CAR_Public/190118.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, January 18, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 14

                            Headlines

AIR FRANCE: Cozen O'Connor Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
ALLIANCE RESOURCE: Wins Summary Judgment Bid in WARN Suit
AMAZON: Faces Wage-and-Hour Class Action in North Carolina
ANADARKO E&P: 10th Cir. Flips Judgment in Bay Suit
ARCONIC: Sorrell, RBS Named in Grenfell Tower Cladding Case

BAKERS PIZZA: Andujar Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
BANK OF NEW YORK: $13.5MM Becker Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
BARCLAYS BANK: Court Trims Claims in Consolidated Antitrust Suit
BEVERLY HILLS BMW: Silva Sues over Nonpayment of Wages
BHP GROUP: Court Narrows Samarco Disaster Class Actions

BIMBO BAKERIES: Court Refuses to Dismiss D. Camp's FSLA Suit
BONCHON USA: Sut Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime, Withheld Tips
BRAD PITT: Seeks Dismissal of Hurricane Katrina Class Action
BRISTOL BAY: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Abikar Suit
BRUCKNER BAR: Lazaro Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Hours Worked Over 40

CANADA: Koskie Minsky Commences Class Action Against RCMP
CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Indigenous Mistreatment
CAPITAL ONE: Court Dismisses M. Gensmer's TILA Suit
CHARLES SCHWAB: Jan. 2020 Class Certification Hearing in Crago
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court OKs Filing of 2nd Amended Guzman Complaint

COBALT INTERNATIONAL: Feb. 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
COLUMBIA GAS: Faces Class Action Following Gas Explosions
COOK COUNTY, IL: Inmate's Claim Not Time-Barred, Court Rules
CREDIT BUREAU: FDCPA and NCPA Classes Certified in Bassett Suit
CRUISIN' CHUBBY'S: Judge Rejects Wage Class Action Settlement

EASTERN MUSHROOM: $11.5MM Settlement in Antitrust Suit Has Final OK
ENCORE HEALTH: N. Pierce's Suit Transferred to S.D. Tex.
ENTEROMEDICS INC: Settlement in Derivative Suit Has Final Approval
EQT CORP: Files Settlement Term Sheet Under Seal
EXPEDIA INC: Faces Traveler Fee Class Action in Washington

FACEBOOK INC: ACLU Files "Friend of the Court Brief"
FORD MOTOR: Potential Settlement in Works in Design Defect Case
GIANT EAGLE: Fitch Seeks to Certify and Notify Class Under FLSA
GUACAMOLE GROUP: Diaz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missing Pay Slips
HEALTH INSURANCE: Can Partly Compel Replies to Interrogatories

HEALTHPLUS SURGERY: Marrero Seeks Damages for Negligent Practice
HILL DELI: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Bouhajrah Suit Alleges
HOMES OF OPPORTUNITY: Court OKs Settlement in Belmont
HURON COUNTY, MI: Faces Class Action Over Tax Forfeiture Process
HYUNDAI: Faces Class Action in Calif. Over GDI Engine Defect

IDE PONTIAC: Wins Summary Judgment as to Buehlman Unpaid OT Claims
INTEGRATED DEVICE: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
INTELLIPHARMACEUTICS: Court Narrows Claims in Shanawaz Suit
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: Judge Set to Rule in Sexual Abuse Class Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Inks Stipulation in Class Action

KAISER PERMANENTE: Must Face Black Employees' Discrimination Case
KAPRAUN PC: Dismissal of Arnold TCPA Suit Affirmed
KINDER MORGAN: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Gas Emissions
KOHLER CO: Wendel Rosen Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
KRISHNA HOLDING: Singh Seeks Unpaid OT Wages, Spread-of-Hours Pay

LEGEND MAKERS: Cooperman Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
LOUISIANA: S&WB Attorneys Present Arguments in Class Action
M&T BANK: 3d Cir. Partly Affirms Dismissal of Jaroslawicz Suit
MARBLECAST OF MICHIGAN: Summ. Judgment in Garner TCPA Suit Granted
MARIN COUNTY: Court Issues Pretrial Preparation Order in Thayer

MARRIOTT INT'L: B.C. Residents File Data Breach Class Action
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Braun Sues Over Data Breach
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Sued over Starwood Hotel Data Breach
METROPCS COMMS: Arbitration Bid Denial in Porter TCPA Suit Flipped
MILLER & MILONE: Court Dismisses Taubenfliegel FDCPA Suit

MINNESOTA: Dismissal of Carufel Suit Partly Affirmed
MISSOURI: Class of Adult Parolees Certified in Gasca v. Precythe
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES: Denial of Krislov's Attys' Fees Request Upheld
MYLAN NV: State Attorney Generals Plan to Expand Class Action
MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS: Cacaccio Sues Over Contaminated Drug

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOC: Sullivan Claims Website not Deaf-Friendly
NEW YORK: Faces Adams-Flores Case in Southern District of New York
NISSAN MOTOR: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Lawsuit
NORTH 2ND STREET: Pelland Seeks Unpaid Wages
NOVARTIS PHARMA: KPH Healthcare Hits Overpriced Hypertension Med

OCEAN SPRAY: Calif. Court Certifies Food Labeling Class Action
OHIO MULCH SUPPLY: Two Subclasses Certified in Smyers Suit
PEAK SECURITY: Court Approves $200K Settlement in Chime FLSA Suit
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Ct. Stays Proceedings on Serifoski's Cert. Bid
PNC BANK: Faces Class Action Over Free Banking Plan Offer

POSTMATES INC: Court Grants OKs Arbitration in Wage & Hour Suit
PRISONER TRANSPORTATION: Class Certification Bid in Groover Granted
PRIVATE LABEL: June 3 Final Approval Hearing on Schourup Settlement
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilson TCPA Suit
RICO POLLO: Court Certifies Class in Alberto FLSA Suit

RJ REYNOLDS: Fla. Dist. App. Affirms Final Judgment in Schleider
SCHWABE NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in Sonner Suit
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS: Court Denies Summary Judgment in ADEA Suit
SPRINT SPECTRUM: Carnevali Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
SUDDENLY EXPRESS: Vilches Seeks Overtime Wage

TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Truck Frames
TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Disabled Entune App Support
TRACTOR SUPPLY: Court Dismisses Johnson FLSA Suit Without Prejudice
TRANSAMERICA CORP: Karg Sues Over Mismanaged Pension Fund
TRIAD MEDIA: Court OKs Cross-Claimant Plaintiff's Summary Judgment

TURN INC: Court Dismisses Henson's NYGBL Suit With Leave to Amend
UNITED STATES: Court OKs Settlement of FAMs' ADEA Suit
UNITED STATES: Medicare Diabetic Patients File Class Suit v. HHS
UNITEDHEALTHCARE: CMC in Smith ERISA Suit Continued to March 21
VIRGINIA: Bid for Prelim Injunction in Stinnie Suit Granted

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Settles Faulty-Engine Class Action
WAL-MART DE MEXICO: 2d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Fogel Claims
WELLS FARGO: Coosa Nation Suit Moved to Middle District of Georgia
WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in Mitchell Suit
WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Court Refuses to Review Ruling in Rushing


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: A. Fletcher Sues Over Take-Home Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal of N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Bid to Review NHIC Liability Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Florida Woman Sues J&J over Baby Powder
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judges Warrants Summary Judgment For Maersk Line

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Perkins Couple Sues ABB, et al., over Lung Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: R. Cannon Sues Atwood, et al., over Lung Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Williams Couple Sues Car Parts Makers over Cancer


                            *********

AIR FRANCE: Cozen O'Connor Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher B Kende, Esq. -- ckende@cozen.com -- of Cozen O'Connor,
in an article for International Law Office, reports that in an
interesting decision that may have significant repercussions for
air carriers, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the US
District Court for the Northern District of California issued an
order on 4 October 2018 dismissing a putative class action brought
against Air France based on a limitations provision set out in Air
France's General Conditions of Carriage (GCC) and the pre-emption
provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act.(1)

Facts

The putative class action contended that Air France had breached
its contract with the class representative, Abraham Hakimi, when it
allegedly promised – in advertising – that a premium economy
class seat offered 40% more space than an economy seat. The
complaint contended that the premium economy seat was only two
inches wider than a coach seat and only reclined six inches more.
It further contended that Hakimi had booked the more expensive
premium economy seat based on this claimed promise and, as such, he
suffered damage from the advertising's misrepresentation. The
putative class claim included numerous causes of action, including
claims for breaches of:

   -- a self-imposed undertaking;
   -- an express contract;
   -- an implied contract;
   -- contract under federal common law; and
   -- the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust
enrichment.

Hakimi's counsel apparently overlooked the fact that Air France's
GCC provides a two-year period in which claims for liability can be
brought (no doubt following the two-year jurisdictional limitation
set out in the Montreal Convention with regard to passenger claims
for personal injury or death).(2) Luckily for Air France, the GCC
did not specify the nature of the liability subject to the two-year
limitation and, therefore, Air France argued that any claim for
liability against Air France of whatever nature would be
time-barred after two years. Hakimi claimed to have purchased his
ticket in June 2014. Since the GCC provides that a ticket is valid
only from one year of the date of purchase, the latest Hakimi could
have flown was June 2015. Consequently, any window to file a claim
closed on 30 June 2017, and the plaintiff filed its complaint only
on 2 March 2018.

Air France moved to dismiss on the basis of the time bar and also
the contention that the claim was really one for disguised false
advertising­ – even though it was framed as a breach of contract
claim – and that therefore, because the advertising related to
"prices, routes, or services" (ie, the level of comfort or space
offered in premium economy), the complaint was pre-empted by the
Airline Deregulation Act under Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc
and its progeny.(3)

As far as the time-bar argument was concerned, the plaintiff
attempted to argue that the two-year limitation was "harsh". That
claim fell on deaf ears since under California law, claims for a
breach of an implied contract are barred by an identical two-year
statute. Thus the court enforced the two-year limitation in the GCC
and held that the contract claims were time-barred.

Decision

The plaintiff dropped its claims for breach of a self-imposed
undertaking, breach of contract under federal law and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing without even submitting an
opposition to the motion regarding those counts. However, the
plaintiff persisted in contending that its claim for unjust
enrichment was not pre-empted. The court disagreed. The court
argued that, notwithstanding the exemption for an express breach of
contract claim carved out in American Airlines, Inc v Wolens, the
claim for unjust enrichment was actually extra-contractual since it
looked outside of the four corners of any alleged agreement between
the parties.(4) Further, the court found that the comfort level of
a seat in premium economy clearly related to a 'service'. As a
result, the court determined that this claim was pre-empted by the
Airline Deregulation Act. This is a significant determination, even
at the district court level, because it essentially means that any
quasi-contract claim or claim for unjust enrichment that is
extra-contractual in nature and is outside the four corners of any
alleged contract running between a passenger and an airline will be
pre-empted under the Airline Deregulation Act if it relates to a
"price, route or service of an air carrier", and is therefore not
cognisable.

Comment

The time in which to appeal this decision has run. However, the
door has been left open to reassert a breach of contract claim
(even though the court expressed doubt that a mere advertisement
constituted a contract) if such a claim is brought by a putative
class member who travelled within the two-year period between the
purchase of the ticket and the date the complaint is filed. [GN]


ALLIANCE RESOURCE: Wins Summary Judgment Bid in WARN Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned CARL LEEPER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ALLIANCE RESOURCE PARTNERS, L.P., and HAMILTON COUNTY
COAL, LLC, Defendants. Case No. 16-CV-250-NJR-DGW. (S.D. Ill.).

Leeper brings this putative class action against Defendants
Alliance Resource Partners, L.P. (Alliance) and Hamilton County
Coal, LLC (Hamilton), alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act). Leeper alleges that the
Defendants violated his rights and a class of similarly situated
persons' rights under the WARN Act by failing to provide timely
notice to workers who suffered an employment loss.

Leeper argues that the Defendants failed to provide the necessary
60 days' notice to himself and the proposed class when at least 33
percent and more than 50 of Hamilton's employees experienced an
employment loss on February 6, 2016. Specifically, Leeper argues
that the employment loss he and the proposed class suffered was a
termination as set forth in 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(6)(A).
Leeper alternatively argues that the employment loss was a
reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent in each month of
any 6-month period, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(6).

Under Leeper's first theory, he argues that 158 full-time employees
were terminated out of a total of 315 full-time employees, which
constitutes more than 33 percent of the Hamilton workforce.

The Defendants respond that the employment loss was actually a
layoff. They argue that, since the layoff did not exceed six months
as required under 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(6)(B), there was no
employment loss under the WARN Act.

Because 56 of the 158 full-time employees who received the written
notice returned to work within six months, Leeper cannot establish
that more than 33 percent of the 315 full-time employees
experienced an employment termination. Instead, these workers
suffered a layoff or a temporary cessation of the employment
relationship because they returned to work at pre-layoff wages.
While the Court is certainly empathetic to the employees'
situation, the Warn Act draws a lot of bright lines and bright
lines must be enforced consistently or they won't work.

Leeper alternatively argues that the Defendants' actions
constituted a reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent in
each month of any 6-month period, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. Section
2101(a)(6). Specifically, Leeper argues that at least 141 (44%) of
Hamilton Coal's 315 full-time workers suffered a reduction in hours
of work of more than fifty percent during the six-month period of
February 6, 2016 through August 6, 2016. The Court has already
found that the employment loss suffered by the employees was a
layoff that did not exceed 6 months for more than 33% of the
full-time workforce. The issue then becomes whether a layoff can
simultaneously be considered a reduction in hours of work of more
than 50 percent in each month of any 6-month period.

Leeper argues that, under the plain language of the statute, an
employment loss occurs when any one of the subsections apply, and
the WARN Act clearly contemplates that an employee may suffer
multiple employment losses, necessitating separate notices.
Defendants respond by pointing out that the plain language of the
statute distinguishes between the terms layoff and reduction in
hours and argue that adopting Leeper's interpretation would render
section subsection (B) meaningless.

Leeper has not cited to any controlling authority indicating that
the Court should read the statute in the way that he suggests.
Leeper cites to Phason v. Meridian Rail Corp., 479 F.3d 527, 527
(7th Cir. 2007), but this case does not hold that a temporary
layoff may be simultaneously treated as a reduction in hours under
subsection (C).

Phason involved a plant closing, which 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(2)
defines as any permanent or temporary shutdown that results in an
employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period for 50 or more employees. Workers who lost their jobs with
their employer, Meridian Rail Corporation (Meridian), were invited
to apply for jobs with NAE Nortrak, Inc. (Nortrak), the company
that agreed to buy Meridian's assets. Although the agreement was in
place when the employees were let go by Meridian, the transaction
did not close until one week after Meridian had severed all ties to
the former workers.The district court granted summary judgment for
Meridian on the basis that the WARN Act did not apply because
Nortrak eventually hired many of the workers back, and thus 50 or
more employees did not suffer an employment loss.  

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that all employees that Meridian
let go suffered a termination on December 31, 2003, regardless of
whether they were hired by Nortrak one week later.  

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs,
holding that Meridian terminated the employees within the meaning
of subsection (A) when it closed its operations and severed all
ties to the workers on December 31, 2003. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that, even though Nortrak hired many of these employees,
the sale did not close until January 8, 2004, so Section 2101(b)(1)
could not be used to avoid the classification of the event as an
employment loss.  

Overall, the Court concludes that the employees did not suffer an
employment loss as that term is defined in Section 2101(a)(6).
Thus, any failure by Hamilton to provide 60 days' advanced notice
before instituting the layoff did not constitute a violation of the
WARN Act. In light of this finding, the Court need not address the
argument that Alliance was not an employer under the WARN Act.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8k8oocy
from Leagle.com.

Carl Leeper, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green --
kevin@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Thomas J.
Lech -- tlech@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Kreig
Blakley Taylor, Culley, Feist, Kuppart & Taylor, LLC, Thomas C.
Horscroft -- thorscroft@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli
PC & Thomas P. Rosenfeld -- tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC.

Alliance Resource Partners, L.P. & Hamilton County Coal, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Richard Garrett Griffith --
richard.griffith@skofirm.com -- Stoll, Keenon et al., Elizabeth
Smith Muyskens -- elizabeth.muyskens@skofirm.com -- Stoll, Keenon
et al. & Kif Harward Skidmore -- kif.skidmore@skofirm.com -- Stoll,
Keenon et al.


AMAZON: Faces Wage-and-Hour Class Action in North Carolina
----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Flood, writing for BloomberLaw, reports that Amazon is
skirting federal wage and hour laws by contracting out to
third-party delivery service providers, a delivery driver claimed
in a new lawsuit.

The driver, Fredrich Green, asked the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina to recognize his case as a class
action.

The court referred the case to mediation on Dec. 19.

Amazon failed to pay its delivery associates for all the time they
worked, including overtime. [GN]


ANADARKO E&P: 10th Cir. Flips Judgment in Bay Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARVIN BAY; MILDRED BAY, Co-Trustees of the Bay Family
Trust, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and VERNON JESSER; MARY JESSER; KENT
J. MCDANIEL; DEANNA R. MCDANIEL, Plaintiffs, v. ANADARKO E&P
ONSHORE LLC; ANADARKO LAND CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 17-1374 (10th Cir.), Judge Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr. of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's order granting the Defendants' motion for judgment as a
matter of law ("JMOL").

The appeal concerns a trespass claim by Plaintiffs-Appellants
Marvin and Mildred Bay that the Defendants-Appellees, through their
lessee, exceeded the scope of an easement by using excessive
surface land to drill for oil and gas.  Judge Kelly decides whether
a deed reserving mineral rights in land -- and the specific right
to use the surface as "convenient or necessary" to access the
minerals -- requires applying a different test than the one
prescribed in Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927
(Colo. 1997), to evaluate whether the mineral owner's use of land
constitutes a trespass.

The Bays are farmers in Weld County, Colorado, who (through a
family trust) own the surface estate of their land.  Their deed can
be traced back to 1907, when the Union Pacific Railroad Co.
conveyed the surface to the Bays' predecessors in interest but
reserved the underlying mineral estate.

The Bays' farm sits above a large oil and gas deposit called the
Wattenberg Field.  Prior to 2000, Union Pacific would enter into
agreements with surface owners before drilling for oil or gas.  
These agreements typically included payments to surface owners and
also provided that Union Pacific would pay for surface property
damages, including damages to crops.  In 2000, Anadarko bought
Union Pacific's mineral rights in the Wattenberg Field, and
discontinued the practice of entering into agreements with surface
owners.

In 2004, Anadarko leased the mineral rights beneath the Bays' farm
to United States Exploration, which drilled three vertical wells on
the Bays' south farm.  Noble Energy bought United States
Exploration in 2006, and Noble drilled four additional vertical oil
and gas wells on the Bays' north farm between 2007 and 2011.
According to Anadarko, 97% of wells drilled in the Wattenberg Field
had been drilled vertically up to 2007.

Despite the prevalence of vertical drilling at the time, the Bays
asked Noble Energy to drill directionally instead because
directional drilling would require using fewer well sites, thus
reducing the surface impacts on the Bays' property.  Noble Energy
responded by requesting $100,000 per well to drill directionally
and, when the Bays refused, proceeded to drill vertically.  As a
result, the Bays have seven wells on their property when they
contend there could be as few as two.  They argued that this
surface use constituted a trespass.

The Bays filed a putative class action against Anadarko on behalf
of themselves and similarly situated surface owners, which was
certified for the purpose of addressing common questions of law.
In two orders (one issued after additional discovery and briefing),
the district court answered two questions relevant to the appeal:
(1) how the terms of the surface reservation in the Union Pacific
deeds should be interpreted; and (2) whether Anadarko itself can be
held liable for any trespasses on the Plaintiffs' land committed by
its lessees.

The district court first interpreted the portion of the deed
granting Anadarko the right to use as much of the surface as is
convenient or necessary to access the underlying minerals, given
the background rule of reasonable use in Gerrity.  Thus, whereas
Gerrity would require an operator to choose the least disruptive of
two reasonable alternatives, the district court concluded that the
"convenient" clause grants the operator the right to decide which
reasonable alternative to select.

Second, the district court decided whether Anadarko could be held
vicariously liable for its lessee's trespasses.  It noted that
Anadarko could theoretically be held liable but declined to make a
ruling on a class-wide basis, determining that this question was
factually intensive and required individual proof in each
Plaintiff's case.

After addressing all the questions of law capable of resolution on
a class-wide basis, the district court decertified the class and
directed the parties to select a Plaintiff for a bellwether trial.
It also affirmed its earlier interpretation of the deed
reservation, and again deferred deciding the vicarious liability
issue until trial.  The Bays were selected as the bellwether
Plaintiffs, and their case proceeded to a jury trial with five days
of testimony.

At trial, the Bays adduced testimony about how the drilling
operations and well sites had affected the surface land and their
ability to farm.  They, however, did not produce any evidence that
vertical drilling was contrary to industry practice or commercially
unreasonable (i.e., evidence showing that vertical wells were
"inconsistent with prevailing standards in the oil and gas industry
at the time"), despite the district court's earlier ruling
requiring such a showing.  Indeed, it is unlikely that the Bays
could have produced such testimony when vertical drilling remained
a common technique in the Wattenberg Field.

On the sixth day, after the close of both parties' cases, Anadarko
moved for JMOL, arguing that (1) the Bays had consented to any
trespass; (2) Anadarko could not be held vicariously liable for
Noble's conduct; (3) the Bays, as trustees, could not collect
damages for discomfort and annoyance; and (4) the Bays failed to
present evidence sufficient to show other damages.

After hearing the Bays' response, the district court then entered
JMOL pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). It
determined that Anadarko had produced unrebutted evidence that
vertical drilling was commercially reasonable.  Therefore, given
the district court's earlier rulings, Anadarko was free, consistent
with the terms of the surface reservation, to allow its lessees to
drill vertically rather than directionally.  In such circumstances,
the undisputed evidence compels the conclusion that the Bays could
not establish their claim of trespass.

Accordingly, the district court entered JMOL and, because the Bays
were only two of the many Plaintiffs, directed entry of a final
judgment against the Bays pursuant to Rule 54(b).   On appeal, the
Bays argue that Anadarko was not entitled to JMOL, and they ask
that Court reverses and remands for a new trial.

Jdge Kelly finds that the district court erred when it interpreted
the deed's language to expand the mineral owner's rights beyond the
common law.  He reaches this conclusion for several reasons.
First, under Colorado law, the goal when interpreting a deed is to
give effect to the instrument by ascertaining the parties' intent
at the time of execution.  Second, the Colorado Supreme Court's
interpretation of a deed with identical terms supports the
understanding that the "convenient or necessary" clause does not
grant mineral owners more rights than those already provided at
common law.  Third, this understanding is consistent with the
common law in other jurisdictions.  Fourth, under Colorado law, he
doubts whether a deed's mineral reservation can expand surface or
mineral ownership rights unless the reservation clearly defines the
right.

Although the Judge does not decide how clear, explicit, or specific
a deed must be to grant the surface owner or mineral owner more
rights than the due regard each already owes the other under
Gerrity, he concludes the deed's reservation was insufficient.
Accordingly, the reservation should not bestow the mineral owner
with any rights beyond those already provided at common law.

Next, the Judge finds that the deed did not expand Anadarko's
rights beyond the right to reasonable surface use under common law.
Consequently, requiring the Bays to meet an increased burden on
rebuttal was inappropriate, and the district court should have
applied the Gerrity test without any modifications.  Because he can
affirm the district court for any reason supported by the record,
he now applies Gerrity's burden-shifting approach to see whether
the district court reached the correct result despite having
applied an inappropriate test.

Given the factual differences between the Bays' claims, Gerrity,
and the aforementioned Texas authorities, he questions whether the
record before the Court supports a legally sufficient finding of
material interference.  But he does not resolve the issue because
Anadarko has not raised it on appeal; therefore, he does not affirm
the district court on this basis.

He then finds that that the Bays failed to satisfy their burden
under Gerrity because the Bays did not offer evidence that vertical
drilling was unreasonable or that the proposed alternative was
"more reasonable."  This argument misunderstands Gerrity.  Nowhere
does Gerrity require the surface owner to show that another
alternative was "more reasonable."  Accordingly, he concludes that
the district court erred in granting JMOL in favor of Anadarko with
respect to the Bays' trespass claim.

Finally, iIn the alternative, Anadarko argues that the Bays failed
to present evidence that Anadarko can be held vicariously liable
for any of Noble Energy's alleged trespasses.  Because the district
court granted JMOL based on the trespass theory, it did not rule on
this issue.  Anadarko nevertheless asks the court to affirm because
JMOL would have been warranted even if the district court erred
when it ruled that the Bays had failed to establish their trespass
claim as a matter of law.  Again, the Judge holds he may affirm for
any reason supported by the record.  Ordinarily, a lessor is not
liable for its lessee's trespasses.  However, a lessor may be
liable if it authorized or ratified the trespass.  He leaves this
for the district court to consider at the appropriate time.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Kelly reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/08vT2P from Leagle.com.

Sean Connelly -- sean@sconnellylaw.com -- of Connelly Law, LLC
(Stacy A. Burrows -- stacy@georgebartonlaw.com -- and George A.
Barton -- gab@georgebartonlaw.com -- of Law Offices of George A.
Barton, P.C., Overland Park, Kansas, Lance F. Astrella --
lance@astrellalaw.co -- and Steven Louis-Prescott--
steven@astrellalaw.com -- of Astrella Law, P.C., Denver, Colorado,
Donald M. Ostrander -- dostrander@hrodlaw.com -- of Hamre,
Rodriguez, Ostrander & Dingess, Denver, Colorado, with him on the
briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David G. Palmer -- palmerdg@gtlaw.com -- (John Voorhees --
voorheesj@gtlaw.com -- John K. Crisham, Jeffrey M. Lippa --
LippaJ@gtlaw.com -- Harriet Retford, and Lindsay N. Uhl --
uhll@gtlaw.com -- of Greenberg, Traurig, L.L.P, with him on the
brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.


ARCONIC: Sorrell, RBS Named in Grenfell Tower Cladding Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jasper Jolly, writing for The Guardian, reports that Sir Martin
Sorrell and Royal Bank of Scotland have been named in legal action
against the manufacturer of cladding installed on Grenfell Tower
shortly before the 2017 fatal fire.

Sorrell, the British businessman who built the advertising firm WPP
into one of the world's "big four", was a non-executive director of
Arconic and its predecessor business from 2012 until March 2017,
three months before the fire which killed 72 people.

Arconic and its board are facing a class action in the US. Brought
by investors, the lawsuit alleges that Arconic "knowingly or
recklessly" supplied flammable cladding panels for use in highrises
such as Grenfell Tower in west London. Other current and former
board members named include the Indian industrialist Ratan Tata,
the former president of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo and Stanley O'Neal,
a former chairman and chief executive of the US investment bank
Merrill Lynch.

The specialist law firm Pomerantz Law is lead counsel in the suit.

Arconic, which made revenues of almost $13bn (GBP10.3bn) in 2017,
was created in 2016 when Alcoa Inc was separated into two
independent companies -- the other being Alcoa Corp.

The suit claims that the board of Arconic/Alcoa Inc "made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose", that
"Arconic knowingly or recklessly supplied its highly flammable
Reynobond polyethylene (PE) cladding panels for use in highrise
buildings", as well as providing an inaccurate prospectus for a
$1.3bn share issue in 2014.

In the suit, investors also allege that a "precipitous decline" in
the company's share price after the Grenfell fire lost them money.

First filed in 2017, the class action also targets banks who are
alleged to have misled investors while performing their role as
underwriters during the share issue. Those named include RBS's US
operations, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas, Mitsubishi UFJ, and RBC Capital
Markets.

Grenfell Tower was refurbished between 2014 and 2016 at a cost of
£10.3m, of £3.5m was spent on cladding.

Arconic has accumulated $28m in "external legal and other advisory
costs" related to the fire, according to quarterly filings with the
US Securities and Exchange Commission.

Arconic manufactured the external aluminium composite panels used
in the refurbishment carried out by Rydon, a construction company
contracted by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management
Organisation, which managed Grenfell on behalf of the local
council.

The installation of the cladding and insulation is a key area for
the public inquiry into the fire. It has heard hours of evidence
from expert witnesses who claimed the panels were an important
factor in the spread of the fire. Lawyers acting for Arconic told
the inquiry that the panels were "at most, a contributing factor"
and instead blamed the materials used in the windows.

Regulators in other countries, such as Germany and the US, have
banned some forms of plastic-filled cladding, such as the Reynobond
PE, on high buildings because of fire risk. New York Stock
Exchange-listed Arconic discontinued sales of Reynobond PE in the
aftermath of the fire.

The class action cites a Reuters report from June 2017. The article
said Arconic had known the products would be used in the
construction of Grenfell Tower.

In its quarterly filing Arconic said it believed these cases were
without merit and that it intended to challenge them vigorously.

The filing added: "The company cannot reasonably estimate at this
time the likelihood of an unfavourable outcome or the possible loss
or range of losses in the event of an unfavourable outcome."

Mr. Sorrell said: "Like everyone, I am greatly saddened by the
horrific events at Grenfell. However, I left the board of the
company in March 2017 and I cannot comment on the legal actions to
which you refer."

Arconic declined to comment. All of the banks named in the lawsuit
declined to comment, as did Tata and O'Neal. Zedillo did not
respond to requests for comment. [GN]


BAKERS PIZZA: Andujar Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shacory Antonio Andujar, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Bakers Pizza HK LLC dba Baker's Pizza +
Espresso, Baker's Pizza Inc. dba Baker's Pizza, Jordan Baker and
Jeremy Baker, Case No. 1:18-cv-11400 (S.D. N.Y., December 6, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff claims that he worked for the Defendants in excess of
40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and
spread of hours compensation for the hours that he worked.

The Plaintiff Shacory Antonio Andujar was employed as a cook and a
counter employee at the restaurants located at 754 10th Avenue, New
York, NY 10019 and at 201 Avenue A, New York, NY 10009.

The Defendants own, operate, or control two pizzerias, located at
754 10th Avenue, New York, NY 10019 under the name "Baker's Pizza +
Espresso" and at 201 Avenue A, New York, NY 10009 under the name
"Baker’s Pizza". [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


BANK OF NEW YORK: $13.5MM Becker Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONARD BECKER INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST
COMPANY, N.A., et al., Civil Action No. 11-6460, Consolidated with
No. 12-6412 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Juan R. Sanchez of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Class
Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses.

In the consolidated class action lawsuit, Becker brings claims
against The Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM") and J.P. Morgan Trust
Company, N.A. on behalf of a class of holders of revenue bonds
issued by the Borough of Langhorne Manor Higher Education and
Health Authority for the benefit of Lower Bucks Hospital, to
recover damages for financial losses the bondholders allegedly
sustained as a result of the Defendants' failure to maintain a
perfected security interest in the collateral securing the bonds,
and to compel BNYM to distribute funds awarded to the bondholders
in the Hospital's bankruptcy plan.

After more than six years of contentious pretrial proceedings,
including multiple rounds of dispositive motions and vigorously
contested class certification proceedings, the case went to trial
in April 2018.  Just prior to the start of the proceedings on the
final day of trial, the parties notified the Court that they had
reached an agreement to settle the case for $13.5 million, with
additional terms to be negotiated, and requested that the trial be
adjourned.  The parties filed the proposed settlement with the
Court on June 8, 2018, and on June 20, 2018, the Court issued an
order preliminarily approving the proposed settlement as fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the class, subject to further
consideration at a fairness hearing to be held on Sept. 20, 2018.
The order also authorized distribution of a notice regarding the
settlement to the class members.

The Plaintiff now seeks final approval of the settlement, and the
class counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses.  The class counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees in
the amount of $2.15 million, plus interest at the same rate as
earned by the Settlement Fund, and reimbursement of $273,284.51 in
litigation expenses.

The Court held a final fairness hearing on Sept. 20, 2018.

Judge Sanchez finds that the proposed settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate.  He therefore granted the Plaintiff's
motion for final approval of settlement.

Next, the Judge finds that the declarations submitted in the case
show that the Plaintiff's counsel expended a total of 7,575.55
hours of attorney and professional support staff time prosecuting
the case at rates ranging from $170 to $850 per hour, for a total
lodestar amount of $4,706,091.  The requested fee of $2.15 million
(before interest) thus represents a discount of more than $2.5
million dollars or 54% of the lodestar amount.

The class counsel also seeks reimbursement of $273,284.51 in
litigation expenses, significantly less than the $325,000 the
counsel reserved the right to seek in the settlement.  The expenses
for which the counsel seeks reimbursement include trial-related
costs, and expenses, online research, court reporting and
transcripts, photocopying, travel, postage expenses, and, most
significantly, expert fees, which constitute $108,950.37 of the
amount requested.

Judge Sanchez finds the attorneys' fees and litigation expenses
requested by the class counsel are reasonable, and the class
counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement
litigation expenses is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/tgBf1U from Leagle.com.

LEONARD BECKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL E. BACINE --
dbacine@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, LISA M. PORT --
lport@barrack.com -- BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE, CHARLES M. GOLDEN,
FELLHEIMER and EICHEN & JEFFREY B. GITTLEMAN, BARRACK, RODOS &
BACINE.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A. & J.P. MORGAN TRUST
COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendants, represented by CHRISTINE
CESARE -- cbcesare@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, HOWARD M.
ROGATNICK, BRYAN CAVE LLP, MATTHEW C.R. ZIEGLER, MORGAN LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP, STEPHANIE WICKOUSKI --
stephanie.wickouski@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, THOMAS J.
SCHELL -- tjschell@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, ANN LAUREN
CARPENTER, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, EVAN K. JACOBS, MORGAN LEWIS
& BOCKIUS LLP, JOHN C. GOODCHILD, III --
john.goodchild@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P. &
MARC J. SONNENFELD, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP.

SAUL EWING LLP & ADAM ISENBERG, Respondents, represented by TIMOTHY
W. CALLAHAN, II -- tcallahan@saul.com -- SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR
LLP.

BLANK ROME LLP & JOHN LUCIAN, Respondents, represented by JEREMY A.
RIST -- Rist@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP.

SILVERCREST FUNDS, Respondent, represented by KAREN E. FRIEDMAN --
kfriedman@luriefriedman.com -- LURIE FRIEDMAN LLP & MATTHEW TODD
NEWCOMER -- mnewcomer@postschell.com -- POST & SCHELL, PC.


BARCLAYS BANK: Court Trims Claims in Consolidated Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ONTERRA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD., RICHARD DENNIS,
FRONTPOINT EUROPEAN FUND L.P., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BARCLAYS BANK PLC,
COOPERATIEVE CENTRALE RAIFFEISEN-BOERENLEENBANK B.A., DEUTSCHE BANK
AG, LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC, THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, UBS
AG, JOHN DOE NOS. 1-50, BARCLAYS CAPITAL, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 15-CV-3538 (VSB) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC").

The CAC brings claims (1) under the Sherman Antitrust Act, (2)
under the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), (3) under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and (4) asserts
common-law claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and unjust enrichment.

The case is one of several civil cases filed in the District
alleging that certain banks manipulated and fixed prices of the
London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"), submitted them to the
British Bankers' Association ("BBA"), and thereby made artificial
submissions over a period of years, which allegedly harmed the
Plaintiffs as purchasers or sellers of financial instruments they
claim were in some way connected to LIBOR.  LIBOR is an interest
rate benchmark used in financial markets around the world and
intended to reflect the competitive conditions of the London
interbank money market.  It is calculated by averaging a number of
submitting banks' estimates of their own respective costs of
borrowing money in the London interbank market in several
currencies and for a number of maturities (or "tenors") per
currency.  It is administered by the BBA, the leading trade
association for the United Kingdom banking and financial services
sector.

Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Lloyds, Rabobank, RBS, and UBS were among
the members of the sixteen-bank Contributor Panel for Sterling
LIBOR during the putative Class Period.  The Plaintiffs allege that
each member bank over that period coordinated their Sterling LIBOR
submissions and manipulative trading practices to fix the prices of
Sterling LIBORbased derivatives for their financial benefit.
According to the CAC, the Defendants' derivatives traders
frequently used electronic communications that allegedly took place
internally as well as externally (among Sterling LIBOR-based
derivatives traders and submitters located at different, supposedly
competing, Sterling LIBOR contributor banks).

During the Class Period, the Defendants entered into a series of
agreements designed to create profit or limit liabilities amongst
themselves by coordinating the manipulation of Sterling LIBOR and
the prices of Sterling LIBOR-based derivatives, by conspiring to,
inter alia, make false submissions to the BBA designed to
artificially suppress, inflate, maintain, or otherwise alter
Sterling LIBOR.  The Defendants have entered into various
settlements and non-prosecution agreements with government
regulators, such as the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), and United Kingdom Financial
Conduct Authority ("FCA"), in connection with LIBOR manipulation
related to various currencies.

Plaintiff Sonterra filed its complaint on May 6, 2015, and amended
it on July 24, 2015.  The Defendants requested a pre-motion
conference to discuss their proposed motion to dismiss.  The
pre-motion conference was held on Oct. 19, 2015, during which Judge
Broderick granted the parties' request to submit separate briefing
on the question of whether the Court lacks personal jurisdiction,
as distinct from their briefing on whether to dismiss on other
grounds, and set a motion schedule.

On Feb. 16, 2016, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
consolidate the Sonterra action, Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd.
v. Barclays Bank PLC, Case No. 15-cv-3538, with a similar case
brought by Plaintiffs FrontPoint and Dennis, FrontPoint European
Fund, L.P. v. Barclays Bank plc, No. 16-cv-464, and dismissed the
Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to renew after the filing
of a consolidated amended complaint.  

The Plaintiffs filed the CAC on Feb.y 25, 2016.  The CAC asserted
federal claims under Section 1 f the Sherman Act (First and Second
Claims for Relief), the CEA (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for
Relief), RICO (Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief), as well as
state law claims for unjust enrichment and violation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Eighth and Ninth Claims
for Relief).

On April 11, 2016, the Defendants moved to dismiss the CAC, and
filed two briefs in support—one brief addressing the question of
personal jurisdiction and the other brief addressing Defendants'
remaining arguments.  The Plaintiffs filed their oppositions; and
Defendants filed their reply briefs.  The parties also filed
various declarations with exhibits in support of their positions.

The Judge has since received the parties' letters of supplemental
authority addressing recent decisions of the Supreme Court and
Second Circuit, as well as other cases in the Southern District of
New York.  The oral argument on the motion was held on Aug. 4,
2017.

Judge Broderick granted in part the denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.  He denied the motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; and granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as to all
claims against Defendant BCI.  He also granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is as to the
Plaintiffs' CEA claims, RICO claims, and state-law claim of breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as
to the Plaintiffs Sonterra's and Dennis' Sherman Act claims and
unjust enrichment claim against all the Defendants, and Plaintiff
FrontPoint's Sherman Act claims and unjust enrichment claim against
all the Defendants except UBS.

Because the Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction over Defendant UBS with regard to Plaintiff
FrontPoint's Sherman Act claims and unjust enrichment claim against
Defendant UBS, the Judge denied the Foreign Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to those claims.  He denied the
Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery.

In light of his Opinion and Order, the Judge directed the
Plaintiffs to file any motion to substitute pursuant to Rule
17(a)(3), limited in scope to the surviving claims, no later than
Jan. 21, 2019; the Defendants' response will be due no later than
Feb.y 20, 2019; the Plaintiffs' reply will be due no later than
Feb. 27, 2019.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
pending motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/eWPTFg from Leagle.com.

Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd., on bhealf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christian
Levis --  clevis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Geoffrey
Milbank Horn -- ghorn@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Raymond
Peter Girnys -- rgirnys@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.,
Vincent Briganti --  -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Benjamin Martin
Jaccarino -- bjaccarino@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian
Jacobson LLP, Christopher Lovell -- CLovell@lshllp.com -- Lovell
Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Lee Jason Lefkowitz --
name@email.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter Dexter St. Phillip,
Jr. -- pstphillip@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. & Sitso W.
Bediako -- sbediako@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C.

Richard Dennis, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christian Levis, Lowey
Dannenberg P.C., Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Lee
Jason Lefkowitz, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter Dexter St. Phillip,
Jr., Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond Peter Girnys, Lowey
Dannenberg, P.C., Sitso W. Bediako, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Vincent
Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. & James Anthony Diehl, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Frontpoint European Fund L.P., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christian
Levis, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey
Dannenberg P.C., Lee Jason Lefkowitz, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter
Dexter St. Phillip, Jr., Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond Peter
Girnys, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Sitso W. Bediako, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C. & Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.

Frontpoint European Fund, L.P., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated & Richard Dennis, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Consolidated Plaintiffs,
represented by Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. &
Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.

Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital, Inc., Defendants, represented
by David Harold Braff `-- braffd@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and
Cromwell, LLP, Jonathan David Schiller -- jschiller@bsfllp.com --
Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Amos Emory Friedland --
afriedland@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Jeffrey T.
Scott -- scottj@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell, LLP, Leigh
Mager Nathanson -- lnathanson@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller &
Flexner LLP, Matthew Joseph Porpora porporam@sullcrom.com --
Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, Melissa Brooke Felder Zappala --
mfelder@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Michael Brille
-- mbrille@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, pro hac
vice & Yvonne Susan Quinn -- quinny@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP.

Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A., Defendant,
represented by David Robert Gelfand, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy LLP, Jonathan Ohring, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP,
Mark David Villaverde, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Melanie
Westover Yanez, Milbank, Twwed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP & Sean Miles
Murphy, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP.

Deutsche Bank AG, Defendant, represented by Aidan John Synnott,
Paul Weiss, Elizabeth M. Sacksteder, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP, Elizabeth Justine Grossman, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison & Michael Joseph Biondi, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP.

Lloyds Banking Group Plc, Defendant, represented by Lisa Jean Fried
, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Benjamin Andrew Fleming, Hogan Lovells US
LLP, Kevin Timothy Baumann, Hogan Lovells US LLP & Marc Joel
Gottridge, Hogan Lovells US LLP.

The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, Defendant, represented by David
Sapir Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Fraser Lee
Hunter, Jr., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Jamie
Stephen Dycus, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.

UBS AG, Defendant, represented by Eric Jonathan Stock, Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, LLP, Jefferson Eliot Bell, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
LLP, Lawrence Jay Zweifach, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP & Mark
Adam Kirsch, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.

Lloyds Banking Group Plc, Consolidated Defendant, represented by
Marc Joel Gottridge, Hogan Lovells US LLP.


BEVERLY HILLS BMW: Silva Sues over Nonpayment of Wages
------------------------------------------------------
CATIRYA SILVA, the Plaintiffs, vs. BEVERLY HILLS BMW; and DOES
1-50, inclusive; the Defendants, Case No.: 18STCV09653 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Dec. 26, 2018), seeks to recover damages for nonpayment of
wages of all hours worked that were improperly deducted by
Defendants' policies, penalties, and reasonable attorney's fees,
expenses, and costs of suit pursuant to California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, during her employment with Defendants,
the Plaintiff frequently worked more than eight hours each workday
and/or 40 hours each workweek as reflected in her lime records. The
Defendants jointly and severally employed Plaintiff and controlled
the nature of her employment and the terms and conditions of her
wage payments from 2012 until her voluntary resignation until or
around April 2017.

