CAR_Public/181227.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, December 27, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 259

                            Headlines

ADT LLC: Tadlock Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: Court OKs Dismissal of Perry Suit
AMALIE OIL: Sued over Sale of XCEL Premium Passenger Car Motor Oil
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Faces Farro FDCPA Suit in District of New Jersey
AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC: Judge Okays $84MM Class Action Settlement

AMERITECH MOBILE: Class Certification in Satterfield Suit Reversed
APPLE INC: Ct. Narrows Doc Production in iPhone 6 Touchscreen Suit
APPLE INC: Orshan Appeals N.D. California Decision to 9th Circuit
ASN FAITH: Marc Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
AUBURN CONSTRUCTORS: Faces Baker Labor Suit in Calif. State Suit

AUSTRALIA: Victoria Braces for Class Action from Gangland Crooks
BB&T CORP: Settles 401(k) Class Action for $24MM
BEAUTIFUL HOLLYWOOD: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
BELLISIMO MASONRY: Ganadara Seeks Overtime Wages for Laborers
BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory's Bid for Class Certification Denied

BOJANGLES' INC: Faces Shareholder Suit Over Merger With Durational
BROWARD COLLEGE: Hovenga Seeks Unpaid Wages & Commissions
C & A TRANSPORTATION: Ornelas Seeks Minimum Wage for Truck Drivers
CALIBER HOME: Court Dismisses Data Security Breach Class Action
CALIFORNIA FINE: Faces Blackshear Labor Suit in Calif. State Court

CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses State Prisoner's Suit
CANADA: Class Action Over Ontario's Training Schools Certified
CANADA: Indigenous Women Sue Over Foreced Sterilization
CELTIC SERVICES: Parada Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
CHARTER COMMS: Plaintiff Ordered to Show Cause in TCPA Case

CHEMOURS: Class Action Attorney Provides Update on GenX Case
CHG EMPLOYEE: Hale Seeks Overtime Pay for Patient Care Nurses
CITIZENS FOR RAUNER: Stratics Group Removes Suit to N.D. Ill.
COLLECTION ANALYST: Ct. Awards $28.5K Attorney's Fees in Powers
COLLECTION ASSOCIATES: Kanehl Moves for Certification of Class

CONNOLLY MASONRY:  Ex-worker Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
COSMETIC INSTITUTE: Breast Augmentation Class Action Can Proceed
COSMETIC INSTITUTE: Breast Surgery Class Action Set for Trial
COVENANT TRANSPORT: Tabizon Labor Suit Moved to C.D. California
CREDIT BUREAU: Class Certification Sought in O'Boyle Suit

CREDIT SYSTEMS: Whalen's Proceedings on Bid to Certify Stayed
DESERT STATES: Koch Seeks to Recover Pension Benefits Under ERISA
DOUBLE DOWN: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Benson Suit
DOUGLAS K. WHITE: Faces Pagan et al. Suit in M.D Pennsylvania
DRIFT HOTEL: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida

DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Jones-Bell Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
EDISON BALLROOM: Dawson-Wainer Files Bid for Judicial Intervention
EL PUNTO PERUANO: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Lemos Claims
FEDERAL AVIATION: Wins Bid to Dismiss $5 Registration Rule
FG KEY: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in Southern District of Florida

FINANCE SYSTEM: Seventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Larkin Suit
FLOWERS BAKING: Button Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
GEICO GENERAL: Savage Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Dismisses Count III in ERISA Suit
GRAMERCY PARK HOTEL: Ullo Hits Illegal Tip Pool, Seeks Overtime Pay

GUILLERMO PRADO: Wins Final OK of $275K Settlement in Ledo Suit
HASBRO INC: Faces Stockholders Class Action
HAVEN'S KITCHEN: Faces Delacruz ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HEALTH KOREA: Shin Sues over Misleading Advertising Scheme
HOMELAND SECURITY: Pending Motions Stricken without Prejudice

HOSPITALITY VENTURES: Bid for Class Certification Denied as Moot
HUUUGE INC: Appeals Decision in Wilson Suit to 9th Circuit
IDT TELECOM: Lainez Suit Seeks to Stop Unwanted Text Messages
INNOVIS DATA: Consumers Sue Over Erroneous Credit Reports
J. FRED: Restaurant Not Fully Accessible to Disabled, Suit Claims

JP ENVIRONMENTAL: Restaurant Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
JPMORGAN CHASE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Suit Over BBSW
KISTLER FORD: K. Payne Suit Remains in Ohio District Court
KMPG LLP: Seyfarth Shaw Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling
LEADERS IN COMMUNITY: Court Narrows Claims in Edwards Suit

MAINE: Court Dismisses Gladu Class Allegations
MARRIOTT INT'L: DiCello Levitt Files Data Breach Class Action
MARRIOTT INT'L: Hiteshew Seeks Authority to File Class Suit
MARRIOTT INT'L: Jan. 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Dorfman Sues Over Data Breach

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Faces Kimmel Suit Over Data Breach
MOM'S BODY: Lara Mertens Seeks Payment of Past Wages
MONINI NORTH: Truffle Oil Class Action Dismissal Affirmed
MORGAN STANLEY: Motion to Dismiss Discrimination Case Granted
NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Gurrieri FLSA Suit

NEOSTRATA CO: Settlement in Horton Labor Suit Has Prelim Approval
NEW BALANCE: Court Denies 2nd Class Certification Bid in Dashnaw
NFSM PIZZA: McFadden Wants to Recover Wages for Delivery Drivers
NISSAN: Faces Class Action Over Defective Braking Systems
NORTH SHORE: Certification of Class Sought in O'Boyle Suit

NOW LLC: Richards et al. Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
PACIFIC UNION: Mortgage Borrowers File Class Action
PEBBLE BEACH: Court Affirms $180K Attys' Fees Award in Orozco Suit
PINNACLE FOODS: Faces False Advertising Class Action
PNC BANK: Kennedy-Rose Sues Over Illegal Bank Charges

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Madinya Okayed
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Bulger & Hamadeh Sue over Debt Collection
PRINCESS ANNE MOTEL: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
PTT LLC: Wash. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilson Suit
PURDUE PHARMA: Faces Sherman Suit in District of Minnesota

QWEST CORP: Bid to Dismiss/Transfer Seiffert Suit Under FLSA Denied
RAINBOW DISPOSAL: Hurtado Seeks to Certify Class
RAMS: Settles Class Action Over St. Louis Seat Licenses
RENZENBERGER INC: Ford Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
ROYALTY PUPPIES: Inda Seeks Unpaid Wages, Commissions

RWI TRANSPORTATION: Craft Settlement Has Final Court Approval
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Judge Tosses 2nd Amended Class Action
SAMUEL SPICER: Md. App. Certifies Question in Price MCLL Suit
SENDGRID INC: Chen Files Suit Over Twilio Merger Deal
SENTOSA NURSING: Filipino Nurses' Class Action Can Proceed

SPRINT/UNITED: Court Certifies Three Classes in Caudle Suit
STATE FARM: Court OKs Dismissal of Cranfield Suit
STONY HOLLOW: Beck Settlement Has Final Court Approval
SUNRISE DETOX III: Dunleavey Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
SYKES ENTERPRISES: Kronzer FCRA Suit Moved to M.D. Florida

TICKETMASTER: Defends Class Action Over Ticket Scalpers
TIGER BRANDS: Lawyers to File Listeriosis Class Action Next Year
TIGER BRANDS: To Cooperate with Listeriosis Class Action
TRES DIAMANTE RESTAURANT: Flores et al. Seek Minimum & OT Wages
TRINITY RESTAURANT: Conditional Certification Bid, Partly Granted

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers Petition to Compel Arbitration
UNITED STATES: Settlement Restores Migrants' US Asylum Rights
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA: Chemistry Professor Files Class Action
WEBLOYALTY.COM INC: LS Appeals Decision in EFTA Breach Suit
WILLIAMS PLANT: Gounder Seeks Overtime Wages

WOLVERINE WORLD: Faces Henry Suit in Delaware Federal Court
WOODSTREAM CORPORATION: Painter Suit Removed to N.D. Ohio
[*] Swansea Water District May Get Class Action Settlement Payout

                            *********

ADT LLC: Tadlock Sues over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------
Jo Lynne Tadlock, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ADT LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-25077-MGC (S.D. Fla., Dec. 4, 2018), seeks damages and
other equitable and legal remedies resulting from the unlawful
conduct of ADT in placing telemarketing calls to the cellular
telephones of Plaintiff and Class members without their prior
express written consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the complaint, on August 15, 2018, the Plaintiff
received a call from ADT promoting its security services. The
Plaintiff has never been a customer of ADT and never consented to
receive telemarketing calls from ADT. The Plaintiff brings this
class action on behalf of herself and others who received ADT's
telemarketing calls without consenting to receive such calls. The
Plaintiff did not provide her cellular phone number to ADT and did
not consent to receive these calls. She has no prior affiliation
with ADT. The Plaintiff's cellular phone number has been registered
on the national do-not-call registry since August 4, 2010, the
lawsuit says.

ADT LLC is a privately owned company with headquarters located in
Boca Raton, FL. The Company's line of business involves electronic
security systems.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Adam M. Moskowitz, Esq.
          Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 740-1423
          E-mail: adam@moskowitz-law.com
                  howard@moskowitz-law.com
                  adams@moskowitz-law.com

               - and -

          Simon S. Grille, Esq.
          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          Simon S. Grille, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com
                  sg@girardgibbs.com

ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: Court OKs Dismissal of Perry Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned ANDREA PERRY, individually and on behalf
of all other Ohio residents similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants. Case No.
1:16CV01522. (N.D. Ohio).

This matter comes before the Court following Defendants Allstate
Indemnity Company and eight affiliated companies' (Allstate) Motion
to Dismiss.

Perry filed a class action lawsuit alleging one count of Breach of
Contract against Allstate with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas. Perry's home suffered water damage on June 28, 2015 and she
submitted a claim to Allstate requesting coverage. An adjuster
inspected the damage and an estimate for repair was sent to Perry.
The total estimated cost to repair the damage, the replacement cost
value, was $32,965.09.  Allstate calculated the depreciation amount
at issue in this case to be $4,570.35. It subtracted this amount
and Perry's deductible from the replacement cost value to arrive at
a net ACV payment to Perry of $28,394.74.

No Ambiguity Exists in the Contract

Ambiguity exists when a term is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Ambiguous provisions will be construed strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. However,
courts cannot create ambiguity if none exists.  

Plain Meaning Analysis of ACV

To determine whether Allstate's depreciation calculation breached
the contract, the Court examines the term  Actual Cash Value (ACV),
which is undefined within the policy. Giving the wording in the
policy its natural and reasonable construction, ACV is not
ambiguous. ACV has been defined as replacement cost minus normal
depreciation or fair market value. Either of these definitions
could fit within the contract clause without resulting in
absurdity. In fact, the policy states that an actual cash value
payment may include a depreciation deduction.  

Perry seeks to limit the definition of ACV to exclude labor and
CO&P from depreciation. However, there is nothing within the text
of the contract to indicate that this was the intent of the parties
at the time that the contract was formed. Further, the plain
meaning of depreciation is inclusive of labor and CO&P. The
ordinary meaning of depreciation has been defined as a reduction in
the value or price of something; specif., a decline in an asset's
value because of use, wear, obsolescence, or age. A depreciation
method is a set formula used in estimating an asset's use, wear, or
obsolescence over the asset's useful life or some portion thereof.

As evidenced by Black's Law Dictionary, depreciation commonly
focuses on the value of the whole product, rather than the
component parts.   

Therefore, as used in the policy, ACV cannot reasonably be
interpreted to exclude labor and CO&P from a depreciation
calculation.

Ohio Case Law Analysis of ACV

When contractual terms are undefined, courts also look to Ohio case
law to determine their meaning.  

Here, support also exists for finding ACV is unambiguous. The term
ACV has been used in Ohio insurance case law for over 150 years.
Like Black's Law Dictionary, Ohio law has defined ACV to mean
either the market value of the property at the time of the loss or
the cost of repair or replacement less depreciation for age and
condition.  

Additionally, the exact same language found in the policy at issue
has been determined to be clear and unambiguous by an Ohio
appellate court. While persuasive authority, these appellate court
decisions lend support to a clear and unambiguous finding.

Analysis of Ohio Administrative Code Definition of ACV

Here, the Court finds that the regulation outlining the method to
determine ACV is clear and unambiguous. Further, because the
regulation states less any depreciation, a plain meaning analysis
of ACV in this regulation requires an inclusive definition of
depreciation. Read naturally, the word any has an expansive
meaning. There are no stated limitations or exclusions. Therefore,
it is reasonable for the Court to interpret depreciation to include
labor and CO&P as well as materials.  

Since no ambiguity exists in the contract and a calculation of the
ACV could depreciate labor and CO&P as well as materials, there is
no breach of contract as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court
grants Allstate's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8q7voed from
Leagle.com.

Andrea Perry, individually and on behalf of all other Ohio
residents similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel P.
Goetz -- dgoetz@weismanlaw.com -- Weisman, Kennedy & Berris, James
A. DeRoche, Garson Johnson, Patrick J. Perotti --
pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein, R. Eric Kennedy --
ekennedy@weismanlaw.com -- Weisman, Kennedy & Berris & Stuart I.
Garson, Garson Johnson.

Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Vehicle & Property
Insurance Company, Encompass Home & Auto Insurance Company,
Encompass Insurance Company of America, Encompass Indemnity
Company, Encompass Property & Casualty Company & Esurance Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Kristine M. Schanbacher --
kristine.schanbacher@dentons.com -- Dentons US, Leah R. Bruno,
Dentons US, Mark L. Hanover, Dentons US, pro hac vice & Gregory R.
Farkas -- gfarkas@frantzward.com -- Frantz Ward.


AMALIE OIL: Sued over Sale of XCEL Premium Passenger Car Motor Oil
------------------------------------------------------------------
BRANDON OPALKA and RYAN O'CONNOR, individuals, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
AMALIE OIL COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
81762738 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct, Miami-Dade Cty., Dec. 6, 2018), seeks
redress for the deceptive and unfair trade practices, acts, and
omissions employed by Defendant in the marketing and sale of its
XCEL Premium passenger car motor oil.

According to the complaint, using deceptive and unfair tactics,
Defendant manufactures, markets, advertises, and sells XCEL Oil,
which is considered "obsolete" by the American Petroleum Institute
("API"), receiving an "API SA" rating. The Product is unsuitable,
harmful, ineffective as a motor oil for automotive engines
manufactured after 1930. Despite the fact that XCEL Oil is
unsuitable for automotive engines, Defendant continues to sell the
Product to Florida citizens, using product packaging intentionally
conveying the impression that the Product is meant for use in
modern passenger car automotive engines. Indeed, the Product is
labeled as "automotive oil." The label not only misleads reasonable
consumers, but also contains flat-out falsehoods.

The Plaintiff purchased a bottle of XCEL Premium SAE lOW-40 in late
2016 from a gas station in Seminole County based on Defendant's
label, which led Mr. O'Connor to purchase the Product based on the
belief that it was a motor oil suitable for his vehicle and offered
engine protection. Mr. O'Connor relied on Defendant's
representations and omissions that the Product was a suitable motor
oil for his vehicle and offered engine protection in passenger car
automotive engines in making his purchase and would not have
purchased the Product, or would not have paid a premium for it, had
Defendant not made the misrepresentations and omissions. Through
its labeling, Defendant intentionally disguised its Product as that
which it is not: automotive oil that protects automotive engine,
the lawsuit says.

Amalie Oil Company is an American company that manufactures various
weights of motor oil, synthetic oil, transmission fluid, and other
automotive fluids. The company was founded in Franklin,
Pennsylvania in 1903, giving rise to its current slogan "Better
than it has to be... Since 1903.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Harley S. Tropin, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Widlanski, Esq.
          Robert Neary, Esq.
          Tal J. Lifshitz, Esq.
          KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON LLP
          2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9th Floor
          Miami, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 372-1800
          Facsimile: (305) 372-3508
          E-mail: bwidlanski@kttlaw.com
                  tjl@kttlaw.com

               - and -

          Allan Kanner, Esq.
          Cynthia St. Amant, Esq.
          KANNER & WHITELEY, LLC
          701 Camp Street
          New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
          Telephone: (504) 524-5777
          Facsimile: (504) 524-5763
          E-mail: a.kanner@kanner-law.com
                  c.stamant@kanner-law.com

               - and -

          Ryan Casey, Esq.
          CASEY LAW FIRM, LLC
          20 NE Thompson Street
          Portland, Oregon 97212
          Telephone: (503) 928-7611
          Facsimile: (503) 345-7470
          E-mail: ryan@rcaseylaw.com


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Faces Farro FDCPA Suit in District of New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Medical
Collection Agency. The lawsuit is styled as ANDREW FARRO, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLECTION AGENCY and JOHN DOES 1-25, the
Defendants, Case No.: 2:18-cv-16820-JLL-SCM (D.N.J., Dec. 4, 2018).
The suit alleges Fair Debt Collection Act violation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Jose L. Linares.

American Medical Collection Agency or AMCA is a debt collection
agency.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          Facsimile: (973) 244-0019
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com

AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC: Judge Okays $84MM Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for New Jersey Journal, reports that a
federal judge in Camden has granted final approval to an $84
million settlement of an antitrust class action against the
American Osteopathic Association.

The suit targeted a policy requiring physicians who seek board
certification in osteopathy to buy membership in the association at
an annual rate of $683. The settlement calls for the AOA to end the
disputed policy coupling board certification with membership in the
association, and to reduce the membership fee by $90, to $593.

The settlement also calls for the AOA to waive an annual $90
certification fee for three years; allow members to take two free
continuing medical education courses for free annually through
December 2021; and spend $4 million between 2019 and 2021 on a
brand awareness campaign for osteopathic physicians. The costs of
the settlement terms over three years comes to $84.2 million.

The association has roughly 48,000 members practicing osteopathy,
32,000 of whom are AOA-board certified. The value of the settlement
was calculated based on an assumption that AOA membership will
decline 3 percent as a result of the elimination of the challenged
rule.

The judge also approved counsel fees of $2.62 million, which is
slightly less than the lodestar amount of $2.65 million. The
lodestar is based on a blended rate of $601 and 4,418 hours spent
investigating and litigating the case. The judge also approved
service awards of $15,000 each to the four class representatives.

U.S. District Judge Noel Hillman of the District of New Jersey
granted final approval to the settlement after rejecting a claim by
the attorneys general of Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Rhode Island
and Texas that the settlement is structured in a manner that
conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court's guidance in a 2011 case,
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.

The five states' attorneys general argued in an amicus curiae brief
that individualized damages claims could not be certified under R.
23(b)(2) because class members may not opt out of such a
settlement. The attorneys general argue that the settlement raises
due process violations because under R. 23(b)(2), class members
cannot opt out of the settlement and pursue individual claims for
monetary damage.

But Judge Hillman said he did not find the objections of the
attorneys general compelling. The class notice clearly stated that
damage claims in the suit would be extinguished in the settlement,
and none of the notice recipients objected, he said. In addition,
the present case did not raise concerns of collusion between named
plaintiffs, class counsel and defense attorneys to resolve the case
in a manner that addressed only their interests.

Wal-Mart involved an employer and its employees, an arm's-length
relationship that has historically been the basis for abusive
conduct, the judge said. But the defendant in the present case is a
private membership association with "significant aspects of
self-regulation and governance."

The AOA's board of trustees approved the settlement and its House
of Delegates agreed to the dues decrease, Judge Hillman said.

"Thus, the AOA's governing body, filling essentially the same shoes
as the states' attorneys' general under 28 U.S.C. 1715, agreed that
the settlement was fair to itself as an organization as well as to
its individual members. This is a classic case of institutional
reform, for which Rule 23(b)(2) is the precise vehicle," Judge
Hillman said.

Judge Hillman noted with frustration that the efforts of the
attorneys general were "seriously misguided and myopic; their ardor
and zeal badly misplaced."

The settlement reflects, "as Rule 23(b)(2) must, the concrete over
the ephemeral, the real over the hypothetical, and the tangible
over unfounded fears," Judge Hillman said. Still, amici continued
"in their quixotic quest to vindicate a principle that is not
offended, on behalf of their citizens who have not complained," he
said.

"And in doing so, they have succeeded in delaying approval of the
settlement, have frustrated its orderly administration and
ultimately sought to scuttle an agreement that promised real,
tangible and substantial benefit to literally thousands of their
own citizens in each of their respective states," Judge Hillman
said.

Arizona Assistant Attorney General Drew Ensign represented the
amici. A spokeswoman for the Arizona Attorney General's office,
Katie Conner, said in a statement, "We believe we flagged
significant problems in the brief we filed on behalf of bipartisan
attorneys general and we're disappointed with the outcome. To date,
we've led more than a dozen class action fairness challenges, many
of them bipartisan. We've always put consumers first and we will
continue to fight on their behalf."

James Greenberg -- jgreenberg@duanemorris.com -- of Duane Morris in
Cherry Hill, representing the class, said Hillman's ruling "nailed
it," adding that much of what was in the opinion was what he argued
in his court papers.

Jeffrey Lorell -- jlorell@saiber.com -- of Saiber in Florham Park,
representing the AOA, did not respond to requests for comment.
[GN]


AMERITECH MOBILE: Class Certification in Satterfield Suit Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SATTERFIELD ET AL.; INTERMESSAGE COMMUNICATIONS,
Appellee, v. AMERITECH MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL.;
CINCINNATI SMSA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellant, Case No. 2017-0684
(Ohio), Judge Sharon L. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals
granting class certification, and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the matter.

In the discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District,
the Judge considers the parameters established by R.C. 4905.61
regarding the parties that have standing to bring a treble-damages
action pursuant to that statute.  Appellee Intermessage, and the
members of a proposed class of retail cellular-telephone-service
subscribers seek to recover treble damages under R.C. 4905.61 for
regulatory violations committed in the mid-1990s when those
regulatory violations—as determined by the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio ("PUCO")-related to the wholesale
cellular-service market.

The origins of the current action arose in October 1993, when
Westside Cellular, Inc., doing business as Cellnet, filed a
multicount complaint with the PUCO against Ameritech and other
wholesale cellular-service providers.  The Judge focuses on only
the allegations against Ameritech and the resolution of those
allegations in the Cellnet order because Ameritech is the only
wholesale cellular-service provider involved in the current
dispute.

Cellnet, a cellular-telephone-service reseller, had purchased
cellular service on a wholesale basis from Ameritech, rebranded the
service, and marketed it on a retail basis.  It alleged that
Ameritech had engaged in rate discrimination against it.  More
specifically, Cellnet claimed that Ameritech had failed to offer
cellular service, equipment, and features to Cellnet on a wholesale
basis at the same rate Ameritech had charged its own retail
businesses.  It also claimed that Ameritech had failed to maintain
separate operations and records for its wholesale and retail
businesses.

In 2001, the PUCO issued the Cellnet order, finding that Ameritech
had engaged in numerous practices that were prohibited by R.C.
Chapter 4905.  Ameritech appealed the findings of the PUCO in the
Cellnet order as of right to the Court.  The Court affirmed.

Based upon the PUCO's ruling regarding Ameritech's activities in
the wholesale cellular-service market, Intermessage and two other
named Plaintiffs who are no longer involved in the litigation --
Cindy Satterfield and Cindy Satterfield, Inc., also known as
Highland Speech Services, Inc. -- filed the instant class-action
complaint against Ameritech and other parties in December 2003.
Because only the claims of Intermessage and the proposed class
against Ameritech are at issue in the case as it comes to the
Court, the Judge will limit discussion of the facts to those
parties.

Intermessage was a retail purchaser of cellular-telephone service
from Ameritech.  It entered into contracts with Ameritech for
cellular-telephone numbers and used the accompanying service to
back up alarm systems that Intermessage sold to its customers.
Intermessage paid Ameritech for the retail cellular service and
then passed those costs on to its customers.

Intermessage initially sought to define the class as all
subscribers to Ameritech Mobile service from 1993-1998 and sought
recovery under several different theories of relief, including
under R.C. 4905.61.  Intermessage claimed that the practices
Ameritech had engaged in -- practices for which the PUCO had
already found Ameritech liable -- included preventing
cellular-service resellers from entering the Ohio market and from
increasing the resellers' market shares.  Intermessage further
alleged that these practices caused each member of the proposed
class to pay more for cellular-telephone service than the retail
market otherwise would have charged.

The trial court in 2006 and 2008 made several rulings that limited
Intermessage's class action against Ameritech to recovery only
under R.C. 4905.61 and only for the period Oct. 18, 1993, through
Sept. 8, 1995.

The trial court eventually granted Intermessage's motion for class
certification, certifying a class under Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(3)
consisting of all retail subscribers of Ameritech who purchased
service with an Ohio area code within geographic areas in which the
PUCO decision found wholesale price discrimination during the
period Oct. 18, 1993 through Sept. 8, 1995 upon its finding that
the statutory prerequisites for class certification had been
satisfied.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in certifying the class.

Ameritech contends that Intermessage's class action cannot survive
because the plain meaning of R.C. 4905.61 provides standing to sue
only to those persons or entities whose rights the PUCO has
expressly found were violated.  In other words, it maintains that
the statutory language unequivocally limits standing to persons or
entities directly injured by the violations found by the PUCO.
Ameritech asserts that there is no language in R.C. 4905.61 that
authorizes a class-action lawsuit for indirect harms allegedly
caused by a violation of the rights of some other person or entity.


Intermessage counters that the Court should not adopt Ameritech's
interpretation, because Ameritech seeks to have the Court ignore
the actual language of the statute -- which gives standing to "the
person injured" by a violation -- and Ameritech also seeks to have
the Court insert the phrase "whose rights the PUCO expressly finds
to have been violated" into the statute.

Judge Kennedy finds that the Cellnet order reveals that pursuant to
R.C. 4905.61, the parties injured by the violations -- Ameritech's
discriminatory behavior -- were nonaffiliated
cellular-telephone-service resellers in the wholesale market, i.e.,
direct purchasers of wholesale cellular service from Ameritech.
Intermessage was not a cellular-telephone-service reseller in the
wholesale market.  It was a purchaser of cellular service.  It was
a retail customer of Ameritech that purchased cellular service to
back up its alarm systems, and any injuries it suffered were
qualitatively different from those found in the Cellnet order,
meaning that Intermessage's injuries were indirect and remote.

The fact that Intermessage simply passed those costs on to its
customers does not make Intermessage a reseller in the wholesale
market.  Intermessage's customers were not purchasing cellular
service from Intermessage.  Its customers were purchasing an alarm
system with backup features that relied on Ameritech's cellular
service.  Therefore, Intermessage and the other retail customers of
Ameritech in the proposed class that were similarly indirectly
injured are unable to bring an action for treble damages pursuant
to R.C. 4905.61 based upon the violations found in the Cellnet
order.

Because the language of R.C. 4905.61 limits recovery of treble
damages to the "person, firm, or corporation" directly injured as a
result of the "violation, failure, or omission" found by the PUCO,
Judge Kennedy holds that Intermessage and members of the proposed
class of retail cellular-service subscribers lack standing to bring
an action pursuant to R.C. 4905.61.  She therefore reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/g6jfFf from Leagle.com.

Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Robert J. Fogarty --
rjfogarty@hahnlaw.com -- Dennis R. Rose -- drrose@hahnlaw.com --
and Royce R. Remington -- rrr@hahnlaw.com; Gary, Naegele & Theado,
L.L.C., and Thomas R. Theado -- office@gntlaw.com; Randy J. Hart,
L.L.P., and Randy J. Hart --  randyjhart@gmail.com; Tricarichi &
Carnes, L.L.C., and Carla M. Tricarichi; and Law Offices of Mark
Griffin and Mark D. Griffin -- mgriffin@bakerdonelson.com -- for
appellee.

Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker --
irene.keyse-walker@tuckerellis.com --  and Benjamin C. Sassé --
benjamin.sasse@tuckerellis.com; and Calfee, Halter & Griswold,
L.L.P., and James F. Lang -- jlang@calfee.com -- for appellant.

Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra -- asferra@bricker.com
-- Drew Campbell -- dcampbell@bricker.com -- and Bryan Smeenk --
bsmeenk@bricker.com -- urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio
Counsel of Retail Merchants, Ohio Insurance Institute, Ohio
Alliance for Civil Justice, and Ohio Association of Civil Trial
Attorneys.

Mac Murray & Shuster, L.L.P., Betty D. Montgomery --
‎bmontgomery@mslawgroup.com -- and Patrick W. Skilliter --
pskilliter@mslawgroup.com -- urging reversal for amicus curiae
Betty D. Montgomery, former Attorney General of Ohio.

K&L Gates, L.L.P., and J. Nicholas Ranjan; and Donald T. Boyd,
urging reversal for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America and Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

Steven T. Nourse, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Power
Company, d.b.a. AEP Ohio.

Rocco O. D'Ascenzo, urging reversal for amicus curiae Duke Energy
Ohio, Inc.

Joshua R. Eckert, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Edison
Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison
Company.

Michael J. Schuler, urging reversal for amicus curiae Dayton Power
and Light Company.


APPLE INC: Ct. Narrows Doc Production in iPhone 6 Touchscreen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production in the case
captioned THOMAS DAVIDSON, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC.,
Defendant. Case No.16-cv-04942-LHK (VKD). (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs move to compel defendant Apple, Inc. (Apple) to
supplement its document production and an interrogatory response.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Apple iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus
suffer from a material manufacturing defect that causes the
touchscreen to become unresponsive to users' touch inputs. The
Plaintiffs allege that a defect in the iPhones' external casing
causes this touchscreen malfunction. According to plaintiffs, the
logic board inside the iPhones contains two touchscreen controller
chips that are responsible for converting touches on the
touchscreen into actions in Apple's iPhone software.

The Court denies plaintiffs motion to compel with respect to the
following requests or portions of requests:

RFP (First) No. 5: All documents that refer to, discuss or analyze,
in whole or in part, any component of the external casing of the
iPhones .

RFP (First) No. 15: All documents that constitute, refer to,
discuss or analyze, in whole or in part, any testing of the
iPhones, including, but not limited to quality control, performance
testing, pre-production testing, design failure mode and effects
analysis, failure mode and effects analysis, failure mode and
effects management, fault tree analysis, Ishikawa diagrams, as well
as any remedial efforts referred to, discussed, or analyzed as a
result of such testing whether adopted by defendant or not.

RFP (First) No. 18: All documents that refer to, discuss or
analyze, in whole or in part, any potential or actual changes,
revisions, or modifications made to the iPhones, whether
contemplated in the iPhones or in successive versions or releases
of the iPhones.

RFP (First) No. 29: All documents that constitute, refer to,
discuss or analyze, in whole or in part, any complaints, from any
source, relating to the external casing of the iPhones otherwise
deviating from your manufacturing and/or design specifications.

RFP (First) No. 34: All documents that constitute, refer to,
discuss or analyze, in whole or in part, your response to any
complaints from any source regarding iPhones with external casing
that otherwise deviated from your manufacturing and/or design
specifications.

RFP (First) No. 36: All documents that constitute, refer to,
discuss or analyze, in whole or in part, standard operating
procedures related to the external casing of the iPhones otherwise
deviating from your manufacturing and/or design specifications.

RFP (First) No. 37: All communications between you and your
authorized stores, repair centers, or other field locations
regarding iPhones with external casing that may otherwise deviate
from your manufacturing and/or design specifications.

RFP (First) No. 46: All reports related to investigations of
potential failures, defects, or other problems with the iPhones,
including any draft(s).

RFP (First) No. 49: All documents exchanged between defendant and
any third parties relating to the external casing of the iPhones
otherwise deviating from your manufacturing and/or design
specifications.

Interrogatory No. 2: State the number of complaints, warranty
claims, and inquiries regarding the external casing of the iPhones
otherwise deviating from your manufacturing and/or design
specifications that you have received.

Post-Release Documents and Information Concerning Bending, Twisting
or Flexing of the Casing
The Court understands that Apple has already produced all
responsive pre-release documents relating to the design and testing
of the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus casing, in compliance with Judge
Lloyd's December 14, 2017 order. In addition, the Court understands
that Apple has already produced all post-release responsive
documents and information that relate to the bending, twisting, or
flexing of the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus to the extent they
concern the touchscreen defect or the mechanisms that lead to the
touchscreen defect, including the disruption of the connections
between the touchscreen controller chip and the logic board. If
such productions have not been made, Apple must produce all such
responsive material now.

The broader discovery plaintiffs' seek is not directly related to
the claims and defenses actually in dispute, and while the Court
appreciates plaintiffs' thesis that a broader scope of discovery
might yield additional support for plaintiffs' argument that Apple
should have known its iPhones would suffer a touchscreen defect,
the sheer breadth of plaintiffs' requests and their delay in moving
to compel this discovery weigh strongly against the relief they
seek.

