CAR_Public/190124.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, January 24, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 18

                            Headlines

410LEX INC: Boccio Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Bellenger Sues Over Auto-dialled Calls
ADT LLC: John Snow Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages for Sales Reps
ALBANESE ENTERPRISES: Epps Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Arbitration Bid Denial in Pichardo Suit Flipped

AMPLIFY ENERGY: Thompson FLSA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
ASSET RECOVERY: Ct. Withholds Ruling on Arbitration Bid in Vandehey
AUROBINDO PHARMA: Duffy Sues Over Carcinogen in Hypertension Meds
AVENUE THERAPEUTICS: Bushansky Files Suit Over Sale to InvaGen
AXOGEN INC: Faces Einhorn Securities Class Suit in M.D. Florida

BAYVIEW LOAN: Court Won't Dismiss R. Hackett's TILA Suit
BDO USA: McIntire et al Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
BENIHANA NATIONAL: Bid to Remand Ramirez Suit to State Court Denied
BOFI HOLDING: Grigsby Appeals Mandalevy Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
BOSWORTH PLACE: Never Pays Overtime Under FLSA, Dalfior Suit Says

CAMPBELL SOUP: Court Denies Bid to Remand Schwartz ICFA Suit
CANADA: $135MM Suit Accuses RCMP of Failing to Protect New Recruits
CANARY: Facing Class-Action Lawsuit Over Monthly Monitoring Fee
CIT BANK: Court Junks Tortious Interference Claims in M. Gray Suit
CLEAR MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Summary Ruling Bid in Morrison Suit

CLUBHOUSE DINER: Class Certification Sought in Viscomi Suit
CMRE FINANCIAL: Accused by Bonaventure of Calling Without Consent
COACH INC: Vaughn's Bid to Certify Denied; Jan. 29 Case Conf. Set
COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Davis Sues Over Deceptive Debt Collection
CORELOGIC INC: Stevens Files Petitions for Writ of Certiorari

CREDIT BUREAU: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Bassett FDCPA Suit
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Levi & Korsinsky Files Class Actions Lawsuit
DIAMOND RESORTS: Delara Action to Recover Unpaid Overtime
DISKOLAB LLC: Accused by Rodriguez Class Suit of Violating TCPA
FAITH AND FREEDOM COALITION: Pickett Hits SMS Ad Blasts

FCA US: Court Recommends Partial Dismissal of Canfield Suit
FINISAR CORP: Davis Files Securities Suit Over Sale to II-VI Inc.
FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses Wozniak Suit over Defective Lug Nuts
FTS USA: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Estrada FLSA Suit
GENMARK DIAGNOSTICS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Fulinara Says

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Bid to Dismiss Wilcox ERISA Suit Granted
GOD'S MOVING: Kenneth Woodson Seeks Minimum & OT Wages
GOLDMAN SACHS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
GOLDWATER BANK: Fabricant Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
HOLTGER BROS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Workers

HOME ATTENDANT VENDOR: Home Aides Claim Unpaid Overtime Wages
INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Arroyo Moves to Certify Class and Subclasses
JA SOLAR: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit
JEFFERSON PARISH, LA: Partial Summary Judgment in Mellor Reversed
JOY GLOBAL: Duncan Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval

KPMG LLP: Court Won't Certify for Interlocutory Appeal in Jones
KROGER CO: Brooks Sues for Invasion of Privacy
L.L. BEAN: Court Dismisses Berger Suit Without Prejudice
MADISON COUNTY, MS: Court Won't Certify MCSD Discrimination Suit
MARRIOTT INT'L:  Failed to Secure Private Info, Durant Sues Says

MERIDIAN PAIN: Sent Unsolicited Text Messages, Alvarez Suit Says
MIDWAY IMPORTING: Court Enters Final Judgment in Prudencio Suit
MONEY STORE: Court Refuses to Reconsider Asberry Suit Dismissal
NANO: Faces Fabian Suit Over Lost Investment
NATURAL HEALTH: Sued by Kauffman Over Pyramid Scheme in China

NCAA: Staggs' Injury Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
NEVADA GOLD: D'Arcy Wants to Halt Maverick Merger, Seeks Financials
NEVADA GOLD: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action Lawsuit
OPKO HEALTH: Adsport Securities Suit Transferred to S.D. Fla.
OVERTON RUSSELL: Luci Appeals Consumer Suit Ruling to 2nd Circuit

PACIFIC BIOSCIENCES: Speiser Balks at Merger Deal with Illumina
PARTNERS REIT: Gets Court Approval of Settlement of Class Action
PERSONAL-TOUCH: Cucinotta Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
PHELAN HALLINAN: Pa. Super. Affirms Demurrer Order in Johnson Suit
PLAINS ALL: Santa Barbara County Property Owners File Class Action

PONTILLO'S PIZZERIA: Ragaglia Seeks Overtime Pay, Hits Tip Pool
PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED: Martinez et al. Suit Moved to D.N.M.
RECIPES INC: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, Withheld Tips, Says Fabry
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Collazo Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
RUSS DARROW: Court Consolidates 2 FLSA Suits

SANTA CLARA, CA: Summary Judgment in Estorga FLSA Suit Partly OK'd
SC DATA: 8th Cir. Vacates Schumacher FCRA Suit Settlement Approval
SCOTT SEMPLE: Judge Rejects Efforts By State To Dismiss Suit
SELDAT INC: Misclassified Security Guards, D'Carpio Alleges
SIGMA TRANSPORTATION: Johnson Seeks to Recover Minimum & OT Wages

SMILEMAKERS INC: S. Wainess' TCPA Suit Remains in Dist. Court
SOLARIS HEALTHCARE: Swinson Claims Overtime for Hrs. Worked Over 40
SOUTH CAROLINA: Suit Settlement Calls for Testing Hep C Testing
SOUTH FLORIDA COURIER: Da Silva Files Labor Class Suit in NY
SSC KERRVILLE: Can't Compel Arbitration in Passmore FLSA Suit

STARBUCKS CORP: Court Dismisses Amster Suit Without Prejudice
STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Somerset FDCPA Suit
STITCH FIX: Faces Fischler Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web site
SWEPI LP: 6th Cir. Compels Arbitration in Ohio Landowners' Suit
TASKRABBIT INC: Diaz Sues Over Non-Blind Friendly Website

TD AMERITRADE: Judge Denies Class Action Certification
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY: Reaches $5.4MM Settlement in Students' Suit
TENARIS SA: Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
TESARO INC: Scarantino Balks at Merger Deal with GlaxoSmithKline
TOYOTA AUSTRALIA: Class Action Over DPF Issues Being Considered

UNION PACIFIC: Ct. Won't Certify Classes in Landing Agreement Suit
UNION PACIFIC: Settlement in Fowler Suit Has Final Approval
UNITED STATES: Prison Employees Hit Gov't Shutdown
USAA FEDERAL: Faces Eiess Class Suit Over Illegal NSF Fees
WELLS FARGO: Court Approves $480MM Settlement

WORLDWIDE TILE: Ayala Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
WYNDHAM HOTEL: Website Violates Disabilities Act, Breeze Claims
XPO LOGISTICS: Bernstein Liebhard Files Class Action Lawsuit
XPO LOGISTICS: Robbins Arroyo Files Class Action
YOUNIQUE LLC: Ct. Certifies Ca., Fla., Ohio Classes in "Schmitt"

ZIMMER BIOMET: Court Partly Stays J. Carl's FLSA Suit

                            *********

410LEX INC: Boccio Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Boccio and Sandra Castellano, individually and on behalf of
those individual similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. 410LEX, Inc.
d/b/a Pro Test Environmental and Thomas Leddy, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00283 (E.D. N.Y., January 15, 2019) seeks monetary damages,
declaratory, relief, and affirmative relief based upon Defendants'
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") New York Labor
Law ("NYLL"), New York State Department of Labor Regulations,
common law, and other appropriate rules, regulations, statutes and
ordinances.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully failed and
refused to pay the Plaintiffs overtime pay at a rate of 1.5 times
their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week.

Plaintiffs Boccio and Castellano  were employees of the
Defendants.

410LEX, Inc. d/b/a Pro Test Environmental, is a domestic business
corporation operating at 410 Lexington Avenue, West Babylon, NY
11552.

Thomas Leddy is the owner, or part owner and principal of Defendant
410LEX, Inc. d/b/a Pro Test Environmental.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Christopher K. Collotta, Esq.
     Ryan M. Eden, Esq.
     ZABELL & COLLOTTA, P.C.
     1 Corporate Drive, Suite 103
     Bohemia, NY 11716
     Phone: (631) 589-7242
     Fax: (631) 563-7475
     Email: CCollotta@laborlawsny.com
            REden@laborlawsny.com


ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Bellenger Sues Over Auto-dialled Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gina Bellenger, individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Accounts Receivable Management, Inc. and
Radius Global Solutions, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00117
(M.D. Fla., January 16, 2019) is a case involving activities
conducted by Defendants in contacting individuals believed to be
its debtors through use of prerecorded messages and automated calls
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the
Federal Communications Commission.

The Defendants have violated the TCPA by making calls to Plaintiff
and Class Members using an "automatic telephone dialing system" and
an "artificial or prerecorded voice" without Plaintiff's and Class
Members' prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA,
asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and statutory damages, all
arising from the illegal activities of Defendants, which used
pre-recorded and automatically dialed messages to solicit payment
from individuals it presumably believed to be debtors, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Gina Belleneger is a citizen of the State of Florida
residing in the City of Tampa.

Accounts Receivable Management, Inc. is a New Jersey corporation
with its principal place of business in Thorofare, New Jersey. ARM
is a debt collection agency.

Radius Global Solutions, LLC is Minnesota limited liability company
with its principal place of business in Edina, Minnesota. Radius is
a collection agency. In 2014, Radius acquired ARM.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: (305) 479-2299
     Facsimile: (786) 623-0915
     Email: efilings@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
     110 SE 6th Street
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 907-1136
     Fax: (855) 529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com

          - and -

     Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
     KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
     4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60630
     Phone: 312.283.3814
     Fax: 773.496.8617
     Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


ADT LLC: John Snow Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages for Sales Reps
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN SNOW, the PLAINTIFF, vs. ADT, LLC; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 5:19-cv-00021 (C.D. Cal., Jan.
4, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to pay overtime
compensation as well as minimum wage in a timely manner pursuant to
the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, on or about January of 2015, the
Plaintiff began employment for ADT in the position of Sales
Representative for the North County San Diego territory, which was
potentially lucrative territory for Plaintiff. At the time of his
hiring, the Plaintiff was misclassified as an employee "exempt"
from applicable Wage Orders. Since he began working in this
position, the Plaintiff has spent less than 51 percent of his
working hours engaged in the duties of actively selling to
customers, but he has spent more than 51 percent of his working
hours at his regular place of business.

