CAR_Public/190123.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, January 23, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 17

                            Headlines

1800 EUCLID AVENUE: Faces Honeywell Suit Asserting ADA Violation
190 MAIN: Diaz Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
ACREBAY CAPITAL: Defrauded Investors, Class Action Says
ADSAD LLC: Does Not Pay Wages to Bussers/Runners, Georgiev Says
AIG PROPERTY: Court Grants Bid to Strike in John Suit

ALBERTA: Faces Proposed Class-Action Lawsuit Over Sterilizations
ARCHE USA: Garey Files Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE: Piazza Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
AT&T MOBILITY: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Unli Data Suit Reversed
AUTO ZONE: Can Compel Arbitration in Hernandez Suit

BALBOA WATER: Sonny Le Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
BEST RATE: Can Compel Arbitration in J. Temple TCPA Suit
BIG MACK PAINTING: Pena Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
BIMBO BAKERIES: Tiscareno Wants to Notify Class of Associates
BLUEBIRD BIO: Robbins Arroyo LLP Files Class Action

BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Wijesinha Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
BOLT THREADS: Faces Garey Suit Asserting ADA Violation
BROADWAY BEAUTY: Nunez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
BUFFALO FUEL: Jorge Torres Seeks Overtime Wages
BUGATCHI GROUP: Violates ADA, Garey Suit Asserts

CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Indigenous Mistreatment
CAREEXPAND LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Darden Alleges
CARMAX AUTO: Doucette Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
CERTIFIED RECOVERY: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CONNECTICUT: McNee Seeks Certification of Class and Subclass

CONNECTICUT: Murphy Files Civil Rights Class Action
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CA: Summ. Judgment Bid in Farrow Suit Granted
CREDIT BUREAU: Court Certifies Class in Bassett FDCPA/NCPA Suit
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH: Sued Over County Jail Conditions
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bernstein Litowitz Files Securities Class Action

DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
DEX MEDIA: Alexander Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
EMINENT INC: Garey Sues Online Retailer for ADA  Breach
EMPRO INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Dreval Suit Claims

EVOLUCION INNOVATIONS: Violates Disabilities Act, Garey Suit Says
EXXON MOBIL: 100% Fault in Baton Rouge Pipe Failure Suit Affirmed
F.H. CANN: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in Scanno Consumer Suit
FANATICS RETAIL: Faces Garey Class Action Asserting ADA Violation
FCA US: All Discovery in Alger Suit to be Completed by March 18

FEIT INDUSTRIES: Footwear Firm Faces Class Action under ADA
FIDELITY BANK: McAlister Asks to Certify Class of MLOs Under FLSA
FINANCIAL CORP: Court Okays Class Notice in Encarnacion FDCA Suit
FINANCIAL MEDIA: Violates TCPA and Invades Privacy, Hanks Claims
GALIANO ENTERPRISES: Ramirez Brito Suit Moved to S.D. Florida

GLORIA JEWEL: Violates Disabilities Act, Says Garey Suit
GOLDMAN SACHS: Pomerantz Law Files Class Action
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Banaga Files Class Action Over Discrimination
H&R BLOCK:  Deborah Robinson Sues over No Poach Policy
HANBAT RESTAURANT: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Armando Suit Says

HERTZ CORPORATION: Denicolo Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. California
HOLLAR INC: Garey Targets Online Gift Shop in ADA Suit
HOLTGER BROS: Field Workers Class Certified in McChesney Suit
ILLUMINA INC: Filing of 2nd Amended Securities Suit Denied
INDIANA: Inmates Files Civil Rights Class Action

INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY: Scarantino Suit Challenges Sale to Virtu
IRONBOUND EXPRESS: Court Certifies Luxama Drivers Class
KEITH D. WEINER: Placeholder Class Certification Bid Filed
LAOS: 9th Cir. Tosses Hmong Exiles' Lawsuit
LIFEBRIDGE HEALTH: Murphy Falcon Files Class Action Lawsuit

LULU'S FASHION: Online Clothes Shop Hit with ADA Suit
MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL: Public Employees Files Securities Suit
MIAMI-DADE, FL: Alvarez et al. Seek to Certify Class of Teachers
MISSOURI: Court Certifies Class of Adult Parolees in Gasca Suit
MONSANTO COMPANY: Matlock Sues Over Roundup Exposure

NATIONAL CREDIT: Class Cert. Proceedings in Gochet Suit Stayed
NATIONAL CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
NELSON MANAGEMENT: Faces Fischler Suit Alleging ADA Violation
NOBILIS HEALTH: Misled Shareholders, Robbins Arroyo Suit Says
OHIO MULCH: Court Certifies Two Subclassses in Smyers FLSA Suit

OLDE GOOD THINGS: Antique Shop Faces Class Suit under ADA
ONE KINGS LANE: Dennis Files Suit Alleging ADA Breach
PAUL VALLAS: Klueh Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Illinois
PHARMAVITE LLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Anthony Suit Under UCL
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

PIXELS.COM: Faces Class Action in New York Asserting ADA Violation
PRESIDENTIAL LIMOUSINE: Thurmond Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
PROCARE CRS: Lawson Deal Approval Held in Abeyance Pending Notice
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Settlement Reached in Flushable Wipes Suit
RAMADA WORLDWIDE: Breeze Files Suit under ADA in New Jersey

RAYOSUN LLC: Naiman Sues Over TCPA Violation
SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Ct. Refuses to Certify Classes in Lil' Man Suit
SHOEBUY.COM: Online Footwear Firm Faces ADA Class Action
SKAGIT REGIONAL: Court Extends Deadlines in McLean Suit
SUNRISE SENIOR: Van Cleave Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations

TARGET CORP: Minn. App. Affirms Denial of In Forma Pauperis Bid
TIGER DIRECT: Garey Files Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
TIO LEO: Huerta Suit Alleges Calif. Labor Code Violations
TOT BABY CORP: Violates Disabilities Act, Garey Suit Asserts
TRES AMIGOS: Flynn & Toroveci  Suit Has Conditional Class Cert.

TRUSTMARK NATIONAL: Sued for Overdraft Fees
UNITED AIRLINES: Fails to Pay Wages for Short-Term Military Leave
UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Fights Suit Over Underpaying Health Services
US AVIATION SERVICES: Haralson Asks for Initial Nod of Class Deal

VIDA SHOES: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Slade Says
VIRGINIA: Court Orders Enforcement of Scott Suit Agreement
WALKERHEALTHCAREIT LLC: Debra Bey Suit Transferred to S.D. Texas
WELLS FARGO: Bid to Vacate Arbitral Award in Tucker Suit Denied
WISCONSIN: Bender Suit Alleges Civil Rights Violation

YUMI KIM SHOP: Women's Clothing Line Faces ADA Class Action in NY

                            *********

1800 EUCLID AVENUE: Faces Honeywell Suit Asserting ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
1800 Euclid Avenue LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Cheri Honeywell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 1800 Euclid Avenue LLC doing
business as: Comfort Inn Downtown, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00075-SO (N.D. Ohio, January 10, 2019).

1800 Euclid Avenue LLC is a hotel located in the historic area of
downtown Memphis and overlooks both the Mississippi River and the
Mud Island River Park.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Marc E. Dann, Esq.
   Dann Law Firm - Cleveland
   P.O. Box 6031040
   Cleveland, OH 44103
   Tel: (216) 373-0539
   Fax: (216) 373-0536
   Email: mdann@dannlaw.com

      - and -

   Emily C. White, Esq.
   Dann Law Firm - Cleveland
   P.O. Box 6031040
   Cleveland, OH 44103
   Tel: (216) 373-0539
   Fax: (216) 373-0536
   Email: ewhite@dannlaw.com



190 MAIN: Diaz Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY DIAZ, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. 190 MAIN STREET ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., JP MANAGEMENT
GROUP, LLC, JOHN PJETERNIKAJ SR., and JOHN PJETERNIKAJ JR., Case
No. 2:19-cv-00127 (D.N.J., January 4, 2019), seeks to recover
alleged unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs as a result of the Defendants' willful
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

190 Main Street Associates, L.L.C., is a limited liability company
registered in New Jersey.  JP Management Group, LLC, is a limited
liability company registered in New Jersey.  The Corporate
Defendants's principal place of business is located in Hackensack,
New Jersey.  The Individual Defendants own, manage, and exercise
day-to-day, operational control over the Corporate Defendants.

The Defendants collectively operate a property management group
that owns and manages several residential properties in New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          BROWN, LLC
          111 Town Square Place, Suite 400
          Jersey City, NJ 07310
          Telephone: (877) 561-0000
          Facsimile: (855) 582-5297
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com


ACREBAY CAPITAL: Defrauded Investors, Class Action Says
-------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
class claims in court that Acrebay Capital Management, Credit
Portfolio Lending II and their directors defrauded investors
through a feeder fund for a $345 million Ponzi scam.


ADSAD LLC: Does Not Pay Wages to Bussers/Runners, Georgiev Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
IGOR GEORGIEV, SANJAR ORTIKOV, and SEMEN SEREDENKO, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated v. ADSAD, LLC d/b/a ONEGIN
RESTAURANT, ALEKSANDER SHAPIRO, and JACOB RIFKIN, in their
individual and professional capacities, Case No. 1:19-cv-00122
(S.D.N.Y., January 4, 2019), alleges, among other things, that the
Defendants require all of their bussers and runners to work without
wages and rely solely upon tips for compensation, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Adsad, LLC, doing business as Onegin Restaurant, is a limited
liability company with its principal place of business located in
New York City.  The Individual Defendants are shareholders,
officers managers or employees of the Company.

The Defendants own a Russian restaurant -- Onegin -- in the
Greenwich Village neighborhood in New York City.  Onegin, which
opened in approximately the fall of 2011, is located at 391 Sixth
Avenue, in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Innessa M. Huot, Esq.
          Alex J. Hartzband, Esq.
          Patrick J. Collopy, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: ahartzband@faruqilaw.com
                  ihuot@faruqilaw.com
                  pcollopy@faruqilaw.com


AIG PROPERTY: Court Grants Bid to Strike in John Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATALIE NADIRA JOHN, Plaintiff, v. AIG PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY GROUP, INC. UNKNOWN FORM OR RESIDENCE, Defendant,
Case No. CV 18-8664-RSWL-JEM (C.D. Cal.), Judge Ronald S.W. Lew of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the Defendant's Motion to Strike.

On March 25, 2018, the Plaintiff was involved in a car accident
with two other vehicles, allegedly causing third party losses over
$150,000 in property and personal injury damages.  The Plaintiff
alleges that at all relevant times, her car was covered by Policy
No. 0013913512, entered into by the Defendant and the Plaintiff.  

The Plaintiff alleges she paid all premiums due under the Policy.
Shortly after the accident, the Plaintiff contacted an agent of the
Defendant to make a claim for the losses.  After several requests
for coverage, the Defendant advised the Plaintiff it had rejected
coverage of her claims.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
represented to the Plaintiff it would honor her claims in return
for maintaining her Policy and continuing to make premium payments,
and by denying coverage, the Defendant has breached a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior
Court on Sept. 5, 2018.  The Defendant removed the Action to the
Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction on Oct. 9, 2018.  The
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on Oct. 22, 2018.  The
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike on Oct. 31, 2018.  The
Plaintiff filed her Opposition late on Nov. 25, 2018.  The
Defendant filed a Reply on Nov. 28, 2018.

The Defendant seeks to strike the Plaintiff's allegation in
Paragraph 22 of the FAC that there are numerous other individuals
and groups insured by Defendant who were or are similarly situated
to the Plaintiff and who, upon learning the names of these
individuals, the Plaintiff will seek leave of court to join such
persons as the Plaintiffs in the action.  The Defendant argues that
the case is a putative "class" allegation that lacks any connection
to the Plaintiff's dispute with the Defendant.

Judge Lew finds that the Plaintiff does not bring her claim as a
class action and did not argue that the allegation should be
treated as a class allegation, let alone mention Paragraph 22 in
her Opposition.  Nor does the Plaintiff specifically identifies who
the alleged "similarly situated" parties are and how they are
"similarly situated" to her set of facts.  Because the allegation
in Paragraph 22 does not plead facts for any of the required
elements of Rule 23, it is insufficient to survive a motion to
strike.  In addition to being conclusory, the Plaintiff's
allegation is immaterial as it provides no facts showing how the
unidentified individuals relate to the Plaintiff's specific policy,
or the facts surrounding the Plaintiff's accident and denial of
coverage for her claims.  Accordingly, he will grant the
Defendant's Motion to strike Paragraph 22.

Because the substantive arguments he Defendant provides as to
punitive damages could properly be asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the Court can construe the Defendant's Motion as
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Because he construes the Defendant's
Motion as a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages, and that the Plaintiff's largest problem is that
she fails to plead sufficient facts for her claim for punitive
damages, the Judge holds there is a chance that amendment will cure
these deficiencies.  Accordingly, he grants leave to amend as to
the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Lew (1) granted the Defendant's
Motion to Strike Paragraph 22 of the FAC; (2) construed the
Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
as a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and granted the Defendant's
12(b)(6) Motion; and (3) granted leave to amend as to the
Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages only.  The Plaintiff will
have 21 days from the date to file her Second Amended Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DjSRFi from Leagle.com.

Natalie Nadira John, Plaintiff, represented by Barry Fischer --
bfischer@bfischerlaw.com -- Law Offices of Barry Fischer APC.

AIG Property Casualty Company, a business of unknown form or
residence, Defendant, represented by Max Gerald Garcia --
jerry.garcia@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith
LLP & Rebecca R. Weinreich -- Rebecca.Weinreich@lewisbrisbois.com
-- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP.


ALBERTA: Faces Proposed Class-Action Lawsuit Over Sterilizations
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hamilton Spectator reports that a proposed class action has
been filed against the Alberta government on behalf of Indigenous
women who say they were subjected to forced sterilizations.

The lawsuit seeks $500 million in damages, plus an additional $50
million in punitive damages, and has been brought on behalf of all
Indigenous women sterilized in Alberta without their prior and
informed consent before Dec. 14 of this year.

The lawsuit alleges Alberta -- including senior officials and
ministers -- had specific knowledge of widespread coerced
sterilizations perpetrated on Indigenous women.

It also alleges the government turned a blind eye to that conduct
and breached its fiduciary responsibilities.

Celeste Poltak, Esq. -- cpoltak@kmlaw.ca -- a lawyer with Toronto
firm Koskie Minsky LLP, said the coerced sterilization of
Indigenous women is "yet another dark chapter" in the relationship
between governments and Indigenous Peoples.

A proposed class action is also underway in Saskatchewan that names
the Saskatoon Health Authority, the Saskatchewan government, the
federal government and a handful of medical professionals as
defendants.[GN]


ARCHE USA: Garey Files Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
Arche USA, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Arche USA, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00343
(S.D. N.Y., January 13, 2019).

Arche Usa, Inc. is a New York Domestic Business Corporation filed
on October 20, 2005.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE: Piazza Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned MICHAEL PIAZZA, JR., On
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. ASSOCIATED
WHOLESALE GROCERS, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-10289-JTM-KWR (E.D. La.),
files with the Court his second motion for conditional
certification and judicial notice.

Mr. Piazza moves the Court for conditional certification of his
action as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
He also seeks an order directing the Defendant to produce contact
information on the putative class and an authorization to send
notice to putative collection members.

The class is defined as:

     All individuals who were employed by AWG at any point from
     October 7, 2014 to the present, were compensated on an
     hourly wage basis, and had 30 minute lunch breaks
     automatically removed from their recorded work hours.

Mr. Piazza complains that the Defendant implemented and followed a
policy or practice by which the Defendant routinely failed
improperly deducted 30 minutes a day from his work hours for a
lunch break regardless of whether or not he took the lunch
break.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chad A. Danenhower, Esq.
          DANENHOWER LAW FIRM, LLC
          212 Park Place
          Covington, LA 70433
          Telephone: (985) 590-5026
          E-mail: chad.danenhower@danenhowerlaw.com

               - and -

          Dale E. Williams, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DALE E. WILLIAMS
          212 Park Place
          Covington, LA 70433
          Telephone: (985) 898-6368
          E-mail: dale@daleslaw.com


AT&T MOBILITY: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Unli Data Suit Reversed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reversed the lower court's denial
of Respondent AT&T Mobility, LLC's Motion to Dismiss the lawsuits
brought by seven customers of respondent/cross-appellant claiming
breach of contract based on data-speed limitations applied to
unlimited-data plans.

The Respondent moved to dismiss, in part on the ground that the
appellant, CrowdSuit, LLC, assignee of the lawsuits, lacked
standing to bring the lawsuit because an aggregated lawsuit was
precluded by respondent's contract with its customers.  The
district court denied the motion to dismiss.  

In its motion to dismiss, AT&T argued that CrowdSuit lacked
standing to bring the lawsuit because the WCA provided that AT&T
customers could sue only as individuals. The legal question of
standing to sue is reviewed de novo.  

Here, the question is governed by the parties' contract, the WCA.
Absent ambiguity, the interpretation of a contract is a question of
law and is also reviewed de novo.  The primary goal of contract
interpretation is to ascertain and enforce the intent of the
parties.

The assignors had explicitly agreed to bring claims against AT&T
only in their individual capacities and not as members of any
purported class or representative proceeding. Nothing in the WCA
indicates that the parties to it intended disputes to be resolved
collectively, or by third parties, or both. AT&T and its customers
clearly intended that any dispute would be resolved one-on-one,
whether in small-claims court or through arbitration. The
assignors, all of whom had explicitly agreed to resolve their
disputes as individuals, could not engage in a collective district
court action.

CrowdSuit lacked standing to bring this lawsuit, and the district
court erred in not dismissing it on that basis.

The appeals case is CrowdSuit, LLC, Appellant, v. AT & T Mobility,
LLC, Respondent. No. A17-1733. (Minn. App.).

A full-text copy of the Minn. App.'s December 24, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaewoc23 from Leagle.com.

Matthew L. Woods -- MWoods@RobinsKaplan.com -- Stephen P. Safranski
-- SSafranski@RobinsKaplan.com -- Peter N. Surdo --
PSurdo@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for appellant.

Karla M. Vehrs -- VEHRSK@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- Ballard Spahr LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Kevin S. Ranlett --
kranlett@mayerbrown.com -- pro hac vice, Mayer Brown LLP,
Washington, D.C., for respondent.


AUTO ZONE: Can Compel Arbitration in Hernandez Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARVIN HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AUTO ZONE, INC., a Nevada
corporation; AUTOZONERS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company;
AUTOZONE PARTS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01324-JAH-AGS (S.D. Cal.),
Judge John A. Houston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Defendants' (i) Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Matter Pending Arbitration or, in the
Alternative, Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(1),
and (i) Request for Judicial Notice.

On May 14, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in
state court bringing seven causes of action against the Defendants
pursuant to the California Labor Code and the California Business
and Professions Code.  The Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on
June 18, 2018.  On Sept. 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed his First
Amended Class Action Complaint adding an eighth cause of action
pursuant to California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").
the Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed the instant motion to
compel arbitration and stay the matter or, in the alternative, to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Defendants' motion sets forth the following background facts:
On Dec. 24, 2012, the Plaintiff electronically executed an
AutoZoners Dispute Resolution Agreement, a mutual arbitration
agreement requiring all such disputes to be resolved only by an
arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of
court or jury trial and applying to any dispute arising out of or
related to employees' employment with AutoZone or one of its
affiliates, subsidiaries or parent companies or termination of
employment.  He executed a second, substantively-identical
Arbitration Agreement on July 13, 2015.

The Arbitration Agreements also provides a class, collective, and
representative waiver, stating that, there will be no right or
authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a
class, collective, or representative action, and the Class Action
Waiver means neither party will have the right to participate in or
be a representative plaintiff in a class, collective or
representative action.

On Oct. 29, 2014, former employee of AutoZoners, Jesse Alvarez,
filed a PAGA action against the Defendant in San Bernardino County
Superior Court.  On Dec. 1, 2014, Alvarez was removed to the
Central District, where it is currently pending.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants Motion to Compel and
Request for Judicial Notice.  The Plaintiff filed no opposition.

Judge Houston finds that the Plaintiffs did not file an opposition
brief or a statement of non-opposition in response to the
Defendant's motion.  Therefore, no issue as to the validity or
enforceability of the agreements has been raised.  He finds the
arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable as
written, requiring the Plaintiff to submit his claims to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreements.

After a review of the pleadings in the action and the Alvarez
complaint, the Judge finds that the two actions involve
substantially similar parties and issues.  Because the Alvarez
complaint was filed more than three years prior to the complaint in
the instant action, the first-to-file rule is applicable and the
Plaintiff's PAGA claim will be severed and stayed pending the
resolution of Alvarez and the completion of arbitration
proceedings.

Accordingly, Judge Houston granted the Defendants' (i) motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay the Action and (ii) Request for
Judicial Notice.  Plaintiff Hernandez will submit all of his
individual claims, causes of action one through seven, against the
Defendants to binding arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the parties' arbitration agreements.

The Judge also granted the Defendants' motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Marvin Hernandez's class action allegations.  The Plaintiff's
representative PAGA claim, alleged as the eighth cause of action,
is severed and stayed pending arbitration of the Plaintiff's
individual claims and pending the resolution of Alvarez v.
AutoZone, Inc.

The litigation, including all pending discovery not relating to the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, is stayed pending
completion of the parties' arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1NUlHc from Leagle.com.

Marvin Hernandez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob N. Whitehead --
reception@jnwpc.com -- Whitehead Employment Law & Patrick
McNicholas, IV , McNicholas & McNicholas.

Autozone, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Autozoners, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company & Autozone Parts, Inc., a Nevada
corporation, Defendants, represented by Evan Reed Moses --
evan.moses@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart P.C., Graham Hoerauf -- graham.hoerauf@ogletree.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Elizabeth Falcone
-- elizabeth.falcone@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins & Nardo J.
Catahan -- nardo.catahan@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


BALBOA WATER: Sonny Le Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
SONNY LE, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BALBOA WATER
GROUP LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. 30-2019-01042358-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct., Jan.7, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime, unpaid meal premiums, unpaid rest
period, and unpaid minimum wages, under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the other class
members worked over eight hours in a day and/or 40 hours in a week
during their employment with the Defendants. The Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of wage abuse
against their hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State
of California. This pattern and practice involved, inter alia,
failing to pay them for all regular and/or overtime wages earned
and for missed meal periods and rest breaks in violation of
California law. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew or
should have known that Plaintiff and the other class members were
entitled to receive certain wages for overtime compensation and
that they were not receiving accurate overtime compensation for all
overtime hours worked, the lawsuit says.

Balboa Water Group, Inc. designs and manufactures control systems
and equipment for the leisure water industry in the United States
and internationally.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265 1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265 1021

BEST RATE: Can Compel Arbitration in J. Temple TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned JOHN TEMPLE,
Plaintiff, v. BEST RATE HOLDINGS LLC and LENDING TREE INC.,
Defendants. Case No. 8:18-cv-176-T-36JSS. (M.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff filed a single-count putative class action complaint
against Best Rate and Lending Tree, alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), based on purported text
messages sent by Defendants to Plaintiff's wireless telephone
number using an automatic telephone dialing system.

The Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Provision is
unenforceable, and that he cannot be compelled to arbitrate his
claim, for two reasons: first, because the Agreement is a
browsewrap agreement and second, because the Agreement is
unconscionable.  

Where one party offers terms of a contract to another, unequivocal
acceptance of the terms by the receiving party is required.

Contracts available on the internet come in different forms. Two
such forms include clickwrap agreements and browsewrap agreements.
Clickwrap agreements, which courts generally find enforceable,
necessitate an active role by the user of a website. They require a
user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging
awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or she
is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website.
Because clickwrap agreements require the user to physically
manifest assent, the user is said to be put on inquiry notice of
the terms assented to.

In contrast, browsewrap agreements require a less active role by
the website user. Generally, a browsewrap agreement consists of a
notice on a website stating that the user is agreeing to and is
bound by the website's terms of service by merely using the
website. Because a user's consent to a browsewrap agreement is
generally passive, courts closely examine the factual circumstances
surrounding a person's use of the website and alleged assent to the
terms of service.

To be valid, a browsewrap agreement must give at least reasonable,
constructive, or inquiry notice of the website's terms to the user,
and the user must exhibit unambiguous assent to the terms. The
conspicuousness and placement of hyperlinks to terms, notices of
the terms and the website's general design all contribute to
whether an individual would have reasonable notice of a browsewrap
agreement.  

The Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Provision here is
unenforceable because it is part of a browsewrap agreement that
could be found only by clicking on the Terms and Conditions
Hyperlink located below the Get a Quote button.  

Best Rate disputes that the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink was
located below the Get a Quote button, as Plaintiff describes, at
the time Plaintiff visited the website. Best Rate offers evidence
that the website was revised on March 21, 2018, after Plaintiff
visited it. Although the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink now appears
below the Get a Quote button, as Plaintiff describes, the website
setup was different on the date Plaintiff visited the website and
entered his information.

In support, Best Rate attaches the declarations of Zach South,
Senior Vice President of Mortgage Operations for Best Rate. South
avers that on the date Plaintiff visited the website, October 30,
2016, the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink was prominently displayed
and located directly above the Get a Quote button that a user
clicks to complete his/her registration. The declarations provide
an image of a regenerated HMTL representation of what the webpage
looked like at the time Plaintiff registered. That image, in turn,
shows that the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink was located above the
Get a Quote button.  

