CAR_Public/190101.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, January 1, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 1

                            Headlines

Major Court Rulings in Class Action Lawsuits - 2018

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Major Court Rulings in Class Action Lawsuits - 2018
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The Class Action Reporter is pleased to provide our subscribers the
following list of court decisions in class action lawsuits that we
have identified as major rulings during 2018.

This list is the product of and copyrighted by Beard Group, Inc.,
and no reproduction or further use of this list is permitted
without the prior written consent of Beard Group, Inc.

CYAN, INC., ET AL. v. BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND ET
AL., CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT, No. 15–1439 (U.S.)

           The respondents are three pension funds and an
           individual who purchased shares of Cyan stock in an
           initial public offering.  After the stock declined
           in value, the Investors brought a damages class
           action against Cyan in California Superior Court.
           Their complaint alleges that Cyan's offering
           documents contained material misstatements, in
           violation of the 1933 Act.  It does not assert any
           claims based on state law.  Cyan moved to dismiss
           the Investors' suit for lack of subject matter
           jurisdiction. It argued that what the Supreme Court
           has termed SLUSA's "except clause" -- i.e., the
           amendment made to Section 77v(a)'s concurrent
           jurisdiction grant -- stripped state courts of power
           to adjudicate 1933 Act claims in "covered class
           actions." The Investors did not dispute that their
           suit qualifies as such an action under SLUSA's
           definition, see Section 77p(f)(2). But they
           maintained that SLUSA left intact state courts'
           jurisdiction over all suits -- including "covered
           class actions" -- alleging only 1933 Act claims. The
           California Superior Court agreed with the Investors
           and denied Cyan's motion to dismiss.  The state
           appellate courts then denied review of that ruling.

           The issue before the Supreme Court is whether
           Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
           (SLUSA) deprived state courts of jurisdiction over
           "covered class actions" asserting only 1933 Act
           claims.  The Federal Government, as amicus curiae,
           raised another question: whether SLUSA enabled Cyan
           to remove 1933 Act class actions from state to
           federal court for adjudication.

           The Supreme Court held that SLUSA did nothing to
           strip state courts of their longstanding
           jurisdiction to adjudicate class actions alleging
           only 1933 Act violations.  Neither did SLUSA
           authorize removing such suits from state to federal
           court.

           The Supreme Court explained that SLUSA's text, read
           most straightforwardly, leaves in place state
           courts' jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims, including
           when brought in class actions.  Recall that the
           background rule of Section 77v(a) -- in place since
           the 1933 Act's passage -- gives state courts
           concurrent jurisdiction over all suits brought to
           enforce any liability or duty created by that
           statute.  The except clause is drafted as a
           limitation on that rule: It ensures that in any case
           in which Section 77v(a) and Section 77p come into
           conflict, Section 77p will control. The critical
           question for the case is therefore whether Section
           77p limits state-court jurisdiction over class
           actions brought under the 1933 Act.  It does not.
           Section 77p bars certain securities class actions
           based on state law.  And as a corollary of that
           prohibition, it authorizes removal of those suits so
           that a federal court can dismiss them.  But the
           section says nothing, and so does nothing, to
           deprive state courts of jurisdiction over class
           actions based on federal law.  That means the
           background rule of Section 77v(a) -- under which a
           state court may hear the Investors' 1933 Act suit --
           continues to govern.

           Still more, the Supreme Court points out that SLUSA
           ensured that federal courts would play the principal
           role in adjudicating securities class actions by
           means of its revisions to the 1934 Act.  SLUSA
           amended that statute in the same main way it did the
           1933 Act -- by adding a state-law class-action bar.
           But there, the change had a double effect: Because
           federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 1934
           Act claims, forcing plaintiffs to bring class
           actions under the 1934 statute instead of state law
           also forced them to file in federal court.  That
           meant the bulk of securities class actions would
           proceed in federal court -- because the 1934 Act
           regulates all trading of securities whereas the 1933
           Act addresses only securities offerings.  So even,
           without Cyan's contrived reading of the except
           clause, SLUSA largely accomplished the purpose
           articulated in its Conference Report: moving
           securities class actions to federal court.

           Finally, the Supreme Court explains that the covered
           class actions described in Section 77p(b) can be
           removed to federal court (and, once there, will be
           subject to dismissal because precluded).  The
           covered class actions described in Section 77p(b)
           are state-law class actions alleging securities
           misconduct.  So those state-law suits are removable.
           But conversely, federal-law suits like this one --
           alleging only 1933 Act claims -- are not class
           actions as set forth in subsection (b). So they
           remain subject to the 1933 Act's removal ban.

           Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous
           Court.

           Attorneys for Petitioners:

              Boris Feldman, Esq.
              Ignacio E. Salceda, Esq.
              Aaron J. Benjamin, Esq.
              WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
              650 Page Mill Road
              Palo Alto, CA 94304
              Tel: (650) 493-9300
              Fax: (650) 493-6811
              Email: Boris.Feldman@wsgr.com
                     ISalceda@wsgr.com
                     abenjamin@wsgr.com

                 -- and --

              Gideon A. Schor, Esq.
              WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI PC
              1301 Avenue of the Americas
              40th Floor
              New York, NY 10019
              Tel: (212) 999-5800
              Fax: (212) 999-5899
              Email: gschor@wsgr.com

                 -- and --

              Neal Kumar Katyal, Esq.
              Mitchell P. Reich, Esq.
              HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
              Columbia Square
              555 Thirteenth Street, NW
              Washington, D.C. 20004
              Tel: (202) 637-5600
              Fax: (202) 637-5910
              Email: neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
                     mitchell.reich@hoganlovells.com

                 -- and --

              Thomas P. Schmidt, Esq.
              HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
              875 Third Avenue
              New York, NY 10022
              Tel: (212) 918-3000
              Fax: (212) 918-3100
              Email: thomas.schmidt@hoganlovells.com

           Attorneys for the United States as amicus curiae, by
           special leave of the Court, in support of
           affirmance:

              Allon Kedem, Esq.
              U.S. Department of Justice
              Assistant in the Office of the Solicitor General

           Attorneys for Respondents:

              Andrew S. Love, Esq.
              John K. Grant, Esq.
              ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
              One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
              San Francisco, CA 94104
              Tel: (415) 288-4545
              Fax: (415) 288-4534
              Email: alove@rgrdlaw.com
                     johng@rgrdlaw.com

                 -- and --

              Thomas C. Goldstein, Esq.
              Tejinder Singh, Esq.
              GOLDSTEIN & RUSSELL, P.C.
              7475 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 850
              Bethesda, MD 20814
              Tel: (202) 362-0636
              Fax: (866) 574-2033
              Email: tgoldstein@goldsteinrussell.com
                     tsingh@goldsteinrussell.com

                 -- and --

              Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
              Ex Kano S. Sams II, Esq.
              GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
              1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
              Los Angeles, CA 90067
              Tel: (310) 201-9150
              Email: RProngay@glancylaw.com
                     ESams@glancylaw.com

DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CHARLES LEE et al., Real Parties in
Interest, No. S222732 (Cal.).

           The issue in this case relates to the resolution of
           the employee or independent contractor question in
           one specific context.  The California Supreme Court
           was asked to decide what standard applies, under
           California law, in determining whether workers
           should be classified as employees or as independent
           contractors for purposes of California wage orders,
           which impose obligations relating to the minimum
           wages, maximum hours, and a limited number of very
           basic working conditions (such as minimally required
           meal and rest breaks) of California employees.

           Two individual delivery drivers, suing on their own
           behalf and on behalf of a class of allegedly
           similarly situated drivers, filed a complaint
           against Dynamex Operations West, Inc., alleging that
           Dynamex had misclassified its delivery drivers as
           independent contractors rather than employees.
           After an earlier round of litigation in which the
           trial court's initial order denying class
           certification was reversed by the Court of Appeal,
           the trial court ultimately certified a class action
           embodying a class of Dynamex drivers who, during a
           pay period, did not themselves employ other drivers
           and did not do delivery work for other delivery
           businesses or for the drivers' own personal
           customers.