The Defendants altered Plaintiff's employment in or around January
2016 until the time of her resignation. Prior to January 2016,
Plaintiff was compensated by Defendants on an hourly basis.
Thereafter, the Defendants changed her compensation to a monthly
"base salary” with no overtime or bonuses. Thereafter, the
Plaintiff continued to regularly work between 9 and 12 hours a day
for Defendants, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Alan S. Turlington, Esq.
          Kenneth R. Shy, Esq.
          TURLINGTON SHY & PARKER
          2024 N. Broadway, Ste. 205
          Santa Ana, CA 90076
          Telephone: (949) 575-8874
          Facsimile: (833) 329-8874
          E-mail: contactfaHushlaw.com

BHP GROUP: Court Narrows Samarco Disaster Class Actions
-------------------------------------------------------
Melanie Burton, writing for Reuters, reports that the Federal Court
of Australia on Dec. 18 ordered that the number of class-action
lawsuits against BHP Group over a Brazilian mine collapse be
narrowed to one from three.

BHP is facing legal challenges over the 2015 collapse of the Fundao
tailings dam, which stored mining waste at a mined owned by the
Samarco joint venture between BHP and Brazilian iron ore mining
giant Vale. The disaster killed 19 and spilled about 40 million
cubic meters of sludge over communities and into the Rio Doce river
and the Atlantic Ocean.

The Federal Court ruled that a class action suit led by Vince
Impiombato, filed in the state of Victoria, could proceed. The suit
claims that Impiombato, a former BHP shareholder, sustained losses
stemming from deceptive conduct and failures in continuous
disclosure requirements.

Additionally, the court placed a permanent stay, or hold, on a
class action led by an Australian retirement fund and a temporary
stay on a suit brought by the Los Angeles County Employees
Retirement Association until Sept. 1, 2019, in order to cut costs
and reduce court overlap since the allegations were similar.

Impiombato is represented by specialist law firm Phi Finney
McDonald, and funded by litigation company KTMC Funding LLC.

A BHP spokesman said the company was defending the claim.

BHP still faces lawsuits in other jurisdictions. In November, SPG
Law, a British offshoot of a U.S. litigator, filed three legal
claims for unlimited damages over the Fundao dam failure in a court
in the English city of Liverpool.

In June, Samarco [SAMNE.UL], Vale SA and BHP signed a deal with
Brazilian authorities to settle a 20 billion reais ($5.30 billion)
lawsuit related to the failure.

The miner also agreed to fund a total of $211 million in financial
support for the Renova Foundation, created to help victims of the
Samarco dam disaster in Brazil.

In July, BHP said it expected to record a charge of $650 million in
its fiscal 2018 results on account of the failure. The charge was
at the lower end of expectations according to analysts. [GN]


BIMBO BAKERIES: Court Refuses to Dismiss D. Camp's FSLA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned David Camp and Keith Hadmack, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bimbo Bakeries USA,
Inc. and Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, Defendants. Case
No. 18-cv-378-SM. (D.N.H.).

The Plaintiffs bring this wage and hour class action, asserting
that the defendants unlawfully treated them as independent
contractors when, in fact, they were employees. As a consequence,
say the plaintiffs, they were wrongfully denied overtime pay,
denied reimbursement for work-related expenses, and subjected to
unlawful withholdings from their pay.

The Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Bimbo Bakeries
USA (BBUSA), asserting that the plaintiffs have failed to
specifically identify any alleged wrongdoing on its part. Instead,
the complaint simply groups the named defendants together and
routinely ascribes allegedly wrongful conduct to the defendants,
without identifying which defendant engaged in which conduct.
Moreover, the defendants point out that BBUSA is not a party to
either of the distribution agreements at issue in the case.  

The court disagrees.

The Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient albeit barely to survive a
motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs' primary complaint is that they
were improperly treated as independent contractors, rather than
employees. If they prevail on that claim, it will be necessary to
determine which entity acted as their employer that is, which
entity exercised control over the details of the performance of the
plaintiffs' work and the means by which they performed that work.
At this juncture, the complaint adequately alleges that one or both
named defendants may be liable as the plaintiffs' employer.

If discovery reveals that is not the case, the defendants are free
to raise the issue again, in the context of a properly supported
motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants assert that the plaintiffs have failed to adequately
plead sufficient facts to properly state a claim for overtime wages
under the FLSA. Specifically, they say that to survive a motion to
dismiss an FLSA claim, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, specify a
single workweek in which he or she worked at least forty hours and
was not compensated for such time.

In support of their view that a viable FLSA claim must identify at
least one specific week during which a plaintiff worked more than
40 hours, the defendants rely upon the court of appeals' opinion in
Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012). In that
case, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of FLSA
claims on grounds that they were insufficiently detailed, although
not by a large margin. In support of that decision, the court
observed that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to provide examples
(let alone estimates as to the amounts) of such unpaid time for
either plaintiff or describe the nature of the work performed
during those times.

To the extent the defendants' assert that the plaintiffs' complaint
is deficient because it fails to identify a specific workweek
during which each plaintiff worked more than 40 hours without
receiving overtime compensation, that view is inconsistent with
circuit precedent. For that reason, the defendants' motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' FLSA claims is denied.

The Defendants move to dismiss asserting that: (1) the plaintiffs
are properly viewed as independent contractors, so RSA 275:48 does
not apply to them and (2) even if the statute does apply, it
specifically permits the deductions identified by the plaintiffs
because the plaintiffs provided written authorization for such
deductions.

In response, the plaintiffs contend that they are employees,
subject to the provisions of RSA 275:48, an issue that cannot be
resolved at this preliminary stage of the litigation. Moreover, say
the plaintiffs, because the defendants are attempting to avail
themselves of one or more exceptions to that statute's general
prohibition, the defendants will bear the burden of proving that
such an exception or exceptions apply.  

Again, the factual allegations set forth in the plaintiffs'
complaint are, if accepted as true, sufficient to plausibly state
the essential elements of a viable claim under RSA 275:48. At this
juncture, they need do no more.

Next, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants violated RSA
275:57, which provides:

     "An employee who incurs expenses in connection with his or her
employment and at the request of the employer, except those
expenses normally borne by the employee as a precondition of
employment, which are not paid for by wages, cash advance, or other
means from the employer, shall be reimbursed for the payment of the
expenses within 30 days of the presentation by the employee of
proof of payment."

The Defendants assert that even if the plaintiffs are properly
viewed as employees and are, therefore, subject to the provisions
of that statute, they have been fully reimbursed for all such
expenses pursuant to the terms of their distribution agreements.

Whether the plaintiffs have been properly and fully reimbursed for
work-related expenses in accordance with RSA 275:57 would seem to
be a disputed factual question. At a minimum, whether defendants
could lawfully contract to shift the burden of assuming
work-related expenses to plaintiffs is an issue better resolved at
summary judgment, with the benefit of a complete record.  

In their third state statutory claim, the plaintiffs assert that
defendants violated the provisions of RSA 279:21 by failing to pay
them overtime wages for those weeks during which plaintiffs worked
in excess of forty hours. That statute provides that Unless
otherwise provided by statute, no person, firm, or corporation
shall employ any employee at an hourly rate lower than that set
forth in the federal minimum wage law, as amended.

The Defendants assert that the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for
enforcement of rights created by the FLSA and, therefore, the
plaintiffs' state statutory claims for overtime are preempted.
  
The Defendants have failed to demonstrate that, as a matter of law,
the plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing their claims under New
Hampshire's statute governing wages and overtime. And, while it is
true that the plaintiffs cannot recover twice for the same injuries
under federal and state overtime statutes, the plaintiffs are
plainly entitled to plead their claims for relief in the
alternative.  

The Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' common law claim of
unjust enrichment. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is that one
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself at the expense of
another contrary to equity.

To state a viable claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
defendant was enriched at the plaintiff's expense through either:
(1) wrongful acts or (2) passive acceptance of a benefit that would
be unconscionable to retain.

The Defendants assert that because their relationship with the
plaintiffs is governed by a written contract, the plaintiffs are
precluded from pursuing any claim for unjust enrichment. In other
words, says the defendants, the plaintiffs' sole avenue of relief
is a potential breach of contract claim.

The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, say the underlying contracts
between them and the defendants, which require them to buy their
jobs and bear the employer's expenses such as worker's compensation
insurance, which must be supplied by an employer are likely void
and unenforceable as against public policy. If those contracts are,
as plaintiffs claim, unenforceable, a claim for unjust enrichment
is likely viable. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court has observed,
Unjust enrichment may be available to contracting parties where the
contract was breached, rescinded, or otherwise made invalid, or
where the benefit received was outside the scope of the contract.

And, of course, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is permitted to
advance as many separate claims as it has, regardless of
consistency.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya9dpra3 from Leagle.com.

David Camp & Keith Hadmack, Plaintiffs, represented by Harold L.
Lichten -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, PC, pro
hac vice, Matthew Thomson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, PC, pro hac vice
& Christopher B. Coughlin, Coughlin Law Office.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. & Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC,
Defendants, represented by William D. Pandolph --
wpandolph@sulloway.com -- Sulloway & Hollis PLLC, Michael J. Puma
-- michael.puma@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, pro hac
vice & Siobhan E. Mee -- siobhan.mee@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice.


BONCHON USA: Sut Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime, Withheld Tips
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hugo Israel Lucas Sut, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Bonchon USA, Inc., Hong Tae Kim,
Jinduk Seo and Esther Doe, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-12313 (S.D.
N.Y., December 28, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum, overtime
and spread-of-hours wages, withheld tips and redress for failure to
provide itemized wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable
liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a Korean restaurant, located at
207 W 38th Street, New York, NY 10018 under the name "Bonchon"
where Sut was employed as a as a dishwasher, food preparer, cook
and delivery worker. He worked in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the
hours that he worked including the required "spread of hours" pay
for any day in which he had to work over 10 hours a day and was
denied the tip credits. Defendants also failed to maintain accurate
recordkeeping of the hours worked, the complaint asserts. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


BRAD PITT: Seeks Dismissal of Hurricane Katrina Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Francesca Bacardi, writing for New York Post, reports that Brad
Pitt is defending himself against claims he only helped New Orleans
residents in the wake of Hurricane Katrina for good publicity.

The "War Machine" star is demanding a judge release him from the
class-action suit the Hurricane Katrina victims have filed against
him, claiming the lawsuit "does not otherwise contain a single
factual allegation that Mr. Pitt made any promise to any putative
class member, that he entered any contract with any putative class
member, or that he made any misrepresentation to any putative class
member," according to legal documents, obtained by The Blast.

The lawsuit is also against Mr. Pitt's Make It Right Foundation.
The plaintiffs argue that Pitt and his foundation promised to build
homes that would withstand "hurricane force winds" but instead
received houses that won't last another five years, despite owners
being tied to 30-year mortgages.

Mr. Pitt argued, "While plaintiffs urge in the Opposition that
certain generic and innocuous statements Mr. Pitt allegedly made to
the press somehow give rise to claims against him individually,
this is simply unsupportable."

Although the Oscar winner is demanding to be released from the
lawsuit, he's not asking for his charitable foundation be removed.

The class-action suit accused Make It Right of knowing about issues
with the building materials used but failing to inform the buyers.
The residents claimed the homes were not up to code and came with
issues, including mold, plumbing, air quality, rotten wood,
structural problems and ventilation issues.

Sources told Page Six over the summer that Mr. Pitt has spent
millions of dollars of his own money to fix the problems. [GN]


BRISTOL BAY: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Abikar Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ABUCAR NUNOW ABIKAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL
BAY NATIVE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Action.

The Plaintiffs in the case are refugees from Africa and were
formerly employed by the Defendants to assist training Marines in
African culture.  In the litigation, they claim that the Defendants
harassed and discriminated against them based on their race,
national origin, and religion.

The Plaintiffs are current or former employees of Defendants
Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC, Bristol Bay Native Corp., and
Workforce Resources.  Bristol Bay is the parent company of Glacier
Technical Solutions ("GTS") and Workforce Resources.  The
Defendants operate as joint employers with respect to the
allegations in the First Amended Complaint.

The Defendants contract with the U.S. Department of Defense to
train Marines in African, Iraqi, Afghani, and Filipino culture.
They employ East African refugees to roleplay as shopkeepers,
village elders, and insurgents in simulated villages.  The
simulations teach Marines how to conduct safe and effective
counter-insurgency operations.  This roleplay employment is
temporary, part-time, and sporadic.  The Members of the proffered
class have worked for the Defendants since 2010.  The East African
refugees Defendants employ are either citizens or permanent
residents of the United States.

Beginning in December 2015 to February 2016, dozens of East African
role-players filed complaints of discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation with the EEOC.  The Defendants nonetheless persisted in
their mistreatment.

The FAC presents three classes.  The "East African Class" consists
of female and male refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Burundi.  The "Female Class" consists of
female East African refugees.  The "Muslim Class" consists of
Muslim East African refugees.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on May 19, 2017.  On Oct. 6,
2017, they filed their First Amended Complaint.  Count IV of the
FAC claimed that the Defendants' practices and policies constitute
illegal race discrimination with respect to the making,
performance, and termination of contracts prohibited by 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981.  In Counts VII-X, they claim under California
Government Code Sections 12940(a) and (j) that the Defendants
discriminated against and harassed them on the basis of race,
color, national origin, gender/sex, and religion.  In Count XII,
the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants failed to prevent
discrimination and harassment in violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA").  Count XIII advances a claim
for retaliation in violation of FEHA.

The Plaintiffs have now filed a Motion for Class Certification.
They request the Court certifies a class of all refugees living or
formerly living in the United States, from Somalia, Ethiopia, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and other African
countries, who work or worked as role-players for any of the
Defendants at any time between January 01, 2010 and the date of
judgment in this action, who allege they were treated worse than
their counterparts because of race, color, and national origin.
The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint the named Plaintiffs
as the class representatives, and appoint Marilyn Spencer and David
Duchrow as the co-lead counsel.

Judge Curiel finds that the Plaintiffs have not carried their
burden of demonstrating that they have satisfied all of the
requirements for class certification.  The Plaintiffs have not
carried their burden of demonstrating that questions of law or fact
common to the class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individuals, that the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, or that the class counsel
is adequate. For these reasons, he denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Certification of Class Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fOOdJd from Leagle.com.

Abucar Nunow Abikar, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by A. Melissa Johnson ,
The Spencer Law Firm, David J. Duchrow , Law Offices of David J
Duchrow, Marilynn Mika Spencer -- mjohnson@thespencerlawfirm.com --
Spencer Johnson McCammon LLP & Neil Pedersen, Pedersen McQueen
APLC.

Barkadle Sheikh Muhamed Awmagan, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Arab Mursal Deh, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Majuma Madende, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Osman Musa Mohamed,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Osman
Musa Muganga, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Rukia Musa, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Fatuma Somow, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Melissa
Johnson, The Spencer Law Firm, David J. Duchrow --
djduchrow@yahoo.com – Law Offices of David J. Duchrow & Marilynn
Mika Spencer -- mspencer@thespencerlawfirm.com -- The Spencer Law
Firm.

Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC &
Workforce Resources, LLC, Defendants, represented by Amy Todd-Gher
-- atodd-gher@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C & Ruth Dapper
-- rdapper@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.


BRUCKNER BAR: Lazaro Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Hours Worked Over 40
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Perfecto Lazaro, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Bruckner Bar & Grill LLC, The Bronx Bar &
Grill LLC, Bruckner Restaurant LLC, Bruckner Rail LLC and Rosa
Garcia, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-12323 (S.D. N.Y., December 28,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum, overtime and
spread-of-hours wages and redress for failure to provide itemized
wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated damages,
interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control an American restaurant, located
at 1 Bruckner Blvd., Bronx, NY 10454 under the name "Mott Haven Bar
& Grill" where Victoriano was employed as a salad preparer. He
worked in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum
wage and overtime compensation for the hours that he worked
including the required "spread of hours" pay for any day in which
he had to work over 10 hours a day. Defendants also failed to
maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


CANADA: Koskie Minsky Commences Class Action Against RCMP
---------------------------------------------------------
Koskie Minsky LLP in Toronto and Cooper Regel in Edmonton have
commenced a class action against the Attorney General of Canada on
behalf of Aboriginal persons who were subjected to excessive force
by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Nunavut, Yukon
Territories and the Northwest Territories.

The claim alleges systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and
breaches of sections 7 and 15 the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.

The lawsuit seeks $500 million in damages, plus an additional $100
million in punitive damages.

The representative plaintiff is Joe David Nasogaluak who commenced
the claim through his litigation guardian, Diane Nasogaluak. Mr.
Nasogaluak alleges he was assaulted by RCMP officers upon arrest
outside of his hometown of Tuktoyaktok, Northwest Territories when
he was 15 years old. It is alleged that RCMP officers beat Mr.
Nasogaluak and yelled racial slurs while they took him into
custody.

"Aboriginal persons are regularly assaulted by RCMP officers
because of who they are. This epidemic of assault amounts to
state-sponsored harm against Aboriginal persons", said Kirk M.
Baert, the lawyer leading the case at Koskie Minsky LLP.

A Statement of Claim was issued in Federal Court on December 19,
2018. [GN]


CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Indigenous Mistreatment
------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that a class-action lawsuit filed in an
Edmonton court alleges RCMP in the three northern territories
regularly assault and abuse Indigenous people.

"We know from anecdotal and media reports that this class is going
to be quite significant," said Steven Cooper, one of the lawyers
involved in the lawsuit filed against the federal government on
Dec. 19.

The statement of claim, which contains allegations that have not
been proven in court, points to the example of David Nasogaluak, a
resident of Tuktoyaktuk, N.W.T.

It says that in November 2017, Mr. Nasogaluak, then 15, was stopped
and questioned by officers as he was riding his snowmobile outside
town with five friends.

The statement says officers beat, choked, punched, Tasered and used
racial insults against Mr. Nasogaluak. It says he was handcuffed
and taken to the police station, where he was released without
charge.

Officers continued to drive by Mr. Nasogaluak's home until his
mother called to complain. The lawsuit says Mr. Nasogaluak suffered
lasting physical and emotional damage, and has since quit school.

Such treatment is far too common across Yukon, the Northwest
Territories and Nunavut, the statement says.

"It is well known in the territories that Aboriginal persons are
improperly targeted by the RCMP on the basis of their race,
ancestry and beliefs."

Mr. Cooper, who has long legal experience in both Nunavut and the
N.W.T., said the courts must first rule that there is an issue to
be considered, which would define who was eligible to be a
plaintiff in the class action. If the courts certify the lawsuit,
appropriate plaintiffs can then sign on.

He said his office routinely receives complaints about RCMP
misbehaviour.

"It is indicative of what's happening across the country. There's
no shortage of videos."

One such video documented the apparent beating of Bernard Naulilak
in RCMP cells in July 2016 and led to a debate in the Nunavut
legislature about whether the territory should form a civilian body
to review complaints against the force.

Nor was that the first time the issue was debated by Nunavut
lawmakers. In 2015, a report was commissioned into police
misconduct. The report was never released.

A letter that year from Nunavut's legal-aid service suggested it
had information on 30 cases of excessive use of force. The
service's chairwoman has said there were 27 civil cases filed
between 2014 and 2017.

In 2010, the Yukon government released its own report on similar
concerns. That led to the formation of a council that visits the
territory's communities annually to discuss policing concerns.

RCMP in Nunavut have defended their record.

Statistics released by the territory's V Division indicate Mounties
responded to 27,000 calls and held 7,500 people in custody in 2017.
The force received 13 complaints between 2016 and 2018.

Cooper said such numbers reveal little.

Misconduct complaints are always going to be swamped in Nunavut by
the huge numbers of arrests, he said. As well, few in tiny, remote
communities far from legal advice are willing to take on
authority.

"The complaint system is intimidating and not very friendly. Most
people won't know about it, won't know how to access it and have
zero faith in the ability of the complaints commission to deal with
these types of issues." [GN]


CAPITAL ONE: Court Dismisses M. Gensmer's TILA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHELLE GENSMER, Plaintiff,
v. CAPITAL ONE N.A., Defendant. Civil Action 18-0361-WS-M. (S.D.
Ala.).

Plaintiff, Michelle Gensmer, brought this putative class action
against defendant, Capital One N.A., alleging a violation of the
Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA).  Gensmer has two Capital One credit
card accounts. At some point, Gensmer opted out of receiving paper
account statements from Capital One, in favor of managing her
accounts electronically via a mobile application known as the
Capital One Wallet App, which Capital One published, marketed and
promoted to its customers. By the terms of her agreements with
Capital One, Gensmer's monthly credit card payments were due on or
before the 25th of each month, failing which Capital One was
entitled to assess a late fee.

First, Capital One moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
Fed.R.Civ.P., on the ground that Gensmer has failed to allege
sufficient facts to show a concrete and particularized injury, as
necessary to establish Article III standing.

Second, Capital One moves for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, reasoning
that Gensmer is ineligible for statutory damages and has alleged no
facts showing that she suffered actual damages as a result of the
alleged TILA violation. Each of these grounds for dismissal will be
examined in turn.

Article III Standing

Capital One moves for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that Gensmer cannot satisfy the requirements of Article III
standing. The three irreducible elements of Article III standing
are that a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact (2)
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.

Gensmer's Complaint alleges that Capital One violated TILA by
publishing through its Wallet App materially false information
regarding the dates of credit transactions and the dates on which
late fees were incurred. According to the Complaint, this violation
was manifested through listed transaction dates that were one day
earlier than the actual transactions (i.e., a Starbucks purchase on
August 19 was inaccurately reflected in the Wallet App as having
occurred on August 18) and late fee charges listed as having been
assessed one day earlier than they actually were (i.e., a $25 late
fee assessed on August 25 appeared incorrectly in the Wallet App as
having been charged on August 24).

The critical concreteness inquiry is whether Gensmer has shown some
real harm or risk of real harm to her by virtue of those
inaccuracies. The Court answers this question in the negative.

In her Complaint, Gensmer alleges that she has been injured by the
complained-of practices in a concrete way because the incorrect
display of the payment due date by the Wallet App creates a real
risk of harm in by lulling consumers into the belief that they had
another day to pay before they would incur a late fee. Also, the
false information creates the impression that more time is allowed
for avoiding a late fee than the contract actually provides.

These allegations do not satisfy the Article III concreteness
requirement for two distinct reasons.

First, the Complaint nowhere alleges an incorrect display of the
payment due date in the Wallet App or anywhere else. Gensmer does
not identify anything in the Wallet App display indicating that any
future month's payment was due on any date other than the 25th of
the month, which is the accurate date. Even as to August 2017, the
Complaint does not allege that Gensmer was ever confused, misled or
uncertain of the actual payment due date at any time on or before
August 25.

Second, to the extent that Gensmer suggests in her Complaint that
she extrapolated (or could have extrapolated) from the line items
in the Wallet App showing that a late fee was charged on August 24
to be lulled into thinking that she had another day to pay before a
late fee would be charged, the contention does not make sense. The
inaccurate dates reflected on the late fee entries could not
logically have lulled her into thinking the payment due date was
later than the contract actually provides" because they reflected a
late fee charge date earlier not later than the contractual payment
due date.

In sum, Gensmer's efforts to satisfy the concrete injury
requirement for Article III standing lack a sufficient basis in the
well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint. Plaintiff argues
that she faced a risk of harm because the Wallet App inaccurately
displayed the payment due date; however, her pleading is devoid of
any factual allegations that the Wallet App displayed an incorrect
payment due date.9 She maintains that the inaccurate date reflected
in the Wallet App as to when late payment charges were assessed
risked harm by lulling her into thinking that she had one more day
than she actually did to avoid late fees; however, the inaccurate
information she cites could not have had such an effect.  

The Court finds that Gensmer has not adequately pleaded a concrete
injury as necessary to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of
Article III standing. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is
properly granted for lack of jurisdiction.

Whether the Complaint Alleges a Viable Remedy under TILA

Even if Gensmer had pleaded sufficient facts to meet her burden of
showing an injury in fact for standing purposes, her Complaint
would nonetheless face dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim.

Recall that Gensmer's theory of liability, as pleaded in the
Complaint, is as follows: Capital One has violated 15 U.S.C.
Section 1637(b), and Regulation Z Section 1026.5(b) by failing to
properly and accurately disclose to persons using its Wallet App
the due dates of their payments and the dates of their
transactions.

TILA's remedial framework includes a provision stating that any
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
this part with respect to any person is liable to such person in an
amount equal to the sum of any actual damage sustained by such
person as a result of the failure.

Thus, TILA authorizes an award of actual damages for violation of
the disclosure requirements of Section 1637(b) that are at issue
here. The trouble is that Gensmer's Complaint is devoid of
well-pleaded factual allegations raising a plausible inference that
she sustained any actual damage as a result of Capital One's
alleged violations. Gensmer does not allege that she was ever
misled about the payment due date on her Capital One accounts, that
she altered her behavior vis a vis the timing of her account
payments in any way based on inaccurate information in the Wallet
App, or that she was charged late fees that she would not otherwise
have incurred but for the Wallet App's inaccurate information.
Nowhere does Gensmer allege that she relied to her detriment on any
incorrect transaction dates listed in the Wallet App, much less
that she was damaged thereby. These omissions, as to both reliance
on inaccurate disclosures and actual damages caused by same, are
fatal to her ability to proceed with her TILA claim on an actual
damages theory.  

With no viable claim for actual or statutory damages pleaded in her
Complaint, Gensmer has failed to state a TILA cause of action upon
which relief may be granted. A plaintiff who has pleaded facts
showing neither the existence of actual damages nor the
availability of statutory damages has not stated a claim under
TILA. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycsh4hzy from Leagle.com.

Michelle Gensmer, Plaintiff, represented by Earl P. Underwood, Jr.,
Underwood & Riemer, PC & Kenneth J. Riemer, Underwood & Riemer,
P.C.

Capital One N.A., Defendant, represented by Rik Stanford Tozzi,
Burr & Forman LLP & Jennifer E. Ziemann, Hall, Booth, Smith, P.C.


CHARLES SCHWAB: Jan. 2020 Class Certification Hearing in Crago
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Opinion and Order extending Case Management
Schedules in the case captioned ROBERT CRAGO, Individually And On
Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES
SCHWAB & CO., INC., and THE CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION, Defendants.
Case No. 3:16-cv-3938-RS. (N.D. Cal.).

The deadlines through the class certification hearing will be as
follows:

   -- Event Deadline Pre-class certification fact depositions:
March 29, 2019

   -- Plaintiffs' expert disclosures and report(s) concerning class
certification (including any backup materials): April 15, 2019

   -- Defendants' expert disclosures and report(s) concerning class
certification (including any backup materials): July 1, 2019

   -- Plaintiffs' rebuttal report(s) concerning class certification
(including any backup materials): August 16, 2019

   -- Expert depositions concerning class certification: September
3-13, 2019

   -- Plaintiffs' class certification motion and Daubert
challenges: October 4, 2019

   -- Defendants' class certification opposition, Daubert
challenges, and Daubert opposition: December 4, 2019

   -- Plaintiffs' reply brief, opposition to Daubert challenges,
and reply to Daubert challenges of Defendants' expert(s): December
20, 2019

   -- Defendants' reply to Daubert challenges of Plaintiffs'
experts: January 13, 2020

   -- Class Certification Hearing TBD (as soon as practicable on a
date convenient to the Court) January 30, 2020 at 1:30 pm.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 13, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybdftur4 from
Leagle.com.

Robert Crago, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Christopher McCall --
amccall@zlk.com -- LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP.

Robert Wolfson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similary
Situated & Frank Pino, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert Vincent
Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
David Jay Stone -- stone@bespc.com -- Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.,
Garth A. Spencer -- gspencer@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Jeffrey H. Squire -- squire@bespc.com -- Bragar Eagel &
Squire, P.C., pro hac vice, Joshua L. Crowell --
jcrowell@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Lawrence
Paul Eagel -- eagel@bespc.com -- Bragar Eagel and Squire, P.C., pro
hac vice, Melissa Ann Fortunato -- fortunato@bespc.com -- Bragar
Eagel & Squire, P.C. & Todd Harris Henderson -- henderson@bespc.com
-- Bragar Eagel and Squire, P.C., pro hac vice.

Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. & The Charles Schwab Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota --
gilbert.serota@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Alex Jason Kaplan -- AJKAPLAN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP,
Jee Young You -- jeeyoung.you@apks.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP & Jonathan Warren Muenz -- jmuenz@sidley.com -- Sidley
Austin LLP.

Scott Posson, Movant, represented by Nicholas Ian Porritt --
nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi and Korsinsky & Adam Christopher McCall,
LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court OKs Filing of 2nd Amended Guzman Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned ADRIANA GUZMAN,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-02606-HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that their
employers, Defendants Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (CMGI) and
Chipotle Services, LLC (CSL), systematically discriminate against
them and other proposed class members on the basis of their
Hispanic race and/or Mexican national origin in violation of
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act.  

The Plaintiffs contend that they have met the good cause standard
because they did not learn of facts supporting their alter-ego
theory of liability until a July 17, 2018 deposition in a separate
case.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs assert that Defendants had
exclusive possession of the underlying facts and did not disclose
them in initial disclosures or discovery responses.  

The Defendants respond that the Plaintiffs' November 2017 motion
for leave to file an amended complaint demonstrates that the
Plaintiffs knew that they potentially had alter ego claims against
the Defendants because they knew of the connection between CSL and
CMGI.

The Plaintiffs have acted with sufficient diligence to satisfy the
good cause standard. In the first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs
named the same two Defendants, but alleged a theory of joint
liability. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
Plaintiffs had facts supporting an alter ego theory prior to the
July 17 deposition. The Plaintiffs have established good cause to
amend their Complaint.

The Court cannot say that the Plaintiffs' proposed amendment is
futile. In their proposed second amended complaint, the Plaintiffs
have pled facts to support their allegations that CMGI and CSL
share a unity of interest and that respecting the corporate
formality would lead to an injustice.  The Plaintiffs' proposed
amendment is not clearly futile.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8f3w5nb from Leagle.com.

Adriana Guzman, Juan Pablo Aldana Lira & Jonathon Poot, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Carolyn Hunt Cottrell --
ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Adalberto Corres-Morales, Villegas Carrera,
LLP, David Christopher Leimbach, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns LLP, Karen C. Carrera, Villegas Carrera, LLP, Mira Pearl
Karageorge, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Ori
Edelstein, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns & Virginia
Villegas, Villegas / Carrera, LLP.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amish Ashok
Shah -- ashah@messner.com -- Messner Reeves LLP, Charles C.
Cavanagh -- ccavanagh@messner.com -- Messner Reeves LLP & Kathleen
June Mowry -- kmowry@messner.com -- Messner Reeves, pro hac vice.

CHIPOTLE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, represented by Charles C.
Cavanagh, Messner Reeves LLP, Amish Ashok Shah, Messner Reeves LLP
& Kathleen June Mowry, Messner Reeves.


COBALT INTERNATIONAL: Feb. 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

IN RE COBALT INTERNATIONAL

ENERGY, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

Lead Case No. 4:14–cv–3428 (NFA)

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENTS; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION
EXPENSES

TO:     All persons and entities who, during the period between
March 1, 2011 and November 3, 2014, inclusive (the "Class Period")
purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of Cobalt
International Energy, Inc. ("Cobalt"), Cobalt 2.625% Convertible
Senior Notes due 2019, and/or Cobalt 3.125% Convertible Senior
Notes due 2024 (collectively, "Cobalt Securities"), and were
damaged thereby (the "Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain persons and
entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by definition
as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency of Class
Action and Proposed Settlements; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing;
and (III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Plaintiffs in the Action have reached
three proposed settlements, that, if approved, will resolve all
claims in the Action against the "Settling Defendants," including:

(A) The Private equity sponsors who invested in Cobalt prior to its
initial public offering and sold certain Cobalt Securities during
the Class Period, certain individuals designated to the Cobalt
board of directors by the Sponsor Defendants, and a
sponsor-affiliated underwriter of certain Cobalt Securities
offerings during the class period for $146,850,000 in cash (the
"Sponsor/GS&Co. Settlement");

(B) The other underwriters of Cobalt Securities offerings during
the class period for $22,750,000 in cash (the "Underwriter
Settlement"); and

(C) Cobalt and certain of its former officers and directors for
$220,000,000, that is payable exclusively from the proceeds of
litigation to recover on liability insurance policies preserved
through Cobalt's plan in bankruptcy (the "Cobalt Settlement").  The
projected recovery in the Cobalt Settlement is between $4,200,000
and $165,700,000.      

The total recoveries from the Sponsor/GS&Co., Underwriter and
Cobalt Settlements (the "Settlements") should total between
$173,800,000 and $335,300,000 (the "Settlement Fund").

A hearing will be held on February 13, 2019 at 10:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Nancy F. Atlas at the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, United States Courthouse, 515
Rusk Avenue, Houston, TX 77002, to determine (i) whether the
proposed Settlements should be approved as fair, reasonable, and
adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be dismissed with
prejudice against the Settling Defendants, and the Releases
specified and described in the respective Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement governing each Settlement (and in the Notice) should
be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation should be
approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead Counsel's
application for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
expenses should be approved.  Each of the three proposed
Settlements stands alone and none is contingent on the Court's
approval of the other Settlements.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlements, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator at In re Cobalt
International Energy, Inc. Securities Litigation, c/o Epiq, P.O.
Box 4109, Portland, OR 97208-4109, 1-877-440-0638.  Copies of the
Notice and Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website
maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.CobaltSecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlements, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked no later than April 4, 2019.
If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not submit a proper
Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in the distribution
of the net proceeds of the Settlements but you will nevertheless be
bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than January 23, 2019,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.  If
you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will
not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action with respect to the Settling Defendants and you will not be
eligible to share in the proceeds of the Settlements.

Any objections to the proposed Settlements, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than January 23, 2019, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Cobalt, the
other Settling Defendants or their counsel regarding this notice.
All questions about this notice, the proposed Settlements, or your
eligibility to participate in the Settlements should be directed to
Lead Counsel or the Claims Administrator.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Lead Counsel:

         Andrew J. Entwistle, Esq.
         ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI LLP
         299 Park Avenue, 20th Floor
         New York, NY 10171
         (212) 894-7200
         aentwistle@entwistle-law.com

         David R. Stickney, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
         12481 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300
         San Diego, CA 92130-3582
         1-800-380-8496
         settlements@blbglaw.com

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

    In re Cobalt International Energy, Inc. Securities Litigation  

    c/o Epiq
    P.O. Box 4109
    Portland, OR 97208-4109
    877-440-0638
    www.CobaltSecuritiesLitigation.com
                                                                   
                                                    By Order of the
Court [GN]


COLUMBIA GAS: Faces Class Action Following Gas Explosions
---------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Ng, writing for Boston Herald, reports that a Lawrence mom
who still can't go back into her home months after gas explosions
rocked the Merrimack Valley is headlining a class-action lawsuit
against Columbia Gas.

"I want (Columbia) to know it was painful and hard to be out of
your house and be in the 2 percent and not have a place to go for
the holidays," Yohanny Cespedes, the lead plaintiff, told the
Herald.

The 24 plaintiffs in the complaint allege the utility company
failed to adequately manage their gas system and have a safety plan
in place. They also say they've been displacement for months,
suffered lost income and profits and are owed out-of-pocket
expenses. The suit, filed Tuesday in Essex Superior Court, does not
disclose how much they are seeking in damages.

Columbia Gas "engaged in the extreme and outrageous conduct …
with wanton and reckless disregard" for the safety of residents,
according to the suit. The gas distribution system was "antiquated,
obsolete, not operated properly and highly dangerous," the
plaintiffs allege.

"We're seeking to address what we interpret as deceptive practices
in their way of doing business," said attorney
Danilo J. Gomez. "Two percent of the 100,000 folks without gas
serve is 2,000 people. Many of the folks want to be heard and they
do not want the same thing to happen again."

A spokesman for Columbia Gas said the company will not comment on
pending litigation. As the Herald previously reported, the second
phase of work for Columbia Gas will continue in the spring, when
they will replace about 900 boilers and continue to assess homes to
make sure they are up to code.

A whistleblower said that the company implemented job cuts to the
department responsible for monitoring gas pressurization months
prior to the September gas explosions, prompting further questions
from U.S. Sens. Edward Markey and Elizabeth Warren, the Herald
reported on Dec. 18.

"You would think that any form of rate increases prior to this
incident would be to increase infrastructure safety, but they were
cutting corners," said Gomez.

As for Cespedes, a mom of three that the Herald has followed since
the deadly September gas explosions and fire, she said it is "nice
to be a voice for everyone" but the entire ordeal is "painful."

She first moved into a hotel with her kids and then back to her
home only to have the pipes burst leaving her with water damage and
out of the house for the holidays.

A hearing was scheduled for Dec. 19 on the lawsuit in Essex
Superior Court before Judge James F. Lang, who has been assigned to
any case "arising from the fires and explosions on September 13,
2018," according to court documents. There are 10 other lawsuits
against Columbia Gas filed in the county. [GN]


COOK COUNTY, IL: Inmate's Claim Not Time-Barred, Court Rules
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss motion to dismiss Gregory L.
Jordan's claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in the case captioned
LEONICIO ELIZARRI AND GREGORY L. JORDAN, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY
AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Defendants. No. 17 CV 8120. (N.D.
Ill.).

Plaintiffs Leonicio Elizarri and Gregory L. Jordan, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, sued the Sheriff of
Cook County and Cook County, Illinois based on Cook County Jail's
practice of holding the personal property of thousands of former
prisoners. Elizarri filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, alleging that the Sheriff failed to return the personal
property taken from him on December 30, 2015 upon his December 9,
2016 release from the Illinois Department of Corrections in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint.
A complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, sufficient to
provide defendant with fair notice of the claim and the basis for
it.
  
The Sheriff now moves to dismiss Jordan's Section 1983 claims as
untimely. Typically, complaints do not have to anticipate
affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss.

The statute of limitations period for Section 1983 claims in
Illinois is two years.  The class action tolls the statute of
limitations for potential class members.  

The Sheriff contends that Jordan's claims accrued in March 2015
when Jordan was released from Cook County Jail and transferred to
the Illinois Department of Corrections, or at the latest forty-five
days thereafter.

In response, Jordan alleges that although the Sheriff has retained
his property since his July 3, 2014 incarceration, he was not aware
until his discharge from the Illinois Department of Corrections on
December 22, 2017 that the Sheriff possessed and would not release
it. Because of this, Jordan contends that his claims accrued upon
his release or perhaps have yet to accrue because the Sheriff still
possesses his property. Accordingly, the sole issue here is the
date upon which Jordan's claims accrued. If the accrual date is
March 2015 when Jordan was transferred out of Cook County Jail or
forty-five days later, his claims are time-barred. If the date is
December 2017 when Jordan was discharged (or later), his claims are
timely.

Here, the amended complaint does not specify exactly when Jordan
became aware of the whereabouts of his personal property. Nor does
it indicate whether he received notice of any policy governing his
personal property. Jordan indicates in his brief that he could not
have known until his December 2017 release from penitentiary that
his compliant property did not follow him. It is unclear when
Jordan knew or should have known about his constitutional claims as
to his personal property. It is thus inappropriate to dismiss his
claims as time-barred at this stage.
  
The Sheriff's multiple representations in its reply brief that
Jordan admitted that he was made aware that his property had to be
picked up from the Sheriff within 45 days after his release from
the Cook County Jail and that he voluntarily relinquished" his
rights to his property by not timely claiming it do not change the
result. Not only did Jordan lack the opportunity to respond to the
Sheriff's assertions, but neither the amended complaint nor
Jordan's response brief contain any such admission. To be sure,
paragraph 13 of the amended complaint spoke to the pre-2008 policy
regarding non-compliant prisoner property, and, as noted, neither
it, nor any other paragraph in the amended complaint said anything
about the notice Jordan received regarding his property under the
post-2008 procedure applicable to such property here.  

Thus, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing
all possible inferences in Jordan's favor, the Court finds that the
amended complaint supports an inference that Jordan's claims were
not time-barred as of the November 9, 2017 filing of this lawsuit.
Dismissal on that ground at this stage is not appropriate.  

The Court denies the Sheriff's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9byfxbz from Leagle.com.

Leoncio Elizarri, individually and for others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman,
P.C. & Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C.

Gregory L jordan, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth N. Flaxman ,
Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C.
Sheriff of Cook County, Defendant, represented by Gerald Michael
Dombrowski -- GDombrowski@SanchezDH.com -- Sanchez & Daniels,
Meghan Domenica White -- MWhite@SanchezDH.com -- Sanchez Daniels &
Hoffman, Robert Franklin Kunkel -- RKunkel@SanchezDH.com -- Sanchez
Daniels & Hoffman & Yifan Xu Sanchez -- YSanchez@SanchezDH.com --
Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman.


CREDIT BUREAU: FDCPA and NCPA Classes Certified in Bassett Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Joseph F. Bataillon issued a memorandum and order in the
lawsuit captioned KELLY M. BASSETT, individually and as heir of
James M. Bassett, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated v. CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, INC., and C. J. TIGHE, Case No.
8:16-cv-00449-JFB-SMB (D. Neb.), granting the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification on behalf of two classes under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act and the Nebraska Consumer Practices
Act:

   A. FDCPA Class:

        (i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska;

       (ii) to whom the defendants sent a letter in the form of
            Exhibit A (Filing No. 1-1) (identified in the
            defendants' records as B-10) from October 3, 2015,
            through this date;

      (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt incurred for
            personal, family or household purposes as shown by
            defendants' or the creditors' records;

       (iv) allegedly due for a medical obligation;

        (v) that was not returned as undeliverable;

       (vi) excluding members of the class certified in Kenneth
            M. Reynolds v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. and C.J.
            Tighe, No. 8:15-cv-00168; and

   B. NCPA Class:

        (i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska;

       (ii) to whom the defendants sent a letter in the form of
            Exhibit A (Filing No. 1-1) (identified in the
            defendants' records as B-10) from October 3, 2012,
            through this date;

      (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt incurred for
            personal, family or household purposes as shown by
            defendants' or the creditors' records;

       (iv) allegedly due for a medical obligation;

        (v) that was not returned as undeliverable;

       (vi) excluding members of the class certified in Kenneth
            M. Reynolds v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. and C.J.
            Tighe, No. 8:15-cv-00168.

Plaintiff Kelly M. Bassett is appointed representative plaintiff,
and the Horwitz, Horwitz Law Firm and the Car, Reinbrecht Law Firm
are appointed class counsel.

