Plaintiff maintains that the Defendants violated his right to be
free from unreasonable seizure, custodial arrest, and imprisonment
for the alleged ordinance violations; to be free from prosecution
not based on probable cause; to be released from imprisonment; to
have his case heard and adjudicated before being compelled to plead
guilty or prepay fines and court costs under the guise of a cash
only bond; and to promptly be brought before a judge for an initial
appearance and released at the time of arrest.

The appellate case is captioned as Henry Hamilton v. Calvin
Ragland, et al., Case No. 18-3450, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Henry Hamilton, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jim R. Bruce, II, Esq.
          403 St. Francis Street
          P.O. Box 37
          Kennett, MO 63857-0000
          Telephone: (573) 888-9696

Defendants-Appellees City of Hayti, Missouri, Calvin Ragland and
Glenda Overby are represented by:

          Albert M. Spradling, III, Esq.
          SPRADLING & SPRADLING
          1838 Broadway
          P.O. Drawer 1119
          Cape Girardeau, MO 63702-1119
          Telephone: (573) 335-8296

Defendant-Appellee Amy Leeann Inman is represented by:

          John William Grimm, Esq.
          John Christian Steffens, Esq.
          LIMBAUGH & RUSSELL
          407 N. Kingshighway
          P.O. Box 1150
          Cape Girardeau, MO 63701
          Telephone: (573) 335-3316
          E-mail: jgrimm@limbaughlaw.com
                  jsteffens@limbaughlaw.com


HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Removed Soranno Case to District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Heartland Payment Systems, LLC removed case captioned JOSEPH
SORANNO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC,
successor in interest to HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., the
Defendant, Case MER-L-002139-18, from the the Superior Court of New
Jersey, to the the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, Trenton Vicinage on Nov. 16, 2018. The District of New
Jersey assignes Case No. 3:18-cv-16218-FLW-LHG to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs sought compensatory and statutory damages, punitive
damages, and award of attorney's fees, among other relief.
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking back-pay for the unpaid
commissions from February 2015 to present, as well as reinstatement
of future commission payments, and such other further relief as the
Court deems appropriate, including but not limited to attorney’s
fees and costs.[BN]

Attorneys for Heartland Payment Systems, LLC:

          Richard J. Williams, Jr., Esq.
          MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP
          1300 Mount Kemble Avenue
          P.O. Box 2075
          Morristown, NJ 07962-2075
          Telephone: (973) 425-8773
          E-mail: rwilliams@mdmc-law.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          Paul A. DiGiorgio, Esq.
          THE KEEFE LAW FIRM
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701

HORTONWORKS INC: Victor Sues over Misleading Financial Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
ALEX VICTOR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HORTONWORKS, INC., ROBERT BEARDEN,
KEVIN KLAUSMEYER, MARTIN FINK, JAY ROSSITER, MICHELANGELO VOLPI,
PAUL CORMIER, and PETER FENTON, the Defendants, Case 3:18-cv-06923
(N.D. Cal., Nov. 15, 2018), alleges that Defendants violated
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in relation
to a merger transaction. The Plaintiff wants the Defendants barred
from holding a shareholder vote on the proposed transaction and
taking any steps consummate the proposed transaction unless, and
until, the material information is disclosed to Hortonworks
shareholders sufficiently in advance of the vote on a proposed
transaction or, in the event the proposed transaction is
consummated, to recover damages resulting from the Defendants'
violations of the Exchange Act.

According to the complaint, on October 3, 2018, the Board caused
the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger, pursuant
to which Hortonworks' stockholders will receive shares of Cloudera
common stock in exchange for each share of Hortonworks common. On
November 5, 2018, in order to convince Hortonworks shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Registration
Statement on Form S-4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. While
Defendants are touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to
the Company's shareholders in the S-4, they have failed to disclose
certain material information that is necessary for shareholders to
properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Transaction, thereby
rendering certain statements in the S-4 false and/or misleading.

In particular, the S-4 contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning the financial projections for the
Company, which were developed by the Company's management and
utilized by the Company's financial advisor, Qatalyst Partners in
rendering its fairness opinion, both of which were relied upon by
the Board in recommending shareholders vote in favor of the
Proposed Transaction; and the sale process leading up to the
Proposed Transaction. It is imperative that the material
information that has been omitted from the S-4 is 6 disclosed to
the Company's shareholders prior to the forthcoming shareholder
vote, so that they can properly exercise their corporate suffrage
rights, the lawsuit says.

Hortonworks is a data software company based in Santa Clara,
California that develops, supports, and provides expertise on a set
of open-source software designed to manage data and processing for
things such as IOT, single view of X, and advanced analytics and
machine learning.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256-2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
                  nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com

IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM: PI Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Iowa Health System.
The case is styled as Jane Doe individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Iowa Health System doing
business as: UnityPoint Health, Defendant, Case No.
4:18-cv-00453-SMR-CFB (S.D. Iowa, Nov. 26, 2018).

This personal injury suit asserts breach of fiduciary duty.

Iowa Health System, Inc., doing business as UnityPoint Health,
provides coordinated clinic, hospital, and home-based care for
patients in Des Moines and Central Iowa.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brian P Galligan, Esq.
     REID LAW FIRM
     300 Walnut Street, Suite 5
     Des Moines, IA 50309-2239
     Phone: (515) 282-3333
     Fax: (515) 282-0318
     Email: bgalligan@galliganlaw.com


KEYVIEW LABS: Jamara Sues Over Unauthorized Auto-dialed Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kail Jamara, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Keyview Labs, Inc. dba Procera Health; and
Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-03040-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal., November 26, 2018) seeks
damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant in negligently,
knowingly, and/or willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's
cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act thereby invading Plaintiff' privacy.

According to the complaint, the Defendant contacted Plaintiff on
his cellular telephone in an effort to sell or solicit its
services. However, the Plaintiff never provided the Defendant with
consent to contact Plaintiff on his cellular phone. The Defendant's
calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes.

Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant's services and has never
provided any personal information, including his cellular telephone
numbers, to Defendant for any purpose whatsoever. In addition,
Plaintiff told Defendant at least once to stop contacting them and
Plaintiff has been registered on the Do-Not- Call Registry for at
least 30 days prior to Defendant contacting him. Accordingly,
Defendant never received Plaintiff' "prior express consent" to
receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on their cellular telephone, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff, Kail Jamara is a natural person residing in Sacramento,
California.

Keyview Labs, Inc. dba Procera Health is a company engaged in
research, development and testing of brain health and fitness
supplements.

Doe Defendants 1 through 10, inclusive, are currently unknown to
Plaintiff, who therefore sues such Defendants by fictitious
names.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: 323-306-4234
     Fax: 866-633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com
            twheeler@toddflaw.com


LET'S EAT OUT: Bid to Exclude Expert Testimony in Cope Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OLIVIA COPE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. LET'S EAT OUT,
INCORPORATED, d/b/a BUFFALO WILD WINGS, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 6:16-cv-03050-SRB (W.D. Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Bough of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Southern
Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Expert Witness, Dr. Chester Hanvey, and Memorandum of Law.

On February 10, 2016, Plaintiff Cope sued the Defendants for
failure to pay her and the other tipped employees who all earned
minimum wages.  The Plaintiff brings a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, asserting claims under Missouri common
law and the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, and a collective action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Among other claims, the
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated both Missouri law and the
FLSA based on the Defendants' policy that bartenders and servers
pay for customer walkouts and cash register shortages from their
tips.

On Aug. 30, 2017, the Defendants served interrogatories directed to
all Rule 23 class members on the Plaintiff's Counsel.  Upon the
Plaintiff's counsel's objection to propounding interrogatories to
all class members, the Court held a discovery dispute and ordered
the parties to submit proposals for an alternate course of action.
The parties subsequently agreed to convert the interrogatories to a
questionnaire which would not be responded to under oath.

The Counsel for both parties jointly developed a questionnaire to
send to all 992 Missouri class members inquiring about their
experiences paying for customer walkouts and cash register
shortages.  It is disputed whether and to what extent the
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Hanvey, participated in the development of
the questionnaire.  The Court approved the questionnaire, and the
Plaintiff's Counsel subsequently mailed the questionnaire to the
class members.

The Plaintiff's Counsel retained Dr. Hanvey, "o analyze the data
from 195 class members who responded to the questionnaire to
determine the frequency with which the class members personally
experienced 'customer walkouts' or 'cash register shortages.'  The
Defendants challenge Dr. Hanvey's Sept. 4, 2018, report analyzing
the questionnaire data and any related testimony, arguing they
violate Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 702, and the
legal standard for admissibility expressed in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharamaceuticals, Inc.

The Defendants argue Dr. Hanvey's report and related testimony are
inadmissible because in analyzing questionnaire data, Dr. Hanvey
did not utilize generally accepted scientific surveying
methodologies.  They contend that (1) the questionnaire sent to the
class members is not a survey that can be extrapolated to the
class; (2) the questionnaire was not administered by a neutral
third party; (3) Dr. Hanvey did not draw a random sample of
employees that is representative of the class for which a margin of
error could be calculated; and (4) the results suffer from
substantial non-response bias.

Judge Bough finds Dr. Hanvey's testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods.  Exclusion of Dr. Hanvey's testimony is
improper, as his opinions are not so fundamentally unsupported that
they can offer no assistance to the jury.  The Defendants may
cross-examine Dr. Hanvey regarding his methodology and counter Dr.
Hanvey's expertise with their own expert's testimony.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge denied the Defendants' Motion
to Exclude Testimony of Expert Witness, Chester Hanvey, and
Memorandum of Law.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rYNRrl from Leagle.com.

Olivia Cope, On behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas M. Werman --
dwerman@flsalaw.com -- pro hac vice, Sarah J. Arendt --
sarendt@flsalaw.com -- pro hac vice, Zachary C. Flowerree --
zflowerree@flsalaw.com -- pro hac vice & Rowdy B. Meeks --
Rowdy.Meeks@rmlegalgroup.com -- Rowdy Meeks Legal Group LLC.

Let's Eat Out, Incorporated, doing business as Buffalo Wild Wings,
Defendant, represented by Kirsten A. Milton --
Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Kyle B. Russell -- Kyle.Russell@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
PC & Paul DeCamp -- PDeCamp@ebglaw.com -- Epstein, Becker & Green,
PC, pro hac vice.

Jeremy Boyer, individually, Bruno Management Company, Inc., Bruno
Enterprises, Inc. Too, Wing Backs, Inc., Sooners or Later, Inc.,
Hot Tex, Inc. & Spreading Our Wings, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Kirsten A. Milton, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice & Kyle B.
Russell, Jackson Lewis PC.

James Bruno, Defendant, represented by Kyle B. Russell, Jackson
Lewis PC.


MARKETPLACE 41: Ramirez Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Ambrocio Hernandez Ramirez, Edgar Eduardo Oroman, Ernestino (aka
Mario) Hernandez, Eusebio Cruz, Ignacio A. Ferrada Diaz, Jaime
Lorenzo Garcia, Jose Gonzalez, Juan Miranda Huerta, Luis Antonio
Ortiz Ochoa, Luis Jofree Lema Mayancela, and Manuel De Jesus Gamez
Sanchez, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v.
Marketplace 41, Inc. dba Bistro Marketplace, Marketplace 125 Inc.
dba Bistro Marketplace, Bistro Marketplace 17 Inc. dba Shelley's
Kitchen, Fresh Kitchen Inc. dba Fresh Kitchen, Shelley's Kitchen,
Inc. dba Shelley's Kitchen, Peter Park, Tony Choi, Scott Shin,
Santos Bravo, and David Doe, Case No. 1:18-cv-10498 (S.D. N.Y.,
November 12, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiffs have worked for
the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that they have worked.

The Plaintiffs have been employed as cooks, grillers and ostensibly
as delivery workers at the Defendants' delis/restaurants.

The Defendants own, operate, or control three delis/restaurants,
located at 125 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10168 under the name
"Bistro Marketplace", at 90 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10016
under the name "Shelley's Kitchen", and at 270 Madison Avenue, New
York, New York 10016 under the name "Fresh Kitchen". [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


MARYLAND: Court Dismisses Suit Over SB-707
------------------------------------------
Judge James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland dismissed the case, MARYLAND will ISSUE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. LAWRENCE HOGAN, in his official capacity as Governor
of Maryland, Defendant, Civil No. JKB-18-1700 (D. Md.).

On Oct. 1, 2017, a gunman opened fire on a concert crowd in Las
Vegas.  In the span of barely 10 minutes, the attacker unleashed
hundreds of rounds of ammunition, killing 58 people and injuring
more than 850.  It was the deadliest mass shooting in the modern
era.  The shooter used semiautomatic rifles modified with devices
known as "bump stocks," which enabled rapid fire approaching the
rate of a fully automatic machine gun.

In the wake of the Las Vegas shooting, numerous elected officials
called for changes to federal law.  Even the National Rifle
Association publicly declared support for more stringent
regulation.  Shortly thereafter, DOJ proposed a rule that would
reclassify bump-stock-type devices as machine guns under federal
law, but no changes have yet been made.

The Maryland General Assembly moved more decisively.  In April
2018, the democratically elected representatives of Maryland
enacted Senate Bill 707, which made manufacture, sale, transport,
or possession of "rapid fire trigger activators," including bump
stocks and similar devices, unlawful in Maryland.  In crafting the
law, legislators expressed concern about mass shootings, the
lethality of firearms equipped with bump-stock-type devices, their
unregulated status, and the danger to public safety.  Seven other
states similarly moved to restrict bump-stock-type devices.

In the case, a putative class action filed on June 11, 2018, the
Plaintiffs seek to invalidate SB-707's restrictions on bump stocks
and similar devices.  Plaintiff Maryland will Issue, Inc. ("MSI"),
a non-profit membership organization dedicated to the preservation
and advancement of gun owners' rights in Maryland, asserts claims
on its own behalf, and on behalf of its members and others
similarly situated.  Four individual MSI members are also named as
individual Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs have sued Gov. Hogan in his official capacity,
alleging that SB-707 violates their constitutional rights under the
Federal and State Constitutions.  The Complaint puts forward five
counts: a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment (Count I); a violation of the Takings Clause
of the Maryland Constitution, Article III, Section 40 (Count II); a
violation of the federal Due Process Clause, because of the
imposition of an impossible condition (Count III); a violation of
the federal Due Process Clause, because of vagueness (Count IV);
and a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Constitution, because
of the abrogation of vested property rights (Count V).

Currently before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judge Bredar finds that the only direct harm MSI alleges to support
standing in its non-representational, organizational capacity is
that the Act undermines MSI's message and acts] as an obstacle to
the organization's objectives and purposes.  In short, it disagrees
with the policy decisions of the Maryland Legislature embodied in
SB-707, which are inconsistent with MSI's own policy objectives.
To the extent this is an "injury" at all, it is neither concrete,
nor particularized.  A mere interest in a problem, no matter how
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient [to
establish standing.  Therefore, the Judge holds that MSI lacks
standing to bring claims on its own behalf.  Accordingly, in
evaluating the motion to dismiss, he will only consider MSI's
allegations as to harms suffered by its individual members.

The Judge finds that (i) the Act regulates rapid fire trigger
activators as contraband, a legitimate exercise of the state's
traditional police power to regulate for public safety; (ii) the
Supreme Court did not reject all consideration of traditional state
police powers in all Takings Clause analyses; and (iii) the
Plaintiffs fail to allege a taking under any of the per se theories
recognized by the Supreme Court.  Thus, reading all alleged facts
in the Plaintiffs' favor, he finds taht the Plaintiffs failed to
plausibly allege a per se taking under any theory recognized in
federal Takings Clause jurisprudence.  Accordingly, Count I will be
dismissed in full, and Count II will be dismissed insofar as it
relies on federal law to establish a per se taking under the
Maryland Constitution.

As to Counts II and V, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not
identified a single Maryland case suggesting that rights in
tangible personal property can "vest" for the purposes of Article
24.  He therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs' per se theory
under Maryland law also fails.  Accordingly, Counts II and V will
be dismissed.

As to Count IV, because the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts from
which the Court could infer a credible threat of prosecution, the
Judge finds tha the Plaintiffs lack standing to mount a
pre-enforcement challenge on vagueness grounds.  Accordingly, Count
IV will be dismissed.  The Plaintiffs are free to return to the
courts later should there be an actual record or imminent threat of
enforcement on the grounds alleged.

Finally, as to Count III, the Judge holds that the factual
impossibility of obtaining authorization for continued lawful
ownership in Maryland presents no constitutional problem in the
case; nor have the Plaintiffs alleged that the exception clause is
itself dependent on any constitutionally suspect classification.
Therefore, the exception clause is not invalid.  Having concluded
that SB-707's exception clause is not invalid, the Judge needs not
consider whether it would be severable.  Accordingly, Count III
will be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bredar granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss as to all counts of the Complaint.  Plaintiff
MSI, in its non-representational capacity, lacks standing to pursue
relief on its own behalf.  Accordingly, it will not be permitted to
bring claims in that capacity.  As to the Plaintiffs' remaining
claims, Count IV of the Complaint is dismissed under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and Counts I, II, III, and V are
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  An Order
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/7UdKMi from Leagle.com.

Maryland will Issue, Inc., Paul Mark Brockman, Robert Brunger,
Caroline Brunger & David Orlin, Plaintiffs, represented by Cary
Johnson Hansel, III -- cary@hansellaw.com -- Hansel Law, P.C.

Governor of Maryland Lawrence Hogan, Defendant, represented by
Jennifer L. Katz, Office of the Attorney General Civil Division.

Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Amicus, represented by
Thad Alan Davis -- tdavis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Jennifer E. Rosenberg -- jrosenberg@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn and Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Marc Fagel --
mfagel@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice
& Vivek Gopalan -- vgopalan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice.


MDL 2672: Changes to Tribal Trust Allocation Formula Approved
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has issued an order regarding discovery
dispute in the case, IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING,
SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order
Relates To: MDL Dkt. No. 5193. United States v. Volkswagen AG,
16-cv-295-CRB (N.D. Cal.), MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.),
approved the United States' material modifications to the Indian
Tribe Mitigation Trust's allocation formula.

As part of the settlement between the United States, California,
and Volkswagen in the multidistrict litigation, Volkswagen agreed
to fund a trust to be used by federally-recognized Indian tribes to
finance emission mitigation projects.  Volkswagen has since funded
the trust, but in March the Court stayed all disbursements pending
a determination of whether the trust's allocation formula needs to
be modified.

The tribal trust is one of two trusts established to fund emission
mitigation projects to offset the negative effects of Volkswagen's
"clean diesel" vehicles.  The beneficiaries of the tribal trust are
the federally-recognized Indian tribes, while the beneficiaries of
the second trust are the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District
of Columbia.  Volkswagen has set aside a combined $2.925 billion
for these trusts.  The company has contributed $2.025 billion to
date, with the final payment, of $900 million, scheduled later in
November 2018.  Almost 98% of the money has been allotted to the
state trust.  After administrative costs and expenses, that leaves
approximately $54.5 million for the tribal trust.

The United States has now asked the Court to approve material
modifications to the trust's allocation formula.  Currently, if a
funding cycle is oversubscribed -- that is, if tribes ask for more
money than is available -- funds are allocated among participating
tribes on a pro rata basis, based on population.  As proposed, the
allocation formula would be modified so that 50% of the funds would
be allocated equally among participating tribes and 50 would be
allocated based on population.  The result would be that smaller
tribes would receive a greater share of the funds than they would
under the current allocation formula.

As most relevant, the United States proposes a modified allocation
formula for the first funding cycle consisting of the following
three steps:

     a. Step 1: Per Tribe Allocation - The trustee will allocate
50% of the available funds equally among the 26 participating
beneficiaries;

     b. Step 2: Pro Rata Population-based Allocation - The trustee
will allocate the remaining 50% of the available funds into three
separate funding pools based on the Jenks natural breaks
optimization method. The trustee will assign 51.52% of the
available funding to Group One, 10.61 to Group Two, and 37.87% to
Group Three based on the relative population of each group, and
will then allocate an amount to each participating beneficiary
based on the pro rata share of its population to the total
population of all the participating beneficiaries within its group;
and

     c. Step 3: Funding Limit - The trustee will limit the amount
of funding for a beneficiary to no more than the beneficiary
requested in its original funding request and will reallocate the
remaining amount to the other beneficiaries.

As compared with the current, exclusively population-based
oversubscription formula, the proposed formula would allocate more
funds to the smaller tribes. In the first funding cycle, for
example, Beaver Village, a tribe with 83 members, would receive
$68,348 under the proposed formula, as compared to $345 under the
current formula.  This increase comes at the expense of the larger
tribes. Cherokee Nation, a tribe with 125,440 members, would
receive $808,789 under the proposed formula, as compared to
$2,072,034 under the current formula.

The proposed allocation formula would also apply in all future
funding cycles.  The United States also proposes reducing the
number of funding cycles from six to four and modifying the funding
request procedures so that, in future funding cycles, each
beneficiary would learn of its allocation before it is required to
submit a funding request.  This change would avoid oversubscribed
funding cycles.  The United States also proposes adding an
alignment table as an appendix to the trust, which would be used to
determine the population of each Indian tribe by comparing the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' current list of federally-recognized
Indian tribes to Table PCT4 of the 2010 U.S. Census.

The trustee notified the Indian tribes of the proposed
modifications after submitting them to the Court in June.  The
United States also agreed to accept written comments from the
tribes for a 30-day period thereafter.  In August 2018, the United
States filed a request for Court approval of the proposed
modifications.  With its request, the United States included a copy
of all comments it had received.  The United States also filed its
own summary of and responses to the comments.

Cherokee Nation opposes the United States' request for Court
approval of the modified allocation formula.  It seeks to enforce
the current formula.

Judge Breyer finds that the record does not support that the Nation
has materially changed its position in justifiable reliance on the
current formula.  The Nation therefore cannot enforce the current
formula on reliance grounds.  Even though the trust may have
created enforceable rights in the tribes, those rights can be
modified without the tribes consent.  What matters is whether the
proposed modifications satisfy Paragraph 6.5 of the trust.

The Judge also finds that the proposed allocation formula does not
"change or inhibit" the trust's purpose.  To the contrary, it
furthers the trust's purpose by ensuring that tribes with more
members (and likely more of the Subject Vehicles) receive more of
the trust funds, while also enabling smaller tribes to participate
in emission mitigation efforts.  He will therefore approve the
proposed formula.

Finally, the United States has proposed several other material
modifications to the tribal trust, including modifications that
reduce the number of funding cycles and simplify funding request
procedures.  The Judge holds that there is no reason to believe
that any of the proposed modifications would "change or inhibit the
purpose of the Indian Tribe Mitigation Trust.  He will therefore
approve all of the remaining material modifications.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Breyer granted the United States'
request for approval of the proposed modifications.  Within two
weeks of the Order, (a) the trustee and the settling Defendants
will execute and deliver to the United States the executed tribal
trust agreement, and (b) the United States will file the fully
executed tribal trust agreement with the Court.  The modifications
to the trust agreement will become effective on the date that the
fully executed modified agreement is filed with the Court.  The
stay imposed on trust disbursements is lifted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yIeF2T from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

David Fiol, Plaintiff, represented by William M. Audet, Audet &
Partners, LLP, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Peter B. Fredman -- peter@peterfredmanlaw.com -- Law Office of
Peter Fredman, Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.  

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro.

Nicholas Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Caleb Marker --
caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice &
Charles S. Zimmerman -- charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman
Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Brett Alters, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, David S. Stellings, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, Kevin R. Budner, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Phong-Chau Gia Nguyen, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Tana Lin -- tlin@kellerrohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback LLP & Todd A. Walburg, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann,
Bernstein.

Donald Ardine, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry --
awilliams-derry@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Dean
Noburu Kawamoto -- dkawamoto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
LLP, Derek William Loeser -- dloeser@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice,
Lynn L. Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Annie Argento, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., Dean Noburu Kawamoto, Keller Rohrback LLP, Derek
William Loeser, Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio,
Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn L. Sarko, Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Arkansas State Highway Employees Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Jai K. Chandrasekhar -- jai@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, James A. Harrod --
jim.harrod@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP,
Matthew I. Henzi -- mhenzi@swappc.com -- Sullivan, War, Niki L.
Mendoza, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Ross M.
Shikowitz -- ross@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, The Law
Offices of Susan R. Podolsky.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amie
Adelia Vague -- avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang -- wlang@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, David M. Eisenberg, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC,
Elizabeth L. Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com - - Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr., Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, Howard Feller, McGuireWoods LLP, Hugh J. Bode, Reminger &
Reminger Co LPA, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr., Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey, Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey
L. Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg,
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer Marino Thibodaux,
Gibbons PC, John W. Cowden, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Ric, LLC-KCMO,
John W. Cowden, Baker Sterchi  Cowden and Rice LLC, John L. Hone,
Lipshultz and Hone Chtd, John H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones
Tucker & Gable, Kerry R. Lewis, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker &
Gable, Kurt E. Lindquist, II, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice,
PLLC, Larry Martin Roth, Rumberger,
Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Michael D. Begey, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell,
PA, Michael R. McDonald, Gibbons PC, Natalie Marie Lefkowitz, Chase
Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC, Ronald G. DeWald, Lipshultz and Hone
Chtd, Russ Ferguson, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP, Ryan
Nelson Clark, Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., Sara
Anne Ford, Lightfoot Ffanklin & White LLC, Seth Abram Schaeffer,
McGuireWoods LLP, Thomas R. Valen, Gibbons PC, William L. Boesch,
Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, Adam K. Bult, Brownstein Hyatt
Farber Schreck, Allison Rachel McLaughlin, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell
LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R.
Levin, Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, PC, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Anne Katherine Guillory,
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, April L. Watson, Sessions, Fishman & Nathan,
Benjamin K. Reitz, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Blake Adam
Gansborg, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, Brett R. Leland, Verrill
Dana LLP, Brian C. Langs, Johnson & Bell LTD, C. Vernon Hartline,
Jr., Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, pro hac vice, Carine M.
Williams, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline M.
Tinsley, BAKER AND STERCHI, LLC, Charles William McIntyre, Jr.,
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles Pendleton Mitchell, Rumberger Kirk &
Caldwell, Christine Kingston, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
LLP, Christopher Edward Tribe, McGuireWoods LLP Gateway Plaza, Dan
R. Larsen, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, Darrell L. Barger, Hartline
Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, David L. Ayers, Watkins and Eager PLLC,
David A. Barry, Esq., Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, David N.
May, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrove, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, David T. Schaefer, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Edward W.
Hearn, JOHNSON & BELL, PC, Elena Lalli Coronado, Sullivan and
Cromwell, Elizabeth Righton Johnson, Balch & Bingham LLP, Emily
Anne Ellis, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shreck, Eric R. Burris,
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Erin Patricia Mead, Thorn,
Gershon, Tymann & Bonanni, LLP, Gail Ponder Gaines, Barber Law Firm
PLLC, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, Harlan I. Prater,
IV, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, Hugh Brown McNatt, McNatt, Greene
& Peterson, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
James L. Hollis, Balch & Bingham, Jeffrey L. Chase, Herzfeld &
Rubin PC, Jimmy B. Wilkins, WATKINS & EAGER, Jo E. Peifer, Lavin,
O'Neil, Ricci, Cedrone & DiSipio, John David Ayers, WATKINS &
EAGER, PLLC, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and
Gray LLP, John Alan Knox, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, John Garrett
McCarthy, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, John Thomas
Prisbe, Venable LLP, Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law Group, LLP, Joy
Goldberg Braun, Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, Kenneth Abrams,
McGuire Woods LLP, Kevin P. Polansky, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Mark
A. Weissman, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice, Mary E. Bolkcom,
Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Matthew A. Schwartz, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Nelson,
Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Meredith J. McKee, Womble
Carlyle Sandridge & RIice, PLLC, Meredith J. McKee, Womble Carlyle
Sandridge & Rice, Michael Thad Allen, Day Pitney LLP-HTFD, Michael
B. Gallub, Herzfeld and Rubin, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hale,
Barber Law Firm PLLC, Michael L. O'Don ell, Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP, Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP,
Michael A. Yoshida, MB Law Group, LLP, Mickey W. Greene, Hanson
Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Miranda Hanley, Smith Welch Webb & White,
LLC, Ningur Akoglu, Herzfeld & Rubin PC, Patricia Rodriguez
Britton, Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough LLP, Patrick Demetrios
Grindlay, Paul T. Collins, Nelson Mullins Riley  & Scarborough LLP,
pro hac vice, Paul E.D. Darsow, Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd.,
Paul D. Williams, Day Pitney LLP-Htfd-CT, Richard White Crews, Jr.,
Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, Righton Johnson, Robert J.
Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Ryan A.
Morrison, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, S. Keith Hutto, Nelson Mullins
Riley & Scarborough, Sarah Motley Stone, Womble Carlyle Sandridge &
Rice, PLLC, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L.
Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Shawn P. George,
George & Lorensen, Stanley Abbott Roberts, McGuireWoods LLP,
Stephen D. Bell, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Steve S. Tervooren, Hughes
Gorski Seedorf Odsen & Tervooren LLC, Stuart A. Drake, Kirkland and
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Suhana S. Han, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP,
pro hac vice, Sverker K. Hogberg, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Thomas
R. Ferguson, III, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Thomas W.
Purcell, MB Law Group LLP, William B. Monahan, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice & William Henry Wagener, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice.

Audi AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley --
elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com - Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew Henry
Marmolejo -- mmarmolejo@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Michael
Howard Steinberg -- steinbergm@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell,
LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok - andrew.clubok@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin -- levin@sugarmanrogers.c0m  -
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland -
bleland@verrilldana.com -- Verrill Dana LLP, David Maxwell James
Rein --  reind@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart
Webb, Jr. -- gswebb@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, Garrett L.  Boehm,
Jr. -- boehmg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell LTD, J. Gordon Cooney,
Jr. -- gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP,
James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD, John
Thomas Prisbe -- jtprisbe@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Laura Kabler
Oswell -- oswelll@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Robert
J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell
LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy -- ryan.mccarthy@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Sharon L. Nelles -- nelless@sullcrom.com --
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, Stephen D. Bell -- bell.steve@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney
LLP, Stuart A. Drake -- stuart.drake@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & William B. Monahan --
monahanw@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley,
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP,
Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian
Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman,
Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David M.J. Rein,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable LLP, John D.
Donovan, Jr., Ropes and Gray LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP,
Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Stuart A. Drake,
Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & William B. Monahan, Sullivan
and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice,
Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R.
Leland, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb,
Jr., Venable LLP, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and Gray LLP, Laura
Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr.,
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, Stuart A. Drake, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice &
William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, a New Jersey corporation, Defendant,
represented by P. Arley Harrel, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, PLLC,
Gerard Cedrone, Lavin, O'Neil Ricci Cedrone & DiSipio, Kenneth
Abrams, McGuire Woods LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP & William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Carine M. Williams, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl A. Bush, Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC,
Colin H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, David M.J.
Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, John H. Tucker, Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Nelson, Mullins, Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, Michael R. Williams, Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC,
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP & William B.
Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Abby L.
Parsons, King & Spalding LLP, Adam G. Sowatzka, King & Spalding
LLP, Alexander K. Haas, King & Spalding LLP, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David M.
Fine, King, Spaulding Law Firm, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable LLP,
Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, J. W. Codinha, Nixon
Peabody, LLP, James K. Toohey, Johns & Bell LTD, James K. Vines,
King & Spalding, John Thomas Prisbe, Venable LLP, Joseph Eisert,
King & Spalding LLP, Kenneth Yeatts Turnbull, King & Spalding LLP,
Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew A.
Holian, DLA Piper LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper LLP, Sheldon T.
Bradshaw, KING & SPALDING, Sonya R. Braunschweig, DLA Piper LLP, W.
Scott O'Connell, Nixon Peabody LLP, pro hac vice & William F.
Kiniry, Jr., DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.  