           The state Supreme Court agrees with the Court of
           Appeal that the trial court did not err in
           concluding that the "suffer or permit to work"
           definition of "employ" contained in the wage order
           may be relied upon in evaluating whether a worker is
           an employee or, instead, an independent contractor
           for purposes of the obligations imposed by the wage
           order. In light of its history and purpose, the
           state Supreme Court concludes that the wage order's
           suffer or permit to work definition must be
           interpreted broadly to treat as "employees," and
           thereby provide the wage order's protection to, all
           workers who would ordinarily be viewed as working in
           the hiring business. At the same time, the state
           Supreme Court concludes that the suffer or permit to
           work definition is a term of art that cannot be
           interpreted literally in a manner that would
           encompass within the employee category the type of
           individual workers, like independent plumbers or
           electricians, who have traditionally been viewed as
           genuine independent contractors who are working only
           in their own independent business.

           The state Supreme Court concludes that in
           determining whether, under the suffer or permit to
           work definition, a worker is properly considered the
           type of independent contractor to whom the wage
           order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to a
           standard, commonly referred to as the "ABC" test,
           that is utilized in other jurisdictions in a variety
           of contexts to distinguish employees from
           independent contractors. Under this test, a worker
           is properly considered an independent contractor to
           whom a wage order does not apply only if the hiring
           entity establishes: (A) that the worker is free from
           the control and direction of the hirer in connection
           with the performance of the work, both under the
           contract for the performance of such work and in
           fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is
           outside the usual course of the hiring entity's
           business; and (C) that the worker is customarily
           engaged in an independently established trade,
           occupation, or business of the same nature as the
           work performed for the hiring entity.

           The state Supreme Court concludes that on the facts
           disclosed by the record, the trial court's
           certification order is nonetheless correct as a
           matter of law under a proper understanding of the
           suffer or permit to work standard and should be
           upheld.

           Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye delivered the opinion.
           Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, and
           Siggins, concurred.

           Attorneys for Petitioner:

              Robert G. Hulteng, Esq.
              Damon M. Ott, Esq.
              LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.
              333 Bush Street
              34th Floor
              San Francisco, CA 94104
              Tel: (415) 433-1940
              Fax: (415) 399-8490
              Email: rhulteng@littler.com
                     dott@littler.com

                 -- and --

              Paul S. Cowie, Esq.
              SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON
              379 Lytton Avenue
              Palo Alto, CA 94301
              Tel: (650) 815-2600
              Fax: (650) 815-2601
              Email: pcowie@sheppardmullin.com

           Attorneys for California Employment Law Council and
           Employers Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of
           Petitioner:

              Andrew R. Livingston, Esq.
              Michael Weil, Esq.
              Kathryn G. Mantoan, Esq.
              ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE
              The Orrick Building
              405 Howard Street
              San Francisco, CA 94105-2669
              Tel: (415) 773-5700
              Email: alivingston@orrick.com
                     mweil@orrick.com
                     kmantoan@orrick.com

           Attorneys for Chamber of Commerce of the United
           States of America and California Chamber of Commerce
           as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner:

              John A. Taylor, Esq.
              Jeremy B. Rosen, Esq.
              Felix Shafir, Esq.
              HORVITZ & LEVY
              3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor
              Burbank, CA 91505
              Tel: (818) 995-0800
              Fax: (844) 497-6592
              Email: jtaylor@horvitzlevy.com
                     jrosen@horvitzlevy.com
                     fshafir@horvitzlevy.com

           No appearance for Respondent.

           Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest:

              Steven Boudreau, Esq.
              Jon R. Williams, Esq.
              WILLIAM IAGMIN LLP
              666 State Street
              San Diego, CA 92101
              Tel: (619) 238-0370
              Email: boudreau@williamsiagmin.com
                     williams@williamsiagmin.com

           Attorneys for California Rural Legal Assistance
           Foundation, National Employment Law Project, Los
           Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, La Raza Centro
           Legal, Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center,
           Asian Americans Advancing Justice-LA, Asian
           Americans Advancing Justice-ALC, The Impact Fund,
           Alexander Community Law Center, UCLA Center for
           Labor Research, Women's Employment Rights Clinic and
           Worksafe as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties
           in Interest:

              Della Barnett, Esq.
              R. Erandi Zamora, Esq.

                 -- and --

              Anthony Mischel, Esq.

                 -- and --

             Cynthia L. Rice, Esq.
             William G. Hoerger, Esq.
             Jean H. Choi, Esq.
             California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
             2210 K Street, Suite 201
             Sacramento, CA 95816
             Tel: (916) 446-7904

          Attorneys for California Employment Lawyers
          Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real
          Parties in Interest:

             Monique Olivier, Esq.
             Olivier Schreiber & Chao, LLP
             201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
             San Francisco, CA 94133
             Tel: (415) 484-0980
             Email: monique@osclegal.com

          Attorneys for Service Employees International Union,
          United Food and Commercial Workers International
          Union and International Brotherhood of Teamsters as
          Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest:

             Judith A. Scott, Esq.
             Nicole G. Berner, Esq.
             JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C.
             1130 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 950
             Washington, D.C. 20036
             Tel: (202) 496-0500
             Fax: (202) 496-0555
             Email: jscott@jamhoff.com
                    nicole.berner@seiu.org

                -- and --

             Michael Rubin, Esq.
             Barbara J. Chisholm, Esq.
             P. Casey Pitts, Esq.
             Altshuler Berzon LLP
             177 Post ST., Suite 300
             San Francisco, CA 94108
             Tel: (415) 421-7151
             Fax: (415) 362-8064
             Email: mrubin@altshulerberzon.com
                    bchisholm@altshulerberzon.com
                    cpitts@altshulerberzon.com

                -- and --

             Nicholas W. Clark, Esq.

                -- and --

             Bradley T. Raymond, Esq.

          Attorney for Division of Labor Standards Enforcement,
          Department of Industrial Relations as Amicus Curiae
          on behalf of Real Parties in Interest:

             David Balter, Esq.
             DICKENSON PEATMAN & FOGARTY
             1455 First Street, Suite 301
             Napa, CA 94559
             Tel: (707) 261-7000
             Fax: (707) 255-6876
             Email: dbalter@dpf-law.com

UNITED STATES v. SANCHEZ-GOMEZ ET AL., No. 17–312 (U.S.).

          The judges of the United States District Court for
          the Southern District of California adopted a
          district-wide policy permitting the use of full
          restraints on most in-custody defendants produced in
          court for non-jury proceedings by the United States
          Marshals Service.  Jasmin Morales, Rene
          Sanchez-Gomez, Moises Patricio-Guzman, and Mark Ring
          challenged the use of these restraints in their cases
          and the restraint policy as a whole.  The District
          Court denied their challenges, and the respondents
          appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
          Circuit.  Before that court could issue a decision,
          the respondents' criminal cases ended.  The court
          -- viewing the case as a "functional class action"
          involving "class-like claims" seeking "class-like
          relief" -- held that the Supreme Court's civil class
          action precedents saved the case from mootness. On
          the merits, the Court of Appeals held the policy
          unconstitutional.

          The question presented before the Supreme Court is
          whether the appeals were saved from mootness either
          because the defendants sought "class-like relief" in
          a "functional class action," or because the
          challenged practice was "capable of repetition, yet
          evading review."

          The Supreme Court held that the case is moot.  The
          Supreme Court held that federal judiciary may
          adjudicate only "actual and concrete disputes, the
          resolutions of which have direct consequences on the
          parties involved."  That dispute "must be extant at
          all stages of review, not merely at the time the
          complaint is filed."  A case that becomes moot at any
          point during the proceedings is thus outside the
          jurisdiction of the federal courts.