The parties shall contact Magistrate Judge Susan M. Bazis to set a
status conference on further progression of this case.[CC]


CRUISIN' CHUBBY'S: Judge Rejects Wage Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Murphy, writing for Wisconsin Dells Events, reports that
owners of a Wisconsin Dells strip club and the exotic dancers who
worked for them are asking a federal judge to approve a $400,000
settlement to a Fair Wage Act class-action lawsuit the dancers
filed.

In November, District Judge James Peterson rejected preliminary
consideration of the agreement between Cruisin' Chubby's
Gentleman's Club and about 110 dancers, saying it was too bare
bones. However, he gave the parties a chance to provide the needed
information

He found that the proposed settlement, which included $262,312 for
the dancers and $137,706 for their attorneys, lacked an explanation
as to why it was considered a fair settlement amount. The proposal
also lacked information about the process used to calculate the
dancer's potential damages and why the proposed agreement
represents a fair settlement for each dancer.

Also, attorneys for the dancers will need to justify their request
for fees, which amounted to about 35 percent of the settlement, as
they provided no billing records or explained why their request was
a reasonable amount.

In response, the parties on Dec. 18 renewed the $400,000 proposed
settlement outlining the number of hours the dancers worked at the
$7.25 per hour minimum wage rate since Feb. 22, 2014.

The law allows plaintiffs to seek damages for three years prior to
filing suit.

According to the calculations supplied to the court:

   -- the dancers worked 39,780 regular hours and 15,370 overtime
hours since February 2014;
   -- the owners faced exposure to $1.388 million in damages, which
included double damage for unpaid overtime wages, if the case had
gone to trial.
   -- The dancers' attorney supplied billing records which included
some legal fees billed at $500 per hour and listed their years of
experience to justify the rates.

Two dancers, Teriana Jones and Bethany Morrissey, filed suit in
2017 alleging they should be considered employees of the club
instead of independent contractors, a claim brought against strip
clubs more frequently in recent years.

Their suit contended that they danced on stage and performed
private dances for customers that involved varying degree of nudity
and customer interaction. The women also contended that the club
owners violated state and federal law by keeping a portion of the
tips they received.

According to the complaint:

The dancers earned money by soliciting tips from customers while
dancing on stage and collecting fees for private dances. Fees for
private dances can vary from $20 for a topless lap dance to $300
for a "VIP" dance. Dancers alleged that they weren't paid for
management-required nude events and the Edge 'O Dells campground,
which is nearby the club, and talk to the campers.

The club's owners disputed that the dancers were employees due to
the conditions of their employment, which is structured for
independent contractors.

In May, Judge Peterson dismissed the corporate defendants from the
suit but not the individual defendants Timothy, Kenneth and Lantz
Ray Roberts. He also excluded claims related to work at the
campground, saying the suit would focus just on the employment
conditions at the nightclub. In the same order, Peterson declined
the dancers' motion for summary judgment.

Earlier in the litigation, Judge Peterson set trial for Oct. 18 but
the parties began engaging in settlement discussions and the trial
was taken off the court's calendar.

If Judge Peterson preliminary accepts the revised proposed
settlement, he would issue a final order after notifying the class
members to the suit and hold a hearing to determine the fairness of
the settlement. [GN]


EASTERN MUSHROOM: $11.5MM Settlement in Antitrust Suit Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of the Settlement in the case captioned IN RE
MUSHROOM DIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT
RELATES TO: Giorgi Mushroom Co. and Giorgio Foods, Inc. Master No.
06-0620. (E.D. Pa.).

The Class has moved for final approval of the settlement with
Giorgi and reimbursement of out-of-pocket litigation expenses.

Class Plaintiffs contend that Giorgi, along with more than twenty
other defendants, violated both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Class
Plaintiffs allege that the Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative,
Inc. (EMMC) and its members, including Giorgi, was formed solely as
a front and pretext for a naked price-fixing and anticompetitive
supply control scheme.

The proposed settlement between Giorgi and Class Plaintiffs,
defines the Direct Purchaser Class as:

     All persons or entities who purchased Agaricus mushrooms
directly from an EMMC member or one of its co-conspirators or its
owned or controlled affiliates, agents, or subsidiaries at any
times during the period January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2008.
The term Agaricus mushrooms shall mean all varieties and strains of
the species Agaricus bisporus, including, among others, both brown
and white varieties. The Direct Purchaser Class excludes the EMMC,
its members and their parents, subsidiaries and affiliates. The
Class also excludes Giant Eagle and Publix Super Markets, Inc. and
their parents, subsidiaries and affiliates.

In exchange for the Direct Purchaser Class's release of its claims,
Giorgi paid $11,500,000 into an escrow account to be distributed to
the Class, along with any interest earned.The Settlement Agreement
provides that any reimbursement or indemnification for the costs of
notice, administration of the Settlement Fund, or other expenses
for the prosecution of the case that the Court approves shall be
made from the Settlement Fund.

The Court finds that the settlement is presumptively fair, because
all four factors for the presumption are met.  While the Class
Plaintiffs have already spent considerable resources during the
last twelve years of this litigation, the additional cost of trial
would be high. Indeed, Class Counsel currently estimates the
liability phase of the trial alone would take four weeks. Trial
will require further involvement of the Plaintiffs' expert
witnesses plus weeks of the Class Counsel's time preparing for and
conducting the trial. Since the Defendants have already twice
appealed to the Third Circuit, it is also likely that post-trial
motions and appeals would follow trial.  Given the cost of trial
plus the factual and legal complexity of this large antitrust case,
involving the application of two different antitrust standards, the
Court finds that this factor supports approval of the settlement.

Here, 2,239 potential class members were mailed long form notices,
of which 586 remain undeliverable. Summary notice was also
published in the May 2018 issue of a monthly trade magazine for
food retailers. Only one request for exclusion was received by the
due date. The request asked that Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Bi-Lo
Holdings, LLC, Southeastern Grocers, LLC, and seven other
associated entities and brand names (Winn-Dixie) be excluded from
the Class litigation and settlement. Winn-Dixie and Bi-Lo Holdings
had previously filed an individual claim in a separate civil action
in 2015, which was stayed until these plaintiffs opted out of the
Class during the exclusion period. Early in this litigation, two
other opt-out plaintiffs, Publix Super Markets, Inc. and Giant
Eagle, Inc., filed their own class complaints and ever since, have
been prosecuting their individual claims alongside Class
Plaintiffs.

The MFN Defendants appear to argue that there is prejudice
sufficient to confer standing because, if the Court does not find
that one of the exceptions to the MFN provisions apply, most if not
all of the MFN Defendants will be forced to undertake the risks and
substantial expenses associated with a trial and possible appeals,
which will potentially weaken them as competitors or even lead to
bankruptcy. But this does not amount to a formal legal prejudice.
Rather, this prejudice is simply the result of the serious
antitrust claims brought by Class Plaintiffs. As the Court stated
in its preliminary approval of the Giorgi Settlement,the terms of
the Giorgi Agreement may work a hardship upon the MFN defendants'
ability to negotiate their own settlements with the class. But this
strategic disadvantage does not give the MFN Defendants standing to
challenge the Giorgi settlement.  

Thus, because the Court finds that the MFN Defendants do not have
standing to challenge the Giorgi settlement and no class members
themselves have objected, the second Girsh factor favors approval
of the settlement.

Beyond the invariable risk of decertification, the Class Plaintiffs
do not point to any specific reasons that it is likely in this
case. Thus, the Court agrees with Class Plaintiffs that this factor
is neutral with respect to final approval of the settlement.

The Class Plaintiffs' expert economist estimated that the class's
aggregate damages were $167.3 million if the Class Plaintiffs were
able to prove price fixing alone or price fixing and the supply
control violation. If the Class Plaintiffs were to prove only their
supply control claim, the Class Plaintiffs' expert economist
estimated that damages were $82.5 million.

Giorgi's $11.5 million settlement is approximately 7% of the
Plaintiffs' expert's estimated damages for both the price fixing
and supply control claims and approximately 14% of the Plaintiffs'
expert's estimated damages for the supply control claim alone.
However, the damage estimates provided by the Plaintiffs are
aggregate estimates for all defendants. While Giorgi sold a
proportionally large volume of mushrooms to the class during the
class period relative to some defendants, other defendants,
including some who sold a larger volume of mushrooms than Giorgi,
have not yet settled, giving Class Plaintiffs additional
opportunities to increase the class's overall recovery. Given that
this settlement does not represent the class's only opportunity for
recovery, the substantial monetary benefit that the settlement
confers to the class, the likelihood that the class would recover
less than its maximum possible damages, and all of the risks of
continued litigation, the settlement is within the range of
reasonableness.

The Court concludes that the Giorgi settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate. Thus, the Court grants the motion for final approval
of the Giorgi settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hspp5l from
Leagle.com.

WM. ROSENSTEIN & SONS CO., Plaintiff, represented by ADAM M.
MOSKOWITZ , The Moskowitz Law Firm, PLLC, ANDREW WILLIAM KELLY --
akelly@odrlaw.com -- ODOM & DES ROCHES LLP, BARRY L. REFSIN --
brefsin@hangley.com -- HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN, BRUCE E.
GERSTEIN -- bgerstein@garwingerstein.com -- GARWIN GERSTEIN AND
FISHER LLP, DAVID C. RAPHAEL, Jr., SMITH SEGURA & RAPHAEL LLP,
DAVID P. SMITH, SMITH SEGURA & RAPHAEL LLP, JOHN GREGORY ODOM --
jodom@odrlaw.com -- ODOM & DES ROCHES LLP, JONATHAN M. GERSTEIN --
jgerstein@garwingerstein.com -- GARWIN GERSTEIN & FISHER LLP, KEVIN
LANDAU -- klandau@tcllaw.com -- TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP., NOAH
SILVERMAN -- nsilverman@garwingerstein.com -- GARWIN GERSTEIN &
FISHER LLP, SCOTT W. FISHER, GARWIN GERSTEIN AND FISHER LLP, STUART
E. DE SROCHES -- stuart@odrlaw.com -- ODOM & DES ROCHES LLP, SUSAN
C. SEGURA, SMITH SEGURA & RAPHAEL LLP, TAL J. LIFSHITZ --
tjl@kttlaw.com -- KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON & THOMAS A. TUCKER
RONZETTI -- tr@kttlaw.com -- KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON.

EASTERN MUSHROOM MARKETING COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendant,
represented by DONALD M. BARNES -- dbarnes@porterwright.com --
PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, H. LADDIE MONTAGUE, Jr.  --
hlmontague@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, MARTIN I. TWERSKY --
hlmontague@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, TERRI A. PAWELSKI --
tap@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE, WILLIAM A. DESTEFANO --
wad@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE, CLIFFORD E. HAINES, HAINES &
ASSOCIATES, DAVID LANGER -- dlanger@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC,
JOSEPH R. LOVERDI -- jloverdi@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON
LLP & RUDOLPH GARCIA.


ENCORE HEALTH: N. Pierce's Suit Transferred to S.D. Tex.
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order transferring the the case captioned
NANCY PIERCE, Plaintiff, v. ENCORE HEALTH RESOURCES, LLC,
Defendant. No. 3:18-cv-04097-WHO. (N.D. Cal.) to the Southern
District of Texas.

Plaintiff Nancy Pierce filed this class action complaint against
her employer, defendant Encore Health Resources, LLC (Encore).  The
parties filed a notice indicating that they had reached an
agreement to settle all claims in this case along with those in two
factually similar cases, one of which is pending in the Southern
District of Texas.  

Given that the parties have reached a settlement and the plaintiff
does not oppose transfer, this case is transferred to the Southern
District of Texas.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 13, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7okm4z2 from Leagle.com.

Nancy Pierce, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Andrew Christopher Ficzko --
aficzko@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, LLP, pro hac vice,
Catherine Mitchell -- cmitchell@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan
Zouras, LLP, pro hac vice, Eric M. Epstein, Eric M. Epstein, APC,
James Zouras, STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua David Buck
-- josh@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP, Mark R. Thierman --
mark@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP & Ryan F. Stephan --
rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, LLP, pro hac vice.

Encore Health Resources, LLC, Defendant, represented by Paul James
Hall, Esq. -- paul.hall@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, Joy Gowoon
Kim -- joy.kim@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Kevin David Harlow
-- kevin.harlow@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.


ENTEROMEDICS INC: Settlement in Derivative Suit Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval
of Settlement in the case captioned VINH DU, derivatively on behalf
of ENTEROMEDICS, INC. and individually and on behalf of himself and
all other similarly situated stockholders of ENTEROMEDICS, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. GARY BLACKFORD, DAN W. GLADNEY, CARL GOLDFISCHER,
BOBBY I. GRIFFIN, LORI C. MCDOUGAL, NICHOLAS L. TETI JR., JON T.
TREMMEL, NAGEEB A. ANSARI, PETER M. DELANGE, PAUL F. HICKEY, SCOTT
YOUNGSTROM, and ENTEROMEDICS, INC., Defendants, And ENTEROMEDICS,
INC., Nominal Defendant. Civil Action No. 17-cv-194. (D. Del.).

The Plaintiff filed a derivative class action complaint on behalf
of EnteroMedics, alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
unjust enrichment against the Defendants. The Plaintiff alleged
that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by: (1) making
false and misleading statements in connection with soliciting
stockholder approval of: (a) an amendment to EnteroMedics's
Certificate of Incorporation to effect a reverse stock split of the
Company's outstanding and issued shares of common stock (Reverse
Stock Split).

The Settlement Agreement provides for the cancellation and
rescission of the stock options at issue, and stockholders will
have the opportunity to vote on any additional stock options for
Defendants made in connection with the rescission.

Second, the board of directors is required to make proportional
adjustments to the Stock Plan and other Company equity plans to
account for any changes in EnteroMedics's capitalization, thus
protecting stockholders from unanticipated dilution.

Third, the board of directors is amending the Company's equity plan
to add a specific provision imposing an annual cap on equity
compensation for non-employee directors and will seek stockholder
approval of this amendment.

The Court finds that the class counsel is experienced and
represented the class well in that they have negotiated a
settlement that redresses all of the Plaintiff's complaints. The
settlement was signed at arm's length after the parties had a full
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. The
relief is adequate in that it addresses the Plaintiff's claims and
provides protections against future issues. Since all of the relief
is intuitional, there is no concern regarding distribution to the
class. The attorney's fees sought are reasonable and do not impact
the class' relief. Finally, the settlement treats all relevant
class members equally. Thus, Rule 23(e) is satisfied.

This is a complex shareholder derivative action. The Court states
that it would have been expensive to bring to trial and would not
have provided significant additional relief. The Plaintiff has
received what he sought in the settlement: rescission of the stock
options at issue and protections to avoid similar future
situations. Continued litigation would have also required
significant and costly expert discovery. Summary judgment motions
have not yet been filed and, thus, the litigation would have
continued for a substantial period of time. This factor weighs in
favor of settlement.

The Court concludes that the parties had an adequate appreciation
of the issues. For almost two years, the parties have litigated
this action, which has included the exchange of significant
discovery and the litigation of a motion to dismiss. The time and
work put into the case indicates that Plaintiff had a good
understanding of the merits of the action. Thus, this factor weighs
in favor of settlement.

The parties have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the case, including the risks of
continuing the litigation. Such risks include the possibility of
class decertification or the class losing their claims given the
complex nature of the action and the factual findings that would be
necessary. Such findings include whether the Proxy disclosures were
materially misleading, which Defendants have strongly contested,
and which depends on the jury evaluating the total mix of the
information provided to the stockholders. Plaintiff's success was
certainly not assured.   

Trial could have provided little if any additional benefit.

Plaintiff and the class have received all of the relief they
sought. As discussed, this is a complex case that would require
difficult factual determinations. Settling now saves money,
provides the relief sought, and avoids the uncertainty of trial.

Beginning on October 15, 2018, pursuant to the Court's order,
EnteroMedics mailed the notice to stockholders of record or class
members at their last known address appearing in the Company's
stock transfer records. The notice advised stockholders that they
had the right to object, explained the procedure for making such
objections, and provided several weeks for objections to be made.
No class member objected.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the
notice program used in this case satisfied Rule 23(c)(2)(A) and (e)
and was reasonably calculated to apprise the class of the pendency
of the action, the proposed settlement, the class members' rights
to object, and the applicability of a final judgment on all
participating class members.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7pzpkld from
Leagle.com.

Vinh Du, on behalf of EnteroMedics, Inc. and individually and on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated stockholders of
EnteroMedics, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Brian E. Farnan,
Farnan LLP, Douglas E. Julie -- djulie@pjlfirm.com -- Purcell Julie
& Lefkowitz LLP Attorneys at Law, pro hac vice, Michael J. Farnan,
Farnan LLP & Steven J. Purcell -- spurcell@pjlfirm.com -- Purcell
Julie & Lefkowitz LLP Attorneys at Law, pro hac vice.

Gary Blackford, Dan W. Gladney, Carl Goldfischer, Bobby I. Griffin,
Lori C. McDougal, Nicholas L. Teti, Jr., Jon T. Tremmel, Peter M.
Delange, Paul F. Hickey, Scott Youngstrom & EnteroMedics, Inc.,
Nominal, Defendants, represented by Alessandra Glorioso --
glorioso.alessandra@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney (Delaware) LLP,
Chelsea R. McLean -- mclean.chelsea@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney
LLP, pro hac vice & Theresa M. Bevilacqua --
bevilacqua.theresa@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro hac
vice.


EQT CORP: Files Settlement Term Sheet Under Seal
------------------------------------------------
Kate Mishkin, writing for WVGazette, reports that EQT Corp., the
major energy company thousands of West Virginians said had
shortchanged them on royalty payments, has filed its settlement
term sheet.

The energy giant was the subject of a class-action lawsuit
involving more than 10,000 individuals and businesses in West
Virginia who said EQT was illegally deducting costs from their
royalty payments.

The trial was scheduled to begin Nov. 27 in U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia but was canceled after the
parties reached a tentative settlement. The trial would've started
again Dec. 17 if the matter hadn't been resolved.

A clerk for the court confirmed the trial didn't start on
Dec. 17.

Now, EQT has filed a settlement term sheet under seal until the
plaintiffs file their motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement and U.S. District Judge John Preston Bailey approves the
final settlement.

In a motion to file the settlement term sheet under seal, lawyers
for EQT said the plaintiffs were expected to file a public motion
for preliminary approval of the settlement that would include the
specific terms of the proposed settlement.

Federal court rules say details of class-action settlements are
subject to review by members of the plaintiff class and determined
to be "fair, reasonable and adequate" by Judge Bailey.

The final terms of the settlement will be publicly available.

This lawsuit was among the royalty cases highlighted in November in
a joint examination by the Charleston Gazette-Mail and ProPublica
that showed how West Virginia's natural gas producers continue to
avoid paying royalties promised to thousands of residents and
businesses. EQT and other companies insist they've done nothing
wrong, and that the royalty payments are fair. [GN]


EXPEDIA INC: Faces Traveler Fee Class Action in Washington
----------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Schaal, writing for Skift, reports that there have been
several consumer lawsuits over the years charging deceptive
practices in the ways online travel agencies opaquely bundle "taxes
and fees" when selling hotel stays that consumers pay for at the
time of booking.

Expedia, for example, settled a consumer class-action lawsuit in
its home state, Washington, for $123.4 million in 2009. The lawsuit
alleged breach of contract and deceptive business practices in the
way Expedia described its fees when selling hotel rooms on a
wholesale basis, which is also known as the merchant model.

The same Seattle law firm Hagens Berman, which was part of the
litigation that was settled in 2009, filed a new consumer lawsuit
seeking class action status that accuses Expedia of conducting a
tax fraud, or a racketeering enterprise (RICO), in allegedly
scheming with an affiliate, Reservations.com, to collect a secret
fee to ratchet up profits and rip off consumers.

The plaintiff, Joseph Church, on behalf of the purported class of
consumers, seeks to have the lawsuit certified as a class action,
and to collect triple the amount of actual damages, and attorneys
fees. The defendants are Expedia Inc., the Expedia Affiliate
Network, Travelscape, and Hotels.com, all of which are part of
Expedia Group.

Expedia didn't immediately respond to a request for comment.

Reservations.com, which gets the vast majority of its hotel
inventory through the Expedia Affiliate Network and claims to have
sold four million room nights since its founding in 2014, is not
named as a defendant. However, the lawsuit alleges that
Reservations.com is a willing partner in the enterprise.

"Contrary to Reservations.com's representations and/or the
expectations of consumers, the 'taxes and fees' charged by the
defendants are not the actual taxes and fees remitted to
governmental authorities but contain additional amounts
surreptitiously added by the defendants (the tax overcharge)," the
lawsuit alleges.

The lawsuit is a twist on earlier lawsuits about online travel
agency taxes and fees because the focus is not on the "taxes" or
"taxes and fees" that Expedia charges on Expedia.com for a hotel
booking, but on the "tax recovery charges and fees" that
Reservations.com levels on behalf of Expedia on the
Reservations.com website.

For example, Reservations.com was charging consumers $50.88 in "tax
recovery charges and fees" on a $159 room rate at the W Hotel in
Seattle for a November 22-24 stay, according to the suit. The
lawsuit alleges that Reservations.com leads consumers to believe
that those taxes and fees are meant to pay local and state taxes,
which "should have been $27," and that Expedia is enriching itself
by secretly pocketing the difference.

In fact, the Reservations.com website states: "Amounts displayed in
the taxes and fees line for prepaid hotel transactions include an
estimated amount we expect the hotel to bill for applicable taxes,
governmental fees and other charges that the hotels must pay to the
government."

On top of those taxes and fees, which the suit alleges are
transferred to Expedia to remit taxes to the hotels and to
clandestinely take a cut, Reservations.com charges its own service
fee of $14.99 per hotel booking, but the lawsuit is not taking
issue with that latter fee.

Coincidentally, the lawsuit points out, the $14.99 fee that
Reservations.com charges consumers often leads to hotel bookings
being more expensive for travelers on Expedia's affiliate,
Reservations.com, than on Expedia.com.

MERCHANT MODEL ONSLAUGHT
The workings of the online travel agencies' merchant model has
attracted hundreds of lawsuits around the world since the City of
Los Angeles kicked off the litigation frenzy in 2004. The
plaintiffs in those suits generally allege that the online travel
agencies obtain wholesale rates from hotels, mark the rates up for
consumers, add service fees, but only remit to the hotel taxes on
the wholesale rates rather than the full retail rates. The online
travel agencies have prevailed in many of the lawsuits, and lost
many others.

The current litigation filed by Hagens Berman, however, doesn't
deal with the bevy of local and state lawsuits against the online
travel agencies, but alleges deception and tax fraud in the way
Expedia charges taxes and fees to consumers on one of hundreds of
its affiliate websites, Reservations.com. The lawsuit alleges a
close relationship between the companies, saying Expedia operated a
call center for Reservations.com for four years, ending in 2017.

The Expedia Affiliate Network powers hotel bookings on hundreds of
airline, travel agency, loyalty club, corporate travel, and
consumer websites outside the travel industry. It is a material
part of Expedia Group's business, although the company doesn't
break out revenue or profits for the affiliate business.

Although the lawsuit merely focuses on Expedia's practices in
relation to Reservations.com, the litigation said the plaintiff
retains the right to expand its scope. That means the lawsuit could
potentially have implications for a broader swath of Expedia's
affiliate business.

The lawsuit alleges that Reservations.com, acting on behalf of
Expedia, has overcharged consumers some $95 million, and it is
seeking treble damages. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: ACLU Files "Friend of the Court Brief"
----------------------------------------------------
Rachel Kraus, writing for Mashable, reports that we already know
Facebook will do pretty much whatever it wants with your data, but
a lawsuit shows the lengths it will go to in defending that
approach.

On Dec. 17, the ACLU, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Center
for Democracy & Technology, and Illinois Public Interest Research
Group, filed what's known as a "friend of the court brief."  The
brief takes a stance against what appears to be an argument
Facebook is advancing in court that would weaken a strong biometric
data privacy law.

Three Illinois plaintiffs are suing Facebook in a class-action
suit, stating Facebook did not comply with an Illinois law that
requires informed and written consent for the collection of
biometric data -- in Facebook's case, facial recognition. A federal
judge gave the case the go ahead in April.

To defend itself, Facebook is reportedly arguing that the
plaintiffs don't have the right to sue at all, because they haven't
proved that they've suffered damages.

But the ACLU et. al say that this argument is not only inconsistent
with the law -- it also renders it unenforceable and, therefore,
toothless.

"Adopting the defendant's reading of BIPA would effectively gut the
statute's primary purpose and leave people without meaningful
recourse in a world of rapidly advancing technology and
proliferating uses of biometric information," the brief reads.

In 2008, Illinois passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA). The idea of the law is that biometric information in
particular is so sensitive that it needs its own class of extra
strong legal protection. Biometric data is sensitive because,
unlike a password, you can't change your face or your fingerprint;
once it's compromised, it's compromised.

So BIPA states that users have to give companies collecting
biometric information written, informed consent. That means they
have to affirmatively agree to the collection of data, and they
have to know what it's being used for, the scope of the data, and
who has access to it.

Then came 2010, when Facebook rolls out suggested tagging. When
people were still, ya know, making Facebook albums, Facebook
introduced the option to make tagging easier by "suggesting" who to
tag. That means it used facial-recognition technology to pair
photos with identities. Most crucially here, the feature was
"opt-out" only.

In 2017, Facebook gave users the ability to opt out completely of
having their faces recognized, and earlier in 2018 Facebook began
automatically notifying users when a picture of them had been
uploaded to Facebook, giving them the option to tag themselves.

Facebook is reportedly trying many tactics to rebut the suit. It's
challenging the nature of consent, what even constitutes biometric
data, and more. But the portion of their argument that the ACLU et.
al. are opposing now concerns the ability of BIPA to actually be
enforceable.

Typically, in a lawsuit, plaintiffs have to prove damages or that
they have suffered (financially, emotionally, or otherwise) as a
result of the defendants' actions. The nature of suffering is
what's on the table now.

The Amicus Brief argues that the collection of biometric data
without informed, written consent is a violation of the law. It
states that the act of collecting the data is the damage done; not
"some additional harm."

If Facebook wins the damages argument, the brief says it would set
a dangerous precedent, arguing that citizens need to have a legally
enforceable way to prevent against the unlawful collection of data,
not just misuse of data once it's collected. And, most importantly,
the brief says that that is what the law already does, and that
Facebook's reading would fundamentally change the purpose of the
law.

Facebook has taken pains to urge users to review their privacy
permissions, though the calls for proactive check-ups took on
renewed vigor after the 2018 data scandals, and coinciding with the
European Union's adoption of its General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Potential Settlement in Works in Design Defect Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
Anne Drewa, writing for Global News, reports that a class action
settlement in Canada over an alleged design defect for some owners
of certain Ford Focus and Fiesta models is on its way in Ontario,
but still has to be approved by a court.

"There's a potential settlement in the works. We haven't seen
anything of that settlement yet. We'll be continuing to pursue our
class action simultaneously," said lawyer Steven Roxborough from
Merchant Law Group, one of at least two firms representing
Canadians in the class action against Ford over the alleged
Powershift dual clutch transmission.

A national class action lawsuit has been launched against Ford
Motor Company and Ford Motor Company of Canada over the Powershift
dual clutch transmission in Ford Focus 2012-2016 models and Ford
Fiesta 2011-2016 models.

It is allegedly a design defect in the dual clutch which causes
drivers of these vehicles to experience everything from difficulty
stopping, jerking, and delayed acceleration, allegedly putting
drivers at risk of serious injury or death.

B.C. resident Amber D'Amico says she's had nothing but problems
since she bought her 2014 Ford Focus.

"It's shuddering. It's now recently in November or two starting to
stall, it won't accelerate up hills, loss of power trying to
accelerate into traffic," said D'Amico.

She added, "it's not safe. I can't accelerate in front of cars. You
never know if it can get its gear."

She's not alone. Transport Canada says it has received over 1,826
complaints concerning the operation and performance of the dual
clutch transmission in Ford Fiesta and Focus passenger cars. It
also says it is not aware of any injuries or collisions related to
this issue.

When it comes to the speed at which class actions move through the
courts in Canada, Mr. Roxborough says it needs to change.

Current consumer protection laws in B.C. fall short, he says.

"Access delayed is access denied. We need a procedure for these
individuals' claims to be adjudicated in an effective and timely
manner and there needs to be changes. I think those changes need to
come from the legislature," said Mr. Roxborough.

Shortly after D'Amico was interviewed by Consumer Matters, she says
the dealership where she bought the Ford Focus bought it back and
replaced it with a different Ford model.

Ford Canada would not comment on this story, stating, "we don't
comment on pending litigation."

The earliest a court could approve the proposed settlement is March
2019.

Once the settlement comes down and is approved by a court, affected
Ford owners will have an opportunity to review the settlement and
decide to participate in the class action or opt out if they don't
approve of the compensation. [GN]


GIANT EAGLE: Fitch Seeks to Certify and Notify Class Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled ANDREW FITCH, RICHARD
D'ALESSANDRO, and MICHELLE HUTCHISON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. GIANT EAGLE, INC., d/b/a GETGO
CAFE + MARKET, Case No. 2:18-cv-01534-DSC-CRE (W.D. Pa.), ask the
Court to certify class, and to grant them permission to send
nationwide notice of this lawsuit to a Fair Labor Standards Act
Collective comprised of these individuals:

     All current and former employees of Defendant throughout the
     country who were employed in the position of "Senior Team
     Leader" at any time on or after April 23, 2015, and were
     classified as exempt and not paid overtime compensation for
     hours worked above 40 in a workweek.

Because the statute of limitations on FLSA claims continues to run
against the individuals, it is critical that notice is issued as
soon as practicable in order to give them the opportunity to join
this lawsuit and vindicate their rights under the FLSA, the
Plaintiffs assert.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Camar Jones, Esq.
          Logan A. Pardell, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  cjones@shavitzlaw.com
                  lpardell@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Palitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          830 Third Avenue, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (800) 616-4000
          E-mail: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Jason Conway, Esq.
          CONWAY LEGAL, LLC
          1700 Market Street, Suite 1005
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 278-4782
          Facsimile: (215) 278-4807
          E-mail: jconway@conwaylegalpa.com

               - and -

          Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1000
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: dlevin@lfsblaw.com


GUACAMOLE GROUP: Diaz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missing Pay Slips
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sergio Medina Diaz, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Guacamole Corp., Guacamole Midtown Corp.,
Victor Hernandez Perez, Ingrid Rodriguez, Miguel Hernandez and
Claudio Hernandez, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-12321, (S.D. N.Y.,
December 28, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid minimum, overtime and
spread-of-hours wages and redress for failure to provide itemized
wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated damages,
interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a Mexican restaurant, located
at 5025 Broadway New York, New York 10034 under the name "Guacamole
Taqueria" where Diaz was employed as a as a bartender and a waiter.
He was required to spend a considerable part of his work day
performing non-tipped duties, thus Defendants were not entitled to
take a tip credit because his non-tipped duties exceeded 20% of
each workday, asserts the complaint. Plaintiff also worked for
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage and overtime compensation for the hours that he worked
including the required "spread of hours" pay for any day in which
he had to work over 10 hours a day. Defendants also failed to
maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked, the complaint
adds. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


HEALTH INSURANCE: Can Partly Compel Replies to Interrogatories
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH J. MOSER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEALTH INSURANCE
INNOVATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, et al., Defendants. AND
RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS, Case No. 17cv1127-WQH (KSC) (S.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California granted in part and denied in
part HII's request for an order compelling the Plaintiff to provide
further responses to certain interrogatories and document
requests.

Before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Determination of
Discovery Dispute.  In the Joint Motion, HII seeks an order
compelling the Plaintiff to provide further, substantive responses
to certain document requests and interrogatories.  The Plaintiff
objects to these written discovery requests.

The original class action Complaint was filed on June 5, 2017.  The
Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint on June 7, 2017.
The First Amended Complaint includes two causes of action for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  In
the first cause of action, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants violated the TCPA by making multiple, unauthorized calls
to his cellular telephone using an automatic dialing system or
artificial, pre-recorded voice starting on Jan. 28, 2015.  The
second cause of action alleges that the Defendants violated the
TCPA by making multiple, unauthorized telephone calls to the
Plaintiff's residential telephone line using an artificial or
pre-recorded voice to deliver a message beginning on Jan. 28, 2015.
The Plaintiff also alleges in the First Amended Complaint that he
received 32 autodialed, pre-recorded calls from defendant
Nationwide Health Advisors between April 6, 2017 and May 10, 2017.
The First Amended Complaint also alleges there are a number of
outstanding "junk call complaints" against the Defendants.

The class allegations section of the First Amended Complaint
indicates that the Plaintiff plans to seek certification of two
sub-classes of Plaintiffs: (1) those who have received
unauthorized, auto-dialed calls on their cellular telephones from
the Defendants since Jan. 28, 2015; and (2) those who have received
unauthorized, auto-dialed calls on the residential telephone lines
since Jan. 28, 2015.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, HII requested that
the Plaintiff produces for inspection and copying all servers,
computers, tablets, cellular and landline telephones, routers,
wireless network equipment, reporting systems, databases and the
equivalent containing electronically stored information and
information contained on such systems.  The request specifically
seeks inspection of any cellular or residential telephone or other
device that uses or has used the telephone numbers identified by
the Plaintiff in the First Amended Complaint.  The time period
included in this request is Jan. 1, 2013 through the present.

HII's Interrogatory No. 6 seeks the Plaintiff to identify and
describe in detail all facts and circumstances showing that HII's
alleged conduct (or that of its alleged agents) toward the
Plaintiff was 'knowing' and/or 'willful' as alleged in the First
Amended Complaint.

HII's Interrogatory No. 8, as re-written by HII in the Joint
Motion, seeks to provide the name of any website, including the
URL, where the Plaintiff searched for insurance and provided a
phone number through the website.  

As narrowed in the Joint Motion, HII's Document Request No. 20
seeks all emails the Plaintiff received from any third party in
which an email was sent to the Plaintiff after he entered any of
his phone numbers and email address into a website related to
insurance.

As narrowed in the Joint Motion, HII's Document Request No. 22
seeks all internet/online, telephone and/or paper requests the
Plaintiff has made for information concerning insurance offers
during the relevant time period in which the Plaintiff provided a]
phone number.

HII's Document Request No. 24 seeks production of all consent and
waiver forms completed by the Plaintiff in connection with all
online/Internet, telephone, email and/or postal mail offers or
advertisements, including but not limited to insurance-related
offers and advertisements.

HII's Document Request No. 26 seeks production of all documents
reflecting the provision by the Plaintiff of any personal
identifying information (e.g., the Plaintiff's name, address,
telephone number and the like) in connection with a website
offering any form of medical insurance or other insurance upon the
completion of requirements, whether via answering qualification
questions, providing registration information, or entering the
Plaintiff's personal information, etc.

Judge Crawford granted in part and denied in part HII's request for
an order compelling plaintiff to provide further responses to
certain interrogatories and document requests.  HII's request for
an order compelling a forensic examination of the Plaintiff's
electronic devices is denied because HII has not provided
sufficient facts to justify an order permitting direct access to
the Plaintiff's electronic devices.

HII's request for an order compelling the Plaintiff to provide a
full and complete response to Interrogatory No. 6, as narrowed, is
granted.  The Plaintiff will respond to the following
interrogatory: State the principal or material facts supporting the
allegations in the First Amended Complaint that HII's alleged
conduct (or that of its alleged agents) toward the Plaintiff was
knowing and/or willful.

HII's request for an order compelling the Plaintiff to provide full
and complete responses to Interrogatory No. 8, Document Request
Nos. 20 and 22, as narrowed in the Joint Motion, and Document
Request No. 24 is granted.

HII's request for an order compelling the Plaintiff to provide full
and complete responses to Document Request Nos. 48, 49, 50, and 51
is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

     a. The Defendant's request for an order compelling the
Plaintiff to produce documents responsive to Document Request Nos.
48 and 49 is granted to the extent HII seeks production of any
official corporate documents, such as ownership or stock
certificates, articles of incorporation, bylaws, or meeting minutes
that reveal: (1) the identities of any owners or officers of the
business Marketing Support Systems during the period April 6, 2017
through June 5, 2017; and (2) the type of business Marketing
Support Systems engaged in during the period April 6, 2017 through
June 5, 2017.  HII's request for an order compelling production of
any other documents in response to Document Request Nos. 48 and 49
is denied for failure to establish relevance.

     b. The Defendant's request for an order compelling plaintiff
to produce documents response to Document Request Nos. 50 and 51 is
granted to the extent HII seeks production of any form or
application completed on behalf of the business known as Marketing
Support Systems during the years 2016, 2017, or 2018 and then
submitted to the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, the Better Business
Bureau, City Search, and/or the Yellow Pages for the purpose of
permitting any of these entities to include Marketing Support
Systems and its phone number(s) in any type of business or phone
directory or on a website accessible by the public or other
businesses.  HII's request for an order compelling production of
any other documents in response to Document Request Nos. 50 and 51
is denied for failure to establish relevance.

The Judge denied the Defendant HII's request for an order
compelling the Plaintiff to provide a further response to Document
Request No. 37 because the request is overly broad and it is not
possible for the Court to determine the appropriate scope for the
request.

The Defendant HII's request for an order compelling the Plaintiff
to provide full and complete responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10,
12, 23, and Document Request Nos. 36 and 39 must be granted.  The
Plaintiff must provide HII with full and complete responses to
these requests for the time period Jan. 1, 2010 through the
present.  As offered by HII in the Joint Motion, it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to produce copies of complaints filed
in Federal cases.  Instead, the Plaintiff may produce a list of
Federal cases showing the name of the case, the case number, and
the name of the court where the action was filed.  However, for
each state case, the Plaintiff must produce a copy of the complaint
that was filed.

The Judge granted HII's request for an order compelling plaintiff
to provide a full and complete response to Interrogatory No. 14 and
request for an order compelling the Plaintiff to provide full and
complete responses to Document Request Nos. 16 and 33.

The Plaintiff will comply with the Order no later than Jan. 11,
2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fSpKva from Leagle.com.

Kenneth J. Moser, individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Reichman

-- chrisr@prato-reichman.com -- Prato & Reichman, APC, Jeffrey
Braillard Cereghino  -- jbc@rocklawcal.com -- Cereghino Law Group,
Justin M. Prato  -- jmprato@gmail.com -- Prato & Reichman, APC &
Matt J. Malone , Rock Law LLP.

Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Anton N. Handal -- tony.handal@gmlaw.com
-- Greenspoon Marder LLP, Dariel Jonathan Abrahamy --
dariel.abrahamy@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon Marder LLP, pro hac vice &
Garry W. O'Donnell -- garry.odonnell@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon
Marder, P.A., pro hac vice.

National Congress of Employers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Barton H. Hegeler --
mail@hegeler-anderson.com -- Hegler & Anderson, Ethan T. Litney,
Hegeler & Anderson, A.P.C. & Sarah M. Reddiconto, Hegeler &
Anderson, A.P.C.

Companion Life Insurance Company, a South Carolina Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Chad R. Fuller --
chad.fuller@troutman.com  -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Virginia B.
Flynn -- virginia.flynn@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro
hac vice.

Donisi Jax, Inc., a Florida Corporation also known as Nationwide
Health Advisors, Defendant, represented by Jennifer L. Meeker --
jmeeker@nossaman.com -- Nossaman LLP, Maya Hamouie --
mhamouie@nossaman.com -- Nossaman LLP & Stephen P. Wiman --
swiman@nossaman.com -- Nossaman, LLP.

National Congress of Employers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Counter Claimant, represented by Barton H. Hegeler, Hegler &
Anderson, Ethan T. Litney, Hegeler & Anderson, A.P.C. & Sarah M.
Reddiconto, Hegeler & Anderson, A.P.C.

Kenneth J. Moser, individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Counter Defendant, represented by Christopher
Reichman, Prato & Reichman, APC, Jeffrey Braillard Cereghino,
Cereghino Law Group, Justin M. Prato, Prato & Reichman, APC & Matt
J. Malone, Rock Law LLP.


HEALTHPLUS SURGERY: Marrero Seeks Damages for Negligent Practice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Marrero and Julio C. Marrero, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Healthplus
Surgery Center, LLC, Defendant, Case No. BER-L-009265-18, filed in
the Superior Court of New Jersey on December 28, 2018, seeks
compensatory damages, interest, attorney's fees, costs of suit
resulting from negligence.

On or about December 26, 2018, HealthPlus released a statement
disclosing that on September 7, 2018, the New Jersey Department of
Health closed the HealthPlus Surgery Center because of alleged
lapses in proper sterile processing procedures and improper
dispensing and storage of medication, as well as infection control
planning and procedures.

Plaintiffs received medical care and treatment between January 1,
2018 and September 7,2018 at HealthPlus Surgery Center. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael J. Maggiano, Esq.
      MAGGIANO, DIGIROLAMO AND LIZZI PC
      201 Columbia Avenue
      Fort Lee, NJ 07024
      Tel: (201) 585-9111
      Fax: (201) 292-8145


HILL DELI: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Bouhajrah Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mohammed Bouhajrah, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. Hill Deli Grocery Corp., Azaal Deli Grocery Corp., Ana
Deli Grocery Corp., and Nasser Almasmari, Case No. 1:18-cv-11391
(S.D. N.Y., December 6, 2018), is brought against the Defendants
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New
York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay employees
the applicable minimum wages and overtime rate for all time worked
in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a cashier from in or
around March 2017 until in or around September 2017. As a cashier,
the Plaintiff's primary job duties included checking customers out
at the cash register, cleaning the deli, and making coffee for
customers.

The Defendants own and operate a deli stores in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Adam Sackowitz, Esq.
      KATZ MELINGER PLLC
      280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 460-0047
      E-mail: ajsackowitz@katzmelinger.com


HOMES OF OPPORTUNITY: Court OKs Settlement in Belmont
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement in the case captioned SUSAN
BELMONT, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. HOMES OF OPPORTUNITY, INC., and LAWRENCE A. MANIACI,
Defendants. Civil Case No. 18-10854. (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiff filed this putative collective action claiming that
Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing
to pay Plaintiff's overtime wages.  

The Court has found no reason to suspect fraud or collusion nor
have the parties advanced any such reason. A bona fide dispute
between the parties is evident and remains. Whether the Defendants
violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime and whether the
Plaintiff was properly classified as a managerial employee remains
in dispute. Due to these disputes, bona fide issues remain as to
the amount of wages, if any, still owed the Plaintiff and the
ultimate amount she could recover if she prevails.
  
The Court looks to the extent that settlement will enable the
parties to avoid additional burdens and expenses. With the proposed
settlement, the parties will avoid the significant burden and
expense of trial, costs anticipated to be more than $100,000 that
would likely dwarf the Plaintiff's potential award. Thus, the
settlement serves as a means for the parties to minimize future
litigation costs.