David Antellocy, Defendant, represented by Thomas Eric Loeser,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Scott Moen,
Defendant, represented by Peter B. Fredman, Law Office of Peter
Fredman, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Haas, King &
Spalding LLP, Christina Courtney Sheehan, Modrall Sperling Roehl
Harris & Sisk PA, Joseph Eisert, King & Spalding LLP, Laura Kabler
Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA Piper
LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper LLP, Susan Miller Bisong, Modrall
Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA & William F. Kiniry, Jr., DLA Piper
LLP.

Robert Bosch GmbH, Defendant, represented by Matthew D. Slater,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Carmine D.
Boccuzzi, Jr., Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice &
David Lloyd Anderson, Sidley Austin LLP.  

Bay Ridge Volvo-American, Inc, Defendant, represented by Natalie
Marie Lefkowitz, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC.

Audi USA, Defendant, represented by Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP.


METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER: Johnson Appeals Ruling in Bond Films Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Mary L. Johnson filed an appeal from a court ruling in
her lawsuit titled Mary Johnson v. MGM Holdings, Inc., et al., Case
No. 2:17-cv-00541-RSM, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 16, 2018, Judge
Ricardo S. Martinez (i) granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval of Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement and
Final Certification of the Settlement Class, and (ii) granted in
part the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses and Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award.

The Defendants marketed several James Bond DVD and Blu-ray boxsets
as containing "all the Bond films" and "every gorgeous girl,
nefarious villain and charismatic star."  However, the boxsets did
not include two James Bond movies -- Casino Royale and Never Say
Never Again.  The Plaintiff relied on the advertising, but did not
receive the product she was led to believe she purchased.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff instituted the action on behalf of a
nationwide class of consumers, alleging a violation of Washington's
Consumer Protection Act, breach of express warranties, and breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability.

The Plaintiff originally filed suit in Washington's King County
Superior Court and Defendants removed the action to the Court on
April 7, 2017.  Thereafter, the Court partially granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the claim for breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, dismissing the Defendants'
corporate parents, and granting the Plaintiff leave to amend.  The
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that re-alleged the dismissed
claims and claims against the corporate parents.  This prompted the
parties to mediate, stipulate to dismissal of the corporate
parents, and ultimately reach a preliminary settlement which the
Court approved.

The appellate case is captioned as Mary Johnson v. MGM Holdings,
Inc., et al., Case No. 18-35967, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by December 17, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on January 14, 2019;

   -- Appellant Mary L. Johnson's opening brief is due on
      February 25, 2019;

   -- Appellees METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC. and Twentieth
      Century Fox Home Entertainment, LLC's answering brief is
      due on March 25, 2019;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MARY L. JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Alexander Sether Kleinberg, Esq.
          EISENHOWER CARLSON PLLC
          1201 Pacific Avenue, Suite 1200
          Tacoma, WA 98402-4395
          Telephone: (253) 572-4500
          E-mail: akleinberg@eisenhowerlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC., and
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX HOME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, are represented by:

          John S. Devlin, III, Esq.
          LANE POWELL PC
          1420 Fifth Avenue
          P.O. Box 91302
          Seattle, WA 98111-9402
          Telephone: (206) 223-7000
          E-mail: devlinj@lanepowell.com

               - and -

          Tamerlin J. Godley, Esq.
          Ariel C. Green, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9232
          E-mail: Tamerlin.Godley@mto.com
                  Ariel.Green@mto.com


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Court Dismisses Pilots' Insurance Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint in the case captioned DALE MILLER and JOHN F.
BARTON, JR., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New
York Corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. No. 17 Civ.
7284 (AT) (SN). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs are current and former United Airlines pilots who
hold Metlife life insurance policies. The Plaintiffs sued Defendant
Metlife alleging that Metlife intentionally and erroneously
designated them as smokers when calculating their premiums.
Plaintiffs assert claims for fraud and breach of contract and seek
to certify a class of California-based pilots, a class of
Colorado-based pilots, and a nationwide class.

Metlife moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs' claims
are precluded under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 (SLUSA).

Judge Netburn stated that there is some question about whether a
dismissal under SLUSA is properly brought as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and then determined that SLUSA preclusion as a matter
of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate given the limits to
the law's mandate.

The Plaintiffs argue that they were prejudiced by Judge Netburn's
review of Metlife's motion under Rule 12(b)(1) because this review
was performed without notice and Plaintiffs would have submitted
additional objections to the evidence considered, tailored
specifically to Rule 12(b)(1) considerations, and discussed such in
their briefing, had they had proper notice.

SLUSA Preclusion

SLUSA precludes private parties from filing in federal or state
court (1) a covered class action (2) based on state law claims, (3)
alleging that defendants made a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact' or used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance' (4) in connection with' the purchase or sale
of (5) covered securities. A fraudulent misrepresentation is made
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security if it
is material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than
the fraudster) to buy or to sell a 'covered security.'

The Plaintiffs argue that Judge Netburn ignored the Supreme Court's
more recent and overriding instruction on the scope of SLUSA
preclusion that explains that a fraudulent misrepresentation or
omission is not made in connection with a purchase or sale of a
covered security unless it is material to a decision by one or more
individuals other than the fraudster and the individual making that
decision  must be a party other than the fraudster.

Here, the relevant covered security purchases were the Plaintiffs'
purchases of the Group Variable Universal Life (GVUL) policies. A
feature of the GVUL policy is that policyholders can invest their
premiums in various mutual funds and the insurance charges are then
paid out of these investments.

As a result of Metlife's alleged fraud, the value of the pilots'
investment was diminished because they had to pay higher insurance
charges and in order to pay for these higher insurance charges, the
investment division sold a greater amount of the pilots' investment
in mutual funds than if the pilots had been designated as
non-smokers. Because of Plaintiffs' purchases of the GVUL policies,
they paid higher insurance charges based on Metlife's alleged fraud
relating to smoker rates.

The Court agrees with Metlife, therefore, that under these
allegations, Metlife is the alleged fraudster and Plaintiffs are
the someone' who made a decision as a result of the alleged fraud.
It follows, then, that any misrepresentations that resulted in
higher premiums are in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security.  

Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Netburn that the
Plaintiffs allege fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
a covered security, and, therefore, that the Plaintiffs' fraud
claim is precluded by SLUSA.

Breach of Contract Claim

The Plaintiffs object to Judge Netburn's recommendation that the
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim be dismissed without prejudice.
In a two sentence objection, the Plaintiffs argue that they
continue to believe they adequately stated a claim for breach of
contract for the reasons stated in their Opposition. This objection
is too vague and general to trigger de novo review. The Court finds
no clear error with Judge Netburn's determination. For that reason,
this objection is overruled.

Metlife's Objections

Failure to Cure Deficiencies

Metlife contends that the R&R failed to consider its argument that
the Plaintiffs' repeated failure to cure the deficiencies in their
complaint bars any further amendment. Metlife's objection is
unavailing as it does nothing more than repeat the arguments it
presented to Judge Netburn.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a court should freely
give leave when justice so requires. When a motion to dismiss is
granted, the usual practice is to grant leave to amend the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 25, 2017, Metlife
moved to dismiss the complaint on February 1, 2018 and then
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 20, 2018 instead
of opposing the motion, which dismissed a defendant and made
substantive revisions to the pleading.

Contrary to Metlife's assertions, therefore, the R&R was the first
time that any court adjudicated the substance of the claims alleged
in the Amended Complaint. The proper time for a plaintiff to move
to amend the complaint is when the plaintiff learns from the
District Court in what respect the complaint is deficient. Before
learning from the court what are its deficiencies, the plaintiff
cannot know whether he is capable of amending the complaint
efficaciously.

The Court agrees with Judge Netburn that the Plaintiffs' fraud and
breach of contract claims should be dismissed without prejudice.

Fraud Claim

Metlife argues that the fraud claim should be dismissed with
prejudice because (1) they are time-barred, (2) Metlife did not
conceal that it was charging the Plaintiffs a smoker rate, (3)
Plaintiff Miller's individual fraud claim is barred by California's
economic loss rule, and (4) the individual fraud claims do not meet
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s particularity standards.  

The Plaintiffs, this objection merely cuts and pastes numerous
extensive sections from the Motion to Dismiss, with slight
revisions in some areas. These objections, therefore, do not give
rise to de novo review, as they simply reiterate Metlife's original
arguments. To find otherwise would reduce the magistrate's work to
something akin to a meaningless dress rehearsal. The Court,
therefore, reviews this portion of the R&R strictly for clear error
and finds none. Judge Netburn's determination that Plaintiffs'
fraud claim should be dismissed without prejudice is free of legal
error.

Breach of Contract Claim

Metlife argues that Judge Netburn incorrectly recommended dismissal
of Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims without prejudice.

Metlife contends that the R&R did not consider whether Plaintiffs
had alleged facts which would make it impossible [to plead] a
breach of contract claim such that: (1) the continuing wrong
doctrine would apply and (2) the claim would not be based on
misrepresentation or omission.

Judge Netburn held that at this point, the Court is unable to
determine whether the continuing wrong doctrine applies because the
pilots fail to state a claim for breach of contract for which
relief may be granted. The Court agrees that it cannot now assess
whether the alleged breach was ongoing or occurred only at one
moment in time, but should thepilots decide to amend their
complaint again, the Court will be able to assess whether the
continuing wrong doctrine applies.

Once the Plaintiffs amend the Amended Complaint and provide the
Court with additional information, as detailed in the R&R, the
Court may properly assess whether Plaintiffs' claims are
time-barred by the continuing wrong doctrine. Doing so at this
stage is premature and a waste of judicial resources.

The R&R recommends dismissing the Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim without prejudice, granting leave (1) to identify which
specific contractual provision was allegedly breached and/or (2) to
assert a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
Court agrees, and the objections are overruled.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' fraud claim is dismissed without
prejudice to refiling as an individual action and the Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim is dismissed without prejudice to refiling
as a class or individual action, provided that the second amended
complaint complies with SLUSA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybhx2bpp from Leagle.com.

Dale Miller, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & John F. Barton, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew John
Dressel, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Behram Viraf Parekh --
bparekh@yaplaw.com -- Kirtland & Packard LLP, Joshua Fields --
jf@kirtlandpackard.com -- Kirtland & Packard LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael Louis Kelly -- mlk@kirtlandpackard.com -- Kirtland &
Packard LLP, Salvatore Charles Badala, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC &
Hunter Jay Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Edward Morris Holt --
tholt@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale, P.C., John
Michael Hintz -- jhintz@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale,
P.C. & Lee E. Bains, Jr. -- lbains@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard
Cooper & Gale, P.C..


MIDLAND CREDIT: Sued Over Deceptive Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Hensley nka Robeson, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. and
Midland Funding, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-03516 (S.D. Ind., November
12, 2018), seeks to recover damages under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants attempt to collect
time-barred debts via deceptive and misleading collection letters.

The Plaintiff Carrie Hensley, is a citizen of the State of Indiana,
residing in the Southern District of Indiana.

The Defendant Midland is a bad debt buyer that buys large
portfolios of defaulted consumer debts for pennies on the dollar,
which it then collects upon through other collection agencies, like
its sister company, Defendant MCM. Defendant Midland's principal,
if not sole, business purpose is the collection of defaulted
consumer debts originated by others. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      E-mail: davephilipps@aol.com
              mephilipps@aol.com


MISSISSIPPI: Court Reinstates Hinton Inmate Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, HENRY HINTON, JR. (# 200283), Plaintiff, v. WARDEN
TIMOTHY MORRIS, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 4:17CV132-NBB-DAS
(N.D. Miss.), Judge Neal B. Biggers of the U.S. District Court for
the Norrthern District of Mississippi, Greenville Division, granted
the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's final
judgment dismissing the instant case as moot.

The Court dismissed the instant case as moot on April 27, 2018,
because the Plaintiff's complaint sought only injunctive relief and
it appeared that he had been released from incarceration because:
(1) the Court had received returned mail addressed to him, and (2)
he could not be found in the Mississippi Department of Corrections
public Inmate Locator, either as an inmate or a parolee.  In the
current motion, however, the Plaintiff states that, as a protective
custody inmate, his whereabouts are not available on the public
website.  He also states that his address temporarily changed when
he was subpoenaed for trial and that he has since been returned to
Unit 29, where the events of this case took place.

Jugde Biggers explains that an order granting relief under Rule 60
must be based upon: (1) clerical mistakes, (2) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (3) newly discovered
evidence, (4) fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party, (5) a
void judgment, or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the order.   He finds that the plaintiff has asserted
a valid reason under subsection (1) -- the Court's mistaken belief
that he had been released from prison.  As such, his request for
reconsideration will be granted.

The Plaintiff also asserts that he has filed a class action suit
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; however, he must meet the strictures
associated with that rule, and he has not.  Thus, the Judge will
consider only those allegations which involve the Plaintiff.

Twice now the Plaintiff has relocated without informing the Court
of his new address.  The Court cannot administer the case without a
valid mailing address for the Plaintiff.  The Judge admonishes the
plaintiff to keep the Court informed of his address; failure to do
so will lead to the dismissal of the case under Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with an order
of the Court.

For these reasons, Judge Biggers granted the instant motion to
reconsider.  He directed the Clerk of the Court to place the case
back on the Court's active docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/s6unkm from Leagle.com.

Henry Hinton DO NOT FILE, Jr., Plaintiff, pro se.


NAVARRE CORPORATION: Kurth et al. Seek Minimum & OT Pay for Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------------
TAMMIE KURTH and MARK GRAF JR., on behalf of themselves and all
other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, the
Plaintiffs, vs. NAVARRE CORPORATION, a Florida for-profit
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-13577-BAF-APP (E.D.
Mich, Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to recover the benefits due to them
from Defendant as a result of Defendant's failure to pay minimum
wages and overtime wages to Plaintiffs and other similarly situated
employees.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant, working as
transport drivers. Mr. Kurth worked for Navarre from June to
August. Mr. Graf worked for Navarre in August and September. In
their positions as transport drivers, Plaintiffs drove veterans to
and from the Veterans' Affairs Healthcare System in Ann Arbor,
Michigan. As a result, Plaintiffs spent part of their shift driving
and part of their shifts waiting in standby at the VA Hospital, the
lawsuit says.

Defendant operates its non-emergency medical transportation
business in the states of California, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Tennessee.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Bryan Yaldou, Esq.
          Elaina S. Bailey, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF
          BRYAN YALDOU, PLLC
          23000 Telegraph, Suite 5
          Brownstown, MI 48134
          Telephone: (734) 692 9200
          Facsimile: (734) 692 9201
          E-mail: bryan@yaldoulaw.com
                  elaina@yaldoulaw.com


NEW JERSEY: Wahab Appeals D.N.J. Ruling to Third Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Atiya Wahab filed an appeal from a court ruling in her
lawsuit titled Atiya Wahab v. State of New Jersey, et al., Case No.
3-18-cv-06067, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey.

The nature of suit is stated as other civil rights.

The appellate case is captioned as Atiya Wahab v. State of New
Jersey, et al., Case No. 18-3526, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ATIYA WAHAB, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Donald F. Burke, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DONALD F. BURKE
          45 Gale Road
          Brick, NJ 08723
          Telephone: (732) 966-4922
          E-mail: donaldburkeesq@gmail.com

Defendants-Appellees STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; GURBIR S. GREWAL, Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey; and PHILIP DUNTON MURPHY, Governor of the
State of New Jersey, are represented by:

          Nicole E. Adams, Esq.
          Rachel S. Frey, Esq.
          OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
          25 Market Street
          Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
          Trenton, NJ 08625
          Telephone: (609) 633-1971
          E-mail: Nicole.adams@law.njoag.gov


NRG ENERGY: Tejero Wage & Hour Suit Remanded to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California remanded the case, AARON TEJERO,
Plaintiff, v. NRG ENERGY SERVICES LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-04188-PJH (N.D. Cal.), to the Contra Costa County Superior
Court.

Tejero's motion to remand came on for hearing before the Court on
Nov. 14, 2018.

The action is a putative wage and hour class action filed in Contra
Costa County Superior Court on May 25, 2018.  The Defendants
employed Plaintiff as a non-exempt, hourly paid Solar Tech III from
approximately March 14, 2017, to Feb. 2, 2018.  On July 12, 2018,
the Defendants removed the action to federal court asserting that
federal jurisdiction existed based on the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA").

Though the complaint alleges nine causes of action, the Defendants'
attempt to meet the $5 million threshold relies on just four causes
of action: (1) Violation of California Labor Code Sections 226.7,
512(a) and 1198 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods); (2) Violation of
California Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 1198 (Failure to Provide
Rest Periods); (3) Violation of California Labor Code Sections
226(a), 1174(d), and 1198 (Non-Compliant Wage Statements and
Failure to Maintain Payroll Records); (4) Violation of California
Labor Code Sections 201, 202, and 203 (Wages Not Timely Paid Upon
Termination).  They contend that those four causes of action put a
total of $5,512,248 in controversy, with the meal and rest period
claims accounting for $3,547,362 of that amount.  The Defendants
reached the latter figure by "conservatively" assuming one meal
period and one rest period violation per week per putative class
member.

Fatal to the Defendants' contention, however, Judge Hamilton finds,
is the fact that their proposed violation rate is essentially
speculative because it is unsupported by any evidence or allegation
in the complaint.  Speculation does not meet the Defendants' burden
to show CAFA's amount in controversy requirement has been met.
Moreover, the pleadings and evidence do not establish the threshold
jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence, hence the
case must be remanded to state court.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hamilton finds that the Defendants
have not met their burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
Accordingly, he granted the Plaintiff's motion and remanded the
action to the Contra Costa County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/X2fjeW from Leagle.com.

Aaron Tejero, Jr., individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Ariel S. Harman-Holmes -- Ariel.Harman-Holmes@CapstoneLawyers.com
-- Capstone Law APC, Jonathan Sing Lee --
Jonathan.Lee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Liana Carol
Carter, Capstone Law APC, Molly Ann DeSario, Capstone Law APC &
Robert Joseph Drexler, Jr. -- Robert.Drexler@capstonelawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC.

NRG Energy Services LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, NRG
Energy Services Group LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company &
NRG Energy, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented
by Carolyn Blecha Hall -- carolyn.hall@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Roshni Chaudhari Kapoor --
roshni.kapoor@ogletree.com -- Ogltree, Deakins, Nash, Smoke,
Stewart, P.C. & Thomas Michael McInerney -- tmm@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


ORLANS PC: Garland FDCPA Suit Held in Abeyance
----------------------------------------------
Judge Denise Page Hood of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, held in abeyance the case,
FREDDIE GARLAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ORLANS PC, LINDA ORLANS, and ALISON ORLANS,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-11561 (E.D. Mich.), until the U.S.
Supreme Court renders a decision in the matter of Obduskey v.
McCarthy & Holthus LLP.

On May 17, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the proposed class action
lawsuit, alleging that the Defendants violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the Regulation of
Collection Practices Act ("RCPA"), when they mailed one or more
similar letters to the Plaintiff and others.  

On July 18, 2018, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Motion to Dismiss was fully
briefed and set for a hearing on Oct. 3, 2018.  When reviewing the
Defendants' reply brief, the Court noted that the Defendants argued
that the case should be held in abeyance pending the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Obduskey.

As the Defendants asserted, the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari on the question of whether the FDCPA applies to
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.  They argue that, if the
Supreme Court determined that the FDCPA does not apply to
non-judicial proceedings, the Plaintiff's FDCPA claim (and the RCPA
claim) must be dismissed.  Based on the Defendants' argument, the
Court ordered the parties to submit limited briefs addressing
whether this case should be stayed, and the parties timely filed
those briefs.

Judge Hood has reviewed the parties' pleadings, the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Obduskey, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Glazer v.
Chase Home Fin. LLC, and the FDCPA.  She agrees with the
Defendants.

First, the Judge is persuaded that the FDCPA claim at issue is
based upon a non-judicial mortgage foreclosure.  Second, in
Obduskey, the Tenth Circuit was presented with -- and expressly
rejected -- an argument raised by the Plaintiff that relied upon
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Glazer holding that a non-judicial
mortgage foreclosure was covered under the FDCPA.  Those competing
interpretations of the FDCPA vis a vis non-judicial mortgage
foreclosures led to the U.S. Supreme Court granting a writ of
certiorari on the issue.

Third, she finds that, if non-judicial mortgage foreclosures are
not covered by the FDCPA, the Plaintiff's FDCPA claim likely will
fail as a matter of law.  Fourth, if there is no potentially viable
FDCPA claim before the Court, the Court would be stripped of
federal subject matter jurisdiction and likely would exercise its
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff's RCPA claim.

Fifth, the U.S. Supreme Court likely will issue a ruling that
provides certainty as to the viability -- or non-viability -- of
the FDCPA claim in the case.  Right now, it is not clear whether
Glazer (the currently controlling law over the case) will be upheld
or overruled, such that if the Court were to move forward, there is
approximately a 50% chance that doing so will be for no purpose.

For all of those reasons, Judge Hood finds that the interests of
justice weigh in favor of staying the case pending the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling regarding the issue upon which it granted a writ of
certiorari in Obduskey.  Accordingly, she ordered that the case be
held in abeyance pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Obduskey.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/HyBHEL from Leagle.com.

Freddie Garland, Plaintiff, represented by Samuel G. Firebaugh --
samuelgfirebaugh@hotmail.com -- Firebaugh & Andrews & Andrew J.
McGuinness -- drewmcg@topclasslaw.com -- United Sta.

Orlans PC, Linda Orlans & Alison Orlans, Defendants, represented by
Bruce L. Segal -- bsegal@honigman.com -- Honigman, Miller & I.W.
Winsten -- iwinsten@honigman.com -- Honigman, Miller.


OVERLAND SOLUTIONS: Parducci Sues Over Excessive Insurance Premiums
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard P. Parducci, as conservator for and on behalf of Margarett
Parducci and as Trustee of the JOHN A. PARDUCCI AND MARGARETT L.
PARDUCCI SURVIVOR'S TRUST dated December 29, 1987, Plaintiff, v.
Overland Solutions, Inc., AMCO Insurance Company and Does 1-20,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-07162-RMI (N.D. Cal., November 27,
2018) is a class action on behalf of those persons who were harmed
by Defendants' violation of California's Unfair Competition Law,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent
misrepresentations, breach of contract and Elder Abuse
(Financial).

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the senior Parduccis'
residence has been insured with AMCO since at least 2008. The
senior Parduccis, due to their advanced age and frailties, relied
on AMCO and its agents to place the proper amount of insurance on
their home and to ensure that they were not taken advantage of
through the sale of uncollectable and/or useless and/or unnecessary
insurance coverage.

Pursuant to his duties and responsibilities as Trustee of the
Trust, Plaintiff requested from AMCO's agent, Mark Davis Insurance
Agency, Inc., a 7-year history of the amount of insurance that was
being carried on the senior Parduccis' residence, together with an
accounting of the premiums for the coverage on the structure, and
an explanation of how the replacement cost had been determined for
each year that the property had been insured.

In response, only a limited amount of documentation and information
was provided to Plaintiff and, as of this date, Plaintiff still
cannot determine whether the documents provided are complete and
accurate and cover the entire period during which the Parducci home
was over-insured. Based upon the limited documentation that was
obtained by Plaintiff, it appeared that the Parduccis' home had
been over-insured for at least 6 years, resulting in the payment of
excessive premiums for coverage that the family would never be able
to collect if there had been a loss. This fact was confirmed by
Plaintiff's own investigation, says the complaint.

John A. Parducci and Margarett L. Parducci, were initially the
trustees of their revocable trust and handled their own affairs
until sometime in 2008 at which time they appointed Richard P.
Parducci, their grandson, to be their agent under a power of
attorney to assist them with the administrative tasks of the
trust.

Overland Solutions, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware with its primary corporate
office located in Overland Park, Kansas.

AMCO Insurance Company is a corporation organized and domiciled in
the State of Iowa and is licensed and authorized to engage in the
business of insurance. Defendant AMCO is authorized to do business
under the laws and regulations of the State of California.

Does 1 through 20, are sued herein under fictitious names because
their true names and capacities are unknown to Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Attila Panczel, Esq.
     Joseph John Turri, Esq.
     INSURANCE LITIGATORS & COUNSELORS, PLC.
     419-J Talmage Road
     Ukiah, CA 95482
     Phone: (707) 462-6117
     Fax: (707) 230-5525
     Email: insterminator@aol.com


PALMER ADMINISTRATIVE: Karon Sues over Prerecorded Voice Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL KARON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PALMER ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, and JOHN DOE CORPORATION, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-02658-CAB (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to
stop Defendants from placing calls using "an artificial or
prerecorded voice" to the telephones of consumers nationwide
without their prior express written consent; and to obtain redress
for all persons injured by their conduct.

According to the complaint, Palmer is a nationwide provider of
automotive extended protection plans to consumers. In recent years,
extended protection plan providers, such as Palmer, have turned to
unsolicited telemarketing as a way to increase its customer base.
Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which Palmer
solicits new customers. John Doe Corporation initiated a
prerecorded telemarketing call to the cellular telephone numbers of
Plaintiff and the Class to promote Palmer in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Palmer hired John Doe
Corporation to originate new customers and is vicariously liable
for its illegal telemarketing conduct.

Palmer has violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its
implementing regulations by placing, or having placed on its
behalf, prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers (a) who
have not expressly consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who
have expressly requested not to receive such calls, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Adam T. Savett, Esq.
          SAVETT LAW OFFICES LLC
          2764 Carole Lane
          Allentown PA 18104
          Telephone: (610) 621-4550
          Facsimile: (610) 978-2970
          E-mail: adam@savettlaw.com

               - and -

          Katrina Carroll. Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 750-1265
          Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
          E-mail: kcarroll@litedepalma.com

PANDORA MEDIA: Faces Kapela Suit Over Sale to Sirius
----------------------------------------------------
Richard Kapela, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Pandora Media, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-06847
(N.D. Calif., November 12, 2018), is brought against the Defendants
for breach of fiduciary duties and violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff brings this stockholder class action against Pandora,
the Company's Board of Directors as a result of the Defendants'
efforts to sell the Company to Sirius XM Holdings Inc., and White
Oaks Acquisition Corp. as a result of an unfair process for an
unfair price, and to enjoin an upcoming stockholder vote on a
proposed all-stock transaction valued at approximately $3.5
billion.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida and, at all times relevant
hereto, has been a Pandora stockholder.

The Defendant Pandora provides music discovery platform services in
the United States and internationally. Pandora is incorporated
under the laws of the State of Delaware and has its principal place
of business at 2100 Franklin Street, Suite 700, Oakland, CA 94612.
Shares of Pandora common stock are traded on the New York Stock
Exchange under the symbol "P." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Evan J. Smith, Esq.
      Ryan P. Cardona, Esq.
      BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
      9595 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 900
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Tel: (877) 534-2590
      Fax: (310) 247-0160
      E-mail: esmith@brodskysmith.com
              rcardona@brodskysmith.com


PANDORA MEDIA: Thompson Balks at Merger Deal with Sirius XM
-----------------------------------------------------------
DEREK THOMPSON, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PANDORA MEDIA, INC., GREGORY B.
MAFFEI, ROGER CONANT FAXON, DAVID J. FREAR, JASON HIRSCHHORN,
TIMOTHY LEIWEKE, ROGER J. LYNCH, MICHAEL M. LYNTON, JAMES E. MEYER,
and MICKIE ROSEN, the Defendants, Case 3:18-cv-06973-WHA (N.D.
Cal., Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to enjoin vote on a proposed
transaction, pursuant to which Pandora will be acquired by Sirius
XM Holdings Inc. through its wholly owned subsidiary, White Oaks
Acquisition Corp.

The case is a class action brought on behalf of the public
stockholders of Pandora Media, Inc. against Pandora and the members
of its Board of Directors for their violations of Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On September 24,
2018, Pandora and Sirius XM issued a joint press release announcing
they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated
September 23, 2018 to sell Pandora to Sirius XM. Under the terms of
the Merger Agreement, Pandora stockholders will be entitled to
receive 1.44 shares of Sirius XM common stock for each Pandora
common share they own. The Merger Consideration has an implied
value of $10.05 per share based on the closing price of Sirius XM's
stock on September 21, 2018. The Proposed Transaction is valued at
approximately $3.5 billion. On October 31, 2018, Pandora and Sirius
XM filed a joint proxy statement/prospectus on Form S-4 with the
SEC.

The Registration Statement, which recommends that Pandora
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits
and/or misrepresents material information concerning, among other
things: (i) Sirius XM's financial projections and the projected
cost savings and operating synergies for the combined company,
relied upon by Pandora's financial advisor Centerview Partners LLC
("Centerview") in its financial analyses; (ii) the data and inputs
underlying the financial valuation analyses that support the
fairness opinions provided by Centerview and LionTree Advisors LLC;
and (iii) LionTree's potential conflicts of interest.

In short, unless remedied, Pandora's public stockholders will be
forced to make a voting decision on the Proposed Transaction
without full disclosure of all material information concerning the
Proposed Transaction being provided to them. Plaintiff seeks to
enjoin the stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction unless and
until such Exchange Act violations are cured, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: 310 208-2800
          Facsimile: 310 209-2348
          E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

PAWN SHOP: Tupitsyn Seeks Damages for Retaliatory Discharge
-----------------------------------------------------------
VALERIY TUPITSYN, DAVID SHAKMEYSTER, and other similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiffs, v. PAWN SHOP IN DAVIE, INC. d/b/a Gold
Pawn City f/k/a Citi Pawn, IGOR PETROSOV, and PETER SHMANDURA, the
Defendants, Case 0:18-cv-62798-WPD (S.D. Fla., Nov. 16, 2018),
seeks to recover money damages for retaliatory discharge under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

On or about early 2018, the U.S. Department of Labor began an
investigation of Defendants for FLSA violations. As a result of the
DOL Investigation, the U.S. Department of Labor ordered Defendants
to pay a negotiated sum in unpaid minimum/overtime wages to
Plaintiffs and to their similarly situated co-workers. The
Defendants paid Plaintiffs and their similarly situated co-workers
pursuant to the U.S. Department of Labor instructions. Soon
thereafter, Defendants contacted Plaintiffs and each of the
similarly situated store clerks who are members of the Russian race
and ordered them to return the moneys Defendants had paid them as a
result of the DOL Investigation.

