CAR_Public/181213.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, December 13, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 249

                            Headlines

AAC HOLDINGS: Has Settlement with Former Officer Menz
ALDI INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Dieter ADA Suit
ALLIED EAGLE: Bermudez Wants to Send Notice to FLSA Class Members
ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES: Two Collectives Certified in Martinez FLSA Suit
ANGIE'S LIST: Strauss Has Until Dec. 18 to File Notice of Appeal

ATLANTIC CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Bencomo Suit
ATLANTIC CREDIT: Proceedings in Bencomo's Class Cert. Bid Stayed
BANK OF AMERICA: Vasquez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BARNES & NOBLE: Appeal in Bernardino Class Action Still Pending
BARNES & NOBLE: Cafe Managers' Class Suit Ongoing

BECTON DICKINSON: Defending Against 3,154 Hernia Product Claims
BIG MIKE'S: Magistrate Recommends Conditional FLSA Certification
BLACKBOARD INC: McMechen Suit Alleges Equal Pay Act Violation
BONNIER CORP: Friske Seeks to Certify Class of Mich. Subscribers
BOYSEN USA: Auto Shops Hit Overpriced Automotive Exhaust Systems

BROOKS BROTHERS: Phipps Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Calif.
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Castillo TCPA Suit Moved to N.D. Nevada
CAMBIUM LEARNING: Strahan Balks at Merger Deal with Veritas
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Class Certification Sought in Montoya Suit
COHEN & SLAMOWITZ: Hallmark FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval

CORAL CAST: Niebles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
COVENTRY HEALTH: Arbitration Denial in 206 Golden Suit Affirmed
CV SCIENCES: Time to Reply to Consolidated Securities Suit Extended
DHI MORTGAGE: Can Compel Arbitration in Ahlstrom FLSA Suit
DIGNITY HEALTH: Cruz Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

DSV AIR & SEA: Pitarro Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ESTERLINE TECH: Kent Sues Over TransDigm Merger
EVANS HOTELS: Protective Order Bid in Rutherford Suit Partly OK'd
FAMOUS BOURBON: Ramos Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
FIFTH THIRD: Protective Order Bid in Hendrickson FDCA Suit Denied

FIRST SOLAR: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit
FLORIDA: Merchison Asks to Extend to Feb. 4 Time to File Writ
FOUR SEASONS: Olsen Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
GC SERVICES: Renewed Class Cert. Bid in Ocampo FDCPA Suit Denied
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Court Allows Bid to Amend Sullivan Suit

GRUBHUB INC: Court Rules on Lawson's Bid for Relief from Judgment
H & D ELECTRIC: Faces Magana Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Torres & Martinez Can't Intervene in Edwards
HH FRANCHISING: Class of In-Home Caregivers Certified in "Geiger"
HSBC FINANCE: Lewis Sues Over Erroneous Credit Reports

HUNTER WARFIELD: Nimmer Moves to Certify Class Under Damasco
ILLINOIS: Rauner Dismissed w/ Prejudice from Monroe Prisoners Suit
JM SMUCKER: Submits Stipulation and Joint Case Management Order
JULIAN SPENCE: Heberle Moves to Certify Class of DRIP Purchasers
KENAN ADVANTAGE: Ballard Civil Rights Suit Removed to C.D. Calif.

L.P.C.C. RESTAURANT: Weng Sues over Unpaid Wages, Tip-Pooling
LUCAS CONSTRUCTION: Polanco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
MANU INC: Tenesaca Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Pay
MDL 2391: Court Denies Bid to Vacate Remand Order for 3 Actions
MDL 2437: Court Transfers Home Depot Suit to N.D. Georgia

MDL 2672: $48MM Settlement in Clean Diesel Suit Has Prelim Approval
MDL 2738: Court Transfers 3 Actions to District of New Jersey
MDL 2741: Court Transfers 2 Actions to N. District of California
MDL 2741: Simmons Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Singletary Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Consolidated

MDL 2741: Sixbury Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Wooley Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2742: Court Transfers Zornoza Suit to S.D. New York
MDL 2744: Claims in Monostable Electronic Gearshift Suit Narrowed
MDL 2795: Court Transfers Palkon Lawsuit to District of Minnesota

MDL 2800: Court Transfers 2 Suits v. Equifax to N.D. Georgia
MDL 2800: Court Transfers Bordelon Suit to N. District of Georgia
MDL 2804: Court Transfers 22 Actions to Northern District of Ohio
MDL 2804: Court Vacates Order Moving Suit v. Purdue Pharma to Ohio
MDL 2846: Court Transfers Luks v. Davol Suit to S. Dist. of Ohio

MDL 2870: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 4 Securities Litigation
MDL 2872: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 7 Products Liability Suits
MDL 2872: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 7 Products Liability Suits
MDL 2873: 75 of 84 Suits Transferred to South Carolina
MDL 2874: 3 RAH Patent Lawsuits Transferred to N. Dist. of Calif.

MEDICREDIT INC: Settlement in Raffin Suit Has Final Approval
MEDTRONIC PLC: Pretrial in Sprint Fidelis-Related Suit Ongoing
MEDTRONIC PLC: Settled 15,100 Pelvic Mesh-Related Claims
MERCY HEALTH: Ohio Court Issues Final Judgment in ERISA Suit
MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bid to Drop Forman Class Suit Still Pending

MIDLAND CREDIT: Olivia Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection
MISSOURI: Gasca Moves for Certification of Adult Parolees Class
MOBILE DIRECT: Strange Files Tort Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
MONSANTO COMPANY: Perry Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Violates FDCPA, Walston Suit Says

ONE TECHNOLOGIES: 5th Cir. Flips Arbitration Ruling in Forby Suit
OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in "Rhino" Suit
OXNARD SCHOOL: Certification of Students Class Sought in JR Suit
PATENAUDE & FELIX: Court Dismisses Schultz FDCPA Suit
PORSCHE CARS: Padilla Sues Over Defective Cooling System

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Certifies Class in Bereket FDCPA Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Refuses to Certify Class in Gomes Suit
PPDAI GROUP: Lai Hits Share Drop from Illegal Business Practices
QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Denial of Bid to Stay in Vanderwerff Suit Upheld
R&L CARRIERS: Miranda Suit Moved to C.D. California

RAYMOND JAMES: Bid to Drop Wistar Class Suit Pending
RAYMOND JAMES: Trial in Brink Suit to Commence April 2019
SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Class Certification in Mays Suit Recommended
SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Settlement Reached in Morning Song Bird Suit
SECURIAN FINANCIAL: Harrison Suit Transferred to Minnesota

SETERUS INC: Ct. Denies w/ Prejudice Class Cert. Bid in "Baxa"
SHOREFRONT OPERATING: Chow Sues over Unsafe and Inadequate Care
STARBUCKS CORP: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Carrington Labor Suit
STATE COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in Cajigas Suit
SUBURBAN PROPANE: Asks Court to Reconsider Bid to Drop NY Suit

SUPERIOR MALPRACTICE: Faces Retina Associates Suit Over Junk Faxes
TENAGLIA & HUNT: Yungreis Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
TEXAS: LULAC Moves to Cert. Class, Subclass of Latino ELL Students
TRANS UNION: Violates Fair Credit Reporting Act, Sztillerman Says
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: Millman Class Cert. Bid Taken Under Advisement

US NUTRITION: Matic Files Slack-fill Suit in Calif.
USA WATER POLO: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Mayall Injury Suit
VIGO IMPORTING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Buso CLRA/CFPLA Suit
VIRGIN AMERICA: Court Grants Bid for Sanctions in Bernstein Suit
WAKEFIELD & ASSOCIATES: Daniels Brings FDCPA Class Suit in Alabama

WALMART INC: Faces Krauss Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
YELP INC: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit

                            *********

AAC HOLDINGS: Has Settlement with Former Officer Menz
------------------------------------------------------
AAC Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on November 28, 2018, that
on November 21, 2018, the Company entered into a settlement with
its former officer and director, Jerrod N. Menz ("Menz").  

In exchange for Menz releasing his claim for indemnification in the
Smith, et al. v. American Addiction Centers, Inc., et al., Case No.
BC667311 Litigation, the Company has agreed to release Menz from
his agreement to contribute 300,000 shares to the settlement of the
securities class action lawsuit (Kasper v. AAC Holdings, Inc., et
al., Case No. 3:15-cv-923, United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee) that was finally settled on June 11,
2018.

AAC Holdings, Inc. provides inpatient and outpatient substance use
treatment services for individuals with drug addiction, alcohol
addiction, and co-occurring mental/behavioral health issues in the
United States. AAC Holdings, Inc. was founded in 2014 and is
headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.


ALDI INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Dieter ADA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD DIETER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALDI, INC., Defendant,
Civ. Action No. 2:18-00846 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Joy Flowers Conti of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
denied without prejudice Aldi's motion to dismiss and/or strike
class allegations.

Dieter filed an amended class action complaint, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, under Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), against Aldi.  Aldi filed
the pending motion to dismiss and/or strike class allegations with
an accompanying brief in support of the motion.  The Plaintiff
filed a response and brief in opposition to the motion.  On Nov. 2,
2018, Aldi with leave of court filed a reply in support of its
motion.

The Plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, has a mobility
disability and is dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility.  Aldi
is a corporation organized under Illinois law and a public
accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 12181(7).

The Plaintiff visited Aldi's Allison Park, PA, location within the
last year and experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to
excessive slopes in a purportedly accessible parking space and
other ADA accessibility violations.  Aldi operates over 1,600
stores in 35 states and "corporately" manages all the facilities.
It uses centralized policies, practices, and procedures with
respect to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and
operation of its facilities.  The Plaintiff alleges that Aldi's
centralized design, construction, alteration, maintenance and
operational policies and practices have systematically and
routinely violated the ADA.

The amended class action complaint describes the nationwide class
as all persons with qualified mobility disabilities who, due to the
Defendant's failure to comply with the ADA's accessible parking and
path of travel requirements, have experienced or will experience
slope-related injuries that occur within the parking facilities at
all locations within the United States for which the Defendant owns
and/or controls the parking facilities.

The Plaintiff asserts class claims for a permanent injunction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) to remove the
barriers currently present at Aldi's facilities and an injunction
to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed
inaccessibility to affect Aldi's network of facilities.

Judge Conti concludes that the amended class action sufficiently
alleges class allegations.  Among other things, she finds that
because the putative class in the case is limited to alleged
slope-related violations in parking lots, the concern about
different species of violations is not sufficiently present to
strike the class allegation prior to discovery.  Only discovery
will uncover whether the common violation actually derives from a
common policy.

She also finds that with respect to the factual circumstances
underpinning the Plaintiff's individual claim and those of the
class, the amended class complaint shows differences among the
Plaintiff's experience, the alleged findings of the investigation,
and the class description.  The class description captures all
slope-related injuries that occur within the parking facilities,
incorporating not just sloping violations with respect to parking
spaces and access aisles but also the sloping of routes leading to
a facility entrances and curb ramps.

The Judge further finds that although it may be that putative class
members have competing interests, conflicts that are "unduly
speculative" do not defeat the adequacy requirement, even at the
certification stage.  It is impossible to glean from the amended
class complaint the extent to which the Plaintiff's individual
claim may or may not conflict with the other putative class members
and whether that conflict will prevent the Plaintiff from
adequately representing the class.

For these reasons, Judge Conti denied Aldi's motion to dismiss
and/or strike class allegations, without prejudice to Aldi
reasserting its arguments at certification.  An appropriate order
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/W4sUFC from Leagle.com.

RICHARD DIETER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin J. Sweet --
bsweet@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter,
LLP, Elizabeth Pollock-Avery, Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP & Kelly K. Iverson, Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP.

ALDI, INC., Defendant, represented by Brian H. Simmons --
brian.simmons@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Christian
Antkowiak -- christian.antkowiak@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll and
Rooney & Ryan Wilk -- ryan.wilk@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll &
Rooney PC.


ALLIED EAGLE: Bermudez Wants to Send Notice to FLSA Class Members
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled BENJAMIN BERMUDEZ, Individually
and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALLIED EAGLE
TRANSPORTS, LLC, and JOSE PENA, Case No. 7:18-cv-00158-DC-RCG (W.D.
Tex.), moves for approval and distribution of notice and for
disclosure of contact information.

The Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of certain former and
current Delivery Driver for the Defendants to recover overtime
wages and other damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In conjunction with his Motion for Conditional Certification, the
Plaintiff seeks this Court's approval of certain procedures for
providing notice to class members.  The Plaintiff asks a period of
90 days to distribute Notice and file Consent forms with this Court
and asks the Court to enter an Order directing the Defendants to
provide the names, including any aliases they may have gone by or
go by now, last known home and work addresses, and any and all cell
phone numbers and e-mail addresses of potential opt-in Plaintiffs
no later than one week after the date of the entry of the Order
granting this Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Gerald K. Fugit, Esq.
          GERALD K. FUGIT P.C.
          412 North Texas Avenue
          Odessa, TX 79761
          Telephone: (432) 332-1661
          E-mail: fugitassist@att.net


ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES: Two Collectives Certified in Martinez FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Louise W. Flanagan grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification of a Collective Action in the lawsuit
captioned PEDRO RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ, MATEO HERNANDEZ LOPEZ and ELMER
MENJIVAR ARGETA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES, INC., EAST CAROLINA
COMMERCIAL SERVICES, LLC, SOLAR GUYS, INC., CESAR MENDOZA, and
JORGE RAMOS, Case No. 5:17-cv-00628-FL (E.D.N.C.).

The Court conditionally certifies two collectives pursuant to
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   (a) A collective consisting of all similarly situated
       individuals engaged in the construction of IS46 through
       Defendant East Carolina Commercial Services individually
       or jointly with one or more of the other Defendants who
       were required to work in excess of forty hours per week
       and were not paid the appropriate overtime rate for hours
       worked over 40 in a workweek, and who timely file (or have
       already filed) a written consent to be a party to this
       action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b); and

   (b) A collective consisting of all similarly situated
       individuals engaged in the construction of IS46 through
       Defendant East Carolina Commercial Services individually
       or jointly with one or more of the other Defendants who
       were required to purchase and provide their own hard hats,
       vests, boots, safety glasses and/or gloves and were not
       reimbursed for those purchases or paid minimum wage for
       their first week of work, and who timely file (or have
       already filed) a written consent to be a party to this
       action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

Judge Flanagan authorizes the Notice distribution in English and
Spanish to potential opt-in Plaintiffs via United States mail,
electronic mail, and/or Facebook Messenger.  The Parties are
directed to meet and confer after 45 days following the date of
entry of this Order to attempt to agree on whether any additional
means of distribution of the Notice is necessary to provide the
named Plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to apprise potential
members of the conditionally certified collectives of the existence
of this action and their opportunity to participate.  The Parties
will report back to the Court within 60 days of this Order
regarding the outcome of their conferral and shall at that time
inform the Court of any disputes regarding the means of
distributing notice and seek a ruling from the Court.

The Court further approves the Consent to Sue Form attached as
Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum.  The Defendants shall within
14 days of the Court's Order on this Motion, provide to the
Plaintiffs available information regarding the full names, date(s)
of employment, job title(s), last known addresses, email addresses,
telephone numbers, and dates of birth of all putative members of
the collectives to assist the Plaintiffs in the distribution of the
approved notice.

The deadline for joinder of opt-in Plaintiffs filing Consent to
Join forms to join the conditionally certified collectives shall be
four months from the date of this Order.  Upon timely application
by the Plaintiffs and a showing that the Defendants have failed to
provide personal contact information such as home addresses,
telephone numbers or e-mail addresses for a significant number of
the members of the proposed collectives conditionally certified, or
that the information provided is no longer valid, the Court may
extend the opt-in period by up to two months.[CC]


ANGIE'S LIST: Strauss Has Until Dec. 18 to File Notice of Appeal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVE STRAUSS d/b/a CLASSIC TREE CARE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. ANGIE'S LIST, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:17-CV-02560-HLT-TJJ (D. Kan.), Judge Holly L. Teeter of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas granted Strauss and David
Garner a 15-day extension, up to and including Dec. 18, 2018 to
file a notice of appeal of the Court's dismissal of their putative
class action.

The Plaintiffs seek a 30-day extension, up to and including Jan. 2,
2019, to file the notice of appeal.  McDowell, Rice, Smith &
Buchanan, P.C. -- attorneys for the Plaintiffs -- also seek to
withdraw as the Plaintiffs' counsel.  

Because the counsel has complied with the requirements of the
District of Kansas Local Rule 83.5.5(a)(1)-(4), Judge Teeter
granted the counsel's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff
Steve Strauss d/b/a Classic Tree Care, and the counsel's Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff Steve Strauss d/b/a Classic Tree
Care.  

She finds that in accordance with the requirements of the
applicable Local Rule, because their withdrawal will leave the
Plaintiffs without counsel, the counsel has: (1) notified the Court
of the reasons for the withdrawal; (2) provided evidence that the
Plaintiffs have been notified of their withdrawal; (3) provided the
Court with the Plaintiffs' current mailing addresses and telephone
numbers; (4) served the motion to withdraw on the Plaintiffs by
certified mail, with return receipt requested; (5) filed an
affidavit indicating that the Plaintiffs received a copy of the
motion to withdraw; and (6) served the motion to withdraw on all
attorneys of record.  

Because the Court granted the Plaintiffs' counsel leave to
withdraw, she also finds good cause exists to grant an extension of
time to file the notice of appeal. She concludes, however, that a
15-day extension, up to and including Dec. 18, 2018, is sufficient
time to allow the Plaintiffs to prepare and file the notice of
appeal.  For these reasons, the Judge granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice
of Appeal.

The Plaintiffs' notice of appeal must therefore be filed with the
Clerk of Courts for the United States District Court, District of
Kansas, on Dec. 18, 2018.  A copy of the notice of appeal is
available in PDF format on the Court's website.   The Plaintiffs
may file the completed notice of appeal in person (Robert J. Dole
United States Courthouse, 500 State Avenue, Suite 259, Kansas City,
KS 66101), via email in PDF format
(ksd_clerks_kansascity@ksd.uscourts.gov), or via United States mail
(Robert J. Dole United States Courthouse, Attn: Clerk's Office, 500
State Avenue, Suite 259, Kansas City, KS 66101).

The Clerk of Courts will mail a copy of the Order, via certified
mail, to Strauss at 18450 W. 367th Street, Paola, KS 66071 and to
Garner, via certified mail, at 1507 Willowdale Drive, Bel Air, MD
21015.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/6zuN56 from Leagle.com.

Steve Strauss, doing business as, Plaintiff, pro se.

Angie's List, Inc., Defendant, represented by Franco A. Corrado --
franco.corrado@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. -- gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice, J. Kevin Fee --
kevin.fee@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac
vice, Lynn W. Hursh -- lhursh@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong
Teasdale LLP, Matthew R. Brunkhorst --
mbrunkhorst@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale, LLP,
Natalie M. Georges -- natalie.georges@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice & Paul M. Croker --
pcroker@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP.


ATLANTIC CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Bencomo Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Modest Luna Bencomo moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned MODESTA LUNA BENCOMO,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
ATLANTIC CREDIT & FINANCE INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01858-WED (E.D.
Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ATLANTIC CREDIT: Proceedings in Bencomo's Class Cert. Bid Stayed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin granted the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification in the
lawsuit titled MODESTA LUNA BENCOMO v. ATLANTIC CREDIT & FINANCE,
INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01858-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On November 26, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In
this Motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in
the complaint but also moved the Court to stay further proceedings
on that Motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."

However, Judge Duffin notes, because parties are generally
unprepared to proceed with a motion for class certification at the
beginning of a case, the Damasco court suggested that the parties
"ask the district court to delay its ruling to provide time for
additional discovery or investigation."

The Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted.  The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c).  Moreover, Judge Duffin says, for administrative purposes,
it is necessary that the Clerk terminate the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.  However, this Motion will be regarded as
pending to serve its protective purpose under Damasco, Judge Duffin
adds.[CC]


BANK OF AMERICA: Vasquez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bank of America, et
al. The case is styled as Carmen Vasquez an individual, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bank of
America, National Association, a business entity, form unknown,
Does 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC18571669 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Nov. 29, 2018).

The Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational
investment bank and financial services company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina with central hubs in New York City, London, Hong
Kong, and Toronto.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by David R. Markham, Esq. and Richard
E. Quintilone, Esq.


BARNES & NOBLE: Appeal in Bernardino Class Action Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Barnes & Noble, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 20, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended October 27, 2018, that appeal in Bernardino
v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., still pending.

On June 16, 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed
against Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. (B&N Booksellers) in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging violations of the federal Video Privacy Protection Act and
related New York law.

The plaintiff, who seeks to represent a class of subscribers of
Facebook, Inc. (Facebook) who purchased DVDs or other video media
from the Barnes & Noble website, seeks damages, injunctive relief
and attorneys' fees, among other things, based on her allegation
that B&N Booksellers supposedly knowingly disclosed her personally
identifiable information to Facebook without her consent when she
bought a DVD from Barnes & Noble's website.

On July 10, 2017, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction
requiring Barnes & Noble to change the operation of its website,
which motion B&N Booksellers opposed. On July 31, 2017, B&N
Booksellers moved to compel the case to arbitration, consistent
with the terms of use on Barnes & Noble's website.

On August 28, 2017, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction. On January 31, 2018, the court granted B&N
Booksellers' motion to compel arbitration, and the clerk of court
closed the case on February 1, 2018. On March 2, 2018, the
plaintiff filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit from the district court's grant of B&N
Booksellers' motion to compel arbitration.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Barnes & Noble, Inc. primarily operates as a bookseller in the
United States. The company operates through two segments, B&N
Retail and NOOK. The company was founded in 1986 and is based in
New York, New York.


BARNES & NOBLE: Cafe Managers' Class Suit Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------
Barnes & Noble, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 20, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended October 27, 2018, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit initiated by Kelly Brown involving
Cafe Managers.

On September 20, 2016, Kelly Brown filed a complaint against Barnes
& Noble in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York in which she alleges that she is entitled to unpaid
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Illinois
law.

Ms. Brown seeks to represent a class of allegedly similarly
situated employees who performed the same position (Cafe Manager)
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as well as an
Illinois-based class under Illinois law.

On November 9, 2016, Ms. Brown filed an amended complaint to add an
additional plaintiff named Tiffany Stewart, who is a former Cafe
Manager who also alleges unpaid overtime compensation in violation
of New York law and seeks to represent a class of similarly
situated New York-based Cafe Managers under New York law.

On May 2, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification, without prejudice. The Plaintiffs filed a renewed
motion for Conditional Certification on November 17, 2017, which
the Court denied on June 25, 2018.

There are currently 24 former Cafe Managers who have joined the
action as opt-in plaintiffs.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Barnes & Noble, Inc. primarily operates as a bookseller in the
United States. The company operates through two segments, B&N
Retail and NOOK. The company was founded in 1986 and is based in
New York, New York.


BECTON DICKINSON: Defending Against 3,154 Hernia Product Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Becton, Dickinson and Company said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 21,
2018, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that as of
September 30, 2018, the company is defending approximately 3,154
product liability claims involving Bard's line of hernia repair
devices (collectively, the "Hernia Product Claims").

The majority of those claims are currently pending in a coordinated
proceeding in Rhode Island State Court, but claims are also pending
in other state and/or federal court jurisdictions. In addition,
those claims include multiple putative class actions in Canada.

Generally, the Hernia Product Claims seek damages for personal
injury allegedly resulting from use of the products. From time to
time, the Company engages in resolution discussions with
plaintiffs' law firms regarding certain of the Hernia Product
Claims, but the Company also intends to vigorously defend Hernia
Product Claims that do not settle, including through litigation.

Trials are scheduled throughout 2019 in various state and/or
federal courts. The Company expects additional trials of Hernia
Product Claims to take place over the next 12 months.

In August 2018, a new hernia multi-district litigation ("MDL") was
ordered to be established in the Southern District of Ohio.

Becton, Dickinson said, "The Company cannot give any assurances
that the resolution of the Hernia Product Claims that have not
settled, including asserted and unasserted claims and the putative
class action lawsuits, will not have a material adverse effect on
the Company's business, results of operations, financial condition
and/or liquidity."

Becton, Dickinson and Company develops, manufactures, and sells
medical supplies, devices, laboratory equipment, and diagnostic
products worldwide. Becton, Dickinson and Company was founded in
1897 and is based in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey.


BIG MIKE'S: Magistrate Recommends Conditional FLSA Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WENDY FITZWATER Plaintiff, v. MIKE COLE, SR, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-00137-N (S.D. Ala.), Magistrate
Judge Katherine P. Nelson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, has issued a
memorandum opinion regarding the Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited
Court-Supervised Notice to the Putative Class and for Conditional
Certification.

Fitzwater's complaint alleges violations of, and proposes to bring
a collective action under, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

The action is before the Court on her Motion for Expedited
Court-Supervised Notice to the Putative Class and for Conditional
Certification, and separate supporting memorandum brief.  The
Defendants have timely filed a response in opposition to the
motion, and Fitzwater has timely filed a reply to the response.

Fitzwater's present motion invokes the two-stage procedure
described above and moves for stage-one conditional certification
of the putative class of all current and former employees of Big
Mike's Steakhouse for whom the Defendants claimed a 'tip credit' by
paying them a direct hourly wage of less than $7.25 per hour for
any work week since Sept. 10, 2015.

In response, the Defendants point out that in April 2018, after
Fitzwater filed the action on March 21, 2018, but before the
Defendants were served with the complaint in late May and early
June, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor
("DOL") initiated an audit of the Defendants' payroll practices.
The DOL issued its determinations to the Defendants on Aug. 22,
2018, including a settlement demand requiring payment of back wages
and other elements of compensation, including properly calculated
overtime and other elements of compensation, to all current and
former employees, with the sole exception of Plaintiff Fitzwater.


The Agency's determination and settlement demand included loss of
the Defendants' 'tip credit' due to a tip pooling arrangement that
was deemed not compliant with the FSLA.  The DOL did not assess
liquidated damages after determining no willful conduct on the part
of the Defendants.  Fitzwater was excluded from the DOL's payment
compensation roster due to the DOL's policy of not representing
employees who are represented by counsel and have claims pending in
court.  The roster did include former employee Carlissa Phillips,
to date the only opt-in Plaintiff.

The Defendants assert that they have agreed to pay the DOL's
settlement demand for all current and former employees on the
compensation roster and have transmitted settlement payments to all
current and former employees with the exception of Plaintiff
Fitzwater and Ms. Phillips.  They request that the Court exercises
its inherent power to control its docket by staying the case to
allow for the DOL settlement process to conclude.  In reply,
Fitzwater opposes the request for a stay.  Briefing on the present
motion closed after Oct. 4, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Nelson heard oral argument regarding the motion at
a telephonic scheduling conference with the counsel for the parties
held Nov. 16, 2018.  She opined that indeed, by arguing for
allowing the DOL settlement proceedings, involving dozens of the
Defendants' employees, to continue so as to resolve the claims at
issue in the action, the Defendants tacitly concede that a putative
class exists.  Upon consideration, she finds it appropriate to
conditionally certify a collective action with a putative class of
all current and former employees of Big Mike's Steakhouse for whom
the Defendants claimed a 'tip credit' by paying them a direct
hourly wage of less than $7.25 per hour for any work week since
Sept. 10, 2015.

Moreover, the Magistrate Judge finds that the pendency of the DOL's
parallel settlement proceedings does not warrant a stay or denial
of conditional certification.  Nothing in the plain text of the
FLSA suggests that a DOL-supervised settlement proceeding and a
district court collective action cannot proceed at the same time,
and given that the broad remedial goal of the collective action
statute should be enforced to the full extent of its terms, the
Magistrate Judge finds that the rights of the putative class will
be best protected by allowing notice of the action to issue.

In accordance with this, Magistrate Judge Nelson will, in due
course after hearing from the parties at the telephonic follow-up
scheduling conference enter a separate order denying the
Defendants' motion to stay, granting Fitzwater's motion for
conditional certification, and setting forth additional appropriate
provisions and instructions to effectuate notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/FHXV8J from Leagle.com.

Wendy Fitzwater, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak,
III -- yezbak@yezbaklaw.com -- Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice &
Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, Arciniegas Law PLLC.

Mike Cole, Sr., Scott Powell, Caine Conway, Casey Taylor, Big
Mike's Restaurant LLC, Big Mike's Steakhouse OB, LLC, Big Mike's
Restaurant II, LLC & Big Mike's Restaurant Andalusia, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Emily C. Killion -- ekillion@burr.com --
BURR & FORMAN LLP & H. William Wasden -- bwasden@burr.com -- Burr
Forman.


BLACKBOARD INC: McMechen Suit Alleges Equal Pay Act Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tina McMechen and Madeleine Watson, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated employees v. Blackboard Inc., Case No.
3:18-cv-00218 (E.D. Ark., November 14, 2018), seeks to recover the
equal pay owed to them under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Equal Pay Act.

The Plaintiffs alleges that the Defendant's Female Salespeople and
the Members of the Class were paid less for equal work than men.
There has been a stark disparity in pay between Blackboard's male
and female salespeople despite performing virtually identical
jobs.

The Plaintiff Tina McMechen worked for Blackboard as a salesperson
in its K-12 division based out of her residence in Craighead
County, Arkansas, from January 11, 2016, until July 20, 2018.

The Plaintiff Madeleine Watson worked for Blackboard as a
salesperson in its K-12 division based out of her residence in Cook
County, Illinois, from March 2015 until June 29, 2018.

The Defendant Blackboard, which bills itself as the "#1 Global
Education Software Provider," provides educational software
solutions to educators, schools, and school districts throughout
the United States and worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Jennifer J. Spencer, Esq.
      Mary L. Scott, Esq.
      James E. Hunnicutt, Esq.
      SPENCER SCOTT PLLC
      Three Forest Plaza
      12221 Merit Drive, Suite 160
      Dallas, TX 75225
      Tel: (972) 458-5301
      Fax: (972) 770-2156
      E-mail: jspencer@spencerscottlaw.com
              mscott@spencerscottlaw.com
              jhunnicutt@spencerscottlaw.com


BONNIER CORP: Friske Seeks to Certify Class of Mich. Subscribers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned REBECCA FRISKE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BONNIER
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Case No. 2:16-cv-12799-DML-EAS
(E.D. Mich.), seeks certification of this class:

     All Michigan residents who received one or more
     subscriptions to a magazine published by Bonnier between
     July 28, 2010 and the present, and who did not purchase such
     subscriptions through a Third-Party Subscription Agent.

Ms. Friske alleges that Bonnier violated the Michigan Video Rental
Privacy Act by disclosing her and other similarly situated Michigan
customers' personal magazine subscriber information to third
parties without notice or consent.

Ms. Friske also asks the Court to appoint her as Class
Representative, and to appoint her counsel as Class Counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15232
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                  jetzel@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Daniel Myers, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL O. MYERS
          818 Red Drive, Suite 210
          Traverse City, MI 49684
          Telephone: (231) 943-1135
          E-mail: dmyers@domlawoffice.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Francis A. Zacherl, Esq.
          Daniel T. Stabile, Esq.
          SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP
          200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 4100
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 415-9063
          Facsimile: (305) 347-7714
          E-mail: fzacherl@shutts.com
                  dstabile@shutts.com

               - and -

          John J. Gillooly, Esq.
          GARAN LUCOW MILLER P.C.
          1155 Brewery Park Blvd., Suite 200
          Detroit, MI 48207
          Telephone: (313) 446-5501
          E-mail: jgillooly@garanlucow.com


BOYSEN USA: Auto Shops Hit Overpriced Automotive Exhaust Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------
Manny's Auto Supply, Inc. and Irving Levine Automotive
Distributors, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Boysen USA, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-13688 (E.D. Mich., November 26, 2018), seeks treble
damages under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the
Clayton Act.

Defendant is a manufacturer and supplier of automotive exhaust
systems. Boysen USA is owned by Friedrich Boysen GmbH & Co. KG of
Germany. Boysen is accused of conspiring to rig bids and fix,
raise, maintain, or stabilize prices of automotive exhaust systems
sold in the United States at supra-competitive levels.

Plaintiffs are automotive parts dealers who purchased these exhaust
systems. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     David H. Fink, Esq.
     Darryl Bressack, Esq.
     Nathan J. Fink, Esq.
     FINK ASSOCIATES LAW
     38500 Woodward Avenue, Ste. 350
     Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
     Tel: (248) 971-2500
     Email: dfink@finkandassociateslaw.com
            dbressack@finkandassociateslaw.com
            nfink@finkandassociateslaw.com

            - and -

     Eugene A. Spector, Esq.
     William G. Caldes, Esq.
     Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
     Jeffrey L. Spector, Esq.
     SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.
     1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Telephone: (215) 496-0300
     Email: espector@srkattorneys.com
            bcaldes@srkattorneys.com
            jjagher@srkattorneys.com
            jspector@srkattorneys.com

            - and -

     Steven A. Kanner, Esq.
     William H. London, Esq.
     Michael E. Moskovitz, Esq.
     FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
     2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
     Bannockburn, IL 60015
     Telephone: (224) 632-4500
     Email: skanner@fklmlaw.com
            wlondon@fklmlaw.com
            mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com

            - and -

     Joseph C. Kohn, Esq.
     William E. Hoese, Esq.
     Douglas A. Abrahams, Esq.
     Craig W. Hillwig, Esq.
     KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
     One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
     Philadelphia, PA 19107
     Telephone: (215) 238-1700
     Email: jkohn@kohnswift.com
            whose@kohnswift.com
            dabrahams@kohnswift.com

            - and -

     Gregory P. Hansel, Esq.
     Randall B. Weill, Esq.
     Michael S. Smith, Esq.
     PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS LLP
     One City Center, P.O. Box 9546
     Portland, ME 04112-9546
     Telephone: (207) 791-3000
     Email: ghansel@preti.com
            rweill@preti.com

            - and -

     Carl E. Person, Esq.
     225 E. 36th Street, Suite 3A
     New York, NY 10016-3664
     Telephone: (212) 307- 4444
     Email: carlpers2@gmail.com

            - and -

     Scott D. Gilchrist, Esq.
     Richard E. Shevitz, Esq.
     COHEN & MALAD, LLP
     One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
     Indianapolis, IN 46204
     Telephone: (317) 636-6481
     Fax: (317) 636-2593
     Email: rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com
            sgilchrist@cohenandmalad.com


BROOKS BROTHERS: Phipps Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Delina Phipps an individual, and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Brooks Brothers
Group, Inc. a Delaware limited liability company, Does 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC719429 was removed from Los
Angeles County Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on November 29, 2018, and assigned
Case No. 2:18-cv-10010-SJO-RAO.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights and was asserts
Employment Discrimination.

Brooks Brothers Group, Inc. retails apparel and accessories for
women, men, and kids. The company offers dress shirts, sport
shirts, ties, blazers, suits, outerwear, sport coats and vests,
sweaters, formalwear, dress trousers, casual pants, polos, rugby
shirts and tees, shorts, underwear and socks, sleepwear, and
swimwear; and non-iron dress shirts, dresses, blouses, knits,
jackets, pants, skirts, and petites.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew John Matern, Esq.
     Matern Law Group PC
     1230 Rosecrans Avenue Suite 200
     Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
     Phone: (310) 531-1900
     Fax: (310) 531-1901
     Email: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com

          - and -

     Scott Ashford Brooks, Esq.
     Matern Law Group PC
     1230 Rosecrans Avenue Suite 200
     Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
     Phone: (310) 531-1900
     Fax: (310) 531-1901
     Email: sbrooks@maternlawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Amy Schaefer Ramsey, Esq.
     Littler Mendelson PC
     633 West Fifth Street 63rd Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 443-4300
     Fax: (213) 443-4299
     Email: aramsey@littler.com

          - and -

     Bennett Kaspar, Esq.
     Littler Mendelson PC
     633 West Fifth Street 63rd Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: (213) 443-4300
     Fax: (213) 443-4299
     Email: bkaspar@littler.com


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Castillo TCPA Suit Moved to N.D. Nevada
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California transferred the case, JUSTIN CASTILLO,
Plaintiff, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-05781-EMC (N.D. Cal.), to the District
of Nevada.

Castillo has filed a class action against Defendants Caesars and
Desert Palace, LLC, asserting a violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.  According to Mr. Castillo, Caesars violated the
statute because it sent unsolicited marketing and advertising text
messages to its hotel guests.

In his complaint, Mr. Castillo alleges that he resides in Los
Angeles, California.  In April 2018, he checked into the Caesars
Palace hotel, which is located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  Approximately
half an hour later, he received a text message.  At the time he
received the text message, Mr. Castillo had not authorized Caesars
to send him marketing-related text messages.  He does not allege
that he received any more messages from Caesars.

According to Mr. Castillo, Caesars worked with GoMoment, a
California-based company, to roll out the guest-engagement platform
known as Ivy. As alleged in the complaint, GoMoment was responsible
for developing and maintaining the Ivy platform, but Caesars was
responsible for implementing the platform for its hotel.

Currently pending before the Court is Caesars's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to
transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404.

Judge Chen agrees with Caesars that personal jurisdiction is
lacking.  He holds that Mr. Castillo has failed to make a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction.  The Judge, however, does
not dismiss the action based on the lack of personal jurisdiction
because personal jurisdiction is a defect capable of being cured,
and because 28 U.S.C. C. Section 1631 allows the Court to transfer
as an alternative to dismissal.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the District of
Nevada has personal jurisdiction over Caesars.  Moreover, there is
no real dispute that a significant part of the events took place in
Nevada, including but not limited to Caesars's decision to send the
text messages and the receipt of those text messages by guests
after checking into the Caesars hotel.  Finally, there is no
apparent frivolousness or bad faith with respect to Mr. Castillo's
claims.  A transfer to the District of Nevada is therefore
appropriate.

Finally, the Judge notes that, even if it did have personal
jurisdiction over Caesars with respect to the instant case, it
would still find a transfer to the District of Nevada proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen denied the Defendants' motion
to dismiss, and transferred the instant case to the District of
Nevada.  The Clerk of the Court is ordered to immediately
effectuate the transfer of the case.  The Order disposes of Docket
No. 20.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FSq57j from Leagle.com.

Justin Castillo, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
info@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Danielle Leigh
Manning -- dmanning@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
Marc Lawrence Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Mark Samuel Greenstone -- mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com
-- Greenstone Law APC & Michael Joe Jaurigue --
michael@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation & Desert Palace, LLC, doing
business as Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, Defendants, represented
by Matthew T. Murchison -- matthew.murchison@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Melanie Marilyn Blunschi --
melanie.blunschi@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Adam J. Tuetken --
adam.tuetken@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice & Natalie
Hardwick Rao -- natalie.rao@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice.