The Court recognizes that plaintiffs' motion is technically timely,
but it is also very late in the discovery period. Moreover, it
appears that plaintiffs compromised on much of the discovery they
now seek to compel as part of their proposed resolution of the
discovery dispute briefed to and resolved by Judge Lloyd. They now
seek to regain ground they arguably gave up to resolve an earlier
dispute. This too weighs against the relief plaintiffs seek.

Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion to compel
discovery with respect to all other aspects of RFP (First) Nos. 5,
29, 34, 36, 37 and 49, and RFP (Third) Nos. 8 and 9, and
Interrogatory No. 2.

Documents and Information Concerning Apple's Defenses

The Plaintiffs seek production of documents responsive to RFP
(Third) Nos. 6 and 7. These document requests seek relevant
information about Apple's primary defense, which is that the
touchscreen defect is caused by users dropping their iPhones and
not by the bending, twisting, or flexing of the casing. Apple
represented at the hearing that it has produced all responsive
documents that compare or contrast the drop rates of the iPhone 5
and the iPhone 6s on the one hand, and the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6
Plus on the other hand. Assuming Apple has produced these
responsive documents, plaintiffs are entitled to no further
production. If Apple has not produced all responsive documents it
shall produce them now.

In summary, with respect to RFP (First) Nos. 5, 29, 34, 36, 37 and
49, and RFP (Third) Nos. 8 and 9, and Interrogatory No. 2, the
Court orders Apple to produce all pre-release documents and
information relating to the design and testing of the iPhone 6 and
iPhone 6 Plus casing, and all post-release documents and
information that relate to the bending, twisting, or flexing of the
iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus to the extent they concern the
touchscreen defect or the mechanisms that lead to the touchscreen
defect, including the disruption of the connections between the
touchscreen controller chip and the logic board. The Court also
orders Apple to produce all documents responsive to RFP (Third)
Nos. 6 and 7.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya8woe2y from Leagle.com.

Thomas Davidson, Todd Cleary, Jun Bai, Adam Benelhachemi, Brooke
Corbett, Kathleen Baker, Taylor Brown, Michael Pajaro, Heirloom
Estate Services, Inc., John Borzymowski & Justin Bauer, Plaintiffs,
represented by David Christopher Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com --
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law
PC, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Bruce
Daniel Greenberg -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite Depalma
Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright, LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew
David Schelkopf -- mds@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, pro
hac vice, Mitchell M. Breit -- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS
HANLY CONROY, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Hanly, Jr. --
phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conry LLC, pro hac vice,
Stephen Gerard Larson -- slarson@larsonobrienlaw.com -- Larson
O'Brien LLP, Susana Cruz Hodge -- scruzhodge@litedepalma.com --
Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr.
, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP.

Apple, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arturo J. Gonzalez --
agonzalez@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, David Ramraj Singh
-- david.singh@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Alexandria
Armida Amezcua -- aamezcua@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Ashley K. Nakamura -- anakamura@mofo.com -- Morrison Foerster, LLP,
Christopher Leonard Robinson -- christopherrobinson@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP, David Michael Walsh, Esq. --
dwalsh@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster, Diane P. Sullivan --
diane.sullivan@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac
vice, Penelope Athene Preovolos -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- Morrison
& Foerster LLP, Sabrina Larson -- slarson@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster, LLP & Tiffany Cheung -- tcheung@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP.


APPLE INC: Orshan Appeals N.D. California Decision to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Christopher Endara, David Henderson and Paul Orshan
filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Paul
Orshan, et al. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 5:14-cv-05659-EJD, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Jose.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 29, 2018, Judge
Edward J. Davila granted Apple's motion to dismiss all of the
claims in the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") with prejudice.

Plaintiffs Orshan, Endara, and Henderson filed the class action
suit against Apple on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, alleging that Apple violated various consumer protection
laws by misleading consumers regarding the storage capacity of
certain mobile devices running iOS 8.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Dec. 30, 2014 and filed
their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on April 9, 2015.  The
Plaintiffs are California consumers who purchased Apple products
running iOS 8.  According to the allegations in the FAC, all the
three Plaintiffs purchased their devices in reliance on the
Defendant's claims, on its website, advertisements, product
packaging, and other promotional materials, that the devices came
with 16GB of storage space and they expected that capacity would be
available for their personal use.  Contrary to these expectations,
anywhere from 18.1% to 23.1% of this capacity (2.9 to 3.7 GB) was
used by iOS 8 and not available to the Plaintiffs for personal
storage.  The Plaintiffs alleged that had they known this, they
would not have upgraded to iOS 8, would not have purchased the 16GB
of storage capacity or would not have been willing to pay the same
price for it.

The appellate case is captioned as Paul Orshan, et al. v. Apple
Inc., Case No. 18-17329, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Christopher Endara, David Henderson and Paul
      Orshan's opening brief is due on February 4, 2019;

   -- Appellee Apple Inc.'s answering brief is due on March 5,
      2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants PAUL ORSHAN, CHRISTOPHER ENDARA and DAVID
HENDERSON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Ling Kuang, Esq.
          Michael Andrew McShane, Esq.
          Sean Clinton Woods, Esq.
          AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP
          711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 568-2555
          E-mail: lkuang@audetlaw.com
                  mmcshane@audetlaw.com
                  cwoods@audetlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles LaDuca, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          E-mail: charlesl@cuneolaw.com

Defendant-Appellee APPLE INC. is represented by:

          Matthew David Powers, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 984-8898
          E-mail: mpowers@omm.com


ASN FAITH: Marc Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
--------------------------------------------
James Marc, Berthe Thermile, Terrell Hunter, Wiveline Petitdo, and
other similarly situated individuals v. ASN Faith Corp dba
7-Eleven, George Moshen, and Amir George, Case No. 1:18-cv-24856
(S.D. Fla., November 20, 2018), seek to recover money damages for
unpaid minimum wages, overtime wages, and retaliatory discharge
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs allege that The Corporate Defendant knew and showed
reckless disregard for the provisions of the Act concerning the
payment of minimum wages and remain owing the Plaintiffs and those
similarly situated these minimum and overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Corporate Defendant as store
clerks for the Corporate Defendant's business.

The Defendants operated as an organization which sells and markets
its services and goods to customers from throughout the United
States and also provides its services for goods sold and
transported from across state lines of other states. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      R. Martin Saenz, Esq.re
      SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
      20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Tel: (305) 503-5131
      Fax: (888) 270-5549
      E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


AUBURN CONSTRUCTORS: Faces Baker Labor Suit in Calif. State Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Auburn Constructors
Inc. The lawsuit is captioned as Larry Baker and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Auburn Constructors
Inc. and Does 1-100, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2018-00245759-CU-OE-GDS (Calif. Super. Ct., Dec. 4, 2018). The
suit alleges employment-related violation.

Auburn Constructors, Inc., a general contractor, provides
construction services for water/wastewater treatment plants, and
water/wastewater pumping facilities.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Galen T. Shimoda, Esq.
          Shimoda Law Corp.
          9401 E Stockton Blvd Ste 200,
          Elk Grove, CA 95624
          Telephone: (916) 525-0716
          Facsimile: (916) 760-3733
          E-mail: attorney@shimodalaw.com

AUSTRALIA: Victoria Braces for Class Action from Gangland Crooks
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that a senior Melbourne
barrister says Victoria should prepare to be sued by some of the
state's worst gangland crooks who have learned their lawyer also
acted as a police informant.

Philip Dunn QC said he feels ashamed to be part of the state's
legal system, following the shocking revelations which have sparked
national outcry and a royal commission.

He warned the fallout could cost the state millions of dollars and
take years to resolve.

The informant lawyer, who cannot be named but was known as 3838,
represented numerous high-profile figures, including drug lord Tony
Mokbel.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has already written to 20
people about their convictions -- and more cases dating from 2005
to 2009, when she acted as an informant, are being assessed.

It could open the door for criminals to appeal their convictions.

"It's going to spiral into a lot more. The Victorian government
better brace itself for a class action, made worse by the fact the
police sat on this for a number of years," Dunn told AAP.

The barrister said 3838 was viewed as a gangland lawyer who had
become close to some clients, but she was not suspected of working
with police at the time.

"It's like a rotten maggot in the apple of justice and it's just
wrong," Dunn said, expressing fears it could damage public
confidence in the courts and trust in the police.

"It actually makes me feel ashamed to be part of the system that
produced this."

The Law Council of Australia said the actions of the lawyer were
unethical and concerning.

"A lawyer purporting to act as counsel for the convicted person,
while also covertly informing against them, is a fundamental breach
of a lawyer's duties to the court," president Morry Bailes said.

Former homicide detective and police union boss Ron Iddles said 10
to 15 "very senior police" would have known what was happening, and
warned force bosses in 2009 the situation could trigger a royal
commission.

"It was always going to come out, I think, and be a mess," he told
3AW.

Chief Commissioner Graham Ashton was at the time part of a steering
committee overseeing several operations that could have used the
lawyer in question.

Peter Faris QC, former chairman of the National Crime Authority,
represented Mt Mokbel after the supergrass lawyer, and told ABC
radio on Dec. 4 Ashton should step aside.

But the police chief maintained the confidence of the government.

The extent of what was known by police will be a focus of the $7.5
million royal commission announced by the Victorian government.

The probe will be headed by two interstate commissioners to prevent
conflicts of interest, and Mr Ashton and now-Supreme Court justices
might have to give evidence, Attorney-General
Jill Hennessy said. [GN]


BB&T CORP: Settles 401(k) Class Action for $24MM
------------------------------------------------
Richard Craver, writing for Winston-Salem Journal, reports that
BB&T Corp. has agreed to pay $24 million to settle a federal
class-action lawsuit targeting the bank and managers of its 401(k)
plan.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA, lawsuit was
filed by 12 named plaintiffs in May 2016.

A motion was submitted on Dec. 3 to federal Judge Catherine Eagles
asking the court to enforce the terms the settlement. An agreement
was reached on Nov. 30, though BB&T continues to dispute the
allegations and denies liabilities for any alleged fiduciary
breaches or ERISA violations.

There is the potential for 67,000 current and former employee
claimants, considering the settlement time frame of Sept. 4, 2009,
to Oct. 25, 2018.

BB&T had 36,233 full- and full-time equivalent employees as of
Sept. 30.

"We are pleased to have resolved the claims involving supervision
of our 401(k) plan and believe a voluntary settlement is the best
way for all parties to move forward, avoid a costly trial and
further extend an already lengthy litigation process," BB&T said in
a statement.

Jerry Schlichter, lead attorney for the plaintiffs, said the
settlement "will provide compensation to the BB&T employees and
retirees, as well as improvements to their plan so that they will
be able to build their retirement assets in a meaningful way."

The lawsuit claims participants are being charged excessive fees
for often underperforming proprietary mutual funds. In August 2017,
Eagles approved class-action lawsuit status for the complaint.

Also named as defendants are current and past board directors, the
corporation's employee-benefits plan committee and two subsidiaries
associated with the mutual funds. Record keeping has been done by
Branch Banking & Trust Co. as trustee.

The $24 million goes into a gross settlement fund. A fairness
hearing won't occur before April 15.

The fund amount will be used to pay $8 million in attorney fees and
$1.1 million in attorney costs. Having one-third of the settlement
amount go to attorney fees is typical.

The named plaintiffs would each receive an additional $20,000
settlement payment.

Notices will be sent by first-class mail to the last known
addresses of current and former employees. There will be a website
created -- www.BB&T401ksettlement.com -- for participants.

According to the settlement, current employees would have their
reimbursement paid into their 401(k) plan. Former employees could
get their reimbursement sent in a check or as a rollover into
another retirement account.

Most class members would receive their reimbursement as
tax-deferred.

The judge approved two law firms to serve as lead counsel,
including Schlichter, Bogard & Denton of St. Louis, which gained a
$32 million settlement in May 2016 in a similar lawsuit involving
Novant Health Inc.

The plaintiffs accuse the defendants of overloading the 401(k) plan
with BB&T's proprietary mutual funds, including having no
nonproprietary mutual funds until 2009.

They claim the actions of the plan and its fiduciaries cost
participants "tens of millions of dollars in retirement savings."

The complaint lists four counts of breach of duties of loyalty and
prudence, and one count each of failure to monitor fiduciaries,
prohibited transactions between plan and party in interest, and
prohibited transactions between plan and fiduciary.

The plaintiffs want all defendants to be held "personally liable to
make good to the plan all losses resulting from each breach of
fiduciary duties or prohibited transaction," as well as to disgorge
all money gained if it is determined excessive fees were charged.
They want all fiduciaries accused of breach of duties to be removed
from the plan.

The BB&T plan had more than $1 billion in assets at the end of 2014
within six proprietary Sterling Capital Management LLC funds.
Altogether, 63 percent of the plan's $2.93 billion in assets were
invested in proprietary BB&T options as of Dec. 31, 2014.

"These defendants chose the BB&T funds not based on their merits as
investments, or because doing so was in the interest of plan
participants, but because these products provided significant
revenues and profits to BB&T Corp. and its subsidiaries," the
complaint states.

"Defendants generated profits for BB&T Corp. and its subsidiaries,
while the plan suffered losses due to excessive administrative and
investment management fees and poor performance."

BB&T argued the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed "because it
is based solely on a hindsight analysis of market performance. The
courts have consistently held that the ultimate outcome of an
investment is not proof of its imprudence." [GN]


BEAUTIFUL HOLLYWOOD: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beautiful Hollywood,
LLC. The lawsuit is captioned as Cheri Honeywell, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Beautiful Hollywood, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, the

Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-62958-CMA (S.D. Fla., Dec. 4, 2018).
The suit alleges Americans with Disabilities violation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.

Beautiful Hollywood LLC (trade name Hollywood Beach Five) is in the
hotels and motels business.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L. KERR, P.A.
          DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com

BELLISIMO MASONRY: Ganadara Seeks Overtime Wages for Laborers
-------------------------------------------------------------
RAMIRO GANDARA, "JOHN DOE 1," "JOHN DOE 2," in their individual
capacities and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. BELLISIMO MASONRY & CONSTRUCTION LLC, and ANTHONY S
ANTANGELO , an individual, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-06962
(E.D.N.Y., Dec. 10, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid or underpaid
wages and other damages under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, the New York Minimum Wage Act, and New York
Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked as construction
laborers for Defendants' masonry business for several months each.
During this time, Plaintiffs, like their similarly situated
coworkers, were never properly paid the overtime wages that they
rightfully earned. Additionally, Plaintiff Gandara was not paid for
his last two weeks of work, nor was he paid a promised and earned
bonus.

Mr. Ramiro Gandara worked for Bellisimo as a construction laborer
from February 23rd, 2018 to October 7th, 2018, or about eight
months. Gandara estimates that generally he worked approximately 63
hours per week. While working in this capacity, Mr. Gandara was not
expected to record time worked. Mr. Gandara typically started
working at 7 AM and stopped working at 6 PM. He usually worked six
days per week. We estimate his average workweek to be 63 hours.
While in this position, Plaintiff Gandara's pay scheme was hourly,
set at $25/hr. For hours over 40 worked in the workweek, Plaintiff
Gandara was paid at a "straight time" rate (i.e. same as his
regular hourly rate), the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          Penn A. Dodson, Esq.
          ANDERSON DODSON, P.C.
          11 Broadway, Suite 615
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 961-7639
          Facsimile: (646) 998-8051
          E-mail: penn@andersondodson.com

BERKS COUNTY, PA: Victory's Bid for Class Certification Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mark A. Kearney denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification in the lawsuit styled THERESA
VICTORY v. BERKS COUNTY, et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-05170-MAK (E.D.
Pa.).

According to the order, upon filing of the complaint, the Plaintiff
also filed an immediate Motion for class certification before the
Court can discern the issues involved for discovery or trial under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Hence, the
Plaintiff's Motion for class certification is denied without
prejudice to be renewed under a scheduling Order after we define
the issues necessary to be resolved for trial on either an
individual or class basis, ruled Judge Kearney.[CC]


BOJANGLES' INC: Faces Shareholder Suit Over Merger With Durational
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reba Purdessy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Bojangles', Inc., William A. Kussell  James
R. Kibler, Steven J. Collins, John E. Currie, Christopher J.
Doubrava, Tommy L. Haddock, Robert F. Hull, Jr., Starlette Johnson,
Mark A. Rowan, and Steven M. Tadler, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-11649 (S.D. N.Y., December 13, 2018) is a class action
brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the other
shareholders of Bojangles', Inc. except Defendants and their
affiliates, against Bojangles and the members of Bojangles' board
of directors for their violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the proposed merger between Bojangles, on
the one hand, and Durational Capital Management LP, The Jordan
Company, L.P., TEI Investment Pte. Ltd., Walker Parent, Inc., and
Walker Merger Sub, Inc.

On November 5, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger. On December 10, 2018, the Board
authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading
definitive proxy statement (the "Proxy") with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in violation of the Exchange Act that
recommends shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed Merger,
asserts the complaint.

While the Defendants are touting the fairness of the Merger
Consideration to the Company's shareholders in the Proxy, they have
failed to disclose material information that is necessary for
shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Merger, thereby rendering certain statements in the Proxy
incomplete and misleading, the complaint adds. Specifically, the
Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the valuation analyses performed by the Company's
financial advisors, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated and Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc., in support of their
fairness opinion; and (ii) the background of the Proposed Merger.

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding the
shareholder vote on the Proposed Merger and taking any steps to
consummate the Proposed Merger unless and until the material
information discussed and is disclosed to Bojangles shareholders,
or, in the event the Proposed Merger is consummated, to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange
Act, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of
Bojangles common stock and held such stock since prior to the
wrongs complained of herein.

Bojangles is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices
located at 9600 Southern Pine Boulevard, Suite J, Charlotte, North
Carolina 28273. The Company is a restaurant operator and franchisor
serving customers southern food, including breakfast all day,
biscuits, fried chicken, and sides. Bojangles' common stock trades
on the Nasdaq under the symbol "BOJA".

Individual Defendant William A. Kussell is director of Bojangles
and Chairman of the Board.

Individual Defendant James R. Kibler is a director of Bojangles and
the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company.

Individual Defendants Steven J. Collins, John E. Currie,
Christopher J. Doubrava, Tommy L. Haddock, Robert F. Hull, Jr.,
Starlette Johnson, Mark A. Rowan and Steven M. Tadler are directors
of Bojangles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
     MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
     The Empire State Building
     350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
     New York, NY 10118
     Phone: (212) 971-1341
     Fax: (212) 202-7880
     Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


BROWARD COLLEGE: Hovenga Seeks Unpaid Wages & Commissions
---------------------------------------------------------
Audrey Hovenga, the Plaintiff, vs. Broward College and Alan
Applebaum, the Defendants, Case No. CACE-18-028249 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct., In and For Broward County, Dec. 6, 2018), seeks unpaid wages
and commissions.

According to the complaint, Mr. Applebaum told Hovenga her pay rate
was going to be paid hourly for her work, and Hovenga was made to
keep track of her hours, and she did. Hovenga worked for the
Defendants in the manner indicated for several weeks for 2-3 days
per week, each shift lasting approximately 6-8 hours. Despite
working significant hours for the Defendants, neither Defendant
paid Hovenga any monies for her work.

Broward College, is a state college in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. It
is part of the Florida College System. It was established in 1959
as part of a move to broaden Florida's two-year colleges.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Chris Kleppin, Esq.
          Glasser & Kleppin, P.A.
          8751 W. Broward Blvd., Suite 105
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 424 1933
          Facsimile: (954) 474 7405

C & A TRANSPORTATION: Ornelas Seeks Minimum Wage for Truck Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES ORNELAS, an individual, on behalf of herself and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. C & A
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., a California Corporation; MIDWEST
SERVICES, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and DOES
1-50, Inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-D0D61289-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 4, 2018), alleges
that the Defendants violated and continue to violate the California
Unfair Competition Law and and the California Labor Code in failing
to pay minimum wage regardless of whether employees' work is paid
by commission, by salary, by piece rate, or by part commission,
part piece rate, and/or part salary.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked and drove a truck
in California for the Defendants from July of 2014 to November of
2016. As a Truck Driver, the Plaintiff's work required the
performance of manual labor consisting of driving Defendants'
trucks and transporting goods within the State of California. To
the contrary, the work of the Plaintiff as a Truck Driver was to
provide on a daily basis the transportation of goods in accordance
with the management decisions and business policies established by
the Defendants. As a result, the Plaintiff was entitled to be paid
minimum wages, accurate wage statements, and meal and rest periods
as required by California law. The Plaintiff was paid by piece-rate
only while he was employed as a Truck Driver for Defendant.
Importantly, he was not provided with minimum wages for his
non-production work time. The Plaintiff also did not receive paid
rest breaks as required by California law and the Defendants failed
to provide the Plaintiff with the legally required meal periods,
the lawsuit says.

C & A Transportation, Inc. was founded in 1989. The company's line
of business includes providing trucking transportation
services.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Shani O. Zakay, Esq.
          ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC
          Website: www.zakaylaw.com
          3990 Old Town Ave. Suite C204
          San Diego, CA 92110
          Telephone: (619)255-9047
          Facsimile: (858) 404-9203

               - and -

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
          Website: www.bamlawca.com
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232

CALIBER HOME: Court Dismisses Data Security Breach Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher P. Hahn, Esq. -- chahn@mauricewutscher.com -- of
Maurice Wutscher LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
recently dismissed a consumer's putative class action lawsuit
against a mortgage lending and servicing company for purported
damages sustained as a result of a security breach wherein his
personal information was compromised, and the hackers attempted to
open credit cards in his name.

Although the Court previously concluded that the consumer had
standing to bring his claims under Article III of the Constitution,
it held that the consumer failed to state causes of action for
negligence and violations of various California laws.

A copy of the opinion in Razuki v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. is
available at: Link to Opinion.

A consumer on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, sued
a mortgage lender and servicer after its customer database was
hacked, and confidential customer information, such as social
security numbers, was compromised.

The consumer claimed that he suffered monetary and emotional
distress damages as a result of a cybercriminal's attempts to open
credit cards in his name, as a result of the mortgage company's
inadequate security and failure to timely notify its customers of
the breach.

The consumer filed suit against the mortgage company in the
Superior Court of California, San Diego County, alleging causes of
action for: (i) negligence; (ii) violation(s) of California
Constitution (Art. I, § I); (iii) violation(s) of the California
Customer Records Act (Civ. Code § 1798.80); (iv) violation(s) of
the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code §
1750), and; (v) violation(s) of the California Unfair Competition
Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).

The mortgage company removed the action to United States District
Court for the Southern District of California under the Class
Action Fairness Act, and moved to dismiss the consumer's complaint
for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.

First, in an earlier decision (available here), the federal trial
court rejected the mortgage company's arguments that increased risk
of identity theft is not an injury in fact for Article III
standing, citing the Ninth Circuit's recent holding that data
breach victims sufficiently pleaded "an injury in fact based on a
substantial risk that . . . hackers will commit identity fraud" and
established a reasonable inference of causation by alleging that
their identity was stolen and exploited. In re Zappos.com, Inc.,888
F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2018).

In addition, the court held that the mortgage company's argument
that the consumer failed to allege it possessed his data at the
time of the breach or that it was actually stolen was undermined by
its admission that it sent notices to customers who may have been
affected by the breach -- which the consumer received -- and in any
event, was waived because it was raised for the first time in the
mortgage company's reply brief. Thus, the motion to dismiss for
lack of standing was denied.

But here, the Court found the alleged negligence damages "too
conclusory and vague to satisfy the pleading standard," even though
the consumer could allege the necessary elements for Article III
standing, citing the Ninth Circuit case of Krottner v. Starbucks,
where the plaintiff consumer similarly alleged that personal
information was misused, but the Court couldn't find "loss related
to the attempt to open a bank account in his name." Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App'x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010).

Although the Starbucks court found the risk of identity theft
following a data breach sufficient to supply an injury-in-fact for
standing, the Starbucks consumer plaintiff's claims were
insufficient to support actual damages for a negligence claim
because the injuries "stem from the danger of future harm." Here,
the consumer alleged he would suffer a continued risk of harm to
his "personal data," but the court concluded the alleged damage was
insufficient because it really is a potential "future harm."
Second, his claim alleging diminution of value of his personal data
fails to allege enough facts to establish how his personal
information is less valuable as a result of the breach.

Similarly, the Court also found the allegation the consumer
"overpaid [mortage company] for financial services during or after
the breach" as too vague because the consumer failed to "provide
any information to show that he paid a premium for [mortgage
company] to provide reasonable and adequate security measures."

The consumer also argued that the mortgage company's breach of data
violated his right to privacy under Art. I, Section I of the
California Constitution. However, the loss of personal data through
insufficient security fails to constitute "a serious invasion of
privacy" that is "an egregious breach of the social norms
underlying the privacy right" necessary to meet the standard of
actionable conduct under the California Constitution. Hill v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 37, 40 (1994); In re
iPhone Application Litig.,844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D. Cal.
2012) ("Even negligent conduct that leads to theft of highly
personal information, including social security numbers, does not
approach the standard of actionable conduct under the California
Constitution and thus does not constitute a violation of
Plaintiffs' right to privacy." ). Accordingly, these claims, too,
were dismissed, with leave to amend.

Next, the Court considered the consumer's claims that the mortgage
company failed to comply with the Customer Records Act (CRA), Civ.
Code Sec. 1798.80, which requires businesses to protect customers'
personal information by maintaining "reasonable security
procedures," and if a data breach occurs, to notify affected
customers "without unreasonable delay" Secs. 1798.81.5, 82.

The consumer argued that the mortgage company waived its argument
by failing to address this claim, but the Court found just the
opposite and that the consumer failed to address the mortgage
company's arguments that dismissal was warranted for failure to
allege injury, and for conclusory allegations about security, data
disposal, and notification. Thus, the claim was deemed abandoned
and dismissed with leave to amend. See, e.g., Shull v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 2014 WL 1404877, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014).

Following amendment by the consumer, the Court also dismissed the
CRA claim with prejudice and without leave to amend. The Court
noted that, although the CRA requires businesses to notify
customers of a data breach "in the most expedient time possible and
without reasonable delay" (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a)), courts
have required plaintiffs to "show that the delay in notification
led to incremental harm." The consumer did not do so here.

Moreover, the CRA requires businesses to "implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information." Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1798.81.5. The
Court held that the consumer "could have identified what made
[mortgage company's] security measures unreasonable by comparison
to what other companies are doing, but simply knowing of
higher-quality security measures is not sufficient to state a
claim."

The consumer's claims under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA)
asserted that the mortgage company violated various provisions of
Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1770(a)'s ban on unfair business practices that
result "in the sale or lease of goods or services to any
consumer."

As you may recall, the CLRA defines "services" as "work, labor, and
services for other than a commercial or business use, including
services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."
§ 1761.

Here, the Court accepted the mortgage company's argument that home
loans do not qualify as "the sale of a service" under the CLRA,
citing California Supreme Court authority that "ancillary services
that insurers provide to actual and prospective purchasers of life
insurance" do not count as a "service" under the CLRA because the
activity centers on a "contractual obligation to pay money."
Fairbanks v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 56, 61, 65 (2009). Thus,
the consumer's CLRA claims were dismissed, but without leave to
amend.

Lastly, the consumer claimed that the mortgage company violated
California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Sec. 17200, by supposedly engaging in unfair business practices by
failing to provide sufficient security for his data.

Here, the Court noted that the consumer's complaint failed to
explain which theory he was advancing under the UCL. Although his
opposition brief suggested the consumer relied upon his CLRA and
CRA claims as predicates for an unlawful theory, because those
causes of action failed to state a claim, and because the consumer
failed to sufficiently allege "lost money or property," as
required, the consumer's Unfair Competition Law claim also failed
to state a cause of action and was dismissed with leave to amend.

The consumer amended his UCL claim, but the Court held the
amendments were insufficient, and this time dismissed the UCL claim
with prejudice. The Court noted that a UCL plaintiff must "have
suffered an 'injury in fact' and 'lost money or property as a
result of such unfair competition.'" The consumer argued that he
met this element because funds were withdrawn without his consent
from his bank account. However, the Court noted, the consumer's
bank quickly reversed the transaction, and therefore the consumer
suffered no "injury in fact," as required.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the consumer's putative class
action lawsuit was granted with prejudice and without leave to
amend. [GN]


CALIFORNIA FINE: Faces Blackshear Labor Suit in Calif. State Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against California Fine Wine.
The lawsuit is captioned as Carla Blackshear and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. California Fine Wine
and Spirits LLC and Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2018-00245842-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 5, 2018). The
suit alleges employment-related violation.

California Fine Wine & Spirits is in the Liquor Stores
business.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Norman B Blumenthal, Esq.
          Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037-3107
          Telephone: (858) 551-1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551-1232
          E-mail: norm@bamlawca.com


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses State Prisoner's Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Finding and Recommendation dismissing
Plaintiff's Pro Se Complaint in the case captioned CARL CHRISTIAN,
Plaintiff, v. CLARK, et al., Defendants. Case No.
1:18-cv-01173-DAD-BAM (PC). (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Carl Christian (Plaintiff) is a state prisoner proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Plaintiff purports to bring this case as a class action lawsuit
on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals.
However, he may not do so. A non-attorney proceeding pro se may
bring his own claims to court, but he may not represent others.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Findings
and Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9kdon5t
from Leagle.com.

Carl Christian, Plaintiff, pro se.


CANADA: Class Action Over Ontario's Training Schools Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kenyon Wallace, writing for Toronto Star, reports that an Ontario
Superior Court judge has certified a class-action lawsuit seeking
$600 million in damages against the Ontario government on behalf of
former residents of the province's training schools.

The certification order, signed by Justice Danial Newton in Thunder
Bay and released on Dec. 4, defines the class as all individuals
who resided at 13 of the province's training school facilities
between Jan. 1, 1953, and April 2, 1984.

"This is an important milestone for the boys and girls from the
training schools," said lead plaintiff Kirk Keeping in a statement
issued by Koskie Minsky, the law firm representing him and other
class members. Keeping alleges he was sexually, physically and
psychologically abused while attending Pine Ridge Training School
in Bowmanville in 1968 when he was 15.

"We have all lived with this for years and we are glad this case is
moving forward," he said.

Training schools were institutions set up and operated by the
provincial government to house and educate thousands of children
between the ages of 8 and 16 who were deemed by the courts to be
"incorrible" or "unmanageable." Children sent to training school
need not have committed any crimes; transgressions such as petty
theft, truancy, or running away from home could land a child in
training school. Many children sent to the institutions came from
abusive or poverty-stricken homes.

A Star investigation published last year revealed that the
provincial government has secretly settled more than 200 individual
lawsuits launched by former training school residents who alleged
horrifying treatment at the hands of school employees. Former
students interviewed by the Star alleged they were raped, beaten
and put in solitary confinement by staff members, among other
abuses they say they suffered.

The Star's investigation also revealed that provincial officials
warned the government -- in one case as early as the late 1960s —
that students were being mistreated at the institutions, but that
these warnings appeared to have been ignored. The last training
school closed in 1984.

"The allegations of abuse by the province are quite frankly
shocking," Jonathan Ptak -- jptak@kmlaw.ca -- a partner at Koskie
Minsky and the lead lawyer for the class, said in a statement on
Dec. 4. "We are pleased that the case now has been certified as a
class proceeding, so that we can now litigate this case on the
merits. We will continue to push forward as quickly as possible and
to seek access to justice for the thousands of survivors of the
Ontario training schools."

The next step in the case, he said, will be to return to court to
determine how to provide notice to class members that the action is
proceeding. Class members will then have the opportunity to opt out
if they wish. Mr. Ptak said records filed by the province in the
case show there were about 21,000 former residents of training
schools.

The lawsuit, which seeks $500 million in damages for negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty and vicarious liability, as well as $100
million in punitive damages, was certified in Thunder Bay, where
lead plaintiff Keeping lives.

Among Keeping's allegations in the statement of claim, which was
filed in Dec. 2017, were that he was sexually abused by two Pine
Ridge training school employees: a female kitchen worker who
allegedly took Keeping, who was a virgin, into a large cooler and
had sex with him; and a male employee working at the school's dairy
farm who allegedly performed oral sex and "simulated sex" on
Keeping.

It also alleges he was put in a locker by staff members and hit
with running shoes when he misbehaved.

"The children who resided (in training schools) were vulnerable and
powerless and due to the Crown's systemic failure, were subjected
to a toxic environment in which physical, sexual and psychological
abuse was widespread," reads the statement of claim.