Defendants further instructed Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated co-workers, members of the Russian race, that "if they did
not return the moneys, their jobs would be terminated." Defendants
only threatened termination to workers who are members of the
Russian race. Defendants did not threaten Americans with
termination if they failed to give back their moneys. The
Plaintiffs refused to give back to Defendants the moneys the U.S.
Department of Labor had ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs. As a
result, Defendants terminated Plaintiffs, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30 th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com

PETCO ANIMAL: $1.2MM Settlement in Feist FCRA Suit Has Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACKLYN FEIST, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; and ANGELICA ZIMMER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PETCO ANIMAL
SUPPLIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-01369-H-MSB (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Marilyn L. Huff of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
final approval of class action settlement, and request for
attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative service awards.

Petco is a major national retailer that primarily sells pet care
products and services.  Zimmer is a former Petco employee, and
Feist is a former Petco job applicant.  The Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendant obtained and reviewed consumer reports detailing
their financial histories after they applied for jobs at the
Defendant's stores, without first providing them the notice
required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").

Zimmer was hired by a Petco store and worked there for roughly five
months.  Feist was not hired, allegedly because of adverse
information on her consumer report.  Feist alleges that she was not
properly notified that the Defendant would be reviewing her
consumer report and was thus deprived of an opportunity to review
and challenge the report upon which her denial of employment was
based.

On May 5, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed the class action in the San
Diego County Superior Court.  They asserted three different claims
for violations of FCRA and sought to represent a class of all
persons regarding whom the Defendant procured or caused to be
procured a consumer report for employment purposes during the
period from May 1, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2015 ("Disclosure Class"),
including a proposed subclass of all persons regarding whom the
Defendant took adverse action subsequent to procuring a consumer
report and did not receive a pre-adverse action notification letter
during the period May 1, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2015 ("Adverse
Action Subclass").

On June 6, 2016, the Defendant removed the action to the District
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.  The Defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of
standing on July 15, 2016, but the Court denied the motion on Nov.
2, 2016.

On Jan. 18, 2018, the parties notified the Court that they had
reached a global settlement following mediation before the Hon. Leo
S. Papas (Retired), a former Magistrate Judge of the Court.  After
further negotiations, the Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval
of the parties' class settlement on April 20, 2018.  The Court
granted preliminary approval of the class settlement.  On Sept. 18,
2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for final approval of class
action settlement and a request for attorneys' fees, costs, and
class representative service awards.

Under the proposed settlement, the Defendant will pay $1.2 million
to establish a nonreversionary settlement fund to resolve the
litigation.  The settlement allocates $10,000 as an incentive award
for the lead Plaintiffs, $300,000 for attorney fees, up to
$15,725.26 to cover costs of suit, up to $114,028.88 to pay the
settlement administrator, and the remainder to participating class
members.  The estimated 37,279 members of the Disclosure Class will
each receive roughly $20, while the estimated 52 members of the
Adverse Action Subclass will receive an additional $150.

The Defendant provided notice to 35,681 class members constituting
95% of the total class.  The case administrator posted the notice
on the settlement website accessible 24 hours per day and 7 days
per week to potential class members.  In addition, the case
administrator established a toll free number, fax number, e-mail
address, and mailing address to accommodate potential class member
inquiries.  As of Sept. 18, 2018, there have been no objections and
four timely requests for exclusion were received.  Non-objecting
class members will be paid automatically, without need to file a
claim.  Any unclaimed funds will be donated to the National
Consumer Law Center as cy pres recipient.

Judge Huff holds that the Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this action and all parties to the action, including all
settlement class members.  She certified the settlement class and
granted final approval of the settlement.  The form and method of
notice satisfied the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the United States Constitution, including the Due
Process Clause.

The Judge granted the class counsel $300,000 in attorneys' fees and
$12,875.69 in expenses.  She granted the class representatives
Zimmer and Feist each an incentive payment of $5,000 for a total of
$10,000.  The attorneys' fees, expense awards, and incentive
payment will be paid out of the settlement fund created by
Defendant Petco.

The Judge dismissed the action with prejudice, and no costs will be
awarded other than those specified in the Order or provided by the
settlement agreement.  The Clerk of Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/skbV6c from Leagle.com.

Jacklyn Feist, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Angelica Zimmer, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Marc L.
Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP &
Mark S. Greenstone -- mgreenstone@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP.

Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frederick
William Kosmo, Jr. , Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Marissa L. Lyftogt --
mlyftogt@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Hali M.
Anderson -- fkosmo@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP
& Loleena Ansari May -- lmay@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner
Kosmo.


PRINSTON PHARMACEUTICAL: Kaplan Sues Over Contaminated Valsartan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Kaplan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Prinston Pharmaceutical Inc. dba Solco Healthcare LLC,
Solco Healthcare U.S., LLC, Huahai U.S. Inc., and Zhejiang Huahai
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Case No. 3:18-cv-16067 (D. N.J., November
12, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for breach of express
warranties and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and hundreds
of thousands of other Valsartan consumers who paid for the
Defendants' generic Valsartan that was adulterated through its
contamination with an IARC- and EPA-listed probable human
carcinogen known as N-nitrosodimethylamine.

The complaint says the Plaintiff paid for all or part of their
Valsartan prescriptions that were illegally introduced into the
market by the Defendants and which were not fit for their ordinary
use. The Defendants have been unjustly enriched through the sale of
these adulterated drugs since at least 2012.

Plaintiff Dennis Kaplan is a citizen and resident of Ohio, who
resides and is domiciled in Mayfield Heights, Ohio. During the
class period, Plaintiff paid money for one or more of Defendants'
Valsartan products.

The Defendant Prinston Pharmaceutical Inc. dba Solco Healthcare LLC
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
located at 2002 Eastpark Blvd., Cranbury, New Jersey 08512. At all
times material to this case, Prinston has been engaged in the
manufacturing, sale, and distribution of adulterated generic
Valsartan in the United States, including in the States of Ohio and
New Jersey.

The Defendant Solco Healthcare U.S., LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company with its principal place of business located at
2002 Eastpark Blvd., Cranbury, New Jersey 08512.

The Defendant Huahai U.S. Inc. is a New Jersey corporation, with
its principal place of business located at 2002 Eastpark Blvd.,
Cranbury, New Jersey 08512.

The Defendant Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. is a Chinese
company, organized under the laws of China, with its principal
place of business located at Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No.
1 Branch, Linhai, Zhejiang Province 317016 China. On information
and belief, ZHP exercised control over subsidiary and affiliate
entities that sold generic Valsartan in the United States,
including but not limited to Prinston, Solco U.S., and Huahai U.S.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ruben Honik, Esq.
      David J. Stanoch, Esq.
      GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C.
      1835 Market Street, Suite 2900
      Philadelphia, PA 19103
      Tel: (215) 965-9177
      Fax: (215) 985-4169
      E-mail: rhonik@golombhonik.com
              dstanoch@golombhonik.com


PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: 3d Cir. Vacates Dismissal of CFA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the judgment of the District Court granting
Defendant'S Motion to Dismiss the case captioned ANA LIDIA
ALPIZAR-FALLAS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Appellant, v. FRANK E. FAVERO; BRIAN BARBOSA; PROGRESSIVE
GARDEN STATE INSURANCE COMPANY; JOHN DOE 1-5; JOHN DOE INCORPORATED
1-5, (fictitious designations). No. 17-3837. (3rd Cir.).

Ana Lidia Alpizar-Fallas brought a class action claim against
Progressive Garden State Insurance Company (Progressive) and one of
its agents, Bryan Barbosa, alleging that Progressive and Barbosa's
deceptive business practices violated New Jersey's Consumer Fraud
Act (CFA).

The District Court first dismissed Alpizar-Fallas's class action
claim to the extent it alleged a violation of the UCSPR because
that set of regulations does not provide a private right of
action.

Next, the District Court dismissed Alpizar-Fallas's CFA claim,
construing the CFA to only apply to the sale or marketing" of
insurance policies. A. 40. Although the District Court referred to
our opinion in Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., 482 F.3d
254, 266 (3d Cir. 2007), in which the Court held that the CFA
covers the performance of insurance policies, the District Court
opted to follow a more recent decision of the New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Division, Myska v. N.J. Manufacturers Insurance
Co., 114 A.3d 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).

On appeal, Alpizar-Fallas contends that the District Court erred in
dismissing her CFA claim because the allegations of her complaint
set forth the type of harm that the CFA is designed to remedy.  In
opposition, THE Appellees argue that her CFA claim is precluded by
the UCSPR, that her allegations are not within the scope of the
CFA, and that her pleading fails to conform to the requirements of
the CFA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

The Appellees contend that the UCSPR precludes application of the
CFA in this case. Specifically, the Appellees argue that the ITPA,
the statute pursuant to which the UCSPR regulations were
promulgated, creates a direct and unavoidable conflict with the CFA
because the former does not offer a private right of action while
the latter does.   

Moreover, the fact that a private right of action exists under the
CFA but not the ITPA does not create a direct and unavoidable
conflict that would preclude application of the CFA here.

In Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566 (N.J. 1978), the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected application of the CFA to the
rate-setting of a privately owned public utility, reasoning that
application of the CFA could lead to the anomalous result of a
tariff approved by the Public Utilities Commission but rejected and
penalized by the Division of Consumer Affairs or the courts
applying the CFA.

In determining whether such a conflict exists, a court should
consider whether the other regulation or regulations deal
specifically, concretely, and pervasively with the particular
activity, implying a legislative intent not to subject parties to
multiple regulations that, as applied, will work at cross-purposes.
Furthermore, the conflict must be patent and sharp, and must not
simply constitute a mere possibility of incompatibility.

First, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly authorized
multiple remedies of these types, stating that the allowance of a
cause of action for damages in one statute does not inhibit
enforcement of other statutes, because a court can assess damages
in addition to any other penalty to which a defendant is subject.

Second, regulation by the New Jersey Department of Banking and
Insurance under the UCSPR would not be inconsistent with
Alpizar-Fallas's CFA claim to the same extent as the potential
conflict with utility rate-setting in Daaleman, since, in this
case, both would potentially punish unlawful behavior and neither
would affirmatively approve the same conduct. Finally, the remedies
of both the CFA and the ITPA are explicitly cumulative, which
reflects an apparent legislative intent to enlarge fraud-fighting
authority and to delegate that authority among various governmental
and nongovernmental entities, each exercising different forms of
remedial power.

The Court rejects the Appellees' argument that application of the
CFA to this case is precluded by the UCSPR.

The Appellees argue that Alpizar-Fallas's complaint does not
conform to the heightened pleading requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) and does not allege an ascertainable loss as
required by the CFA.  

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that in alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. This has been
interpreted to require that plaintiffs state the circumstances of
the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity to place the
defendant on notice of the `precise misconduct with which it is
charged and plead or allege the date, time and place of the alleged
fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of
substantiation into a fraud allegation. In her complaint,
Alpizar-Fallas alleged the precise events surrounding her CFA
claim. She pled the date, time, and place of Appellees' conduct and
provided a detailed description of that conduct.

Therefore, the Court finds that her allegations meet Rule 9(b)'s
standard.

The CFA requires a plaintiff to allege ascertainable loss. The New
Jersey Supreme Court has defined ascertainable loss as either an
out-of-pocket loss or a demonstration of loss in value that is
quantifiable or measureable.

In Alpizar-Fallas's complaint, she alleged that, because of
Appellees' conduct, she and other class members were stripped of
their rights to pursue claims against other policy holders of
Progressive.  

In Alpizar-Fallas's case, this means that she is unable to recover
certain losses from her accident with Favero, which are detailed in
the beginning of her complaint. Specifically, she has required and
will continue to require medical care, has suffered impairment of
her earning capacity and power, has suffered and will continue to
suffer great pain, suffering agony, mental anguish, embarrassment
and humiliation, has been hindered and will be hindered from
attending to her daily duties, functions and occupation and will
continue to incur other financial losses or expenses. These
allegations are sufficient to demonstrate a loss in value that is
quantifiable or measureable.

The Court will vacate the District Court's dismissal and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's November 15, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybwmwfzp from Leagle.com.

Charles X. Gormally, Esquire ARGUED, Thomas Kamvosoulis, Esquire,
Brach Eichler, Counsel for Appellant.

Francis J. Leddy, III, Esquire, McGivney & Kluger, Kymberly Kochis,
Esquire ARGUED, Francis X. Nolan, IV, Esquire, Eversheds
Sutherland, Counsel for Appellee.


PROMEDICA HEALTH: Hires Files Suit Asserting Equal Pay Act Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Marla K. Hires, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ProMedica Health System, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-13689-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich., November 26,
2018) seeks all available relief under the Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the doctrines of quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment.

On or about October 30, 2014, Dr. Hires began working as a
physician for Defendant and also as Medical Director of Inpatient
Psychiatry for Defendant at the Mercy Memorial Hospital in Monroe,
Michigan. Plaintiff did not have a contract with Defendant
regarding compensation for her time performing on-call work.

Shortly after she began working for Defendant, Dr. Hires discovered
that she was not being compensated for any of her on-call shifts.
Dr. Hires questioned this practice and was told the hospital does
not provide compensation to its doctors for taking call. Dr. Hires
tried to limit how much on-call time she worked due to not
receiving any additional compensation for taking call.

In 2017, that Plaintiff learned that the Defendant had been paying
a male doctor for performing on-call work, while she had not been
paid for performing the same duties for nearly 3 years.

On or around September 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed Charge No.
471-2018-04807 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Plaintiff has not received a "Notice of Right to Sue" from the
EEOC. After she has exhausted administrative remedies with the
EEOC, Plaintiff will be amending this Complaint to add claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Dr. Marla K. Hires is a female physician that resides in
Washtenaw County, Michigan.

ProMedica Health System, Inc. is a not-for-profit "integrated
healthcare organization" headquartered in Toledo, Ohio. It serves
communities in 30 states. The organization offers acute and
ambulatory care at its network of 13 hospitals and other health
care centers across 27 counties in northwest Ohio and southeast
Michigan. The organization has more than 70,000 employees, 13
hospitals, 2,700 physicians and advanced practice providers with
privileges, and 900 healthcare providers. ProMedica operates under
the name ProMedica Monroe Regional Hospital where Plaintiff is
employed in Monroe, Michigan. ProMedica Monroe Regional Hospital
also currently operates under the assumed name of Mercy Memorial
Hospital Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Angela Walker, Esq.
     David M. Blanchard, Esq.
     BLANCHARD & WALKER, PLLC
     221 N. Main Street, Suite 300
     Ann Arbor, MI 48104
     Phone: (734) 929-4313
     Email: walker@bwlawonline.com
            blanchard@bwlawonline.com


RUBY RECEPTIONISTS: Faces McKenzie Lawsuit in D. Oregon
-------------------------------------------------------
McKENZIE LAW FIRM, P.A.; and OLIVER LAW OFFICES, INC., individually
and behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. RUBY
RECEPTIONISTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01921-SI (D. Or.,
Nov. 2, 2018) is an action against the Defendant for breach of
contract.

The Plaintiffs alleges in the complaint that the Defendant
materially breached the parties' agreement by 1) delivering fewer
Receptionist Minutes than called for due to its rounding up and
charging for hold queue time; 2) rounding up receptionist time
beyond the time actually involved in handling the call; and 3)
charging for receptionist time while callers were in a hold queue
waiting for their call to be received when no receptionist was
involved with the call, and rounding that time up beyond the time a
caller is actually on hold.

Ruby Receptionists, Inc. provides virtual receptionists services.
Its services include live phone answering, live call transferring,
answering frequently asked questions about the business, taking
messages or sending to voicemail, relaying messages promptly,
returning calls on user's behalf, mobile apps to update user's
whereabouts, and detailed/real-time call reports. It serves law
firms and legal professionals, technology professionals, marketing
agencies and creative firms, financial professionals, construction,
reality, and virtual offices. The company was formerly known as
Worksource, Inc. and changed its name to Ruby Receptionists, Inc.
in 2005. The company was founded in 2003 and is based in Portland,
Oregon. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Keith S. Dubanevich, Esq.
          Cody Berne, Esq.
          STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C.
          209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 227-1600
          Facsimile: (503) 227-6840
          E-mail: kdubanevich@stollberne.com
                  cberne@stollberne.com


RW DIRECT: Claims in Patterson Suit Under Moss Warranty Act Trimmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vince Chhabria of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California the granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the case, KEITH PATTERSON, Plaintiff,
v. RW DIRECT, INC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00055-VC
(N.D. Cal.).

The Judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Although courts have divided on this issue, he finds that whether a
named plaintiff can represent class members whose claims arise
under the laws of different states does not appear to be a question
of standing. Patterson does not himself seek to raise a claim under
the laws of a different state; rather, he seeks to represent a
class member who can raise such a claim.  Accordingly, the issue
will be addressed in connection with class certification.  That
said, it is questionable whether Patterson will be able to pursue a
nationwide class action, and given the California-centric nature of
the case it may be appropriate to address adequacy and commonality
before allowing Patterson to embark on nationwide class discovery.

Next, he denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdictio.  He says absent controlling authority to the
contrary, he declines to extend Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court, to the class action context.

He also denied the motion to dismiss Patterson's express warranty
claims.  The complaint adequately alleges that the lawnmower became
defective during the warranty term, and Patterson notified the
company of the defect shortly thereafter.

Judge Chhabria dismissed with prejudice Patterson's claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  A Magnuson-Moss claim is only
cognizable on a class-wide basis where the number of named
plaintiffs is less than one hundred.  Because Patterson is the only
named Plaintiff, that requirement is not satisfied.

He denied the motion to dismiss Patterson's implied warranty claims
for the claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
Patterson has alleged that the lawnmower failed immediately.  The
Defendants' argument that Patterson failed to assert an
implied-warranty claim during the applicable implied-warranty
period again conflates the warranty term with the statute of
limitations.

However, he granted the motion to dismiss the implied warranty
claims brought under section 2314 of the California Commercial Code
because Patterson purchased the lawnmower from Amazon, and was thus
not in vertical privity with the defendants.  Although Patterson is
correct that the California Supreme Court recognized an exception
to this requirement when a plaintiff relies on a manufacturer's
written representations, it limited that exception to express
warranty claims.

The motion to dismiss Patterson's CLRA and UCL claims is granted
with leave to amend.  The Judge finds that Patterson's Second
Amended Complaint does not allege that the defendants received an
unusual number of complaints, nor does it provide enough context to
assess whether that might be the case.  Patterson has one final
opportunity to state a claim under the CLRA.  Any amended complaint
must be filed within 21 days of the order.

Finally, with respect to the Defendants' separate argument that
Patterson's CLRA claim fails for lack of notice, the Judge does not
interpret the CLRA to prevent a plaintiff from curing a notice
defect, as Patterson has done.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Bh8CjW from Leagle.com.

Keith Patterson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Stephen Kabateck --
bsk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, John Lewis
Holcomb, Jr. -- JHOLCOMB@KHSLAW.COM -- Kramer Holcomb Sheik LLP,
Stephanie Elyse Charlin , Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP & Christopher
B. Noyes -- cn@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck LLP.

RW Direct, INC, Defendant, represented by Eric Y. Kizirian --
Eric.Kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and
Smith, Evan Margosian Sauda -- evan.sauda@nelsonmullins.com --
Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough LLP, Fred M. Wood, Jr. --
fred.wood@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough
LLP, Michael K. Grimaldi -- mgrimaldi@lbbslaw.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP & William Harding Latham --
bill.latham@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough,
LLP.

POSITEC USA, INC., Defendant, represented by Eric Y. Kizirian,
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith, Michael K. Grimaldi, Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & William Harding Latham, Nelson
Mullins Riley Scarborough, LLP.


S.W. CORP: Garcia Seeks Minimum Wage for Sales Reps
---------------------------------------------------
ANGEL GARCIA, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. S.W. CORPORATION, a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 30-2018-01032432-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 15, 2018), alleges that Plaintiff was a victim of Defendants'
policies and/or practices resulting to lost money and/or property,
and has been deprived of the rights guaranteed by California
Business & Professions Code, the California Labor Code, and Wage
Order, which sets employment standards for the mercantile
industry.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants
from mid-2013 to September 17, 2018, at which time he was
terminated. The Plaintiff worked at Defendants dealerships in
Fullerton, California and Orange, California during the four years
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. During
Plaintiff's employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and other current
or former employees (who are and were sales representatives and/or
paid primarily on a commission-only basis) were in most workweeks,
paid primarily on a commission-only basis. While paid primarily on
a commission-only basis, Plaintiff and other current or former
employees were not separately compensated for time spent working on
non-sales related tasks which were and could not be compensated on
a commission basis, including for example (and without limitation),
time spent waiting for customers, picking up and dropping off
vehicles at Defendants' dealerships, picking up and dropping
vehicles at mechanic shops, rearranging vehicles on Defendants'
lot, putting gas in the vehicles, completing paperwork, delivering
cars to customers after a sale was completed, and time spent taking
rest breaks (i.e., non-productive time). As a result, when paid
primarily on a commission-only basis, the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees were not paid at least the minimum
wage for all hours worked, including for non-sales related tasks,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Scott M. Lidman, Esq.
          LIDMAN LAW, APC
          N. Sepulveda Blvd., Suite 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 322-4772
          Facsimile: (424) 322-4775
          E-mail: siidman@Iidmaniaw.com

               - and -

          Sam Sani, Esq.
          SANI LAW, APC
          136 Main Street, Suite A
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 935-0405
          Facsimile: (310) 935-0409
          E-mail: ssani@saniiawfinn.com

SAFEMARK SYSTEMS: Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned GORSS MOTELS,
INC. and E & G, INC., Plaintiffs, v. SAFEMARK SYSTEMS, LP,
Defendant. Case No. 6:16-cv-1638-Orl-31DCI. (M.D. Fla.).

This matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiffs, Gorss Motels, Inc.
(Gorss) and E & G, Inc. (E & G), and the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by the Defendant, Safemark Systems, LP (Safemark).


The instant case arises out of two facsimile advertisements sent to
Gorss in 2013 (the Gorss Faxes) and a third sent in 2015 to E & G
(E & G Fax). All three faxes advertised goods offered by the
Defendant, Safemark. Safemark admits having sent the Gorss Faxes
or, more particularly, having arranged to have those faxes sent to
Gorss but denies responsibility for the sending of the E & G Fax.


In 1998, Gorss entered into a franchise agreement with Super 8
Motels, Inc., which is now known as Super 8 Worldwide, Inc. (SWI).
Prior to the 2013 Wyndham Global Conference, using contact
information supplied by WSSI, Safemark arranged to have two faxes
sent to a number of franchisees, including Gorss. Safemark does not
dispute that Gorss received the two faxes at issue on September 4,
2013 and September 6, 2013.

Safemark argues that the Gorss Faxes were not unsolicited  and
therefore sending them did not violate the TCPA because Gorss had
given permission to (1) receive faxes and (2) receive
advertisements from Approved Suppliers.  

As to the first point, Gorss provided its fax number to SWI in
conjunction with its registration for the 2012 Wyndham Global
Conference and on other occasions, such as on a Contact Form it
submitted in 2010. As to the second, Safemark relies on Gorss's
franchise agreement.  

Safemark argues that by agreeing that SWI affiliates could offer
assistance in purchasing items for the facility, such as through
the Approved Supplier program, and by providing its fax number to
SWI, Gorss was giving its permission to receive advertisements, by
fax, from affiliates such as Approved Suppliers. Gorss generally
denies that any entity had permission to send it fax advertisements
and argues that the TCPA requires that permission be given to the
entity actually responsible for sending the fax, and that it did
not give such permission to Safemark.  

The E & G Fax was sent in 2015 by a third-party vendor, WestFax, at
the direction of WSSI. It contained advertisements for a total of
five Approved Suppliers, including Safemark. Safemark contends that
it did not authorize WSSI to send the E & G Fax and therefore it
cannot be held responsible for it under the TCPA.  

Safemark makes the same argument in regard to E & G that it made in
regard to Gorss, i.e., that sending the E & G Fax did not violate
the TCPA because E & G had given its permission to receiv1e such
advertising faxes. E & G entered into a franchise agreement in 1997
with Hotel Franchising Limited Partnership, which is now known as
Wingate Inns, L.P. (Wingate Inns).  

The Court finds that the same result applies to E & G as to Gorss:
E & G gave its permission to receive advertising faxes in regard to
the Approved Supplier program, and therefore no reasonable
factfinder could determine that the E & G fax was unsolicited.

Accordingly, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant,
Safemark Systems, L.P., is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxq7o3l from Leagle.com.

Gorss Motels, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons & E &
G, Inc., a West Virginia corporation, individually and as the
representatives of a class of similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiffs, represented by Ryan M. Kelly --
rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca & Ross M. Good --
rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice.

Safemark Systems, LP, Defendant, represented by Amy Leigh Baker --
amy.baker@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker, LLP & Joseph L. Francoeur --
joseph.francoeur@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser LLP, pro hac
vice.


SANDBOX TRANSPORTATION: Cockrell Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shawn Cockrell, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sandbox Transportation, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-04453 (S.D. Tex., November 26, 2018) seeks to
recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's willful
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The complaint asserts that Plaintiff regularly worked over 40 hours
in most, if not all weeks. The Defendant violated the FLSA overtime
requirement by paying Plaintiff his regular rate of pay for every
hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. As a result, there were
many weeks in which Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek without being paid overtime premium at a rate not less
than one and one half times of Plaintiff's regular rate of pay,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff, a resident of Guthrie, Oklahoma, is an employee of
Defendant.

Sandbox Transportation, LLC is a bonded freight shipping and
trucking company that provides local sand, rock, gravel, and
asphalt hauling and delivery to the oil and gas industry throughout
the United States. It is a domestic limited liability company
incorporated in the state of Texas with its principal place address
located at 3200 Southwest Freeway, Houston, Texas 77027.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Charles W. Branham, III, Esq.
     DEAN OMAR & BRANHAM, LLP
     302 N. Market Street, Suite 300
     Dallas, TX 75202
     Phone: (214) 722-5990
     Fax: (214) 722-5991
     Email: tbranham@dobllp.com

          - and -

     Irene Chan, Esq.
     Nicholas R. Conlon, Esq.
     Jason T. Brown, Esq.
     BROWN, LLC
     155 2nd Street, Suite 4
     Jersey City, NJ 07302
     Phone: (877) 561-0000
     Fax: (855) 582-5297
     Email: irene.chan@jtblawgroup.com
            nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com
            jtb@jtblawgroup.com


SANTA ROSA CONSULTING: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Jones Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Karen Jones, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Santa Rosa Consulting, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-11005 (S.D. N.Y., November 26, 2018) seeks to
recover unpaid wages and related penalties and damages for herself
and other similarly situated Consultants who worked for Defendant
in New York to remedy Defendant's practice and policy of willfully
failing and refusing to properly pay Plaintiff and other similarly
situated New York Consultants all of their earned and accrued wages
on their regular pay dates.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 by knowingly suffering and/or permitting Representative
Plaintiff and the putative Class and Collective members to work in
excess of 40 hours per week without properly compensating them at
an overtime premium rate for these overtime hours, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Jones is a resident of Atlanta, Georgia and Long Island,
New York and worked for Defendant as an At-The-Elbow Consultant
("ATE") in the Spring of 2016, providing assistance to Santa Rosa's
clients in using healthcare-related software.

Santa Rosa Consulting, Inc. main function was to recruit and hire
individuals to assist hospitals and healthcare organizations learn
and navigate a new integrated health computer system. Its principal
place of business is located in Franklin, Tennessee. Defendant
provides staffing services to customers throughout the United
States, including New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Palitz, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
     800 Third Avenue, Suite 2800
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (800) 616-4000
     Fax: (561) 447-8831
     Email: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

          - and -

     Gregg Shavitz, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
     951 Yamato Rd, Suite 285
     Boca Raton, FL 33431
     Phone: (561) 447-8888
     Fax: (561) 447-8831
     Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com

          - and -

     Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
     Catherine T. Mitchell, Esq.
     STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
     100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Phone: (312) 233-1550
     Fax: (312) 233-1560
     Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
            cmitchell@stephanzouras.com


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Hinkle Settlement Has Final Court Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Final Approval of Settlement in the case captioned ROBIN L. HINKLE,
individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. CASEY JOE MATTHEWS, TIMOTHY MAY and CONNIE MAY, Husband and
wife, SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., an Illinois Corporation;
SAFE-GUARD PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, A Georgia limited liability
company; and JOHNNY HINKLE, Defendants. Civil Action No.
2:15-cv-13856. (S.D.W.V).

The Plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated
individuals, claimed that assignors of Settling Defendant and other
non-parties to this settlement agreement violated West Virginia's
insurance licensing requirements.

The Court finds that the parties have completed all settlement
notice obligations imposed in the Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement.  

The settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.

Such approval typically involves a two-step process of preliminary
and final approval. In the first stage, the Parties submit the
proposed settlement to the Court for preliminary approval. In the
second stage, following preliminary approval, the Class is notified
and a fairness hearing scheduled at which the Court will determine
whether to approve the settlement.   The Court has already granted
preliminary approval.

In assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement, the Court must
look to the following factors: (1) posture of the case at the time
the settlement is proposed; (2) extent of discovery that has been
conducted; (3) circumstances surrounding the negotiations; and (4)
experience of counsel in the relevant area of class action
litigation.   In determining the adequacy of the proposed
settlement, the Court must consider: (1) relative strength of
Plaintiff's case on the merits; (2) existence of any difficulties
of proof or strong defenses Plaintiff is likely to encounter if the
case proceeds to trial; (3) anticipated duration and expense of
additional litigation; (4) solvency of defendant and likelihood of
recovery of a litigated judgment; and (5) degree of opposition to
the settlement.  

The settlement has no obvious deficiencies, and does not grant
preferential treatment to the class representative or any segments
of the class. All class members will be compensated using the same
formula and will be able to recover a cash payment. The intrinsic
value of the net settlement payment to Class Members is readily
apparent when one considers the risks inherent in continued and
protracted litigation.

The settlement is particularly valuable to absent Class Members
who, but for the settlement, likely would be unaware of the
existence of their legal claims. Even if they were aware, given the
relatively small amounts of money involved, absent class members
and attorneys who may represent them would have little financial
incentive to prosecute individual actions. The alternative to
bringing this case as a class action is bringing hundreds of
individual claims. Realistically, the alternative to a class action
under the present circumstances is no action at all.

The Requested Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable

Awarding attorney's fees as a percentage of the benefit to the
class is the preferable and prevailing method of determining fee
awards in class actions that establish common funds for the benefit
of the class. The requested award of one-third of the common fund,
exclusive of litigation expenses, is reasonable under the
circumstances of this case. It is noteworthy that no class member
has objected to the fees and expenses sought by counsel.
Additionally, counsel are not seeking recovery of their litigation
expenses, which they have incurred in the amount of $45,975.57.