          In concluding that this case was not moot, the Court
          of Appeals relied upon the Supreme Court's class
          action precedents, most prominently Gerstein v. Pugh,
          420 U.S. 103.  That reliance, according to the
          Supreme Court, was misplaced. Gerstein was a class
          action respecting pretrial detention brought under
          Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The named class
          representatives' individual claims had apparently
          become moot before class certification.  The Supreme
          Court held that the case could nonetheless proceed,
          explaining that due to the inherently temporary
          nature of pretrial detention, no named representative
          might be in custody long enough for a class to be
          certified. Gerstein does not support a freestanding
          exception to mootness outside the class action
          context. It belongs to a line of cases that the
          Supreme Court has described as turning on the
          particular traits of Rule 23 class actions.  The
          Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish for
          criminal cases no vehicle comparable to the civil
          class action, and the Supreme Court has never
          permitted criminal defendants to band together to
          seek prospective relief in their individual cases on
          behalf of a class.  Here, the mere presence of
          allegations that might, if resolved in the
          respondents' favor, benefit other similarly situated
          individuals cannot save their case from mootness.
          That conclusion is unaffected by the Court of
          Appeals' decision to recast the respondents' appeals
          as petitions for supervisory mandamus.

          The Respondents do not defend the reasoning of the
          Court of Appeals, and instead argue that the claims
          of two respondents -- Sanchez-Gomez and
          Patricio-Guzman -- fall within the "exception to the
          mootness doctrine for a controversy that is capable
          of repetition, yet evading review."  The Respondents
          claim that the exception applies because
          Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman will again violate
          the law, be apprehended, and be returned to pretrial
          custody. But the Supreme Court said it has
          consistently refused to "conclude that the
          case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by" the
          possibility that a party "will be prosecuted for
          violating valid criminal laws."  The Respondents
          argue that this usual refusal to assume future
          criminal conduct is unwarranted here given the
          particular circumstances of Sanchez-Gomez's and
          Patricio-Guzman's offenses.  They cite two civil
          cases -- Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, and Turner v.
          Rogers, 564 U. S. 431 -- in which the Supreme Court
          concluded that the expectation that a litigant would
          repeat the misconduct that gave rise to his claims
          rendered those claims capable of repetition. But the
          Supreme Court said Honig and Turner are inapposite
          because they concerned litigants unable, for reasons
          beyond their control, to prevent themselves from
          transgressing and avoid recurrence of the challenged
          conduct.  Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman, in
          contrast, are "able -- and indeed required by law" --
          to refrain from further criminal conduct.

          Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a
          unanimous Court.

          Attorneys for Petitioner:

             Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
             Solicitor General
             John P. Cronan, Esq.
             Acting Assistant Attorney General
             Edwin S. Kneedler, Esq.
             Deputy Solicitor General
             Eric J. Feigin, Esq.
             Allon Kedem, Esq.
             Assistants to the Solicitor General
             David B. Goodhand, Esq.
             Attorney
             Department of Justice
             Washington, D.C.

          Attorneys for Respondents:

             Ellis Murray Johnston, III, Esq.
             Reuben Camper Cahn, Esq.
             Shereen J. Charlick, Esq.
             Vincent J. Brunkow, Esq.
             Michele A. McKenzie, Esq.
             Kimberly S. Trimble, Esq.
             Kara L. Hartzler, Esq.
             Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.
             225 Broadway, Ste 900
             San Diego, CA 92101
             Tel: (619) 234-8467
             Fax: (619) 687-2666

EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. v. LEWIS, No. 16–285 (U.S.).

           In each of the cases -- EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
           PETITIONER v. JACOB LEWIS, 16–285; ERNST & YOUNG
           LLP, et al., PETITIONERS, v. STEPHEN MORRIS, et al.,
           16–300; and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
           PETITIONER, v. MURPHY OIL USA, INC., et al., 16–307
           -- an employer and employee entered into a contract
           providing for individualized arbitration proceedings
           to resolve employment disputes between the parties.
           Each employee nonetheless sought to litigate Fair
           Labor Standards Act and related state law claims
           through class or collective actions in federal
           court.  Although the Federal Arbitration Act
           generally requires courts to enforce arbitration
           agreements as written, the employees argued that its
           "saving clause" removes this obligation if an
           arbitration agreement violates some other federal
           law and that, by requiring individualized
           proceedings, the agreements here violated the
           National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The employers
           countered that the Arbitration Act protects
           agreements requiring arbitration from judicial
           interference and that neither the saving clause nor
           the NLRA demands a different conclusion.  Until
           recently, courts as well as the National Labor
           Relations Board (NLRB)'s general counsel agreed that
           the arbitration agreements are enforceable. In 2012,
           however, the Board ruled that the NLRA effectively
           nullifies the Arbitration Act in cases like these,
           and since then other courts have either agreed with
           or deferred to the Board's position.

           The questions before the Supreme Court were: Should
           employees and employers be allowed to agree that any
           disputes between them will be resolved through
           one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always
           be permitted to bring their claims in class or
           collective actions, no matter what they agreed with
           their employers?

           The Supreme Court held that in the Federal
           Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal
           courts to enforce arbitration agreements according
           to their terms -- including terms providing for
           individualized proceedings. The Supreme Court
           further held that nor can it agree with the
           employees' suggestion that the NLRA offers a
           conflicting command. It is the Supreme Court's duty
           to interpret Congress's statutes as a harmonious
           whole rather than at war with one another.  And
           abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable
           conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to
           organize unions and bargain collectively, but it
           says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must
           try legal disputes that leave the workplace and
           enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. The Supreme
           Court said it has never read a right to class
           actions into the NLRA -- and for three quarters of a
           century neither did the NLRB.  Far from conflicting,
           the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed
           separate spheres of influence and neither permits
           the Supreme Court to declare the parties' agreements
           unlawful.

           Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court,
           in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
           Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, joined. Justice Thomas
           filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a
           dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer,
           Sotomayor and Kagan, joined.

           Attorneys for the United States as amicus curiae, by
           special leave of the Court, supporting the
           petitioners in Nos. 16-285 and 16-300 and
           respondents in No. 16-307:

              Jeffrey B. Wall, Esq.

           Attorneys for Epic Systems Corporation and Murphy
           Oil USA, Inc.:

              Paul D. Clement, Esq.
              Kirkland & Ellis LLP
              655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
              Washington, D.C. 20005-5793
              Tel: (202) 879-5000
              Email: paul.clement@kirkland.com

                 -- and --

              Neal Kumar Katyal, Esq.
              Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak, Esq.
              Hogan Lovells US LLP
              Columbia Square
              555 Thirteenth Street, NW
              Washington, D.C. 20004
              Tel: (202) 637-5600
              Fax: (202) 637-5910
              Email: neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
                     colleen.sinzdak@hoganlovells.com
                     
                 -- and --

              Thomas P. Schmidt, Esq.
              Hogan Lovells US LLP
              875 Third Avenue
              New York, NY 10022
              Tel: (212) 918-5547
              Fax: (212) 918-3100
              Email: thomas.schmidt@​hoganlovells.com

           Attorneys for Epic Systems Corporation:

              Noah A. Finkel, Esq.
              Andrew Scroggins, Esq.
              Seyfarth Shaw LLP
              233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 8000
              Chicago, IL 60606-6448
              Tel: (312) 460-5000
              Fax: (312) 460-7000
              Email: nfinkel@seyfarth.com
                     ascroggins@seyfarth.com

           Attorneys for Murphy Oil USA, Inc.:

              Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Esq.
              Jackson Lewis P.C.
              1155 Peachtree Street N.E., Suite 1000
              Atlanta, GA 30309
              Tel: (404) 525-8200
              Fax: (404) 525-1173
              Email: Jake.Schwartz@jacksonlewis.com

                 -- and --

              Daniel D. Schudroff, Esq.
              Jackson Lewis P.C.
              666 Third Avenue, 29th Floor
              New York, NY 10017
              Tel: (212) 545-4000
              Fax: (212) 972-3213
              Email: Daniel.Schudroff@jacksonlewis.com