CAMBIUM LEARNING: Strahan Balks at Merger Deal with Veritas
-----------------------------------------------------------
ERIC STRAHAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CAMBIUM LEARNING GROUP, INC., JOHN
CAMPBELL, DAVID F. BAINBRIDGE, WALTER G. BUMPHUS, CLIFFORD K. CHIU,
CAROLYN GETRIDGE, THOMAS KALINSKE, JEFFREY T. STEVENSON, JOE WALSH,
CAMPUS HOLDING CORP., CAMPUS MERGER SUB INC., and VERITAS CAPITAL
FUND MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., the Defendants, Case 3:18-cv-03123-K (N.D.
Tex., Nov. 27, 2018), seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking any
steps to consummate a proposed transaction unless and until
material information discussed below is disseminated to Cambium's
shareholders, and in the event the proposed transaction is
consummated without the material omissions referenced below being
remedied, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from the
Defendants' violations.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff brings this class action
on behalf of the public shareholders of Cambium Learning Group
against Cambium's Board of Directors for their violations of
Section 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9, arising out of the Board's
attempt to sell the Company to Veritas Capital Fund Management,
L.L.C. through its affiliate Campus Holding Corp. and its
wholly-owned subsidiary Campus Merger Sub Inc. The Defendants have
violated the Exchange Act by causing a materially incomplete and
misleading information statement to be filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 19, 2018. The Proposed
Transaction was first disclosed on October 15, 2018, when Cambium
and Veritas Capital announced that they had entered into a
definitive merger agreement pursuant to which Veritas Capital will
acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Cambium
for $14.50 per share. The deal is expected to close in the fourth
quarter of 2018 or the first quarter of 2019.

Cambium is controlled by Veronis Suhler Stevenson, which holds a
majority of the outstanding shares of Cambium through an affiliated
entity. VSS is a private equity firm that invests in healthcare,
education and business services companies. VSS decided to liquidate
its holdings in Cambium, around the same time that VSS sought to
liquidate its ownership of VKidz, a private company. After securing
a financial advisor and beginning a process to sell the Company,
VSS presented the Board with an opportunity to purchase VKidz. By
selling Vkidz to Cambium and then selling Cambium, VSS was able to
liquidate its holdings in both with just one transaction. Despite
the benefits to VSS, the Proposed Transaction is not in the best
interests of the minority shareholders. The process by which the
Board entered into the Merger Agreement was unfair, as is the
Merger Consideration. Yet the minority shareholders were not even
considered throughout the sales process. There was no special
committee with the authority to hire its own advisors and consider
the Proposed Transaction. There is no majority-of-the-minority
vote. And the Proposed Transaction is a foregone conclusion, given
that VSS has provided written consent and abrogated the need for a
shareholder vote. Furthermore, the Information Statement is
materially incomplete and contains misleading representations and
information in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. Specifically, the Information Statement contains
materially incomplete and misleading information concerning the
sales process, financial projections prepared by Cambium
management, as well as the financial analyses conducted by
Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc., Cambium's financial advisor. In the
absence of this material information the minority shareholders
cannot make an informed decision concerning whether or not to
exercise their appraisal rights, the lawsuit says.

Cambium Learning Group is an American company which creates
computer software and hardware products serving students ranging
from pre-kindergarten to adult; and enabling educators who help
them learn. In December 2009, Cambium acquired Voyager Learning
Company.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joe Kendall, Esq.
          Jamie J. McKey, Esq.
          KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: 214 744-3000
          Facsimile: 214 744-3015
          E-mail: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com
                  jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com

               - and -

          Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
          Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
          ROWLEY LAW PLLC
          50 Main Street, Suite 1000
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 400-1920
          Facsimile: (914) 301-3514

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Class Certification Sought in Montoya Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled Martha E. Montoya,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-2433(ADS)(GRB)
(E.D.N.Y.), asks the Court to certify the matter as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ms. Montoya also asks the Court to appoint her as Class
Representative, and to appoint Barshay Sanders, PLLC, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          SANDERS BARSHAY GROSSMAN, LLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: dbarshay@sbglawny.com


COHEN & SLAMOWITZ: Hallmark FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL HALLMARK, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, V. COHEN & SLAMOWITZ, LLP and
MIDLAND FUNDING EEC d/b/a MIDLAND FUNDING OF DELAWARE, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:11-CV-0842 EAW (W.D. N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth
A. Wolford of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
New York granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement.

On Sept. 16, 2013, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court certified the class, with respect to
the claims asserted in the Action, of all consumers with New York
addresses, who:(a) within one year before March 9, 2012, the date
of filing of the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend in this action; (b)
were sent a debt collection letter by Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, in a
form materially identical or substantially similar to the letter
attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit B sent to the
Plaintiff; or(c) were sent a debt collection letter demanding City
Court filing fees that had not yet been paid, incurred, or reduced
to judgment; or (d) were sent a debt collection letter that failed
to disclose that the balance demanded included filing fees that had
not yet been paid, incurred, or reduced to judgment; and (e)the
letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered.

The parties to the action have agreed, subject to Court approval
following notice to the settlement class members and a final
approval hearing, to settle the Action upon the terms and
conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement and Release, which
has been filed with the Court.

On March 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the Settlement Agreement,
along with a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement.  On June 8, 2018, upon consideration of the Settlement
Agreement and the Preliminary Approval Motion, the Court entered an
Order of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, under
which, the Court, among other things, (i) preliminarily approved
the proposed Settlement Agreement; (ii) approved the form and
content of the Class Notice; and (v) set the date and time of the
Final Fairness Hearing.

On Nov. 21, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the Final Approval Motion,
requesting final certification of the settlement class under Rule
23(b)(3) and final approval of the class action settlement.  On
Nov. 27, 2018, a final fairness hearing was held.  

Judge Wolford reaffirmed the findings set forth in its Sept. 16,
2013 Order with respect to the appropriateness of maintaining the
matter as a class action.  The proposed settlement and Settlement
Agreement are finally approved, and will be consummated in
accordance with the terms and provisions thereof, except as amended
by any order issued by the Court.  The parties are directed to
perform the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiff has submitted, in connection with the Final Approval
Motion, a request for $400,000 in attorneys' fees.  For the reasons
stated on the record at the final fairness hearing, the Judge deems
the request a separate motion for attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and reserves decision on the
motion pending additional briefing.  In particular, she gave the
Defendants until Jan. 14, 2019, to file any opposition papers to
the request for attorneys' fees and costs.  The Plaintiff may file
any reply by no later than Feb. 15, 2019.   Her reservation on the
issue of attorneys' fees will not delay the entry of judgment in
the matter, nor will any amendment of the judgment be required upon
the Court's resolution of the issue.

The Settlement Administrator is ordered to distribute checks to all
the class members who have timely returned a claim form by Dec. 31,
2018.  Within 120 days of the date of the Final Order and Judgment,
the Settlement Administrator is directed to file a notice apprising
the Court that the terms of the Agreement have been complied with
and providing the Court with an accounting of how all settlement
moneys were distributed.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, any portion of
the Settlement Fund that remains after the void date on the Class
Members' checks will be donated to the Western New York Law Center.


Judge Wolford approved the payment of an incentive award of $25,000
to the Plaintiff for his services as the Class Representative,
consistent with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge's Final Order and Judgment dismissed the Action in its
entirety.  Ten days after the filing of the notice and accounting
contemplated of the Final Order and Judgment, the dismissal will
become with prejudice and without costs, absent a timely motion by
any party.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Decision and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2EcJ4C4 from Leagle.com.

Michael Hallmark, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian L. Bromberg, Bromberg Law
Office, P.C., Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller,
Seth Andrews, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC & Jonathan R.
Miller, Salem Community Law Office.

Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Christopher Sayles, Esq. -- asayles@connellfoley.com -- Joseph L.
Linares, Esq. -- jlinares@connellfoley.com -- and Steven A. Kroll,
Esq. -- skroll@connellfoley.com -- CONNELL FOLEY LLP

Midland Funding LLC, doing business as Midland Funding of Delaware
LLC, Defendant, represented by Han Sheng Beh, Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP & Ellen Beth Silverman -- esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw
& Culbertson LLP.


CORAL CAST: Niebles Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Wayner Niebles and Jose Batista, on behalf of themselves, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiffs, v. Coral Cast, LLC
and Joseph Marden, Defendants Case No. 2:18-cv-06803 (E.D. N.Y.,
November 29, 2018) bringd claims for relief as a collective action
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law
that they and others similarly situated are entitled to recover
from Defendants, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages
and attorneys' fees and costs.

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had
substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are
and have been subjected to Defendants' decisions, policies, plans,
programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules,
all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them proper
overtime wages at the rate of one-and-one-half times the regular
rate of pay. The claims of Plaintiffs stated herein are essentially
the same as those of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiffs' and
Class Members' rights by failing to pay overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of 40 per workweek at the proper overtime rate
that is at least one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay, in
violation of the New York Labor Law, says the complaint. The
Defendants also failed to provide proper wage statements and hour
notices to Plaintiffs and Class Members as required under the New
York Labor Law.

Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs
and Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants unpaid
overtime wages, damages for unreasonably delayed payments,
reasonable attorneys' fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties
and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York
Labor Law, adds the comaplaint.

Plaintiffs Wayner Niebles and Jose Batista are residents of Queens
County, New York. At all relevant times, the work performed by
Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members was
directly essential to the business operated by Defendants.

Coral Cast, LLC is a domestic limited liability company organized
under the laws of the State of New York, with a principal place of
business and an address for service of process located at 31
Commercial Court, Plainview, NY 11803. Defendants operate Coral
Cast through Coral Cast, LLC.

Joseph Marden is a principal and president of Corporate Defendant
and has operational control of Coral Cast. He additionally
exercises the authority to fire and hire, supervise and control
work schedules, determine rate and method of pay, maintain
employment records, and otherwise affect the terms and conditions
of employment for managerial employees who directly supervise
Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at Coral
Cast.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Anne Seelig, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 465-1188
     Fax: (212) 465-1181


COVENTRY HEALTH: Arbitration Denial in 206 Golden Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Coventry Health Care of Florida, Inc., Appellant, v.
Crosswinds Rehab, Inc., LLC, etc., et al., Appellees, Case No.
3D18-1342 (Fla. App.), Judge Vance E. Salter of the District Court
of Appeal of Florida for the Third District affirmed the trial
court's order denying Coventry's motion to compel arbitration.

Coventry sought arbitration of putative class action claims brought
against it by the Appellee, 206 Golden, LLC.  It is undisputed that
206 Golden is not the same entity that entered into a participating
provider agreement with Coventry in 2012.  Rather, the agreement
was signed by a prior provider operating the skilled nursing
facility now operated by 206 Golden but still known as "The
Crossroads."  It is also undisputed that the Agreement contains a
binding arbitration provision between Coventry and the entity which
signed the Agreement, and that the Agreement excluded long-term
care services.

Coventry argues that, since at least 2014, 206 Golden's submission
of claims to, and receipt of payments from, Coventry, establishes
that the Agreement is still operative and binds 206 Golden.  It
further argues that the arbitrator, not the trial court, should
determine the enforceability and scope of the Agreement.

206 Golden responds that: (1) it never signed and never agreed to
the terms in Coventry's Agreement with the prior entity; and (2) it
has submitted the claims in controversy and has been paid by
Coventry (a) exclusively for long-term care services, which are
excluded under the express terms of the Agreement,1 and (b) only
because 206 Golden "must" submit such claims to Coventry under
section 409.982(2), Florida Statutes (2018), irrespective of any
agreement or contract.

The first issue is dispositive and eliminates our need to address
the long-term care exclusion in the Agreement. In Careplus Health
Plans, Inc. v. Interamerican Medical Center Group, LLC, 124 So.3d
968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), as here, the agreement containing the
mandatory arbitration provision was not signed by the entity
against which the provision was sought to be enforced; this Court
held that the trial court, not an arbitrator, was to determine the
applicability of the arbitration provision based on the
relationship of the parties.

Although the Agreement in the present case included a broad
"successors and assigns" provision applicable to Coventry, Judge
Salter finds no such provision applied to a successor owner or
operator of the Crossroads facility.  The first element to be
considered under the controlling case of Seifert v. U.S. Home
Corp., is whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.  In the
case, it does not, as between these parties.  The record before the
Court lacks competent substantial evidence supporting Coventry's
contentions regarding (a) an implied assumption of such a provision
by 206 Golden, or (b) estoppel as against 206 Golden.  Therefore
the Judge affirmed the order denying Coventry's motion to compel
arbitration is affirmed.  

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, Order is available at
https://is.gd/4OH7hZ from Leagle.com.

Shook Hardy & Bacon and Daniel B. Rogers -- drogers@shb.com;
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Matthew Papkin, Melissa M. Coates --
melissa.coates@morganlewis.com -- and Brian M. Ercole --
brian.ercole@morganlewis.com; Shapiro, Blasi, Wasserman & Hermann
and Richard P. Hermann, II and David J. DePiano (Boca Raton), for
appellant.

The Moskowitz Law Firm and Adam Moskowitz -- adam@moskowitz-law.com
-- and Howard M. Bushman -- howard@moskowitz-law.com -- and Adam A.
Schwartzbaum -- adams@moskowitz-law.com -- and Joseph M. Kaye;
Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph and Allan A. Joseph --
joseph@moskowitz-law.com -- Christopher M. David -- cdavid@fidj.com
-- and Michael B. Kornhauser -- mkornhauser@fidjlaw.com -- for
appellee 206 Golden LLC d/b/a Crossroads.


CV SCIENCES: Time to Reply to Consolidated Securities Suit Extended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: CV SCIENCES, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, C.A. No. 2:18-cv-01602-JAD-PAL
(D. Nev.), Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada has issued an order extending the
time to respond to the complaint.

On Aug. 24, 2018, David Smith, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint captioned
Smith v. CV Sciences, Inc., et al., No. 2:18-cv-01602-JAD-PAL,
against the Defendants alleging violations of violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

On Sept. 6, 2018, Lenny Alvarado, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a related class action complaint
captioned Alvarado v. CV Sciences, Inc., et al., No.
2:18-cv-01709-JAD-GWFm against the Defendants alleging violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5.

The CV Sciences Actions are subject to the procedural requirements
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
which contemplates: (i) the consolidation of similar actions; and
then (ii) the appointment of a Lead Plaintiff and a Lead Counsel.

On Oct. 23, 2018, several movants, including Ina, filed motions for
consolidation of the CV Sciences Actions, appointment as the Lead
Plaintiff, and approval of their respective Lead Counsel selections
in the CV Sciences Actions.  By Nov. 5, 2018, all of the parties
who filed such motions, except Ina, withdrew their motions or filed
notices of non-opposition to Ina's Motion.

On Nov. 15, 2018, the Court consolidated the CV Sciences Actions,
appointed Ina as the Lead Plaintiff for the consolidated CV
Sciences Actions, and approved his selection of the Lead Counsel.
The Defendants do not contest service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
Ina intends to file a consolidated amended complaint.  The parties
agree that tge Defendants' deadline to respond to the CV Sciences
Actions should be extended until 60 days after a consolidated
amended complaint is filed, as set forth in the proposed schedule.
Ina's consolidated amended complaint will be subject to the
heightened pleading standards imposed by the PSLRA and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b), and therefore requires more detailed allegations and more
detailed arguments if the Defendants move to dismiss the Lead
Plaintiff's consolidated amended complaint.

It is the first stipulation for extension of time to respond to the
complaint.  Therefore, the parties stipulated and agreed, and
Magistrate Judge Leen granted that the Parties will proceed
according to the schedule below:

     a. Lead Plaintiff to file a consolidated amended complaint:
Jan. 4, 2019

     b. Defendants to file their motion to dismiss - March 5, 2019

     c. Lead Plaintiff to file his opposition to the Defendants'
motion to dismiss - May 3, 2019

     d. Defendants to file their reply in support of their motion
to dismiss - June 3, 2019

In light of the heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the Parties' page limitations will be as
follows: 30 pages for the Defendants' Motion, 20 pages for the Lead
Plaintiff's Opposition, and 20 pages for the Defendants' Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Stipulated Order is
available at https://is.gd/FobU0G from Leagle.com.

Richard Ina, as Trustee for The Ina Family Trust, Plaintiff,
represented by Dillon Hagius -- dhagius@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi &
Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Muckleroy, Richard Gonnello ,
Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, Richard Gonnello -- rgonnello@faruqilaw.com --
Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice & Sherief Morsy --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice.

David Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Martin Muckleroy & Patrick
R. Leverty -- pat@levertylaw.com -- Leverty & Associates Chtd.

Kenneth Zelden, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew R. Muehlbauer,
Muehlbauer Law Office, Ltd.

Lenny Alvarado, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew R. Muehlbauer,
Muehlbauer Law Office, Ltd., pro hac vice.

CVI Investor Group, Movant, represented by Patrick R. Leverty,
Leverty & Associates Chtd.

CV Sciences, Inc., Michael Mona, Jr., Joseph D Dowling & Michael
Mona, III, Defendants, represented by Terry A. Coffing --
tcoffing@maclaw.com -- Marquis & Aurbach & Michael David Maupin --
mmaupin@maclaw.com -- c/o Marquis Aurbach Coffing.

Jerry Faulkner, Defendant, represented by Andrew R. Muehlbauer,
Muehlbauer Law Office, Ltd.


DHI MORTGAGE: Can Compel Arbitration in Ahlstrom FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT W. AHLSTROM, Plaintiff, v. DHI MORTGAGE COMPANY
GP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04383-BLF (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and dismissed without
prejudice the case.

Ahlstrom brings claims on behalf of himself and a putative class of
others similarly situated in connection with Defendants DHI GP,
D.R. Horton, Inc., and DOES 1 through 50, for state law wage and
hour and contract violations.  He was employed by DHI Mortgage
Company, Ltd. between July 2015 and December 2016.  On June 27,
2015, Ahlstrom filled out and electronically signed an application
for employment.  On July 24, 2015, shortly after he was hired by
DHI Ltd., Ahlstrom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement ("MAA").

Despite being hired by DHI Ltd., the MAA on its face is between the
undersigned employee and D.R. Horton.  The MAA covers all legal
disputes and claims between the Employee and the Company, including
claims by the Employee against the Company's parents, subsidiaries,
affiliates, directors, employees, or agents, for, inter alia,
wages, overtime, benefits, or other compensation and breach of any
express or implied contract.  The MAA includes various provisions
relevant to the present motion. First, it includes a
delegation-of-arbitrability provision.  Second, it includes an
opt-out provision.  And finally, it includes a class action
waiver.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration.
The Court heard oral argument on the motion on Nov. 8, 2018.

Judge Freeman is not persuaded by Ahlstrom's arguments on
interpretation of the opt-out provision.  Unfortunately for
Ahlstrom, she says, interpretation of that provision is delegated
exclusively to the arbitrator and cannot be adjudicated by the
Court.  The antecedent question of whether the arbitration
agreement covers Ahlstrom's claims must be sent to the arbitrator.
Given that Ahlstrom validly accepted the arbitrability provision,
then, the question of whether he validly terminated his acceptance
of the MAA is delegated to the arbitrator as an ancillary formation
issue.

Finally, the Judge finds it appropriate to dismiss the case without
prejudice.  The MAA includes a valid class action waiver, the
substance of which Ahlstrom does not challenge.  As such, given
that Ahlstrom's individual claims must be sent to arbitration, she
will dismiss the class action claims pending resolution of the
arbitration.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman granted the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration.  There being no remaining claims
outside of arbitration, she dismissed the entire action without
prejudice to filing a later action should the arbitrator determine
the arbitration agreement is not binding on Ahlstrom, or to confirm
or vacate any arbitration award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2B38dvU from Leagle.com.

Robert W. Ahlstrom, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Alistair Segal
-- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Ashley N. Batiste --
ashley@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Farrah Grant --
info@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

DHI Mortgage Company GP, Inc. & D.R. Horton, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Alexandra Caroline Aurisch --
alexandra.aurisch@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
and Stewart, P.C., Jack Steven Sholkoff --
jack.sholkoff@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C. & Jennifer Lindsay Katz -- jennifer.katz@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins.


DIGNITY HEALTH: Cruz Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dignity Health. The
case is styled as Isidro B Cruz and behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Dignity Health, Does 1-100, Defendants, Case
No. 34-2018-00245506-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty.,
Nov. 29, 2018).

Dignity Health is a California-based not-for-profit public-benefit
corporation that operates hospitals and ancillary care facilities
in 3 states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Kevin T. Barnes, Esq.



DSV AIR & SEA: Pitarro Files Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DSV Air & Sea, Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Maya Pitarro an individual, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DSV Air
& Sea, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, UTI United States, Inc. a New
York Corporation, Does 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
CGC18571672 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Nov. 29, 2018).

DSV Air & Sea Inc. provides transport and logistics services in the
United States and internationally. It offers air, sea, and land
freight forwarding services, and
consolidating/assembly/distribution, non-vessel operating common
carrier, project forwarding/charter and part charter, hazmat cargo
handling, export and import, and federal maritime commission
services.

UTi, United States, Inc. provides freight forwarding,
transportation, logistics, warehouse, and supply chain management
services in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Matthew J. Matern, Esq.


ESTERLINE TECH: Kent Sues Over TransDigm Merger
-----------------------------------------------
Michael Kent, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Esterline Technologies Corporation, Curtis
C. Reusser, Michael J. Cave, Michael J. Covey, Delores M. Etter,
Anthony P. Franceschini, Paul V. Haack, Mary L. Howell, Scott E.
Kuechle, nd Nils E. Larsen, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01862 (D.
Del., November 26, 2018), seeks (i) to enjoin defendants and all
persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating or closing the acquisition of Esterline Technologies
Corporation by TransDigm Group Incorporated and Thunderbird Merger
Sub Inc., (ii) rescinding it in the event defendants consummate the
merger, (iii) rescissory damages, (iv) costs of this action,
including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and
experts' fees, and (v) such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Esterline's
stockholders will receive $122.50 in cash for each share of
Esterline common stock they hold.

Esterline is a supplier to the aerospace and defense industry
specializing in materials, avionics and controls and sensors and
systems.

The Plaintiff asserts that the solicitation statement filed in
connection with the merger omitted material information regarding
Esterline's financial projections and the analyses performed by its
financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, fails to disclose
illustrative present value of future share price analyses, the
discounted cash flow analyses and the premia paid analysis. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
      Wilmington, DE 19801
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
             gms@rl-legal.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 3112
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Email: rm@maniskas.com


EVANS HOTELS: Protective Order Bid in Rutherford Suit Partly OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES RUTHERFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EVANS HOTELS,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18cv435-JLS(MSB)(S.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Micahel S. Berg of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California (i) granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's request for an Order Limiting the Scope of
30(b)(6) Deposition Topics as a Motion for Protective Order, and
(ii) denied as mooot the Defendant's request for leave to file a
Motion for Protective Order.

Rutherford and The Association 4 Equal Access are alleging
violations of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act and Title III
of Americans with Disabilities Act.  The Defendant manages three
hotel properties: The Lodge at Torrey Pines, the Catamaran Resort
Hotel and Spa, and the Bahia Resort Hotel.

The Plaintiffs allege that Rutherford visited the websites of the
Defendant's hotel properties, did not see accessibility information
on the websites, and therefore did not make a reservation at any of
the hotels.  They bring the action on behalf of themselves, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(b)(2), and alternatively, (b)(3), on behalf of all legally
disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted to
access the Defendant's websites.  For the claims under California
law, the Plaintiffs seek to represent a California subclass of all
legally disabled individuals in California who attempted to visit
the Defendant's websites.

The Plaintiffs seek a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition with regard to the
Defendant's employment practices and its physical facilities.  In
the instant motion, the Defendant seeks to preclude or limit the
scope of the proposed deposition topics, or obtain leave to file a
Motion for Protective Order.

The parties contacted Magistrate Judge Skomal on Nov. 2, 2018, in
order for the Defendant to seek leave to file a Motion for a
Protective Order.  On Nov. 6, 2018, prior to Magistrate Judge
Skomal ruling on the Defendant's request for leave to file a Motion
for a Protective Order, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge
Berg.

The Defendant seeks to limit the scope of the following topics as
overbroad and unreasonable:

      a. Proposed Topic 1: The allegations of the Operative
Complaint in the action.  The Defendant objected that the topic is
unclear and may involve attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.  

      b. Proposed Topic 10: Facts or documents that support any
affirmative defense relied upon or asserted by the Defendant.  The
Defendant objected that the request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad,
and might invade attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine.

      c. Proposed Topic 11: The Defendant's responses to the
Plaintiff's written discovery requests.            

      d. Proposed Topic 17: The conduct of the Defendant in
responding to the Plaintiff's written discovery requests in the
matter.

Magistrate Judge Berg denied the Defendant's motion with respect to
Proposed Topic 1 finding that the Defendant's refusal to provide
discovery on this basis to be without merit.

The Defendant seeks to limit the following topics to actual issues
in the case and alleged violations of 28 CFR Section 36.302(e)(1):

      a. Proposed Topic 2: The manner in which the Defendant
ensures compliance with ADA requirements at its hotels including,
but not limited to, identifying individuals, policies, procedures,
and documents related to the Defendant's ADA compliance efforts.

      b. Proposed Topic 12: The Defendant's websites at issue.

      c. Proposed Topic 13: Any changes to the Defendant's hotel
websites since th action was initiated including but not limited to
elements of the website related to hotel reservations.

The Magistrate Judge limits discovery on Proposed Topics 2, 12, and
13 to the relevant portions of the Defendant's websites regarding
room reservations only and the alleged violations of 28 CFR
36.302(e)(1) with regard to the hotels' website reservation system.


The Defendant seeks to limit the following topics, stating that
there are less burdensome discovery means that have been offered
and rejected by the Plaintiff:

      a. Proposed Topic 3: The organizational structure of the
Defendant, including hierarchical structures of subsidiaries,
parent companies, and/or related affiliate companies.

      b. Proposed Topic 4: Ownership and/or control of hotels
operated by the Defendant.

      c. Proposed Topic 9: Information on any customer complaints,
lawsuits, incidents reports and/or other grievances that the
Defendant has received regarding accessibility barriers related to
its hotels for the last 6 years.

As the Plaintiff has agreed to allow the Defendant to produce
documentation in lieu of witness testimony, the Magistrate does not
need to make a ruling on the issue.  Nonetheless, he limits
production of documentation on Proposed Topic 9 to any customer
complaints, lawsuits, incident reports and/or other grievances that
the Defendant has received in the last six years with regard to the
relevant portions of the Defendant's websites regarding room
reservations only.

The Defendant seeks to limit the following topics, claiming that
they are not proportional to the needs of the case:

      a. Proposed Topic 5: Policies, practices and procedures,
construction standards and/or other guidelines that the Defendant
follows regarding the construction, alteration and maintenance of
the hotels operated by the Defendant.
      
      b. Proposed Topic 7: The terms of the Defendant's leases or
other similar legal arrangements applicable to its facilities
including provisions delineating responsibility for ensuring
compliance with ADA requirements regarding parking and/or paths of
travel/access at the Defendant's facilities.

      c. Proposed Topic 8: Information on the Defendant's
implementation and use of internal and/or third-party surveys,
evaluations and/or assessments (Surveys) across Defendant's
locations relating to the Defendant's compliance with the ADA,
including but not limited to, the qualifications and training of
individuals to conduct such Surveys, the frequency and scope of
such Surveys, the policies, practices and procedures surrounding
the Surveys, and the procedures and/or policies relating to
remediation and monitoring following the completion of Surveys.

The Magistrate granted the Defendant's motion with respect to
Proposed Topics 5, 7 and 8.  He finds that these topics to be
outside the scope of the issues in the case.

The Defendant seeks to limit the following topics, stating that
they request numerical data which could be more accurate and less
burdensome if produced in writing:

      a. Proposed Topic 14: The number of visitors to the
Defendant's websites.

      b. Proposed Topic 15: The number of persons that reserved a
room through the Defendant's websites.

      c. Proposed Topic 16: The number of persons that reserved an
accessible room through the Defendant's websites.

Magistrate Judge Berg denied the Defendant's motion as to these
topics.  As the Defendants have apparently already provided the
information to the Plaintiffs in written discovery, it appears to
be a waste of resources to obtain the same information through the
taking of depositions.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Berg granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's Motion for Protective Orde, and denied as
moot the Defendant's motion for leave to file a Motion for
Protective Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1PGeqv from Leagle.com.

James Rutherford, an individual & The Association 4 Equal Access,
Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth Ann Wagner --
elizabeth@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, APC, Joseph R. Manning,
Jr. -- joe@manninglawoffice.com -- The Law Offices of Joseph R.
Manning Jr. & Matthew M. Loker -- ml@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law
Group, APC.

Evans Hotels, LLC, a California limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Nadia Parra Bermudez --
nbermudez@klinedinstlaw.com -- KLINEDINST PC & Charles E.H. Gulley,
III -- CGuilley@Klinedinst.com -- Klinedinst PC.


FAMOUS BOURBON: Ramos Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled BROOKE RAMOS AND TAYLOR JONES
v. FAMOUS BOURBON MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., 327 BOURBON STREET, INC.
(AKA "TEMPTATIONS"), TEMPTATIONS, INC. (AKA "STILETTOS"), PLATINUM
BOURBON, INC. (AKA "LIPSTICKS"), SILVER BOURBON, INC. (AKA "MANSION
ON BOURBON " OR "SCORES"), BRASS BOURBON, INC. (AKA "BOURBON BAD
BOYS" AKA "FISHBOWLS SOLD HERE"), LA BEAUTI, INC. (AKA "BEERFEST"),
JAXX'S HOUSE, INC. (AKA "JAZZ CAFE"), MANHATTAN FASHION, LLC (AKA
"SCORES WEST"), FAIS DEAUX-DEAUX, INC. (AKA "LAST CALL"),
FIORELLA'S ON DECATUR, INC. (AKA "FIORELLA'S CAFE"), BOURBON
BURLESQUE CLUB, INC., (AKA "TEMPTATIONS"), N'AWLINS ENTERTAINMENT
OF LOUISIANA, INC. D/B/A N'AWLINS ENTERTAINMENT GROUP; GUY OLANO,
III, GUY OLANO, JR. AND JOSEPH ASCANI, Case No.
2:18-cv-06573-JTM-DEK (E.D. La.), moves for class certification
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The "FLSA Collective Class" consists of:

     All persons employed by Defendants since December 2015 who
     were subjected to an invalid tip credit policy because they
     were required to kick back a portion of their tips to
     Defendants' owners and managers in violation of the Fair
     Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. ("FLSA").

In their Collective Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted
claims on behalf of a collective class for wages wrongfully not
paid to them by the Defendants due to the Defendants' actions of
taking a "tip credit" and paying them less than $7.25 per hour, but
requiring them to "kick back" a portion of their tips to the
Defendants' owners and management staff, in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

In addition, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court authorize notice of
this collective action to potential members of the FLSA Collective
Class and approve the proposed notice and consent form submitted
herewith.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON+JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599-5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988-6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net

               - and -

          Christopher L. Williams, Esq.
          WILLIAMS LITIGATION, L.L.C.
          639 Loyola Ave., Suite 1850
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 308-1438
          Facsimile: (504) 308-1446
          E-mail: chris@williamslitigation.com


FIFTH THIRD: Protective Order Bid in Hendrickson FDCA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Kelley L. Hendrickson, Plaintiff, v. Fifth Third Bank,
and 11th Hour Recovery, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-86
(WMW/TNL) (D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota (i) granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, and (ii)
denied Defendant Fifth Third Bank's Motion for Protective Order.

In August 2016, Hendrickson obtained a loan from Fifth Third for
the purchase of an automobile.  The original balance on the loan
was $14,419.37.  As a condition of the loan, the Plaintiff granted
Fifth Third a security interest in the automobile.

Between June and October 2017, the Plaintiff made five late
payments on her loan, which Fifth Third accepted.  She further
claims that she spoke with a Fifth Third representative on several
occasions, who told her that Fifth Third would not repossess her
car as long as she continued to make payments.  At no point did
Fifth Third indicate to the Plaintiff, either orally or in writing,
that it intended to strictly enforce the terms of her loan
agreement.

Sometime around October 2017, Fifth Third hired Defendant 11th Hour
to repossess the car.  According to the Plaintiff, 11th Hour
repossessed her car in the middle of October, without providing any
notice to her beforehand.  She subsequently filed suit in Hennepin
County.  The Plaintiff alleged that 11th Hour violated the Federal
Debt Collection Practices Act, that Fifth Third unlawfully
converted her car, and that both Defendants violated Minnesota
Statutes section 336.9-609.  Fifth Third removed the lawsuit to
federal court.

On March 13, 2018, the Court issued its pretrial scheduling order.
Among other things, the pretrial scheduling order required the
parties to file amended pleadings no later than May 1, 2018.  On
June 1, 2018, the Plaintiff moved to amend the pretrial scheduling
order, seeking to extend the deadline to file amended pleadings to
Aug. 1, 2018.  The Plaintiff's motion was based in part on the fact
that she had retained new counsel.  Approximately six weeks later,
in response to discovery requests that the Plaintiff served on June
13, 2018, Fifth Third moved for a protective order.

The Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to amend the pretrial
scheduling order on July 26, 2018 and issued an amended scheduling
order the same day, extending the deadline to file amended
pleadings to Aug. 1, 2018.  

On Aug. 1, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an
amended complaint.  Her amended complaint seeks to (1) turn her
individual action into a putative class action and (2) add 10 "John
Doe Repossession Agencies" as Defendants.

The Court held a hearing on Oct. 30, 2018 on both the Plaintiff's
motion to file an amended complaint and Fifth Third's motion for a
protective order.  At that hearing, it ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefing related to Fifth Third's motion for a
protective order.  The parties filed their briefs on Nov. 13, 2018
and the Court took both motions under advisement.

Fifth Third seeks a protective order regarding the following
interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for
production that Plaintiff served on June 13, 2018:

     a. Interrogatory No. 10: Identify and explain the Bank's
policy and procedure for sending a written strict compliance notice
to Minnesota customers when the Bank has accepted late or partial
payments from that Minnesota customer and then is warning those
customers that no such future late or partial payments will be
tolerated.

     b. Interrogatory No. 11: Identify and explain the Bank's
policy and procedure for sending a written notice to Minnesota
customers when the Bank has accepted late or partial payments from
that Minnesota customer and then is warning those customers that
failure to make the arrearage payments by a date specific may
result in repossession of the collateral.

     c. Interrogatory No. 13: Have any guidelines or procedures
identified in your preceding answers to interrogatories been
modified in any way since the occurrence of the facts and
circumstances as alleged in the Complaint?  If so, describe in
detail all such modifications, provide the dates upon which such
modifications were made, identify the individuals authorizing such
modification, and provide the reasons therefore.

     d. Interrogatory No. 14: Identify and explain the Bank's
policies and procedures, if any, for phone conversation with
borrowers who are delinquent on vehicle loans.

     e. Interrogatory No. 15: Identify and explain the Bank's
policies and procedures, if any, for entering into credit
accommodation agreements, forbearance agreements, or other
arrangements to delay repossession in exchange for promises of
future loan payments.

     f. Interrogatory No. 18: From Jan. 11, 2017 through the
present date, identify how many borrowers had their vehicles
repossessed in Minnesota.

     g. Interrogatory No. 19: From Jan. 11, 2014 through the
present date, identify how many borrowers had their vehicles
repossessed in Minnesota.

     h. Interrogatory No. 20: With regard to the repossession
identified in the previous Interrogatory, identify whether or not
Defendant Bank sent the borrower a Cobb Notice prior to the
repossession.

     i. Interrogatory No. 21: Identify and describe all complaints,
lawsuits, regulatory investigations or communications to Defendant
Bank concerning alleged wrongful repossession from Jan. 1, 2014 to
the present

     j. Interrogatory No. 22: Identify all Bank memos, emails,
policies or other writings or communications that refer to
Minnesota law, Minnesota regulations, strict compliance notices, or
Cobb Notices.

     k. Request for Admission No. 11: Admit that within the past
year, Defendant Bank has repossessed over 40 vehicles from
Minnesota customers.

     l. Request for Admission No. 12: Admit that between Jan. 1,
2014 through Jan. 11, 2018, Defendant Bank did not have a policy or
procedure for sending Cobb Notices.

     m. Request for Admission No. 13: Admit that between Jan. 1,
2014 through Jan. 11, 2018, Defendant Bank did not have a policy or
procedure for notifying borrowers in writing that strict compliance
with the terms their loan or contract is required.

     n. Request for Production No. 9: From January 2016 through the
present date, all procedural and policy manuals in existence and in
the possession or control of Defendant Bank which relate to the
following: (i) colletion/repossession of delinquent accounts; (ii)
creation and documentation of accommodation or forbearance on
repossession arrangements or agreements with borrowers; (iii)
Mailing of notices related to strict compliance with original
contract terms, account arrearages, delinquent payment history,
repossession remedies, and/or Cobb notices; (iv) handling payments
on account after the account has been designated or referred to
collection/repossession; (v) assigning accounts to outside
collection contractors for collection/repossession; (vi) issuing
notices of sales of the collateral subject to the security
agreements; and (vii) any other procedures which relate to the
subject matter.

     o. Request for Production No. 12: Any and all policies
referencing Minnesota law, Cobb Notices, and/or notices concerning
strict compliance with contract or loan terms.

Fifth Third argues that a protective order should issue for two
reasons.  First, it contends that any request related to the
Plaintiff's putative class actions claims is irrelevant and
disproportional to the needs of this lawsuit because the Plaintiff
has only filed an individual claim.  Second, it argues that
discovery related to its internal policies and procedures is also
not relevant and disproportional to the needs of the lawsuit
because Fifth Third's internal policies and procedures are not
relevant to any standard of conduct at issue in the case.

With respect to the Plaintiff's motion, the Defendants argue that
the Plaintiff's motion should be denied because they will suffer
substantial prejudice and because the Plaintiff's proposed
amendments are futile.  Alternatively, they argue that, if the
motion for leave to amend is granted, the Court should consolidate
the matter with a class action complaint filed in Sampson et al. v.
Fifth Third Bank, No. 18-cv-1622 (D. Minn.) on June 11, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Leung granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint.  He finds, among other things, that (i)
good cause to amend the scheduling order and notes that the
Defendants could not point to pending motions as evidence of
prejudice when they knowingly chose to file those motions after the
Plaintiff moved to amend the scheduling order; (ii) at this stage
of litigation, it would be more efficient for the amendment to go
forward, for the parties to determine what motion practice is
required to resolve the issue of consolidation between this matter
and Sampson, and for the Defendants' argument regarding the
Plaintiff's adequacy as a class representative to be tested at the
class certification hearing with the other Rule 23(a) factors; and
(iii) judicial economy is not best served by consolidating the
matter with Sampson through the order.  The Plaintiff will file her
Amended Complaint within seven days of the Order.