However, the Plaintiff has not been paid minimum wage for all hours
worked and has not been paid overtime wages at an amount of 1.5
times his regular rate for hours worked in excess of eight hours
per day or forty hours per week from through present. Thus, during
pay periods where the Plaintiff's commission did not represent a
total equaling at least California minimum wage, his paycheck did
not include all wages owed for the identified pay period. Timely
payment cannot be cured, as ADT was aware of California minimum
wage requirements and the nature and distribution of Plaintiff's
duties. As a result of the above unlawful actions, ADT has gained
an unfair competitive advantage over law-abiding companies
complying with the Labor Code and applicable IWC Wage Orders, the
lawsuit says.

ADT LLC is a privately owned company with headquarters located in
Boca Raton, FL. The Company's line of business involves electronic
security systems.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Babak Semnar, Esq.
          Jared M. Hartman, Esq.
          Laurel N. Holmes, Esq.
          SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP
          41707 Winchester Road, Suite 201
          Temecula, CA 92590
          Telephone: (951) 293-4187
          Facsimile: (888) 819-8230

ALBANESE ENTERPRISES: Epps Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
DIONA EPPS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ALBANESE ENTERPRISES INC., d/b/a PARADISE GENTLEMEN'S
CLUB, ALBANESE ENTERPRISES INC., d/b/a LIVE BAR, KLODIAN "JOHNNY"
FERRA, individually, and LIANG ZHAO, Individually, Case No.
3:19-cv-00051-HES-JRK (M.D. Fla., January 9, 2019), is brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover alleged unpaid
minimum and overtime wages, liquidated damages and reasonable
attorney's fees and costs.

Albanese is a Florida Profit Corporation with its principal place
of business located in Jacksonville, Florida.  The Individual
Defendants are officers or managers of the Defendant Corporations.

Albanese owns and operates a club named Paradise Gentlemen's Club
located at 8669 Baymeadows Road, in Jacksonville, Florida; and
another club named Live Bar located at 331 East Bay Street, also in
Jacksonville.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) WORKERS
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3013
          E-mail: AFrisch@forthepeople.com


AMERICAN FINANCIAL: Arbitration Bid Denial in Pichardo Suit Flipped
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEJANDRO PICHARDO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
AMERICAN FINANCIAL NETWORK, Defendant and Appellant, Case No.
G054755 (Cal. App.), Judge Raymond J. Ikola of the Court of Appeals
of California for the Fourth District, Division Three, reversed the
trial court's order denying the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.

Pichardo is the named Plaintiff in a putative class action against
his former employer, the Defendant, for alleged wage and hour
violations.  The Defendant is a retail mortgage lender with offices
in 28 states.  It makes loans to consumers and then sells the loans
on the secondary market to investors.  It employs "Post Closers,"
who facilitate the sale of loans to investors.

In August 2015, the Plaintiff (a high school graduate with three
years of college coursework, who at the time was unemployed)
received an offer to work for the Defendant as a Post Closer.  On
his start date, he reported to the Defendant's hiring manager, who
gave him a stack of about 20 onboarding documents that he was
instructed to fill out before he could begin work.  According to
the Defendant, one of the documents that the Plaintiff signed was a
four-page document entitled "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Employment-Related Disputes."  Although the Plaintiff does not
recall signing the Arbitration Agreement, he does not deny that the
"wet ink" signature on the document is his or otherwise assert that
the signature was forged.

After one year of employment with the Defendant, the Plaintiff quit
his job.  A few months later, he was substituted in as the named
Plaintiff in a pending putative class action against the Defendant
for alleged wage and hour violations.

The Defendant moved to stay the trial court proceedings and compel
arbitration.  In its memorandum of points and authorities, it asked
the court to issue a statement of decision under Section 1291 of
the Code of Civil Procedure if the motion is denied.  In support of
its motion to compel, the Defendant provided a declaration by
Andrew Kalyviaris, the Defendant's chief compliance officer and
associate general counsel, attached to which was the subject
Arbitration Agreement.  Kalyviaris did not claim to have been
present when plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement or
otherwise attempt to authenticate the Arbitration Agreement.

The Plaintiff opposed the motion.  In support of his opposition, he
provided his own declaration, a declaration by the former named
plaintiff, and a declaration by his attorney, attached to which was
the Rules and Procedures document that defendant had produced in
response to the records request.

The court heard oral argument and took the matter under submission.
Four days later, it issued a three-page minute order denying the
Defendant's motion for the following reasons: (1) the Defendant
failed to authenticate  the Plaintiff's signature on the
Arbitration Agreement; (2) the class action waiver provision
violates the National Labor Relations Act; (3) the Arbitration
Agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and
(4) severance was not possible because the Arbitration Agreement
was permeated with one-sided, overly harsh and unfair provisions.
Two days later, the Plaintiff served a notice of entry of judgment.
The Defendant appealed.

On appeal, the Defendant challenges: (1) the court failure's to
provide a statement of decision in accordance with Code of Civil
Procedure section 632; (2) the court's finding that defendant
failed to authenticate the Arbitration Agreement; (3) the court's
finding that the Arbitration Agreement's class action waiver
violates the NLRA; (4) the court's finding that the Arbitration
Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and thus
unenforceable; and (5) the court's refusal to sever the offending
provisions.

Judge Ikola reversed the order denying the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration, and directed the trial court is directed to
sever section 8 of the Arbitration Agreement.  To be clear, he
opined that the Defendant's Rules and Procedures are not part of
the Arbitration Agreement.  While the Arbitration Agreement may be
procedurally unconscionable, after severance it is not
substantively unconscionable and is, without more, enforceable as
to the Plaintiff's individual non-PAGA claims.  The resolution of
any other issues bearing on whether arbitration should be compelled
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

In the interests of justice, each party will bear its or his own
costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Opinion is available at
https://is.gd/dzTLKc from Leagle.com.

Law Office of Brett C. LaCues, Brett Christian LaCues --
brett@lacueslaw.com; Fisher & Phillips, Wendy McGuire Coats and
Annie Lau -- alau@fisherphillips.com -- for Defendant and
Appellant.

Justice Law Corporation, Douglas Han -- dhan@justicelawcorp.com --
Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh -- statavos@justicelawcorp.com -- Daniel J.
Park -- dpark@justicelawcorp.com -- and Arsine Grigoryan --
agrigoryan@justicelawcorp.com -- for Plaintiff and Respondent.


AMPLIFY ENERGY: Thompson FLSA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Percy Anderson of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed without prejudice the case, HOWARD
THOMPSON, an individual, for himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AMPLIFY ENERGY CORP., a Delaware corporation doing
business in California; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-CV-09541-PA-E (C.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to each
and every claim therein, whether brought in an individual, the
class action, or the representative capacity.  The Plaintiff will
not re-file any wage-and-hour related complaint against Amplify
while the Jefferson Action is pending.

he putative class in the within action will not be given notice of
the dismissal because it has not received notice of the filing of
the action and because its rights are to be adjudicated in the
Jefferson Action.

Each party is responsible for bearing its own fees and costs
related to the instant action and its dismissal.

Amplify will stipulate to allow the Plaintiff in the Jefferson
Action to amend his operative complaint (provided it is remanded to
the District Court) to add the Additional Claims, subject to the
conditions set forth in the Order.

In the event that the plaintiff in the Jefferson Action amends his
operative complaint to add the Additional Claims, the defendants in
the Jefferson Action do not waive any defenses to the newly added
claims, including without limitation their contention that the
newly added claims do not relate back to the original filing date
in the Jefferson Action.

Amplify is relieved from filing a responsive pleading to the
Plaintiff's Complaint in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/kRqDbj from Leagle.com.

Howard Thompson, an individual, for himself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aris Edmund Karakalos --
aris@strausslawyers.com -- Strauss and Strauss APC, Michael Anthony
Strauss -- mike@strausslawyers.com -- Strauss and Strauss APC &
Andrew Clayton Ellison -- andrew@strausslawyers.com -- Strauss and
Strauss APC.

Amplify Energy Corp., a Delaware corporation doing business in
California, Defendant, represented by George W. Abele --
georgeabele@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP.


ASSET RECOVERY: Ct. Withholds Ruling on Arbitration Bid in Vandehey
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued a Decision and Order withholding ruling on the
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration in the case captioned
JACQUELYN A. VANDEHEY and MICHELLE L. O'LAIRE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ASSET
RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, VELOCITY INVESTMENTS LLC, and JOHN AND
JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 25, Defendants. Case No. 18-C-144. (E.D. Wis.),
pending supplemental pleadings.  

Plaintiffs Jacquelyn A. Vandehey and Michelle L. O'Laire, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, allege that
Defendants Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC (ARS), Velocity
Investments LLC (Velocity), and John and Jane Does Numbers 1
through 25 violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
by sending letters to Plaintiffs regarding consumer loans on which
they had defaulted.

The Plaintiffs challenge the admissibility of the loan and sale
documents attached to the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration
on hearsay grounds, arguing that the declaration filed in support
of their motion is insufficient to show that the referenced
documents constitute business records under Rule 803(6) of Federal
Rules of Evidence.  The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' objection
on grounds of hearsay as to the notes, the Borrower Registration
Agreements, and the Terms of Use of the Proper website are
unavailing. The question instead is whether the notes and contracts
have been properly authenticated.

The Defendants have filed the Declaration of W. Peter Ragan, Jr.,
Velocity's Vice President, to identify and authenticate the various
loan and sales documents they have attached to their Memorandum and
Reply Memorandum in support of their motion to compel arbitration.


According to the Borrower Registration Agreement, Prosper operates
the Prosper marketplace, which is an online credit platform that
offers, among other things, access to unsecured personal loans in
the form of a promissory note. All loans originated through the
Platform are made by WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank. In
order for the listing to result in a loan, the applicant must
receive aggregate funding in commitments from Prosper investor
members that equal or exceed the minimum funding amount applicable
to the listing.