           Attorneys for Jacob Lewis, Respondent in No. 16-285:

              David C. Zoeller, Esq.
              William E. Parsons, Esq.
              Caitlin M. Madden, Esq.
              Katelynn M. Williams, Esq.
              Madison, WI

                 -- and --

              Daniel R. Ortiz, Esq.
              Toby J. Heytens, Esq.
              University of Virginia
                 School of Law
                 Supreme Court Litigation Clinic
              Charlottesville, VA

                 -- and --

              Adam Hansen, Esq.
              Apollo Law LLC
              3217 Hennepin Avenue South, Suite 7
              Minneapolis, MN 55408
              Tel: (612) 927-2969
              Email: adam@apollo-law.com

           Attorneys for Ernst & Young, et al., Petitioners in
           No. 16-300:

              Paul D. Clement, Esq.
              Kirkland & Ellis LLP
              655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
              Washington, D.C. 20005-5793
              Tel: (202) 879-5000
              Email: paul.clement@kirkland.com

                 -- and --

              Pratik A. Shah, Esq.
              Daniel L. Nash, Esq.
              Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
              Robert S. Strauss Building
              1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
              Washington, DC 20036-1564
              Tel: (202) 887-4000
              Fax: (202) 887-4288
              Email: pshah@akingump.com
                     dnash@akingump.com

                 -- and --

              Kannon K. Shanmugam, Esq.
              Allison Jones Rushing, Esq.
              A. Joshua Podoll, Esq.
              William T. Marks, Esq.
              Eden Schiffmann, Esq.
              Williams & Connolly LLP,
              Washington, DC

                 -- and --

              Rex S. Heinke, Esq.
              Gregory W. Knopp, Esq.
              Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
              1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600
              Los Angeles, CA 90067-6022
              Tel: (310) 229-1000
              Fax: (310) 229-1001
              Email: rheinke@akingump.com
                     gknopp@akingump.com

           Attorneys for Stephen Morris, et al., Respondents in
           No. 16-300:

              Ross Libenson, Esq.
              Libenson Law
              The Kaiser Center
              300 Lakeside Dr.
              Oakland, CA
              Tel: (510) 451-4441
              Email: ross@libensonlaw.com

                 -- and --

              H. Tim Hoffman, Esq.
              Oakland, CA

                 -- and --

              Max Folkenflik, Esq.
              Margaret McGerity, Esq.
              Folkenflik & McGerity, LLP
              1500 Broadway, 21st Floor
              New York, NY 10036
              Tel: (212) 757-0400
              Fax: (212) 757-2010
              Email: MFolkenflik@fmlaw.net
                     MMcGerity@fmlaw.net

           Attorneys for National Labor Relations Board:

              Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Esq.
              General Counsel
              Jennifer Abruzzo, Esq.
              Deputy General Counsel
              John H. Ferguson, Esq.
              Associate General Counsel
              Linda Dreeben, Esq.
              Deputy Associate General Counsel
              Meredith Jason, Esq.
              Deputy Assistant General Counsel
              Kira Dellinger Vol, Esq.
              Supervisory Attorney
              Jeffrey W. Burritt, Esq.
              Attorney
              Washington, DC

Alex M. AZAR, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.,
v. Rochelle GARZA, as guardian ad litem to unaccompanied minor
J.D., No. 17-654 (U.S.)

           Jane Doe, a minor, was eight weeks pregnant when she
           unlawfully crossed the border into the United
           States. She was detained and placed into the custody
           of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), part of
           the Department of Health and Human Services. ORR
           placed her in a federally funded shelter in Texas.
           After an initial medical examination, Doe requested
           an abortion. But ORR did not allow Doe to go to an
           abortion clinic. Absent "emergency medical
           situations," ORR policy prohibits shelter personnel
           from "taking any action that facilitates an abortion
           without direction and approval from the Director of
           ORR."  Respondent Rochelle Garza, Doe's guardian ad
           litem, filed a putative class action on behalf of
           Doe and "all other pregnant unaccompanied minors in
           ORR custody" challenging the constitutionality of
           ORR's policy.

           On October 18, 2017, the District Court issued a
           temporary restraining order allowing Doe to obtain
           an abortion immediately.  On October 20, a panel of
           the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
           Circuit vacated the relevant portions of the
           temporary restraining order. Noting that the
           Government had assumed for purposes of this case
           that Doe had a constitutional right to an abortion,
           the panel concluded that ORR's policy was not an
           "undue burden."  On October 24, the Court of
           Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the panel order
           and remanded the case to the District Court.  The
           same day, Garza sought an amended restraining order.

           The Government planned to ask the Supreme Court for
           emergency review of the en banc order but sometime
           over the course of the night and the following day,
           Garza's lawyers informed the Government that Doe
           "had the abortion this morning."  The abortion
           rendered the relevant claim moot, so the Government
           did not file its emergency stay application.
           Instead, the Government filed this petition for
           certiorari.

           The Supreme Court held that when "a civil case from
           a court in the federal system . . . has become moot
           while on its way here," the Supreme Court's
           "established practice" is "to reverse or vacate the
           judgment below and remand with a direction to
           dismiss."

           The litigation over Doe's temporary restraining
           order falls squarely within the Supreme Court's
           established practice. Doe's individual claim for
           injunctive relief -- the only claim addressed by the
           D.C. Circuit -- became moot after the abortion. It
           is undisputed that Garza and her lawyers prevailed
           in the D.C. Circuit, took voluntary, unilateral
           action to have Doe undergo an abortion sooner than
           initially expected, and thus retained the benefit of
           that favorable judgment. And although not every moot
           case will warrant vacatur, the fact that the
           relevant claim here became moot before certiorari
           does not limit the Supreme Court's discretion.  The
           unique circumstances of this case and the balance of
           equities weigh in favor of vacatur.

           The Government also suggests that opposing counsel
           made "what appear to be material misrepresentations
           and omissions" that were "designed to thwart this
           Court's review."  The Respondent says this
           suggestion is "baseless."  The Supreme Court takes
           allegations like those the Government makes here
           seriously, for ethical rules are necessary to the
           maintenance of a culture of civility and mutual
           trust within the legal profession. On the one hand,
           all attorneys must remain aware of the principle
           that zealous advocacy does not displace their
           obligations as officers of the court. Especially in
           fast-paced, emergency proceedings like those at
           issue here, it is critical that lawyers and courts
           alike be able to rely on one another's
           representations. On the other hand, lawyers also
           have ethical obligations to their clients and not
           all communication breakdowns constitute misconduct.
           The Supreme Court said it need not delve into the
           factual disputes raised by the parties in order to
           answer the Munsingwear question here.

           Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition
           for a writ of certiorari, vacated the en banc order,
           and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit with
           instructions to direct the District Court to dismiss
           the relevant individual claim for injunctive relief
           as moot.

           Attorneys for Plaintiff ROCHELLE GARZA:

              Arthur B. Spitzer, Esq.
              American Civil Liberties Union
                 Of The District Of Columbia
              Tel: (202) 457-0800
              Email: artspitzer@gmail.com

                 -- and --

              Scott Michelman, Esq.
              American Civil Liberties Union
                 Of The District Of Columbia
              Tel: (202) 601-4267
              Email: smichelman@acludc.org

                -- and --

              Brigitte Amiri, Esq.
              American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
              Tel: (212) 549-2500
              Email: bamiri@aclu.org

                -- and --

              Daniel Mach, Esq.
              American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
              Tel: (202) 548-6604
              Email: dmach@aclu.org

           Attorneys for Defendant STEPHEN WAGNER, SCOTT LLOYD,
           AND ERIC HARGAN:

              Michael H. Park, Esq.
              Consovoy Mccarthy Park PLLC
              745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500
              New York, NY 10151
              Tel: (212) 247-8006
              Email: park@consovoymccarthy.com

                -- and --

              William S. Consovoy, Esq.
              Consovoy Mccarthy Park PLLC
              3033 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700
              Arlington, VA 22201
              Tel: (703) 243-9423
              Email: will@consovoymccarthy.com