Upon careful review of Best Rate's evidence concerning the
placement of the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink, the Court finds
that Plaintiff had reasonable notice of the Agreement and that the
Agreement is enforceable. Where the website user was cautioned that
clicking the Sign Up button indicated his agreement to the Terms of
Service, here, Plaintiff was cautioned that clicking the Get a
Quote button would indicate his acceptance to the Agreement
available via the Terms and Conditions Hyperlink.

The Terms and Conditions Hyperlink was placed in a manner
conspicuous enough to provide reasonable notice to a prudent user,
thereby requiring the user to affirmatively acknowledge the Terms
and Conditions Hyperlink to the Agreement before proceeding.
Because the website provided reasonable notice of the Agreement, it
is enforceable.

Generally, to determine that a contract is unconscionable is to
find that the contract was both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable when made, i.e., some showing of an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.

Upon careful review, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy either element.

The procedural element of unconscionability requires an examination
of the contract formation process and the alleged lack of
meaningful choice. But a plaintiff does not lack a meaningful
choice, and a contract is not procedurally unconscionable, where a
plaintiff had the opportunity to opt out without any adverse
consequences. Here, the Arbitration Provision provided Plaintiff
with thirty-days to opt-out. The parties do not present any
evidence that Plaintiff attempted to opt-out.

The Plaintiff's argument that he had no bargaining power in the
formation of the Agreement, and that the terms were presented to
him on an impermissible take-it-or-leave-it basis, is unavailing.
The fact that an arbitration agreement is presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis is not sufficient under New York law to
render the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable.
Plaintiff provides no basis for the Court to determine that the
Agreement is procedurally unconscionable.

It is only in exceptional cases where a provision of a contract is
so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground
of substantive unconscionability alone. A party's failure to show
procedural unconscionability is generally fatal to an
unconscionability claim.  

The Plaintiff argues the Agreement is substantively unconscionable
because the provisions are drawn in favor of Best Rate. Plaintiff
points to the following: (1) the class action waiver, which
prohibits only plaintiff, but not Best Rate, from filing or
participating in a class action lawsuit (2) the provision allowing
Best Rate to recover attorney's fees it incurs in seeking
injunctive relief against consumers who attempt to participate in
class action lawsuits and (3) the provision allowing Best Rate to
seek attorney's fees from consumers if the arbitrator determines
the consumer's claim was frivolous.

The Plaintiff does not cite any case law in support of his argument
that the class action waiver is procedurally unconscionable. To the
extent Plaintiff argues the class action waiver is procedurally
unconscionable solely because it is a class action waiver, his
argument fails.  

Moreover, the fact that an arbitration provision may not be
entirely reciprocal does not equate to a finding of
unconscionability. Again, the question is whether the contract
contains terms unreasonably favorable to one party over the other.
Simply, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Arbitration
Provision contains any such terms. In this case, the Arbitration
Provision provides Plaintiff with certain other benefits; for
example, although the Arbitration Provision allows Best Rate to
recover attorney's fees for defending frivolous claims, it also
allows Plaintiff to recover all filing fees, administration fees,
arbitrator fees, and reasonable attorney's fees where the
arbitrator awards Plaintiff relief in an amount greater than Best
Rate's final settlement offer.  

Having determined that the Arbitration Provision is enforceable,
the Court turns to Plaintiff's argument that he should not be
compelled to arbitrate because his claim does not fit within the
scope of the Arbitration Provision.

Pursuant to the Arbitration Provision, the parties agreed to
arbitrate: should a dispute arise concerning the Site Offerings,
the terms and conditions of the Agreement or the breach of same by
any party hereto.

The Plaintiff argues that his claim does not fit within the
intended scope of arbitration because it does not concern the
Contact Services. Rather, Plaintiff argues, his claim, Defendants'
failure to stop sending him text messages after he replied stop
occurred months after Plaintiff visited the website and does not
concern his use of the website at all. Plaintiff's argument is
strained, at best. Plaintiff's Complaint states that he entered his
contact information in the fields on the website to learn more
about mortgage products. Plaintiff received the alleged contact
from Defendants as a result of providing his information and
assenting to the terms of the Agreement.

Indeed, the text on the website above the Get a Quote button
informed Plaintiff that entering his contact information and
clicking Get a Quote would mean he agreed to share his information
with lenders and agreed to be contacted by them. Defendants'
alleged text messages to Plaintiff were clearly precipitated by
Plaintiff's utilization of a contact form on the website, a feature
described in the Agreement as part of the Contact Services.
Plaintiff offers no other explanation for why he would receive such
contact. The Contact Services, which are part of the Site
Offerings, are subject to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration
Provision.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycc9bx8d from Leagle.com.

John Temple, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situtated, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick H. Peluso --
ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, pro hac vice,
Ryan S. Shipp, Law Office of Ryan S. Shipp, PLLC & Steven L.
Woodrow -- swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, pro
hac vice.

Best Rate Holdings LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Amy E. Stoll, Barnett, Bolt, Kirkwood,
Long & Koche & Ethan McLeod Knott -- eknott@kilpatricktownsend.com
-- Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP.

Lending Tree Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Ethan McLeod Knott, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP.


BIG MACK PAINTING: Pena Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Harold Pena, on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. Big Mack Painting
Corp., and OV Painting and Supply, Inc., and Bruce Polk,
individually, and Dennis Carollo, individually, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00265 (E.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019) is a civil action
for damages and equitable relief based upon Defendants' willful
violations of Plaintiff's rights guaranteed to him by: (i) the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), (ii)
the overtime provisions of the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), (iii)
the NYLL's requirement that employers provide on each payday proper
wage statements to their employees containing specific categories
of accurate information, (iv) the NYLL's requirement that employers
furnish employees with a wage notice at hire containing specific
categories of accurate information, and (v) any other claim(s) that
can be inferred from the facts set forth herein.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants - two corporations that operate as
a single enterprise that runs a Staten Island-based painting and
renovation business, and their day-to-day overseers - as a painter
from in or around March 2013 until on or around April 3, 2018.

Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Defendants intentionally failed
to pay Plaintiff overtime wages for his hours worked in a week over
forty in violation of the FLSA and the NYLL. Specifically, despite
Plaintiff working in excess of forty hours per week, Defendants
initially paid Plaintiff a flat daily rate for each day worked
regardless of how many hours he worked per day or per week, and
thus failed to compensate Plaintiff at the statutorily-required
overtime rate for any hours that he worked per week in excess of
forty. Then, when Defendants made Plaintiff an hourly employee,
Defendants continued to require Plaintiff to work more than forty
hours per week but paid him at his regular rate of pay for all
hours worked, including those in excess of forty.

Furthermore, also in violation of the NYLL, Defendants failed to
provide Plaintiff with accurate wage statements on each payday
throughout his employment or with any wage notice at the time of
his hire, let alone an accurate one. The Defendants paid and
treated all of their employees whom they paid on either a daily or
hourly basis in the same manner, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants in New York and was an "employee"
entitled to protection as defined by the FLSA, the NYLL, and the
NYCRR.

Big Mack was a New York corporation with its principal place of
business located at 261 Chelsea Street, Staten Island, New York
10307.

OV was and is a New York corporation with its principal place of
business also located at 261 Chelsea Street, Staten Island, New
York 10307.

Polk was and is the Chief Executive Officer and Carollo was and is
the owner of Defendants Big Mack and OV.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kenneth F. St. John, Esq.
     Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
     Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
     BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
     Attorneys for Plaintiff
     910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 248-5550
     Fax: (516) 248-6027


BIMBO BAKERIES: Tiscareno Wants to Notify Class of Associates
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled KATY TISCARENO, individually
and on behalf of all similarly-situated v. BIMBO BAKERIES USA,
INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-01167-CFK (E.D. Pa.), moves for an order,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   (a) allowing the sending of notice of this action to all
       hourly/non-exempt associates working at Bimbo Bakeries USA
       bakery plants that do not pay for time spent donning and
       doffing material required under Bimbo's national Uniform
       Policy, from three years prior to the filing of this
       action to the present (excluding office/clerical
       employees);

   (b) designating the Plaintiff's counsel as counsel for the
       collective;

   (c) directing the Defendant to electronically produce the
       names, dates of employment, telephone numbers, e-mail
       addresses, addresses, e-mails and such other necessary
       identifying information, for all members of the
       collective; and

   (d) setting this matter for a status conference regarding
       notice and opt-in procedures.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alice W. Ballard, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ALICE W. BALLARD, P.C.
          123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2135
          Philadelphia, PA 19109
          Telephone: (215) 893-9708
          E-mail: awballard@awballard.com

               - and -

          Edward (E.E.) Keenan, Esq.
          Sonal Bhatia, Esq.
          KEENAN & BHATIA, LLC
          1301 Oak Street, Suite 510
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 809-2100
          E-mail: ee@keenanfirm.com
                  sonal@keenanfirm.com


BLUEBIRD BIO: Robbins Arroyo LLP Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP disclosed that
purchasers of bluebird bio, Inc. filed a class action complaint
against the company's officers and directors for alleged violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between December 11, 2017
and November 29, 2018. bluebird bio, Inc. is a clinical-stage
biotechnology company developing transformative gene therapies for
genetic diseases and cancer.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/bluebird-bio-inc/

bluebird bio Failed to Disclose Relevant Material Facts to Mislead
Shareholders of Regulatory Approval Prospects

According to the complaint, beginning on December 11, 2017,
bluebird bio touted the efficacy and future prospects of its
LentiGlobin™ gene therapy. Then, on December 1, 2018, bluebird
issued a press release advising investors that it had "announced
new long-term data from the completed Phase 1/2 Northstar (HGB-204)
study of investigational LentiGlobin™ gene therapy in patients
with transfusion-dependent β-thalassemia (TDT) and from the
ongoing Phase 1/2 HGB-206 study of LentiGlobin in patients with
sickle cell disease (SCD)." bluebird's reported results cast doubt
on the efficacy of LentiGlobin in increasing the production of
anti-sickling hemoglobin. On December 3, 2018, Seeking Alpha
published an article noting that these "results were lower than
initial data reported a year ago indicating a lower rate of
production of anti-sickling hemoglobin." Following the clinical
studies' results announcement, bluebird's stock price fell $6.39,
or 5.2%, to close at $116.50.

Bluebird bio Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies:

         Leonid Kandinov, Esq.
         Robbins Arroyo LLP
         600 B Street, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 525-3990
         Toll Free: (800) 350-6003
         Email: LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


BLUEGREEN VACATIONS: Wijesinha Sues over Unsolicited Phone Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHEHAN WIJESINHA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BLUEGREEN VACATIONS, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-20073-CMA (S.D. Fla., Jan. 7,
2019), seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant is a vacation ownership and experiences company based
in Boca Raton. As part of its marketing strategy, the Defendant
utilizes automatic telephone dialing systems to place calls to
unsuspecting consumers on their cellular telephones to sell their
vacations services and goods. The Defendant caused thousands of
calls to be placed to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and
Class Members, causing them injuries, including invasion of their
privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass,
and conversion.

According to the complaint, on or about December 11, 2018, the
Defendant called Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in
7557. The Plaintiff heard a pause before he was greeted by a live
person. This pause is indicative of automatic telephone dialing
system technology. When Plaintiff was transferred to a live person,
the person indicated that they were an employee of BlueGreen
Vacations and promoted BlueGreen Vacations' services. The Plaintiff
is the subscriber and sole user of the 7557 Number. The Defendant
called Plaintiff from 417-413-4979, a number which upon information
and belief, Defendant owned and/or operated. At no point in time
did Plaintiff provide Defendant with written express consent to be
contacted. Defendant's unsolicited calls caused Plaintiff actual
harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's calls
also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily
life, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH LAW
          1200 Brickell Ave Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          E-mail: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com
          Telephone: (786) 496 4469

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713

BOLT THREADS: Faces Garey Suit Asserting ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Bolt Threads, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Bolt Threads, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00344
(S.D. N.Y., January 13, 2019).

Bolt Threads Inc. engages in the manufacture of fibers and fabrics.
The company was formerly known as Refactored Materials, Inc. and
changed its name to Bolt Threads Inc. in May 2014. Bolt Threads
Inc. was founded in 2009 and is based in Emeryville,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


BROADWAY BEAUTY: Nunez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sucre Nunez, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Broadway Beauty Wholesale Inc., Musthafa
Kamal, and John Does #1-10, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00362
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019) alleges against Defendants, who elect
to opt into this action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), that they are entitled to: (i) unpaid wages from
defendants for overtime work for which they did not receive
overtime premium pay as required by law, and (ii) liquidated
damages pursuant to the FLSA. Mr. Nunez further complains that he
is entitled to (i) compensation for wages paid at less than the
statutory New York minimum wage; (ii) back wages for overtime work
for which defendants willfully failed to pay overtime premium pay
as required by the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York
State Department of Labor regulations; (iii) liquidated damages
pursuant to New York Labor Law for these violations; and (iv)
statutory damages for defendants' violation of the Wage Theft
Prevention Act.

Plaintiff Mr. Nunez was employed at Broadway Beauty from
approximately August 2003 through August 2018. Mr. Nunez was
employed as a retail sales clerk. Mr. Nunez's work was performed in
the normal course of defendants' business and was integrated into
the business of defendants, and did not involve executive or
administrative responsibilities.

When he got checks, Mr. Nunez would receive paystubs; those
paystubs did not list his hours worked and did not reflect the cash
payments he was also receiving. The amount of pay that Mr. Nunez
received did not vary based on the precise number of hours that he
worked in a week. As a result, commencing in about 2017, Mr.
Nunez's effective rate of pay was below the statutory New York
minimum wages in effect at applicable times.

The Defendants' failure to pay Mr. Nunez amounts at least equal to
the New York state minimum wage in effect during relevant time
periods was willful, and lacked a good faith basis. In addition,
defendants failed to pay Mr. Nunez any overtime "bonus" for hours
worked beyond 40 hours in a workweek, in violation of the FLSA, the
New York Labor Law, and the supporting New York State Department of
Labor regulations, says the complaint.

Sucre Nunez is an adult individual residing in the Bronx, New
York.

Broadway Beauty Wholesale Inc. is a New York corporation with a
principal place of business at 28 West 28th Street, New York, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David Stein, Esq.
     SAMUEL & STEIN
     38 West 32nd Street, Suite 1110
     New York, NY 10001
     Phone: (212) 563-9884
     Email: dstein@samuelandstein.com


BUFFALO FUEL: Jorge Torres Seeks Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------
JORGE TORRES, individually, and on behalf of other individuals
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BUFFALO FUEL CORP., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00041 (W.D.N.Y., Jan. 7, 2019), seeks
to recover overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff brings this claim under the FLSA and for Defendant
failing to pay Plaintiff, and other similarly situated employees,
at a rate equal to one and one-half times their regular rate of pay
(overtime) for all hours worked in excess of 40 in individual work
weeks. As a result of Defendant's willful violations of the New
York Labor Law and supporting regulations, the Plaintiff and the
Collective have suffered damages, the lawsuit says.

Buffalo Fuel Corp. provides trucking transportation services. The
Company offers transportation of hazardous waste materials, waste
consulting, safety, and road call.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Rafael O. Gomez, Esq.
          GOMEZ & BECKER, LLP
          2746 Delaware Avenue
          The Eberhardt Mansion
          Buffalo, NY 14217
          Telephone: (716) 873-0333
          E-mail: rgomez@gomezbecker.com

BUGATCHI GROUP: Violates ADA, Garey Suit Asserts
------------------------------------------------
Bugatchi Group, Inc is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Bugatchi Group, Inc, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00346
(S.D. N.Y., January 13, 2019).

Bugatchi Group, Inc manufactures and supplies menswear to retail
stores in the United States and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Indigenous Mistreatment
------------------------------------------------------------
Bob Weber, writing for Surrey Now-Leader, reports that a
class-action lawsuit filed in an Edmonton court alleges RCMP in the
three northern territories regularly assault and abuse Indigenous
people.

"We know from anecdotal and media reports that this class is going
to be quite significant," said Steven Cooper, Esq. one of the
lawyers involved in the lawsuit filed against the federal
government on Dec. 19.

The statement of claim, which contains allegations that have not
been proven in court, points to the example of David Nasogaluak, a
resident of Tuktoyaktuk, N.W.T.

It says that in November 2017, Nasogaluak, then 15, was stopped and
questioned by officers as he was riding his snowmobile outside town
with five friends.

The statement says officers beat, choked, punched, Tasered and used
racial insults against Nasogaluak. It says he was handcuffed and
taken to the police station, where he was released without charge.

Officers continued to drive by Nasogaluak's home until his mother
called to complain. The lawsuit says Nasogaluak suffered lasting
physical and emotional damage, and has since quit school.

Such treatment is far too common across Yukon, the Northwest
Territories and Nunavut, the statement says.

"It is well known in the territories that Aboriginal persons are
improperly targeted by the RCMP on the basis of their race,
ancestry and beliefs."

Cooper, who has long legal experience in both Nunavut and the
N.W.T., said the courts must first rule that there is an issue to
be considered, which would define who was eligible to be a
plaintiff in the class action. If the courts certify the lawsuit,
appropriate plaintiffs can then sign on.

He said his office routinely receives complaints about RCMP
misbehaviour.

"It is indicative of what's happening across the country. There's
no shortage of videos."

One such video documented the apparent beating of Bernard Naulilak
in RCMP cells in July 2016 and led to a debate in the Nunavut
legislature about whether the territory should form a civilian body
to review complaints against the force.

Nor was that the first time the issue was debated by Nunavut
lawmakers. In 2015, a report was commissioned into police
misconduct. The report was never released.

A letter that year from Nunavut's legal-aid service suggested it
had information on 30 cases of excessive use of force. The
service's chairwoman has said there were 27 civil cases filed
between 2014 and 2017.

In 2010, the Yukon government released its own report on similar
concerns. That led to the formation of a council that visits the
territory's communities annually to discuss policing concerns.

RCMP in Nunavut have defended their record.

Statistics released by the territory's V Division indicate Mounties
responded to 27,000 calls and held 7,500 people in custody last
year. The force received 13 complaints between 2016 and 2018.

Cooper said such numbers reveal little.

Misconduct complaints are always going to be swamped in Nunavut by
the huge numbers of arrests, he said. As well, few in tiny, remote
communities far from legal advice are willing to take on
authority.

"The complaint system is intimidating and not very friendly. Most
people won't know about it, won't know how to access it and have
zero faith in the ability of the complaints commission to deal with
these types of issues."[GN]


CAREEXPAND LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Darden Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAPHINE DARDEN and FELICIA HINOJOSA, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated v. CAREEXPAND, LLC, Case No.
3:19-cv-00023-B (N.D. Tex., January 4, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's alleged widespread violations of the overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires
employers to compensate their employees for a workweek longer than
40 hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate at which the employee is employed.

CareExpand, LLC, is a Texas limited liability company.  The Company
provides an online medical service platform that connects
physicians with their patients and colleagues.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brandi J. McKay, Esq.
          Katherine Valent, Esq.
          SCHEEF & STONE, L.L.P.
          500 North Akard, Suite 2700
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 706-4200
          Facsimile: (214) 706-4242
          E-mail: brandi.mckay@solidcounsel.com
                  Katherine.valent@solidcounsel.com


CARMAX AUTO: Doucette Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN DOUCETTE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc., Case No.
1:19-cv-10031-GAO (D. Mass., January 7, 2019), seeks to recover
alleged unpaid overtime wages, minimum wages, Sunday premium pay,
and reimbursement for improper deductions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc., is a foreign corporation with a
principal office located in Richmond, Virginia.

The Defendant operates a chain of automobile dealerships in
Massachusetts and other states that is known as "CarMax."  The
Defendant sells tangible personal products -- i.e. cars -- through
its CarMax dealerships to members of the public.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brook S. Lane, Esq.
          Hillary Schwab, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607-3260
          E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com
                  hillary@fairworklaw.com


CERTIFIED RECOVERY: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned KAYLA STAMM, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
CERTIFIED RECOVERY INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00026-JPS
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CONNECTICUT: McNee Seeks Certification of Class and Subclass
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled DAVID MCNEE, DEBORAH CARR
EDINELIS VEGA, Plaintiffs, Individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, and IDA DAVIDSON, ERNESTINE COLEMAN
TERRILYNNE TRUDEAU, MATTHEW IBRAHIM, Plaintiffs, Individually and
on behalf of all Other persons similarly situated v. RODERICK
BREMBY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State of
Connecticut Department of Social Services, Case No. 3:19-cv-00035
(D. Conn.), ask the Court to certify the case as a class action
pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class and subclass
consisting of these individuals:

   * Primary Class:

     All Connecticut residents who receive, or who in the future
     will have their non emergency medical transportation
     Medicaid benefits denied, reduced, suspended, and/or
     terminated without receiving adequate written notice with
     adequate factual information about the basis for the
     decision and the recipient's right to a hearing; and

   * Subclass:

     Members of the main class who are unable to travel by way of
     public transit due to their disability and must instead take
     a specialized mode of transportation such as a wheelchair
     van, stretcher transport, or other vehicle necessary as a
     result of their disability.

The proposed Classes each satisfy the numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule
23(a)(1) through (4), the Plaintiffs contend.  The Plaintiffs add
that the Defendants have acted or refused to act with respect to
the class as a whole, thereby, making declaratory and injunctive
relief appropriate for the class as a whole, in accordance with
Rule 23(b)(2).[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kristen Noelle Hatcher, Esq.
          CONNECTICUT LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
          16 Main Street
          New Britain, CT 06050
          Telephone: (860) 357-9308
          E-mail: Khatcher@connlegalservices.org

               - and -

          James S. Haslam, Esq.
          CONNECTICUT LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
          125 Eugene O'Neill Drive, Suite 120
          New London, CT 06320
          Telephone: (860) 271-7312
          E-mail: jhaslam@connlegalservices.org


CONNECTICUT: Murphy Files Civil Rights Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the officials of the
State of Connecticut. The case is styled as Kyle Murphy,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Mayor Joseph Maturo, in His Official and Individual Capacities,
Lt. David Emerman, in His Individual Capacity, Chief of Police Ed
Lennon, in His Official and Individual Capacities, Sgt. Stephen
Paulsen, in His Individual Capacity, Officer Kershen Bissette, in
His Individual Capacity, Brent Larrabee, in His Individual
Capacity, Frank Gentilesco, in His Individual Capacity, Attorney
Joseph Zullo, in His Official Capacity and Attorney Frank J. Kolb,
in His Individual Capacity, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00055 (D.
Conn., January 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as violation of
civil rights.

Joseph Maturo Jr. is a politician. He is the long-term mayor of
East Haven, Connecticut. He is a Republican and with his
re-election in 2005, he became the second person in East Haven
history to be elected for five terms as mayor, serving 1997-2007.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Rachel M. Baird, Esq.
   15 Burlington Road
   Harwinton, CT 06791
   Tel: (860) 605-9340
   Fax: (860) 605-9343
   Email: rbaird@rachelbairdlaw.com


CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CA: Summ. Judgment Bid in Farrow Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN FARROW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONTRA COSTA
COUNTY, Defendant, Case No. 12-cv-06495-JCS (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Joseph C. Spero of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (i) granted in part the County's motion to
exclude expert testimony; (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment; (iii) granted the County's motion for summary
judgment as to the Plaintiffs' Sixth Amendment claim; and (iv)
dismissed the Plaintiffs' state law claim for lack of
jurisdiction.

Farrow and Jerome Wade brought the putative class action asserting
a number of claims based on the alleged failure of Defendant Contra
Costa County to provide appointed counsel at the Plaintiffs' first
court appearances, or within a reasonable time thereafter, in
criminal proceedings in state court.  After multiple motions to
dismiss, an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and remand to the Court,
the Plaintiffs' remaining claims are for failure to provide the
counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment within a reasonable time
after the right attached, and for a writ of mandamus to enforce
Contra Costa Public Defender Robin Lipetzky's obligations under
section 27706 of the California Government Code.

In accordance with the case schedule set by the Court, the parties
now bring cross motions for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs'
individual claims before the question of class certification has
been addressed, and the County moves to exclude the opinions of the
Plaintiffs' expert witness.

The Court held a hearing on Jan. 19, 2018.

The Plaintiffs seek summary judgment granting equitable relief and
nominal damages on their individual claims, or alternatively,
summary adjudication of issues including whether they were deprived
of their Sixth Amendment right to the counsel and whether the
County had a policy of deliberate indifference to the Plaintiffs'
rights.

The County argues that the Plaintiffs' motion should be denied
because it fails to address the circumstances of the Plaintiffs'
individual experiences during their criminal prosecutions.  It
contends that it did not have a policy of withholding
representation for a period of days, but rather did not provide
counsel at first appearances because the Public Defender's Office
did not have a sufficient number of attorneys to staff those
appearances.

The County argues in its motion for summary judgment that the
reasonableness determination focuses on the consequences, if any,
of the delay on the criminal defendant's ability to defend the
charges against her/him.  It contends that the Sixth Amendment only
protects the right to a fair trial, and that the Court should
reconsider its previous order holding that an unreasonable delay in
providing counsel is distinct from the Strickland and Cronic
framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of the counsel.

The Plaintiffs argue that the County's argument that actual
prejudice is required is a nonstarter, as the County bizarrely
insists upon a legal standard that both this Court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals have explicitly rejected.

The County moves to exclude the opinions of the Plaintiffs' expert
Robert Boruchowitz, arguing that his testimony only "fits" the case
if it corresponds to harms that actually befell Farrow and Wade,
and faulting Boruchowitz for failing to review evidence regarding
the particular prosecutions at issue in the case.