The Percentage of Fund Method is the Appropriate Measure for
Determining Fees

The common fund doctrine is one of the earliest recognized
exceptions to the American Rule which generally requires that
litigants bear their own costs and attorneys' fees. Premised on the
equitable powers of the court, the common fund doctrine allows a
person who maintains a suit that results in the creation,
preservation or increase of a fund in which others have a common
interest, to be reimbursed from that fund for the litigation
expenses incurred.  

Although the Fourth Circuit has not determined the preferred method
for calculating attorney fees where the common fund has been
generated on behalf of a class, nearly all circuits, as well as
district courts within this Circuit, that have considered the issue
have found that the trial court may use the percentage method.

In sum, there is a clear consensus among the federal and state
courts, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that the award of
attorneys' fees in common fund cases should be based on a
percentage of the recovery. This consensus derives from the
recognition that the percentage of fund approach is the
better-reasoned and more equitable method of determining attorneys'
fees in such cases.  

The Percentage Requested by Class Counsel is Fully Supported by the
Work Performed, Risks Taken, and Results Obtained

Some courts also consider certain factors in analyzing the
reasonableness of fees determined by the percentage of recovery
method.  

These factors can include: (1) the size of the fund created and the
number of persons benefited; (2) the presence or absence of
substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement
terms and/or fees requested by counsel (3) the skill and efficiency
of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the
litigation (5) the risk of non-payment (6) the amount of time
devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel and (7) the awards in
similar cases.

All of these considerations warrant an award of the requested fees
in this case. The fund established for Class Members is substantial
in light of the size of the class. Judging by the fact that no
Class Member has objected to the proposed Settlement, and that no
Class Members have opted out, the Class Members overwhelmingly
support the settlement. Additionally, class counsel are skilled and
experienced in class action litigation, and have served as class
counsel in several cases.

The case involved complex issues related to West Virginia insurance
and consumer law. The Court recently granted Defendant Safe-Guard's
motion to dismiss. The outcome of the case was hardly a foregone
conclusion, but nonetheless class counsel accepted representation
of the Plaintiffs and the class on a contingent fee basis, fronting
the costs of litigation.

Consideration of all of these factors overwhelmingly supports the
requested award of one-third the amount of the common fund
established for the Class.

The Proposed Service Award is Justified and Appropriate

Incentive or service awards reward representative plaintiffs' work
in support of the class, as well as their promotion of the public
interest. Courts around the country have allowed such awards to
named plaintiffs or class representatives. One district court has
gone so far as to say that incentive awards are routinely approved.
The purpose of such awards is to encourage socially beneficial
litigation by compensating named plaintiffs for their expenses on
travel and other incidental costs, as well as their personal time
spent advancing the litigation on behalf of the class and for any
personal risk they undertook.  

Class members would have received nothing had the Plaintiff not
been willing to step up and file this action. The Plaintiff gave
her time and effort to prosecute the case. She was deposed twice,
attended meetings with counsel, and consulted with counsel
regarding critical aspects of the settlement. She made herself
available to counsel whenever she was needed, and stood willing to
do whatever tasks would be asked of her. Accordingly, the proposed
service award is justified and appropriate.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the Court grants
final approval in all respects of the terms and provisions of the
Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8x4mnq8 from Leagle.com.

Robin L. Hinkle, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Howard M. Persinger, III,
PERSINGER & PERSINGER, Jonathan R. Marshall --
jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER & Raymond S.
Franks, II -- rfranks@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER.

Timothy May & Connie May, husband and wife, Defendants, represented
by David F. Nelson, ALLEN KOPET & ASSOCIATES.

Santander Consumer, USA, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Defendant,
represented by Daniel J. Konrad -- daniel.konrad@dinsmore.com --
DINSMORE & SHOHL.

Safe-Guard Products International, LLC, a Georgia limited liability
company; Defendant, represented by Debra Tedeschi Varner --
dtvarner@wvlawyers.com -- MCNEER HIGHLAND MCMUNN & VARNER, James A.
Varner, Sr. -- javarner@wvlawyers.com -- MCNEER HIGHLAND MCMUNN &
VARNER & Jeffrey D. Van Volkenburg -- jdvanvolkenburg@wvlawyers.com
-- MCNEER HIGHLAND MCMUNN & VARNER.


SHO-ME POWER: Barfield Class Settlement Has Prelim. Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Central Division, issued an Order and Judgment granting
Parties' joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Sho-Me Class
Settlement Agreement in the case captioned CHASE BARFIELD, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Sho-Me POWER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 2:11-cv-4321-NKL. (W.D. Mo.).

Sho-Me and the Class in the Action moved under Rule 23(e) for an
order preliminarily approving the proposed settlement of the Class
Members' claims in accordance with the Agreement and approving the
form and plan of notice as set forth in the Parties' joint Motion
for Preliminary Approval of the Sho-Me Class Settlement Agreement.

The Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best
interests of Class Members, and is approved in all respects, and
the parties to the Agreement are directed to perform and satisfy
the terms and conditions of the Agreement.

Class Members will be permitted to make claims for the Benefits
described in the Agreement, subject to the conditions and
limitations stated herein.

After this Order and Judgment has become Final and an order
awarding attorneys' fees and expenses to Class Counsel with respect
to the Agreement becomes Final (Effective Date), Sho-Me and all
other Released Parties shall be released from any and all
Communications Claims that any Class Member (and all successors in
interest) had, has, or may have in the future, against Sho-Me or
any other Released Party. This Release may be enforced by any
Released Party.

All Communications Claims of any Class Member (and the successors
in interest of all Class Members against Sho-Me are hereby
dismissed. Upon the Effective Date, such dismissal shall be with
prejudice.

The form of the Notice of Final Approval of Settlement is approved.
Upon this Order and Judgment becoming Final, the Claims
Administrator will within thirty (30) days thereafter cause the
Notice of Final Approval Package to be sent by United States mail,
first class postage prepaid, to all Class Members who have been
identified, who requested copies, or who otherwise came to the
Claims Administrator's attention.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order
and Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycnbj7tm from
Leagle.com.

Michael D Biffle & Gina Biffle, Plaintiffs, represented by Cecilia
Fex, pro hac vice, Kathleen C. Kauffman, Ackerson Kauffman Fex, PC,
pro hac vice, Michael Amberg, pro hac vice, Brad A. Catlin, Price
Waicukauski Joven & Catlin, LLC, pro hac vice, F. Alexander
O'Neill, Matthew A. Clement, Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr,
P.C., Ronald J. Waicukauski, Price Waicukauski Joven & Catlin, LLC,
pro hac vice & Heidi Doerhoff Vollet, Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff &
Landwehr, P.C.

Dwight K Robertson, Plaintiff, represented by Cecilia Fex , pro hac
vice, Kathleen C. Kauffman, Ackerson Kauffman Fex, PC, pro hac
vice, Michael Amberg, pro hac vice, Ronald J. Waicukauski, Price
Waicukauski Joven & Catlin, LLC, pro hac vice, Brad A. Catlin,
Price Waicukauski Joven & Catlin, LLC, pro hac vice & Heidi
Doerhoff Vollet, Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr, P.C.

Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative & Sho-Me Technologies, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Christopher M. Hohn --
chohn@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, David L. Coffman
-- dcoffman@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, Robert
Joseph Wagner -- rwagner@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP,
W. Stanley Walch -- swalch@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn
LLP, Dana L. Flora, Andereck, Evans, Lewis, Figg & Battagler LLC,
Mark A. Mattingly, Thompson Coburn LLP, Shawn P. Battagler,
Andereck, Evans, Lewis, Figg & Battagler LLC & Stephen A. D'Aunoy
-- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP.


SMITH TURF: Langley et al. Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
GORDON L. LANGLEY, PAUL MAULL IV, and WILLIAM A. POWELL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated who
consent to their inclusion in a collective action, the Plaintiffs,
vs. SMITH TURF & IRRIGATION, LLC and STEPHEN E. SMITH WAYNE SMITH,
Jr., and ANNA-LINDSAY YARBROUGH, the Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-00619 (W.D.N.C., Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages and additional like amount as liquidated damages; to
enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and; and to
reimbursed costs of litigation, including reasonable attorneys'
fees.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were employed by
Defendant Smith Turf as outside technicians and, for the three
years previous to filing of the Complaint, worked more than 40
hours in the work week. The Defendants paid Plaintiffs straight
time hours for 40 hours in the workweek but never paid Plaintiffs
time and a half overtime pay for the hours worked in excess of 40
hours in the workweek as required by the FLSA, the lawsuit says.

Smith Turf & Irrigation LLC distributes golf course maintenance,
residential/commercial irrigation, and sports/grounds maintenance
equipment.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          McNeill Stokes, Esq.
          5372 Whitehall PL SE
          Mableton, GA 30126
          Telephone 404-352-2144
          E-mail: mcstokes@bellsouth.net

               - and -

          James Faucher, Esq.
          GREENSBORO LAW CENTER
          NORTH CAROLINA BAR
          822 N Elm St
          Greensboro, NC 27401
          Telephone 336 478-6000
          E-mail: james@greensborolawcenter.com

SPECIALIZED LOAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss Erk FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the case captioned Erk, v.
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC Civil Action No. 18-12671 (SDW)
(SCM). (D.N.J.).

The Plaintiff filed a four-count class action Complaint in this
Court on behalf of herself and others similarly situated alleging
that the Defendant's letter violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).  

This Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's Complaint sufficiently
sets forth claims upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff
first alleges that the Letter violates the FDCPA because it failed
to inform the Plaintiff that she was required to dispute the Debt
in writing. The letter provides that she can dispute the debt by
contacting SLS at the toll-free number listed below or in writing
at the address listed below. The word or could arguably confuse the
least sophisticated consumer as to whether a written response was
required. Thus, Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to sustain a
claim under Section 1692g (Count I).

The Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendant falsely represented
the character, amount or legal status of the Plaintiff's debt, in
violation of Section 1692e which prohibits the use of misleading,
deceptive or false representations in the collection of debts and
Section 1692f which prohibits the use of improper means to collect
a debt to which the debt collector is not legally entitled.

The Plaintiff pleads that the Letter falsely represents both the
actual principal of the debt and the uncollected interest allegedly
owed, such that the Defendant overstated the total balance of the
Debt by almost $15,000. Although it remains to be seen whether the
facts will ultimately support that allegation (and, indeed the
parties disagree as to how interest should be calculated under the
HELOC, Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to sustain her claims
under Section 1692e and 1692f (Counts II-IV).

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y8mrv7m6 from Leagle.com.

VIVIENNE ERK, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JUSTIN ALAN AUSLAENDER.

SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant, represented by DANIEL
J.T. MCKENNA -- MCKENNAD@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR, LLP &
WILLIAM PATRICK REILEY -- reileyw@ballardspahr.com -- BALLARD
SPAHR.


STORED VALUE: Court Certifies 3 Classes in Humphrey Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMBER HUMPHREY, on behalf of herself and the class,
Plaintiff, v. STORED VALUE CARDS, D/B/A NUMI FINANCIAL, et al.
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-1050 (N.D. Ohio), Judge James S. Gwin
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify the three proposed
classes: a nationwide class for the Plaintiff's claims under the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), and two Ohio classes for
Ohio law conversion and unjust enrichment claims.

Humphrey brings the class action complaint against Defendants
Stored Bank Cards, doing business as Numi Financial, and Republic
Bank & Trust Co.  She alleges that the Defendants wrongfully issued
unsolicited and activated debit cards to her and the class members.
The Plaintiff says this distribution of unsolicited and activated
debit cards was illegal and caused them to suffer fees they had
never agreed to.

When an Ohio jail or correctional facility takes an individual into
custody, the arrestee must surrender their cash.  The correctional
facility holds the arrestee's funds in an inmate trust account.
After release from incarceration, many facilities do not return the
inmate's cash or give the inmate a check for the inmate trust
account balance.  Instead, the correctional facility deposits the
inmate's money to a bank account and gives the former inmate a
debit card.  The inmates do not ask to establish the bank account
and do not ask that the correctional facility give them the debit
card.  These cards carry high fees.  

When the Lorain County Jail released Humphrey, she had a roughly
$30 trust account balance.  Within five days the bank who issued
the debit card began charging her a $5.95 per month maintenance
charge and began charging her $2.95 for each ATM withdrawal she
made and charged her $1.50 for each balance inquiry she made.

Humphrey alleges that she did not request the card and that neither
Lorain County nor Republic gave her any notice of account terms,
financial disclosures, or other documentation.  She also alleges
that Republic charged her extremely high fees for using the card.
She says Republic charged her a $2.50 weekly service fee, a $0.95
fee for each declined transaction, and transaction fees as high as
$2.95 for each purchase made.  Republic charged these fees even
though the account had a scant $30 in it when Republic took
possession of Humphrey's money.  Humphrey says she never agreed to
the Republic fees.

The Defendants do not claim or give evidence that Humphrey received
any cardholder agreement.  Instead, they contend that correctional
institutions usually provide account terms and conditions to
inmates upon issuance.  The Defendants argue that its contract with
Lorain County Jail obligated Lorain to furnish the cardholder
agreement.  They have also submitted training materials and emails
instructing correctional institutions to provide the cardholder
agreement to inmates when the correctional facility issued debit
cards.

The Plaintiff moves to certify three classes:

     a. The first is a nationwide class under EFTA: All persons in
the United States who were taken into custody at a jail,
correctional facility, detainment center, or any other law
enforcement facility, and upon release were issued a pre-activated
debit card by the Defendants to access a bank account containing
any funds remaining in their inmate trust account within one year
prior to the filing of the original Complaint in the action and
during its pendency.

     b. The first class makes Ohio conversion claims: All persons
in Ohio who were taken into custody at a jail, correctional
facility, detainment center, or any other law enforcement facility,
and upon release were issued a pre-activated debit card by the
Defendants containing any funds remaining in their inmate trust
account and from which the Defendants deducted any fees within four
years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in the action
and during its pendency.

     c. The second class makes Ohio unjust enrichment claims: All
persons in Ohio who were taken into custody at a jail, correctional
facility, detainment center, or any other law enforcement facility,
and upon release were issued a pre-activated debit card by the
Defendants containing any funds remaining in their inmate trust
account and from which the Defendants deducted any fees within six
years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in the action
and during its pendency.

Judge Gwin finds that the proposed classes meet the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  Therefore, he granted Humphrey's
motion for class certification.  Accordingly, he certified the
three Rule 23(b)(3) classes: (i) EFTA Class, (ii) Ohio Conversion
Class, and (iii) Ohio Unjust Enrichment Class.  The Judge appointed
Humphrey as the class representative, and A. Dooley, Ryan M.
Gembala, and Stephen M. Bosak, Jr., as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/gee5SN from Leagle.com.

Amber Humphrey, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew B. Ameer --
mameer@laribee-hertrick.com -- Laribee & Hertrick, Matthew A.
Dooley -- MDooley@omdplaw.com -- O'Toole McLaughlin Dooley &
Pecora, Ryan M. Gembala -- rgembala@omdplaw.com -- O'Toole
McLaughlin Dooley & Pecora & Stephen M. Bosak -- sbosak@omdplaw.com
-- O'Toole McLaughlin Dooley & Pecora.

Stored Value Cards, Inc., doing business as Numi Financial &
Republic Bank & Trust Company, Defendants, represented by Daniel S.
Blynn -- mameer@laribee-hertrick.com -- Venable, Mary M. Gardner --
mmgardner@venable.com -- Venable, Gerald S. Sachs --
gsachs@Venable.com -- Venable, Laura L.W. Schultz --
Laura.Schultz@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine & Robert F. Ware --
Rob.Ware@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine.


SUNRISE SENIOR: Heredia Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled AUDREY HEREDIA as
successor-in-interest to the Estate of CARLOS HEREDIA; AMY FEARN as
successor-in-interest to the Estate of EDITH ZAck; and HELEN GANZ,
by and through her Guardian ad Litem, ELISE GANZ, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SUNRISE
SENIOR LIVING, LLC; and Does 1 Through 100, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-01974-JLS-JDE, was removed from the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on November 5, 2018. The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-00616 to the
proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon. Haywood S. Gilliam,
Jr.

Sunrise Senior Living, LLC provides senior living services in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The company offers
independent and assisted living; care for individuals with
Alzheimer's and other forms of memory loss; nursing; and
rehabilitative care services. It also provides medication
management and reminiscence neighborhoods. The company was founded
in 1981 and is headquartered in McLean, Virginia. As of April 21,
2014, Sunrise Senior Living, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Revera
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kathryn A. Stebner, Esq.
          George Kawamoto, Esq.
          STEBNER AND ASSOCIATES
          870 Market Street, Suite 1212
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 362-9800
          Facsimile: (415) 362-9801

               - and -

          Christopher J. Healey, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          4655 Executive Drive, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 236-1414
          Facsimile: (619) 232-8311

               - and -

          Robert S. Arns, Esq.
          Julie C. Erickson, Esq.
          THE ARNS LAW FIRM
          515 Folsom Street, 3rd Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 495-7800
          Facsimile: (415) 495-7888


SWITCH INC: Seeks Approval of Bid to Strike Briefing Sched in Cai
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MINGBO CAI, Individually and on Behalf of All Other
Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SWITCH, INC., ROB ROY,
GABE NACHT, ZAREH SARRAFIAN, DONALD SNYDER, TOM THOMAS, BRYAN WOLF,
GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, BMO CAPITAL
MARKETS CORP., WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC, CITIGROUP GLOBAL
MARKETS INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES, JEFFERIES LLC, BTIG, LLC,
RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., STIFEL, NICOLAUS & COMPANY, INC.,
and WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-01471-JCM-VCF (D. Nev.), the parties ask Magistrate Judge
Cam Ferenbach of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
to approve their stipulation that (i) the Lead Plaintiff will have
until Dec. 21, 2018 to file an opposition to the Motion to Strike;
and (ii) the Defendants will have until Jan. 21, 2019 to file a
reply in support of their Motion to Strike.

On Sept. 18, 2018, Lead Plaintiff Oscar Farach and the Defendants
filed a Joint Stipulation re Filing of Amended Complaint and
Subsequent Briefing, which set the dates for the filing of an
amended complaint, the Defendants' motion to dismiss (if any), and
any subsequent briefing thereon.

On Sept. 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Ferenbach granted the
stipulation and set the following schedule for the amended
complaint and Defendants' motion to dismiss:

     a. The Plaintiffs will have until Oct. 12, 2018 to file their
amended complaint;

     b. The Defendants will have until Nov. 19, 2018 to file any
motion(s) to dismiss the amended complaint;

     c. The Plaintiffs will have until Dec. 21, 2018 to file any
opposition(s) to the Defendants' motion(s) to dismiss; and

     d. The Defendants will have until Jan. 21, 2019 to file any
reply/replies in support of their motion(s).

On Oct. 12, 2018, the Lead Plaintiff timely filed his Amended
Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws.  On Nov.
19, 2018, the Switch Defendants timely filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws, and additionally filed a Motion to Strike
Allegations from Plaintiff's Amended Class Action Complaint for
Violation of the Securities Laws Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(f).

On Nov. 20, 2018, the Underwriter Defendants filed a Joinder to the
Motion to Dismiss and additionally filed a Joinder to the Motion to
Strike.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7-2(b), the Lead Plaintiff would have 14
days to respond to the Motion to Strike, and the Defendants would
have 7 days thereafter to file a reply.  Since the Motion to Strike
is related to the Motion to Dismiss and incorporates by reference
sections of the Motion to Dismiss, the counsel for the parties have
met and conferred and have agreed that simultaneous briefing of the
two motions would best serve the interests of efficiency and
judicial economy.

Therefore, they stipulated, and subject to the Court's approval and
order, that (i) the Lead Plaintiff will have until Dec. 21, 2018 to
file an opposition to the Motion to Strike; and (ii) the Defendants
will have until Jan. 21, 2019 to file a reply in support of their
Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Parties' Joint Stipulation is available at
https://is.gd/aUnuXW from Leagle.com.

Mingbo Cai, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Oscar Farach, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Casey
Sadler, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP, pro hac vice, Lesley F.
Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Robert V. Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP & Andrew R. Muehlbauer, Muehlbauer Law Office,
Ltd.

Kissimmee Utility Authority Employees' Retirement Plan, Movant,
represented by Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Switch, Inc., Rob Roy, Zareh Sarrafian, Donald Snyder, Tom Thomas &
Bryan Wolf, Defendants, represented by Andrew R. Gray --
andrew.gray@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, pro hac vice, Joshua G.
Hamilton -- joshua.hamilton@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Michele
D. Johnson -- michele.johnson@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, pro hac
vice, Ava M. Schaefer -- ams@pisanellibice.com -- Pisanelli Bice,
Kendall M. Howes -- kendall.howes@lw.com -- Latham & Wakins LLP,
pro hac vice & Todd L. Bice -- tlb@pisanellibice.com -- Pisanelli
Bice PLLC.

Gabe Nacht, Defendant, represented by Joshua G. Hamilton , Latham &
Watkins LLP, Ava M. Schaefer, Pisanelli Bice, Kendall M. Howes,
Latham & Wakins LLP, pro hac vice & Todd L. Bice, Pisanelli Bice
PLLC.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, BMO Capital
Markets Corp., Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Jefferies LLC,
BTIG, LLC, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Stifel, Nicolaus &
Company, Inc. & William Blair & Company, L.L.C., Defendants,
represented by Mark E. Ferrario -- ferrariom@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig & Christopher R. Miltenberger -- miltenbergerc@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


TRINITY HEATING: Court Denies Bid to Deposit Check in Boger Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAN BOGER, On Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY HEATING & AIR, INC., d/b/a Trinity
Solar, and MEDIA MIX 365, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No.
TDC-17-1729 (D. Md.), Judge Theodore D. Chuang of the U.S. District
Court for the District Court of Maryland (i) denied Trinity's
Motion to Deposit Check, Enter Judgment in Plaintiffs Favor, and
Dismiss the Putative Class Action Case as Moot, and (ii) granted in
part and denied in part Media Mix's Motion for Joinder in Trinity's
Motion.

Boger has brought the putative class action against Defendants
Trinity and Media Mix, alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), and the Maryland Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("MTCPA").  He alleges that the Defendants
violated these laws by using an automatic telephone dialing system
("ATDS") to call his cellular telephone without his consent.

Trinity, a company that installs solar power systems, uses
telemarketing to reach new customers.  To that end, Trinity hired
Media Mix to conduct a telemarketing campaign on its behalf.  As
part of this campaign, Media Mix used an ATDS, which places calls
automatically, then transfers them to live operators only when the
calls are answered.  Media Mix called Boger, allegedly on behalf of
Trinity, at least three times using an ATDS without his consent
between January 2017 and May 2017.  

Boger filed the putative class action on behalf of the thousands of
persons who, he alleges, have received similar ATDS-initiated calls
without their consent from the Defendants over the past four years.
The Defendants both filed Motions to Dismiss Boger's MTCPA claims,
which the Court denied.  Two days after the Court issued its ruling
on those motions, Trinity transmitted an offer of judgment to Boger
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and requested a
court order authorizing deposit of a $6,000 cashier's check into
the Court's registry for transmittal to Boger.  Boger rejected
Trinity's offer of judgment and objected to Trinity's request to
deposit funds in the Court's registry.  Trinity then filed its
Motion seeking entry of judgment in favor of Boger and dismissal of
the case.  Although the Court declined to accept the check into its
accounts because of processing difficulties, it agreed to deem the
check received for purposes of the resolution of the Motion.

In its Motion, Trinity argues that by consenting to entry of
judgment in Boger's favor for the full relief requested in the
Complaint and by depositing with the Court, for transmittal to
Boger, sufficient funds to cover the judgment, Trinity has tendered
to Boger complete relief, extinguished his individual claim, and
deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
of the putative class.  Trinity's argument rests upon its
interpretation of Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, in which the United
States Supreme Court held that an unaccepted offer of judgment in
the full amount sought by the individual plaintiff in a class
action case does not moot the case, but left open the question
whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the
full amount of a plaintiff's individual claim into an account
payable to the plaintiff and the court then enters judgment for the
plaintiff in that amount.  Trinity asserts that where it has now
invoked and executed on this hypothetical scenario referenced in
Campbell-Ewald, judgment should be entered in favor of Boger, and
the class action should be dismissed as moot.

In Fulton Dental v. Bisco, Inc., the defendant in a TCPA class
action case deposited the maximum amount of statutory damages in
the court's registry Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 and
argued that the district court should enter judgment in Fulton's
favor and dismiss the case as moot.  The court identified two
primary bases for declining to find that the deposit of funds
required dismissal.

Judge Chuang holds that the reasoning of Campbell-Ewald is clear: a
class action plaintiff should have the opportunity to seek class
certification before a defendant can force a settlement.  Fulton's
interpretation that a settlement offer made by depositing funds
under Rule 67 is no different than a Rule 68 offer of judgment
reflects sound logic in that a deposit in a court's registry does
not constitute a direct payment to Boger.  Even if it did, such a
payment, even combined with the requested injunction, does not
necessarily satisfy Boger's interest in pursuing a class action,
which simply cannot be met by any offer that precludes him from
seeking class certification.  Thus, the Court will deny the Motion.
Accordingly, he needs not address the remaining arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chuang denied Trinity's Motion.
He granted Media Mix's Motion for Joinder to the extent it seeks to
join in Trinity's arguments, and denied to the extent it seeks the
same relief sought in Trinity's Motion.  A separate Order will
issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
Order is available at https://is.gd/hvbGFI from Leagle.com.

Dan Boger, on behalf of himself and others similary situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Broderick --
ted@broderick-law.com -- Broderick and Paronich PC, pro hac vice &
Stephen Howard Ring -- shr@ringlaw.us -- Stephen H Ring PC.

Trinity Heating & Air, Inc., doing business as Trinity Solar,
Defendant, represented by Genevieve C. Bradley --
gbradley@rothjackson.com -- Roth Doner Jackson, PLC & Mitchell N.
Roth -- mroth@rothjackson.com -- Roth Jackson, pro hac vice.

Media Mix 365, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew T. Stephenson
-- astephenson@fandpnet.com -- Franklin and Prokopik PC, Jonathan
Kent, Kushner Carlson PC, pro hac vice, Michael B. Kushner --
mkushner@kushnercarlson.com -- Kushner Carlson PC, pro hac vice &
Suren N. Weerasuriya -- Sweerasuriya@kushnercarlson.com -- Kushner
Carlson PC, pro hac vice.


UNIQLO USA: Removed Jacobs Case to Central District of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed the case captioned ANN S. JACOBS, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
UNIQLO USA, LLC, a Delaware corporation; UNIQLO CALIFORNIA, LLC, a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 30-2017-00944118-CU-BT-CXC, from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Orange, to the U.S District
Court for the Central District of California on Nov.. 16, 2018. The
Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
8:18-cv-02051 to the proceeding.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff's claims challenge
Defendants' advertising of their retail clothing products offered
for sale online and in their retail stores in California. The
Plaintiff's FAC asserts eight (8) causes of action: violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law, California's False Advertising
Law, California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Michael J. Stortz, Esq.
          Marshall L. Baker, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94104-1036
          Telephone: 415.765.9500
          Facsimile: 415.765.9501
          E-mail: mstortz@akingump.com
                  mbaker@akingump.com

UNITED RESTAURANT: Chin et al Seek Minimum Wages & OT under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
HOK CHIN, HAO LI, FILADELFO HERRERA, AIQING LI, and JIANBO LI,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. UNITED RESTAURANT GROUP, INC., KIN ASIAN BISTRO
INC. d/b/a CARMA EAST, BADA GARDEN, LLC d/b/a LUMOS WEST d/b/a
CARMA ASIAN TAPAS DUMPLING 2 AVENUE, INC. d/b/a LUMOS KITCHEN d/b/a
HOT POT CENTRAL, QIFAN, LLC d/b/a LUMOS, DUMPLING 516 HUDSON NY,
INC. d/b/a BENEDICTS, R & M CENTURY INC. d/b/a SHANGHAI CUISINE, EL
SOTANO OF BROOKLYN, CORP. d/b/a THE GENTRY, CHRISTIAN A. VEGA,
SERGEI BEZRUKOV, CHRISTINA CHERNIAWSKY, QIFAN LI, and CHEN WEN HO
a/k/a JONATHAN HO, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-10734
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 16, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
New York Labor.

The Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of
hour's compensation for the hours that they worked.  Defendants
fail to pay wages in all weeks Plaintiffs worked and still owe all
Plaintiffs wages despite Plaintiffs' repeated demands to pay. The
Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours
worked, failed to pay Plaintiffs appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium. Further, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs the
required "spread of hours" pay for any day in which they had a
shift longer than 10 hours/day, the lawsuit says.

United Restaurant owns and operates a chain of casual dining
restaurants in the Atlantic Coast.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Bingchen Li, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF Z. TAN PLLC
          110 E. 59th Street, Suite 3200
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 539-6188
          Facsimile: (718) 679-9122

UNITED STATES: Bid for Preliminary Injunction in Hamama Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned USAMA J. HAMAMA, et al., Petitioners, v.
REBECCA ADDUCCI, et al., Respondents, Case No. 17-cv-11910 (E.D.
Mich.), District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith entered an order granting
Petitioners' renewed motion for preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on October 12, 2017, both
reasserting and revising their claims, and requesting three forms
of relief: (i) a stay of removal proceedings to allow class members
to seek relief from removal before the appropriate body in the
immigration court system; (ii) bond hearings for those held in
prolonged detention; and (iii) release under orders of supervision,
pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, unless and until repatriation to
Iraq becomes significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Zadvydas prohibits civil detention where there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.

The law is clear that the Federal Government cannot indefinitely
detain foreign nationals while it seeks to repatriate them, when
there is no significant likelihood of repatriation in the
reasonably foreseeable future. This principle emanates from the
Constitution's core value of rejecting arbitrary restraints on
individual liberty.

The issue the Court now resolves is whether there is such a
likelihood of repatriation for scores of Iraqi nationals whom the
Government has detained for an extended period--many for well over
a year--while it engages in a diplomatic dialogue with Iraq that
has yet to produce any clear agreement on repatriation. In fact,
the weight of the evidence actually uncovered during discovery
shows that Iraq will not take back individuals who will not
voluntarily agree to return. This means that the Iraqi detainees
could remain locked up indefinitely whether their challenges to
their orders of removal are exhausted or on-going. More evidence
confirming Iraq's refusal to repatriate might well exist, but the
Government has acted ignobly in this case, by failing to comply
with court orders, submitting demonstrably false declarations of
Government officials, and otherwise violating its litigation
obligations--all of which impels this Court to impose sanctions.