The Borrower Registration Agreement includes the applicant's
express consent to electronic transactions and disclosures, as set
forth in the Terms and Conditions of Use, which are incorporated by
reference. The Agreement states in bold letters: "You expressly
agree that each of (a) this Agreement and (b) any Promissory Note
in the form set forth on the attached Exhibit A that we sign on
your behalf, may comprise a 'transferrable record' for all purposes
under the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act."

The Court further finds that it is unclear what the Plaintiffs mean
in their denials of having signed the notes or authorized Prosper
Marketplace to act as their attorney-in-fact in signing the notes
on their behalf. Do they mean that they did not physically affix
their signature to the notes or a document appointing Prosper
Marketplace their attorney-in-fact and authorizing it to sign the
notes on their behalf? If that is all they are saying, they are
playing games since it is clear from the circumstances surrounding
the loans that any signatures would have been electronic, not
physical. The same is true of their statement that they are unaware
of doing anything that would have given Prosper Marketplace
permission to act on their behalf. Do they mean that they never
obtained a loan through the Prosper Marketplace? Or are they saying
that they did obtain the loans reflected in the notes, but did not
read, or do not now recall, the Borrower Registration Agreements
and Terms of Use they were apparently required to electronically
sign as a condition of obtaining the loans? Given the equivocal
statements in their respective declarations, it is unclear whether
Plaintiffs are denying the validity and enforceability of the notes
because they did not lawfully assent to the terms, whether or not
they read those terms, or whether they are simply saying they
didn't physically sign any notes or powers of attorney, which under
the circumstances is irrelevant.

Civil litigation is too expensive to allow it to get bogged down in
such obfuscation.

The court will therefore hold an evidentiary hearing on Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration to clarify the record unless the
parties are able to do so by supplementing the record.

The Plaintiffs also challenge the Defendants' claim that they
acquired the right to assert any rights under the arbitration and
class action waiver provisions of the notes that might exist. In
other words, they challenge the sales documents Ragan identifies in
his declaration. Ragan's declaration would seem sufficient to
authenticate some of the sales documents as records kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business within the meaning of Rule
803(6).  

The evidence is less clear concerning Proper's interest in the
loans. Prosper's interest in the loans is evidenced by the
Certificates of Loan Sale signed by Kelly Barnett, the President of
WebBank, certifying that each of the loans identified by loan
number on the attached Exhibit A was originated by WebBank,
serviced by Prosper or its affiliate PMI, and that WebBank then
"transferred, assigned, and conveyed to Prosper Funding LLC and its
successors and permitted assigns, all right, title and interest
WebBank held in each Asset. The Certificates of Loan Sale,
according to Ragan, are copies of documents Velocity received from
Prosper as part of the loan purchase transaction. But as Plaintiffs
point out, the certificates are not in the form of a sworn
affidavit or declaration, and they do not constitute
contemporaneous records of the business of WebBank. Since it is
necessary to clarify the record as to whether Plaintiffs
electronically signed the notes and/or appointment of Prosper
Marketplace as their attorney-in-fact, Defendants should use the
same opportunity to more clearly substantiate the chain of title to
the loans at issue.

Even aside from these evidentiary issues, the Plaintiffs contend
that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable under the
circumstances of this case. Since if the Plaintiffs are right, it
would render the evidentiary issues moot, the Court turns to the
Plaintiffs' more substantive arguments in opposition to Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration.

Enforceability of Arbitration Provision

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) embodies a national policy
favoring arbitration and requires courts to place arbitration
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.

Under the FAA, a court must compel arbitration if three elements
are present: (1) an enforceable written agreement to arbitrate (2)
a dispute within the scope of the arbitration agreement and (3) a
refusal to arbitrate. Once an enforceable arbitration contract is
shown to exist, questions as to the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.

Assuming PMI's electronic signatures as attorney-in-fact for the
Plaintiffs are valid and enforceable, the Plaintiffs are bound by
the terms of the notes PMI signed on their behalf. The Plaintiffs
argue, however, that it is clear both Defendants are not entitled
to the benefit of the arbitration clause. The Plaintiffs argue that
the court can readily dispose of the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration as it relates to the claims against ARS because ARS
does not fall within the definition of those covered by the
arbitration clause.

Paragraph 18(a)(ii) of the note defines those whose disputes with
the borrowers are subject to arbitration as: WebBank, any person
servicing this Note for WebBank, any subsequent holders of this
Note or any interest in this Note, any person servicing the Note
for such subsequent holder of this Note, and each of their
respective parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors,
successors, and assigns, as well as the officers, directors, and
employees of each of them. This definition is broad enough to
encompass ARS. Ragan states in his supplemental declaration that
after Velocity purchased the Vandehey and O'Laire loans, Galaxy, a
company that services the debts purchased by Velocity, authorized
ARS to service the debts purchased by Velocity.   

Thus, ARS was servicing the notes for Velocity, a subsequent holder
of the notes. As such, both Velocity and ARS fall within the
definition of those entitled to enforce the arbitration provision
to resolve Plaintiffs' disputes.

The Plaintiffs also dispute whether Velocity is a subsequent holder
of the notes. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have failed
to prove a transfer of Vandehey and O'Laire's specific loans to
Velocity. They contend that the exhibits Defendants have offered
fail to establish that any note was negotiated or that any interest
in the loans was assigned or sold to Velocity. But as noted above,
the Bills of Sale, Exhibits D and F, show that Prosper sold
Plaintiffs' accounts to Velocity.   

Assuming, as Ragan asserts in his declaration, that WebBank sold
its interest in Plaintiffs' loans to Prosper, the Bills of Sale
clearly indicate that the loan accounts, and evidences of debt were
transferred to Velocity. Evidences of debt would presumably include
the notes, though Defendants may wish to make this more clear when
they supplement the record. Velocity would therefore be considered
a holder of the notes Plaintiffs gave to WebBank. As such, Velocity
would be entitled to enforce the arbitration provision.

The Plaintiffs next contend that the Defendants waived their right
to arbitrate any dispute by failing to assert it earlier in the
proceeding. Waiver of a right to enforce arbitration can be either
explicit or inferred from a party's actions. There was no explicit
waiver here. To find implied waiver, a court must consider the
totality of the circumstances and determine that a party acted
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Relevant factors to
consider in this analysis include the allegedly defaulting party's
diligence or lack thereof, delay in requesting arbitration, and
participation in discovery, as well as prejudice to the party
asserting waiver. Diligence and prejudice are weighed most heavily.


The Court concludes that the record is unclear as to whether
Plaintiffs assented to the terms of the note either directly or by
authorizing Prosper Marketplace to sign the notes on their behalf
as their attorney-in-fact. The evidence is also insufficient to
establish that WebBank assigned the notes to Prosper, which in turn
transferred them to Velocity. The chain of title to the debts and
notes evidencing them should be clarified by Velocity.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y8kp3k7e from
Leagle.com.

Jacquelyn A Vandehey & Michelle L O'Laire, Plaintiffs, represented
by Francis R. Greene, Stern Thomasson LLP, Philip D. Stern, Stern
Thomasson LLP & Andrew T. Thomasson, Stern Thomasson LLP.

Asset Recovery Solutions LLC, an Illinois limited liability company
& Velocity Investments LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company,
Defendants, represented by Douglas A. Albritton --
albritton@actuatelaw.com -- Actuate Law LLC.


AUROBINDO PHARMA: Duffy Sues Over Carcinogen in Hypertension Meds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Duffy, Joseph Cacaccio, And Cecil Byrd, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., CVS Health Co., Rite Aid Corporation
and Throggs Neck Pharmacy, Defendants., Case No. 19-cv-00088 (S.D.
N.Y., January 3, 2019), seeks compensatory, statutory and punitive
damages, prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded, restitution
and all other forms of equitable monetary relief, injunctive relief
and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and costs of suit
resulting from negligence, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of
implied and express warranty and for violation of South Carolina's
Unfair Trade Practices Act, New York general business laws.

Aurobindo, CVS, Rite Aid and Throggs Neck Pharmacy are alleged of
manufacturing, distributing and selling valsartan-containing
generic prescription medications contaminated with
N-nitrosodiethylamine, a carcinogenic and liver-damaging impurity.
Valsartan is a prescription medication mainly used for the
treatment of high blood pressure and congestive heart failure.

Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc. has been engaged in the manufacturing,
sale and distribution of generic drugs in the United States.
Throggs Neck Pharmacy, CVS and Rite Aid Corporation are pharmacy
chains with locations all over the US and carry Autobindo's drugs.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
      BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
      888 Seventh Avenue
      New York, NY 10019
      Telephone: (212) 989-9113
      Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
      E-Mail: jmarchese@bursor.com


AVENUE THERAPEUTICS: Bushansky Files Suit Over Sale to InvaGen
--------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Bushansky, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Avenue Therapeutics, Inc.,
Lindsay A. Rosenwald, Lucy Lu,Neil Herskowitz, Jay Kranzler, Akhtar
Samad, Jeffrey Paley and Michael S. Weiss, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00085-UNA (D. Del., January 15, 2019) is a stockholder
class action brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all
other public stockholders of Avenue Therapeutics, Inc. against
Avenue and the members of Avenue's Board of Directors for their
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and to enjoin the vote on a
proposed transaction, pursuant to which Avenue will be acquired by
InvaGen Pharmaceuticals Inc. in a two-stage transaction.

On November 13, 2018, Avenue and InvaGen issued a joint press
release announcing they had entered into a Stock Purchase and
Merger Agreement dated November 12, 2018 to sell Avenue to InvaGen
in a two-stage transaction.

On December 21, 2018, Avenue filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on
Schedule 14A with the SEC. The Proxy Statement, which recommends
that Avenue stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction,
omits or misrepresents material information concerning, among other
things: (i) Avenue's financial projections, relied upon by the
Company's financial advisor, Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., in its
financial analyses, which are wholly omitted from the Proxy
Statement; (ii) the data and inputs underlying the financial
valuation analyses that support the fairness opinion provided by
Oppenheimer; (iii) the background process leading to the Proposed
Transaction; (iv) Oppenheimer's potential conflicts of interest;
and (v) potential conflicts of interest faced by Company insiders.
The failure to adequately disclose such material information
constitutes a violation the Exchange Act as Avenue stockholders
need such information in order to make a fully informed decision
whether to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction or seek
appraisal.