Among other things, Magistrate Judge Spero finds that to the extent
that the Court looks more generally to whether the County's former
policy violated the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants
as a class, Boruchowitz's expertise and experience qualifies him to
identify risks associated with delayed appointment of the counsel,
and his statements identifying such risks are admissible expert
opinion.  He denied the County's motion as to those portions of
Boruchowitz's report.  But while those ill effects support a
conclusion that delay is bad, it is less clear whether they can
support a conclusion that a particular period of delay is or is not
reasonable.  Boruchowitz's ultimate conclusion is not based on any
discernable framework for determining reasonableness. See
Boruchowitz Report.  If Boruchowitz's opinion is read more
liberally as requiring appointment as soon as reasonably possible,
it only begs the original question of what delay is reasonable.
The County's motion to exclude these opinions on the ultimate
question at issue is granted.

He agrees with the County, however, that statements by Lipetzky do
not constitute binding judicial admissions on behalf of the County,
nor are her or any other witness's personal opinions as to what the
Sixth Amendment requires in this context relevant to the Court's
interpretation of the law.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs cannot prevail based on a
per se rule of when the counsel should be appointed, a theory of
systemic deficiency based on a generally applicable policy of
delay, or a theory that deliberate inaction or indifference itself
violates the Sixth Amendment without need to consider the specific
circumstances of their own appointment of the counsel.

Because Coker's opinion as to how much time is reasonable for a
public defender's office to resolve conflicts of interest in a case
like Wade's, that issue is undisputed, and taking into account the
fact that there is no evidence that the delay left counsel with
insufficient time to prepare for a critical stage, no rational
finder of fact could conclude on this record that the four-day
delay in Wade's case was unreasonable.  The County's motion for
summary judgment is therefore granted as to Wade's Sixth Amendment
claim, and the Plaintiffs' motion is denied as to that claim.

Because he concludes that a rational finder of fact could not find
on the record that provision of the counsel to Farrow and Wade was
unreasonably delayed for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment, the
Magistrate does not reach the parties' remaining arguments
regarding the Sixth Amendment claim, including whether Farrow is
collaterally estopped from bringing such a claim and whether the
practices at issue violated the Sixth Amendment rights of potential
class members other than the current Plaintiffs.

Finally, he finds that the Plaintiffs present no argument in their
briefs why the case warrants a deviation from the usual approach of
declining to exercise state law claims after all federal claims
have been dismissed.  He therefore grants the County's request and
dismisses the Plaintiffs' section 27706 for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, without prejudice to them bringing that claim in a
court of competent jurisdiction.

Magistrate Judge Spero concludes that a reasonable finder of fact
could not find that the delay in providing the counsel after the
Plaintiffs' first appearances in their criminal cases was
constitutionally unreasonable.  To be clear, in reaching this
determination, he considers only what conclusions can be drawn from
the record available, and does not purport to hold that a four- or
12-day delay is presumptively reasonable, or that an interview by a
paralegal before the counsel is appointed can necessarily
substitute under the Sixth Amendment for providing an attorney.
Based on the evidence presented in the case, however, the
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, the County's
motion for summary judgment is granted as to the Plaintiffs' claim
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Sixth Amendment, and the
Plaintiffs' claim under California Government Code section 27706 is
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without
prejudice to the Plaintiffs bringing that claim in a court of
competent jurisdiction.  The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment
accordingly and to close the file.

Because the claims of the putative class are not before the Court,
the Order does not bar absent putative class members from bringing
any claim in a separate action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 2, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QHKXhn from Leagle.com.

John Farrow, on his behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jerome Wade, on his behalf, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher Alan
Martin -- chris@martindefenders.com -- at Martin Law Offices,
Michael E. Dietrick -- dietrick@pacbell.net -- at Law Offices of
Michael Dietrick & Michael Emery Dietrick, Attorney at Law.

Contra Costa County, Defendant, represented by D. Cameron Baker --
cameron.baker@cc.cccounty.us -- at County of Contra Costa.


CREDIT BUREAU: Court Certifies Class in Bassett FDCPA/NCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KELLY M. BASSETT, individually and as heir of James M.
Bassett, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated;
Plaintiff, v. CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, INC., and C.J. TIGHE,
Defendants, Case No. 8:16CV449 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph F. Bataillon
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The case is a putative class action for violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the Nebraska Consumer
Practices Act ("NCPA").  The Plaintiff challenges a collection
letter sent to her by the Defendants.

The time period for violations of the FDCPA is one year period
prior to the filing of the litigation, i.e., Oct. 3, 2015, through
the date of class certification.  he time period for violations of
the NCPA is four years prior to the filing of the litigation, i.e.,
Oct. 3, 2012, through the date of certification.

On Oct. 3, 2016, Bassett, individually and as the heir of James
Bassett, brought an action against the Defendants, alleging that
the letter at issue is false or misleading because it: (1)
identified an appointment but did not identify the location of the
appointment; (b) identified a Norfolk address, but also listed a
P.O. Box in Fremont; and (c) stated that teh Defendants would
proceed with collection efforts if the appointment was not kept.
She alleges the letter was confusing.

The record shows the Defendants sent at least 9,796 of the
challenged standard debt collection letters during the class
periods defined in the case.  Over 4,000 of those letters sought
collection of an allegedly unpaid medical account.  Defendant Tighe
owns and runs CBS.

Credit Bureau Services' debtor profile and collection notes for the
Bassetts shows that Credit Bureau Services sent the collection
letter at issue to them.  The computer inserts the
consumer-specific information into the collection letter.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of a class defined as (i) all
persons with addresses in Nebraska; (ii) to whom the Defendants
sent a letter in the form of Exhibit A (Filing No. 1-1); (iii) in
an attempt to collect a debt incurred for personal, family or
household purposes as shown by Defendants' or the creditors'
records; (iv) allegedly due for a medical obligation.

The Defendants are opposed to class certification.  They first
argue that a class should not be certified because the Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing to pursue her claims.  Next, they argue
the Plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) since the FDCPA does not
provide for injunctive relief and injunctive relief is the primary
relief that the plaintiff seeks.  Finally, they argue that the
Plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) because a particularized
review would be required to determine: (1) if the alleged violation
was material (e.g., if each member actually reviewed the letter at
issue); and (2) whether the debt was commercial or consumer; and
(3) whether a class member's claim may be barred by a previously
litigated class action.

Judge Bataillon finds that the requirements of Rule 23 have been
met and the proposed class should be certified.  The Rule 23(b)(3)
requirements are likewise satisfied.  He also finds that certifying
the class will achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
will promote uniformity as to similarly-situated persons, without
sacrificing procedural fairness. Because individual recoveries in
this type of action are small, a class action is superior to other
methods of fairly adjudicating the controversy.

Accordingly, he granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  The action is certified as a class action pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following
classes:

     A. FDCPA Class: (i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska;
(ii) to whom the defendants sent a letter in the form of Exhibit A
(Filing No. 1-1) (identified in the Defendants' records as B-10)
from Oct. 3, 2015, through this date; (iii) in an attempt to
collect a debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes
as shown by the Defendants' or the creditors' records; (iv)
allegedly due for a medical obligation; (v) that was not returned
as undeliverable; (vi) excluding members of the class certified in
Kenneth M. Reynolds v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. and C.J. Tighe,
No. 8:15-cv-00168.

     B. NCPA Class: (i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska;
(ii) to whom the defendants sent a letter in the form of Exhibit A
(Filing No. 1-1) (identified in the defendants' records as B-10)
from Oct. 3, 2012, through this date; (iii) in an attempt to
collect a debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes
as shown by the Defendants' or the creditors' records; (iv)
allegedly due for a medical obligation; (v) that was not returned
as undeliverable; (vi) excluding members of the class certified in
Kenneth M. Reynolds v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. and C.J. Tighe,
No. 8:15-cv-00168.

The Judge appointed Bassett as the representative Plaintiff; and
the Horwitz, Horwitz Law Firm and the Car, Reinbrecht Law Firm as
the class counsel.

The parties will contact Magistrate Judge Susan M. Bazis to set a
status conference on further progression of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/8mIBMU from Leagle.com.

Kelly M. Bassett, individually and as heir of James M. Bassett, on
behald of herself and all other similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by O. Randolph Bragg -- rand@horwitzlaw.com -- HORWITZ,
HORWITZ LAW FIRM, Pamela A. Car -- pacar@cox.net -- CAR, REINBRECHT
LAW FIRM & William L. Reinbrecht, CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM.

Credit Bureau Services, Inc. & C. J. Tighe, Defendants, represented
by Joshua C. Dickinson -- jdickinson@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER,
FANE LAW FIRM & Shilee T. Mullin -- smullin@spencerfane.com --
SPENCER, FANE LAW FIRM.


CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH: Sued Over County Jail Conditions
-----------------------------------------------------
Drew Scofield, writing for News 5 Cleveland, reports that a
Cleveland law firm said on De. 20 they have filed a class action
lawsuit regarding deplorable conditions at the Cuyahoga County
Jail.

Attorneys from the firm of Friedman & Gilbert held a press
conference on Dec. 20 discussing the pending lawsuit against the
county, Cuyahoga County Executive Armond Budish, county sheriff
Clifford Pinkney and other jail officials.

"The lawsuit is a critical step toward addressing a multitude of
constitutional rights violations suffered by people in the custody
of the County Jail," according to a news release from the law
firm.

The lawsuit seeks "judicial intervention and independent oversight
for the implementation of comprehensive remedies to eliminate the
deplorable conditions inmates have endured and will continue to
endure if immediate relief is not forthcoming."

The lawsuit comes on the heels of a report released by the U.S.
Marshals Service about conditions in the jail. U.S. Marshal Pete
Elliott said the jail review team found the Cuyahoga County Jail to
be "one of the worst in the country."

Inmates who reside in the Cuyahoga County Jail are forced to live
in unacceptable conditions in an inhumane environment where basic
civil liberties are withheld, sometimes as a form of punishment by
staff, according to the facility review report from the U.S.
Marshals Service.

Inmates at the facility have "suffered both physical and
psychological consequences resulting from these inexcusable
conditions," the firm stated.

Multiple inmates have died at the jail, and according to the U.S.
Marshals Service, there were 55 suicide attempts at the facility
last year.

In wake of the report, the U.S. Marshals pulled federal inmates out
of the Cuyahoga County Jail downtown and are now housing their
prisoners in the Euclid Jail Annex, which is part of the county
system.

The law firm states that "incompetent supervision and management"
has allowed jail conditions to fester over the years. Federal
courts have stepped in on three separate occasions since 1975 to
address various issues at the jail, attorneys said.

The U.S. Marshals have confirmed that both the FBI and Cuyahoga
County Inspector General are conducting investigations into civil
rights issues inside the jail.[GN]


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bernstein Litowitz Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP has filed a securities
class action lawsuit on behalf of the Boynton Beach Employees'
Pension Plan against Dentsply Sirona, Inc. ("Dentsply" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: XRAY) and certain of its senior officers and
directors ("Defendants").  The action, which is captioned Boynton
Beach General Employees' Pension Plan v. Dentsply Sirona, Inc., No.
18-cv-7253 (E.D.N.Y.) ("Boynton Beach"), asserts claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") on behalf of investors in Dentsply common stock
during the time period of February 20, 2014 through August 7, 2018
(the "Class Period").  The action also asserts claims under Section
14(a) of the Exchange Act on behalf of investors in Dentsply's
predecessor, Dentsply International, Inc., who were entitled to
vote with respect to Dentsply International, Inc.'s acquisition of
Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. ("Sirona") on or about February 29,
2016 (the "Acquisition").  The action also asserts claims under
Section 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of
all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of
Dentsply in exchange for their shares of the common stock of Sirona
in connection with the Acquisition.

The Complaint alleges that during the Class Period, Defendants
falsely represented the drivers of the Company's financial
performance.  Specifically, Defendants attributed the Company's
financial performance to the Company's "innovation," "operational
improvement efforts," "new products," and "continued investments in
sales and marketing" and told investors that these factors helped
the Company succeed despite the "highly competitive" market for its
products.  In reality, the Company's financial results had been
buoyed by an anticompetitive scheme among the Company's three
primary distributors that suppressed competition in the dental
supply market and artificially inflated the price of dental
supplies sold by Dentsply.  Further, Defendants concealed that an
exclusive distribution arrangement that Sirona had with one of its
distributors, Patterson Companies, Inc. ("Patterson"), required
Patterson to regularly make large minimum purchases regardless of
demand and, as a result, by 2015, Patterson had been supplied with
so much excess inventory that it could not be sold.  This
channel-stuffing rendered the Company's reported sales, financial
results and guidance materially false and misleading.  In addition,
the Company represented that it reported its financial statements,
including its goodwill, in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, or GAAP.  In reality, the Company's reported
goodwill was artificially inflated and not reported in accordance
with GAAP because it did not reflect the financial impact of the
anticompetitive scheme.    

The truth about Dentsply's financial condition and business was
revealed in a series of corrective disclosures.  Specifically, in a
series of disclosures culminating on August 7, 2018, the Company
disclosed that it was subject of an investigation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, announced the surprise departure of the
Company's top three executives, repeatedly downwardly revised its
guidance, and reported several quarters of disappointing financial
results and significant goodwill impairment charges that were
attributed to, among other things, an "increase in competition" and
destocking from the Company's dealer partners, including Patterson.
In all, when the truth concerning the fraud and its impact on the
Company's financial condition was revealed to investors, Dentsply
stock declined by over 45% from its Class Period high.

A copy of the complaint filed in Boynton Beach is available on
BLB&G's website at www.blbglaw.com.

If you wish to serve as Lead Plaintiff for the Class, you must file
a motion with the Court no later than February 19, 2019, which is
the first business day on which the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York is open that is 60 days after the
publication date of December 20, 2018.  Any member of the proposed
Class may move the Court to serve as Lead Plaintiff through counsel
of their choice.  Members may also choose to do nothing and remain
part of the proposed Class.

         Michael Blatchley, Esq.
         Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP
         1251 Avenue of Americas
         New York, New York 10020
         Telephone: (212) 554-1281
         Email:  michaelb@blbglaw.com [GN]


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notified investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Dentsply Sirona, Inc.
("Dentsply" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: XRAY) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise
acquired Dentsply shares between February 20, 2014 through August
7, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors
are encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
bgandg.com/xray.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, specifically
relating to its financial performance and its "innovation,"
"operational improvement efforts," "new products," and "continued
investments in sales and marketing." The complaint alleges that:
(1) Dentsply was engaged in an anticompetitive scheme among its
three primary distributors that suppressed competition and
artificially inflated the price of Dentsply's products; and (2)
Dentsply engaged in "channel-stuffing" which rendered the Company's
reported sales, financial results and guidance materially false and
misleading.

On August 7, 2018, Dentsply divulged that it was under
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, revealed
that three of its top executives were stepping down, lowered its
guidance, and related disappointing financial results and a
significant goodwill impairment charge.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
bgandg.com/xray or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Dentsply
you have until February 19, 2019 to request that the Court appoint
you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Dentsply Sirona, Inc. ("Dentsply" or the
"Company") (Nasdaq: XRAY) in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, on behalf of a class consisting
of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of
Dentsply between February 20, 2014 through August 7, 2018 (the
"Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
The action also asserts claims under Section 11, 12 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of all persons who purchased or
otherwise acquired the common stock of Dentsply in exchange for
their shares of the common stock of Sirona in connection with the
Acquisition.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants falsely represented the
drivers of the Company's financial performance.  Defendants
attributed the Company's financial performance to the Company's
"innovation," "operational improvement efforts," "new products,"
and "continued investments in sales and marketing" and told
investors that these factors helped the Company succeed despite the
"highly competitive" market for its products.  However, the
Company's financial results had been buoyed by an anticompetitive
scheme among the Company's three primary distributors that
suppressed competition in the dental supply market and artificially
inflated the price of dental supplies sold by Dentsply.  Moreover,
Defendants concealed that an exclusive distribution arrangement
that Sirona had with one of its distributors, Patterson Companies,
Inc. ("Patterson"), required Patterson to regularly make large
minimum purchases regardless of demand and, as a result, by 2015,
Patterson had been supplied with so much excess inventory that it
could not be sold.   This channel-stuffing rendered the Company's
reported sales, financial results and guidance materially false and
misleading.  In addition, the Company represented that it reported
its financial statements, including its goodwill, in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP.  In
reality, the Company's reported goodwill was artificially inflated
and not reported in accordance with GAAP because it did not reflect
the financial impact of the anticompetitive scheme.   

The truth about the Company's financial condition and business was
revealed in a series of corrective disclosures.  In a series of
disclosures culminating on August 7, 2018, the Company disclosed
that it was subject of an investigation by the SEC, announced the
surprise departure of the Company's top three executives,
repeatedly downwardly revised its guidance, and reported several
quarters of disappointing financial results and significant
goodwill impairment charges that were attributed to, among other
things, an "increase in competition" and destocking from the
Company's dealer partners, including Patterson.  When the truth
concerning the fraud and its impact on the Company's financial
condition was revealed to investors, Dentsply stock declined by
over 45% from its Class Period high.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the February 19, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action please;

         Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
         Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
         Gainey McKenna & Egleston
         Telephone: (212) 983-1300
         Website: www.gme-law.com  
         E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                 gegleston@gme-law.com [GN]


DEX MEDIA: Alexander Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
------------------------------------------------
Jeanne Alexander, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Dex Media, Inc., aka DexYP, Case No. 3:18-cv-03230
(N.D. Tex., December 7, 2018), is brought against the Defendant for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the federal
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to pay the
Plaintiff time and one-half her regular rate pay for all hours
worked over 40 during each seven day workweek.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Denton County, Texas and worked as
an account manager/campaign manager for the Defendant from
approximately August 2015 to February 2017.

The Defendant Dex Media, Inc. provides advertising and marketing
goods and services to customers throughout the United States.
Examples of those goods and services include internet based
advertising, search engine optimization, search engine marketing,
website creation and services, directories, and yellow pages. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Allen R. Vaught, Esq.
      BARON & BUDD, P.C.
      3102 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1100
      Dallas, TX 75219
      Tel: (214) 521-3605
      Fax: (214) 520-1181
      E-mail: avaught@baronbudd.com


EMINENT INC: Garey Sues Online Retailer for ADA  Breach
-------------------------------------------------------
Eminent, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Eminent, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00378 (S.D.
N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Eminent, Inc. engages in the online retail of clothing, shoes,
bags, and accessories for women, men, and kids.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


EMPRO INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Dreval Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
IRINA DREVAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EMPRO INC. and JOHN DOES 1-25, Case No. 1:19-cv-00091
(E.D.N.Y., January 7, 2019), arises from the Defendants' alleged:

     (i) failure to pay overtime as required by the Fair Labor
         Standards Act and the New York Labor Law; and

   (ii) failure to furnish accurate wage statements in violation
        of NYLL Section 195.

Empro Inc. is a domestic corporation operating in the home
healthcare industry in the City and State of New York, County of
Kings.  The identities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown
to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Feinerman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. FEINERMAN
          2765 Coney Island Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11235
          Telephone: (718) 646-4800


EVOLUCION INNOVATIONS: Violates Disabilities Act, Garey Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Evolucion Innovations, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Evolucion Innovations, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00392 (S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Evolucion Innovations, Inc., doing business as evo, retails sports
and outdoor lifestyle products. It offers products in the areas of
ski, snowboard, wake, bike, skate, and surf; and accessories,
shoes, and apparel for men, women, and kids. The company sells its
products through its stores in Seattle, Washington; and Portland,
Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



EXXON MOBIL: 100% Fault in Baton Rouge Pipe Failure Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, issued an Opinion
affirming the City Court's judgment finding that Exxon was 100% at
fault and liable for damages in the case captioned ANDRE AARON, ET
AL., v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION. ANDRE AARON, ET AL., v.
EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATION F/K/A EXXON COMPANY U.S.A., EXXON
CORPORATION. CONSOLIDATED WITH GLORIA H. POOLE, ET AL., v.
EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATION F/K/A EXXON COMPANY U.S.A., EXXON
CORPORATION. ANDRE AARON, ET AL., v. EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATION F/K/A
EXXON COMPANY U.S.A., EXXON CORPORATION. CONSOLIDATED WITH AYANNA
ABADIE, ET AL., v. EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATION F/K/A EXXON COMPANY
U.S.A., EXXON CORPORATION. CONSOLIDATED WITH ADELEAN McALOPE, ET
AL., v. EXXONMOBIL, CORPORATION F/K/A EXXON COMPANY U.S.A., EXXON
CORPORATION. No. 2018 CW 0476. (La. App.)

The defendant, Exxon, appeals the city court's judgment after
remand, finding that Exxon was 100% at fault and liable to the
trial plaintiffs for damages.

This case arises from a pipe failure and rupture that resulted in a
fire at the Exxon refinery in Baton Rouge, at approximately 4:15
a.m. The fire occurred in the East Coker Unit of the Exxon
refinery, one of three coker units at the refinery which converted
high-sulfur, heavy crude oil into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. A
carbon steel piping elbow that was a component part of the East
Coker Unit ruptured, causing an explosion. Two minutes later,
escaping hydrocarbon gases ignited, causing a fire. Six minutes
later, a nearby flushing oil line ruptured, releasing additional
fuel for the fire.

With Exxon as the sole remaining defendant, the federal district
court denied class certification, and following a bench trial,
rendered judgment in favor of Exxon and against the plaintiffs,
holding that Exxon was not liable to the plaintiffs for their
alleged injuries under either a strict liability theory or
negligence theory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.

Baton Rouge City Court Litigation

Prior to the handing down of the decision by the federal district
court, approximately 8,500 plaintiffs who lived near the Exxon
refinery at the time of the explosion and resulting fire filed
three mass tort lawsuits against Exxon in city court, which are the
subject of the instant supervisory writ application. The first suit
was filed by 4,172 plaintiffs against Exxon. The second suit was
filed by 2,939 plaintiffs against Exxon. The third suit was filed
on behalf of 1,450 minor plaintiffs against Exxon.

The city court conducted a trial on the claims of six plaintiffs
out of the thousands who filed suit against Exxon.  After closing
arguments, the city court announced its ruling, holding that the
trial plaintiffs proved their claims of negligence pursuant to La.
C.C. art. 2315, and rendered judgment in favor of the trial
plaintiffs, awarding damages.

Appeals to the 19th JDC

Exxon appealed from the portion of the city court's judgment
finding Exxon negligent and awarding damages to the trial
plaintiffs. Exxon argued that the city court erred in failing to
assign any fault to Foster Wheeler and in awarding excessive
damages to the plaintiffs, who they argued suffered minor symptoms
or no symptoms at all and who never sought medical attention.

The 19th JDC orally rendered judgment affirming the city court's
judgment, which stated, in pertinent part: "Whereupon, the Court
found that the City Court, the trial court in this matter, did not
abuse its discretion. For these reasons[,] the Court affirmed the
judgment from Baton Rouge City Court on December 10, 2014. The
Court further adopts the Appellee's brief as its written reasons."

Review by the First Circuit and Supreme Court

Thereafter, Exxon applied for supervisory and/or remedial writs
with the Louisiana Supreme Court.

The supreme court granted writs and remanded the matter to this
Court for consideration under our supervisory jurisdiction.  

Based on the directives of this Court and the supreme court, the
city court was charged with: 1) reviewing the testimony and
evidence received at the trial of this matter to determine whether,
based on the record, Foster Wheeler was at fault, and if so, the
percentage of fault attributable to Foster Wheeler; and 2)
reviewing the testimony and evidence received at the trial of this
matter and reconsidering its damage awards pursuant to Howard v.
Union Carbide Corp., 2009-2750 (La. 10/19/10), 50 So.3d 1251.
Neither this Court nor the supreme court ordered a new trial for
the receipt of additional evidence and testimony.

Remand to City Court

Following remand, the city court heard oral arguments. Thereafter,
the city court signed a judgment after remand which vacated and
amended, in part, its prior judgment. The city court's judgment
after remand decreed that Exxon was 100% at fault.  

Review by the First Circuit and Supreme Court Following Remand

Exxon appealed the city court's judgment after remand to the 19th
JDC. After briefing and oral arguments, the 19th JDC took the
matter under advisement. Thereafter, the 19th JDC affirmed the city
court's judgment after remand and adopted the brief of the trial
plaintiffs as its written reasons for judgment.  

The appropriate standard for appellate review in this case is the
manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which precludes the setting
aside of the city court's finding of fact unless that finding is
clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. It
is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a
fact-finder's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or
unless it is clearly wrong.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Allocation of Fault

In their first assignment of error, Exxon argues that the city
court erred in imposing 100% fault on Exxon and failing to impose
any fault on Foster Wheeler, a non-party to this litigation. Exxon
argues that Foster Wheeler was solely responsible for creating the
hazard that resulted in the fire. The court is required to
determine the fault of all persons causing or contributing to
injury, death, or loss, regardless of whether the person is a party
to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the theory of
liability asserted against that party. Where non-parties are
claimed by a defendant to be at fault in causing damages to the
plaintiff, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the fault of
the non-party by a preponderance of the evidence

On appeal, Exxon argues that Foster Wheeler, not Exxon, was solely
responsible for the design, construction, and testing of the
component parts of the East Coker Unit, making Foster Wheeler
solely at fault for installing a piping elbow made of the wrong
material. Exxon argues that it had no actual knowledge that Foster
Wheeler had installed a piping elbow made of the wrong material.

Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, Exxon further contends it
should not have discovered the carbon steel piping elbow
negligently installed by Foster Wheeler by conducting positive
material identification (PMI) tests on every pipe and fitting in
every coker unit because such an expectation is unreasonable. Exxon
further avers that its program for testing pipe-wall thickness
likewise met or exceeded industry standards. Finally, Exxon avers
that the majority of, if not all of, the fault should be placed on
Foster Wheeler because between the owner of a thing containing a
hazard and the party who created the hazard, the majority of fault
should be allocated to the party who created the hazard.