Petitioners' central contention is that Zadvydas subclass members
must be granted relief because their continued detention violates
the statutory provisions under which they are detained and/or the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. They are likely to succeed on
this claim. Many of the subclass members are detained under the
specific statutory provision analyzed in Zadvydas, 8 U.S.C. section
1231(a) (applicable to persons subject to final orders of removal),
which the Supreme Court interpreted as not allowing detention
beyond six months, if there were no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, absent exceptional
circumstances. Others are held under 8 U.S.C. section1226(a)
(pre-order-detention statute), which is linguistically
indistinguishable from the provision addressed in Zadvydas and must
be interpreted in the same way. Other detention statutes-- 8 U.S.C.
section 1225(b) (applicable to arriving aliens) and 8 U.S.C.
section 1226(c) (applicable to persons convicted of certain
crimes)--contain different language providing for mandatory
detention--meaning they cannot be interpreted to avoid the
unconstitutional consequence of indefinite detention. Regardless of
which provision applies to any particular subclass member,
continued detention beyond six months is not permissible, because
the record unquestionably demonstrates that there is no significant
likelihood of repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The Government's arguments to the contrary on all these points are
without merit, as are its arguments on standing and the propriety
of classwide relief. Thus, the Court grants Petitioners' renewed
motion for preliminary injunction.

A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Nov. 20, 2018 is
available at https://bit.ly/2E9nAXM from Leagle.com.

Usama J. Hamama, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba ,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott  --
scott@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, Lee Gelernt ,
American Civil Liberties Union, Michael J. Steinberg, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman ,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan West Michigan Regional
Office, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora Youkhana ,
Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed , Michigan
Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr, Wendolyn W.
Richards --Richards@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, David
Brian Johnson, Margo Schlanger, Maria Martinez Sanchez, American
Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico & William W. Swor .

Atheer F. Ali, Ali Al-Dilami, HABIL NISSAN, Jihan Asker, Moayad
Jalal Barash & Sami Ismael Al-Issawi, Petitioners, represented by
Bonsitu A. Kitaba, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan,
Kimberly L. Scott , Miller, Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg ,
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J.
Aukerman, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan West Michigan
Regional Office, Nadine Yousif , Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora
Youkhana , Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed ,
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr,
Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller Canfield, David Brian Johnson , Margo
Schlanger & Maria Martinez Sanchez , American Civil Liberties Union
of New Mexico.

Abdulkuder Hashem Al-Shimmary, Petitioner, represented by Kimberly
L. Scott , Miller, Canfield, Maria Martinez Sanchez, American Civil
Liberties Union of New Mexico & Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller
Canfield.

Qassim Hashem Al-Saedy & Abbas Oda Manshad Al-Sokaini, Petitioners,
represented by David Brian Johnson, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller,
Canfield, Maria Martinez Sanchez, American Civil Liberties Union of
New Mexico & Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield.

Mukhlis Murad, Adel Shaba, Kamiran Taymour, Jony Jarjiss, Jami
Derywosh & Anwar Hamad, Petitioners, represented by David Brian
Johnson, Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Kimberly L.
Scott, Miller, Canfield.


UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Suit Over Oct. 13 Memo
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIAHAO KUANG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03698-JST
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (1) granted Plaintiffs Kuang and
Deron Cooke's unopposed motion for class certification; (2) granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction; and (3) denied
Defendants U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") and Secretary of
Defense James Mattis' motion to dismiss.

In October 2007, an eight-year-old Jiahao Kuang moved with his
father from China to the United States.  Kuang entered the United
States on a CR2 visa, which is issued to children of a foreign
spouse who is married or soon to be married to a U.S. citizen.  A
month later, Kuang obtained his green card pursuant to his father's
marriage.  Since then, Kuang has resided with his family in San
Leandro, California, as a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") of the
United States.

On July 18, 2017, during the summer before his senior year of high
school, Kuang enlisted in the U.S. Navy for a four-year term of
active service, followed by a four-year term of reserve duty.
Kuang enlisted in the military because of desire to serve his
country.  Kuang's enlistment contract provided that he would be
eligible to "ship out," or enter active service, on July 5, 2018.
He was placed in a Delayed Entry Program ("DEP") in the interim and
attended monthly DEP meetings.

At the age of 22, Deron Cooke successfully applied for a green card
based on his father's U.S. citizenship. In July 2015, Cooke
emigrated from Jamaica to the United States; he has maintained LPR
status since then.  Cooke lives with his wife, who is a U.S.
citizen, in Trenton, New Jersey.

On Aug. 3, 2017, Cooke enlisted in the U.S. Air Force for a
four-year term of active service, followed by a four-year term of
reserve duty.  Upon enlisting, Cooke was also informed that he
would be eligible for an expedited naturalization process through
the military.  Two weeks later, Cooke entered into an employment
contract with the Air Force for an auto mechanic position, with a
scheduled ship-out date of Nov. 15, 2017.  Cooke was also placed in
a DEP and began attending biweekly drills.

On Oct. 13, 2017, DoD under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness A.M. Kurta issued a memo implementing a new policy for
background investigations for LPRs ("October 13 Memo"). The October
13 Memo explained that in order to facilitate process efficiency
and the appropriate sharing of information for security risk based
suitability and security decisions for LPRs, DoD would require a
completed background investigation before an LPR could enter
"Active, Reserve or Guard Service."

The October 13 Memo's policy change prevented Kuang and Cooke from
entering active service on their projected ship-out dates.  In May
2018, a recruiter informed Kuang that his ship-out date had been
delayed until Jan. 17, 2019.  In the interim, he was informed that
his career track designation had been switched from personnel
specialist to one that does not receive a "designated position or
career path and is usually assigned manual labor responsibilities,
despite Kuang's experience with computers.  In anticipation of
entering active service, Kuang did not apply to college, and
continues to be hampered in his pursuit of interim employment and
education due to uncertainty regarding when he will be permitted to
enter the military.

Unaware of the October 13 Memo, Cooke resigned from his job on Oct.
27, 2017, in preparation for his November 15 ship-out date.
Although he was able to reclaim that job when informed of DoD's new
policy, his ability to further his civilian career or take
advantage of his employer's education benefits is hampered by his
looming military service.  A recruiter has also informed Cooke that
the auto mechanic position for which he originally enlisted may no
longer be available when he is ultimately able to enter active
service.

As of Nov. 16, 2018, neither Kuang nor Cooke has received
notification from DoD of a completed background investigation.

On June 21, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class action
lawsuit on behalf of all similarly situated LPRs.  They raised four
claims.  First, the Plaintiffs alleged that the October 13 Memo
violated their equal protection rights by unjustifiably
discriminating against LPRs.  Second, they alleged that the memo
violated their substantive due process rights to pursue their
chosen profession of military service.  Third, they asserted that
DoD had unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed their entrance
into military service, in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA").  Finally, the Plaintiffs raised another APA claim
under 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2), contending that the October 13 Memo
exceeded DoD's lawful authority and was otherwise arbitrary and
capricious.  The Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive
relief on these claims.

On July 19, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, solely on the basis of their 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)
claim.  They subsequently filed a motion to certify a class of
similarly situated LPRs.  When DoD expressed its intent to file a
motion to dismiss, the Court approved a consolidated briefing
schedule on the motion to dismiss and the preliminary injunction.
DoD later filed a notice of non-opposition to class certification,
in which the parties agreed to slight modifications in the class
definition.

On Sept. 6, 2018, DoD filed its motion to dismiss.  After briefing
on the preliminary injunction and motion to dismiss were complete,
DoD produced the administrative record on Oct. 19, 2018, pursuant
to Court order.  The Court permitted the parties to file
supplemental briefs regarding any relevant information in the
administrative record.

As modified, the Plaintiffs' proposed class consists of all persons
who (i) are lawful permanent residents of the United States; (ii)
have signed an enlistment contract with the U.S. military; and
(iii) pursuant to the Defendants' October 13 memo, have not been
permitted to begin initial entry training, commonly referred to as
boot camp, pending completion of their Military Service Suitability
Determinations and National Security Determinations.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for class
certification, Judge Tigar finds that the Plaintiffs' have met the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).

As to their motion for a preliminary injunction, the Judge finds
that (i) DoD has simply provided no evidence to support a rational
connection between the facts and its choice, nor any indication
that the process by which it reached that result was logical and
rational; (ii) the Plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm;
and (iii) the balance of equities and the public interest favor
granting an injunction.

Finally, turning to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Judge
concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims survive a motion to dismiss.
He finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' APA claims are reviewable; (ii)
he cannot determine whether the time DoD has taken to process the
Plaintiffs' investigations was unreasonable as a matter of law;
(iii) the Plaintiffs' allegations, even if true, do not state a
claim that the October 13 Memo exceeded DoD's jurisdiction or was
otherwise prohibited by statute; and (iv) even if the Judge agreed
with DoD, it would not mean that the Plaintiffs failed to state a 5
U.S.C. Section 706(2) claim upon which relief can be granted.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Tigar (1) granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification; (2) denied DoD's motion to dismiss;
and (3) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.
He enjoined the Defendants and their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity subject to
their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or
participation with them from taking any action continuing to
implement the October 13 Memo; and ordered them to return to the
pre-Oct. 13, 2017 practices for the accession of LPRs into the
military.  The Preliminary Injunction will take effect immediately
and will remain in effect pending resolution of the action on the
merits or further order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/pqYAoS from Leagle.com.

Jiahao Kuang & Deron Cooke, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Colleen Carlton
Smith -- colleen.smith@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Peter Allen
Wald -- peter.wald@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Sameer Ahmed --
sahmed@aclusocal.org -- ACLU Foundation of Southern California,
Caitlin Dahl, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Christine
Patricia Sun -- csun@aclunc.org -- ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Jennifer Lee Pasquarella -- jpasquarella@aclusocal.org
-- ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Matthew C. Catalano,
Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Megan Fitzpatrick --
megan.fitzpatrick@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Michael Bryan
Kaufman -- mkaufman@aclusocal.org -- ACLU of Southern California &
Sophia Louise Jane Mendez, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.

United States Department of Defense & James Mattis, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Defense of the United States Department of
Defense, Defendants, represented by Stuart Justin Robinson, U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division & Nathan M. Swinton,
Department of Justice Civil Division.


VACATION RESORTS: Hall Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL HALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. VACATION RESORTS INTERNATIONAL; LAW OFFICES
OF CLARK J. DUELLMAN; CLARK J. DUELLMAN; and STACEY SHILLING, Case
No. 3:18-cv-06705-EDL (N.D. Cal., Nov. 5, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte.

Vacation Resorts International, Inc. provides management and
marketing services to resorts, condominiums, and timeshares. The
company is based in Laguna Hills, California. As of February 28,
2012, Vacation Resorts International, Inc. operates as a subsidiary
of ILG, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roya Nafeie Graziano, Esq.
          DC CAPITAL LAW, LLP
          700 12th Street NW, Suite 700
          Washington, DC 20005
          E-mail: rgraziano@dccapitallaw.com


VALBIN CORP: Court Approves $30K Saleh Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Parties'
Joint Motion for Settlement Approval in the case captioned RESHAD
SALEH, Plaintiff, v. VALBIN CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.
17-CV-00593-LHK. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Rashad Saleh filed this collective action case under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that Defendant Valbin
Corporation (Valbin) failed to pay adequate overtime.

Valbin will pay $30,000 into the settlement fund. the Plaintiffs'
attorney's costs totaling $10,046.62 as well as an incentive
payment for Saleh totaling $1,000 will be deducted from the
settlement fund. The remaining amount of money, $18,953.38, will be
distributed evenly amongst all the collective action class members.
Thus, each class member (with the exception of Saleh) will receive
$824.06. Saleh receives $1,824.06.

Here, there is a bona fide dispute. The Plaintiffs believe that
they should be compensated for 24 hours of work each rotation they
were on because the conditions on base effectively rendered them to
be working 24 hours a day. They alleged that troops would interact
with the role players at all times of the day and night in
accordance with the specific rotation tasks. The exercises during
these rotations are completely unscripted and can occur at any
time, day or night. Valbin maintains that the Plaintiffs admitted
they were not on duty 24 hours per day, and that the Plaintiffs
agreed they would not be paid for time in excess of the up to 10
hours of role playing time each day.  

There are 23 Plaintiffs who worked a total of 265 days during the
class period. Assuming the Plaintiffs worked 24 hours a day, the
collective action the Plaintiffs would be entitled to a maximum
recovery of $79,500. If liquidated damages were assessed, then the
amount would double to $159,000. Therefore, the $30,000 settlement
is 37.74% of total possible recovery, assuming liquidated damages
were not assessed. Assuming liquidated damages were assessed, the
settlement amount here would be 18.87% of total possible recovery.
Furthermore, considering Plaintiffs' admission that their claims
against Valbin were not as substantial as they initially believed
when they brought the case the Court finds that the settlement
amount is reasonable. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approval
of the FLSA settlement.

The Court assesses the stage of proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed to ensure the parties have an adequate
appreciation of the merits of the case before reaching a
settlement.  
Here, the parties engaged in discovery including interrogatories,
document production, admissions, and depositions. Furthermore, the
parties briefed and the Court ruled on collective action
certification. Given the late stage of the case, the Court believes
that the parties have a very good sense of the merits of their
respective positions.  Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
approval of the FLSA settlement.

This factor favors approving a settlement where there is a
significant risk that litigation might result in a lesser recovery
for the class or no recovery at all. In light of Plaintiffs'
admission that their claims against Valbin were not as substantial
as they initially believed when they brought the case, the Court is
led to believe that further litigation might result in the
collective action class recovering less or nothing.  Accordingly,
this factor weighs in favor of approval of the FLSA settlement.

Courts in this district have rejected blanket releases for all
potential claims.  Here, the release provision, consistent with
Ninth Circuit precedent, is limited to releasing claims based on
the identical factual predicate as the claims in the instant
action. This is not an example of a release provision that would
release claims based on different facts than those alleged in the
litigation at issue. Moreover, this release provision is not a
blanket release of all potential claims. Accordingly, this factor
weighs in favor of approval of the FLSA settlement.

In determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the
opinions of counsel should be given considerable weight both
because of counsel's familiarity with the litigation and previous
experience with cases.  Here, the Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that
the settlement is fair and reasonable. The Plaintiffs' counsel has
been practicing law for 22 years, and has represented more than
4,000 plaintiffs in employment-related matters. Moreover,
"Plaintiffs were informed of their pro rata share of the expenses
and approved their allocation of the expenses before agreeing to
the settlement. Furthermore, to date, 21 out of the 23 collective
action class members have agreed to the settlement, indicating
widespread approval of the settlement by the participating
Plaintiffs. This factor weighs in favor of approval of the FLSA
settlement.

The likelihood of fraud or collusion is low here because the
Settlement was reached through arm's-length negotiations,
facilitated by an impartial mediator.  There is nothing on the face
of the record that shows that Plaintiff's counsel allowed pursuit
of their own self-interests and that of certain class members to
infect the negotiation. Additionally, the Court does not find
evidence of more subtle signs of collusion, such as when counsel
receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when
the class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are
amply rewarded. Class counsel is not requesting any attorneys'
fees, only litigation expenses.

Overall, on consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the
Court finds that the proposed settlement is a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4snjkh from Leagle.com.

Reshad Saleh, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Sean Christopher Davis --
seand@phillipsdayeslaw.com -- Phillips Dayes Law Firm PC, pro hac
vice, Trey A.R. Dayes, III -- treyd@phillipsdayeslaw.com --
Phillips Dayes Law Firm PC, pro hac vice & Dennis L. Evans,
Phillips Dayes Law Firm PC.

Valbin Corporation, a Virginia corporation, Defendant, represented
by Veronica Meryl Gray -- vgray@nossaman.com -- Nossaman LLP &
Edward J. Tolchin -- etolchin@offitkurman.com -- Offit Kurman, PA,
pro hac vice.


WAL-MART STORES: Prado Moves to Certify Classes of Managers
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned MARK PRADO, Individually,
and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation, and DOES
1-10, inclusive, Case No. 2:17-cv-05630-AB-KK (C.D. Cal.), moves
the Court for an order certifying certain classes for the
Plaintiff's claims that the Defendant failed to reimburse Assistant
Store Managers, who participated in Wal-Mart's Bring Your Own
Device policy.

Mark Prado also seeks to be appointed as class representative, and
for the appointment of The Westrick Law Firm, P.C., as class
counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on December 14, 2018, at 10:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shawn C. Westrick, Esq.
          THE WESTRICK LAW FIRM, P.C.
          11075 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 125
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 746-5303
          Facsimile: (310) 943-3373
          E-mail: swestrick@westricklawfirm.com


WALMART INC: Edwards Sues over Sale of EquateTM Gelcaps
-------------------------------------------------------
TOYA EDWARDS on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. WALMART, INC., the Defendant, Case
2:18-cv-09655 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018), alleges that the Company
misleads consumers about the nature, quality, and effectiveness of
its so-called rapid release Equate (TM) products through
advertising and labeling.

According to the complaint, as part of their health and wellness
department, Walmart stocks and sells brand name over-the-counter
drugs, such as Tylenol (TM) products. In addition to selling brand
name over-the-counter drugs, Walmart also produces, manufactures,
markets, distributes, and sells a generic version of certain
over-the-counter drugs under its own brand EquateTM to families,
children, and other consumers. Walmart's Equate (TM) products
include analgesic or pain-relieving medicines using acetaminophen.
In 2005, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. introduced the name brand
Tylenol (TM) Extra Strength Rapid Release Gels to the American
public as "specially designed" gelcaps "with holes to allow for the
release of powerful medicine even faster than before. Three years
later, Tylenol (TM) PM Rapid Release Gels were launched with the
same promises.

Walmart then introduced its own version of the Tylenol (TM) Extra
Strength Rapid Release Gels called EquateTM Extra Strength
Acetaminophen Rapid Release Gelcaps. Walmart also introduced its
own version of the Tylenol (TM) Extra Strength PM Rapid Release
Gels called Equate (TM) Extra Strength Acetaminophen PM Rapid
Release Gelcaps. Since the release of its generic versions of the
rapid release gelcaps.

In particular, the Walmart brand Equate (TM) rapid release gelcaps
are marketed as comparable to Tylenol (TM) Extra Strength Rapid
Release Gels even though, they do not contain the unique laser
drilled holes of Tylenol (TM) Extra Strength Rapid Release Gels.
The Equate (TM) rapid release gels are nonetheless labeled and
advertised as a "rapid release" product. Despite the technology
used for the Class Rapid Release Gelcaps and despite what Walmart's
labeling and advertising would have consumers believe, the term
"rapid release" does not actually mean that the drug works faster
for consumers than non-rapid release products. The same is true of
the brand name Tylenol (TM) rapid release products.

The lawsuit contends Walmart has long known or should have known
that traditional, non-rapid release acetaminophen products can be
equally effective in the same, if not faster, time period than its
rapid release products. In fact, a new study demonstrates that
Walmart's Equate (TM) acetaminophen rapid release gelcaps dissolve
slower than the Walmart non-rapid release products. Yet, Walmart
charges a premium for its rapid release gelcaps. Walmart sells its
rapid release gelcaps with false, misleading, unfair, deceptive
labeling and marketing in an effort to dupe consumers into
purchasing these gelcaps for prices that exceed their true value.
Walmart has pursued and continues to pursue this course of conduct
in order to profit off of unassuming, unwitting consumers looking
for the fastest pain-relief possible from an over-the-counter
acetaminophen product, the lawsuit says.

Walmart is the world's largest retail company operating thousands
of retail stores worldwide. Walmart stores sell all types of
products to the American public, including toys, groceries, sports
and outdoor equipment, electronics, home goods, school supplies,
apparel, cosmetics, health and wellness products, and many
more.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Crystal Foley, Esq.
          Mitchel M. Breit, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          100 N. Sepulveda Blvd., Suite 1350
          Los Angeles, CA 90245
          Phone: (310) 322-3555
          112 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          E-mail: cfoley@simmonsfirm.com
                  mbreit@simmonsfirm.com

WELTMAN & WEINBERG: Appeals Ruling in Gibbons Suit to 3rd Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co. filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Meghan Gibbons v. Weltman Weinberg &
Reis Co., Case No. 2-17-cv-01851, in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 27, 2018, Judge
Joel L. Slomsky granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

Judge Slonsky certified the class of all persons with addresses
within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit who, beginning one year prior to the filing of
the Complaint through and including the final resolution of the
case, were sent an initial letter from Defendant attempting to
collect a consumer debt which was printed on law firm letterhead.

The Court grante Rule 23 certification for the following
Plaintiff's claims: (i) the Defendant violated Section 1692e of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") by using false,
deceptive, and misleading representations in debt-collection
communications; (ii) the Defendant violated Section 1692e(3) of the
FDCPA by falsely representing or implying that any communication is
from an attorney; and (iii) the Defendant violated Section
1692e(10) of the FDCPA by using false representations or deceptive
means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

The appellate case is captioned as Meghan Gibbons v. Weltman
Weinberg & Reis Co., Case No. 18-8057, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent MEGHAN GIBBONS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, is represented by:

          James A. Francis, Esq.
          Joseph L. Gentilcore, Esq.
          David A. Searles, Esq.
          John Soumilas, Esq.
          FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2510
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 735-8600
          E-mail: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com
                  jgentilcore@consumerlawfirm.com
                  dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com
                  jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com

Defendant-Petitioner WELTMAN WEINBERG & REIS CO. is represented
by:

          Graeme E. Hogan, Esq.
          Richard J. Perr, Esq.
          FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, P.C.
          Ten Penn Center
          1801 Market Street, Suite 1100
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 644-6590
          E-mail: ghogan@finemanlawfirm.com
                  rperr@finemanlawfirm.com


WELTMAN WEINBERG: Certification of Class Sought in Bitzko Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned Christy Bitzko individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Weltman, Weinberg
& Reis Co., LPA, Case No. 1:17-cv-00458-BKS-DJS (N.D.N.Y.), moves
for an order certifying the matter as a class action.

Christy Bitzko also seeks appointment as Class Representative, and
for the appointment of Barshay Sanders, PLLC, as class counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on January 17, 2019, to consider
the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: dbarshay@sbglawny.com


WESTERN REGIONAL: Court Separates Prisoners' Section 1983 Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Huntington Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order separating claims into discreet Civil Action in the case
captioned RONNIE LEE HAMMONDS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN
REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY; CAPTAIN ALDRAGE; CAPTAIN SAVILLA; and ANY
C.O. that has worked in A5 Section, Defendants. Case No.
3:18-cv-01412. (S.D.W.V).

Nineteen prisoners at the Western Regional Jail in Barboursville,
West Virginia, have jointly filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 alleging that the defendants are violating the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by subjecting the
prisoners to inhumane living conditions at the Jail.

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has not explicitly ruled that multiple prisoners are prohibited
from joining together as plaintiffs in a single Section 1983
action, at least one circuit has determined that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars such joinders.  

In addition to the courts' disinclination to allow multiple
prisoners to join in one Sesction 1983 complaint, the law is
well-settled that it is plain error for a pro se inmate to
represent other inmates in a class action. Moreover, while the
living conditions about which the plaintiffs complain are
collectively described as inhumane, it is clear from the Complaint
that the plaintiffs have been exposed to different circumstances
and various levels of alleged harm at different times, involving
different transactions with different defendants, and resulting in
different injuries. Consequently, joinder is not appropriate for
the additional reason that each plaintiff's claim will require
individualized determinations.  

Accordingly, the claims of the plaintiffs must be separated into
discreet civil actions and must undergo a preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2).

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8xh4mw8 from Leagle.com.

Derreck Hatfield, Plaintiff, pro se.


WICHITA, KS: Suit Over Remington GO Remanded to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for District of Kansas issued a
Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the case
captioned DAVID SNODGRASS and LESLIE SNODGRASS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY
OF WICHITA, KANSAS, et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-1231-JWB. (D.
Kan.).

This case comes before the court on responses to the court's show
cause order, this court entered an order to show cause as to why
this matter should not be remanded to state court pursuant to the
Tax Injunction Act (TIA) or the principle of comity.

The Plaintiffs allege violations of their Fifth Amendment rights
and their Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs allege that the City of Wichita issued general
obligation and special obligation bonds under Kansas law to finance
payment of certain improvements within the Remington Place Addition
(Remington).

The TIA provides that the district courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
the courts of such State. The Tenth Circuit has held that section
1341 is a broad prohibition against the use of the equity powers of
federal courts involving state tax matters.

Tax

In determining whether it is a tax, the Tenth Circuit has
identified the following characteristics of state taxes:

"The classic tax sustains the essential flow of revenue to the
government, while the classic fee is linked to some regulatory
scheme. The classic tax is imposed by a state or municipal
legislature, while the classic fee is imposed by an agency upon
those it regulates. The classic tax is designed to provide a
benefit for the entire community, while the classic fee is designed
to help defray an agency's regulatory expenses."

Kutak asserts that the special assessments levied against the
Plaintiffs' property are not taxes because they were imposed on
specific property in consideration of a benefit to that property,
they were paid to a separate fund to pay those costs, the purpose
is not revenue-raising, and the public at large does not benefit
from the improvement. Kutak argues that the assessments are akin to
contracts for work completed.

Although the Tenth Circuit has yet to address this issue, several
courts have concluded that special assessments for improvements,
such as sewer and water, are taxes under the TIA. The special
assessments at issue in this case are also referred to as taxes in
one of the statutes at issue: The assessments, with accrued
interest, shall be levied as a special tax upon the property
included therein concurrent with general property taxes, and shall
be payable in not more than 20 equal annual installments, as the
governing body determines.

In addition to the prevailing authority treating special
assessments for improvements as taxes under the TIA and Kansas law,
the factors cited by the Tenth Circuit also support such a finding.
A tax is more likely to be imposed by a municipality instead of an
agency.  

In this instance, the assessment was imposed by the City and is
billed at the same time as the general property taxes, which
supports a finding that it is a tax. A tax also benefits the
public, while a fee is to defray agency's regulatory expenses.

Kutak argues that the improvements do not benefit the public
because it is only for the benefit of the specific parcels of land.
Kutak, however, does not cite any authority for the proposition
that paving and sewer work for a particular area of town only
benefits those landowners. While Plaintiffs have certainly
benefitted by the improvements and their land has value due to the
same, the public is also generally benefitted to some degree by the
paving of roads and development of land in Remington.

The court finds that the special assessments are taxes under the
TIA. Kutak contends that even if the assessments are taxes,
Plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin those taxes and, therefore,
the TIA is inapplicable.  Plaintiffs' complaint seeks a refund of
special assessments paid on behalf of themselves and a class of
property owners. The TIA applies to claims seeking declaratory
judgments, injunctive relief, and refunds of taxes paid. The
principle of comity also prohibits this court from exercising
jurisdiction over Section 1983 damage claims where the taxpayer has
a plain, adequate, and complete remedy in state court to correct
any violations of their federal rights.

Therefore, as long as the Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in
state court, this action must be remanded.

Remedy

The Plaintiffs contend that Kansas state court provides an adequate
remedy for their claims.  Kutak, however, argues that the
Plaintiffs do not have an adequate remedy. Kutak cites to Zipperer
v. City of Ft. Myers, 41 F.3d 619 (11th Cir. 1995), in support of
its position. Zipperer, however, is clearly distinguishable. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the TIA did not apply because there was
no state remedy to taxpayers challenging special assessments under
Florida law. Kansas provides a remedy for individuals challenging
tax assessments.  

Therefore, because this is an action for a refund of tax payments,
and because the Plaintiffs have a plain, speedy, and efficient,
remedy in Kansas courts, this action must be remanded to state
court under the TIA and the principle of comity.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to remand is granted for the
reasons stated in this order. This action is remanded to Sedgwick
County District Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9zkm7rk from Leagle.com.

David L. Snodgrass & Leslie J. Snodgrass, Plaintiffs, represented
by Austin K. Parker -- austin@austinkparkeratty.com

City of Wichita, Kansas, Robert Layton, Wichita City Manager, Shawn
Henning, Wichita Finance Director, Kelly Carpenter, Former Wichita
Finance Director, Karen Sublett, Wichita City Clerk, Jeff Longwell,
Wichita Mayor; Former Wichita City Council Member, Carl Brewer,
Former Wichita Mayor, Brandon Johnson, Wichita City Council Member,
Pete Meitzner, Wichita City Council Member, James Clendenin,
Wichita City Council Member, Jeff Blubaugh, Wichita City Council
Member, Bryan Frye, Wichita City Council Member, Cindy Claycomb,
Wichita City Council Member, Lavonta Williams, Former Wichita City
Council Member, Janet Miller, Former Wichita City Council Member &
Jim Skelton, Former Wichita City Council Member, Defendants,
represented by Erik Houghton , City of Wichita, Law Department &
Jennifer L. Magana , City of Wichita, Kansas - Law Department.

Sue Schlapp, Former Wichita City Council Member & Paul Gray, Former
Wichita City Council Member, Defendants, represented by Erik
Houghton , City of Wichita, Law Department.
Michael O'Donnell, Former Wichita City Council Member, Defendant,
represented by Adam R. Burrus - aburrus@fleeson.com - Fleeson,
Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, LLC.


WILMINGTON TRUST: Court OKs $200MM Settlement in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlements in the case captioned IN RE WILMINGTON
TRUST SECURITIES LITIGATION, This document relates to: ALL ACTIONS.
Master File No. 10-cv-0990-ER. (D. Del.).

Numerous securities class actions were filed against certain
Defendants in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The Court
consolidated the various actions under the caption In re Wilmington
Trust Securities Litigation pursuant to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), and appointed Lead
Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel.

On behalf of themselves and other members of the class, Lead
Plaintiffs have agreed to two class action settlements: (i) a
settlement with the Wilmington Trust Defendants and Underwriter
Defendants, and (ii) a settlement with KPMG LLP (KPMG).

The settlement agreements provide for a Class defined as follows:
All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
Wilmington Trust common stock during the period of January 18, 2008
up to November 1, 2010 (the Class Period), including all persons or
entities who purchased shares of Wilmington Trust common stock
issued in the secondary common stock offering that occurred on or
about February 23, 2010 (Offering), and were damaged thereby.

The settlement agreements provide that Wilmington Trust will pay
$200,000,000 and KPMG will pay $10,000,000. Class Members who
submit a valid claim form will be reimbursed a pro rata share of
the settlement funds in accordance with the proposed Plan of
Allocation.

Whether the Notice to the Class Members Was Adequate

First, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that class members be given the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all potential class members identifiable
through reasonable efforts. Specifically, the Rule provides that
such notice must, in clear, concise, and plain language, state: (i)
the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class
certified (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) the
class member's right to enter an appearance by an attorney (v) the
class member's right to be excluded from the class; (vi) the time
and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect
of settlement on class members.  

Second, Rule 23(e) requires notification to all members of the
class of the terms of any proposed settlement. This notice is
designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement and to
apprise class members of the right and opportunity to inspect the
complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the
litigation.

In the Court's memorandum and order granting preliminary approval
of the settlement, the Court approved notice by direct mail,
periodical publication, toll-free information number, and a
settlement-specific website. At that time, the Court reviewed the
parties' notice program, including the language of the notices, and
found that they were clear, included all requisite information, and
met the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and (e).

Whether the Proposed Settlements Are Fair and Reasonable

There is a presumption of fairness in reviewing a class settlement
when (1) the negotiations occurred at arm's-length (2) there was
sufficient discovery (3) the proponents of the settlement are
experienced in similar litigation and (4) only a small fraction of
the class objected.