The Court notes that formal discovery had not commenced in this
case. Still, the parties exchanged several documents and other data
relevant to the FLSA claims. Ultimately, the parties used these to
evaluate the merits of their respective claims and defenses.
Clearly, settlement will allow the parties to avoid incurring
further costs associated with conducting formal discovery.

Since a genuine dispute between the parties remains, the
Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits and potential award
are uncertain. Here, both parties face risks if the Court
determines the appropriate calculation of overtime pay. The
Plaintiff is concerned that the Court may identify her as a
managerial employee. The Defendant faces the risk that the Court
could find them liable for damages that exceed the settlement
amount. Thus, settlement would preclude the potential risks to both
parties.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 13, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y74d78o2 from
Leagle.com.

Susan Belmont, Plaintiff, represented by Megan Bonanni, Pitt,
McGehee & Robin Beth Wagner, Pitt McGehee Palmer & Rivers PC.

Homes of Opportunity, Inc & Lawrence Maniaci, Defendants,
represented by Christian A. Lobb -- Gregory@BatorLegal.com -- Bator
Legal, P.C..


HURON COUNTY, MI: Faces Class Action Over Tax Forfeiture Process
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bradley Massman, writing for Huron Daily Tribune, reports that
Huron County has been added to a class action lawsuit accompanied
by four other counties, county commissioners learned.

"It's a lawsuit against the treasurer's office and the tax
forfeiture process that we go through," Huron County Corporate
Counsel Stephen Allen explained at the Dec. 18 committee meeting of
the whole by the local board of commissioners.

The lawsuit, which was filed Nov. 28 in St. Clair County Circuit
Court, includes Huron, Sanilac, St. Clair, Lapeer and Genesee
counties. Huron County was served on Dec. 17, Mr. Allen said.

Tammy Puchlak, a trustee of the Walter Puchlak Trust, is the
plaintiff listed in the lawsuit.

Mr. Allen briefed commissioners with an example to explain what the
lawsuit means.

He said there is a person who has owned a piece of property for
years and paid their taxes in a timely fashion, but didn't pay his
taxes for a few years. The county begins the foreclosure process
and takes the property, he said.

"In that (period), he's paid down his underlying debt and owns it
free and clear," he explained. "It's a $200,000 piece of property
and we take it for back taxes of $8,000 because he hasn't paid his
taxes."

"We then sell it at a public auction. The successful bidder
typically pays less than market value," he added. "Let's say we
take $150,000 for this $200,000 property. We take the taxes off the
top and fees to make that up and put the rest of the equity in the
Delinquent Tax Fund."

Allen said the Delinquent Tax Fund is how the county settles with
the local communities during the settlement period each year. He
said there are also situations where the county can't get rid of
the property -- such as one in Port Hope with water in the
basement.

"The ones we get a spike in and dump the money into the fund,
that's how we stay above water with the others," he said.

He said in his example he used, the lawsuit alleges the equity
belonged to the property owner.

"I know our treasurer is very fastidious at following the law,"
Allen said. "We've got the State of Michigan and the Tax Act behind
us to back us up in what we've been doing."

According to court records, a future court date has not been set.
[GN]


HYUNDAI: Faces Class Action in Calif. Over GDI Engine Defect
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Jensen, writing for Forbes, reports that an engine
defect on gasoline direct injection (GDI) engines in some of the
most popular Hyundai and Kia models makes them vulnerable to
fast-moving fires and the automakers have tried to conceal the
problem from buyers, according to a suit filed earlier in December
in a federal district court in California.

The defect "presents consumers with an unacceptable risk of their
vehicles spontaneously bursting into flames," the suit says.

It says there have been more than 350 complaints about
"non-collision" fires sent by owners to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.

The problem is said to affect the 2011-2019 Hyundai Sonata;
2013-2019 Hyundai Santa Fe and Santa Fe Sport; 2011-2019 Kia
Optima; 2012-2019 Kia Sorento; 2012-2019 Kia Soul; 2011-2019 Kia
Sportage.

The non-profit Center for Auto Safety says it shares the fire
concern. It has asked federal regulators to investigate the fires.
Earlier in 2018 it filed a defect petition saying the vehicles were
dangerous and a recall of 2.9 million vehicles is necessary. The
agency is considering the request.

The suit claims there is a design flaw in the engines that can
restrict or block "oil flow to the engine's moving parts, such as
connecting rod bearings, prematurely wearing out those parts to the
point that the engine parts seize, which stops engine operation
while running. Engine seizure often causes internal parts, such as
the connecting rods, to break and knock a hole in the engine,
permitting fluids to leak and ignite a fire."

Hyundai spokesman James Trainor said the automaker has already
recalled more than one million vehicles (certain model year
2011-2014 Sonatas and 2013-2014 Santa Fe Sports) in actions in 2015
and 2017 "to address a manufacturing issue that could lead to
bearing wear and engine failure."

In its 2017 report to federal regulators Hyundai said debris from
the manufacturing process could result in not enough oil reaching
crucial parts.

At the time Hyundai told federal regulators it was recalling the
vehicles because of a possible stalling problem, although in a
recent email Mr. Trainor said "in certain circumstances the
affected engines have caught on fire."

He added "nothing is more important than the safety and security of
Hyundai customers" and the automaker has been working with federal
regulators on the issue.

The suit was filed by the law firm of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
of Pasadena in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. [GN]


IDE PONTIAC: Wins Summary Judgment as to Buehlman Unpaid OT Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned JEFF BUEHLMAN, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. IDE
PONTIAC, INC. and ANNE IDE, individually, Defendants. No.
6:15-cv-06745 EAW. (W.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Jeff Buehlman commenced this action against defendants
Ide Pontiac, Inc. and Anne Ide, asserting causes of action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York State Labor
Law (NYLL). The Plaintiff seeks, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated individuals, unpaid overtime compensation from
the Defendants under Section 207(a)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
Section 207(a)(1). The Plaintiff individually seeks unpaid overtime
under New York law.

The Defendants seek reconsideration of that portion of the November
2016 Decision denying their motion for summary judgment as to the
Plaintiff's claims for unpaid overtime compensation, arguing that
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, U.S. 138 S.Ct. 1134 (2018) represents an intervening
change in controlling law that undermines the Court's earlier
determination.  

With respect to the Plaintiff's overtime claims, the November 2016
Decision considered the dispositive issue of whether Plaintiff's
employment with Defendants fell within the scope of the Exemption.


Encino Motorcars directly conflicts with the analysis set forth in
the November 2016 Decision and reiterated in the August 2017
Decision) as to this issue.

In Encino Motorcars, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Exemption applies to service advisors employees at car dealerships
who consult with customers about their servicing needs and sell
them servicing solutions and concluded that it did. In reaching
this conclusion, the Encino Motorcars Court made two findings that
are relevant to the instant matter, and contrary to the November
2016 Decision.

First, the Court rejected the long-standing rule that exemptions to
the FLSA are to be construed narrowly.  

Second, the Court interpreted the word servicing as used in the
Exemption and concluded that it was not limited to individuals who
spend their time physically repairing automobiles but also
encompassed those who do not physically repair automobiles
themselves but who are integrally involved in the servicing
process.  

Encino Motorcars is in direct conflict with the November 2016
Decision, which found as a matter of law that the term servicing,
as used in the Exemption, did not include being involved in or
integral to the service process and that Plaintiff did not fall
within the purview of the Exemption because he did not actually
work on vehicles. Moreover, because Encino Motorcars is a decision
of the Supreme Court, this Court is bound by it. Encino Motorcars
therefore represents an intervening change in the controlling law
and warrants reconsideration of the November 2016 Decision.

The Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the Plaintiff's unpaid overtime claims.

Encino Motorcars necessitates revisiting the Court's prior finding
that the Plaintiff's work for the Defendants was not subject to the
Exemption. On reconsideration, the Court finds that, applying the
definition of servicing established in Encino Motorcars, the
Defendants have demonstrated that the Plaintiffs work was within
the scope of the Exemption and he was therefore not entitled to the
payment of overtime compensation.

As the Court explained in the November 2016 Decision, the Exemption
has three requirements: (1) an individual must fall within the
regulatory definition of partsman; (2) an individual must have been
primarily engaged in selling or servicing vehicles; and (3) the
individual must have been employed by a nonmanufacturing
establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling
vehicles.  Turning to the first of these requirements, the Court
previously found that the parties agree that Plaintiff was a
`partsman' as defined in 29 C.F.R. Section 779.372(c)(2).

The Court finds no reason to revisit that determination.

The next requirement that the Plaintiff must have been primarily
engaged in selling or servicing vehiclesis where the Court
previously found in favor of the Plaintiff. In particular, the
Court found that the Plaintiff was not primarily engaged in
servicing vehicles because, while his work was integral to the
service process he did not actually work on vehicles. Encino
Motorcars now compels a contrary conclusion.  Encino Motorcars
makes clear that work that is integral to the service process falls
within the definition of servicing as that term is used in the
Exemption. Moreover, Encino Motorcars specifically identifies a
partsman who obtains the vehicle parts and provides those parts to
the mechanics as an individual who is integrally involved in the
servicing process.

In connection with the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
Plaintiff admitted that, as a partsman at Ide, approximately 70% of
his job duties consisted of ordering, stocking, organizing and
dispensing parts for mechanics to use in the course of servicing
vehicles at Ide. On these facts, and applying the definition of
servicing set forth in Encino Motorcars, a reasonable jury would be
compelled to conclude that, while employed by the Defendants, the
Plaintiff was primarily engaged in servicing vehicles.

For these reasons, under the standards set forth in Encino
Motorcars, the Defendants have demonstrated as a matter of law
that, during his employment at Ide, the Plaintiff was a partsman
primarily engaged in servicing automobiles while employed by a
nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of
selling such vehicles to ultimate purchasers. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff was exempt from the overtime payment requirements of both
the FLSA and the NYLL, and the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as to his claims for unpaid overtime.

The Court's conclusion that the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on the Plaintiff's claims for unpaid
overtime also necessarily means that the Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment as to those claims must be denied. The Plaintiff's
motion is premised entirely on the Court's prior determination that
the Plaintiff was not subject to the Exemption because his work did
not involve servicing automobiles. Because the Court has
reconsidered and reversed that determination based on Encino
Motorcars, the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to
summary judgment in his favor.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted.
The Defendants are granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
unpaid overtime claims under both the FLSA and the NYLL.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8f5l7sd from
Leagle.com.

Jeff Buehlman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert L. Mullin, Ferr and
Mullin.

Ide Pontiac Inc & Anne Ide, individually, Defendants, represented
by Jeffrey J. Calabrese, Harter, Secrest & Emery LLP.


INTEGRATED DEVICE: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. on Dec. 18 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware on behalf of holders of Integrated Device
Technology, Inc. ("Integrated Device Technology") (NasdaqGS: IDTI)
common stock in connection with the proposed acquisition of
Integrated Device Technology by Renesas Electronics Corporation
("Renesas") announced on September 11, 2018 (the "Complaint"). The
Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against Integrated Device Technology and its Board of
Directors (the "Board"), is captioned Rosenblatt v. Integrated
Device Technology, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-01860 (D. Del.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long,
P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On September 10, 2018, Integrated Device Technology entered into an
agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Renesas.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of
Integrated Device Technology will receive $49.00 in cash for each
share of Integrated Device Technology stock they own (the "Proposed
Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a proxy statement (the
"Proxy Statement") filed with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission. The Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement
omits material information with respect to, among other things,
Integrated Device Technology's financial projections and the
analyses performed by Integrated Device Technology's financial
advisor. The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and
damages on behalf of holders of Integrated Device Technology common
stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than February 15, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

With offices in Delaware, New York, and California, Rigrodsky &
Long, P.A. -- http://www.rigrodskylong.com-- has recovered
hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of investors and achieved
substantial corporate governance reforms in numerous cases
nationwide, including federal securities fraud actions, shareholder
class actions, and shareholder derivative actions. [GN]


INTELLIPHARMACEUTICS: Court Narrows Claims in Shanawaz Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned SHAWN
SHANAWAZ, Plaintiff, v. INTELLIPHARMACEUTICS INTERNATIONAL INC., et
al., Defendants. No. 17-CV-5761 (JPO). (S.D.N.Y.).

This is a putative shareholder class action consolidated from three
related lawsuits brought against Intellipharmaceutics International
Inc. (IPCI) and two of its executives, Isa Odidi and Domenic Della
Penna (Defendants) based on their alleged violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The crux of the
plaintiffs' allegations is that Defendants misled investors
regarding the types of research and testing IPCI had performed on
one of its products, and that plaintiffs' stock value dropped once
the truth came to light.

The Amended Complaint identifies twenty-four allegedly misleading
statements made by Defendants.  

The first type of misrepresentation alleged in the Amended
Complaint concerns Defendants' statements describing the content
and scope of studies included in the Rexista NDA.The Amended
Complaint alleges that these statements were false and misleading
because Rexista's NDA in truth did not include any studies relating
to the drug's capacity for abuse via the oral or nasal pathways or
any Category 2 or Category 3 studies as suggested by the Guidance.
  
The second type of misrepresentation alleged in the Amended
Complaint concerns Defendants' statements describing Rexista's
bioequivalence to OcyContin. The Amended Complaint alleges that
these statements were false and misleading because IPCI had not
conducted studies demonstrating Rexista's bioequivalence to
Oxycontin in accordance with the Guidance.  

The third type of misrepresentation described in the Amended
Complaint relates to Defendants' descriptions of Rexista's oral and
nasal abuse-deterrent properties. The Amended Complaint alleges
that these statements were false and misleading when made because
IPCI had not conducted all studies in accordance with the 2015 FDA
Guidance necessary to demonstrate that the Company's formulation of
Rexista possessed the foregoing abuse-deterrent properties.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Lead
Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and 20(a) claims to the extent they are
based on the Defendants' statements describing Rexista's
abuse-deterrent features and its bioequivalence to OxyContin. The
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied with respect to the Lead
Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and 20(a) claims based on the Defendants'
statements describing the contents of the Rexista NDA as filed with
the FDA.

Section 10(b) Claims

The elements of Lead Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims are: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant (2)
scienter (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission (5) economic loss and (6) loss
causation.

The Defendants move to dismiss based on elements one and two of
these claims, contesting whether their statements constituted
material misrepresentations or omissions, and whether they made the
statements with the requisite level of scienter.  

Statements may constitute actionable misrepresentations under
Section 10(b) if they include any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.

Statements Regarding the Content of the Rexista NDA

In the first of those statements, which was issued on November 25,
2016, Defendants allegedly represented that the Rexista NDA
included a comprehensive array of abuse-deterrent studies conducted
to support abuse-deterrent label claims related to abuse of drug
[sic] by oral, intra-nasal and intravenous pathways, having
reference to the FDA's `Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, Evaluation and
Labelling' guidance published in April 2015.

In the other seven statements, all of which were issued between
February 2, 2017 and July 11, 2017, Defendants are alleged to have
represented that the Rexista NDA included abuse-deterrent studies
conducted to support abuse-deterrent label claims related to abuse
of the drug by various pathways, including oral, intra-nasal and
intravenous, having reference to the FDA's `Abuse-Deterrent
Opioids, Evaluation and Labelling' guidance published in April
2015.

Misrepresentation

The Defendants' public statements during the Class Period
describing the contents of the Rexista NDA are directly
contradicted by the true contents of the Rexista NDA.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that these statements may
constitute actionable misrepresentations.

For example, contrary to Defendants' public statements that the
Rexista NDA included studies related to abuse of drug by oral,
intra-nasal and intravenous pathways, the FDA later revealed that
the abuse-deterrent features of Rexista for the oral and intranasal
routes had not been formally evaluated in the NDA.

The Defendants' alleged public representations that the Rexista NDA
contained studies necessary to support nasal and oral
abuse-deterrent labelling were thus false when made, and
accordingly, these statements may constitute actionable
representations.

The context in which these statements were issued, namely as part
of press releases also describing Rexista's suite of
abuse-deterrent features and overdose prevention technologies,
would plausibly have led a reasonable investor to believe that
Defendants had fully complied with the terms of Guidance to the
extent necessary to obtain such a suite of abusedeterrent labeling.
Defendants' other statements from the Class Period, for example
their suggestion that it was their goal to receive all three
allowable deterrent claims for Rexista, would only have buttressed
such a conclusion. And the Amended Complaint includes the
assessment of a contemporary investment analyst who understood
Defendants' statements in just such a way. Yet despite these
statements, the NDA in fact contained none of the Category 2 and
Category 3 recommended by the Guidance to manufacturers seeking
such a broad spectrum of abuse-deterrent labeling.

Accordingly, the Defendants' statements describing the scope of the
NDA's compliance with the terms of the Guidance may also subject
the Defendants to Section 10(b) liability.

The Defendants contest this conclusion. In doing so, the Defendants
attempt to construe the Lead Plaintiffs' claims based on these
statements as fraud by hindsight. To support this contention, the
Defendants cite cases in which courts have held that a party's
failure to obtain FDA approval for a drug does not render earlier
statements actionable for expressing optimism about that drug's
prospects before the FDA.

The Defendants misconstrue the Lead Plaintiffs' allegations. At
issue here are not the Defendants' opinions about the NDA's
prospects before the FDA, but the Defendants' allegedly false
descriptions of the contents of the NDA itself. This case is thus
unlike those in which a drug manufacturer is alleged to have stated
an opinion about a drug's trial results and the FDA disagreed with
the Defendants' interpretation of the data. Instead, the Lead
Plaintiffs here allege that there was no such data to interpret,
because IPCI never even performed or submitted the described
studies to the FDA, despite having told the public otherwise. These
types of misstatements may constitute actionable misrepresentations
under Section 10(b).  

Section 20(a) Claims

The elements of the Lead Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims are: (1)
a primary violation by the controlled person, (2) control of the
primary violator by the defendant, and (3) that the defendant was,
in some meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled
person's fraud. Defendants move to dismiss Lead Plaintiffs' Section
20(a) claims against Defendants Odidi and Della Penna on the basis
of elements one and three.

The Lead Plaintiffs have successfully pleaded a primary violation
of Section 10(b) by a controlled person, namely IPCI, with respect
to IPCI's statements describing the contents of the Rexista NDA.
Accordingly, the Lead Plaintiffs have pleaded the first element of
control person liability for these statements. Similarly, the same
facts that were sufficient to establish that Defendants Odidi and
Della Penna acted knowingly when disseminating false information
about the contents Rexista NDA would also be sufficient to
establish that each of them was, in some meaningful sense, a
culpable participant in the controlled person's fraud. Accordingly,
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Lead Plaintiffs' Section
20(a) claims based on IPCI's statements regarding the contents of
the Rexista NDA is denied.

In contrast, because the Court has resolved to dismiss the Lead
Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims premised on the Defendants'
statements describing Rexista's abuse-deterrent features and its
bioequivalency to OxyContin, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Lead Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims based on these statements is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya74kbnm from
Leagle.com.

David Ducharme, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Kim Elaine Miller --
kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC.

Shawn Shanawaz, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Apton -- aapton@zlk.com
-- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Intellipharmaceutics International Inc., Isa Odidi & Domenic Della
Penna, Defendants, represented by John J. Clarke, Jr. --
john.clarke@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper US LLP & Rachael C. Kessler
-- rachael.kessler@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper US LLP.


JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: Judge Set to Rule in Sexual Abuse Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ainslie MacLellan, writing for CBC News, reports that a group of
complainants who accuse the Jehovah's Witnesses of failing to
protect them from sexual abuse will find out this year if a Quebec
judge will authorize their class-action lawsuit.

If approved, the class action would cover current and former
Jehovah's Witnesses, who claim they were either sexually assaulted
by an elder of the church, or sexually assaulted as children by
another Jehovah's Witness.

The request for the lawsuit was filed in the name of Lisa Blais, a
Quebec Jehovah's Witness who alleges she was abused for years by
her older brother, also a Jehovah's Witness.

It seeks $250,000 per complainant for moral and punitiv2e damages.

The lawsuit names as defendants The Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society, the parent company of Jehovah's Witnesses in Canada, as
well as the religious organization's American headquarters and
governing body.

Ms. Blais says she complained to a church elder about the alleged
abuses when she was 16, and claims Jehovah's Witnesses did nothing
to protect her.

She claims she had to leave her family home at age 17 and was
ex-communicated when she was 24, because of the fallout from the
abuse. The allegations have not been proven in court.

Each congregation is governed by a council of elders, placing them
within the church hierarchy, according to the lawsuit.

Jean St-Onge, a lawyer for the church, argued in a Montreal
courtroom on Dec. 18 that Ms. Blais has not established that the
wider church organization knew about the abuse or tried to cover it
up, calling the complainant's filing "filled with opinions,
inferences and unverified speculation."

But ex-Jehovah's witness Marilou Lagace said that elders should be
considered as church authorities with a responsibility to report
abuse.

"When you're an elder, you're an elder 24 hours a day. You have to
exercise your role as a shepherd for the congregation,"
Ms. Lagace told reporters outside the courtroom.

Penelope Herbert, another ex-Jehovah's witness attending the
hearing, claims she was sexually abused by a man in the religious
community from the time she was 10 until the age of 16.

Ms. Herbert said elders have an enormous amount of influence over
their congregation, particularly women and children. She claims
that when her family reported her allegations of abuse to elders,
nothing was done.

"We understood pretty quickly that we were to keep quiet,"
Ms. Herbert said. "Because we were going to sully the name of
Jehovah. But it wasn't me that was sullying the name of Jehovah: it
was my aggressor. But they made me carry that."

The defence referred to several policy letters put out by church
leadership, which instructed Jehovah's Witnesses to report any
cases of sexual abuse to the authorities. Elders were also
instructed to contact the church's internal legal department about
sexual abuse allegations.

Complainants argue this created a parallel legal system within the
church hierarchy that discouraged families from disclosing cases of
abuse to secular authorities, something the Jehovah's Witness
organization disputes.

In a statement, Jehovah's Witnesses Canada said the organization
does not "shield any perpetrator of child abuse from the
consequences of their crimes."

"We have and will continue to report allegations of abuse to the
authorities, in line with the Youth Protection Act," it said,
adding that elders are not a replacement for authorities.

Quebec Superior Court of Quebec Justice Chantal Corriveau must
decide whether the application is sufficiently substantiated to
authorize the collective action. [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Inks Stipulation in Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reports that a New Jersey federal court has
signed off on a stipulation submitted by parties in a class action
lawsuit filed by Johnson & Johnson stock holders against the
company in which the parties outlined deadlines for an amended
complaint and motions to dismiss.

In a Dec. 11 joint stipulation filed in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey noted that in a prior order it had
appointed the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association as
lead plaintiff and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as lead
counsel. [GN]


KAISER PERMANENTE: Must Face Black Employees' Discrimination Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
two black women who were fired from Kaiser Permanente after 16
years of employment may proceed with a class action that claims
Kaiser hospitals have a policy of discriminating against black
employees by firing them and denying them promotions.

Lunell Gamble worked in Kaiser's human resources department for 16
years, until she was fired on false allegations of falsifying work
records and acting aggressively toward her boss, she said in her
lawsuit originally filed in Alameda County Superior Court in 2016.

Ms. Gamble said she was routinely denied promotions despite her
qualifications and clean record. In 2012, Gamble said her new
supervisor Rosa Grajeda began harassing her.

Among other things, Ms. Gamble said, Ms. Grajeda followed her into
a bathroom and accused her of being lazy; scolded her in front of
co-workers for laughing; and told her that the entire department
had complained about her perfume, then acknowledged that she, Ms.
Grajeda, was the only one who complained.

Gamble said she received a "final written warning" in July 2014,
with a negative evaluation of her performance and accusations of
hostile behavior toward Ms. Grajeda. Despite making improvements
and meeting with hospital officials about the discipline imposed on
her, Kaiser fired Gamble within the month, she said.

Sheila Kennedy, who was added to the case in 2018, also worked for
Kaiser for 16 years in various positions in its chemical dependency
and rehabilitation programs. She also claims she was denied
promotions, transfers and pay raises that were given to other
non-black employees and was eventually fired when she complained.

Both women are over 40 and also claim that Kaiser discriminated
against them based on their ages.

On Dec. 18, U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers delivered a
blow to Kaiser, rejecting the hospital's argument that the women
had failed to allege plausible claims for class-wide
discrimination, writing "plaintiffs' allegations of a completely
arbitrary and subjective system for making employment decisions
including promotions are sufficient to state a claim."

Kaiser also claimed neither had identified a specific employment
policy that created a disparate impact against African-Americans in
the administrative charges they filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission prior to the lawsuit.

Judge Gonzalez Rogers rejected that argument as well, saying that
while Gamble did not raise allegations that Kaiser discriminated
against African-Americans in her charge, she can piggyback on
Kennedy's claim.

The women's attorney Jeremy Friedman said in an email that he is
still reviewing the 27-page ruling, but believes it could have a
significant influence on future employment cases involving race
discrimination.

"Judge Rogers' carefully considered opinion resolves a number of
important legal questions under California and federal laws," he
said. "We think it will be extremely helpful to the continuing
litigation of the claims in this lawsuit, and will help guide other
parties and courts addressing race discrimination and class actions
in the employment setting."

Attorneys for Kaiser could not be reached for comment on Dec. 18.
[GN]


KAPRAUN PC: Dismissal of Arnold TCPA Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael B. Hyman of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District, Second Division, affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the case, JEFF ARNOLD, d/b/a ARNOLD FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC, Individually and as the Representative of a Class of
Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAPRAUN, P.C.,
and DR. MICHAEL KAPRAUN, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 1-17-2854
(Ill. App.).

On March 2, 2006, and again in September 2006, Defendants Kapraun,
P.C., and Dr. Michael Kapraun and others allegedly "faxed" an
unsolicited one-page advertisement to 7877 recipients without
express permission or invitation.  The original complaint, filed on
July 7, 2009, tolled the statute of limitations.

The complaint alleged violations of the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA") and common law conversion and did
not name Dr. Michael Kapraun and Kapraun, P.C., as the Defendants.
Six months later, the complaint was amended to add Kapraun and
Kapraun, P.C., as the Defendants.  The Plaintiff's attorneys,
however, voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit and, at the same time,
filed a new class action with Byer Clinic serving as a Plaintiff.

In June 2011, Byer Clinic voluntarily dismissed all the Defendants
except Dr. Kapraun and Kapraun, P.C.  Thereafter, the trial court
certified a class of recipients of Kapraun's faxes and appointed
Byer Clinic as class representative.  Kapraun appealed to the court
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8).

On Jan. 19, 2016, the Appellate Court issued Byer Clinic &
Chiropractic, Ltd. v. Kapraun, 2016 IL App (1st) 143733, reversing
the class certification because Byer Clinic & Chiropractic, Ltd.
(i) lacked the ability to fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class and (ii) did not satisfy the commonality
requirement for certification as the class representative.  The
Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, since
Byer Clinic's individual action remained viable.

Byer Clinic petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court.  The PLA was denied on May 25, 2016.  The clerk of the
appellate court issued the mandate on July 5, 2016.

On Aug. 22, 2016, Jeff Arnold petitioned for leave to intervene as
class representative for the recipients of the March 2006 faxes.
On Feb. 24, 2017, Kapraun moved to dismiss the complaint under
section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2016)), arguing mootness and the statute of
limitations, and to strike the class claims under section 2-615 of
the Code.

After a hearing, the trial court found the statute of limitations
resumed running on May 25, 2016, the date of the denial of the PLA,
which left 64 days before the four-year statute of limitations on
TCPA violations expired.  Arnold's August 22 petition to intervene
was filed 89 days after the denial of the PLA.  The trial court
dismissed the complaint for expiration of the statute of
limitations.

Judge Hyman agree with the trial court's observation that Arnold
offered no authority for the proposition that a class may be
'mostly' or 'partly' certified."  Neither the Court nor the trial
court knows of any authority for Arnold's argument, and Byer Clinic
cites none in its briefs.  Simply put, without a class
representative, no certified class exists under Illinois law.

The Judge then holds that the statute of limitations resumed the
day the supreme court denied the PLA.  Accordingly, the intervening
Plaintiff waited too long to move to intervene.  After the supreme
court denied the PLA, they could have moved in the appellate court
to expedite the issuance of the mandate.  As they had done with
Byer Clinic, they could have filed a separate class action with
Arnold as the putative class representative.  Or they could have
filed more promptly after the mandate issued.

The appellate court mandate was issued on July 5, revesting the
circuit court with jurisdiction.  Even if Arnold waited until after
the mandate issued, he still would have had about three weeks of
daylight before the sun set on his claim, ample time.  The trial
court's dismissal was proper.

For these reasons, Judge Hyman affirmed the trial court's
dismissal.  His decision obviates the need to consider the
Plaintiff's remaining arguments on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/XUpOd0 from Leagle.com.


KINDER MORGAN: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Gas Emissions
----------------------------------------------------------
Arundhati Sarkar and John Benny, writing for Reuters, report that
Kinder Morgan is facing a proposed class action lawsuit, claiming
that a division of the pipeline operator has emitted chemicals and
toxic gas that caused damage to property and killed animals.

A Texas-based resident filed a petition and requested class
certification against the company and its Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Company unit, and petitioned other landowners.

According to the petition filed on Dec. 17 at a Harris County
court, plaintiffs claim that the pipeline, which transports natural
gas from Louisiana to the northeast section of the United States,
has released at least 565,000 cubic feet of toxic gases and other
chemicals.

Kinder Morgan said the petition contained numerous misstatements
and is working with nearby landowners to remediate any impacts to
their property.

In an emailed statement, the company said its unit was aware of
seven landowners in close proximity who have been affected by the
"mist", not "thousands of people" as alleged in the lawsuit.

The plaintiffs are seeking monetary compensation of at least US$5
million, according to the petition filed by Potts Law Firm LLP and
the law offices of Patrick Zummo.

Micah Dortch, who is representing the plaintiffs, said Kinder
Morgan refused to provide a sample of the released chemical.

However, the company said it had provided safety data sheets to the
landowners and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. [GN]


KOHLER CO: Wendel Rosen Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Garret Murai, Esq. -- gmurai@wendel.com -- of Wendel, Rosen, Black
& Dean LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that nothing brings
neighbors closer together than class action residential
construction defect litigation.

In Kohler Co. v. Superior Court, Case No. B288935 (November 14,
2018), the Second District Court of Appeal addressed whether
neighbors can bring class action lawsuits under the Right to Repair
Act. For those who are regular readers of the California
Construction Law Blog you're familiar with the Right to Repair Act
codified at Civil Code sections 895 et seq.

For those of you who aren't here's a short history. In 1998, in Aas
v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.4th 916, the California Supreme
Court held that economic damages arising from construction defects,
say a defective roof (as opposed to damage to your holiday gifts as
a result of water damage resulting from the defective roof), are
not recoverable if the basis for liability is negligence (e.g.,
faulty workmanship) or strict liability (e.g., defective
materials).

To limit the application of the Aas case to newly constructed
residential housing, including single family homes and condominiums
(but not condominium conversions), the California legislature
enacted SB 800 also known as the Right to Repair Act. The Right to
Repair Act permits homeowners of newly constructed residential
housing to sue for economic damages alone if new residential
construction does not meet certain enumerated construction
standards set forth under the Right to Repair Act and the homeowner
satisfies the pre-litigation procedures of the Act.

One aspect the Right to Repair Act does not clearly address,
however, is if homeowners can join together and bring a class
action lawsuit under the statute.

Kohler Co. v. Superior Court
In Kohler, two homeowners, Joanna Park-Kim and Maria Cecilia Ramos,
filed a lawsuit against Kohler Co. on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated  throughout California. The plaintiffs
alleged that "Rite-Temp Pressure Balancing Valves" and "Mixer Caps"
manufactured by Kohler, which are used to regulate water flow and
temperature in household plumbing, were "corroding, failing, and/or
will inevitably fail" and violated the construction standards of
the Right to Repair Act.  Kohler sold approximately 630,000 of
these valves and mixer caps in California during the relevant
period.

While the case was pending, Kohler filed a motion claiming that the
Plaintiffs could not bring a class action lawsuit under the Right
to Repair Act. The trial court denied Kohler's motion but certified
its ruling for appellate review finding that the issue presented a
controlling question of law upon which there were substantial
grounds for differences of opinion.

The Appellate Court Decision
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal focused on Section
931 of the Right to Repair Act, which provides that, when
construction defect claims combine causes of action or damages that
are not covered under the Right to Repair Act (i.e., construction
defects that are not among enumerated construction standards of the
Act) with other claims involving construction defects that are
covered by the Act, that those defects that are covered by the Act
are to be administered according to the Act (i.e., the
pre-litigation procedures of the Act). Specifically, Section 931
provides:

If a claim combines causes of action or damages not covered by this
part, including, without limitation, personal injuries, class
actions, other statutory remedies, or fraud-based claims, the
claimed unmet standards shall be administered according to this
part, although evidence of the property in its unrepaired condition
may be introduced to support the respective elements of any such
cause of action. As to any fraud-based claim, if the fact that the
property has been repaired under this chapter is deemed admissible,
the trier of fact shall be informed that the repair was not
voluntarily accepted by the homeowner. As to any class action
claims that address solely the incorporation of a defective
component into a residence, the named and unnamed class members
need not comply with this chapter.

Describing Section 931 as "somewhat obtuse," the court noted that
while the inclusion of the term "class actions" in the first
sentence implies that class actions cannot be brought under the
Right to Repair Act, the last sentence of the section that "any
class action claims that address solely the incorporation of a
defective competent into a residence" suggests that certain class
actions might be able to be brought under the Act.

Looking to the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act, the
Court of Appeals held that class actions may not be brought under
the Right to the Repair Act, "with one very narrow exception."

The Court of Appeal referred to a Senate bill analysis of SB 800
discussing the pre-litigation procedures of the Right to Repair
Act, which stated: "The bill establishes a mandatory process prior
to the filing of a construction defect action. The major component
of this process is the builder's absolute right to attempt a repair
prior to a homeowner filing an action in court. Builders, insurers
and other business groups are hopeful that this right to repair
will reduce litigation." The Court concluded that "it makes sense"
that "the Legislature intended to exclude class actions for
virtually any claim under the Act, because class actions make
prelitigation resolution impossible." Moreover, held the Court:

Even if the named plaintiffs bringing a class action comply with
the prelitigation process, thus giving the builder of their homes
an opportunity to attempt to repair whatever defect is claimed as
to their homes, the builders of other homes are given no such
opportunity with respect to the unnamed class members, thus
thwarting one of the most significant aspects of the Act.

However, held the Court of Appeal, Section 931 does carve out one
narrow, or, as the Court stated, one "very narrow" exception to the
Right Repair Act.  And that is claims that solely involve the
incorporation of a defective component into a home.

And, here, because the plaintiffs' claims against Kohler alleged
that the defective valves and mixers violated several of the
enumerated construction standards set forth under the Right to
Repair Act causing damage to other components in their homes, the
Court of Appeal held that their claims did not solely involve
incorporation of a defective component in their homes, and further,
involved an allegedly defective manufactured product that is
excluded under Section 896 of the Right to Repair Act, which
excludes "any action seeking recovery solely for a defect in a
manufactured product located within or adjacent to a structure."

"In short," held the Court of Appeal, the Right to Repair Act "does
not permit class action claims except when those claims address
solely the incorporation into the home of a defective component
other than a product that is completely manufactured offsite."

Conclusion
Kohler Co. clarifies that, with one very narrow exception, class
action lawsuits cannot be brought under the Right to Repair Act.
Furthermore, while the Court did not directly address what
constitutes a "defective component other than a product that is
completely manufactured offsite," it would seem that this is
indeed, as the Court of Appeal stated, a very narrow exception that
would exclude class action claims involving most  manufactured
products except products built in whole or in part at a project.
Maybe I've had too much eggnog, but I can't even imagine what those
types of products might be. [GN]


KRISHNA HOLDING: Singh Seeks Unpaid OT Wages, Spread-of-Hours Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Narinder Singh, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Krishna Holding Inc. and Senthil Kumar,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-07426 (E.D. N.Y., December 28, 2018),
seeks compensation for wages paid at less than the statutory
minimum wage, unpaid wages from defendants for overtime work for
which they did not receive overtime premium pay as required by law,
and liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
New York Labor Law, as well as "spread of hours" requirements of
New York Labor Law and statutory damages for violation of the Wage
Theft Prevention Act.

Defendants own, operate, or control three ethnic foods
supermarkets, operating under the trade name Maharaja Farmers
Market where Singh was employed as a cashier and stock clerk at
their supermarket located in Queens, New York at 249-12 Hillside
Avenue, Bellerose, New York 11426. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Arthur H. Forman, Esq.
      98-20 Metropolitan Avenue
      Forest Hills, NY 11375
      Tel: (718) 268-2616


LEGEND MAKERS: Cooperman Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
Marcie Cooperman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Legend Makers, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-01751
(W.D. Wash., December 6, 2018), is brought against the Defendant
for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that from December 9, 2016, through October
2018, the Defendant sent texts to Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular
telephone number via an "automatic telephone dialing system".

The Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Los Angeles, County of
Los Angeles, State of California.

The Defendant is located in the City of Seattle, in the State of
Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
      Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      2633 E. Indian School Road, Ste. 460
      Phoenix, AZ 85016
      Tel: (800) 400-6808
      Fax: (800) 520-552
      E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
              ryan@kazlg.com


LOUISIANA: S&WB Attorneys Present Arguments in Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
According to The Times-Picayune Editorial Board, the Sewerage &
Water Board is claiming Louisiana law protects it from having to
pay anything for flood damage to homes and businesses in 2017.

In a brief responding to nine lawsuits for damage done in July and
August 2017, S&WB attorneys argued that the law protects the
utility during emergencies, making it "immune from liability for
policymaking and discretionary acts."

What about negligence? There shouldn't be any protection from
that.

Does the Sewerage & Water Board plan to argue that its
"discretionary act" was to let pumps deteriorate to the point of
being useless? Or it used discretion to have some pumping stations
unmanned? That doesn't seem likely to persuade a judge to give them
a pass.

Essentially everyone in New Orleans knows the utility failed to
keep its pumps in working condition and then lied about it after an
Aug. 5, 2017, rainstorm swamped Mid-City, Lakeview and Gentilly.

During that storm, three of five power turbines were down, and nine
major drainage pumps weren't operating. In Lakeview, a drainage
pump wasn't turned on until almost 9 p.m., five hours after an
alarm signaled the S&WB it was needed, according to
FixThePumps.blogspot. There was no pump operator at the station
until 7:50 p.m., the blog reported, and operator's initial request
to start the pump was denied, apparently because of power
problems.

The Sewerage & Water Board's top managers made the whole situation
worse by lying about the condition of the pumps. They initially
said the pumps were working at capacity, but finally admitted the
truth under questioning by the City Council.

Those people are no longer running the Sewerage & Water Board, but
their ineptitude is clear.

"It's not discretionary," Joseph Bruno, a lawyer representing
residents and businesses in the class-action suit, said. "They
didn't turn on the pumps and misrepresented to the city and those
in charge about their obligations to do what they're there to do."

Exactly.

Blaine LeCesne, a professor at Loyola University's law school, said
the state law in question is meant to protect government agencies
when they are acting quickly to respond to an emergency. But that's
not the situation here.

"These are alleged failures that go to the very core of the
Sewerage & Water Board's responsibility," he said in an interview
with NOLA.com | The Times-Picayune. "To cast those failures as a
function of an emergency and a discretionary decision on their
part, is a bit of a stretch in my mind."

Mr. Bruno has had some success in a 2015 lawsuit representing
roughly 300 homeowners and businesses seeking compensation for
damage done during construction of drainage canals Uptown. In
April, five of the homeowners collectively were awarded more than
$500,000 by Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott.

The flood class-action suit includes a 91-year-old resident in St.
Roch who had more than 2 feet of water in her house and a totaled
car. Sixth Union Baptist Church said it had water and mold damage
to walls and floors, with a flood line stain between 3 and 4 feet
high on the first floor. Another owner spent more than $40,000 on
water and mold damage at two rental properties near Orleans Avenue
and Broad Street, according to the lawsuit.

The flood cases were filed in the summer, so it likely will be
awhile before they are decided. A judge will have to figure out who
is owed what.

But one thing seems clear: The S&WB's argument for immunity is
bogus. [GN]


M&T BANK: 3d Cir. Partly Affirms Dismissal of Jaroslawicz Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID JAROSLAWICZ, v. M&T BANK CORPORATION; HUDSON
CITY BANCORP INC.; *THE ESTATE OF ROBERT G. WILMERS, BY ITS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES ELISABETH ROCHE WILMERS, PETER MILLIKEN,
AND HOLLY McALLISTER SWETT; RENE F. JONES; MARK J. CZARNECKI; BRENT
D. BAIRD; ANGELA C. BONTEMPO; ROBERT T. BRADY; T. JEFFERSON
CUNNINGHAM, III; GARY N. GEISEL; JOHN D. HAWKE, JR.; PATRICK W.E.
HODGSON; RICHARD G. KING; JORGE G. PEREIRA; MELINDA R. RICH; ROBERT
E. SADLER, JR.; HERBERT L. WASHINGTON; DENIS J. SALAMONE; MICHAEL
W. AZZARA; VICTORIA H. BRUNI; DONALD O. QUEST; JOSEPH G. SPONHOLZ;
CORNELIUS E. GOLDING; WILLIAM G. BARDEL; SCOTT A. BELAIR BELINA
FAMILY; JEFF KRUBLIT, Appellants (*Amended pursuant to Clerk's
Order dated 3/1/18), Case No. 17-3695 (3d Cir.), Judge Thomas I.
Vanaskie of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (i)
vacated the District Court's dismissal of the suit concerning
mandatory disclosure under Item 503(c) and (ii) affirmed its
dismissal of the claims concerning misleading opinions.

The case arises out of the 2015 merger of consumer banks Hudson and
M&T.  According to former Hudson shareholders, the banks violated
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 14a-9 of the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), by omitting several facts concerning
M&T's regulatory compliance from their joint proxy materials.  The
alleged omissions concerned two non-compliant practices: (1) M&T's
having advertised no-fee checking accounts but later switching
those accounts to fee-based accounts (the "consumer violations");
and (2) deficiencies in M&T's Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money
laundering compliance program, particularly its "Know Your
Customer" program ("BSA/AML deficiencies").  Beyond these general
descriptions, the parties do not provide any more detail about
M&T's allegedly non-compliant practices.

In October 2015, Jaroslawicz, a former Hudson shareholder, filed a
putative class action on behalf of Hudson shareholders, claiming,
inter alia, that the joint proxy materials violated the Exchange
Act's prohibition against misleading omissions.  The original
complaint named M&T, Hudson, and their directors and officers as
the Defendants.  In January 2016, the District Court appointed the
Belina Family, former Hudson shareholders, to serve as the lead
Plaintiffs.  One month later, the Belina Family and Plaintiff
Krublit, another former shareholder, filed an amended complaint.