                -- and --

              Patrick Neilson Strawbridge, Esq.
              Consovoy Mccarthy Park LLC
              Ten Post Office Square
              8th Floor South PMB #706
              Boston, MA 02109
              Tel: (617) 227-0548
              Email: Patrick@consovoymccarthy.com

                -- and --

              Sabatino Fioravante Leo, Esq.
              Ernesto Horacio Molina, Jr., Esq.
              Joseph Anton Darrow, Esq.
              Scott Grant Stewart, Esq.
              Alexander Kenneth Haas, Esq.
              Michael Christopher Heyse, Esq.
              Woei-Tyng Daniel Shieh, Esq.
              United States Department Of Justice
              Tel: (202) 514-8599
              Email: sabatino.f.leo@usdoj.gov
                     ernesto.h.molina@usdoj.gov
                     joseph.a.darrow@usdoj.gov
                     scott.g.stewart@usdoj.gov
                     alexander.haas@usdoj.gov
                     michael.heyse@usdoj.gov
                     daniel.shieh@usdoj.gov

              Attorney for Amicus STATE OF OKLAHOMA, STATE OF
              SOUTH CAROLINA, STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF WEST
              VIRGINIA, STATE OF MICHIGAN, STATE OF MISSOURI,
              STATE OF NEBRASKA, STATE OF OHIO, COMMONWEALTH OF
              KENTUCKY, STATE OF ARKANSAS, and STATE OF
              LOUISIANA:

                 Scott A. Keller, Esq.
                 Office Of The Texas Attorney General
                 Tel: (512) 936-2725
                 Email: scott.keller@texasattorneygeneral.gov


CHINA AGRITECH, INC. v. RESH ET AL., No. 17–432 (U.S.).

              American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S.
              538, established that the timely filing of a
              class action tolls the applicable statute of
              limitations for all persons encompassed by the
              class complaint and that members of a class that
              fails to gain certification can timely intervene
              as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending
              action, shorn of its class character.  American
              Pipe's tolling rule also applies to putative
              class members who, after denial of class
              certification, "prefer to bring an individual
              suit rather than intervene."

              The question presented in this case is whether
              American Pipe tolling applies not only to
              individual claims, but to successive class
              actions as well.

              The Supreme Court held that upon denial of class
              certification, a putative class member may not,
              in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or
              promptly filing an individual action, commence a
              class action anew beyond the time allowed by the
              applicable statute of limitations.

              American Pipe and Crown, Cork addressed only
              putative class members who wish to sue
              individually after a class-certification denial.
              The "efficiency and economy of litigation" that
              support tolling of individual claims, do not
              support maintenance of untimely successive class
              actions such as the one brought by Michael Resh.
              Economy of litigation favors delaying individual
              claims until after a class-certification denial.
              With class claims, on the other hand, efficiency
              favors early assertion of competing class
              representative claims. If class treatment is
              appropriate, and all would-be representatives
              have come forward, the district court can select
              the best plaintiff with knowledge of the full
              array of potential class representatives and
              class counsel. And if the class mechanism is not
              a viable option, the decision denying
              certification will be made at the outset of the
              case, litigated once for all would-be class
              representatives.

              Federal Rule of Procedure 23 evinces a preference
              for preclusion of untimely successive class
              actions by instructing that class certification
              should be resolved early on. The Private
              Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),
              which governs this litigation, evinces a similar
              preference, this time embodied in legislation
              providing for early notice and lead-plaintiff
              procedures. The Supreme Court held that there is
              little reason to allow plaintiffs who passed up
              opportunities to participate in the first (and
              second) round of class litigation to enter the
              fray several years after class proceedings first
              commenced.

              Class representatives who commence suit after
              expiration of the limitation period are unlikely
              to qualify as diligent in asserting claims and
              pursuing relief, the Supreme Court said.  And
              respondents' proposed reading would allow
              extension of the statute of limitations time and
              again; as each class is denied certification, a
              new named plaintiff could file a class complaint
              that resuscitates the litigation. Endless tolling
              of a statute of limitations is not a result
              envisioned by American Pipe.

              Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
              Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and
              Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan,
              and Gorsuch, joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an
              opinion concurring in the judgment.

              Attorney for Petitioner:

                 Seth Alben Aronson, Esq.
                 William K. Pao, Esq.
                 Brittany Rogers, Esq.
                 Michelle C. Leu, Esq.
                 O'Melveny & Myers LLP
                 400 South Hope Street
                 18th Floor
                 Los Angeles, CA 90071
                 Tel: (213) 430-7486
                 Email: saronson@omm.com
                        wpao@omm.com
                        brogers@omm.com
                        mleu@omm.com

                    -- and --

                 Abby F. Rudzin, Esq.
                 Anton Metlitsky, Esq.
                 O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
                 Times Square Tower
                 7 Times Square
                 New York, NY 10036
                 Tel: (212) 326-2000
                 Email: arudzin@omm.com
                        ametlitsky@omm.com

                   -- and --

                 Bradley N. Garcia, Esq.
                 Jason Zarrow, Esq.
                 O'Melveny & Myers LLP
                 1625 Eye Street, NW
                 Washington, DC 20006
                 Tel: (202) 383-5300
                 Email: bgarcia@omm.com
                        jzarrow@omm.com

              Attorney for Respondent:

                 David C. Frederick, Esq.
                 Kellogg, Hansen, Todd,
                    Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C.
                 SUMNER SQUARE
                 1615 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 400
                 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
                 Tel: (202) 326-7951
                 Fax: (202) 326-7999
                 Email: dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

              Attorneys for Respondents William Schoenke,
              Heroca Holding, B.V., and Ninella Beheer, B.V.:

                 Matthew M. Guiney, Esq.
                 Wolf Haldenstein Adler, Freeman & Herz LLP
                 270 Madison Avenue
                 New York, NY 10016                 
                 Tel: (212) 545-4761
                 Email: guiney@whafh.com

                   -- and --

                 David A.P. Brower, Esq.
                 Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
                 136 Madison Avenue, 5th Floor
                 New York, NY 10016
                 Tel: (212) 501-9000
                 Fax: (212) 501-0300
                 Email: brower@browerpiven.com

                   -- and --

                 Betsy C. Manifold, Esq.
                 Wolf Haldenstein Adler, Freeman & Herz LLP
                 Symphony Towers
                 750 B Street, Suite 2770
                 San Diego, CA 92101
                 Tel: (619) 234-3896
                 Email: manifold@whafh.com

                   -- and --

                 David C. Frederick, Esq.
                 Jeremy S.B. Newman, Esq.
                 Kellogg, Hansen, Todd,
                    Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C.
                 SUMNER SQUARE
                 1615 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 400
                 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
                 Tel: (202) 326-7951
                 Fax: (202) 326-7999
                 Email:jnewman@kellogghansen.com

              Attorneys for Respondent, Charles Law:

                 Charles Eric Coleman, Esq.
                 Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP
                 2020 West El Camino Avenue, Suite 700
                 Sacramento, CA 95833
                 Tel: (916) 646-8222
                 Fax: (916) 564-5444
                 Email: Charles.Coleman@lewisbrisbois.com

              Attorneys for Washington Legal Foundation:

                 George Edward Anhang, Esq.
                 COOLEY LLP
                 Email: GAnhang@Cooley.com

              Attorneys for National Conference on Public
              Employee Retirement Systems:

                 Max W. Berger, Esq.
                 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP
                 1251 Avenue of the Americas
                 New York, NY 10020
                 Tel: (212) 554-1403
                 Fax: (212) 554-1444
                 Email: MWB@blbglaw.com

              Attorneys for Retired Federal Judges:

                 Andrew Nathan Goldfarb, Esq.
                 Zuckerman Spaeder LLP
                 1800 M Street NW, Suite 1000
                 Washington, DC 20036-5807
                 Tel: (202) 778-1822
                 Fax: (202) 822-8106
                 Email: agoldfarb@zuckerman.com