The Girsh Factors

The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

The first Girsh factor is the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of the litigation, which aims to take into account the
probable costs, in both time and money, of continued litigation.
This case involved a number of highly complex issues, even for a
securities action, and counsel devoted substantial resources to
consulting with experts to gather the highly technical evidence.

That complex and expensive work would have continued if the
settlements had not been reached. But for the settlements, the case
would have required significant additional expenses including
detailed expert reports, cross-motions for summary judgment,
motions in limine, pre-trial documents and significant trial
preparation, and almost certainly an appeal.

The Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of the
settlements.

The Reaction of the Class to Settlement

The second Girsh factor is the reaction of the class to the
settlement. In an effort to measure the class's own reaction to the
settlement's terms directly, courts look to the number and
vociferousness of the objectors.

There were no objections to the settlements or the request for fees
and costs. Lead Counsel contend that this is particularly
remarkable in that 82% of Wilmington Trust shares are owned by
institutional investors who have the knowledge and resources to
properly evaluate a settlement and to object if necessary. The
Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of the
settlements.

The Stage of the Proceedings

The third factor to be considered is the stage of the proceedings
and the amount of discovery completed. This Girsh factor requires
the Court to evaluate whether Plaintiffs had an adequate
appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating
settlement.  

After eight years of intense litigation which included significant
discovery (including the exchange of nearly 13 million documents
and the taking of 39 depositions) and certification of the Class,
Lead Counsel and Lead Plaintiffs thoroughly understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the case. This factor weighs in favor
of the settlements.

The Risks of Continued Litigation

The fourth, fifth, and sixth Girsh factors are the risks of
establishing liability, the risks of establishing damages, and the
risks of maintaining the class action throughout the trial. These
factors "balance the likelihood of success and the potential damage
award if the case were taken to trial against the benefits of
immediate settlement.

The parties have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the case, including the risks of
continuing the litigation. This is a technical financial matter
that would likely turn on highly complex expert testimony. While
both parties believe in the merits of their case, they understand
the unpredictability of a case of this type. Moreover, to support
their fraud claims, Plaintiffs would have been required to
establish that Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly, which
is very difficult to prove.   

Likewise, the Plaintiffs would have had to establish that their
losses were attributable to the Defendants' fraud rather than
upheaval in the market. The fact of a related criminal trial and
subsequent convictions also added significant delays, would have
added risk and uncertainty in litigating the action, and would have
likely affected the financial recovery in this case. The risk of
class decertification would have been low, but such a risk did
exist. Thus, the factors regarding risks of establishing liability
and damages weigh in favor of the settlement, while the risk of
decertification is neutral.

The Ability of the Defendant to Withstand Greater Judgment

The seventh factor regards the ability of the defendant to
withstand a greater judgment. This factor is most clearly relevant
where a settlement in a given case is less than would ordinarily be
awarded but the defendant's financial circumstances do not permit a
greater settlement. That is not the case here.

Defendants are capable of withstanding a larger judgment. However,
they would still not be required to pay more than the Class Members
are entitled. The Court finds that this factor does not weigh
heavily for or against the settlement.  

The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best
Possible Recovery and the Attendant Risks of Litigation

The eighth and ninth factors are the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery and the
attendant risks of litigation. These factors examine whether the
settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor value
for a strong case.

The Plaintiffs estimate that the Class suffered $530 million to
$546 million in recoverable damages and have provided expert
calculations to support the estimate. Thus, the $210 million
recovery is nearly 40% of the Class' maximum likely recovery, which
Plaintiffs argue is far better than average.  The Court concludes
this factor weighs in favor of the settlement agreements.

It is clear that upon balancing of the Girsh factors, they tip
strongly in favor of the settlement.

The Prudential Factors

Those factors include: (1) the maturity of the underlying
substantive issues, as measured by among other things the extent of
discovery on the merits, and other factors that bear on the ability
to assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of
liability and individual damages (2) the existence and probable
outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses (3) the
comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for
individual class or subclass members and the results achieved or
likely to be achieved for other claimants (4) whether class or
subclass members are accorded the right to opt out of the
settlement (5) whether any provisions for attorneys' fees are
reasonable and (6) whether the procedure for processing individual
claims under the settlement is fair and reasonable.

There do not appear to be any other similar pending cases. Class
Members were given the opportunity to opt-out of the Class when it
was certified. As discussed below, the fees and costs sought are
reasonable. Regarding the final factor, the court finds that the
allocation of the settlement funds to the individual Class Members
is fair and reasonable. The allocation was developed by the
parties' experts and includes a calculated loss amount for each
relevant stock purchase.

The loss amount equals the difference between the alleged
artificial inflation on the date of stock purchase and the alleged
artificial inflation on the date of sale, or the difference between
the actual purchase price and the sale price, whichever is less.
The settlement funds will be allocated on a pro rata basis based on
the relative size of the Class Members' loss.

In that the Girsh and Prudential factors weigh in favor of the
settlements, the Court finds them fair and will approve the
settlement agreements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 19, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya75cxts
from Leagle.com.

Pipefitters Local 537 Annuity Fund, On Behalf Of Themselves And All
Others Similarly Situated & Mohammed Elzagha, Plaintiffs,
represented by Norman M. Monhait -- nmonhait@rmgglaw.com --
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. & Peter Bradford deLeeuw --
bdeleeuw@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A.

Merced County Employees Retirement Association, St. Petersburg
Firefighters Retirement System & Pompano Beach General Employees
Retirement System, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert J. Kriner,
Jr., Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP, Salvatore J. Graziano, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, Steven B. Singer,
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, Tiffany
Joanne Cramer, Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP & Vera Gerrit Belger,
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP.

Wilmington Trust Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jamie Lynne
Edmonson -- jledmonson@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Barry S. Simon
-- bsimon@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher T. Berg -- cberg@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro
hac vice, Daniel P. Moylan -- dpmoylan@Venable.com -- Venable LLP,
pro hac vice, Daniel A. O'Brien -- dao'brien@Venable.com -- Venable
LLP, James A. Dunbar -- jadunbar@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, pro
hac vice, James L. Shea -- jlshea@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, pro
hac vice, Katherine A. Trefz -- ktrefz@wc.com -- Williams &
Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Lance A. Wade -- lwade@wc.com --
Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Margaret A. Keeley --
mkeeley@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew R.
Alsip -- mralsip@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, pro hac vice, Simon A.
Latcovich -- slatcovich@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac
vice &Tobin J. Romero -- tromero@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP,
pro hac vice.


WURTH LOUIS: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Craftwood Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Craftwood II, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling
in its lawsuit styled Craftwood II, Inc. v. Wurth Louis and
Company, et al., Case No. 8:17-cv-00606-DOC-KES, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Santa Ana.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
asked the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons and entities that were subscribers of
      facsimile telephone numbers to which material that
      discusses, describes, or promotes Wurth Louis and Company's
      property, goods or services, was sent via facsimile
      broadcasts between March 7, 2013, and April 19, 2017";

   2. designating Craftwood II as Class Representative;

   3. appointing C. Darryl Cordero and Scott O. Luskin of Payne &
      Fears LLP as lead Class Counsel, and Joel S. Magolnick of
      Marko & Magolnick, P.A., as additional class counsel; and

   4. directing to class members the best notice that is
      practicable under the circumstances, including individual
      notice to all members who can be identified through
      reasonable effort.

The appellate case is captioned as Craftwood II, Inc. v. Wurth
Louis and Company, et al., Case No. 18-80166, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner CRAFTWOOD II, INC., a California corporation,
DBA Bay Hardware, individually and as representative of all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Scott O. Luskin, Esq.
          PAYNE & FEARS LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (213) 439-9911
          E-mail: sol@paynefears.com

               - and -

          C. Darryl Cordero, Esq.
          PAYNE & FEARS LLP
          400 Continental Boulevard, Suite 600
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 689-1750
          Facsimile: (310) 689-1755
          E-mail: cdc@paynefears.com

Defendant-Respondent WURTH LOUIS AND COMPANY, a California
corporation, is represented by:

          Michael B. Shortnacy, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6000
          E-mail: mshortnacy@sidley.com


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Aerojet Rocketdyne Faces 54 Cases at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. still defends itself against 54
asbestos cases pending as of September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

Aerojet Rocketdyne states, "The Company has been, and continues to
be, named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury or
death due to exposure to asbestos in building materials, products,
or in manufacturing operations.  The majority of cases are pending
in Texas and Illinois state courts.  There were 54 asbestos cases
pending as of September 30, 2018.

"Given the lack of any significant consistency to claims (i.e., as
to product, operational site, or other relevant assertions) filed
against the Company, the Company is generally unable to make a
reasonable estimate of the future costs of pending claims or
unasserted claims.  As of September 30, 2018, the Company has
accrued an immaterial amount related to pending claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/nSXcHD


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Still Faces Mount Vernon Mills Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is still a named direct defendant in
some asbestos cases as the "successor in interest" to Mount Vernon
Mills, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In some of these asbestos cases, the Company
is named both as a direct defendant and as the "successor in
interest" to Mount Vernon Mills ("Mount Vernon").  We acquired
certain assets from Mount Vernon in 1993.  Certain plaintiffs
allege injury caused by asbestos-containing products alleged to
have been sold by Mount Vernon many years prior to this
acquisition.  Mount Vernon is contractually obligated to indemnify
the Company against any liability arising out of such products.  We
deny any liability for products sold by Mount Vernon prior to the
acquisition of the Mount Vernon assets.  Pursuant to its
contractual indemnification obligations, Mount Vernon has assumed
the defense of these claims.  On this basis, we have successfully
moved for dismissal in a number of actions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2qWXTRn


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Revives Airborne Asbestos Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reported that a California appeals court has revived a
lawsuit against two former asbestos manufacturers alleging a man
developed cancer due to airborne exposure to asbestos from plants
several miles from his home.

In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the 6th District
California Court of Appeal in San Jose found the companies owe a
duty of care that extends beyond the premises of their facilities
and reversed a grant of summary judgment to the defendants.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Company's Expert Witness Request Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mesothelioma.net reported that Nancy Little's father, Robert L.
Rabe, died of malignant mesothelioma in December of 2012 after
years of working for the Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad. She
has filed a mesothelioma lawsuit against The Budd Company, accusing
them of exposing her father to asbestos in the pipe insulation that
they supplied for the railroad's railcars, and in doing so plans on
having testimony provided by several expert witnesses. In response,
The Budd Company has filed a motion to prevent these witnesses from
testifying in the case. District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree has ruled
against this request, and the woman's case seeking justice for her
father will be able to proceed with the strength of the testimony
of the experts that she had chosen.

When juries hear mesothelioma lawsuits filed by victims of asbestos
exposure, they are asked to make decisions on extremely complex
scientific issues. To help them in this process, expert witnesses
are brought in to explain the details of how asbestos causes
mesothelioma, whether asbestos is present in particular pieces of
equipment, and more. In the case of Ms. Little's lawsuit, she had
requested testimony from two well-known asbestos experts: Dr.
Arnold Brody and Dr. Barry Castleman.  Despite or because of the
fact that these two experts are so well-versed, The Budd Company
attempted to exclude their testimony for a variety of reasons,
including indicating that Dr. Castleman's testimony is an "undue
waste of time" because it takes too long, a claim which Ms.
Little's attorneys called "hyperbolic."

In reviewing the credentials of the mesothelioma and asbestos
experts, the judge closely examined each of the reasons that the
defense offered against the use of the experts, as well as
decisions made by previous courts on whether to allow their
testimony. In the end, he allowed both, saying that with the
exception of one point, both could provide admissible expert
testimony. The victim's family will be allowed to have the evidence
supporting their accusation presented by the two men.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CBS Corp. Had 31,500 Claims Pending at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
CBS Corporation had approximately 31,500 asbestos-related claims
pending as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

CBS Corp. states, "The Company is a defendant in lawsuits claiming
various personal injuries related to asbestos and other materials,
which allegedly occurred as a result of exposure caused by various
products manufactured by Westinghouse, a predecessor, generally
prior to the early 1970s.  Westinghouse was neither a producer nor
a manufacturer of asbestos.  The Company is typically named as one
of a large number of defendants in both state and federal cases.
In the majority of asbestos lawsuits, the plaintiffs have not
identified which of the Company's products is the basis of a claim.
Claims against the Company in which a product has been identified
principally relate to exposures allegedly caused by
asbestos-containing insulating material in turbines sold for
power-generation, industrial and marine use.

"Claims are frequently filed and/or settled in groups, which may
make the amount and timing of settlements, and the number of
pending claims, subject to significant fluctuation from period to
period.  The Company does not report as pending those claims on
inactive, stayed, deferred or similar dockets which some
jurisdictions have established for claimants who allege minimal or
no impairment.  As of September 30, 2018, the Company had pending
approximately 31,500 asbestos claims, as compared with
approximately 31,660 as of December 31, 2017 and 32,760 as of
September 30, 2017.  During the third quarter of 2018, the Company
received approximately 770 new claims and closed or moved to an
inactive docket approximately 1,020 claims.  The Company reports
claims as closed when it becomes aware that a dismissal order has
been entered by a court or when the Company has reached agreement
with the claimants on the material terms of a settlement.
Settlement costs depend on the seriousness of the injuries that
form the basis of the claims, the quality of evidence supporting
the claims and other factors.  The Company's total costs for the
years 2017 and 2016 for settlement and defense of asbestos claims
after insurance recoveries and net of tax were approximately US$57
million and US$48 million, respectively.  The Company's costs for
settlement and defense of asbestos claims may vary year to year and
insurance proceeds are not always recovered in the same period as
the insured portion of the expenses.

"The Company believes that its reserves and insurance are adequate
to cover its asbestos liabilities.  This belief is based upon many
factors and assumptions, including the number of outstanding
claims, estimated average cost per claim, the breakdown of claims
by disease type, historic claim filings, costs per claim of
resolution and the filing of new claims.  While the number of
asbestos claims filed against the Company has remained generally
flat in recent years, it is difficult to predict future asbestos
liabilities, as events and circumstances may occur including, among
others, the number and types of claims and average cost to resolve
such claims, which could affect the Company's estimate of its
asbestos liabilities."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2qWQqln


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CertainTeed Corp. Can't Shake Asbestos Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Law reported that CertainTeed Corp. will again face
asbestos exposure claims by the estate of man who lived and worked
near its cement pipe plant.

The building material manufacturer failed to prove that it owed no
duty of care to Dean Trapp, who lived and worked between four and
seven miles from the plant, a California appeals court said.

Whether the company had a duty turns on the foreseability of the
risk of harm, the court said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Claims vs. Special Electric Dismissal Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that a California appellate court
has affirmed the dismissal of asbestos-related claims against
Special Electric Company Inc. as time-barred, concluding that the
defendant gave sufficient notice of its dissolution.

In the Nov. 26 order, the California Court of Appeal, First
District, Division Five, rejected the plaintiff's position that the
operative Wisconsin statute is preempted by Special Electric's
Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan.

The underlying claims were brought on behalf of David Hart, who
allegedly developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to
asbestos-containing cement pipe and drywall joint compound products
supplied by Special Electric.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Records $5.9MM Liability
-----------------------------------------------------------
Columbus McKinnon Corporation has US$5,897,000 as its
asbestos-related aggregate liability that is probable and estimable
as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Like many industrial manufacturers, the
Company is involved in asbestos-related litigation.  In continually
evaluating costs relating to its estimated asbestos-related
liability, the Company reviews, among other things, the incidence
of past and recent claims, the historical case dismissal rate, the
mix of the claimed illnesses and occupations of the plaintiffs, its
recent and historical resolution of the cases, the number of cases
pending against it, the status and results of broad-based
settlement discussions, and the number of years such activity might
continue.  Based on this review, the Company has estimated its
share of liability to defend and resolve probable asbestos-related
personal injury claims.  This estimate is highly uncertain due to
the limitations of the available data and the difficulty of
forecasting with any certainty the numerous variables that can
affect the range of the liability.  The Company will continue to
study the variables in light of additional information in order to
identify trends that may become evident and to assess their impact
on the range of liability that is probable and estimable.

"Based on actuarial information, the Company has estimated its
asbestos-related aggregate liability including related legal costs
to range between US$4,000,000 and US$7,700,000 using actuarial
parameters of continued claims for a period of 37 years from
September 30, 2018.  The Company's estimation of its
asbestos-related aggregate liability that is probable and
estimable, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles approximates US$5,897,000, which has been reflected as a
liability in the consolidated financial statements as of September
30, 2018.  The recorded liability does not consider the impact of
any potential favorable federal legislation.  This liability will
fluctuate based on the uncertainty in the number of future claims
that will be filed and the cost to resolve those claims, which may
be influenced by a number of factors, including the outcome of the
ongoing broad-based settlement negotiations, defensive strategies,
and the cost to resolve claims outside the broad-based settlement
program.  Of this amount, management expects to incur asbestos
liability payments of approximately US$2,000,000 over the next 12
months.  Because payment of the liability is likely to extend over
many years, management believes that the potential additional costs
for claims will not have a material effect on the financial
condition of the Company or its liquidity, although the effect of
any future liabilities recorded could be material to earnings in a
future period.

"The Company believes that a share of its previously incurred
asbestos-related expenses and future asbestos-related expenses are
covered by pre-existing insurance policies.  The Company has
engaged in a legal action against the insurance carriers for those
policies to recover these expenses and future costs incurred.  When
the Company resolves this legal action, it is expected that a gain
will be recorded for previously expensed cost that is recovered.
In July 2017 and August 2018, the Company received settlement
payments of US$1,741,000 and US$120,000, respectively, net of legal
fees, from one of its insurance carriers as partial reimbursement
for asbestos-related expenses.  These partial payments have been
recorded as gains in cost of products sold.  In February 2018 and
June 2018 additional settlement payments of US$621,000 and
US$9,000, respectively, were received from another insurance
carrier as partial reimbursement for asbestos-related expenses.
The Company is continuing its actions to recover further past costs
and to cover future costs."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/N7TkF0


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Accrues $8MM Liability at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc. had accrued liability of US$8 million for
asbestos suits at September 30, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.  The Company
also deferred US$8 million as regulatory assets related to asbestos
suits at September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Suits have been brought in New York State and
federal courts against the Utilities and many other defendants,
wherein a large number of plaintiffs sought large amounts of
compensatory and punitive damages for deaths and injuries allegedly
caused by exposure to asbestos at various premises of the
Utilities.  The suits that have been resolved, which are many, have
been resolved without any payment by the Utilities, or for amounts
that were not, in the aggregate, material to them.  The amounts
specified in all the remaining thousands of suits total billions of
dollars; however, the Utilities believe that these amounts are
greatly exaggerated, based on the disposition of previous claims.

"At September 30, 2018, Con Edison and CECONY have accrued their
estimated aggregate undiscounted potential liabilities for these
suits and additional suits that may be brought over the next 15
years as shown in the following table.  These estimates were based
upon a combination of modeling, historical data analysis and risk
factor assessment.  Courts have begun, and unless otherwise
determined on appeal may continue, to apply different standards for
determining liability in asbestos suits than the standard that
applied historically.  As a result, the Companies currently believe
that there is a reasonable possibility of an exposure to loss in
excess of the liability accrued for the suits.  The Companies are
unable to estimate the amount or range of such loss.

"In addition, certain current and former employees have claimed or
are claiming workers' compensation benefits based on alleged
disability from exposure to asbestos.  CECONY is permitted to defer
as regulatory assets (for subsequent recovery through rates) costs
incurred for its asbestos lawsuits and workers' compensation
claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2zkHj2C


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Flips $1.6MM Asbestos Jury Award
-------------------------------------------------------
San Francisco Chronicle reported that a state appeals court has
overturned $1.6 million in damages awarded by an Alameda County
jury against a pipe supply company last year in a suit by a former
construction worker who was stricken with cancer after cutting
pipes laden with asbestos.

The only evidence that the company supplied the pipes was a
foreman's testimony that he saw the company's logo on some
invoices, the appeals court said. The jury never got to see the
invoices because they were destroyed. So that testimony was hearsay
-- a secondhand account of events occurring outside the courtroom
-- and it should not have been allowed in Frank C. Hart's trial
against Keenan Properties, the First District Court of Appeal in
San Francisco said in a 2-1 ruling, published Monday as a precedent
for future cases.

Without the foreman's statements, the court said, there was no
evidence that Keenan supplied the asbestos pipes that Hart worked
on in 1976-77.

Hart, who worked as a pipelayer and later as a foreman, suffers
from mesothelioma, an often fatal cancer most commonly caused by
exposure to asbestos. He and his wife, Cynthia, sued companies
involved in manufacturing or supplying the pipes he worked on. They
settled their claims against some of the companies, but Keenan
declined to settle, and their dispute went to trial.

Hart had worked as a pipe cutter for his employer, Christeve Corp.,
installing thousands of feet of asbestos-cement pipe in sewer lines
in McKinleyville (Humboldt County) from September 1976 to March
1977. To identify the supplier, he relied on testimony by a
foreman, John Glamuzina, who said he recalled seeing Keenan's logo,
a circled letter K, on invoices he signed when receiving the
pipes.

A company official said he had no information that Keenan had sold
pipes in McKinleyille at the time, and invoices from that period
have long since been destroyed. The jury found that Keenan had been
one of the companies that harmed Hart, and awarded damages for
financial losses and pain and suffering.

The appeals court said Glamuzina should not have been allowed to
testify because his testimony was based on secondhand information,
his recollection of the invoices.

"He lacked personal knowledge of who the supplier was," Presiding
Justice Barbara Jones said in the majority opinion. He did not see
the invoices prepared and thus could not properly authenticate
them, she said.

In dissent, Justice Henry Needham said Glamuzina had personal
knowledge of the documents he had seen. And because they were
allegedly prepared by Hart's opponent in the suit -- an exception
to the usual ban on hearsay evidence -- the jury was entitled to
decide whether the invoices the foreman recalled were authentic,
Needham said.

Lawyers for the Harts could not be reached for comment. They could
appeal the ruling to the state Supreme Court.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Had 55,500 Claims at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Crown Holdings, Inc. (fka Crown Cork & Seal Co Inc.) had 55,500
outstanding claims related to asbestos matters as of September 30,
2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. ("Crown Cork")
is one of many defendants in a substantial number of lawsuits filed
throughout the U.S. by persons alleging bodily injury as a result
of exposure to asbestos.  These claims arose from the insulation
operations of a U.S. company, the majority of whose stock Crown
Cork purchased in 1963.  Approximately ninety days after the stock
purchase, this U.S. company sold its insulation assets and was
later merged into Crown Cork.

"Prior to 1998, amounts paid to asbestos claimants were covered by
a fund made available to Crown Cork under a 1985 settlement with
carriers insuring Crown Cork through 1976, when Crown Cork became
self-insured.  The fund was depleted in 1998 and the Company has no
remaining coverage for asbestos-related costs.

"In December 2001, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted
legislation that limits the asbestos-related liabilities of
Pennsylvania corporations that are successors by corporate merger
to companies involved with asbestos.  The legislation limits the
successor's liability for asbestos to the acquired company's asset
value adjusted for inflation.  Crown Cork has paid significantly
more for asbestos-related claims than the acquired company's
adjusted asset value.  In November 2004, the legislation was
amended to address a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision (Ieropoli
v. AC&S Corporation, et al., No. 117 EM 2002) which held that the
statute violated the Pennsylvania Constitution due to retroactive
application.  The Company cautions that the limitations of the
statute, as amended, are subject to litigation and may not be
upheld.

"In June 2003, the state of Texas enacted legislation that limits
the asbestos-related liabilities in Texas courts of companies such
as Crown Cork that allegedly incurred these liabilities because
they are successors by corporate merger to companies that had been
involved with asbestos.  The Texas legislation, which applies to
future claims and pending claims, caps asbestos-related liabilities
at the total gross value of the predecessor's assets adjusted for
inflation.  Crown Cork has paid significantly more for
asbestos-related claims than the total adjusted value of its
predecessor's assets.

"In October 2010, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas
legislation was unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution when
applied to asbestos-related claims pending against Crown Cork when
the legislation was enacted in June 2003.  The Company believes
that the decision of the Texas Supreme Court is limited to
retroactive application of the Texas legislation to
asbestos-related cases that were pending against Crown Cork in
Texas on June 11, 2003 and therefore, in its accrual, continues to
assign no value to claims filed after June 11, 2003.

"In recent years, the states of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming enacted legislation that limits
asbestos-related liabilities under state law of companies such as
Crown Cork that allegedly incurred these liabilities because they
are successors by corporate merger to companies that had been
involved with asbestos.  The legislation, which applies to future
and, with the exception of Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, South
Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming, pending claims, caps
asbestos-related liabilities at the fair market value of the
predecessor's total gross assets adjusted for inflation.  Crown
Cork has paid significantly more for asbestos-related claims than
the total value of its predecessor's assets adjusted for inflation.
Crown Cork has integrated the legislation into its claims defense
strategy.

"The Company further cautions that an adverse ruling in any
litigation relating to the constitutionality or applicability to
Crown Cork of one or more statutes that limits the asbestos-related
liability of alleged defendants like Crown Cork could have a
material impact on the Company."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/dyQoJg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Decision Tossing $11MM Asbestos Verdict Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com reported that the New York Court of Appeals decided there
was insufficient evidence to establish that Ford Motor Co. caused a
mechanic's mesothelioma, affirming a decision that reversed an $11
million jury verdict holding the auto manufacturer partly liable
for his injuries.

The court said in a one-paragraph memorandum that the trial court's
decision tossing the jury's verdict should be upheld based on the
evidence, or lack thereof, presented during trial.

"Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that
respondent Ford Motor Company's conduct was a proximate cause of
the decedent's injuries pursuant to the standards set forth in
Parker v. Mobil Oil," the decision said.

In Parker, a service station employee linked his leukemia diagnosis
to exposure to benzene in gasoline. In a 2006 decision, the Court
of Appeals decided that plaintiffs needed to show evidence they had
been exposed to levels of toxin that could have caused the
disease.

That standard was before the high court Tuesday in its opinion
siding with Ford in the lawsuit, which was brought by a former auto
mechanic named Arthur Juni Jr. in 2012. Juni alleged that exposure
to asbestos-containing Ford products during his time as an auto
mechanic caused his mesothelioma.

J. Tracy Walker IV argued for Ford in the case before the Court of
Appeals in October. Ford said in a statement it was pleased with
the result.

Juni worked on Ford vehicles at Orange & Rockland utilities for
more than four decades until 2009. He said he worked without a
respirator that would have protected him from chrysotile asbestos
fibers for his first 25 years at the company. He also claimed Ford
recognized that some of its products would expose mechanics to the
cancer-causing asbestos fibers.

Juni sued Ford, among others, in 2012 for damages after he
developed mesothelioma. He died two years after bringing the
lawsuit, but the litigation continued with his wife as the
plaintiff. They called two expert witnesses to testify about the
link between Ford's products and Juni's disease.

The jury in the trial ultimately awarded Juni's estate $8 million
for pain and suffering and his wife $3 million for her loss. Ford
was responsible for 49 percent of that liability under the jury's
decision.

The auto manufacturer moved for the district court to set aside the
jury's verdict, arguing that the evidence presented by Juni's
attorneys at trial was insufficient to hold them liable for his
mesothelioma. That motion was granted by the trial court and
affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department.

The only difference between the trial and appellate court decisions
was the phrasing. The trial court wrote in its decision tossing the
jury's verdict that Juni's attorneys had generally not established
that his exposure to Ford's products caused his mesothelioma. The
Appellate Division's decision mirrored more closely the decision in
Parker, saying specifically that "a causation expert must still
establish that the plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of
the toxin from the defendant's products to have caused his
disease."

Associate Judge Rowan Wilson wrote in a separate opinion concurring
with the majority that his position affirmed the decision of the
trial court without addressing the Appellate Division's decision.
He said Juni's attorneys had not rebutted an argument from Ford
during trial that the products he handled may not have been as
dangerous as experts testified.

Juni worked with Ford and other so-called "friction" products, like
brakes and clutches. Ford produced evidence at trial claiming that
when those products are subject to high temperatures, the asbestos
is converted into a substance less potent than chrysotile asbestos
fibers. The plaintiffs did not have evidence contradicting those
claims, Wilson wrote.

"Thus, a necessary link in the proof of proximate cause was
missing," Wilson wrote. "I do not suggest that Ford is correct as a
scientific matter; that question remains for the trier of fact in
each case. Here, in my view, there was simply a gap in proof as to
the toxicity of the products at issue."

Associate Judge Jenny Rivera wrote the only dissent. She argued
that the only reason to throw out the jury's verdict would be if it
was determined to be "utterly irrational," as decided in Campbell
v. City of Elmira in 1994. Rivera wrote that the verdict in Juni's
case was not irrational based on the facts presented during trial.

"On a daily basis, he was exposed to asbestos-laden dust from new
and used brakes, clutches, and manifold and engine gaskets," Rivera
wrote. "The jury also heard expert testimony that during the time
of Mr. Juni's exposure, Ford's vehicle parts contained chrysotile
asbestos, which had been linked to mesothelioma."

"In light of the compelling evidence of Mr. Juni's exposure to
asbestos while working on Ford vehicles and products, I find no
basis to conclude that the verdict was utterly irrational," Rivera
later wrote.

Juni was represented before the Court of Appeals by Alani Golanski,
director of the appellate litigation unit at Weitz & Luxenberg, a
Manhattan firm specializing in cases involving exposure to asbestos
and other environmental toxins. Golanski did not immediately return
a call for comment on Tuesday.

Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and Associate Judge Leslie Stein joined
the memorandum decision. Associate Judges Michael Garcia and Paul
Feinman did not take part in the decision. Feinman recused himself
from the case because he was on the Appellate Division panel that
heard the appeal before his appointment to the Court of Appeals.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $27.6MM Asbestos Coverage at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Enpro Industries, Inc. had approximately US$27.6 million of
insurance coverage to cover asbestos claims payments and certain
expense payments as of September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "The historical business operations of our
subsidiaries, Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC ("GST LLC") and The
Anchor Packing Company ("Anchor"), resulted in a substantial volume
of asbestos litigation in which plaintiffs alleged personal injury
or death as a result of exposure to asbestos fibers.  Those
subsidiaries manufactured and/or sold industrial sealing products,
predominately gaskets and packing, that contained encapsulated
asbestos fibers.  Anchor was an inactive and insolvent indirect
subsidiary of EnPro's then-direct subsidiary, Coltec Industries Inc
("Coltec").  Our subsidiaries' exposure to asbestos litigation and
their relationships with insurance carriers had been managed
through another subsidiary, Garrison Litigation Management Group,
Ltd. ("Garrison").  GST LLC, Anchor and Garrison are collectively
referred to as "GST."