M&T moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, which the
District Court granted.  The District Court reasoned that the first
amended complaint failed to plausibly allege an actionable
omission. However, in light of allegations made for the first time
during oral argument, the District Court granted leave to amend so
that the shareholders could assert allegations the Court believed
constituted misleading omissions.  Additionally, it observed, in a
conclusory fashion, that the shareholders had plausibly alleged
loss causation and negligence.

The shareholders then filed their second amended complaint, adding
the allegations which the District Court had identified as
potentially relevant.  M&T moved to dismiss the second amended
complaint.  The shareholders objected to the motion as duplicative
of the earlier motion to dismiss and, alternatively, argued that
the complaint was sufficiently pled.  Before resolving the motion,
the District Court requested additional briefing on the
applicability of Item 503(c) to the Joint Proxy.  The parties filed
a joint response, stating that Schedule 14A, and that, therefore,
M&T had been required to comply with Item 503(c).

The District Court then granted M&T's second motion to dismiss.
After rejecting the shareholders' procedural arguments, it
concluded that the second amended complaint failed to plead an
actionable omission under either a mandatory disclosure or
misleading opinion theory.  In particular, the District Court
concluded that the complaint failed to plausibly allege that, at
the time the proxy materials issued, the consumer violations posed
a risk to regulatory approval of the merger.  Additionally, it
concluded that, as a matter of law, M&T had adequately disclosed in
the Joint Proxy the risk that the BSA/AML deficiencies posed to the
merger.  It Court was silent with regard to loss causation and
negligence.  Once again, the District Court granted the motion to
dismiss without prejudice, giving the shareholders another
opportunity to amend their pleadings.

The shareholders elected to stand on their second amended
complaint.  Shortly thereafter, the District Court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.  The shareholders timely filed their
Notice of Appeal.

The Court invited the SEC to participate in the appeal as amicus.
On July 13, 2018, it received a letter from David R. Fredrickson,
Chief Counsel of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance,
declining to participate as amicus but providing background
information on the legal obligations imposed by the federal
securities laws at issue in the case.

Judge Vanaskie vacated in part and affirmed in part the District
Court's Order dated Nov. 21, 2017.  Among other things, he finds
that (i) the District Court erred when it concluded that the second
amended complaint failed to plausibly allege that the consumer
violations posed a significant risk to the merger at the time the
Joint Proxy issued; (ii) concludes that the shareholders alleged a
plausible claim for relief under Item 503(c) regarding M&T's
inadequate disclosure of the consumer violations; (iii) the
solitary allegation concerning sampling is too weak to defeat the
motion to dismiss; and (iv) the shareholders' allegations of loss
causation are sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

On remand, the District Court is directed to proceed to discovery
on the mandatory-disclosure claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/z7TUtb from Leagle.com.

Deborah R. Gross, Esq. -- debbie@bernardmgross.com -- [Argued],
Kaufman Coren & Ress, 2001 Market Street, Two Commerce Square,
Suite 3900, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Francis J. Murphy, Esq. --
fmurphy@msllaw.com -- Jonathan L. Parshall, Esq., Murphy & Landon,
1011 Centre Road, Suite 210, Wilmington, DE 19805, Laurence D.
Paskowitz, Esq. -- lpaskowitz@pasklaw.com -- Suite 380, 208 East
51st Street, New York, NY 10022, Counsel for Appellants Belina
Family and Jeff Krublit.

George T. Conway, III, Esq. --  GTConway@wlrk.com -- -- Bradley R.
Wilson Esq., Jordan L. Pietzsch, Esq. -- JLPietzsch@wlrk.com --
Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, 51 West 52nd Street, New York, NY
10019, John C. Cordrey, Esq. -- jcordrey@reedsmith.com -- Brian M.
Rostocki, Esq., Reed Smith, 1201 Market Street, Suite 1500,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Counsel for Appellees M&T Bank Corporation,
The, Estate of Robert G. Wilmers, Rene F. Jones, Mark J.,
Czarnecki, Brent D. Baird, Angela C. Bontempo, Robert T. Brady, T.
Jefferson Cunningham, III, Gary, N. Geisel, John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Patrick W.E. Hodgson, Richard G. King, Jorge G. Pereira, Melinda A.
Rich, Robert E. Sadler, Jr., and Herbert L. Washington.

Tracy R. High, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell, 125 Broad Street, New
York, NY 10004, Kevin R. Shannon, Esq., Potter Anderson & Corroon,
1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, Counsel
for Appellees Denis J. Salamone, Michael W., Azzara, Victoria H.
Bruni, Donald O. Quest, Joseph G., Sponholz, Cornelius E. Golding,
William G. Bardel, and Scott A. Belair.


MARBLECAST OF MICHIGAN: Summ. Judgment in Garner TCPA Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARNER PROPERTIES & MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v.
MARBLECAST OF MICHIGAN, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-11439
(E.D. Mich.), Judge Victoria A. Roberts of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, granted
Defendant American Woodmark Corp.'s motion for summary judgment.

On May 4, 2017, Garner, individually and as a representative of
similarly-situated persons, filed suit against Defendants
Marblecast and American Woodmark.  Garner says the Defendants
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), by sending
it and the similarly-situated persons unsolicited fax
advertisements.

Marblecast is a Michigan kitchen and bath contractor.  American
Woodmark is a kitchen and bath cabinet manufacturer based in
Virginia.  In November 2016, Garner received an unsolicited fax
referencing Marblecast's complete line of quality cultured marble
and solid surface.  The Fax provides Marblecast's website and
contact information for "Bud" at Marblecast.

Garner filed a class action suit against Marblecast and American
Woodmark, alleging that the Defendants are liable under the TCPA
and for conversion based on the Fax sent to Garner and at least 39
other recipients.  

The Court previously dismissed Garner's conversion claim.  It noted
in its earlier order that Garner plausibly stated a strict
liability cause of action that American Woodmark is a "sender"
under the TCPA, because its goods were advertised or promoted in
the Fax. However, after the Court's order, the Sixth Circuit
decided Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe P.L.L.C. v. Mohawk,
Inc., 889 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2018).

American Woodmark now moves for ummary judgment on Garner's strict
liability claim, arguing that Garner failed to offer evidence from
which a reasonable juror could find that American Woodmark "sent"
the Fax, as the Health One Court interpreted the meaning of the
term "sender" under the TCPA and its applicable regulations.

Judge Roberts holds that given American Woodmark's clear lack of
knowledge and involvement -- and the evidence showing that
Marblecast sent the Fax to advertise its own business and would
have sent it even had it never contracted with American Woodmark --
no reasonable juror could find that American Woodmark "sent" the
Fax, as that term is defined by the TCPA in accordance with the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Health One.  American Woodmark simply
did not cause the Fax to be sent.  There is no genuine issue of
material fact for trial.

Earlier, the Court dismissed Garner's "on whose behalf" theory of
liability under the TCPA.  It gave Garner the opportunity to file
for leave to amend its complaint should facts supporting American
Woodmark's liability under the "on whose behalf" theory arise.
Garner never did so.  Garner's attempt to revive the claim in its
response to American Woodmark's motion for summary judgment is
inappropriate; the Court declines Garner's request.

Judge Roberts concludes that Health One squarely addressed whether
"sender" liability under the TCPA could be imposed where an entity
is completely unaware that its information is included in a fax
that it did not send or cause to be sent.  She granted American
Woodmark's motion for summary judgment.  No reasonable juror could
find that American Woodmark sent the Fax under the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of the TCPA in Health One.  The Judge dismissed
Garner's TCPA claim against American Woodmark with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xQR5bl from Leagle.com.

Garner Properties & Management, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by
Aaron D. Cox -- Aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com -- Law Offices of Aaron D.
Cox PLLC, David M. Oppenheim, Bock, Hatch, Lewis, & Oppenheim, LLC,
Mark K. Wasvary -- markwasvary@hotmail.com -- Becker and Wasvary,
Robert M. Hatch -- robert@classlawyers.com -- Macey, Chern, Tod A.
Lewis, Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC &
Phillip A. Bock -- phil@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Marblecast of Michigan, Inc., Defendant, represented by Raymond I.
Foley, II, Foley Law Offices.


MARIN COUNTY: Court Issues Pretrial Preparation Order in Thayer
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued a Pretrial Preparation Order in the case
captioned CYNTHIA THAYER, Plaintiffs, v. MARIN COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT, Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-01505-SI (SI) (CIVIL). (N.D.
Cal.).

FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT: April 5, 2019 at 3:00 PM. Counsel must
file a joint case management statement seven days in advance of the
conference.

NON-EXPERT DISCOVERY CUTOFF is: August 30, 2019.

DESIGNATION OF EXPERTS: September 6, 2019; REBUTTAL: September 27,
2019;

EXPERT DISCOVERY CUTOFF is: October 11, 2019.

DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS SHALL be filed by; October 18, 2019;

Opp. Due: November 1, 2019;

Reply Due: November 8, 2019; and

Set for hearing no later than November 22, 2019 at 9:00 AM.

January 13, 2020 TRIAL DATE: Jury at 8:30 AM.

The pretrial conference will be attended by trial counsel prepared
to discuss all aspects of the case, including settlement. Parties
must conform to the attached instructions. The Plaintiff is ordered
to serve a copy of this order on any party subsequently joined in
this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc9bjrns from Leagle.com.

Cynthia Thayer, Plaintiff, represented by Asit S. Panwala --
asit@panwalalaw.com -- Law Office of Asit Panwala.

Marin County Superior Court, Defendant, represented by Katherine A.
Alberts -- kalberts@leonealberts.com -- Leone & Alberts, a
Professional Corporation.


MARRIOTT INT'L: B.C. Residents File Data Breach Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Campbell, writing for Richmond News, reports that a class
action lawsuit on behalf of B.C. residents has been filed against
the Marriot group of hotels after a data breach in November.

Vancouver-based Hammerberg Lawyers filed the proposed class action
on behalf of B.C. residents whose personal information has been
affected as a result of the Marriott/Starwood data breach
incident.

On Nov. 30, Marriott -- which has two hotel in Richmond, the
Vancouver Airport Marriot and the Four Points by Sheraton --
reported that unauthorized parties had illegally accessed
Marriott's Starwood Hotels guest reservation database and obtained
personal information of individuals who made reservations at their
properties.

Marriott lists its Starwood brands as including W Hotels, St.
Regis, Sheraton Hotels & Resorts, Westin Hotels & Resorts, Element
Hotels, Aloft Hotels, The Luxury Collection, Tribute Portfolio, Le
Meridien Hotels & Resorts, Four Points by Sheraton and Design
Hotels, and Starwood branded timeshare properties.

People who made a reservation on or before Sept. 10 at a Starwood
property may have been affected by the data breach.

Any resident of B.C. who believes they may have been affected is
encouraged to visit the Helpforme website to register for the
proposed class action by completing the contact form at
HelpForMe.ca/contact. [GN]


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Braun Sues Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Marvin Braun and Penn Chabrow, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Marriott International, Inc., Case No.
1:18-cv-25136 (S.D. Fla., December 6, 2018), seeks damages for
negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and unjust
enrichment.

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action to seek redress on
behalf of all Marriott former and current customers whose personal
identifying information have been compromised as a result of
Marriott's failure to adequately protect and secure its systems,
including the Starwood guest reservation database.

The Plaintiff Marvin Braun is a citizen of Florida who, at all
relevant times, has resided in Miami, Miami-Dade County, Florida.
Prior to September 10, 2018, Plaintiff Braun made reservations at
Marriott properties, including Starwood properties, such as the St.
Regis and Sheraton, entrusting Marriott with aggregating his
personal identifying information.

The Plaintiff Penn Chabrow is a citizen of Florida who, at all
relevant times, has resided in Miami, Miami-Dade County, Florida.
Prior to September 10, 2018, Plaintiff Chabrow made reservations at
Marriott properties, including Starwood properties, such as Westin,
W Hotels, Le Meridien, and Sheraton.

The Defendant Marriott International, Inc. is a Delaware
corporation with a principal executive office located at 10400
Fernwood Road, Bethesda, Maryland. Defendant owns and operates over
435 hotels within the State of Florida, including within the
Southern District of Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Julie Braman Kane, Esq.
      COLSON HICKS EIDSON, P.A.
      255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse
      Coral Gables, FL 33134
      Tel: (305) 476.7400
      Fax: (305) 476.7444
      E-mail: julie@colson.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Sued over Starwood Hotel Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
MARC WEINBERG and VICTORIA NEIKIRK, the Plaintiffs, vs. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL INC. and STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-03966-TDC (D. Md., Dec. 24, 2018),
alleges that Defendants failed to secure and safeguard the
personally identifiable information ("PII") of up to approximately
500 million of their customers, including passport numbers of up to
327 million of these customers which Marriott's Starwood division
collected and maintained.

According to the complaint, the Defendants maintain and operate a
customer reservation and rewards database which they refer to as
the "Starwood guest reservation database." This is separate from
the guest reservation system Marriott uses for guest reservations
for its non-Starwood properties. Starwood used the "Starwood guest
reservation database" as its guest reservation system before
Starwood was acquired by Marriott in 2016.

On November 30, 2018, Marriott disclosed that it had suffered an
extremely significant data breach. It stated that "on September 8,
2018, it received an alert from an internal security tool regarding
an attempt to access the Starwood guest reservation database in the
United States." Marriott learned during the investigation "that
there had been unauthorized access to the Starwood network since
2014. The Company recently discovered that an unauthorized party
had copied and encrypted PII. On November 19, 2018, Marriott was
able to decrypt the PII and determined that the contents were from
the Starwood guest reservation database."

The Company, in its announcement of November 30, stated that it
believed the corrupted data base had information on up to
approximately 500 million guests who made a reservation at a
Starwood property. For approximately 327 million of these guests,
the PII includes some combination of name, mailing address, phone
number, email address, passport number, Starwood Preferred Guest
("SPG") account information, date of birth, gender, arrival and
departure information, and reservation date. The PII of the
Plaintiffs and the other customers who used Starwood's reservation
system they seek to represent was compromised due to Marriott
and/or Starwood's acts and omissions and their failure to properly
protect their customer's PII.

Marriott and/or Starwood could have prevented this Data Breach.
They disregarded the rights of Plaintiffs and the other Class
members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently
failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure that the
Starwood data systems were protected, failing to disclose to their
customers the material fact that Starwood and/or Marriott did not
have adequate security practices to safeguard the PII that Starwood
customers had disclosed to Starwood and/or Marriott with the
understanding they would be secure; failing to take available steps
to prevent and stop the breach from ever happening; and failing to
monitor and detect the breach on a timely basis. As a result of the
Data Breach, Plaintiffs and the other Class members have been
exposed, in all likelihood, to criminals for misuse of their PII,
the lawsuit says.

Marriott International is an American multinational diversified
hospitality company that manages and franchises a broad portfolio
of hotels and related lodging facilities.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Putative Class:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Ste. 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          Jay Brody, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Rd.
          Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356-2570
          Facsimile: (845) 356-4335
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
                  jbrody@kgglaw.com

METROPCS COMMS: Arbitration Bid Denial in Porter TCPA Suit Flipped
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MetroPCS Communications, Inc. and MetroPCS Florida,
LLC, Appellants, v. Jorge Porter, Appellee, Case No. 3D17-375 (Fla.
Dist. App.), the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third
District, reversed the trial court's denial of the
Defendans'request for enforcement of an arbitration provision
against Porter.

Porter filed the putative class action claiming that MetroPCS
violated Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act when it
improperly charged Porter and other MetroPCS customers sales tax on
the full price of mobile phones purchased using a rebate.  MetroPCS
moved to compel arbitration of the claim based on a provision found
in its terms and conditions of service.

The trial court summarily denied MetroPCS' motion.  In MetroPCS
Communications, Inc. v. Porter, 114 So.3d 348, 348 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013), the Court reversed the summary denial for a determination
after an evidentiary hearing of the threshold issue of whether the
arbitration clause was contained in a binding agreement between the
parties.

On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing where it
heard testimony from Porter, Mr. Avila, the former MetroPCS sales
agent who sold Porter his phone in 2012, and MetroPCS
representative, Ms. Brown.  The testimony and documents admitted
revealed the process used by MetroPCS to inform its customers of
its terms of use.  Three different notice methods are germane to
Porter's interaction with MetroPCS: (1) written documents at sale;
(2) pre-litigation text messages; and (3) post-litigation text
messages.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that Porter
did not receive the purchase documents.  Additionally, although it
found that Porter received both the pre-litigation and
post-litigation text messages, the trial court concluded that the
messages did not put Porter on notice of the arbitration provision.
Thus, the trial court decided there was no binding agreement to
arbitrate and again denied the motion to compel arbitration.
MetroPCS appeals this ruling.

The Court finds that the key issues in most cases involving
electronic contract formation is notice and manifestation of
assent.  The notice to Porter via the pre-litigation text messages
was more direct.  Between the sale and the filing of the action,
MetroPCS sent text messages to Porter each month letting Porter
know that payment for next month's service was due and then
acknowledging payment for the service.  These text messages
informed Porter that terms and conditions applied to use of the
service.  The reference to terms and conditions was a hyperlink
which Porter could use to read the terms and conditions.  The
hyperlink was at the end of the short text messages.  In marked
contrast to the circumstances in Vitacost.com and other browsewrap
cases, the hyperlink was not buried in pages of information or
hidden at the foot of a web page.  Here, the notice that terms and
conditions applied was conspicuous.

Porter admitted he saw the messages and the trial court found that
Porter received the text message.  He also testified he understood
the messages contained a hyperlink which he could use to read the
terms and conditions.  Porter simply chose not to click on the
hyperlink.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that because Porter was put
on notice that his contract with MetroPCS was subject to
arbitration, it reversed the trial court's order denying
arbitration on the ground that the parties did not agree to
arbitrate disputes arising from their contract.  The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Opinion.  The
Opinion is not final until disposition of timely filed motion for
rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wu9kb3 from Leagle.com.

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (San Francisco), Michael J. Sortz --
michael.maimone@dbr.com -- (San Francisco), Carlton Fields Jorden
Burt, P.A., Aaron S. Weiss -- aweiss@carltonfields.com -- and
Steven M. Blickensderfer -- sblickensderfer@carltonfields.com --
for appellants.

Dorta Law, Gonzalo R. Dorta -- grd@dortalaw.com -- for appellee.


MILLER & MILONE: Court Dismisses Taubenfliegel FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned ELIZABETH TAUBENFLIEGEL on
behalf of herself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff, v. MILLER & MILONE, P.C., Defendant. No. 18-CV-1884
(ERK) (JO). (E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Elizabeth Taubenfliegel brings this putative class action
against defendant debt collector Miller & Milone, P.C., alleging
that the collection letter she received violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

The sole basis for the plaintiff's claim is that the letter she
received merely names the creditor without specifically identifying
the entity as the current creditor to whom the debt is owed in
violation of the FDCPA.   

According to the plaintiff, it is unclear that the hospital is the
current creditor, even though the letter (1) identifies the
hospital in the subject line (2) states that defendant represents
the hospital in connection with your outstanding bill and further
specifies the (3) patient name, (4) hospital account number, and
(5) date of service.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, a genuine
dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

The FDCPA generally forbids collectors from engaging in unfair
deceptive, or harassing behavior and establishes certain rights for
consumers whose debts are placed in the hands of professional debt
collectors for collection. To that end, Section 1692g(a)(2) of the
FDCPA requires that a written debt collection notice contain the
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.

Here, the collection letter explains that the defendant represents
the hospital creditor in connection with the plaintiff's
outstanding bill and lists a patient name, hospital account number,
date of service, and amount due. These details, read together with
the rest of the letter, compel the conclusion that the defendant
was collecting a debt on behalf of the creditor hospital. Although
the word creditor is not used, the FDCPA does not require debt
collectors to use magic words to avoid liability.

On the same basis, no reasonable jury could conclude here that
defendant violated the FDCPA. And none of the cases upon which
plaintiff relies suggests otherwise, as each involved letters
containing substantially less context regarding the current
creditor's identity.  

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted
and the case dismissed.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8d6oxnn
from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Taubenfliegel, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Jon
Fishbein -- fishbeinadamj@gmail.com -- Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.

Miller & Milone, P.C., Defendant, represented by Wendy B. Shepps,
Mound Cotton.


MINNESOTA: Dismissal of Carufel Suit Partly Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota issued an Opinion affirming in
part and reversing in part District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned Andrew Carufel,
et al., Appellants, v. Minnesota Department of Public Safety, et
al., Respondents, Seven, Inc., d/b/a Smart Start, et al.,
Defendants, Intoxalock, Respondent. No. A18-0476. (Minn. App.).

Appellants Andrew Carufel, Steven Demko, and Kristen Murray, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals
(collectively, appellants), challenge the district court's
dismissal of their claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) against
respondents Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS), Driver and
Vehicle Services (DVS), the DPS commissioner, the DVS director
(collectively, state respondents), and ignition interlock device
manufacturer, Consumer Safety Technology (Intoxalock).

In a second amended complaint (second amended complaint or
complaint), the appellants allege several causes of action,
including violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
(MGDPA or Act) against the state respondents and Intoxalock, based
on its performance of a government function; and, against
Intoxalock alone, the appellants alleged fraudulent nondisclosure
under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment. Appellants seek injunctive relief, damages, and
attorney fees.

The district court concluded that the location data on the
manufacturers' websites was not subject to the MGDPA, because the
state respondents did not collect and store the data. On appeal,
appellants argue that the district court's interpretation of the
MGDPA was too narrow and the MGDPA applies to all data to which the
state has access.

This Court agrees with the district court. The complaint
acknowledges that the device manufacturers collect and store the
personal information of program participants and the manufacturer
is the owner of the data.

The Appellants respond that, because the state had access to the
location data stored on the manufacturers' websites, the data
should be subject to the MGDPA.The complaint asserts that the state
respondents have the ability to access location data through the
device manufacturer's Web Portal. Importantly, the complaint does
not allege that the state respondents have actually accessed any
location data through the Web Portal.

The Appellants' claim fails because the MGDPA regulates the
public's access to government data, and does not regulate the
government's ability to access data. Government data is limited to
all data collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated
by any government entity.

The Court concludes the state respondents' ability to access
location data is not sufficient to trigger the MGDPA for two
additional reasons. First, appellants have not offered any
authority for us to expand the scope of the MGDPA to include data
that the government may access. Second, our view that the ability
to access data is not the same as collecting, storing, or receiving
data is consistent with previous caselaw construing government
data. We have held that government data must be recorded in some
physical form other than the human brain and does not include
verbal statements by government employees unless those statements
disclose recorded government data.  

Because the location data maintained on Intoxalock's website has
not been recorded by the government in some physical form, or
received by the state respondents, it is not covered by the MGDPA.

Simply put, the complaint fails to allege that the location data is
government data. The district court correctly concluded that the
complaint failed to state a claim under the MGDPA because it does
not allege that location data was collected, stored, or received by
the state respondents. Thus, we affirm dismissal of count I of the
complaint.

The district court, after determining that the MGDPA did not apply
to the location data stored on the manufacturers' websites,
dismissed appellants' claim against the state respondents for
failing to provide a Tennessen warning. The Court agree with the
district court that the complaint fails to state a Tennessen claim
regarding the location data on the device manufacturer's websites
because it is not government data.

But the complaint's Tennessen-warning claim was not limited to the
location data on the manufacturers' websites. According to the
complaint, and reiterated in appellants' written arguments to the
district court and to this court on appeal, the state respondents
required appellants to complete an agreement with DPS in order to
participate in the program.

In contrast, according to the complaint, the state respondents
requested private or confidential information from appellants in
the agreement that they were required to execute before
participating in the program. Additionally, appellants have alleged
facts to support their claim that the state respondents either did
not provide a Tennessen warning, or that the warnings they received
were not sufficient. Thus, without deciding the merits of the
claim, we conclude that appellants' Tennessen-warning claim against
the state respondents is sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).

While the district court correctly determined that the complaint
fails to state a Tennessen-warning claim for location data, the
district court incorrectly dismissed the Tennessen-warning claim
for private or confidential information in the participation
agreement required by the state respondents. Thus, the Court
reverses and remand the dismissal of count II of the complaint.

The Appellants allege in their complaint that Intoxalock is liable
as a government entity for violations of the MGDPA under Minn.
Stat. Section 13.05, subd. 11(a) because Intoxalock entered into a
contract with the state to perform its duties under the
certification programs and the Ignition Interlock Program. In other
words, appellants contend that their MGDPA claims against
Intoxalock are valid because they have properly alleged that
government functions were privatized under the program.

In granting Intoxalock's motion to dismiss, the district court
determined that the complaint alleged an implied contract existed
because the state offered the manufacturers the opportunity to
participate in the program and the manufacturers accepted when they
agreed to be bound by the certification process. The district
court, however, found that the certification process was not an
express or implied contract; the guidelines were performance
standards and state agencies hold private companies to similar
certification processes in a variety of industries but this does
not mean that the state has a contractual relationship with all of
them. Because it found that there was no contract between the state
and Intoxalock, the district court determined that the MGDPA did
not apply and dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the appellants first argue that the district court erred
in dismissing their MGDPA claim against Intoxalock because,
irrespective of whether or not they will ultimately prove a
contractual relationship existed at this stage the complaint
sufficiently pled Intoxalock contracted with the government.

The Appellants are correct that the complaint does make several
references to express or implied contracts between the state and
Intoxalock. Appellants are also correct that Minnesota does not
require specificity in pleading, and it is enough to set forth a
sufficient basis of facts to notify the opposing party of the
claims raised against it. Additionally, when a complaint refers to
a document as a contract, the court may consider the document to
determine whether, as a matter of law, the document supports the
allegation of a contractual relationship. The district court
determined that, after considering the DVS guidelines, which the
complaint alleges is the basis for an implied contract, Intoxalock
was not subject to the MGDPA, as a matter of law. Thus, the
district court appropriately dismissed the claim once it determined
that appellants had failed to sufficiently state a privatization
claim under Minn. Stat. Section 13.05, subd. 11(a).

Here, no consideration is alleged to support either an express or
implied contract. The DVS guidelines provide that if a
manufacturer's device meets performance standards, the state may
issue a certificate. But the guidelines do not legally obligate the
manufacturers to participate in the program. There is also no
bargain; the manufacturers either choose to comply with the
standards or choose not to participate in the program.  

Because the complaint did not allege any facts establishing that
consideration was exchanged when the state certified Intoxalock's
device, the Court concludes that Intoxalock did not enter into a
contract with the state respondents; therefore, Intoxalock is not
subject to the MGDPA. The Court declines to address whether
Intoxalock performed a government function. Thus, the district
court correctly dismissed the MGDPA claim against Intoxalock.

In sum, although appellants have standing to bring their MGDPA
claims against Intoxalock, the district court correctly concluded
that there was no contract between the state and Intoxalock. Thus,
we affirm the district court's dismissal of the MGDPA and
Tennessen-warning claims against Intoxalock as stated in counts III
and IV of the complaint. III. Other statutory and common law claims
against Intoxalock. A. Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.

In count V, the complaint asserts that Intoxalock violated the
Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (MCFA) because it failed to disclose
that the device collected appellants' location information. The
complaint further alleges that Intoxalock's failure to disclose
that it intended to collect, store and use appellants' location
data was false, deceptive or misleading and Intoxalock caused
appellants to enroll in the program under false pretenses. In its
motion to dismiss, Intoxalock argued that the MCFA does not permit
claims for failure to disclose in the absence of a special
relationship, which has not been alleged. The district court agreed
with Intoxalock. Appellants argue on appeal that their complaint
sufficiently alleges special circumstances under the MCFA.

The Appellants argue that Intoxalock had special knowledge of
material facts which it does not disclose to consumers namely, the
fact it collects real-time GPS data. In Graphic Communications, the
supreme court held that special knowledge of material facts must be
accompanied by actual knowledge of fraudulent conduct to trigger a
duty to disclose under the MCFA. 850 N.W.2d at 697-98.

Here, the complaint does not demonstrate or allege that Intoxalock
had actual knowledge of any fraudulent activity. Rather, the
complaint only alleges that Intoxalock, as a national supplier of
[devices] knew, or should have known, that collection of GPS data
amounted to a violation of the Minnesota Constitution. Because the
complaint does not allege that Intoxalock had actual knowledge of
fraudulent activity, the Court affirms the district court's
dismissal of appellants' MCFA claim against Intoxalock as stated in
count V.

Here, the complaint alleges that appellants entered into a contract
with Intoxalock when they leased a device to participate in the
program. Intoxalock produced a copy of the written agreement
between the appellants and Intoxalock. But the complaint does not
claim that Intoxalock breached a term in the written agreement.
Instead, the appellants claim Intoxalock failed to disclose that
its device would collect location data. Because the complaint does
not allege that the written agreement between appellants and
Intoxalock was breached, the Court affirms the district court's
dismissal of appellants' breach of contract claim as stated in
count VI.

An unjust-enrichment claim cannot be granted where the rights of
the parties are governed by a valid contract. Here, there is no
dispute that the relationship between appellants and Intoxalock was
governed by a valid contract. Accordingly, the Court affirms the
district court's dismissal of appellants' unjust-enrichment claim
as stated in count VII.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals of Minnesota's December
17, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8zv8hno from
Leagle.com.

Timothy J. Becker, Jennell K. Shannon, Johnson Becker, PLLC, and
Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm PLLC, for appellants.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney
General, St. Paul, Minnesota, for respondent Minnesota Department
of Public Safety, et al.

K. Jon Breyer -- jon.breyer@kutakrock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Stephen H. Locher, Belin McCormick,
P.C., for respondent Intoxalock.


MISSOURI: Class of Adult Parolees Certified in Gasca v. Precythe
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Stephen R. Bough grants the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
Class Certification in the lawsuit titled STEPHANIE GASCA, et al.
v. ANNE PRECYTHE, Director of the Missouri, Department of
Corrections, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-04149-SRB (W.D. Mo.).

The class is defined as:

     All adult parolees in the state of Missouri who currently
     face, or who in the future will face, parole revocation
     proceedings.

Mildred Curren, Timothy Gallagher, Stephanie Gasca, Kenneth
Hemphill, Jesse Neely, Soloman Warren, and Amber Wyse are
designated as the Class Representatives and Locke E. Bowman, Esq.,
Sheila A. Bedi, Esq., and Amy E. Breihan, Esq., will serve as Class
Counsel.

Judge Bough orders the parties to meet and confer within 14 days to
arrange a Court hearing on how to proceed with the timing of class
notifications.

The lawsuit challenges the parole revocation policies and
procedures of the Missouri Department of Corrections and its
Division of Probation and Parole.  The Plaintiffs allege the
revocation policies and procedures violate their rights "under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . as articulated
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) and Morissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972)."[CC]


MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES: Denial of Krislov's Attys' Fees Request Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEABF Participants: JEFFREY JOHNSON, and LABF
Participants: ROBERT ORLICH, TERRY T. WHITE, and FRANK T. LOWERY,
and MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES SOCIETY, AS ASSOCIATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
FOR ITS MEMBERS, WHO ARE ALL MEABF AND LABF PARTICIPANTS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES' ANNUITY and BENEFIT
FUND OF CHICAGO and LABORERS' ANNUITY and BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 1-17-0732 (Ill. App.), Judge Michael
B. Hyman of Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District,
Second Division, affirmed the trial court's denial of Krislov &
Associates, Ltd.'s motion for attorneys' fees.

As summarized in Jones v. Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit
Fund of Chicago, 2016 IL 119618 (2016), Illinois has established
public pension systems for public employees of the City of Chicago,
including the Municipal Employees', Officers', and Officials'
Annuity and Benefit Fund ("MEABF"), and the Laborers' and
Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund ("LABF").  The
benefits under MEABF and LABF come from three sources, the City,
the employees, and investment returns.  Historically, the public
pensions have been underfunded.  Uncertainty associated with
deficiencies led to the adoption of the pension protection clause
in the Illinois Constitution.  Actuarial valuation of the funds
continued to show serious shortfalls, however.

The General Assembly adopted legislative strategies to deal with
some of the underfunded pensions.  Public Act 98-641, passed in
2014, consisted of a comprehensive set of provisions designed to
reduce annuity benefits for MEABF and LABF members.

After Public Act 98-641 became law, MEABF participants challenged
its constitutionality and sought to enjoin enforcement: Jones v.
MEABF, No. 2014 CH 20027 (Cir.Ct. Cook Co.), and Johnson v. MEABF,
No. 2014 CH 20668 (Cir.Ct. Cook Co.).  Both complaints sought a
declaration that Public Act 98-641 violated the pension protection
clause by diminishing pension benefits of the fund's participants.

The Jones plaintiffs included 14 individual participants in the
MEABF, including current employees and retirees receiving an
annuity, and four labor unions whose members participated in the
MEABF.  The Defendants included MEABF and its board of trustees.
The law firm of Freeborn & Peters LLP represented the Plaintiffs.
Ten days later, Krislov filed the Johnson lawsuit on behalf of one
current participant in the MEABF, three retired participants
receiving annuities from the LABF, and the Municipal Employees
Society of Chicago.  The Defendants included MEABF and LABF.  The
City of Chicago and the State intervened, and the cases were
consolidated.  Ultimately, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, with the State adopting the City's motion.

The trial court declared that the Act, by reducing the value of
annual annuity increases, violated the Constitution's pension
protection clause.  The City, the State, the MEABF, and the LABF
appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 302(a).
In March 2016, the supreme court affirmed, declaring the entire
statute unconstitutional.

Krislov, the Johnson plaintiffs' counsel, petitioned for attorneys'
fees against the City, the MEABF, and the LABF under the Civil
Rights Act (740 ILCS 23/5 (West 2016)) in the amount of $219,041
representing the firm's statutory lodestar fee.  In addition, under
a common fund theory, Krislov sought an additional $750,000 from
the 3% annual annuity increase for plan members.

Deciding as a matter of law that attorneys' fees were not available
under either approach, the trial court denied with prejudice
Krislov's petition as well as a motion for class certification, and
a motion to compel production of his opponents' time records.
Krislov requests that the Court reverses and remands with
directions to award an appropriate fee, considering both statutory
lodestar and common fund sources.  It also requests the Court
orders production of the time records and certification of a class
for purposes of applying the common fund doctrine.

Although the Court needs not decide the appropriateness of a double
recovery of fees, Judge Hyman holds it would be remiss not to
mention Krislov's desire for an award of both statutory fees and
common fund fees, not one or the other.  Krislov has asked for
statutory fees in excess of $200,000 under the "fee-shifting"
provision of the Illinois Civil Rights Act, section 5(c), along
with $750,000 under the "common fund" doctrine.  The Defendants
label this a double recovery.

He finds that Krislov cites no basis for this brazen request.
Also, even had fees been obtainable, Krislov leaves unexplained why
recovery of "reasonable attorneys' fees" under section 5(c)
wouldn't have afforded sufficient compensation alone.

Given his resolution, the Judge holds he needs not address the
remaining issues asserted by Krislov.  Accordingly, he affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/oPT0pb from Leagle.com.


MYLAN NV: State Attorney Generals Plan to Expand Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Ballard, writing for The Advocate, reports that generic
prescription drug companies are acting like a price-fixing cartel
and state attorneys general across the nation plan to expand a
class action that eventually will include 300 drugs and most of the
companies, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry said on Dec. 18.

"There's a lot of blame to go around," Landry said in telephone
news conference with Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen. An
expanded complaint will be filed early this year.

About 88 percent of all prescriptions are filled with generic
drugs. The industry accounts for $74.5 billion in annual sales.

Mr. Jepsen in October 2017 led attorneys general in 45 other states
in a class-action lawsuit alleging 18 generic drug manufacturers
and two executives colluded to drive up the price for 15 generic
drugs for consumers and insurers. The targeted antibiotics and
drugs treat illnesses from glaucoma to high blood pressure to
diabetes and bleeding vessels in the brain.

The state attorneys general allege multiple conspiracies to
restrain trade, artificially inflate prices and reduce
competition.

Mylan N.V., of Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, and Heritage
Pharmaceuticals, of Eatontown, New Jersey, two of the manufacturers
whose executives were individually named as defendants, did not
respond on Dec. 18 to requests for comment.

Landry, a Republican, is the president of the National Association
of Attorneys General, which helped organize the class action. Mr.
Jepsen, a Democrat, is the group's past president.

The lawsuit is pending in Philadelphia federal court.

Once patents expire on a branded drug, the company that developed
and manufactured the medicine loses its monopoly. Generic companies
can make the same drug and charge less. The idea is the price of
prescription medicine goes down.

State investigators have uncovered evidence of what they claim are
illegal agreements among generic drug company executives to fix
prices and allocate customers for several of the generics.

"We allege in this complaint that the defendant drug companies'
collusion was so pervasive that it essentially eliminated
competition from the market for these 15 drugs in its entirety,"
Mr. Jepsen said.

Once an intensely competitive business, generic drug manufacturers
in the late 1990s became much more collegial with executives from
different companies socializing together at cocktail parties, golf
outings and fancy dinners, Mr. Jepsen said. Executives of competing
companies texted and emailed each other hundreds, even thousands of
times, particularly right before the price of a generic spiked, he
said.

The topics of those conversations were to ensure that all the
companies were on board with a price increase and to divvy up
territories deciding which company would sell a particular drug in
a particular area, Mr. Jepsen said.

Mr. Jepsen said some of the companies have begun talking about
settling the case, and he expects more to make offers.

Landry said he hopes Louisiana uses its share of any settlements
with the drug companies to reduce health costs in the state.

Generic drugs the class action lawsuit claims were priced higher
because of collusion:

* Acetazolamide, used to treat glaucoma and epilepsy;

* Doxycycline monohydrate, an antibiotic;

* Fosinopril-hydrochlorothiazide, used to treat high blood
pressure;

* Glipizide-metformin, a diabetes medication;

* Glyburide-metformin, a diabetes medication;

* Leflunomide, used to treat rheumatoid arthritis;

* Meprobamate, an anxiety medication;

* Nimodipine, a calcium channel blocking agent used to reduce
problems caused by a bleeding blood vessel in the brain;

* Nystatin, an antifungal medication;

* Paromomycin, an antibiotic used to treat certain parasite
infections;

* Theophylline, used to treat asthma and other lung problems;

* Verapamil, used to treat hypertension; and

* Zoledronic acid, used to treat hypercalcemia. [GN]


MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS: Cacaccio Sues Over Contaminated Drug
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Cacaccio, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan N.V., and Rite Aid
Corporation, Case No. 9:18-cv-06916 (E.D. N.Y., December 5, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for breach of express and implied
warranty and for violations of the New York's General Business
Law.

This is a class action lawsuit regarding the Mylan Defendants' and
Rite Aid's manufacturing, distribution, and sale of
valsartan-containing generic prescription medications contaminated
with N-nitrosodiethylamine, a carcinogenic and liver-damaging
impurity.

The Plaintiff Joseph Cacaccio is a citizen of New York who resides
in Levittown, New York. During all relevant time periods, Plaintiff
Joseph Cacaccio was prescribed, purchased, and consumed
valsartan-containing medication manufactured and distributed by
Defendants Mylan and Mylan N.V., and sold by Defendant Rite Aid.

The Defendant Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and maintains its
principal place of business at 1000 Mylan Boulevard, Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania 15317. The Defendant Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
conducts substantial business in the State of New York, and
nationwide. The Defendant Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has been
engaged in the manufacturing, sale, and distribution of
contaminated generic valsartan in the United States, including in
New York.

The Defendant Mylan N.V. is a global generic and specialty
pharmaceuticals company registered in the Netherlands, with its
global headquarters at 1000 Mylan Boulevard, Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania 15317.

The Defendant Rite Aid Corporation sells the Mylan Defendants'
valsartancontaining medication throughout the United States, and
specifically in the State of New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
      BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
      888 Seventh Avenue
      New York, NY 10019
      Tel: (212) 837-7150
      Fax: (212) 989-9163
      E-mail: scott@bursor.com


NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOC: Sullivan Claims Website not Deaf-Friendly
---------------------------------------------------------------
Phillip Sullivan, Jr., on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. National Rifle Association of
America, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-12314, (S.D. N.Y., December 28,
2018), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory
damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State
Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Defendant is an association of firearm owners that operates
https://www.nracarryguard.com, which provides news articles, laws,
videos, and information on firearms. Plaintiff browsed and intended
to watch the "Training for the Real-Life Situation You Must be
Prepared to Face" video on their Website. Sullivan is a deaf person
who alleges that their website is not deaf-friendly. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      Anne Seelig, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 465-1188
      Fax: (212) 465-1181



NEW YORK: Faces Adams-Flores Case in Southern District of New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the City of New York.
The case is captioned as Nichole Adams-Flores, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. City of
New York; New York City Department Corrections; Health & Hospital
Corporation; Cynthia Brann, Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections;
Patsy Yang, Chief Operating Officer of Correctional Health
Services; Ross MacDonald, Chief of Medicine; Jeff Thamkittikasem,
Former Chief of Staff of Dept. of Corrections; and Martin Murphy,
former Chief of Department of Dept. of Corrections, the Defendants,
Case No.: 1:18-cv-12150-JMF (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 24, 2018). The suit
demands $1,000,000 and alleges civil rights violation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Jesse M. Furman.