The city court held that Foster Wheeler was not negligent,
concluding that Foster Wheeler has no complicity in the events that
ultimately caused the piping to rupture.

Following this Court review of the record, including the city
court's extensive reasons for judgment after remand, this Court
concludes that Exxon failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that Foster Wheeler's negligence contributed to the
plaintiffs' injuries.  

In assessing the nature of the parties' conduct, factors that may
influence the degree of fault allocated include: (1) whether the
conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the
danger; (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct (3) the
significance of what was sought by the conduct; (4) the capacities
of the actor, whether superior or inferior and (5) any extenuating
circumstances that might require the actor to proceed in haste,
without proper thought.  

Considering the nature of each party's wrongful conduct and the
extent of the causal relationship between that conduct and the
damages claimed, we utilize the Watson factors to guide our
determination as to the highest or lowest percentage of fault that
could reasonably be assessed to each party. After reviewing the
entire record, we find that the city court did not err in its
allocation of 100% fault to Exxon.

Because the city court found that Foster Wheeler was not negligent,
the city court did not consider Foster Wheeler in its allocation of
fault.  As to the fault allocated to Exxon, the city court
considered the Watson factors and found that Exxon's conduct
involved an awareness of the danger and how great a risk was
created by the installation of a piping elbow in the East Coker
Unit made of the wrong material.  

As owner of the East Coker Unit for more than thirty years, Exxon
retained ultimate responsibility for maintaining the East Coker
Unit in a reasonably safe condition. Despite this, Exxon failed to
make inspections, repairs, or replacements in a reasonably prudent
manner. For example, the record reveals that later-constructed
portions of the East Coker Unit contained parts made of carbon
steel, as opposed to chrome-moly. For example, an April 25, 1988
Near Miss Report details a replacement spool pipe installed in 1978
that was made of carbon steel. Similarly, an Inspection History
Report, dated December 9, 1993, memorializing an inspection
conducted on September 7, 1982 details a small bore instrument
piping made of carbon steel that was threaded and screwed onto
existing piping. Exxon's failure to inspect the work done
constructing, repairing, and replacing parts of the East Coker
Unit, which contributed to weaknesses in the unit, had a direct
causative impact on the accident that occurred.

Therefore, the Court find that there is a reasonable factual basis
for the city court's finding that Exxon was 100% at fault for the
plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, the Court affirms the city
court's allocation of 100% fault to Exxon.

Assignment of Error No. 2: Damages

In its second assignment of error, Exxon argues that the city
court's damage awards are excessive and violate the supreme court's
order to reconsider the awarded damages in light of Howard, 50
So.3d 1251. See Aaron, 201 So.3d 241.

The role of an appellate court in reviewing general damages is not
to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather
to review the exercise of discretion by the trier-of-fact. The
initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries
and their effects under the particular circumstances on the
particular injured person is a clear abuse of the much discretion
of the trier-of-fact.  

In Howard, a chemical leak that occurred at a plant in Taft,
Louisiana, owned by the defendant, Union Carbide, from ten o'clock
one night until three o'clock the following afternoon, vaporized
4.6 million pounds of naphtha and dispersed the naphtha vapor into
the surrounding communities. Affected individuals sustained
irritation of the eyes, nose, and throat, as well as headaches,
nausea, dizziness, stinging and tearful eyes, stinging nasal
membranes, sore throat, coughing, and a sensation of almost feeling
drunk. None of the affected individuals sought or required medical
attention, had to evacuate the area, or missed any work or school.
The symptoms resolved in a day and could be treated with
over-the-counter medication such as Visine.  

The plaintiffs instituted a class action, and a trial of certain
randomly-selected claimants was held to determine whether the
claimants were exposed to the naphtha fumes; whether they suffered
compensable damages; and the amount of their damages.The supreme
court granted certiorari to review the quantum of general damages
awarded by the district court in Howard.  

The Court have carefully examined the arguments of Exxon regarding
the alleged errors in the damage awards made by the city court. The
Court have individually considered the claims of the trial
plaintiffs, giving particular attention to each plaintiffs
proximity to the release site; the evidence of her symptoms; the
nature and duration of the symptoms; whether medical treatment was
sought, and if so, the diagnosis received; whether each plaintiff
was required to shelter-in-place or evacuate from her home; and
whether each plaintiff experienced fear and fright. The city court
found that the trial plaintiffs experienced physical symptoms such
as burning, irritated, and red eyes, sore throat, nausea, vomiting,
and trouble breathing. These physical symptoms lasted for a few
days to several weeks.

The city court concluded that the trial plaintiffs also experienced
fear and fright based on the ensuing emergency and environmental
response at the plant and in their community following the
explosion and fire. Responders clad in white space type protective
jumpsuits came into their communities to conduct testing and
retrieve debris. The trial plaintiffs testified that they were not
told whether the debris and ash blanketing their properties and
belongings was harmful, nor whether there was anything harmful in
the smoke they breathed. The trial plaintiffs were not provided
with information or protective clothing, but were merely instructed
not to touch anything. The trial plaintiffs experienced fear and
fright regarding any adverse health effects that may arise as a
result of the accident. In some instances, this fear lasted for
months.

Based on the Court's review of the entire record, as well as the
city court's detailed reasons for judgment after remand, the Court
finds no manifest error in the factual findings made by the city
court relative to its quantum determinations. Further, the finds no
abuse of the city court's broad discretion in the general damage
awards made. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is extremely
mindful of the holding of the supreme court in Howard, which does
not, however, establish a bright line rule for evaluating this type
of chemical exposure case.  

A full-text copy of the Court's December 27, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb32vmee from Leagle.com.

Martin A. Stern, Raymond P. Ward, New Orleans, Louisiana, Kellen J.
Mathews, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Michael P. Cash -- mcash@liskow.com -- Wade T. Howard --
wthoward@liskow.com -- Houston, Texas, ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR,
DEFENDANT -- ExxonMobil, Corporation f/k/a Exxon Company, U.S.A.,
Exxon Corporation.

Calvin C. Fayard, Jr., Lewis O. Unglesby, Rebecca Cunard, Roy F.
Amedee, Jr., David S. Scalia, ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS, PLAINTIFFS
-- Andre Aaron, et al., Ayanna Abadie, et al., Adelean, McAlope, et
al., and Gloria H., Poole, et al.


F.H. CANN: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in Scanno Consumer Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Joanne Scanno filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Joanne Scanno v. F.H. Cann & Associates Inc., Case
No. 2-16-cv-05943, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed on September 26, 2016, and assigned to Judge Madeline C.
Arleo.

F.H. Cann provides default prevention, debt collection and account
resolution solution for a wide range of industries.

The appellate case is captioned as Joanne Scanno v. F.H. Cann &
Associates Inc., Case No. 19-1055, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JOANNE SCANNO, on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated, is represented by:

          Lawrence C. Hersh, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF LAWRENCE HERSH
          17 Sylvan Street
          Rutherford, NJ 07070
          Telephone: (201) 507-6300
          E-mail: lh@hershlegal.com

Defendant-Appellee F.H. CANN & ASSOCIATES INC. is represented by:

          Graeme E. Hogan, Esq.
          Monica M. Littman, Esq.
          Richard J. Perr, Esq.
          FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS P.C.
          Ten Penn Center
          1801 Market Street, Suite 1100
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 644-6590
          E-mail: ghogan@finemanlawfirm.com
                  mlittman@finemanlawfirm.com
                  rperr@finemanlawfirm.com


FANATICS RETAIL: Faces Garey Class Action Asserting ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fanatics Retail Group North, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fanatics Retail Group North, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00380 (S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Fanatics Retail Group North, LLC operates retails licensed sports
merchandise in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


FCA US: All Discovery in Alger Suit to be Completed by March 18
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAWN ALGER as an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC f/k/a CHRYSLER
GROUP LLC, a Delaware Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00360-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California ordered that all discovery, with the
exception of expert discovery, will be completed no later than
March 18, 2019.

The Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Feb. 15, 2018, and his
class action complaint on Feb. 16, 2018.  On April 9, 2018, the
Parties stipulated to the filing of the Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC") and a briefing schedule on the Defendant's
potential motion to dismiss.

On April 10, 2018, the Court entered an Order allowing the
Plaintiff to file his SAC by April 23, 2018 and granting the
Parties' proposed briefing schedule.  

The Plaintiff filed his SAC on April 23, 2018, and the Defendant
filed its Answer to the SAC on May 14, 2018.  During the next
month, the Plaintiff served his first set of requests for
production of documents ("RFPs") and interrogatories ("ROGs") and
noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that included 23 topics and 14
categories of document production.

In June and July 2018, the Parties extensively met and conferred on
discovery disputes, including on the noticed Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition and competing provisions in their Joint Rule 26(f)
Report, which was filed on Aug. 1, 2018.  

The Parties' meet and confer efforts on the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition reached an impasse, culminating in the Defendant's
motion for protective order and Joint Statement Re Discovery
Disagreement.  The Defendant's motion was heard on Aug. 8, 2018;

On Aug. 8, 2018, the Defendant served a first set of RFPs and ROGs
on the Plaintiff.  Magistrate Judge Brennan entered a Minute Order
on Aug. 8, 2018 denying the Defendant's motion and directing the
Parties to submit a Stipulation and Proposed Order designating the
number of proposed witnesses and estimated time required for the
deposition, as discussed at the hearing.  Pursuant to Judge
Brennan's Minute Order, the Parties submitted their Stipulation on
Aug. 17, 2018, and Judge Brennan entered an Order on the Parties'
stipulated discovery topics, proposed witnesses, and estimated time
periods on Aug. 22, 2018.  Less than a week later, the Plaintiff
served document subpoenas on Grammer Industries, Inc. and Grammer,
Inc., a supplier of Active Headrest Restraint ("AHR") Systems at
issue in the litigation.

In September 2018, the Parties met and conferred on dates for the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Parties' respective responses to
pending discovery requests, and initial disclosures.  The Plaintiff
filed a motion to compel on Sept. 14, 2018 and the Defendant filed
a motion to compel on Sept. 19, 2018.

The Parties continued to meet and confer on their outstanding
discovery disputes and their respective motions were vacated.  The
Plaintiff served his initial disclosures on Sept. 19, 2018 and the
Defendant served its initial disclosures and supplemental initial
disclosures on Sept. 28, 2018.

The Defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) designees were deposed in Michigan on
Sept. 24, 2018 and Oct. 1, 2018.  The Plaintiff served four
deposition notices on the Defendant employees on Nov. 6, 20181 and
served a deposition subpoena on Grammer on Nov. 7, 2018, pursuant
to Rules 30(b)(6) and 45.  The Defendant served a second set of
RFPs and ROGs on the Plaintiff on Nov. 26, 2018 and the Plaintiff
served a second set of RFPs and ROGs on the Defendant on Dec. 7,
2018.

The Plaintiff deposed two of the Defendant's employees in Michigan
on Dec. 10 and 11, 2018.  On Dec. 13, 2018, the Plaintiff noticed
the deposition of two additional Defendant employees and served a
third set of ROGs on Dec. 17, 2018.  The Defendant has noticed the
Plaintiff's Vehicle Inspection for Jan. 17, 2019 and the
depositions of the Plaintiff and his girlfriend, Alyssa Pfanner,
for Jan. 18, 2019;

Grammer's Rule 30(b)(6) designee is not available for deposition
until Feb. 6, 2018 in Michigan.  The Parties are meeting and
conferring to coordinate deposition dates and times for three of
the Defendant's employees so that they occur during the same week
as the Grammer Rule 30(b)(6) deposition in Michigan.

The Parties are currently meeting and conferring on a protocol for
the Plaintiff's Vehicle Inspection, the Defendant's document
production and supplemental ROG responses, and potential search
terms for the Plaintiff's recent RFPs.  The Plaintiff is preparing
responses to the Defendant's second set of RFPs and ROGs and
continuing to review documents produced by both the Defendant and
Grammer.  Discovery requests are still pending for both Parties.

The Parties are engaged in multi-state discovery efforts, including
third-party discovery, that involves a significant number of
witnesses, anticipated experts, and implicates a significant number
of vehicles.  Further discovery will be limited over the upcoming
weeks due to the intervening holidays and the Defendant's offices
are closed over the next two weeks.  The current deadline to
complete all discovery with the exception of expert discovery is
Feb. 15, 2019.

It has become apparent that it will not be possible for the Parties
to complete all fact discovery prior to the current Feb. 15, 2019
deadline.  The Parties have actively participated in discovery of
the case.  They have met and conferred on extending the existing
discovery period and have not previously sought to extend the
current discovery deadline.

Good cause exists to extend the discovery cut off by 30 days for
the reasons described.  Therefore, the Parties stipulated, and
Judge England granted, that all discovery, with the exception of
expert discovery, will be completed no later than March 18, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/C4PfCR from Leagle.com.

Shawn Alger, Plaintiff, represented by Stuart C. Talley, Kershaw,
Cook & Talley PC & William A. Kershaw, Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC.

FCA US LLC, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Abirami Gnanadesigan -- agnanadesigan@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett
LLP, Dommond E. Lonnie -- dlonnie@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett,
LLP, Fred J. Fresard -- ffresard@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC,
pro hac vice, James P. Feeney -- jfeeney@dykema.com -- Dykema
Gossett PLLC & Brittany J. Mouzourakis -- BMouzourakis@dykema.com
-- Dykema Gossett, PLLC, pro hac vice.


FEIT INDUSTRIES: Footwear Firm Faces Class Action under ADA
------------------------------------------------------------
Feit Industries, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Feit Industries, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00382 (S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Feit Industries, LLC is engaged in a footwear industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



FIDELITY BANK: McAlister Asks to Certify Class of MLOs Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled DUSTIN MCALISTER, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated v. FIDELITY BANK, Case No.
2:18-cv-02274-JWL-TJJ (D. Kan.), moves the Court to grant
conditional class certification on behalf of mortgage loan
originators under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Specifically, Mr. McAlister seeks an order:

   a. granting conditional class certification regarding the
      Plaintiff's claims under Section 216(b) of the FLSA
      regarding all employees who performed as MLOs (or other
      similarly situated job positions) for Fidelity from three
      years from the date the Complaint was filed in federal
      court;

   b. directing Defendant Fidelity to provide a list of names of
      these persons within fourteen (14) days of the Court's
      order for these persons along with their last known home
      addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses, all in a
      workable electronic format (e.g., Excel) for mailing
      purposes;

   c. providing the social security numbers for all class members
      whose mailed notices are returned so the Plaintiff can
      locate a viable mailing address; and

   d. approving and authorizing the Plaintiff to send the notice
      of claims and right to opt-in forms.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brendan J. Donelon, Esq.
          DONELON, P.C.
          4600 Madison, Suite 810
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 221-7100
          Facsimile: (816) 709-1044
          E-mail: brendan@donelonpc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brian N. Woolley, Esq.
          LATHROP GAGE LLP
          2345 Grand Blvd., Suite 2200
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 292-2000
          Facsimile: (816) 292-2001
          E-mail: bwoolley@lathropgage.com

               - and -

          Tammy M. Somogye, Esq.
          LATHROP GAGE LLP
          10851 Mastin Boulevard, Suite 1000
          Overland Park, KS 66210
          Telephone: (913) 451-5100
          Facsimile: (913) 451-0875
          E-mail: tsomogye@lathropgage.com

               - and -

          Frank B. Harty, Esq.
          NYEMASTER GOODE PC
          700 Walnut St., Suite 1600
          Des Moines, IA 50309
          Telephone: (515) 283-3170
          E-mail: fharty@nyemaster.com


FINANCIAL CORP: Court Okays Class Notice in Encarnacion FDCA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OMAR ENCARNACION, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-566-FtM-38CM (M.D. Fla.),
Magistrate Judge Carol Mirando of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of the
Parties' Class Notice and Plan for Dissemination of the Class
Notice filed on Dec. 21, 2018.

The Plaintiff seeks an order approving the proposed class notice to
be disseminated to the class members.  The parties agree on the
form and substance of all but one sentence in the proposed class
notice.

The parties dispute whether the following sentence should be
included: "Plaintiff is seeking a Class Recovery of up to $48,264,
which would entitle each Class Member to approximately $13.96."

Magistrate Judge Mirando finds that none of the cases cited by the
Plaintiff demonstrate an approximation of potential recovery is
necessary or appropriate for the class members to make an
intelligent decision about whether to remain in a class action.
She finds all the other information in the notice -- without the
approximation of potential recovery -- provides sufficient
information for class members to make an intelligent decision about
whether to stay in the class.  Additionally, she has adjusted the
proposed deadlines to ensure prompt notice in light of the upcoming
deadlines in the Case Management and Scheduling Order.

Accordingly, the Magistrate granted in part and denied in part the
Motion for Approval of the Parties' Class Notice and Plan for
Dissemination of the Class Notice.  She approved the form and
substance of the class notice attached as Exhibit B to the Motion
and the approved class notice attached to the Order.

The class administrator will mail the notice to the class members
by First Class mail on or before Feb. 8, 2019.  Any Class Member
who wishes to be excluded from the class must send a written
request for exclusion to the Class Administrator with a postmark
date by March 15, 2019.  Any Class Member who wishes to be
represented by his or her own attorney must have an attorney file a
notice of appearance by March 15, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/B8qavr from Leagle.com.

Omar Encarnacion, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Katie Marguerite
Miller, The Law Offices of Katie M. Miller, PA & Yitzchak Zelman --
Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, pro hac vice.

Financial Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by Charles
James McHale, Jr. -- cmchale@gsgfirm.com. -- Golden Scaz Gagain,
PLLC & Dale Thomas Golden -- dgolden@gsgfirm.com -- Golden Scaz
Gagain, PLLC.


FINANCIAL MEDIA: Violates TCPA and Invades Privacy, Hanks Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
KIM HANKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FINANCIAL MEDIA GROUP, LLC and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Case No. 2:19-at-00017 (C.D. Cal.,
January 4, 2018), alleges violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Mr. Hanks alleges that the Defendants negligently contacted him on
his cellular telephone in violation of the TCPA, specifically the
National Do-Not-Call provisions, thereby, invading his privacy.

Financial Media Group, LLC, is a financial data company.  The true
names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to
the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866)633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


GALIANO ENTERPRISES: Ramirez Brito Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Cecilia Ramirez Brito and other similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff, vs. Galiano Enterprises of Miami,
Corp., a Florida Profit Corporation, and Sultan Mamun, the
Defendants, Case No. 18-39848CA00, was removed from the 11th
Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade, Florida, to the  U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida (Miami) on Jan 7, 2019. The
Southern District of Florida assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-20074-JEM to
the proceeding. The suit alleges Fair Labor Standards Act
violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Jose E.
Martinez.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Anthony Maximillien Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          Max Lloyd Horowitz, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          Court House Tower
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416-5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416-5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  mhorowitz@rgpattorneys.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Adi Amit, Esq.
          ADI AMIT, P.A.
          101 NE 3rd Ave., Suite 300
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-5922
          E-mail: adi@defenderofbusiness.com

GLORIA JEWEL: Violates Disabilities Act, Says Garey Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Gloria Jewel, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Gloria Jewel, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00383
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Gloria Jewel is a Hamptons fashion boutique with locations in
Westhampton Beach, Amagansett, East Hampton, Bridgehampton and
Tribeca.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


GOLDMAN SACHS: Pomerantz Law Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman Sachs" or the
"Company") (NYSE: GS) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, and indexed under 18-cv-12084, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities, other than Defendants and
their affiliates, who purchased or otherwise, acquired Goldman
Sachs securities between February 28, 2014, and December 17, 2018,
both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities
laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Goldman Sachs securities
between February 28, 2014, and December 17, 2018, both dates
inclusive, you have until February 19, 2019, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Goldman Sachs was founded in 1869 and is headquartered in New York,
New York.  The Company operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide, serving
corporations, financial institutions, governments, and
high-net-worth individuals.

According to 2016 data compiled by Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs has
"worked on $18.8 billion of Malaysian mergers and acquisitions over
the past five years, making it the top foreign adviser with a
20.5[%] market share."  Goldman Sachs's business in Malaysia
included, inter alia, raising funds for 1Malaysia Development Bhd.
("1MDB"), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund set up in 2009,
four months after Najib Razak ("Razak") became Prime Minister of
Malaysia.  1MDB was initially established to finance infrastructure
and economic deals in Malaysia.

In 2012, officials from 1MDB met with Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong to
discuss a bond deal.  Goldman Sachs subsequently raised $6.5
billion for 1MDB, earning approximately $600 million in fees.

Since early 2015, 1MDB has been the subject of international
criminal and regulatory investigations for suspected fraud and
money laundering after missing $11 billion in payments owed to
banks and bondholders.

On June 18, 2015, The Wall Street Journal published an article
entitled "Fund Controversy Threatens Malaysia's Leader," detailing
how 1MDB indirectly funded Razak's 2013 election campaign.  A probe
into 1MDB subsequently followed.

On July 2, 2015, The Wall Street Journal published another article,
entitled "Investigators Believe Money Flowed to Malaysian Leader
Najib's Accounts Amid 1MDB Probe," reporting how Malaysian
investigators traced nearly $700 million in deposits to what they
believed to be Razak's personal bank accounts.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, high-level 1MDB
officials and their associates misappropriated an estimated $4.5
billion from 1MDB between 2009 and 2014. Implicated in the 1MDB
scandal were two former Goldman Sachs managing directors— Tim
Leissner ("Leissner") and Ng Chong Hwa, also known as Roger Ng
("Ng").

Leissner was Chairman of South East Asia and Vice Chairman of the
Investment Banking Division in Asia Ex-Japan (i.e., Asia, excluding
Japan) for Goldman Sachs. Ng was a former Goldman Sachs banker,
managing director, and deputy to Leissner.  Ng most recently was
the head of South-East Asian sales in Goldman Sachs's fixed-income,
currencies, and commodities unit.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Goldman Sachs participated in a
fraud and money-laundering scheme in collusion with 1MDB; (ii) the
foregoing conduct, when revealed, would foreseeably subject Goldman
Sachs to heightened regulatory investigation and enforcement; and
(iii) as a result, Goldman Sachs's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On March 7, 2016, Bloomberg News published an article entitled
"Ex-Goldman Banker to Malaysia Fund Said Subpoenaed in U.S. Probe,"
reporting that the U.S. Justice Department had subpoenaed Leissner
in late February in connection with a probe linked to 1MDB.
Goldman Sachs has since been the subject of investigations by the
U.S. Justice Department regarding the multibillion-dollar fraud and
money-laundering scheme involving 1MDB, for which Goldman Sachs was
the primary bond underwriter. Following this news, Goldman Sachs's
stock price fell $3.75 per share, or 2.41%, to close at $151.60 on
March 8, 2016.

On November 1, 2018, U.S. federal prosecutors in the Eastern
District of New York ("E.D.N.Y.") unsealed indictments against
Leissner and Ng related to the 1MDB probe, explicitly describing
them as "agents acting within the scope of their employment on
behalf of" the Company "with the intent, at least in part, to
benefit" Goldman Sachs.  That same day, the United States
Attorney's Office for the E.D.N.Y. announced that Leissner's guilty
plea was unsealed for "a two-count criminal information charging
Leissner with conspiring to launder money and conspiring to violate
the FCPA [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] by both paying bribes to
various Malaysian and Abu Dhabi officials and circumventing the
internal accounting controls of the Financial Institution while he
was employed by it."  The U.S. Attorney's Office also stated that,
"[a]ccording to court filings, Leissner has been ordered to forfeit
$43,700,000 as a result of his crimes."

On November 8, 2018, a report by Bloomberg News detailed the
personal involvement of Goldman Sachs's then-Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO"), Lloyd Blankfein, in a meeting to establish ties
with Malaysia and its new sovereign wealth fund that was referenced
in the court documents unsealed the prior week.  In a November 8,
2018 article entitled "Goldman's Blankfein Said to Have Attended
2009 1MDB Meeting," Bloomberg News noted that "Blankfein was the
unidentified high-ranking Goldman Sachs executive referenced in
U.S. court documents who attended a 2009 meeting with the former
Malaysian prime minister," and that "[t]he meeting was arranged
with the help of men who are now tied to the subsequent plundering
of the 1MDB fund[.]"

On this news, Goldman Sachs's stock price fell by $9.00, or nearly
4%, closing at $222.65 on November 9, 2018.

On November 12, 2018, Malaysian government officials denounced
Goldman Sachs's role in the 1MDB scandal.  Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad stated that "[t]here is evidence that Goldman
Sachs has done things that are wrong" and "[o]bviously we have been
cheated through the compliance by Goldman Sachs people."
Meanwhile, the country's Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng said that
Malaysia would seek a "full refund" of the approximately $600
million in fees that the Company earned in connection with 1MDB's
$6.5 billion bond deal.

Following this news, Goldman Sachs's stock price fell $16.60 per
share, or nearly 7.5%, to close at $206.05 on November 12, 2018.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Banaga Files Class Action Over Discrimination
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jesse Banaga, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Government Employees Insurance Company, Case No.
3:18-cv-02756 (S.D. Calif., December 7, 2018), seeks damages,
injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable
remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of the Defendant in
intentionally and willfully interfering, discriminating, and
retaliating against Plaintiff in violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act.

The Plaintiff also brings this class action complaint for the
Defendant's discriminating against the Plaintiff on account of his
disability in violation of the Americans with Disability Act.

The Plaintiff began his employment with the Defendant on or about
April 30, 2001 as a Customer Service Representative. The Plaintiff
is a resident of the County of San Diego, in the State of
California.