"On June 5, 2010 (the "GST Petition Date"), GST LLC, Anchor and
Garrison (collectively referred to as "GST") filed voluntary
petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (the "GST Chapter 11 Case") in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of North Carolina in Charlotte (the
"Bankruptcy Court").  GST LLC is one of the businesses in our
broader Garlock group and it and its subsidiaries operate five
manufacturing facilities, including operations in Palmyra, New York
and Houston, Texas.  The filings on the GST Petition Date did not
include EnPro Industries, Inc. or any other EnPro Industries, Inc.
operating subsidiary.

"The filings were the initial step in a claims resolution process
for an efficient and permanent resolution of pending and future
asbestos claims through court approval of a plan of reorganization
to establish a facility to resolve and pay all GST asbestos
claims.

"On March 17, 2016, we announced that we had reached a
comprehensive consensual settlement (the "Consensual Settlement")
to resolve current and future asbestos claims which contemplated
the joint plan of reorganization (the "Joint Plan") which was filed
with the Bankruptcy Court.  The Joint Plan and Consensual
Settlement contemplated that, as an appropriate and necessary step
to facilitate the implementation of the Consensual Settlement and
not to delay or hinder creditors or the resolution of claims,
Coltec would, subject to the receipt of necessary consents, undergo
a restructuring (the "Coltec Restructuring") in which all of its
significant operating assets and subsidiaries, which included each
of our major business units, would be distributed to a new direct
EnPro subsidiary, EnPro Holdings, Inc. ("EnPro Holdings").  EnPro
Holdings would also assume all of Coltec's non-asbestos
liabilities.  The Coltec Restructuring was completed on December
31, 2016, and included the merger of Coltec with and into OldCo,
LLC ("OldCo"), which was a direct subsidiary of EnPro Holdings.
OldCo, as the restructured entity, retained responsibility for all
asbestos claims and rights to certain insurance assets of Coltec,
as well as the business operated by our EnPro Learning System, LLC
subsidiary ("EnPro Learning System"), which provides occupational
safety training and consulting services to third parties.  EnPro
Learning System was also merged into OldCo.

"As contemplated by the Joint Plan, on January 30, 2017 (the "OldCo
Petition Date"), OldCo, as the successor by merger to Coltec, filed
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the Bankruptcy Court (the
"OldCo Chapter 11 Case").  On February 3, 2017, the Bankruptcy
Court issued an order for the joint administration of the OldCo
Chapter 11 Case with the GST Chapter 11 Case.

"During the pendency of the GST Chapter 11 Case and the OldCo
Chapter 11 Case, certain actions proposed to be taken by GST or
OldCo not in the ordinary course of business were subject to
approval by the Bankruptcy Court.  As a result, during the pendency
of the GST Chapter 11 Case and the OldCo Chapter 11 Case, we did
not have exclusive control over these companies.  Accordingly, as
required by GAAP, GST was deconsolidated beginning on the GST
Petition Date and OldCo was deconsolidated beginning on the OldCo
Petition Date.

"As of September 30, 2018, approximately US$27.6 million of
available products hazard limits or insurance receivables existed
under primary and excess general liability insurance policies other
than the Pre-Garlock Coverage Block (the "Garlock Coverage Block")
from solvent carriers with investment grade ratings, which we
believe is available to cover GST asbestos claims payments and
certain expense payments, including contributions to the Trust.  We
consider such amount of available insurance coverage under the
Garlock Coverage Block to be of high quality because the insurance
policies are written or guaranteed by U.S.-based carriers whose
credit rating by S&P is investment grade (BBB-) or better, and
whose AM Best rating is excellent (A-) or better.  Of such amount
of remaining solvent insurance coverage under the Garlock Coverage
Block, US$15.0 million is allocated to claims that were paid by GST
LLC prior to the initiation of the Chapter 11 proceedings and
submitted to insurance companies for reimbursement, and the
remaining US$12.6 million is available to pending and estimated
future claims.  There are specific agreements in place with
carriers covering US$12.6 million of the remaining available
coverage.  Based on those agreements and the terms of the policies
in place and prior decisions concerning coverage, we believe that
all of the US$27.6 million of insurance proceeds will ultimately be
collected, although there can be no assurance that the insurance
companies will make the payments as and when due.  Based on those
agreements and policies, some of which define specific annual
amounts to be paid and others of which limit the amount that can be
recovered in any one year, we anticipate that US$15.0 million will
be received either through settlements or in reimbursements of
GST's plan funding as payments are made by the Trust."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2Q3RsKL


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Footballer From Asbestos-Related Disease
----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reported that a former footballer died from an
asbestos-related disease, an inquest heard.

Colin Harper, who played for Ipswich Town for more than a decade,
died from mesothelioma on 29 March, aged 71.

The hearing in Ipswich was told he had been exposed to asbestos
when he worked as an apprentice joiner and carpenter before he
became a professional footballer.

A conclusion of death through industrial disease was recorded.

'Impossible to avoid'

Assistant Suffolk coroner Dr Dan Sharpstone said Harper had cut
asbestos with a circular saw when he was an apprentice.

He said it "generated a lot of dust", which was "impossible to
avoid".

The hearing was told Harper was never warned of the dangers of
asbestos and was never given a mask to wear.

He had been undergoing radiotherapy and chemotherapy treatment
before he was transferred to St Elizabeth Hospice in Ipswich for
end of life care, where he died.

It was heard he worked as self-employed builder after he retired
from football, but he was not exposed to asbestos at that time.

Harper played 176 times for Ipswich in an 11-year stay at the club,
from 1966 to 1977.

He was in the side that lifted the Second Division title in 1967-68
and was granted a testimonial in 1975.

The defender competed in Europe under Sir Bobby Robson and was part
of the team which beat Real Madrid in the 1973 Uefa Cup.

He also had spells on loan at Grimsby and Cambridge before joining
Port Vale in 1977.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Gardner Denver Had $98.3MM Reserve at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gardner Denver Holdings, Inc. had total litigation reserve of
US$98.3 million as of September 30, 2018, with respect to potential
liability arising from the Company's asbestos-related litigation,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018.

Gardner Denver states, "The Company has also been named as a
defendant in a number of asbestos-related and silica-related
personal injury lawsuits.  The plaintiffs in these suits allege
exposure to asbestos or silica from multiple sources and typically
the Company is one of approximately 25 or more named defendants.

"Predecessors to the Company sometimes manufactured, distributed
and/or sold products allegedly at issue in the pending asbestos and
silica-related lawsuits (the "Products").  However, neither the
Company nor its predecessors ever mined, manufactured, mixed,
produced or distributed asbestos fiber or silica sand, the
materials that allegedly caused the injury underlying the lawsuits.
Moreover, the asbestos-containing components of the Products, if
any, were enclosed within the subject Products.

"Although the Company has never mined, manufactured, mixed,
produced or distributed asbestos fiber or silica sand nor sold
products that could result in a direct asbestos or silica exposure,
many of the companies that did engage in such activities or
produced such products are no longer in operation.  This has led to
law firms seeking potential alternative companies to name in
lawsuits where there has been an asbestos or silica related
injury.

"The Company believes that the pending and future asbestos and
silica-related lawsuits are not likely to, in the aggregate, have a
material adverse effect on its consolidated financial position,
results of operations or liquidity, based on: the Company's
anticipated insurance and indemnification rights to address the
risks of such matters; the limited potential asbestos exposure from
the Products; the Company's experience that the vast majority of
plaintiffs are not impaired with a disease attributable to alleged
exposure to asbestos or silica from or relating to the Products or
for which the Company otherwise bears responsibility; various
potential defenses available to the Company with respect to such
matters; and the Company's prior disposition of comparable matters.
However, inherent uncertainties of litigation and future
developments, including, without limitation, potential insolvencies
of insurance companies or other defendants, an adverse
determination in the Adams County Case, or other inability to
collect from the Company's historical insurers or indemnitors,
could cause a different outcome.  While the outcome of legal
proceedings is inherently uncertain, based on presently known
facts, experience, and circumstances, the Company believes that the
amounts accrued on its balance sheet are adequate and that the
liabilities arising from the asbestos and silica-related personal
injury lawsuits will not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's consolidated financial position, results of operations or
liquidity.  "Accrued liabilities" and "Other liabilities" on the
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet include a total litigation
reserve of US$98.3 million and US$105.6 million as of September 30,
2018 and December 31, 2017, with respect to potential liability
arising from the Company's asbestos-related litigation.  Asbestos
related defense costs are excluded from the asbestos claims
liability and are recorded separately as services are incurred.  In
the event of unexpected future developments, it is possible that
the ultimate resolution of these matters may be material to the
Company's consolidated financial position, results of operation or
liquidity.

"The Company has entered into a series of agreements with certain
of its or its predecessors' legacy insurers and certain potential
indemnitors to secure insurance coverage and/or reimbursement for
the costs associated with the asbestos and silica-related lawsuits
filed against the Company.  The Company has also pursued litigation
against certain insurers or indemnitors, where necessary.  The
Company has an insurance recovery receivable for probable asbestos
related recoveries of approximately US$95.9 million and US$100.4
million as of September 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017,
respectively, which was included in "Other assets" on the
Consolidated Balance Sheets.  During the nine month period ended
September 30, 2018 the Company received asbestos related insurance
recoveries of US$10.1 million, of which US$4.5 million related to
the recovery of indemnity payments, and was recorded as a reduction
of the insurance recovery receivable in "Other assets" on the
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, and US$5.6 million related
to reimbursement of previously expensed legal defense costs, and
was recorded as a reduction of "Selling and administrative
expenses" in the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations.

"The largest such recent action, Gardner Denver, Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, et al., was filed on July 9, 2010,
in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Adams County, Illinois, as case
number 10-L-48 (the "Adams County Case").  In the lawsuit, the
Company seeks, among other things, to require certain excess
insurer defendants to honor their insurance policy obligations to
the Company, including payment in whole or in part of the costs
associated with the asbestos-related lawsuits filed against the
Company.  In October 2011, the Company reached a settlement with
one of the insurer defendants, which had issued both primary and
excess policies, for approximately the amount of such defendant's
policies that were subject to the lawsuit.  Since then, the case
has been proceeding through the discovery and motions process with
the remaining insurer defendants.  On January 29, 2016, the Company
prevailed on the first phase of that discovery and motions process
("Phase I").  Specifically, the Court in the Adams County Case
ruled that the Company has rights under all of the policies in the
case, subject to their terms and conditions, even though the
policies were sold to the Company's former owners rather than to
the Company itself.  On June 9, 2016, the Court denied a motion by
several of the insurers who sought permission to appeal the Phase I
ruling immediately rather than waiting until the end of the whole
case as is normally required.  The case is now proceeding through
the discovery process regarding the remaining issues in dispute
("Phase II").

"A majority of the Company's expected future recoveries of the
costs associated with the asbestos-related lawsuits are the subject
of the Adams County Case.

"The amounts recorded by the Company for asbestos-related
liabilities and insurance recoveries are based on currently
available information and assumptions that the Company believes are
reasonable based on an evaluation of relevant factors.  The actual
liabilities or insurance recoveries could be higher or lower than
those recorded if actual results vary significantly from the
assumptions.  There are a number of key variables and assumptions
including the number and type of new claims to be filed each year,
the resolution or outcome of these claims, the average cost of
resolution of each new claim, the amount of insurance available,
allocation methodologies, the contractual terms with each insurer
with whom the Company has reached settlements, the resolution of
coverage issues with other excess insurance carriers with whom the
Company has not yet achieved settlements, and the solvency risk
with respect to the Company's insurance carriers.  Other factors
that may affect the future liability include uncertainties
surrounding the litigation process from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from case to case, legal rulings that may be made
by state and federal courts, and the passage of state or federal
legislation.  The Company makes the necessary adjustments for the
asbestos liability and corresponding insurance recoveries on an
annual basis unless facts or circumstances warrant assessment as of
an interim date."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/GiQzwn


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Magnetek Has $1MM Liability at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------
Columbus McKinnon Corporation's subsidiary, Magnetek, recorded
approximately US$1,000,000 for asbestos-related liability as of
September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Magnetek has been named, along with multiple
other defendants, in asbestos-related lawsuits associated with
business operations previously acquired but which are no longer
owned.  During Magnetek's ownership, none of the businesses
produced or sold asbestos-containing products.  For such claims,
Magnetek is uninsured and either contractually indemnified against
liability, or contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the
purchaser of these former business operations.  The Company
aggressively seeks dismissal from these proceedings.  Based on
actuarial information, the asbestos related liability including
legal costs is estimated to be approximately US$1,000,000 which has
been reflected as a liability in the consolidated financial
statements at September 30, 2018."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/N7TkF0


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Says Wife Had Secondary Asbestos Exposure
--------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Record reported that a man alleges his late wife
developed mesothelioma as a result of secondary exposure to
asbestos.

Gerald Day filed a complaint on Nov. 9 in the St. Louis 22nd
Judicial Circuit Court against Alfa Laval Inc., Flowserve US Inc.,
Warren Pumps LLC, et al. alleging negligence and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his wife,
Reba Day, was secondarily exposed to and inhaled or ingested
asbestos fibers emanating from certain products manufactured, sold,
distributed or installed by defendants.

The suit states that on or about June 22, his wife was diagnosed
with mesothelioma, an asbestos-induced disease, and she died on
July 4.

The plaintiff holds Alfa Laval Inc., Flowserve US Inc., Warren
Pumps LLC, et al. responsible because the defendants allegedly
failed to provide information regarding the safe handling and
cleaning apparel to avoid exposure to asbestos.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks compensatory and
punitive damages of more than $25,000 costs and all other relief
that is just and proper. He is represented by Andrew A. O'Brien,
Christopher J. Thoron, Bartholomew J. Baumstark, Gerald J.
FitzGerald and Adam J. Reynolds of O'Brien Law Firm in St. Louis.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1822-CC11616


ASBESTOS UPDATE: McDermott Int'l Still Defends Suits at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
McDermott International, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018, that it is a defendant in numerous
lawsuits wherein plaintiffs allege exposure to asbestos at various
locations.

The Company states, "We review and defend each case on its own
merits and make accruals based on the probability of loss and best
estimates of potential loss.  We do not believe any unresolved
asserted claim will have a material adverse effect on our future
results of operations, financial position or cash flow.  With
respect to unasserted asbestos claims, we cannot identify a
population of potential claimants with sufficient certainty to
determine the probability of loss or estimate of future loss.  We
do not believe a risk of material loss is probable related to this
matter, and, accordingly, our reserves were not significant at
September 30, 2018.

"While we continue to pursue recovery for recognized and
unrecognized contingent losses through insurance, indemnification
arrangements and other sources, we are unable to quantify the
amount that we may recover because of the variability in coverage
amounts, limitations and deductibles or the viability of carriers,
with respect to our insurance policies for the years in question."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/XwBYJe


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Md. Spec. App. Vacates Judgments vs. Vitale
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland vacates the judgments of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (a) granting Burnham and
Weil-McLain's, appellees, motion to dismiss, Audrey Vitale, and her
children, Ralph Vitale, Jr., Tony Vitale, Patricia Smith, Maria
Pycha, and Gina Messersmith's, appellants, wrongful death suit, and
(b) the court's subsequent denial of appellants' motion to
reconsider, and remands the case for further proceedings.

Appellants filed a wrongful death suit against appellees, which
alleged that Ralph Vitale, Sr., contracted malignant pleural
mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos. He died on January 11,
2014, and was not deposed prior to his death. Vitale was allegedly
exposed to asbestos through the installation, removal, and
maintenance of Weil-McLain and Burnham boilers while employed at
Vitale Plumbing and Heating.

On April 18, 2016, appellees filed for summary judgment as to all
claims arguing that no cause of action accrued against it based on
Maryland's Statute of Repose. The Statute of Repose precludes
actions for personal injury and death resulting from the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property that occurs
more than 20 years after the improvement first becomes available
for its intended use.

In appellants' written opposition to the motion they only addressed
arguments relating to causation, but did not include any argument
as to Maryland's Statute of Repose, that would have barred
appellants from pursing an action against appellees.

During oral argument on the motion for summary judgment,
appellants' counsel conceded that Weil-McLain and Burnham were not
suppliers under the Statute of Repose but argued that their
principal business was the manufacture and sale of boilers, which
were asbestos-containing products under the Statute of Repose. The
Court notes that the parties never addressed the question as to
whether Weil-McLain's and Burnham's boilers were an improvement to
real property.

Following argument, the circuit court granted appellees' motion for
summary judgment, ruling that Weil-McLain and Burnham were
protected by the Statute of Repose pursuant to CJP Section 5-108.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which argued that
Weil-McLain and Burnham were not protected by the Statute of
Repose.

In their motion for reconsideration, the appellants requested that
the circuit court reconsider its ruling and deny appellees' motion
for summary judgment as to the Statute of Repose. Appellants
contended that the Statute of Repose does not apply to Vitale as
appellees are not entitled to this protection from litigation
because both were manufacturers of products that contained
asbestos, i.e., boilers that contained asbestos. Specifically,
appellants aver that appellees are manufacturers of products that
contain asbestos, which was a factual matter to be resolved by the
trier of fact.

To further support their claim that appellees manufactured a
product containing asbestos, appellants submitted its boiler
expert's, Larry Jones, testimony at deposition in this case that
there is no difference in the operation of any Burnham or
Weil-McLain cast iron boiler regardless of its size, shape, or
configuration and significantly there is no difference in the
requirement to seal parts of the boiler with asbestos components
during assembly. Additionally, there was evidence presented to the
circuit court that there were two types of boilers; one that had
asbestos incorporated in the product, and others that required the
application of asbestos to function properly, i.e., "not burn down
the house."

As to Weil-McLain, a document prepared by a member of the
Weil-McLain engineering staff identified asbestos components within
each Weil-McLain boiler manufactured and sold by it between the mid
1960's to the early 1980's.

As demonstrated by Burnham in its motion for summary judgment, and
at the May 27 hearing, appellees contended that there was no
evidence in the record that the boilers in question were
manufactured with asbestos-containing components, or that Burnham
manufactured or supplied any of the asbestos-containing materials
which appellants alleged were used by or around Vitale to install
the boilers. Burnham argued that it was not a supplier as defined
in CJP Section 5-108(b)(1) and that appellants offered nothing in
their motion for reconsideration to demonstrate otherwise.

The Court finds that the appellants met their burden to identify
the portions of the record that identify with particularity the
material facts that were in dispute. Thus, putting side by side the
testimony and documents before the circuit court would demonstrate
that a factfinder should resolve the dispute as to what were the
types of boilers, assembled or unassembled, installed by Vitale and
whether their specific components, either incorporated or add-ons
were, "products that contain asbestos."

Accordingly, the Court determines that the circuit court erred in
denying appellants' motion to reconsider its decision to grant
appellees' motion for summary judgment.

The appealed case is Audrey Vitale, et al. v. Burnham, LLC, et al.,
No. 0566, September Term, 2017, (Md. Ct. Spec. App.).

A copy of the Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yalqmzec
from Leagle.com.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Faces 568 Lawsuits at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------
MRC Global Inc. remains a defendant in 568 asbestos-related
lawsuits involving approximately 1,166 claims, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018

The Company states, "We are one of many defendants in lawsuits that
plaintiffs have brought seeking damages for personal injuries that
exposure to asbestos allegedly caused.  Plaintiffs and their family
members have brought these lawsuits against a large volume of
defendant entities as a result of the defendants' manufacture,
distribution, supply or other involvement with asbestos, asbestos
containing-products or equipment or activities that allegedly
caused plaintiffs to be exposed to asbestos.  These plaintiffs
typically assert exposure to asbestos as a consequence of
third-party manufactured products that our MRC Global (US) Inc.
subsidiary purportedly distributed.

"As of September 30, 2018, we are named a defendant in
approximately 568 lawsuits involving approximately 1,166 claims.
No asbestos lawsuit has resulted in a judgment against us to date,
with a majority being settled, dismissed or otherwise resolved.
Applicable third-party insurance has substantially covered these
claims, and insurance should continue to cover a substantial
majority of existing and anticipated future claims.  Accordingly,
we have recorded a liability for our estimate of the most likely
settlement of asserted claims and a related receivable from
insurers for our estimated recovery, to the extent we believe that
the amounts of recovery are probable.  It is not possible to
predict the outcome of these claims and proceedings.  However, in
our opinion, the likelihood that the ultimate disposition of any of
these claims and legal proceedings will have a material adverse
effect on our consolidated financial statements is remote."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2DQgQO6


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NASSCO Colorable Defense in Morton's Suit Fails
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Manuel L. Real of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, at the behest of Plaintiffs
Randolph Morton & Edna S. Morton, remands the case styled Randolph
Morton; et al., Plaintiffs, v. 3M Company; et al., Defendants, Case
No. CV 18-5956-R, (C.D. Cal.).

This personal injury case stemmed from Plaintiff Randolph Morton's
asbestos-related disease allegedly caused by Defendants' acts and
omissions involving the use of asbestos at or in the vicinity of
Plaintiffs' workplaces. The Complaint alleges causes of action for
(1) strict products liability, (2) negligence, (3) fraud, (4)
conspiracy to defraud, and (5) market share.

Defendant National Steel and Shipbuilding Company ("NASSCO")
removed the case to federal court based on federal officer removal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a). The federal defense
that NASSCO seeks to assert is the government contractor defense,
pursuant to which military contractors cannot be held liable under
state law for any injuries caused by the work performed on
equipment supplied to the U.S. military when (a) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (b) the equipment or
services conformed to these specifications; and (c) the government
contractor warns the military about any hazards involved in the
equipment or services it was contracted to supply that are known to
the government contractor but not known to the military.

While Plaintiffs do not dispute that NASSCO qualifies as a "person"
within the meaning of the statute, the Court finds, however, that
NASSCO fails to meet the remaining two requirements for Section
1442(a) removal. Although the Declaration of Roger B. Horne, Jr.
attests to the federal government's involvement in ensuring
compliance with contract specifications and setting standards for
work by private contractors on Navy ships, NASSCO has failed to
introduce any evidence that such specifications and standards have
a causal nexus to Plaintiffs' claims.

The Court finds that Horne had no knowledge of or involvement in
the specific NASSCO contracts that allegedly contributed to
Plaintiffs' injuries, and NASSCO has introduced neither those
contracts (or any similar representative contracts) nor any other
evidence of Navy policies restricting the safety procedures
available to government contractors handling asbestos. Moreover,
federal law -- specifically 10 U.S.C. Section 7311, the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936; the Navy Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversions, and Repair Operations Manual; and
NASSCO's company policies all require that the repair/maintenance
of naval vehicles and handling of hazardous wastes be performed in
accordance not only with federal laws and standards but also with
potentially stricter state law requirements.

Finally, the Declarations of retired shipyard manager Captain
William Lowell and retired United States Navy Inspector Nick Peak
on behalf of Plaintiffs testify that, in their experience, private
shipyards developed asbestos safety procedures without Navy
supervision and the Navy did not inspect the private shipyard for
asbestos hazards. The Court, therefore, concludes that there is no
factual basis to support NASSCO's position that it was bound by
Navy specifications and standards even if such specifications and
standards proved to be inadequate.

NASSCO also fails to demonstrate that it has asserted a "colorable
defense." While it is clearly true that the Navy requires strict
compliance with precise specifications in many facets of
ship-building, maintenance, and repair, NASSCO has failed to
provide any evidence that such specifications placed limits on
NASSCO's ability to implement precautions to protect and warn
against the dangers of asbestos. There is simply no reason to
believe that NASSCO was prevented from protecting civilian
contractors from asbestos hazards while still performing its
contracts with the Navy.

A copy of the Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd6nj5n2
from Leagle.com.

Randolph Morton & Edna S. Morton, Plaintiffs, represented by H.W.
Trey Jones , Law Office of H.W. Trey Jones.

3M Company, also known as Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company, Defendant, represented by Denisse Lopez Campa --
denisse.lopezc@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP & Jayme C. Long --
jayme.long@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP.

Baldor Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Bartek R. Rejch
-- brejch@hptylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell Thackston and Young LLP.

Borgwarner Morse Tec LLC, individually and as
successor-in-interest, parent, alter ego and equitable trustee of
Borg-Warner Corporation, Defendant, represented by Matthew Stephen
Brady -- mbrady@selmanlaw.com -- Selman Breitman LLP, Holly Chang
Beal -- hbeal@selmanlaw.com -- Selman Breitman LLP & Karen B.
Goldberg -- kgoldberg@selmanlaw.com -- Selman Breitman LLP.

CBS Corporation, fka Viacom, Inc. (as successor-by-merger to CBS
Corporation), fka Westinghouse Electric Corporation & General
Electric Company, Defendants, represented by Justin F. Cronin ,
Kevin Jamison Law PC & Kevin D. Jamison , Kevin D Jamison Law PC.

Dr. Ing. J.C.F. Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Nicole C.
Orjiakor -- nicole.orjiakor@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP US.

Eaton Corporation, Defendant, represented by Robert H. Baronian --
bbaronian@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle Goetz Barnes and Reinholtz LLP
& Sherrie Soon Diveglia -- sdiveglia@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle
Goetz Barnes and Reinholtz LLP.

Edelbrock, LLC, Defendant, represented by Arpi Galfayan --
agalfayan@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle Goetz Barnes and Reinholtz LLP,
Carla Lynn Crochet -- ccrochet@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle Goetz
Barnes and Reinholtz LLP, Jeremy David Milbrodt --
jmilbrodt@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle Goetz Barnes and Reinholtz LLP
& Kenneth B. Prindle -- kprindle@prindlelaw.com -- Prindle Goetz
Barnes and Reinholtz LLP.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Heather M. Sweeney --
hkirkpatrick@lclaw.com -- Lankford Crawford Moreno and Ostertag
LLP, Paul Vincent Lankford -- plankford@lclaw.com -- Lankford
Crawford Moreno and Ostertag LLP & Paul Lannus -- plannus@lclaw.com
-- Lankford Crawford Moreno and Ostertag LLP.

Fryer Knowles, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles S. Bishop --
info@sinunubruni.com -- Sinunu Bruni LLP.

Genuine Parts Company, Defendant, represented by Erik R. Overlid --
eoverlid@pondnorth.com -- Pond North LLP, Francis D. Pond --
fpond@pondnorth.com -- Pond North LLP, Michael A. Graham --
mgraham@pondnorth.com -- Pond North LLP & Timothy C. Pieper --
tpieper@pondnorth.com -- Pond North LLP.

Hennessy Industries, Inc., individually and as
successor-in-interest to AMMCO Tools, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Ian G. Williamson -- igwilliamson@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully
Mansukhani LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., fka Allied Signal, Inc., as
successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jessica Thomas -- jjthomas@mwe.com -- McDermott Will
and Emery LLP & Katherine C. Elford , McDermott Will and Emery
LLP.

National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, Defendant, represented by
Amber Lee Kelly -- alk@darlaw.com -- Demler Armstong and Rowland
LLP & Paul M. Bessette -- bes@darlaw.com -- Demler Armstrong and
Rowland LLP.

The Pep Boys Manny Moe and Jack of California, Defendant,
represented by Bradford J. DeJardin -- brad.dejardin@dentons.com --
Dentons US LLP, Julia M. Beckley -- julia.beckley@dentons.com --
Dentons US LLP & Katherine A. Clements --
katherine.clements@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP.

Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., individually and as successor-in-interest to
Pneumo Abex Corporation and Abex Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Heather L. Weakley -- hweakley@dehay.com -- DeHay
and Elliston LLP, William H. Armstrong -- barmstrong@dehay.com --
DeHay and Elliston LLP & Salin Ebrahamian -- sebrahamian@dehay.com
-- DeHay and Elliston LLP.

Porsche Cars North America Inc., Defendant, represented by James J.
Yukevich -- jyukevich@yukelaw.com -- Yukevich Cavanaugh & Paul
Christopher White, II -- pwhite@yukelaw.com -- Yukevich Cavanaugh.

SB Decking, Inc., formerly known as Selby Battersby and Company,
Defendant, represented by Florence A. McClain --
Florence.McClain@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and
Smith LLP & Lesa M. Meyers -- Lesa.Meyers@lewisbrisbois.com --
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP.

Schneider Electric USA, Inc., individually and as
successor-in-interest to Square D Company, Defendant, represented
by Michele C. Barnes -- michele.barnes@klgates.com -- K and L Gates
LLP & Jonathan Theonugraha -- jonathan.theonugraha@klgates.com -- K
and L Gates LLP.

Union Carbide Corporation, Defendant, represented by Farah Sohaili
Nicol -- fnicol@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli LLP Attorney Has Not
Consented To Electronic Service, Stephen M. Nichols --
snichols@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli LLP Attorney Has Not
Consented To Electronic Service & Ryan S. Landis --
rlandis@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NSW Gov't Imposes $2MM Fine for Asbestos Dumping
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ferret reported that illegally dumping asbestos now carries a
multi-million dollar fine under new laws passed by the NSW
Government.

Previously, the maximum penalty for asbestos waste offenders were
$44,000 for corporation and $22,000 for individuals. Under the new
laws, these are now $2 million for corporation and $500,000 for
individuals who illegally dispose, recycle or re-use asbestos
waste.

Maximum court penalties for land pollution and waste offences
involving asbestos have also been doubled to $2 million for
corporations and $500,000 for individuals.

Managers and directors can also now be held accountable for
offences committed by their companies under the new laws.

NSW Environment Minister Gabrielle Upton said illegally dumping
asbestos is a serious crime, and the government wants dumpers to
know there are tough penalties for those that break the law.

"The new laws also require the courts to consider the presence of
asbestos when determining the magnitude of the penalty," Ms Upton
said.

"The massive fine hike comes on top recently announced tougher
asbestos handling controls for waste facilities and a tenfold
increase in on-the-spot asbestos fines for illegally transporting
or disposing of asbestos waste," she said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY Asbestos Court to Hear Baby Power Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Powder Mesothelioma reported that the New York City court dedicated
to hearing all asbestos litigation cases has ruled against parts of
Johnson & Johnson's motion for summary judgment in a mesothelioma
lawsuit accusing the company's baby powder product of causing a
woman's terminal illness. As a result, 65-year-old Donna A. Olson's
case against the consumer giant will be able to move forward, and
asbestos victims around the country will see which side of the
issue this esteemed court will land on.

Mesothelioma lawsuits have been filed against hundreds of companies
that have exposed people to asbestos, but few of those companies
have names as recognizable as Johnson & Johnson. The company's baby
powder product has long been one of the most trusted and iconic
brands in the world, but in recent years thousands of people have
connected their cancers to asbestos that they believe contaminated
the talc-based product. Asbestos and talc are both minerals, and
they are frequently found in close proximity to one another.
Asbestos victims' belief that Johnson & Johnson's talc contained
asbestos is supported by internal documents written decades ago by
scientists working for the company: memos have been discovered that
warned company executives of legal liability in case the public
ever discovered that the product contained asbestos.

Though Johnson & Johnson attorneys have worked to minimize the
impact of this evidence, juries around the country have chosen to
believe many of the mesothelioma victims that have come forward to
file mesothelioma lawsuits against the company, as well as women
who believe that their ovarian cancer was caused by their use of
the product in the genital area. Though some juries have denied
victims' claims and several have been unable to reach a conclusion,
other victims have been awarded significant multi-million dollar
awards from juries, and there are over 11,000 Johnson & Johnson's
baby powder lawsuits pending around the country.