In short, unless remedied, Avenue's public stockholders will be
forced to make a voting or appraisal decision on the Proposed
Transaction without full disclosure of all material information
concerning the Proposed Transaction being provided to them.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the stockholder vote on the Proposed
Transaction unless and until such Exchange Act violations are
cured, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a stockholder of Avenue.

Avenue is a Delaware corporation, with its principal executive
offices located at 2 Gansevoort Street, 9th Floor, New York, New
York 10014. The Company is a specialty pharmaceutical company that
acquires, licenses, develops, and commercializes products primarily
for use in the acute/intensive care hospital setting. Avenue's
common stock trades on the NASDAQ Capital Market under the ticker
symbol "ATXI".

Lindsay A. Rosenwald has been Executive Chairman of the Board since
the Company's inception on February 9, 2015. Defendant Rosenwald
has been Chairman and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Fortress
Biotech, Inc. since December 2013.

Lucy Lu has been President, CEO and a director of the Company since
its inception on February 9, 2015. From February 2012 to June 2017,
defendant Lu previously served as the Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer of Fortress.

Neil Herskowitz has been a director of the Company since August
2015.

Jay Kranzler has been a director of the Company since February
2017.

Jeffrey Paley has been a director of the Company since December
2015.

Akhtar Samad has been a director of the Company since December
2015.

Michael S. Weiss has been a director of the Company since February
2015. Defendant Weiss also serves in several capacities at
Fortress, most recently as Executive Vice Chairman since February
2014.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
     O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
     901 N. Market St., Suite 1000
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 778-4000
     Email: rernst@oelegal.com

          - and -

     Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
     Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
     Kelly K. Moran, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
     New York, NY 10036
     Phone: (212) 682-3025
     Fax: (212) 682-3010


AXOGEN INC: Faces Einhorn Securities Class Suit in M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------------------
NEIL EINHORN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. AXOGEN, INC, KAREN ZADEREJ, PETER J. MARIANI, GREGORY
G. FREITAG, JAMIE M. GROOMS, ROBERT J. RUDELIUS, MARK GOLD, JOHN
HARPER, JOE MANDATO, GUIDO NEELS, AMY WENDELL, LEERINK PARTNERS
LLC, CANTOR FITZGERALD & CO., JMP SECURITIES LLC, JEFFERIES LLC,
and WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., Case No. 8:19-cv-00069 (M.D.
Fla., January 9, 2019), pursues claims against the Defendants under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Mr. Einhorn alleges that the Registration Statements the Defendants
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the Company's public offerings were false and misleading and
omitted to state material adverse facts.  Specifically, he
contends, the Defendants failed to disclose to investors that,
among other things: (1) the Company aggressively increased prices
to mask lower sales; (2) the Company's pricing alienated customers
and threatened the Company's future growth; (3) ambulatory surgery
centers form a significant part of the market for the Company's
products; (4) such centers were especially sensitive to price
increases; and (5) the Company was dependent on a small number of
surgeons whom the Company paid to generate sales.

AxoGen is incorporated under the laws of Minnesota with its
principal executive offices located in Alachua, Florida.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.
Defendants Leerink, Cantor, JMP, Jefferies, and William Blair
served as underwriters for the Company's public offerings.

AxoGen purports to provide surgical solutions for physical damage
or discontinuity to peripheral nerves. Its products include nerve
allografts and extracellular matrices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leo W. Desmond, Esq.
          DESMOND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          5070 Highway A1A, Suite D
          Vero Beach, FL 32963
          Telephone: (772) 231-9600
          Facsimile: (772) 231-0300
          E-mail: lwd@desmondlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  rprongay@glancylaw.com
                  lportnoy@glancylaw.com
                  clinehan@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Howard G. Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
          3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
          Bensalem, PA 19020
          Telephone: (215) 638-4847
          Facsimile: (215) 638-4867
          E-mail: hsmith@howardsmithlaw.com


BAYVIEW LOAN: Court Won't Dismiss R. Hackett's TILA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
issued a Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned RICHARD HACKETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAYVIEW
LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No.
18-cv-01286-PX. (D. Md.).

The Complaint avers that Bayview, as an agent for the Bank,
improperly assessed property preservation or inspection charges on
loans that it serviced and improperly denied the Hacketts' loan
modification application. As a result, the Hacketts filed suit
individually and on behalf of three subclasses of debtors,
asserting violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the
Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Practices Act; the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act, the Maryland usury statute; the Maryland
Mortgage Fraud Protection Act and the common law doctrine of unjust
enrichment.  

Dismissal of TILA Claims

In responding to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Hacketts
concede dismissal of the TILA claims in light of this Court's
recent dismissal of nearly identical claims. The Hacketts are
correct that dismissal of the TILA claims is warranted for the same
reasons articulated in Kemp. Kemp v. Seterus, Inc., No. 18-472,
2018 WL 3159070, at *4-6 (D. Md. June 27, 2018).

TILA mandates that a creditor or servicer of a home loan shall send
an accurate payoff balance within a reasonable time, but in no case
more than 7 business days, after the receipt of a written request
for such balance from or on behalf of the borrower.

In Kemp, the plaintiff brought TILA claims on behalf of herself and
a putative class against a loan servicer and an assignee creditor
arising from the assessment of property inspection fees.

This Court held that the TILA claims against the loan servicer are
clearly dismissible because the loan servicer was neither a
creditor nor assignee of a creditor. The Court then found that
Fannie Mae, as an assignee creditor, was not liable under TILA
because the alleged inaccuracy forming the basis of the TILA
violation (the assessment of inspection fees) was not apparent on
the face of the disclosure statement.  

Similar to Kemp, the claims against Bayview fail because Bayview,
as loan servicer, is neither a creditor nor assignee creditor.
Accordingly, assessment of such fees could not render the
disclosure statement facially inaccurate. Assignee liability
against the Bank under TILA cannot attach.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the
TILA claims.

Remaining State Law Claims

As to the remaining state law claims, the Hacketts argue that
remand is warranted.
The Defendants disagree, contending that the Court maintains
diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims.  

The Court finds that diversity jurisdiction is lacking and
exercises its inherent authority to remand the case.

This Court, as one of limited jurisdiction, may hear only civil
cases that implicate a federal question or are brought pursuant to
the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is
proper where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and no
plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Where
diversity jurisdiction is proper, a defendant may remove the case
to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441.  

The parties confine their jurisdictional dispute to the allegations
in the Complaint. The Hacketts expressly limit the amount in
controversy to $63,500 on their individual claims, a sum decidedly
not in excess of $75,000. Further, although the Hacketts would be
entitled, in theory, to additional damages based on membership in
the putative class, the Court has no way of determining the
Hacketts pro rata share of the recoverable class claims. Because
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that any individual class
member, let alone the Hacketts, seeks to recover an amount
exceeding $75,000, diversity jurisdiction is lacking.

In deciding whether to dismiss or remand, the Court must consider
'principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' and
whether the efforts of a party in seeking remand amount to a
'manipulative tactic.'  Efficiency and continuity of the case tilt
in favor of remand over dismissal, particularly where removal has
now delayed the case for the better part of a year. Furthermore,
the Court does not find that the Hacketts have sought dismissal of
the TILA claims to manipulate jurisdiction; rather dismissal is
warranted on the merits and in light of recent persuasive
authority. Remand in this context is appropriate.

The Court remands the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland, and denies as moot the Defendants' motion to
dismiss as to the non-TILA claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydb395qu
from Leagle.com.

Richard Hackett, on their behalf and on behalf of three classes of
similarly situated persons & Megan Hackett, on their behalf and on
behalf of three classes of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,
represented by Phillip R. Robinson, Consumer Law Center LLC.

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC & The Bank of New York Mellon, as
Trustee for the Certificate Holders of the CWALT, Inc., Alternative
Loan Trust 2006-OA19, Defendants, represented by Andrew North Cook
-- andrew.cook@klgates.com -- K and L Gates LLP, Andrew C. Glass --
andrew.glass@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory N.
Blase -- gregory.blaze@klgates.com -- K and L Gates LLP, pro hac
vice & Hollee Watson -- hollee.watson@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP,
pro hac vice.


BDO USA: McIntire et al Suit Transferred to S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A case, ARIC MCINTIRE, and HENRY WASIK, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. STEVEN M.
MARIANO, THOMAS C. SHIELDS, JOHN R. DEL PIZZO, AUSTIN J.
SHANFELTER, CHRISTOPHER PESCH, CHARLES H. WALSH, QUENTIN P. SMITH,
BDO USA LLP, UBS SECURITIES LLC, BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP.,
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY, INC., JMP SECURITIES LLC, and WILLIAM
BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., the Defendants, Case No. 0:18-cv-60075,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Foley Square) on Jan. 4, 2019. The Southern
District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00098-CM
to the proceeding. The case is Assigned to Hon. Judge Colleen
McMahon.

The case is a securities class action on behalf of all purchasers
of Patriot National common stock from January 15, 2015 to November
22, 2017 who sustained significant losses due to the Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws. From the moment Patriot
National sold shares to the public in its initial public offering
on January 15, 2015, the Defendants, led by Steven Mariano, Patriot
National's controlling stockholder and former Chairman, President,
and Chief Executive Officer, presented a false image of Patriot
National and its business, the lawsuit says.