The Magistrate denied Fifth Third Bank's Motion for Protective
Order. Because he has granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend her complaint, he also concludes that the Plaintiff's
discovery requests that relate to her putative class action claims
are relevant and proportional to the scope of her lawsuit.  He also
finds that undoubtedly, information related to Fifth Third's
internal policies and procedures, including lawsuits related to
those policies and procedures would be relevant and reasonably
likely to lead the discovery admissible evidence related to the
factual question of what constitutes a sufficient Cobb notice.  In
any event, it is not certain that the information that the
Plaintiff seeks would even be inadmissible at trial.

All discovery related to Interrogatories 18, 19, and 20, and
Request for Admission 11 of the Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions with Interrogatory,
Requests For Production of Documents, and Requests for Productions
of Statements to Defendant Fifth Third Bank is stayed until the
Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are decided in the matter.  

All prior consistent orders remain in full force and effect.
Failure to comply with any provision of the Order or any other
prior consistent order will subject the non-complying party,
non-complying counsel and/or the party such counsel represents to
any and all appropriate remedies, sanctions and the like, including
without limitation: assessment of costs, fines and attorneys' fees
and disbursements; waiver of rights to object; exclusion or
limitation of witnesses, testimony, exhibits, and other evidence;
striking of pleadings; complete or partial dismissal with
prejudice; entry of whole or partial default judgment; and/or any
other relief that the Court may from time to time deem
appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/W8G5UA from Leagle.com.

Kelley L. Hendrickson, Plaintiff, represented by Adam R. Strauss,
Tarshish Cody, PLC, Andrew C. Walker, Curtis Walker Attorney at
Law, Bennett Hartz & Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center
P.A.

Fifth Third Bank, Defendant, represented by C.J. Schoenwetter --
cj.schoenwetter@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman & Brooke LLP, David
J. Carrier -- david.carrier@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and
Brooke LLP & Patrick T. Lewis -- plewis@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice.

11th Hour Recovery, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael G.
Phillips -- mike@phillipslawmn.com -- Phillips Law, PLLC.


FIRST SOLAR: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Maverick Fund, L.D.C.; Maverick Fund USA, Ltd.;
Maverick Fund II, Ltd., Maverick Neutral Fund, Ltd.; Maverick
Neutral Levered Fund, Ltd.; Maverick Long Fund, Ltd.; and Maverick
Long Enhanced Fund, Ltd., Plaintiff, v. First Solar, Inc.; Michael
J. Ahern; Robert J. Gillette; Mark R. Widmar; Jens Meyerhoff; James
Zhu; Bruce Sohn; and David Eaglesham, Defendants, No.
CV15-1156-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.), Judge David G. Campbell of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona granted in part and
denied in part the  Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b)
and 12(b)(6), and under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act.

The Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for violations of federal and
state securities laws, common law fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation.  Between May 4, 2011 and Dec. 15, 2011, the
Plaintiffs purchased millions of First Solar common stock.  They
purchased these shares relying on the Defendants'
misrepresentations that First Solar would reach grid parity through
advanced technology and large scale solar power plants in the
southwest.  They also relied on statements by the Defendants that
although the Defendants experienced problems with defective and
underperforming panels throughout 2009 to 2011, the problems were
minimal and would not affect First Solar's earnings or grid parity
goals.

Beginning in 2009, First Solar announced a plan to reach grid
parity by 2010-2012.  In 2010-2011, First Solar became aware that
the plants were not producing the quantity of energy projected due
to poor performance in high heat environments.

In July 2010, First Solar released a statement that it had a
"manufacturing excursion" from June 2008 to June 2009.  According
to its release, 4% of the modules produced during that period could
experience premature power loss.  On several occasions from 2010 to
2011, First Solar announced robust earnings projections, positive
expectations for construction of solar power plants, reduction of
CpW, and progress on achieving grid parity.  The Defendants never
mentioned issues involving panel performance in high heat
environments or possible heat degradation in panels.

On Sept. 13, 2011, the Plaintiffs met with Gillette to discuss
First Solar.  Gillette assured them that the projects in the
southwest would drive profits despite cheap imports from China.
Gillette also reassured them that First Solar was on track to
achieve grid parity.

Over the second half of 2011, First Solar made several
announcements regarding high-level executives leaving the company
and delays in construction of solar power plants, which caused the
stock value to dip.  In late 2011, First Solar reduced its earnings
projections and announced that it would have to slash its operation
margins to achieve grid parity.  By the beginning of 2012, First
Solar announced a net loss of $39.5 million for 2011, an additional
$125.8 million warranty reserve cost for the manufacturing
excursion, and an additional $37.8 million for handling heat
degradation issues in panels.  As a result of these announcements,
the Plaintiffs' stock value dropped precipitously.

The Plaintiffs allege that they purchased First Solar common stock
and suffered substantial losses after relying on the Defendants'
false and misleading statements.  They allege, among other things,
that the Defendants concealed the existence and severity of known
defects in First Solar's panels; the Defendants misrepresented
panel degradation rates and concealed heat-related problems with
panels and systems; and the Defendants manipulated their CpW metric
reported to investors.

The Plaintiffs allege six causes of action: (1) violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (2) violation
of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) common
law fraud; (4) violation of A.R.S. Section 44-1991(A)(2)-(2) and
A.R.S. Section 44-2003(A); (5) violation of A.R.S. Section
44-1999(B); and (6) negligent misrepresentation under New York
common law.

The Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6), and
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  They argue
that the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claim should be dismissed for
three reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs failed to plead that the
Defendants made actionable false or misleading statements.  Second,
they have not pled sufficient facts to establish loss causation.
Third, the Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to establish
scienter.

Judge Campbell granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. He granted the Motion as to the Plaintiffs claim
for negligent misrepresentation and denied as to the rest of the
claims.  

Among other things, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs'
allegations are based on the Defendants' legal duty to all
shareholders, not on a special or unique relationship.  They allege
they relied on statements and publications issued for all
shareholders when making purchases of First Solar stock.  They
allege numerous communications, meetings, and phone calls, but
identify only one individual meeting with the Defendants, where the
Defendants reassured them of First Solar's projections and
expectations after an investors' conference.  He finds that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that demonstrate this meeting
included an exchange of information distinct from the public
exchanges and indicative of a special trust or confidence between
the parties.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations are
insufficient to demonstrate a special relationship, and will
dismiss the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's request to amend.  The Plaintiffs
will file an amended complaint by Dec. 11, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 27, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ykxLkg from Leagle.com.

Maverick Fund LDC, Maverick Fund USA Limited, Maverick Fund II
Limited, Maverick Neutral Fund Limited, Maverick Neutral Levered
Fund Limited, Maverick Long Fund Limited & Maverick Long Enhanced
Fund Limited, Plaintiffs, represented by David A. Thorpe --
david@dstlegal.com -- Dietrich Siben Thorpe LLP, Matthew P. Siben,
Dietrich Siben Thorpe LLP & Richard Glenn Himelrick --
RGH@TBLAW.COM -- Tiffany & Bosco PA.

First Solar Incorporated, Michael J Ahearn, Robert J Gillette, Mark
R Widmar, Jens Meyerhoff, James Zhu, Bruce Sohn & David Eaglesham,
Defendants, represented by Daniel Slifkin -- dslifkin@cravath.com
-- Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, Joseph Nathaniel Roth --
jroth@omlaw.com -- Osborn Maledon PA, Karin A. DeMasi --
kdemasi@cravath.com -- Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP & Michael T.
Reynolds -- mreynolds@cravath.com -- Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP.


FLORIDA: Merchison Asks to Extend to Feb. 4 Time to File Writ
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Michael Merchison submitted to Justice Clarence Thomas an
application to extend to February 4, 2019, the time to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter styled MICHAEL
MERCHISON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Petitioner v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Case No. 18A541, in the Supreme
Court of the United States.

The Lower Court Case is titled Michael Merchison v. Florida, Case
No. 3D16-2084, in the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District.

Mr. Merchison asks the Court to grant his motion for extension of
time due to reasons of "excusable neglect" and good cause shown,
and to permit him an additional 60 days until February 4, 2019, to
file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

On October 10, 2018, Hurricane Michael hit directly over Jackson
County where the Petitioner is housed and destroyed the prison law
library located at Apalachee Correctional Institution ("ACT") in
Sneads, Florida.  Law library access was not returned to ACI
inmates until November 1, 2018.

Mr. Merchison contends that this delay caused by the Hurricane
created a hardship in that his petition will have to be placed in
line with all other inmate demands for extensions of time and any
interim inmate deadline filings that have to be prepared in the
coming month.

Plaintiffs-Petitioner Michael Merchison, of Sneads, Florida,
appears pro se.[BN]


FOUR SEASONS: Olsen Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
--------------------------------------------------------
Thomas J. Olsen, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Four Seasons Hotel Limited,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06773-MKB-RLM (E.D. N.Y., November 29,
2018) is a civil rights action against Defendant for its failure to
design, construct, maintain, and operate its website,
www.fourseasons.com/NewYork, to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff Olsen and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

Defendant denies full and equal access to its Website in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights
Law and New York City Human Rights Law, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Olsen seeks a permanent injunction to cause Defendant to
change its corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its Website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually
impaired consumers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Olsen, at all relevant times, is a resident of Brooklyn,
New York, Kings County. As a blind, visually-impaired handicapped
person, he is a member of a protected class of individuals under
Title III of the ADA.

Defendant is at all relevant times a foreign business corporation
that is organized under Canadian law, and authorized to do business
in the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
     Christopher Lowe, Esq.
     LIPSKY LOWE LLP
     630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: 212-392-4772
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com
            chris@lipskylowe.com


GC SERVICES: Renewed Class Cert. Bid in Ocampo FDCPA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE LUIS OCAMPO, Plaintiff, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-9388 (N.D. Ill.), Judge
Robert M. Dow, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiff's
renewed motion for class certification.

On Aug. 18, 2016, after Ocampo could no longer afford to pay a debt
owed to DISH Network due to his financial circumstance, the
Defendant -- a collection agency -- mailed him a collection letter
regarding his debt.  The collection letter, which wasthe
Defendant's initial communication with the Plaintiff, provided
information regarding his account with DISH Network, such as the
account number, the original creditor (i.e. DISH Network), and a
current balance due.  The collection letter stated that the debt
had been placed in collection and the balance due was $523.70.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant never intended to report
his account to the three major credit reporting agencies as it was
the Defendant's practice only to perform account reviews on
consumers, using their credit reports, but not to actually report
accounts on consumers.

On Sept. 30, 2016, he filed the class action lawsuit against GCS
and GC Services International, LLC, bringing one count under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  Specifically, he
claims that the Aug. 18, 2016 collection letter violated Section
1692g(a)(1) and Section 1692e of the FDCPA.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class of (1) all
persons with addresses in the State of Illinois (2) from whom the
Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt, (3) upon
which the Defendants sent a form letter substantially similar to
that of the Plaintiff's Exhibit D, which contained the following
paragraphs:

     (a) While we have not reported this account to any consumer
reporting agency as of the date of this letter, our client has
authorized us to report your account to the three major consumer
reporting agencies unless we are able to resolve your account; and

     (b) Please read the following message provided by DISH
Network: The balance that has been placed in collections may
include the cost of your leased DISH Network equipment. If you
choose to return the equipment to DISH Network they will reverse
the leased equipment fees and/or refund any payments made that were
applied to equipment charges;

     (4) From which the letter was sent between a time on or after
Sept. 30, 2015, and on or before Oct. 14, 2017.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class
certification.

Judge Dow altered the Plaintiff's proposed class definition to (1)
all persons with addresses in the State of Illinois (2) who leased
equipment from DISH Network (3) from whom Defendant GC Services
Limited Partnership attempted to collect a delinquent consumer
debt, (4) by sending an initial communication in the form of a
letter containing the following paragraphs:

     (a) While we have not reported this account to any consumer
reporting agency as of the date of this letter, our client has
authorized us to report your account to the three major consumer
reporting agencies unless we are able to resolve your account; and

     (b) Please read the following message provided by DISH
Network: The balance that has been placed in collections may
include the cost of your leased DISH Network equipment. If you
choose to return the equipment to DISH Network they will reverse
the leased equipment fees and/or refund any payments made that were
applied to equipment charges;

     (5) sent on or after Sept. 30, 2015 and on or before Oct. 14,
2017.

With this altered class definition, the Judge addresses the
remaining Rule 23 requirements.  He finds that because the
Plaintiff has not satisfied the adequacy requirement, he will not
certify a class at this time.  Because he is denying class
certification based on the Plaintiff's failure to satisfy Rule
23(a)'s adequacy requirement, he holds he needs not determine at
this time whether the Plaintiff's class should be limited to those
who received letters with the challenged language.  Should the
Plaintiff again move for class certification, however, the
Plaintiff should consider whether such a limitation is appropriate.


Finally, because the Court did not specifically request
supplemental briefing on whether it legally is possible to
substitute in a named Plaintiff in the case, the Judge defers
consideration of whether substitution of the named Plaintiff is
appropriate.   
For these reasons, Judge Dow denied the Plaintiff's renewed motion
for class certification.  The Judge gave the Plaintiff until Jan.
7, 2019 to file any motion for substitution.  The case is set for
further status hearing on Jan. 10, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Lrg1vd from Leagle.com.

Jose Luis Ocampo, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Celetha Chatman --
cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com -- Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.
& Michael Jacob Wood -- mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com --
Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.

GC Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, represented by Jill
Marie Felkins -- jfelkins@smsm.com -- Segal, McCambridge, Singer &
Mahoney & Alexios James Dravillas -- adravillas@smsm.com -- Segal
McCambridge Singer Mahoney.


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Court Allows Bid to Amend Sullivan Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH SULLIVAN, MAURICE JONES, WILSON SANTOS and
ANTHONY C. COOK, Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE
COMPANY and GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No.
6:17-cv-891-Orl-40KRS (M.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Karla R.
Spaulding of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, (i) granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Micah Bellamy as Named
Plaintiff in Place of Elizabeth Sullivan; and (ii) denied as moot
Intervenor Micah Bellamy's Motion to Intervene.

On Aug. 29, 2017, Plaintiffs Sullivan, Jones (on behalf of the
estate of Kailyn Jones), Santos and Cook, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, filed a Second Amended Class
Action Complaint against Defendants Government Employees and GEICO
General.

On April 10, 2018, Consolidated Plaintiffs Anthony Lorenti and
Ashley Barrett filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint, on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, against GEICO
Indemnity Co.  The Plaintiffs all allege that the Defendants
breached vehicle insurance contracts by failing to include title
and license plate transfer fees in actual cash value payments the
Defendants made after the insured suffered a total loss of the
insured vehicle.

Sullivan brings her claim against Government Employees based on the
amount paid after her insured vehicle was declared a total loss.
Both Jones and Cook bring claims against GEICO General for the
total loss of insured vehicles.  Lorenti and Barrett maintain
claims against GEICO Indemnity.

On Nov. 1, 2018, the Plaintiffs collectively moved for class
certification, with Ms. Sullivan and Micah Bellamy as the putative
class representatives for those with claims against Government
Employees.  The Plaintiffs subsequently filed two related motions:
Intervenor Micah Bellamy's Motion to Intervene and a Motion to
Substitute Micah Bellamy as Named Plaintiff in Place of Elizabeth
Sullivan.

In the Motion to Intervene, Mr. Bellamy seeks to become a named
Plaintiff in the case.  He alleges that he is a member of the
putative class of persons with claims against Government Employees.
The counsel for the Plaintiffs represent in the motion that Ms.
Sullivan no longer wishes to serve as a potential class
representative and they submitted a declaration from Ms. Sullivan
to that effect.  In the declaration, Ms. Sullivan avers that she no
longer wishes to serve as the class representative because the
accident resulting in the total loss of her insured vehicle
resulted in the death of her husband.  She requests that the Court
substitutes Mr. Bellamy in her stead.  She wishes to remain a
putative class member but seeks to be removed as a named
Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs' counsel also submitted a declaration from the
Plaintiffs' counsel, Jacob Phillips Esq., who states that Ms.
Sullivan notified the counsel in or around September 2018 that she
wished to be removed as the potential class representative.
Attorney Phillips also states that Mr. Bellamy first contacted the
Plaintiffs' counsel in or around September 2018.  The counsel
notified the Defendants on Oct. 5, 2018 of the Plaintiffs' intent
to substitute Mr. Bellamy for Ms. Sullivan, stated Mr. Bellamy was
available for deposition, and provided discovery responses for Mr.
Bellamy.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a declaration from Mr.
Bellamy, in which he avers that he is able and willing to prosecute
the action individually and on behalf of the other insureds of
Geico that have not been paid the tag and title fees owed to us in
connection with our insured total loss vehicle payments.  He states
that he is engaged in investigating the claim, is involved in
discovery, has provided responsive documents and interrogatory
answers to the Defendants, and will be available for deposition in
the same date ranges in which the Defendants were seeking to depose
Ms. Sullivan.

In the Motion to Substitute, the Plaintiffs request that Mr.
Bellamy be substituted for Ms. Sullivan as a named Plaintiff, ask
to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 15 and 16 and ask the Court to amend the Case Management
Scheduling Order ("CMSO") as necessary.

The Defendants oppose both motions.  In both opposition memoranda,
the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' motions are untimely and
that granting the relief that the Plaintiffs seek will cause undue
prejudice to the Defendants.  With both opposition memoranda, the
Defendants included the Declaration of Kimberly Kochis, Esq., the
counsel for the Defendants, as well as email correspondence between
the counsel for the Plaintiffs and the counsel for the Defendants
regarding the potential substitution of Mr. Bellamy for Ms.
Sullivan.

The Defendants argue, in the alternative, that if leave to amend to
add Mr. Bellamy as a party is granted, they should be permitted to
take discovery from Mr. Bellamy before they are required to respond
to the class certification motion.  They ask that the date for
responding to that motion be extended to Dec. 17, 2018.

Both the Motion to Substitute and the Motion to Intervene in
substance seek the same relief -- to allow Mr. Bellamy to join the
action as a named Plaintiff and the putative class representative.
An order granting either motion would require the Court to permit
the Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint

Magistrate Judge Spaulding finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed
amendment to the complaint would not materially change the factual
allegations of the complaint; it would only add allegations related
to Mr. Bellamy's vehicle and related policy.  The counsel for the
Defendants are correct, however, that they should be permitted to
take discovery from Mr. Bellamy before they are required to respond
to the class certification motion.  Finally, permitting Mr. Bellamy
to be added as a Plaintiff will serve the interests of justice. I f
Mr. Bellamy is added as a named Plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge can
determine, in the first instance rather than awaiting filing of
another class action complaint, whether certification of a class
with Mr. Bellamy serving as the class representative for
individuals with claims against Government Employees is warranted.
Accordingly, she finds that leave to amend the complaint to add a
party is appropriate.

The Plaintiffs do not cite any authority supporting their request
to allow Ms. Sullivan to withdraw as a named Plaintiff yet still
remain a member of the putative class.  The counsel for the
Plaintiffs may voluntarily drop Ms. Sullivan as a named Plaintiff
in the third amended complaint.  If this occurs, the Magistrate
makes no finding regarding whether Ms. Sullivan would remain a
member of any class that may be certified.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Spaulding granted in part and
denied in part the Motion to Substitute.  She ordered that the
Plaintiffs will file, by Dec. 5, 2018, a third amended complaint as
a separate document, adding only the claims of Mr. Bellamy as a
named party and withdrawing claims of Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Santos
(if they choose to do so).  The Plaintiffs must also file and serve
a revised motion for class certification by Dec. 5, 2018, solely to
omit arguments that Ms. Sullivan would be a proper class
representative.

The deadline for the Defendants to respond to the Plaintiffs'
revised motion for the class certification is extended up to and
including Dec. 19, 2018.  If the Plaintiffs are granted leave to
file a reply to the response, the deadline for filing the reply,
Jan. 2, 2019, is not extended.

She further ordered that the Plaintiffs must serve by Dec. 7, 2018,
Mr. Bellamy's verified responses to the Defendants' individual and
nationwide interrogatories and produce all documents in his
possession, custody or control responsive to the Defendants'
requests for production of documents directed to the named
Plaintiffs.  Because there is no indication that Mr. Bellamy
asserted any objections when he provided some discovery to the
Defendants, he may not assert any objections now.  

The counsel for the Defendants must promptly confer with the
counsel for the Plaintiffs to identify a date, time and place for
Mr. Bellamy's deposition.  If the attorneys cannot agree on a date,
time and place to depose Mr. Bellamy, then by Dec. 11, 2018, the
counsel will contact my courtroom deputy clerk, Edward Jackson, at
407/835-5809 to schedule a telephone conference during which she
scheduled the deposition.

Because the Plaintiffs will be permitted to amend their complaint
to add Mr. Bellamy as a named Plaintiff, the alternative Motion to
Intervene is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2rv6Im0 from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Sullivan, as Personal Representative and on behalf of the
Estate of Kailyn Jones,Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Maurice Jones, as Personal Representative and
on behalf of the Estate of Kailyn Jones, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated & Anthony C. Cook, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Bradley W. Pratt -- bradley@prattclay.com -- Pratt
Clay, LLC, Christopher B. Hall -- chall@hallandlampros.com -- Hall
& Lampros, pro hac vice, Christopher J. Lynch --
clynch@hunterlynchlaw.com -- Christopher J. Lynch, P.A, Edmund A.
Normand -- Ed@EdNormand.com -- Normand Law, PLLC, Tracy Lynne
Markham -- tlm@avoliohanlonfl.com -- Avolio & Hanlon, PC & Jacob
Lawrence Phillips -- jacob@ednormand.com -- Normand PLLC.

Anthony Lorenti, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Ashley Barrett, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Bradley W.
Pratt, Pratt Clay, LLC, Christopher B. Hall, Hall & Lampros, pro
hac vice, Christopher J. Lynch, Christopher J. Lynch, P.A, Edmund
A. Normand, Normand Law, PLLC, Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Normand
PLLC, Peter Andrew Lampros, Hall & Lampros, pro hac vice & Tracy
Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

Government Employees Insurance Company, a foreign corporation &
Geico General Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Defendants,
represented by Alexander Fuchs --
alexfuchs@eversheds-sutherland.com -- Eversheds Sutherland LLP, pro
hac vice, Amelia Toy Rudolph, Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP,
Kymberly Kochis -- kymberlykockis@eversheds-sutherland.com --
Eversheds Sutherland LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Banks Harwood --
SusanHarwood@kaplanzeena.com -- Kaplan Zeena LLP.

Geico Indemnity Company, Consol Defendant, represented by Alexander
Fuchs, Eversheds Sutherland LLP, Amelia Toy Rudolph, Eversheds
Sutherland (US) LLP, Kymberly Kochis, Eversheds Sutherland LLP &
Susan Banks Harwood, Kaplan Zeena LLP.

Mr. Micah Bellamy, Movant, represented by Edmund A. Normand,
Normand Law, PLLC & Jacob Lawrence Phillips, Normand PLLC.


GRUBHUB INC: Court Rules on Lawson's Bid for Relief from Judgment
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAEF LAWSON, Plaintiff, v. GRUBHUB, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-05128-JSC (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California indicated that the Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6)
request for relief from the Feb. 8, 2018 judgment in Grubhub's
favor raises a substantial issue.

Following a bench trial, the Court found that Grubhub properly
classified Lawson as an independent contractor and entered judgment
on Feb. 8, 2018 in Grubhub's favor.  Now pending before the Court
is the Plaintiff's motion for an indicative ruling pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a).  The Plaintiff asks the
Court to indicate that it would grant Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6)
request for relief from judgment, or at least indicate that the
request raises a substantial question. After carefully considering
the issues, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court
declines to definitively rule that it would vacate the judgment,
but the motion does raise a substantial issue.

The lawsuit began when San Francisco Grubhub driver Andrew Tan
filed a putative wage and hour class action in California state
court.  Grubhub removed the action to the Court pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Tan filed a
First Amended Complaint that added Mr. Lawson as a Plaintiff and
the proposed class representative, and as a co-plaintiff on the
California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claim.  Mr. Tan
remained as a Plaintiff on the PAGA claim and no longer sought to
represent the class.  Following the dismissal of the First Amended
Complaint with leave to amend the Plaintiff's minimum wage,
overtime, PAGA, and UCL claims, the Plaintiffs filed a Second
Amended Complaint with the same claims.

Grubhub then moved to deny class certification, which the Court
granted.  Following that ruling, the parties agreed that the
lawsuit would be prosecuted solely by Mr. Lawson on behalf of
himself and as a PAGA representative.  The parties subsequently
stipulated to a bench trial, and to bifurcating the case into two
phases: (1) phase one limited to Mr. Lawson's individual claims and
whether he is an "aggrieved employee" under PAGA, and (2) assuming
the Court finds he is an aggrieved employee, phase two would
resolve the PAGA claim following additional discovery.

The Court held a bench trial in September 2017 and following the
parties' submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, heard closing arguments on Oct. 30, 2017.  The Court applied
the multi-factor test set forth in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations, which held that for the purpose
of determining whether an employer can rebut a prima facie showing
of employment, the most significant consideration is the employer's
right to control work details.  After considering all of the
Borello factors as a whole in light of the trial record, the Court
found that Grubhub satisfied its burden of showing that Mr. Lawson
was properly classified as an independent contractor.  On Feb. 8,
2018, the Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

The Plaintiff timely appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit.
The following month, the California Supreme Court decided Dynamex
Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, which addressed the
classification of workers for purposes of California wage orders.
In particular, Dynamex held that the suffer or permit to work
definition of "employ" in a particular wage order must be
determined based upon the "ABC" test rather than the Borello test.
Under the "ABC" test, for a worker to be properly classified as an
independent contractor, the hiring entity must establish that the
worker meets three independent criteria: (A) that the worker is
free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the
contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and (B) that
the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity's business; and (C) that the worker is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as the work performed.

The Plaintiff subsequently moved the Ninth Circuit to remand the
case to the Court in light of Dynamex.  The Ninth Circuit denied
their remand motion without prejudice to his renewing it in his
opening brief.  The Ninth Circuit also held that its denial was
without prejudice to the Plaintiff filing a motion for limited
remand accompanied by an indication that the district court is
willing to entertain a post-judgment motion related to the
arguments raised in the motion to remand.  The Plaintiff's motion
for indicative ruling pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62.1(a) is now before the Court.

Magistrate Judge Corley concludes that the outcome of the
Plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment hinges on the application
of Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, to the wage order
claims at this stage in the proceedings.  If it does, she would
likely revisit the judgment, at least as to the overtime and
minimum wage claims.  The answer to the retroactivity question,
however, is complicated and she declines to definitively answer it
on this record.

Nonetheless, the Magistrate can and does say that the Plaintiff's
motion raises a substantial issue.  The Defendant's insistence that
the Court should deny the Plaintiff's motion because judicial
economy counsels in favor of the Ninth Circuit deciding the
retroactivity question in the first instance is directed to the
wrong court; that is an argument to make to the Ninth Circuit.

Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1,
Magistrate Judge Corley the Court indicated that the Plaintiff's
Rule 60(b)(6) motion raises a substantial issue.  The Order
disposes of Docket No. 240.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WfHPjS from Leagle.com.

Raef Lawson, in his capacity as Private Attorney General
Representative; individually and on behalf of all other simiarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon
Liss-Riordan -- sliss@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. &
Thomas Fowler, pro hac vice.

Grubhub, Inc. & Grubhub Holdings Inc, Defendants, represented by
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Brandon J. Stoker -- bstoker@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Dhananjay Saikrishna Manthripragada
-- dmanthripragada@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP,
Justin Tyler Goodwin -- jgoodwin@willenken.com -- Gibson Dunn and
Crutcher, Kevin Joseph Ring-Dowell -- Kevin.Ring-Dowell@jud.ca.gov
-- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Megan M. Cooney --
mcooney@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn Crutcher LLP, Michele Leigh
Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP &
Theane Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP.

Caviar, Inc., Interested Party, represented by Erin E. Meyer --
emeyer@keker.com -- Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP.


H & D ELECTRIC: Faces Magana Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against H & D Electric. The
case is styled as Joel Magana and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. H & D Electric, Does 1-100, Defendants, Case
No. 34-2018-00245530-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty.,
Nov. 29, 2018).

H & D Electric, Inc. operates as a residential electrical
contractor. It provides lighting and structured wiring services for
single and multi-family projects.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Andrew Daniel Weaver, Esq.


HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Torres & Martinez Can't Intervene in Edwards
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tricia Bigelow of the Court of Appeals of California for the
Second District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's denial
of Jaime Torres and Jorge Martinez's motion to intervene in the
case, ROBIN EDWARDS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. JAIME
TORRES et al., Interveners and Appellants, Case No. B284000 (Cal.
App.).

Heartland provides electronic processing services in California and
employs sales-based employees to secure clients for those services.
It was sued in three separate class action lawsuits for alleged
wage and hour violations -- Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems,
Inc. (Super Ct. L.A. County, 2016, No. BC606083), Wilson v.
Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (Super Ct. L.A. County, 2016, No.
PC056816); and Torres v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (Super Ct.
Orange County, 2016, No. 30-2016-00838951-CU-OE-CXC).

The original complaints in Edwards and Wilson were filed on the
same day -- Jan. 5, 2016.  Edwards alleged he was a
California-based Relationship Manager.  It identified the putative
class as "California-based Relationship Managers" who worked for
Heartland within the prior four years, including two sub-classes of
Relationship Managers who were not paid minimum wage for
participating in new hire orientation and mandatory training
sessions, and Relationship Managers who were not reimbursed for
business expenses.

The complaint alleged a host of violations of the Labor Code and
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.  Specifically, it
asserted claims for failure to pay minimum wage, to pay wages upon
termination, to provide accurate wage statements, and to reimburse
employee expenses, as well as violations of Business and
Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

Prior to mediation, Edwards had served discovery on Heartland.  The
mediation was conducted on Nov. 1, 2016, and the Plaintiffs'
counsel from all three cases was present.  The Counsel in Torres
claimed that the counsel in Edwards refused to speak with him or
with the counsel in Wilson during the mediation.  The Plaintiffs in
Edwards and Heartland reached a settlement in principle and
executed a memorandum of understanding.  After the preliminary
settlement was reached, Edwards propounded additional "confirmatory
discovery" on Heartland.  Heartland provided "formal and informal
responses" to those requests.

The complaint in Edwards was then amended twice after the
settlement but before the Torres plaintiffs moved to intervene.
Filed on March 14, 2017, the third amended complaint was the
operative complaint when the Torres plaintiffs filed their motion.
It basically brought the Edwards case in line with the allegations
in Wilson and Torres. Suzanne Armstrong was named as a second
plaintiff as a "sales-based employee" of Heartland.  The proposed
class was defined as all current and former sales-based employees,
including those holding the positions of "Relationship Manager,
Territory Manager, Sales Manager, Division Manager, and/or similar
job titles," for the prior four years.

Claims were added for meal and rest period violations, unlawful
wage deductions, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, an
accounting, and a violation of PAGA.  And factual allegations were
added to support the unreimbursed business expenses claim,
identifying several of the alleged Heartland policies and practices
mentioned in the Torres complaint.

On April 27, 2017, the Torres plaintiffs filed their motion to
intervene in Edwards.  They argued for both mandatory and
permissive intervention pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
387, subdivisions (a) and (b).

Several days later on May 5, 2017, the Plaintiff's counsel in
Edwards moved for preliminary approval of the settlement.  The
filing disclosed a proposed total settlement amount of $650,000 and
a putative class of 581 members.  Heartland's counsel later updated
the number of proposed class members to 773.  The Torres plaintiffs
filed an opposition to the motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement.

The trial court denied the Torres plaintiffs' motion to intervene
on May 24, 2017.  It denied mandatory intervention because the
Torres plaintiffs could "opt-out of or object to the settlement,"
and it noted that they had already objected.  Further, it denied
permissive intervention because a t this stage of the proceeding,
the settlement has not been approved by the Court and thus the
Torres plaintiffs' rights have not been detracted.  Furthermore, if
the settlement is approved, they will have the opportunity to
challenge the release in the Edwards settlement by objecting to the
settlement or may opt out of the settlement completely, such that
their legal rights in the action are not hindered.

The Torres plaintiffs timely appealed the court's order denying
intervention.  They contend the trial court erred in denying both
mandatory and permissive intervention pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 387.

Judge Bigelow finds no error under either provision.  The trial
court did not separately analyze the final element of inadequate
representation, and she needs not address it.  The Torres
plaintiffs' failure to show their own ability to protect their
interests would be practically impaired or impeded by the
settlement defeats mandatory intervention.

She also finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying permissive intervention.  The trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the Torres plaintiffs' reasons for
intervening in light of their right to opt out or object to the
settlement did not outweigh the objections by the other parties.
They do not need to intervene to seek discovery; as objectors, they
may seek discovery to ensure sufficient information has been
provided to evaluate the fairness of the settlement.

For these reasons, Judge Bigelow affirmed the order.  Respondents
Edwards and Heartland are awarded costs on appeal.  The stay of
proceedings previously imposed is lifted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2QpgSDg from Leagle.com.

Shanberg, Stafford & Bartz, Ross E. Shanberg and Aaron A. Bartz for
Interveners and Appellants.

Lawyers for Justice, Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Arby
Aiwazian -- arby@lfjpc.com -- and Joanna Ghosh -- joanna@lfjpc.com
-- for Platintiffs and Respondents.

Fisher & Phillips, Todd B. Scherwin -- tscherwin@fisherphillips.com
-- Wendy McGuire Coats -- wcoats@fisherphillips.com -- and Shaun J.
Voigt -- svoigt@fisherphillips.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.


HH FRANCHISING: Class of In-Home Caregivers Certified in "Geiger"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Frank D. Whitney grants in part and denies in part the
Revised Motion to Conditionally Certify a Collective Action and
Facilitate Notice under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) in the lawsuit
entitled ROSEANN GEIGER and SHERRI HOLLEY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. H.H. FRANCHISING
SYSTEMS, INC., d/b/a HOME HELPERS, a foreign corporation; GLENKAT,
INC.; KATHLEEN HOLDEN, an individual; and GLENN HOLDEN, an
individual, Case No. 3:17-cv-00738-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C.).

The original Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification and
Judicial Notice under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) is denied as moot.
The Court approves the issuance of a notice consistent with this
Order and sets the deadline for opting into this action as February
9, 2019.

The Court orders certain modifications to the Proposed Notice of
Collective Action Lawsuit.  The Modified Notice will be sent to:

    "All current and former in-home caregiver employees who
     regularly worked 24-hour shifts and/or who worked more than
     40 hours per week, are/were employed by H.H. Franchising
     Systems, Inc. d/b/a Home Helpers; and/or Glenkat, Inc.;
     Kathleen Holden and Glenn Holden (collectively,
     "Defendants") in North Carolina from December 24, 2014[,] to
     the present."

The Court also declines to grant Plaintiff's request to send
additional notices or subsequent notices.  The Court sua sponte
modifies only these deadlines:

   a. Discovery Completion - March 27, 2019;
   b. ADR - April 13, 2019; and
   c. Dispositive Motions (filed) - April 27, 2019.[CC]


HSBC FINANCE: Lewis Sues Over Erroneous Credit Reports
------------------------------------------------------
Charissa Lewis, on behalf of herself, and on all others similarly
situated v. HSBC Finance Corporation fka Household Financial
Corporation, Case No. 3:18-cv-02605 (S.D. Calif., November 14,
2018), seeks damages for the Defendant's violation of the
California Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

The Plaintiff brings this Complaint for damages arising out of the
systematic issuance of erroneous credit reports by the Defendant.
The Defendant has erroneously reported continual monthly payment
obligations on accounts that have been closed and paid in full.

The Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in the City of San
Diego, County of San Diego, in the State of California.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business located in Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Yana A. Hart, Esq.
      HYDE & SWIGART, APC
      2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
      San Diego, CA 92108-3609
      Tel: (619) 233-7770
      Fax: (619) 297-1022
      E-mail: yana@westcoastlitigation.com

          - and -

      Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
      409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
      San Diego, CA 92108
      Tel: (619) 222-7429
      Fax: (866) 431-3292
      E-mail: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com


HUNTER WARFIELD: Nimmer Moves to Certify Class Under Damasco
------------------------------------------------------------
Kristine Nimmer moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit entitled KRISTINE NIMMER, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. HUNTER WARFIELD
OF NEW ENGLAND, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01859-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


ILLINOIS: Rauner Dismissed w/ Prejudice from Monroe Prisoners Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANIAH MONROE, MARILYN MELENDEZ EBONY STAMPS, LYDIA
HELENA VISION, SORA KUYKENDALL, and SASHA REED, Plaintiffs, v.
BRUCE RAUNER, JOHN BALDWIN, STEVE MEEKS, and MELVIN HINTON,
Defendants, Case No. 18-0156-DRH (S.D. Ill.), Judge David R.
Herndon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois granted Defendant Rauner's motion to dismiss, and denied
as moot the motion to stay discovery.

Pending before the Court is a Nov. 9, 2018 Report and
Recommendation recommending that the Court grants Defendant
Rauner's motion to dismiss and denies as moot a motion to stay
discovery.  Specifically, the Report recommends that the Court
grants the motion to dismiss, that Governor Rauner be dismissed
with prejudice and the motion to stay discovery be denied as moot.
On Nov. 20, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed objections to the Report.

On Jan. 31, 2018, the named Plaintiffs filed suit against the
Defendants.  Ruaner is the current governor of Illinois, Meeks is
the medical director for the Illinois Department of Corrections
("IDOC"), Hinton is the Chief of Mental Health Services for IDOC
and Baldwin is the Acting Director of the IDOC.  The Plaintiffs are
prisoners in the custody of the IDOC.  Represented by their
counsel, they bring the civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
inmates.  The Plaintiffs are currently in various institutions both
within and outside the Southern District of Illinois; those located
in the District are Kuykendall (Menard Correctional Center), and
Reed (Lawrence Correctional Center).

The Plaintiffs identify themselves as transgender women, and have
sought evaluation and/or treatment for gender dysphoria during
their IDOC custody.  They allege that the IDOC has denied and/or
delayed evaluation and medically necessary treatment and
accommodations for their gender dysphoria, causing them to suffer
physical and psychological distress, including self-harm and
suicide attempts.  They contend that incarceration under these
conditions violates their Eighth Amendment rights.  They seek class
action certification, and declaratory and injunctive relief.  On
Feb. 1, 2018, the undersigned conducted its review of the complaint
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A and referred the matter to Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson.