New York City comprises 5 boroughs sitting where the Hudson River
meets the Atlantic Ocean. At its core is Manhattan, a densely
populated borough that's among the world's major commercial,
financial and cultural centers. The New York City Department of
Correction, is the branch of the municipal government of New York
City responsible for the custody, control, and care of New York
City's imprisoned population, housing the majority of them on
Rikers Island. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation,
operates the public hospitals and clinics in New York City.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Rocco G Avallone, Esq.
          AVALLONE & BELLISTRI LLP
          3000 Marcus Avenue, Suite 3E7
          Lake Sucess, NY 11042
          Telephone: (516) 986-2500
          Facsimile: (516) 986-2501
          E-mail: ravallone@lawyersab.com

NISSAN MOTOR: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Dec. 19
announced the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (OTC:NSANY)
from December 10, 2013 through November 16, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Nissan
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Nissan class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1454.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Nissan had been materially understating expenses and
overstating profits by concealing half of the annual executive
compensation it was obligated to pay its former Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") and Chairman of its Board, Carlos Ghosn; (2) this
was done to avoid shareholder scrutiny of Ghosn's inordinately high
executive compensation; (3) Nissan had significant defects in its
corporate governance and internal controls that facilitated this
false financial reporting; and (4) Nissan had failed to heed the
express direction of its outside auditors dating back to at least
2013 to accurately report its executive compensation. When the true
details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than February
8, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1454.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm
was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number
of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


NORTH 2ND STREET: Pelland Seeks Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------
NATHAN PELLAND, as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other
similarly situated "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code
Private Attorney General Act of 2004, the Plaintiff(s), vs. NORTH
2ND STREET LLC, an Arizona limited liability company: and DOES 1
through 50. inclusive, the Defendant(s), Case No. 18STCV09622 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Dec. 26, 2018), alleges that Defendants failed to pay
wages for all hours worked at the correct rates of pay, failed to
provide rest breaks, failed to provide all meal periods, failed to
issue accurate written wage statements, failed to maintain accurate
employment records, failed to timely pay wages during employment,
and failed to timely pay wages upon termination, pursuant to the
California Labor Code and Industrial Welfare Commission Order No.
5-2001.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff began working for
Defendants in Santa Monica, California as a non-exempt hourly
server in about May of 2017. The Plaintiff continuously worked for
Defendants as a server until approximately October 2, 2017 when he
ended his employment. The Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees
have worked over eight hours in one workday and/or over 40 hours in
one work week. Despite this, the Defendants failed to provide
Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees with all timely rest and meal
periods pursuant to California law. The Defendants failed to hire
sufficient staff members, including "breaker" employees, to cover
Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees so they could take duty-free,
ten-minute rest periods and duty-free, thirty-minute meal periods.
Moreover, the Defendants failed to pay premium wages for days on
which they failed to provide Plaintiff and the other Aggrieved
Employees with timely rest and/or meal periods, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Nathan Pelland:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          Maralle Messrelian, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Suite 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone (818) 582-3086
          Facsimile (818) 582-2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com
                  maralle@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Ave, Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (562) 256-1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: whaines@uelglaw.com

NOVARTIS PHARMA: KPH Healthcare Hits Overpriced Hypertension Med
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KPH Healthcare Services, Inc., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corporation, Novartis AG and Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv-12293, (S.D. N.Y., December 28, 2018) seeks to
recover damages, interest, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys'
fees resulting from anticompetitive foreclosure of hypertension
medication comprising the active ingredients amlodipine (Exforge)
and Valsartan in violation of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff seeks
overcharge damages arising out of Novartis's unlawful agreement
with Par not to compete in the market for Exforge and corresponding
AB-rated generic drug products.

KPH operates retail and online pharmacies in the Northeast under
the name "Kinney Drugs." KPH is the assignee of McKesson
Corporation, who directly purchased Exforge from Defendants.

Exforge is a high blood pressure medication that combines calcium
channel blocker amlodipine besylate (Norvasc) and the
angiotensin-II receptor blocker valsartan (Diovan). As the
pharmaceuticals unit of Novartis Corporation and Novartis AG,
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation develops, manufactures, sells
and markets Novartis drugs in the U.S.

Par Pharmaceutical develops, manufactures and markets generic
versions of brand name drugs.  [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
      Debra G. Josephson, Esq.
      Stephanie E. Smith, Esq.
      ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.A.
      20 Rahling Circle
      Little Rock, AR 72223-1790
      Tel: (501) 821-5575
      Email: mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us
             debrajosephson@robertslawfirm.us
             stephaniesmith@robertslawfirm.us


OCEAN SPRAY: Calif. Court Certifies Food Labeling Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gary M. Pappas, Esq. and Ryan P. Forrest, Esq., of Carlton Fields,
in an article for The National Law Review, report that the Southern
District of California certified a food labeling class against
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. based in part upon a price premium
damages model developed by an aptly named Dr. Belch. The plaintiff,
a self-proclaimed "health coach" and "label guru," alleged Ocean
Spray misrepresented that many of its juice products contained no
artificial flavors when in fact they contained malic and fumaric
acids, synthetic chemicals that simulate the advertised flavors.
She asserted Ocean Spray's juice labels violated various provisions
of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act as well as other
causes of action. The plaintiff sought to certify a Rule 23(b)(3)
class of California consumers who purchased any of 12 specified
Ocean Spray juices.

The Court dispensed with Ocean Spray's arguments as to Rule 23(a)
requirements and devoted the majority of its attention to the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). This inquiry asks
whether the common, aggregation-enabling issues in the case are
more prevalent or important than the class-defeating individual
issues.

The plaintiff argued that liability under her statutory consumer
fraud claims satisfied predominance because the claims centered on
an objective standard that did not require proof of individual
reliance: whether Ocean Spray's representations that its juices did
not contain artificial flavors were likely to deceive a reasonable
customer. Ocean Spray's only response on the liability issue was
that the plaintiff did not prove the artificial ingredients in its
juices were actually flavors. The court agreed with the plaintiff,
finding Ocean Spray's argument was an improper attempt to tread
into the merits of the dispute at the class certification stage.

Next, the court conducted a rigorous analysis -- as required by
Comcast -- as to whether Plaintiff's damages model for restitution
to the class was consistent with her liability theory that Ocean
Spray's misrepresentations caused consumers to pay more than they
otherwise would have. Such price premium damages models must link
the consumer price differential to the defendant's allegedly
deceptive labeling to be acceptable, as we have blogged about.

The plaintiff proffered two damages models. The first, prepared by
an expert named Dr. Goedde, was based solely on a survey of
California juice prices unrelated to Ocean Spray products. Dr.
Goedde found customers paid a price premium of 25 percent for
all-natural juice products. The court rejected this model because
it was untethered to the plaintiff's legal theories or Ocean
Spray's alleged misrepresentations and thus failed to satisfy
Comcast.

Enter Dr. Belch, who proffered consumer survey results based on the
contingent valuation methodology. The results purported to show
customers preferred Ocean Spray's juices without artificial
flavoring and that they were willing to pay a premium of 61 cents
to obtain such juices. The plaintiff then provided Dr. Belch's
survey to Dr. Goedde, who applied Dr. Belch's findings to Ocean
Spray's actual unit sales during the class period to arrive at a
restitution figure. The court found that this Belch-Goedde model
satisfied the predominance requirement and Comcast because it
accounted for both the consumer class demand and Ocean Spray
supply-side factors in the market.

On the strength of the Belch-Goedde Model, the court certified a
Rule 23(b)(3) class under Plaintiff's statutory consumer fraud
claims.

Hilsley v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 2018 WL 6245894 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 29, 2018) [GN]


OHIO MULCH SUPPLY: Two Subclasses Certified in Smyers Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Algenon L. Marbley grants Plaintiff's Motion to
Conditionally Certify in the lawsuit entitled DIANE SMYERS, On
behalf of herself and other members of the general public similarly
situated v.  OHIO MULCH SUPPLY, INC., et al., Case No.
2:17-cv-01110-ALM-CMV (S.D. Ohio).

The Court conditionally certifies the collective action, consisting
of two subclasses:

   1. All current and former Ohio hourly, non-exempt employees of
      Defendants, employed at any retail location, who since
      December 18, 2014 worked over 40 hours in any workweek but
      were not properly compensated for all their overtime hours
      worked under the FLSA because of Defendants' automatic meal
      deduction policy; and

   2. All current and former Ohio Hourly Retail Managers of
      Defendants who since December 18, 2014 worked over 40 hours
      in any workweek but were not properly compensated for all
      of their overtime hours because of Defendants' policy of
      not compensating them for any time spent working if they
      were not physically at one of Defendants' OMS stores.

Judge Marbley further orders that within 14 days of the date the
notice is approved, the Defendant shall answer the Plaintiff's
Opt-In Discovery, and shall provide to the Plaintiff an Excel
spreadsheet containing the full name, last known address, telephone
number, all known e-mail addresses, job titles, and dates and
location(s) of employment of those individuals named by the
subclasses (1) and (2).

Plaintiff Diane Smyers worked for the Defendants at three of their
locations in the greater Columbus metro area, from March 2015 until
October 2017.  Ms. Smyers was a retail manager for Ohio Mulch
Supply ("OMS").  She alleges that OMS regularly required her -- and
others similarly situated -- to perform uncompensated work.
Specifically, she alleges, inter alia, that OMS retail managers
were required to travel to the bank and between OMS locations
without compensation.[CC]


PEAK SECURITY: Court Approves $200K Settlement in Chime FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Certification of the Settlement Class in the case captioned PAUL
CHIME, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PEAK SECURITY PLUS, INC. and EMMANUEL
OSULA, jointly and severally, Defendants. No. 13-CV-470 (AMD)(PK).
(E.D.N.Y.).

Before the Court is the plaintiff's unopposed motion for
certification of the settlement class and final approval of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and class settlement.  

Paul Chime filed this action on behalf of himself and a putative
class of others similarly situated, alleging that the defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor
Laws by (1) failing to pay for all hours worked in a given workweek
(2) failing to pay overtime premiums for all hours worked over 40
in a given workweek (3) failing to provide written wage statements
with each payment and (4) failing to provide a Notice and
Acknowledgement of Pay rate and Payday at hiring for security
guards hired.  

After the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement
agreement, on August 2, 2018, the claims administrator, Optime
Administration, LLC, served 508 settlement class members with the
approved notice and claim form. Of the 508 notice packets that were
sent, 324 packets were returned as undeliverable.  Optime
Administration located updated addresses for 188 of the 324 packets
that were returned.  As a result, a total of 372 class members
received notice packets, about 74% of the settlement class members.


As of November 20, 2018, 50 class members, or about 10% of the
entire settlement class, submitted timely and valid claim forms.
Overall, the sums to be paid out of the settlement fund, which
provided for up to $200,000, includes: (1) attorneys' fees and
costs of $73,916.67; (2) service awards of $28,750.00; and (3)
administration costs of $11,147.00, resulting in a total payment of
$113,813.67.

The Court also finally certifies the following settlement class:

     All persons who were employed by Peak Security, in the State
of New York as Security Guards for any period between January 28,
2007 and August 19, 2016.

The Court approves the following service awards to the plaintiffs:
(a) $7,000 for Paul Chime; (b) $4,500 for Demilade Elutilo; (c)
$3,000 for Umar Abdulkhabir; (d) $3,000 for Osagie Egharevba; (e)
$1,875 for Akinde Akintunde; (f) $1,875 for Joseph Alenze; (g)
$1,875 for Mfon Akpan; (h) $1,875 for Abiodun Bello; (i) $1.875 for
Morufu Ganiyu; and (j) $1,875 for Paul Kyree; and approves
$73,916.67 in attorney's fees and costs to Class Counsel, Lipsky
Lowe LLP.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 13, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybh35b7b from
Leagle.com.

Paul Chime, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Dana Lauren Gottlieb
-- danalgottlieb@aol.com -- Gottlieb & Associates, Douglas Brian
Lipsky -- doug@lipskylowe.com -- Bronson Lipsky LLP & Jeffrey M.
Gottlieb -- NYJG@aol.com -- Gottlieb & Associates.

Demilade Elutilo, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Brian Lipsky,
Bronson Lipsky LLP.

Peak Security Plus, Inc., Jointly and Severally & Emmanuel Osula,
Jointly and Severally, Defendants, represented by Raymond Nardo --
raymondnardo@gmail.com -- Attorney at Law.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Ct. Stays Proceedings on Serifoski's Cert. Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin grants the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification in the
lawsuit titled MEFAIL SERIFOSKI v. PHILLIPS & COHEN ASSOCIATES,
LTD., Case No. 2:19-cv-00024-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On January 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In
this motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in
the complaint but also moved the Court to stay further proceedings
on that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."

However, Judge Duffin notes, because parties are generally
unprepared to proceed with a motion for class certification at the
beginning of a case, the Damasco court suggested that the parties
"ask the district court to delay its ruling to provide time for
additional discovery or investigation."

According to the Court's order, the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification is
granted.  The parties are relieved from the automatic briefing
schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).

Moreover, Judge Duffin adds, for administrative purposes, it is
necessary that the Clerk terminate the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  However, this motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]


PNC BANK: Faces Class Action Over Free Banking Plan Offer
---------------------------------------------------------
Jenie Mallari-Torres, writing for Cook County Record, reports that
a class action lawsuit accuses PNC Bank of charging for services
for an allegedly free banking plan.

Simon Kennedy-Rose and Third Force Negotiation LLC filed a
complaint individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated on Dec. 4 in Cook County Circuit Court against PNC Bank
NA, alleging breach of contract, violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Businesses Practices Act and common law fraud.

According to the complaint, Mr. Kennedy-Rose opened a personal
checking account with PNC in Chicago in 2013. The suit states he is
the majority owner and managing member of Third Force Negotiation.

He alleges he relied on the defendant's representations that the
account was free banking and had no monthly fees. He alleges
beginning in September 2014, the account was enrolled to receive
several services that included fees, resulting $22 worth of charges
monthly. He alleges he contacted the defendant and had the services
removed, but the services were reinstated in 2016.

The plaintiffs allege the defendant failed to honor its offer and
provide free banking to them as promised, and added services to
their account that were not part of the original account
agreement.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek judgment against
defendants, actual and punitive damages, attorney fees, litigation
costs, expenses, interest and further relief. They are represented
by David B. Levin of Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman PC in
Northbrook.

Cook County Circuit Court case number 18-CH-15093 [GN]


POSTMATES INC: Court Grants OKs Arbitration in Wage & Hour Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned DORA LEE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
POSTMATES INC., Defendant. Case No. 18-cv-03421-JCS. (N.D. Cal.).

Defendant Postmates Inc. now moves to compel arbitration of
Timmerman's claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
and to dismiss Albert's claims.

The Plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleges that Postmates
misclassifies its couriers, who deliver not only prepared meals but
also goods that originate across state lines, as independent
contractors rather than employees. The Plaintiffs allege generally
that Postmates failed to reimburse couriers for business expenses,
failed to pay them minimum wage, and failed to pay agreed rates for
waiting time.

The Court previously granted a motion to compel arbitration of
Plaintiff Dora Lee's claims in this putative class action regarding
alleged employee misclassification, but allowed an amended
complaint asserting claims by Plaintiffs Kellyn Timmerman and
Joshua Albert. Plaintiffs are or were couriers engaged in
intrastate delivery of various products.

Postmates argues that Timmerman's claims are subject to arbitration
for the same reasons as Lee's.

According to Postmates, Timmerman agreed the Fleet Agreement and
did not validly opt out of its arbitration provision, which is
enforceable, and Timmerman's request for public injunctive relief
does not alter the analysis.

The Plaintiffs argue, as they did with respect to Lee's claims,
that Postmates has not carried its burden to show that the
arbitration provision was reasonably conspicuous and thus that
Timmerman actually entered an agreement to arbitrate. The
Plaintiffs also argue once again that Postmates couriers fall
within the transportation worker exception to the FAA. The
Plaintiffs contend that Albert's allegations are sufficient, and
argue that section 226.8 supports a private right of action and
that a claim for breach of contract can be asserted concurrently
with a claim for unpaid wages based on the same conduct.

According to Postmates' records, Timmerman agreed to the 2017
version of the Fleet Agreement on May 24, 2017, and agreed to the
updated 2018 version of the Fleet Agreement on May 11, 2018.
Postmates employs a click-through' process in which prospective
couriers are presented with a link to the Fleet Agreement during
the process of signing up to make deliveries for Postmates, must
click on the link to proceed, at which point the text of the Fleet
Agreement is displayed, and then must click either Agree or Dismiss
before moving to the next step.  Couriers who accept the agreement
are emailed a copy of it and may also access it in the Postmates
Fleet App after they sign up, and must follow the same process when
Postmates updates its Fleet Agreement.  

Timmerman also did not effectively opt out of the arbitration
provision. She did not affirmatively opt out of the 2017 Fleet
Agreement's arbitration clause, which she could have done within
thirty days of accepting the 2017 Fleet Agreement. The Fleet
Agreement does not provide a renewed opportunity to opt out when
changes are made to the agreement unless such changes materially
affect the arbitration clause, which Timmerman has not argued is
the case here. Thus, although Timmerman attempted to opt out of the
2018 Fleet Agreement on June 1, 2018, she was not permitted to do
so at that time.  

The statutory language of the FAA excludes contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has
interpreted this exception as governing only contracts of
employment of transportation workers. A court must assess whether a
Section 1 exemption applies before ordering arbitration; the
parties' agreement may not delegate that question to an arbitrator.


The Court previously held that Postmates couriers do not fall
within the transportation worker exception because Lee failed to
show that couriers are sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce.
Plaintiffs renew their argument that the exception applies, citing
Timmerman's declaration that she delivered packaged goods
presumably produced out of state. The fact remains that there is no
evidence of Timmerman actually engaging in interstate commerce
Plaintiffs do not dispute that all of Timmerman's deliveries were
from local merchants within California, and do not cite any case
holding that making only local deliveries, for a company that does
not hold itself out as transporting goods between states,
constitutes engaging in interstate commerce within the meaning of
the statute. Plaintiffs rely on an unpublished Ninth Circuit
decision from 2006 concerning truck drivers who delivered soda but
that two-paragraph non-precedential memorandum disposition does not
address whether the drivers crossed state lines.

The Court stands by its previous decision that Postmates couriers
do not fall within the transportation worker exception to the FAA
because they do not engage in interstate commerce. Postmates'
motion to compel arbitration of Timmerman's claims is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yauewmwl from Leagle.com.

Dora Lee, Kellyn Timmerman & Joshua Albert, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Postmates Inc., Defendant, represented by Theane Evangelis --
tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dhananjay
Saikrishna Manthripragada -- dmanthripragada@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Michele Leigh Maryott --
mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP & Peter C.
Squeri -- psqueri@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


PRISONER TRANSPORTATION: Class Certification Bid in Groover Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY EMIL GROOVER, Plaintiff, v. PRISONER
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC and U.S. CORRECTIONS, LLC. Defendants,
Case No. 15-cv-61902-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

Groover filed the action, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, against Prisoner Transportation Services
("PTS"), U.S. Corrections ("USC"), and John Does 1-100, alleging
civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  In the
Amended Complaint, Groover, an inmate at the Butner Low Security
Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina, alleges
that between Aug. 14, 2015, and Aug. 16, 2015, USC transported him
from Butner, North Carolina to Fort Lauderdale, Florida in a
windowless transport van lacking sufficient ventilation and air
conditioning.  Groover claims that he was deprived of sleep, water,
and refuge from the heat.  As a result of the purported excessively
hot conditions and lack of adequate ventilation in the van, Groover
experienced physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion as well as a
heat stroke.

According to the Amended Complaint, USC knew of the conditions to
which Groover was subjected and failed to take appropriate
measures.  Groover states that numerous other pretrial detainees
transported by USC and PTS suffered similar inhumane conditions and
harm as a result of their transportation practices.  Groover
alleges that these conditions violate his and other pretrial
detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In Count I, Groover, individually, asserts a claim for a violation
of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the
Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1983.  In Count II, he
asserts the same claim against the Defendants on behalf of the
putative class members.  Groover seeks an award of damages and
injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff now asks the Court to certify the action as a class
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3).  In response, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that class certification is proper.  The
Plaintiff's reply followed.  

The USC requested, and was granted, leave to file a sur-reply to
address discrepancies between the Plaintiff's class definition as
set forth in the Amended Complaint, the Motion, and the Reply,
which USC thereafter filed.  On Aug. 21, 2018, the Court held a
hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.  On Aug.
30, 2018, the Plaintiff submitted a supplemental report regarding
the proposed class's numerosity and ascertainability, in light of
discovery produced by USC on Aug. 23, 2018.

Judge Bloom holds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a
claim for injunctive and declaratory relief, and therefore, she
cannot certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2).  Additionally, the
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a class is ascertainable
and has failed to satisfy the predominance requirement, thus the
she cannot certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3).  Accordingly, she
denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QEy497 from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Emil Groover, Plaintiff, represented by Frank S. Hedin --
fhedin@hedinhall.com -- Hedin Hall LLP & David W. Hall, Hedin Hall
LLP, pro hac vice.

Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by D.
David Keller -- david.keller@kellerlandsberg.com -- Keller
Landsberg PA & Jose R. Riguera -- Jose.Riguera@kellerlandsberg.com
-- Keller Landsberg PA.

U.S. Corrections, LLC, Defendant, represented by Erin G. Jackson --
ejackson@johnsonjackson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC & Ashley Americo
Tinsley -- atinsley@johnsonjackson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC.


PRIVATE LABEL: June 3 Final Approval Hearing on Schourup Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Western Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiff
Heather Schourup's motion for conditional class certification and
preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement in the case
captioned HEATHER SCHOURUP, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. PRIVATE LABEL NUTRACEUTICALS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants. No. CV 15-01026 TJH (AJWx). (C.D. Cal.).

It appears to the Court, on a preliminary basis, that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable to the
putative class members. It appears to the Court that adequate
discovery has been conducted such that counsel for the parties at
this time are able to reasonably evaluate their respective
positions. It further appears to the Court that settlement, at this
time, will avoid substantial additional costs by all parties, as
well as avoid the delay and risks that would be presented by the
further prosecution of the Action. It further appears that the
Settlement Agreement has been reached as the result of serious,
informed, arms-length negotiations with the assistance of a
reputable mediator.

The Court preliminarily finds that the Settlement Agreement appears
to be within the range of reasonableness of a settlement that could
ultimately be given final approval by this Court. Indeed, the Court
has reviewed the Settlement Agreement and preliminary finds that
the monetary, claim-based relief made available to all Class
Members is fair, adequate and reasonable when balanced with against
the amount in controversy and potential outcomes of further
litigation. Further, the Court preliminarily finds that the
injunctive relief provided by the terms of the Settlement Agreement
is fair, adequate and reasonable to warn consumers of the actual
possible effects of Defendant Private Label Nutraceuticals, LLC's
(PLN) Products, albeit no changes were made to the ingredient
list.

The Court conditionally certifies the following Class for
settlement purposes only:

     All persons who are domiciled or reside in the United States
of America, who purchased any of the Products from PLN in the
United States for personal use between February 12, 2011, and the
Opt-Out Date, and were domiciled or resided in the United States at
the time of purchase.

Schourup is preliminarily appointed and designated, for all
purposes, as the Representative Plaintiff. Attorneys Marcus J.
Bradley and Kiley L. Grombacher of Bradley Grombacher LLP and
Attorney Ronald Hartmann of Hartmann & Kananen are, hereby,
preliminarily appointed and designated, for all purposes, as Class
Counsel to act on behalf of Schourup and the rest of the Class.

Class Notice must be sent by: February 8, 2019.

Settlement website launched by: January 9, 2019

Fee and Expense Application: May 6, 2019

Opt-Out Deadline: April 9, 2019

Claims deadline: April 9, 2019

Motions in Support of Final Approval: May 6, 2019

Final Approval Hearing: June 3, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd5ta47t from Leagle.com.

Heather Schourup, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth K. King --
kkinghk@sbcglobal.net -- Hartmann and Kananen, Kiley Lynn
Grombacher -- kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com -- Bradley
Grombacher LLP, Kurt E. Kananen -- kurtkananen@sbcglobal.net --
Hartmann and Kananen, Marcus J. Bradley --
mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com -- Bradley Grombacher LLP & Ronald
Allen Hartmann -- constructiondefects@sbcglobal.net -- Hartmann and
Kananen.

Private Label Nutraceuticals LLC, a Georgia limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by John D. Alessio, Procopio Cory
Hargreaves and Savitch LLP & Sean M. Gaffney, Procopio Cory
Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP.


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilson TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) in the case captioned JUDY WILSON, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
INC., Defendant. Civ. No. 2:18-11960. (D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Judy Wilson brings this putative class action against
Defendant Quest Diagnostics Inc. (Quest) for violating the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).  The Plaintiff
answered an unsolicited call to her cell phone from Quest. The
Quest representative told the Plaintiff the purpose of the call was
to collect a debt owed by someone other than the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff never gave Quest permission to call her cell phone, never
had any contact with Quest prior to receiving the call, and never
provided Quest her phone number.  

The Plaintiff asserts this conduct violates the TCPA's prohibition
on placing nonemergency calls to her cell phone using an automatic
telephone dialing system (ATDS) without having the prior express
consent of the person called.  

Quest contends Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts
alleging that Quest called her cell phone using an ATDS.   

The Court disagrees.

The Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Quest contacted her
cell phone using a predictive dialer a device considered an ATDS
under binding precedent. When she answered Quest's calls, she heard
a momentary pause before someone started speaking to her. Dead air
after answering the phone is indicative that the caller used a
predictive dialer.   

The Plaintiff further alleges Quest called her to collect a debt
owed by someone other than the Plaintiff. Thus, it is plausible
that Quest used a predictive dialer to call the Plaintiff. And
since a predictive dialer can qualify as an ATDS under the TCPA,
the Plaintiff adequately states a claim for relief. Moreover,
courts in this Circuit have found such allegations sufficient to
allege a TCPA claim.

The cases Quest cites as authority that a predictive dialer is not
an ATDS unless the device can dial and call numbers randomly or
sequentially were decided at summary judgment, meaning the court
had the benefit of a fully developed record showing the types of
devices used to contact plaintiffs. At this stage, the Court only
tests the sufficiency of the allegations. With the benefit of
discovery as to the type of equipment Quest used and the nature and
extent of Quest's contacts with the Plaintiff, the case will be
well postured to assess Quest's conduct under the TCPA. The Court
will thus unlock the doors of discovery.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7la29lr from Leagle.com.

JUDY WILSON, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW JOSEPH OBERGFELL --
aobergfell@bursor.com -- BURSOR & FISHER PA

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL
T. HENSLEY New Jersey -- mhensley@bressler.com -- BRESSLER, AMERY &
ROSS, P.C.


RICO POLLO: Court Certifies Class in Alberto FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUIS ALBERTO, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, v. RICO POLLO #2 RESTAURANT
CORP. d/b/a/ RICO POLLO, ABC CORP. d/b/a RICO POLLO, JUAN F.
PUNTIEL, CLEMENTE DE LA CRUZ, and JOHN DOE #1-10, Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-4762 (BMC) (E.D. N.Y), Judge Brian M. Cogan of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York substantially
granted the Plaintiffs'motion for conditional certification of a
putative collective under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").

The Plaintiff brings the action under the FLSA and the New York
Labor Law ("NYLL"), seeking to represent both a collective and a
class of similarly situated employees.  The Plaintiffs have moved
for conditional certification of a putative collective under
Section 216(b) of the FLSA.

There are two restaurants named as the Defendants in the suit, both
operating under the name "Rico Pollo," but owned by the separate
Defendant corporations, and, according to the Defendants, each
corporation is wholly owned by one of the two individual
Defendants.  The Plaintiff was a delivery person for one of the
restaurants, the Queens restaurant, from about May  1, 2016 until
about May 7, 2018.  The other restaurant is in Brooklyn.

In his affidavit in support of his motion, the Plaintiff states
that he worked for 10.5 hours per day, six days a week, for a total
of 63 hours.  He was paid a fixed salary of $360 in cash weekly,
regardless of hours worked.  In addition to delivering orders to
customers, the Plaintiff prepared food, cleaned the restaurant,
washed dishes, and did some janitorial or porter-like tasks.  He
describes these tasks as "non-tipped" work -- in contrast to his
delivery work -- and estimates that the nontipped work was more
than 20% of his typical workday. He never received any advice as to
how tips he received would factor into his compensation, and he
never received any wage statements or notices about wages and
hours.

Like most FLSA motions for a collective, the case depends primarily
on averments in the Plaintiff's affidavit describing his view of
how the Defendants operated the restaurants and how defendants
treated other employees.  

The individual Defendants, Clemente De La Cruz and Juan F. Puntiel,
have submitted their own affidavits.  They explain that although
they were originally partners in the Queens restaurant, Mr. De La
Cruz bought out Mr. Puntiel in 2012, leaving Mr. De La Cruz as the
sole owner.  Mr. Puntiel then opened the Brooklyn restaurant
shortly thereafter as the sole owner.  They disavow any involvement
in the operations of their co-Defendant's restaurant, and profess
to have sole responsibility for operating each respective
restaurant and its payroll practices.  They also assert that the
other employees that the Plaintiff names never worked for the
Brooklyn restaurant, and deny sharing employees except for Sofirio,
who handled deliveries for the Brooklyn restaurant during
renovations of the Queens restaurant over a four-month period.

Labeling the averments in the Plaintiff's affidavit as
"conclusory," the Defendants' repetitive briefing offers what
distills into two reasons for not recognizing a collective action
here, specifically, that the Plaintiff has not shown that (1)
employees at either restaurant were subject to a common illegal
practice in paying their wages or that (2) the employees at the
Brooklyn restaurant were paid under the same policy as the Queens
restaurant.

Judge Cogan disagrees.  He finds that despite a sprinkling of these
kind of lawyer-composed conclusory assertions, there is sufficient
detail in the Plaintiff's affidavit to warrant a collective.  If
he's going to allow hearsay on these motions, then the Plaintiff
has relayed enough of it to make the modest showing that the law
requires.  Specifically, he has spoken to at least five other
workers, whose first names he has provided, and all of whom say
they were paid a fixed wage just like him.  Those workers have
three different job titles, so the Plaintiff's experience is
applicable to some titles other than delivery person.

The only valid point that the Defendants raise is that the
Plaintiff's proposed collective of "nonmanagement" employees is too
vague.  The Judge finds that there are cases too numerous to cite,
including in the restaurant context, as to which employees
constitute "management."  He is not going to lay the groundwork for
later litigation over which employees should receive notice and
which should not.  Since, despite his conversations with fellow
employees, the Pplaintiff can only identify delivery persons,
chefs, and porters as similarly situated employees, the notice will
be limited to those positions.

Although articulated in an entirely different legal context, the
Supreme Court has instructed that equitable tolling is not a
"cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs.  If Congress
wanted to toll the statute of limitations for opt-in plaintiffs
under the FLSA as a means of avoiding the very scenario that
plaintiff argues warrants equitable tolling in the instant case,
Congress would have included such a provision in the statute.  It
did not, and the Plaintiff has not shown why their case is any
different from a regular, run-of-the-mill FLSA collective action.
Hence, the Judge will deny the Plaintiffs' motion for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.

Finally, the Judge finds that a modest adjustment of the
Plaintiff's proposed notice is warranted.  The current proposed
notice states that the case is being handled "on a 'contingency
fee' basis, which means that you do not have to pay attorneys' fee
or expenses for this lawsuit."  The Judge knows that construction
is routinely used to solicit personal injury claims, but he thinks
it is somewhat misleading.  Of course an opt-in plaintiff, like the
named Plaintiff, will, in fact, pay attorneys' fees if the case is
successful -- it may be deducted from the Plaintiff's recovery.  In
addition, costs may be advanced by the attorney, and repayment may
be contingent on the outcome of the case.  Thus, if the case is
unsuccessful, the Plaintiff may bear those costs, unless he lacks
the funds for the attorney to obtain reimbursement.

Judge Cogan granted the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification is granted except to the extent that it seeks to
provide notice to "non-management employees."  The notice shall be
sent to employees who are delivery persons, porters, or chefs,
including employees whose responsibilities include any of those
tasks.  In addition, within 10 days, the parties are directed to
agree on a revision of the Plaintiff's proposed notice to clarify
how a contingent fee arrangement would work should any opt-in
Plaintiff choose to retain the Plaintiff's counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/FxdlaI from Leagle.com.

Luis Alberto, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Seelig --
info@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC, William M.
Brown, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group,
PLLC.

Rico Pollo #2 Restaurant Corp., doing business as Rico Pollo, ABC
Corp., doing business as Rico Pollo, Juan F. Puntiel, John Doe
#1-10 & Clemente De La Cruz, Defendants, represented by Jian Hang
-- jhang@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC & Lorena P. Duarte
, Hang & Associates PLLC.

Los Hermanos Restaurant Corp., doing business as Rico Pollo,
Defendant, represented by Lorena P. Duarte -- lduarte@hanglaw.com
-- Hang & Associates PLLC.


RJ REYNOLDS: Fla. Dist. App. Affirms Final Judgment in Schleider
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Diane Schleider, etc.,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Case No. 3D15-1634 (Fla. Dist. App.),
Judge Thomas Logue of the District Court of Appeal of Florida for
the Third District affirmed the the final judgment entered in favor
of Schleider, the wife and personal representative of the Estate of
Andrew Schleider, and Suzanne LeMehaute, their daughter.

Andrew Schleider, a cigarette smoker, died from lung cancer and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  His wife sued R.J. Reynolds
for wrongful death in her capacity as personal representative of
his estate alleging she and their daughter were statutory survivors
within the meaning of Florida's Wrongful Death Act.  The complaint
alleged the father was a member of the class created in Engle v.
Liggett Group., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).  Under Engle, if
the plaintiff qualifies as a member of the class, certain facts are
found against the defendant tobacco company as a matter of res
judicata without the need of further proof.

One of the prerequisites for Engle class membership is that the
decedent's disease manifested on or before Nov. 21, 1996.  The
issue of when the father's disease manifested was one of the main
issues at trial and the jury's finding in favor of the wife and
daughter is challenged on appeal, but Judge Logue affirms that
point without discussion.

The trial spanned nearly three weeks.  In addition to the evidence
presented at trial, the jury was instructed on specific findings it
must apply if, as occurred, Schleider was found to be a member of
the Engle class.  The instructions specified that R.J. Reynolds
intentionally concealed facts regarding the dangers and addictive
qualities of cigarettes.

Evidence was presented throughout the trial indicating the tobacco
industry spent approximately $250 billion dollars between 1940 and
2005 to promote and advertise cigarettes.  The jury also heard
evidence regarding the tobacco industry's lobbying efforts and
attempts to conceal the hazards of smoking.  In addition, the jury
heard from R.J. Reynolds' own corporate representative that 400,000
to 480,000 people were dying each year from smoking cigarettes.

During the closing arguments addressing entitlement to punitive
damages, the Plaintiffs' attorney made various arguments
dramatizing the number of deaths caused by cigarettes and the size
of the sums spent to promote smoking and conceal its dangers.  In
particular, he noted that 450,000 deaths equate to three plane
crashes every day for a year.  He also asked the jury to compare
the attempts of Mr. Schleider, an individual addicted to nicotine,
to stop smoking with the $250 billion spent by the tobacco industry
with all their power, all their money" to encourage people like the
Plaintiff to continue smoking.

Regarding the damages awards, the jury heard testimony from the
wife regarding her husband's illness, the difficulties they
endured, and the impact his suffering and death had upon their
lives and future plans.  In closing argument, the Plaintiffs'
counsel requested an award of non-economic damages for loss of
companionship and protection and mental pain and suffering in the
amounts of $11 million to the wife and $7 million to the daughter.


The jury ultimately awarded $15 million in non-economic damages to
the wife and $6 million to the daughter, but refused to award the
requested punitive damages.  Regarding comparative negligence, the
Plaintiffs' counsel requested the jury find R.J. Reynolds 87.5% at
fault and the decedent 12.5% at fault.  The jury instead found R.J.
Reynolds 70% at fault and the decedent 30% at fault.  Following the
application of comparative fault, the final judgment awarded $10.5
million to the wife and $4.2 million to the daughter.

Among other motions, R.J. Reynolds moved for a new trial on damages
and for remittitur.  The motions were denied and the appeal
followed.  

Judge Logue finds no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying remittitur or a new trial on the awards to the wife and
daughter.  Considering the unique facts of the case and weighing
the evidence, he holds the jury made its determination that a $15
million award to the wife was warranted.  The jury heard
significant evidence in support of the wife's loss of consortium
and pain and suffering claims.  

Similarly, the jury determined that a $6 million award to the
daughter -- $1 million less than what the Plaintiff requested --
was appropriate.  The Judge finds that R.J. Reynolds primarily
relies on a number of cases involving damages awards to adult
children to establish that the award in the case is an outlier, and
therefore, excessive.  However, a comparison of the award to cases
involving adult children is inappropriate because the daughter was
not an adult child under the statute.  Florida's Wrongful Death Act
expressly permits recovery of damages by either a decedent's
surviving spouse, surviving minor child, or both.  Schleider's
daughter was 22 years old, and thus a statutory minor, when her
father died.  The Judge concludes that an inquiry into the matter
is factually intensive and turns largely on the nature and
credibility of the evidence presented, not merely the age of the
surviving child.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Logue affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/PFS7RY from Leagle.com.

King & Spalding LLP, and William L. Durham II -- bdurham@kslaw.com
-- Chad A. Peterson -- cpeterson@kslaw.com -- Val Leppert --
vleppert@kslaw.com -- (Atlanta, Georgia), and Scott M. Edson --
sedson@kslaw.com -- and Ashley C. Parrish -- aparrish@kslaw.com --
(Washington, DC); Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., and Benjamine
Reid -- breid@carltonfields.com -- Douglas J. Chumbley --
dchumbley@carltonfields.com -- Jeffrey A. Cohen --
jacohen@carltonfields.com -- and Olga M. Vieira --
Olga.Vieira@gmlaw.com -- for appellant/cross-appellee.

Alex Alvarez -- Alex@integrityforjustice.com; Gary M. Paige --
gpaige@fortheinjured.com -- (Davie, Florida); The Mills Firm, P.A.,
and John S. Mills and Courtney Brewer (Tallahassee), for
appellee/cross-appellant.


SCHWABE NORTH: 9th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in Sonner Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHLEEN SONNER, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHWABE NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; NATURE'S WAY PRODUCTS, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
17-55261 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants.

Schwabe North America and Nature's Way Products market and sell
nutritional supplements, including two products known as "Ginkgold
Advanced Ginkgo Extract" and "Ginkgold Max Advanced Ginkgo Extract
Max."  The labels on both products tout benefits to "mental
sharpness," "memory," and "concentration."

On July 7, 2015, Sonner filed a consumer class action against the
sellers of two Ginkgold nutritional supplements for violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and breach of express warranty.  Sonner
alleges that the operative ingredient in both products, the EGb 761
variety of Ginkgo biloba extract, does not actually have any of the
advertised cognitive benefits.

On Sept. 14, 2016, Schwabe moved for summary judgment, supporting
its motion with expert testimony from Dr. Alan F. Shatzberg, as
well evidence from randomized controlled trials, that Ginkgo biloba
benefits cognitive function.  In opposition, Sonner produced expert
testimony from Dr. Beth E. Snitz, who analyzed several clinical
studies and meta-analyses to conclude that "Ginkgo biloba is no
more effective than a placebo for improving cognitive functioning
or preventing cognitive decline.  Sonner also proffered independent
reviews and meta-analyses, randomized controlled trials, and a
scientific review article to support her contention that Ginkgo
biloba does not benefit cognitive functions.

On Feb. 2, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Schwabe.  It acknowledged that both sides have produced
expert testimony and scientific research in support of their
claims, but it nevertheless granted Schwabe summary judgment on the
ground that Sonner failed to critique the expert testimony and each
of the scientific studies proffered by Schwabe.  The district court
reasoned that because Sonner fell short in challenging the
methodology, structure, or independence of Schwabe's studies, her
evidence is "insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude
that there is no scientific support for Schwabe's claims.  Sonner
timely appealed.

The Ninth Court finds that the district courts in the circuit
appear to be split on the summary judgment standard that applies to
false advertising claims under California's UCL and CLRA.  It
clarifies that UCL and CLRA claims are to be analyzed in the same
manner as any other claim, and the usual summary judgment rules
apply.

The Court is unpersuaded by the notion that a plaintiff must not
only produce affirmative evidence, but also fatally undermine the
defendant's evidence, in order to proceed to trial. "[A]bsolute
certainty is not the evidentiary benchmark in civil (or even
criminal) litigation, and it has never been the standard for
weighing conflicting evidence for purposes of summary judgment.  It
finds that if the Plaintiff's evidence suggests that the products
do not work as advertised and the Defendant's evidence suggests the
opposite, there is a genuine dispute of material fact for the
fact-finder to decide. We see no reason to diverge from the usual
summary judgment rules for UCL and CLRA claims.

Schwabe also argues that Sonner's claims are essentially "lack of
substantiation" claims, which private Plaintiffs are prohibited
from pursuing under California law.  The district court rejected
the argument, and so does the Ninth Circuit.  It finds that Sonner
has the burden of proof as to her claims, unlike a substantiation
claim where the onus is on the defendant to substantiate the
assertions in its advertisements.

The Court therefore reversed the district court's judgment in favor
of Schwabe as to the UCL and CLRA claims, as well as the breach of
express warranty claim that relies on the same evidence.  It
remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/91VxYY from Leagle.com.

Leslie E. Hurst -- lhurst@bholaw.com -- (argued), Paula R. Brown --
pbrown@bholaw.com -- Thomas J. O'Reardon II -- toreardon@bholaw.com
-- and Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst &
O'Reardon LLP, San Diego, California; Todd D. Carpenter --
tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter LLP, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael P. Bryant -- mbryant@grsm.com -- (argued), Gordon & Rees
LLP, San Diego, California; Thomas R. Watson -- twatson@grsm.com --
and Kevin W. Alexander -- kalexander@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP,
Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

Jeffrey S. Jacobson -- jjacobson@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye &
Warren LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae Council for
Responsible Nutrition.


SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS: Court Denies Summary Judgment in ADEA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in the case captioned DONETTA RAYMOND, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 16-1282-JWB. (D. Kan.).

The Plaintiffs are former employees of Spirit. They filed this
collective action on behalf of themselves and others under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that Spirit
unlawfully discriminated against them when it terminated their
employment in a reduction-in-force (RIF), and later when it did not
hire them for new job openings. The Plaintiffs also bring
individual ADEA claims, and some assert claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and/or the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).

Spirit engaged in a number of Human Resource (HR) actions to reduce
its overhead, including offering employees early retirement
incentives and laying off workers. Such actions were taken at
Spirit's manufacturing facilities in Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma;
in Kinston, North Carolina; and in Wichita, Kansas.

Spirit implemented layoffs at its Wichita facility. There were 271
employees selected for layoff, including 221 represented by the
Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA).
Spirit offered each laid-off employee a severance package which
included a lump-sum payment in exchange for a waiver of claims
against Spirit. All but 11 of the employees impacted by the Wichita
layoffs executed a release agreement containing a waiver.

24 of the SPEEA-represented employees filed this lawsuit. They were
later joined by 47 opt-in Plaintiffs. Of the 71 total Plaintiffs,
66 signed a release agreement. The Plaintiffs who signed the
releases argue their waivers of ADEA claims were not knowing and
voluntary under the standards of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA. The parties agreed to conduct the litigation
in two phases, with the first phase to address the validity of the
ADEA waivers. The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary
judgment addressing that issue.

Distribution of OWBPA Disclosure Lists

Spirit cites evidence that its representatives met with those
Wichita employees who were selected for layoff and who were at work
on July 25, 2013. Prior to those meetings, according to Spirit, its
HR personnel generated a set of paperwork for each employee that
included a personalized Release Agreement and OWBPA Disclosure
Statement, with a 65-page OWBPA disclosure list setting forth the
job titles and ages of employees in Wichita selected and not
selected for layoff. Spirit cites evidence that its HR
representatives received the packets and delivered them to the
selected employees during face-to-face individual meetings. It also
cites evidence that selected employees who were not at work that
day or who refused to meet with HR representatives were mailed the
prepared packets, both by certified and regular mail, to their home
address.

OWBPA notice requirements

The primary provision of the OWBPA in dispute here provides in
relevant part:
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive
or other employment termination program offered to a group or class
of employees, the employer informs the individual in writing in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average individual
eligible to participate, as to (i) any class, unit, or group of
individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for
such program, and any time limits applicable to such program;
and(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the
same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible
or selected for the program.