As of publication time, the Ministry of the Attorney General had
not responded to a request for comment. [GN]


CANADA: Indigenous Women Sue Over Foreced Sterilization
-------------------------------------------------------
Anna Kusmer, writing for Rewire.News, reports that in 2001, a
29-year-old Cree woman, nicknamed S.A.T. in legal documents, went
to the Royal University Hospital in Saskatchewan, Canada, to give
birth to her sixth child. After she gave birth, she says, she was
wheeled into an operating room to be sterilized. She says she
desperately protested, but no one listened. To this day, she
remembers "the smell of burning flesh" as her fallopian tubes were
cauterized against her will in an irreversible birth control
procedure.

This claim is laid out in a new class action lawsuit alleging
widespread abuse of power by Saskatchewan health professionals and
the violation of many indigenous women when they were at their most
vulnerable.

If successful, the women in the lawsuit will each be entitled to
millions of dollars of reparations from the Saskatchewan and
Canadian governments and their health systems. While these women
may only represent a fraction of the people negatively affected by
forced sterilization in Canada, their lawsuit is recognition of the
ubiquity of the practice  -- and its consequences.

Attorney Alisa Lombard is directing the lawsuit. She's an associate
at Maurice Law, Canada's only indigenous-owned national law firm.
Since news broke of the legal action last month, over 60 more women
have contacted Ms. Lombard's office, saying they were sterilized
without their consent. In the seven days after CBC's November 13
article about the lawsuit, 29 women called or emailed her.

The women were mostly from Saskatchewan, but also from Ontario and
Manitoba. They reported similar experiences of being coerced into
signing consent forms and being misled about the irreversible
nature of the procedure. The stories go back decades; one is as
recent as 2017. Most of the sterilizations happened in the hectic
time directly after the women gave birth. In some cases, women were
denied access to their newborn babies unless they agreed to the
procedure.

The class action currently has two representative plaintiffs, and
when certified, dozens more may be added. "My clients' lives were
upended," Ms. Lombard told Rewire.News. "They've lost
relationships, and they've come down quite hard on themselves. I
really don't think you can overstate the trauma."

The lawsuit is aimed at three specific doctors, the Saskatchewan
and Athabasca Health Authorities and their health professionals,
the province of Saskatchewan, and the Canadian federal government.
The charges include battery of a sexual nature, negligence, breach
of contract and fiduciary obligations, violation of the right to
life, cruel and unusual treatment, and the violation of the right
to freedom of conscience, belief, and religion.

The lawsuit was launched about six months after a 2017 report
exposed the pervasive forced sterilization of indigenous women in
Saskatchewan hospitals. The report, an independent review
commissioned by the Saskatoon Health Region, shares stories of
seven indigenous women who were pressured into a tubal ligation, a
permanent form of birth control in which the fallopian tubes are
cut, burned, or tied in an irreversible procedure. The women say
they were sterilized against their will, usually in the hectic and
fraught period directly after giving birth.

The women in the report, anonymous to the public, shared similar
stories to those of the lawsuit's plaintiffs -- full of feelings of
confusion, distress, and shame. They said they felt harassed by
health-care workers to agree to the procedure, which they didn't
know much about, and they were told it was for their health.

"When [I was] in for C-section, the nurse came to [get] me to sign
the paper for tubal ligation . . . Even though I didn't want to, I
signed it," said one women in the report. "I just said, 'I don't
want to do this.' and he [the doctor] just didn't hear me. I was
being ignored," said another.

One women recounted that a social worker told her the doctors
didn't want her to leave the hospital until the procedure was done,
and she felt she didn't have a choice.

"They were all severely traumatized," said Yvonne Boyer, a Canadian
senator, a legal scholar, and a co-author of the 2017 report. "They
had either revoked their consent, not realizing that a tubal
ligation was a permanent procedure, or they had not consented at
all to the procedure that they were having done," she told
Rewire.News.

The 2017 report sparked a growing recognition that the practice of
forced and coerced sterilization of indigenous women in
Saskatchewan hospitals was rampant.

According to Ms. Boyer, the precedent for indigenous women being
mistreated in Canadian public systems is rooted in a deep history
of colonialism, sexism, and racism. "Unfortunately, far too many
institutions today claim to be value free but continue to reflect a
colonial male dominated comprehension of reality," she and
physician Judith Bartlett wrote in the 2017 report.

Ms. Boyer said medical practices that assume non-indigenous doctors
know what's best for indigenous women, despite their express wishes
to the contrary, mirror a historical legal system that seeks to
undermine the autonomy and independence of indigenous people of
Canada. She refers to this as the "guardian and ward model" of law,
which assumes that indigenous people do not have the capabilities
to make decisions about their own health and well-being. In Canada,
it is mostly famously exemplified by residential schools, a
widespread practice that removed an estimated 150,000 First Nation,
Metis, and Inuit children from their communities before ending in
1996.

According to Ms. Boyer, the "guardian and ward model" of law
contributes to a mainstream culture that does not respect the
autonomy of indigenous women, and the forced sterilization cases
currently coming forward show that this patronizing and racist
mentality is present in Canadian health systems. "The health-care
professionals are saying, 'we know what's best for you. You've got
three kids at home, you don't need anymore, so I'm just going to
sterilize you, because that's what I think,'" said Boyer. "That's
what happens. There's a power imbalance."

Ms. Boyer and Ms. Bartlett's 2017 report highlights the
"degradation" experienced by the women interviewed about forced
sterilization. Most of the women were never again able to trust
doctors, and they consequently don't seek health care or address
chronic pain or illness. "We found with the women we interviewed
that there was a terror, an absolute terror of these women [with
regard to] seeking health care," said Boyer. "They're not going [to
the doctor], and they're not allowing their families to go."

Canada has a long history of eugenics and forced sterilization. The
provinces of Alberta and British Columbia both had legislation
condoning sterilizing people without consent, and records suggest
the practice was widespread across other provinces as well. The
practice of forced sterilization in Canada started with people with
mental illness or disabilities but it soon became pretense for the
sterilization of indigenous people, mostly women, based on racist
ideas of culture and behavior.

Forced sterilization of Native women based on racist policies was
also rampant in the United States, persisting into the 1970s and
1980s. Some estimate that as many as 25 to 50 percent of Native
American women in the United States were sterilized between 1970
and 1976. In Puerto Rico, an estimated one-third of women were
sterilized between 1936 and 1968 by the U.S. government, which
spread misinformation about the sterilization procedure.

The impact of forced sterilization can be severe. The plaintiffs in
Ms. Lombard's lawsuit say they have experienced debilitating
physical and mental repercussions, including hormonal disorders,
migraines, depression, anxiety, and social isolation. One of the
women said her marriage ended as the result of her sterility.

Ms. Lombard told CBC News that one woman in Manitoba took her own
life 10 months after the procedure.

"It's hard to sum it up in a sentence and say, 'these are the
damages,'" said Lombard. "The greater trauma here … it can't be
overstated. I think that any well-thinking, well-meaning human
being looking at the scenario will inherently understand that."

She says health professionals and the Canadian public have known
about forced sterilization in Canadian hospitals for decades. "What
this teaches us . . . is that this continues to happen," she said.
She poses the rhetorical question: "At what time does inaction in
the face of knowledge become intent?"

Once the lawsuit is certified by the Saskatchewan courts, Lombard
can add more women to the class action. She says no matter how many
women are included, there are countless cases of women who will
never see a shred of justice. "Certainly there are many women that
these things have happened to who are no longer with us, who are
not here to speak on their own behalf," she said. Lombard added
that the bulk of the women who have approached her have experienced
forced sterilization in the last three decades. "It's not a very
long time ago," she said, "This basically happened yesterday."

Ms. Lombard told Rewire.News she will be pleased if they win the
lawsuit, as it would mean recognition for a problem that is too
often swept under the rug. "[Winning the lawsuit] would be a
reinforcement and a confirmation that indigenous women have bodily
autonomy," she said, "It's about saying these women have a right to
have families on their own terms. It's about saying these women
have the right, first and foremost, to make decisions about their
own bodies."

But real justice will only come with a systemic overhaul of
Canadian health care to address the pernicious underpinnings of
racism and unequal access to care that are deeply rooted in the
system.

In their 2017 report, Boyer and Bartlett outlined "Calls to Action"
based on what they heard from the affected women, which include
legal, procedural, educational, and structural changes to the
health system. They include enacting a constitutionally protected
right to traditional indigenous medicine and reproductive health
care, mandatory cultural training for health-care workers, greater
representation of indigenous advocates in the shaping of
health-care policy, and the creation of a reproductive center for
vulnerable indigenous women who need particularly sensitive care.

"We know that indigenous patients can face systemic barriers in
accessing medical services, including discrimination and racism,"
said Jane Philpott, Canadian minister of indigenous services, in a
statement. "We all have a role to play to ensure that Indigenous
patients receive quality health care free of prejudice, including
ensuring medical professionals receive cultural safety training."

After the 2017 report came out, the Saskatchewan Health Authority
did change its policy around tubal ligation and now requires women
to have a documented discussion with their doctor about the
procedure before coming in for birth. They also shared the report
with their staff and implemented cultural competency training.

"We are working closely with our First Nations and Métis community
partners (Federation of Sovereign Indigenous Nations, Métis
Nation-Saskatchewan), as well as Elders and Grandmothers, through
the establishment of an advisory council to guide the SHA on the
future of health care in Saskatchewan," the Saskatchewan Health
Authority said in a statement. "The council continues to meet
regularly to create detailed plans specific to the 10 calls to
action outlined in the review, with SHA leadership teams working to
put these plans into action."

Ms. Boyer is currently working on getting support from her senate
colleagues for more action and investigation into the practice.
"The more people we can have talking about this, the more solutions
we are going to be able to come up with," she said.

Ms. Boyer said that only the women can determine what justice means
for them personally. Moving forward, the goal is to never let this
happen again. "Quite frankly, I don't think there is any justice, I
think the only thing we can do is stop things like this from
happening to their children," said Boyer.

"We don't want their daughters to go through the same things that
they've been through. That's what we're working at." [GN]


CELTIC SERVICES: Parada Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lorenzo M. Parada, individually and on behalf of all employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Celtic Services NYC Inc., John
Doe a/k/a Camaron, and Carlos Mendoza, Defendants, Case No.
7:18-cv-11677 (S.D.N.Y., December 13, 2018) alleges violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York Labor Law, arising
from Defendants' various willful and unlawful employment policies,
patterns and/or practices.

The complaint asserts that Defendants have willfully and
intentionally committed widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL
by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to pay their
employees, including Plaintiff, overtime compensation for all hours
worked over 40 each workweek.

Plaintiff alleges pursuant to the FLSA and the NYLL that he is
entitled to recover from the Defendants unpaid overtime wages,
compensation for failure to provide wage notice at the time of
hiring and failure to provide paystubs in violation of the NYLL,
liquidated damages equal to the sum of unpaid "spread of hours"
premium, unpaid overtime Pursuant to the NY Wage Theft Prevention
Act, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
and attorneys' fees and costs, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Lorenzo M. Parada is a resident of Bronx County and was
employed as a demolition worker by Celtic Services NYC Inc.

Celtic Services NYC Inc. owns and operates a demolition company in
Westchester County located at 156 Mt. Vernon Avenue, Ste. 210, Mt.
Vernon, NY 10550.

Defendant John Doe a/k/a Camaron is the owner, officer, director
and/or managing agent of Celtic Services NYC Inc. and participated
in the day-to-day operations of Celtic Services NYC Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Lorena P. Duarte, Esq.
     136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
     Flushing, NY, 11354
     Phone: (718)353-8588
     Email: lduarte@hanglaw.com


CHARTER COMMS: Plaintiff Ordered to Show Cause in TCPA Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nadia Adams, Esq. -- nadia.adams@wbd-us.com -- of Womble Bond
Dickinson (US) LLP, in an article for The National Law Review,
reports that on Dec. 4, Judge Otis Wright of the Central District
of California ordered the Plaintiff in a TCPA class action to show
cause why the case shouldn't be stayed pending the outcome the
First Amendment issues before the Ninth Circuit  in the Gallion v.
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 920 (C.D. Cal. 2018)
appeal.  Elliot Pershes v. USA Fitness Center et al.,
18-cv-7258-ODW-RAO ("Pershes").

Remember when we said, "the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") is the broadest restriction on constitutionally protected
speech in our nation's history?" Of course you do.  

Also, remember when we reported about a first-in-the-nation ruling
out of the U.S. Central District Court of California staying the
Meza v. Sirius Xm Radio, Case No.: 17-cv-2252-AJB-JMA, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 164601 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) TCPA case pending the
outcome Gallion? Yep!

A few weeks after the Meza decision, the defense in the Pershes
case moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the TCPA is an
unconstitutional restriction on free speech in violation of the
First Amendment, and alternatively asked the Court to stay the
action pending the outcome of the Gallion appeal.  Smart move.  Per
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(a), the Defendant also notified
the United States Attorney General of its constitutional challenge
to a federal statute.  Just a few weeks ago, the US AG's office
chimed in stating that it didn't appear that briefing on the
constitutional issue was warranted in light of the pending Gallion
appeal and -- under those circumstances -- agreed that a stay of
the case pending the outcome of the appeal was appropriate.

And it looks like the Court is also in agreement.  In a short and
sweet minute order issued on Dec. 4, the court stated it was
"inclined to stay this action pending the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Gallion," and ordered the Plaintiff to show cause why the case
shouldn't be stayed pending that decision.

With the defense, the US AG, and the Court seemingly aligned on the
appropriateness of a stay here, it will be interesting to see how
this all plays out.  We have our money on a stay being granted.
And the momentum is definitely building here.  If the stay is
ultimately granted, this will be the second court in the Ninth
Circuit to order a case stayed pending the outcome of Gallion.  But
what's even more interesting is that we now have the US AG's office
going on the record and agreeing that a stay is appropriate pending
the Ninth Circuit's determination of the constitutional issues in
Gallion.

Plaintiff has until December 28, 2018 to respond to the OSC. [GN]


CHEMOURS: Class Action Attorney Provides Update on GenX Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Guarino, writing for WECT, reports that dozens of concerned
community members gathered at Cape Fear Community College on Dec. 4
to hear the latest on the state of their drinking water, and the
GenX investigation.

Dr. Larry Cahoon, a UNCW professor, started the meeting with an
update on research pertaining to GenX and other chemical compounds
found in the water, air, and soil across the region.

Dr. Cahoon told the crowd, "There is a lot left to learn" about
GenX and other compounds discharged into the Cape Fear River at the
Chemours Company's Fayetteville Works plant.

Ted Leopold, an attorney working on a federal class action lawsuit
against Chemours and Dupont, updated the audience about the status
of the lawsuit.

Mr. Leopold brought up the consent order filed before Thanksgiving,
which would require Chemours to pay a $12 million fine and provide
safe drinking water to those living around the Fayetteville Works
plant.

He said the order was a step in the right direction, but that few
people will be helped by the consent order and the goal is to
ensure the hundreds of thousands affected have fair compensation.

"I think it's the beginning and it's a good step by the DEQ, and
Chemours and DuPont should be commended for starting the process
but the example I gave tonight is this is a marathon,"
Mr. Leopold said. "This is the first few steps of a very long race
and very few people are going to be helped in any way by this. Our
goal and our responsibility is to make sure everyone, the hundreds
of thousands who have been affected, and over 200,000 homes and the
filtration systems that are effected, are provided a full measure
of justice and provided clean water in their homes and for the
health and safety of them as individuals."

Many who attended the meeting were curious about the health impacts
of GenX and other chemical compounds. Dr. Cahoon and Mr. Leopold
said it is too early to know effects the compounds cause on humans,
but there are things concerned community members can do now.

"A lot of people come to these events who have health related
issues and they're not sure if the contamination of the water has
caused their problems," Mr. Leopold said. "We don't have a crystal
ball but we do know that certain pieces of education such as their
medical records, their history, how long they've lived here, how
long they've drank the water, how long the toxins have been in the
water, how long Chemours and DuPont have contaminated the water,
the number of years of dumping this stuff into the Cape Fear River.
If you put all those things together, sometimes it leads to the
right answers that a lot of these physical problems and health
related issues are a result of the conduct of DuPont and
Chemours."

He compared the process to a marathon, but is urging everyone in
the area to save receipts pertaining to safe drinking water or
health expenses.

"Everybody who has to pay out of pocket for their bottled water or
their health issues, potentially, depending on how the litigation
goes, can be reimbursed appropriately for those out of pocket
expenses," Mr. Leopold said. [GN]


CHG EMPLOYEE: Hale Seeks Overtime Pay for Patient Care Nurses
-------------------------------------------------------------
CAROL HALE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. CHG EMPLOYEE HOLDING LLC; and CORNERSTONE
HEALTHCARE GROUP HOLDING, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-00580-JAS (D. Ariz., Dec. 4, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff and class members worked as hourly paid direct patient
care nurses at Defendants' medical facilities located in Arizona.
The Plaintiff and class members did not receive bona fide meal
break periods. Instead, they were required and permitted to work
off-the-clock for Defendants during their meal break periods and
were not paid for such time. However, Defendants required nurses at
Cornerstone to remain responsible for patient care throughout their
shifts, including during meal periods. Nurses frequently went
without meals, and even when they did attempt to eat, their meal
periods were regularly interrupted by work demands. In short,
Defendants used the nurses' meal periods for the predominant
benefit of Cornerstone. Notwithstanding Defendants' practice of
requiring nurses to be available for work and to in fact work
throughout their meal periods, the Defendants employed timekeeping
software which automatically deducted 30 minutes from the total
time worked by nurses each shift so as to account for these
hypothetical meal periods, thereby enabling Defendants to receive
the benefit of an additional 30 minutes of unpaid work for each
shift worked by class members.

The Defendants' practice of failing to relieve nurses of their
duties during meal periods, while simultaneously using timekeeping
software to automatically deduct 30 minutes from the total time
paid per shift (on the pretext of accounting for meal periods which
nurses were not in fact free to take without constant
interruption), had the effect of depriving nurses of overtime
compensation due to them under the FLSA in the weeks in which they
worked more than 40 hours in a week, and of depriving them of
straight-time compensation at their hourly rate in weeks in which
they worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, the lawsuit says.

Cornerstone Healthcare owns and operates long term acute care
hospitals. The company offers a pulmonary/ventilator program that
includes individualized treatment for patients beset with various
cardiopulmonary/medical needs ranging from supplemental oxygen
therapies to complex ventilator management and weaning protocols; a
wound management program utilizing technology and techniques; a
medically complex program designed to treat patients with multiple
medical diagnoses requiring intensive care nursing and therapies,
such as PT, OT, SL, nutrition, medication management, wound care,
dialysis, and special procedures; and a medical rehabilitation
program.[BN]

Counsel for Carol Hale, and Proposed Class and Collective Action
Members:

          Todd Slobin, Esq.
          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          SHELLIST | LAZARZ | SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: tslobin@eeoc.net
                  rprieto@eeoc.net

               - and -

          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          BARON & BUDD, P.C.
          3102 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1100
          Dallas, Texas 75219
          Telephone: (214) 521-3605
          Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
          E-mail: marbuckl@baronbudd.com

CITIZENS FOR RAUNER: Stratics Group Removes Suit to N.D. Ill.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1441(a) and 1446, The Stratics
Group Inc. removed the cases docketed as (1) Peter Garvey,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. Citizens for Rauner, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2018CH3859 (Circuit Court of Cook County, March 23, 2018)
and (2) Citizens for Rauner, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff, v.
Victory Phones LLC and The Stratics Group, Inc., Third-Party
Defendants filed October 22, 2018, from the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on November 30, 2018, under Case No.
18-cv-07919.

Garvey's complaint against Citizens for Rauner alleges violations
of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and seeks monetary
and injunctive relief.

Citizens for Rauner filed a Third-Party Complaint against Stratics
and Victory Phones LLC on October 22, 2018, asserting Illinois
state-law claims for indemnification and contribution, as well as a
negligent misrepresentation claim only against Victory Phones, all
of which are entirely contingent on Rauner's liability under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Grounds for removal includes the fact that the original complaint
presents a federal question under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, and the Third-Party Complaint necessarily raises substantial
issues of federal law which the original court lacks original
jurisdiction.

The Stratics Group is represented by:

     Simon Fleischmann, Esq.
     W. Patrick Conlon, Esq.
     LOCKE LORD LLP
     111 South Wacker Drive
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Phone: (312) 443-0462
     Email: sfleischmann@lockelord.com
            wpatrick.conlon@lockelord.com

            - and -

Garvey is represented by:

      John Sawin, Esq.
      SAWIN LAW FIRM, LTD.
      55 West Wacker Drive, Suite 900
      Chicago, Illinois 60601
      Tel: (312) 853-2490
      Email: jsawin@sawinlawyers.com

Citizens for Rauner is represented by:

      Kevin M. O'Hagan, Esq.
      Shane M. Bradwell, Esq.
      O'Hagan Meyer, LLC
      1 E. Wacker Drive, Suite 3400
      Chicago, Illinois 60601
      Tel: (312) 422-6100
      Email: kohagan@ohaganmeyer.com
             sbradwell@ohaganmeyer.com

Victory Phones is represented by:

      Hal Ostrow, Esq.
      Rhoades McKee, Esq.
      55 Campau Ave NW, Suite 300
      Grand Rapids, MI 49503
      Tel: (616) 233-5120
      Email:hostrow@rhoadesmckee.com




COLLECTION ANALYST: Ct. Awards $28.5K Attorney's Fees in Powers
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Approval of Plaintiff's Incentive Award & Damages and
Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees and Costs in the case captioned LAURA
POWERS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated;
Plaintiff, v. THE COLLECTION ANALYST, INC., and JUDITH D.
RETELSDORF, Defendants. No. 8:17CV229. (D. Nev.).

This is a class action for violations of the Fair Debt Practices
and Collection Act (FDCPA) and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act
(NCPA).

The Court finds that the plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is
entitled to attorney fees. The Court has considered the Johnson
factors and finds that an award of $28,500.00, as agreed by the
parties, is fair and reasonable. The plaintiff has achieved a
significant degree of success in that she, on behalf of the class,
has recovered the maximum amount of statutory damages under the
FDCPA and NCPA. Significantly, on behalf of the class, the
plaintiff has also achieved prospective relief in that the
defendants have agreed to change collection practices. Also, the
amount of plaintiff's attorney fees and costs is separate from, and
in addition to, the class recovery. The plaintiff has demonstrated
that counsels' services have benefitted the class.

The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel and time records
submitted in connection with the motion. The plaintiff has shown
that the negotiated amount represents a substantial reduction in
the time actually spent on the case by plaintiff's counsel. The
Court finds counsel expended a modest amount of time on the
litigation, presumably due to counsels' combined experience in
consumer protection litigation. The plaintiff seeks fees in an
amount that is below the lodestar, which would be $33,749.37. The
Court finds the time and labor expended by plaintiff's counsel in
this case is reasonable and necessary to prosecute a case of this
nature.

The plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and approval of incentive
award is granted.

The plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the amount of
$28,500.00.

The plaintiff class may recover costs amount of $440.62.

Statutory damages in the amount of $2000.00 and an incentive award
of $2000.00 to the plaintiff are approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7qgkx2k
from Leagle.com.

Laura Powers, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by O. Randolph Bragg --
rand@horwitzlaw.com -- HORWITZ, HORWITZ LAW FIRM, Pamela A. Car,
CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM & William L. Reinbrecht, CAR, REINBRECHT
LAW FIRM.

The Collection Analyst, Inc., Defendant, represented by John C.
Ochoa -- johoa!salawus.com -- SMITH, AMUNDSEN LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice, Michael T. Gibbons, WOODKE, GIBBONS LAW FIRM & Patrick M.
Heng, JEFFREY WELCH LAW FIRM.


COLLECTION ASSOCIATES: Kanehl Moves for Certification of Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marlene Kanehl moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit titled MARLENE KANEHL, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. COLLECTION
ASSOCIATES, LTD., Case No. 2:18-cv-01919 (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CONNOLLY MASONRY:  Ex-worker Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
--------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Lugo, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v.
Connolly Masonry, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-13622 (E.D. Mich.,
November 20, 2018), is brought against the Defendant for violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit to recover unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs owed to him individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals.

The Plaintiff, a resident of Pontiac, Michigan, worked as a mason,
operator, and laborer for Connolly for approximately ten years
until November 2017.

The Defendant Connolly Masonry, Inc. is a commercial and industrial
masonry company located in Clarkston, Michigan and doing business
in Michigan. The Defendant engages in the commercial construction
business and offers services including commercial and industrial
brick installation, block and stone work repair, and value
engineering. The company has been in business since 1996. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Philip J. Goodman, Esq.
      PHILIP J. GOODMAN, P.C.
      280 N. Old Woodward Ave., Suite 407
      Birmingham, MI 48009
      Tel: (248) 647-9300
      E-mail: pjgoodman1@aol.com

          - and -

      Robert W. Cowan, Esq.
      BAILEY PEAVEY BAILEY
      COWAN HECKAMAN PLLC
      5555 San Felipe St., Suite 900
      Houston, TX 77056
      Tel: (713) 425-7100
      E-mail: rcowan@bpblaw.com


COSMETIC INSTITUTE: Breast Augmentation Class Action Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Smith, writing for 2GB, repots that the Supreme Court has
given a class action against the country's largest cosmetic surgery
provider the green light.

The Cosmetic Institute had tried to halt the legal action, sparked
after a woman went into cardiac arrest during a breast augmentation
procedure.

Turner Freeman lawyer Sally Gleeson tells Chris Smith hundreds of
women have contacted them, and they expect the numbers will grow.

She says it's the first action of its kind in the country.

"This is a class action about a system of breast augmentation
surgery.

"It's about a system and a model that we say was created and
designed and implemented by the Cosmetic Institute, which at the
forefront of its objectives, we say, was profit rather than the
welfare of its patients." [GN]


COSMETIC INSTITUTE: Breast Surgery Class Action Set for Trial
-------------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Coe, writing for Daily Mail Australia, reports that the
Supreme Court has given up to 1000 women the green light to take
class action against a cosmetic surgery which they allege operated
like a 'fast food franchise'.  

Justice Peter Garling ruled five women who received treatment at
The Cosmetic Institute facilities in Queensland and NSW, could now
continue the suit against the company and their ex-surgical
director Dr Eddy Dona.  

The ruling will also open the door to potentially hundreds of other
claims.   

The ruling at NSW Supreme Court on Dec. 4 means up to 1000 women
could take part in a class action, according to The Daily
Telegraph.

All of the women had surgeries at places where TCI facilities were
offered, including two Sydney clinics, two Sydney hospitals and one
clinic in Queensland.

The case began after two women, including Amy Rickhuss, 24, had to
be resuscitated on the operating table at the cosmetic company's
Parramatta and Bondi Junction clinics.

Jessica Bruen, Kirsty-Anne Rowlands and Lily Knowland were the
three other women so far involved in the case.

According to court documents, the five plaintiffs claimed their
surgeries involved inadequate infection control procedures.

The claim added the two Sydney clinics were incapable of accessing
sufficient medical assistance in the case of an emergency.

The 'one size fits all approach' was also alleged to have increased
the risk of 11 complications including haemorrhage, scarring, local
anaesthetic toxicity, leading to cardiac arrest, pneumothorax and
death.

Dr Dona allegedly created the procedure and trained doctors to
administer the same implants even if customers had different breast
shapes.

The quality of training for the clinic's anaesthetists was also put
under the spotlight, including whether they knew to only use local
anaesthetic in all cases.

Summing up, Justice Girling said: 'I do not consider it is
'otherwise inappropriate' for the matter to continue as
representative proceedings.

The case is now due to go to trial, while TCI and Dr Dona will have
to pay the women's costs so far.

It had been adjourned until December 14. [GN]


COVENANT TRANSPORT: Tabizon Labor Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Richard Tabizon, as an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Covenant Transport,
Inc., a Corporation, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No.: 18STCV03468, was removed from the Los Angeles
County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California (Western Division - Los Angeles). The
Central District of California Court Clerk Assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-10147-PA-PJW to the proceeding. The suit alleges
Labor/Management Relations violation. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Percy Anderson.[BN]

Covenant Transport is a truckload carrier headquartered in
Chattanooga, Tennessee. The company provides temperature controlled
trucking, regional delivery, and longhaul delivery. Having been
founded on Christian principles, it also promotes a Pro-Life
agenda.

Attorneys for Richard Tabizon:

          David J Lee, Esq.
          DAVID LEE LAW
          515 South Flower Street Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 236-3536
          Facsimile: (866) 658-4722
          E-mail: david@davidjleelaw.com

               - and -

          Edward W Choi, Esq.
          CHOI AND ASSOCIATES APC
          515 South Figueroa Street Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 381-1515
          Facsimile: (213) 465-4885
          E-mail: edward.choi@calaw.biz

               - and -

          Larry W Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP PC
          515 South Figueroa Street Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

Attorneys for Covenant Transport, Inc.:

          Kai-Ching Cha, Esq.
          Richard H Rahm, Esq.
          Gal Gressel, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON PC
          333 Bush Street 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-1940
          Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
          E-mail: kcha@littler.com
                  rrahm@littler.com
                  ggressel@littler.com

CREDIT BUREAU: Class Certification Sought in O'Boyle Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Anne O'Boyle moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit entitled ANNE O'BOYLE, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CREDIT BUREAU OF NAPA
COUNTY, INC. d/b/a CHASE RECEIVABLES, Case No. 2:18-cv-01927-LA
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CREDIT SYSTEMS: Whalen's Proceedings on Bid to Certify Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin granted the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification in the
lawsuit titled THOMAS WHALEN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. CREDIT SYSTEMS OF THE FOX VALLEY,
INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01914-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On December 5, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In
this Motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in
the complaint but also moved the Court to stay further proceedings
on that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."  However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."

Accordingly, the Court rules that the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification is
granted.  The parties are relieved from the automatic briefing
schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).

Moreover, Judge Duffin notes, for administrative purposes, it is
necessary that the Clerk terminate the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  However, this Motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]


DESERT STATES: Koch Seeks to Recover Pension Benefits Under ERISA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Koch, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Desert States Employers & UFCW Unions Pension
Plan; Board of Trustees of the Desert States Employers & UFCW
Unions Pension Plan, Plan Administrator of the Desert States
Employers & UFCW Unions Pension Plan, Case No. 2:18-cv-04458-DMF
(D. Ariz., December 5, 2018), accuses the Defendants of violating
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Mr. Koch brings this action under the ERISA for benefits and to
declare his rights under the terms of the Desert States Employers &
UFCW Unions Pension Plan and to enforce his rights and remedy
violations of the Plan and ERISA.  He alleges, inter alia, that
when he commenced receipt of retirement benefits several years
after attainment of normal retirement age, the Defendants failed to
pay him that portion of his nonforfeitable vested retirement
benefits attributable to the years following his attainment of
normal retirement age to account for the delay past his Normal
Retirement Date.

The Plan is a defined benefit employee pension benefit plan within
the meaning of the ERISA, which was established and maintained for
the purpose of providing retirement benefits for participants and
their beneficiaries, including the Plaintiff.

The Board of Trustees of the Desert States Employers & UFCW Pension
Plan is the Administrator of the Plan and a fiduciary with respect
to the Plan within the meaning of the ERISA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Susan Martin, Esq.
          Jennifer Kroll, Esq.
          Michael M. Licata, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONNETT, P.L.L.C.
          4647 N. 32nd Street, Suite 185
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Telephone: (602) 240-6900
          E-mail: smartin@martinbonnett.com
                  jkroll@martinbonnett.com
                  mlicata@martinbonnett.com


DOUBLE DOWN: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Benson Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Double Down Interactive, LLC, and International Game
Technology filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
styled Adrienne Benson, et al. v. Double Down Interactive, LLC, et
al., Case No. 2:18-cv-00525-RBL, in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 4, 2018, Judge
Ronald B. Leighton denied the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Double Down on April
17, 2018, alleging that Double Down Casino constitutes illegal
gambling in violation of RCW Section 4.24.070.  Double Down Casino
is a game available as a computer or mobile app and allows users to
play gambling games with virtual "chips" that may be purchased in
the app after users run out of the initial free allotment.  Despite
the fact that these chips cannot be redeemed for actual money, the
Plaintiffs allege that they are nonetheless valuable because they
can be used to continue playing.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs allege
that Double Down's game amounts to gambling as defined by statute
and that they are entitled to recover the money they lost playing.