BDO USA, LLP is the United States Member Firm of BDO International,
a global accounting network. The company is headquartered in
Chicago. UBS Securities Co., Ltd. is a Chinese investment bank and
brokerage firm that affiliated to Swiss investment bank UBS, which
was the second largest shareholder for 24.99% stake. BMO Capital
Markets is the investment banking subsidiary of Canadian Bank of
Montreal. The company offers corporate, institutional and
government clients access to a range of financial services.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Cullin Avram O'Brien, Esq.
          CULLIN O'BRIEN LAW, P.A.
          6541 NE 21st Way
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308
          Telephone: (561) 676-6370
          Facsimile: (561) 320-0285
          E-mail: cullin@cullinobrienlaw.com


Attorneys for Steven M. Mariano:

          Michael Edward Dutko, Jr., Esq.
          William R. Scherer, Esq.
          CONRAD & SCHERER
          633 South Federal Highway, 8th Floor
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 462-9567
          E-mail: wrs@conradscherer.com

Attorneys for Thomas C. Shields and John R. Del Pizzo:

          Bradley Joseph Bondi, Esq.
          Jason Michael Hall, Esq.
          Peter J. Linken, Esq.
          CHAILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
          1990 K. Street, NW, Suite 950
          Wasington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 862-8910
          E-mail: bbondi@cahill.com
                  jhall@cahill.com

Attorneys for Austin J. Shanfelter:

          Marcos Daniel Jimenez, Esq.
          MARCOS D. JIMENEZ, P.A.
          255 Alhambra Circle, Suite 800
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 570-3249
          E-mail: mdj@mdjlegal.com

Attorneys for Christopher Pesch and Quentin P. Smith:

          Erica Gomer, Esq.
          Jason Samuel Oletsky, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          350 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1600
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 463-2700
          E-mail: erica.gomer@akerman.com
                  jason.oletsky@akerman.com

               - and -

          Christopher Bosch, Esq.
          John P. Stigi, III, Esq.
          Kandace Watson, Esq.
          Rena Andoh, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMILTON LLP
          12275 El Camino Real, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 720-8900
          E-mail: cbosch@sheppardmullin.com
                  jstigi@sheppardmullin.com
                  kwatson@sheppardmullin.com
                  randoh@sheppardmullin.com

Attorneys for BDO USA L.L.P.

          Audrey M Pumariega, Esq.
          MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
          333 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4500
          Miami, FL 33131-4336
          Telephone: (305) 329-4421
          Facsimile: (305) 402-6287
          E-mail: apumariega@mwe.com

               - and -

          Jason D. Gerstein, Esq.
          Seth L. Friedman, Esq.
          MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
          340 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10173
          E-mail: jgerstein@mwe.com
                  sfriedman@mwe.com

Attorneys for William Blair & Company L.L.C.; JMP Securities
L.L.C.; UBS Securities L.L.C.; Suntrust Robinson Humphrey Inc.; and
BMO Capital Markets Corp.:

          Alan J. Brudner, Esq.
          David L. Goldberg, Esq.
          KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN, LLP (NYC)
          575 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 940-6362
          Facsimile: (212) 940-8776
          E-mail: alan.brudner@kattenlaw.com
                  david.goldberg@kattenlaw.com

               - and -

          Jezabel Pereira Lima, Esq.
          Lawrence Allan Kellogg, Esq.
          LEVINE KELLOGG LEHMAN SCHNEIDER & GROSSMAN LLP
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 722-8904
          Facsimile: (305) 403-8789
          E-mail: jl@lklsg.com
                  lak@lklsg.com

Attorneys for Anthony Gingello, Intervenor:

          Josh M Rubens, Esq.
          KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1700
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 379-9000
          E-mail: jrubens@klugerkaplan.com

BENIHANA NATIONAL: Bid to Remand Ramirez Suit to State Court Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORGE A. RAMIREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BENIHANA
NATIONAL CORP., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-05575-MMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
Class Action to State Court.

On June 26, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
of Contra Costa, by which the pleading Plaintiffs assert the
following Six Causes of Action: (1) "Failure to Pay Wages" in
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 510, 1194, and 1197; (2)
"Failure to Provide Meal Periods" in violation of Cal. Lab. Code
Sections 226.7 and 512; (3) "Failure to Provide Rest Periods" in
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections violation of Cal. Lab. Code
Section 226(a); (5) "Failure to Pay Earned Wages Upon Termination
or Discharge" in violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 201 and 202;
and (6) "Unfair Competition" in violation of Cal. Bus. and Prof.
Code Section 17200.  The Complaint does not allege an amount in
controversy.

On Sept. 12, 2018, the Defendant filed a Notice of Removal,
contending that the case meets each Class Action Fairness Act
requirement for removal, and is timely and properly removed by the
filing of the Notice.

By the instant motion, filed Oct. 11, 2018, the Plaintiffs seek an
order remanding the instant action to state court, on the ground
the Defendant has not demonstrated the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million, the monetary threshold for removal under CAFA.

Judge Chesney finds that the Defendant has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the amount in controversy in the
instant case includes damages and attorneys' fees totaling a sum in
excess of $5 million, and, consequently, the requirements for
removal under CAFA have been met.  For these reasons, she denied
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lLx5Gi from Leagle.com.

Jorge A Ramirez, individually and on behalf ofothers similarly
situated & Angel Sandoval-Rivera, individually and on behalf
ofothers similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jamielee
Fabia Martinez, Michael H. Kim P.C. & Michael Hyungchoon Kim --
kim@mhklawyers.com -- Law Offices of Michael H. Kim, PC.

Benihana National Corp., Defendant, represented by Constance
Elizabeth Norton -- cnorton@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, APC,
Angela Joy Rafoth -- arafoth@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.
& Charles Robert Harrington -- rharrington@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C..


BOFI HOLDING: Grigsby Appeals Mandalevy Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs David Grigsby and Joseph Shepard filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Bar Mandalevy, et al. v.
BofI Holding, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00667-GPC-KSC, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, San
Diego.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 19, 2018, Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs claim that BofI and its executives made numerous
false representations in public statements, which misled investors.
When the truth of these misrepresentations was revealed in media
reports, BofI's share price dropped.

On April 3, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint
against the Defendants which asserted a claim under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act by way of violation of the SEC's
Rule 10b-5.  They also alleged a count for violation of Section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  The Plaintiffs claimed that
the Defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) by making
misrepresentations about BofI's loans to criminals and government
investigations.

The appellate case is captioned as David Grigsby, et al. v. BofI
Holding, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-55042, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants David Grigsby and Joseph Shepard's opening brief
      is due on March 6, 2019;

   -- Appellees Eshel Bar-Adon, BofI Holding, Inc., Gregory
      Garrabrants, Paul J. Grinberg and Andrew J. Micheletti's
      answering brief is due on April 8, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants DAVID GRIGSBY and JOSEPH SHEPARD, On Behalf
of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, are represented
by:

          Patrick M. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          Brenda F. Szydlo, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  bszydlo@pomlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees BOFI HOLDING, INC., GREGORY GARRABRANTS,
ANDREW J. MICHELETTI, ESHEL BAR-ADON and PAUL J. GRINBERG are
represented by:

          John P. Stigi, III, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6001
          Telephone: (310) 228-3700
          E-mail: jstigi@sheppardmullin.com


BOSWORTH PLACE: Never Pays Overtime Under FLSA, Dalfior Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTENOR DALFIOR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. BOSWORTH PLACE, INC. d/b/a BEANTOWN PUB; ROGER W.
ZEGHIBE, Case No. 1:19-cv-10049-FDS (D. Mass., January 9, 2019),
alleges that the Defendants never paid the Plaintiff overtime
premium for any of the hours he worked in excess of 40 each week,
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Bosworth Place, Inc., doing business as Beantown Pub, is a
Massachusetts corporation with a principal place of business in
Boston, Massachusetts.  Roger W. Zeghibe is the president,
treasurer, and owner of Beantown Pub.

According to the Company, Beantown Pub is a sports bar with large
portions of New England comfort food in casual digs near the
Freedom Trail.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen S. Churchill, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607-6230
          E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com


CAMPBELL SOUP: Court Denies Bid to Remand Schwartz ICFA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIELLE SCHWARTZ and HAUNAH VANLANINGHAM,
Individually and On Behalf of All Other Similarly-Situated Current
Citizens of Illinois, Plaintiffs, v. CAMPBELL SOUP CO., Defendant,
Case No. 18-CV-1655-NJR-DGW (S.D. Ill.), Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action on June 21, 2018, in
the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair
County, Illinois.  They allege Campbell was unjustly enriched and
violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act by
deceptively and falsely representing that its soups were not made
with preservatives

The Plaintiffs define the class as all current citizens of Illinois
who purchased Campbell Soup Slow Kettle Style Tomato & Sweet Basil
Bisque, Roasted Red Pepper & Smoked Gouda Bisque, New England Clam
Chowder, Home Style Harvest Tomato with Basil, Zesty Tomato, and/or
Home Style Healthy Request Harvest Tomato with Basil soups in the
five years preceding the filing of the Petition in the case.

The Plaintiffs allege there are hundreds of members of the class,
and the total value of their individual claims is, at most, equal
to the refund of the purchase price of the soup.  Plaintiff
Schwartz contends she paid $3.89 for one of Campbell's soups, which
is typical of all class members.  Plaintiff Vanlaningham asserts
she paid $2.49 for soup, which is also typical of all class
members.  The Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages or,
alternatively, disgorgement or restitution; pre- and post- judgment
interest; attorneys' fees and costs; and all such other and further
relief.

On Aug. 29, 2018, Campbell filed a notice of removal in the Court,
invoking the Court's jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA").  The Plaintiffs move to remand the case, asserting
the amount in controversy does not exceed $5 million, as required
under CAFA.

Judge Rosenstengel finds that Campbell has met its burden regarding
proof of the jurisdictional amount in controversy.  For now, the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied.  Accordingly, she
denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/SGkPqG from Leagle.com.

Danielle Schwartz, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly-situated current citizens of Illinois & Haunah
Vanlaningham, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly-situated current citizens of Illinois, Plaintiffs,
represented by David C. Nelson, Nelson & Nelson Attorneys at Law,
P.C., Matthew H. Armstrong, Armstrong Law Firm LLC, L. Kirstine
Rogers -- krogers@stecklerlaw.com -- Steckler Gresham Cochran, PLLC
& Stuart L. Cochran -- stuart@stecklerlaw.com -- Steckler Gresham
Cochran, PLLC.

Campbell Soup Co., Defendant, represented by Cassandra L. Abernathy
-- CAbernathy@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie, LLP, Charles C.
Sipos -- CSipos@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP & David T.
Biderman -- DBiderman@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP.


CANADA: $135MM Suit Accuses RCMP of Failing to Protect New Recruits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Houlihan and Dave Seglins, writing for CBC News, reported
that a medical exam at RCMP headquarters in Toronto is all that
stood between 20-year-old Helen Henderson and a promotion within
the Mounties in February 1987.

But as the office door closed, Henderson said terror set in, as the
RCMP's doctor began rubbing up against her, pinching her nipples
and proceeding with an invasive vaginal exam.