Thereafter on March 27, 2018, Rauner filed a motion to dismiss.  In
the motion, he argues that he should be dismissed from the case as
he is not the proper party for carrying out any of the Plaintiffs'
requested injunctive relief.  Raunder maintains that the proper
Defendants are the named IDOC officials who would have the
responsibility for complying with any injunction that the Court may
enter in the case.  The Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the
motion countering that Governor Rauner is a proper Defendant
because he has the constitutional authority as the executive of the
State of Illinois and the Plaintiffs allege that he bears
responsibility for ensuring the provision of constitutionally
adequate medical care for IDOC prisons.

On Nov. 9, 2018, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson issued the Report
finding that however, the person with authority to effect change
already has been named in the suit, namely the Director of the
IDOC.  As such, the Complaint fails to set forth what the Governor
could conceivably do to remedy the alleged constitutional
violations above and beyond the other named parties.  His inclusion
in the lawsuit appears superfluous.

The Plaintiffs object to the Report's recommendation that the
motion to dismiss be granted, and to the extent that it is granted,
that the dismissal should be without prejudice.  In addition, the
Plaintiffs reiterate their prior arguments countering the motion to
dismiss.

Judge Herndon rejects the Plaintiffs' objections and arguments.
There are no allegations suggesting that Gov. Rauner personally
participated in any decision to deny the Plaintiffs medical care
or, for that matter, implemented any policy or custom, or practice
that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.  The Plaintiffs
offer nothing more than conclusory allegations that Ruaner has been
aware and are aware of all the deprivations complained of and have
condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct.  They
also offer no other allegations suggesting that Rauner was on
notice that a particular policy, custom, or widespread practice
resulted in the Plaintiffs' denial of care or that Rauner exhibited
deliberate indifference toward them. Further, the Judge finds that
the complaint does not establish that Rauner would have any
involvement in carrying out any injunctive relief that is
ultimately ordered.   Thus, he grants the motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Judge Herndon adopted the Report, granted Defendant
Rauner's motion to dismiss, and denied as moot the motion to stay
discovery.  He dismissed with prejudice Defendant Rauner. He
directed the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting the
same at the end of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Amended Memorandum
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2G9BLxR from Leagle.com.

Janiah Monroe, Marilyn Melendez, Ebony Stamps, Lydia Helena Vision,
Sora Kuykendall & Sasha Reed, Plaintiffs, represented by John A.
Knight, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Austin B.
Stephenson -- austin.stephenson@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, Catherine L. Fitzpatrick -- catherine.fitzpatrick@kirkland.com
-- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Erica B. Zolner --
erica.zolner@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Ghirlandi
Guidetti, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Megan M. New --
megan.new@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Sarah Jane Hunt ,
Law Office of Thomas Kennedy, III, L.C., Scott H. Lerner --
scott.lerner@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Sydney L.
Schneider -- sydney.schneider@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP,
Thomas E. Kennedy, III , Law Offices of Thomas E. Kennedy, III,
L.C. & Jordan M. Heinz -- jordan.heinz@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP.

Bruce Rauner, Defendant, represented by Christopher L. Higgerson ,
Illinois Attorney General's Office, Kyle Rockershousen, Office of
the Attorney General & Lisa A. Cook, Office of the Attorney
General.

John Baldwin, Steve Meeks & Melvin Hinton, Defendants, represented
by Christopher L. Higgerson, Illinois Attorney General's Office,
Joseph E. Okon, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Kyle
Rockershousen, Office of the Attorney General & Lisa A. Cook,
Office of the Attorney General.


JM SMUCKER: Submits Stipulation and Joint Case Management Order
---------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. presents the class action
stipulation and proposed joint case management order submitted by
Plaintiff Shelly Robinson and Defendant The J.M. Smucker Company.

The Class certification schedules are as follows:

* Plaintiff's motion for class certification due -- Monday, April
30, 2019
* Defendant's response due -- Friday, June 14, 2019
* Plaintiff's reply due -- Monday, July 15, 2019
* Class certification hearing -- Thursday, August 1, 2019

After the Court issues a decision on class certification, the Court
will schedule a conference with the Parties to discuss subsequent
dispositive motion, pre-trial and trial deadlines.

The case is SHELLY ROBINSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY,
an Ohio corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive Defendants,
Case No. 4:18-cv-04654-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

A copy of the Stipulation dated Nov. 20, 2018 is available at
https://bit.ly/2FZTGaa from Leagle.com.

Shelly Robinson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott J. Ferrell --
sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Pacific Trial Attorneys.

J.M. Smucker Company, an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented
by Ronald Y. Rothstein – rrothstein@winston.com --Winston and
Strawn LLP, pro hac vice, Crista N. Welch – cwelch@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP & Megan Lee Whipp -- mwhipp@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP.


JULIAN SPENCE: Heberle Moves to Certify Class of DRIP Purchasers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled KEVIN HEBERLE, individually and
On behalf of others similar situated v. JULIAN SPENCE a/k/a JUVANE
BRYAN SPENCE, Case No. 1:18-cv-02288 (N.D. Ill.), files his amended
motion for certification of a class defined as:

     all purchasers of DRIP tokens from Defendant Spence.
     Excluded from the Class is: (1) Defendant, Defendant's
     agents, subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and
     any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a
     controlling interest, and those entities' current and former
     employees, officers, and directors; (2) the Judge to whom
     this case is assigned and the Judge's immediate family; (3)
     any person who executes and files a timely request for
     exclusion from the Class; (4) any person who has had their
     claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise
     released; and (5) the legal representatives, successors and
     assigns of any such excluded person.

The purported class action lawsuit seeks damages from the Defendant
arising out of an alleged fraudulent "Initial Coin Offering" -- a
transaction akin to an Initial Public Offering in which a new
cryptocurrency is created and sold to investors to fund the issuing
entity.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant concocted and
manufactured a cryptocurrency, which he fraudulent represented held
superior properties to the popular "Ripple" cryptocurrency.  This
cryptocurrency, named "Dark Ripple" or "DRIP" by the Defendant, was
nothing more than an artifice to defraud the unwitting Class of
investors, who purchased DRIP from the Defendant, the Plaintiff
contends.

The Plaintiff also seeks to be appointed as a representative of the
Class and for the appointment of the Plaintiff's attorneys as
counsel for the Class.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam S. Tracy, Esq.
          THE TRACY FIRM, LTD.
          141 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 2172
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 754-9499
          Facsimile: (630) 689-9471
          E-mail: at@tracyfirm.com


KENAN ADVANTAGE: Ballard Civil Rights Suit Removed to C.D. Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Dwayne Ballard on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Kenan Advantage Group,
Inc. a Delaware corporation, Does 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 18STCV01633 was removed from Los Angeles
County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California on November 29, 2018, and assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-09990-SJO-GJS.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights and asserts
Employment Discrimination.

The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries provide
transportation services for petroleum-based products in the United
States. It delivers refined petroleum products, such as gasoline,
diesel, and aviation fuels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alexandria R Kachadoorian, Esq.
     CounselOne PC
     9301 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 650
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Phone: (310) 277-9945
     Fax: (424) 277-3727
     Email: alexandria@counselonegroup.com

          - and -

     Anthony J Orshansky
     CounselOne PC
     9301 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 650
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Phone:(310) 277-9945
     Fax: (424) 277-3727
     Email: anthony@counselonegroup.com

          - and –


     Justin K Kachadoorian, Esq.
     CounselOne PC
     9301 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 650
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Phone: (310) 277-9945
     Fax: (424) 277-3727
     Email: justin@counselonegroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Katherine Consuelo Huibonhoa, Esq.
     Grube Brown and Geidt LLP
     601 Montgomery Street Suite 1150
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Phone: (415) 603-5008
     Fax: (415) 840-7210
     Email: khuibonhoa@chjllp.com

          - and -

     Stephen N Yang
     Curley Hurtgen and Johnsrud LLP
     4400 Bohannon Drive Suite 230
     Menlo Park, CA 94025
     Phone: (650) 600-5306
     Email: syang@chjllp.com


L.P.C.C. RESTAURANT: Weng Sues over Unpaid Wages, Tip-Pooling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sheng Juan Weng, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. L.P.C.C. RESTAURANT, LLC. d/b/a Shogun Legends, and
Ai Fen Chen, the Defendants, Case 3:18-cv-16462 (D.N.J., Nov. 27,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime
wages, unlawful tips retentions, liquidated damages, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest; and/or attorneys' fees and costs under
the Federal Labor Standards Act, and the New Jersey State Wage and
Hour Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have willfully and
intentionally committed widespread violations of the FLSA and NJWHL
by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to pay its
employees, including Plaintiff, minimum wage and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek. The
Defendants also engaged in unlawful tip-pooling, requiring
tipped-employees, including Plaintiff, to share their tips with
employees who do not regularly and customarily receive tips, for
instance, the manager of Defendants' restaurant, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant operates a restaurant under the trade name Shogun
Legends and is a business engaged in interstate commerce that has
gross sales in excess of $500,000 per year.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and proposed FLSA Collective:

          Xiaoxi LIU, Esq.
          HANG AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38 th Ave. Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          Facsimile: (718) 353-6288
          E-mail: xliu@hanglaw.com

LUCAS CONSTRUCTION: Polanco Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Polanco, and similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v.
Lucas Construction Group, Inc., and all other affiliated Entities
and/or Joint Employers, Lionel Lucas, individually, and Anthony
Lucas, individually, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-17036-AET-DEA (D.
N.J., December 10, 2018) brought this lawsuit seeking recovery
against Defendants for Defendants' violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law, and the New
Jersey State Prevailing Wage Act.

This is a case action brought on behalf of Plaintiff and a putative
class of individuals who worked as laborers, and in other
construction related trades for Lucas and/or any other entities
affiliated with, controlling, or controlled by Lucas or Lucas
Defendants, to recover statutory wage and overtime payments,
payment for unpaid supplemental benefits that Plaintiff and the
members of the putative class were statutorily and contractually
entitled to receive for work they performed on numerous privately
financed projects and publicly financed projects pursuant to
contracts with various government entities. The Government Entities
include but are not limited to the following: Middletown, Monmouth
County.

Beginning in or about 2012, the Lucas Defendants entered into a
number of Public Works Contracts to perform, inter alia road and
bridge construction, drainage work, pilings, and other related
construction, and other related construction work with the
Government Entities, or prime contractors, at the sites of the
Public Works Projects. A schedule of prevailing rates of wages and
supplemental benefits to be paid was annexed to and was made a part
of each contract.

This promise to pay and ensure payment of the prevailing wage and
supplemental benefit rates in the contracts between Lucas, and the
individual Defendants, and the Government Entities and/or the prime
contractors of record was made for the benefit of all workers
furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects and, as
such, the workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works
Projects are the beneficiaries of that promise.

Based upon the information preliminarily available, and subject to
discovery in this cause, the Defendant did not properly compensate
Plaintiff, and those similarly situated employees, for overtime
hours worked in a work week. Plaintiff, were also deprived of pay
for those hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. The
Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and
practice of violating the FLSA, NJWHL, and NJPWA as described in
this complaint.

Plaintiff Polanco is an adult individual who is a resident of
Plainfield, Middlesex County, New Jersey. Plaintiff Polanco was
employed by Defendants full time as a laborer, performing
construction duties, from in or about the end of February 2016,
through in or about mid July 2018.

Lucas Defendants own and/or maintain construction business
throughout the State of New Jersey. Defendant is headquartered in
Tinton Falls, Monmouth County, New Jersey.

Lionel Lucas is a New Jersey state resident. Lucas was and is an
employer engaged in commerce under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Defendant Lionel Lucas has had power over personnel decisions at
the Defendant Lucas's business.

Anthony Lucas is a New Jersey state resident. Individual Defendant
Anthony Lucas has been an owner, partner, officer and/or manager of
the Defendant Lucas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs is represented by:

     Andrew I. Glenn, Esq.
     Jodi J. Jaffe, Esq.
     JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP, P.A.
     301 N. Harrison Street, Suite 9F, #306
     Princeton, NJ 08540
     Phone: (201) 687-9977
     Facsimile: (201) 595-0308
     Email: Jjaffe@JaffeGlenn.com
            Aglenn@JaffeGlenn.com


MANU INC: Tenesaca Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------
JORGE A TENESACA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MANU INC. (D/B/A I TRE MERLI), ITM
GARDEN INC. (F/D/B/A REVEL), PAOLO SECONDO, EMANUELA COSTA, DENIS
LABRAMOWITZ, PETER DOE, ANA DOE, and MARY DOE, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-11068 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 27, 2018), seeks minimum wage and
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New
York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants own, operate, or control
an Italian restaurant, located at 10-12 Little West 12th street,
New York, NY 10014 under the name "I Tre Merli f/d/b/a Revel". The
Plaintiff was employed as a barback at the restaurant. However, he
was required to spend a considerable part of his workday performing
non-tipped duties, including but not limited to bartending,
bringing merchandise from and to the basement, stocking and
restocking newly arrived merchandise in the basement, doing the
liquor and merchandise inventory for the restaurant, bringing
alcohol to the restaurant from the basement, unloading deliveries,
taking out trash, washing dishes and glasses, going to the
neighbor's business to get ice, purchasing liquor at the liquor
store 5 blocks away, purchasing beet with the owner at a business
that was 20 blocks away once or twice a month, requesting carbon
dioxide from the neighbors once every two weeks, requesting liquor
from the neighbors every weekend and returning carbon dioxide to
the neighbors every two weeks (non-tipped duties). The Plaintiff
worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES , P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: faillace@employmentcompliance.com

MDL 2391: Court Denies Bid to Vacate Remand Order for 3 Actions
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: BIOMET M2A MAGNUM HIP IMPLANT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2391, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has denied the
Defendants' motion to vacate the Panel's order, which conditionally
remanded three actions to their respective transferor districts.

The three actions are:

   * CHADWICK v. BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
3:12-00614;

   * CARTER v. BIOMET, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 3:13-00256; and

   * RICHARDS v. BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS LLC, ET AL., C.A. No.
3:14-00612.

Defendants in the three actions move under Panel Rule 10.2 to
vacate the Panel's order that conditionally remanded the actions
listed on Schedule A to their respective transferor districts.
Defendants request that, instead of sending these cases to their
originating courts, the Panel instead send the actions to districts
in which venue is purportedly proper.  Defendants request that
actions be remanded to: (1) the District of Wyoming with respect to
the Chadwick action (which was originally brought in the District
of New Jersey); (2) the Eastern District of Virginia with respect
to the Carter action (which was brought in the Southern District of
New York); and (3) the Northern District of Texas with respect to
the Richards action (which was brought in the Southern District of
Texas).  Plaintiffs did not respond to the motion.

The Panel placed these actions on a conditional remand order after
receiving the transferee judge's suggestion of remand.  Each action
now before the Panel was conditionally remanded to the district in
which it was filed or removed to from state court.  Defendants now
suggest that the Panel redirect the remands to three
non-originating courts.

After considering all argument of counsel, the Panel finds that
Section 1407(a) requires it to remand these three actions to their
respective transferor courts.  Defendants' request is a matter of
first impression.  Defendants argue that the parties can waive the
right to return to their originating court, akin to what parties
often do in the transferee court by waiving their Lexecon
objections. "We are not persuaded by this argument," Judge Vance
held, saying the parties' waiver of objections to Section 1407
remand does not imbue the Panel with the power to send their cases
wherever the parties agree.  While parties often waive Lexecon
rights for a given case to remain in the transferee court for
trial, once the Section 1407 remand process is initiated, the
statute unambiguously requires the Panel to return a transferred
action to the district from whence it came.  Under Section 1407(a),
"[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated[.]"  As the transferee judge noted in his suggestion of
remand, the Panel is without authority to "redirect the remand" to
a different, non-originating court.  Instead, any motion for change
of venue must be made to the original transferor court following
Section 1407 remand."

While the parties may view this process as cumbersome, since they
agree that venue is proper in the proposed, non-originating
districts, the clear terms of the statute afford the Panel no
discretion as to where a transferred case must be remanded: the
only destination allowed by Section 1407(a)is the "district from
which it was transferred."

For these reasons, Judge Vance ordered that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1407, the Defendants' motion to vacate the conditional remand
order is DENIED, and the three actions, as listed on Schedule A,
are remanded to their respective transferor courts.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Remand Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2EsrRp5


MDL 2437: Court Transfers Home Depot Suit to N.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DOMESTIC DRYWALL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, MDL No.
2437, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring the
action styled HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. v. LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA
INC.,C.A. No. 1:18-cv-02839 from the Northern District of Georgia
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and, with the consent of
that court, assigned the action to the Honorable Michael M. Baylson
for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

Plaintiff moves under Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's order
conditionally transferring the Home Depot action to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for inclusion in MDL No. 2437.  Defendant
Lafarge North America Inc. opposes the motion and supports
transfer.  

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance concludes
that this action shares questions of fact with the actions
transferred to MDL No. 2437 and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation.
Plaintiff does not dispute that its action shares questions of fact
with MDL No. 2437.  Like many of the already-centralized actions,
Home Depot involves factual questions arising from an alleged
conspiracy to fix the price of drywall products sold in the United
States.  The transferee court has presided over substantial
discovery and expert testimony, and issued significant pretrial
rulings on discovery disputes and dispositive motions.  These
common pretrial proceedings in the MDL 1undoubtedlywill serve the
just and efficient conduct of the Home Depot action.

In opposing transfer, plaintiff contends that the litigation in MDL
No. 2437 is too far advanced for this action to benefit from
transfer.  Plaintiff asserts that discovery is complete, all
actions but one have settled, and thus there allegedly are no
efficiencies to be gained from transfer.  Plaintiff further
contends that Home Depot can benefit from the work completed in the
MDL by, for example, making use of the common discovery taken in
the MDL.  Defendant Lafarge points out that Home Depot will involve
discovery with respect to competitively sensitive information
already subject to protective orders in the MDL and that
significant pretrial motions relevant to the Home Depot claims
against Lafarge remain pending.

On this record, the Judge concludes that, while the MDL undoubtedly
is at an advanced stage, transfer of Home Depot is appropriate.
Whether the continued inclusion of tag-along actions is appropriate
is based upon a review of the status of the MDL proceedings and an
assessment of the relative merits of transferring additional cases.
Her review of the record leads her to conclude that transfer of
Home Depot would serve the efficient resolution of this litigation.
The transferee judge has overseen substantial pretrial proceedings
concerning the alleged conspiracy in MDL No. 2437 since 2013,
including significant rulings on dispositive motions and discovery
disputes.  Thus, he remains in the best position to streamline
discovery and motions practice in the new action in light of the
discovery and motions practice that have been completed.  He also
can ensure the just and efficient resolution of common motions
concerning defendant Lafarge, the alleged coconspirators, and other
nonparties with relevant information.

Home Depot's further contention that transfer would be inconvenient
for Home Depot and its witnesses is unavailing.  The Panel looks to
"the overall convenience of the parties and witnesses, not just
those of a single plaintiff or defendant in isolation."

Judge Vance therefore transferred the action to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and, with the consent of that court,
assigned the action to the Honorable Michael M. Baylson for
inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2LaLq5S


MDL 2672: $48MM Settlement in Clean Diesel Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates
To: City of St. Clair Shores, 15-6167 Travalio, 15-6168 George Leon
Family Trust, 15-6168 Charter Twp. of Clinton, 16-190 Wolfenbarger,
16-184, MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge Charles R. Breyer
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
granted the parties' motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement.

Among the lawsuits in the multidistrict litigation is a
consolidated class action brought by investors in
Volkswagen-sponsored American Depository Receipts ("ADRs").  These
investors contend that VWAG, related corporate entities, and
members of management violated federal securities laws by making
false and misleading statements about Volkswagen's financial
condition, regulatory compliance, and commitment to producing
environmentally friendly cars.

For much of the last year, the parties have been engaged in
discovery.  They have now agreed to settle, and a motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement is before the Court.

Judge Breyer finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule
23(a) and (b)(3) requirements.  He therefore conditionally
certified the proposed class for settlement purposes.  He also
appointed ASHERS and Miami Police as the class representatives and
James A. Harrod of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP as the
class counsel.

Having conditionally certified the class, the Judge continues by
considering the settlement's terms and by evaluating whether the
settlement warrants preliminary approval.

The agreement, if approved, will require VWAG to contribute $48
million to a settlement fund.  Before distribution, the fund will
be used to pay the Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses, notice and administration costs, taxes, and any other
costs or fees approved by the Court.   The remaining balance will
be distributed to the class members who submit timely and valid
claims to the claims administrator.  If the class members do not
cash their distribution checks, and if follow-on distributions are
unsuccessful or not cost effective, any remaining funds will be
given to the Investor Protection Trust, a nonprofit organization
dedicated to investor education, as a cy pres recipient.

The class counsel will file a motion for attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses before the final fairness hearing.  The class
counsel has agreed to limit the request for reimbursement of
litigation expenses to no more than $500,000, and to limit the
request for attorneys' fees to 25% of the settlement fund, net of
litigation expenses.  The class counsel also intends to seek an
award for the two class representatives, in an amount not to exceed
a total of $50,000, to reimburse them for their time and expenses
in representing the class.  The award will also be deducted from
the settlement fund.

The settlement class consists of all persons and entities in the
U.S. or elsewhere who purchased or otherwise acquired VWAG Ordinary
American Depositary Receipts (CUSIP: 928662303) and/or VWAG
Preferred American Depositary Receipts (CUSIP: 928662402) from Nov.
19, 2010 through Jan. 4, 2016, inclusive, and who were allegedly
damaged thereby.

The settlement funds will be allocated on a pro rata basis based on
a comparison of the relative size of each claimant's recognized
claim.  The value of each recognized claim is the product of
several calculations.

Judge Breyer granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval of the class settlement.  The claims administrator will
commence mailing the notice and claims form to potential settlement
class members by Dec. 19, 2018 in accordance with the method of
notice set forth in the motion for preliminary approval and in the
Order.  The summary notice will be published by Jan. 4, 2019.

The class members will submit their objections or requests for
exclusion by April 18, 2019 in the manner set forth in the
settlement.  The eligible class members will submit claims forms as
required by the settlement by April 18, 2019.

On April 5, 2019, the class counsel will file a motion for final
approval of the settlement and a motion for approval of the
attorneys' fees and the litigation expenses.  The deadline for any
reply papers is May 3, 2019.

The Court will hold a fairness hearing on May 10, 2019 at 10:00
a.m.  The deadline for class members to file a notice of intent to
appear at the fairness hearing is April 26, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vpn2Vu from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

David Fiol, Plaintiff, represented by William M. Audet, Audet &
Partners, LLP, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Peter B. Fredman -- peter@peterfredmanlaw.com -- Law Office of
Peter Fredman, Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.  

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro.

Nicholas Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Caleb Marker --
caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice &
Charles S. Zimmerman -- charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman
Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Brett Alters, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, David S. Stellings, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, Kevin R. Budner, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Phong-Chau Gia Nguyen, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Tana Lin -- tlin@kellerrohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback LLP & Todd A. Walburg, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann,
Bernstein.

Donald Ardine, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry --
awilliams-derry@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Dean
Noburu Kawamoto -- dkawamoto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
LLP, Derek William Loeser -- dloeser@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice,
Lynn L. Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Annie Argento, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., Dean Noburu Kawamoto, Keller Rohrback LLP, Derek
William Loeser, Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio,
Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn L. Sarko, Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Arkansas State Highway Employees Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Jai K. Chandrasekhar -- jai@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, James A. Harrod --
jim.harrod@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP,
Matthew I. Henzi -- mhenzi@swappc.com -- Sullivan, War, Niki L.
Mendoza, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Ross M.
Shikowitz -- ross@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, The Law
Offices of Susan R. Podolsky.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amie
Adelia Vague -- avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang -- wlang@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, David M. Eisenberg, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC,
Elizabeth L. Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com - - Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr., Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, Howard Feller, McGuireWoods LLP, Hugh J. Bode, Reminger &
Reminger Co LPA, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr., Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey, Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey
L. Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg,
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer Marino Thibodaux,
Gibbons PC, John W. Cowden, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Ric, LLC-KCMO,
John W. Cowden, Baker Sterchi  Cowden and Rice LLC, John L. Hone,
Lipshultz and Hone Chtd, John H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones
Tucker & Gable, Kerry R. Lewis, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker &
Gable, Kurt E. Lindquist, II, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice,
PLLC, Larry Martin Roth, Rumberger,
Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Michael D. Begey, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell,
PA, Michael R. McDonald, Gibbons PC, Natalie Marie Lefkowitz, Chase
Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC, Ronald G. DeWald, Lipshultz and Hone
Chtd, Russ Ferguson, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP, Ryan
Nelson Clark, Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., Sara
Anne Ford, Lightfoot Ffanklin & White LLC, Seth Abram Schaeffer,
McGuireWoods LLP, Thomas R. Valen, Gibbons PC, William L. Boesch,
Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, Adam K. Bult, Brownstein Hyatt
Farber Schreck, Allison Rachel McLaughlin, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell
LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R.
Levin, Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, PC, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Anne Katherine Guillory,
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, April L. Watson, Sessions, Fishman & Nathan,
Benjamin K. Reitz, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Blake Adam
Gansborg, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, Brett R. Leland, Verrill
Dana LLP, Brian C. Langs, Johnson & Bell LTD, C. Vernon Hartline,
Jr., Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, pro hac vice, Carine M.
Williams, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline M.
Tinsley, BAKER AND STERCHI, LLC, Charles William McIntyre, Jr.,
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles Pendleton Mitchell, Rumberger Kirk &
Caldwell, Christine Kingston, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
LLP, Christopher Edward Tribe, McGuireWoods LLP Gateway Plaza, Dan
R. Larsen, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, Darrell L. Barger, Hartline
Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, David L. Ayers, Watkins and Eager PLLC,
David A. Barry, Esq., Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, David N.
May, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrove, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, David T. Schaefer, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Edward W.
Hearn, JOHNSON & BELL, PC, Elena Lalli Coronado, Sullivan and
Cromwell, Elizabeth Righton Johnson, Balch & Bingham LLP, Emily
Anne Ellis, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shreck, Eric R. Burris,
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Erin Patricia Mead, Thorn,
Gershon, Tymann & Bonanni, LLP, Gail Ponder Gaines, Barber Law Firm
PLLC, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, Harlan I. Prater,
IV, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, Hugh Brown McNatt, McNatt, Greene
& Peterson, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
James L. Hollis, Balch & Bingham, Jeffrey L. Chase, Herzfeld &
Rubin PC, Jimmy B. Wilkins, WATKINS & EAGER, Jo E. Peifer, Lavin,
O'Neil, Ricci, Cedrone & DiSipio, John David Ayers, WATKINS &
EAGER, PLLC, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and
Gray LLP, John Alan Knox, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, John Garrett
McCarthy, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, John Thomas
Prisbe, Venable LLP, Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law Group, LLP, Joy
Goldberg Braun, Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, Kenneth Abrams,
McGuire Woods LLP, Kevin P. Polansky, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Mark
A. Weissman, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice, Mary E. Bolkcom,
Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Matthew A. Schwartz, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Nelson,
Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Meredith J. McKee, Womble
Carlyle Sandridge & RIice, PLLC, Meredith J. McKee, Womble Carlyle
Sandridge & Rice, Michael Thad Allen, Day Pitney LLP-HTFD, Michael
B. Gallub, Herzfeld and Rubin, pro hac vice, Michael E. Hale,
Barber Law Firm PLLC, Michael L. O'Don ell, Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP, Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP,
Michael A. Yoshida, MB Law Group, LLP, Mickey W. Greene, Hanson
Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Miranda Hanley, Smith Welch Webb & White,
LLC, Ningur Akoglu, Herzfeld & Rubin PC, Patricia Rodriguez
Britton, Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough LLP, Patrick Demetrios
Grindlay, Paul T. Collins, Nelson Mullins Riley  & Scarborough LLP,
pro hac vice, Paul E.D. Darsow, Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd.,
Paul D. Williams, Day Pitney LLP-Htfd-CT, Richard White Crews, Jr.,
Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, Righton Johnson, Robert J.
Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Ryan A.
Morrison, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, S. Keith Hutto, Nelson Mullins
Riley & Scarborough, Sarah Motley Stone, Womble Carlyle Sandridge &
Rice, PLLC, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L.
Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Shawn P. George,
George & Lorensen, Stanley Abbott Roberts, McGuireWoods LLP,
Stephen D. Bell, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Steve S. Tervooren, Hughes
Gorski Seedorf Odsen & Tervooren LLC, Stuart A. Drake, Kirkland and
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Suhana S. Han, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP,
pro hac vice, Sverker K. Hogberg, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Thomas
R. Ferguson, III, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Thomas W.
Purcell, MB Law Group LLP, William B. Monahan, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice & William Henry Wagener, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice.

Audi AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley --
elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com - Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew Henry
Marmolejo -- mmarmolejo@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Michael
Howard Steinberg -- steinbergm@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell,
LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok - andrew.clubok@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin -- levin@sugarmanrogers.c0m  -
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland -
bleland@verrilldana.com -- Verrill Dana LLP, David Maxwell James
Rein --  reind@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart
Webb, Jr. -- gswebb@Venable.com -- Venable LLP, Garrett L.  Boehm,
Jr. -- boehmg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell LTD, J. Gordon Cooney,
Jr. -- gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP,
James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD, John
Thomas Prisbe -- jtprisbe@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Laura Kabler
Oswell -- oswelll@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Robert
J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell
LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy -- ryan.mccarthy@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Sharon L. Nelles -- nelless@sullcrom.com --
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, Stephen D. Bell -- bell.steve@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney
LLP, Stuart A. Drake -- stuart.drake@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & William B. Monahan --
monahanw@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley,
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP,
Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian
Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman,
Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David M.J. Rein,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable LLP, John D.
Donovan, Jr., Ropes and Gray LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP,
Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Stuart A. Drake,
Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & William B. Monahan, Sullivan
and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice,
Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R.
Leland, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb,
Jr., Venable LLP, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and Gray LLP, Laura
Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr.,
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, Stuart A. Drake, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice &
William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, a New Jersey corporation, Defendant,
represented by P. Arley Harrel, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, PLLC,
Gerard Cedrone, Lavin, O'Neil Ricci Cedrone & DiSipio, Kenneth
Abrams, McGuire Woods LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP & William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Carine M. Williams, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl A. Bush, Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC,
Colin H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, David M.J.
Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, John H. Tucker, Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Nelson, Mullins, Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, Michael R. Williams, Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC,
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell LLP & William B.
Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Abby L.
Parsons, King & Spalding LLP, Adam G. Sowatzka, King & Spalding
LLP, Alexander K. Haas, King & Spalding LLP, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David M.
Fine, King, Spaulding Law Firm, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable LLP,
Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, J. W. Codinha, Nixon
Peabody, LLP, James K. Toohey, Johns & Bell LTD, James K. Vines,
King & Spalding, John Thomas Prisbe, Venable LLP, Joseph Eisert,
King & Spalding LLP, Kenneth Yeatts Turnbull, King & Spalding LLP,
Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew A.
Holian, DLA Piper LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper LLP, Sheldon T.
Bradshaw, KING & SPALDING, Sonya R. Braunschweig, DLA Piper LLP, W.
Scott O'Connell, Nixon Peabody LLP, pro hac vice & William F.
Kiniry, Jr., DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.  

David Antellocy, Defendant, represented by Thomas Eric Loeser,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Scott Moen,
Defendant, represented by Peter B. Fredman, Law Office of Peter
Fredman, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Haas, King &
Spalding LLP, Christina Courtney Sheehan, Modrall Sperling Roehl
Harris & Sisk PA, Joseph Eisert, King & Spalding LLP, Laura Kabler
Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA Piper
LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper LLP, Susan Miller Bisong, Modrall
Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA & William F. Kiniry, Jr., DLA Piper
LLP.

Robert Bosch GmbH, Defendant, represented by Matthew D. Slater,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Carmine D.
Boccuzzi, Jr., Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice &
David Lloyd Anderson, Sidley Austin LLP.  

Bay Ridge Volvo-American, Inc, Defendant, represented by Natalie
Marie Lefkowitz, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC.

Audi USA, Defendant, represented by Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP.


MDL 2738: Court Transfers 3 Actions to District of New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL
No. 2738, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring three
actions from the Eastern District of Missouri to the District of
New Jersey and, with the consent of that court, assigned the
actions to the Honorable Freda L. Wolfson for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The three actions are:

   * BARSH, ET AL. v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ET AL., C.A. No.
4:18-01464;

   * HITTLER, ET AL. v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
4:18-01474; and

   * HINTON v. PTI UNION, LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 4:18-01602

Plaintiffs in the three actions, as listed on Schedule A, move
under Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's orders that
conditionally transferred the actions to the District of New Jersey
for inclusion in MDL No. 2738.  Defendants PTI Union, LLC, and PTI
Royston, LLC (the PTI Defendants), oppose the motions in all three
actions.  Defendants Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
Inc., and Imerys Talc America, Inc., oppose the motions pertaining
to the Eastern District of Missouri Barsh and Hittler actions.

In support of their motions to vacate, plaintiffs in all three
actions argue that federal subject matter jurisdiction over their
actions is lacking, and that plaintiffs' motions for remand to
state court are pending.  The Panel has held that such
jurisdictional issues generally do not present an impediment to
transfer.  Plaintiffs can present their remand arguments to the
transferee judge.

Plaintiffs in the Barsh and Hinton actions also argue that transfer
of those actions is not appropriate because plaintiffs assert
claims against unique defendants -- namely, Schnuck Markets, Inc.,
and the PTI Defendants.  Plaintiffs' arguments are not persuasive.
Transfer under Section 1407 does not require a complete identity of
factual issues or parties when the actions arise from a common
factual core.  Plaintiffs' claims, like those of plaintiffs in the
MDL, arise from a common factual core -- that plaintiffs allegedly
developed ovarian cancer following perineal application of Johnson
& Johnson's talcum powder products.  Accordingly, transfer is
appropriate.  Moreover, the Panel has transferred numerous actions
involving claims against retailers and other defendants to the MDL,
including several actions involving claims against the PTI
Defendants.  

Therefore, after considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance
finds that the actions listed on Schedule A involve common
questions of fact with the actions transferred to MDL No. 2738, and
that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will serve the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation.  In the Judge's order centralizing this
litigation, she held that the District of New Jersey was an
appropriate Section 1407 forum for actions sharing factual
questions arising from allegations that plaintiffs or their
decedents developed ovarian or other gynecological cancer following
perineal application of Johnson & Johnson's talcum powder products
(namely, Johnson's Baby Powder and Shower to Shower body powder).
The actions listed on Schedule A share multiple factual issues with
those already in the MDL.  

Judge Vance therefore transferred the three actions listed on
Schedule A to the District of New Jersey and, with the consent of
that court, assigned to the Honorable Freda L. Wolfson for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2ROC8PK


MDL 2741: Court Transfers 2 Actions to N. District of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No.
2741, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring two
actions to the Northern District of California and, with the
consent of that court, assigned the actions to the Honorable Vince
Chhabria for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

These two actions are styled LOPEZ v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No.
4:18-00360 pending in the District of Arizona and POULIN v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:18-00318 pending in the District of
Maine.

Defendant Monsanto Company moves under Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the
Panel's order that conditionally transferred the two actions listed
on Schedule A to the Northern District of California for inclusion
in MDL No. 2741.  Plaintiff in the District of Maine Poulin action
did not respond to the motion and is deemed to acquiesce to it
under Panel Rule 6.1(c) ("Failure to respond to a motion shall be
treated as that party's acquiescence to it.").  Plaintiff in the
District of Arizona Lopez action opposes the motion.

In support of its motion to vacate, Monsanto argues that transfer
of Lopez and Poulin is inappropriate because plaintiffs in these
actions do not allege that they developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma
(NHL) after using Roundup.  Rather, they allegedly suffer from
either acute lymphocytic leukemia (also called acute lymphoblastic
leukemia, or ALL) or multiple myeloma.  NHL, though, is an umbrella
term that cover s a number of different blood cancers.  In its
papers, Monsanto concedes that there is a split in the scientific
literature as to whether multiple myeloma is a subtype of NHL.
And, while ALL seems not to be considered a sub-type of NHL,
chronic lymphocytic leukemia has been classified as such.  The
transferee court recently completed the general causation phase of
the pretrial proceedings, which included both a "Science Day"
presentation By the parties as well as nearly a week-long
evidentiary hearing on Monsanto's motion to exclude plaintiffs'
general causation experts.  Given this background, the transferee
court is far better positioned than the Panel is to determine
whether these alleged cancers, which at first glance seem quite
similar to NHL, fit within the scope of MDL No. 2741.  

Moreover, even if these two actions were not transferred to the
MDL, the transferee court still would have to address the question
of which blood cancers, if any, maybe caused by exposure to
Monsanto's products.  Numerous complaints in the MDL allege that
the "[International Agency for Research on Cancer] Working Group
concluded that the cancers most associated with glyphosate exposure
are non-Hodgkin lymphoma and other haematopoietic cancers,
including lymphocytic lymphoma/chronic lymphocytic leukemia, B-cell
lymphoma, and multiple myeloma." At least one complaint pending in
the MDL alleges that plaintiff developed ALL as a result of using
Roundup.  Excluding Poulin and Lopez thus seems likely to result in
duplication of the pretrial proceedings.  

After considering the parties' arguments, Judge Vance finds that
the two actions involve common questions of fact with the actions
transferred to MDL No. 2741, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  In her
order centralizing this litigation, she held that the Northern
District of California was an appropriate Section 1407 forum for
actions sharing factual questions arising out of allegations that
Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its active ingredient,
glyphosate, causes NHL.  Both the Lopez and Poulin complaints share
numerous factual issues with the cases already in the MDL.  Indeed,
substantial portions of these complaints contain allegations
regarding glyphosate and its regulatory history that are
essentially identical to the complaints pending in the MDL.  Given
the transferee court's familiarity with the issues and the
substantial discovery that has taken place in the MDL, transfer of
these actions likely will result in efficiencies with respect to
discovery and other pretrial proceedings.

Judge Vance therefore transferred the two actions to the Northern
District of California and, with the consent of that court,
assigned the actions to the Honorable Vince Chhabria for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2QNHU6O


MDL 2741: Simmons Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled NIKITA SIMMONS, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01844, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on Nov. 20, 2018. The Northern
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-07065-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Simmons case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MDL 2741: Singletary Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled MARY B. SINGLETARY, the Plaintiffs,
v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01851, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on Nov. 20, 2018. The Northern
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-07067-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Singletary case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Plaintiffs each allege that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that
the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in
particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MDL 2741: Sixbury Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DAN L. SIXBURY, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01821, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on Nov. 20, 2018. The Northern
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-07058-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Sixbury case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MDL 2741: Wooley Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled JOHN H. WOOLEY JR., the Plaintiffs,
v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01840, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on Nov. 20, 2018. The Northern
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No.3:18-cv-07062-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Wooley case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359

MDL 2742: Court Transfers Zornoza Suit to S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SUNEDISON, INC., SECURITIES LITIGATION, MDL No.
2742, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring the
action styled ZORNOZA v. TERRAFORM GLOBAL, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
8:18-2523 from the District of Maryland to the Southern District of
New York and, with the consent of that court, assigned the action
to the Honorable P. Kevin Castel for inclusion in the coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiff Carlos Domenech Zornoza in a District of Maryland action
(Domenech II) listed on the attached Schedule A moves under Panel
Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's order conditionally transferring his
action to MDL No. 2742.  Defendants Peter Blackmore, Ahmad Chatila,
Emmanuel Hernandez, Brian Wuebbels, TerraForm Power, Inc., and
Terraform Global, Inc., oppose the motion.  