The Defendant Government Employees Insurance Company provides
private passenger automobile insurance in the United States. The
Defendant is a Maryland corporation doing business in the State of
California, County of San Diego. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
      Veronica Cruz, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      245 Fisher Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Tel: (800) 400-6808
      Fax: (800) 520-5523
      E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
              veronica@kazlg.com

          - and -

      Corey P. Hanrahan, Esq.
      THE HANRAHAN FIRM
      402 West Broadway, Suite 1760
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 377-6522
      Fax: (619) 377-6662
      E-mail: corey@hanrahanfirm.com


H&R BLOCK:  Deborah Robinson Sues over No Poach Policy
------------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH ROBINSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. H&R BLOCK, INC., and H&R
BLOCK TAX SERVICES L.L.C., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00134
(N.D. Ill., Jan. 7, 2019), challenges Defendants' anticompetitive
"No-Poach" agreements for corporate and franchise employees in
violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, and seeks to
recover treble damages and other appropriate relief based on
Defendants' violations of the antitrust laws of the United States.


According to the complaint, H&R Block, Inc. is an American tax
preparation company. Among other tax preparation services, H&R
Block, Inc. provides in-person tax preparation assistance and
services at approximately 10,000 offices across the United States
as well as outside the United States. H&R Block also has over 3,300
franchised units in the United States and has both corporate-owned
offices and franchise-owned offices.

Beginning at least by January 2009, and continuing until at least
May 2018, Defendants and their currently unidentified
co-conspirators engaged in a conspiracy with respect to the
recruitment of employees and potential employees, including but not
limited to, agreements not to solicit or recruit each other’s
employees without prior approval. The Defendants formed, entered
into, carried out, and enforced the anticompetitive agreement,
combination, or conspiracy. The Defendants orchestrated, dispersed,
and enforced the agreement among themselves and all franchisees,
including at least in part through an explicit contractual
prohibition ("No Poach clause" or "No Poach agreement") contained
in the standard H&R Block franchise agreement.

The conspiracy, which is a per se violation of Sections 1 and 3 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 1, 3, limited Plaintiff and
Class members’ job mobility and suppressed their wages,
compensation, and other employee benefits below the levels that
would have been available to them in a competitive market, absent
the conspiracy. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy was to
limit employees’ job mobility and to suppress their wages,
compensation, and other employee benefits. As a result, H&R Block
employees, including Plaintiff and Class members, were unable to
seek employment with any other H&R Block locations, and as a direct
result, the No Poach agreements severely decreased employment
options available to H&R Block employees. The Defendants'
anticompetitive practices have harmed Plaintiff and Class members,
the lawsuit says.

H&R Block, Inc., or H&R Block, is an American tax preparation
company operating in North America, Australia, and India. The
company was founded in 1955 by brothers Henry W. Bloch and Richard
Bloch.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Brian Murray, Esq.
          Lee Albert, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: bmurray@glancylaw.com
                  lalbert@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Kasif Khowaja, Esq.
          Frank Castiglione, Esq.
          THE KHOWAJA LAW FIRM, LLC
          8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 356- 3200
          E-mail: kasif@khowajalaw.com
                  fcastiglione@khowajalaw.com

HANBAT RESTAURANT: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Armando Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Armando Sapon Sapon and Fredy Tomas Baquiax Ajche,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Hanbat
Restaurant, Inc. dba Han Bat and Nack Gyeun Mun, Case No.
1:18-cv-11457 (S.D. N.Y., December 7, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Plaintiffs worked for
the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that they worked, asserts the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed as delivery workers and a cook at the
restaurant located at 53 W 35th St, New York, NY 10001.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Korean restaurant,
located at 53 W 35th St,New York, NY 10001 under the name "Han
Bat". [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


HERTZ CORPORATION: Denicolo Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Hertz
Corporation. The case is styled as Ronald G Denicolo, Jr., on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
The Hertz Corporation and Viking Client Services, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00210 (N.D. Cal., January 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Hertz Corporation, a subsidiary of Hertz Global Holdings Inc.,
is an American car rental company based in Estero, Florida that
operates 9,700 international corporate and franchisee
locations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Lori Erin Andrus, Esq.
   Andrus Anderson LLP
   155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
   San Francisco, CA 94104
   Tel: (415) 986-1400
   Fax: (415) 986-1474
   Email: lori@andrusanderson.com


HOLLAR INC: Garey Targets Online Gift Shop in ADA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Hollar Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin Garey,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Hollar Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00384 (S.D. N.Y.,
January 14, 2019).

Hollar, Inc. is a discount online store for gifts and other goods.
The Company offers toys, beauty, electronics, apparel, and
accessories. Hollar serves customers the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



HOLTGER BROS: Field Workers Class Certified in McChesney Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Kristine G. Baker grants, in part, and denies, in part,
the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification of collective
action, for disclosure of potential opt-in plaintiffs' contact
information, and to send court-approved notice in the lawsuit
titled JACOB MCCHESNEY v. HOLTGER BROS., INC., Case No.
4:17-cv-00824-KGB (E.D. Ark.).

Mr. McChesney brings claims against the Defendant pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

The Court conditionally certifies this case as a collective action
and proposes the following language as the class of individuals to
receive notice:

     All current and former hourly-paid field workers employed by
     Defendant Holtger Bros., Inc. at any time since December 13,
     2014, and who performed work for Defendant Holtger Bros.,
     Inc. within Arkansas.

The parties have 10 days from the entry of this Order to inform the
Court in writing whether this proposed language is acceptable, in
the light of the Court's other rulings in this matter, or to
propose alternate language for consideration that accounts for the
Court's rulings, Judge Baker states.

Judge Baker also grants Mr. McChesney's motion for equitable
tolling.  To facilitate notice, Holtger is ordered to provide to
Mr. McChesney's counsel the names, last known home and work
addresses, and all known e-mail addresses for the potential opt-in
plaintiffs within 21 days of the date of this Order.  Mr. McChesney
shall have 90 days from the date Holtger provides this information
to distribute notice to the potential opt-in plaintiffs and file
copies of the consent forms with the Court.  He may provide notice
to the class of individuals consistent with the terms of this
Order.[CC]


ILLUMINA INC: Filing of 2nd Amended Securities Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ILLUMINA, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No.
3:16-cv-03044-L-MSB (S.B. Cal.), Judge M. James Lorenz of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California denied
Plaintiff Natissisa Enterprises Ltd.'s motion to file a second
amended complaint.

The Court appointed the Plaintiff as the lead Plaintiff in the
class action lawsuit on March 30, 2017.  On May 30, 2017, the
Plaintiff filed the operative complaint.  In that complaint, it
sought for the Court to certify it as the class representative.

The Hon. Karen S. Crawford, U.S. Magistrate Judge, issued a
Scheduling Order on May 11, 2018.  In that order, the parties'
deadline to amend the pleadings, or to file additional pleadings
was set for June 11, 2018, and the Plaintiff's deadline to file its
motion for class certification was set for Sept. 14, 2018.   On May
21, 2018, Judge Crawford vacated the class discovery cut-off
deadline originally set for Sept. 4, 2018.

In December 2017, the Plaintiff decided to voluntarily unwind.  It
assigned its interests in the lawsuit to Oleksandr Agoshkow, the
Plaintiff's ultimate beneficial owner.  In March 2018, Oleksandr
Agoshkov assigned his interests in these claims to his son Anton.

On Sept. 12, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking
to add Mr. Anton Agoshkov as an additional named Plaintiff in the
complaint to avoid interference in the dissolution and provide an
additional class representative to the potential class.  Defendants
Illumina, Francis A. deSouza, and Marc A. Stapley opposed the
motion on Oct. 4, 2018.  The Plaintiff replied on Oct. 8, 2018.

Judge Lorenz finds that the Plaintiff sought to amend the operative
complaint three months after the scheduling order deadline expired.
As such, good cause must be shown as the Plaintiff concedes.  The
Plaintiff contends good cause exists to justify amending the
complaint for the following reasons: (1) to prevent unnecessary
waste of resources; (2) to ensure the existing class members do not
lose their rights; (3) to further the interests of justice; and (4)
no prejudice would result because the Plaintiff has neither engaged
in undue delay nor attempted to add new claims or expand the class.
However, the Plaintiff fails to raise any contention regarding
their diligence to amend the complaint since March 2018.

Illumina points out that the Plaintiff failed to include the
assignments when it served its Initial Disclosures on May 4, 2018.
Likewise, the Plaintiff failed to inform Illumina and the Court of
its need to amend during a telephonic case management conference
held on May 11, 2018.   The Plaintiff simply does not assert facts
showing that it has been diligent in attempting to amend their
complaint.  Accordingly, the Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion
without prejudice to the Plaintiff refiling it with a showing of
good cause and diligence.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yvAHlM from Leagle.com.

Yi Fan Chen & Frontline Global Trading Pte. Ltd., Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by Robert Vincent Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP.

Natissisa Enterprise Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Adam C. McCall
-- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP., Nicholas Porritt --
nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice & Adam C.
McCall, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

James McLeod, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Illumina, Inc., Defendant, represented by Clarence William
Phillips, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Jordan Scott
Joachim, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Mark Chen --
mychen@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP & Mark Putnam
Gimbel -- mgimbel@cov.com -- Covington and Burling LLP, pro hac
vice  & Russell Squire, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice.

Francis A. Desouza & Marc A. Stapley, Defendants, represented by
Mark Chen, Covington & Burling LLP & Mark Putnam Gimbel, Covington
and Burling LLP, pro hac vice.

Batali and Greenwald, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Anton Agoshkov, Movant, represented by Adam Marc Apton --
aapton@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.


INDIANA: Inmates Files Civil Rights Class Action
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Robert Carter. The
case is styled as Menes Ankh-El and Craig Wilson, all prisoners
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Robert Carter, Kieth Butts, Ms.
French and Mr. Fetz, Defendants in their official and private
capacities, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00115-SEB-DLP (S.D. Ind.,
January 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Prisoner Civil
Rights Violation.

The Defendants are officers of the Indiana Department of
Correction.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY: Scarantino Suit Challenges Sale to Virtu
---------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., MINDER
CHENG, BRIAN G. CARTWRIGHT, TIMOTHY L. JONES, R. JARRETT LILIEN,
KEVIN J. LYNCH, LEE M. SHAVEL, FRANCIS J. TROISE, and STEVEN S.
WOOD, Case No. 1:19-cv-00024-UNA (D. Del., January 4, 2018), stems
from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which ITG will be acquired
by Virtu Financial, Inc. ("Parent") and Impala Merger Sub, Inc.

On November 6, 2018, ITG's Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Virtu.  Pursuant to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, ITG's stockholders will receive
$30.30 in cash for each share of ITG common stock they hold.  The
Defendants filed the Proxy Statement with the SEC in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote
on the Proposed Transaction for January 24, 2019.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy Statement omits material
information regarding the Company's financial projections and the
analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC.  With
respect to the Company's financial projections, the Proxy Statement
fails to disclose the Company's unlevered free cash flows and all
underlying line items, the Plaintiff contends.

ITG is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal executive
offices in New York City.  The Individual Defendants are directors
and officers of the Company.

ITG is a global financial technology company that helps leading
brokers and asset managers improve returns for investors around the
world.  The Company allows traders to reduce the end-to-end cost of
implementing investments through liquidity, execution, analytics,
and workflow technology solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


IRONBOUND EXPRESS: Court Certifies Luxama Drivers Class
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs'
Second Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned VAUDRAL
LUXAMA, CHANDLER LUXEUS, JAVIER R. GARCIA, FREDO BONHOMME, SANTOS
MALDONADO, CHANEL FONTIN, each individually and as class
representatives, Plaintiffs, v. IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 11-2224 (JMV) (JBC). (D.N.J.)

The Plaintiffs are owner-operator tractor-trailer drivers who lease
their vehicles and driving services to Defendant. This matter began
as a wage and hour claim but has since morphed into allegations
that the lease agreements violated federal Truth-in-Leasing
regulations and for breach of contract.

Truth-in-Leasing and Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs allege (1) five violations of federal Truth-in-Leasing
regulations and (2) breach of contract.  

The purpose of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations is to protect
independent truckers from motor carriers' abusive leasing
practices. Thus, the regulations seek to promote truth-in-leasing a
full disclosure between the carrier and the owner-operator of the
elements, obligations, and benefits of leasing contracts signed by
both parties; to eliminate or reduce opportunities for skimming and
other illegal or inequitable practices by motor carriers and to
promote the stability and economic welfare of the independent
trucker segment of the motor carrier industry.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant violated this provision
because the Lease refers to a Schedule B to govern compensation,
but the Defendant does not attach a Schedule B to the Lease
meaning compensation is not clearly stated on the face of the Lease
or in an attached addendum.  

Section 376.12(g) requires the authorized carrier to also provide
sufficient documentation to support this compensation, stating:

"Copies of freight bill or other form of freight documentation.
When a lessor's revenue is based on a percentage of the gross
revenue for a shipment, the lease must specify that the authorized
carrier will give the lessor, before or at the time of settlement,
a copy of the rated freight bill, or, in the case of contract
carriers, any other form of documentation actually used for a
shipment containing the same information that would appear on a
rated freight bill. Regardless of the method of compensation, the
lease must permit lessor to examine copies of the carrier's tariff
or, in the case of contract carriers, other documents from which
rates and charges are computed, provided that where rates and
charges are computed from a contract of a contract carrier, only
those portions of the contract containing the same information that
would appear on a rated freight bill need be disclosed. The
authorized carrier may delete the names of shippers and consignees
shown on the freight bill or other form of documentation."

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class comprised of owners
and lessors who at any time since April 20, 2007, executed the
Lease, or a lease that contained substantially similar language,
and performed transportation services for the Defendant.

Rule 23(a) Requirements

The Defendant only challenges 23(a) requirements as to commonality
and typicality.  

In reviewing the adequacy element, a court must decide whether the
class representative has the ability and the incentive to represent
the claims of the class vigorously, that he or she has obtained
adequate counsel, and that there is no conflict between the
individual's claims and those asserted on behalf of the class.
Adequate representation depends on two factors: (a) the plaintiffs
attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to
conduct the proposed litigation, and (b) the plaintiff must not
have interests antagonistic to those of the class.
Here, adequacy is met. Plaintiffs' counsel is more than adequate to
represent the class as they are experienced in class action
litigation and other complex litigation. Additionally, the named
Plaintiffs' interests are not antagonistic of the rest of the class
members. The fact that a majority of the named Plaintiffs are
former employees of Defendant does not mean that they will
inadequately represent current employees who are also members of
the class. Defendant has not advanced any arguments to the
contrary.

Turning to commonality, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs
cannot meet the requirement because each class member would be
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.  

In Dukes, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360-61
(2011), the potential class consisted of over one million current
and former female Wal-Mart employees. The plaintiffs alleged that
local Wal-Mart managers' discretion over pay and promotions is
exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an
unlawful disparate impact on female employees in violation of Title
VII. Wal-Mart, a retail juggernaut, was comprised of seven
nation-wide divisions which were made up of 41 regions; each region
had 80 to 85 stores. Wal-Mart also had a corporate policy against
sex discrimination. Wal-Mart, however, generally committed pay and
promotion decisions to the discretion of local managers, who
exercised their discretion in a predominately subjective manner.To
support their disparate impact claims, the plaintiffs relied on
statistical evidence, anecdotal proofs, and expert sociological
testimony.  

The majority of the Supreme Court found that commonality under Rule
23(a) had not been met.
The Dukes Court observed that the plaintiffs' claims must depend on
a common contention, such as discriminatory conduct by the same
supervisor, which is capable of classwide resolution by way of a
common answer to the claims. Justice Scalia continued that the
plaintiffs wish to sue about literally millions of employment
decisions at once but lacked the necessary glue which would connect
the reasons for those decisions. Wal-Mart, the Court in Dukes
noted, did not have a company-wide testing method that plaintiffs
could allege to be biased and it had a general policy against
gender discrimination.  

The current matter is far different from Dukes. First, the
Defendant's leasing policy and leasing forms are derived from a
central source. Moreover, the Plaintiffs' common claims whether the
Lease was breached and/or violated the Truth-in-Leasing regulations
are subject to common answers. The Defendant does not have numerous
locations in which different lease are or were used.

Unlike in Dukes, the validity of the Plaintiff's assertions as to
the Truth-in-Leasing violations can be determined in one stroke
because demonstrating the invalidly (or validity) of a provision in
one Lease will necessarily demonstrate the invalidity (or validity)
of that provision in all Leases, as the relevant portions of these
Leases are all identical. The same is true for determining whether
Defendant breached provisions of the Lease regarding compensation,
fuel charges, charge backs, escrow deductions, parking space
rentals, and worker's compensation deductions. The Court does not
have to analyze the discretionary decisions of potentially hundreds
of different managers in order to determine if a class-wide
violation exists  only the validity of a single contract under
definite regulations and consistent, established practices by the
company.

Thus, Dukes is inapposite and does not countenance against a
finding of commonality here.

As to typicality, the Defendant primarily argues that because the
Plaintiffs individually negotiated their rates, the Plaintiffs'
claims are atypical of each other, as the Plaintiffs cannot point
to a common practice that the Defendant adhered to in these
negotiations.
Typicality demands that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.

However, all plaintiffs are not required to share identical factual
circumstances. Instead, a named plaintiff's individual
circumstances cannot be markedly different from the other class
members. If the claims of the named plaintiffs and putative class
members involve the same conduct by the defendant, typicality is
established regardless of factual differences.  The typicality
requirement does not mandate that all putative class members share
identical claims, because even relatively pronounced factual
differences will generally not preclude a finding of typicality
where there is a strong similarity of legal theories' or where the
claim arises from the same practice or course of conduct.

Here, typicality is met. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are
typical of the claims of all potential class members. Plaintiffs
seek to remedy (1) violations of Truth-in-Leasing regulations, and
(2) breaches of the Lease. Even if there are factual differences
about the damage that the improper Lease provisions or breaches of
contract may have caused different Plaintiffs, such factual
differences do not defeat typicality. The claims of the named
Plaintiffs and putative class members all involve the same alleged
conduct by Defendant: violations of federal regulations in the
Lease and breaches of the Lease.

The Court concludes that the Rule 23(a) requirements are met in
this matter.
  
Proposed Rule 23(b)(1) Class

Rule 23(b)(1)(A) permits certification if prosecuting separate
actions by or against individual class members would create a risk
of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
class members that would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class.

A class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) when
"prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests."

This type of class action is commonly applied in a limited fund
case, where numerous persons make claims against a fund
insufficient to satisfy all claims. Here, the Plaintiffs have not
established that there is a limited fund incapable of satisfying
all class members' claims, nor have they established that Rule
23(b)(1)(B) otherwise applies. Therefore, the Court denies
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) with prejudice.

Proposed Rule 23(b)(2) Class

Rule 23(b)(2) allows for class treatment when the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole. Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single
injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each
member of the class.

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 49
U.S.C. Section 14704(a)(1) for violations of federal
Truth-in-Leasing regulations. Section 14704(a)(1) authorizes a
private citizen to bring a civil action for injunctive relief for
violations of the regulations.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Lease violates the regulations in
numerous ways. All relevant portions of the Lease are identical for
each Plaintiff and putative class member who entered into a Lease
with Defendant prior to January 2018, when Defendant stopped using
the standard Lease form at issue.  

Therefore, the Plaintiffs and the relevant putative class members
are sufficiently cohesive for purposes of determining whether these
portions of the Lease do in fact violate Truth-in-Leasing
regulations.

The Defendant does not claim that the Lease was compliant with the
regulations. Instead, the Defendant argues that injunctive relief
is needless and moot because the Defendant stopped using the Lease
at issue in January 2018.  However, it is well settled that a
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of
the practice in other words, it does not moot the case.  

The Court finds Ironbound's mootness argument unpersuasive. The
Defendant is still free to return to its old Lease form, or
otherwise change its current lease. In addition, there has not been
an adjudication that the newly-implemented lease complies with the
regulations. Therefore, the Court finds that the alleged violations
could reasonably reoccur and does not find declaratory and
injunctive relief moot.

The Court certifies the following class under Rule 23(b)(2) for
declaratory and injunctive relief9 regarding Plaintiffs' alleged
Truth-in-Leasing violations.

Proposed Rule 23(b)(3) Class

The requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification are that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Here, if the issue were solely liability, it appears that Rule
23(b)(3) certification would be appropriate on both the
Truth-in-Leasing violations and the breach of contract action
because the Lease is the same, or substantially the same, as to all
class members. Damage assessments, however, would prove difficult
at the class level. Regarding compensation, Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs cannot establish that any 70/30 split agreement was ever
in effect due to conflicting testimony from lead Plaintiffs. Yet
even assuming that Plaintiffs could establish the existence of a
70/30 split agreement, the Court agrees that the individualized
damages calculations would be unmanageable and also predominate
over common questions as to liability. Each individual trip of each
Plaintiff would have to be reviewed to determine what each class
member was actually paid for a particular trip. As noted, payment
for each trip was individually negotiated with each driver, meaning
that no overarching method or formula was employed. Although the
parties have not provided an estimate as to the number of trips
involved, it appears safe to assume that thousands if not tens of
thousands of trips were involved. This voluminous, individual
review is unworkable for purposes of class adjudication.

Damages related to charge-backs, escrow account management, and
administration of workers' compensation appear more appropriate for
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification than the compensation issue.
Among other things, establishing an accurate baseline would appear
to be easier. For example, as to worker's compensation, the
calculation should involve a relatively rudimentary comparison of
what Defendant paid for insurance as opposed to what Defendant
charged Plaintiffs.

That is not to say that the Court is finding that predominance or
superiority would be met as to these damage calculations only that
they potentially could be.

Class Definition

Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires that the class-certification order or
incorporated opinion to indicate (1) a readily discernible, clear,
and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or
classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and
complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a
class basis. Therefore, the Court certifies the following class
under Rule 23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
Plaintiffs' alleged Truth-in-Leasing violations:

     All independent owner-operators who entered into a regulated
lease with Defendant, directly or indirectly through Defendant's
agents, and whose regulated lease was in effect at any time between
April 20, 2007 through the pendency of this action.  Excluded from
this class are Plaintiffs' counsel, officers and directors of
Defendant, judicial officers assigned to this case, and staff and
immediate relatives of judicial officers assigned to this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb7cahrd from Leagle.com.

VAUDRAL LUXAMA, CHANDLER LUXEUS, JAVIER R. GARCIA, FREDO BONHOMME,
SANTOS MALDONADO & CHANEL FONTIN, individually and as class
representatives, Plaintiffs, represented by JERRY MAROULES, Leanza
& Agrapidis, PC, LAUREN TOPELSOHN -- ltopelsohn@lawfirm.ms --
Mandelbaum Salsburg PC & STEVEN I. ADLER -- sadler@lawfirm.ms --
Mandelbaum Salsburg Lazris & Discenza.

IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC., Defendant, represented by DAVID S. KIM --
davidkimesq@sbcglobal.net -- FORD & HARRISON LLP, LISA M. HANNAN,
McCARTER & ENGLISH, MARK A. SALOMAN -- msaloman@fordharrison.com --
FORDHARRISON LLP & SALVADOR PEDRO SIMAO -- ssimao@fordharrison.co
-- FORD & HARRISON.


KEITH D. WEINER: Placeholder Class Certification Bid Filed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned ROBERT HOFFMAN, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
KEITH D. WEINER & ASSOC. CO., L.P.A., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00019-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


LAOS: 9th Cir. Tosses Hmong Exiles' Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 14 tossed a Hmong woman's proposed class
action accusing Laos and several of its highest-ranking government
officials of trying to exterminate Hmong people who fought in the
Vietnam War as part of the CIA's "secret army."

In an unsigned memorandum, the three-judge panel affirmed findings
that the unidentified woman failed to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute because her allegations
weren't connected with events in the United States.

"Because plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction, the district court could not have granted her
default judgment," the 4-page memorandum.

The plaintiff, who lives in an unspecified location in Southeast
Asia, sued Laos, its then-president Choummaly Sayasone and several
government ministers in November 2015 following the killing of her
husband in what she called "the official campaign in Laos to
terminate Hmong people."

According to the complaint, Laos' communist government launched a
campaign immediately after the end of the Vietnam War to
"exterminate to their last root" Hmong people in Laos who had
helped the CIA fight Vietcong guerillas on the border between Laos
and Vietnam as part of a CIA-backed "secret army."

The Laotian government "then proceeded to do exactly that and sent
the full force of their firepower into the jungles of Laos where
hundreds of thousands of Hmong veterans of the ‘Secret War' and
their descendants were located, killed, maimed, tortured, raped,
and poisoned both the Hmong people and the jungle/their environment
[including poisoning of the water systems and food systems]," the
woman claimed in her lawsuit.

She said this "official military campaigning" constituted "an act
of war against the Hmong people in complete defiance" of a February
1973 ceasefire agreement between Laos' warring royalist and
communist factions, in violation of the 1962 Geneva Convention and
the 1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

In August 2017, U.S. District Judge Troy Nunley in Sacramento
denied the woman's motion for a default judgment, holding that none
of the alleged atrocities were connected to the United States – a
necessary requirement for establishing federal jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute.

Nunley noted the woman's attorney only alleged conduct connected
with the United States in a hearing on his client's motion for
default judgment, making it ineligible for consideration in his
review of the motion.

In that hearing, the attorney said the United States breached an
"oral treaty" between U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the
"King of Laos," and that this breach occurred in the United States.
Under this alleged treaty, the Hmong people would help the United
States fight Laos' Pathet Lao communist party in the Vietnam War,
and the United States would protect the Hmong after the war. But
the United States, the lawyer said, "had no intention of honoring
the treaty, even at the moment that agreement was reached,"
according to Nunley's recap of the proceedings.