Summary of Arguments

The Plaintiffs contend their ADEA waivers were invalid because
Spirit did not accurately inform them about the class, unit, or
group of individuals considered for the termination program.   

They argue Spirit failed to disclose that terminations under the
same program included layoffs and terminations at other facilities
and at other times in Wichita, and also failed to disclose that
Spirit excluded its newest hires from consideration for
termination. Plaintiffs further argue that Spirit failed to
disclose "the criteria it used to determine which employees would
be terminated.  

Plaintiff Fred Heston argues that Spirit cannot enforce his waiver
because he never received consideration for it. He argues Section
626(f)(3) requires proof of receipt of consideration before a
waiver can be valid under the OWBPA.  

Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Spirit failed to provide OWBPA
disclosure lists to eight Plaintiffs (Caire, Denny, Ensor, Longan,
Richardson, Sha, Schmidt, and Heston) at the time of the layoffs,
making their waivers unenforceable under the OWBPA.  

For its part, Spirit argues the relevant termination program was
the severance offer to Wichita employees impacted by the July 2013
layoffs. Spirit contends its overall business plan of reducing
headcount was not a termination program within the meaning of the
OWBPA, and that other HR activities in Wichita or at other Spirit
facilities were not part of the same program offered to Wichita
employees in the July layoffs.  

Spirit argues that terminations at other times in Wichita and at
other facilities did not involve the same decisional unit as the
July Wichita layoffs, and therefore were not part of the same OWBPA
program.

An EEOC regulation implementing the OWBPA explains there are two
types of relevant programs. One is an exit incentive program, which
is a voluntary program offered to a group or class of employees
where they are offered additional consideration in exchange for a
decision to resign voluntarily and sign a waiver. The second type
encompasses other employment termination programs, and refers to a
group or class of employees who were involuntarily terminated and
offered additional consideration in exchange for their decision to
sign a waiver.  

The uncontroverted facts show Spirit's decision-making process
concerning the July 2013 Wichita layoffs was "neither fish nor
fowl." It lay somewhere between the two poles described in the
regulation. It included some aspects of a company-wide
determination, but the greater part of the decision-making process
reflected a single-facility consideration and decision. The
objective of reducing overall employment levels at Spirit clearly
came from Spirit's corporate leadership. It is also obvious that
Spirit leadership coordinated HR reductions at various facilities
for example, layoffs were planned for and were carried out
simultaneously on July 25, 2013, at multiple facilities. But the
evidence cited on summary judgment shows that implementation of the
company's objectives was largely left in the hands of individual
facility leaders. Site leaders were not given mandatory reduction
quotas or specific directives as to how reductions were to be
implemented. They were generally directed to reduce overhead by
focusing on performance and targeting the lowest ten percent of
performers. The decision-makers at each Spirit facility, including
Wichita, proceeded to evaluate their site's needs and to exercise
business judgment as to how many and which employees should be
terminated or laid off in light of the work needs of the facility.


In light of that ambiguity, it makes sense to apply its provisions
to further the statutory goal of preventing unknowing or
involuntary waivers of ADEA rights and claims. In this case, the
focus of any ADEA claims Plaintiffs might have would be the
decision-making process of Wichita site managers implementing the
July 2013 Wichita layoffs. The process by which Spirit decided
which of the Plaintiffs and their co-workers would be considered,
selected, or excluded from a layoff and consequently offered
severance pay in exchange for a waiver), were matters entrusted to
Wichita site management, subject to corporate approval. Wichita
employees laid off in July 2013 were not considered against,
compared to, or impacted by Spirit employees at other facilities or
at other times. Although Spirit had programs that spanned multiple
facilities, Wichita employees performed work that was not
duplicated at other sites, but was unique to the Wichita facility.
Under these circumstances, disclosing termination data pertaining
to a multitude of employees at other facilities, who were
considered and terminated by different managers, and whose work and
positions were not compared to the Plaintiffs, would do little
except dilute the data relevant to the decision to select the
Plaintiffs for layoff.   

The court concludes that Spirit's limitation of the decisional unit
to the Wichita facility layoffs and the corresponding description
of the class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program
was consistent with the OWBPA and its guidelines.

The Plaintiffs also argue the disclosure was improper because it
omitted any reference to Spirit's decision to exclude newly hired
employees from the layoff. Plaintiffs contend Spirit misrepresented
the decisional unit because it failed to disclose that it exempted
employees hired after May 20, 2013, from the layoffs. But Spirit
cites uncontroverted evidence that it considered whether employees
hired after May 20, 2013, would be subject to the layoffs, before
ultimately concluding they should be exempt from being selected.
Because they were considered, the regulation indicates they must be
included in the decisional unit, even though they were ultimately
exempted, and Spirit was thus obligated to disclose the titles and
ages of these workers as individuals in the same job classification
or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the
program.

The Plaintiffs argue that Spirit's failure to disclose the
exemption for newer hires was inconsistent with its other
disclosures, such as those accompanying the March 2013
terminations, which stated that employees hired after December 2012
were not considered for that layoff.

As an initial matter, the question here is not whether Spirit acted
consistently with its prior practice, but whether the disclosure
accompanying the July 2013 layoffs complied with the OWBPA. The
court finds that it did. Moreover, Spirit cites evidence that it
considered the group of new employees for the July 2013 termination
program before deciding to exempt them. The regulation shows this
is sufficient to require their inclusion in the decisional unit.  

The Plaintiffs also contend their waivers are invalid because
Spirit did not disclose the eligibility factors used to select
employees for termination. But after examining the OWBPA and its
supporting regulation, the court concludes that disclosure of the
factors Spirit used to select employees for termination is not
among the items that must be disclosed for a valid waiver.

The OWBPA provides in part that if a waiver is requested in
connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination
program offered to a group of employees, the employer must inform
the individual as to, among other things, any eligibility factors
for such program.  

The Plaintiffs have cited evidence that eight individuals (Caire,
Denny, Ensor, Heston, Longan, Richardson, Sha, and Schmidt) did not
receive the 65-page OWBPA disclosure list from Spirit.

Affidavits or testimony from these individuals state they were not
given the disclosure list during their layoff meeting or any other
time in 2013, but were only given a packet containing a dozen or so
pages. Plaintiffs argue these individuals are entitled to partial
summary judgment declaring their waivers invalid.

In response, Spirit cites evidence that it systematically provided
disclosures lists to every employee selected for the layoff, that
Spirit personnel say they provided the lists to these specific
Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs signed release agreements
acknowledging receipt of the disclosure lists. Spirit also argues
that these Plaintiffs are attempting to create an issue of fact
based on sham affidavits. Spirit contends it is entitled to summary
judgment on the ADEA claims because the ADEA waivers of all of the
Plaintiffs are valid.  

The court concludes there are genuine disputes of material fact as
to whether these eight the Plaintiffs were provided the Disclosure
List. The court first notes that, perhaps unlike an ordinary
contract case, no legal bar arises merely because Plaintiffs signed
an agreement stating that they acknowledged receiving the list. A
waiver under the OWBPA is not knowing and voluntary unless the
employer in fact provided the employee a written disclosure in
accordance with the Act, no matter what the acknowledgement stated.
The Plaintiffs cite sworn evidence that they did not receive the
lists. To be sure, a reasonable jury might well find that Spirit's
evidence including the written acknowledgments and testimony that
Spirit provided the lists to all the Plaintiffs outweighs the
Plaintiffs' contrary testimony, but it would not have to do so.

A reasonable jury could find in the Plaintiffs' favor if it
believed their testimony and concluded that, apparently due to some
clerical error or oversight, these Plaintiffs were not given the
full list required by the OWBPA.

Spirit cites an alleged contradiction between interrogatory
responses stating that these Plaintiffs do not recall receiving the
OWBPA disclosure, and subsequent affidavits by Plaintiffs that they
did not receive the Disclosure List. A consideration of the
relevant factors shows this is not a sufficient basis to invoke the
sham rule. The affidavits indicate possible confusion on the
Plaintiffs' part at the time of the interrogatory response. The
affidavits state that having recently reviewed the 65-page document
disclosed in the litigation, the Plaintiffs did not see and [were]
not provided with a similar document at the time of the layoff, and
that the paperwork they were given during the layoff was no more
than a dozen pages.  

Accordingly, both parties' motions for summary judgment are denied
with respect to the validity of ADEA waivers of Plaintiffs Caire,
Denny, Ensor, Heston, Longan, Richardson, Sha, and Schmidt.

According to Plaintiff Fred Heston, he did not receive an initial
severance check from Spirit after he signed an ADEA waiver. When
Spirit sent him instructions for obtaining a replacement check, he
declined to seek one and did not accept Spirit's offer of payment,
because at that point he was interested in pursuing an ADEA claim.
Heston argues Spirit cannot show that he waived his rights in
exchange for consideration as required by the OWBPA. Plaintiffs
argue Heston made no such `exchange' because he did not actually
receive consideration.

Spirit argues it satisfied the consideration requirement by
promising to pay Heston and to provide career transition services,
and by tendering a replacement check when it learned Heston claimed
not to have received an initial check.   

The court agrees.

Section 626(f)(1)(D) provides that a waiver is not knowing and
voluntary unless the individual waives rights only in exchange for
consideration in addition to anything of value to which the
individual already is entitled. The uncontroverted facts show that
Heston agreed to waive ADEA claims in exchange for Spirit's promise
to provide him a severance payment and career services.

Agreeing to accept these promises in exchange for execution of the
waiver was an exchange for consideration. Long-established contract
principles make clear that Spirit's promise to pay constituted
consideration for the waiver, and because Heston was not already
entitled to such consideration prior to executing the agreement,
the exchange satisfied the requirements of Ssection 626(f)(1)(D).

Plaintiffs Donetta Raymond, Debra Hatcher, Gregory Bucchin, and
Brian Scott did not sign a severance agreement and release of
claims with Spirit. Any Plaintiff who did not sign a release
agreement is obviously not barred by a waiver of ADEA claims in
that agreement.

Spirit argues that Count 3 fails as a matter of law because it
asserts a claim for relief under the OWBPA, but the OWBPA does not
provide a private right of action.  

The Tenth Circuit has stated in an unpublished opinion that the
OWBPA provides a plaintiff a cause of action for declaratory or
injunctive relief to negate the validity of a waiver as it applies
to an ADEA claim. Count 3 of Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the
waivers at issue violated the OWBPA and are unenforceable with
respect to ADEA claims, and it seeks a declaration to that effect.
Spirit's motion to dismiss Count 3 is accordingly denied.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmz7lwz
from Leagle.com.

Donetta Raymond, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Frederick Heston, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Jilun Sha, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Randy Williams, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, William Scott Denny, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Debra Hatcher, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Brian
Marks, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Russell Ballard, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Gregory Bucchin, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Bruce Ensor, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Forrest Faris, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Cheryl Renee Gardner, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Clark T. Harbaugh,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Craig
Hoobler, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Brian Scott Jackson, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, William Koch, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Fred Longan, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, David B. Miller, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Kenneth L Poole, Jr.,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Bahram
Rahbar, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Russell Sprague, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Craig Tolson, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Robert Troilo, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Curtis J. Vines, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Bradley Kent Asmann, Richard T.
Bach, Robin S. Bradley, Kathleen K. Byram, Emilio C. Caire, Jr.,
John M. Chandler, Victor L. Daniels, Deadra E. Doyon, Roderick L.
Duke, Anne M. Duncan, Jimmie L. Felt, Steven Eric Floyd, Ronald E.
Guest, Joel M. Goyot, Audrey Henning, Alan B. Holt, Randy T.
Hopper, Donna J. Hottman, James Hutchison, Korvin J. Kilgroe,
Lambert Kobagaya, Nick Koss, Dennis Kraus, John O. Lawellin, Robert
H. Lawson, Brent John Lobile, Jill Lorber, Jeff Martin, Brian T.
Maschino, William B. Moehring, Brian Owens, Jodene Patterson,
Cornell D. Payne, Nancy D. Rapp, James D. Reese, Dennis Edward
Richardson, Jeffrey Lee Roberts, James R. Russell, Terry Sawyer,
Ronald Schauf, Shane Schmidt, Chadwick R. Scott, Michael Duane
Shaheen, Terry Spear, Diane G. Ward, Larry G. Weaver & Glen Fondaw,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel B. Kohrman , AARP Foundation
Litigation, pro hac vice, Dara S. Smith , AARP Foundation
Litigation, pro hac vice, Diane S. King , King & Greisen, LLP, pro
hac vice,Jennifer Bezoza , King & Greisen, LLP, pro hac vice &
Laurie A. McCann , AARP Foundation Litigation, 601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049, pro hac vice.

Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. & Spirit Aerosystems, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Boyd A. Byers -- bbyers@foulston.com --
Foulston Siefkin LLP, Charles E. McClellan --
cefflandt@foulston.com -- Foulston Siefkin LLP, James M. Armstrong
-- jarmstrong@foulston.com -- Foulston Siefkin LLP, Jeff P.
DeGraffenreid -- jdegraffenreid@foulston.com -- Foulston Siefkin
LLP, Stacy D. Mueller -- smueller@constangy.com -- Constangy,
Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, pro hac vice, Steven W. Moore --
smoore@constangy.com -- Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP,
pro hac vice & Teresa L. Shulda -- tshulda@foulston.com -- Foulston
Siefkin LLP.


SPRINT SPECTRUM: Carnevali Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Brittany Carnevali, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. dba Boost Mobile, Case
No. 18-cv-62981 (S.D. Fla., December 6, 2018), is brought against
the Defendant for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The case challenges the Defendant Boost Mobile's practice of
sending unauthorized text messages promoting its cellular wireless
products and services to consumers.

The Plaintiff Brittany Carnevali is a Broward County, Florida
resident. The Plaintiff's cellular telephone number has been
registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since approximately
2006.

The Defendant Boost Mobile is a provider of cellular wireless
products and services across the United States. The Defendant is
headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
      KAUFMAN P.A.
      400 NW 26th Street
      Miami, FL 33127
      Tel: (305) 469-5881
      E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


SUDDENLY EXPRESS: Vilches Seeks Overtime Wage
---------------------------------------------
RENE VILCHES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(b), the Plaintiff, vs. SUDDENLY
EXPRESS, CORP., UNITED EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS INC., a/k/a
TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS OF SOUTH FLORIDA, and LAZARO HERNANDEZ,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-25410-UU (S.D. Fla., Dec. 24,
2018), seeks to recover overtime wage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have employed several
other similarly situated employees like Plaintiff (i.e. other
drivers) who have not been paid overtime and/or minimum wages for
work performed in excess of 40 hours weekly from the filing of this
complaint back three years, the lawsuit say.

Suddenly Express Corp is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and
trucking company running freight hauling business from Miami,
Florida.[BN]

Attorney For Plaintiff:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71 St. Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167

TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Truck Frames
------------------------------------------------------------
Cheryl Jensen and Christopher Jensen, writing for Forbes, report
that a federal class-action suit claiming that the frames on the
2005 - 11 4Runners are defective and dangerous because they rust
prematurely has been filed against Toyota. The action echoes a
class-action settled in 2017 but covering different Toyota trucks.

The allegation in the new class-action contends the frames "are
prone to excessive, premature rust corrosion because the frames
were not properly prepared and treated against rust corrosion when
they were manufactured."

It names Gary Weinreich, the owner of a 2005 4Runner, as the lead
plaintiff in the suit filed in South Carolina.

"The excessive rust corrosion on the Toyota 4Runner compromises the
vehicles' safety, stability, and crash-worthiness because important
suspension components, engine mounts, transmission mounts, and body
mounts anchor to the vehicles' frames. It has also affected the
value of the vehicle," according to the suit.

In an email Toyota spokesman Eric Booth said "the safety of our
customers is a top priority. While we cannot comment on these
specific claims at this time, we will respond in the appropriate
forum."

The class-action settled in 2017 covered 2005 -- 10 Tacoma models;
2007 – 08 Tundras and 2005 – 08 Sequoias.

At the time Toyota did not admit any wrongdoing, but said it would
inspect the vehicles and owners whose frames have rust holes
greater than four-tenths of an inch in diameter would get new
frames. If the hole is smaller the frame would be cleaned and a
corrosion-resistant compound will be applied.

The action is expected to cost Toyota about $3.4 billion.

Both suits claim Toyota has long known the frames were not treated
properly and yet it failed to warn new buyers or offer significant
help to owners.

The Weinreich suit, filed December 6th in the U.S. District Court,
Charleston, Division by J. Edward Bell, of Georgetown, South
Carolina.

Toyota has had a series of problems with rusting frames including a
2009 recall of 110,000 of its Tundra trucks.

In 2008 the automaker said it would extend the warranty on on about
813,000 1995-2000 Tacomas by extending the warranty to 15 years,
with unlimited mileage.

The automaker said it would buy back rusted-out Tacomas for 1 and a
half times the suggested retail price for a vehicle in excellent
condition as calculated by Kelley Blue Book, according to a story
in The New York Times. [GN]


TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Disabled Entune App Support
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Noddy A. Fernandez, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
man has filed a class action lawsuit against Toyota after it
disabled support for an interactive feature for which he paid an
additional cost.

Raymond Auyeung, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a complaint on Dec. 6 in Cook County Circuit Court
against Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc. over alleged violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and
other counts.

According to the complaint, Auyeung and the class of consumers paid
a significant amount on top of the purchase price of their Toyota
vehicles to equip the vehicles with an Entune Premium System. The
suit states the plaintiff was promised this system would allow him
to use software applications such as Pandora and Facebook Places.

However, after plaintiff and the class paid the extra fee,
defendant Toyota allegedly discontinued and eliminated support for
the applications they were promised to receive.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks judgment for
actual and compensatory damages, restitution and such other relief
as the court deems reasonable and just. He is represented by Eugene
Y. Turin and David L. Gerbie of McGuire Law PC in Chicago.

Circuit Court of Cook County case number 18-CH-15221 [GN]


TRACTOR SUPPLY: Court Dismisses Johnson FLSA Suit Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMMY JOHNSON and VANESSA DETTWILER, Plaintiffs, v.
TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-06039-RJB (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Tacoma, (i) granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal; (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Seal Unredacted Declaration of Michael Malk; and (iii) granted
in part and denied without prejudice the Defendant's Motion to
Strike.

Filed on Dec. 12, 2017, the putative class action centers on
allegations that the Defendant failed to provide adequate meal and
rest breaks to non-exempt employees in violation of federal and
state wage and hour laws.  The Complaint alleges one claim for
violations of the Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.  Supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a) is alleged for
three Washington state law claims.

The Court has granted two stipulated continuances, the second of
which stayed formal discovery and tolled the statute of limitations
to accommodate an Oct. 24, 2018 mediation.

On Nov. 21, 2018, after the mediation failed to resolve the case,
the Plaintiffs filed the pending motion to dismiss.  Having
attempted mediation, they represent, they have decided not to
further pursue their bonus-overtime claims under the FLSA or
Washington law, based on the prospect of years of costly litigation
and the risk that Defendant may prevail on the FLSA claim.

With that motion and pursuant to a stipulated protective order, the
Plaintiffs pro forma filed a motion to seal certain paragraphs of
the Declaration of Michael Malk.  The declaration recounts from Mr.
Malk's perspective what occurred in preparation for and at the Oct.
24, 2018 mediation.  The Plaintiffs have partially redacted one
paragraph of Mr. Malk's declaration, paragraph five, which is
redacted.

In response to the motion to seal, the Defendant filed a motion to
strike, seeking to strike the declaration and references to and
information gleaned from the Oct. 24, 2018 mediation.  It requests
in the alternative that, at a minimum, the Plaintiffs' motion to
seal be granted.

In Judge Bryan's view, the Defendant goes too far seeking to
preclude reference to broadly-defined "mediation information."
Nonetheless, redactions to Mr. Malk's declaration are not
inappropriate under the circumstances.  With formal discovery
stayed, he says the Plaintiffs explicitly asked for specific
information "for purposes of mediation," such as that used to
calculate the number of the potential class members and wage
damages.  Particularly where the information redacted was gained
through mediation and is immaterial to the merits of the pending
motion to dismiss, redaction is allowable.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiff's motion to seal should be
granted.  The unredacted declaration of Mr. Malk, Dkt. 29, should
remain under seal.  To that extent, the Defendant's motion to
strike should be granted.  The Defendant's motion to strike should
otherwise be denied without prejudice.  No finding about these two
motions should be construed to limit findings by State courts in
future proceedings.

Finally, he holds that the Plaintiffs' request for voluntary
dismissal should be granted.  It does not appear that the Defendant
opposes dismissal per se, but rather, opposes the extra costs
associated with ending the case and re-filing in State court.  The
Defendant's request for attorneys' fees should be denied.  Judging
by the Defendant's workup for the mediation, he finds it would
appear that the bulk of attorney work in the case thus far has had
nothing to do with voluntary dismissal.  Other than issuing orders
on stipulated motions and the motions addressed by the Order above,
the Judge has not reached the merits on any substantive issues and
is reluctant to tilt the balance of attorneys' fees in favor of one
party over another.

Based on this, Judge Bryan granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal.  He dismissed without prejudice the case.  He
denied the Defendant's request for attorneys' fees.

The Judge granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal Unredacted
Declaration of Michael Malk.  Docket 29 will remain sealed.  To the
extent the Defendant's Motion to Strike requests that Docket 29
remain sealed, he granted in part the motion, and otherwise denied
without prejudice the motion.

The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of the Order to
all counsel of record and to any party appearing pro se at said
party's last known address.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fE0x8V from Leagle.com.

Tammy Johnson & Vanessa Dettwiler, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael
C. Subit -- msubit@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS,
Michael Malk -- mm@malklawfirm.com -- MALK LAW FIRM, pro hac vice &
Marc C. Cote -- mcote@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT &
THOMAS.

Tractor Supply Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Adam T. Pankratz -- adam.pankratz@ogletree.com --
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, Christopher W. Decker --
christopher.decker@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS, pro hac vice &
Kyle Nelson -- kyle.nelson@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH
SMOAK & STEWART.


TRANSAMERICA CORP: Karg Sues Over Mismanaged Pension Fund
---------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Karg, Matthew R. Lamarche and Shirley Rhodes, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Transamerica Corporation, The Investment Committee of the
Transamerica 401(K) Plan and Does 1-40, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-01042 (N.D. Iowa, December 28, 2018), seeks monetary,
equitable and other relief for breach of fiduciary duties and for
violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

Transamerica Corporation sponsors the retirement plan of its
employees and participants, which is a profit-sharing plan that
includes a "qualified cash or deferred arrangement." Plaintiffs are
plan participants who claim that Transamerica affiliate,
Transamerica Asset Management, made substandard investment
portfolios and retained poor-performing proprietary investment
portfolios despite the availability of other investment options.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
      SHINDLER ANDERSON GOPLERUD & WEESE PC
      5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
      West Des Moines, IA 50265
      Telephone: (515) 223-4567
      Fax: (515) 223-8887
      Email: goplerud@sagwlaw.com

              - and -

      Charles H. Field, Esq.
      SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
      655 West Broadway, Suite 1700
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 577-4253
      Fax: (619) 577-4250
      Email: cfield@sanfordheisler.com

             - and -

      David Sanford, Esq.
      Alexandra Harwin, Esq.
      David Tracey, Esq.
      SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
      1350 A venue of the Americas, 31st Floor
      New York, NY 10019
      Tel: (646) 402-5650
      Fax: (646) 402-5651
      Email: amelzer@sanfordheisler.com
             aharwin@sanfordheisler.com
             dtracey@sanfordheisler.com


TRIAD MEDIA: Court OKs Cross-Claimant Plaintiff's Summary Judgment
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Cross-Claim Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned NORMA VAZQUEZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRIAD
MEDIA SOLUTIONS, INC., ZETA INTERACTIVE CORPORATION, and SPIRE
VISION LLC, Defendants. Civ. No. 15-7220. (D.N.J.).

Cross-claim plaintiff TriAd Media Solutions, Inc. (TriAd) and
cross-claim defendants Zeta Interactive Corporation (Zeta) and
Spire Media LLC (Spire) (Zeta/Spire) each move for summary judgment
on all cross-claims asserted by TriAd under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.

Plaintiff Vazquez filed a putative class action complaint against
TriAd on September 30, 2015, alleging that TriAd sent Vazquez an
unsolicited marketing text message in violation of the TCPA.

Plaintiff's Suit Triggered Zeta/Spire's Obligation to Indemnify
TriAd

Zeta/Spire makes three arguments as to why it is not required to
indemnify TriAd: (1) TriAd was not entitled to its own counsel when
Zeta/Spire controlled the defense of Vazquez's claim, (2) no TCPA
violation occurred,  and (3) there is no evidence that Zeta/Spire
sent the text message to Vazquez.

TriAd Was Entitled to Its Own Counsel.

Zeta/Spire contends that TriAd should not be reimbursed for its
legal fees because Zeta/Spire controlled the joint defense of
Vazquez's claims. This argument is problematic in two ways.

First, it is undisputed that TriAd led the defense of Vazquez's
suit for some time. Vazquez sued on September 30, 2015 and
Zeta/Spire did not learn of this action until January 8, 2016. The
parties did not agree that Zeta/Spire would lead the defense until
July 13, 2016 Because TriAd as indemnitee was allowed to lead the
defense under New York law,  TriAd is entitled to reimbursement for
fees incurred during this time.

Second, Zeta/Spire repeatedly agreed that TriAd could retain its
own counsel while Zeta/Spire led the defense. Zeta/Spire first
consented in correspondence to TriAd on June 27, 2016. And the
parties' Joint Defense Agreement provided that nothing in this
Agreement shall limit or interfere with the right or ability of a
Party or its counsel to take reasonable and necessary measures to
conduct its own independent analysis, litigation and/or defense of
Vazquez's Allegations.

Consequently, Zeta/Spire has assented to Triad's retention of
separate counsel.

Proof of a TCPA Violation Is Not Required

Zeta/Spire also argues that it has no indemnification obligation
because the Advertiser Agreement requires that there be an actual
TCPA violation.  According to Zeta/Spire, because In]either Vazquez
nor TriAd presents any evidence that the TCPA's elements have been
met, there is no violation and thus no indemnity. TriAd disagrees,
pointing to the unambiguous language of the Advertiser Agreement,
which it argues requires Zeta/Spire to defend and indemnify TriAd
upon the filing of plaintiff's TCPA lawsuit.

The Court agrees with TriAd. New York cases on this precise
question—whether a contractual indemnification obligation is
triggered by the filing of a lawsuit or instead only once proof of
a legal violation is presentedare sparse. Neither party provides
the Court with a sufficiently analogous decision. Zeta/Spire cites
no New York authority for its contention that a TCPA violation must
be proven—rather than merely alleged to trigger its
indemnification obligation. And the case TriAd references, is
inapposite because the indemnification provision there explicitly
mentioned allegations.  

Direct Proof that Zeta/Spire Sent the Text Message Is Not
Necessary

Zeta/Spire further argues that the Advertiser Agreement does not
cover the present dispute because there is no evidence it sent the
text message to Vazquez. Notably, Zeta/Spire does not deny sending
the text message. It merely claims that there is no evidence it did
so. But as said, proof of a TCPA violation is not necessary to
trigger Zeta/Spire's indemnification obligation. For the same
reasons, evidence that Zeta/Spire sent the text message is
unnecessary. Zeta/Spire, by controlling the defense, was in a
position to prevent any such evidence from coming to light.

TriAd Is Not Entitled to Indemnification for Its Fees in Litigating
Its Indemnification Claim.

TriAd contends that Zeta/Spire's indemnification obligation extends
to fees incurred in prosecuting its indemnity cross-claims.
Zeta/Spire disagrees, arguing that fees spent in negotiating with
Zeta and pursuing TriAd's indemnity claim are not recoverable under
the Advertiser Agreement.  

According to the New York Court of Appeals, because a promise by
one party to a contract to indemnify the other for attorney's fees
incurred in litigation between them is contrary to the
well-understood rule that parties are responsible for their own
attorney's fees, the court should not infer a party's intention to
waive the benefit of the rule unless the intention to do so is
unmistakably clear from the language of the promise. Hooper, 74
N.Y.2d at 492. The Hooper Court concluded that the indemnitee was
not entitled to reimbursement for fees incurred in seeking
indemnification because the parties' contract does not contain
language clearly permitting such recovery.  

TriAd's fees incurred in prosecuting its cross-claims are not
recoverable under the Advertiser Agreement. New York requires
unmistakable clarity that the parties intended an indemnification
provision to cover indemnification claims against the indemnitor.
TriAd argues that the Indemnification Clause covers its cross-claim
because it promises indemnity for any claim which may arise out of
the breach of any duty, representation or warranty under [the
Advertiser] Agreement.

But TriAd is neither suing for nor alleging a breach of the
Advertiser Agreement. TriAd has not shown the parties' unmistakable
intention to cover an indemnification claim.  Indeed, the
Indemnification Clause's plain text does not mention or even
obliquely refer to claims between the parties. Consequently, this
Court cannot find that the Indemnification Clause is outside
Hooper's standard.

TriAd's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Zeta/Spire's
motion for summary judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 13, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycj3fm2o from Leagle.com.

NORMA VAZQUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH J. DEPALMA --
jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG, LLC.

TRIAD MEDIA SOLUTIONS, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, Defendant,
represented by KENNETH J. CESTA -- kcesta@hoaglandlongo.com --
HOAGLAND MORAN DUNST & DOUKAS LLP, MARK M. TALLMADGE --
mtallmadge@bressler.com -- BRESSLER, AMERY & ROSS, PC & MICHAEL
DAVID MARGULIES, Bressler, Amery & Ross, P.C.

ZETA INTERACTIVE CORPORATION & Spire Vision LLC, Defendants,
represented by PETER GEORGE SIACHOS -- psiachos@grsm.com -- Gordon
& Rees, LLP.


TURN INC: Court Dismisses Henson's NYGBL Suit With Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ANTHONY HENSON and WILLIAM CINTRON, Plaintiffs,
v. TURN, INC., Defendant. No. C 15-01497 JSW. (N.D. Cal.).

Defendant Turn operates as an online advertising clearinghouse for
online companies to general targeted advertising programs. Verizon
partnered with Turn to implement such a targeted advertising
program that uses Verizon's Unique Identifier Header (UIDH) to help
online advertisers deliver relevant advertisement to subscribers
based upon the usage data from their mobile devices.

The Plaintiffs allege that Turn violated users' reasonable
expectations of privacy by creating zombie cookies which monitored
their behavior surreptitiously and that users could not detect,
delete or block. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs filed this
putative class action suit for violation of New York General
Business Law section 349 for deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any business, trade or commerce and for trespass to
chattels.   

Section 349(a) of the New York General Business Law declares as
unlawful deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any
business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in
this state. To state a claim under this section, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) the challenged act or practice was
consumer-oriented, (2) it was deceptive or misleading in a material
way, and (3) the plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof.

The New York courts have adopted an objective definition of
deceptive acts and practices, whether representations or omissions,
limited to those likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances.

Turn argues that its conduct, while perhaps not pleasing to the
plaintiff consumers, does not constitute deceptive conduct because
a reasonable consumer would know that deleting old cookies does not
block the reoccurrence of new cookies with the same information as
the old, deleted ones. Turns contends that a reasonable consumer
has no basis to assume, as a general matter, that a company will
not or cannot use identifiers embedded in web traffic to uniquely
recognize users.

The Court finds the Plaintiffs' contention sufficient, at least at
the pleading phase, that the allegations that the Plaintiffs were
unaware, and reasonably unaware, that their deleting of old cookies
did not block the return of the same cookies carrying the same
detailed information. The question of whether the failure to
disclose the nature of how the cookies work to defeat the deletion
would mislead a reasonable consumer is sufficient to withstand the
motion to dismiss.  

To successfully allege a claim under Section 349, however, the
Plaintiffs must also identify a cognizable injury. To establish a
claim, the Plaintiffs must identify a connection between the
misrepresentation and any harm from, or failure of, the product.

The Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Turn's deceptive acts and
practices, the Plaintiffs and Class members were injured and
damaged in that they suffered a loss of privacy through tracking
and collection of their personal and private information; were
denied use of the privacy controls and settings on their mobile
devices, including the ability to clear or delete third-party
tracking cookies and browsing history; had their devices
persistently infected with zombie cookies they could not delete or
remove; and had their personal and confidential information used by
Turn for its own commercial gain without the consumers' knowledge
or consent.

The Court finds persuasive the distinction between confidential,
individually identifiable information, such as medical records or
social security numbers, as opposed to anonymized data.   

Here, the Plaintiffs merely plead that Turn collects data that is
anonymous and fails to link the data to specific persons. Because
the Plaintiffs have not alleged that their data is confidential and
readily recognizable and identifiable as belonging to any
particular person, the Court finds that they have failed to state a
cognizable injury.  

Accordingly, the Court grants Turn's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claim for violation of New York General Business Law
section 349. The Plaintiffs are given leave to amend to state, if
they can, that the invasion of their privacy and collection of
their data can be identified as belonging to any specific person,
in order to state a cognizable claim for injury under this
provision.

Turn moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' second claim for relief for
trespass to chattels. A trespass to chattels occurs when a party
intentionally, and without justification or consent, physically
interferes with the use and enjoyment of personal property in
another's possession, and thereby harms that personal property.

The Plaintiffs summarily allege that Turn's conduct impaired the
condition, quality, and value of the Plaintiffs' mobile devices,
causing them real and substantial damage. However, there is no
allegation that the placement of the cookies had any noticeable
effect on the performance of the devices. The Court finds no
authority for the position that the deprivation of the use of
security features, similar to the efficacy of third-party cookie
blocker, is sufficient to state a claim for cognizable deprivation
of the use of chattel.  

Because the Court finds there is no support for the allegation of
harm to the Plaintiffs' personal property, the Court grants Turn's
motion to dismiss the claim for trespass to chattels. However, the
Plaintiffs are given leave to amend to state, again if they can,
that the placement of the cookies caused substantial degradation to
the functioning of their devices.

Accordingly, the Court grants Turn's motion to dismiss the
complaint with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7qn7mue from Leagle.com.

Anthony Henson & William Cintron, Plaintiffs, represented by
Michael W. Sobol -- msobol@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Bradley Scott Clanton, Clanton Legal Group, PLLC,
Joseph Henry Bates, III -- hbates@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates &
Pulliam, PLLC, Nicholas Diamand -- ndiamand@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP & Nimish Ramesh Desai --
ndesai@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Turn, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael H. Rubin --
michael.rubin@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Melanie Marilyn
Blunschi -- melanie.blunschi@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP &
Serrin A. Turner -- serrin.turner@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP,
pro hac vice.


UNITED STATES: Court OKs Settlement of FAMs' ADEA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' and Defendant's
Renewed Joint Motion for Final Approval of a Collective Action
Settlement in the case captioned K.H., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Defendant. Case
No. 15-cv-02740-JST. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are current and former Field Air Marshalls (FAMs)
employed by the Defendant, the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. All are over forty years of age. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
targeted the six Field Offices for closure in an attempt to drive
out older FAMs so that it could in turn hire two young FAMs for
every older FAM.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the Defendant agrees
to pay each class member who separated from the Service a total sum
of $1,500.   

The Plaintiffs face the risk of recovering nothing at trial;
Magistrate Judge Beeler supervised the settlement, which was the
product of arm's-length negotiations; and the Plaintiffs
unanimously approve the settlement terms.

Under the agreement, all class members who have separated from the
Service will be paid a total sum of $1,500, and class members who
remain employed with the Service will receive seven additional days
of leave. Based on the additional information provided by the
parties, the Court concludes that this represents a fair and
reasonable settlement amount in light of the Plaintiffs' range of
possible recovery.

The Plaintiffs who relocated to other offices were already provided
five days of paid leave to move and would be relying on a legally
and factually speculative theory to demonstrate a limited amount of
lost wages. Given these difficulties, seven additional days of paid
leave is a reasonable recovery for the relocating Plaintiffs. As
for the Plaintiffs who left the Service, the parties agree that
only four of fifty-one attempted to obtain work to mitigate their
damages. Though the parties calculate that these four Plaintiffs
could possibly recover up to $80-100,000, they acknowledge
significant issues in proving liability.

The Court finds that the settlement amount is fair and reasonable,
given these considerations, combined with the usual risks, costs,
and delay of further litigation.

In view of these factors, the Court concludes that the proposed
settlement agreement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona
fide dispute and will therefore approve it.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at
https://tinyurl.com/y87p6vyj from Leagle.com.

K.H., Gary McConaghy, Richard DeVivo, Donna Baxter, Brian Pierog,
Jeffrey Boyer, J. M., W. L. & C. V., on behalf of themselves and
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Nicholas
Michael Wieczorek -- nwieczorek@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill PLLC,
Ernest B. Orsatti, Rothman Gordon, P.C., pro hac vice, Jeremy J.
Thompson -- jthompson@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill PLLC & William
Francis Ward, Rothman Gordon, PC, pro hac vice.

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Defendant,
represented by Wendy M. Garbers, United States Attorney's Office &
David Alejandro Pereda, United States Attorney's Office Civil
Division.


UNITED STATES: Medicare Diabetic Patients File Class Suit v. HHS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Morse, writing for Healthcare Finance, reports that  diabetic
patients on Medicare have filed a class action lawsuit against
Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar for allegedly denying
them coverage for continuous glucose monitors.

The suit was filed December 13 by plaintiffs Carol A. Lewis and
Douglas B. Sargent on behalf of themselves and others in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, after their complaint
was denied by the Medicare Appeals Council.

CGM devices continuously test a diabetic's blood to monitor for
glucose levels and transmit that information to patients and
caregivers. The devices reduce the need to finger prick for blood,
the method of testing prior to the early 2000s when CGMs were
developed.

In January 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services did
deem CGMs as durable medical equipment covered under Medicare, but
only for certain devices that were "primarily and customarily used
to serve a medical purpose," according to the lawsuit.

CMS denies coverage if the CGM does not completely replace the
finger prick test strips, according to the lawsuit.

Therapeutic CGM systems that aid in treatment decisions are covered
but nontherapeutic CGMs are not. CMS said that without the
treatment decisions, patients are not led to change their diet or
insulin dosage based on the readings.

The lawsuit said that more than 98 percent of private insurers
cover CGMs.

CGMs cost about $300 to $350 a month for the purchase of a
receiver, transmitter, disposable sensors and test strip supplies.
They are available by prescription only.

The plaintiffs want retroactive payments for patients who have
spent about $3,500 a year out-of-pocket replacing sensors and
transmitters, according to attorneys.

WHY THIS MATTERS

The complaint asserts that HHS's coverage denials have serious
consequences for patients' health outcomes and have an impact on
healthcare costs at both the individual and national level.

Those who can't afford the cost of a CGM forgo the device and risk
acute health complications.

Dramatic changes in glucose levels can mean the difference between
just-in-time treatment and serious, even fatal, complications that
can result from the delays in care that are all too common with
older, more traditional monitoring methods, the complaint states.

THE TREND

Diabetes costs the United States hundreds of billions of dollars
each year through direct expenses and lost productivity, the
lawsuit said.

THEIR TAKE

The complaint seeks a declaration that federal law requires HHS to
reimburse for CGMs; compensation for Medicare beneficiaries' past
out-of-pocket costs to purchase these devices in claims previously
denied; and a ruling to establish a precedent for all Medicare
beneficiaries filing claims for CGMs in the future.

ON THE RECORD

"The Department has continued to deny diabetes patients potentially
lifesaving and cost-reducing medical devices and care," said
Attorney James Pistorino with the Parrish Law Offices and lead
representative for the plaintiffs. "Nonsensically, the department
has claimed that CGMs do not serve a medical purpose and are not
necessary, despite their being an FDA-approved and verified method
for preventing those with diabetes from facing dangerous
consequences, such as falling into a diabetic coma or, even worse,
death." [GN]


UNITEDHEALTHCARE: CMC in Smith ERISA Suit Continued to March 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANE SMITH, on her behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE
COMPANY and UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-06336-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland Division, continued the Case Management Conference set for
Jan. 22, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. to March 21, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.  The
deadline to file the Case Management Statement is reset from Jan.
15, 2019 to March 14, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sDhyBp from Leagle.com.

Jane Smith, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by D. Brian Hufford --
dbhufford@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Jason S. Cowart -- jcowart@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Anant Kumar -- akumar@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Nell Zora Peyser --
npeyser@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Shawn
P. Naunton -- snaunton@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro
hac vice & Meiram Bendat, Psych-Appeal, Inc.

United Healthcare Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Jennifer Salzman Romano -- jromano@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring
LLP, Jared L. Facher -- jfacher@crowell.com -- Crowell Moring LLP,
pro hac vice, Margaret Carroll Gomes -- MGomes@crowell.com --
CROWELL MORING LLP & Michael W. Lieberman -- mlieberman@crowell.com
-- Crowell Moring LLP.

United Behavioral Health, Defendant, represented by Jennifer
Salzman Romano, Crowell & Moring LLP, Jared L. Facher, Crowell
Moring LLP, Margaret Carroll Gomes, CROWELL MORING LLP & Michael W.
Lieberman, Crowell Moring LLP, pro hac vice.


VIRGINIA: Bid for Prelim Injunction in Stinnie Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAMIAN STINNIE, ET AL, v. RICHARD D. HOLCOMB, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-CV-00044 (W.D. va.), Judge
Norman K. Moon of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Virginia, Charlottesville Division, granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary injunction.

The Plaintiffs in the putative class action have sued the
Commissioner of Virginia's Department of Motor Vehicles,
challenging the constitutionality of Virginia Code Section
46.2-395, which requires the automatic suspension of drivers'
licenses for failure to pay state court fines and costs.  

The case was first filed with the Court in July 2016 and was
dismissed without prejudice.  The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
Plaintiffs' appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  The Fourth
Circuit explained that its grounds for dismissal did not clearly
indicate that no amendment in the complaint could cure the defects
in the the Plaintiff's case.  Accordingly, on remand, in September
2018, the Plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, alleging that
Section 46.2-395 as written and as implemented by the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") Commissioner Richard D.
Holcomb, is unconstitutional on its face for failing to provide
sufficient notice or hearing to any driver before license
suspension.  The Plaintiffs also allege Section 46.2-395 is
unconstitutional as applied to people who cannot afford to pay due
to their modest financial circumstances.

In their motion for preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs request
that the Court: (1) enjoins the Commissioner from enforcing Section
46.2-395 against the Plaintiffs and the Future Suspended Class
Members without notice and determination of ability to pay; (2)
removes any current suspensions of the Plaintiffs' driver's
licenses imposed under Section 46.2-395; and (3) enjoins the
Commissioner from charging a fee to reinstate the Plaintiffs'
licenses if there are no other restrictions on their licenses.