              Attorneys for American Association for Justice,
              et al.:

                 Deepak Gupta, Esq.
                 Gupta Wessler PLLC
                 1900 L Street, NW, Suite 312
                 Washington, DC 20036
                 Tel: (202) 888-1741
                 Email: deepak@guptawessler.com

              Attorneys for Securities Industry and Financial
              Markets Association:

                 Lewis Jeffrey Liman, Esq.
                 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
                 One Liberty Plaza
                 New York, NY 10006
                 Tel: (212) 225-2550
                 Email: lliman@cgsh.com

              Attorneys for Law Professors:

                 Lumen N. Mulligan, Esq.
                 University of Kansas School of Law
                 1535 W 15th St.
                 Lawrence, KS 66045
                 Email: lumen@ku.edu


              Attorneys for Public Citizen, Inc.:

                 Scott Lawrence Nelson, Esq.
                 Public Citizen Litigation Group
                 1600 20th Street NW
                 Washington, D.C. 20009
                 Tel: (202) 588-1000
                 Email: snelson@citizen.org

              Attorneys for AARP and AARP Foundation:

                 Julie Nepveu, Esq.
                 AARP Foundation Litigation
                 Email: jnepveu@aarp.org

              Attorneys for Chamber of Commerce of the United
              States of America, et al.:

                 Mark Andrew Perry, Esq.
                 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP
                 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
                 Washington, DC 20036-5306 USA
                 Tel: (202) 887-3667
                 Fax: (202) 467-0539
                 Email: mperry@gibsondunn.com

              Attorneys for Plaintiffs in Post-Dukes Successor
              Class Actions:

                 Joseph Marc Sellers, Esq.
                 Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC
                 1100 New York Ave., NW, Fifth Floor
                 Washington, DC 20005
                 Tel: (202) 408-4600
                 Fax: (202) 408-4699
                 Email: jsellers@cohenmilstein.com

              Attorneys for DRI - The Voice of the Defense Bar:

                 Robert Latane Wise, Esq.
                 Bowman and Brooke LLP
                 901 East Byrd Street, Suite 1650
                 Richmond, VA 23219
                 Tel: (804) 819-1134
                 Fax: (804) 649-1762
                 Email: rob.wise@bowmanandbrooke.com

                    -- and --

                 Susan E. Burnett, Esq.
                 Bowman and Brooke LLP
                 2901 Via Fortuna Drive, Suite 500
                 Austin, TX 78746
                 Tel: (512) 874-3844
                 Fax: (512) 874-3801
                 Email: susan.burnett@bowmanandbrooke.com

              Attorneys for Washington Legal Foundation:

                 Lyle Roberts, Esq.
                 Cooley LLP
                 Email: lroberts@cooley.com

TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. HAWAII ET AL., No.
17–965 (U.S.).

              In September 2017, the President issued
              Proclamation No. 9645, seeking to improve vetting
              procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the
              United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies
              in the information needed to assess whether
              nationals of particular countries present a
              security threat.  The Proclamation placed entry
              restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign
              states -- Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
              Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen -- whose systems for
              managing and sharing information about their
              nationals the President deemed inadequate.  

              Plaintiffs -- the State of Hawaii, three
              individuals with foreign relatives affected by
              the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association
              of Hawaii -- argue that the Proclamation violates
              the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the
              Establishment Clause.  The District Court granted
              a nationwide preliminary injunction barring
              enforcement of the restrictions. The Ninth
              Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
              Proclamation contravened two provisions of the
              INA: Section 1182(f), which authorizes the
              President to "suspend the entry of all aliens or
              any class of aliens" whenever he "finds" that
              their entry "would be detrimental to the
              interests of the United States," and Section
              1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that "no person
              shall . . . be discriminated against in the
              issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
              person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth,
              or place of residence." The court did not reach
              the Establishment Clause claim.

              The issues before the Supreme Court were whether
              the President had authority under the Act to
              issue the Proclamation, and whether the entry
              policy violates the Establishment Clause of the
              First Amendment.

              The Supreme Court found that the President has
              lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted
              to him under Section 1182(f) to suspend the entry
              of aliens into the United States.  The sole
              prerequisite set forth in Section 1182(f) is that
              the President "find[ ]" that the entry of the
              covered aliens "would be detrimental to the
              interests of the United States." The Supreme
              Court said the President has undoubtedly
              fulfilled that requirement here.  Even assuming
              that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness
              of the President's findings is appropriate, but
              see Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600, the
              plaintiffs' attacks on the sufficiency of the
              findings cannot be sustained, the Supreme Court
              held.

              The Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of
              the Proclamation was religious animus and that
              the President's stated concerns about vetting
              protocols and national security were but pretexts
              for discriminating against Muslims. At the heart
              of their case is a series of statements by the
              President and his advisers both during the
              campaign and since the President assumed office.
              The issue, however, is not whether to denounce
              the President's statements, but the significance
              of those statements in reviewing a Presidential
              directive, neutral on its face, addressing a
              matter within the core of executive
              responsibility. In doing so, the Court must
              consider not only the statements of a particular
              President, but also the authority of the
              Presidency itself.

              The Supreme Court ruled that admission and
              exclusion of foreign nationals is a "fundamental
              sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's
              political departments largely immune from
              judicial control."  Although foreign nationals
              seeking admission have no constitutional right to
              entry, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
              circumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of
              a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional
              rights of a U. S. citizen. That review is limited
              to whether the Executive gives a "facially
              legitimate and bona fide" reason for its action,
              but the Court need not define the precise
              contours of that narrow inquiry in this case.

              The Supreme Court also pointed out three
              additional features of the entry policy support
              the Government's claim of a legitimate national
              security interest. First, since the President
              introduced entry restrictions in January 2017,
              three Muslim-majority countries -- Iraq, Sudan,
              and Chad -- have been removed from the list.
              Second, for those countries still subject to
              entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes
              numerous exceptions for various categories of
              foreign nationals. Finally, the Proclamation
              creates a waiver program open to all covered
              foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or
              nonimmigrants. Under these circumstances, the
              Government has set forth a sufficient national
              security justification to survive rational basis
              review.

              Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
              the Court, in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
              Alito, and Gorsuch, joined. Justices Kennedy and
              Thomas filed concurring opinions.  Justice Breyer
              filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
              Kagan, joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a
              dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg
              joined.

              Attorneys for Petitioners:

                 Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
                 Solicitor General
                 Chad A. Readler, Esq.
                 Acting Assistant Attorney, General
                 Jeffrey B. Wall, Esq.
                 Edwin S. Kneedler, Esq.
                 Deputy Solicitors General
                 Hashim M. Moopan, Esq.
                 Deputy Assistant Attorney, General
                 Jonathan C. Bond, Esq.
                 Michael R. Huston, Esq.
                 Assistants to the Solicitor, General
                 Sharon Swingle, Esq.
                 H. Thomas Byron III, Esq.
                 Attorney
                 Department of Justice
                 Washington, DC

              Attorneys for Respondents:

                 Neal Kumar Katyal, Esq.
                 Mitchell P. Reich, Esq.
                 Elizabeth Hagerty, Esq.
                 Sundeep Iyer, Esq.
                 Reedy C. Swanson, Esq.
                 HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
                 Columbia Square
                 555 Thirteenth Street, NW
                 Washington, D.C. 20004
                 Tel: (202) 637-5600
                 Fax: (202) 637-5910
                 Email: neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
                        mitchell.reich@hoganlovells.com
                        elizabeth.hagerty@hoganlovells.com

                    -- and --

                 Thomas P. Schmidt, Esq.
                 Sara Solow, Esq.
                 Alexander B. Bowerman, Esq.
                 HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
                 875 Third Avenue
                 New York, NY 10022
                 Tel: (212) 918-3000
                 Fax: (212) 918-3100
                 Email: thomas.schmidt@hoganlovells.com
                        sara.solow@hoganlovells.com
                        alexander.bowerman@hoganlovells.com

              Attorneys for the State of Hawaii:

                 Russell A. Suzuki, Esq.
                 Acting Attorney General
                 Clyde J. Wadsworth, Esq.
                 Solicitor General
                 Deirdre Marie-Iha, Esq.
                 Donna H. Kalama, Esq.
                 Kimberly T. Guidry, Esq.
                 Robert T. Nakatsuji, Esq.
                 Kaliko'onalani D. Fernandes, Esq.
                 Kevin M. Richardson, Esq.
                 Deputy Attorneys General
                 Department of the Attorney General
                 Honolulu, HI

Mark JANUS, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY,
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, et al., No. 16–1466 (U.S.).