The appellate case is captioned as Adrienne Benson, et al. v.
Double Down Interactive, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-36015, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Double Down Interactive, LLC and International
      Game Technology's opening brief is due on February 4, 2019;

   -- Appellees Adrienne Benson and Mary Simonson's answering
      brief is due on March 6, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees ADRIENNE BENSON and MARY SIMONSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON P.C.
          350 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1400
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589-6370
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com

               - and -

          Janissa A. Strabuk, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          E-mail: jstrabuk@tousley.com

Defendant-Appellant DOUBLE DOWN INTERACTIVE, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company, is represented by:

          Jaime Drozd Allen, Esq.
          OGDEN MURPHY WALLACE PLLC
          901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3500
          Seattle, WA 98164
          Telephone: (206) 447-7000
          E-mail: jaimeallen@dwt.com

               - and -

          Cyrus Earl Ansari, Esq.
          Stuart Russell Dunwoody, Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
          920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104-1610
          Telephone: (206) 757-8353
          E-mail: cyrusansari@dwt.com
                  stuartdunwoody@dwt.com

Defendant-Appellant INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada
corporation, is represented by:

          Bonnie Lau, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          525 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2708
          Telephone: (415) 882-5083
          E-mail: bonnie.lau@dentons.com

               - and -

          Adam T. Pankratz, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 5150
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 693-7057
          E-mail: adam.pankratz@ogletree.com


DOUGLAS K. WHITE: Faces Pagan et al. Suit in M.D Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Warden Douglas K.
White. The lawsuit is captioned as Angel M. Pagan, Vladimir Cruz,
Edwin Michael Brown, and Jaime Sanchez, and Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Warden Douglas K. White and J. Ray
Ormond, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02317-JEJ-KM (M.D. Pa.,
Dec .4, 2018). The suit alleges civil rights violation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. John E. Jones, III.

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

DRIFT HOTEL: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Drift Hotel, Inc. The
lawsuit is styled Cheri Honeywell, Individually And On Behalf Of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Drift Hotel,
Inc., A Florida Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.:
0:18-cv-62959-CMA (S.D. Fla., Dec. 4, 2018). The suit alleges
Americans with Disabilities Act violation. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.

Drift Hotel, Inc. is in the hotels business.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L. KERR, P.A.
          DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com

DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Jones-Bell Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
Natasha Jones-Bell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC, CF Medical,
LLC and John Does 1-25, Case No. 2:18-cv-13634 (E.D. Mich.,
November 20, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory relief under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff alleges abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection
practices by the Defendants.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Michigan, County of
Wayne, residing at 29042 Burningtree Lane, Romulus, MI 48174.

The Defendants are debt collectors that use the mail, telephone,
and facsimile to collect debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Yaakov Saks, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      Fax: (201) 282-6501
      E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


EDISON BALLROOM: Dawson-Wainer Files Bid for Judicial Intervention
------------------------------------------------------------------
A request for judicial intervention was filed on December 4, 2018,
in the case docketed as Mariella Dawson-Wainer, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Edison
Ballroom, LLC, Jaime C. Masada, Jerry Wartski and any other related
entities, Defendants, Case No. 605824/2018 (N.Y. Sup., May 2,
2018).

Wainer seeks to recover unlawfully retained tips and gratuities
owed while working as server for the Defendants pursuant to New
York Labor Law.

Defendants operate a catered and ticketed events business at the
premises known as Edison Ballroom at 228 W. 47th Street, New York,
NY. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
      One Old Country Road, Suite 347
      Carle Place, NY 11514
      Tel: (516) 873-9550

Defendants are represented by:

      HOFFMAN & ASSOCIATES
      360 West 31st Street
      New York, NY 10001
      Tel: (212) 465-8840


EL PUNTO PERUANO: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Lemos Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIO LEMOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EL PUNTO PERUANO, LLC and VITALINO VASQUEZ, Case No.
2:18-cv-16870 (D.N.J., December 5, 2018), alleges that the
Defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed the
Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs by engaging in a
pattern, practice and policy of violating the Fair Labor Standards
Act by failing to pay their employees the applicable overtime rates
for all time worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

Punto Peruano is a New Jersey limited liability company located at
36 Watchung Avenue, in Plainfield, New Jersey.  Vitalino Vasquez is
an owner of Punto Peruano.

Punto Peruano is a restaurant that serves Peruvian cuisine to its
patrons.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Sackowitz, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          E-mail: ajsackowitz@katzmelinger.com


FEDERAL AVIATION: Wins Bid to Dismiss $5 Registration Rule
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ROBERT C. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00035(APM).
(D.D.C.).

FAA moves to dismiss, arguing that (1) the Plaintiff lacks standing
to sue, (2) the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over this
matter, and (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Plaintiff Robert Taylor is a model aircraft enthusiast who owns
multiple model planes and flies them as a hobby and for
recreational purposes. He brings this action on behalf of himself
and a putative class of all model aircraft owners who paid $5 to
register their aircraft with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) under a rule later struck down by the D.C. Circuit. The
Plaintiff claims that the registration requirement violated the
Privacy Act and the Little Tucker Act. He also advances against the
FAA a violation of his constitutional right of privacy, as well as
the common law tort of unjust enrichment.

The time value of money is the notion that money available today is
worth more than the same amount of money in the future.  That
principle is premised on the idea that money can earn interest over
time or be put to some other income-generating use, if invested.  

Neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has determined
whether the lost time value of money is a harm concrete enough to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Indeed, only one circuit
court appears to have even come close to embracing such a theory,
and there the alleged lost use was for a sum of money ($10,000) far
greater than at issue here. The only other circuit to have faced
the question declined to reach it. And some district courts have
rejected the notion that lost time value of money is
constitutionally sufficient to satisfy standing when the amount
wrongfully taken or withheld was discharged before filing suit a
circumstance comparable to this case, as Plaintiff now must pay the
$5 fee to register his model aircraft. Thus, accepting the lost
time value of money as a cognizable constitutional injury is far
from well established.

The court need not, however, venture down this rabbit hole. For
even if the lost time value of money could suffice to make out an
Article III injury, the bare allegation that a plaintiff has lost
the value of the time and resources sets out an injury that is too
abstract and indefinite to confer Article III standing.

Here, the Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that if he
had not paid the $5 registration fee he would have invested the $5
in some way to increase its value. At most, he offers only
generalizations that he was deprived of the use of those funds and
is entitled to be compensated for his lost use of funds. Such
conclusory proclamations are not the kind of clear allegations of
fact necessary to establish an injury in fact, even at the motion
to dismiss stage. Other courts have reached the same conclusion.

Therefore, as pleaded, the Plaintiff does not allege a sufficient
injury in fact to support standing based on the lost time value of
money.

Unlawful Maintenance of Personal Information

The Plaintiff's contention that the FAA's unlawful acquisition and
maintenance of his personal information constitutes a cognizable
injury suffers from similar problems. Presumably, this asserted
injury arises from the FAA's alleged violation of the Privacy Act.


In Doe v. Chao, the Supreme Court explained that the Privacy Act's
reference to adverse effect in 5 U.S.C. Section552a(g)(1)(D), the
statutory section under which Plaintiff asserts his Privacy Act
claim, acts as a term of art identifying a potential plaintiff who
satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article
III standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without
suffering dismissal for want of standing to sue. Thus, the wrongful
possession of Plaintiff's personal information, without more, does
not establish an injury in fact.

The Plaintiff's claimed injury arising from the FAA's keeping of
his personal information also runs aground on Circuit precedent.
Recently, the D.C. Circuit held in Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, that the
mere existence of inaccurate information about truckers' driving
records in an agency database does not amount to a sufficiently
concrete injury to confer standing, even where the agency had a
statutory obligation to keep accurate records. If the mere
maintenance of inaccurate information is not sufficient to confer
standing, surely an agency's retention of prosaic personal
information is not either. Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to
assert his claim under the Privacy Act.

Redressability

Here, the Plaintiff asserts that the court can redress his claimed
injuries by (1) refunding his $5 registration fee, (2) compensating
him for the lost use of the $5 fee, and (3) awarding him statutory
damages under the Privacy Act as a result of the FAA's unlawful,
intentional, and willful conduct.

The court cannot award the Plaintiff a $5 refund, or some lesser
amount, to compensate him for the lost time value of money. As the
FAA correctly points out, making Plaintiff whole for the lost use
of $5 over a two-year period would be tantamount to an award of
interest.  Neither the Privacy Act nor the Little Tucker Act the
only statutory claims advanced by Plaintiff provide such a waiver.


Moreover, the Plaintiff cannot avoid the bar of the no-interest
rule by recharacterizing his claimed injury as compensatory
damages. The character or nature of `interest' cannot be changed by
calling it damages, loss, earned increment, just compensation,
discount, offset or penalty, or any other term, because it is still
interest and the no-interest rule applies to it. Plaintiff's claim
for the lost use of the $5 fee is a demand for interest. Therefore,
the court lacks the power to redress Plaintiff's asserted injury of
the lost time value of money.

Here, the Plaintiff's Complaint contains no factual basis from
which the court can plausibly infer that it would have the power to
award him the minimum $1,000 statutory award to redress his claimed
injury. Having made no allegation whatsoever of pecuniary or
economic harm caused by the alleged Privacy Act violation, the
court is foreclosed from granting the $1,000 statutory award he
seeks.

Causation

Here, to some degree, the Plaintiff has brought harm upon himself.
He did not avail himself of the opportunity that the FAA afforded
registrants post-Taylor to request both a refund and removal of his
personal information from the agency's database. Had he done so,
Plaintiff would have achieved much of what he now seeks, at least
on his own behalf, through this lawsuit. The return of the $5
application fee when the FAA offered it would have reduced the lost
time value of money, and the deletion of his personal information
would have ended the agency's possession of it. There would have
been little to remedy at the time he filed suit. Thus, the injury
he now claims feels manufactured.

In any event, the court forgoes making any finding as to causation,
because the FAA has not argued that the element is lacking and the
absence of the remaining two elements is sufficient to conclude
Plaintiff does not have standing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yaw9nagn from Leagle.com.

ROBERT C. TAYLOR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by M. Therese Waymel --
therese.waymel@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C., Ryan M.
Poteet -- rmp@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C., John Peter
Glaws IV -- peter.glaws@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C.,
Thomas L. McCally -- thomas.mccally@carrmaloney.com -- CARR
MALONEY, P.C. & Matthew D. Berkowitz --
matthew.berkowitz@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION & MICHAEL P. HUERTA, as
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Defendants,
represented by Daniel Riess, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


FG KEY: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in Southern District of Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FG Key Haven, L.L.C.
The lawsuit is styled Cheri Honeywell, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FG Key Haven,
L.L.C., a Florida limited liability company, the Defendant, Case
No.: 0:18-cv-62960-DPG (S.D. Fla., Dec. 4, 2018). The suit alleges
Americans with Disabilities violation. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Judge Darrin P. Gayles.[BN]

Attorneys for Cheri Honeywell:

          Jessica Lyaintiffnn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L. KERR, P.A.
          DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com

FINANCE SYSTEM: Seventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Larkin Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jennifer R. Larkin filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Jennifer Larkin v. Finance System of Green Bay,
et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00496-WCG, in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the purported
class action lawsuit was filed on March 28, 2018.

Finance System of Green Bay, Inc. is a debt collector.

The appellate case is captioned as Jennifer Larkin v. Finance
System of Green Bay, et al., Case No. 18-3582, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that the
Appellant's brief is due on or before January 15, 2019, for
Jennifer R. Larkin.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JENNIFER R. LARKIN, individually and on behalf
of all those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Francis R. Greene, Esq.
          EDELMAN COMBS LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
          20 S. Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60603-0000
          Telephone: (312) 739-4200
          E-mail: fgreene@edcombs.com

               - and -

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue
          Springfield, NJ 07081-1315
          Telephone: (973) 379-7500
          Facsimile: (973) 532-5868
          E-mail: philip@sternthomasson.com
                  andrew@sternthomasson.com

Defendant-Appellee FINANCE SYSTEM OF GREEN BAY, INC., is
represented by:

          Jessica Lee Prom Klander, Esq.
          BASSFORD REMELE
          100 S. Fifth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 376-1660
          E-mail: jklander@bassford.com


FLOWERS BAKING: Button Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Richard Button, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Flowers Baking Co. of
Henderson, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company Erroneously Sued
As FBC of Henderson, LLC, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 18STCV00865, was removed from the Los Angeles
Superior Court, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California (Western Division - Los Angeles) on Dec. 5, 2018. The
Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-10116-RGK-AS to the proceeding. The suit alleges employment
discrimination. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge R. Gary
Klausner.

The Defendant is in the breads, rolls and buns business.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Alvin B Lindsay, Esq.
          David Yeremian, Esq.
          DAVID YEREMIAN AND ASSOCIATES INC
          535 North Brand Boulevard Suite 705
          Glendale, CA 91203-1989
          Telephone: (818) 230-8380
          Facsimile: (818) 230-0308
          E-mail: alvin@yeremianlaw.com
                  david@yeremianlaw.com

               - and -

          Walter L Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP PC
          5500 Bolsa Avenue Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (562) 652-2242
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: walter@whaines.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Alexander Miller Chemers, Esq.
          Jared Lee Palmer, Esq.
          Johnnie A. James, Esq.
          OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK AND STEWART PC
          400 South Hope Street Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 239-9800
          Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
          E-mail: alexander.chemers@ogletreedeakins.com
                  jared.palmer@ogletree.com
                  johnnie.james@ogletreedeakins.com

GEICO GENERAL: Savage Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Amanda Savage, Individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. GEICO General Insurance
Company, the Defendant, Case No.: CACE-18-025687, was removed from
the 17th Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Ft Lauderdale)
on on Dec. 4, 2018. The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 0:18-cv-62953-UU to the proceeding. The suit
alleges insurance-related violation. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Ursula Ungaro.

GEICO provides personal automobile insurance products. The company
operates as a private passenger auto insurer.[BN]

Attorneys for Amanda Savage:

          Casim Adam Neff, Esq.
          NEFF INSURANCE LAW, PLLC
          4051 27th Ave. North
          Saint Petersburg, FL 33713
          Telephone: (727) 342-0617

               - and -

          Craig Evan Rothburd, Esq.
          CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, P.A.
          320 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 251-8800
          Facsimile: 251-5042
          E-mail: crothburd@e-rlaw.com

               - and -

          Edward Herbert Zebersky, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP
          110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989-6333
          Facsimile: (954) 989-7781
          E-mail: ezebersky@zpllp.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Kristen Wenger Bracken, Esq.
          Lindsey Ryan Trowell, Esq.
          John Patrick Marino, Esq.
          SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, L.L.P.
          50 North Laura Street, Suite 2600
          Jacksonville, FL 32202
          Telephone: (904) 598-6100
          E-mail: kbracken@sgrlaw.com
                  ltrowell@sgrlaw.com
                  jmarino@sgrlaw.com

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Dismisses Count III in ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: G.E. ERISA LITIGATION, Civil Action No.
17-cv-12123-IT (D. Mass.), Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second
Consolidated Amended Complaint.

The putative class action is brought by participants in a 401(k)
plan against the institutional and individual Defendants, alleging
breaches of fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions in
violation of the Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").  Eligible employees of GE and participating affiliates
can participate in GE's 401(k) Plan, also known as the GE
Retirement Savings Plan by investing up to 30% of their eligible
earnings in any of a number of investment options within the Plan.


The action pertains to the Plaintiffs' investments in five mutual
funds among these options: the GE Institutional Strategic
Investment Fund, the GE Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund, the GE
Institutional International Equity Fund, the GE RSP Income Fund,
and the GE U.S. Equity Fund.

The GE Funds are the only actively managed funds open to eligible
employees of GE and participating affiliates.  The Employees and
affiliates can also participate in the Plan by investing in the GE
Stock Fund, six collective trust index funds, Target Date Funds,
and/or a Money Market Fund.  GE also required that certain
proprietary investment options, the Income Fund and the US Equity
Fund, be offered to Plan participants.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants used the Plan
participants to offset the investor exodus from the underperforming
funds despite the fact that the Plan participants could have been
better served by investment options from unaffiliated companies
that were cheaper and better performing.  As of Dec. 31, 2015, the
Plan owned the vast majority of assets in the five mutual funds;
assets from Plan participants ranged from approximately 40% of all
fund assets to approximately 96% of all fund assets, depending on
the fund and the year.

All of the Plan's actively managed funds were managed and sponsored
by GE's whollyowned subsidiary, GE Asset Management, until July 1,
2016, when GE sold the subsidiary to State Street for a reported
$485 million dollars.  The Plaintiffs allege that GE retained the
poorly performing proprietary funds as a constant source of fees
and to help inflate the market value of GE Asset Management prior
to its sale to State Street.  Of the total $28 billion value of the
Plan, at the time of its sale, GE Asset Management managed $8
billion in assets.  Furthermore, from 2010 to 2016, GE earned more
than $175 million in fees from the proprietary funds.

Pending before the court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Second Consolidated Amended Complaint.  The Defendants argue that
Counts III and IV are barred because of the statute of limitations.
They raise two further arguments regarding prohibited
transactions: (1) that ERISA Section 406 does not apply because the
management fees are not a "plan asset," and (2) that even if
management fees are a "plan asset," the Plaintiffs' claim must be
dismissed because they have not pled a non-exempt prohibited
transaction.

After a hearing, the Curt denied the motion as to Counts I, II, V,
VI, VII, and VIII, and took Counts III and IV under advisement.

Judge Talwani finds that to the extent that the basis of the
Plaintiffs' claim is that the Defendants only offered proprietary
funds as the sole actively managed investment options of the Plan,
the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge the day they elected their Plan
options.  Thus, Count III is barred by the statute of limitations.

Next, he finds that there are no facts in the Second Amended
Complaint to suggest that the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge that
their funds were performing poorer and their fees cost higher
compared to other funds.  Even if they did, the Plaintiffs would
certainly not have known about the sale of GE Asset Management
prior to July 1, 2016, to State Street Corporation.  The Plaintiffs
do not only allege that the Defendants profited from the management
fees, but that they also profited from the financial health of GE
Asset Management due to the selection and presence of the GE Funds
in GE Asset Management's portfolio.  This financial benefit
culminated in the sale of GE Asset Management for a reported $485
million dollars.  As July 2016 is within the three-year statute of
limitations, the Judge holds that Count IV is not barred by the
statute of limitations.

Finally, the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants continued
to place and keep them in GE Funds despite the funds' lackluster
performances to prop up the funds prior to GE Asset Management's
sale to State Street.  The allegation, at the motion to dismiss
stage, would fail the duty of prudence under ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(B).12  At this stage, this exemption would not apply to
Count IV.

For these reasons, Judge Talwani granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion.  She granted the Defendants' motion as to
Count III and denied as to Count IV.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/cqNv2F from Leagle.com.

Brian Sullivan, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiff, represented by Jordan D. Mamorsky --
jmamorsky@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Lee Squitieri, Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice,
Theodore M. Hess-Mahan -- thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com --
Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP, Jacob A. Walker --
jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton --
jason@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP.

Kristi Haskins, Individually and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security Program,
Plaintiff, represented by Charles H. Field --
cfield@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac
vice, David W. Sanford -- dsanford@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford
Heisler, LLP, David Hahn Tracey -- dtracey@sanfordheisler.com --
Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin Sharp --
ksharp@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac
vice, Andrew H. Miller -- amiller@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford
Heisler Sharp, LLP, Edward D. Chapin -- echapin@sanfordheisler.com
-- Sanford Heisler SHarp, LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker, Block
& Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C.
Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Anthony Powell, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiff, represented by Evan J. Kaufman , Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M. Leviton, Block &
Leviton LLP, Jordan D. Mamorsky, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Orin Kurtz -- okurtz@gardylaw.com -- Gardy & Notis,
LLP, pro hac vice, R. Joseph Barton -- jbarton@blockesq.com --
Block & Leviton LLP, Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey
C. Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Frank Magliocca, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Kelvin Douglas, Individually and on behalf of a class
of all persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN & Melinda Stubblefield, Individually and on behalf of
a class of all persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiffs, represented by Evan J.
Kaufman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M.
Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP, Jordan D. Mamorsky, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Orin Kurtz, Gardy & Notis, LLP,
pro hac vice, R. Joseph Barton, Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice,
Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block, Block &
Leviton LLP.

Maria LaTorre, Individually and on behalf of a class of all persons
simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN &
Robyn Berger, Individually and on behalf of a class of all persons
simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adam M. Stewart, Shapiro Haber & Urmy
LLP, Edward F. Haber, Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Jordan D. Mamorsky,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker,
Block & Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP &
Jeffrey C. Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Laura Scully, Individually and as a representative of a class
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security Program
& Donald J. Janak, Individually and as representative of a class of
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security Program,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew H. Miller, Sanford Heisler Sharp,
LLP, Charles H. Field, Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice,
David W. Sanford, Sanford Heisler, LLP, David Hahn Tracey, Sanford
Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin Sharp, Sanford Heisler
Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP,
Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block, Block &
Leviton LLP.

General Electric Company, GE Asset Management Incorporated, Dmitri
Stockton, Ralph Richard Layman, Rochelle Lazarus, Matthew Simpson,
Francisco DSouza, Robert Lane, James Tisch, Matthew Zakrzewski,
Marjin Dekkers, Mary Schapiro, Susan Hockfield, John J. Brennan,
Benefit Plans Investment Committee, Michael Cosgrove, W. Geoffrey
Beattie, GE Pension Board, Andrea Jung, David Wiederecht, James
Mulva, Jeffrey Immelt, Don Torey, John Flannery, GEAM Committee,
George Bicher, Jessica Holscott, James Rohr, Greg Hartch, Jeanne
LaPorta, Paul Colonna, GE Board of Directors, Roger Penske, Matt
Cribbins, Keith Sherin, Sam Nunn, Alan Lafley, James Cash, John
Samuels, Carol Anderson, Douglas Warner, Kelly Lafnitzegger, Brian
Worrell, Susan Peters, Jamie Miller, Jan Hauser, Ann Fudge, Robert
Swieringa, Sharon Daley, John Lynch, Tracie Winbigler, Jeff
Bornstein, Puneet Mahajan & Trevor Schauenberg, Defendants,
represented by Alison V. Douglass -- adouglass@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP, Jaime A. Santos -- jsantos@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter LLP & James O. Fleckner -- jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com
-- Goodwin Procter, LLP.

John Walker, Defendant, represented by James O. Fleckner, Goodwin
Procter, LLP.


GRAMERCY PARK HOTEL: Ullo Hits Illegal Tip Pool, Seeks Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Allison Ullo, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Aby Rosen, Gregg Popkin, Patrick Hall, Dane
Asermely, Sebastien Lefavre, RFR Holding LLC, GPH Partners LLC, GPH
Management LLC and GP Services LLC, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-11281 (S.D. N.Y., December 4, 2018), seeks redress for
damages, liquidated damages, statutory damages, prejudgment
interest, post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York
Labor Law.

Defendants own and operate the hotel property known as "Gramercy
Park Hotel" where Ullo worked as waitress at their location in 2
Lexington Avenue in New York, New York. Ullo claims overtime for
off-the-clock work, swing shifts and was required to perform
non-tipped duties including handling all paperwork that takes
approximately 30 minutes to an hour despite being required to
participate in a tip pool without being informed of the tip pool
guidelines. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
      LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      1 Penn Plaza, Suite 2527
      New York, NY 10119
      Tel: (212) 792-0046
      Email: joshua@levinepstein.com

             - and -

      David M. Kasell, Esq.
      1038 Jackson Avenue, #4
      Long Island City, NY 11101
      Tel: (718) 404-6668



GUILLERMO PRADO: Wins Final OK of $275K Settlement in Ledo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Lucy H. Koh issued an order granting final approval of the
class action settlement in the lawsuit entitled CESAR LEDO, et al.
v. GUILLERMO PRADO and MARIA PRADO, Case No. 5:17-cv-02393-LHK
(N.D. Cal.).

The classes are defined as:

   (1) The Overtime ("OT") Class includes all "non-exempt hourly
       employees who were employed by Defendants in California as
       non-exempt hourly employees between April 26, 2014 and
       December 31, 2014 who were not paid overtime at the rate
       of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay."; and

   (2) The Hourly Wage Dispute ("Hourly") Class includes "all
       non-exempt hourly employees who are employed or have been
       employed by Defendants from April 26, 2013 through
       April 1, 2018."

The total gross recovery for both classes is $275,000.  All members
of the OT Class are members of the Hourly Class.  The total net
recovery for both classes is $179,850.  There are 222 Hourly Class
Members and 69 OT Class Members.  Class members will receive in
total an average of $810.  The most a class member will receive in
total is $6,485.  The least a class member will receive in total is
$4.30.

The Hourly Class will receive a net total of $70,141.  The Hourly
Class Members will receive an average of $5.37 per workweek.  The
OT Class will receive a net total of $109,708.  The OT Class
Members will receive an average of $131.86 per workweek.

The Court approves the Settlement and each of the releases and
other terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair, just,
reasonable and adequate as to the Hourly and OT Classes, the Class
Representatives, and the Defendants (collectively, the "Settling
Parties").  The Settling Parties and the Claims Administrator are
directed to perform in accordance with the terms set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court orders the appointment of Cesar Ledo, Miguel Ledo and
Ricardo Choy Morey as Class Representatives for the Hourly Class
and the OT Class for purposes of settlement.

The Court orders the appointment of James Dal Bon, Esq., of the Law
Offices of James Dal Bon as Class Counsel for the Settlement
Classes for purposes of settlement and the releases and other
obligations.

The Defendant has agreed that the Claims Administrator shall pay
from the Gross Settlement Amount: (i) to the Claims Administrator
$14,000, and (ii) to the Class Representatives $2,500 each to
reimburse them for their valuable services in initiating and
maintaining this litigation, and the benefits conferred onto the
Settlement Classes and Defendant's current and future employees as
a result of the Action.

The Court awards to Class Counsel $68,750 for attorney's fees, and
$4,900 for costs.

The Action is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice,
permanently barring the Releasing Members from prosecuting any of
the Released Claims.  The Court reserves and retains exclusive and
continuing jurisdiction over the Action, the Class Representatives,
the Settlement Classes, and Defendant for the purposes of
supervising the implementation, effectuation, enforcement,
construction, administration and interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement and this Judgment.[CC]


HASBRO INC: Faces Stockholders Class Action
-------------------------------------------
Tonya Garcia, writing for MarketWatch, reports that Hasbro Inc.
stock was downgraded to hold from strong buy at CFRA after a
class-action lawsuit alleges executives deceived stockholders about
the state of the business. "Members of retirement systems across
the U.S. that bought shares of Hasbro have filed a class-action
lawsuit against the toy-maker alleging that Hasbro deceived
investors about the financial condition of the company and
artificially boosted share prices, while the CEO and CFO sold $147
million in personal shares, according to several unconfirmed
reports on November 30," CFRA wrote. Hasbro stock closed down 5.2%
on Nov. 30. "[W]e see this lawsuit posing longer-term
implications," wrote CFRA, which cut its price target to $98 from
$108. Hasbro shares are down 1.7% in the Dec. 3 trading, and have
fallen nearly 10% for the last three months. The S&P 500 index SPX,
-1.54% is down 4% for the past three months. [GN]


HAVEN'S KITCHEN: Faces Delacruz ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Haven's Kitchen LLC.
The lawsuit is captioned as Emanuel Delacruz and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Haven's
Kitchen LLC and Haven's Kitchen Home LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-11318-KPF (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2018). The suit alleges
Americans with Disabilities Act violation. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Katherine Polk Failla.

The Defendants operate a cooking school.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (917) 796-7437
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: danalgottlieb@aol.com

HEALTH KOREA: Shin Sues over Misleading Advertising Scheme
----------------------------------------------------------
James Shin, on behalf of herself and ail other similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. Health Korea, individual and DOES 1-125,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 18STCV07225 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 5,
2018), seeks an order compelling the Defendant to (1) cease
packaging, distributing, advertising and selling its health product
massage in violation of U.S. FDA regulations and California
consumer protection law; (2) re-label or recall all existing
deceptively packaged Products; (3) conduct a corrective advertising
campaign to fully inform California consumers; (4) award Plaintiff
and Plaintiff family restitution, actual damages, and punitive
damages; and (5) pay all costs of suit, expense, and attorney
fees.

Health Korea manufactures, packages, distributes, advertises,
markets, and sells a variety of health products massage called Dr.
Mouse (MSP).  According to the complaint, the Products' labeling
and advertising is false and misleading and the Products are
misbranded.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


HOMELAND SECURITY: Pending Motions Stricken without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Margarito Castanon Nava,
et al., the Plaintiff, vs. Department of Homeland Security, et al.
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D Ill.), the Hon. Judge
Rebecca R. Pallmeyer entered an order striking pending motions
without prejudice, according to the docket entry made by the Clerk
on  December 18, 2018.[CC]

According to a report by Ben Leonard, writing for NBC News, the
class-action was filed against the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of
likely more than 100 people arrested and detained by ICE without
warrants or an established flight risk in a seven-day period near
Chicago.  Four of the five plaintiffs named in the complaint do not
have criminal records, according to the complaint.

The NBC News report said Mr. Castanon, a construction worker,
indicated he was heading home with a co-worker on the afternoon of
Sunday, May 20, 2018, after finishing work, according to his
declaration. A 17-year resident of the U.S. with no criminal
record, Mr. Castanon, 42, was driving his truck through a Chicago
suburb.  Then, unmarked cars driven by officers in street clothes
pulled him over. Although he first thought the officers were local
police, Mr. Castanon later found out they were ICE agents. They
didn't give Mr. Castanon or his passenger, also Latino, a reason
for the stop and didn't have a warrant, according to his attorney.
Another car pulled in 10 minutes later and Mr. Castanon observed
officers in generic vests that said "POLICE." He and his passenger
were arrested, but only told the arresting officers were ICE agents
when they arrived at an immigration building.

Attorneys for Margarito Castanon Nava and John Doe:

          Mark M. Fleming, Esq.
          Katherine Elizabeth Mello Goettel, Esq.
          NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER
          208 S. Lasalle Street, Suite 1300
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 660 1628
          E-mail: mfleming@heartlandalliance.org
                  kgoettel@heartlandalliance.org

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Linda Y Cheng, Esq.
          Wisecup Lloyd Jason, Esq.
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION,
          OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
          P.O. Box 878
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 514-0500
          E-mail: linda.cheng@usdoj.gov
                  jason.wisecup2@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Craig Arthur Oswald, Esq.
          AUSA - CHICAGO, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          (NDIL-CHICAGO)
          219 South Dearborn Street
          Chicago, IL 60604
          E-mail: USAILN.ECFAUSA@usdoj.gov
                  craig.oswald@usdoj.gov


HOSPITALITY VENTURES: Bid for Class Certification Denied as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WAI MAN TOM on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
HOSPITALITY VENTURES LLC doing business as Umstead Hotel and Spa,
SAS INSTITUTE INC., and NC CULINARY VENTURES LLC doing business as
An Asian Cuisine, the Defendants, Case 5:17-cv-00098-FL (E.D.N.C.),
the Hon. Judge Louise W. Flanagan entered an order on December 18,
2018:

   1. granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment with
      respect to plaintiff's federal law claims;

   2. dismissing the Plaintiff's state law claims without
      prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c);

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
      class certification, and the Plaintiff's motion to seal;

   4. denying the Defendants' motion for hearing and directing
      clerk to close the case.

The Court said, "Although defendants suggest that summary judgment
on plaintiff's state law claims is required largely on the same
grounds as the Fair Labor Standards Act claims, the scope of
liability and relief under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act is
sharply contested by plaintiff. Neither party cites controlling
Fourth Circuit or North Carolina law regarding the interpretation
of the scope of the NCWHA in comparison to the FLSA. In this
manner, declining jurisdiction is appropriate both due to dismissal
of all federal claims as well as the novel issue of state law
arising from interpretation of the NCWHA. See 28 U.S.C. section
1367(c). In these circumstances, the court declines in its
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff's pendent
state law claims, and such claims are dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c). Having determined that
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted with
respect to plaintiff's federal law claims and that plaintiff's
state law claims shall be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 1367(c), the plaintiff's motion for conditional
and class certification is denied as moot."[CC]

HUUUGE INC: Appeals Decision in Wilson Suit to 9th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Defendant HUUUGE, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Sean Wilson v. HUUUGE, Inc., Case No.
3:18-cv-05276-RBL, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 5, 2018, Judge
Ronald B. Leighton denied Huuuge's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Huuuge on April 6,
2018, alleging that Huuuge Casino constitutes illegal gambling in
violation of RCW Section 4.24.070.  Huuuge Casino is a game
available as a mobile app and allows users to play gambling games
with virtual "chips" that may be purchased in the app after users
run out of the initial free allotment.  Despite the fact that these
chips cannot be redeemed for actual money, Wilson alleges that they
are nonetheless valuable because they can be used to continue
playing.  Therefore, Wilson alleges that Huuuge's game amounts to
gambling as defined by statute and that he is entitled to recover
the money he lost playing.