"There was no way out," Henderson told CBC News, recalling the
appointment 30 years later. "There [were] no gloves. There was no
handwashing. He was taking advantage of a young girl who didn't
know any better. He was getting off personally."

Henderson said she "basically ran out of the office, knowing that
something really wrong happened there."

The doctor, John A. Macdougall, examined hundreds of new recruits
to Canada's national police force, and had the power to shut down
their careers.

For two years, Henderson felt haunted and alone -- until a chance
meeting with Sylvie Corriveau and Vicki Gravelle, two other new
recruits who alleged they had also been sexually assaulted by
Macdougall.

Henderson, Corriveau and Gravelle vowed to stop him. They
complained to RCMP bosses, Toronto police and medical regulators.
But their faith in authority was shattered, they say, when the
entire affair was "swept under the carpet."

For nearly three decades, nothing happened. But in response to
pressure from the three women, as well as headlines about the
#MeToo movement, Toronto police reopened their investigation in
2018, and have since interviewed dozens of additional
complainants.

Yet, there has been no discernible progress, and the three women
are growing impatient.

Corriveau filed a new $135-million class action suit against the
federal government on behalf of anyone victimized by abusive
doctors at the RCMP -- including Macdougall, but also others,
including one in Halifax.

Henderson, Corriveau and Gravelle are also going public for the
first time by telling their story to the CBC.

"I want justice. I want him to be charged," said Henderson. "I want
him to be shamed in front of his family, his peers, his colleagues.
We never thought we would be here today, but for whatever has
happened with the #MeToo movement. It's time."

But time for justice is running out. That's because Macdougall, who
is in his mid-80s, is on his deathbed, no longer of sound mind.

'Dr. Tweakers'

After her traumatic medical exam in 1987, Helen Henderson would
often pass Macdougall in the hallways of the RCMP building in
Toronto. It distressed her so much that she demanded a transfer.

It was at her new post at the RCMP's Toronto airport detachment
that she met Sylvie Corriveau and Vicki Gravelle. It was the fall
of 1989, and the two recruits had been on the job for just a week
or two. The trio got to talking, and it turned out they had all
endured nearly identical, invasive medical exams from Macdougall,
which were supposed to determine their fitness for duty.

The trio dubbed him "Dr. Tweakers," recounting how Macdougall spent
considerable time probing their breasts and pinching their nipples
in what he called "tweak tests." They also recalled him caressing
their legs and backs, and conducting vaginal exams that left them
feeling violated.

"This entire encounter felt more like a sexual encounter than a
medical encounter," Corriveau told CBC News, explaining she worked
as a paramedic before being hired by the RCMP.

"He's rubbing my legs up and down. He commented on how soft they
were," she said. "I'm thinking, You're touching me. You've not
washed your hands. You don't have gloves. You're into my private
parts. It's something that I've never seen and it's completely
wrong. I was flabbergasted."

Gravelle recalled a similar exam, in which Macdougall pressed up
against her naked body during a test he assured her was to measure
her spine.

"I just have a gown on and he stands directly behind me, with his
body touching right up against me, and [asks me] to bend over, and
starts feeling every little notch in my spine. [He] takes hold of
my hips, turns them, wiggles them."

"I'm questioning him along the way, trying to get him to stop, or
to say, 'Why are you doing this? Because I have a gynecologist I
see that has done these examinations [already]. You can have the
paperwork.'"

Corriveau said Macdougall was "using his authority for his sexual
gratification," and emphasized during the exam that he had "the
last say in whether or not . . . you get this job."

Macdougall retired in 2001 and now lives in a retirement residence
west of Toronto. According to his lawyer, he has dementia, suffered
near-fatal pneumonia last month and is currently living with
around-the clock care.

A lawyer for Macdougall and his family declined CBC's requests for
comment.

The 'cover-up'

When the three women gave detailed statements to Toronto police in
November of 1989, they expected to be taken seriously. But instead
of any follow-up from the Toronto force, their male bosses at the
RCMP stepped in a month later and announced there was no basis for
any criminal charges, and that Macdougall would be dealt with
internally.

"The practices carried out by the medical examiner fall within
policy guidelines of the RCMP," an RCMP Superintendent wrote to the
three women.

Nonetheless, the Superintendent promised a full internal
investigation. That was four days before Christmas. By late
January, RCMP commanders closed the file, never having spoken to
the women, according to the trio.

"Absolutely, they covered it up," Henderson said. She was so
disgusted that within two years, she quit the RCMP.

CBC was unable to reach those senior RCMP officers.

The investigation may have been shut down, but RCMP bosses were
still concerned enough to issue a directive to all medical staff in
January 1990.

CBC News has obtained that memo. It set out rules for proper breast
exams, ordered a halt to all internal exams and told staff doctors
to instead rely on medical reports from patients' gynecologists.

'He got extremely mad'

The RCMP kept Macdougall on the job, where he appears to have
ignored the new directives.

One alleged victim, Brenda Di iorio, said her male supervisor
cautioned her to be on guard when she reported to Macdougall for a
simple eye exam in the summer of 1990. When Di iorio arrived, she
said Macdougall instructed her to remove all of her clothing.

When she refused, Di iorio said Macdougall flew into a rage,
throwing a stethoscope at her and swiping the papers from his
desk.

"He got extremely mad," Di iorio said. "He was saying to me, like,
'Who do you think you are? You don't undermine me! I could have
your career.'"

Di iorio said she ran from the office in tears, immediately
reporting it to her direct supervisor, who alerted senior police
leaders.

Around the same time, 22-year-old Laurel Hodder, a new recruit,
arrived on Macdougall's doorstep armed with medical records from
her personal doctor. She said Macdougall insisted she undergo a
vaginal exam, during which, she alleges, he sexually assaulted
her.

"I felt very disgusted," Hodder said. The exam "was something I
needed to have done, or I assumed that I needed to have done in
order to get the job. I just was creeped out by it, but I kept
quiet."

Hodder worked for the Mounties for almost three decades, but took
early retirement last year after learning, after all these years,
that RCMP brass had known of previous complaints against
Macdougall, and still sent her to him in the summer of 1990.

"Nobody warned me. They sent me there to this monster," she said.

Hodder filed a lawsuit against Macdougall and the federal
government in July 2018, accusing the RCMP of failing to protect
her from a known threat.

Case was 'withdrawn'

Back in 1990, the women who filed the original complaint turned to
the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Believing the
RCMP were actively suppressing any real investigation, Henderson,
Corriveau and Gravelle hoped Ontario's medical regulator would
strip Macdougall of his doctor's licence.

The CPSO investigated and asked Macdougall to respond to the
allegations. In a detailed defence obtained by CBC News, Macdougall
wrote that during exams on recruits, he taught what he called
proper "breast self-examination technique."

"I choose to introduce instruction at this medical opportunity
because I have the time, because my readings in medical
publications indicate poor attention paid by professionals to this
important topic," Macdougall wrote in his seven-page response.

He also wrote that he was "deeply disappointed that the applicants,
subject of this investigation, have felt in any way mistreated."

The CPSO ordered Macdougall to appear at a formal disciplinary
hearing in June 1992, but at the last minute, the case was
mysteriously "withdrawn."

CBC News has obtained an internal CPSO letter showing the college
negotiated some sort of "final agreement" with the doctor. But
large portions of the record are redacted, and the college will not
discuss what happened.

That letter between the CPSO prosecutor and a director at the
college states the three women became scared and were no longer
willing to testify against Macdougall, making a hearing impossible.
That prosecutor, who is now retired, told CBC News she has no
memory of the case. But after reviewing her letter, she said it
appears the women got "cold feet."

Henderson, Corriveau and Gravelle say they never spoke to any
prosecutor, and certainly never backed down.

"This never happened! No one remembers it this way," said
Corriveau.

The CPSO declined to answer questions about what "final agreement"
was reached in the case.

'I blame everyone'

Macdougall left the RCMP in 1992, around the time the CPSO case was
dropped.

He continued to practise as a doctor, holding a licence until 2001.
He also worked for several years as a staff physician at Ontario
Hydro.

Henderson feels "defeated" and "deflated" by the current state of
Macdougall's health.

"It makes it feel it's almost too late as far as him being punished
for what he did," Henderson said. Even so, she said "it's important
that it's still revealed. Whether it hits him, whether he
understands what's happening, there's still a really huge part of
this story that needs to be revealed: accountability."

Toronto Police won't discuss the current investigation into
Macdougall or comment on whether they intend to lay charges. They
did, however, say about 30 complainants have come forward since
they reopened the case in early 2018.

The RCMP declined to comment on their handling of the case, citing
the renewed police investigation.

The reason Corriveau filed a class action suit against the federal
government last week is that she and Gravelle did not qualify for
compensation under a previous RCMP sexual abuse settlement because
they weren't technically RCMP employees at the time of their
exams.

Helen Henderson did qualify for compensation and received a cheque
last month.  The difference between her and the other two women is
that Henderson was already employed by the RCMP and was applying
for a promotion when she encountered MacDougall.

The new lawsuit takes aim at any abusive RCMP doctor, and
specifically cites Macdougall as well as Douglas Campbell, a former
RCMP doctor in Halifax accused of abusing 140 women and men while
working for the Mounties.

Three decades later, Corriveau still marvels at the lack of
accountability across multiple agencies.

"I blame everyone: Toronto police, the RCMP and the College of
Physicians," said Corriveau. "Their lack of action . . . resulted
in more females being sexually assaulted. They could have stopped
this and they failed to do so."

"I think that we need to complete the circle and finish what we
started 30 years ago." [GN]


CANARY: Facing Class-Action Lawsuit Over Monthly Monitoring Fee
---------------------------------------------------------------
CE Pro Editors reports that when a customer invests money in a
product that is supposed to offer a certain set of features for no
fee, they expect it to stay that way. Canary is now finding that
out the hard way.

A group of Canary consumers, led by irate customer Jeff Reifman,
have come together to file a class-action lawsuit against the DIY
smart home camera company.

The lawsuit says Canary is guilty of pulling a "bait and switch" by
offering features that did not require monthly or subscription
fees. Then in Oct. 2017, these features suddenly required a $120
annual subscription, according to court documents.

"Plaintiffs and other consumers purchased the Products reasonably
believing that all key features included with their initial
purchase would remain available without any future cost," the
lawsuit says.