           Illinois law permits public employees to unionize.
           If a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit
           vote to be represented by a union, that union is
           designated as the exclusive representative of all
           the employees, even those who do not join. Only the
           union may engage in collective bargaining;
           individual employees may not be represented by
           another agent or negotiate directly with their
           employer. Non-members are required to pay what is
           generally called an "agency fee," i.e., a percentage
           of the full union dues. Under Abood v. Detroit Bd.
           of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 235–236, this fee may cover
           union expenditures attributable to those activities
           "germane" to the union's collective-bargaining
           activities (chargeable expenditures), but may not
           cover the union's political and ideological projects
           (nonchargeable expenditures). The union sets the
           agency fee annually and then sends non-members a
           notice explaining the basis for the fee and the
           breakdown of expenditures. Here it was 78.06% of
           full union dues.

           Petitioner Mark Janus is a state employee whose unit
           is represented by a public-sector union (Union), one
           of the respondents. He refused to join the Union
           because he opposes many of its positions, including
           those taken in collective bargaining. Illinois'
           Governor, similarly opposed to many of these
           positions, filed suit challenging the
           constitutionality of the state law authorizing
           agency fees. The state attorney general, another
           respondent, intervened to defend the law, while
           Janus moved to intervene on the Governor's side. The
           District Court dismissed the Governor's challenge
           for lack of standing, but it simultaneously allowed
           Janus to file his own complaint challenging the
           constitutionality of agency fees. The District Court
           granted respondents' motion to dismiss on the ground
           that the claim was foreclosed by Abood.  The Seventh
           Circuit affirmed.

           The Supreme Court held that states and public-sector
           unions may no longer extract agency fees from
           non-consenting employees. The Supreme Court said the
           First Amendment is violated when money is taken from
           non-consenting employees for a public-sector union;
           employees must choose to support the union before
           anything is taken from them. Accordingly, neither an
           agency fee nor any other form of payment to a
           public-sector union may be deducted from an
           employee, nor may any other attempt be made to
           collect such a payment, unless the employee
           affirmatively consents to pay.

           The Supreme Court recognized the importance of
           following precedent unless there are strong reasons
           for not doing so. But there are very strong reasons
           in this case. Fundamental free speech rights are at
           stake. Abood, the Supreme Court said, was poorly
           reasoned. It has led to practical problems and
           abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment
           cases and has been undermined by more recent
           decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down
           have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and
           no reliance interests on the part of public-sector
           unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of
           the free speech violations that Abood has
           countenanced for the past 41 years. The Supreme
           Court, therefore, overruled Abood.

           Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in
           which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
           Thomas, and Gorsuch, joined. Justice Sotomayor filed
           a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan filed a
           dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg,
           Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.

           Attorneys for Petitioner:

              William L. Messenger, Esq.
              Aaron B. Solem, Esq.
              National Right to Work Legal
                 Defense Foundation, Inc.
              8001 Braddock Road
              Springfield, VA 22160
              Tel: (703) 321-8510
              Fax: (703) 321-9613

                 -- and --

              Dan K. Webb, Esq.
              Joseph J. Torres, Esq.
              Lawrence R. Desideri, Esq.
              Winston & Strawn LLP
              35 W. Wacker Drive
              Chicago, IL 60601-9703
              Tel: (312) 558-5600
              Fax: (312) 558-5700
              Email: dwebb@winston.com
                     jtorres@winston.com
                     ldesideri@winston.com

                 -- and --

              Jacob H. Huebert, Esq.
              Jeffrey M. Schwab, Esq.
              Liberty Justice Center
              Chicago, IL

           Attorney for the United States as amicus curiae, by
           special leave of the Court, supporting the
           Petitioner:

              Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
              Solicitor General

           Attorneys for the State Respondents:

              David L. Franklin, Esq.
              Solicitor General
              Chicago, IL

           Attorneys for the Respondent AFSCME Council 31:

              David C. Frederick, Esq.
              Washington, DC

           Attorneys for Respondents Lisa Madigan and Michael
           Hoffman:

              Lisa Madigan, Esq.
              Attorney General
              State of Illinois

                 -- and --

              David L. Franklin, Esq.
              Solicitor General
              Counsel of Record

                 -- and --

              Brett E. Legner, Esq.
              Deputy Solicitor General

                 -- and --

              Frank H. Bieszczat, Esq.
              Jane Flanagan, Esq.
              Sarah A. Hunger, Esq.
              Richard S. Huszagh, Esq.
              Lindsay Beyer Payne, Esq.
              Andrew Tonelli, Esq.
              Assistant Attorneys General
              Chicago, IL

           Attorneys for Respondent American Federation of
           State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31:

              John M. West, Esq.
              Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC
              805 Fifteenth Street N.W.
              Washington, DC 20005-2207
              Tel: (202) 842-2600

                 -- and --

              Judith E. Rivlin, Esq.
              Teague P. Paterson, Esq.
              AFSCME
              Washington, DC

                 -- and --

              David C. Frederick, Esq.
              Derek T. Ho, Esq.
              Benjamin S. Softness, Esq.
              KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
                 FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
              Sumner Square
              1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
              Washington, D.C. 20036
              Tel: (202) 326-7900
              Email: dfrederick@kellogghansen.com
                     dho@kellogghansen.com
                     bsoftness@kellogghansen.com

David JENNINGS et al., Petitioners v. Alejandro RODRIGUEZ et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, No.
15-1204 (U.S.).

          Alejandro Rodriguez is a Mexican citizen. Since 1987,
          he has also been a lawful permanent resident of the
          United States. In April 2004, after Rodriguez was
          convicted of a drug offense and theft of a vehicle,
          the Government detained him under Section 1226 and
          sought to remove him from the country.  At his
          removal hearing, Rodriguez argued both that he was
          not removable and, in the alternative, that he was
          eligible for relief from removal.  In July 2004, an
          Immigration Judge ordered Rodriguez deported to
          Mexico.  Rodriguez chose to appeal that decision to
          the Board of Immigration Appeals, but five months
          later the Board agreed that Rodriguez was subject to
          mandatory removal.  Once again, Rodriguez chose to
          seek further review, this time petitioning the Court
          of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the
          Board's decision.

          In May 2007, while Rodriguez was still litigating his
          removal in the Court of Appeals, he filed a habeas
          petition in the District Court for the Central
          District of California, alleging that he was entitled
          to a bond hearing to determine whether his continued
          detention was justified.  Rodriguez's case was
          consolidated with another, similar case brought by
          Alejandro Garcia, and together they moved for class
          certification.  The District Court denied their
          motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
          Circuit reversed, concluding that the proposed class
          met the certification requirements of Rule 23 of the
          Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

          On remand, the District Court certified the following
          class: All non-citizens within the Central District
          of California who: (1) are or were detained for
          longer than six months pursuant to one of the general
          immigration detention statutes pending completion of
          removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2)
          are not and have not been detained pursuant to a
          national security detention statute, and (3) have not
          been afforded a hearing to determine whether their
          detention is justified.

          In their complaint, Rodriguez and the other
          respondents argued that the relevant statutory
          provisions -- Sections 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c)
          -- do not authorize "prolonged" detention in the
          absence of an individualized bond hearing at which
          the Government proves by clear and convincing
          evidence that the class member's detention remains
          justified.  Absent such a bond-hearing requirement,
          respondents continued, those three provisions would
          violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
          Amendment.