If you have been diagnosed with mesothelioma or another
asbestos-related product, it doesn't matter whether your exposure
came from a product in your workplace, in your home, or anywhere
else -- you just need help. Contact the Patient Advocates at
Mesothelioma.net at 1-800-692-8608 to get the resources you need.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Owens-Illinois Defends 1,065 Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Owens-Illinois, Inc. still defends itself against approximately
1,065 plaintiffs and claimants related to asbestos matters as of
September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2018.

Owens-Illinois states, "The Company is a defendant in numerous
lawsuits alleging bodily injury and death as a result of exposure
to asbestos.  From 1948 to 1958, one of the Company's former
business units commercially produced and sold approximately US$40
million of a high-temperature, calcium-silicate based pipe and
block insulation material containing asbestos.  The Company sold
its insulation business unit at the end of April 1958.  The typical
asbestos personal injury lawsuit alleges various theories of
liability, including negligence, gross negligence and strict
liability and seeks compensatory and, in some cases, punitive
damages in various amounts (herein referred to as "asbestos
claims").

"Based on an analysis of the lawsuits pending as of December 31,
2017, approximately 89% of plaintiffs either do not specify the
monetary damages sought, or in the case of court filings, claim an
amount sufficient to invoke the jurisdictional minimum of the trial
court.  Approximately 8% of plaintiffs specifically plead damages
above the jurisdictional minimum up to, and including, US$15
million or less, and 3% of plaintiffs specifically plead damages
greater than US$15 million but less than or equal to US$100
million.

"As indicated by the foregoing summary, current pleading practice
permits considerable variation in the assertion of monetary
damages.  The Company's experience resolving hundreds of thousands
of asbestos claims and lawsuits over an extended period
demonstrates that the monetary relief alleged in a complaint bears
little relevance to a claim's merits or disposition value.  Rather,
the amount potentially recoverable is determined by such factors as
the type and severity of the plaintiff's asbestos disease, the
plaintiff's medical history and exposure to other disease-causing
agents, the product identification evidence against the Company and
other co-defendants, the defenses available to the Company and
other co-defendants, the specific jurisdiction in which the claim
is made, and the plaintiff's firm representing the claimant.

"In addition to the pending claims, the Company has claims-handling
agreements in place with many plaintiffs' counsel throughout the
country.  These agreements require evaluation and negotiation
regarding whether particular claimants qualify under the criteria
established by such agreements.  The criteria for such claims
include verification of a compensable illness and a reasonable
probability of exposure to a product manufactured by the Company's
former business unit during its manufacturing period ending in
1958.  

"The Company has also been a defendant in other asbestos-related
lawsuits or claims involving maritime workers, medical monitoring
claimants, co-defendants and property damage claimants.  Based upon
its past experience, the Company believes that these categories of
lawsuits and claims will not involve any material liability and
they are not included in the above description of pending matters
or in the following description of disposed matters.

"Since receiving its first asbestos claim, the Company as of
September 30, 2018, has disposed of asbestos claims of
approximately 399,800 plaintiffs and claimants at an average
indemnity payment per claim of approximately US$9,700.  The
Company's asbestos indemnity payments have varied on a per claim
basis, and are expected to continue to vary considerably over time.
Asbestos-related cash payments for 2017, 2016 and 2015 were US$110
million, US$125 million, and US$138 million, respectively.  The
Company's cash payments per claim disposed (inclusive of legal
costs) were approximately US$83,000, US$71,000, and US$95,000 for
the years ended December 31, 2017, 2016 and 2015, respectively.

"The Company's objective is to achieve, where possible, resolution
of asbestos claims pursuant to claims-handling agreements.  Failure
of claimants to meet certain medical and product exposure criteria
in the Company's administrative claims handling agreements has
generally reduced the number of claims that would otherwise have
been received by the Company in the tort system.  In addition,
certain court orders and legislative acts have reduced or
eliminated the number of claims that the Company otherwise would
have received by the Company in the tort system.  These
developments generally have had the effect of increasing the
Company's per-claim average indemnity payment over time."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2DRTo38


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Oxford Building Vacated After Asbestos Find
------------------------------------------------------------
Oxford Mail reported that Oxford University's zoology department
has applied for planning permission to create a construction
vehicle access into the Tinbergen Building on South Parks Road to
be used until mid-2020.

Hundreds of staff, students and animals were forced to leave the
building in February 2017 after high levels of asbestos were
found.

Everyone in the zoology and experimental psychology departments has
now been re-homed in temporary accommodation which could continue
until 2022.

The university previously said it would either refurbish the
building or demolish it, but either way the asbestos would have to
be removed.

Some of that work have already begun but now the university has
applied for the construction access to begin the operation in
earnest.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pepco's Buzzard Point ARO Reveals Asbestos
-----------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Corporation's subsidiary, Potomac Electric Power Company
(Pepco), recorded an increase of US$22 million in operating and
maintenance expense in the third quarter of 2018 primarily related
to asbestos identified at its Buzzard Point property as part of an
annual Asset Retirement Obligation (ARO) study, according to the
Companies' consolidated Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September
30, 2018.

The Company states, "Pepco has AROs primarily associated with the
abatement and disposal of equipment and buildings contaminated with
asbestos and PCBs.  In the third quarter of 2018, Pepco recorded an
increase of US$22 million in Operating and maintenance expense
primarily related to asbestos identified at its Buzzard Point
property as part of an annual ARO study.  Buzzard Point is a
waterfront property in the District of Columbia occupied by an
active substation and former Pepco operated steam plant building,
which Pepco retired and closed in 1981.  Pepco's AROs were US$38
million and US$3 million at September 30, 2018 and December 31,
2017, respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2S0TBUA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Real Estate Developer Obtains Victory in Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Northern California Record reported that a real estate developer
that allegedly provided asbestos-laden pipes to a worker who later
developed mesothelioma obtained a victory in court.

State Appeals Judge Henry Needham, on the bench of the California
First District Court of Appeal, issued a 23-page ruling on Nov. 11,
reversing the Alameda County Superior Court's decision in the
lawsuit, filed by Frank Hart against Keenan Properties Inc.

Hart, who worked as a pipe layer, sued Keenan on allegations that
while he was working at a construction site for one of the
defendant's projects in McKinleyville, the developer, as well as
other companies involved in the project, provided pipes that were
made of asbestos cement, causing him to be exposed to the
substance.

Supervisor John Glamuzina stated that Hart and the rest of the crew
he supervised had laid over 4,000 feet of pipe in 1977 and
"observed Mr. Hart cut and bevel asbestos-cement pipe without any
respiratory protection," the court ruling said.

Representatives from the construction company Christeve Corporation
and from Keenan denied that the companies had provided pipes
containing asbestos.

Hart later developed mesothelioma and sued Keenan, the building
contractor and the pipe supplier for personal injury and loss of
consortium on Nov. 6, 2016, with a jury deciding in his favor on
Jul. 14, 2017, awarding damages.

In his appeals court ruling, Judge Needham considered the testimony
of Olga Glamuzina, who worked for Christeve, labeling Glamuzina's
claim that Keenan had supplied asbestos-laden pipes as
"inadmissible hearsay" and stating that "there was no other
evidence Keenan supplied the pipes."

"Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against Keenan," the judge
said.

"Appellant Keenan fails to show that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Glamuzina’s testimony. Of course, it was
up to the jury to decide whether to believe Glamuzina’s testimony
and trust his recollection of what he saw on the pipe invoices, and
Keenan’s lawyer was free to present evidence and argue that
Glamuzina was incorrect. But any doubts as to Glamuzina’s
recollection went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility," Needham said.

California First District Court of Appeal Case number A152692


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Estimates $38MM Liability at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rexnord Corporation estimates approximately US$38.0 million
potential liability for asbestos-related claims as of September 30,
2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal quarter ended
September 30, 2018.

Rexnord Corp. states, "The Company's subsidiaries are involved in
various unresolved legal actions, administrative proceedings and
claims in the ordinary course of business involving, among other
things, product liability, commercial, employment, workers'
compensation, intellectual property claims and environmental
matters.  The Company establishes accruals in a manner that is
consistent with accounting principles generally accepted in the
United States for costs associated with such matters when liability
is probable and those costs are capable of being reasonably
estimated.  Although it is not possible to predict with certainty
the outcome of these unresolved legal actions or the range of
possible loss or recovery, based upon current information,
management believes the eventual outcome of these unresolved legal
actions, either individually or in the aggregate, will not have a
material adverse effect on the financial position, results of
operations or cash flows of the Company.  

"In connection with its sale, Invensys plc ("Invensys") provided
the Company with indemnification against certain contingent
liabilities, including certain pre-closing environmental
liabilities.  The Company believes that, pursuant to such indemnity
obligations, Invensys is obligated to defend and indemnify the
Company with respect to the matters relating to the Ellsworth
Industrial Park Site and to various asbestos claims.  The indemnity
obligations relating to the matters are subject, together with
indemnity obligations relating to other matters, to an overall
dollar cap equal to the purchase price, which is an amount in
excess of US$900 million.  The following paragraphs summarize the
most significant actions and proceedings:

   * In 2002, Rexnord Industries, LLC ("Rexnord Industries") was
named as a potentially responsible party ("PRP"), together with at
least ten other companies, at the Ellsworth Industrial Park Site,
Downers Grove, DuPage County, Illinois (the "Site"), by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA"), and the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA").  Rexnord Industries'
Downers Grove property is situated within the Ellsworth Industrial
Complex.  The USEPA and IEPA allege there have been one or more
releases or threatened releases of chlorinated solvents and other
hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants, allegedly
including but not limited to a release or threatened release on or
from the Company's property, at the Site.  The relief sought by the
USEPA and IEPA includes further investigation and potential
remediation of the Site and reimbursement of USEPA's past costs.
Rexnord Industries' allocated share of past and future costs
related to the Site, including for investigation and/or
remediation, could be significant.  All previously pending property
damage and personal injury lawsuits against the Company related to
the Site have been settled or dismissed.  Pursuant to its indemnity
obligation, Invensys continues to defend the Company in known
matters related to the Site and has paid 100% of the costs to date.


   * Multiple lawsuits (with approximately 300 claimants) are
pending in state or federal court in numerous jurisdictions
relating to alleged personal injuries due to the alleged presence
of asbestos in certain brakes and clutches previously manufactured
by the Company's Stearns division and/or its predecessor owners.
Invensys and FMC, prior owners of the Stearns business, have paid
100% of the costs to date related to the Stearns lawsuits.
Similarly, the Company's Prager subsidiary is a defendant in two
pending multi-defendant lawsuits relating to alleged personal
injuries due to the alleged presence of asbestos in a product
allegedly manufactured by Prager.  Additionally, there are numerous
individuals who have filed asbestos related claims against Prager;
however, these claims are currently on the Texas Multi-district
Litigation inactive docket.  The ultimate outcome of these asbestos
matters cannot presently be determined.  To date, the Company's
insurance providers have paid 100% of the costs related to the
Prager asbestos matters.  The Company believes that the combination
of its insurance coverage and the Invensys indemnity obligations
will cover any future costs of these matters.

"In connection with the Company's acquisition of The Falk
Corporation ("Falk"), Hamilton Sundstrand provided the Company with
indemnification against certain products-related asbestos exposure
liabilities.  The Company believes that, pursuant to such indemnity
obligations, Hamilton Sundstrand is obligated to defend and
indemnify the Company with respect to the asbestos claims, and
that, with respect to these claims, such indemnity obligations are
not subject to any time or dollar limitations.
"The following paragraph summarizes the most significant actions
and proceedings for which Hamilton Sundstrand has accepted
responsibility:

   * Falk, through its successor entity, is a defendant in multiple
lawsuits pending in state or federal court in numerous
jurisdictions relating to alleged personal injuries due to the
alleged presence of asbestos in certain clutches and drives
previously manufactured by Falk.  There are approximately 100
claimants in these suits.  The ultimate outcome of these lawsuits
cannot presently be determined.  Hamilton Sundstrand is defending
the Company in these lawsuits pursuant to its indemnity obligations
and has paid 100% of the costs to date.

"Certain Water Management subsidiaries are also subject to asbestos
litigation.  As of September 30, 2018, Zurn and numerous other
unrelated companies were defendants in approximately 6,000 asbestos
related lawsuits representing approximately 14,000 claims.
Plaintiffs' claims allege personal injuries caused by exposure to
asbestos used primarily in industrial boilers formerly manufactured
by a segment of Zurn.  Zurn did not manufacture asbestos or
asbestos components.  Instead, Zurn purchased them from suppliers.
These claims are being handled pursuant to a defense strategy
funded by insurers.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company estimates the potential
liability for the asbestos-related claims as well as the claims
expected to be filed in the next ten years to be approximately
US$38.0 million, of which Zurn expects its insurance carriers to
pay approximately US$29.0 million in the next ten years on such
claims, with the balance of the estimated liability being paid in
subsequent years.  The US$38.0 million was developed based on
actuarial studies and represents the projected indemnity payout for
current and future claims.  There are inherent uncertainties
involved in estimating the number of future asbestos claims, future
settlement costs, and the effectiveness of defense strategies and
settlement initiatives.  As a result, actual liability could differ
from the estimate described herein and could be substantial.  The
liability for the asbestos-related claims is recorded in Other
liabilities within the condensed consolidated balance sheets.

"Management estimates that its available insurance to cover this
potential asbestos liability as of September 30, 2018, is in excess
of the ten year estimated exposure, and accordingly, believes that
all current claims are covered by insurance.

"As of September 30, 2018, the Company had a recorded receivable
from its insurance carriers of US$38.0 million, which corresponds
to the amount of this potential asbestos liability that is covered
by available insurance and is currently determined to be probable
of recovery.  However, there is no assurance the Company's current
insurance coverage will ultimately be available or that this
asbestos liability will not ultimately exceed the Company's
coverage limits.  Factors that could cause a decrease in the amount
of available coverage or create gaps in coverage include: changes
in law governing the policies, potential disputes and settlements
with the carriers regarding the scope of coverage, and insolvencies
of one or more of the Company's carriers.  The receivable for
probable asbestos-related recoveries is recorded in Other assets
within the condensed consolidated balance sheets."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/WE7YBK


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Had 718 Pending Claims at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers Corporation continues to face 718 asbestos-related product
liability claims as of September 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We, like many other industrial companies, have
been named as a defendant in a number of lawsuits filed in courts
across the country by persons alleging personal injury from
exposure to products containing asbestos.  We have never mined,
milled, manufactured or marketed asbestos; rather, we made and
provided to industrial users a limited number of products that
contained encapsulated asbestos, but we stopped manufacturing these
products in the late 1980s.  Most of the claims filed against us
involve numerous defendants, sometimes as many as several hundred.

"For the nine months ended September 30, 2018, 143 claims were
dismissed and 20 claims were settled.  Settlements totaled
approximately US$5.9 million for the nine months ended September
30, 2018.

"We recognize a liability for asbestos-related contingencies that
are probable of occurrence and reasonably estimable.  In connection
with the recognition of liabilities for asbestos related matters,
we record asbestos-related insurance receivables that are deemed
probable.  Our estimates of asbestos-related contingent liabilities
and related insurance receivables are based on an independent
actuarial analysis and an independent insurance usage analysis
prepared annually by third parties.  The actuarial analysis
contains numerous assumptions, including general assumptions
regarding the asbestos-related product liability litigation
environment and company-specific assumptions regarding claims rates
(including diseases alleged), dismissal rates, average settlement
costs and average defense costs.  The insurance usage analysis
considers, among other things, applicable deductibles, retentions
and policy limits, the solvency and historical payment experience
of various insurance carriers, the likelihood of recovery as
estimated by external legal counsel and existing insurance
settlements.

"We review our asbestos-related forecasts annually in the fourth
quarter of each year unless facts and circumstances materially
change during the year, at which time we would analyze these
forecasts.  During 2017, we reviewed the projections of our current
and future asbestos claims, and determined it was appropriate to
extend the liability projection period to cover all current and
future claims through 2058.  We based our conclusion on our history
and experience with the claims data, the diminished volatility and
consistency of observable claims data, the period of time that has
elapsed since we stopped manufacturing products that contained
encapsulated asbestos and an expectation of a downward trend in
claims due to the average age of our claimants, which is
approaching the average life expectancy.  As a result, we believe
we are now able to make a reasonable estimate of the actuarially
determined liability for current and future asbestos claims through
2058, the expected end of our asbestos liability exposure.

"As of December 31, 2017, the balances of the asbestos-related
claims and insurance receivables, which are projected to cover all
current and future claims through 2058, were US$76.2 million and
US$69.2 million, respectively.  To date, the defense and settlement
costs of our asbestos-related product liability litigation have
been substantially covered by insurance.  We have identified
continuous coverage for primary, excess and umbrella insurance from
the 1950s through the mid-1980s, except for a period in the early
1960s, with respect to which we have entered into an agreement for
primary, but not excess or umbrella, coverage.  In addition, we
have entered into a cost sharing agreement with most of our
primary, excess and umbrella insurance carriers to facilitate the
ongoing administration and payment of claims by the carriers.  The
cost sharing agreement may be terminated by any party, but will
continue until a party elects to terminate it.  As of the filing
date for this report, the agreement has not been terminated, and no
carrier had informed us it intended to terminate the agreement.
During the first quarter of 2018, we received notice that primary
coverage for a period of eight years and excess coverage for a
period of two years had been exhausted, and as a result, we
incurred indemnity and defense costs of US$0.5 million and US$1.0
million for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2018,
respectively.  These costs reduced our existing asbestos-related
liabilities to US$75.2 million as of September 30, 2018.  We expect
to exhaust individual primary, excess and umbrella coverages over
time, and there is no assurance that such exhaustion will not
accelerate due to additional claims, damages and settlements or
that coverage will be available as expected.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related liabilities and the
related insurance receivables were based on facts known at the time
and a number of assumptions.  However, projecting future events,
such as the number of new claims to be filed each year, the average
cost of disposing of such claims, the length of time it takes to
dispose of such claims, coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies, as well as the
numerous uncertainties surrounding asbestos litigation in the
United States could cause the actual liability and insurance
recoveries for us to be higher or lower than those projected or
recorded."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2Q5Dubh


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Simmons Hanly Wins $30MM Asbestos Verdict
----------------------------------------------------------
The Edwardsville Intelligencer reported that Simmons Hanly Conroy,
one of the nation's leading mesothelioma law firms, announced that
a California jury has awarded $30.2 million to a man who was
diagnosed with mesothelioma, a rare and aggressive cancer caused by
exposure to asbestos.

Norris Morgan, 65, apparently contracted mesothelioma after
repeated exposure to asbestos-containing transite pipe sold by
defendant J-M Manufacturing (J-MM) while working as a construction
supervisor in southern California.

The compensatory verdict awarded in Los Angeles Superior Court
before Judge Maurice A. Leiter included $15.2 million in damages.
The jury awarded Morgan $1 million in economic damages and $13.2
million for pain and suffering. His wife, Lori Morgan, was awarded
$1 million for loss of consortium. The jury held J-MM 45 percent
responsible for Morgan's mesothelioma diagnosis and split the
remaining liability among several entities that also exposed Morgan
to asbestos.

Jurors also found J-MM acted with malice and awarded punitive
damages. According to evidence presented during trial, more than
700 articles and studies were published prior to 1964 showing
asbestos caused cancer and death. Yet, despite knowing the existing
danger and having access to a safe alternative, J-MM chose to use
asbestos in its pipes. As a result, jurors awarded punitive damages
totaling $15 million during a separate punitive damages hearing.
Simmons attorneys Scott Peebles and Robert Woodward and
shareholders Tim Thompson and Benjamin Goldstein represented Morgan
and his wife in Norris Morgan and Lori Morgan vs CBS Corporation,
et al., Case No. BC695605 in Los Angeles Superior Court.

"After examining the evidence, the jury found J-MM made a
calculated business decision to use asbestos, and Norris and his
family are suffering for it," said Peebles, who served as lead
attorney during the trial. "Norris should have never been diagnosed
with cancer because he should have never been exposed to asbestos.
This result is fair and holds the defendant accountable for its
actions."

Morgan was born and raised in Los Angeles. He left college in the
mid-1970s for construction jobs around San Luis Obisbo and in
Ventura, California. Over the next 20 years, Morgan was exposed to
asbestos while supervising workers who cut and beveled the
defendant's transite pipe, which released airborne asbestos fibers
into the surrounding work environment. Morgan was a bystander to
the exposure and did not perform the work himself.

The jury found the transite pipe sold by J-MM was unreasonably
dangerous and that Morgan's exposure to the pipe caused his
mesothelioma diagnosis. Evidence presented during trial showed that
J-MM failed to adequately warn about the hazards of asbestos. As a
result, Morgan was repeatedly exposed to asbestos without learning
of its dangers.

Lori Morgan, who testified during trial, said she would give it all
back to have her husband healthy again.

"While no amount of money can give my husband back his health, this
result acknowledges the devastation our family has suffered," she
said. "I hope this result sends a clear message to companies about
the consequences of using asbestos."

The dangers of asbestos have been known since the early 1900s.
Mesothelioma occurs when asbestos fibers become lodged in the
lining of a person’s lungs. The cancer has a long latency period
and typically takes decades to form. There is currently no cure.

"I battled and held on to have my day in court," Norris said. "We
are so appreciative of our team at Simmons Hanly Conroy."

The verdict is the fourth asbestos verdict Simmons Hanly Conroy has
won on behalf of its clients in the past 15 months. The trial
lasted three weeks, and the jury deliberated for five hours before
holding J-MM liable for Morgan’s mesothelioma. The couple
currently resides in Washington state to be near family.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Unit Had 141 PI Suits at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Transocean Ltd. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018, that one of its subsidiaries was a defendant in
approximately 141 lawsuits as of September 30, 2018.  The Company
also disclosed that in September 2018, the subsidiary and certain
insurers agreed to a settlement of outstanding disputes that leaves
the subsidiary with funding, which the Company believes to be
sufficient to respond to both the current lawsuits as well as
future lawsuits of a similar nature.

The Company states, "One of our subsidiaries has been named as a
defendant, along with numerous other companies, in lawsuits arising
out of the subsidiary's manufacture and sale of heat exchangers,
and involvement in the construction and refurbishment of major
industrial complexes alleging bodily injury or personal injury as a
result of exposure to asbestos.

"As of September 30, 2018, the subsidiary was a defendant in
approximately 141 lawsuits with a corresponding number of
plaintiffs.

"For many of these lawsuits, we have not been provided sufficient
information from the plaintiffs to determine whether all or some of
the plaintiffs have claims against the subsidiary, the basis of any
such claims, or the nature of their alleged injuries.

"The operating assets of the subsidiary were sold in 1989.  In
September 2018, the subsidiary and certain insurers agreed to a
settlement of outstanding disputes that leaves the subsidiary with
funding, including cash, annuities and coverage in place
settlement, that we believe will be sufficient to respond to both
the current lawsuits as well as future lawsuits of a similar
nature.

"While we cannot predict or provide assurance as to the outcome of
these matters, we do not expect the ultimate liability, if any,
resulting from these claims to have a material adverse effect on
our condensed consolidated statement of financial position, results
of operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ipf2ue


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Units Faces 9 Claims at Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------
Transocean Ltd. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2018, that nine plaintiffs have claims pending in
Louisiana against the Company's subsidiaries at September 30,
2018.

The Company said, "In 2004, several of our subsidiaries were named,
along with numerous other unaffiliated defendants in complaints
filed in the Circuit Courts of the State of Mississippi, and in
2014, a group of similar complaints were filed in Louisiana.

"The plaintiffs, former employees of some of the defendants,
generally allege that the defendants used or manufactured asbestos
containing drilling mud additives for use in connection with
drilling operations, claiming negligence, products liability,
strict liability and claims allowed under the Jones Act and general
maritime law.  The plaintiffs generally seek awards of unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages, but the court-appointed special
master has ruled that a Jones Act employer defendant, such as us,
cannot be sued for punitive damages.

"At September 30, 2018, nine plaintiffs have claims pending in
Louisiana, in which we have or may have an interest.

"We intend to defend these lawsuits vigorously, although we can
provide no assurance as to the outcome.  We historically have
maintained broad liability insurance, although we are not certain
whether insurance will cover the liabilities, if any, arising out
of these claims.  Based on our evaluation of the exposure to date,
we do not expect the liability, if any, resulting from these claims
to have a material adverse effect on our condensed consolidated
statement of financial position, results of operations or cash
flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ipf2ue


ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Had 390 Pending Cases at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
TriMas Corporation has 390 pending asbestos-related personal injury
cases as of September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

The Company states, "As of September 30, 2018, the Company was a
party to 390 pending cases involving an aggregate of 4,833 claims
primarily alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos
containing materials formerly used in gaskets (both encapsulated
and otherwise) manufactured or distributed by certain of its
subsidiaries for use primarily in the petrochemical, refining and
exploration industries.

"In addition, the Company acquired various companies to distribute
its products that had distributed gaskets of other manufacturers
prior to acquisition.  The Company believes that many of its
pending cases relate to locations at which none of its gaskets were
distributed or used.

"The Company may be subjected to significant additional
asbestos-related claims in the future, the cost of settling cases
in which product identification can be made may increase, and the
Company may be subjected to further claims in respect of the former
activities of its acquired gasket distributors.  The Company is
unable to make a meaningful statement concerning the monetary
claims made in the asbestos cases given that, among other things,
claims may be initially made in some jurisdictions without
specifying the amount sought or by simply stating the requisite or
maximum permissible monetary relief, and may be amended to alter
the amount sought.  The large majority of claims do not specify the
amount sought.

"Of the 4,833 claims pending at September 30, 2018, 54 set forth
specific amounts of damages (other than those stating the statutory
minimum or maximum).  At September 30, 2018, of the 54 claims that
set forth specific amounts, there were no claims seeking specific
amounts for punitive damages.

"In addition, relatively few of the claims have reached the
discovery stage and even fewer claims have gone past the discovery
stage.

"Total settlement costs (exclusive of defense costs) for all such
cases, some of which were filed over 20 years ago, have been
approximately US$8.8 million.  All relief sought in the asbestos
cases is monetary in nature.  To date, approximately 40% of the
Company's costs related to settlement and defense of asbestos
litigation have been covered by its primary insurance.

"Effective February 14, 2006, the Company entered into a
coverage-in-place agreement with its first level excess carriers
regarding the coverage to be provided to the Company for
asbestos-related claims when the primary insurance is exhausted.
The coverage-in-place agreement makes asbestos defense costs and
indemnity insurance coverage available to the Company that might
otherwise be disputed by the carriers and provides a methodology
for the administration of such expenses.  Nonetheless, the Company
believes it is likely there will be a period within the next six
months, prior to the commencement of coverage under this agreement
and following exhaustion of the Company's primary insurance
coverage, during which the Company will be solely responsible for
defense costs and indemnity payments, the duration of which would
be subject to the scope of damage awards and settlements paid.

"Based on the settlements made to date and the number of claims
dismissed or withdrawn for lack of product identification, the
Company believes that the relief sought (when specified) does not
bear a reasonable relationship to its potential liability.  Based
upon the Company's experience to date, including the trend in
annual defense and settlement costs incurred to date, and other
available information (including the availability of excess
insurance), the Company does not believe these cases will have a
material adverse effect on its financial position and results of
operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/HA1veQ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Faces 12,845 Claims at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Union Carbide Corporation has 12,845 unresolved asbestos-related
claims at September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

Union Carbide states, "The Corporation is and has been involved in
a large number of asbestos-related suits filed primarily in state
courts during the past four decades.  These suits principally
allege personal injury resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing products and frequently seek both actual and
punitive damages.  The alleged claims primarily relate to products
that UCC sold in the past, alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products located on UCC's premises, and UCC's responsibility for
asbestos suits filed against a former UCC subsidiary, Amchem
Products, Inc. ("Amchem").  In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable loss as a
result of such exposure, or that injuries incurred in fact resulted
from exposure to UCC's products.

"Plaintiffs' lawyers often sue numerous defendants in individual
lawsuits or on behalf of numerous claimants.  As a result, the
damages alleged are not expressly identified as to UCC, Amchem or
any other particular defendant, even when specific damages are
alleged with respect to a specific disease or injury.  In fact,
there are no personal injury cases in which only the Corporation
and/or Amchem are the sole named defendants.  For these reasons and
based upon the Corporation's litigation and settlement experience,
the Corporation does not consider the damages alleged against it
and Amchem to be a meaningful factor in its determination of any
potential asbestos-related liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2OUQdsl


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.3BB Liability at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Union Carbide Corporation's asbestos-related liability for pending
and future claims and defense and processing costs was US$1,290
million at September 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018.

Union Carbide states, "The Corporation is and has been involved in
a large number of asbestos-related suits filed primarily in state
courts during the past four decades.  These suits principally
allege personal injury resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing products and frequently seek both actual and
punitive damages.  The alleged claims primarily relate to products
that UCC sold in the past, alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products located on UCC's premises and UCC's responsibility for
asbestos suits filed against a former UCC subsidiary, Amchem
Products, Inc. ("Amchem").  In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable loss as a
result of such exposure, or that injuries incurred in fact resulted
from exposure to the Corporation's products.

"The Corporation expects more asbestos-related suits to be filed
against UCC and Amchem in the future, and will aggressively defend
or reasonably resolve, as appropriate, both pending and future
claims.

"Since 2003, the Corporation has engaged Ankura Consulting Group,
LLC ("Ankura"), a third party actuarial specialist, to review the
Corporation's historical asbestos-related claim and resolution
activity in order to assist UCC management in estimating the
Corporation's asbestos-related liability.  Each year, Ankura has
reviewed the claim and resolution activity to determine the
appropriateness of updating the most recent Ankura study.

"Based on the December 2017 Ankura review and the Corporation's own
review of the data, the Corporation's total asbestos-related
liability through the terminal year of 2049, including
asbestos-related defense and processing costs, was US$1,369 million
at December 31, 2017, and was included in "Asbestos-related
liabilities - current" and "Asbestos-related liabilities -
noncurrent" in the consolidated balance sheets.

"Each quarter, the Corporation reviews claims filed, settled and
dismissed, as well as average settlement and resolution costs by
disease category.  The Corporation also considers additional
quantitative and qualitative factors such as the nature of pending
claims, trial experience of the Corporation and other asbestos
defendants, current spending for defense and processing costs,
significant appellate rulings and legislative developments, trends
in the tort system, and their respective effects on expected future
resolution costs.  UCC management considers all these factors in
conjunction with the most recent Ankura study and determines
whether a change in the estimate is warranted.  Based on the
Corporation's review of 2018 activity, it was determined that no
adjustment to the accrual was required at September 30, 2018.

"The Corporation's asbestos-related liability for pending and
future claims and defense and processing costs was US$1,290 million
at September 30, 2018, and approximately 16 percent of the recorded
liability related to pending claims and approximately 84 percent
related to future claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2OUQdsl



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