"Had Plaintiffs and other consumers known that Canary would remove
the Product's features and place them behind a paywall, they would
not have purchased the Products or would have paid significantly
less for the Products."

Prior to the "switch," customers were able to view previously
recorded videos, download clips and access a "night mode." These
features now require a subscription, with only 30-second video
clips after motion is detected, one-day video history and 24/7 live
check-in available for free.

Canary debuted in 2013 as a crowdfunded project on Indiegogo. It
would end up raising nearly $2 million, or 1961% of its goal. Its
products are now sold at various retailers such as Best Buy and
Amazon.

Canary isn't the only smart home security company to land in legal
trouble recently. Last year and earlier this year, Ring was hit
with lawsuits for allegedly stealing intellectual property. [GN]


CIT BANK: Court Junks Tortious Interference Claims in M. Gray Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the
case captioned MONICA GRAY, EXECUTRIX, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CIT
BANK, N.A., ET AL., Defendants. Civil No. 18-1520 (RMB/AMD).
(D.N.J.).

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action suit alleging that
the Defendants conspired to: (1) overcharge the Plaintiffs in
connection with forced-placed hazard insurance and (2) charge
unnecessary property inspection fees. The Amended Complaint asserts
nine counts: (1) Monica Gray, Executrix v. Financial Freedom and
CIT, breach of contract (2) Monica Gray, Executrix v. Financial
Freedom and CIT, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
(3) all Plaintiffs v. Financial Freedom and CIT, violation of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJ CFA) (4) all Plaintiffs v. the
Insurer Defendants, violation of the NJ CFA (5) all Plaintiffs v.
all Defendants, civil conspiracy (6) Monica Gray, Executrix v. the
Insurer Defendants, tortious interference (7) all Plaintiffs v. all
Defendants, violation of RICO (8) all Plaintiffs v. all Defendants,
violation of RICO and (9) Monica Gray, Executrix v. CIT, violation
of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).

The Insurer Defendants' motion will be granted as to the tortious
interference claim and denied in all other respects; and the other
Defendants' motion will be denied.

Standing

The Court finds that Justin Gray and Jasmine Gray-Oliver have
sufficiently pled that they have personally suffered injuries for
which they may pursue the NJ CFA and conspiracy claims for a
limited time frame. The Amended Complaint alleges that in 2017,
when Justin and Jasmine were the property owners and responsible to
satisfy Financial Freedom's mortgage lien, Financial Freedom
charged the mortgage account for insurance charges in the amount of
$2,357.06 for the period 11/02/2017 to 11/02/2018.  Accordingly,
the Motions to Dismiss Justin Gray and Jasmine Gray-Oliver's NJ CFA
and conspiracy claims for lack of standing will be denied.

As to the RICO claims, the Court holds that the Plaintiffs' alleged
facts are sufficient, at the pleadings stage, to establish the
standing of Plaintiffs Justin Gray and Jasmine Gray-Oliver. The
Motions to Dismiss for lack of standing will be denied.

HOLA Preemption

Financial Freedom and CIT assert that all of the state law claims
asserted against them (Counts 1-3, and 5) are preempted by the Home
Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) and its implementing regulations,
specifically in this case. The Court disagrees.

While neither the Supreme Court, nor the Third Circuit, has ruled
on the preemptive effect of these specific regulations on the state
law claims asserted here6, a clear consensus emerges from the
persuasive authorities that have addressed these issues.

Turning to the allegations of the Amended Complaint, it is plain
that Count 1, the breach of contract claim, is a traditional common
law breach of contract claim. Financial Freedom and CIT's assertion
to the contrary notwithstanding, Monica Gray asserts that Financial
Freedom and CIT violated two express provisions of the mortgage
contract. First, she asserts that by allegedly (a) charging the
cost of the force-placed insurance premiums plus an allegedly
undisclosed unearned commission or kickback, and (b) over-insuring
the property at issue, Financial Freedom and CIT violated the
mortgage contract provision which states that Lender may do and pay
whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and
Lender's rights in the Property, including the payment of taxes,
hazard insurance and other items.  

Second, Monica Gray asserts that the inspection fee charges violate
the mortgage contract provision concerning property inspections.
That provision states: Lender may inspect the Property in a
reasonable manner provided that the purpose for the inspection must
be related to the Lender's interest in the Property. Plaintiff
asserts that because the property was not vacant, Plaintiffs were
in contact with Financial Freedom, and that inspection fees were
generated automatically by the default status of the loan, the
inspections were not reasonable and therefore in breach of" the
inspection fee provision of the mortgage contract.

Both of these claims allege only that Financial Freedom and CIT
failed to honor their contractual promises, therefore the Court
holds that such claims only incidentally affect the lending
operations of Federal savings associations and are not preempted.


Logically, the same result should obtain as to the breach of good
faith and fair dealing claim (Count 2), which, for purposes of the
HOLA preemption analysis, is not meaningfully distinguishable from
the breach of contract claim. Plaintiff explains in her opposition
brief that her good faith and fair dealing claims are premised on
the same conduct as her breach of contract claims. The Court thus
holds that the good faith and fair dealing count is not preempted
by HOLA.

Similarly, as to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claim (Count 3),
courts have held that claims under state consumer protection
statutes that are based on conduct which is simultaneously an
alleged breach of contract, as well as allegedly violative of the
state consumer protection statute, are not preempted by HOLA. Thus,
the Court holds that Count 3, the NJ CFA claim against CIT and
Financial Freedom, is not preempted by HOLA.

Lastly, Financial Freedom and CIT make no argument for preemption
of the conspiracy claim (Count 5) that is independent of the NJ CFA
claim discussed above. Because the NJ CFA claim survives, this
claim survives as well.

The Court holds that none of the state law claims, as pled,
asserted against CIT and Financial Freedom in this suit are
preempted by HOLA.

Breach of Contract/Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In addition to HOLA preemption, Financial Freedom and CIT also
assert that the breach of contract claim, and the good faith and
fair dealing claim, fail on the merits. They argue that: (1) the
mortgage was not breached (2) Plaintiff failed to perform under the
mortgage and (3) Plaintiff has not alleged damages.

All three arguments fail at this pleadings stage.

First, Plaintiff Monica Gray asserts that two specific provisions
of the mortgage contract were breached in three different ways.
CIT's and Financial Freedom's arguments to the contrary
misunderstand Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff does not, as Defendants
assert, base her breach of contract claims on allegations that CIT
and Financial Freedom placed insurance on the Property and
backdat[ed] coverage and she does, indeed, challenge the inspection
activity in her breach of contract count. Likewise, Defendants
misunderstand the good faith and fair dealing claim. As already
stated, Plaintiffs do not assert that Defendants had no right to
place insurance on the Property when Mr. Gray failed to do so.

Second, while it is undisputed that Gray and his
successors-in-interest did not obtain the requisite hazard
insurance on the property and did not pay the property taxes, those
facts do not legally bar the breach of contract claim. Upon each
failure to obtain hazard insurance and failure to pay taxes,
Defendants elected their remedies as provided in the mortgage
contract at first charging the mortgage account for the costs and
later declaring a default and commencing a foreclosure action. It
is not alleged that CIT/Financial Freedom elected to terminate the
mortgage contract upon the failure to obtain insurance or pay
taxes.

Third, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has not alleged
damages because it is not alleged that anyone ever paid the alleged
excessive, unreasonable or unnecessary charges. As Plaintiff
correctly observes, however, the charges resulted in increased
indebtedness on the mortgage, which is a quantifiable, concrete
injury.

The Motion to Dismiss the breach of contract and good faith and
fair dealing claims (Counts 1 and 2) will be denied.

New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

All Defendants move to dismiss the NJ CFA claims (Counts 3 and 4)
asserting that Plaintiffs fail to allege: (1) a misrepresentation
(2) an unconscionable commercial conduct and (3) an ascertainable
loss.

The Court disagrees.

The NJ CFA provides, in relevant part, "The act, use or employment
by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact
with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or
omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of
such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an
unlawful practice."

With respect to argument (1), like their arguments as to the breach
of contract claims, Defendants misperceive the nature of
Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs do not complain of the fact that
hazard insurance was force-placed on the property at issue, and
therefore they do not complain about actions that were specifically
contemplated and disclosed in the mortgage contract. Rather,
Plaintiffs assert that the cost of the force-placed insurance was
misrepresented because that cost includeed extraneous charges
resulting from the alleged unearned compensation kickback scheme.

With respect to argument (2), the Court disagrees that Plaintiffs'
NJ CFA claim which is based upon the alleged unnecessary inspection
fees fails for lack of a deceptive element. Plaintiffs allege that
CIT and Financial Freedom misrepresented the circumstances under
which they would inspect the property. This is sufficient at this
stage of the case, although just barel, to state a claim for
violation of the NJ CFA based on an alleged unconscionable
commercial practice.

Lastly, with respect to argument (3), consistent with the Court's
discussion above concerning the damages resulting from the breach
of contract claim, the Court holds that the Amended Complaint
sufficiently pleads an ascertainable loss. The alleged increased
indebtedness that resulted from the alleged excessive, unreasonable
or unnecessary charges associated with the force-placed insurance
and property inspections is an ascertainable loss under the
standard discussed in Alpizar-Fallas. Thus, the Court holds that
the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads an ascertainable loss.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the NJ CFA claims
will be denied.

Conspiracy

The Defendants briefly argue in conclusory fashion that the
conspiracy claim (Count 5) fails because it does not adequately
allege an underlying fraud or a valid underlying tort claim. The
Plaintiffs have stated claims for violation of the NJ CFA. The
Defendants' argument as to the conspiracy claim fails. The Motions
to Dismiss the conspiracy claim will be denied.

RICO

The Defendants assert that the RICO claims (Counts 7 and 8) are
time-barred and that they fail on the merits.

As to the statute of limitations issue, the Plaintiffs contend that
equitable tolling applies, or that the injury discovery rule delays
the accrual of their claims. The Defendants disagree, but do so
relying on an opinion deciding a motion for summary judgment, Weiss
v. Bank of America, 2016 WL 6879566 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 22, 2016), and
evidence outside the pleadings, namely, the Balettie Declaration.
The Defendants' argument in this regard demonstrates that the
statute of limitations issue one in which they ultimately may
prevail is better decided after discovery.