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance finds this
action involves common questions of fact with the actions
previously transferred to MDL No. 2742, and that transfer under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation.  Transfer is warranted for the reasons set out in the
Panel's order directing centralization.  In that order, the Judge
held that the Southern District of New York was an appropriate
Section 1407 forum for actions sharing factual questions arising
from allegedly inaccurate statements concerning SunEdison's
operational and financial condition (e.g., its liquidity,
classification of debt, and internal financial control), as well as
the propriety of its public filings.  The centralized actions
involved various transactions, offerings and statements made in the
roughly ten-month period before SunEdison filed for bankruptcy
relief.  As the Judge noted when she transferred plaintiff's prior
whistleblower action (also over his objections), this action
involves allegations related to SunEdison's liquidity, particularly
defendants' alleged efforts to conceal the true state of
SunEdison's liquidity, in the months preceding the bankruptcy.
Domenech II thus falls within the MDL's ambit.

Plaintiff in Domenech II is the former President and Chief
Executive Officer of SunEdison (SUNE) yieldcos, GLBL and TERP, as
well as a former Executive Vice President of their controlling
parent company, SUNE.  Plaintiff contends that he was improperly
dismissed from employment for his refusal to participate in an
unlawful scheme to falsely report SunEdison's actual and projected
cash holdings, as well as his advocacy against certain self-dealing
transactions designed to siphon hundreds of millions of dollars
from SunEdison subsidiaries into SunEdison coffers.  These events
allegedly led to the collapse and bankruptcy of SunEdison; in fact,
plaintiff's initial action (which was transferred over his
objections in May2017) is quoted at length in the complaints of
several MDL actions.  Defendants in Domenech II- GLBL, TERP, and
four individual former officers and directors of SUNE and certain
yieldcos - also are defendants in multiple MDL actions.  Plaintiff
Domenech himself remains a defendant in the GLBLIPO litigation,
which was tentatively settled but is currently in litigation over
whether defendants' rights to terminate the settlement were
triggered by two investor groups' decision to opt out.  Transfer
will benefit these common parties' convenience and that of any
common witnesses.  

Plaintiff opposes transfer primarily by arguing that his action
focuses only on his unique whistleblower allegations, that there is
no significant factual overlap with the remaining MDL cases, and
that transfer will be a burden to him.  Plaintiff also expresses
the concern that his action will take longer to resolve in the
transferee court than it would without transfer.  The Panel has
long held that"Section1407does not require a complete identity or
even majority of common factual and legal issues."  The significant
events in Domenech II, without doubt, concern "factual issues
arising from allegedly inaccurate statements concerning SunEdison's
operational and financial condition -- e.g., its liquidity,
classification of debt [], and internal financial controls -- and
the alleged impropriety of its public filings."

While it appears that Domenech II maybe the only whistleblower
action in the MDL (a similar action was dismissed in March 2018),
plaintiff's role in SunEdison's demise remains of interest to the
plaintiffs in some of the remaining MDL actions.  For instance,
plaintiff recently was deposed in connection with the Horowitz
action, and that testimony is at the center of a pending MDL
discovery dispute regarding the production of documents related to
an internal investigation.  Transfer of Domenech II will allow for
the streamlined resolution of all related actions while, at the
same time, reducing the risk of inconsistent pretrial rulings and
duplicative pretrial discovery.  Further, transfer will obviate the
need for another judge to become familiar with the extensive
factual background of SunEdison, its yieldcos and their ultimate
demise.

Judge Vance therefore transferred the Zornoza action from the
District of Maryland to the Southern District of New York and, with
the consent of that court, assigned the action to the Honorable P.
Kevin Castel for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2LbN1bO


MDL 2744: Claims in Monostable Electronic Gearshift Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: FCA US LLC MONOSTABLE ELECTRONIC GEARSHIFT
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2744, Case No. 16-md-02744 (E.D. Mich.), Judge
David M. Lawson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the economic loss Plaintiffs'
second amended consolidated master class action complaint
("SACMC").

The Defendant has filed a fourth motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).  This one is aimed at the SACMC in
the multidistrict litigation proceeding, and it is based on Rule
12(b)(6).  The parties agreed to submit the motion on the papers a
waive oral argument.  The parties are familiar with the facts and
proceedings to date in the multidistrict litigation matter
involving certain alleged defects in the transmissions of
approximately 850,000 vehicles manufactured by FCA.  

On November 15, 2017, the Court issued its opinion rejecting the
defendant's principal challenges to the FACMC and dismissing
several claims based on other minor defects. On December 8, 2017,
the plaintiffs filed their SACMC omitting the claims and plaintiffs
that had been dismissed and consolidating parties and claims from
individual actions that had been transferred into the MDL after the
FACMC was filed and while the defendant's previous motion was
pending.

The SACMC contains 120 counts brought on behalf of 43 the
Plaintiffs from 26 states.  After the SACMC was filed, Pennsylvania
Plaintiff Timothy Weber was dismissed from the case based on his
notice of voluntary dismissal.  Weber's dismissal does not affect
the resolution of the motion since FCA does not challenge any
counts raised by the Pennsylvania Plaintiffs, and Weber was not the
only Plaintiff from that state.

Oklahoma plaintiff Carol Clark also filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal of her claims.  In addition, at the status conference on
Nov. 21, 2108, the Lead Counsel for the plaintiffs moved to dismiss
the case of Justine Andollo from Florida.  Clark was the only
economic loss Plaintiff from Oklahoma, and Andollo was the only
economic loss Plaintiff from Florida; the class claims from those
states vanished with the dismissal of those underlying cases.

However, the Defendant did not challenge any of the counts
asserting claims under Oklahoma law.  Nevertheless, it appears that
all of the claims under Oklahoma law must be dismissed due to the
withdrawal of the only named Plaintiff from that state.  Those
counts are: LXXXIII (consumer fraud), LXXXIV (fraudulent
concealment), LXXXV (express warranty), LXXXVI (implied warranty),
and LXXXVII (unjust enrichment).  The following Florida counts
likewise will be dismissed: XVIII (Florida Fair Trade Practices
Act), XIX (fraudulent concealment), XX (express warranty), and XXI
(unjust enrichment).

As the case now stands with the dismissals of those counts, the
SACMC consists of live class claims by the 41 Plaintiffs from 24
states, pleaded in 111 counts.

In its second motion under Rule 12(b)(6), FCA asks the Court to
dismiss in their entirety Counts III, XIII, XIV, XIX, XXII, XXIII,
XXX, XXXII, XXXVI, XXXVIII, XLV, XLIX, LI, LXI, LXIV, LXXIII,
LXXIV, LXXVI, LXXXI, CI, CIII, CX and CXVI of the SACMC.  It also
asks the Court to dismiss in part Count I (the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act claim) to the extent that it is premised on the
challenged state law claims, and Count XXVIII (for consumer fraud
under Illinois state law).

Judge Lawson holds that most of the Plaintiffs' economic loss
claims will survive, but some of them must be dismissed.
Accordingly, he granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the economic loss Plaintiffs' SACMC.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the following claims: (1) the
portion of Count LI (Minnesota) that may be construed as premised
on failure to disclose a known defect at the point of sale; (2) the
implied warranty claims in Count LXXVI (North Carolina), LXI
(Nevada), CX (Washington); and (3) that portion of Count XXVIII
that may be construed as raising any claims under the authority of
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Section 295/1A.

He struck the citation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Section 295/1A in
Count XXVIII.

The Judge dismissed withoutr prejudice the claims of former
Oklahoma Plaintiff Clark pleaded in Counts LXXXIII (consumer
fraud), LXXXIV (fraudulent concealment), LXXXV (express warranty),
LXXXVI (implied warranty), and LXXXVII (unjust enrichment), and the
claims of former Florida Plaintiff Andollo pleaded in XVIII
(Florida Fair Trade Practices Act), XIX (fraudulent concealment),
XX (express warranty), and XXI (unjust enrichment).

In all other respects, the Defendant's motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/GuBGYv from Leagle.com.

In Re FCA US LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litigation,
represented by Larry J. Saylor -- saylor@millercanfield.com --
Miller, Canfield.

Bruce Vosburgh, Plaintiff, represented by E. Powell Miller --
epm@miller.law.com -- The Miller Law Firm, Sharon S. Almonrode --
ssa@miller.law.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C. & Dennis A.
Lienhardt -- dal@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C..

Timothy Weber, Plaintiff, represented by E. Powell Miller, The
Miller Law Firm, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Peter A. Muhic -- pmuhic@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Sharon S. Almonrode, The Miller
Law Firm, P.C. & Tyler S. Graden, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check,
LLP.

Bernadine Hartt, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Honigman --
dhonigman@manteselaw.com -- Mantese Honigman, PC, Douglas Toering
-- dtoering@manteselaw.com -- Mantese Honigman, P.C., Gerard V.
Mantese -- gmantese@manteselaw.com -- Mantese Honigman, P.C., E.
Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, James A. Buster, Mantese
Honigman, P.C., Kevin A. Seely, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Krista M.
Hosmer, Mantese Honigman, P.C., Leonid Kandinov, Robbins Arroyo
LLP, Matthew Thomas Prewitt, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP & Robert
K. Shelquist  -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen
PLLP.

Berardino D'Onofrio, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Honigman,
Mantese Honigman, PC, Douglas Toering, Mantese Honigman, P.C.,
Gerard V. Mantese, Mantese Honigman, P.C., E. Powell Miller, The
Miller Law Firm, James A. Buster, Mantese Honigman, P.C., Kevin A.
Seely, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Krista M. Hosmer, Mantese Honigman,
P.C., Leonid Kandinov, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Matthew Thomas Prewitt,
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP & Robert K. Shelquist, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Marc Hughes, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson --
dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC & E. Powell
Miller, The Miller Law Firm.

Andre Barfield, Plaintiff, represented by E. Powell Miller, The
Miller Law Firm, Kevin F. O'Shea -- kfo@miller.law -- Miller Law
Firm & Sharon S. Almonrode, The Miller Law Firm, P.C..

Nina Walker, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC & E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm.

David Goldsmith, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Christopher
R. Pitoun -- christopherp@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman, E. Powell
Miller, The Miller Law Firm, Elizabeth A. Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Michael Vincent Nathan, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W.
Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Christopher R. Pitoun,
Hagens Berman, E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, Elizabeth A.
Fegan, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP & Thomas Eric Loeser --
toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Pascual Pietri, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Christopher R. Pitoun, Hagens Berman, E.
Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, Elizabeth A. Fegan, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro, LLP & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Amanda J. Hettinger --
ahettinger@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, Kathy A.
Wisniewski -- kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn
LLP, Larry J. Saylor, Miller, Canfield, Sharon B. Rosenberg --
srosenberg@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, Stephen A.
D'Aunoy, Thompson Coburn LLP, Cheryl A. Bush -- bush@bsplaw.com --
Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC, Michael R. Williams --
williams@bsplaw.com -- Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC & Thomas L. Azar,
Jr. -- tazar@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP.



MDL 2795: Court Transfers Palkon Lawsuit to District of Minnesota
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: CENTURYLINK SALES PRACTICES AND SECURITIES
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2795, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring
the action styled PALKON v. CENTURYLINK, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
3:18-00998 from the Western District of Louisiana to the District
of Minnesota, and, with the consent of that court, assigned the
action to the Honorable Michael J. Davis for inclusion in the
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiff and defendants in a shareholder derivative action pending
in the Western District of Louisiana (Palkon) separately move under
Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's order conditionally
transferring the action to the District of Minnesota for inclusion
in MDL No. 2795.  The State of Oregon, which is the lead plaintiff
in the securities class action in the MDL, opposes the motions.

After considering the arguments of counsel, Judge Vance finds that
Palkon involves common questions of fact with the consumer actions
transferred to MDL No. 2795, and that transfer will serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and
efficient conduct of the litigation.  The actions in the MDL "share
factual questions arising from allegations that [CenturyLink and
its affiliates]...  engaged in a range of deceptive or otherwise
improper practices, such as billing subscribers for telephone lines
or services that the subscribers did not request, billing
subscribers higher rates than the rates quoted during sales calls,
imposing early termination fees when subscribers cancelled the
services due to the higher-than-quoted rates, charging for periods
of service before the service was connected or products received,
and failing to process subscribers' service cancellation requests
in a timely manner." Palkon plainly involves those same questions,
and, indeed, is substantially similar to three other derivative
actions (Flanders, Ault, and Barbree) that the Panel recently
transferred to the MDL over those parties' objections.  

The moving parties' arguments in support of vacatur are essentially
the same as those raised by the parties in Flanders, Ault, and
Barbree. The Panel rejects them for the same reasons it ordered
transfer of those actions.  

Judge Vance therefore transferred the Palkon action to the District
of Minnesota, and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the
Honorable Michael J. Davis for inclusion in the coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2RNqRiu


MDL 2800: Court Transfers 2 Suits v. Equifax to N.D. Georgia
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: EQUIFAX, INC., CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2800, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring
two actions to the Northern District of Georgia and, with the
consent of that court, assigned the cases to the Honorable Thomas
W. Thrash for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

These two cases are LAMAR v. EQUIFAX, INC., C.A. No. 5:18-01369 (in
Central District of California) and COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO v.
EQUIFAX, INC., C.A. No. 3:18-01424 (in District of Puerto Rico).

The Plaintiffs in the two actions each move under Panel Rule 7.1 to
vacate the Panel's order conditionally transferring their actions
to MDL No. 2800.  Defendant Equifax, Inc., opposes the motions to
vacate.  

After considering all arguments, Judge Vance finds these actions
involve common questions of fact with the actions previously
transferred to MDL No. 2800, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  The
actions in MDL No. 2800 arise from a 2017 cybersecurity incident
involving Equifax in which it is alleged the personally
identifiable information of more than 145 million consumers was
compromised.  While the initial transfer order in MDL No. 2800
included only putative nationwide and statewide consumer class
actions, actions brought by individual consumers, including pro se
plaintiffs, and at least one government enforcement action have
been included in centralized proceedings through Section 1407
transfer or direct filing in the transferee court.  The actions
before the Panel involve allegations, similar to those in the MDL
No. 2800 actions, that Equifax failed to adequately safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information, which was
compromised during the Equifax data breach, and that defendants
failed to inform the public of the data breach in a timely manner.


Plaintiffs argue that transfer will cause them inconvenience and
delay.  As the Judge has held, while it might inconvenience some
parties, transfer of a particular action often is necessary to
further the expeditious resolution of the litigation taken as a
whole.  The transferee judge is in the best position to structure
proceedings so as to minimize inconvenience to any individual
party.

The remaining arguments asserted by plaintiffs are not persuasive.
The Central District of California Lamar plaintiff, proceeding pro
se, does not dispute that her action shares questions of fact and
law with the actions in MDL No. 2800, though she argues that it
goes "beyond the scope" of the MDL because she did not give Equifax
express consent to use her personal information.  Like the actions
centralized in MDL No. 2800, plaintiff alleges that Equifax failed
to adequately safeguard her personal information, which was
compromised during the Equifax data breach.  Transfer to MDL No.
2800, therefore, is consistent with the Panel's initial transfer
order in this litigation.  Plaintiff argues that she does not
consent to a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a), but
transfer By the Panel under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 does not require
plaintiff's consent.  Plaintiff also incorrectly asserts that a
default judgment is pending against Equifax in the transferor
court.

The District of Puerto Rico Commonwealth of Puerto Rico plaintiff
also does not dispute that this action shares factual questions
with the MDL No. 2800 consumer class actions arising from the data
breach, the state of Equifax's cybersecurity leading up to the
breach, and Equifax's response to the breach.  Rather, plaintiff
argues that Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is unique because it is not
a class action but instead is brought by plaintiff in its sovereign
capacity on its own behalf and as parens patriae on behalf of the
people of Puerto Rico.  But the Panel recently transferred a
similar government enforcement action to MDL No. 2800, over
plaintiff's objections.  Moreover, the Panel has held that Section
1407 transfer "does not require a complete identity of common
factual issues or parties as a prerequisite to transfer, and the
presence of...  differing legal theories is not significant where,
as here, the actions still arise from a common factual core."
Though there may be some differences between Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico and the MDL No. 2800 consumer class actions, discovery between
this action and the consumer class actions will overlap
significantly, and inclusion likely will result in efficiencies.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico plaintiff argues that its action
will be consolidated into and supplanted by the consolidated
consumer class action complaint without proper representation of
plaintiff's citizens, but the transferee judge can employ any
number of pretrial techniques--such as establishing separate
discovery and/or motion tracks--to efficiently and fairly handle
the government enforcement actions.  And if the transferee judge
determines that Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is best excluded from
centralized proceedings, procedures are available where by this may
be accomplished with a minimum of delay.  

Plaintiff also argues that United States citizens in Puerto Rico
are subjected to "continuing inequality" with regard to their
representation in federal government, and they lack an ability to
use "additional extra-judicial avenues of reproach against Equifax"
that purportedly are available to other United States citizens.
This argument is irrelevant to the Panel's determination of whether
Section1407 transfer is appropriate.  Similarly, the Panel does not
consider choice-of-law issues or differences in the substantive
laws of different jurisdictions when deciding Section 1407
transfer.  Moreover, it is "within the very nature of coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation
for the transferee judge to be called upon to apply the law of more
than one state."

Judge Vance therefore transferred the two actions to the Northern
District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court, assigned
the cases to the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash for inclusion in the
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2QrBtai


MDL 2800: Court Transfers Bordelon Suit to N. District of Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: EQUIFAX, INC., CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2800, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order
transferring the action styled BORDELON v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES LLC, C.A. No. 6:18-01137 from Western District of
Louisiana to the Northern District of Georgia and, with the consent
of that court, assigned the action to the Honorable Thomas W.
Thrash for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

Plaintiff in the Bordelon action, proceeding pro se, moves under
Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's order conditionally
transferring his action to MDL No. 2800.  Defendant Equifax
Information Services, LLC, opposes the motion to vacate.  

After considering all arguments, Judge Kaplan find this action
involves common questions of fact with the actions previously
transferred to MDL No. 2800, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  The
actions in MDL No. 2800 arise from a 2017 cybersecurity incident
involving Equifax in which it is alleged the personally
identifiable information of more than 145 million consumers was
compromised.  While the initial transfer order in MDL No. 2800
included only putative nationwide and statewide consumer class
actions, actions brought by individual consumers, including pro se
plaintiffs, have been included in centralized proceedings through
Section 1407 transfer or direct filing in the transferee court.
Bordelon involves allegations, similar to those in the MDL No. 2800
actions, that Equifax failed to adequately safeguard plaintiff's
personally identifiable information, which was compromised during
the Equifax data breach, and that certain Equifax employees
improperly sold Equifax stock prior to publicly announcing the
breach.

Plaintiff does not dispute that his action shares questions of fact
and law with the actions in MDL No. 2800, or that his action arises
out of the 2017 Equifax data breach.  Plaintiff's complaint also
includes allegations that Equifax failed to properly investigate
and correct inaccurate information on his individual credit report.
Against transfer, plaintiff argues that his action involves unique
allegations and state law claims, and that he plans to amend his
complaint to add additional parties and claims, but he states that
he will consent to transfer of some claims to the MDL if the Panel
separates and remands certain others that he asserts do not relate
to the Equifax data breach.  It appears though from the complaint
that plaintiff's allegations regarding the data breach are involved
in most, if not all, of his claims.  In these circumstances, the
Panel finds the most efficient course is to transfer the entire
action at this time.  If the transferee judge determines that
certain claims in Bordelon (or in the amended complaint plaintiff
has stated he intends to file) are best excluded from centralized
proceedings, procedures are available whereby this may be
accomplished with a minimum of delay.  Plaintiff's assertion that
MDL No. 2800 does not already include state law claims is
incorrect.  Moreover, as the Panel has stated, "the presence of...
differing legal theories is not significant where, as here, the
actions still arise from a common factual core."

Plaintiff argues that transfer will cause him inconvenience, but
the Panel has held that, while it might inconvenience some parties,
transfer of a particular action often is necessary to further the
expeditious resolution of the litigation taken as a whole.  The
transferee judge is in the best position to structure proceedings
so as to minimize inconvenience to any individual party.

Finally, plaintiff argues that Section 1407 transfer deprives him
of due process.  As an initial matter, "[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  Plaintiff's arguments
are speculative and largely devoid of specifics, and the Panel
finds they are without merit.  The Panel has rejected similar
arguments in the past.  As in those instances, the Panel finds that
transfer does not deny plaintiff the opportunity to meaning fully
participate in pretrial proceedings before the transferee court.

Judge Kaplan therefore transferred the Bordelon action to the
Northern District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court,
assigned the action to the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash for inclusion
in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 7, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2QNrn2J


MDL 2804: Court Transfers 22 Actions to Northern District of Ohio
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION, MDL
No. 2804, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring 22
actions to the Northern District of Ohio and, with the consent of
that court, assigned the cases to the Honorable Dan A. Polster for
inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiffs in 22 actions and certain physician defendants in three
District of Maine actions move under Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the
orders conditionally transferring the actions listed on Schedule A
to MDL No. 2804.  Non-governmental agency amici support the motion
brought by plaintiffs in the Southern District of West Virginia
Doyle action.  The Maine physician defendants request that Judge
Vance separate and remand the claims against them.  Amici The
American Hospital Association supports defendants' motion.  Various
responding manufacturer and distributor defendants oppose the
motions.  

After considering the argument of counsel, the Judge find these
actions involve common questions of fact with the actions
previously transferred to MDL No. 2804, and that transfer under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation.  Moreover, transfer is warranted for the reasons set
out in the Panel's order directing centralization.  In that order,
the Panel held that the Northern District of Ohio was an
appropriate Section 1407 forum for actions sharing factual
questions regarding the allegedly improper marketing and/or
distribution of various prescription opiate medications into
cities, states and towns across the country.  Plaintiffs in the
initial motion for centralization were cities, counties and a state
that alleged: "(1) manufacturers of prescription opioid medications
overstated the benefits and downplayed the risks of the use of
their opioids and aggressively marketed (directly and through key
opinion leaders) these drugs to physicians, and/or (2) distributors
failed to monitor, detect, investigate, refuse and report
suspicious orders of prescription opiates."  The Panel held that
"[a]ll actions involve common factual questions about, inter alia,
the manufacturing and distributor defendants' knowledge of and
conduct regarding the alleged diversion of these prescription
opiates, as well as the manufacturers' alleged improper marketing
of such drugs."

Despite some variances among the actions before the Panel, all
contain a factual core common to the MDL actions: the manufacturing
and distributor defendants' alleged knowledge of and conduct
regarding the diversion of these prescription opiates, as well as
the manufacturers' allegedly improper marketing of such drugs.  The
actions therefore fall within the MDL's ambit.  

The parties opposing transfer in nineteen actions argue principally
that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their cases.  But
opposition to transfer challenging the propriety of federal
jurisdiction is insufficient to warrant vacating conditional
transfer orders covering otherwise factually-related cases.
Several parties argue that including their actions in this large
MDL will cause them inconvenience.  Given the undisputed factual
overlap with the MDL proceedings, transfer is justified in order to
facilitate the efficient conduct of the litigation as a whole.

Local health care provider defendants in the District Maine actions
request that Judge Vance excludes the claims against them from the
MDL.  This request invites the Judge to make substantive judgments
about the merits of these claims, which she declines to do, since
dealing with the merits of claims is beyond the Panel's statutory
mission.

Plaintiffs in three actions argue that the identity of the
plaintiffs, infants born opioid-dependent, and their unique damages
- which include the alleged need for a medical monitoring trust
that funds prolonged, multidisciplinary care - differentiate these
cases from those brought by the cities, counties and states that
comprise the bulk of MDL No. 2804.  While Judge Vance agrees that
plaintiffs will have different damages and potential remedies, the
differences among these claims are outweighed by the substantial
factual allegations shared with the MDL actions.  Counsel for these
plaintiffs are dissatisfied, inter alia, that the transferee court
denied their request for leave to seek to establish an neonatal
abstinence syndrome (NAS) track in MDL No. 2804 in June 2018.
Their renewed motion, filed in late-August 2018, remains under
submission.  The Panel historically has declined to become
entangled in parties' disagreements with the transferee court, and
Judge Vance declines plaintiffs' invitation to do so here.  The
Judge further deny the NAS plaintiffs' motions to vacate for the
reasons stated in the Panel's order denying centralization in MDL
No. 2872

Judge Vance therefore transferred the actions listed on Schedule A
to the Northern District of Ohio and, with the consent of that
court, assigned the cases to the Honorable Dan A. Polster for
inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2B7BZQc


MDL 2804: Court Vacates Order Moving Suit v. Purdue Pharma to Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION, MDL
No. 2804, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation vacated the Panel's order conditionally
transferring a District of Massachusetts qui tam action, styled
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. v. PURDUE PHARMA, L.P., ET AL.,
C.A. No. 1:16-10947, to the Northern District of Ohio for inclusion
in MDL No. 2804.

The United States of America moves under Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate
the Panel's order conditionally transferring a District of
Massachusetts qui tam action listed on the attached Schedule A to
the Northern District of Ohio for inclusion in MDL No. 2804.
Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma, Inc., and The Purdue
Frederick Company support the motion.  No party opposes the motion
to vacate.

After considering the argument of counsel, the Judge grants the
motion to vacate.  Without doubt, the action shares factual
questions with the other MDL cases.  Relator alleges that Purdue
and the defendant distributors caused the submission of false
claims to government healthcare programs (i.e.  Medicare, Medicaid)
by knowingly failing to report providers who were engaged in
diversion, and because Purdue should have introduced an
abuse-deterrent formulation earlier but failed to do so until it
was approved By the Food and Drug Administration in 2010.  But no
qui tam cases are pending in the MDL.  The United States is moving
to dismiss the action based on the False Claims Act's prior
disclosure bar and relator's asserted lack of standing to pursue
his claims.  Resolution of this motion could obviate the need for
transfer.  If any claims survive and the action proceeds to
discovery, then the parties agree that they will re-notice the
action, and the Panel can reinitiate the conditional transfer
process.  Vacating the conditional transfer of this action in these
circumstances will assist the transferee court in maintaining its
focus on the principal tasks before it, which at present includes
significant bellwether litigation, while ensuring the orderly
progress of this qui tam action.

For these reasons, Judge Vance vacated the Panel's conditional
transfer order designated as "CTO-50" with respect to this action.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Orders is
available at https://bit.ly/2RQ8Ujv


MDL 2846: Court Transfers Luks v. Davol Suit to S. Dist. of Ohio
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DAVOL, INC./C.R. BARD, INC., POLYPROPYLENE
HERNIA MESH PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2846, Judge
Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has entered an order transferring the case styled LUKS
v. DAVOL INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 2:18-01280 from the District of
Arizona to the Southern District of Ohio and, with the consent of
that court, assigned the case to the Honorable Edmund A. Sargus for
inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiff in the Luks action moves under Panel Rule7.1 to vacate
the Panel's order conditionally transferring the action to MDL No.
2846.  Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc.; Davol Inc.; Becton, Dickinson
and Co.; and Bard Devices, Inc., oppose the motion to vacate.

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance finds that
Luks involves common questions of fact with the actions transferred
to MDL No. 2846, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will
serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the
just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  Like many of the
already-centralized actions, it involves factual questions arising
out of allegations that defects in defendants' polypropylene hernia
mesh products can lead to complications when implanted in patients
including, inter alia, adhesions, damage to organs, and infections.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of her implantation with a
Composix Kugel patch (CK Patch), she suffered injuries including a
tear and laceration in the liver and infection, which required
subsequent surgeries.

Plaintiff argues that cases involving the CK Patch are unique from
the other MDL No. 2846 actions, and her action therefore should be
excluded.  The CK Patch was the subject of a recall between
December 2005 and January 2007, following reports that the memory
recoil ring in some CK Patches had broken.  The CK Patch was one of
the models of hernia patches at issue in MDL No. 1842 -- In re:
Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Products Liability Litigation, 493 F. Supp.
2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2007).  Plaintiff argues that very few of the MDL
No. 2846 actions involve allegations of memory recoil ring break,
and that discovery in the MDL will focus more broadly on defects
with Bard's polypropylene mesh products that do not contain a ring.
According to defendants, there are at least eleven cases pending
in MDL No. 2846 that involve the CK Patch, and discussions are
underway between the parties and the court concerning how the CK
Patch cases should be handled in this MDL.  The Panel finds that
the transferee court is in the best position to determine whether
claims involving the CK Patch would benefit from inclusion in the
MDL.  If the transferee judge determines that Section 1407 remand
of any claims is appropriate, then he can suggest remand with a
minimum of delay.

The CK Patch was not the only hernia patch model at issue in MDL
No. 1842, and plaintiffs in the MDL No. 1842 actions alleged
defects in addition to the memory recoil ring break.  The Luks
plaintiff suggests that her action will be subject to both MDL s,
but MDL No. 1842 has been closed for over a year.  Plaintiff argues
that the additional discovery material she will seek beyond that
produced in MDL No. 1842 will be limited.  But such discovery will
be common with the discovery that will be sought in the other CK
Patch cases pending in MDL No. 2846 and maybe accomplished more
efficiently in a centralized fashion.  Plaintiff also argues that
leadership counsel in MDL No. 2846 will not adequately represent
the interests of the CK Patch plaintiffs.  The transferee judge is
in the best position to address this concern and structure
proceedings so as to minimize inconvenience to any individual
party, such as through the use of separate discovery tracks.  Judge
Vance is confident that, if the transferee judge determines
inclusion of the CK Patch cases is appropriate, he will efficiently
and fairly manage these claims.

Judge Vance therefore transferred the action to the Southern
District of Ohio and, with the consent of that court, assigned the
case to the Honorable Edmund A. Sargus for inclusion in the
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2RSz6tG


MDL 2870: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 4 Securities Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: PATRIOT NATIONAL, INC., SECURITIES LITIGATION,
MDL No. 2870, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation denied the Plaintiff's motion for
centralization of four actions in the Southern District of
Florida.

The actions pending in the Southern District of Florida are:

   * MCINTIRE, ET AL. v. MARIANO, ET AL., C.A. No. 0:18-60075; and

   * KANIKI v. MARIANO, ET AL., C.A. No. 0:18-62097.

The actions pending in the Southern District of New York are:

   * GINGELLO v. PATRIOT NATIONAL, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
1:17-01866; and

   * KAYCE v. PATRIOT NATIONAL, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 1:17-07164.

Plaintiffs in the McIntire action move to centralize the four
actions in the Southern District of Florida.  Plaintiffs in the New
York actions oppose centralization, as do defendants Christopher
Pesch and Quentin P.  Smith, Jr.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held,
Judge Vance concludes that centralization is not necessary for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses or to further the just and
efficient conduct of this litigation.  Undoubtedly, these actions
share factual issues arising from allegations of financial
misconduct involving Patriot National, Inc., a provider of
technology and out sourcing solutions to the insurance industry,
which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2018.  But, there
are, in reality, only three actions, as the New York actions have
been consolidated.

Further, plaintiffs in the Florida actions are represented by
common counsel.  As the Panel has stated, "where only a minimal
number of actions are involved, the moving party generally bears a
heavier burden of demonstrating the need for centralization." The
McIntire plaintiffs have not carried that burden.

In addition to the small number of actions, the litigation appears
to be at an advanced stage.  According to counsel for the New York
plaintiffs, a settlement in principle has been reached with the
Patriot National director and officer defendants.  They represent
that they anticipate filing a motion for preliminary approval of
that settlement by late December.  If that is the case, there is
little, if any, need for centralization.

In the event that the settlement is not consummated, and
significant pretrial proceedings are required, alternatives to
centralization seem practicable.  For example, in McIntire, a
motion to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York
under 28U.S.C. Sec. 1404or the first-to-file rule is pending.
Although no such motion has been filed yet in the other Florida
case (Kaniki), an order granting transfer of McIntire likely would
spur similar motion practice.  Even if transfer is denied, the
limited number of actions suggests that cooperation and informal
coordination by the involved courts and counsel should be
feasible.

Finally, the record provides at least some support for the argument
of the New York plaintiffs that the true animating force behind
this Section 1407 motion is the McIntire plaintiffs'
dissatisfaction with the lead plaintiff/lead counsel appointment
process that took place in the New York actions, and their
corresponding quest to reopen that process.  Section 1407's
purposes do not include resolving disputes among counsel over
control of the litigation.  Whatever the merits of the McIntire
plaintiffs' aggrievement, they are not properly before the Panel.

For these reasons, Judge Vance denied the motion for centralization
of the actions.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2C1ISUV


MDL 2872: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 7 Products Liability Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: INFANTS BORN OPIOID-DEPENDENT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2872, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the
Plaintiff's motion for centralization of seven actions.

Plaintiffs in the seven actions move under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to
centralize this litigation in the Southern District of West
Virginia or, alternatively, the Southern District of Illinois.  The
litigation consists of seven actions pending in two districts, as
listed on Schedule A.  Plaintiffs in potential tag-along actions in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Doe) and the Southern
District of West Virginia (Riling) support the motion, as do
non-governmental agency amici Manufacturer defendants oppose the
motion, as do distributor defendants.

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance concludes
that Section 1407 centralization of this litigation is not
necessary.  The actions now before her are all brought on behalf of
opioid-addicted infants who have been diagnosed with neonatal
abstinence syndrome (NAS).  All cases share facts concerning the
allegedly improper marketing and sale of prescription opiates, as
well as their allegedly improper diversion to illicit channels.
There is substantial overlap between all of these cases and MDL No.
2804 - In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, which she
centralized in December 2017.  This is unsurprising, since many of
the cases on plaintiffs' motion already are pending in that MDL,
transferred without objection from plaintiffs.  Factual questions
of the manufacturing and distributor defendants' knowledge of and
conduct regarding the alleged diversion of prescription opiates, as
well as the manufacturers' alleged improper marketing of such
drugs, lie at the heart of each case now before her. The identity
of plaintiffs and their unique damages - which plaintiffs and amici
assert include the need for a medical monitoring trust that funds
prolonged, multidisciplinary care - do indeed differentiate these
cases from those brought by the cities, counties and states that
comprise the bulk of MDL No. 2804.  But these differences among
claims and requested relief, in the Judge's opinion, do not justify
the creation of a new MDL.

Few efficiencies will be gained by creating a new MDL for NAS
plaintiffs.  Discovery regarding the marketing, manufacture,
distribution and diversion of prescription opiates in plaintiffs'
cases will substantially overlap with that being undertaken in MDL
No. 2804.  The transferee judge in anew MDL would need to
coordinate on most matters pertaining to liability with the
transferee court in MDL No. 2804.  Significantly, the risk of
inconsistent pretrial rulings would increase dramatically were the
Panel to create another MDL, as plaintiffs request, before a judge
in a district outside the Northern District of Ohio (in fact,
plaintiffs' requested transferee courts are both outside the Sixth
Circuit).  The progress of both MDLs likely would be hindered by
the need for two judges to attend to overlapping discovery matters,
rule on redundant motion practice and administer both MDLs
separately.  New case management protocols and counsel leadership
would have to be6established in the NAS MDL.  The substantial
duplication of activity would be costly, and it likely would slow
the pace of MDL No. 2804, in which discovery and bellwether motion
practice is underway.  Creating a new MDL simply is at odds with
Section 1407's mandate that centralization "promote the just and
efficient conduct of [the involved] actions."

Movants offer several critiques of MDL No. 2804 as a justification
for a new MDL.  Plaintiffs are dissatisfied that the transferee
court denied their request for leave to seek to establish an NAS
infant track in June 2018.  Their renewed motion, filed in
late-August 2018, remains under submission.  In their briefs and at
oral argument, the NAS plaintiffs expressed concern that the MDL
No. 2804 Plaintiffs' Executive Committee was not sufficiently
addressing their needs in the7litigation by, for instance, keeping
counsel for the NAS plaintiffs sufficiently apprised of upcoming
depositions.  NAS plaintiffs argue that these issues rise to the
level of a deprivation of due process, citing the Supreme Court
class settlement cases Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591(1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815(1999)).
Amchem and Ortiz, however, are readily distinguishable, in as much
as they arose in starkly different procedural circumstances.  The
NAS plaintiffs now before the Panel are represented by their own
counsel, and no other counsel is purporting to settle the NAS
plaintiffs' interests on their behalf while also representing
another class with conflicting interests.

Historically, the Panel has declined to entangle ourselves in case
management disputes such as this.  Instead, the Panel dedicates its
resolution to the discretion of the transferee judge.  In 2013, for
example, the Panel was asked to carve out claims from the existing
Deepwater Horizon MDL to create a new MDL.

Although Judge Vance is denying centralization, she appreciates
plaintiffs' concerns that their counsel are not being informed
about the conduct of this litigation.  Still, the Judge thinks
plaintiffs' arguments for creating a new MDL boil down to case
management issues that are most appropriately presented to, and
resolved by, the transferee judge, who is in the best position to
appreciate all of the nuances presented by this exceptionally
complex litigation.  The Judge is confident in his ability to
ensure that non-leadership counsel and other litigants are treated
appropriately in this litigation.

For these reasons, Judge Vance denied the motion for centralization
of the seven actions listed on Schedule A.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2UuYN5e


MDL 2872: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 7 Products Liability Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: INFANTS BORN OPIOID-DEPENDENT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2872, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has denied the
Plaintiff's motion for Section 1407 centralization of seven actions
pending in two districts, as listed on Schedule A.

Plaintiffs in seven actions move under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to
centralize this litigation in the Southern District of West
Virginia or, alternatively, the Southern District of Illinois.  The
litigation consists of seven actions pending in two districts, as
listed on Schedule A.  Plaintiffs in potential tag-along actions in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Doe) and the Southern
District of West Virginia (Riling) support the motion, as do
non-governmental agency amici. Manufacturer defendants oppose the
motion, as do distributor defendants.