The appellate case is captioned as Sean Wilson v. HUUUGE, Inc.,
Case No. 18-36017, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant HUUUGE, Inc.'s opening brief is due on
      February 4, 2019;

   -- Appellee Sean Wilson's answering brief is due on March 6,
      2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee SEAN WILSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON P.C.
          350 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1400
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589-6370
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com

               - and -

          Janissa A. Strabuk, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          E-mail: jstrabuk@tousley.com

Defendant-Appellant HUUUGE, INC., a Delaware corporation, is
represented by:

          Jaime Drozd Allen, Esq.
          OGDEN MURPHY WALLACE PLLC
          901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3500
          Seattle, WA 98164
          Telephone: (206) 447-7000
          E-mail: jaimeallen@dwt.com

               - and -

          Cyrus Earl Ansari, Esq.
          Stuart Russell Dunwoody, Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
          920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104-1610
          Telephone: (206) 757-8353
          E-mail: cyrusansari@dwt.com
                  stuartdunwoody@dwt.com


IDT TELECOM: Lainez Suit Seeks to Stop Unwanted Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
FIDENCIO LAINEZ, on behalf of himself and other persons similarly
situated v. IDT TELECOM, INC. d/b/a BOSS REVOLUTION, Case No.
2:18-cv-12519 (E.D. La., December 5, 2018), seeks to stop the
Defendant's alleged practice of making unauthorized and unwanted
text message calls to the cellular telephones of consumers
nationwide and to obtain redress for all persons injured by their
conduct pursuant to Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

IDT is a New Jersey-based for-profit corporation.  IDT conducts
business in Louisiana and throughout the United States.

IDT is the company behind the popular, international
telecommunications service Boss Revolution.  Consumers use Boss
Revolution's mobile phone application and pre-paid, rechargeable
phone cards to make international calls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          Jonathan Mille Kirkland, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                  whb@beaumontcostales.com
                  jmk@beaumontcostales.com


INNOVIS DATA: Consumers Sue Over Erroneous Credit Reports
---------------------------------------------------------
William Perez, Jr., and Kelissa Ronquillo-Griffin, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Innovis
Data Solutions, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-02801-L-MSB (S.D.
Cal., December 13, 2018) is a complaint for damages, injunctive
relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant with regard to
Defendant's reporting of erroneous negative and derogatory reports
to Plaintiffs' credit reports.

The Defendant has erroneously reported continual monthly payment
obligations on accounts that have been closed and paid in full,
says the complaint. The Defendant has negligently and willfully
failed to employ reasonable procedures -- including procedures
readily available to them of which they are aware -- to ensure
maximum possible accuracy of their credit reports. This willful and
negligent failure to properly investigate the repeated disputes of
Plaintiffs concerning the inaccurate data Defendant is reporting in
consumers' credit files, and Defendant's failure to correct such,
which Defendant knew or should have known was erroneous, caused
Plaintiffs damages.

For this reason, Plaintiffs seek damages arising out of the
systematic issuance of erroneous credit reports by Defendant, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs are "consumers" who reside in the County of San Diego,
in the State of California.

Defendant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State
of Ohio and authorized to do business in the State of California.
Defendant is regularly engaged in the practice of assembling and
evaluating consumer credit information for the purpose of
furnishing to third parties reports of consumers' credit histories,
commonly referred to as "credit reports,".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
     Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
     Elizabeth Wagner, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     1303 East Grand Avenue, Ste. 101
     Arroyo Grande, CA 93420
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ak@kazlg.com
            ml@kazlg.com
            elizabeth@kazlg.com

          - and -

     Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
     HYDE & SWIGART
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Ste. 101
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: (619) 233-7770
     Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
     Email: josh@westcoastlitigation.com


J. FRED: Restaurant Not Fully Accessible to Disabled, Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SPENCER NEAL, the Plaintiff, vs. THE J. FRED SCHMIDT PACKING
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01589-GCS-EPD (S.D. Ohio,
Dec. 6, 2018), seeks injunctive relief, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is an individual with
disabilities as defined by the ADA.  Mr. Neal is paralyzed as a
result of spina bifida and relies on a wheelchair to ambulate.  Mr.
Neal has visited the property on August 31, 2018, which forms the
basis of this lawsuit.  Mr. Neal will return to Defendant's
restaurant, because he enjoys the German-style food there, if
Defendant's restaurant is made fully accessible to a disabled
person in a wheelchair, and to also avail himself of the
restaurant's services. Furthermore, Mr. Neal intends to return to
Defendant's restaurant as an ADA tester to ascertain whether
Defendant removed the barriers to access which are the subject of
this litigation. The Plaintiff has personally encountered
architectural barriers at the subject property. The barriers to
access at the property have denied him the full and equal access to
the property, the lawsuit says.

Fred J (trade name Schmidts Sausage Haus Rest) is in the German
restaurant business.[BN]

Attorney for Spencer Neal:

          Colin G. Meeker, Esq.
          BLAKEMORE, MEEKER & BOWLER CO., L.P.A.
          495 Portage Lakes Dr.
          Akron, OH 44319
          Telephone: (330) 253-3337
          Facsimile: (330) 253-4131
          E-mail: cgm@bmblaw.com

JP ENVIRONMENTAL: Restaurant Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime Premium
----------------------------------------------------------------
Leoncio Gumercindo Gomez Escobar and Carmen Rufino Gabriel Miranda,
on behalf of themselves and all other plaintiffs similarly
situated, known and unknown, v. J.P. Environmental Products
Corporation and Fred S. Wang, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-08005
(N.D. Ill., December 5, 2018), seeks redress for Defendants'
failure to pay overtime compensation and unlawfully deducting
thirty minutes from work hours each day for un-availed meal breaks
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law, the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance and the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act.

Defendants operate as Great Sea Chinese Restaurant located at 3253
West Lawrence Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, where Miranda and
Escobar worked as a food preparers. Defendants failed to create,
maintain, and preserve complete and accurate payroll records and
did not pay Plaintiffs overtime premium for hours worked in excess
of forty in any work week, the complaint asserts. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Timothy M. Nolan, Esq.
      Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
      NOLAN LAW OFFICE
      53 W. Jackson Blvd., Ste. 1137
      Chicago, IL 60604
      Tel (312) 322-1100
      Fax (312) 322-1106
      Email: tnolan@nolanwagelaw.com
             sengelson@nolanwagelaw.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Suit Over BBSW
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned RICHARD DENNIS, et
al., Plaintiffs v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al., Defendants. No.
16-cv-6496 (LAK). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, in violation of the
federal antitrust laws, entered into a series of agreements
designed to create profit or limit liabilities amongst themselves
by coordinating the manipulation of BBSW and the prices of
BBSW-Based Derivatives, by conspiring to, inter alia: (1) engage in
manipulative money market transactions during the BBSW Fixing
Window (2) make false BBSW rate submissions that did not reflect
actual transaction prices (3) uneconomically buy or sell money
market instruments at a loss to cause artificial derivatives prices
and (4) share proprietary BBSW-Based Derivatives information.

BBSW is a benchmark interest rate, somewhat similar in concept to
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in that it is used to
price certain types of financial derivatives. Plaintiffs here, all
of whom engaged in U.S.-based transactions for BBSW-based
derivatives during the purported class period, bring claims under
the Clayton Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act). They
sue as well on state law claims for unjust enrichment and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Defendants' motions to dismiss each are granted in part and
denied in part, as follows:

   A. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim is granted (except as to defendants
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.) to the
following extent:

      (1) All claims brought by plaintiffs FrontPoint Financial
Services Fund, L.P. and FrontPoint Financial Horizons Fund, L.P.
are dismissed;

      (2) The Plaintiffs do not have class standing to assert
claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or unjust enrichment on behalf of purported class members
to the extent such class members traded in BBSW-based forward rate
agreements and 90-day BAB futures;

      (3) The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) claims brought by
FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, L.P. and Sonterra Capital
Master Fund, Ltd. are dismissed;

      (4) The remaining CEA and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act claims are dismissed as to defendants
Deutsche Bank AG, Royal Bank of Canada, RBC Capital Markets LLC,
Lloyds Banking Group plc, Lloyds Bank plc, Macquarie Group Ltd.,
Macquarie Bank Ltd., Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Australia
Limited, ICAP plc, ICAP Australia Pty Ltd., Tullett Prebon plc, and
Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd.

The Defendants argue that Sonterra and the FrontPoint Plaintiffs
lack standing under the CEA on the basis that the pre-Dodd Frank
CEA governs this case, not the current version of the statute.

The CEA was amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, which became effective on July 21, 2011.
Among other things, the amendment added swaps to the purview of
Sections 6(c) and 22, quoted above. Prior to that amendment, the
CEA excluded a sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery from the term future delivery as well as agreements,
contracts, and transactions in excluded commodities if the
agreement, contract or transaction was (1) entered into by eligible
contract participants and (2) not executed or traded on a trading
facility.

Even if the pre-Dodd Frank version of the CEA excluded such swaps
and forwards, the amendments to the CEA enacted by Dodd Frank
became effective before the changes AFMA made to the BBSW rate set
process, which occurred just over two years later in September
2013. Accordingly, it is unclear whether all of the transactions
allegedly entered into by the FrontPoint Plaintiffs and Sonterra
would fall under the pre-Dodd Frank version of the CEA.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs have waived their CEA claims in respect of
BBSW-Based Derivatives other than CME Australian dollar futures
contracts the derivatives in which Dennis transacted.

Accordingly, Sonterra's and the FrontPoint Plaintiffs' claims under
the CEA will be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yadg4qd9 from Leagle.com.

Richard Dennis, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, FrontPoint Financial Services Fund, L.P., On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, FrontPoint Asian
Event Driven Fund, L.P., On behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, FrontPoint Financial Horizons Fund, L.P., On
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated & Sonterra
Capital Master Fund, Ltd., On behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christian Levis
-clevis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Christopher Lovell --
CLovell@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Edward
Y. Kroub -- Ekroub@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson
LLP, Geoffrey Milbank Horn -- ghorn@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Lee Jason Lefkowitz -- llefkowitz@lowey.com -- Lowey
Dannenberg P.C.,Peter Dexter St. Phillip, Jr. --
pstphillip@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond Peter
Girnys -- rgirnys@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Roland
Raymond St. Louis, III -- rstlouis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Sitso W. Bediako -- sbediako@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C. & Vincent Briganti -- vbriganti@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. & JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendants,
represented by Paul Christopher Gluckow -- pgluckow@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Abram Jeremy Ellis
-aellis@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Alan Craig
Turner -- aturner@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Alexander Nuo Li -- jiarui.li@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Eamonn Wesley Campbell -- eamonn.campbell@stblaw.com
-- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Francis John Acott --
francis.acott@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Jonathan Thomas Menitove -- jonathan.menitove@stblaw.com -- Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Mary Beth Forshaw -- mforshaw@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Michael Steven Carnevale --
michael.carnevale@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Rachel Serenity Sparks Bradley -- rachel.sparksbradley@stblaw.com
-- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP & Sarah Emily Phillips --
francis.acott@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

BNP Paribas, S.A., Defendant, represented by Jayant W. Tambe --
jtambe@jonesday.com -- Jones Day


KISTLER FORD: K. Payne Suit Remains in Ohio District Court
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Western Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in the case captioned Kellie Payne,
Plaintiff, v. Kistler Ford, et al., Defendants. Case No.
3:18-cv-2451. (N.D. Ohio)

Payne seeks to remand the case, arguing the removal was
procedurally improper and that I also lack subject matter
jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Kellie Payne filed suit against Defendants Ford Motor
Company and Kistler Ford (Ford) in the Lucas County, Ohio Court of
Common Pleas. Ford removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Sections 1332, 1441, and 1446.

Payne argues Ford did not remove the case within the 30-day
timeline mandated by statute and that the Court lack subject matter
jurisdiction because there is not complete diversity between
plaintiffs and defendants. Ford argues I should deny Payne's motion
for remand because the notice for removal met the minimal
jurisdiction requirements in a class action and the notice was
timely filed within 28 days of service.

Ford, citing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and Miss. ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,argues jurisdiction is proper because
this case meets the minimal diversity requirements, as the named
plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio and one of the defendants is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Michigan. Contrarily, Payne argues Hood is irrelevant because it is
not factually similar to this case, as Hood involved a mass action
claim and this claim is a class action.

While Hood is not factually analogous to this case, the Supreme
Court's discussion of the amendments to Section 1332 is relevant
and reinforces the existence of jurisdiction and the
appropriateness of removal. The Court in Hood differentiates the
loosening of the diversity jurisdiction requirements in both mass
actions and class actions and explicitly notes that the CAFA
amendments to Section 1332 permit a class action to be removed when
there are 100 or more named or unnamed persons falling within the
definition of the proposed or certified class. Payne estimates the
number of potential plaintiffs at no less than 1,000.  

Payne further argues Ford's notice of removal was untimely and
therefore the case should be remanded to state court. A notice of
removal of a civil action must be filed within 30 days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or other means, of the
pleading, motion, order, or other paper.  

Here, service on Ford was perfected on September 25, 2018, when it
actually received the complaint and service of process. Ford filed
its notice of removal on October 23, 2018, 28 days after its
receipt of service. The plain language of the statute and its
interpretation establishes removal was proper under Section 1446.

Payne's motion for remand and her motion to strike Ford's motion to
dismiss, are denied.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yatvtqka from Leagle.com.

Kellie Payne, individually and on behalf of those individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael D. Portnoy.

Kistler Ford & Ford Motor Company, Defendants, represented by
Brianna W. Stuart -- Brianna.Stuart@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson
Hine, Conor A. McLaughlin -- Conor.McLaughlin@ThompsonHine.com --
Thompson Hine & Elizabeth B. Wright --
Elizabeth.Wright@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine.


KMPG LLP: Seyfarth Shaw Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Cascino, Esq., and Gerald Maatman, Jr., Esq., of
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in an article for JDSupra, report that in a
major end-of-the-year ruling, employers scored a significant
victory in terms of the denial of class certification in a major
gender discrimination case that has been closely watched by the
media and the bar alike. It underscores the power of U.S. Supreme
Court rulings as a bulwark for defending class action litigation.

Introduction

On November 30, 2018, Judge Lorna Schofield of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District Of New York denied certification of
a proposed nationwide Title VII class action alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex by KPMG. In the decision,
Kassman v. KMPG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 3743 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), the
Court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that KPMG established a
framework for managers to exercise their discretion in making
compensation and promotion decisions that led to discrimination on
the basis of sex. This case represents a significant win for
employers as the Court rebuffed a novel attempt to create
commonality out of discretionary decision-making after the Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338
(2011). It also provides further guidance to employers about how to
make pay and promotion decisions in a manner that avoids potential
class action lawsuits.

Case Background

On June 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit against KMPG, alleging that
it discriminates against women in making pay and promotion
decisions. Id. at 1. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its landmark decision in Wal-Mart, which the Court
characterized as "provid[ing] a roadmap to avoid class
certification of a nationwide class asserting gender
discrimination." Id.

After the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart, KPMG utilized a
decentralized system for determining pay and promotions. Id. at 2.
However, that decentralized system still had a structure. Id. Among
other things, compensation decisions were made under the direction
of a National Director of Compensation Strategies within a
framework designed to pay KPMG employees at the appropriate market
rate. Id. at 2, 5-6. Additionally, KPMG also conducted performance
reviews within a framework containing standards for, among other
things, years of experience necessary for particular promotions.
Id. at 7-9.

Plaintiffs argued that the framework within which KPMG made
decentralized compensation and promotion decisions led to
discrimination against women on both a disparate impact and
disparate treatment basis. They moved for certification of a
nationwide class, a New York State class, and a collective action.

The Court's Decision

The Court first analyzed Plaintiffs' disparate impact claim.
Unsurprisingly, it began with an analysis of Wal-Mart.  It observed
that, under Wal-Mart, discretionary pay and promotion procedures
can only satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23 if
decision-makers operate under "a common mode of exercising
discretion that pervades the entire company, such that individual
discretionary decisions nonetheless produce a common answer to the
question 'why was I disfavored.'"  Id. at 35 (quotation marks
omitted).  The Court found that the appropriate way to analyze if
such a common mode of exercising discretion was present is to
analyze four factors, including: "(1) the nature of the purported
class; (2) the process through which discretion is exercised; (3)
the criteria governing the discretion and (4) the involvement of
upper management."  Id. at 36.

Applying the first factor, the Court opined that the large size of
the putative class -- at least 10,000 women -- and the fact it was
located across the country weighed against a finding of a common
mode of exercising discretion. Id. at 36-37. The Court observed
that it is much more difficult for a common mode of exercising
discretion to exist when decisions are being made by large numbers
of decision-makers across the country. Id. at 37.

Turning to the second factor, the Court considered whether the
framework within which pay and promotion decisions were made
weighed in favor of finding that a common mode of exercising
discretion existed. The Court found that "KPMG's pay and promotion
procedures act more as a framework that dictates who will make
discretionary decisions rather than how they will exercise their
discretion." Id. at 38. While finding that pay ranges were set at a
company-wide level, the Court reasoned that the fact that
compensation decisions were made within that range weighed against
a finding that a common mode of exercising discretion existed. Id.

The Court next analyzed whether the criteria governing the
discretion weighed in favor of finding that a common mode of
exercising discretion existed.  Id. at 41.  It observed that
"whether a set of criteria creates a common mode of exercising
discretion depends on the rigidity of the criteria. Subjective
criteria, prone to different interpretations, generally do not
provide common direction."  Id.  Finding that the criteria applied
by KPMG, such as "'professionalism,' 'integrity,' 'reputation' and
potential to be a 'partner candidate'" were "amorphous" and thus
weighed against a finding that a common mode of exercising
discretion existed.  Id. at 42.

Finally, the Court analyzed the fourth factor of "the involvement
of top management in the discretionary decision-making." Id. The
Court determined that Plaintiffs' argument that all pay and
promotion decisions must ultimately be approved by two individuals
unpersuasive because there was no evidence that these two
individuals were doing anything other than approving aggregate
promotion and pay numbers rather than at an individual level. Id.
at 43. Accordingly, the Court noted that the fourth factor also
weighed against a finding that a common mode of discretion existed.
Id.

With all four factors weighing against such a finding, the Court
concluded that Plaintiffs had not established commonality and
denied class certification of Plaintiffs' disparate impact claim.
Id. at 43-44.

Turning to Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim, the Court held
that Plaintiffs did not show that their statistical evidence
demonstrated disparate treatment because Plaintiffs had not shown
that promotion policies and practices were uniform across KPMG as
required to make statistical evidence relevant under Wal-Mart.  Id.
at 46-47.  The Court further found that Plaintiffs' argument that
KPMG ignored evidence of gender discrimination did not comport with
the record, and that their anecdotal evidence was insufficient to
show intentional discrimination.  Id. at 48-50.  Accordingly, the
Court denied certification of Plaintiffs' disparate treatment
claim. Id.

Finally, the Court denied certification of a New York state class
because Plaintiffs did not provide any evidence of New York
state-specific practices, and it denied certification of an Equal
Pay Act collective action because Plaintiffs failed to prove the
members of the putative collective action worked in a single
establishment and that they were similarly-situated. Id. at 51-60.

Conclusion

This case represents a significant win for employers. After
Wal-Mart, plaintiffs' lawyers have tried to develop new theories to
secure certification of classes even where decisions are made in a
decentralized manner. In Kassman, the Court not only rebuffed the
latest such attempt, but also provided employers with additional
ways to structure their pay and promotion policies to avoid
potential class actions. [GN]


LEADERS IN COMMUNITY: Court Narrows Claims in Edwards Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM EDWARDS, ROBERT JACKSON, JAMES BROOKS, and
KYSER WILSON, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, INC.,
SUPERCOM, INC., LINDA CONNELLY, DIANE HARRINGTON, KENT BOROWICK,
RAELENE RIVAS, JEANETTE ARGUELLO-RAMOS, BELINDA DOE, DOES 1-10,
inclusive, ALAMEDA COUNTY, and WENDY STILL, Defendants, Case No. C
18-04609 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted the
Alameda Defendants' motion to dismiss; and (ii) granted in part and
denied in part the LCA Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Defendant County of Alameda contracted with Defendant Leaders in
Community Alternatives ("LCA") to provide an electronic-monitoring
program, including GPS and alcohol monitoring, for criminal
defendants on pre-trial or home detention.  Defendant SuperCom was
LCA's parent company.  LCA executives and employees included
Defendants Harrington (executive director), Connelly (founder,
president and CEO), Borowick (CFO and COO), Rivas (case manager)
and Arguello-Ramos (case manager).

Under the contract between Alameda County and LCA, both the
superior court and the probation department referred individuals to
LCA's program.  Once referred, LCA tracked the participants,
providing the necessary equipment, and reported any non-compliance.
Defendant Still, Alameda County's chief probation officer, oversaw
Alameda County's contract with LCA.  On average, 112 Alameda County
residents participated in LCA's electronic monitoring on any given
day.

Plaintiffs Edwards, Jackson, Brooks, and Wilson were referred to
LCA's program.  LCA required the Plaintiffs to fill out an
enrollment form which included, among other things, basic contact
information, employment details, and information about their court
case.  Without conducting an inquiry into their ability to pay, LCA
required the Plaintiffs to sign a Supervision Fee Agreement that
imposed a $150 enrollment fee and a commitment to pay $25.50 per
day.  The Plaintiffs had to pay at least two weeks in advance by
credit or debit card, money order, or cashier's check.  They also
agreed that failure to make timely payments could result in their
termination from electronic monitoring.

LCA's program was (and still is) fully funded by fees charged to
participants.  Neither Alameda County nor its probation department
had any financial responsibility for the program.  Although LCA's
contract provided that LCA must adjust participant fees based on
ability to pay, and although Section 1208.2(g) of the California
Penal Code provided that persons cannot be removed from an
electronic-monitoring program because of an inability to pay all or
a portion of the program supervision fees, LCA did not inform the
Plaintiffs that they only needed to pay what they could afford.
Nor did LCA inform them of their right to have a judge determine
how much they can afford to pay while on LCA's monitoring programs.
LCA also imposed a series of "roadblocks" to keep individuals from
obtaining a reduced fee.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class
action in July 2018, asserting a RICO claim, claims under Section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and a claim for abuse
of process.  In addition to monetary damages, the Plaintiffs seek
an order enjoining the Defendants' illegal fee extortion scheme.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

Judge Alsup holds that to the extent the Plaintiffs argue that they
may seek injunctive relief on behalf of the putative class even if
they themselves lack standing, they are incorrect.  The Plaintiffs'
conclusory allegation that only individuals with relatively short
sentences may be booked into LCA's program, resulting in
supervision durations that are capable of repetition but evading
review, is insufficient to invoke Gerstein v. Pugh's exception.
Accordingly, the Judge granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.  The order needs not
reach the Defendants' alternative argument that the Plaintiffs'
claims for injunctive relief are moot in light of recent changes to
LCA's policies.

Next, the Defendants argue that by seeking relief related to the
conditions of their probation, the Plaintiffs' claims involve state
court criminal sentencing and probation proceedings.  The Judge
explains that Younger v. Harris requires federal courts to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction where (1) a state-initiated proceeding
is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating
federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the
federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the
practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state
proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.  All four elements of
Younger must be present in order for abstention to be appropriate.

Judge Alsup holds that the first factor of Younger abstention does
not apply.  Because the Plaintiffs' probationary status does not
amount to ongoing state judicial proceedings for Younger purposes,
abstention is not warranted.  Moreover, the Defendants do not
contend that the Plaintiffs or the Defendants ever initiated such
proceedings.  The Defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground is
denied.

As to the constitutional claims, among other things, the Judge
finds that (i) the complaint fails to allege facts plausibly
suggesting that Alameda County violated the Equal Protection
Clause; (ii) the complaint fails to show a causal connection
between Probation Chief Still's conduct and any constitutional
violation; (iii) the Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable
claim for a violation of their due process or equal protection
rights; (iv) because the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts
showing a specific intent to defraud, they have failed to allege
that the Defendants engaged in wire fraud; and (v) because the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that the reports
were filed to scare program participants into paying LCA's fees,
they have not alleged a claim for abuse of process.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Alsup granted the Alameda
Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and granted in part and denied in
part the LCA Defendants' motion.  The order sustained the
Plaintiffs' RICO claim against LCA.  All other claims are
dismissed.  Under no circumstances should the Order be construed as
interfering with the conditions of release imposed by Alameda
County or the conditions of release imposed by LCA.  In sustaining
the Plaintiffs' RICO claim against LCA, the Order does not suggest
that Edwards should be released from pre-trial detention.  Nor does
it bless the Plaintiffs' various allegations regarding the
inconveniences associated with electronic monitoring or LCA's
restrictions on individuals' use of alcohol or medical marijuana.

by Jna. 4, 2019 at noon, the Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend the
dismissed claims by a motion noticed on the normal 35-day calendar.
The Plaintiffs must plead their best case.  Their motion should
affirmatively demonstrate how the proposed amended complaint
corrects the deficiencies identified in the Order, as well as any
others raised in the Defendants' motions but not addressed.  The
motion should be accompanied by a redlined copy of the proposed
amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qulAqn from Leagle.com.

William Edwards, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Robert Jackson, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, James Brooks, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated & Kyser Wilson, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Phil Telfeyan --
ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- Equal Justice Under Law.

Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc., Supercom, Inc., Linda
Connelly, Diane Harrington, Kent Borowick, Raelene Rivas & Jeanette
Arguello-Ramos, Defendants, represented by Kristina Doan Strottman
-- kstrottman@bwslaw.com -- & Susan Eileen Coleman --
scoleman@bwslaw.com -- Burke, Williams & Sorensen LLP.

Alameda County & Wendy Still, Defendants, represented by Kevin E.
Gilbert , Orbach, Huff, Suarez & Henderson, Susan Eileen Coleman,
Burke, Williams & Sorensen LLP & Kristina Doan Strottman --
kgilbert@ohshlaw.com.


MAINE: Court Dismisses Gladu Class Allegations
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maine issued
an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint the case
captioned NICHOLAS A. GLADU, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH FITZPATRICK, et
al., Defendants. No. 1:18-cv-00274-GZS. (D. Me.).

The Court have reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge's
Recommended Decision and the Supplemental Recommended Decision,
together with the entire record; the Court have made a de novo
determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate Judge's
Recommended Decision and the Supplemental Recommended Decision; and
the Court concurs with the recommendations of the United States
Magistrate Judge for the reasons set forth in his Recommended
Decision and Supplemental Recommended Decision, and determine that
no further proceeding is necessary.

It is ordered that the Recommended Decisions of the Magistrate
Judge are affirmed and the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is
granted.  The Plaintiff's class action allegations are dismissed,
and the Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Fitzpatrick,
Thornell, Liberty, Ross, Cassese, and Burns are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yayy23qg from Leagle.com.

NICHOLAS A GLADU, and Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, pro
se.


MARRIOTT INT'L: DiCello Levitt Files Data Breach Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marriott International Inc. (NASDAQ: MAR), the parent company of
Starwood Hotels, failed to ensure that the personal information of
as many as 500 million customers was adequately protected, leading
to a massive, long-running data breach that may have lasted more
than four years, according to a new nationwide class action
lawsuit. The suit, filed by Adam Levitt and Amy Keller, partners at
prominent national law firm DiCello Levitt & Casey, alleges that
Starwood, and later Marriott, took more than four years to discover
the breach and then failed to notify its customers in a timely
manner. Marriott became the world's largest hotel chain when it
completed an acquisition of Starwood in 2016.

Beginning in 2014 and possibly earlier, and continuing through
November 2018, hackers exploited vulnerabilities in Starwood's
network to access the guest reservation system and steal customer
data. Marriott discovered the breach on September 8, 2018 but
failed to publicly disclose it until nearly three months later, on
November 30, 2018, when it admitted that there had been
unauthorized access to the Starwood guest reservation database.
This database contained personally identifiable customer
information, including names, mailing addresses, phone numbers,
email addresses, passport numbers, Starwood Preferred Guest (SPG)
account information, date of birth, gender, arrival and departure
information, reservation dates, and communication preferences. For
some, the information also included payment card numbers and
payment card expiration dates. Starwood currently maintains a
separate reservation system from other Marriott-branded hotels,
though the company reportedly has plans to merge them at a later
date.

"It is particularly egregious that Marriott did not discover this
serious data breach during the course of its due diligence efforts
in conjunction with its 2016 Starwood acquisition," said Ms.
Keller, who also serves as co-lead counsel in the nationwide class
action against Equifax related to its 2017 data breach. "Marriott
seems to forget that part of being in the customer service business
includes actually taking care of its customers. Through this
lawsuit, we intend to ensure that it never forgets that again."

The lead plaintiffs in the class action are two longtime members of
Starwood's (and now Marriott's) customer loyalty program, Illinois
resident Peter Tapling and California resident David Sparks. Mr.
Tapling, a loyalty program member for more than 31 years, was
notified by email on November 30, 2018, that his information was
compromised by the data breach. Mr. Sparks is still awaiting
notification from Marriott that his information was compromised but
based on public information and other information available only to
him, he believes that his information has also been detrimentally
affected. As a result, both Plaintiffs have been forced to take
measures that otherwise would not have been necessary to ensure
that their identities are not stolen and that their financial
accounts are not compromised.

"It is not surprising that a company which took more than four
years to even recognize its systems were being breached, has also
demonstrated that it was unprepared to properly execute a
post-breach response plan," said Mr. Levitt, one of the firm's
co-founding partners.

Ms. Keller agreed, noting, "Marriott's dedicated website and call
center for data breach inquiries appears woefully inadequate given
the huge number of affected customers. Customers are experiencing
long wait times, and the lack of information about who was affected
and how has left guests confused and concerned. Moreover,
Marriott's offer to its customers of one year's free enrollment in
Web Watcher is deficient. Web Watcher is not a credit monitoring
service. It merely keeps an eye on sites where thieves may sell or
swap personal information. Hackers are likely well aware of
Marriott's one-year offer and will, therefore, wait for that period
to expire before exploiting the stolen data."

The complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland, Southern Division, is Peter Tapling and David Sparks v.
Marriott International Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-3703. DiCello Levitt
& Casey filed this case with Andrew Friedman of Cohen Milstein and
James Pizzirusso of Hausfeld, both of whom are also members of the
Equifax executive committee. A copy of the complaint is available
upon request.

If you believe that you have been affected by the Marriott data
breach, attorneys at DiCello Levitt & Casey are happy to speak with
you about the ongoing litigation and how to protect your rights.
Learn more about the case on the firm's website, or call (440)
953-8888 to speak with one of our attorneys.

DiCello Levitt & Casey has significant experience seeking justice
for plaintiffs in data breach and related technology litigation.
From Mr. Levitt's filing of the very first Internet privacy cases
in the United States in 1999, to Ms. Keller's Equifax leadership
appointment earlier this year, the firm's attorneys have long been
at the forefront of this type of litigation and have been
responsible for some of the key jurisprudence in this field.

                 About DiCello Levitt & Casey

DiCello Levitt & Casey focuses on commercial litigation, class
action litigation, mass tort litigation, catastrophic injury
litigation, labor and employment litigation, and civil rights
litigation.  It is practices nationwide -- and internationally --
from offices in Chicago and Cleveland. [GN]


MARRIOTT INT'L: Hiteshew Seeks Authority to File Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned as DONNA HITESHEW, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, and STARWOOD
HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, LLC, a Maryland limited liability
company, the Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-03755-PWG (D. Md., Dec.
6, 2018), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an Order permitting her
to temporarily file her Class Action Complaint, which will reveal,
reference and/or otherwise discuss:

  --  sensitive, protected, and confidential information and
      documents regarding Defendants Marriott International, Inc.
      and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC, their business

      practices, and potentially, their customers, and

  --  the specific vulnerabilities with Defendants' computer
      systems which allows that information and documents to be
      publicly available, in partially redacted format.

Specifically, Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint details, in part,
how, following Marriott's November 30, 2018 data breach
announcement, its computer systems still fail to properly protect
sensitive and confidential information, which could potentially
cause further harm Plaintiff and the members of the putative
Classes.[BN]

Plaintiff's Attorneys:

          Jeffery M. Mervis, Esq.
          THE MERVIS LAW FIRM , LLC
          12505 Park Potomac Avenue, 6th Floor
          Potomac, MD 20854
          Telephone: 301 762 0020
          E-mail: jmervis@mervislaw.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          Eve-Lynn Rapp, Esq.
          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Christopher L. Dore, Esq.
          David I. Mindell, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: 415.212.9300
          Facsimile: 415.373.9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  erapp@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com
                  cdore@edelson.com
                  dmindell@edelson.com

MARRIOTT INT'L: Jan. 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Marriott International, Inc.
("Marriott" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: MAR) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise
acquired Marriott securities between November 9, 2016 and November
29, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors are
encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
bgandg.com/mar.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Marriott's and Starwood's systems storing their
customers' personal data were not secure; (2) there had been
unauthorized access on Starwood's network since 2014; (3)
consequently, the personal data of approximately 500 million
Starwood guests and sensitive personal information of approximately
327 million of those guests may have been exposed to unauthorized
parties; and (4) as a result, Marriott's public statements were
materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times.