In response to the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction,
the Commissioner argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction for three
reasons: (1) the Rooker Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from
exercising jurisdiction over the claims; (2) the Plaintiffs lack
Article III standing; and (3) the Commissioner is immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment.

The parties briefed the motion, and the Court held an evidentiary
hearing and oral argument.  Based on the current record, Judge Moon
concludes that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits
of their procedural due process claim because the Commissioner
suspends licenses without an opportunity to be heard.  At no time
are the Plaintiffs given any opportunity to be heard regarding
their default, nor do they have the opportunity to present evidence
that they are unable to satisfy court debt.  Because none of the
procedures allow the Plaintiffs to be heard on their alleged
default and later suspension, the procedures fail to present the
necessary opportunity to contest the suspension.

The Judge also finds that the evidence shows that the Commissioner
is at least partially responsible for the Plaintiffs' harms, and
their requested relief would eliminate most, if not all, of the
harms caused by Section 46.2-395.  Without the Commissioner's
actions, not only would the Plaintiffs be able to drive without
fear of being cited, fined, or possibly incarcerated, but they
would not face the additional, and possibly insurmountable, burden
of the reinstatement fee.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established
that their injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the
Commissioner.  Without the Commissioner's actions, it would be
impossible to effectuate a license suspension.  Accordingly,
granting the Plaintiffs' request would allow them to "find full
redress," as their ability to drive would be restored without fear
of penalty.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Moon granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction.  An appropriate order will issue, and
the Clerk of the Court is directed to send a certified copy of the
Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying order to all the counsel of
record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/a94o2j from Leagle.com.

Damian Stinnie, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alyssa M. Pazandak,
McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, Angela A. Ciolfi --
angela@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid Justice Center, Benjamin Peter
Abel, McGuireWoods LLP, Brooke Alexandra Weedon, McGuire Woods LLP,
David Preston Baugh, David P. Baugh, Esq. -- dpbaugh@dpbaugh.com --
PLC, Jonathan Todd Blank -- jblank@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP, Leslie Carolyn Kendrick -- kendrick@virginia.edu -- University
Of Virginia School of Law, Mario David Salas , egal Aid Justice
Center, Mary Catherine Bauer, Southern Poverty Law Center & Patrick
Stephen Levy-Lavelle, Legal Aid Justice Center.

Melissa Adams, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,, Adrainne Johnson, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,, Williest Bandy, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, & Brianna Morgan,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,,
Plaintiffs, represented by Alyssa M. Pazandak, McGuireWoods LLP,
pro hac vice, Benjamin Peter Abel, McGuireWoods LLP, Brooke
Alexandra Weedon, McGuire Woods LLP & Jonathan Todd Blank,
McGuireWoods LLP.

Richard D. Holcomb, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of
the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant, represented
by Adam John Yost, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia,
Janet W. Baugh, Office of the Attorney General, Maya Miriam
Eckstein -- meckstein@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP, Nancy
Hull Davidson -- ndavidson@oag.state.va.us -- Office of the
Attorney General, Neil Keith Gilman -- ngilman@HuntonAK.com --
Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP, pro hac vice, Christian Arrowsmith
Parrish, Office of the Attorney General, David Mitchell Parker --
dparker@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Margaret Hoehl
O'Shea -- moshea@oag.state.va.us -- Office of the Attorney General
of Virginia, Stuart Alan Raphael -- sraphael@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
& Williams LLP & Trevor Stephen Cox -- tcox@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP.

NAACP, Amicus, represented by David L. Heilberg --
dheilberg@charlottesvillelegal.com -- Dygert Wright Hobbs &
Heilberg, PLC.


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Settles Faulty-Engine Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Bill Wichert, writing for Law360, reports that a New Jersey federal
judge has signed off on a settlement and $8.65 million in
attorneys' fees and costs in a consolidated class action against
Volkswagen and Audi over faulty-engine claims. [GN]


WAL-MART DE MEXICO: 2d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Fogel Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL FOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERNESTO VEGA,
WAL-MART DE MEXICO, SAB DE CV, WAL-MART STORES INC., SCOT RANK,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-650-cv (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decisions entered on Feb. 27, 2017, and Feb. 21, 2018 dismissing
Fogel's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and
subsequently denying him leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.

Wal-Mex is a subsidiary of Wal-Mart that owns and operates retail
stores in Mexico and Central America.  There are also several
individual defendants who held various roles at Wal-Mex and
Wal-Mart.  Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") alleges
that beginning in 2003, top executives at Wal-Mex engaged in
widespread bribery of various local government officials to secure
building permits and other local government approvals to build new
stores in Mexico.  He also alleges that officials of Wal-Mart were
aware of the scheme as early as 2005.

After an internal Wal-Mex investigation of the scheme in 2005 and
2006, Wal-Mart concluded that there was no evidence or clear
indication of bribes paid to Mexican government authorities with
the purpose of wrongfully securing any license or permits.  Almost
six years later, on April 21, 2012, however, the New York Times
published an extensive article entitled Wal-Mart Hushed Up a Vast
Mexican Bribery Case, which gained widespread public attention.
The article indicated that extensive bribery had indeed occurred.
The article also suggested that the scheme violated the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.  On April 23, 2012, Congress announced an
investigation into the allegations of bribery by Wal-Mex
officials.

Fogel brought the putative class action in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York in April, 2013, on behalf of
all purchasers of American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") of Wal-Mex
between Dec. 8, 2011 and April 24, 2012.  After the New York Times
article was published, Wal-Mex's ADRs fell by 12.2% on April 23,
2012, and a further 4.3% on April 24, 2012.  Fogel alleges that, as
a result of Defendants' scheme and misrepresentations, Wal-Mex ADRs
were overvalued during the class period.

Fogel, in his SAC, alleges a number of statements that form the
basis of his claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 and Section 20(a).  The statements come
from: (i) a series of Wal-Mex press releases from December 2011
through April 2012 claiming compliance with legal requirements and
stating sales results; (ii) Wal-Mex's 2011 Annual Report, and an
Audit Report issued on Feb. 20, 2012; (iii) Wal-Mex's website,
which stated, that they do not tolerate, permit, or engage in
bribery, corruption or unethical practices of any kind; (iv)
Wal-Mex Annual Reports from 2004 through 2010; and (v) Wal-Mart's
Form 10-Q report of Dec. 8, 2011 for the third quarter of the
fiscal year 2012.

In its Feb. 27, 2017 opinion, the district court granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The district court concluded that
the statute of repose in Section 804 barred any claims based on
misrepresentations prior to April 5, 2008, including those based on
the Wal-Mex 2004, 2005, or 2006 Annual Reports.  The district court
further concluded that all claims raised for the first time in the
First Amended Complaint ("FAC") or SAC were barred to the extent
that they were based on alleged violations prior to Dec. 8, 2009,
or April 7, 2011, but the court found that the Original Complaint's
allegations sufficiently alleged that the statute of repose did not
bar Fogel's claims with regards to the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Annual
Reports.  It also concluded that the statute of limitations barred
the new claims raised for the first time in the amended complaints
because the later-added claims do not relate back to the Original
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, including those
against two new Defendants (Scot Rank and Wal-Mart), the new claims
against the original Defendants, (Wal-Mex and Ernesto Vega), and
the claim relating to the Wal-Mex press releases from January
through April 2012.

The district court dismissed the remaining claims that were not
time-barred for failure to state a claim under Section 10(b),
Section 20(a), and Rule 10b-5 because Fogel had not adequately
pleaded scienter for Vega, and he pleaded insufficient facts to
impute scienter to Wal-Mex (imputed from Vega or another employee).
It also held that Fogel had failed to plead actionable
misrepresentations or omissions because all of the statements from
the Wal-Mex Annual Reports and its website are "inactionable,
immaterial puffery," he alleged no facts demonstrating that the
statements were false, and Fogel had failed to adequately plead
scheme liability.  The district court also found that because it
had concluded that there was no 10b-5 violation, there could be no
liability for control persons under Section 20(a).  Finally, it
denied Fogel's motion for leave to amend his complaint.  The
district court held that a proposed Third Amended Complaint would
be futile because it would not remove the time bar for many of the
claims, and it also would not change the core of the remainder of
the claims.

The district court's Feb. 21, 2018, decision denied Fogel's motion
to alter the judgment to once again attempt to file a Third Amended
Complaint concluding that none of the grounds for proper
reconsideration applied.  It also held that Fogel had not presented
any allegations based on newly discovered evidence that would have
altered the court's decision and that the proffered evidence was
discovered prior to the decision on the original motion to
dismiss.

Fogel appealed these determinations.  He contends that the district
court erred in dismissing his claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and that the
district court abused its discretion in subsequently denying him
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.

In this summary order, the Court addresses those determinations
only to the extent required to affirm the district court's
dismissal.  It needs not address the district court's conclusions
concerning the timeliness of the claims because Fogel does not
challenge those determinations as to many of the misrepresentations
alleged in the SAC, and the remainder of the allegations are not
actionable.

Th Court concudes that (i) the district court did not err in
concluding that the Plaintiff has not alleged factual circumstances
that would lift these generalized claims of honesty and integrity
above the level of mere puffery; (ii) the statements regarding
financial performance are not actionable; and (iii) Fogel fails to
allege a deceptive act, aside from the misstatements he alleges are
actionable under 10b-5(b).

The Court also concludes that the district court did not err in
refusing to allow Fogel to file a Third Amended Complaint.  Fogel
failed to allege valid claims in each of his prior complaints.
Moreover, in its decision on the Rule 59(e) motion, the district
court found that Fogel also had not alleged any new facts or law
that the district court had overlooked, and that the new evidence
was available "nearly three weeks before the district court issued
its decision.  Thus, Fogel had ample opportunity to seek to file an
amended complaint prior to the entry of final judgment but chose
not to do so.  Finally, the Court notes that a Third Amended
Complaint would be futile because it could not remedy the
deficiencies of materiality or scheme liability discussed above.

For the reasons stated, the Court affirmed the district court's
decision and resulting judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 26, 2018 Summary Order is
available at https://is.gd/WKKlMB from Leagle.com.

THOMAS J. MCKENNA -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- (Gregory M. Egleston
-- gegleston@gme-law.com -- on the brief), Gainey McKenna &
Egleston, New York, NY, for Appellant.

PETER A. WALD -- peter.wald@lw.com -- (Melissa Arbus Sherry --
melissa.sherry@lw.com -- Sarah A. Tomkowiak --
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com -- Matthew J. Peters --
matthew.peters@lw.com -- on the brief), Latham & Watkins LLP,
Washington, DC, for Appellees.


WELLS FARGO: Coosa Nation Suit Moved to Middle District of Georgia
------------------------------------------------------------------
A case against Wells Fargo was removed from the Butts County
Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia (Macon) on Dec. 26, 2018. The Middle District of Georgia
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:18-cv-00467-TES to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to Hon. Judge Tilman E Self, III.

The case is styled COOSA NATION OF NORTH AMERICA USA; DR MONIQUE Y
TATE, also known as: SAHANI UGIDAHLI, also known as: PRINCIPAL
CHIEFTESS BLUE FEATHER, in individual and official capacities and
on behalf of all others whom are similarly situated as members and
citizens of the Coosa Nation of North America (USA) ; MICHAEL F
TATE, also known as: PINE CHIEF EAGLE EYES, in individual and
official capacities and on behalf of all others whom are similarly
situated as members and citizens of the Coosa Nation of North
America (USA); LAMAR PERRYMAN, also known as: CATE HONVNWV also
known as: PRINCIPAL CHIEF RED MAN, in individual and official
capacities and on behalf of all others whom are similarly situated
as members and citizens of the Coosa Nation of North America (USA),
the Plaintiffs, vs. WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, in official and corporate personnel in their
individual, corporate and official capacities; PHELAN HALLINAN
DIAMOND AND JONES LLLP, in official and corporate personnel in
their individual, corporate and official capacities; BUTTS COUNTY
GEORGIA, in official and corporate personnel in their individual,
corporate and official capacities; and STATE OF GEORGIA, in
official and corporate personnel in their individual, corporate and
official capacities, the Defendants.

Wells Fargo provides banking, mortgage, investing, credit card, and
personal, small business, and commercial financial services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

Attorneys for Wells Fargo:

          Alan Leeth, Esq.
          Louis G. Fiorilla, Esq.
          BURR & FORMAN LLP
          171 17th Street, NW, Suite 1100
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (404) 815-3000
          E-mail: aleeth@burr.com

WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in Mitchell Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAWRENCE J. MITCHELL, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS
FARGO BANK, et. al., Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-966 (D. Utah),
Judge Clark Waddoud of the U.S. District Court for the Utah,
Central Division, (i) granted the Defendants' 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss, and (ii) granted in part and denied in part their
Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

In the action, the Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo employees
used customers' confidential information to open fraudulent
accounts in the customers' names to meet sales goals, and that
Wells Fargo encouraged, knew of, or should have known of this
practice.  The Plaintiffs nationwide have made very similar
allegations against Wells Fargo, and have filed suit in other
districts.  Of those actions filed in other districts, Jabbari v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:15-cv-2159-VC (N.D. Cal.) is the most
relevant to the case.

The Jabbari plaintiffs filed their action against Wells Fargo on
May 13, 2015, making it the first-filed putative class action.  The
Plaintiffs in the instant case filed the action on Sept. 16, 2016.
On Nov. 3, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint.
Sometime around Feb. 16, 2017, the Court received notice that the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") would hear
argument on whether to create an MDL action from the several cases
filed against Wells Fargo related to fraudulent account openings.
On Feb. 28, 2017, the Court stayed the case pending the JPML's
decision.

On March 28, 2017, the parties in Jabbari filed a Joint Notice of
Settlement.  On April 5, 2017, the JPML determined it would not
order centralization due to the nationwide class
settlement-in-principle reached by the parties in Jabbari.  On that
same day, the Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay in the case.  On
April 13, 2017, the Court heard argument from the parties regarding
the propriety of lifting the stay in light of the pending Jabbari
settlement.  It ultimately lifted the stay.

On June 7, 2017, the Court held a hearing during which it granted
the Plaintiffs' oral motion to amend their complaint.  The
Plaintiffs filed their currently operative Third Amended Complaint
on June 27, 2017.  The Third Amended Complaint initially listed 76
named Plaintiffs, but through a series of voluntary dismissals, was
eventually reduced to 57.

On July 8, 2017, the court in Jabbari entered an order
preliminarily approving the settlement in that case.  That order
provided that the Settlement Class Members who do not opt out agree
to release all claims that could have been asserted, or that arise
out of the same transactions or occurrences as the claims against
Wells Fargo entities that were or could have been asserted in the
Jabbari.  Later, the court in Jabbari entered an order setting the
opt out deadline for Feb. 19, 2018.  The opt out deadline is
relevant in the instant case.  Those who did not opt out of the
Jabbari settlement are unable to pursue their claims in the instant
case.

On Jan. 30, 2018, the Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the
Third Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).  On Feb. 12, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Response.
On Feb. 26, 2018, the Defendants filed their Reply.

On June 14, 2018, the court in Jabbari entered an order granting
final approval of the class action settlement.  Attached as
"Exhibit A" to that order was a list of those individuals who had
opted out of the Jabbari settlement.  That list contained the names
of 967 individuals.  The Jabbari court approved that list,
including those who filed untimely exclusions, as constituting the
list of all Persons who have submitted timely requests for
exclusion from the Settlement Class.  The order also included
"Exhibit B," a list of those individuals who filed both a claim and
an exclusion," and for whom the court provided will not be excluded
unless they subsequently communicate their intent to withdraw their
claim and not participate in the Settlement on or before July 7,
2018.

The Court heard oral argument on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
on June 20, 2018.  On July 31, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a
"Request for the Court to take Judicial Notice."  In this filing,
they requested that the Court considers all proposed the Plaintiffs
as members of a potential class action because of appeals of the
Jabbari case.  The Plaintiffs included no authority in support of
their request.

On Aug. 7, 2018 the Defendants filed an Objection to the
Plaintiffs' request, arguing that the Plaintiffs' submission is not
altogether clear with respect to the implications of the appeals in
the action.

The Defendants argue that a majority of the Plaintiffs fail to
allege standing and move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).  They also
move to dismiss each of the Plaintiffs' 15 claims under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Judge Waddoups agrees and declines the Plaintiffs' request.  He
finds that the Bystander Plaintiffs simply did not allege any
concrete and particularized injury.  An examination of the entire
Third Amended Complaint reveals that any assertion to the contrary
is simply not substantiated.  Even after construing the Third
Amended Complaint in the Plaintiffs' favor, he cannot conclude that
the general allegations -- that the Defendants opened unauthorized
accounts in the Plaintiffs' names -- apply to all the Plaintiffs
when, individually, the "Bystander Plaintiffs" did not make those
same allegations.  For these reasons, he granted the Defendants'
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the 25 Bystander Plaintiffs'
Claims.  Only the eight Wrongful Account Plaintiffs remain.

Because he granted the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, only eight
Wrongful Account Plaintiffs remained in the case.  Each of those
Wrongful Account Plaintiffs brought 15 claims against the
Defendants.  The Judge has granted Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion as
to 11 of those claims.  The Wrongful Account Plaintiffs' only four
remaining claims are Claim 3, Invasion of Privacy; Claim 7 for
Declaratory Judgment; Claim 9, Fraudulent Nondisclosure; and Claim
10, Unjust Enrichment.  All of these claims are state law claims.
The court would continue to have jurisdiction over the state law
claim under supplemental jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, the Judge holds that when only state law claims
remain, after dismissal of the federal causes of action, the Court
may decline to exercise such jurisdiction.  He requests the parties
to address why the Court should not decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  The Plaintiffs'
memorandum will be filed Jan. 18, 2019; the Defendants' response
will be filed by Feb. 1, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/5Fr8kg from Leagle.com.

Lawrence J. Mitchell, Kay Mitchell, Matthew C. Bishop, Tracy
Kilgore, Jennifer K. Zeleny, Joseph W. Steele, V, Scott Westin,
Bruce Bird, Allen Roberts, Nathan Ornellas, Anu Sood, Brent Miller,
Joana Zelaya, Richard Fountain, Matthew Gragg, Sharon Williams,
Samule Hillenburg, Ken Gregory, David Sels, Edward Dowdy, April
Thomas, Andromanche Harvery, Don Black, Reza Kamali, Carina Rhea,
Shanell Golden, Kim Weston, Loretta Grady, David Self, Jennifer
King, Ralph McCoy, Aaron Hands, Lisa Stern, Mbegane Diouf, Doug
Waters, Paul Fos, Patricia Burkhalter, Cameron Casey, Jeffery
Taylor, Robert Moyer, Marcia Cameron, Gloria Pledger, Charles
Jones, Aaron Brodie, Dominique Evans, Richard Farr, Kevin Saliva,
Travis Ashby, Andrew Gorayeb, Edwin Zorilla, Curtis Dowdle, Edward
Klann, Steven Stetzel, Glenn Gilleshammer, Barbara Shadoan,
Jennifer Ellsworth, Denise Poe, Jamal Dean, Brandon Westman,
Concepcion Powell, Adrian Thompson, Eric Talaska, Zachary
Christensen & Erica Jones, Plaintiffs, represented by Zane L.
Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES & Steven A.
Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES PLLC.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, a National Banking
Association & Wells Fargo & Company, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendants, represented by David H. Fry -- David.Fry@mto.com --
MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro hac vice, Elaina M. Maragakis --
emaragakis@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, Eric P. Tuttle --
Eric.Tuttle@mto.com -- MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro hac vice,
Erin J. Cox -- Erin.Cox@mto.com -- MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP, pro
hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER & Michael D.
Mayfield -- mmayfield@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.


WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Court Refuses to Review Ruling in Rushing
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned WILLIAM RUSHING, Plaintiff,
v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.
16-cv-01421-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

The Defendant (WSI) seeks leave to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's October 2018 Order because the
Court's Order (i) did not grant summary judgment terminating the
case and (ii) allowed plaintiffs to undertake discovery to find a
plaintiff to pursue the claims asserted under California law. WSI
argues the Court manifestly failed to consider materials facts and
dispositive legal arguments.  

As to whether the case should have terminated upon the Court's
agreement with WSI's choice of law argument that named plaintiff
William Rushing's claims regarding his purchase of bed linens were
subject to Kentucky law, WSI did not present this legal argument in
its motion. There could be no error in the Court’s failure to
consider it. If it had been presented, however, the Court would
have rejected it. None of the cases relied on by WSI in support of
its initial leave to file or its underlying reconsideration motion
arise in a similar posture (class action) or are otherwise
apposite.

Relatedly, the Court finds that WSI had more than adequate notice
about the facts supporting Rushing's claims and his assertion of
consumer protection causes of action. Therefore, there was no
violation of Rule 8.

The second argument, that the Court manifestly failed to consider
whether discovery to find a new class representative to pursue the
California claims should be allowed under federal law or California
law consistent with the balancing mandate of Hill v. NCAA, 7
Cal.4th 1, 35 (1994), is simply wrong. As an initial matter, this
issue was briefed albeit succinctly in the discovery dispute letter
that was fully considered. On the merits of WSI's argument that
discovery is not proper, the cases from this District and more
generally within the Ninth Circuit on which WSI relies were denials
of discovery that lack significant if any case law analysis and
otherwise lay within the discretion of those judges in light of the
particular postures of those cases.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9vg6juz from Leagle.com.

William Rushing, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by George Richard Baker --
richard@bakerlawpc.com -- Baker Law PC, Amber L. Eck --
ambere@haelaw.com -- Haeggquist & Eck, LLP, Audra Elizabeth
Petrolle -- apetroile@roselawgroup.com

Rose Law Group, pro hac vice, Jonathan Henry Udell --
JUdell@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group pc, pro hac vice, Kathryn
Honecker -- khonecker@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group, pc, pro
hac vice, Lauren Marie Nageotte, Rose Law Group, pc, pro hac vice &
Robert D. Prine -- robertp@haelaw.com -- Haeggquist and Eck.

Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Williams-Sonoma
Advertising, Inc., a California corporation & Williams-Sonoma DTC,
Inc., a California corporation, Defendants, represented by Benjamin
Okhaifo Aigboboh -- baigboboh@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter Hampton LLP, Dylan John Price -- dprice@sheppardmullin.com
-- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, P. Craig Cardon --
ccardon@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP & Robert James Guite -- rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: A. Fletcher Sues Over Take-Home Exposure
---------------------------------------------------------
In Anthony Fletcher, Plaintiff, v. The Georgia Southern University
Herty Advanced Development Center; Hollingsworth and Vose Company;
OYJ Partek ABP, formerly known as OY Partek AB, previously trading
as Paraisten Kalkki OY and Suomi Mineral OY; Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company; Defendants, Case No. N19C-01-065 ASB, filed with
the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Anthony
Fletcher alleges that as a result of the Defendants' wrongful
conduct, he has developed asbestosis and that he also suffered from
household exposure in the course of living in the family home with
his father Adolphus Fletcher, Sr. from 1956 until approximately
1976.

The lawsuit further alleges, "Plaintiff Anthony Fletcher was
exposed within his home as result of the release of toxic asbestos
fibers both within and outside the facilities of the Haveg
Marshallton Plant his father worked at.  Plaintiff was exposed to
asbestos dust brought home by his father on his person, and while
washing his clothes was exposed to asbestos dust on his work
clothes.  Plaintiff's father Adolphus Fletcher, Sr., would come
home in his dust-covered work clothes and would hug and play with
Plaintiff Anthony Fletcher without changing out of his dusty
clothes."

Attorney for Plaintiff:

     David Crumplar, Esq.
     JACOBS & CRUMPLAR, P.A.
     750 Shipyard Drive, Suite 200
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 656-5445


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal of N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York has denied Appeal Nos. 6079-80, in the case styled In
Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation. Motion Nos. M-5404, M-5341,
Index No. 782000/17, (N.Y. App. Div.). Defendants-appellants have
moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision
and order of the Court, entered on March 22, 2018.

A copy of the Order, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycub2mvl
from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Denial of Bid to Review NHIC Liability Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Claimant applied for workers' compensation death benefits after her
husband (Decedent), who was employed by Crucible Metals, died of
lung cancer allegedly caused by his long-term occupational exposure
to asbestos and other dusts. Multiple workers' compensation
carriers, including New Hampshire Insurance Company, were placed on
notice as potentially liable for the claim.

New Hampshire Insurance, which provided coverage for Crucible
Industries, LLC, failed to appear at any of the hearings. By
decision filed Nov. 18, 2015, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge
established the claim for workers' compensation death benefits and
found New Hampshire Insurance to be the liable workers'
compensation carrier. Subsequently, the WCLJ, in a decision filed
Feb. 11, 2016, assessed a penalty against New Hampshire Insurance
for nonpayment of the awarded workers' compensation death benefits
to claimant.

On March 8, 2016, New Hampshire Insurance filed an application for
review of both the Nov. 18, 2015 decision regarding its liability
-- asserting that it never provided coverage for decedent's
employer -- and the Feb. 11, 2016 decision imposing a penalty --
explaining that, although it received notice of the hearings, its
failure to appear was the product of inadvertent errors and
mistakes. In addition, New Hampshire Insurance submitted
documentation that it provided coverage only to Crucible
Industries, Inc., which was neither the same company nor a
successor in interest to Crucible Metals, and contending that,
therefore, it had been improperly deemed the liable workers'
compensation carrier.

Finding, among other things, that New Hampshire Insurance was
exclusively challenging the underlying Nov. 18 Decision imposing
liability, the Workers' Compensation Board deemed an appeal
therefrom as untimely and denied the application for review. The
Board, in a decision filed June 14, 2017, denied the subsequent
application by New Hampshire Insurance for reconsideration and/or
full Board review. New Hampshire Insurance appeals from the Board's
June 14, 2018 Decision.

Since there is no indication that the Board failed to consider the
evidence when determining the timeliness of New Hampshire
Insurance's application for review of the underlying merits of the
Nov. 18, 2015 decision, the Third Department of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirms the decision of
the Board.  The Board noted that New Hampshire Insurance
acknowledged its failure to defend the claim despite receiving
proper notice and offered no excuse for the delay in filing the
application for review.

Moreover, given that the Board considered the relevant information
regarding the timeliness of the application, and given that the
Board has broad discretion in determining whether to accept or
reject an untimely application for review, the Court decides not to
disturb the Board's decision to deny New Hampshire Insurance's
application for reconsideration and/or full Board review. Contrary
to New Hampshire Insurance's contention, the Court finds that the
rejection of the instant application is not arbitrary or capricious
whether the Board has previously accepted untimely applications for
review of liability decisions.

A copy of the Memorandum and Order, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8axb6m8 from Leagle.com.

The appealed case is In the Matter of the Claim of Linda Duncan, as
Widow of William Duncan, Deceased, Claimant, v. Crucible Metals,
Respondent, and New Hampshire Insurance Company, Appellant.
Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent, No. 526150, (N.Y. App.
Div. 3d).

Williams & Williams, Buffalo ( Jared L. Garlipp of counsel), for
appellant.

Barbara D. Underwood , Attorney General, New York City ( Donya
Fernandez of counsel), for Workers' Compensation Board,
respondent.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Florida Woman Sues J&J over Baby Powder
--------------------------------------------------------
In BLANCA MOURE-CABRERA, Plaintiff, -vs- CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO.,
individually and as successor in interest to CHARLES MATHIEU;
IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., individually and as successor in
interest to and/or f/k/a LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., LUZENAC, INC. and
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO., individually and as successor in interest
to CHARLES MATHIEU; JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER
INC.; PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC.; Defendants, Case No. ______,
filed with the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and
for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Asbestos Division, Plaintiff Blanca
Moure-Cabrera seeks damages in excess of $15 million for her
exposure to asbestos and asbestiform fibers in the Defendants'
asbestos-contaminated talc and talcum powders.

Ms. Moure-Cabrera, now 81 years old, was diagnosed with terminal
peritoneal mesothelioma on or about August 15, 2018.  The lawsuit
alleges that she was exposed to Defendants' asbestos-contaminated
Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder, which was purchased from Defendant
Publix Super Markets, Inc., at her residences in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, between or within the approximate years of 1964 and 2018.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Marc P. Kunen, Esq.
     THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
     600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
     Miami, FL 33131
     Tel: (305) 375-0111
     Fax: (305) 379-6222


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judges Warrants Summary Judgment For Maersk Line
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington determines that summary judgment in favor of
Maersk Line, Limited is warranted, because Plaintiff cannot point
to any issue of material fact in support of his successor liability
theory, nor has Plaintiff made a sufficient showing for additional
time under Rule 56(d).

The Court determines that Plaintiff has not made a sufficient
showing under Rule 56(d) that consideration of Defendant's motion
should be continued for further discovery. The Court notes that
Plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to develop the narrow facts
needed to defeat summary judgment. When Plaintiff previously
requested more time for discovery on the issue, the Court
explicitly signaled that Plaintiff's showing was meager, but
allowed Plaintiff a limited chance to conduct further discovery.
Since then, on the successor-in-interest issue Plaintiff has not
conducted further written discovery, which reveals either
Plaintiff's lack of diligence or knowledge that further written
discovery would yield no differing result.

The case styled Eric Klopman-Baerselman, as Personal Representative
for the Estate of Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, deceased, Plaintiff, v.
Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-05536-RJB, (W.D. Wash.), arises from the allegation that
Rudy Klopman-Baerselman, Decedent, was exposed to asbestos from
approximately 1955 through 1959 while working as a merchant mariner
and employee of "Royal Dutch Lloyd, Rotterdam Lloyd," the alleged
corporate owner of the vessels on which Decedent worked. Plaintiff,
the personal representative of Decedent's estate, has named
Defendant Maersk Line, Limited as "successor-in-interest to Royal
Rotterdam Lloyd ("RRL")."

The Defendant seeks summary judgment of dismissal because Defendant
is not the successor-in-interest to RRL, the alleged employer to
the Decedent. In response, Plaintiff has not countered by pointing
to evidence suggesting an issue of material fact, but instead, has
invoked Rule 56(d) and requested more time. According to Plaintiff,
additional time is needed to explore the relationship between
Defendant and RRL, particularly where much time remains for
discovery and Plaintiff has yet to depose Mr. Daniel Sikkens -- a
self-employed Dutch attorney and interim counsel "retained by
certain companies in the Netherlands that are part of the A.P.
Moller Maersk Group," a non-party.

One month after the case was filed, on Nov. 27, 2017, counsel to
Defendant by letter informed Plaintiff of the successor-in-interest
defect, because according to counsel, "Defendant Maersk Line has no
connection" to RRL, and is aware that RRL "ceased operations in
1970, and retained its own liabilities under a different name until
liquidated in 2000." On May 28, 2018, Defendant responded to an
initial round of written discovery from Plaintiff. In written
discovery Defendant disavowed any corporate relationship to RRL.

On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff deposed Mr. Steven Hadder, Defendant's
corporate designee. Plaintiff at length questioned Mr. Hadder about
the relationship between Maersk and RRL, when asking about "KRL,"
a/k/a N.V. Koninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd, a corporate iteration
of RRL. Plaintiff also queried Mr. Hadder about his agreement with
and knowledge of the declaration of Mr. Sikkens.

Plaintiff identifies Mr. Sikkens as a person who "could" have
"relevant information" about Defendant as the successor-in-interest
to RRL. But Plaintiff makes no effort to explain how deposing Mr.
Sikkens will yield information materially different from his
declaration, Mr. Hadden's testimony, or the written discovery.
Plaintiff argues that the inability to complete Mr. Sikkens'
deposition is a sufficient basis to delay consideration of
Defendant's motion, but the Court notes Plaintiff has not pursued
this discovery diligently and in good faith.

In his declaration, Mr. Sikkens represents that he is familiar with
KRL and that Defendant "is not a successor-in-interest to KRL." Mr.
Sikkens also sets out the following sequence of RRL's corporate
structure and liability: (1) RRL, a Dutch company, a/k/a/KRL, was
incorporated in 1921; (2) in 1970, RRL's assets (vessels) were
sold, but the liabilities remained with RRL; (3) RRL changed its
name to N.V. Koninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd-W.M. Ruys & Zonen in
1969, and then to Ruys Transport Group B.V. in 1972; (4) Ruys did
not own or operate vessels, ceased to be active effective December
31, 1979, and was formally liquidated on November 1, 2000.

The Court finds that Plaintiff made no effort to explain how
deposing Mr. Sikkens will yield information materially different
from his declaration, Mr. Hadden's testimony, or the written
discovery. Because evidence is overwhelming and remains unrefuted,
the Court believes possibility of differing testimony would be
remote because the bare conjecture that a deposition could lead to
relevant evidence lacks specificity, and it is an unpersuasive
basis for a continuance under the circumstances of the case.

A copy of the Order, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8ncochy
from Leagle.com.

Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, deceased & Muriel Klopman-Baerselman,
husband and wife, Plaintiffs, represented by Alexandra B. Caggiano
, Weinstein Couture PLLC, Benjamin Robert Couture , Weinstein
Couture PLLC & Brian Weinstein , Weinstein Couture PLLC.

Eric Klopman-Baerselman, as Personal Representative for the estate
of Rudie Klopman-Baerselman, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra B.
Caggiano , Weinstein Couture PLLC, Benjamin Robert Couture ,
Weinstein Couture PLLC, Brian Weinstein , Weinstein Couture PLLC &
Benjamin H. Adams -- badams@dobllp.com -- Dean Omar & Branham, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation,
individually & Ingersoll-Rand Company, a New Jersey corporation,
Defendants, represented by Kevin J. Craig -- kcraig@grsm.com --
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Mark B. Tuvim -- mtuvim@grsm.com
-- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP & Trevor J. Mohr --
tmohr@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP.

Borg Warner Morse Tec, LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Richard D. Ross -- rross@bbllaw.com -- Bennett
Bigelow & Leedom.

CBS Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Christopher S. Marks -- cmarks@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP,
Erin P. Fraser -- efraser@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP &
Malika Johnson -- mjohnson@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP.

Cost Less Auto Parts, Inc., a Washington corporation, Defendant,
represented by Howard Terry I. Hall -- thall@foleymansfield.com --
Foley & Mansfield & Diane Catherine Babbitt --
dbabbitt@foleymansfield.com -- Foley & Mansfield.

Crane Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by G.
William Shaw -- bill.shaw@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP.

Crosby Valve, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation & Viad Corporation,
a Delaware corporation formerly known as The Dial Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Ronald C. Gardner --
rgardner@gandtlawfirm.com -- GARDNER TRABOLSI & ASSOC. PLLC.

DAP Products, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendant, represented
by Diane Catherine Babbitt -- dbabbitt@foleymansfield.com -- Foley
& Mansfield & J. Scott Wood -- swood@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield.

Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust, sued as successor in
interest Felt-Products Manufacturing Co., Defendant, represented by
Christine E. Dinsdale -- dinsdale@sohalang.com -- Soha & Lang PS,
Frances Lopez -- flopez@hpylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell Thackston &
Young LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel A. Rubin -- rubin@sohalang.com --
Soha & Lang PS.

Flowserve US Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Marc Marshall Carlton -- Marc.Carlton@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Randy J. Aliment --
Randy.Aliment@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP.

Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation, a Delaware corporation & General
Electric Company, a New York corporation, Defendants, represented
by Christopher S. Marks -- cmarks@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale
LLP & Erin P. Fraser -- efraser@tktrial.com --  Tanenbaum Keale
LLP.

Genuine Parts Company, a Georgia corporation doing business as
Rayloc also known as NAPA, Defendant, represented by Jeanne F.
Loftis -- jeanne.loftis@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey PC
& Megan Uhle -- megan.uhle@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey
PC.

Henry Company LLC, a California corporation, Defendant, represented
by Daira S. Waldenberg -- dwaldenberg@selmanlaw.com -- Selman
Brietman LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., a Delaware corporation formerly
known as Allied-Products Liability Signal, Inc. successor in
interest Bendix Corporation, Defendant, represented by Kristine E.
Kruger -- KKruger@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie & Mary P. Gaston
-- MGaston@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of other MetLife Inc., Defendant,
represented by Richard G. Gawlowski -- gawlowski@wscd.com -- Wilson
Smith Cochran & Dickerson.

National Automotive Parts Association, a Georgia corporation also
known as NAPA, Defendant, represented by Megan Uhle --
megan.uhle@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey PC.

O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc, an Ohio corporation, Defendant,
represented by Stephen Garrett Leatham , Heurlin Potter Jahn,
Leatham, Holtman & Stoker Ps.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation, an Ohio corporation & Standard Motor
Products, Inc., a New York corporation successor in interest EIS
Automotive, Defendants, represented by Nicole R. MacKenzie --
nmackenzie@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs, Ryan W.
Vollans -- rvollans@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs
& Edward M. Silverman -- esilverman@williamskastner.com -- Williams
Kastner & Gibbs.

Pneumo Abex, LLC, a Delaware corporation successor in interest Abex
Corporation, Defendant, represented by Diane J. Kero --
dkero@gth-law.com -- Gordon Thomas Honeywell.

Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation successor
in interest Norton Company, Defendant, represented by John Michael
Mattingly -- mmattingly@rizzopc.com -- Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth PC
& Kevin Clonts -- kclonts@rizzopc.com -- Rizzo Mattingly Bosworth
PC.

Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc, a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jose Edward Gaitan , The Gaitan Group & Virginia
Leeper , The Gaitan Group.

Viking Pump, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Todd M. Thacker -- tthacker@wfbm.com -- WFBM LLP.

Weir Valves & Controls USA, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation,
individually and as successor in interest Atwood & Morrill Co.,
Inc., Defendant, represented by Dana C. Kopij --
dkopij@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs.

William Powell Company, an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented
by Brian Bernard Smith -- bsmith@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield & James D. Hicks -- jhicks@foleymansfield.com -- Foley &
Mansfield.

WW Henry Company LP, a Pennsylvania corporation Successor in
interest WW Henry Company, Defendant, represented by Robert G.
Engel -- robert.engel@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz
Edelman & Dicker.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Perkins Couple Sues ABB, et al., over Lung Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------------
In IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION., DONALD L. PERKINS and ROSE MARIE
PERKINS, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. ABB, INC., as successor to ITE
CIRCUIT BREAKERS, INC.; et al., Case No. N19C-01-018 ASB, filed
with the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Plaintiffs Donald
L. Perkins and Rose Marie Perkins, residents of Norwalk,
Connecticut, allege that during Plaintiff's employment, he was
wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and otherwise absorbed
asbestos fibers emanating from various sources which were mixed,
mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed, installed, and/or
used by Defendants including, but not limited to: Boilers, pumps,
valves, HVAC, electrical products, steam traps and turbines.

Plaintiff Donald L. Perkin's former employers include, but are not
limited to, the following:

   a. Vickers Hydraulic Co. - located in Waterbury, CT from
approximately 1960 to 1965 as a Delivery/Maintenance Man;

   b. Pratt & Whitney - located in Southington, CT from
approximately 1966 for 1967 as a Jet Engine Mechanic; and

   c. Connecticut Light & Power - located in Connecticut from
approximately 1967 to 2003 as a Lineman.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff Donald
L. Perkins suffers from an asbestos-related disease(s) including,
but not limited to, Lung Cancer.  He first became aware that he
suffered from said disease(s) on or about September 14, 2018, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

Of counsel:

     WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
     700 Broadway
     New York, NY 10003


ASBESTOS UPDATE: R. Cannon Sues Atwood, et al., over Lung Cancer
----------------------------------------------------------------
In IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION., RANDALL CANNON and AUDRY KATHERINE
CANNON, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. ATWOOD & MORRILL CO., d/b/a WEIR
VALVES & CONTROLS USA, INC.; et al., Defendants, Case No.
N19C-01-060 ASB, filed with the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware, Plaintiffs Randall Cannon and Audry Katherine Cannon, his
wife, deceased, allege that during his employment, Plaintiff
Randall Cannon was wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and
otherwise absorbed asbestos fibers emanating from various sources
which were mixed, mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed,
installed, and/or used by the Defendants including, but not limited
to boilers, pumps, valves, packing, gaskets, insulating cement,
pipe covering and turbines.

Plaintiff Randall Cannon's former employers include, but are not
limited to:

   a. United States Navy - USS Okinawa - located in Long Beach, CA
from approximately 1972 to 1976 as an Engineer;

   b. SIS Q Flying Service - located in California from
approximately 1976 to 1979 as a Laborer;

   c. Johnstone Supply - located in Arizona from approximately 1979
to 1980 as a Laborer;

   d. Snap On Tool - located in Logan, UT from approximately 1979
to 1981 as a Salesman; and

   e. Self Employed - located in Arizona from approximately 1980 to
2018 as a Real Estate Agent.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff Randall
Cannon suffers from an asbestos-related disease(s) including, but
not limited to, Lung Cancer.  He first became aware that he
suffered from said disease(s) on or about December 29, 2017, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

Of counsel:

     WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
     700 Broadway
     New York, NY 10003
     Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Williams Couple Sues Car Parts Makers over Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------------
In IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION., JOHN E. WILLIAMS and LAURIE
WILLIAMS, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. ARVINMERITOR, INC., individually
and as successor in interest to ROCKWELL AUTOMOTIVE and ROCKWELL
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; BORGWARNER MORSE TEC LLC; CUMMINS, INC.;
FEDERAL-MOGUL ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY TRUST, as a successor to
FELT PRODUCTS MFG. CO.; MOOG AUTOMOTIVE COMPANY, f/k/a WAGNER
ELECTRIC INC.; FORD MOTOR COMPANY; GENUINE PARTS COMPANY, trading
as NAPA AUTO PARTS; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., f/k/a ALLIED
SIGNAL, INC., as successor in interest to THE BENDIX CORPORATION;
MACK TRUCKS, INC.; PFIZER, INC.; STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, INC.;
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, Defendants, C.A. No. N19C-01-011 ASB,
filed with the Superior Court for the State of Delaware, Plaintiffs
John E. Williams and Laurie Williams, residents of The Dalles,
Oregon, alleges that during his employment, Plaintiff John E.
Williams was wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and otherwise
absorbed asbestos fibers emanating from various sources which were
mixed, mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed, installed,
and/or used by the Defendants including, but not limited to:
working on brakes, clutches and engine gaskets.

The Plaintiff's former employers include, but are not limited to:

   a. Robert Williams Ranch - located in The Dalles, OR from
approximately 1964 to 1989 as a Mechanic and Farmer;

   b. John Williams Ranch - located in The Dalles, OR from
approximately 1977 to 1997 as a Mechanic, Farmer and Truck Driver;
and

   c. J.W.R. Trucking Co. - located in Wasco, OR from approximately
1987 to 2018 as a Mechanic and Owner.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, the Plaintiff
suffers from an asbestos-related disease(s) including, but not
limited to, Lung Cancer.  The Plaintiff first became aware that he
suffered from said disease(s) on or about January of 2017, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

           - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

Of counsel:

     WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
     700 Broadway
     New York, NY 10003



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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