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance concludes
that Section 1407 centralization of this litigation is not
necessary.  The actions now before the Panel are all brought on
behalf of opioid-addicted infants who have been diagnosed with
neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS).  All cases share facts
concerning the allegedly improper marketing and sale of
prescription opiates, as well as their allegedly improper diversion
to illicit channels.  There is substantial overlap between all of
these cases and MDL No. 2804 - In re: National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, which the Panel centralized in December 2017.  This is
unsurprising, since many of the cases on plaintiffs' motion already
are pending in that MDL, transferred without objection from
plaintiffs.  Factual questions of the manufacturing and distributor
defendants' knowledge of and conduct regarding the alleged
diversion of prescription opiates, as well as the manufacturers'
alleged improper marketing of such drugs, lie at the heart of each
case now before the Panel. The identity of plaintiffs and their
unique damages -- which plaintiffs and amici assert include the
need for a medical monitoring trust that funds prolonged,
multidisciplinary care -- do indeed differentiate these cases from
those brought by the cities, counties and states that comprise the
bulk of MDL No. 2804.  But these differences among claims and
requested relief, in the Judge's opinion, do not justify the
creation of a new MDL.

Few efficiencies will be gained by creating a new MDL for NAS
plaintiffs.  Discovery regarding the marketing, manufacture,
distribution and diversion of prescription opiates in plaintiffs'
cases will substantially overlap with that being undertaken in MDL
No. 2804.  The transferee judge in anew MDL would need to
coordinate on most matters pertaining to liability with the
transferee court in MDL No. 2804.  Significantly, the risk of
inconsistent pretrial rulings would increase dramatically were the
Judge to create another MDL, as plaintiffs request, before a judge
in a district outside the Northern District of Ohio (in fact,
plaintiffs' requested transferee courts are both outside the Sixth
Circuit).  The progress of both MDLs likely would be hindered by
the need for two judges to attend to overlapping discovery matters,
rule on redundant motion practice and administer both MDLs
separately.  New case management protocols and counsel leadership
would have to be established in the NAS MDL.  The substantial
duplication of activity would be costly, and it likely would slow
the pace of MDL No. 2804, in which discovery and bellwether motion
practice is underway.  Creating a new MDL simply is at odds with
Section 1407's mandate that centralization "promote the just and
efficient conduct of [the involved] actions."

Movants offer several critiques of MDL No. 2804 as a justification
for a new MDL.  Plaintiffs are dissatisfied that the transferee
court denied their request for leave to seek to establish an NAS
infant track in June 2018.  Their renewed motion, filed in
late-August 2018, remains under submission.  In their briefs and at
oral argument, the NAS plaintiffs expressed concern that the MDL
No. 2804 Plaintiffs' Executive Committee was not sufficiently
addressing their needs in the7litigation by, for instance, keeping
counsel for the NAS plaintiffs sufficiently apprised of upcoming
depositions.  NAS plaintiffs argue that these issues rise to the
level of a deprivation of due process, citing the Supreme Court
class settlement cases Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591(1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815(1999)).
Amchem and Ortiz, however, are readily distinguishable, inasmuch as
they arose in starkly different procedural circumstances.  The NAS
plaintiffs now before the Panel are represented by their own
counsel, and no other counsel is purporting to settle the NAS
plaintiffs' interests on their behalf while also representing
another class with conflicting interests.  

Historically, the Panel has declined to entangle ourselves in case
management disputes such as this.  Instead, the Panel dedicates its
resolution to the discretion of the transferee judge.  In 2013, for
example, the Panel were asked to carve out claims from the existing
Deepwater Horizon MDL to create a new MDL.

Although the Panel is denying centralization, Judge Vance
appreciates plaintiffs' concerns that their counsel are not being
informed about the conduct of this litigation.  Still, the Judge
thinks plaintiffs' arguments for creating a new MDL boil down to
case management issues that are most appropriately presented to,
and resolved by, the transferee judge, who is in the best position
to appreciate all of the nuances presented by this exceptionally
complex litigation.  The Judge is confident in his ability to
ensure that non-leadership counsel and other litigants are treated
appropriately in this litigation.

For these reasons, Judge Vance denies the Plaintiff's motion for
Section 1407 centralization of the actions listed on Schedule A.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2UuYN5e


MDL 2873: 75 of 84 Suits Transferred to South Carolina
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2873, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order:

   * transferring 75 actions to the District of South Carolina and,
with the consent of that court, assign the cases to the Honorable
Richard M. Gergel for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings; and

   * denying the transfer of nine actions.

There are two motions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to centralize
pretrial proceedings in this litigation.  Defendants Tyco Fire
Products, LP, and Chemguard, Inc. (collectively, Tyco) move to
centralize the 75 actions listed on Schedule A in the District of
Massachusetts or, alternatively, the Southern District of New York.
All of the actions on Schedule A involve allegations that aqueous
film-forming foams (AFFFs , which are used to extinguish liquid
fuel fires)contaminated the groundwater near certain airports and
other industrial locations with perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)
and/or perfluorooctanoic acid(PFOA), which allegedly were contained
in the AFFFs  and are toxic.

Defendant 3M Company joins Tyco's motion and separately moves to
include an additional nine actions in the MDL.  These actions,
which are listed on Schedule B, do not involve allegations relating
to AFFFs, but 3M’s manufacture of per- or polyfluoroalkyl
substances (PFAS, an umbrella term that includes PFOS and PFOA).
Specifically, each of these actions names 3M as a defendant and
relates to (a) its sale of PFAS or other PFAS-containing products
to third-parties, or (b) 3M's manufacture, management, or disposal
of PFAS in connection with its manufacturing facilities.  The
actions listed on Schedule B are referred to as the non-AFFF
actions.

Together, the two Section 1407 motions encompass 84 actions pending
in twelve districts.  Additionally, the Panel has been notified of
sixteen related actions pending in nine districts.  Ten of these
related actions appear to involve AFFF claims, while six involve
non-AFFF claims.

The responding parties take a variety of positions with respect to
centralization and the selection of the transferee district for
this litigation.  Tyco takes no position on 3M’s motion to expand
the MDL to include non-AFFF cases.  The other AFFF-manufacturer
defendants support Tyco's motion.  Defendants United Technologies
Corporation, Kidde PLC Inc., Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., and UTC Fire&
Security Americas Corporation, Inc., take no position on 3M’s
motion.  Defendants National Foam, Inc., and Buckeye Fire Equipment
Company, in contrast, oppose inclusion of non-AFFF actions.  All
AFFF manufacturing defendants support D. Massachusetts or S.D. New
York as the transferee district.

Two AFFF governmental defendants (County of Suffolk and Town of
East Hampton) also support or do not oppose centralization, though
East Hampton suggests the Eastern District of New York as the
transferee district.  Plaintiffs in 64 actions and four potential
tag-along actions either do not oppose or support centralization of
all PFAS actions (i.e., both AFFF and non-AFFF actions).
Plaintiffs in six AFFF actions pending in the District of Colorado
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (including interim lead
class counsel in both districts) oppose centralization.  Plaintiffs
in seven non-AFFF actions, as well as defendants Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, oppose
inclusion of the non-AFFF actions in this MDL.  All of the
plaintiffs support the Southern District of Ohio as the transferee
district if an MDL is created, while certain of the plaintiffs also
propose centralization in the Northern District of Alabama, the
District of Colorado, or the District of New Jersey.

Additionally, a number of parties oppose inclusion of their
respective actions in any centralized proceeding.  With respect to
the AFFF actions, plaintiffs in two actions pending in the District
of Colorado request, in the event the Panel creates an MDL, that
the consolidated Bell class actions in that district be excluded
from the MDL.  Plaintiff and six groups of non-manufacturer
defendants in the City of Newburgh action pending in the Southern
District of New York ask Judge Kaplan to exclude that action from
any MDL.  Several of these parties alternatively request the Panel
separate and remand plaintiff's claims against the
non-manufacturers to the transferor court (though one defendant
opposes this).  If centralized, two of the defendant groups request
the Southern District of New York as the transferee district.  With
respect to the nine non-AFFF actions, at least one party in each
action opposes its inclusion in the MDL.

On the basis of the papers filed and hearing session held, the
Judge finds that the AFFF actions listed on Schedule A involve
common questions of fact, and that centralization will serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and
efficient conduct of this litigation.  In each of these actions,
plaintiffs allege that AFFF products used at airports, military
bases, or certain industrial locations caused the release of PFOA
or PFOS into local groundwater and contaminated drinking water
supplies.  With some minor variations, the same group of AFFF
manufacturer defendants is named in each action.  These actions
thus share factual questions concerning the toxicity of PFOA and
PFOS and their effects on human health; the chemical properties of
these substances and their propensity to migrate in groundwater
supplies; the knowledge of the AFFF manufacturers regarding the
dangers of PFOA and PFOS; their warnings, if any, regarding proper
use and storage of AFFFs; and to what extent, if any, defendants
conspired or cooperated to conceal the dangers of PFOA and PFOS in
their products.  Additionally, the AFFF manufacturers likely will
assert identical government contractor defenses in many of the
actions.  Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings (including with respect to
discovery, privilege, and Daubert motion practice); and conserve
the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

Opponents of centralization focus on the factual differences among
the actions.  First, they contend that location-specific factual
issues will predominate over the common AFFF factual issues.  Were
this litigation limited to only a few actions, as in In re Monsanto
PCB Water Contamination Litigation, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1379 (J.P.M.L.
2016), the presence of site-specific contamination issues would
weigh heavily against centralization.  But, here the Judge is
presented with 75 AFFF actions pending in eight districts, and that
number is likely to grow significantly.  Given the large numbers of
involved actions and districts, alternatives to centralization
(such as informal coordination and cooperation among counsel and
the courts) are impracticable.  In similar circumstances, the Judge
has centralized groundwater contamination cases despite the
presence of multiple contamination sites.  The efficiencies to be
gained through centralized treatment of common factual questions in
such a large litigation are considerable.

Opponents of centralization also argue that the causes of action
and parties in the AFFF actions differ so significantly that any
efficiencies from centralization will be offset by delay.  These
actions include personal injury cases brought by individuals who
allegedly drank contaminated groundwater, class actions seeking to
represent individuals who live near sites where AFFF was used and
assert claims for medical monitoring and property damage, and cases
brought by water authorities and other governmental entities
seeking costs for environmental remediation or upgrades to water
treatment systems.  Even so, all the AFFF actions involve the same
mode of groundwater contamination caused by the same product.
Therefore, these actions will involve significant and overlapping
discovery of the AFFF manufacturers and their products.  To the
extent the actions entail unique factual or legal issues, the
transferee court has the discretion to address those issues through
the use of appropriate pretrial devices, such as separate tracks
for discovery and motion practice.10And, should the transferee
court determine that continued inclusion of certain actions or
categories of actions in the MDL no longer is appropriate, the
transferee court may recommend Section 1407 remand of those actions
in advance of other actions.

Judge Kaplan will not exclude any of the AFFF actions from the MDL.
The Colorado plaintiffs argue that the consolidated Bell class
actions in the District of Colorado are too advanced to warrant
transfer.  While those actions are the most procedurally advanced
AFFF actions, the only discovery completed to date pertains to
class certification.  Significant common discovery and pretrial
motion practice pertaining to liability and general causation
remain, and will benefit from inclusion in the centralized
proceedings.  In contrast to Bell, the City of Newburgh action in
the Southern District of New York was only recently filed.  The
parties opposing its inclusion in the MDL -- both plaintiff and
numerous non-manufacturing defendants, including the United States
and the State of New York -- argue that City of Newburgh involves
unique environmental claims against non-manufacturer plaintiffs.
City of Newburgh, though, also involves negligence and strict
liability claims against the AFFF manufacturer defendants that are
substantially similar to those in the other AFFF actions.  To the
extent the City seeks unique or time-sensitive injunctive relief
pertaining to its water supplies, the City can and should raise
such concerns with the transferee court.  Furthermore, six other
actions (three on Tyco's motion and three potential tag-alongs)
involve the same allegations regarding contamination of the City's
water supply through use of AFFFs at New York Stewart International
Airport.  Excluding City of Newburgh thus would result in a
duplication of efforts.

The Judge agrees, however, that the non-AFFF actions listed on
Schedule B should not be included in this MDL.  These nine actions
are quite different from the AFFF actions and, indeed, from each
other.  They include discharges directly into the Tennessee River
by various industrial concerns in Decatur, Alabama; contamination
originating from a shoe manufacturer's industrial waste; and
airborne PFAS discharges from factories in Hoosick Falls, New York.
These actions thus are different in kind from the AFFF actions and
involve more varied defendants.  Moreover, 3M's proposed definition
of this MDL's scope is unworkable -- in the Northern District of
New York, for example, there are at least 21 additional related
actions involving the Hoosick Falls contamination that do not name
3M, only Saint-Gobain and Honeywell.  While a non-AFFF MDL would
allow for common discovery and motion practice with respect to 3M
-- the main producer of PFOA and PFOS -- it also would include far
more site-specific issues, different modes of PFAS contamination,
and different PFAS chemicals (whereas the AFFF actions are limited
to PFOA and PFOS contamination).  Such an MDL could quickly become
unwieldy.  As there are relatively few non-AFFF actions, which are
being managed effectively in their current districts, expansion of
this MDL to include non-AFFF actions is not warranted.

Even excluding the non-AFFF actions, this MDL undoubtedly will be a
complex litigation from a judicial management perspective.  With
this in mind, Judge Kaplan selects the District of South Carolina
as the appropriate transferee district for this litigation.  This
district is not burdened by many MDLs and has the capacity and
resources to successfully guide this litigation.  More importantly,
the Honorable Richard M.  Gergel, who sits in this district, is an
experienced transferee judge who can prudently steer the
litigation.  Though a related action is not currently pending in
the District of South Carolina, that is not a bar to centralization
in a particular district.  

Judge Kaplan therefore transferred the 75 actions listed on
Schedule A to the District of South Carolina and, with the consent
of that court, assigned the cases to the Honorable Richard M.
Gergel for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings; and
denied the motion to transfer the nine actions listed on Schedule
B.

A full-text copy of the Court's Transfer Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2G8lFEz


MDL 2874: 3 RAH Patent Lawsuits Transferred to N. Dist. of Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: RAH COLOR TECHNOLOGIES LLC PATENT LITIGATION,
MDL No. 2874, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring three
actions to the Northern District of California and, with the
consent of that court, assigned the cases to the Honorable Susan
Yvonne Illston for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

These three actions are:

   * RAH COLOR TECHNOLOGIES LLC v. ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC., C.A. No.
3:18-03277 in Northern District of California;

   * RAH COLOR TECHNOLOGIES LLC V. XEROX CORPORATION, C.A. NO.
6:18-06746 in Western District of New York; and

   * ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING, INC. V. RAH COLOR TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
C.A. No. 18-01436 in Eastern District of Virginia.

On October 1, 2018, accused infringer Quad/Graphics, Inc., filed a
motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to centralize this patent
litigation in the Northern District of California or,
alternatively, the Eastern District of Wisconsin.  Originally,
there were four actions on the motion, including one infringement
action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Quad/Graphics.
By the time of oral argument, the Quad/Graphics action was settled
and dismissed.  The issue of centralization remains a live issue
among the parties to the three remaining actions.

The patentholder, RAH Color Management Technologies LLC (RAH),
supports centralization of these three actions in the Northern
District of Illinois.  Accused infringers Xerox Corporation and
Electronics for Imaging, Inc. (EFI) support centralization in the
Northern District of California.  Accused infringer Adobe Systems,
Inc., initially supported centralization in the Northern District
of California, but at oral argument, argued that centralization was
not warranted given the dismissal of Quad/Graphics and,
alternatively, requested the Northern District of California.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held,
Judge Vance finds that the actions on Schedule A involve common
questions of fact, and that centralization in the Northern District
of California will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this
litigation.  All actions involve factual questions about the
alleged infringement, validity, and enforceability of nine related
patents owned by RAH in the field of color management technology,
which is used in products such as print servers, printers, and
color imaging software.  All of the patents have the same inventor,
and seven of the nine patents are in the same patent family.

Additionally, there is significant overlap in the patents asserted
in the actions, as well as the accused products.  Centralization
will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (particularly on claim construction issues), and conserve
the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.

The Judge concludes that the Northern District of California is an
appropriate transferee district for this litigation.  The
headquarters of two of the three accused infringers are located in
this district, indicating that significant evidence will be located
there.  Common third-party discovery of certain members of an
industry association also is anticipated in this district.  Judge
Susan Yvonne Illston is an experienced transferee judge with the
ability and willingness to manage this litigation efficiently.
Judge Vance is confident she will steer this matter on a prudent
course.

Judge Vance therefore transferred the three actions and pending
outside the Northern District of California to the Northern
District of California and, with the consent of that court,
assigned the cases to Judge Illston for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 6, 2018 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2QONmpU


MEDICREDIT INC: Settlement in Raffin Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHEENA RAFFIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MEDICREDIT, INC.; THE
OUTSOURCE GROUP, INC. Defendants, Case No. CV 15-4912-MWF (PJWx)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California granted Raffin's (i) Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and (ii) Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards.

The Court held a hearing on Nov. 19, 2018, for the Motions and
approval of the settlement set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement Agreement of Class Action Claims.

On May 11, 2018, the Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary
Approval of Settlement, resulting in certification of the
provisional Settlement Class of all persons who received telephone
calls from Medicredit between June 29, 2014 and Feb. 26, 2015,
while physically present in California and using a cellular device
with a California area code, and who participated for the first
time in a call with a Medicredit agent during that period.

It further approved the form of, and directed the parties to
provide, the proposed Class Notice to the Class.  No objections had
been made, timely or otherwise, pursuant to the Class Notice sent
to the Settlement Class members, nor did any objectors appear at
the time of the hearing.

Judge Fitzgerald finds that the Settlement Class is properly
certified as a class for settlement purposes only.  He also finds
that the settlement was entered into in good faith, is fair,
reasonable and adequate, and that it satisfies the standards and
applicable requirements for final approval of the class action
settlement under California law, including the provisions of Rule
23.

Upon entry of the Order, the compensation to the participating
members of the Settlement Class will be effected pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement.  The Judge approved the payment (i) of an
incentive award to the Plaintiff Raffin, in the amount of $15,000;
(ii) of attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in the sum of $1.65
million, and the reimbursement of litigation expenses in the sum of
$123,688.82; and (iii) in an amount commensurate with Epiq Class
Action & Claims Solutions, Inc.'s actual costs, and not to exceed
$150,000 to Epiq for performance of its settlement claims
administration services.  Finally, he approved Legal Aid
Association of California as the cy pres recipient.

Upon completion of administration of the Settlement, the parties
will file a declaration setting forth that claims have been paid
and that the terms of the settlement have been completed.  The
Judgment is intended to be a final disposition of the captioned
action in its entirety, and is intended to be immediately
appealable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Judgment is available
at https://bit.ly/2C1lsz2 from Leagle.com.

Sheena Raffin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian Robert Bacon --
abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd Friedman PC & Todd M.
Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Office of Todd M Friedman
PC.

Medicredit, Inc. & The Outsource Group, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Brad Dennis Brian -- Brad.Brian@mto.com -- Munger
Tolles and Olson LLP, C. Hunter Hayes -- Hunter.Hayes@mto.com --
Munger Tolles and Olson LLP, Erik O. Solverud --
esolverud@spencerfane.com -- Spencer Fane LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob
W. Stahl -- jwstahl@debevoise.com -- Debevoise and Plimpton LLP,
pro hac vice, Mark R. Yohalem -- Mark.Yohalem@mto.com -- Munger
Tolles and Olson LLP, Maura Kathleen Monaghan --
mkmonaghan@debevoise.com -- Debevoise and Plimpton LLP, pro hac
vice, Megan D. Meadows -- mmeadows@spencerfane.com -- Spencer Fane
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Robert Doyen -- Michael.Doyen@mto.com --
Munger Tolles and Olson LLP, Scott J. Dickenson --
sdickenson@spencerfane.com -- Spencer Fane LLP, pro hac vice &
Amber D. Henry -- ahenry@eisnerlaw.com -- Eisner Jaffe.


MEDTRONIC PLC: Pretrial in Sprint Fidelis-Related Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Medtronic Public Limited Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 29, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended October 26, 2018, that pretrial
proceedings in Sprint Fidelis class action related suit is still
ongoing.

In 2007, a putative class action was filed in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in Canada seeking damages for personal injuries
allegedly related to the Company's Sprint Fidelis family of
defibrillation leads. On October 20, 2009, the court certified a
class proceeding but denied class certification on plaintiffs'
claim for punitive damages. Pretrial proceedings are underway.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Medtronic plc develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells
device-based medical therapies to hospitals, physicians,
clinicians, and patients worldwide. It operates through four
segments: Cardiac and Vascular Group, Minimally Invasive Therapies
Group, Restorative Therapies Group, and Diabetes Group. The company
was founded in 1949 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


MEDTRONIC PLC: Settled 15,100 Pelvic Mesh-Related Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
Medtronic Public Limited Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 29, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended October 26, 2018, that as of
November 1, 2018, the Company had reached agreements to settle
approximately 15,100 claims relating to the Pelvic Mesh
Litigation.

The Company is currently involved in litigation in various state
and federal courts against manufacturers of pelvic mesh products
alleging personal injuries resulting from the implantation of those
products. Two subsidiaries of Covidien supplied pelvic mesh
products to one of the manufacturers, C.R. Bard (Bard), named in
the litigation.

The litigation includes a federal multi-district litigation in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and
cases in various state courts and jurisdictions outside the U.S.
Generally, complaints allege design and manufacturing claims,
failure to warn, breach of warranty, fraud, violations of state
consumer protection laws and loss of consortium claims.

In fiscal year 2016, Bard paid the Company $121 million towards the
settlement of 11,000 of these claims. In May 2017, the agreement
with Bard was amended to extend the terms to apply to up to an
additional 5,000 claims. That agreement does not resolve the
dispute between the Company and Bard with respect to claims that do
not settle, if any.

As part of the agreement, the Company and Bard agreed to dismiss
without prejudice their pending litigation with respect to Bard's
obligation to defend and indemnify the Company. The Company
estimates law firms representing approximately 15,800 claimants
have asserted or may assert claims involving products manufactured
by Covidien's subsidiaries. As of November 1, 2018, the Company had
reached agreements to settle approximately 15,100 of these claims.

Medtronic plc develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells
device-based medical therapies to hospitals, physicians,
clinicians, and patients worldwide. It operates through four
segments: Cardiac and Vascular Group, Minimally Invasive Therapies
Group, Restorative Therapies Group, and Diabetes Group. The company
was founded in 1949 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


MERCY HEALTH: Ohio Court Issues Final Judgment in ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE MERCY HEALTH ERISA LITIGATION, Case No.
1:16-cv-00441-SKB (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
of the  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, granted the Parties' motion for approval of the
Settlement set forth in the Class Action Settlement Agreement,
executed on July 13, 2018.

The litigation involves claims for alleged violations of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended,
("ERISA"), set forth in the Plaintiffs' Complaint dated Sept. 14,
2017, with respect to the Plans.

On Aug. 8, 2018, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b)(1) or alternatively (b)(2), the Court preliminarily
certified the Settlement Class of all present or past participants
of the Plans (both vested and non-vested) or beneficiaries of the
Plans as of the Effective Date of the Settlement.

The Court appointed David Lupp, Janet Whaley, Leslie Beidelman,
Patricia Blockus, Charles Bork, Marilyn Gagne, Karl Mauger,
Patricia Mauger, Beth Zaworski, Nancy Zink, Mary Alban, and Linda
Derrick as the Class Representatives; and Izard, Kindall & Raabe
LLP and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP as the Class Counsel and
Strauss Troy Co., LPA as the Liaison Counsel.

It directed that the Class Notice be given pursuant to the notice
program proposed by the Parties and approved by the Court.  In
accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order and the
Court-appointed notice program: (1) on Aug. 23, 2018, the Class
Counsel posted the Settlement Agreement and Class Notice to the
Settlement website: http://ikrlaw.com/file/mercy-health/;and (2)
on or Aug. 29, 2018, the Defendants caused to be mailed
approximately 37,433 copies of the Notice of Class Action
Settlement to members of the Settlement Class.  On Oct. 1, 2018, in
accordance with the Court's Sept. 27, 2018 Order, the Defendants
caused an additional 4,459 members of the Settlement Class.

The matter came before the Court for a hearing pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on the application of the Parties for
approval of their Settlement Agreement.  

The Settlement provides that, for a period of nine years after the
effective date of the Settlement, Mercy Health will (i) guarantee
(and ensure that any successor of Mercy Health will guarantee) that
the trust funds for each of the Plans will have sufficient funds to
pay the benefits that are due; (ii) makes a Plan summary available
to Settlement Class Members electronically; (iii) makes up-to-date
information concerning Plan benefits, including information about
accrued and projected benefits, available to Settlement Class
Members either through a toll-free number, a website or a printed
statement.  Furthermore, the Defendants will pay $450 to certain
defined Settlement Class Members who took voluntary lump-sum
distributions of a traditional annuity benefit from the Mercy
Health Partners-Northern Region Retirement Plan, the Mercy Health
Partners of Greater Cincinnati Retirement Plan or the St. Rita's
Medical Center Retirement Plan during the time period from Jan. 1,
2011 through Feb. 27, 2018.  In exchange, the Plaintiffs and the
Settlement Class will provide a release of claims.

Having considered the Settlement Agreement, all papers filed and
proceedings held, Magistrate Judge Bowman finds that the Parties'
proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  She
approved and adopted the Settlement.

The Magistrate dismissed with prejudice the Action and all Released
Claims identified in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement against
each and all Releasees and without costs to any of the Parties as
against the others.  She ordered that on the Effective Date of the
Settlement Agreement, the Class Representatives, as well as the
members of the Settlement Class, release any and all actual or
potential claims, actions, causes of action, demands, obligations,
liabilities, attorneys' fees, expenses and costs under federal or
state laws arising out of the allegations of the Complaint that
were brought or could have been brought as of the date of the
Settlement Agreement by any member of the Settlement Class.

The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), in the amount of $779,531.20, and
46,468.80 in reimbursement of the Class Counsel's reasonable
expenses incurred in prosecuting the Action.  All fees and expenses
paid to the Class Counsel will be paid pursuant to the timing
requirements described in the Settlement Agreement.  She also
ganted in the amount of $2,000 each the Class Counsel's motion for
Case Contribution Awards to the Settlement Class Representatives.

She finds that no reason exists for delay in ordering final
judgment, and the Clerk is directed to enter the Judgment
forthwith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bpB1SL from Leagle.com.

David Lupp, Individually and on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Julie
Siebert-Johnson, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, pro hac vice,
Robert R. Sparks -- rrsparks@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy Co.,
LPA, Douglas P. Needham -- dneedham@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Nobel LLP,
pro hac vice, Mark K. Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Mark P. Kindall --
mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, pro hac vice,
Robert A. Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Nobel LLP, pro hac
vice & Ronald Richard Parry , Strauss Troy.

Janet Whaley, Leslie Beidleman, Patricia K Blockus, Charles Bork,
Marilyn Gagne, Patricia Mauger & Nancy Zink, Consol Plaintiffs,
represented by Mark P. Kindall, Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, Mark
Wayne Napier, Freking Myers & Reul LLC, Michelle C. Yau, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Havila C. Unrein,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Jamie L. Bowers, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Karen L. Handorf, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Laura R. Gerber, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko , Keller Rohrback
LLP, pro hac vice, Ron Kilgard, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Scott M. Lempert, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice & Thomas R. Theado, Gary Naegele & Theado, LLC.

Karl Mauger, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Kindall,
Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, Mark Wayne Napier, Freking Myers & Reul
LLC, Michelle C. Yau, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, Havila C. Unrein, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Jamie
L. Bowers, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Karen
L. Handorf, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Laura
R. Gerber, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko
, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice, Ron Kilgard, Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice, Scott M. Lempert, Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC, pro hac vice & Thomas R. Theado, Gary Naegele & Theado,
LLC.

Beth Zaworski, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Kindall,
Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, Mark Wayne Napier, Freking Myers & Reul
LLC, Michelle C. Yau, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, Havila C. Unrein, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Jamie
L. Bowers, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Karen
L. Handorf, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Laura
R. Gerber, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko
, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice, Ron Kilgard, Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice, Scott M. Lempert, Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC, pro hac vice & Thomas R. Theado, Gary Naegele & Theado,
LLC.

Mary Alban, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Kindall,
Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, Mark Wayne Napier, Freking Myers & Reul
LLC, Laura R. Gerber, Keller Rohrback L.L.P. & Thomas J. McKenna,
pro hac vice.

Linda Derrick, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Kindall,
Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP.

Mercy Health & Mercy Health Partners Retirement Plan Committee,
Defendants, represented by Howard Shapiro --
howshapiro@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice,
Jennifer Orr Mitchell -- jennifer.mitchell@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore
& Shohl, Brian Scott Sullivan -- brian.sullivan@dinsmore.com --
Dinsmore & Shohl, Lindsey Chopin -- lchopin@proskauer.com --
Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Madeline Chimento Rea, Proskauer
Rose LLP, pro hac vice & Stacey C.S. Cerrone --
scerrone@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice.

United States of America, Movant, represented by Emily Sue Newton,
United States Department of Justice.


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bid to Drop Forman Class Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Meridian Bioscience Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 29, 2018,
for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the motion to
dismiss filed in the class action suit initiated by Barbara Forman
has been fully briefed and remains pending before the court.

On November 15, 2017, Barbara Forman filed a class action complaint
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio naming Meridian, its Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer (in their capacities as such) as defendants.

An amended complaint was filed on April 16, 2018 and the Company
believes the essential elements of the amended complaint are the
same. The complaint and the amended complaint are hereafter
referred to as the "Complaint". The Complaint seeks compensatory
damages and attorneys' fees.

Meridian has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, to which the
plaintiff responded on August 14, 2018. The motion has been fully
briefed and remains pending before the court.

Meridian Bioscience said, "We are unable to determine or predict
the ultimate outcome or estimate the range of possible losses, if
any. Accordingly, no provision for litigation losses has been
included within the accompanying Consolidated Statement of
Operations for fiscal 2018 or 2017."

Meridian Bioscience Inc., an integrated life science company,
manufactures, develops, sells, and distributes diagnostic test
kits. These are used primarily for respiratory, gastrointestinal,
viral, and parasitic infectious diseases. Meridian, founded in
1976, is based in Cincinnati.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Olivia Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection
--------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Olivia, Plaintiff, v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,
Midland Funding LLC, and Encore Capital Group, Inc. Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-07895 (N.D. Ill., November 29, 2018) is a putative
class action brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act to remedy Defendants' unlawful conduct relative their attempts
to collect time-barred consumer debt through form debt collection
letters that are purposefully drafted, formatted and worded to
deceive and mislead consumers about their rights relative to
time-barred debt.

As the United States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB")
recognized in a recent remedial action against these Defendants,
consumers do not have a legally enforceable obligation to pay debt
that is beyond the applicable statute of limitations, notes the
complaint.

MCM sent a form collection letter to Plaintiff at a Chicago based
address in an effort to collect a debt allegedly owed at one point
in time to Citibank. The March 7, 2018 collection letter states
that Plaintiff MCM was attempting to collect a debt which was now
owed to Midland. Documentation in the possession, custody or
control of one or more of the Defendants demonstrates that the
Subject Debt is time-barred under Illinois law. To avoid explaining
to consumers that consumers do not have a legally enforceable
obligation to pay debt that is beyond the applicable statute of
limitations, one or more of the Defendants purposefully drafted,
formatted and worded the March 7, 2018 form collection letter for
the purpose of deceiving and misleading Plaintiff and other
consumers about their rights relative to time-barred debt, the
complaint relates.

The Defendants violated the FDCPA by threatening to credit report
Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons despite the fact
that the time-period in which Defendants may lawfully report the
debts had expired, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Ronald Oliva is natural person residing in the Northern
District of Illinois.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. is incorporated in the State of
Kansas and its principal place of business is located in San Diego,
California 92108. MCM is a subsidiary of Encore.

Midland Funding LLC is incorporated in the State of Delaware and
its principal place of business is located in San Diego, California
92108.

Encore Capital Group, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation. Encore
describes itself as an international specialty finance company with
operations and investments in 17 countries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
     Mohammed Badwan, Esq.
     Joseph Davidson, Esq.
     SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
     2500 South Highland Avenue, Suite 200
     Lombard, IL 60148
     Phone: (630) 575-8181
     Facsimile: (630) 575-8188
     Email: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com


MISSOURI: Gasca Moves for Certification of Adult Parolees Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled STEPHANIE GASCA, et al. v.
ANNE PRECYTHE, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-04149-SRB (W.D. Mo.), ask
the Court to certify a class of plaintiffs defined as:

     all adult parolees in the state of Missouri who currently
     face, or who in the future will face, parole revocation
     proceedings.

Anne Precythe is the Director of the Missouri Department of
Corrections.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Mildred Curren,
Timothy Gallagher, Stephanie Gasca, Kenneth Hemphill, Jesse Neely,
Soloman Warren, and Amber Wyse as class representatives, and to
appoint Locke E. Bowman, Esq., Sheila A. Bedi, Esq., and Amy E.
Breihan, Esq., as class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Amy E. Breihan, Esq.
          RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
          3115 South Grand Blvd., Suite 300
          St. Louis, MO 63118
          Telephone: (314) 254-8540
          Facsimile: (314) 254-8547
          E-mail: amy.breihan@macarthurjustice.org

               - and -

          Locke E. Bowman, Esq.
          Sheila A. Bedi, Esq.
          NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW
          375 East Chicago Avenue
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 503-1271
          E-mail: l-bowman@law.northwestern.edu
                  sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu


MOBILE DIRECT: Strange Files Tort Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mobile Direct
Response. The case is styled as Terry Strange and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Mobile Direct Response,
Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 34-2018-00245494-CU-BT-GDS (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Nov. 29, 2018).

The case type is stated as "Business Tort".

Mobile Direct Response transforms traditional one-way advertising
like Outdoor and Print into interactive, trackable media, allowing
it to compete with Online.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Mark A Redmond, Esq.



MONSANTO COMPANY: Perry Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM PERRY, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01983 (E.D. Mo., Nov. 27, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of
the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with
the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiffs' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI JULIAN LAW
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                 jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Violates FDCPA, Walston Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nationwide Credit,
Inc. The case is styled as Rashad W. Walston on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nationwide Credit,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-07877 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 29,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Nationwide Credit, Inc., is a collection agency, providing customer
relationship and accounts receivable management services. The
company specializes in collecting delinquent and defaulted
accounts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Nathan Charles Volheim, Esq.
     Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
     2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
     Lombard, IL 60148
     Phone: (630) 575-8181 ext 113
     Email: nvolheim@sulaimanlaw.com


ONE TECHNOLOGIES: 5th Cir. Flips Arbitration Ruling in Forby Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICKIE FORBY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated in Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ONE
TECHNOLOGIES, L.P., ONE TECHNOLOGIES MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.; ONE
TECHNOLOGIES CAPITAL, L.L.P., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
17-10883 (5th Cir.), Judge Alfred H. Bennett of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant
of Defendant-Appellee One Tech's motion to compel arbitration.

On April 24, 2015, Forby filed a class action in Illinois state
court that was later removed to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois on July 14, 2015.  Forby brought
claims against One Tech for violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA") and unjust
enrichment under Illinois law.

In the notice of removal, One Tech did not reference arbitration
but rather argued that Forby's claims were baseless, and that no
class should be certified.  On July 21, 2015, it filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and, in the alternative, moved
to transfer the case for forum non conveniens, arguing that Forby's
claims were subject to arbitration in Texas and that an Illinois
district court could not compel arbitration outside of the confines
of its district.  On Sept. 4, 2015, One Tech filed an opposed
motion to stay discovery until the Illinois district court ruled on
the motion to dismiss.  On March 25, 2016, the Illinois district
court issued a Memorandum and Order transferring the case to the
Northern District of Texas.

After the case was transferred, One Tech retained new counsel, who
filed an unopposed extension of time to answer the complaint to
investigate Forby's claims and prepare an appropriate response.  On
May 9, 2016, One Tech filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asking
the Texas district court to dismiss all of Forby's claims with
prejudice.  The motion to dismiss did not mention arbitration.

Forby filed her response to One Tech's motion to dismiss.  In its
reply to Forby's response, One Tech once again did not mention
compelling arbitration.  On March 31, 2017, the district court
denied the motion to dismiss with respect to Forby's ICFA claim
concerning the deceptiveness of One Tech's website and granted the
motion as to the unjust enrichment claim -- dismissing that claim
with prejudice.

On April 17, 2017, four days after attending a Rule 26(f)
conference and receiving Forby's requests for production, One Tech
finally filed its motion to compel arbitration.  Additionally, that
same day, it filed an expedited motion to stay all discovery
pending the resolution of the motion to compel.  On April 24, 2017,
the district court conducted a hearing and granted the motion to
stay.

On July 7, 2017, the district court issued an order granting One
Tech's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case with
prejudice.  The district court found that One Tech had
substantially invoked the judicial process but that Forby had not
suffered prejudice.  

Forby now appeals the decision of the district court.  Forby
contends that the district court erred in finding she was not
prejudiced by One Tech's substantial invocation of the judicial
process.

Judge Bennett finds that One Tech sought a full dismissal on the
merits -- prejudice attaches to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  Its
conduct thus fits squarely within the caselaw recognizing that the
judicial process is invoked when a party seeks a decision on the
merits before attempting to arbitrate.  Accordingly, the district
court was correct in finding One Tech substantially invoked the
judicial process.

The Judge also finds that Forby's legal position was damaged by One
Tech's delay in moving to compel arbitration.  Accordingly, the
district court erred in finding Forby was not prejudiced.  When a
party will have to re-litigate in the arbitration forum an issue
already decided by the district court in its favor, that party is
prejudiced.  If the instant case were to proceed to arbitration,
Forby would have to re-litigate whether One Tech's website was
deceptive in front of an arbitrator after One Tech already tested
its arguments with a district court judge.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's determination that
One Tech did not waive its right to arbitration was in error.  The
Judge holds that One Tech substantially invoked the judicial
process and that Forby was prejudiced thereby.  Accordingly, he
reversed the order of the district court finding Forby had not
suffered enough prejudice to establish waiver.  The district
court's order granting One Tech's motion to compel arbitration is
vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with the Judge's Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/iC0TWO from Leagle.com.

Scott Lawrence Nelson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian Edward Robison -- brobison@gibsondunn.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher John Schwegmann -- cjs@lynnllp.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Russell Harris Falconer -- rfalconer@gibsondunn.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Andrew Patrick LeGrand -- alegrand@gibsondunn.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jonathan Ryan Childers -- jchilders@lynnllp.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Adam R. Pulver, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Edwin J. Kilpela --  ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kevin Abramowicz -- contact@carlsonlynch.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in "Rhino" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE OUTLAW LABORATORIES, LP LITIGATION, Case No.
3:18-cv-840-GPC-BGS, No. 3:18-CV-1882-GPC-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
Distric of California (i) granted in part and denied in part
Outlaw's mtion to dismiss the counterclaims; and (ii) denied
Outlaw's motion to strike the Counterclaimants' third cause of
action for rescission pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 425.16.