On November 30, 2018, Marriott disclosed the discovery of "a data
security incident involving [its] Starwood guest reservation
database" and "that an unauthorized party had copied and encrypted
information, and took steps towards removing it."  Marriott stated
that "information on up to approximately 500 million guests" had
been subject to unauthorized access since 2014.  Following this
news, Marriott's stock price fell sharply during intraday trading
on November 30, 2018.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
bgandg.com/mar or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Marriott
you have until January 30, 2019 to request that the Court appoint
you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique.  Its primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients.  In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration. [GN]


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Dorfman Sues Over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
Robert Dorfman, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Marriott International, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-01982 (D. Conn., December 5, 2018), seeks actual,
statutory, punitive, exemplary and/or multiple damages,
disgorgement, restitution, preliminary or other equitable or
declaratory relief, prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses and such other and
favorable relief resulting from negligence and for violation of the
Unfair Competition Law of the California Business and Professions
Code.

Marriott's Starwood guest reservation database suffered a massive
security breach that began in or around 2014, compromising personal
and financial information belonging to up to 500 million
customers.

Marriott operates Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide. Dorfman is
a Marriott customer who used the Starwood reservation system. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
     The Chrysler Building
     405 Lexington Avenue, 40th Floor
     New York, NY 10174
     Telephone: (212) 223-6444
     Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
     Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com

            - and -

     Erin Green Comite, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     156 South Main Street
     P.O. Box 192
     Colchester, CT 06415
     Telephone: (860) 537-5537
     Facsimile: (860) 537-4432
     Email: ecomite@scott-scott.com

            - and -

     Hal Cunningham, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Telephone: (619) 233-4565
     Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
     Email: hcunningham@scott-scott.com

            - and -

     Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
     Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Tel: (412) 322-9243
     Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
            jetzel@carlsonlynch.com

            - and -

     Karen Hanson Riebel, Esq.
     Katie M. Baxter-Kauf, Esq.
     Arielle Wagner, Esq.
     LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
     100 Washington Ave. South, Suite 2200
     Minneapolis, MN 55401
     Email: khriebel@locklaw.com
            kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com
            aswagner@locklaw.com

            - and -

     Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
     CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA
     17 Washington Avenue North, Suite 300
     Minneapolis, MN 55401
     Telephone: (612) 339-7300
     Email: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Faces Kimmel Suit Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID J. KIMMEL, MICHAEL C. CHRISTNER, and THOMAS STABILE,
Individually and on Behalf of a Class of All Others Similarly
Situated v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., and STARWOOD HOTELS &
RESORTS WORLDWIDE LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-01983-KAD (D. Conn.,
December 5, 2018), arises from a data breach that occurred between
at least 2014 and September 2018.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of persons, who
have suffered, and continue to suffer, financial losses and
increased data security risks that are a direct result of the
Defendants' alleged egregious failure to safeguard their customers'
highly sensitive personally identifiable information ("PII"),
including names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, email addresses,
passport numbers, preferred guest account information, date of
birth, gender, arrival and departure information, reservation dates
and communication preferences, and payment card data ("Payment Card
Data"), including credit and debit card numbers, primary account
numbers, card verification value numbers, expiration dates, and zip
codes.  The breach impacted Defendant Starwood's guest database and
affected persons, who made reservations at any of Marriott's
Starwood properties, says the complaint.

Marriott International, Inc., is a publicly traded corporation with
its principal place of business located in Bethesda, Maryland.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC, is an indirect,
wholly-owned subsidiary of Marriott.

Founded in 1927, Marriott is the largest hotel chain in the world.
Owning more than 6,500 properties in 127 countries and territories,
Marriott had $22.894 billion in revenue in 2017.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Ave., 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Erin Green Comite, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          156 South Main Street
          P.O. Box 192
          Colchester, CT 06415
          Telephone: (860) 537-5537
          Facsimile: (860) 537-4432
          E-mail: ecomite@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Hal Cunningham, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          E-mail: hcunningham@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Alfred G. Yates, Jr., Esq.
          Gerald L. Rutledge, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OFALFRED G. YATES, JR., P.C.
          300 Mt. Lebanon Boulevard, Suite 206-B
          Pittsburgh, PA 15234
          Telephone: (412) 391-5164
          Facsimile: (412) 471-1033
          E-mail: yateslaw@aol.com
                  glr1@aol.com

               - and -

          Greg L. Davis, Esq.
          DAVIS & TALIAFERRO LLC
          7031 Halcyon Park Drive
          Montgomery, AL 36117
          Telephone: (334) 832-9080
          E-mail: gldavis@knology.net


MOM'S BODY: Lara Mertens Seeks Payment of Past Wages
----------------------------------------------------
LARA MERTENS, as an individual, the Plaintiff, vs DAVID GROESCHEL
an individual dba MOM's BODY SHOP, and DOES 1-10, the Defendants,
Case No. CGC-18-571882 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 6, 2018), seeks
payment of past wages owed and any other penalties permitted by
law, including penalties pursuant to the California Labor Code
sections and penalties under Private Attorneys General Act of
2004.

According to the complaint, Groeschel intentionally misclassified
his tattoo artists and body piercers, including the Plaintiff, as
independent contractors in violation of the California Labor Code
and subsequently withheld their wages, denied them wage statements,
denied them meal and rest breaks, failed to pay overtime or minimum
wage, failed to pay for sick days, withheld gratuities, failed to
keep payroll records, failed to provide them workers with written
commission agreements, failed to failed to indemnify them for
necessary work expenditures, and engaged in unfair business
practices, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sil Liapis, Esq.
          OPEN DOOR LEGAL
          4634 3rd Street
          San Francisco, CA 94124
          Telephone: (415) 610-5991
          E-mail: sil@opendoorlegal.org

               - and -

          Alison Kosinski, Esq.
          Emily Thiagaraj, Esq.
          KOSINSKI + THIAGARAJ, LLP
          201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 230 2860
          Facsimile: (415) 723 7099
          E-mail: emily@ktlawsf.com

MONINI NORTH: Truffle Oil Class Action Dismissal Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for BloombergLaw, reports that a consumer
class action alleging Monini North America Inc. truffle oil doesn't
contain truffles was properly dismissed, the Second Circuit held
Dec. 3.

"It is simply not plausible that a significant portion of the
general consuming public acting reasonably would conclude that
Monini's mass produced, modestly-priced olive oil was made with the
most expensive food in the world," the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit said in a summary order.

The ingredient list on the bottle doesn't mention the word
"truffle" and the primary label describes the product as "Truffle
Flavored," the court found.

Plaintiffs Vinay Jessani and Wendy Burnett must do more than allege
that a label might conceivably be misunderstood by a few consumers,
the court said.

Judges Robert A. Katzmann, Amalya L. Kearse, and Denny Chin served
on the panel.

Bursor & Fisher P.A. represented the consumers.

Proskauer Rose LLP represented Monini.

The case is Jessani v. Monini N.A., Inc., 2018 BL 443642, 2d Cir.,
No. 17-2504, summary order 12/3/18. [GN]


MORGAN STANLEY: Motion to Dismiss Discrimination Case Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jed Horowitz and Mason Braswell, writing for AdvisorHub, reports
that a federal judge in New York City has granted Morgan Stanley's
motion to dismiss a purported class-action lawsuit alleging
discrimination in the way the firm allocated accounts to African
Americans and women.

U.S. Circuit Judge Richard Sullivan acknowledged the
"potentially-far-reaching consequences" for African Americans of
the 'serious" allegations, but ruled that three of the seven named
plaintiffs in "Kathy Frazier et al versus Morgan Stanley" are
required by their employment contracts to bring individual claims
in arbitration rather than in court. Class-action claims are not
allowed in arbitration under Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority rules.

The four other named plaintiffs "failed to overcome the stringent
administrative" processes required for civil rights claims, or
argued insufficient facts, he ruled.

The 24-page decision, which was dated November 29, is a victory for
brokerage firms that generally favor arbitration over courts, and,
particularly, for Morgan Stanley. The firm has won a series of
recent decisions dismissing employees' claims that they were not
adequately notified in May 2015 of ways to opt out of its tightened
CARE arbitration program, making arbitration mandatory.

However, the defendants continue to argue their individual race
discrimination claims in the New York court, and Morgan Stanley on
December 17 filed an answer to their third amended complaint
denying the remaining discrimination claims.

"The most prominent feature [of the decision] is the arbitration
issue, which is again a clear signal that Morgan Stanley prefers to
divide and conquer and rely on arbitration as a means to silence
class members and evade litigation," said Linda Stowell, the
Chicago lawyer who co-represented the plaintiffs and has has long
represented women and minorities in discrimination suits against
broker-dealers.

Since the case was briefed, five courts have rejected arguments by
defendants that Morgan Stanley gave insufficient notice of changes
in its arbitration requirements, the judge said.

"The court reached the right result here, and we look forward to
adjudicating the remaining claims on their specific facts," Morgan
Stanley spokeswoman Susan Siering wrote in an email. "Morgan
Stanley is strongly committed to attracting, retaining and
developing diverse talent and takes complaints of discrimination
very seriously."

Frazier, who worked in Morgan Stanley's Honolulu, Hawaii, office
from 2007 until she resigned in November 2013, before the
arbitration program was tightened, alleged that "lucrative accounts
were routinely 'steered' to male, non-African American FA" and said
her complaints of discrimination led to hostility, poaching of her
clients and continued exclusion, according to the ruling.

An amended complaint in the case included "near-verbatim,
boilerplate accounts" of the six other plaintiffs' experiences in
Morgan Stanley offices in seven cities. The judge concluded that
the facts presented  "do not support an inference of a pattern or
practice of discriminatory treatment" and "fall short of support
for the inference that intentional discrimination was…standard
operating procedure'" for Morgan Stanley.

Friedman said on Dec. 3 that she was still reviewing the decision
and had not decided whether to proceed with a possible appeal,
re-filing or arbitration to invalidate Morgan Stanley's modified
CARE program. [GN]


NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Gurrieri FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD GURRIERI, DIANE McCAULEY, LAWRENCE LOISELLE,
MARY TEDESCO, EDWARD DONOGHUE, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
NASSAU COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-6983 (ADS)(SIL)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied (i)
the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's Aug. 9,
2017 Order, limiting overtime compensation to hours worked in
excess of 40 hours; (ii) the Defendants' motion pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. CIV. P." or "Rule") 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the complaint; (iii) the Plaintiffs' for sanctions under
Rule 11; and (iv) the Defendants' motion to strike statements made
by the Plaintiffs in their reply brief in support of sanctions.

Plaintiffs Gurrieri, McCauley, Loiselle, Tedesco, and Donoghue
commenced the putative class action on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated against the Defendants County of Nassau,
the Nassau County Police Department ("NCPD"), and the Nassau County
Civil Service Commission ("NCCSC"), alleging that the Defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York
Labor Law ("NYLL") by failing to pay them overtime.

On Aug. 9, 2017, the Court granted a motion by the Defendants to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law claims for failure to serve a
timely notice of claim.  In the Order, the Court granted the
Plaintiffs leave to commence an action in New York State court to
obtain post hoc permission by a court of competent jurisdiction to
file a late notice of claims.  On Aug. 11, 2017, the Court stayed
the action pending the outcome of the state court action.  

On Aug. 16, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider
arguing, inter alia, that the Order contained a clear error of law
with respect to purported gap-time claims raised in the Complaint.
The Defendants opposed the motion on Sept. 13, 2017, ECF 29, and
the Plaintiffs replied on Sept. 18, 2017.  The Court held its
consideration of the motion in abeyance pending the resolution of
the state court action.

On Aug. 21, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an Article 78 Petition in
the New York State Supreme Court for Nassau County.  

On April 9, 2018, Justice Anthony L. Parga granted the Plaintiffs'
petition, and deemed the Plaintiffs' notice of claim to be timely
filed nunc pro tunc.

On May 7, 2018, the Court lifted the stay and restored the
Plaintiffs' NYLL claims.  On June 4, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint reflecting, among other things, the state court
decision deeming their notice of claim timely filed.  On June 1,
2018 and June 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs submitted to examinations in
accordance with Section 50-h of the New York General Municipal Law
("N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law").

On July, 3, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, claiming that it is clear from the examination
transcripts obtained during those 50-h examinations that the
Plaintiffs are subject to an FLSA exemption known as the 207(k)
exemption.
On July 12, 2018, the Plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss, and
cross-moved for sanctions under Rule 11(b) on the ground that the
motion to dismiss was frivolous.  On Aug. 3, 2018, the Defendants
replied to the opposition to the motion to dismiss and opposed the
motion for sanctions.

On Aug. 8, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs leave to submit a
15-page reply brief, rather than the customary 10 pages, to account
for the length of the Defendants' combined reply and opposition.
That same day, the Defendants moved to vacate the order, warning
the Court that the Plaintiffs intended to use the excess pages to
raise new arguments.  

On Aug. 9, 2018, the Court denied the motion, and instructed the
Plaintiffs not to include any arguments in their reply that could
have been raised in their opposition brief or initial motion for
sanctions.   That same day, the Plaintiffs filed their reply
memorandum.  The next day, the Defendants moved to strike portions
of the reply, accusing the Plaintiffs of abusing their reply by
using it to submit a second opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On Aug. 10, 2018, the Plaintiffs responded.

As to the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, Judge Spatt
disagreed with the Plaintiffs' claim that the Order made a clear
error of law by dismissing their gap-time claims under the NYLL.
At no point in time did the Plaintiffs make a claim for gap-time or
otherwise assert unpaid straight time.  

Their suggestion otherwise strain credulity, the Judge finds.  As
support for their claim, they cite two stranded statements in the
Complaint.  The first statement relates to the calculation of the
alleged unpaid overtime rate.  The latter statement relates to the
failure to pay overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss
argues that it is clear that the Plaintiffs are entitled to
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 36 hours per
week under the NYLL.  He says the Plaintiffs' recharacterization of
these statements as claims and arguments for gap-time pay are an
attempt to present the case under new theories.  Therefore, he
denies the motion for reconsideration.

Next, as to the Defendants' motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, the Judge also
denies it.  The Defendants contend that the Court should consider
the 50-h transcripts and dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on the
ground that the transcripts prove the Section 207(k) exemption
applies.  Contrary to the Defendants' suggestion, the great weight
of authority on this issue establishes that courts generally may
not consider 50-h examination transcripts, because they fall
outside the four corners of the complaint.  Similarly, the
Defendants point to nothing in the Amended Complaint attached,
incorporated by reference, or otherwise suggesting that the
Plaintiffs relied on the 50-h transcripts while drafting their
claims.  As the Defendants make no argument that any such exemption
applies, beyond the attendance of the Plaintiffs' counsel at the
examinations, he finds no such exemption to be appropriate.

As to the Plaintiffs' for sanctions under Rule 11, the Judge denies
it as well.  He finds no basis for awarding sanctions.  He has
reviewed the Defendants' submissions and cannot say that their
arguments are "utterly lacking support" as the Plaintiffs contend.
To the extent that the Plaintiffs' desire to sanction the
Defendants based on "unsupported and conclusory" arguments, the
Judge disagrees.

Finally, as to the Defendants' motion to strike statements made by
the Plaintiffs in their reply brief in support of sanctions, the
Judge finds their explanation unpersuasive and denies the motion to
strike portions of the reply.  He finds that the merits of the
motion to dismiss are pivotal to the resolution of the Court's
sanctions determination.  Against this backdrop, the Plaintiffs'
reply arguments are appropriate, considering they did not introduce
new bases for relief and simply responded to the arguments in the
Defendants' opposition.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Spatt denied the motion for
reconsideration, the motion to dismiss, the motion for sanctions,
and the motion to strike, all in their entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Memorandum of
Decision and Order is available at https://is.gd/JiTKC4 from
Leagle.com.

Ronald Gurrieri, Diane McCauley, Lawrence Loiselle, Mary Tedesco &
Edward Donoghue, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Louis D. Stober, Jr., Law Offices of Louis D.
Stober, Jr., LLC.

County Of Nassau, Defendant, represented by Deanna Darlene Panico,
Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, LLP & Michael Paul Siravo --
msiravo@beereadylaw.com -- Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan,
LLP.


NEOSTRATA CO: Settlement in Horton Labor Suit Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CANDLE HORTON and JEANETTE ZDANEK, individually and on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. NEOSTRATA COMPANY INC.; 24 SEVEN LLC; 24 STAFFING LLC; 24 SEVEN
TALENT CALIFORNIA LLC DBA 24 SEVEN CREATIVE SOLUTIONS; 24 SEVEN
RECRUITING LLC; CELESTE GUDAS; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants. KIMBERLEE WINSTON, an individual, Plaintiff, v.
NEOSTRATA COMPANY INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
16-cv-2189-AJB-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Judge Anthony J. Battaglia of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted
the Plaintiffs'unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement.

The Judge preliminarily approved the Settlement set forth in the
Settlement Agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate within the
meaning of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), subject to final
consideration at the final fairness hearing.

He certified the Plaintiff class, for settlement purposes only in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The
Settlement Class is defined as all individuals (1) who provided
services to Defendant NeoStrata in California as Freelance Beauty
Advisors, Field Sales Representatives, or jobs with similar titles,
and (2) who were issued paystubs from one or more of the 24 Seven
Defendants from July 20, 2012 through Nov. 28, 2017.

The Judge appointed (i) Candle Horton and Jeanette Zdanek as the
representatives of the Settlement Class; (ii) the Plaintiffs'
counsel, The Law Offices of Thomas D. Rutledge and Cohelan Khoury &
Singer, as the class counsel; and (iii) CPT Group, Inc. as the
Settlement Administrator.

He approved as to form and content the Notice of Class Action
Settlement and Fairness Hearing and Exclusion Form.  The Defendants
will provide to the Settlement Administrator a confidential class
list by Jan, 4, 2019 (within 21 days following entry of the
Order]).  The Notice of Class Action Settlement will be published
by Feb. 4, 2019 (within 30 days of receipt of the class data
contained in the confidential class list).

The Settlement Administrator will send the Notice of Class Action
Settlement as well as the Exclusion Form to the Settlement Class
via First Class U.S. Mail using the most current, known address for
each Class Member based on the current information obtained by the
Defendants.  Any mailing returned to the Settlement Administrator
as undeliverable will be sent within five calendar days to the
forwarding address affixed thereto.  If no forwarding address is
provided, the Settlement Administrator will attempt to determine
the correct address using a computer-based skip-trace search, and
it will then perform a single re-mailing within five calendar days.
If no current address is located, the Notice of Class Action
Settlement for that individual will be deemed undeliverable.  If a
Class Member cannot be located within two attempts at mailings by
the Settlement Administrator, the Notice of Class Action Settlement
for that individual will be deemed undeliverable.

The Defendants will provide timely notice to all appropriate
government entities in compliance with the Class Action Fairness
Act (including California or any other state where the Class
Members may reside) and submit a statement of compliance with the
Court in a timely manner as to prevent delay of the Effective Date.
At least seven days prior to the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement
Administrator will provide a declaration of due diligence and proof
of mailing with regard to mailing of the Notice of Class Action
Settlement and Exclusion Form, which they will in turn provide to
the Court.

Judge Battaglia approved the claims submission processes described
in the Settlement Agreement.  He preliminarily approved the process
set forth in the Settlement Agreement for submitting, reviewing,
approving and paying all claims as described in the Settlement
Agreement.  The Judge also approved the process for paying the
costs of notice and claims administration, the incentive payments
and the Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation costs,
subject to proof at the Final Fairness Hearing.

Any such Request for Exclusion must be fully completed and
postmarked not more than 45 calendar days after the postmark date
of the initial mailing of the Notice of Class Action Settlement.
Any objection must be sent to the Settlement Administrator and
postmarked no later than 45 calendar days after the first postmark
date of mailing the Notice of Class Action Settlement.

Subject to proof, the Judge preliminary approved the attorneys'
fees and costs award for (1) attorneys' fees in an amount up to
one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount and (2) litigation costs
actually incurred (but not exceeding $20,000) in representing the
interests of the Settlement Class Members, supported by billing
statements and documentation of expenses by the Class Counsel.  Any
fees and costs awarded by the Court to the Class Counsel will be
paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.  The counsel must support
their fee claim by a lodestar analysis of hours spent and fee rates
for those hours in a Motion to be heard at the Final Settlement
Hearing.

The Jude also preliminary approved a PAGA payment from the Gross
Settlement Amount of $20,000, which will be allocated as $15,000 to
the LWDA as the LWDA's share of the settlement of civil penalties
paid under the Agreement pursuant to the PAGA on behalf of the
Settlement Class Members, and $5,000 to the Net Settlement Amount
for distribution to the Settlement Class Members.  The PAGA Payment
is to cover any and all claims for civil penalties on behalf of the
Settlement Class Members for violations of California Labor Code
sections 201-204, 204b, 210, 216, 218, 218.5, 223, 224, 225.5, 226,
226.3, 226.6, 226.7, 245, 246, 246.5, 247, 247.5, 248.5, 249, 510,
512, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1175, 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1,
1198, 2699, 2802, 2804, 2810.3, 2810.5, and the applicable IWC Wage
Order.  This includes any claims for civil penalties, wages,
attorneys' fees, costs, and any other recovery permitted under
California Labor Code sections 210, 218.5, 224, 225.5, 226.3, 558,
1174, 1174.5, 1197.1, and 2699.

Finally, the Judge preliminary approved the general release by the
Class Representatives.

The final fairness hearing will be heldon April 11, 2019, at 2:00
p.m.  The Class Counsel must file a motion for final approval of
settlement, fees, costs, and other distributions no later than 28
days before the Final Approval Hearing.  The Counsel must also
submit a proposed order at that time.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RQrDNt from Leagle.com.

Candle Horton, individually and on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated & Jeanette Zdanek, individually and on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Isam C. Khoury -- ikhoury@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury & Singer,
James Jason Hill -- jhill@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury & Singer,
Michael D. Singer -- msinger@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan, Khoury & Singer
& Thomas D. Rutledge -- rutledgelaw@cox.net -- Law Office of Thomas
D Rutledge.

Kimberlee Winston, individually and on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, pro se.

Neostrata Company Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Michael S. Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com -- Epstein, Becker
& Green, PC.

24 Seven Employment Inc., a New York corporation, 24 Seven Talent
California, Inc., a California corporation, 24 Seven Creative
Solutions, an unknown entity & Celeste Gudas, an individual,
Defendants, represented by Daniel Chul Whang -- dwhang@seyfarth.com
-- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Kevin Steven Saman , Seyfarth Shaw LLP &
Timothy L. Hix -- thix@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

24 Seven LLC, a New York limited liability, 24 Seven Talent
California LLC, a New York limited liability corporation & 24 Seven
Recruiting LLC, a New York limited liability corporation,
Defendants, represented by Kevin Steven Saman --
kevin.saman@bydeluxe.com  -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


NEW BALANCE: Court Denies 2nd Class Certification Bid in Dashnaw
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned  SHEILA DASHNAW et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. NEW BALANCE ATHLETICS, INC., Defendant. Case No.
17-cv-00159-L-JLB. (S.D. Cal.).

Pending before the Court in this putative class action alleging
consumer fraud relating to "made in USA" representations on certain
New Balance athletic shoes, is the Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminarily approval of class action settlement.

The proposed cy pres award to the Public Justice Foundation does
not comply with Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir.
2012). According to its website, the Public Justice Foundation
pursues high impact lawsuits to combat social and economic
injustice, protect the Earth's sustainability, and challenge
predatory corporate conduct and government abuses.

In this regard, Public Justice staff attorneys fight against
injustices such as corporations cheating consumers and using the
courts to find ways to get away with it, reckless polluters,
unscrupulous payday lenders, unjust employers, punitive credit card
companies, inhumane government detention centers, dangerous food
producers, and more. Although protecting consumers from
corporations is one of the areas in which the Public Justice
Foundation is active, the settlement provides no assurance that any
funds would in fact be used to protect California consumers from
false advertising, as opposed to the variety of areas where Public
Justice Foundation is active.

Not just any worthy recipient can qualify as an appropriate cy pres
beneficiary. What is required is assurance that the funds will be
distributed in accordance with the goals of the remedy and that
class members will in fact benefit. The fact that a cy pres
beneficiary could potentially use the funds in a manner that will
benefit the class members provides an insufficient driving nexus
between the plaintiff class and the cy pres beneficiaries.
Accordingly, in the pending case, the settlement must ensure that
the funds are distributed for the purpose of protecting consumers
from, or redressing injuries caused by, false advertising.
Plaintiffs have not provided any assurance that a distribution to
the Public Justice Foundation would be so limited.

The notice is also unnecessarily verbose, repetitive and confusing.
For example, Plaintiffs' explanation of the subject matter of this
action, summary of the monetary terms of the settlement, and
calculation of the likely recovery, as presented in their
memorandum, is far clearer, more accurate and more concise than the
verbiage used to cover the same subject matter in the notice.

The same observations apply to the summary notice and claim form.

The Plaintiffs are therefore urged to reconsider the proposed
notice, summary notice and claim form for accuracy, clarity and
user-friendliness. Specifically, the class members should not be
required to consult the settlement agreement for definition of
material terms used throughout the notice, summary notice and/or
claim form. Although it is fair to refer to the agreement for the
details of less than material provisions, all material terms and
provisions, especially those referenced with frequency, should be
defined and explained in the document itself. In addition,
Plaintiffs should include an exclusion form in the notice package
for the putative class members who wish to exclude themselves. The
settlement administrator shall accept exclusion forms on the same
terms as claim forms.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary class action
certification and settlement approval is denied without prejudice
to re-filing after curing the foregoing defects.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ewnfak from Leagle.com.

Sheila Dashnaw, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, William Meier, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Sherryl Jones, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jason
Hoon Kim -- jkim@schneiderwallace.com -- O'Melveny and Myers, Todd
M. Schneider -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Brayton Konecky LLP &
Aubry Wand -- awand@wandlawfirm.com -- The Wand Law Firm.

New Balance Athletics, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented
by Elizabeth E. Brenckman -- brenckman@fr.com -- Fish & Richardson
P.C., pro hac vice, Garrett K. Sakimae -- sakimae@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., Laura B. Najemy -- najemy@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., pro hac vice, Mark Puzella, Fish & Richardson
P.C., pro hac vice, Richard David Hosp -- hosp@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., pro hac vice & Sheryl K. Garko -- garko@fr.com --
Fish & Richardson P.C., pro hac vice.

The Attorney General of the State of California, Miscellaneous
Party, represented by Timothy Dean Lundgren.


NFSM PIZZA: McFadden Wants to Recover Wages for Delivery Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA MCFADDEN, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons v. NFSM PIZZA, INC., d/b/a "Domino's Pizza," CHARLES RIDDLE
and ALAN GRIFFIN, Case No. 2:18-cv-00204-SWS (D. Wyo., December 5,
2018), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover
alleged unpaid minimum wages and overtime hours owed to the
Plaintiff herself and similarly situated delivery drivers employed
by the Defendants at their Domino's stores.

NFSM Pizza, Inc., is a Wyoming Foreign Profit Corporation, which
may be served with process via its registered agent Charles Riddle.
The Individual Defendants are owners, officers or held managerial
responsibilities and substantial control over terms and conditions
of the drivers' work.

The Defendants operate numerous Domino's franchise stores.  The
Defendants employ delivery drivers, who use their own automobiles
to deliver pizza and other food items to their customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dustin T. Lujan, Esq.
          LUJAN LAW OFFICE
          1603 Capitol Ave., Suite 310 A559
          Cheyenne, WY 82001
          Telephone: (970) 999-4225
          E-mail: wyoadvocate@gmail.com

               - and -

          J. Forester, Esq.
          Matthew Haynie, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com
                  matthew@foresterhaynie.com


NISSAN: Faces Class Action Over Defective Braking Systems
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Nissan sold at least nine models of vehicles since 2015 model year
with defective Forward Emergency Braking or Automatic Emergency
Braking systems that can detect nonexistent obstacles, bringing the
car to a halt in traffic, consumers claim in a federal class
action.


NORTH SHORE: Certification of Class Sought in O'Boyle Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Anne O'Boyle moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned ANNE O'BOYLE, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. NORTH SHORE AGENCY,
LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-01921-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that
the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant
the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules
setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and
supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff notes.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NOW LLC: Richards et al. Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
------------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Copeland Richards, Ceeca Begley, Dehlia Gaynor, Tyshon
Greene, Ernest Markarian, and Christian Montenegro, as an
individual and on behalf of all employees similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. The Now, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Company, Leland Raymond, DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. BC695628, was removed from the Los Angeles
Superior Court, to the Central District of California (Western
Division - Los Angeles) on Dec. 6, 2018. The Central District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-10152-SVW-MRW to
the proceeding. The suit alleges labor-related violation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Stephen V. Wilson.[BN]

Attorneys for Copeland Richards:

          Edward E. Kim, Esq.
          Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
          MAHONEY LAW GROUP APC
          249 East Ocean Boulevard Suite 814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 590-5550
          Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
          E-mail: ekim@mahoney-law.net
                  kmahoney@mahoney-law.net

Attorneys for Ceeca Begley, Christian Montenegro, Ernest Markarian,
Tyshon Greene and Dehlia Gaynor:

          Chantal McCoy Payton, Esq.
          PAYTON EMPLOYMENT LAW
          11500 West Olympic Boulevard Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 444-3039
          Facsimile: (310) 870-7207
          E-mail: CPayton@PaytonEmploymentLaw.com

               - and -

          Marissa L Simmons, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MARISSA L SIMMONS
          11500 West Olympic Boulevard Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 853-2235
          Facsimile: (310) 853-2235
          E-mail: marissa@marissasimmonslaw.com

Attorneys for defendants The Now, LLC and Leland Raymond:

          Ashley Michelle Farrell, Esq.
          Ryan Christopher Bykerk, Esq.
          Mark D Kemple, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          1840 Century Park East Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-2121
          Telephone: (310) 586-7700
          Facsimile: (310) 586-7800
          E-mail: farrellpicketta@gtlaw.com
                  bykerkr@gtlaw.com
                  kemplem@gtlaw.com

PACIFIC UNION: Mortgage Borrowers File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class claims Pacific Union Financial violates California law by
refusing to pay mortgage borrowers at least 2 percent interest on
advance payments for taxes and insurance, held in escrow.


PEBBLE BEACH: Court Affirms $180K Attys' Fees Award in Orozco Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL OROZCO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PEBBLE
BEACH COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. H044232 (Cal.
App.), Judge Nathan D. Mihara of the Court of Appeals of California
for the Sixth District affirmed the trial court's judgment granting
final approval of Orozco's class action settlement with the
Defendant.

In September 2014, Joey Cubbage, who was the original class
representative, filed a class action complaint alleging that the
Defendant failed to provide accurate wage statements in violation
of Labor Code section 226.  More specifically, the first cause of
action alleged that the wage statements failed to identify pay
period dates and the employee identification number and/or the last
four digits of the employee's social security number.  

The Plaintiff also alleged a second cause of action under the
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 for a representative action
for civil penalties.  The complaint alleged that the class included
all current and former California employees of the Defendant, who
received wages from defendant from Sept. 18, 2013, through the
present.  Cubbage was represented by the law firms of Diversity Law
Group and Polaris Law Group.

In March 2015, Cubbage filed a first amended class action
complaint.  The first cause of action added the allegation that the
wage statements also failed to identify the applicable pay rate and
number of hours for OT Premium wages.  The complaint alleged that
the class also included all current and former California employees
of defendant who were paid OT Premium wages from the Defendant from
Sept. 18, 2013, through the present.

In June 2015, the parties participated in a full-day of mediation.
After further negotiations on subsequent days, the parties entered
into an agreement to settle the case.

On Sept. 30, 2015, Cubbage filed a motion for preliminary approval
of the class action settlement.  A month later, the hearing on the
motion was held.  Noting that Cubbage had pleaded guilty to felony
theft from an elder, was ordered to pay over $500,000 in
restitution, and was currently on probation, the trial court found
that he was not an appropriate class representative.  The class
counsel was unaware of Cubbage's conviction.  The trial court also
found that the motion failed to include, among other things, the
number of the class members, a description of the overtime claim,
the counsel's hourly rates and number of hours, and authority to
support the Plaintiff's potential liability for attorney's fees.
The motion was denied without prejudice.

In January 2016, a second amended class action complaint was filed.
Sandra Cassidy was added as a class representative.  The second
amended class action complaint added a cause of action alleging
that the Defendant failed to pay premium compensation at regular
rates of pay for missed rest periods in violation of Labor Code
section 226.7.  This complaint alleged that the class also included
all current and former California employees of defendant, who were
paid meal premium pay from July 28, 2013, through the present.