"It is not at all clear that such allegations, even if they
appeared in the complaint, would suffice to allow this court to
exercise jurisdiction over this case," Nunley concluded. "However,
since these allegations do not even appear in the complaint, they
cannot be used to justify the entry of a default judgment."

The Ninth Circuit agreed on Jan. 14, finding no connection between
the allegations and the United States sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.

Further, the panel found Nunley did not abuse his discretion in
denying the plaintiff permission to file an amended complaint,
"because the additional allegations in the proposed amended
complaint are insufficient to establish jurisdiction."

"While the proposed amended complaint includes allegations of
domestic conduct, these allegations are not relevant to the alleged
claims under the ATS," the panel said.

U.S. Circuit Judges John Owens and Richard Paez, and U.S. Circuit
Judge Danny Boggs, sitting by designation from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, made up the panel.

The plaintiff was represented by Herman Franck, Esq.--
franckhermanlaw88@yahoo.com -- of Franck & Associates in
Sacramento, who had no immediate comment on Jan. 14.

Joseph Fruech, Esq. of the U.S. Justice Department represented the
CIA and the U.S. federal government, who were movants in the case.

The Justice Department also had no immediate comment.


LIFEBRIDGE HEALTH: Murphy Falcon Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, Murphy, Falcon & Murphy filed a statewide class action
lawsuit against LifeBridge Heath, Inc. ("LifeBridge"), a Baltimore
healthcare provider, on behalf of more than 530,000 Maryland
consumers whose personal information, social security numbers,
birth dates, names, addresses, health insurance information, client
treatment information, and medical diagnoses were stolen. The data
breach occurred on or about September 27, 2016.

Hackers accessed LifeBridge's servers through one of its physician
practices and installed malware on a server that hosted
LifeBridge's electronic medical records, patient registration, and
billing systems. Unbelievably, LifeBridge failed to discover the
data breach until approximately March 28, 2018 -- eighteen months
later -- allowing the cybercriminals to freely roam its systems
during that lengthy period of time. LifeBridge then inexplicably
waited nearly two months before disclosing the breach to its
patients.  

The hackers' access was made possible because of LifeBridge's
failure to ensure the integrity of its servers and to properly
safeguard patients' highly sensitive and confidential information.
Well before 2016, LifeBridge knew or should have known that failure
to protect patients' personal identifying information and health
information from unauthorized access would result in a massive data
breach, exposing their patients to serious harm. LifeBridge's
conduct also violated many privacy protection statutes, including
the Maryland Personal Information Protection Act, the Maryland
Social Security Number Privacy Act, and the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act.

Hassan Murphy, Managing Partner at Murphy, Falcon & Murphy, said
today, "LifeBridge's failure to protect their patients' information
demonstrates a serious lack of judgment and oversight."  Murphy
continued, "A health care data breach is devastating in a uniquely
personal way.  In addition to obtaining the victims' valuable and
sensitive personally identifiable information, cybercriminals also
obtained information regarding these patients' medical histories,
diagnoses, and treatments. LifeBridge should have implemented
appropriate and adequate technological safeguards to prevent such a
massive cyberbreach from occurring, and certainly should have
notified its patients immediately after learning of the breach."

"This data breach has compromised every aspect of these patients'
personal identities and has subjected them to significant harm.  We
will continue working until LifeBridge fixes this problem and makes
these victims whole," Murphy added.

         Hassan Murphy, Esq.
         Telephone: (410) 539-6500
         Email: Hassan.Murphy@murphyfalcon.com [GN]


LULU'S FASHION: Online Clothes Shop Hit with ADA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Lulu's Fashion Lounge, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Lulu's Fashion Lounge, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00345 (S.D. N.Y., January 13, 2019).

Lulu*s Fashion Lounge, Inc. sells clothing, shoes, accessories, and
jewelry online. The company offers maxi, party, casual, little
black, shift, skater, backless, long sleeve, strapless, bodycon,
midi, high-low, and print and floral dresses; and sandals, wedges,
flats, boots, vegan shoes, and party shoes.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL: Public Employees Files Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. McDermott International, Inc., David Dickson, and
Stuart Spence, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00135 (S.D. Tex.,
January 14, 2019) is a class action on behalf of persons and
entities that held McDermott common stock as of April 4, 2018, and
had the right to vote on the Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V.
("CB&I") merger pursuant to the Proxy Statement dated March 29,
2018, and were damaged thereby.

On December 18, 2017, after the close of the market, McDermott
announced it was merging with CB&I pursuant to a stock-for-stock
merger, in which McDermott would be the surviving company. The
combination was subject to a majority vote of McDermott
shareholders.

The Defendants disseminated the Proxy Statement to McDermott's
shareholders of record as of April 4, 2018, and recommended they
approve the Merger at an anticipated shareholder vote on May 2,
2018. Between March 20, 2018 and May 2, 2018, McDermott filed with
the SEC and disseminated other materials to shareholders that were
intended to influence the shareholder vote.

The complaint asserts that the 2018 Proxy Statement was materially
false and misleading and failed to disclose material adverse facts
about CB&I and CB&I's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (1)
certain CB&I projects would incur substantially higher costs than
publicly represented; (2) the fair value of these CB&I projects
would be materially impacted; and (3) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about CB&I's business, operations,
and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff The Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi,
held McDermott common stock.

McDermott International, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of
Panama with its principal executive offices located in Houston,
Texas. McDermott is a provider of integrated engineering,
procurement, construction and installation, front-end engineering
and design, and module fabrication services for upstream field
developments worldwide.

David Dickson has been the President and Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") of the Company at all relevant times.

Stuart Spence has been the Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO") of the Company at all relevant
times.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey W. Chambers, Esq.
     WOLF POPPER LLP
     Pennzoil Place
     711 Louisiana, Suite 2150
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 438-5244
     Email: jchambers@wolfpopper.com

          - and -

     Robert C. Finkel, Esq.
     Sean Zaroogian, Esq.
     WOLF POPPER LLP
     845 Third Avenue, 12th Floor
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (212) 759-4600
     Email: rfinkel@wolfpopper.com
            szaroogian@wolfpopper.com


MIAMI-DADE, FL: Alvarez et al. Seek to Certify Class of Teachers
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned NATASHA ALVAREZ, et al., the
Plaintiffs, vs. SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, the Defendant,
Case NO. 1:17-cv-22556-JEM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs move the
Court for class certification of:

   "all of the approximately 19,000 full time instructional
   personnel ("teachers") employed by the Defendant School
   District ("District"), whether hired before or after July 1,
   2014, who worked for the District between that date and the
   present."

Excluded from the prospective Class are substitute teachers, part
time teachers, non-instructional employees and administrative
employees.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Thomas E. Elfers, Esq.
          14036 SW 148 Lane
          Miami, FL 33186
          Telephone: 786-232-8074
          E-mail: thomaselfers@comcast.net

               - and -

          Craig J. Freger, Esq.
          10247 NW 15th Street
          Pembroke Pines, FL 33028
          Telephone: 954-801-9373
          E-mail: fregerlaw@gmail.com

Counsel for Defendants:

          David C. Miller, Esq.
          Denise M. Heekin, Esq.
          Michal L. Elkins, Esq.
          James C. Crosland, Esq.
          BRYANT MILLER OLIVE P.A.
          One S.E. Third Avenue, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: 305 374-7349
          E-mail: dmiller@bmolaw.com
                  dheekin@bmolaw.com
                  melkins@bmolaw.com
                  jcrosland@bmolaw.com

MISSOURI: Court Certifies Class of Adult Parolees in Gasca Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE GASCA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANNE PRECYTHE,
Director of the Missouri, Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04149-SRB (W.D. Mo.), Judge Stephen R.
Bough of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Southern Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion
for Class Certification.

The lawsuit challenges the parole revocation policies and
procedures of the Missouri Department of Corrections and its
Division of Probation and Parole.  The Plaintiffs allege the
revocation policies and procedures violate their rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and Morissey v. Brewer.

The Plaintiffs seek prospective relief and request certification of
the class of all adult parolees in the state of Missouri who
currently face, or who in the future will face, parole revocation
proceedings.  The Defendants consent to certification of the
proposed class.

Judge Bough finds that the proposed class satisfies the Rule 23(a)
requirements of numeorsity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.
He further finds that the litigating class members' claims
individually would create a risk of inconsistent or varying
adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the Defendants' parole revocation proceedings.
Moreover, he finds that the Defendants' parole revocation policies
and procedures apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.  He also notes that
the Defendants filed no opposition to the Plaintiffs' Renewed
Motion for Class Certification, and the Defendants consent to class
certification.

Accordingly, Judge Bough granted the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
Class Certification.  Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2), he certified the matter as a class
action.

The class is defined as all adult parolees in the state of Missouri
who currently face, or who in the future will face, parole
revocation proceedings.

Mildred Curren, Timothy Gallagher, Stephanie Gasca, Kenneth
Hemphill, Jesse Neely, Soloman Warren, and Amber Wyse are
designated as the Class Representatives; and Locke E. Bowman,
Sheila A. Bedi, and Amy E. Breihan will serve as Class Counsel.

The parties will meet and confer within 14 days to arrange a court
hearing on how to proceed with the timing of the class
notifications.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/L4wTFL from Leagle.com.

Stephanie Gasca, Mildred Curren, Kenneth Hemphill, Jesse Neely,
Amber Wyse, Timothy Gallagher & Solomon Warren, Plaintiffs,
represented by Amy Elizabeth Breihan --
amy.breihan@macarthurjustice.org -- MacArthur Justice Center at St.
Louis, Locke E. Bowman -- l-bowman@law.northwestern.edu -- Roderick
and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, pro hac vice, Megan G. Crane,
pro hac vice & Sheila A. Bedi -- sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu
-- Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, pro hac vice.

Anne L. Precythe, in her official capacity, Director of the
Missouri Department of Corrections, Kenneth Jones, in his official
capacity, Chairman of the Missouri Division of Probation and
Parole, Jennifer Zamkus, in her official capacity, Vice Chair of
the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Jim Wells, in his
official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole, Martin Rucker, in his official capacity, Member of the
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Ellis McSwain, Jr, in his
official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole, Gary Dusenberg, in his official capacity, Member of the
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole & Paul Fitzwater, in his
official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole, Defendants, represented by Doug Shull , Missouri Attorney
General's Office & Justin Moore, Missouri Attorney General's
Office.


MONSANTO COMPANY: Matlock Sues Over Roundup Exposure
----------------------------------------------------
Martha Matlock, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Gregory
Dean Matlock, Plaintiff, v. Monsanto Company, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00110-B (N.D. Tex., January 14, 2019) is an action for
damages suffered by Decedent Gregory Dean Matlock, as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup, containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

Plaintiff maintains that Roundup and/or glyphosate is defective,
dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and
sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and directions as to
the dangers associated with its use. The Decedent's injuries, like
those striking thousands of similarly situated victims across the
country, were avoidable.

Rather than performing appropriate tests, Defendant relied upon
flawed industry-supported studies designed to protect Defendant's
economic interests rather than Plaintiff and the consuming public.
Despite its knowledge that Roundup was considerably more dangerous
than glyphosate alone, Defendant continued to promote Roundup as
safe, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Martha Matlock, is a natural person and is a resident of
Mineola, Texas. She brings this action in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of Gregory Dean Matlock.

Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
and principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant
Monsanto Company is in the business of researching, testing,
developing, designing, formulating, manufacturing, producing,
assembling, packaging, labeling, advertising, promoting, marketing,
selling, supplying and distributing herbicides, including Roundup
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew Gardner, Esq.
     JOHNSON LAW GROUP
     2925 Richmond Ave., Suite 1700
     Houston, TX 77098
     Phone: (713)626-9336
     Facsimile: (713) 583-9460
     Email: agardner@johnsonlawgroup.com

          - and -

     Kori Westbrook, Esq.
     JOHNSON LAW GROUP
     2925 Richmond Ave., Suite 1700
     Houston, TX77098
     Phone: (713)626-9336
     Facsimile: (713) 583-9460
     Email: kwestbrook@johnsonlawgroup.com


NATIONAL CREDIT: Class Cert. Proceedings in Gochet Suit Stayed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned KEANNA GOCHET, the Plaintiff,
v. NATIONAL CREDIT SERVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00020-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin
entered an order on Jan. 3, 2019, granting Plaintiff's motion to
stay further proceedings on motion for class certification.

On January 3, 2019, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the plaintiff filed what the court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification. In this
motion the plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the
complaint but also moved the court to stay further proceedings on
that motion. In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th
Cir. 2011), the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs
"move to certify the class at the same time that they file their
complaint." "The pendency of that motion protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs." However, because
parties are generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."

The Court held that the parties are relieved from the automatic
briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).
Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary that the
Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for class certification.
However, the motion will be regarded as pending to serve its
protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]

NATIONAL CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned KEANNA GOCHET, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
NATIONAL CREDIT SERVICES INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00020-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



NELSON MANAGEMENT: Faces Fischler Suit Alleging ADA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nelson Management Group Ltd. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nelson Management Group Ltd.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00342 (S.D. N.Y., January 13, 2019).

Nelson Management Group, Ltd. is a full-service Real Estate
Management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017-6705
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



NOBILIS HEALTH: Misled Shareholders, Robbins Arroyo Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP disclosed that
purchasers of Nobilis Health Corp. filed a class action complaint
against the company's officers and directors for alleged violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between May 8, 2018 and
November 15, 2018. Nobilis Health Corp. owns and manages specialty
surgical hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, and multispecialty
clinics.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/nobilis-health-corp-dec-18/

Nobilis Health Accused of Overstating Revenue

According to the complaint, Nobilis Health failed to disclose that
its accounts receivable and revenue were overstated and need
re-evaluation and adjustment. On August 2, 2018, the truth began to
emerge when Nobilis Health reported that a new accounting standard
regarding account receivable had impacted revenue. On this news,
Nobilis Health's share price fell $0.20, or 17.39%, to $0.95. On
November 9, 2018, Nobilis filed a Form 12b-25, stating that it was
unable to timely file its quarterly report. On this news, Nobilis
Health's share price fell $0.18, more than 25%, to $0.52. Then, on
November 12, 2018, Nobilis Health announced it was not in
compliance with the NYSE's listing requirements. The company's
stock fell to just $0.48 as a result, and now trades at under
$0.25.

Nobilis Health Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

         Leonid Kandinov, Esq.
         Robbins Arroyo LLP
         600 B Street, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 525-3990
         Toll Free: (800) 350-6003
         Email: LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


OHIO MULCH: Court Certifies Two Subclassses in Smyers FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DIANE SMYERS, On behalf of herself and other members
of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OHIO MULCH
SUPPLY, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-1110 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, (i) granted the P
Plaintiff's Pre-Discovery Motion for Conditional Class
Certification and Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In
Plaintiffs; and (ii) denied as moot the Defendants' Motions to
Strike.

Plaintiff Smyers worked for Defendant Ohio Mulch Supply, at three
of their locations in the greater Columbus metro area, from March
2015 until October 2017.  Ms. Smyers was a retail manager for Ohio
Mulch Supply ("OMS").  She alleges that OMS regularly required her
-- and others similarly situated -- to perform uncompensated work.
Specifically, Ms. Smyers alleges, inter alia, that OMS retail
managers were required to travel to the bank and between OMS
locations without compensation; that she and others regularly
worked more than 40 hours without proper compensation; and that she
and others had time deducted from their compensable hours for a
meal break.  

She initiated the collective action against OMS for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act; and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

Ms. Smyers' initial complaint was filed with Robert Carter as
another named Plaintiff, but Mr. Carter has since been offered a
Rule 68 Settlement by the Defendants.  In addition, Ms. Smyers'
ex-husband, Philip Smyers, filed a Supplemental Witness Statement
in Support of Conditional Certification.

The Defendants have submitted Motions to Strike information from
Plaintiff Carter, as well as to strike Mr. Smyers' Declaration.
Ms. Smyers herself also submitted a Second Declaration, which the
Defendants have also moved to strike.

Ms. Smyers seeks conditionally to certify the following collective
action under the FLSA, consisting of two subclasses:

     1. All current and former Ohio hourly, non-exempt employees of
the Defendants, at any retail location, who since Dec. 18, 2014
worked over 40 hours in any workweek but were not properly
compensated for all their overtime hours worked under the FLSA
because of the Defendants' automatic meal deduction policy; and

     2. All current and former Ohio Hourly Retail Managers of
Defendants who since Dec. 18, 2014 worked over 40 hours in any
workweek but were not properly compensated for all of their
overtime hours because of the Defendants' policy of not
compensating them for any time spent working if they were not
physically at one of the Defendants' OMS stores.

In addition to the allegations advanced in her Complaint, Ms.
Smyers submitted to the Court a declaration indicating that she and
other putative members of the collective action are similarly
situated because all of Defendants hourly, non-exempt employees are
subject to the same payroll policies and procedures.  In her
declaration, Ms. Smyers submits to the Court that the Defendants
automatically deducted a 30-minute meal break from hourly,
nonexempt employees' daily hours worked regardless of whether the
employee actually took the 30-minute uninterrupted break.  Ms.
Smyers says she was instructed to forward work phone calls to her
personal cell phone so she could answer the calls after her shift
ended.  Her declaration also says OMS required her and other
employees to clock out anytime they left OMS premises, so they were
not compensated for time spent traveling between the Defendants'
three locations—or for time on the phone, answering email, and
doing other work-related tasks off-site.

Judge Marbley finds that conditional certification of the proposed
class is appropriate.  He says the sworn statement that Ms. Smyers
submitted with the Motion for Conditional Certification is
sufficient at this "fairly lenient" stage to show that Ms. Smyers
is similarly situated to other putative class members because they
suffer from a single, FLSA-violating policy.  The Defendants may
file a motion for decertification at a later date if discovery
reveals that the members of the putative class are not similarly
situated.

Next, the Judge finds that the Defendants submitted a series of
motions objecting to the Plaintiffs' filings on procedural grounds.
The Defendants first submitted a motion to strike information from
Plaintiff Carter's Notice of Acceptance of Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment.  Next, theys submitted a motion to strike Ms. Smyers'
Second Declaration.  Then the Defendants submitted a motion to
strike Phillips Smyers' Declaration.  However, in none of these
filings did the Defendants object to the language of Ms. Smyers'
proposed notice to conditionally certify the class.  As a result,
and because he finds it sufficient, Ms. Smyers' motion is granted.

Finally, the Judge denied the Defendants' Motions to Strike as
moot.  Because an FLSA collective action may be conditionally
certified with just one satisfactory declaration, the Judge holds
he needs not decide whether Mr. Carter's declaration must be
disregarded.  Similarly, Defendants' Motions to Strike regarding
Ms. Smyers' second declaration and Mr. Smyers' declaration for
being in violation of Local Rule 7.2 are denied as moot.  The Judge
declines to strike Mr. Smyers' declaration or Ms. Smyers' second
declaration, and instead denied the Defendants' Motions as moot
because the FLSA collective action is conditionally certified.

For the reasons stated, Judge Marbley granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Conditionally Certify, and conditionally certified the
following collective action, consisting of two subclasses:

     1. All current and former Ohio hourly, non-exempt employees of
the Defendants, employed at any retail location, who since Dec. 18,
2014 worked over 40 hours in any workweek but were not properly
compensated for all their overtime hours worked under the FLSA
because of Defendants' automatic meal deduction policy; and

     2. All current and former Ohio Hourly Retail Managers of the
Defendants who since Dec. 18, 2014 worked over 40 hours in any
workweek but were not properly compensated for all of their
overtime hours because of the Defendants' policy of not
compensating them for any time spent working if they were not
physically at one of the Defendants' OMS stores.

The Judge further ordered that within 14 days of the date the
notice is approved, the Defendant will answer the Plaintiffs Opt-In
Discovery, and will provide to the Plaintiff an Excel spreadsheet
containing the full name, last known address, telephone number, all
known e-mail addresses, job titles, and dates and location(s) of
employment of those individuals named by the subclasses (1) and (2)
above.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/iW5Cb4 from Leagle.com.

Diane Smyers, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Porter Coffman --
mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com -- Coffman Legal, LLC & Peter Alan
Contreras -- peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com -- Contreras Law.

Philip Smyers, Plaintiff, pro se.

Ohio Mulch Supply, Inc. & Jim Weber II, Defendants, represented by
Marion H. Little -- little@litohio.com -- Zeiger Tigges & Little
LLP & Christopher J. Hogan -- hogan@litohio.co -- Zeiger Tigges &
Little LLP.


OLDE GOOD THINGS: Antique Shop Faces Class Suit under ADA
---------------------------------------------------------
Olde Good Things, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Derrick U Dennis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Olde Good Things, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00268 (E.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Olde Good Things has one of the largest inventories of unique and
antique items.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



ONE KINGS LANE: Dennis Files Suit Alleging ADA Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
One Kings Lane, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Derrick U Dennis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. One Kings Lane, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00267 (E.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

One Kings Lane, LLC is a retail store services featuring a wide
variety of consumer goods including household and lifestyle
products image mark.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



PAUL VALLAS: Klueh Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paul Vallas for All
Chicago. The case is styled as Jeff Klueh and Jake Campbell
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated Illinois
residents, Plaintiffs v. Paul Vallas for All Chicago, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00249 (N.D. Ill., January 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Paul Gust Vallas is an American politician and former
superintendent of the Bridgeport Public Schools and the Recovery
School District of Louisiana, former CEO of both the School
District of Philadelphia and the Chicago Public Schools, and a
former budget director for the city of Chicago.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181
   Email: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com


PHARMAVITE LLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Anthony Suit Under UCL
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EUGENE ANTHONY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PHARMAVITE,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-02636-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M.
Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs Anthony and Amanda Holt bring the class action against
Pharmavite, alleging Pharmavite manufactures, markets, and sells
biotin supplements through false, misleading, and deceptive
advertising in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL").  Pharmavite's labeling represents that its biotin
supplements may help support healthy hair, skin and nails.  The
Plaintiffs allege these health benefit representations are
misleading because most people obtain more than enough biotin from
their daily diets, so biotin supplements are unneeded, superfluous,
and will provide no health benefits.  Only a minuscule percentage
of individuals with biotin deficiencies could potentially benefit
from biotin supplements.

At issue in the case are three of Pharmavite's biotin supplements:
(1) Biotin 2500 mcg; (2) Hair Skin Nails adult gummies; and (3)
Biotin 3000 mcg adult gummies.  The Plaintiffs purchased the Biotin
Products after reading the product labels in reliance upon the
health benefit representations.  However, they allege the health
benefit representations are false, misleading and reasonably likely
to deceive the public because the Biotin Products will not provide
any benefits" to the general population.  According to the
Plaintiffs, the human body only requires a finite amount of biotin
on a daily basis for it to perform its enzymatic functions as there
are a finite number of enzymes that use biotin. Once there is
sufficient biotin in the body, any additional supplements are
superfluous and the body ultimately excretes them.  The Plaintiffs
allege, therefore, that apart from the 0.00138% of the population
that is biotin deficient, the Biotin Products are unneeded,
superfluous, and completely worthless and will not provide any
benefits.

On May 4, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the class action complaint
claiming that had they known the truth about Pharmavite's alleged
misrepresentations, they would not have purchased the Biotin
Products.  They seek relief in the form of, inter alia,
restitution, disgorgement, a corrective advertising campaign, and
injunctive relief.

On Aug. 27, 2018, Pharmavite moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint on the basis that they failed to state a plausible claim
with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), failed to state a UCL
violation on the merits, and failed to demonstrate a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury sufficient to sustain standing
to seek injunctive relief.

Both parties ask the Court to take judicial notice of certain
materials.  

Judge Chen granted Pharmavite's request for judicial notice of the
labels for the three Biotin Products at issue, because the
Plaintiffs reference and necessarily rely upon the labels
throughout the complaint.  He denied Pharmavite's request for
judicial notice of the IOM report, and the National Institute of
Health Biotin Fact Sheet,  because Pharmavite cites them to raise
factual disputes as to the relative rarity of biotin deficiencies
in the population that are not appropriate for resolution on a
motion to dismiss.  He also denied Pharmavite's remaining requests,
and the Plaintiffs' requests for judicial notice, because the
materials they reference are not necessary for the resolution of
the motion.

Next, the Judge cannot conclude as a matter of law that no
reasonable consumer would be misled by the labeling on the Biotin
Products.  Although courts have recognized that qualifying phrases
or statements may be material to determining a reasonable
consumer's understanding, "may" is misleading here because 99.9962%
of people have no possibility of benefiting from the Biotin
Products.  A reasonable consumer could understand "may" to mean a
reasonable possibility or a reasonable probability, rather than
merely a vanishingly small possibility on the order of 0.00138%.
And in view of the promises of the health benefit representation on
the labels, the Judge cannot find that the Defendant's disclaimer
is so unambiguous and express such that a reasonable consumer is
unlikely to be deceived as a matter of law by the health benefit
representations on the Biotin Products.

However, the Judge does find that the Plaintiffs' complaint is
lacking in the particularity of pleading required by Rule 9(b).
The complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding whether the
Plaintiffs saw the asterisk, read the corresponding disclaimer, and
if they did read it, how the disclaimer affected their purchasing
decision.  Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed with leave for
the Plaintiffs to amend to plead with the particularity required by
Rule 9(b) what they saw, relied upon, and understood with respect
to Pharmavite's labeling.