Outlaw is a Texas-based manufacturer of male-enhancement products
called "TriSteel" and "TriSteel 8 hour."  Its products are made in
the United States and distributed for sale in all 50 states, and
are claimed to be in compliance with the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act.  According to Counterclaimants, Outlaw was
formed in Texas in September 2016.

Sometime starting in 2017 and continuing through 2018, Outlaw,
through its attorneys at Tauler Smith LLP, began mailing demand
letters to proprietors of gas stations, liquor stores, and corner
stores in California, and beyond.  Those recipients allegedly sold
male-enhancement pills designated by the word "Rhino," which Outlaw
alleges contain undisclosed sildenafil, a prescription
pharmaceutical regulated by the FDA.

Outlaw's demand letters warned recipients that they were selling
illegal sexual enhancement drugs, which subject their company to
legal action for racketeering under Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") and the Federal Lanham Act, and obligate
them to pay to Outlaw profits from the sale of Illicit Products
dating back four years, attorney's fees, punitive damages, and
triple damages.  The letter estimates the recipients' liabilities
at "over $100,000" but states that Outlaw is willing to settle all
claims in exchange for a one-time settlement agreement, $9,765, and
their agreement to stop selling the Illicit Products.

The letters conclude by warning that if the matter is not fully
resolved before a date typically within 30 days, that a lawsuit
will be filed against the recipient.  Some recipients, like
Third-Party Plaintiff Skyline Market, Inc., acquiesced to the
demand letter and settled with Outlaw. Others, like Defendants Roma
Mikha, Inc., and NMRM, Inc., resisted.

True to its word, on July 24, 2018, Outlaw filed a complaint in San
Diego Superior Court against a high volume of defendants, all of
whom it had previously mailed a demand letter.  Roma Mikha, Inc.
was named in the complaint; NMRM, Inc., was not.

On Aug. 12, 2018, Roma Mikha, Inc. removed the action to federal
court.  Thereafter, on Aug. 24, 2018, Roma Mikha, NMRM, and Skyline
Market, Inc. filed a Third Party Complaint ("Cross-Complaint")
against Outlaw.  Their Cross-Complaint alleges a class action
against Outlaw for (1) civil RICO violation,, (2) RICO
conspiracy,and (3) rescission of any settlement agreements like the
one entered into by Skyline Market.

With respect to the RICO counts, the Counterclaimants allege a RICO
enterprise between Outlaw, Tauler Smith, and other as-yet-unnamed
individuals, aimed at perfecting a legal "shakedown" of small-time
San Diego convenience stores.  They claim that the "TriSteel"
products were created as artifices to found the false advertising
claims, and that Outlaw itself is no more than a front for the
unlawful enterprise.

In response, Outlaw moved to dismiss all claims asserted in the
Cross-Complaint.  It also has moved to strike the third cause of
action for rescission pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP law.  

Outlaw has moved to dismiss Counterclaimant's RICO-based causes of
action on two grounds.  First, it argues that that Counterclaimants
have failed to identify a specific, materially false representation
as would sustain their claim that Outlaw is engaged in the
predicate acts of mail fraud.  Second, it argues that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes those who petition the
government for redress from statutory liability for petitioning
conduct, shields it from RICO liability.

Outlaw has also moved to dismiss Skyline Market's third cause of
action for rescission of its settlement agreement.  Skyline Market
claims two justifications for rescission: first, that it had not
known that its agreement had been predicated upon a scheme to
defraud that was illegal ab initio, as set forth above, and in
Counts 1 and 2 -- i.e., its RICO claims, and second, that it had
signed the settlement agreement under the shadow of a $100,000
lawsuit and threat of duress.  Outlaw contends that neither RICO
nor economic duress can justify rescission.

Judge Curiel recognizes that Counterclaimants have pointed to
additional "indicia of sham litigation" in their opposition to
Outlaw's motion to dismiss.  These allegations, however, do not
matter for part one of the PRE II/Kottle analysis.   Without
demonstrating the objective baselessness of Outlaw's suit, the
Counterclaimants cannot proceed to the second part of the PRE
II/Kottle analysis.  Because the Cunterclaimants have failed to
meet their burden of pleading that Outlaw's lawsuit is objectively
baseless, the Judge will grant Outlaw's motion to dismiss
Counterclaimant's RICO claims.  The dismissal applies both to the
first RICO cause of action, and the second cause of action for RICO
conspiracy.  The dismissal will be without prejudice and the
Counterclaimants are granted leave to amend.

As to the rescission claim, the Judge finds that the
Counterclaimants could have availed themselves of the "reasonable
alternative" of hiring an attorney to litigate the case.  Their
failure to do so precludes their cry of economic duress.  He finds,
however, that Outlaw has sufficiently pleaded that hiring an
attorney was not a reasonable alternative.  Several of
Counterclaimants' allegations (and the reasonable inferences
therefrom) suggest why this was so.  It might be the case that the
Counterclaimants' bid for rescission will ultimately fail.  As
such, the Judge will deny Outlaw's motion to dismiss the
Counterclaimants' claim for rescission.

Finally, turning to Outlaw's special motion to strike the
Counterclaimants' third cause of action -- rescission -- pursuant
to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, typically
referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute, and in the event that it
prevails, Outlaw seeks $3,778 in attorneys' fees for efforts spent
litigating the anti-SLAPP motion, the Judge will deny Outlaw's
motion

The Judge finds that the Counterclaimants have somewhat inartfully
labeled their request for rescission as a "third cause of action"
does not bring them within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.
The body of their rescission pleadings announces Skyline Market's
intent to seek rescission, as enabled by California Civil Code
Section 1691, which provides that the service of a pleading in an
action or proceeding that seeks relief based on rescission will be
deemed to be notice of rescission.  Accordingly, the Judge agrees
with the Counterclaimants that Skyline Market's notice of
rescission and prayer for equitable relief are not causes of action
to which the anti-SLAPP statute may apply.  In light of the
foregoing, the Court will deny Outlaw's motion to strike and its
request for related attorneys' fees.

Consistent with the foregoing, Judge Curiel denied in part and
granted in part Outlaw's motion to dismiss.  The Counterclaimants
are granted leave to amend their RICO claims to cure the
deficiencies noted by the Court; if they wish to avail themselves
of this opportunity, they must submit an amended counterclaim
within 30 days of the Order.  The Judge further denied Outlaw's
motion to strike the Counterclaimants' claim for rescission in its
entirety.  The motion hearing set for Nov. 30, 2018 is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 27, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xDMQDR from Leagle.com.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, Plaintiff,
represented by Matthew J. Smith --
msmith@insurancelawservices.com.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Mark Poe -- mpoe@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw
Poe LLP, Samuel Song -- ssong@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor
Meng -- vmeng@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP.

Midway M3, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Eagle's Nest Property Management, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, represented by Robert Charles
Mardian, III -- rmardian@smalawsd.com -- Sullivan, McGibbons &
Associates LLP.

NMRM, Inc. & Skyline Market, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
represented by Mark Poe , Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe LLP,
Samuel Song, Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, ThirdParty Plaintiff,
represented by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe LLP &
Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, ThirdParty
Defendant, represented by Matthew J. Smith.

Roma Mikha, Inc., a California Corporation, Counter Claimant,
represented by Mark Poe, Gaw & Poe LLP, Randolph Gaw, Gaw Poe LLP,
Samuel Song, Gaw & Poe LLP & Victor Meng, Gaw & Poe LLP.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership, Counter
Defendant, represented by Matthew J. Smith & Robert Tauler, Tauler
Smith LLP.


OXNARD SCHOOL: Certification of Students Class Sought in JR Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
I.H., F.S., W.H., and I.B., some of the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit
entitled J.R., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem,
Janelle McCammack, et al. v. OXNARD SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Case
No. 2:17-cv-04304-JAK-FFM (C.D. Cal.), move the Court for an order
certifying their claims as a class action on behalf of:

     All students in Oxnard School District who have or may have
     disabilities and who have been or will be subject to the
     District's policies and procedures regarding identification
     and evaluation of students for purposes of providing
     services or accommodations under the Individuals with
     Disabilities Education Act, Section 504 of the
     Rehabilitation Act and/or the Americans with Disabilities
     Act.

The Plaintiffs also move for (i) the appointment of Plaintiffs
I.H., F.S., W.H., I.B., and Primero Los Ninos as Class
Representatives; and (ii) the appointment of Learning Rights Law
Center, the Law Office of Shawna L. Parks, and Disability Rights
Advocates as Class Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on February 4, 2019, at 8:30
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Janeen Steel, Esq.
          LEARNING RIGHTS LAW CENTER
          205 S. Broadway, Suite 808
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Telephone: (213) 489-4035
          Facsimile: (213) 489-4033
          E-mail: janeen@learningrights.org

               - and -

          Stuart Seaborn, Esq.
          Melissa Riess, Esq.
          Jessica Agatstein, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          2001 Center St., 4th Floor
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 665-8644
          Facsimile: (510) 665-8511
          E-mail: eaborn@dralegal.org
                  mriess@dralegal.org
                  jagatstein@dralegal.org

               - and -

          Shawna L. Parks, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF SHAWNA L. PARKS
          4470 W. Sunset Blvd., Suite 107-347
          Los Angeles, CA 90027
          Telephone: (323) 389-9239
          E-mail: sparks@parks-law-office.com


PATENAUDE & FELIX: Court Dismisses Schultz FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAREN SCHULTZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PATENAUDE & FELIX, A.P.C. and
CACH, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-489 (W.D. Pa.), Judge
Marilyn J. Horan of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania (i) granted both Defendant Patenaude &
Felix, A.P.C.'s Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Cach, LLC's Motion
to Dismiss; and (ii) denied as moot both Defendant Patenaude's
12(f) Motion to Strike and Defendant Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C.'s
Motion to Strike.

Schultz, on behalf of herself and a purported class, filed suit
against Patenaude under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania.  Patenaude timely removed the matter to the Court
based on federal question jurisdiction.  Following the Initial Case
Management Conference, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint withdrawing two claims and adding Cach, LLC as an
additional Defendant.

According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff allegedly defaulted on a
credit card account issued by Synchrony Bank.  Defendant Cach
purchased that account and then assigned the account to Defendant
Patenaude for the purpose of initiating collection efforts.  The
Plaintiff alleges both the Defendants are "debt collectors" within
the meaning of definition provided by -- and therefore subject to
the regulations within -- the FDCPA.  The Plaintiff also asserts
that Defendant Cach is liable for Defendant Patenaude's actions.

According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff received a letter dated
Feb. 2, 2018 from Defendant Patenaude informing the Plaintiff of
Defendant Cach's assignment of collection duties to Defendant
Patenaude.  The Plaintiff alleges that the letter failed to
adequately inform consumers of how to effectively request cessation
of debt collection activities, making the letter a misleading
communication and a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692c(c) and
Section 1692e(10).  She further alleges that the letter is a form
collection letter, sent not only to her, but to numerous other
consumers across western Pennsylvania.  Consequently, the Plaintiff
seeks certification as a class action.

Defendants Patenaude and Cach each filed a Motion to Dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Additionally, Defendant Patenaude moved
to strike under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) in relation to the
Plaintiff's proposed class definition.  The parties filed briefs in
thematter, and the Court held a hearing on the Motions on Nov. 27,
2018.

Turning first to the Defendants' main argument, Judge Horan agrees
that the Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of the FDCPA.
Because the Plaintiff relies on Section 1692c(c) as the basis for
her Section 1692e(10) claim, and because she does not allege a
violation of Section 1692c(c) or otherwise plead facts that allow
the court to reasonably infer that the language in the letter is
misleading and in violation of Section 1692e(10), the Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under Section 1692e(10) for which relief can
be granted.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Finally, based on the foregoing reasoning, the Judge does not reach
Defendant Cach's argument that the Plaintiff failed to adequately
allege that Defendant Cach is a "debt collector," and therefore a
proper defendant, under the FDCPA.  Likewise, she does not reach
the issue of whether the Plaintiff has standing to bring her
claims.

Because the Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted and her Complaint is dismissed accordingly under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Defendant Patenaude's 12(f) Motion to Strike
will be denied as moot.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Horan graned Defendant Patenaude &
Felix, A.P.C.'s Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Cach, LLC's Motion
to Dismiss, and dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint.  She denied as
moot Defendant Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C.'s Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2Qk1tnM from Leagle.com.

KAREN SCHULTZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Clayton S. Morrow --
cmorrow@allconsumerlaw.com -- Morrow & Artim, PC & Jeffrey L. Suher
-- jls@dellmoser.com.

PATENAUDE & FELIX, A.P.C., Defendant, represented by Daniel R.
Bentz -- dbentz@moodklaw.com -- Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty &
Kelly & Thomas Pie, Jr. -- TPie@moodklaw.com -- Marks, O'Neill,
O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C.

CACH, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jessica Lucas --
jlucas@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP & Mark J. Golen, II --
mgolen@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP.


PORSCHE CARS: Padilla Sues Over Defective Cooling System
--------------------------------------------------------
Santiago Padilla and Murray L. Shames, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Porsche Cars North
America, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-24988-FAM (S.D. Fla., November 29, 2018) seeks to address a
persistent safety-related defect in the design and manufacture of
the engine cooling system components in Panamera Vehicles and
Cayenne Vehicles, including the use of adhesive to secure the
slip-fit connection that joins the coolant pipes to the body of the
thermostat housing unit assembly.

The engine cooling systems in the Defective Vehicles are materially
the same and the Cooling System Defect exists in all Defective
Vehicles, regardless of driving conditions or compliance with
Defendant's recommended maintenance schedule, says the coomplaint.

The Defective Vehicles are sold on the promise that they are
high-end performance vehicles, engineered and manufactured using
cutting edge technology and materials, "advanced engineering, rigid
quality control and demanding inspections". Yet, contrary to these
promises and the reasonable consumer expectations of Plaintiffs and
the Class, Porsche failed to implement these alternative, safer
designs in the Defective Vehicles, leaving Plaintiffs and the Class
to bear the risks of the Cooling System Defect that Porsche
created.

Plaintiff Santiago Padilla is a resident of Aventura, Florida in
Miami-Dade County. In 2013, Plaintiff Padilla purchased a model
year 2011 Porsche Panamera, equipped with a V8 engine, from The
Collection Porsche dealership in Miami, Florida.

Plaintiff Murray L. Shames is a resident of Hillsborough County,
Florida. In 2014, Plaintiff Shames purchased a 2011 Cayenne S,
equipped with a V8 engine from Carmax in Tampa, Florida.

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. is incorporated in the State of
Delaware and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. Porsche, as the
importer and distributor of Porsche vehicles for the United States,
sold, marketed, distributed, and serviced the Defective
Vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     T. Michael Morgan, Esq.
     MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
     20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1600
     Orlando, FL 32801
     Phone: (407) 420-1414
     Fax: (407) 641-5846
     Email: mmorgan@forthepeople.com

          - and -

     Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
     Paula R. Brown, Esq.
     Aleksandr J. Yarmolinets, Esq.
     BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
     501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 338-1100
     Fax: (619) 338-1101
     Email: tblood@bholaw.com
            pbrown@bholaw.com
            ayarmolinets@bholaw.com

          - and -

     Ray P. Boucher, Esq.
     Maria L. Weitz, Esq.
     RAY BOUCHER LLP
     26100 Oxnard Street, Suite 600
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (818) 340-5400
     Fax: (818) 340-5401
     Email: ray@boucher.la
            weitz@boucher.la


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Certifies Class in Bereket FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ABBY BEREKET, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,
LLC and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. C17-812 RSM (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, Seattle, (i) granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, and (ii) denied the
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint.

Defendant Portfolio bought certain debts from Bank of America and
sent letters to the debtors attempting to collect on those debts.
On Aug. 23, 2016, the Plaintiff received such a letter from the
Defendant which attempted to collect on the Plaintiff's Bank of
America debt that she had not made payment on since Aug. 18, 2010.
Due to the timing of the last payment, the applicable statute of
limitations -- 6 years in Washington -- had expired before the
Plaintiff received the letter.

The Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit on his own behalf and on behalf
of those similarly situated.  She defines the class -- purportedly
consisting of 243 individuals -- as (a) all individuals with a
Washington State address (b) to whom Defendant mailed an unlawful
collection letter (c) from May 24, 2016 to the present (d) in an
attempt to collect a debt on behalf of Bank of America (e) more
than six years after the last payment was made on that debt.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's debt collection
practices violate the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA")
and seeks to certify a class of all Washington residents affected
by the allegedly unlawful practices.  The Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff and his counsel are not the adequate class
representatives because of the Plaintiff's fraudulent actions prior
to filing suit.  

The Defendant, in the course of discovery, discovered that the
Plaintiff engaged a third-party credit repair agency to attempt to
get its account -- and numerous others -- removed from the
Plaintiff's credit report.  The Defendants discovered that various
letters it received -- purportedly from the Plaintiff -- were
actually from the third-party and that the letters contained
numerous misrepresentations.  The Defendant seeks leave to sue for
damages caused by the Plaintiff's and the third-party's fraud.  

The Plaintiff responds that he's not responsible for the prior
letters, that the activities should not disqualify him in the
action, and that the Defendant's claims cannot be pursued in the
Court.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification and the Defendant's Motion for Leave to File
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.  The Defendant seeks to
amend its Answer to assert a counterclaim of fraud against the
Plaintiff and a third-party complaint for fraud and unfair business
practices against Cobalt.  These claims are premised upon the
letters Cobalt sent to credit reporting agencies and the Defendant.
The Plaintiff opposes the motion on the basis that amendment would
be futile because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant's
claims.

Both parties have requested oral argument, but the Court finds it
unnecessary to its resolution of the Motions.  After considering
the Motions and the record, Judge Martinez granted the Plaintiff's
Motion and denied the Defendant's Motion.  

The Judge finds that finds that the Defendant's claims are not part
of the same case or controversy as its claims do not share a common
nucleus of operative facts with the Plaintiff's federal action.  As
the Plaintiff notes, his claim depends on the language included in
the Defendant's collection letter.  The Defendant's claims depend
on the language included in letters sent to it and credit reporting
agencies and the truth of the statements therein.  There does not
appear to be any overlap and proof of one claim does not impact
resolution of the other.  Because he finds that the Defendant's
claims do not fall within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction,
the Judge holds he needs not consider whether it should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1367(c).

As to the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, the Judge
finds that (i) the class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a);
(ii) the Plaintiff is sufficiently credible and knowledgeable; the
Plaintiff's counsel is adequate; and (iv) the class certification
is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2QOKJVq from Leagle.com.

bby Bereket, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC, pro hac vice,
Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN,
LLC, pro hac vice, Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
-- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Blythe H. Chandler --
bchandler@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Defendant, represented by David
L. Hartsell, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, pro hac vice, Duncan Manville --
dmanville@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE & WILLEY LLP, Sarah A.
Zielinski -- szielinski@mcguirewoods.com -- MCGUIREWOODS LLP, pro
hac vice & Stephen C. Willey -- swilley@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE
& WILLEY LLP.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Refuses to Certify Class in Gomes Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Cecilia M. Altonaga denied the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification and Appointment of Class Representative and
Class Counsel in the lawsuit styled LEONARDO GOMES v. PORTFOLIO
RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-21872-CMA (S.D. Fla.).

Under the June 25, 2018 Scheduling Order, the deadline to amend
pleadings or join parties was August 6, 2018.  Discovery closed on
November 6, 2018.  The Plaintiff has not sought an extension of
time to file the Motion, which would necessarily add an entire
class of Plaintiffs to the case, and he does not attempt to address
good cause for his untimely submission, Judge Altonaga notes.

"Indeed, Plaintiff seeks certification of a class just three months
before the scheduled trial date of February 18, 2019," Judge
Altonaga says.  "Consequently, the Court does not reach the merits
of the Motion," Judge Altonaga adds, citing Payne v. Ryder Sys.,
Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 173 F.R.D. 537, 540 (M.D. Fla.
1997).[CC]


PPDAI GROUP: Lai Hits Share Drop from Illegal Business Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Weichen Lai, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PPDAI Group Inc., Jun Zhang, Tiezheng Li,
Honghui Hu, Shaefeng Gu, Ronald Cao, Congliang Li, Neil Napeng
Shen, Zehui Liu, Qiong Wang, Simon Tak Leung Ho, Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. and Keefe,
Bruyette & Woods, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-06716 (E.D.
N.Y., November 26, 2018), seeks to recover damages caused by
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

PPDAI is an online Peer-to-Peer consumer finance platform, that
connects borrowers to lenders offering short-term loans. In
November 2017, Defendants held an IPO, issuing approximately 17
million American Depository Shares to the investing public at $13
each. raising $221 million in the IPO.

PPDAI was allegedly engaged in predatory lending practices that
saddled subprime borrowers and those with poor or limited credit
histories with high interest rate debt they could not repay.
Customers were using PPDAI-provided loans to repay existing loans
they otherwise could not afford to repay, thereby inflating their
revenues and but increasing the likelihood of defaults that would
affect their reserves. PPDAI was providing online loans to college
students despite a government ban on the practice. It was also
engaged in overly aggressive and improper collection practices thus
making it a target by Chinese regulators, says the complaint.

PPDAI shares traded around $6.16 each, over a 52% decline from the
IPO price. Lai invested in them during the IPO and lost
substantially. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      Phillip Kim, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Telephone: (213) 785-2610
      Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
      Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
             pkim@rosenlegal.com


QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Denial of Bid to Stay in Vanderwerff Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Esther Salas of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer's July 26,
2018 Order denying the Defendants' motion to stay discovery in the
case, JAMES VANDERWERFF, Plaintiff, v. QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING
COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-0784 (ES)
(MAH) (D. N.J.).

On Feb. 7, 2017, Vanderwerff brought the class action on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated alleging that the Defendants
violated various federal and New Jersey laws by making false and
misleading claims regarding its dietary supplement, Prevagen.
Particularly, the Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class
alleging that the Defendants violated the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations Act, as well as a New Jersey class alleging
that they violated three separate New Jersey statutes.

The action arises out of a similar set of facts as a lawsuit filed
by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") against the Defendants on
Jan.9, 2017, in the Southern District of New York.  The FTC alleged
that the Defendants' products are false and misleading, in
violation of sections 5(a) and 12 of the FTC Act and various New
York laws.  The district court in that action granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The
Defendants state that an appeal of the dismissal remains pending
before the Second Circuit.

The Defendants further contend that soon after the Plaintiff filed
the instant action, the new class action, Karathanos v. Quincy
Bioscience Holding Co., et al., No. 17-1091, (Jan. 18, 2018), was
filed against them in the Eastern District of New York, alleging
similar facts as to those in the FTC Action.  Karathanos alleges
deceptive acts or practices and false advertising under New York
law and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.  The Eastern District of New York stayed the matter pending
the appeal of the FTC Action.

A third action, Racies v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 15-0292, 2015
WL 2398268, is also currently pending before the Northern District
of California.  In Racies, which asserts liabilities theories
similar to the present action based on California law, the
California district court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss
in part, finding that the plaintiff's allegations that
representations of Prevagen were false, misleading and deceptive,
were sufficient to state a claim.

On June 14, 2017, the Defendants in the matter filed a motion to
dismiss and a motion to stay, pending the resolution of the FTC
Action in the Second Circuit.  On Sept. 1, 2017, the Magistrate
Judge issued an order denying their motion to stay the matter and
ordered the the Defendants to provide to the Plaintiff the
documents they have provided to the FTC and for all the parties to
prepare to discuss deadlines for the completion of written
discovery, all fact discovery, experts, class certification and
summary judgment.

On March 6, 2018, the Court administratively terminated the
Defendants' motion to dismiss pending the resolution of the FTC
Action.  It specifically observed that discovery is ongoing in the
action and that nothing in the Order will be construed to supersede
Magistrate Judge Hammer's Sept. 1, 2017 Order.

On July 13, 2018, the Defendants renewed their request that further
discovery be stayed until after the Second Circuit resolves the FTC
Action appeal.   On July 26, 2018, the Magistrate Judge rejected
their arguments and ordered limited discovery directed only to
class certification.  Particularly, the Magistrate Judge ordered
the Defendants to produce additional discovery related to total New
Jersey sales of Prevagen, because the discovery in the FTC and
Racies actions do not cover the information.

On Aug.3, 2018, the Defendants filed the instant appeal.  They
contend that the Court should vacate the Magistrate Judge's July 26
Order and stay the action, or in the alternative, decide their
motion to dismiss.  They further argue that the Magistrate Judge's
July 26 Order is unfair and inconsistent with the Court's March 6
Order administratively terminating the motion to dismiss.

In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that the order in which the
Court decides the parties' motions is within the Court's
discretion.  Therefore, the Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate
Judge's July 26 Order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Judge Salas is not persuaded that the Magistrate Judge's July 26
Order is contrary to law or an abuse of discretion.  As a starting
point, the Defendants' argument that it is contrary to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 for the Magistrate Judge to order additional
discovery prior to ruling on the Defendants' motion to dismiss, is
misplaced.  There is no requirement that discovery must be stayed
pending a decision on a party's dispositive motion.

She is also not persuaded that the Magistrate Judge's July 26 Order
is inconsistent with the Court's March 26 Order administratively
terminating the motion to dismiss.  The Court did not state that
discovery was stayed; it only stated that the motion to dismiss
would be administratively terminated pending a decision on the FTC
Action.  Therefore, the Court use of a procedural device to
temporarily terminate the pending motion did not, in any way, limit
the Magistrate Judge's discretion to continue discovery in the
matter, particularly when that discovery is unrelated to the FTC
Action.

The Judge therefore determines that the Magistrate Judge's July 26
Order is neither "clearly erroneous" nor "contrary to law" because
the Magistrate Judge did not misinterpret or misapply the law, nor
did he overlook any law or fact.  Additionally, she declines the
Defendants' request that the Court decide their motion to dismiss.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Salas denied the Defendants'
appeal, and affirmed the Magistrate Judge's July 26 Order.  An
appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/MeH56r from Leagle.com.

JAMES VANDERWERFF, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL R. LAPINSKI --
dlapinski@wilentz.com -- WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER, PC, JOSEPH R.
SANTOLI & KEVIN PETER RODDY -- kroddy@wilentz.com -- WILENTZ,
GOLDMAN & SPITZER, PA.

QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a corporation, QUINCY
BIOSCIENCE, LLC, a limited liability company, PREVAGEN, INC, a
corporation, QUINCY BIOSCIENCE MANUFACTURING, LLC, a limited
liability company, MARK UNDERWOOD, individually and as an officer
of QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING COMPANY, INC., QUINCY BIOSCIENCE, LLC
AND PREVAGEN, INC. & MICHAEL BEAMAN, individually and as an officer
of QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING COMPANY, INC., QUINCY BIOSCIENCE, LLC
AND PREVAGEN, INC., Defendants, represented by JEFFREY S. JACOBSON
-- jjacobson@kelleydrye.com -- KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP.


R&L CARRIERS: Miranda Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, HECTOR MIRANDA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. R&L CARRIERS
SHARED SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-04940-TSH (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, (i) denied Shared
Services' Motion to Dismiss, and (ii) granted its Motion to
Transfer Venue to the Central District of California.

In the proposed class action, Miranda and Rene Maya allege their
former employer, the Defendant, failed to provide meal and rest
breaks and compensate them for all hours worked in violation of
provisions of the California Labor Code and Business and
Professions Code.  Shared Services is an Ohio corporation with its
principal place of business in Wilmington, Ohio.  It provides
transportation services to the public, which includes
transportation of freight by commercial motor vehicle.

Hector Miranda resides in Commerce, California.  He worked for
Shared Services as a "City Driver" and a "Linehaul Driver" from
March 2009 to May 2018.  Maya resides in Hacienda Heights,
California.  He also worked for Shared Services as a City Driver
and a Linehaul Driver from January 2007 to June 2018.

The Plaintiffs filed the proposed class action on Aug. 14, 2018, on
behalf of the following classes:

     a. All drivers who worked at any of Shared Services' locations
as a Pick Up and Delivery Driver also known as a City Driver in
California at any time within four years prior to the initiation of
the action until the present.

     b. All drivers who worked at any of Shared Services' locations
as a Linehaul Driver in California at any time within four years
prior to the initiation of the action until the present.

They bring six causes of action: (1) failure to provide meal and
rest periods; (2) indemnification; (3) waiting time penalties; (4)
failure to pay compensation for all hours worked and minimum wage
violations; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized statements;
and (6) unfair business practice.

Shared Services now moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or alternatively, to transfer the action
to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1406(a), based on improper venue.  Shared Services argues venue is
improper in the District because the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over it.  It maintains general jurisdiction is lacking
because it is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of
business in Ohio, and only 4% of its terminal locations are in the
Northern District of California.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue their claims are well-tethered to
this District as they seek to certify their wage and hour claims
for a putative class comprised of California employees.

Magistrate Judge Hixson finds that the Northern District of
California is not a proper venue for the action and the interests
of justice warrant transfer to the Central District of California
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a).  Accordingly, he (i) denied
Shared Services' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(3); (ii) granted the Defendant's Motion to
Transfer Venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a); and (iii)
transferred the action is to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California for further proceedings pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a).  He vacated the Dec. 13, 2018 hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/n7cnvs from Leagle.com.

Hector Miranda, an individual & Rene Maya, Jr., an individual, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, represented by Armand Raffi Kizirian --
armand@boyamianlaw.com -- Boyamian Law, Inc., Thomas Walker Falvey
-- thomaswfalvey@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey &
Michael Hagop Boyamian -- michael@boyamianlaw.com -- Boyamian Law,
Inc.

R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC, a Corporation, Defendant,
represented by David Stuart Eisen -- david.eisen@wilsonelser.com --
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman Dicker LLP, Diana Marie Estrada --
diana.estrada@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman &
Dicker, LLP & Jennifer Ann Brody -- jennifer.brody@wilsonelser.com
-- Wilson Elser.


RAYMOND JAMES: Bid to Drop Wistar Class Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------
Raymond James Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 21,
2018, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the motion
to dismiss filed in the Wistar complaint remains pending.

On February 11, 2016, Caleb Wistar ("Wistar") and Ernest Mayeaux
("Mayeaux") filed a putative class action complaint in the District
Court under the caption Caleb Wistar and Ernest Mayeaux v. Raymond
James Financial Services, Inc. and Raymond James Financial Services
Advisors, Inc. (as subsequently amended, the "Wistar Complaint").

Similar to the Jyll Brink v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc.,
suit, the Wistar Complaint alleges that Wistar and Mayeaux, former
customers of RJFS and Raymond James Financial Services Advisors,
Inc. ("RJFSA"), were charged a fee in RJFS and RJFSA's Passport
Investment Account and that the fee included an unauthorized and
undisclosed profit to RJFS and RJFSA in violation of its customer
agreement and applicable industry standards.

The Wistar Complaint seeks, among other relief, damages in the
amount of the difference between the actual cost of processing a
trade, as alleged by Wistar and Mayeaux, and the fee charge by RJFS
and RJFSA.

On September 6, 2018, RJFS and RJFSA filed a motion to dismiss the
Wistar Complaint, which motion is pending. The matter is scheduled
for trial commencing September 16, 2019.

Raymond James said, "RJFS and RJFSA believe the claims in the
Wistar Complaint are without merit and are vigorously defending the
action."

Raymond James Financial, Inc., through its subsidiaries, engages in
the underwriting, distribution, trading, and brokerage of equity
and debt securities, and the sale of mutual funds and other
investment products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and
internationally. It operates in five segments: Private Client Group
(PCG), Capital Markets, Asset Management, RJ Bank, and Other. The
company was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in St. Petersburg,
Florida.


RAYMOND JAMES: Trial in Brink Suit to Commence April 2019
---------------------------------------------------------
Raymond James Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 21,
2018, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that the trial
in the case, Jyll Brink v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc., is
scheduled to commence on April 15, 2019.

On February 17, 2015, Jyll Brink ("Brink") filed a putative class
action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (the "District Court") under the caption Jyll
Brink v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (the "Brink Complaint").


The Brink Complaint alleges that Brink, a former customer of RJ&A,
was charged a fee in her Passport Investment Account, and that the
fee included an unauthorized and undisclosed profit to RJ&A in
violation of its customer agreement and applicable industry
standards.

The Passport Investment Account is a fee-based account in which
clients pay asset-based advisory fees and certain processing fees
for ongoing investment advice and monitoring of securities
holdings. The Brink Complaint seeks, among other relief, damages in
the amount of the difference between the actual cost of processing
a trade, as alleged by Brink, and the fee charged by RJ&A.

On May 9, 2016, RJ&A filed a motion to dismiss the Brink Complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"). On June 6, 2016, the
District Court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing
the Brink Complaint on SLUSA preclusion grounds.

On June 24, 2016, Brink filed a notice of appeal of the order of
dismissal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit (the "Appellate Court"). On June 8, 2018, the Appellate
Court issued its opinion reversing the order of dismissal and
remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.

On October 19, 2018, the District Court certified a class of former
and current customers of RJ&A who executed a Passport Agreement and
were charged such fees during the period between February 17, 2010
and February 17, 2015.  The matter is scheduled for trial
commencing April 15, 2019.

Raymond James said, "RJ&A believes the claims in the Brink
Complaint are without merit and is vigorously defending the
action."

Raymond James Financial, Inc., through its subsidiaries, engages in
the underwriting, distribution, trading, and brokerage of equity
and debt securities, and the sale of mutual funds and other
investment products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and
internationally. It operates in five segments: Private Client Group
(PCG), Capital Markets, Asset Management, RJ Bank, and Other. The
company was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in St. Petersburg,
Florida.


SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Class Certification in Mays Suit Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO MAYS, RICKY RICHARDSON, JENNIFER BOTHUN,
ARMANI LEE, LEERTESE BEIRGE, and CODY GARLAND, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY
OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-2081 KJNP (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California has recommended that the
parties' Joint Motion for Class Certification be granted.

A hearing on the Motion was held on Nov. 29, 2018.  After full
consideration of the evidence, the parties' arguments, and the
authorities submitted by counsel, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that the action be maintained as a class action under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2), and
recommended the parties' Joint Motion for Class Certification be
granted.

He finds that the requirements of Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(1) and
Rule 23(b)(2) are satisfied.  The action should be certified as a
class action as to all claims and defenses at issue in the
Complaint pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

He recommended certification of these classes:
  
     a. Plaintiff Class: All people who are now, or in the future
will be, incarcerated in the Sacramento County jails.

     b. Plaintiff Subclass (the Disability Class): All qualified
individuals with disabilities, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
Section 12102, 29 U.S.C. Section 705(9)(B), and California
Government Code Section 12926(j) and (m), who are, or will be in
the future, incarcerated in the Sacramento County jails.

The Magistrate Judge further recommended that the named Plaintiffs
be certified to serve as the class representatives; and that
Disability Rights California, the Prison Law Office, and Cooley LLP
be appointed as the class counsel.

Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(A), the parties will confer and, in their
joint status report to be filed on Dec. 17, 2018, will address the
status of their proposed notice to the Plaintiff Class and
Disabilities Subclass, and the proposed method of distribution of
such notice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United
States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(l).  Within 10 days after
being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may
file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all
parties.  Such a document should be captioned "Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations."  Any response to
the objections will be filed and served within seven days after
service of the objections.  The parties are advised that failure to
file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
appeal the District Court's order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Findings &
Recommendations is available at https://bit.ly/2EctrdR from
Leagle.com.

Armani Lee, Leertese Beirge, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Cody
Garland, Lorenzo Mays & Jennifer Bothun, Plaintiffs, represented by
Donald Specter, Prison Law Office, Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria --
jvs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Addison Mills Litton --
alitton@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Anne Hadreas --
anne.Hadreas@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California, Kathlyn Anne Querubin -- kquerubin@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Margot Knight Mendelson -- mmendelson@prisonlaw.com -- Prison
Law Office, Mark Anthony Zambarda -- mzambarda@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Sophie Jedeikin Hart -- sophieh@prisonlaw.com -- Prison Law
Office, Tifanei Ressl-Moyer --
Tifanei.Ressl-Moyer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California & Aaron Joseph Fischer --
Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California.

County of Sacramento, Defendant, represented by Todd Holton Master
-- tmaster@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley LLP & Shawn
M. Ridley -- sridley@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley.


SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Settlement Reached in Morning Song Bird Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company  said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 29,
2018, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2018, that a
settlement has been reached in the case entitled, In re Morning
Song Bird Food Litigation.

In connection with the sale of wild bird food products that were
the subject of a voluntary recall in 2008, the Company, along with
its Chief Executive Officer, have been named as defendants in four
actions filed on and after June 27, 2012, which have been
consolidated, and, on March 31, 2017, certified as a class action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California as In re Morning Song Bird Food Litigation, Lead Case
No. 3:12-cv-01592-JAH-AGS.

The plaintiffs allege various statutory and common law claims
associated with the Company's sale of wild bird food products and a
plea agreement entered into in previously pending government
proceedings associated with such sales. The plaintiffs allege,
among other things, a class action on behalf of all persons and
entities in the United States who purchased certain bird food
products.

The plaintiffs assert: (i) hundreds of millions of dollars in
monetary damages (actual, compensatory, consequential, and
restitution); (ii) punitive and treble damages; (iii) injunctive
and declaratory relief; (iv) pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest; and (v) costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company and its Chief Executive Officer dispute the plaintiffs'
assertions and have vigorously defended the consolidated action.

The Scotts said, "As a result of the parties reaching an agreement
in principle to settle this matter, which the parties are in the
process of finalizing and which remains subject to Court approval,
the Company recognized a pre-tax charge of $85.0 million for a
probable loss related to this matter for the year ended September
30, 2018 in the "Income (loss) from discontinued operations, net of
tax" line in the Consolidated Statements of Operations. There can
be no assurance that future developments with respect to this
action, whether as a result of an adverse outcome or as a result of
significant defense costs, will not have a material adverse effect
on the Company's financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows."

The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company manufactures, markets, and sells
consumer lawn and garden products in the United States and
internatonally. The company operates through three segments: U.S.
Consumer, Hawthorne, and Other. The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company was
founded in 1868 and is headquartered in Marysville, Ohio.


SECURIAN FINANCIAL: Harrison Suit Transferred to Minnesota
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action styled as Brian Harrison individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Securian
Financial Group, Minnesota Life Insurance Company, Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-02204 was transferred from the District of Ohio
Northern to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
on November 29, 2018, and assigned Case No. 0:18-cv-03274-MJD-KMM.

Securian Financial Group, Inc. provides financial security for
individuals and businesses in the form of insurance, retirement
plans, and investments.