About two months later, the parties agreed for purposes of
settlement that a third amended complaint would be filed. On April
4, 2016, Cassidy withdrew as a named plaintiff and Daniel Orozco
was added as a named plaintiff to act on behalf of the class.

On April 20, 2016, a motion for preliminary approval of a class
action settlement was filed.  The settlement agreement provided:
the Defendant would create a gross common fund of $750,000; any
class member who did not opt out of the settlement would be
automatically issued his or her share of the settlement; none of
the common fund would revert back to the Defendant; after payment
to the class representative, the California Labor & Workforce
Development Agency, and the class counsel, the net settlement sum
would be divided among the approximately 3,000 class members based
on the number of wage statements that each received.  The
settlement agreement also provided for attorney's fees up to
one-third (33.33%) the total settlement sum, equal to $250,000.  No
class members objected to any portion of the class settlement
agreement.  Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order
granting preliminary approval of the settlement.

On Sept. 23, 2016, a motion for final approval of the class action
settlement was filed.  The class counsel attached declarations to
the motion and stated that their rates were $650 per hour and they
had spent 380 hours on the case.  A month later, the trial court
held a hearing on the motion.  The trial court concluded that the
hourly rate and the number of hours charged by the class counsel
was excessive.  It awarded $180,000 in attorney's fees, explaining
that it's the totality of the case, the amount of work the counsel
put into it, the hours.  

The Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it reduced the request for attorney's fees.
  He argues that the trial court erred by failing to follow the
holding in Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.

Judge Mihara disagrees finding the Plaintiff's reliance on Laffitte
is misplaced.  He opines that the Laffitte court did not hold that
trial courts are required to use the percentage method in
calculating attorney's fees.  Instead, it held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in using the method when it approved
the fee request.  

The Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to allow him to seek a multiplier on the
reduced lodestar.  When the class counsel learned that the trial
court intended to reduce the amount of attorney's fees, he
requested that it apply a multiplier to the reduced lodestar and
argued that a multiplier of 1.3 was appropriate.  Thus, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiff was not deprived of the opportunity to
seek a multiplier on the reduced lodestar.

For these reasons, the Judge Mihara affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/RkLQnN from Leagle.com.


PINNACLE FOODS: Faces False Advertising Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Insurance Journal reports that a class-action lawsuit has been
filed against the maker of potato chips sold under the brand name
Hawaiian, claiming the chips made in Washington state are
misleading customers.

The Honolulu Star-Advertiser reported Michael Maeda of Honolulu and
Iliana Sanchez of Los Angeles filed the suit last month, alleging
Pinnacle Foods Inc. is using false and deceptive advertising as
well as fraudulent and unfair business practices.

They claim they and consumers like them would not have purchased
the chips, or would have paid significantly less, if they knew the
snacks were made outside of Hawaii and without ingredients from the
state.

The chips' packaging does not say the snacks are made in Hawaii.

An attorney for the company, which is headquartered in New Jersey,
declined to comment on the lawsuit. [GN]


PNC BANK: Kennedy-Rose Sues Over Illegal Bank Charges
-----------------------------------------------------
Simon Kennedy-Rose and Third Force Negotiation, LLC, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PNC
Bank, National Association, Defendant, Case No. 2018CH15093 (Ill.
Cir. Ct., December 4, 2018), seeks damages, restitution and/or
injunctive relief exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees
arising from charging service fees to which the account holders did
not agree to, in violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act and common law fraud.

Kennedy-Rose opened a "Free Business Checking Account" with PNC at
its branch located at 3844 West Belmont Avenue in Chicago,
Illinois, under the consideration that the account was free banking
and incurred no monthly fees. However, his account was enrolled in
a service called "Cash Flow Insight" which incurred a $22.00 fee,
without his knowledge. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David B. Levin, Esq.
      Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.
      111 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 1700
      Chicago, IL 60604
      Phone: (312) 212-4355
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      Email: dlevin@toddflaw.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Madinya Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SANDRA MADINYA, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-61138-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

Madinya filed the putative class action against the Defendant under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), stemming from a
letter sent to the Plaintiff on Feb. 21, 2018 to collect on a
time-barred debt.  At the time she received the Letter in the mail
related to debt she incurred on a Capital One credit card, the debt
was time-barred.  The Plaintiff contends that the letter violates
the FDCPA because it fails to disclose to the Plaintiff that should
she make a partial payment on the debt, the Defendant's right to
sue for the debt would be "revived" under Florida law.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff alleges in a single count
violations of 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and
1692f.  According to the Plaintiff, although it may not be improper
for the Defendant to seek repayment for a time-barred debt, in
doing so, the Defendant must avoid creating a misleading impression
regarding the consequences of making partial payment on a
time-barred debt, and clearly and prominently disclose that partial
payment would revive the statute of limitations.

The Defendant previously sought to dismiss the Complaint, arguing
that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, and
that in any event, the Defendant is protected by the safe harbor
provision in the FDCPA.  The Court denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.  It noted that although the Plaintiff alleges in the
Complaint that the right to file suit on a time-barred debt can be
revived by partial payment under Florida law, the Plaintiff's
conclusory allegation may not constitute an accurate statement of
the law in Florida.  Nevertheless, the Court observed that the
Defendant had not made that particular argument in its Motion to
Dismiss.  Therefore, the Court declined to entertain it by
implication.  

The Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
the Plaintiff's statement of Florida law is incorrect, and
therefore, that the Plaintiff's FDCPA claim fails as a matter of
law.  In response, the Plaintiff argues that partial payment may
revive the statute of limitations, if accompanied by a writing.
According to her, the Letter features a payment coupon and requests
a check from the consumer, which requires a signature.  She
therefore urges the Court to hold that the completion of the
payment coupon (by filling in the amount paid), accompanied by a
check, is sufficient to revive the statute of limitations.

Judge Bloom finds that despite the Plaintiff's citation to Section
95.04 in the Complaint, the only clear and consistent enunciation
of her legal theory is that partial payment on a time-barred debt
revives the statute of limitations under Florida law.  The
Plaintiff's statement of Florida law is a legal conclusion, which
the Judge needs not accept as true or construe in her favor.  The
Plaintiff's only pled theory is based upon an incorrect statement
of law.  A partial payment alone does not revive the statute of
limitations on a time-barred debt in Florida.

As a result, because a time-barred debt cannot be revived by
partial payment alone under Florida law, then the least
sophisticated consumer could not be misled by omission of language
regarding the potential consequences of such payment.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Bloom granted the Defendant's
Motion.  The Judge will enter judgment by separate order.  The
Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/m1mHaG from Leagle.com.

Sandra Madinya, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Darren R. Newhart --
darren@cloorg.com -- Consumer Law Organization, P.A. & Jordan
Alexander Shaw -- jshaw@zpllp.com -- ZEBERSKY PAYNE.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Defendant, represented by Sara
F. Holladay-Tobias -- stobias@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods &
Brittney Lauren Difato -- bdifato@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Bulger & Hamadeh Sue over Debt Collection
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Bulger and Chafik Hamadeh, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Portfolio Recovery
Associates, L.L.C., the Defendant, Case No. 18-37769A (Mass. Super.
Ct., Dec. 4, 2018), alleges that Defendant violated the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, and the Massachusetts Debt
Collection Regulations, in its illegal efforts to collect consumer
debts.

According to the complaint, the Massachusetts Attorney General
regulated it an "unfair or deceptive act or practice for a
creditor" to "initiate a communication with any debtor via
telephone, either in person or via text messaging or recorded audio
message, in excess of two such communications in each seven day
period to either the debtor's residence, cellular telephone, or
other telephone number provided by the debtor as his or her
personal telephone number." The Attorney General has advised, and
the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently confirmed, that the
regulation means debt collectors cannot place more than two
collection calls per week to Massachusetts consumers, regardless of
the outcome of the gall. See Arntala v. Target Corp.

Mr. Bulger incurred a financial obligation that arose from services
which were primarily for family, personal or household purposes.
PRA attempted to collect the Debts from Plaintiffs and, as such,
initiated and engaged in "communications. PRA called Mr. Bulger at
an excessive and harassing rate, placing more than two calls to Mr.
Bulger in an attempt to collect the Bulger Debt within a seven-day
period. For example, PRA called Mr. Bulger's cellular telephone on
November 14, 2018, November 18, 20I8 and November 20,2018, the
lawsuit says.

PRA, also known as Anchor Receivables Management, manages past-due
accounts. It serves customers through account representatives. The
company was incorporated in 1996 and is based in Norfolk, Virginia.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC operates as a subsidiary of PRA
Group, Inc.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

PRINCESS ANNE MOTEL: Faces Honeywell ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Princess Anne Motel
Management, Inc. The lawsuit is captioned as Cheri Honeywell,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Princess Anne Motel Management, Inc., a Florida
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-62961-WPD (S.D. Fla.,
Dec. 4, 2018). The suit alleges Americans with Disabilities Act
violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William P.
Dimitrouleas.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L.KERR, P.A.
          DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com

PTT LLC: Wash. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilson Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SEAN WILSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PTT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company d/b/a HIGH 5 GAMES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-05275-RBL (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Tacoma, denied High 5's Motion to
Dismiss.

The underlying dispute is a class action to recover money lost
playing electronic gambling games available through mobile apps.
High 5 argues that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.  Specifically,
High 5 contends that it should not be subject to personal
jurisdiction because it has no control over the physical location
of users who download and use its apps.  In addition, High 5 argues
that its apps do not allow users to gamble for a "thing of value"
and do not constitutes "illegal gambling" under Washington law.

High 5, a Delaware company headquartered in New York, markets apps
that allow players to partake in popular gambling games, such as
slot machine.  The apps allow users to play these games with
"virtual coins" that may be won or purchased in the app after users
run out of the initial free allotment.

Wilson purchased $1.99 worth of coins that he subsequently lost
playing High 5's games.  Despite the fact that these coins cannot
be redeemed for actual money, Wilson alleges that they are
nonetheless valuable because they can be used to continue playing.
Therefore, Wilson alleges that the games on High 5's apps
constitute gambling as defined by RCW 9.46.0285 in violation of RCW
4.24.070.  Wilson also alleges two derivative claims for violation
of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, and
unjust enrichment.

Judge Leighton explains that for specific jurisdiction, the Ninth
Circuit applies a three-prong test.  First, the non-resident
defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.  Second, the claim must be
one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related
activities.  Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport
with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be
reasonable.

For the first prong, the Judge finds that under the purposeful
availment framework, High 5 has sufficient contacts with the forum.
Even if the purposeful direction analysis were applied, High 5
would still have sufficient contacts with the forum.

The second prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis is also met
because Wilson's claims arise out of his purchase and use of coins
from apps High 5 makes available in Washington State.  The Judge
finds that although High 5 could argue that the actual gambling at
issue in this case consists of playing High 5's games with
previouslypurchased coins, the purchase of coins is inseparable
from their subsequent use in High 5's games.  Indeed, they have no
other purpose.

Finally, the third prong is also satisfied because exercising
jurisdiction over High 5 is reasonable and fair.  High 5 makes its
apps available in Washington and profits substantially from
business in the forum.  In short, High 5 does not present any
compelling reason why jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  Wilson
therefore has specific jurisdiction to sue High 5 in Washington,
and the case will not be dismissed or transferred on that basis.

Next, the Judge turns to High 5's argument that its apps do not
allow users to gamble for a "thing of value" and do not constitutes
"illegal gambling" under Washington law.  Among other things, he
finds that High 5 misconstrues the nature of the "transaction" at
issue in the case.  Whereas traditional gambling consists of a
single transaction (money for a chance to win), High 5's apps divvy
up this process between two connected transactions.  Although the
first transaction allows a user to obtain the virtual coins, the
second transaction of spending them in High 5's games is what fits
the statutory definition of gambling.  Consequently, regardless of
whether purchasing coins from High 5 is similar to buying
securities or tickets to a baseball game, buying coins and then
using them to play High 5's games is not a "bona fide business
transaction."

High 5 essentially argues that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of RCW 9.46.285 and 4.24.070 cannot be correct because it is
contrary to RCW 9.46.010's statement of the legislature's intent.
However, the Judge holds that RCW 9.46.010 is not necessarily in
tension with categorizing High 5's games as "illegal gambling"
because they allow High 5 to profit and may have a malicious effect
on those predisposed to gambling addiction.  Furthermore, the Court
will not contradict the Ninth Circuit's clearly stated
interpretation in Kater on the basis of an ambiguous statement of
legislative intent.

For all these reasons, Judge Leighton denied Defendant High 5's
Motion to Dismiss.  To the extent that High 5's arguments rely on
evidence that cannot be properly considered at the motion to
dismiss stage, High 5 can raise these arguments by submitting a
Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/U7adhG from Leagle.com.

Sean Wilson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cecily C. Shiel --
cshiel@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Janissa Ann Strabuk
-- jstrabuk@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Benjamin H.
Richman -- brichman@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice,
Eve-Lynn Rapp -- erapp@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice,
Rafey S. Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro
hac vice & Todd Logan -- tlogan@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac
vice.
PTT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Christopher Wright -- wright@carneylaw.com -- CARNEY
BADLEY SPELLMAN PS, Emilia L. Sweeney -- sweeney@carneylaw.com --
CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN PS, Erik F. Stidham --
efstidham@hollandhart.com -- HOLLAND & HART LLP, pro hac vice,
Jennifer M. Jensen, HOLLAND & HART LLP, pro hac vice, Robert C.
Ryan, HOLLAND & HART LLP, pro hac vice & Teague I. Donahey --
tidonahey@hollandhart.com -- HOLLAND & HART LLP, pro hac vice.


PURDUE PHARMA: Faces Sherman Suit in District of Minnesota
----------------------------------------------------------
Darcy Sherman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma,
Inc., Purdue Frederick Company Inc., The Insys Therapeutics, Inc.,
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, LTD, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc., Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Endo Health Solutions
Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, Actavis, Inc.,
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc., McKesson
Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., AmerisourceBergen Corporation,
and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Defendants, Case No.:
0:18-cv-03335-JNE-SER (D. Minn., Dec. 6, 2018). The suit demands
$75,000 alleging Racketeering (RICO) Act violation. The case
assigned to the Hon. Judge Joan N. Ericksen.[BN]

Purdue Pharma L.P. is a privately held pharmaceutical company owned
principally by parties and descendants of Mortimer and Raymond
Sackler.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jared D Shepherd, Esq.
          HOFF, BARRY & KOZAR
          775 Prairie Ctr Dr Ste 160
          Eden Prairie, MN 55344
          Telephone: (952) 941-9220
          Facsimile: (952) 941-7968
          E-mail: jshepherd@hoffbarry.com

QWEST CORP: Bid to Dismiss/Transfer Seiffert Suit Under FLSA Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORDAN SEIFFERT, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. QWEST CORPORATION
D/B/A/CENTURYLINK QC AND CENTURYLINK COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. CV-18-70-GF-BMM (D. Mont.), Judge Brian Morris
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, Great Falls
Division, denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss opt-in
Plaintiffs, or in the Alternative, Transfer Venue.

Seiffert, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly situated,
brings a collective action against the Defendants.  The Defendants
move to dismiss the out-of-state Plaintiffs and putative
Plaintiffs, or, in the alternative, transfer the case to the
Western District of Louisiana where CenturyLink is headquartered.
Seiffert opposes the motion.

CenturyLink first alleges that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state Opt-in Plaintiffs' claims.
Judge Morris finds that the Court possesses personal jurisdiction
over Seiffert, the sole named Plaintiff in the FLSA collective
action.  The proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over Seiffert
proves sufficient at this stage of the case to satisfy the personal
jurisdiction requirement for an FLSA collective action.  The
Supreme Court's analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal. did not intend to restrict the Court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction in FLSA collective action cases.

Next, the Defendants argue that the Court should transfer the case
to the Western District of Louisiana.  CenturyLink maintains its
headquarters in Louisiana and a district court in Louisiana could
exercise its general jurisdiction over CenturyLink.  

The Judge recognized that parties and witnesses resided throughout
the country.  These parties and witnesses would be required to
travel regardless of where the trial took place.  The transfer of
the action would simply shift the inconvenience from some parties
and witnesses to others.  This factor weighed against transfer and
the district court declined to transfer the case.

In addition, the transfer of the action outside Montana similarly
would shift the inconvenience from some parties and witnesses to
others.  Nearly all Plaintiffs reside outside Montana and
Louisiana.  The main witnesses likely will consist of the parties
themselves and CenturyLink employees.  The majority of potential
employee witnesses live outside both Montana and Louisiana.

Finally, the Defendants argue that Seiffert lacks any contacts with
the forum because Seiffert no longer lives or works in Montana.
They point out that no named Plaintiff now resides in Montana and
only 25 opt-in Plaintiffs reside in Montana.  Seiffert both lived
and worked in Montana during the relevant time period.  CenturyLink
continues to conduct business in Montana.  The cause of action
arose from that conduct in Montana.  This factor weighs against
transfer.

Having considered the motion to dismiss, and the factors pertinent
to the motion to transfer the present action to the Western
District of Louisiana, Judge Morris has determined that the factors
weigh against transfer.  Accordingly, he denied the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss opt-in Plaintiffs, or in the Alternative,
Transfer Venue.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8ISPxZ from Leagle.com.

Jordan Seiffert, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Philip L. McGrady --
Philip@mcgradylawfirm.com -- McGRADY LAW, Rowdy B. Meeks , ROWDY
MEEKS LEGAL GROUP LLC, pro hac vice & Tracey F. George , DAVIS
GEORGE MOOK LLC, pro hac vice.

Qwest Corporation, d/b/a CenturyLink QC & CenturyLink
Communications, LLC, Defendants, represented by Brian Mumaugh --
bmumaugh@hollandhart.com -- HOLLAND & HART, pro hac vice, Brianne
C. McClafferty -- bcmcclafferty@hollandhart.com -- HOLLAND & HART,
Chris R. Pace -- chris.pace@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., pro hac vice, Justin M. Dean --
justin.dean@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., pro hac vice & W. Scott Mitchell -- smitchell@hollandhart.com
-- HOLLAND & HART.


RAINBOW DISPOSAL: Hurtado Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTONIO HURTADO, et al.,
the Plaintiffs, vs. RAINBOW DISPOSAL CO., INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLAN COMMITTEE, et al., the Defendants, Case
8:17-cv-01605-JLS-DFM (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the
Court on March 22, 2019, for an order certifying a class of:

   "all persons who were vested participants in the Rainbow
   Disposal Co., Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan as of October
   1, 2014 and the beneficiaries of any such participants."

Excluded from the Class are Defendants and persons who were named
fiduciaries of the Rainbow ESOP, who are alleged to have engaged in
prohibited transactions or breaches of corporate fiduciary duties,
or who had decision-making or administrative authority relating to
the administration, modification, funding, or 15 interpretation of
the Rainbow ESOP, or relating to the decision to sell Rainbow.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Joseph Creitz, Esq.
          CREITZ & SEREBIN LLP
          100 Pine St., Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 466-3090
          E-mail: joe@creitzserebin.com

               - and -

          R. Joseph Barton, Esq.
          Vincent Cheng, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          1735 20th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 734-7046
          E-mail: jbarton@blockesq.com
                    vincent@blockesq.com

RAMS: Settles Class Action Over St. Louis Seat Licenses
-------------------------------------------------------
Joe Harris, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that the
Los Angeles Rams will pay up to $24 million to former personal seat
license owners in St. Louis and another $7.4 million in attorney's
fees and expenses to settle a class action over the football team's
relocation.

The figures were released in a motion for preliminary approval
filed in St. Louis federal court on Dec. 5.

Personal seat licenses, or PSLs, were a one-time fee that gave the
buyer the right to buy season tickets to Rams games in St. Louis,
which didn't include the price of the ticket.  The original PSLs
were good for 30 years, but the Rams moved to Los Angeles in
January 2016 after just 21 seasons.

The settlement awards PSL holders the equivalent of nine years'
worth of their PSL purchase price.

The value of the PSL varied depending on the seat so the amount
that each class member will receive will range from as low as $75
to up to several thousand dollars.

Fernando Bermudez, an attorney for one of the firms representing
the plaintiffs, said it was a good deal for PSL holders.

"Of course, we would have wanted more," Mr. Bermudez told the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch.  "Of course the Rams would have wanted less.
But with the help of a former Missouri Supreme Court judge (Ray
Price), we came to a figure that is reasonable and that everyone
could live with." (Parentheses in original.)

Judge Price served as mediator in the case.

Attorneys representing the Rams did not immediately respond to
emails sent on Dec. 6 seeking comment.

The settlement covers several class actions filed by disgruntled
St. Louis football fans in the immediate aftermath of the Rams
departure for more lucrative California soil.  The lawsuits were
eventually consolidated into one.

There are two classes within the settlement.  There is the "FANS
class" representing original PSL holders who bought season tickets
from the FANS Inc. civic group when the team moved to St. Louis.
The other is the "Rams class" representing PSL owners who bought
their PSLs after March 31, 1996, when the Rams took over the PSL
process.

Since the wording in those contracts was different, the legal
arguments for each class differed. However, the award money is the
same for both classes.

The Rams still face a lawsuit from St. Louis over the move to L.A.,
claiming the Rams and the National Football League failed to meet
the league's own relocation guidelines.  A motion by the Rams to
have the matter moved to arbitration was recently denied by a
Missouri appeals court.


RENZENBERGER INC: Ford Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Roniesha Ford, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Renzenberger, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-02660, (D. Kan., December 5, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid
straight time and overtime compensation for all working hours,
liquidated and/or other damages, attorneys' fees, costs and
expenses pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Ford worked at Hallcon's location in Lenexa, KS as a non-exempt
hourly employee. Hallcon failed to pay Ford the proper amount of
overtime compensation due, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew E. Osman, Esq.
     Kathryn S. Rickley, Esq.
     OSMAN & SMAY LLP
     8500 W. 110th St., Ste. 330
     Overland Park, KS 66210
     Tel: (913) 667-9243
     Fax: (866) 470-9243
     Email: krickley@workerwagerights.com
            mosman@workerwagerights.com


ROYALTY PUPPIES: Inda Seeks Unpaid Wages, Commissions
-----------------------------------------------------
Alexa Marie Inda, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Royalty Puppies LLC et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-24855
(S.D. Fla., November 20, 2018), seeks to recover damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges willful violations of overtime wages and
unpaid commissions by the Defendants.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt retail
employee who sold dogs, dog accessories and products to the retail
public. The Plaintiff was employed from on or about August 2, 2018
through November 11, 2018.

The Defendants operated the business which sold dogs to the public
within the Southern District of Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel T. Feld, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL T. FELD, P.A.
      2847 Hollywood Blvd.
      Hollywood, FL 33020
      Tel: (954) 361-8383
      E-mail: DanielFeld.Esq@gmail.com

          - and -

      Isaac Mamane, Esq.
      MAMANE LAW LLC
      10800 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 350A
      Miami, FL 33161
      Tel: (305) 773 - 6661
      E-mail: mamane@gmail.com


RWI TRANSPORTATION: Craft Settlement Has Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned LARRY
CRAFT, an individual; on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. RWI TRANSPORTATION, LLC a California
corporation and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.
2:17-cv-05289-SVW. (C.D. Cal.).

This Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the product of
good faith arms-length negotiations by the Parties, each of whom
was represented by experienced counsel.

The Court finds that the class proposed for purposes of the
Settlement meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), and
23(b)(2) and (3), and hereby certifies a Settlement Class in the
Action as follows:

     All individuals who Defendant classified as independent
contractors who drove under load for RWI and/or whose tractor was
driven under load from RWI to or from California under RWI's DOT
authority at any time from June 19, 2013, through March 31, 2018.

The Court approves all terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement
and the Settlement reflected therein, and finds that such
Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, adequate and in
the best interests of the Settlement Class Members, and the Parties
to the Settlement Agreement are directed to consummate and perform
its terms.

The settlement of civil penalties under PAGA in the amount of
Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) is hereby approved.
Seventy-Five Percent (75%), or $18,750, shall be paid to the
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency. The remaining
Twenty-Five Percent (25%), or $5,250, will be paid to Participating
Class Members.

The Court approves settlement administration costs and expenses in
the amount of $12,000 to CPT Group, Inc.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd443sjq from Leagle.com.

Larry Craft, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anastasia Kinney
Mazzella -- am@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck LLP, Brian S. Kabateck --
bsk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck LLP & Shant Arthur Karnikian --
sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck LLP.

RWI Transportation, LLC, Defendant, represented by Angela J. Rafoth
-- arafoth@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Carlos Jimenez --
cajimenez@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Gary E. Becker --
gary.becker@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore and Shohl LLP, pro hac vice,
Julie A. Stockton -- jstockton@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC,
Richard H. Rahm -- rrahm@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC &
Susan H. Jackson, Dinsmore and Shohl LLP, pro hac vice.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Judge Tosses 2nd Amended Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh dismissed with prejudice a second
amended class action against Samsung Electronics, in which
consumers claimed that the resale value of Galaxy smartphones
declined because Samsung infringed patents held by Apple.


SAMUEL SPICER: Md. App. Certifies Question in Price MCLL Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM PRICE, ET AL. v. RALPH M. MURDY, et al, Misc.
No. 1 September Term, 2018 (Md. App.), Judge Mary Ellen Barbera of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article ("CJP") Section 5-102 is a statutory specialty
and actions on it are accorded a 12-year limitations period.

The Court is presented with a question of law certified by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the
Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Sections
12-601 to 12-613 of the CJP, Maryland Code.  The question posed is
whether a Maryland statute -- the licensing requirement of the
Maryland Consumer Loan Law, Section 12-302 of the Commercial Law
Article ("CL"), Maryland Code -- is a statutory specialty as
contemplated by CJP Section 5-102(a)(6).

Plaintiffs, Price and Chovan, consumers who financed the purchase
of automobiles through loans under $6,000, brought a putative class
action against the lender, Samuel Spicer, for violations of the
Maryland Consumer Loan Law ("MCLL").  They allege that Spicer was
not licensed to enter into these loans under the MCLL.  The
Plaintiffs further allege that Spicer violated the MCLL by: (1)
failing to provide any notices related to repossession of cars; (2)
charging and collecting compound interest; and (3) charging and
collecting inflated or uncollectable attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs claim that they entered into loans with Spicer while
he was unlicensed, but all of the loan transactions occurred over
three years before the instant lawsuit was filed on March 17, 2017.
The general statute of limitations for civil actions is three
years.  CJP Section 5-102(a)(6), however, provides a 12-year
statute of limitations for causes of action brought under a
specialty statute.

The Plaintiffs assert that the MCLL is another specialty, and
therefore the 12-year statute of limitations applies to their
claims.  Spicer, on the other hand, maintains that the MCLL is not
a specialty, and therefore the three-year statute of limitations
applies.  As a result, Spicer contends, the Plaintiffs' MCLL claims
are time-barred.

The District Court determined that the limitations issue involves a
question of unresolved Maryland law and, therefore, certified the
following question to the Court: Whether the MCLL Section 12-302's
licensing requirement is an "other specialty" subject to Maryland's
12-year limitations period under CJP Section 5-102(a)(6).

In Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, the Court laid out a test for
determining whether a statute creates an "other specialty" under
CJP Section 5-102(a)(6): An action based on a statute will
constitute an other specialty subject to the 12-year period of
limitations if (1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right
sought to be enforced is created or imposed solely by the statute,
or a related statute, and does not otherwise exist as a matter of
common law; (2) the remedy pursued in the action is authorized
solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise
exist under the common law; and (3) if the action is one for civil
damages or recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages
are liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory criteria,
are readily ascertainable.

The parties agree that the second prong of the Crowder test --
whether the remedy pursued is authorized solely by the statute and
does not otherwise exist at common law -- is not at issue, so Judge
Barbera examines the MCLL and its licensing requirement under the
first and third prongs.

As to the first prong one, Spicer argues that the licensing
requirement is not created and imposed solely by the MCLL.  Spicer
does not dispute that the common law contained no licensing
requirement but sees it as a means of enforcing the common law
right of redress by a party to a usurious loan, recognized for
centuries by Maryland courts.  

The Judge finds the Appellee's view as too narrow.  She holds that
the MCLL's licensing requirement -- coming as part of a statutory
scheme that, like the State Secondary Mortgage Loan Law ("SMLL"),
governs licensing, the amount of a loan, misleading advertising,
discrimination, maximum interest rates, permissible fees,
attorney's fees, and lender's disclosure duties, Section  12-301 to
12-317 -- was "created and imposed solely" by statute and not by
common law.

Turning to the third prong, the Appellee argues that the damages
are not liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory
criteria, readily ascertainable.  The Appellee bases the argument
on the MCLL's remedy that a person who is neither a licensee nor
exempt from licensing may not receive or retain any principal,
interest, or other compensation with respect to any loan that is
unenforceable under the subsection.  The Appellants respond by
saying that the fact finding with respect to 'statutory
specialties' damages is a common occurrence.

The Judge agrees with the Appellants.  She finds that the need for
fact-finding does not preclude ready ascertainment.  The Appellants
correctly identify how the fact-finder will "resolve" liability
"based on the relevant documents": all amounts paid by the
Appellants Price and Chovan to Appellee Spicer on each MCLL loan.
The Appellee may be right that the interest, costs, or other
charges, recoverable by a borrower under the SMLL are more easily
ascertainable -- documented on forms required by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development -- but that does not
mean that MCLL borrowers' payments are not readily ascertainable.
Therefore, the third Crowder element is satisfied by the MCLL.

Finally, the Appellee contends that the MCLL's enactment without a
specific limitations period in 1975, after the enactment in 1973 of
CJP Section 5-101's three-year "blanket" limitations period,
indicates the General Assembly's intent that CJP Section 5-101
applies rather than CJP Section 5-102.  

The Judge finds this contention as flawed for several reasons.
First, CJP Section 5-102 was also passed in 1973, and its
predecessor statute dates to 1924.  The same logic, therefore,
applies to the MCLL's relationship with both limitations statutes.
Second, the MCLL was not a new law in 1975, but previously existed
in a different place in the Maryland Code and under a different
name.  Therefore, the language in NVR Mortg. Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen
about statutes passed after CJP Section 5-101 is inapposite.
Third, Carlsen observed that the order of statutes' passage is only
"evidence" of the General Assembly's intent, not that such evidence
is dispositive, or even a weighty consideration.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Barbera held that the MCLL's
licensing requirement is an "other specialty" within the meaning of
CJP Section 5-102(a)(6) and that a claim brought on it is entitled
to a twelve-year limitations period.  She therefore answered "yes"
to the question certified by the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/e3BU7q from Leagle.com.


SENDGRID INC: Chen Files Suit Over Twilio Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
Rick Chen on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Sendgrid, Inc., Warren Adelman, Ajay Agarwal, Fred
Ball, Byron Deeter, Sameer Dholakia, Anne Raimondi, Hilary
Schneider, Sri Viswanath, Twilio, Inc., and Topaz Merger
Subsidiary, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03131 (D. Colo.,
December 5, 2018) seeks (i) to enjoin defendants and all persons
acting in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating or
closing the acquisition of SendGrid, Inc. by Twilio Inc. and Topaz
Merger Subsidiary, Inc., (ii) rescinding it in the event defendants
consummate the merger, (iii) rescissory damages, (iv) costs of this
action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys'
and experts' fees, and (v) such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Under the terms of the merger agreement, SendGrid will become an
indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Twilio, and SendGrid
stockholders will receive 0.485 shares of Twilio Class A common
stock for each share of SendGrid common stock they own, resulting
in a merger consideration of approximately $36.92 per share of
SendGrid common stock based upon the closing price of Twilio Class
A common stock on October 15, 2018, the day preceding the
announcement merger agreement. The transaction was valued at
approximately $2 billion.

SendGrid operates a cloud-based platform that provides various
tools to the businesses such as email application programming
interface, marketing campaigns and email campaigns.