Finally, he dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claim for
injunctive relief.  He finds that the import of the Plaintiffs'
allegations is that Pharmavite can do nothing to alter its
advertising or product to make biotin supplements beneficial to the
Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs do not face the injury of being unable
to rely on Pharmavite's representations of its Biotin Products in
deciding whether or not they should purchase the Biotin Products in
the future.  They therefore do not have standing to seek injunctive
relief.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen dismissed with prejudice the
Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief.  The Plaintiffs' remaining
claims are dismissed without prejudice under Rule 9(b) but not
under Rule 12(b)(6).  The Plaintiffs will have 60 days to amend
their complaint.  The order disposes of Docket No. 12.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/AIDyVF from Leagle.com.

Eugene Anthony, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated & Amanda Holt, Plaintiffs, represented by Carrie Ann
Laliberte -- claliberte@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman
Balint, pro hac vice, Elaine A. Ryan -- eryan@bffb.com -- Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, P.C, pro hac vice, Stewart M. Weltman
-- sweltman@siprut.com -- Siprut PC & Patricia Nicole Syverson --
psyverson@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn.

Pharmavite, a California limited, Defendant, represented by Rene
Pierre Tatro, Tatro Tekosky Sadwick LLP.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned MEFAIL SERIFOSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. PHILLIPS & COHEN ASSOCIATES, LTD., the Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00024-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order certifying classes in this case, appointing the
Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly,
LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the
Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


PIXELS.COM: Faces Class Action in New York Asserting ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Pixels.com, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Pixels.com, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00387
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Pixels is the premier online marketplace for buying and selling
wall art, home decor, lifestyle products, and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


PRESIDENTIAL LIMOUSINE: Thurmond Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIE THURMOND and DAVID THOMAS, Individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PRESIDENTIAL
LIMOUSINE, PRESIDENTIAL LIMOUSINE, A NEVADA CORPORATION, and
PRESIDENTIAL LIMOUSINE CONCIERGE SERVICE, INC., and BRENT J. BELL,
Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-01066-MMD-PAL (D. Nev.), Judge Miranda
M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted
(i) the parties' Joint Motion for an Order Granting Final Approval
to Class Action Settlement; Approving Payment of the Settlement
Administrator's Fees; and Entering a Final Judgment; and (ii) the
Plaintiffs' Counsel's Unopposed Motion for Order Granting Proposed
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Approval of Named Plaintiff
Service Awards.

On Jan. 4, 2019, the Court considered the parties' Joint Motion and
the Plaintiffs' Counsel's Unopposed Motion.  Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e) and the FLSA, Judge Du granted final approval of the
settlement and finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate in all respects, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and
Class Representative Service awards provisions.

The Judge confirmed the appointment of Leon Greenberg and Dana
Sniegocki of Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation as the class
counsel for the settlement class and approved their requests for
attorneys' fees of $94,000 and an expenses payment of $9,039.55
from the Settlement Fund for their services on behalf of the
Plaintiffs and the Class.  He also finds that Simpluris as the
Claims Administrator will be paid an award for Administration Costs
of $7,815 for administering the Settlement in the matter.

The Judge confirmed the appointment of Willie Thurmond and David
Thomas as the Class Representatives; and approved and directed the
payment of $5,000 to each of them, to be paid from the Settlement
Fund, as the Class Representative Service Awards for prosecuting
the case successfully and securing the recovery for the Class and
such awards will be so paid as set forth in the Stipulation.

Upon entry of the Order, the case will have resulted in a Final
Judgment in respect to all claims and all parties and the Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/C4PfCR from Leagle.com.

Willie Thurmond, Plaintiff, represented by Dana Sniegocki , Leon
Greenberg, Leon Marc Greenberg , Leon Greenberg Professional
Corporation & Richard Segerblom .

David Thomas, George W. Caldwell, Wilson Alencar, Luis Maimo
Oropeza, Lynch J. Piernas, Rodney Spight, Michael A. Flores, L.
Scott Granneman, Mohamed Abdel Ghany, William Hanson, Mandrel
Jones, Richard M. Martinez, Anthony Ray, Justin Royston, Susan
Sparks, Oscar Velez, NyAnn L. Young, Chris Arambula, Barbara E.
Chandler, Carlos L. DeAlba, Jr., Scott Greenspan, Robert L.
Grossman, Sandra Hansel, Thomas G. Kelley, Scott J. Raymond, Lynn
Swartwood, Jr., Norbert Turas, Mark Berry, Miguel A Funes-Amador,
Danny Hoover, Glenna L. Magee, Jose Tirado-Cruz, Ricardo Zavala,
Carlos Aguilar, Lee A. Buchholtz, Darren Craney, Raphael J. Lee,
II, Trevor Skelton, Jason M. Patrick, Deren Pickens, Michael Walsh,
Zack Kalashian, Bryant Odis Johnson, Daniel Robledo, Rodney A
Strong, Randy White, Kenneth A Finegood, Imelda Sanchez, Myles
Bunch & David L Perkins, Plaintiffs, represented by Dana Sniegocki
-- dana@overtimelaw.com -- Leon Greenberg & Leon Marc Greenberg --
leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com -- Leon Greenberg Professional
Corporation.

Presidential Limousine, Defendant, represented by Anthony L. Hall,
Esq. -- ahall@hllandhart.com -- R. Calder Huntington, Esq.  --
rchuntington@hollandhart.com -- HOLLAND & HART LLP.

Brent J Bell, Defendant, represented by Anthony L. Hall, Holland
and Hart LLP, Dana Sniegocki, Leon Greenberg, Peter D. Navarro,
Holland & Hart LLP & R. Calder Huntington, MGM Resorts
International.

Bell Trans, doing business as, Defendant, represented by Anthony L.
Hall, Holland and Hart LLP & Peter D. Navarro, Holland & Hart LLP.


PROCARE CRS: Lawson Deal Approval Held in Abeyance Pending Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBORAH L. LAWSON, Individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PROCARE CRS, INC., dba
PRO-CARE COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL SERVICES, INC., a Domestic For
Profit Business Corp., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-00248-TCK-JFJ
(N.D. Okla.), Judge Terence C. Kern of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma held in abeyance (1) the Parties'
Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement and Dismissal
with Prejudice; and (2) the Parties' Joint Motion for Leave to File
Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement and Dismissal
with Prejudice Under Seal for 10 days, pending the Parties' filing
the appropriate Notice.

Lawson and the other Plaintiffs who filed Consents to Join, seek
payment of overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and Okla. Stat. tit. 40, Sections 165.1, et.
seq.  

On May 8, 2018, Lawson filed a Complaint on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated alleging that, at all times relevant
to her lawsuit, she was employed as a Habilitation Training
Specialist and/or Habilitation Training Specialist Supervisor/House
Manager for the Defendant.  She further alleges that while serving
in those positions, she was not exempt and was therefore entitled
to one and one-half times her regular hourly wage for all time
worked in excess of 40 hours in one week.  However, despite her
status as not exempt, Lawson frequently worked in excess of 40
hours per week, but did not receive overtime compensation for the
hours worked in excess of 40 hours.

Two days after the Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit, on May 10,
2018, 14 other employees executed Consents to Join.  The Court
entered a scheduling order on July 27, 2018, setting the close of
discovery on Dec. 27, 2018.  It appears from the parties' lack of
filings that discovery proceeded without incident after that point.
Finally, on Dec. 21, 2018, the parties filed their Approval Motion
and their Motion to File Under Seal.

As set forth in the parties' Joint Motions, the parties seek
approval of the Confidential Settlement Agreement and Full and
Final Release of Claims between the Defendant and the Named
Plaintiffs only.  The Defendant does not admit any liability in the
Settlement Agreement.  However, the parties agree as to the maximum
amount that each Named Plaintiff would recover if the Named
Plaintiffs were to fully succeed on their claims.  The parties
appear to further agree to a distribution of the Settlement Amount
such that each Named Plaintiff receives at least 75% of the amount
that they would have received had they been fully successful on
their claims.  Finally, both parties allege that the Settlement
Agreement is fair and reasonable.

Judge Kern finds that because the Court is not required to review
the merits of the settlement agreement, the public has no
compelling interest in the disclosure of the parties' Approval
Motion and Settlement Agreement.  Accordingly, the parties' filings
have been sealed, and will remain sealed until the parties inform
the Court whether they still wish for the Court to review the
merits of the settlement.  If the parties no longer wish for the
Court to review the merits of the settlement agreement, the motions
will remain sealed and will be denied as moot upon the parties'
filed stipulation of dismissal. If, however, the parties do wish
for the Court to review the merits of the settlement agreement, the
Court will also review the parties' Motion for Leave to File Under
Seal for compliance with Local Civil Rule 79.1(a) at that time.

He therefore ordered that within 10 days, the parties will file a
Notice with the Court advising whether they still wish for the
Court to review the merits of the settlement agreement.  If the
parties do wish for the Court to do so, the Court will review both
the Approval Motion and the Motion for Leave to File Under Seal at
that time.  If the parties no longer wish for the Court to review
the merits of the settlement agreement, to terminate the case, the
parties may include in their Notice that all claims have been
resolved, and that the parties desire to dismiss the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/KXk98i from Leagle.com.

Deborah L Lawson, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Queshnia Lashau Ackerson, Karissa Eileen Allen, Tonia
Renea Corbett, Dianna Teresia Demery, Gwenella Marie Hall, Rhonda
Denise Hall, Courtney Ann Harvel, Summer D Holkum, Crystal Renee
Lopez, Charity Nicole Mahone, Ronald DeLane Pozek, Kevin D Risley,
Ashton M Williams & Patsy Yandell, Plaintiffs, represented by Terry
Arthur Hall -- thall@okhnhlaw.com -- Law Office of Terry A Hall.

ProCare CRS, Inc., dba Pro-Care Community Residential Services,
Inc., a Domestic For Profit Business Corp., Defendant, represented
by Molly A. Aspan -- maspan@hallestill.com -- Hall Estill Hardwick
Gable Golden & Nelson.


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Settlement Reached in Flushable Wipes Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Gutride Safier LLP
regarding the Charmin Freshmates Class Action Settlement.

WHO IS AFFECTED

A class action settlement has been reached involving Charmin
Freshmates Flushable Wipes and any other pre-moistened wipes sold
under the Charmin brand name bearing the word "flushable" on the
package label ("Wipes").  The lawsuits claim that the Wipes are not
actually flushable.  The Procter & Gamble Company ("P&G") denies
these allegations and maintains that the Wipes perform as
advertised.  You may be an eligible class member if you purchased
the Wipes anywhere in the United States, except in the State of New
York, between April 6, 2011 and November 26, 2018.

WHAT DOES THE SETTLEMENT PROVIDE?

In connection with this settlement, P&G will include additional
information on the labeling of the Wipes and agreed to stricter
industry-standard testing protocols.  P&G will also provide a sixty
cent ($0.60) per-package refund, up to $4.20 household maximum, to
class members without proof of purchase.  A $30.00 household
maximum will be paid for claims submitted with a proof of purchase.
Proof of purchase means an itemized sales receipt originally
generated by a retail seller showing the date and place of
purchase, name of the product purchased, and the amount paid.
Proof of purchase can be provided in the form of a photocopy or
digital image file (e.g., PDF, JPG, TIF).

WHAT ARE MY OPTIONS?

You must submit a claim online by February 28, 2019 or by mail so
that it is received (not merely postmarked) no later than February
28, 2019 to receive a payment.  You can opt out of the class by
February 28, 2019 and keep your right to bring your own case
against P&G on the released claims.  The settlement will release
all claims related to Plaintiffs' contentions that P&G's marketing,
advertising, and sale of the Wipes with the representations
"flushable," "septic safe," and "safe for sewer and septic systems"
were false or misleading.  There is no release of claims for
personal injury or property damage allegedly caused by use of the
Wipes. You can also object to the settlement by February 28, 2019.
For details on how to opt out, object, or to file a claim, please
visit www.PettitWipeSettlement.com or contact the Claim
Administrator.  If you do nothing, you will not receive a payment
and you will be bound by the decisions of the Court.

COURT HEARING AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

The Court will hold a hearing on March 28, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. to
consider whether to approve the settlement.  This date and time may
change; visit www.PettitWipeSettlement.com for updated information.
If the settlement is approved, the attorneys for the class will ask
the Court for an award from P&G of up to $2,150,000 in fees, costs,
and expenses, and class representative payments of $1,000 to $5,000
for each of the named plaintiffs.  Note that the hearing date may
change without further notice to you.  You may attend the hearing,
but you do not have to.  Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs will be posted on the website after it is filed.

or

         Contact:
         The  Claim Administrator
         Pettit v. Procter & Gamble,
         c/o Claim Administrator
         PO Box 58280, Philadelphia
         PA 19102-8280
         Telelphone: 1-833-305-3913

or

         Contact Plaintiffs' counsel:
         Gutride Safier LLP, 100 Pine Street,
         Suite 1250, San Francisco, CA 94111.

The case name is Pettit et al. v. Procter & Gamble Company, U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No.
3:15-cv-02150-RS. [GN]


RAMADA WORLDWIDE: Breeze Files Suit under ADA in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ramada Worldwide Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Byron Breeze, Jr., on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Ramada Worldwide Inc., a foreign
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00465 (D. N.J., January
14, 2019).

Ramada Worldwide Inc. operates hotels in the United States and
internationally. It offers accommodations. The company's amenities
include swimming pools, on-site restaurants and lounges, conference
and banquet facilities, a business center, meeting rooms (for
meetings/conferences), and fitness facilities, as well as
facilities for weddings, and special and group events.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Erik Mathew Bashian
   Bashian & Papantoniou, P.C.
   500 Old Country Road, Suite 302
   Garden City, NE 11530
   Tel: (516) 279-1554
   Email: eb@bashpaplaw.com


RAYOSUN LLC: Naiman Sues Over TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------
Sidney Naiman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Rayosun, LLC, Freedom Solar Services, LLC,
Freedom Forever, LLC and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of
them, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00256 (N.D. Cal., January 14,
2019) seeks damages and any other available legal or equitable
remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Defendants, in
negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully contacting Plaintiff on
Plaintiff's cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, ("TCPA") and related regulations,
specifically the National Do-Not-Call provisions, thereby invading
Plaintiff's privacy.

The Defendant used an "automatic telephone dialing system" to place
its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. The
Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from
telephone numbers belonging to Defendant. Defendant's calls
constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes.

The Defendant did not possess Plaintiff's "prior express consent"
to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone. Yet, the
Defendant continued to call Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit its
services and in violation of the National Do-Not-Call provisions of
the TCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Sidney Naiman, is a natural person residing in Contra
Costa County, California.

Rayosun, LLC, Freedom Solar Services, LLC, Freedom Forever, LLC is
a solar energy company.

Doe Defendants 1 through 10, inclusive, are currently unknown to
Plaintiff, who therefore sues such Defendants by fictitious
names.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: 877-206-4741
     Fax: 866-633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@ toddflaw.com
            abacon@ toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com
            twheeler@toddflaw.com


SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Ct. Refuses to Certify Classes in Lil' Man Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jon S. Tigar denies the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the lawsuit entitled LIL' MAN IN THE BOAT, INC. v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Case No.
3:17-cv-00904-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Because neither of Lil' Man's proposed classes is sufficiently
numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the motion for class certification is denied, Judge
Tigar opines.

Lil' Man sought to certify two classes.  The first is the "Damages
Class," consisting of "[a]ll entities that paid a fee for
commercial vessel landings" at the North or South Dock between
"February 23, 2015" and "the date of class certification."  The
second is the "Declaratory Relief Class," which includes "[a]ll
entities that were asked [to] sign the 2016 Landing Rights
Agreement" to make "commercial vessel landings" at the North or
South Dock "from February 23, 2015 to the date of class
certification."

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Lil' Man in the Boat,
Inc., complains against Defendants City and County of San
Francisco, San Francisco Port Commission, and four of those
entities' employees (collectively "Defendants") about a
recently-amended landing agreement to use South Beach Harbor (the
"2016 Landing Agreement") the Defendants require commercial vessels
to sign.

Lil' Man complains that the agreement "impose[s] excessive fees and
charges and place[s] regulations and restrictions on vessels, with
the greatest unjustified imposition on commercial charter vessels
engaged in interstate commerce as a condition of landing at the
Port," and that "[t]he fees charged by Defendants bear no
relationship to the costs generated or to the services provided by
Defendants to commercial vessels."  Lil' Man contends the agreement
is an unlawful infringement of its constitutional rights and asks
the Court to declare the agreement unconstitutional and to order
the Defendants to pay damages and restitution.[CC]


SHOEBUY.COM: Online Footwear Firm Faces ADA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Shoebuy.com, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Shoebuy.com, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00388
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Shoebuy.com, Inc. engages in the online retail of women, men, and
kids footwear, apparel, bags, and accessories in the United States
and internationally. The company was founded in 1999 and is based
in Boston, Massachusetts. As of December 30, 2016, Shoebuy.com,
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Jet.com, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



SKAGIT REGIONAL: Court Extends Deadlines in McLean Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLA McLEAN and DANETTE RANGE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SKAGIT
REGIONAL HEALTH and CASCADE VALLEY HOSPITAL, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-01567-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, has
issued an order extending deadlines to respond to the complaint and
to file class certification motion.

The Plaintiffs and the Defendants, through their undersigned
counsel of record, have conferred regarding appropriate deadlines
for the Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint
in the putative class action, and for the Plaintiffs to file their
proposed class certification motion.  The proposed dates reflect an
extension of approximately five weeks for the Defendants to answer
or otherwise respond to the Complaint, and for a corresponding
extension of the Plaintiffs' class certification motion deadline,
in light of the intervening holidays and the parties' interest in
allowing time for initial discussions about the case.

Without waiving any claims or defenses, the parties stipulate to
and jointly request that Jan. 31, 2019 be set as the Defendants'
new response date to the Complaint, and that June 3, 2019 be set as
the new deadline for the Plaintiffs to move pursuant to Local Rule
23(i)(3) for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) as to
whether the case is to be maintained as a class action.

Accordingly, the parties agreed, and Judge Lasnik granted, that (i)
the Defendants will file and serve their response to the Complaint
by Jan. 31, 2019; and (ii) the Plaintiffs will file and serve their
motion for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), as to
whether the case is to be maintained as a class action, by June 3,
2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1z5OTD from Leagle.com.

Willa McLean & Danette Range, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Abbas
Kazerounian -- ak@kazlg.com -- KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC, Joshua
Swigart -- josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- HYDE & SWIGART & Ryan
Lee McBride -- ryan@kazlg.com -- KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC.

Skagit Regional Health & Cascade Valley Hospital, Defendants,
represented by Tim J. Filer -- tim.filer@foster.com -- FOSTER
PEPPER PLLC & Christopher G. Emch -- chris.emch@foster.com --
FOSTER PEPPER PLLC.


SUNRISE SENIOR: Van Cleave Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christian Van Cleave, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated v. Sunrise Senior Living Management,
Inc. and Does 1-50 inclusive, Case No. 37-2018-00061960 (Cal.
Super., December 7, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the California Labor
Code.

The Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and a
California Class in order to fully compensate the California Class
for their losses incurred during the California Class period caused
by the Defendant's uniform policy and practice which failed to
lawfully compensate these employees for all their overtime worked.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant in California as a
non-exempt employee entitled to overtime pay and meal and rest
periods from July 2016 to November 2018.

The Defendant Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. is a Virginia
corporation and conduct substantial and regular business throughout
California.  The Defendant specializes in senior living communities
which provide senior care services including assisted living,
independent living and memory care in the US, Canada and the UK.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Shani O. Zakay, Esq.
      ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC
      5850 Oberlin Drive. Ste. 230A
      San Diego, CA 92121
      Tel: (619)892-7095
      Fax: (858) 404-9203

          - and -

      Jean-Claude Lapuyade, Esq.
      JCL LAW FIRM, APC
      3990 Old Town Avenue, Suite C204
      San Diego, CA 92110
      Tel: (619)599-8292
      Fax: (619) 599-8291


TARGET CORP: Minn. App. Affirms Denial of In Forma Pauperis Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota issued an Opinion affirming the
District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis in the case captioned Roy A. Day on behalf of
himself and as class action on behalf of others similarly situated,
Appellant, v. Target Corporation, Respondent, Brian C. Cornell,
Respondent, Jane Doe, Respondent, Starbucks Corporation,
Respondent. No. A18-0611. (Minn. App.).

Appellant Roy A. Day alleges the following: Appellant attempted to
deposit five dollars in his Starbucks account at a Starbucks
located inside a Target store. However, when he checked his receipt
the next day, he discovered that only one dollar had been
deposited. The Appellant believed this to be part of a larger
scheme orchestrated by Target and Starbucks to enable cashiers to
steal from consumers. The Appellant sought to proceed in a class
action against Target and Starbucks, arguing three theories for
recovery: fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. He also filed a petition to proceed in forma
pauperis.

The district court denied appellant's in forma pauperis petition,
finding that the action was frivolous.  

A district court shall allow a litigant to proceed in forma
pauperis if it finds that the person meets financial eligibility
requirements and the action is not frivolous. A claim is frivolous
if it is without any reasonable basis in law or equity and cannot
be supported by a good-faith argument for the modification of
existing law.  

The Appellant argues that his action is not frivolous because he
has sufficiently pleaded claims for fraud, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligence.

To be sufficient, pleadings must contain a short and plain
statement of each claim showing that appellant is entitled to
relief.  

A claim of fraud must be pleaded with specificity that there was
(1) a false representation of a past or existing material fact
susceptible of knowledge, (2) made with knowledge of the falsity of
the representation or made without knowing whether it was true or
false, (3) with the intention to induce action in reliance on the
representation, (4) the claimant relied upon the representation,
(5) damages, and (6) the representation was the proximate cause of
the damages. Even generously construed, appellant's claim of fraud
fails. Appellant has failed to plead with specificity that there
was a false statement, he relied upon that false statement, and his
reliance resulted in the loss of his money.

The Appellant has also failed to sufficiently plead a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Intentional
infliction of emotional distress has four elements: conduct that is
extreme and outrageous, the conduct must be intentional or
reckless, it must cause emotional distress, and the distress must
be severe. Extreme and outrageous conduct is so atrocious that it
passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the
civilized community. Although appellant may conclude that the
alleged theft of his four dollars is outrageous, such an occurrence
is not utterly intolerable to the civilized community.  

In sum, the appellant has failed to plead a cause of action.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the action frivolous and in denying the petition to proceed
in forma pauperis.

A full-text copy of the Minn. App.'s December 24, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya9m35sk from Leagle.com.

Roy A. Day, Tarpon Springs, Florida, pro se appellant.

Target Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota, respondent.

Starbucks Corporation, Seattle, Washington, respondent.


TIGER DIRECT: Garey Files Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Tiger Direct, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Tiger Direct, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00390
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

TigerDirect is an El Segundo, California-based online retailer
dealing in electronics, computers, and computer components that
caters to business and corporate customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



TIO LEO: Huerta Suit Alleges Calif. Labor Code Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
Constancio Huerta, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Tio Leo Management Group, LLC and Does 1
through 100 inclusive, Case No. 37-2018-00061890 (Cal. Super.,
December 7, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for California
Labor Code violations.

The Plaintiff alleges unfair business practices, and civil
penalties stemming from Defendants' failure to provide meal
periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to
pay minimum and straight time wages, failure to pay overtime wages,
failure to timely pay all wages to terminated employees, and
failure to furnish accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff worked as a bus boy for the Defendants from October
2017 to March 2018.

The Defendant Tio Leo Management Group, LLC owns and operates
several Mexican restaurants in San Diego County. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Farzad Rastegar, Esq.
      RASTEGAR LAW GROUP, APC
      22760 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 200
      Torrance, CA 90505
      Tel: (310) 961-9600
      Fax: (310) 961-9094
      E-mail: farzad@rastegarlawgroup.com


TOT BABY CORP: Violates Disabilities Act, Garey Suit Asserts
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Tot Baby Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. The Tot Baby Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00389 (S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

The Tot Baby Corporation retails products for tots, mamas, and
mamas-to-be through its online store. It offers baby products, such
as bath and potty products, bouncers and rockers, car seats,
diapers, wipes, accessories, feeding bottles, feeding–solids,
nursing products, personal care products, sleeping products,
strollers and carriers, and teethers and pacifiers. The company
also provides information and advice to mamas-to-be and mamas in
the areas of fertility, pregnancy by month, birth prep, style and
gear, health and safety, wellbeing, nursery products, feeding,
sleeping, being mama, and tot life. The Tot Baby Corporation was
incorporated in 2016 and is based in Dallas, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com




TRES AMIGOS: Flynn & Toroveci  Suit Has Conditional Class Cert.
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned KILEY FLYNN and GLORIA
TOROVECI, et al., the Plaintiffs, vs. TRES AMIGOS, INC., a domestic
corporation, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-12426-MOB-DRG
(S.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Marianne O. Battani entered an order
on Jan. 3, 2019:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' pre-discovery motion for conditional
      class certification and court-supervised notice to potential

      opt-in Plaintiffs Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b); and

   2. directing Parties to issue revised collective notice
      submitted to the collective members.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class:

          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          Charles R. Ash, IV, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, Suite 1700
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: 248-355-0300
          Facsimile: 248-746-4001
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                  crash@sommerspc.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Matthew S. Disbrow, Esq.
          Sean F. Crotty, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Muse, Esq.
          HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ AND COHN LLP
          2290 First National Building
          660 Woodward Avenue
          Detroit, MH 48226-3506
          Telephone: 313 465-7000
          Facsimile: 313 465-7373
          E-mail: scrotty@honigman.com
                  mdisbrow@honigman.com
                  jmuse@honigman.com

TRUSTMARK NATIONAL: Sued for Overdraft Fees
-------------------------------------------
The Island Packet reports that two women say in a lawsuit that a
Mississippi-based bank is unfairly charging overdraft fees.