          As relevant here, the District Court entered a
          permanent injunction in line with the relief sought
          by respondents, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
          Relying heavily on the canon of constitutional
          avoidance, the Court of Appeals construed Sections
          1225(b) and 1226(c) as imposing an implicit 6-month
          time limit on an alien's detention under these
          sections. After that point, the Court of Appeals
          held, the Government may continue to detain the alien
          only under the authority of Section 1226(a). The
          Court of Appeals then construed Section 1226(a) to
          mean that an alien must be given a bond hearing every
          six months and that detention beyond the initial 6
          month period is permitted only if the Government
          proves by clear and convincing evidence that further
          detention is justified.

          In this case the Supreme Court is asked to interpret
          three provisions of U.S. immigration law that
          authorize the Government to detain aliens in the
          course of immigration proceedings. All parties appear
          to agree that the text of these provisions, when read
          most naturally, does not give detained aliens the
          right to periodic bond hearings during the course of
          their detention. But by relying on the
          constitutional-avoidance canon of statutory
          interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
          Circuit held that detained aliens have a statutory
          right to periodic bond hearings under the provisions
          at issue.

          Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when
          statutory language is susceptible of multiple
          interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation
          that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead
          may adopt an alternative that avoids those problems.
          But a court relying on that canon still must
          interpret the statute, not rewrite it. Because the
          Court of Appeals in this case adopted implausible
          constructions of the three immigration provisions at
          issue, the Supreme Court reverses the lower court's
          judgment and remands for further proceedings.

          Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court,
          except as to Part II. Chief Justice Roberts and
          Justice Kennedy joined that opinion in full; Justices
          Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II; and
          Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part III–C. Justice
          Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and
          concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch
          joined except for footnote 6. Justice Breyer filed a
          dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and
          Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan took no part in the
          decision of the case.

          Attorneys for Petitioner, David Jennings, et al.:

             Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
             Solicitor General
             United States Department of Justice
             Email: SupremeCtBriefs@USDOJ.gov

                -- and --

             Edwin Smiley Kneedler, Esq.
             Malcolm L. Stewart, Esq.
             Department of Justice
             Email: Judith.L.Reardon-Bridges@usdoj.gov

          Attorneys for Respondents, Alejandro Rodriguez, et
          al.:

             Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Esq.
             Michael Kaufman, Esq.
             Peter Jay Eliasberg, Esq.
             ACLU Foundation of Southern CA
             Email: aarulanantham@aclusocal.org

                -- and --

             Judy Rabinovitz, Esq.
             Michael K.T. Tan, Esq.
             ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project
             New York,NY

                -- and --

             Cecillia D. Wang, Esq.
             ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project
             San Francisco, CA

                -- and --

             Jayashri Srikantiah, Esq.
             Stanford Law School Mills Legal Clinic
             Stanford, CA

                -- and --

             Sean Ashley Commons, Esq.
             Sidley Austin LLP
             555 WEST FIFTH STREET
             LOS ANGELES, CA 90013
             Tel: (213) 896-6000
             FAX: (213) 896-6600
             Email: scommons@sidley.com

                -- and --

             Steven Andrew Ellis, Esq.
             Goodwin Procter LLP
             601 South Figueroa Street
             41st Floor
             Los Angeles, CA 90017
             Tel: (213) 426-2614
             Email: sellis@goodwinlaw.com

          Attorneys for Professors of Constitutional,
          Immigration, and Administrative Law.

             Dennis Auerbach, Esq.
             Covington & Burling LLP
             One CityCenter
             850 Tenth Street, NW
             Washington, DC 20001-4956
             Tel: (202) 662-6000
             Email: dauerbach@cov.com

          Attorneys for Nine Retired Immigration Judges, and
          Board of Immigration Appeals Members:

             James Joseph Beha, II, Esq.
             Morrison & Foerster
             250 West 55th Street
             New York, NY 10019-9601
             Tel: (212) 336-4079
             Fax: (212) 468-7900
             Email: jbeha@mofo.com

          Attorneys for Members of Asian Americans Advancing
          Justice:

             Anjan Choudhury, Esq.
             Munger Tolles & Olson LLP
             350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
             Los Angeles, CA 90071
             Tel: (213) 683-9107
             Email: anjan.choudhury@mto.com

          Attorneys for 43 Social Science Researchers and
          Professors:

             Kelsi Brown Corkran, Esq.
             Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
             Columbia Center
             1152 15th Street, N.W.
             Washington, D.C. 20005-1706
             Tel: (202) 339-8497
             Email: kcorkran@orrick.com

          Attorneys for Americans for Immigrant Justice,
          et al.:

             Alina Das, Esq.
             Washington Square Legal Services, Inc.
             Email: alina.das@nyu.edu

          Attorneys for National Association of Criminal
          Defense Lawyers, et al.:

             James J. Farrell, Esq.
             Latham & Watkins LLP
             885 Third Avenue
             New York, NY 10022-4834
             Tel: (212) 906-1215
             Fax: (212) 751-4864
            Email: james.farrell@lw.com

          Attorneys for American Immigration Council, and
          American Immigration Lawyers Association:

             Mark C. Fleming, Esq.
             Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP
             60 State Street
             Boston, MA 02109
             Tel: (617) 526-6909
             Email: mark.fleming@wilmerhale.com

          Attorneys for Professors Stephen Legomsky, and
          Stephen Yale-Loehr in support of respondents:

             Justin G. Florence, Esq.
             Ropes & Gray LLP
             Email: justin.florence@ropesgray.com

          Attorneys for National Immigration Project of the
          National Lawyers Guild, and the Immigrant Legal
          Resource Center:

             David C. Frederick, Esq.
             Kellogg, Hansen, Todd,
                Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C.
             SUMNER SQUARE
             1615 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 400
             WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
             Tel: (202) 326-7951
             Fax: (202) 326-7999
             Email: dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

          Attorneys for Human Rights First in support of
          respondent:

             Eugene Martin Gelernter, Esq.
             Paterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
             1133 Avenue of the Americas
             New York NY 10036
             Tel: (212) 336-2553
             Fax: (212) 336-2393
             Email: emgelernter@pbwt.com

          Attorneys for County of Santa Clara California, and
          19 Additional Counties:

             Greta Suzanne Hansen, Esq.
             Lead Deputy County Counsel
             Office of the County Counsel
             Email: greta.hansen@cco.sccgov.org

          Attorneys for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense
          Fund in support of petitioners Eagle Forum Education
          & Legal Defense Fund:

             Steven A. Hirsch, Esq.
             Keker & Van Nest, LLP
             633 Battery Street
             San Francisco, CA  94111-1809
             Tel: (415) 391-5400
             Email: shirsch@kvn.com

                -- and --

             Lawrence J. Joseph, Esq.
             Email: lj@larryjoseph.com

          Attorneys for American Bar Association in support of
          respondents:

             Linda A. Klein, Esq.
             President, American Bar Association
             Email: abapresident@americanbar.org

          Attorneys for Detained Legal Services Providers:

             Brian J. Murray, Esq.
             Jones Day
             77 West Wacker
             Chicago, IL 60601-1692
             Tel: (312) 782-3939
             Fax: (312) 782-8585
             Email: bjmurray@jonesday.com

          Attorneys for United Nations High Commissioner for
          Refugees:

             Amy Mason Saharia, Esq.
             Williams & Connolly LLP
             725 Twelfth Street NW
             Washington D.C. 20005
             Tel: (202) 434-5847
             Email: asaharia@wc.com

          Attorneys for 29 U.S. Representatives; chairman
          Robert Goodlatte, et al.:

             Richard A. Samp, Esq.
             Washington Legal Foundation
             Email: rsamp@wlf.org

          Attorneys for State of California, et al.:

             Samuel Passchier Siegel, Esq.
             Associate Deputy Solicitor General
             Email: Sam.Siegel@doj.ca.gov



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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