Minnesota Life Insurance Company, together with its subsidiaries,
provides life insurance and other financial products and services
to individuals and families in the United States. It offers
individual financial security, financial institution group, group
insurance, retirement plans, and asset management services.[BN]


SETERUS INC: Ct. Denies w/ Prejudice Class Cert. Bid in "Baxa"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jane Triche Milazzo denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class in the lawsuit captioned JOHN
BAXA, ET AL. v. SETERUS, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-05434-JTM-MBN (E.D.
La.).

The Motion to Certify Class is denied without prejudice, to be
re-urged after the Court rules on the Defendant's pending Motion to
Dismiss.  The Defendant's Motion to Stay is denied as moot.

According to the Court's order, the Defendant effectively asks the
Court to delay consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class until the Court rules on the Defendant's previously filed
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.[CC]


SHOREFRONT OPERATING: Chow Sues over Unsafe and Inadequate Care
---------------------------------------------------------------
WALTER CHOW, as Administrator of the Estate of LEROY CHOW,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. SHOREFRONT OPERATING LLC d/b/a SEAGATE
REHABILITATION AND NURSING CENTER; SHAINDY BERKO; ROCHEL DAVID;
LEAH FRIEDMAN; DEENA LANDA; ESTHER FARKOVITZ; AVI PHILIPSON; BERISH
RUBINSTEIN; DAVID RUBINSTEIN; BRUSCHA SINGER; JOEL ZUPNICK;
SHOREFRONT REALTY LLC; SENTOSACARE, LLC; and DOES 1-25, the
Defendants, Case No.: 523769/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 27, 2018),
seeks monetary damages, statutory damages, and injunctive relief
prohibiting further wrongful conduct, as well as any other
available relief at law or in equity.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff brings this class action
against Defendants -- the owners and operators of Seagate
Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, a nursing home located at 3015 W
29th Street, Brooklyn, New York -- on behalf of himself and a class
of similarly situated nursing home patients who were victimized by
unsafe and inadequate care in the Facility. Defendants' unlawful
conduct violates Section 2801-d of New York's Public Health Law.
Defendants are entrusted to provide care to the elderly and infirm
nursing home patients in their custody. Unfortunately, Defendants
have betrayed and continue to betray that trust. For example,
Defendants fail to sufficiently staff the Facility. Throughout
their operation of the Facility, Defendants have failed to staff a
sufficient number of nurses and aides, thereby depriving the
Facility's residents of the level of care required under New York
and federal law. Among many other shocking failures, this
understaffing caused Defendants to fail to provide the correct
dosage of medications at the prescribed times, fail to regularly
wash and change patients, serve patients inappropriate meals, force
patients to clean the Facility walls with caustic chemicals causing
severe skin peeling, put patients on heavy narcotics resulting in
some patients suffering from brain metabolic injury, and refuse
patients their clothing and medication upon discharge.

Unsurprisingly, the Nursing Home Compare website operated by the
federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services shows that the
Facility currently receives rating of one star out of a five star
scale in staffing, further evidencing the lack of adequate care and
staffing at the Facility. As the Facility has approximately 360
beds and is operating at a high occupancy rate (above 90%), there
are many other residents currently languishing in an unsafe and
inadequate nursing home, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Proposed Class:

          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          John Sardesai-Grant, Esq.
          Ayana McGuire, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP,
             FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          Facsimile: (914) 824-1561
          E-mail: jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com
                  tgarber@fbfglaw.com
                  jsardesaigrant@fbfglaw.com
                  amcguire@fbfglaw.com

STARBUCKS CORP: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Carrington Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KILEIGH CARRINGTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant, Case No. D072392
(Cal. App.), Judge Patricia Guerrero of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the
trial court's judgment in Carrington's favor.

Carrington filed a complaint against her former employer,
Starbucks, asserting a representative cause of action under the
Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), claiming that Starbucks
failed to properly provide meal breaks or pay meal period premiums
for certain employees in violation of sections 226.7 and 512.

In her complaint, Carrington alleged that Starbucks implemented a
meal period policy under which employees who worked slightly more
than five hours were not provided meal breaks within the first five
hours of work and were not paid meal period premiums when meal
breaks were not timely provided, in violation of sections 512,
subdivision (a), and 226.7, subdivisions (a) and (b).  As a result,
Starbucks failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements in
violation of section 226 and failed to provide employees with all
wages earned and unpaid at termination in violation of sections
201, 202, and 203.

Carrington sought civil penalties and unpaid wages under sections
2699, subdivision (a), and 558, subdivision (a), and an award of
attorney fees and costs under section 2699, subdivision (g)(1).
She attached to her complaint two letters she previously sent to
the LWDA and Starbucks providing written notice of her claims, as
required under section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(1).

Starbucks moved for summary judgment on Carrington's claims,
arguing that Carrington's meal break claim failed because, although
her time records reflected she twice started a break after working
more than five hours and was not paid a meal premium, Carrington
could not recall the details surrounding those shifts, including
which supervisors or managers were working or why she did not begin
her breaks until more than five hours had elapsed.

Starbucks argued that her lack of memory regarding the specific
instances of these shifts, coupled with Starbucks's policy to
provide employees scheduled to work shifts longer than five hours
with compliant meal periods, indicated summary judgment should be
awarded in Starbucks's favor.  

In a bifurcated bench trial on the Plaintiff's action, the trial
court determined Starbucks was liable for these violations and
imposed penalties of $150,000, with 75% thereof payable to the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") and 25 payable to
Carrington and the employees she represented in the action.  The
trial court entered judgment in Carrington's favor.

Starbucks appeals, contending Carrington failed to prove she is an
aggrieved employee and failed to prove a representative claim.

Judge Guerrero concludes there was no legal error and finds that
substantial evidence supports the judgment.  First, she finds that
Carrington proved she is an aggrieved employee.  Carrington
experienced the violation alleged, Starbucks did not provide
compliant meal breaks, and the de minimis doctrine does not
preclude liability in the case.  Second, she holds that Carrington
proved a representative claim.  She finds that (i) substantial
evidence supports the conclusion that Starbucks had a non-compliant
policy and practice; (ii) the evidence was not overly
individualized to preclude a representative finding; (iii)
Starbucks has not established prejudicial error with respect to the
time records; (iv) Starbucks was not precluded from presenting its
defenses; and (v) Starbucks's good faith attempt to comply with the
law is reflected in the penalty imposed.  Accordingly, she
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 27, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Vkw9vh from Leagle.com.

Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Jonathan P. Slowik --
jpslowik@akingump.com -- Gregory W. Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com --
and Rex S. Heinke -- rheinke@akingump.com -- for Defendant and
Appellant.

Sullivan Law Group, Eric K. Yaeckel --
yaeckel@sullivanlawgroupapc.com -- William B. Sullivan --
helen@sullivanlawgroupapc.com -- and Andrea J. Torres-Figueroa for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


STATE COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in Cajigas Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Rafael Cajigas, Julie Voeks, and Vesta Bills move the Court to
certify the class described in the complaint of their lawsuit
captioned RAFAEL CAJIGAS, JULIE VOEKS, and VESTA BILLS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
STATE COLLECTION SERVICE, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01864-NJ (E.D.
Wisc.), and further ask that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant them (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiffs assert, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

Plaintiffs are obligated to move for class certification to protect
the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiffs contend.  The
Plaintiffs assert that more than one defendant has already
attempted the scheme contemplated in Campbell-Ewald, citing Severns
v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).
Judge Randa denied the defendant's request to deposit funds on
grounds that a class certification motion was pending.

As this Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs argue.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


SUBURBAN PROPANE: Asks Court to Reconsider Bid to Drop NY Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Suburban Propane, L.P. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 21, 2018, for
the fiscal year ended September 29, 2018, that the Partnership has
filed a motion for reconsideration seeking dismissal of the entire
New York complaint.

The Partnership's natural gas and electricity business is currently
a defendant in two putative class action suits in the federal
district courts of New York and Pennsylvania. The complaints allege
a number of claims regarding pricing to its electricity customers
in those states under various consumer statutes and common law.

The complaint in the Pennsylvania action was dismissed in its
entirety by the district court, which dismissal is being appealed
by plaintiff. Plaintiff also filed a motion to amend its complaint
and reverse the dismissal order, which motion was also denied by
the court.

The complaint in the New York action was dismissed in part by the
district court, but causes of action based on the NY consumer
statute and breach of contract were allowed to proceed.  

The Partnership has filed a motion for reconsideration seeking the
dismissal of the entire New York complaint.  

Based on the nature of the allegations under these suits, the
Partnership believes that the suits are without merit and is
defending each of these suits vigorously.  With respect to these
pending suits, the Partnership has determined, based on the
allegations and discovery to date, that no reserve for a loss
contingency other than for legal defense fees and expenses is
required.

The Partnership is unable to reasonably estimate the possible loss
or range of loss, if any, arising from either of these two actions.
Although any litigation is inherently uncertain, based on past
experience, the information currently available to the Partnership,
and the amount of its accrued insurance liabilities, the
Partnership does not believe that currently pending or threatened
litigation matters, or known claims or known contingent claims,
will have a material adverse effect on its results of operations,
financial condition or cash flow.

Suburban Propane, L.P. markets and distributes propane, fuel oils,
refined fuels, natural gas, and electricity in deregulated markets.
It offers propane for homes; recreational purposes; and propane for
businesses, such as restaurants and hotels, landscape mowers, fleet
auto gas applications, builders and constructions, temporary
heating applications, national/major accounts, resellers, and
forklift motor fuels. Suburban Propane, L.P. was founded in 1928
and is based in Whippany, New Jersey. It has locations in the
United States. Suburban Propane, L.P. operates as a subsidiary of
Suburban Propane Partners LP.


SUPERIOR MALPRACTICE: Faces Retina Associates Suit Over Junk Faxes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Retina Associates Medical Group, Inc., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Superior
Malpractice Insurance Services, Inc., Ahmad Oyoun and Nino
Abboushi, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-02117 (C.D. Cal., November
29, 2018) is a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure against Defendants Superior Malpractice Insurance
Services, Inc., Ahmad Oyoun, and Nino Abboushi for their violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, Defendants, or some person authorized
to do so on their behalf, have routinely and systematically caused
to be sent out to Plaintiff and Class Members one or more "blasts"
of unsolicited fax advertisements for goods or services without the
proper opt-out notice required by the TCPA and its regulations.

The complaint asserts, among other things, that the Defendants'
transmission of the subject faxes was intrusive, and interfered
with Plaintiff's legitimate business enterprise.

The Defendants are therefore liable to Plaintiff and the proposed
Class of similarly situated persons under the TCPA, and for Class
Members and itself individually. Plaintiff seeks an injunction,
requiring Defendants to cease all junk faxes and an award of
statutory damages to Plaintiff and Class Members, together with
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, says the complaint.

Plaintiff's principal place of business is in Orange County,
California. Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of California.

Superior Malpractice Insurance Services, Inc. (SMISI), is a
California limited liability.

Ahmad Oyoun is an individual who resides in Los Angeles County,
California. Oyoun is Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of SMISI.

Nino Abboushi is an individual who resides in Los Angeles County,
California. Abboushi is Secretary of SMISI.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
     EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
     425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-524-2820
     Facsimile: 954-524-2822
     Email: seth@epllc.com


TENAGLIA & HUNT: Yungreis Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tenaglia & Hunt,
P.A., et al. The case is styled as Philip Yungreis, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A., John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-16614 (D. N.J., Nov. 29, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A. is a full service regional law firm handling
matters in the Courts of New York, New Jersey and across the
US.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


TEXAS: LULAC Moves to Cert. Class, Subclass of Latino ELL Students
------------------------------------------------------------------
LULAC asks the Court to enter an order certifying the action styled
LULAC v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Case No. 5:15-cv-00219-DAE (W.D.
Tex.), as a class action for all purposes.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of:

   * a Statewide Class composed of:

     "all Latino English Language Learner students who attend
      public secondary schools in Texas;" and

   * a SWISD Subclass comprised of:

     "all Latino English Language Learner students who attend
      public secondary schools in Southwest Independent School
      District."

The Plaintiff is the appointed class representative for all
purposes of a certified class of "all persons of Mexican-American
descent or nationality in the State of Texas," in the lawsuit
titled United States v. Texas, No. 6:71-CV-5281 (E.D. Tex. July 10,
2017) (Order on Motion for GI Forum-LULAC Intervenors for Leave to
Intervene).  The Plaintiff now asks the Court to modify and certify
its Statewide Class and SWISD Subclass in this severed action.

LULAC also asks for an order appointing its counsel as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jack Salmon, Esq.
          MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE
          AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
          110 Broadway, Suite 300
          San Antonio, TX 78205
          Telephone: (210) 224-5476
          Facsimile: (210) 224-5382
          E-mail: jsalmon@maldef.org

               - and -

          Roger Rice, Esq.
          META, INC.
          P.O. Box 440245
          Somerville, MA 02144
          Telephone: (617) 628-2226
          Facsimile: (617) 628-0322
          E-mail: meta.project4@gmail.com

Defendant Southwest I.S.D. is represented by:

          D. Craig Wood, Esq.
          Stacy T. Castillo, Esq.
          WALSH GALLEGOS TREVINO RUSS & KYLE P.C.
          1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 450
          San Antonio, TX 78209
          Telephone: (210) 979-6633

The State Defendants are represented by:

          Adam N. Bitter, Esq.
          Emily Ardolino, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          GENERAL LITIGATION DIVISION
          P. O. Box 12548
          Austin, TX 78711
          Telephone: (512) 475-4055
          E-mail: adam.bitter@oag.texas.gov
                  emily.ardolino@oag.texas.gov


TRANS UNION: Violates Fair Credit Reporting Act, Sztillerman Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SHIMON SZTILLERMAN on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated consumers, the Plaintiff, vs. TRANS UNION, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06728 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 27, 2018), seeks
redress for Trans Union's violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a consumer who is the
victim of inaccurate reporting by Defendant Trans Union, LLC, and
has suffered particularized and concrete harm. The Plaintiff
disputed an American Express account: no. 349992209727 that
appeared on his credit report, directly with Trans Union, LLC
sometime before March of 2018. Thereafter, Trans Union, LLC
notified the Plaintiff that it had initiated an investigation into
the said dispute.

Trans Union, LLC's investigation did not resolve the dispute and
Plaintiff subsequently filed a statement of dispute with Trans
Union, LLC in July of 2018. The Plaintiff obtained his consumer
credit report from Trans Union, LLC and found that the Defendant
had not included Plaintiff's statement of dispute in the credit
report. Subsequent to Trans Union, LLC's receipt of the Plaintiff's
statement of dispute, Trans Union, LLC issued consumer reports
without in any way indicating to the users of the reports that
certain information contained therein was disputed by Plaintiff and
failed to include a copy of Plaintiff's statement of dispute.

Trans Union, LLC intentionally failed to include the statement of
dispute with later copies of the Plaintiff's consumer reports. The
Plaintiff's July 2018 "Statement of Dispute" letter, sent in
response to Defendant's reinvestigation results constitutes a
"statement of dispute" under 15 U.S.C. section 1681i(b). The
"Statement of Dispute" letter was sent after Plaintiff's request
for a reinvestigation yielded no change in the status of the
account on Plaintiff's credit report. This is precisely the process
that section 1681i requires. The Plaintiff clearly provided
sufficient detail in his July "Statement of Dispute" letter to put
the Defendant on notice as to the nature of the dispute, the
lawsuit says.

TransUnion offers complete and multidimensional information for
informed decisions that create opportunities for business.[BN]

Attorneys for Plantiff:

          Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, New York 11598
          Telephone: (516) 668-6945
          E-mail: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: Millman Class Cert. Bid Taken Under Advisement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OPAL MILLMAN, ERIC POWELL, and LAURY POWELL, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, LEAR CORPORATION EEDS AND
INTERIORS, as successor to United Technologies automotive, Inc.,
ANDREWS DAIRY STORE, INC., L.D. WILLIAMS, INC., CP PRODUCT, LLC
successor to Preferred Technical Group, Inc., and LDW DEVELOPMENT,
LLC, Defendants, Cause No. 1:16-CV-312-TLS (N.D. Ind.), Judge
Theresa L. Springmann of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, took the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend/Correct their Motion to Certify Class and
subsequent briefing under advisement.

On June 18, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification.  On July 18, 2018, they filed a Notice containing an
additional case from the Sixth Circuit.  On Aug. 15, 2018, Judge
Jon E. Deguilio issued an opinion in Hostetler et al. v. Johnson
Controls Inc., et al., denying class certification in a very
similar case.  As the Hostetler case involved the same Plaintiffs'
and the Defendants' counsel, and very similar issues, the
Plaintiffs in the matter filed a Motion to Amend/Correct their
Motion to Certify Class.  Some of the Defendants, specifically
United Technologies Corp., CP Product LLC, and Lear Corp. Eeds and
Interiors, filed a Motion in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Amend; the Plaintiffs replied.

On Sept. 21, 2018, additional Defendants, specifically L.D.
Williams, Inc., and LDW Development, LLC, filed a Notice of
Joinder.  The Plaintiffs moved to strike, or in the alternative,
for permission to file a sur-reply to address the additional
arguments raised in the Notice of Joinder.  The LDW Defendants
responded, and the Plaintiffs replied.  The Court denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike but granted them leave to file a
sur-reply, which they filed on Oct. 16, 2018.  Thus, the extensive
briefing on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is complete.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification proposed eight
issues for potential certification.  The Motion to Amend suggests
no changes to two issues, a minor change to two others, significant
changes related to the phrasing of three more, and finally
splitting one issue, whether the Defendants acted with reckless
indifference, into two issues, whether the Defendants negligently
failed to investigate and whether it was foreseeable to the
Defendants that their handling of the chemicals in question could
cause contamination.  The Plaintiffs emphasize that they do not
seek to alter their Memorandum supporting their Motion for Class
Certification; they specifically state that no additional briefing
is proposed.

However, the Defendants object to the proposed amendments.
Specifically, they argue that (1) the deadline for the Plaintiffs'
proposed class issues is long past, and (2) the Defendants would be
prejudiced by the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments.  For the first
issue, the Defendants rely primarily on Chapman v. First Index,
Inc.  For the second, they state that their litigation strategy
would have changed; specifically, that they would have directed
additional fact discovery towards the Plaintiffs on a variety of
issues and would have sought additional expert testimony to address
the issues the Plaintiffs now raise.

Judge Springmann finds that while the proposed amendment comes
after the deadline to file the motion for class certification, a
deadline which had indeed been extended, its timing alone does not
warrant denying the Motion to Amend.  Significant prejudice to the
Defendants, however, might warrant denying the Plaintiff's Motion.
She holds that she needs additional information on exactly how the
Defendants would be prejudiced before it can rule.  Despite the
voluminous briefing, the Defendants have not clarified what
additional fact issues the proposed changes create, or what kind of
additional discovery the Defendants believe would be necessary to
address them.

For the reasons she stated, the Judge ordered that all the
Defendants may file supplemental briefing on the details of the
prejudice they will suffer if the Plaintiffs are permitted to amend
these issues by Jan. 4, 2019.  The Plaintiffs may then reply in
further support of the proposed amended issues by Jan. 25, 2019.
She took the Plaintiffs' Motion and subsequent briefing under
advisement until briefing is complete.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 30, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2C2olzs from Leagle.com.

Opal Millman, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Eric Powell, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & Laury Powell, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Rodney L.
Michael, Jr. -- rmichael@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP, Thomas A. Barnard -- tbarnard@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP,  Benjamin A. Wolowski -- bwolowski@taftlaw.com --
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP & Tammara D. Porter --
tporter@taftlaw.com -- Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP.

United Technologies Corporation & Lear Corporation Eeds and
Interiors, successor to United Technologies Automotive Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Alicia Marcia Raines -
Alicia.RainesBarrs@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Joseph G.
Eaton -- joe.eaton@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP & Kelly J.
Hartzler -- kelly.hartzler@btlaw.com -- Barnes & Thornburg LLP.

Andrews Dairy Store Inc., Defendant, pro se.

L.D. Williams, Inc. & LDW Development LLC, Defendants, represented
by Andrew M. McNeil -- amcneil@boselaw.com -- Bose McKinney & Evans
LLP, Bradley M. Dick -- bdick@boselaw.com -- Bose McKinney & Evans
LLP & Bradley R. Sugarman -- bsugarman@boselaw.com -- Bose McKinney
& Evans LLP.

CP Product LLC, successor to Preferred Technical Group Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Joseph G. Eaton, Barnes & Thornburg LLP,
Kelly J. Hartzler, Barnes & Thornburg LLP & Meredith Thornburgh
White, Barnes & Thornburg LLP.

L.D. Williams, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Bradley R.
Sugarman, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP.

LDW Development LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Andrew M.
McNeil, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Bradley M. Dick, Bose McKinney &
Evans LLP & Bradley R. Sugarman, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP.


US NUTRITION: Matic Files Slack-fill Suit in Calif.
---------------------------------------------------
Matthew Matic, on behalf of himself and on all others similarly
situated. v. United States Nutrition, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-09592
(C.D. Calif., November 14, 2018), is brought against the Defendant
for violations of the California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the
Unfair Competition Law, and California's False Advertising Law.

This lawsuit charges the Defendant with intentionally packaging its
Pure Protein Products in non-transparent containers that contain
nearly 40% empty space. Most consumers purchased the Products
without knowing that the containers were substantially empty.

The Plaintiff Matthew Matic is a citizen of the State of California
and resides in Los Angeles, California. The Plaintiff purchased the
Product in May 2015 in Los Angeles, California at the Walmart
located on 1827 Walnut Grove, Rosemead, CA 91770.

The Defendant marketed and sold the Pure Protein Products. The
Defendant United States Nutrition, Inc. is a Delaware corporation
which has its principal place of business located in Ronkonkoma,
New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
      Michael T. Houchin, Esq.
      Tania Babaie, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
      651 Arroyo Drive
      San Diego, CA 92103
      Tel: (619) 696-9006
      Fax: (619) 564-6665
      E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com
              mike@consumersadvocates.com
              tania@consumersadvocates.com

          - and -

      Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.
      PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
      4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800
      Newport Beach, CA 92660
      Tel: (949) 706-6464
      Fax: (949) 706-6469
      E-mail: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


USA WATER POLO: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Mayall Injury Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William A. Fletcher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case,
ALICE MAYALL, as parent and guardian of minor H.C., on behalf of
H.C. and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. USA
WATER POLO, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 16-56389 (9th
Cir.).

Mayall brought the putative class action against USA Water Polo as
a representative of her minor daughter, alleging negligence, breach
of voluntary undertaking, and gross negligence.  The gravamen of
Mayall's complaint is that USA Water Polo failed to implement
concussion-management and return-to-play protocols for its youth
water polo league.

The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") alleges that H.C., Mayall's
daughter, was returned to play as a goalie in a youth water polo
tournament after being hit in the face by the ball and while
manifesting concussion symptoms.  After she was returned to play,
H.C. received additional hits to the head.  As a result, she
suffered from severely debilitating post-concussion syndrome.  

The district court dismissed the suit under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under California
law.  It held that (1) the SAC fails to allege a duty owed to H.C.
by USA Water Polo and therefore fails to allege actionable
negligence; (2) the SAC insufficiently alleges that a task or duty
was "specifically" undertaken by USA Water Polo, and that USA Water
Polo had increased the risk of harm to H.C.; and (3) the SAC fails
to allege gross negligence because it fails to allege a duty owed
to H.C. by USA Water Polo, and it fails to allege an "extreme
departure from ordinary standards of conduct."

Judge Fletcher finds that the SAC alleges that the USA Water Polo
Concussion Policy and the Zurich II Protocol instruct coaches and
other officials as to the accepted standard of care for athletes
who may have suffered concussions during an athletic contest.  It
further alleges that the Rules Governing Coaches' Conduct fall
short of providing such instruction, and that the existence of the
Rules does not satisfy USA Water Polo's duty of care.  Based on the
comparison, he agrees and concludes that the existence of the Rules
does not satisfy the duty of care.

Nect, he finds that the SAC alleges that USA Water Polo increased
the risk of harm to H.C. by failing to adopt consensus
return-to-play protocols which in turn increased the risk that
players would suffer secondary concussions.  As the SAC alleges,
USA Water Polo is "the rule-making authority" for water polo in the
United States with the self-proclaimed responsibility for player
safety and health and it therefore has a duty to not increase the
risk of injuries.  The failure of USA Water Polo to promulgate
safety rules that would have protected H.C. is sufficient to
support a voluntary undertaking claim.

Finally, he finds that the allegations, taken as true, demonstrate
that USA Water Polo was well-aware of the severe risk of repeat
concussions and of the need to implement a policy to remove players
from play after suffering a head injury.  USA Water Polo's inaction
in the face of substantial evidence of risk of harm, constitutes an
extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct, and
amounts to gross negligence under California law.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Fletcher holds that the SAC pleads
sufficient facts to support claims upon which relief can be granted
under California law for negligence, voluntary undertaking, and
gross negligence.  Accordingly, he reversed and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/16zhcY from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Anne Fegan -- elaine@hbsslaw.com -- (argued), Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Seattle,
Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Steven Jeff Renick -- sjr@manningllp.com -- (argued) and Jeffrey M.
Lenkov -- jml@manningllp.com -- Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez
Trester LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.


VIGO IMPORTING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Buso CLRA/CFPLA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY BUSO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VIGO IMPORTING CO., a Florida
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
18cv1328-WQH-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted
Vigo's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).

On June 19, 2018, Buso initiated the action on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated by filing the Class Action Complaint
against Vigo.  Buso brings a cause of action for violation of the
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") and the California
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act ("CFPLA").

Buso alleges that Vigo's product, Alessi Autentico Premium Risotto
with Porcini Mushrooms (the Risotto mix), is sold in packaging with
over 70 percent empty space, known as slack fill.  He alleges that
the slack fill violates California's consumer protection, labeling,
and unfair competition laws. He seeks class certification,
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, restitution and other
equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

On July 17, 2018, Vigo filed a Motion to Dimiss, asserting that the
Complaint fails to allege facts showing that a reasonable consumer
would be deceived by the packaging of the Risotto mix, or that the
packaging of the Risotto mix contains nonfunctional slack fill.

On Aug. 6, 2018, Buso filed a response in opposition to the Motion,
accompanied by a request for judicial notice.  He asserts that
sufficient facts were alleged in the Complaint to show that the
packaging and slack fill of the Risotto mix may lead reasonable
consumers to believe that the packages contain more product than is
actually sold in the package.

Judge Hayes finds that the package is pliable.  The consumer can
see and feel the package and perceive the amount of product in the
package before purchasing the Risotto mix.  A reasonable consumer
consumer feels the amount of product in the package when picking it
up off the shelf and could not plausibly be misled by the packaging
of the Risotto mix.  Buso's allegations are insufficient to state a
CLRA claim.

Next, the Judge finds that Buso fails to adequately allege
nonfunctional slack fill in violation of the CFPLA under Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code Section 12606.2.  The allegations of nonfunctional
slack fill are inadequate to support Buso's CLRA claim.  He finds
that the soft packaging of the Risotto mix allows consumers to
perceive the amount of product the package contains, even if the
package is opaque.  The consumer is able to assess the amount of
product before purchasing the Risotto mix.  The Complaint does not
adequately allege that the packaging of the Risotto mix is a
container that does not allow the consumer to fully view its
contents within the meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
12606.2(c).

For these reasons, Judge Hayes granted the Defendant's Motion.  Any
motions to file an amended complaint must be filed within 30 days
of the date of the Order in accordance with Local Rule 7.1.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vza7Rx from Leagle.com.

Anthony Buso, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott J. Ferrell --
sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Pacific Trial Attorneys.


VIRGIN AMERICA: Court Grants Bid for Sanctions in Bernstein Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIA BERNSTEIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VIRGIN
AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-02277-JST (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.

The case is a wage-and-hour class action brought by flight
attendants who work or have worked for Defendants Virgin America,
Inc. and Alaska Airlines, Inc. in California.  The Plaintiffs
allege that Virgin violated various California labor laws regarding
payment for hours worked, wage amounts, wage documentation, and the
provision of meal and rest breaks.  The Court certified a class of
certain Virgin flight attendants, which it later decertified in
part.

Virgin alleges that some members of the class have waived their
claims through a voluntary buyout program, Career Choice Program,
in which they released all employment-related claims in exchange
for a lump-sum payment and travel privileges.  Virgin first raised
"Waiver/Release" as an affirmative defense in its answer on May 19,
2015.  

On Nov. 25, 2015, the Plaintiffs requested all documents wherein a
putative class member released or waived legal claims against the
Defendant as well as all documents that evidence, refer or relate
to the Defendant's Career Choice Program.  Virgin refused to
produce any signed Career Choice agreements, citing privacy
concerns on behalf of the Career Choice participants and objecting
to this discovery as premature prior to class certification.
Instead, Virgin provided unsigned template forms that did not
indicate which, if any, the potential class members had entered
into such agreements.  Because they were unsigned, they also did
not establish that any class members had done so.

On Nov. 7, 2016, the Court certified the Plaintiffs' proposed
class.  Fact discovery closed on Oct. 9, 2017.

On Jan. 12, 2018, Virgin moved to decertify the class, asserting in
part that the Court should exclude 88 Class Members who had
participated in the Career Choice program.  It did not produce any
signed agreements of those class members.  On July 9, 2018, the
Court decertified the class in part, but not as to the alleged
Career Choice participants.  The Court concluded that it could not
resolve the question of their class membership without such
documents, and that the Career Choice program it did not require
decertification in any event.  The Court subsequently certified the
Career Choice members as a subclass on Aug. 15, 2018.

The parties contest exactly when, and to what degree, the
Plaintiffs became aware of the identities of these 88 class members
during the more than two-and-a-half years of the dispute.  But all
agree that Virgin did not actually produce any individual's Career
Choice agreements until July 25, 2018, when Virgin produced 32
complete and 27 partial signed forms.  Pursuant to the Court's Aug.
15, 2018 order, Virgin subsequently produced -- albeit after the
Court's deadline -- additional documentation including email
exchanges or paycheck receipts that purportedly indirectly show
that 24 more of the alleged 88 class members participated in the
Career Choice program.

On Sept. 6, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the motion for sanctions.
Virgin does not dispute that it was obligated under the Federal
Rules to disclose the documents on which it seeks to rely at trial.
It argues, however, that (1) the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring
the motion; (2) Virgin's failure was substantially justified; and
(3) Virgin's failure was harmless.

Judge Tigar finds that Virgin's failure to produce the Career
Choice agreements was not substantially justified.  The glaring
flaw in their argument is that Virgin's justification expired on
Nov. 7, 2016, when the Court certified the class.  Fact discovery
did not close until eleven months later, on Oct. 9, 2017.  Even
assuming that Virgin's objection originally had merit, Virgin
failed to comply with its ongoing duty to supplement its Rule 26(a)
disclosures and its response to Plaintiffs' Rule 34 request.

Next, he finds that Virgin's noncompliance was not harmless.  He
says the harmlessness exception does not allow a party to knowingly
withhold such material and shift the burden to the opposing party
to chase down the information from numerous individual sources.
Moreover, it has not adequately demonstrated that its actions
caused no prejudice to the Plaintiffs' ability to obtain such
documents.

He further finds that Virgin's noncompliance was willful.  Virgin
does not dispute that it has had possession of the documents
throughout the litigation.  Even putting aside Virgin's meritless
objections to the Plaintiffs' production request, Virgin also
ignored its own obligation to produce during discovery evidence it
wishes to rely on at trial.  Moreover, merely excluding the
withheld documents but allowing Virgin to litigate its affirmative
defense would be an insufficient sanction, because the Plaintiffs
were not permitted to fully discovery the facts of that defense
during the discovery period.

Finally, the Judge finds that given the willful nature of Virgin's
conduct and the violation of Rule 37(c), he agrees that exercising
his discretion to award reasonable fees and costs is appropriate.
However, he cannot make the award at this juncture, as the
Plaintiffs have not requested a specific amount or submitted
supporting documentation.

Judge Tigar granted the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the disputed
documents and strike Virgin's affirmative defense.  He instructed
the Plaintiffs to submit a request for fees and costs, with
adequate supporting documentation, by Nov. 16, 2018.  Virgin may
file either objections or a statement of non-opposition by Nov. 30,
2018, of not more than 10 pages.  The Plaintiffs may file a
response of not more than five pages by Dec. 7, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 28, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/MonAjk from Leagle.com.

Julia Bernstein, Esther Garcia & Lisa Marie Smith, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Monique Olivier -- monique@osclegal.com -- Olivier
Schreiber & Chao LLP, Alison L. Kosinski -- alison@ktlawsf.com --
Kosinski & Thiagaraj, LLP, Chiharu Gina Sekino --
csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP,
Emily Ann Thiagaraj -- emily@ktlawsf.com -- Kosinski & Thiagaraj,
LLP, James Edward Miller -- jmiller@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd
Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, James C. Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com --
Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, Kolin C. Tang --
ktang@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, Nathan
Curtis Zipperian -- nzipperian@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd Finkleman
Miller & Shah, LLC, pro hac vice & Ronald Scott Kravitz --
rkravitz@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP.

Virgin America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert Jon
Hendricks -- rj.hendricks@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP, Brendan T. Killeen -- brendan.killeen@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Adkins Tomlin
-- jtomlin@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Nancy
Villarreal  -- nvillarreal@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert Jon
Hendricks, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Nancy Villarreals, Morgan
Lewis & Bockius LLP.


WAKEFIELD & ASSOCIATES: Daniels Brings FDCPA Class Suit in Alabama
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wakefield &
Associates, Inc. The case is styled as Jaslyn Daniels individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Wakefield & Associates, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00499
(S.D. Ala., Nov. 29, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Wakefield & Associates Inc was founded in 1982. The company's line
of business includes collection and adjustment services on claims
and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Schoen, Esq.
     2800 Zelda Road, Suite 100-6
     Montgomery, AL 36106
     Phone: (334) 395-6611
     Fax: (917) 591-7586
     Email: DSchoen593@aol.com



WALMART INC: Faces Krauss Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Walmart Inc. The case
is styled as Hope Krauss and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Walmart Inc., Does 1 to 50, Defendants, Case
No. 34-2018-00245485-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty.,
Nov. 29, 2018).

Walmart Inc. engages in the retail and wholesale operations in
various formats worldwide. The company operates through three
segments: Walmart U.S., Walmart International, and Sam's Club.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Matern J Matern, Esq.


YELP INC: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROEI AZAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. YELP, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00400-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edard M.
Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the class action complaint.

The Plaintiffs, investors in Yelp stock, bring the putative
securities class action against Defendants Yelp, Inc., its CEO
Jeremy Stoppelman, CFO Lanny Baker, and COO Jed Nachman.  The crux
of their complaint is that Yelp made false and misleading
statements regarding its expected revenues for fiscal year 2017,
particularly in relation to its advertising program with local
businesses.  

Yelp allegedly touted the program's strong advertiser retention
rate and optimistic growth projections through early 2017, despite
knowing that a significant number of the local advertisers were not
renewing their contracts.  When Yelp made downward adjustments to
its projections and disclosed those retention problems in May 2017,
its stock prices fell.  The Plaintiffs assert that Defendants'
actions violate Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, as well as Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The Plaintiffs filed the suit in January 2018.  On April 27, 2018,
the Court granted Movant Jonathan Davis' motion to be appointed
interim lead Plaintiff and for Glancy Prongay & Murlay LLP and
Holzel & Holzel LLC to be appointed the interim co-lead counsel
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

Named Plaintiffs Azar and Jonathan Davis filed the operative
amended complaint on June 25, 2018, seeking to represent the class
of persons and entities that purchased or acquired Yelp securities
between Feb. 10, 2017 and May 9, 2017.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
class action complaint filed on Aug. 2, 2018.

Before reaching the merits, Judge Chen first addresses the
Defendants' requests for judicial notice.  The Defendants ask the
Court to take judicial notice of the categories of documents,
attached as exhibits to the Declaration of Gilbert R. Serota, or to
consider them under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.

The Plaintiffs do not object to the introduction of Exhibits A, D,
F, H, and N.  Accordingly, the Judge granted judicial notice of
Exhibits A, D, F, H, and N.  

The Plaintiffs object to the introduction of Exhibit C, which
consists of three separate Form 4 filings made by Stoppelman to the
SEC to report the sales of his securities during the proposed class
period.  Given the Plaintiffs' reliance on Stoppelman's stock sales
to plead scienter, the Judge granted judicial notice of Exhibit C.

Exhibits G, I, J, K, and L are transcripts of the Defendants'
earnings calls and presentations at two conferences, all of which
are referenced in the complaint.  Because the Plaintiffs refer
extensively to the documents and the documents form the basis of
their claim, the Judge also granted judicial notice of Exhibits G,
I, J, K, and L.

Next, Plaintiffs rely on Exhibit M, a report published by a
research firm concerning the drop in Yelp's stock prices after Yelp
issued its May 9, 2017 revised guidance, to establish the loss
causation element of their Section 10(b) claim.  Accordingly, the
Judge granted judicial notice of Exhibit M.

Finally, he declined to take judicial notice of Exhibit E because
it is not necessary to the decision.

Turning to the Defendants' Motion, Judge Chen granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  He denied the
Motion with respect to the statements quoted in the First Amended
Complaint paragraphs 81, 83, 87, 91, and 99; and granted with
respect to the other challenged statements.

Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) the Defendants made
potentially misleading statements on Feb. 9, Feb. 14, and March 1
of 2017; (ii) the Defendants' statements regarding when they became
aware of the churn issues, Stoppelman's stock sales during the
proposed class period, and the Plaintiffs' allegations that local
advertising is a core operation for Yelp combine to create a strong
inference of scienter on the Defendants' part in making the
allegedly misleading statement; (iii) the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged loss causation; and (iv) the Plaintiffs have
stated a claim for Section 10(b) violations with respect to several
of the Defendants' statements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 27, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/pjzqwU from Leagle.com.

Roei Azar, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Lesley F. Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Charles Henry Linehan --
clinehan@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Corey
Daniel Holzer -- cholzer@holzerlaw.com -- Holzer and Holzer LLC,
pro hac vice, Kevin Francis Ruf -- kevinruf@gmail.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Robert Vincent Prongay --
RProngay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Stan Karas
-- skaras@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Jonathan Davis, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Corey Daniel Holzer, Holzer and Holzer
LLC, Kevin Francis Ruf, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Lesley F.
Portnoy, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP & Stan Karas, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Yelp, Inc., Jeremy Stoppelman & Lanny Baker, Defendants,
represented by Gilbert Ross Serota --
gilbert.serota@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
& Zheng He , Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice.

Jed Nachman, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota, Arnold
& Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

Gady Davidian, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A..



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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