The Clarion Ledger reports Cryesha McDonald of Waynesboro and
Chantal Lewis of Jackson sued Trustmark National Bank this month in
federal court in Jackson. Lawyers representing the women seek
approval for a class-action lawsuit representing all the bank's
customers.

They allege Trustmark also charges surprise fees for using
automated teller machines on a different bank's network.

The suit claims Trustmark is unjustly enriching itself and breaking
its account agreement with customers.

Similar lawsuits have been filed against other banks.

The Jackson-based bank, with $13 billion in assets, didn't
immediately respond to a request for comment.

Trustmark holds the largest share of bank deposits in Mississippi,
and also has offices in Alabama, Florida, Tennessee and Texas.[GN]


UNITED AIRLINES: Fails to Pay Wages for Short-Term Military Leave
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC WHITE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. and UNITED CONTINENTAL
HOLDINGS, INC., the Defendants, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00114 (N.D. Ill.,
Jan. 7, 2019), seeks a declaration that Defendants violated the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)
by failing to pay Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class
during their periods of short-term military leave.

USERRA protects the rights of service members who take leaves of
absence from their civilian employers to perform qualified military
service. USERRA section 4316(b) requires military leave to be
treated no less favorably than other comparable forms of leave with
respect to the rights and benefits that employees receive during
their leaves of absence. Since at least January 1, 2006, the
Defendants violated this provision in two ways.

First, the Defendants had a policy and practice of continuing to
pay their employees' regular wages or salaries during certain
leaves-of-absence (such as jury duty and sick leave), but not
paying regular wages or salaries to employees when they take
short-term military leave. By paying employees when they took jury
duty leave, sick leave, and other comparable forms of non-military
leave, the Defendants were required by USERRA to do the same for
their employees who took short-term military leave. By failing to
pay wages and salaries to military service members during their
short-term military leave, while continuing to pay employees their
wages or salaries during periods of jury duty, sick leave, and
other comparable forms of non-military leave, the Defendants
violated USERRA's mandate to treat military leave no less favorably
than other comparable forms of non-military leave.

Second, United failed to credit employees' imputed earnings
associated with military leave or otherwise credit their military
leave for the purpose of calculating such employees' profit sharing
awards under the United Continental Holdings, Inc. Profit Sharing
Plan. By doing so,  United violated USERRA Sec. 4318, which
requires all employee pension benefit plans -- like United's profit
sharing plan -- to treat military service as continued service for
an employer. In addition, because Defendants did not give
profit-sharing credit to employees who took short-
term military leave but gave credit for the purpose of the profit
sharing plan to employees when they took comparable forms of
non-military leave such as sick leave and jury duty, United
violated USERRA Sec. 4316(b), which requires that employees who
take military leave receive the same rights and benefits, including
profit sharing, as employees who take comparable forms of
non-military leave.

As a result of these violations, Plaintiffs and other service
members employed by Defendants received less compensation than they
would have received if Defendants had provided them with paid leave
during periods of short-term military leave. In addition, the
Plaintiff and other service members who were participants in the
Profit Sharing Plan received smaller profit sharing awards than
they otherwise would have received if they had been paid during
military leave or if the Profit Sharing Plan had credited their
imputed earnings associated with their military leave for the
purposes of calculating profit sharing awards, the lawsuit says.

United Airlines, Inc., commonly referred to as United, is a major
United States airline headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. United
operates a large domestic and international route network, with an
extensive presence in the Asia-Pacific region.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Peter Romer-Friedman, Esq.
          Paul W. Mollica, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          601 Massachusetts Avenue NW
          Second Floor West
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 847-4400
          E-mail: prf@outtengolden.com
                  pwmollica@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          R. Joseph Barton, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          1735 20th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 734-7046
          Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
          E-mail: jbarton@blockesq.com

               - and -

          Thomas G. Jarrard, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS G. JARRARD LLC
          1020 N. Washington Street
          Spokane, WA 99201
          Telephone: (425) 239-7290
          Facsimile: (509) 326-2932
          E-mail: tjarrard@att.net

               - and -

          Matthew Z. Crotty, Esq.
          CROTTY & SON LAW FIRM, PLLC
          905 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 404
          Spokane, WA 99201
          Telephone: (509) 850-7011
          E-mail: matt@crottyandson.com

UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JOSIE RODRIGUEZ, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00018-JPS (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Fights Suit Over Underpaying Health Services
----------------------------------------------------------------
Morgan Haefner, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that
UnitedHealth Group filed a motion to dismiss a class-action lawsuit
claiming the health insurer unlawfully underpaid reimbursements for
mental healthcare, according to The Recorder.

Here are four things to know:

1. The class-action lawsuit filed against UnitedHealth's insurance
and behavioral health businesses accuses the companies of
underpaying certain psychotherapy services provided by
master's-level counselors and psychologists, but not physicians.

2. In its motion to dismiss the lawsuit, UnitedHealth said the
allegations go against "the common sense practice that health plans
reimburse healthcare providers with different training, experience,
and licensure at different rates. Contrary to plaintiff's
suggestion, it is not unlawful for [UnitedHealth defendants] to pay
a social worker less than a licensed physician would be paid for
the same service," according to the filing, which was obtained by
The Recorder.

3. The original lawsuit also accused UnitedHealth of violating the
ACA, which doesn't allow discriminatory coverage for psychologists
and master's-level counselors who act within the limits of their
state licenses, according to The Recorder. However, in its motion
for dismissal, UnitedHealth argued that the allegation lacked
standing to sue under the ACA.

4. On Dec. 11, U.S. District Judge Haywood Gilliam Jr. granted the
parties' request to extend briefing deadlines in the case. A
hearing is set for March 21 to review UnitedHealth's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit, according to The Recorder.[GN]


US AVIATION SERVICES: Haralson Asks for Initial Nod of Class Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned JAMES HARALSON, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated v. U.S. AVIATION SERVICES
CORP., et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-05207-JST (N.D. Cal.), moves the
Court for an order granting preliminary approval of the STIPULATION
FOR CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT he reached with the Defendant.

Specifically, the Plaintiff moves for an order to:

   1. grant preliminary approval of the terms of the Agreement as
      fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amount of
      the settlement, the amount of distributions to class
      members, the procedure for giving notice to class members,
      the procedure for opting out of the settlement, and the
      amounts allocated to the enhancement payments and
      attorney's fees and costs;

   2. preliminarily certify for settlement purposes the
      Settlement Class described in the Agreement as follows:

      All current and former non-exempt airplane cabin cleaners
      who performed services for USAS in California during the
      Class Period (August 9, 2012 through to Preliminary
      Approval);

   3. appoint the Plaintiff as representative for the Settlement
      Class;

   4. appoint Setareh Law Group as counsel for the Settlement
      Class;

   5. approve the use of ILYM Group as the settlement
      administrator;

   6. direct that notice issue to members of the Settlement Class
      as provided in the Agreement; and,

   7. schedule a final approval and fairness hearing on a date
      approximately 160 days after preliminary approval
      (August 15, 2019 is proposed) to consider whether the
      Agreement should be finally approved as fair, reasonable
      and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
      Procedure and to rule on the motion for attorney's fees,
      costs and enhancement award submitted by the Plaintiff.

According to the Motion, the Plaintiff negotiated a settlement that
resolves claims and recovers money for approximately 550 Settlement
Class Members.  The Plaintiff asserts that this settlement is fair
and reasonable, especially given the claims and the potential
defenses to them and to class certification.

The Court will commence a hearing on March 7, 2019, at 2:00 p.m.,
to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 907
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  scott@setarehlaw.com


VIDA SHOES: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Slade Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
LINDA SLADE, Individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, vs. VIDA SHOES
INTERNATIONAL, INC. d/b/a Jambu & Co., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00146-LGS (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 7, 2019), alleges that Jambu
failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website at
http://www.jambu.comto be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons,
in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the "ADA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. Plaintiff uses the terms
"blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual
impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they
have a visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x
200. Some blind people who meet this definition have limited
vision; others have no vision. Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau
report, approximately 8.1 million people in the United States are
visually impaired, including 2.0 million who are blind, and
according to the American Foundation for the Blind’s 2015 report,
approximately 400,000 visually impaired persons live in the State
of New York.

Vida Shoes International, Inc. designs, produces, and markets
footwear products. The Company sells its products through
departmental stores and specialty shops.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.,
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com

VIRGINIA: Court Orders Enforcement of Scott Suit Agreement
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CYNTHIA B. SCOTT, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. HAROLD W.
CLARKE, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 3:12-cv-00036 (W.D. Va.),
Judge Norman K. Moon of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division, ordered the
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, and discharged the show
cause order regarding contempt.

The case is an Eighth Amendment class action concerning the
long-term failure to provide adequate medical care to inmates at
the Fluvanna (Va.) Correctional Center for Women ("FCCW").  FCCW is
Virginia's primary women's medical prison.  The present Defendants
are officials employed by the Virginia Department of Corrections
("VDOC").

The Plaintiffs filed the underlying lawsuit in 2012.  Various
portions of their complaint survived dispositive motion practice.
The Court also certified a class of inmates seeking medical
treatment at FCCW.  After two years of litigation and days before a
scheduled bench trial, the parties reached a settlement in
principle.  They spent the next 10 months hashing out the details.

On Sept. 15, 2015, the parties jointly filed what the docket
reflects as a consent motion to approve consent judgment.  The
substance of the filing, however, referred to "preliminary approval
of the settlement.

After notice to the class, the Court held a fairness hearing where
it received testimony about the propriety of the proposed
Settlement Agreement, heard comments from objectors, and
entertained oral argument.  The Plaintiffs subsequently filed --
with the Defendants' approval -- proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law urging final approval of the settlement.  The
parties also submitted a stipulated proposed final order that would
(1) approve the Settlement Agreement, (2) declare the Settlement
Agreement implemented as of the date of the final order, and (3)
retain jurisdiction with the Court to ensure implementation of the
Settlement Agreement and the Court's power to preside over such
further proceedings as may be necessary or appropriate to enforce
its terms and conditions.

On Feb. 5, 2016, the Court entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law.  It reasoned that the Settlement Agreement was proper under
both Rule 23 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and it found
that the objectors' concerns did not counsel against final approval
of the Settlement Agreement.  The Court, in summarizing the
Settlement Agreement, referenced the Plaintiffs' ability to enforce
the settlement, seek contempt sanctions, or both.

That same day, the Court entered its final judgment order.  The
order granted final approval of the Settlement Agreement.  No party
appealed.

Just over a year-and-a-half later, the Plaintiffs filed their
motion to show cause why the Defendants should not be held in
contempt for failing to abide by the terms of the Settlement
Agreement -- what they called the Court's "consent judgment" of
Feb. 5, 2016.  The Court set the matter for a week-long bench trial
in June 2018.  In December 2017, after the parties briefed the
motion, the Court adopted the parties' joint request for a
discovery plan, which set the discovery deadline at May 1, 2018.

For the next several months, the volume and intensity of discovery
rivaled that of the hardest-fought merits litigation.  The
presiding magistrate judge held several conferences and hearings to
resolve various motions and discovery matters, and he provided a
few modest accommodations for the May 1st discovery deadline to
allow the parties to complete discrete discovery tasks.  Meanwhile,
the Court, upon inquiry by the parties, indicated it would rule on
the motion to show cause after receiving the Plaintiffs' prima
facie evidence at the June trial.

As the trial date approached, the parties submitted numerous
Daubert motions, motions in limine, and trial briefs.  The
Defendants even filed a motion for summary judgment, less than two
weeks before the trial date.

Finally, trial arrived.  At the close of the Plaintiffs' evidence,
the Court granted the motion to show cause, concluding that the
prima facie case has been made there's certainly a prima facia case
of at least to some extent that the settlement has not been carried
out.  At the time, the Defendants did not argue that contempt was
improper for lack of an operative injunctive order to enforce.

After years of litigation, the parties reached a detailed
settlement agreement to provide for constitutionally adequate
medical care at FCCW.  On the parties' request, the Court
preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement.  In February 2016,
the Court entered a final judgment order that conclusively approved
the agreement, declared it operative, and retained jurisdiction to
enforce it. The agreement provides similarly.

Judge Moon finds that, in some respects, the Defendants have
breached the Settlement Agreement.  He finds that over six years
ago, women at FCCW filed the lawsuit, seeking a remedy for
pervasive constitutionally deficient medical care.  Their quest
continues.  Some women have died along the way.  But the case has
survived because the Defendants have upheld neither their Eighth
Amendment obligations nor the Settlement Agreement they reached to
effectuate those obligations.  Accordingly, he ordered the
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, and discharged the show
cause order regarding contempt.  He directed the Clerk is directed
send a copy of these findings and conclusions to the counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 2, 2019 Findings of Fact is
available at https://is.gd/fj16XY from Leagle.com.

Cynthia B. Scott, A prisoner residing at Fluvanna Correctional
Center for Women, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Toni Hartlove, A prisoner residing at Fluvanna
Correctional Center for Women, Individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adeola
Oluremilekun Ogunkeyede -- adeola@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid
Justice Center, pro hac vice, Elizabeth Wilson Hanes --
elizabeth@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation Associates, PC,
Kimberly Anne Rolla -- kim@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid Justice
Center, Leonard Anthony Bennett , Consumer Litigation Associates,
Mary Catherine Bauer, Southern Poverty Law Center, Shannon Marie
Ellis -- shannon@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid Justice Center,
Abigail Turner -- abigail@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid Justice
Center, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall, PLC, Angela A.
Ciolfi -- angela@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid Justice Center,
Brenda Erin Castaneda -- brenda@justice4all.org -- Legal Aid
Justice Center, Casey Shannon Nash, Kelly & Crandall, PLC, Kristi
Cahoon Kelly, Kelly & Crandall, PLC, Philip Jerome Fornaci,
Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs,
pro hac vice & Theodore Augustus Howard -- thoward@wileyrein.com --
Wiley Rein LLP, pro hac vice.

Melissa Atkins, Plaintiff, represented by Angela A. Ciolfi, Legal
Aid Justice Center & Kimberly Anne Rolla, Legal Aid Justice
Center.

Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., Movant, represented by
Edward J. McNelis, III, Sands Anderson, PC.

Harold W. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections & A.
David Robinson, Chief of Corrections Operations, Virginia
Department of Corrections, Defendants, represented by Edward J.
McNelis, III -- emcnelis@sandsanderson.com -- Sands Anderson, PC,
Elizabeth Martin Muldowney -- EMuldowney@sandsanderson.com -- Sands
Anderson, PC, John Michael Parsons, Office of the Attorney General
of Virginia, Ruth Thomas Griggs -- RGriggs@sandsanderson.com --
Sands Anderson, PC, Diane Marie Abato, Office of the Attorney
General, James Milburn Isaacs, Jr., Office of the Attorney General
of Virginia, John Chadwick Johnson -- jjohnson@faplawfirm.com --
Frith Anderson & Peake PC, Kate Elizabeth Dwyre, Office of the
Attorney General, Katherine Cabell Londos -- klondos@faplawfirm.com
-- Frith Anderson & Peake PC, Nathan Henry Schnetzler , Frith
Anderson & Peake PC & Richard Carson Vorhis, Office of the Attorney
General.

Stephen Herrick & Eric Aldridge, Defendants, represented by Nathan
Henry Schnetzler, Frith Anderson & Peake PC.


WALKERHEALTHCAREIT LLC: Debra Bey Suit Transferred to S.D. Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, DEBRA BEY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WALKERHEALTHCAREIT, LLC,
WALKERSEARCHGROUP, LLC, ENCORE HEALTH RESOURCES, LLC, TIFFANY
WALKER and GREGORY WALKER, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-01167,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, to the U.S. District Court for Southern District
of Texas (Houston) on Jan 7, 2019. The Southern District of Texas
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-00060 to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Nancy F. Atlas.

The Plaintiff contends that Defendants, jointly and severally,
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards, by knowingly suffering and/or permitting
Representative Plaintiff and the putative Class members to work in
excess of 40 hours per week without properly compensating them at
an overtime premium rate for these overtime hours.

Walkerhealthcareit, LLC is in the executive placement business.[BN]


Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          James Papakirk, Esq.
          FLAGEL & PAPAKIRK LLC
          50 E Business Way, Ste. 410
          Cincinnati, OH 45241
          Telephone: (513) 984-8111
          Facsimile: (513) 984-8118

               - and -

          Andrew Ficzko, Esq.
          205 N Michigan Aveue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560

               - and -

          Gregory E. Hull, Esq.
          Flagel & Papakirk LLC
          50 E Business Way, Suite 410
          Cincinnati, OH 45241
          Telephone: (513) 984-8111
          Facsimile: (513) 984-8118

               - and -

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560

Attorneys for Gregory Walker, Tiffany Walker, WalkerSearchGroup,
LLC, and WalkerHealthCareIT, LLC:

          Colin D Dougherty, Esq.
          John J Haggerty, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
          10 Sentry Parkway, Suite 200
          Blue Bell, PA 19422-3001
          Telephone: (610) 397-6500
          E-mail: cdougherty@foxrothschild.com

Attorneys for Encore Health Resources, LLC:

          Katharine C. Weber, Esq.
          Matthew Richard Byrne, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS LLP
          PNC Center, 26th Floor
          201 E. Fifth Street
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 898-0050
          Facsimile: (513) 898-0051

WELLS FARGO: Bid to Vacate Arbitral Award in Tucker Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WELLS FARGO ADVISORS LLC, Petitioner, v. REAGAN
TUCKER, BENJAMIN DOOLEY, and MARVIN GLASGOLD, Respondents (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied Wells Fargo's motion to vacate
the arbitral award.

Before the Court is a petition by Wells Fargo to vacate an
arbitrator's partial final clause construction arbitral award which
held that the parties to an arbitration agreement consented there
to class-wide arbitration.

The Award arises out of a dispute in which three former Wells Fargo
financial advisors, -- Reagan Tucker, Benjamin Dooley, and Marvin
Glasgold -- claim that Wells Fargo failed to pay them, and a
putative class and collective, overtime pay required by the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and New York Labor Law ("NYLL").
Each Respondent is party to a New Financial Advisor Training
Agreement which, with limited exceptions, provides for the
arbitration of disputes.

Having failed in its chosen arbitral forum to limit the scope of
the arbitral proceedings authorized by the Agreement to individual
(non-class) proceedings, Wells Fargo now asks this Court to
intervene. It asks, inter alia, that the Court vacate the
arbitrator's construction of the Agreement and "[i]ssue an Order
directing Respondents that they must arbitrate their claims"
individually, on a non-class basis. Dkt. 1.

The
Respondents were all financial advisors working at Wells Fargo
branch offices in either New York or Texas.  In 2011 and 2013,
Respondents and Wells Fargo entered into employment agreements.
Each Agreement contains an alternate dispute resolution provision
that requires the parties to resolve any dispute, with certain
exceptions, through arbitration.  Each Agreement provides for
mandatory arbitration before either the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") or the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"), pursuant to its May 1, 1993 rules.

The Respondents claim that Wells Fargo, in violation of the FLSA
and NYLL, failed to pay them for overtime work.  They assert that
Wells Fargo, per policy, did not correctly tabulate the hours
worked by employees like the Respondents in its Financial Advisor
Training Program, in that it failed to use appropriate forms of
wage statements for such employees and Misclassified employees in
the Apprentice Phase of the Program as being exempt from overtime
requirements.

The Respondents sought to pursue their claims on a class-wide basis
before FINRA.  Rule 13204 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes, however, prohibits FINRA from
presiding over class arbitration actions. For that reason, FINRA
declined to hear the dispute.  The arbitration, therefore, has
proceeded before the AAA.

On Sept. 30, 2015, Wells Fargo filed an action in the District
seeking a stay of the arbitration to the extent brought on a class
basis and an order compelling arbitration to proceed on an
individual basis.  In Tucker, Judge Caproni, to whom that action
was assigned, denied Wells Fargo's application.  She held that,
under the Agreement, it was for the arbitrator, not a court, to
decide whether the Agreement provided for class arbitration.  Wells
Fargo appealed that decision.

On March 7, 2018, the Second Circuit affirmed.  It held that the
Agreement clearly and unmistakably expresses the parties' intent to
let an arbitrator decide whether they agreed to authorize class
arbitration.

On June 28, 2018, the arbitrator assigned to the Tucker
arbitration, Edith N. Dineen, issued a Partial Final Clause
Construction Award, the decision at issue.  She construed the
Agreement to allow the Respondents to pursue class claims in this
arbitration.

On July 27, 2018, Wells Fargo filed a petition in the Court to
vacate the Arbitrator's clause construction award insofar as it
construed the Agreement to allow the Respondents to permit class
arbitration, and an accompanying memorandum of law.  On Aug. 23,
2018, the Respondents filed a memorandum of law in opposition to
the motion to vacate.  On Sept. 6, 2018, Wells Fargo filed a
reply.

Wells Fargo makes two broad arguments.  First, it contends that the
Arbitrator exceeded her authority by (1) allowing an agreement to
permit the class arbitration to be inferred, rather than textually
explicit, and, ostensibly, requiring a party seeking to preclude
the class arbitration to include a provision explicitly waiving the
class arbitration; (2) in interpreting the Agreement, considering
evidence beyond the four corners of the Agreement; and (3) issuing
a clause construction award that, ostensibly, binds the absent
members of the purported class.

Second, Wells Fargo argues that the Arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law in reaching her decision, specifically by
ignoring holdings of the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen. The Court
addresses each argument in turn.

Judge Engelmayer finds that because the Arbitrator did not require
an express waiver to defeat a construction of the Agreement to
permit class arbitration, Wells Fargo's claim that the Arbitrator
exceeded her authority in so requiring necessarily fails.  Wells
Fargo does not cite any controlling law that precluded the
interpretive approach.  Quite the contrary, the Arbitrator anchored
her approach in substantial case law.

Next, he finds that Wells Fargo has failed to show that any errors
in the Arbitrator's construction of the Agreement support vacatur.
The broader response to Wells Fargo's critiques of the Arbitrator's
construction of the parties' agreement is this: Whether the
Arbitrator's construction or Wells Fargo's would prevail on de novo
review is beside the point.  Provided that the arbitrator recited a
contractual basis, persuasive or not, for the construction she
reached, that decision may not be overturned.

Wells Fargo next attacks the Award by arguing that the Arbitrator
exceeded her authority by purporting to issue an award which
extends to absentee class members.  The Judge finds that the
argument also fails.  The issue there involved the arbitral
certification of an opt-out class, such that members of that class
who had not affirmatively opted out stood to be bound by the
arbitrator's decision.  The Award is explicit that it does not
prejudge whether class certification would be appropriate.  At this
earlier procedural point, at which the sole issue is whether the
parties' Agreement permits class treatment, ock v. Sterling
Jewelers, Inc. is of no moment.

Finally, far from manifestly disregarding clearly applicable law,
the Arbitrator identified the relevant law, parsed it thoughtfully,
and endeavored to apply it with considerable care.  The Judge,
therefore, rejects Wells Fargo's claim of manifest disregard as
baseless.

For the foregoing reasons, in construing the Agreement to permit
class arbitration, the Arbitrator neither exceeded her powers nor
manifestly disregarded the law.  Accordingly, Judge Engelmayer
denied Wells Fargo's motion to vacate the arbitral Award.  He
respectfully directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions
pending at Dkts. 1 and 2 and to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 2, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/cAz3nG from Leagle.com.

Wells Fargo Advisors LLC, Petitioner, represented by Ashley Jean
Hale, Esq. -- ashley.hale@morganlewis.com -- and Kenneth Joseph
Turnbull, Esq. -- kenneth.turnbull@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS
& BOCKIUS LLP.

Reagan Tucker, Benjamin Dooley & Marvin Glasgold, Respondents,
represented by Paul W. Mollica -- pwm@outtengolden.com -- Outten &
Golden LLP, Justin Mitchell Swartz -- jms@outtengolden.com --
Outten & Golden, LLP & Paolo Chagas Meireles --
pmeireles@shavitzlaw.com -- Shavitz Law Group, P.A.


WISCONSIN: Bender Suit Alleges Civil Rights Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the State of
Wisconsin. The case is styled as Joseph W. Bender, Jeremy W.
Stroebel, Thomas G. White, Jr., Tyler S. Holman, Tyler J. Hood and
Chelsea N. Cadotte, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. State of Wisconsin, Anthony S. Evers, in
his official capacity as Governor of Wisconsin and Kelli S.
Thompson, in her official capacity as Wisconsin State Public
Defender, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00029 (W.D. Wis., January
11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as violation of
civil rights.

Wisconsin is a Midwestern U.S. state with coastlines on 2 Great
Lakes (Michigan and Superior) and an interior of forests and farms.
Milwaukee, the largest city, is known for the Milwaukee Public
Museum, with its numerous re-created international villages, and
the Harley-Davidson Museum, displaying classic motorcycles. Several
beer companies are based in Milwaukee, and many offer brewery
tours.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   H. Craig Haukaas, Esq.
   Haukaas Law Office, S.C.
   101 West Main St., Suite 201
   Ashland, WI 54806
   Tel: (715) 685-1001
   Fax: (888) 242-2099
   Email: craig@haukaaslaw.com

      - and -

   Thomas Blake Gross, Esq.
   Haukaas Law Office, S.C.
   200 Chapple Avenue
   Ashland, WI 54806
   Tel: (715) 685-1001
   Fax: (888) 242-2099
   Email: blake@haukaaslaw.com




YUMI KIM SHOP: Women's Clothing Line Faces ADA Class Action in NY
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Yumi Kim Shop Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Yumi Kim Shop Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00391
(S.D. N.Y., January 14, 2019).

Yumi Kim is a women's clothing line based in New York City, United
States, designed by American fashion designer Kim Phan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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