The complaint says Defendants agreed to lock up the merger with
preclusive and onerous deal protection devices that preclude other
bidders from making successful competing offers for the company.
Company board members and executive officers will be getting
lucrative change-in-control agreements upon the termination of
their employment, it notes. The registration statement also omitted
the sales process and particular certain conflicts of interest for
management, as well as financial projections provided by Morgan
Stanley & Co LLC and Twilio's financial advisor Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC, the complaint relates. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marc L. Ackerman, Esq.
      BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
      Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510
      Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
      Phone: (610) 667-6200
      Facsimile: (610) 667-9029
      Email: mackerman@brodskysmith.com


SENTOSA NURSING: Filipino Nurses' Class Action Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
Staffing Industry Analysts reports that Filipino nurses previously
recruited by Sentosa Nursing Recruitment Agency and a related
entity, Prompt Nursing Employment Agency LLC, can move forward with
a class-action lawsuit alleging the agencies abused the legal
system and violated the Trafficking and Violence Protection Act by
forcing nurses to pay a $25,000 fee if they left their positions
before the end of a three-year term. McKnight's Long-Term Care News
reported the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York
on Nov. 28 certified the complaint, and a notice is now being sent
to more than 200 Filipino nurses who were previously recruited.
[GN]


SPRINT/UNITED: Court Certifies Three Classes in Caudle Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSHUA CAUDLE and KRYSTLE
WHITE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Kansas
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-06874-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge William Alsup entered
an order on December 18, 2018:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      Class 1 (Unlawful Deductions – SPS Class):

      "all current and former employees of Sprint who worked at
      Sprint's retail store location(s) in California and whose
      compensation was based in full or in part on incentive
      compensation (also called "commissions"), and whose
      commissions were reduced by a Sprint Promoter Score
      Adjustment, at any time from February 2016 to March 2017";

      Class 2 (Wage Statement Class):

      "all members of the Unlawful Deductions – SPS Class whose
      commissions were reduced by a Sprint Promoter Score
      Adjustment at any time from September 29, 2016 through March

      2017"; and

      Class 3 (Waiting Time Class):

      "all members of the Unlawful Deductions – SPS Class who
      separated their employment from Sprint at any time from
      September 29, 2014 through the present.";

   2. appointing Joshua Caudle and Krystle White as class
      representatives;

   3. appointing Haines Law Group, APC as class counsel.

   4. direcrtintg parties to jointly submit a proposal for class
      notification with a plan to distribute notice, including by
      first-class mail by Jan. 4, 2019 at noon; and

   5. reminding counsel of Plaintiffs' intention of notifying
      class members of the tolling issue in connection with the
      removed deactivation theory of liability.

The Court said. "Both sides request judicial notice of various
documents previously filed in three other cases involving class
action settlements with Sprint. Neither side opposes. A court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it "can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Accordingly, the
requests for judicial notice of documents are Granted. Sprint also
objects to several items of evidence submitted with plainitffs’
motion. Because consideration of the objected-to materials does not
impact the outcome of this order, Sprint’s objections are
overruled as moot."[CC]

STATE FARM: Court OKs Dismissal of Cranfield Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned CHARLES CRANFIELD,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. Case
No. 1:16CV1273. (N.D. Ohio).

This matter comes before the Court following Defendant State Farm
Fire & Casualty Company's (State Farm) Motion to Dismiss with
prejudice.

Cranfield filed a class action lawsuit alleging one count of Breach
of Contract against State Farm with the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas. Cranfield's home was damaged by a storm and he
submitted a claim to State Farm requesting coverage. An adjuster
inspected the damage and an estimate for repair was sent to
Cranfield. The total estimated cost to repair the damage, the
replacement cost value, was $4,044.86. State Farm calculated the
depreciation amount at issue in this case to be $1,348.57. It
subtracted this amount and Cranfield's deductible of $1,854.00 from
the replacement cost value to arrive at a Net ACV of $842.29, which
Cranfield received in two payments.

No Ambiguity Exists in the Contract

Ambiguity exists when a term is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Ambiguous provisions will be construed strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. However,
courts cannot create ambiguity if none exists.  

Plain Meaning Analysis of ACV

Actual Cash Value (ACV) has been defined as replacement cost minus
normal depreciation or fair market value. Either of these
definitions could fit within the contract clause without resulting
in absurdity. In fact, in the estimate provided to Cranfield that
was included with the Complaint, State Farm defined Net ACV in a
similar manner.  

Cranfield seeks to limit the definition of ACV to exclude labor
from depreciation. However, there is nothing within the text of the
contract to indicate that this was the intent of the parties at the
time that the contract was formed. Further, the plain meaning of
depreciation is inclusive of labor. The ordinary meaning of
depreciation has been defined as a reduction in the value or price
of something; specif., a decline in an asset's value because of
use, wear, obsolescence, or age. A depreciation method is a set
formula used in estimating an asset's use, wear, or obsolescence
over the asset's useful life or some portion thereof. As evidenced
by Black's Law Dictionary, depreciation commonly focuses on the
value of the whole product, rather than the component parts.

Therefore, as used in the policy, ACV cannot reasonably be
interpreted to exclude labor from a depreciation calculation.

Ohio Case Law Analysis of ACV

When contractual terms are undefined, courts also look to Ohio case
law to determine their meaning.   

Here, support also exists for finding ACV is unambiguous. The term
ACV has been used in Ohio insurance case law for over 150 years.  
Like Black's Law Dictionary, Ohio law has defined ACV to mean
either the market value of the property at the time of the loss or
the cost of repair or replacement less depreciation for age and
condition.   Additionally, the exact same language found in the
policy at issue has been determined to be clear and unambiguous by
an Ohio appellate court.

While persuasive authority, these appellate court decisions lend
support to a clear and unambiguous finding.

Analysis of Ohio Administrative Code Definition of ACV

Here, the Court finds that the regulation outlining the method to
determine ACV is clear and unambiguous. Further, because the
regulation states less any depreciation, a plain meaning analysis
of ACV in this regulation requires an inclusive definition of
depreciation. Read naturally, the word any has an expansive
meaning.  There are no stated limitations or exclusions. Therefore,
it is reasonable for the Court to interpret depreciation to include
labor as well as materials.  

Since no ambiguity exists in the contract and a calculation of the
ACV could depreciate labor as well as materials, there is no breach
of contract as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court grants State
Farm's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8gooc9u from
Leagle.com.

Charles Cranfield, individually and on behalf of all other Ohio
residents similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel P.
Goetz -- dgoetz@weismanlaw.com -- Weisman, Kennedy & Berris, James
A. DeRoche, Garson Johnson, James S. Timmerberg, Dworken &
Bernstein, Patrick J. Perotti -- pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken
& Bernstein & R. Eric Kennedy -- ekennedy@weismanlaw.com --
Weisman, Kennedy & Berris.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
Benjamin C. Sasse -- benjamin.sasse@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis, Brian J. Neff, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila, Heidi Dalenberg
-- hdalenberg@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila, Joseph
A. Cancila -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes &
Cancila, Karl A. Bekeny -- karl.bekeny@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis, Paul L. Janowicz -- paul.janowicz@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis, Robert C. Tucker -- robert.tucker@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis & Ryan P. Poscablo -- rposcablo@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer
Holmes & Cancila.


STONY HOLLOW: Beck Settlement Has Final Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Final Approval of
the Settlement Agreement in the case captioned CARLY BECK, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
STONY HOLLOW LANDFILL, INC., Defendant. Case No. 3:16-cv-455. (S.D.
Ohio).

The Named Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Settlement Class
Members, seeks final approval of the Settlement Agreement in its
entirety, including an award of attorneys' fees and expenses to
Class Counsel, an incentive award to Named Plaintiff, and the
allocation of the remaining funds to the Settlement Class Members.


Having considered that a class action settlement should be approved
only if it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after comparing the
terms of the settlement with the likely rewards of litigation,
having considered that, in assessing the reasonableness and
adequacy of a settlement in a class action, the Sixth Circuit has
instructed district courts to consider the following factors: (a)
the risk of fraud or collusion;(b) the complexity, expense, and
likely duration of the litigation;(c) the amount of discovery
engaged in by the parties;(d) the likelihood of success on the
merits;(e) the opinions of class counsel and class
representatives;(f) the reaction of absent class members; and(g)
the public interest.

Having considered the substance and amount of opposition to the
proposed settlement, it is hereby determined that:

(i) the Settlement was entered into in good faith being fairly and
honestly negotiated;

(ii) the outcome of the Litigation is in doubt;

(iii) it is possible the proposed Settlement Class could receive
more if the Litigation were to go through trial, but that it is
also quite possible that the proposed Settlement Class could
receive less and/or that Defendant could defeat certification.

(iv) the value of immediate recovery outweighs the possibility of
future relief which would likely occur, if at all, only after
further protracted litigation and appeals.

(v) the parties have in good faith determined the Settlement
Agreement is in their respective best interests, including both the
Named Plaintiff and Class Counsel determining that it is in the
best interest of the Settlement Class Members.

(vi) the aggregate consideration, including both the Settlement
Fund to which Defendant shall contribute and the improvement
measures that the Defendant will implement before the end of 2022,
is commensurate with the claims asserted and that will be released
as part of the settlement, and

(vii) the proposed Settlement Agreement's terms fall well within
the range of settlement terms that would be considered fair,
reasonable, and adequate resolution of the Litigation.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 23(e), the terms of the Settlement
Agreement relating to the above-captioned Litigation are hereby
finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate as to, and in
the best interest of, the Settlement Class and each of the
Settlement Class Members, in light of the factual, legal,
practical, and procedural considerations raised by this Litigation.


The Court further finds that the Settlement Agreement complies with
the applicable requirements under Ohio and Federal law, the Rules
of the Court, any other applicable law, and due process
requirements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 26, 2018 Judgment
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y78a7mfm from
Leagle.com.

Carly Beck, Plaintiff, represented by Nicholas Coulson --
ncoulson@ldclassaction.com -- Liddle & Dubin, PC, pro hac vice,
Steven Liddle, Liddle & Dubin, PC, pro hac vice & Daniel P. Petrov
-- dpetrov@tpgfirm.com -- Thorman Petrov Group Co., LPA.

Stony Hollow Landfill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Timothy
David Hoffman -- tim.hoffman@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP,
Darin K. Waylett -- dwaylett@mcguirewoods.com -- pro hac vice,
Eugene E. Mathews, III -- mmathews@mcguirewoods.com -- pro hac
vice, R. Trent Taylor, McGuire Woods LLP, pro hac vice & Steve N.
Siegel -- jdinsmore@mcguirewoods.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.


SUNRISE DETOX III: Dunleavey Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
------------------------------------------------------
Philip Dunleavey, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Sunrise Detox III, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-25090 (S.D. Fla., December 5, 2018),
seeks injunctive relief, statutory damages and any other available
legal or equitable remedies for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Defendant operates a center for drug and alcohol detox. Sunrise
sent text messages to Dunleavey's cellular telephone number in an
attempt to promote its services using an automatic telephone
dialing system. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

             - and -

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


SYKES ENTERPRISES: Kronzer FCRA Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
A case, William Kronzer, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Sykes Enterprises,
Incorporated, a Florida corporation, the Defendant, Case No.:
18-CV-11017 (Filed 8, 2018), was removed from the 13th Judicial
Circuit, Hillsborough County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida (Tampa). The Middle District of Florida
Court Clerk assigned Case No.: 8:18-cv-02939-MSS-JSS. The suit
alleges Fair Credit Reporting Act violation. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Judge Mary S. Scriven.

Sykes Enterprises, Incorporated is an American multinational
corporation headquartered in Tampa, Florida. The company provides
business process outsourcing services, IT consulting and IT-enabled
services, such as technical support and customer service.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Marc Reed Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, PA
          One Tampa City Center Ste 700
          201 N Franklin Street
          Tampa, FL 33602-5157
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 257-0572
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Hugo Samuel DeBeaubien, Esq.
          Jaime Austrich, Esq.
          SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, LLP
          101 E Kennedy Blvd Ste 2800
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 229-7600
          Facsimile: (813) 229-1660
          E-mail: bdebeaubien@slk-law.com
                  jaustrich@slk-law.com

TICKETMASTER: Defends Class Action Over Ticket Scalpers
-------------------------------------------------------
Eriq Gardner, writing for Hollywood Reporter, reports that to buy
tickets, the live events giant argues, customers also agree to
waive any right to a jury trial and to binding arbitration.

Ticketmaster has turned to the fine print in order to save itself
from a putative class action that alleges the company actively
encourages the sale of tickets on the secondary market.

Allen Lee is among ticket buyers now suing Ticketmaster and its
parent, Live Nation, after undercover reporters from Canada's CBC
and the Toronto Star detailed how Ticketmaster facilitates scalpers
in order to gain a second cut on sales. The lawsuit claims
violations of the Cartwright Act, California Penal Code and unfair
and fraudulent business practices.

To head off any situation where plaintiffs may gang up on the
company in open court, Ticketmaster now points in a brief filedon
Nov. 30 to the "clickwrap" terms of use that Lee assented to when
purchasing secondary tickets to numerous sporting events. The
defendants maintains that "the applicable Terms contained a
provision by which Plaintiffs expressly agreed to submit their
claims to binding arbitration, and waive any right to a jury trial
or to participate in a class action."

Ticketmaster argues that such terms of use constitute a valid,
enforceable agreement and that the arbitration clause encompasses
the dispute at issue.

Mr. Lee's "claims plainly relate to 'products or services sold or
distributed by [Ticketmaster] or through [Ticketmaster],' within
the meaning of the ticketmaster.com Terms of Use," argue the
company's lawyers at Latham & Watkins.

Most courts have upheld clickware agreements so long as they are
conspicuous enough, although Spotify lost a ruling a couple years
ago for the unconscionable way it had modified terms without proper
notice. Plaintiffs lawyers will now argue against compelled
arbitration, while renewed attention to Ticketmaster's alleged
cooperation with scalpers has some calling for new legislation.
[GN]


TIGER BRANDS: Lawyers to File Listeriosis Class Action Next Year
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bonga Dlulane, writing for Eyewitness News, reports that lawyers
for the claimants against Tiger Brands following the listeriosis
outbreak say they're aiming to file their class action suit by
early next year.

This comes after a South Gauteng High Court granted Richard Spoor
Attorneys the go ahead to sue the food producer for damages and
liability.

A Tiger Brands factory in Polokwane was identified as the source of
the outbreak that led to the deaths of 189 people.

The company says that it will cooperate with the process and fork
out up to R1 million for a toll-free call centre and adverts to
inform listeriosis victims to join the class action.

Richard Spoor Attorneys' Thamsanqa Malusi explains: "We're planning
to file our papers with regards to the liability of Tiger Brands in
January. They're going to have to plea on that. That means they
accept or agree that they're liable for the outbreak. We anticipate
that process in totality including the discovery process should
take about eight to nine months."

Meanwhile, Tiger Brands spokesperson Mary-Jane Morifi won't confirm
or deny they might settle out of court.

"What I can confirm is that we will work with the legal process and
follow legal due process to ensure we come out to an outcome that
provides closure to both parties in the matter." [GN]


TIGER BRANDS: To Cooperate with Listeriosis Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Khulekani Magubane, writing for fin24, reports that Tiger Brands
[JSE:TBS] says it will follow the legal process to bring closure to
all parties, after the South Gauteng High Court allowed the
initiation of a class action suit over an outbreak of listeriosis
earlier this year.

No liability has been established yet, the company reiterated.

The court determined that Richard Spoor Attorneys could go ahead
with its class action application representing over a thousand
people affected by the listeriosis outbreak that infected as many
people and killed 200.

Tiger Brands chief corporate affairs officer Mary Jane Morifi said
in a statement that the company would support the class action
notice process to ensure that anyone with a legitimate claim could
be informed of the class action.

In the statement, which was released shortly after the company's
SENS announcement affirming the certification of the class action
application, Tiger Brands said it was still to be determined
whether or not Tiger Brands was at fault in the eyes of the court
for those affected by listeriosis.

"Tiger Brands reiterates that no liability has been established
against the company for the listeriosis outbreak.

"However, should liability be determined, the company will respond
appropriately to any legitimate claims," the statement said.

Ms. Morifi said the R1m that the company extended to assist in
supporting the class action process, and a hotline to facilitate
it, was a sign that the company was committed to finding a
resolution for everyone affected.

"We are committed to ensuring that the legal process runs smoothly
and as quickly as possible. In managing the application for the
certification of the class action in this manner, we have been able
to substantially shorten the time taken for this part of the legal
process," said Ms. Morifi.

Ms. Morifi said Tiger Brands remained committed to following the
legal process to bring closure to all parties as soon as possible.
[GN]


TRES DIAMANTE RESTAURANT: Flores et al. Seek Minimum & OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
ELSY FLORES, EMMA GARCIA, JONATAN ORELLANA, BERNARDA MARTINEZ,
ERIKA MORALES, INGRID SAGASTUME, and YOLANDA MARTINEZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
TRES DIAMANTE RESTAURANT INC. d/b/a THREE DIAMONDS RESTAURANT
a/d/b/a TRES DIAMANTES RESTAURANT a/d/b/a LOS TRES DIAMANTES
RESTAURANTE, NUEVO DIAMANTE, INC. d/b/a EL NUEVO DIAMANTE a/d/b/a
EL NUEVO DIAMANTE RESTAURANT a/d/b/a NUEVO DIAMANTE RESTAURANT,
SANTATECLA RESTAURANT INC. d/b/a LA JOLLA DE ORO, ROSABEL CALDERON,
and JOSE ALFREDO MANCIA, the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-06949-SJF-GRB (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2018), seeks equitable and
legal relief for Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants as
a server at Three Diamonds from in or around November 2016 until on
or around August 17, 2018. As a server, Flores' primary job duties
included cleaning bathrooms and tables, sweeping the floors,
throwing out the trash, preparing drinks and salads, and serving
food and beverages to customers. Throughout her employment with
Defendants, Flores regularly worked three days per week, as
follows: Fridays and Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. until 12:00 a.m., and
Sundays from 9:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., for a total of
approximately 43 hours per week. Flores was not afforded meal or
rest breaks during her shifts. Throughout her employment, Flores
was paid a fixed daily wage of $40.00, regardless of the number of
hours she worked. Based on Flores' compensation and hours worked
per week, Flores' regular rate of pay routinely fell below the
applicable federal and/or state minimum wage rates. Although Flores
received gratuities from the patrons she served, the amount of tips
Plaintiff received, when combined with her wages, still often fell
below the applicable minimum wage rates. Moreover, Defendants did
not pay Flores additional compensation for the hours she worked in
excess of 40 per week, the lawsuit says.

Three Diamonds also known as Tres Diamontes Restorante features
both American and Latin American cuisine and cocktails.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Adam Sackowitz, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
          New York, New York 10016
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          Facsimile: (212) 428-6811
          E-mail: ajsackowitz@katzmelinger.com

TRINITY RESTAURANT: Conditional Certification Bid, Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MERCEDES WHITFIELD, the
Plaintiff, vs. TRINITY RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-10973-DML-EAS (E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge David M.
Lawson entered an order:

   1. granting in part the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
      certification of her Fair Labor Standards Act claims as a
      collective action defined as:

      "all current and former servers who worked for Trinity
      Restaurant Group, LLC at its IHOP restaurants in Detroit,
      Mount Pleasant, and Saginaw at any time during the last
      three years";

   2. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion for
      conditional certification of collective action with respect
      to the Defendant's other restaurant locations.

The Court said, "The form and dissemination of notice is left to
counsel to negotiate. The Court has reviewed the parties'
submissions and heard oral argument on December 17, 2018. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court announced from the bench its
decision to grant in part the motion, finding that the plaintiff
had made a sufficient factual showing to support conditional
certification as to three of the defendant's restaurants. The Court
denied the motion without prejudice as to the eleven
other restaurants. The Court also directed counsel to meet and
confer on the form and dissemination of notice and to submit a
joint proposal for Court approval."[CC]

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers Petition to Compel Arbitration
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class of 12,501 Uber drivers petitioned to compel arbitration,
claiming the company misclassifies them as independent contractors
to deny them employment benefits.


UNITED STATES: Settlement Restores Migrants' US Asylum Rights
-------------------------------------------------------------
Emilio Demetriou-Jones, writing for Latin Lawyer, reports that
Hogan Lovells has worked pro bono to reach a class action
settlement with the US government which guarantees forcibly
separated migrant families have another chance to seek asylum in
the country amid claims mandatory procedures were ignored.

M M M v Sessions got a final settlement on 15 November. Dana
Sabraw, the district judge who oversaw the case, called the
settlement "fair, reasonable and adequate."

The class action was triggered by the consequences of a preliminary
injunction in another migrant case (Ms L v ICE) back in June. That
injunction ordered US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to
reunify migrant parents with their children.

In Hogan Lovells' M M M v Sessions case, the claimants (migrant
parents from Honduras and Guatemala) say the government responded
to the Ms L v ICE injunction by giving them two choices: being
reunified with their children and deported together; or being
deported alone while their children make a claim. This resulted in
many families agreeing to be deported together, but before their
children had a chance to claim asylum through a "credible fear"
interview.

The right to a credible fear interview was at the heart of the M M
M v Sessions case. These interviews are conducted with US border
officials and establish fear of either persecution or torture. If
interviewers find an individual was persecuted or has a
well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion,
nationality, social group, or political opinion, they can make an
asylum claim before a judge. Hogan Lovells' argued the process is
guaranteed by the Immigration and Nationality Act and the US
Constitution's due process clause.

M M M v Sessions was filed in July when the claimants sued several
state agencies. They claimed their children's right to asylum
through a credible fear interview had been ignored. They also said
their own credible fear interviews had been conducted under
emotional stress, having recently been separated from their
children (US President Donald Trump's decision to send all adult
migrants who crossed the border illegally for criminal prosecutions
meant their children were incarcerated in different facilities).

The 15 November settlement reinforces migrants' right to a credible
fear interview. Now, children in independent removal proceedings
will be assigned to their parents' case and can obtain their own
credible fear interviews -- regardless of how their parents'
interviews go -- if they also express fear of return. When parents
already have received a positive credible fear finding, their
children will join their asylum proceedings in immigration court.

The settlement also means the migrant parents who attended credible
fear interviews and received negative responses (resulting in a
final order of removal) will have another interview as part of a
"good faith review." Alternatively, if the parent received a
negative finding after the good faith review was complete, their
children would be entitled to their own interview. If the child's
interview was positive, they would still have a chance to pursue
asylum in immigration court, regardless of their parents' outcome.

Zachary Best, a senior associate that worked on the settlement,
told Latin Lawyer that the interviews were "fundamentally unfair by
virtue of them being conducted after they were separated from their
children." He adds that many, if not all, separated parents were
unable to meaningfully participate in their original credible fear
interviews because of the trauma, anxiety, and confusion caused by
their children being separated from them.

Best also criticises the government's willingness to deport
children without giving them a credible fear interview. "Everybody
who enters the country, legally or illegally, has to have some sort
of pathway to seek asylum in the US," he says. "Those who enter
without inspection are guaranteed an interview and many were not
getting interviews."

Hogan Lovells' offices in Miami, New York, Washington, DC, Mexico
City, and Rio de Janeiro first got involved in the US migrant
crisis by working with families detained at the Texan facilities in
Karnes and Dilley from May to August. A team of more than 30
lawyers worked 13-hour shifts to prepare women and children
separated along the US-Mexico border for their credible fear
interviews.

Best told Latin Lawyer that he and his colleagues got involved in
the case for moral and legal reasons. "It is hard to imagine a more
vulnerable group of people than those fleeing violence to come
here, arriving with no money and in many cases, little knowledge of
the language," he says. "The law should be there to protect them,
and in this instance, it was not. As legal professionals, we have a
duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves."

Best adds that the majority of the families they counselled at the
centre have managed to obtain favourable rulings from asylum
officers. "Nearly all of the reunified families who were detained
at the Karnes and Dilley detention centres in Texas that elected to
go through the settlement procedures have now completed them. This
means the parents have received their good faith reviews and the
children have been screened for credible fear where necessary."

Successfully seeking asylum in the US can be an arduous process,
despite the recent settlement. If migrants obtain a favourable
ruling in a credible fear interview, they are given a hearing date,
which can be several months away. The individual then presents
their case in more detail to an immigration judge, who grants a
verdict. Decisions in favour of deportation can be appealed before
a federal court.

US president Donald Trump came under fire for immigration-related
issues, after border agents sprayed tear gas at a crowd of migrants
trying to cross the San Ysidro border. Trump has since defended the
use of the gas and said that no one will enter the US "unless they
come in legally." He added that many of the migrants, who include
women and children, are "stone cold criminals." The US president
also said that his government will "close the border permanently,
if need be".

Counsel to M M M: Partners Justin Bernick and Theodore Clark
Weymouth and associate Zachary Best in Washington, DC, partners
Oliver Armas and Ira Feinberg in New York, partner Michael Maddigan
in Los Angeles, partner Katherine Nelson in Denver and associate
Haley Costello-Essig in Northern Virginia. [GN]


UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA: Chemistry Professor Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Leingang, writing for Arizona Republic, reports that a
University of Arizona chemistry professor has filed a class-action
lawsuit alleging gender discrimination in pay and promotions at the
Tucson campus.

Dr. Katrina Miranda, a tenured associate professor in the school's
Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, claims in a lawsuit filed
in U.S. District Court on Nov. 29 that there's a pattern of
systematic discrimination against female faculty members in UA's
College of Science.

"Dr. Miranda has suffered substantial pay disparities as compared
to her male counterparts, and the university has failed to promote
her in an equivalent manner to these male peers," the lawsuit
says.

Dr. Miranda has worked at the university since 2002 and received
tenure in 2008. The Arizona Board of Regents is named as the
defendant in the lawsuit, as the board oversees UA.

The lawsuit is the latest discrimination claim the university is
facing. Earlier this year, Patricia MacCorquodale, former dean of
the school's Honors College, sued, saying she was underpaid for two
decades compared with male colleagues

Another former dean, Janice Cervelli, later joined the lawsuit. The
matter is ongoing in U.S. District Court.

What the Miranda lawsuit seeks
In the latest lawsuit, Miranda is seeking back pay, front pay,
damages and attorneys' fees on behalf of herself and any others who
could be included in the class action. The class could include as
many as 80 current and former female professors in the College of
Science, according to the lawsuit.

Dr. Miranda's lawsuit says, despite positive performance reviews
and recognition for her work and service to the university, she was
underpaid and denied promotions.

"Dr. Miranda's experiences are emblematic of these prevailing
patterns and trends at the college. Despite her remarkable
credentials and achievements, her pay has languished at
inordinately low levels for years, and she has been denied a
long-earned promotion to (full) professor," the lawsuit claims.

The lawsuit estimates Dr. Miranda was underpaid by $9,000 to
$36,000 per year from 2016 to 2018 compared with male professors of
"similar or lesser seniority and performance."

Dr. Miranda was paid about $100,000 for the 2017-18 academic year,
while a male chemistry professor made $130,500 despite joining the
university and getting tenure the same year as
Dr. Miranda, the lawsuit claims.

Another male chemistry professor with one year of experience more
than Miranda made more than $136,000, according to the court
filing.

Females 'subjected to humiliating and demeaning treatment'
The pay disparity stems from the college's policies and practices,
the lawsuit says. Female professors are "subjected to humiliating
and demeaning treatment" by male leaders and don't have equal
access to resources like research assistants and mentoring
opportunities.

Dr. Miranda first complained to UA's Office of Institutional Equity
in December 2017 about pay concerns, but the university did not
act, according to the filing.

Since Dr. Miranda complained of pay disparity to the university
prior to filing a lawsuit, she claims the school "retaliated
against her" by reducing lab space and removing her as instructor
of a course she created, the lawsuit claims.

The lawsuit points to a lack of female full professors. Although
about half of the chemistry department's associate professors are
women, only 12.5 percent of full professors are, the lawsuit says.

Dr. Miranda was denied a promotion to full professor on the basis
of gender, the lawsuit claims, citing a stricter standard than her
male counterparts and irregularities in the review process.

The lawsuit claims the university hasn't given substantial raises
to female associate professors since 2011, but has granted raises
to male associate professors in the department.

The University of Arizona said it will not comment on the lawsuit.
[GN]


WEBLOYALTY.COM INC: LS Appeals Decision in EFTA Breach Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff L.S. filed an appeal from the District Court's omnibus
ruling dated October 26, 2018, and amended judgment dated November
9, 2018, issued in his lawsuit titled L.S. v. Webloyalty.com, Inc.,
et al., Case No. 10-cv-1372, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut (New Haven).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 26, 2018, Judge
Charles S. Haight, Jr., (i) granted Webloyalty's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's EFTA claim, and (ii) denied
Webloyalty and GameStop's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
Plaintiff's CUTPA claim.

In November 2009, the Plaintiff purchased a video game from
GameStop's website.  A banner for Defendant Webloyalty appeared on
the wepbage after the Plaintiff completed his online purchase, but
the banner included a "Continue" button that led the Plaintiff to
believe he was still in the process of completing his GameStop
purchase.  Clicking on the banner led the Plaintiff to Webloyalty's
enrollment page that advertised a $20 GameStop coupon and included
references to GameStop throughout its description of Webloyalty's
membership program.  The page at issue required the Plaintiff to
enter the last four digits of his debit card number and to enter
and verify his e-mail.  He apparently did so.

The Plaintiff asserts Webloyalty violated the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act ("EFTA") by not providing a copy of the electronic
fund transfer authorization, i.e., the Enrollment Page.  Webloyalty
contends that the Acknowledgment Page and Join Email satisfy the
copy requirement under EFTA.

The appellate case is captioned as L.S. v. Webloyalty.com, Inc., et
al., Case No. 18-3639, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant L.S., a minor, by P.S., his parent and next
friend, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          David Corey Katz, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          E-mail: dkatz@weisslawllp.com

Defendants-Appellees Webloyalty.com, Inc., and GameStop Corporation
are represented by:

          Paloma Naderi, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          60 State Street
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 526-6000
          E-mail: paloma.naderi@wilmerhale.com


WILLIAMS PLANT: Gounder Seeks Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------
CLIFTON GOUNDER, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMS PLANT SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:18-cv-01066-SDD-RLB D (M.D. Fla., Dec. 10, 2018), seeks
to recover overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Williams Plant paid Gourner and other
workers like him the same hourly rate for all hours worked,
including those in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA,
Gourner only received "straight time” pay for overtime hours
worked, the lawsuit says.

William Plaint is a provider of complete plant maintenance and
modifications services to heavy industrial clients across the
U.S.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925 5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231 7000
          E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                  scott@bohrerbrady.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          William R.Liles, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Green Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352 1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  wliles@mybackwages.com


               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH , PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 877-8788
          Facsimile: 713 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


WOLVERINE WORLD: Faces Henry Suit in Delaware Federal Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wolverine World Wide,
Inc. The lawsuit is styled Susan Henry, for herself and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Waste Management, Inc., a
Delaware Corporation; 3M Company, formerly known as: Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co., a Delaware Corporation, the
Defendants, Case No.: 1:18-cv-01924-UNA (D. Del., Dec. 4, 2018).

Wolverine World Wide, Inc. or Wolverine Worldwide is an American
footwear manufacturer based in Rockford, Michigan, known for its
own brand, Wolverine Boots and Shoes, as well as its subsidiaries
such as Hush Puppies and Merrell.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          R. Joseph Hrubiec, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, LLC
          919 North Market Street, Suite 1801
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 330-8025
          Facsimile: (302) 295-4801
          E-mail: rhrubiec@napolilaw.com

WOODSTREAM CORPORATION: Painter Suit Removed to N.D. Ohio
---------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Nancy Painter, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Woodstream Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 18CV001743 was removed from the Court of Common
Pleas of Lake County, Ohio to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio on December 13, 2018, and assigned
Case No. 1:18-cv-02872.

This putative class action was filed on October 17, 2018.
Plaintiff, Nancy Painter, alleges that she purchased a Victor
PestChaser(R) trademarked ultrasonic pest control device,
advertised by the Defendant as a "Rodent Repeller" that "emits
ultrasound at varying volumes and varying frequencies which
'prevents rodent from being accustomed to the ultrasound'".
However, Plaintiff says these statements were false and that they
form the basis for her common law claims of Fraud and Breach of
Express Warranty.

Woodstream is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place
of business in Lititz, Pennsylvania. Among other things, Woodstream
manufactures Victor PestChaser ultrasonic rodent repellers.[BN]

The Defendants is represented by:

     Sommer L. Sheely, Esq.
     Bricker & Eckler LLP
     100 South Third Street
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Phone: 614.227.8870
     Facsimile: 614.227.2390
     Email: ssheely@bricker.com



[*] Swansea Water District May Get Class Action Settlement Payout
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Hall, writing for SouthCoastTODAY, reports that the Swansea
Water District may be entitled for funds following a class action
suit involving a chemical that is widely used.

Acting Superintendent Jeffrey Sutherland noted that it was found
that firms selling liquid aluminum between 1997 to 2011, colluded
with one another to fix prices. The settlement entitles communities
that purchased the chemical a chance for some of the funding.

The superintendent told the Board of Commissioners that his office
will be looking into the records to determine if the District
purchased the product and whether they would be entitled to the
funds.

The issue came up when the District was contacted by a firm that
was willing to assist in the collection of the funds with a fee
that would amount to 33 percent of whatever is collected.

Supt. Sutherland went to the Water District's attorney Ed Brennan
who suggested that the District do that work.

Supt. Sutherland noted that it would have been a situation where
the District did most of the "leg work." [GN]


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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