The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that in notices that
were mailed to the Plaintiffs in 2010 through 2016, the Defendants
actively misled the Plaintiffs to believe that the Defendants were
only imposing charges authorized by the mortgage. This is
sufficient, at the pleadings stage, to nudge the equitable tolling
issue past the line of possible, and into the realm of plausible.
Thus, the Court declines to rule on the issue now.

Turning to the merits, the Defendants assert that the Amended
Complaint suffers from four deficiencies: failure to particularly
allege (1) an injury (2) CIT's participation in the conduct of an
enterprise (3) any predicate act of mail or wire fraud and (4) the
existence of an association-in-fact enterprise.

With regard to the injury argument, the Court will not belabor the
point. As discussed above with regard to the damages element of the
breach of contract claims, and the ascertainable loss element of
the NJ CFA claims, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled an injury in
the form of increased indebtedness.

The Motions to Dismiss the RICO claims will be denied.

TILA

CIT asserts that the TILA claim (Count 9) is time-barred.
Plaintiffs respond that equitable tolling should apply based on the
misrepresentations alleged in the Amended Complaint. CIT replies
that Plaintiffs must nonetheless demonstrate that they exercised
reasonable diligence. As set forth above, equitable tolling is more
appropriately addressed on a developed record rather than at the
pleadings stage. Accordingly, like the RICO statute of limitations
issue, the Court declines to rule on the TILA statute of
limitations issue at this time.

CIT's Motion to Dismiss the TILA claim (Count 9) will be denied.

Tortious Interference

Lastly, the Insurer Defendants assert that the tortious
interference claim should be dismissed for lack of allegations
supporting a plausible conclusion that the Insurer Defendants acted
with malice. In the context of a tortious interference claim,
malice is not used in its literal sense to mean ill will; rather,
it means that harm was inflicted intentionally and without
justification or excuse. Thus, the Insurer Defendants assert that
the Amended Complaint does not allege facts supporting a plausible
conclusion that the Insurer Defendants intended to interfere with
the mortgage contract at issue.

The Court agrees.

While the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief points to the Amended
Complaint's expanded factual allegations in support of the tortious
interference claim, namely, that the Insurer Defendants allegedly
drafted and mailed letters that allegedly misrepresented what
Plaintiffs were being charged none of those facts support a
conclusion that the Insurer Defendants intended for CIT and
Financial Freedom to allegedly charge Plaintiffs more than the cost
of the insurance and to allegedly conduct unwarranted inspections
of the property.

Accordingly, the Insurer Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the tortious
interference claim will be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9fa8hdp from Leagle.com.

MONICA GRAY, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF EARL GRAY, JR. AND
TRUSTEE OF THE INTEREST OF JASMINE GRAY-OLIVER & JUSTIN GRAY, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by CATHERINE E. ANDERSON -- canderson@gslawny.com --
GISKAN SOLOTAROFF & ANDERSON LLP & ROOSEVELT N. NESMITH, LAW OFFICE
OF ROOSEVELT N. NESMITH, LLC.

CIT BANK, N.A., Defendant, represented by LOUIS SMITH --
smithlo@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, REBECCA GARIBOTTO
ZISEK -- zisekr@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP & AARON VAN
NOSTRAND -- vannostranda@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP.

QBE INSURANCE CORPORATION, QBE FIRST INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. & MIC
GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by CHARLES
J. FALLETTA -- cfalletta@sillscummis.com -- SILLS CUMMIS & GROSS.


CLEAR MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Summary Ruling Bid in Morrison Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AIMEE MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. CLEAR MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-51 (D. Utah), Judge Clark
Waddoups of the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, (i) granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify
Class; (ii) denied the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and
(iii) granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Morrison alleges that she and other similarly situated individuals
received collections letters from CMS that violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and the Utah Consumer Sale Practices Act.
CMS argues that it did not violate the FDCPA because it is not a
debt collector and therefore does not fall under the Act.  The
court heard oral argument on June 28, 2018.

Morrison's three children received medical services from Utah
Imaging Associates July 7, 2016.  UIA charged her $36 per child,
but based on UIA standard practice and believing her insurance
would cover them, Ms. Morrison did not pay UIA.  No party has
provided evidence that Ms. Morrison entered a contract with UIA,
leaving the court to conclude that UIA provided the medical
services without an express contract and that no contract exists
providing the terms for payment.

UIA then sent Morrison a bill for $36 per child on July 17, 2016.
The bill stated she's responsible for payment in full within 20
days.  Morrison again did not make a payment, and UIA sent a second
bill to Ms. Morrison on Aug. 21, 2016, bearing the warning that
it's her final notice. Failure to pay the balance in full within 15
days may result in further collection action.

On Oct. 13, 2016, UIA assigned Morrison's three accounts to CMS.
On Oct. 14, 2016, CMS sent Ms. Morrison three identical
letters—one for each child's account.  The letters indicate that
CMS is a billing service. They also say no interest has accrued and
that accrual can be avoided by paying one's account in full.
Although no interest had accrued at the time the letter was sent to
Morrison, interest began accruing on Oct. 13, 2016.

After receiving CMS' letter, Morrison did not pay.  And on Nov. 21,
2016, her three accounts were assigned to Express Recovery Services
("ERS"), a debt collector and is licensed as such in the state of
Utah.  The ERS letters dated Nov. 21, 2016, are not at issue.
Morrison has since paid off each of the three  accounts.

In their respective statements of facts, the parties make competing
representations about the role CMS played in the collection of Ms.
Morrison's debt to UIA.

Before the court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Morrison's Motion to Certify Class, and Morrison's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Ms. Morrison seeks certification of the classes of all persons with
addresses within Utah; who were sent any communication which was
similar or identical to the Plaintiff's Exhibit A on behalf of Utah
Imaging Associates; to recover a consumer debt; in which the
initial communication failed to provide the notice required by 15
U.S.C. Section 1962g and/or 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(11); which were
not returned undelivered by the United States Postal Service; from
April 11, 2016 until April 11, 2017.

Having concluded that the 23(a) and 23(b) requirements are met and
exercising its duty under Rule 23(c)(1)(B), Judge Waddoups defines
the class to include all persons with addresses within Utah; who
were sent any communication which was similar or identical to the
Plaintiff's Exhibit A on behalf of Utah Imaging Associates; to
recover a consumer debt; in which the initial communication failed
to provide the notice required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1962g and/or 15
U.S.C. Section 1692e(11); which were not returned undelivered by
the United States Postal Service; from April 11, 2016 until April
11, 2017.

The class action will resolve whether CMS violated the FDCPA by
failing to provide such notices and whether that its failure to
comply with the FDCPA constitutes a violation of the UCSPA.
Finally, he appointed Ms. Aimee Morrison as the class
representative, and her counsel, David McGlothlin of Hyde & Swigart
and Ryan McBride of Kazerouni Law Group, as the class counsel.

With respect to the cross motions for summary judgment of the FDCPA
and UCSPA claims, the parties agree that resolution of the claims
turns on whether CMS was a "debt collector," as used in the FDCPA,
and a "person" or "supplier," as used in the UCSPA, when it sent
the letters about which Ms. Morrison complains.  CMS stipulates
that the letters do not contain the disclosures that the FDCPA
Sections 1692e(11) and 1692g require debt collectors to include.
Ms. Morrison contends that without these disclosures, the letters
CMS sent to Ms. Morrison and others violate the FDCPA and UCSPA.
CMS counters that, because the debt was not in default, it was not
acting as a debt collector, is not regulated by the identified
statutory schemes, and was not required to include the disclosures,
which it concedes are absent.

Judge Waddoups concludes that the debts were in default by the time
CMS obtained them.  His conclusion is further supported by the fact
that the debt began accruing interest upon its transfer to CMS.
None of the facts are in dispute, allowing the court to find as a
matter of law that the debt was in default. Because CMS/ERS is
otherwise a debt collector, the court concludes its conduct must
comply with the FDCPA, and the failure to do so in this case
violated the statute.  For these reasons, he denied CMS' Motion
denied and granted Morrisons' on the issue of an FDCPA violation.

Finally, while he agrees that CMS acted deceptively, the Judge
holds that there is not a factual basis for him to conclude as a
matter of law that CMS' misconduct rises to the level of
unconscionability.  Rather, Morrison has simply repackaged the CMS'
allegedly deceptive conduct and called it unconscionable.
Nevertheless, because CMS acted deceptively, the Judge is persuaded
that it violated the UCSPA and Morrison is entitled to summary
judgment on that question.

For these reasons stated, Judge Waddoups (i) certified the class
proposed by Morrison; (ii) denied CMS' Motion for Summary Judgment,
and (iii) granted Morrison's Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Memorandum Decision and
Order is available at https://is.gd/gZ1DqG from Leagle.com.

Aimee Morrison, on Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, represented by David J. McGlothlin --
david@westcoastlitigation.com -- HYDE & SWIGART, pro hac vice,
Scott G. Nance, DAN WILSON AND ASSOCIATES & Ryan L. McBride --
ryan@kazlg.com -- KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP.

Clear Management Solutions, Defendant, represented by Joseph J.
Lico -- joseph@patriciajostone.com -- PATRICIA JO STONE PC.


CLUBHOUSE DINER: Class Certification Sought in Viscomi Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled CAROL VISCOMI, PATRICIA HATCH,
& SUSAN KENNEDY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CLUBHOUSE DINER, CLUBHOUSE BENSALEM HOLDING, INC.,
CLUBHOUSE BENSALEM, LLC, ESAM SALAH & MEYLINDA ARDHYANI, Case No.
2:13-cv-04720-JD (E.D. Pa.), move the Court for an order granting
their Motion for Class Certification.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Patrick G. Murphy, Esq.
          Edward J. Murphy, Jr., Esq.
          MURPHY & ASSOCIATES
          640 Sentry Parkway, Suite 100
          Blue Bell, PA 19422
          Telephone: (215) 643-6500
          E-mail: pmurphy@pgmurphy.com
                  emurphy@pgmurphy.com

One of the Plaintiff's attorneys certifies that a copy of the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification was served upon this
attorney of record:

          John F. Innelli, Esq.
          JOHN F. INNELLI, LLC
          Two Penn Center, Suite 1300
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 561-1011
          E-mail: jinnelli@innellilaw.com


CMRE FINANCIAL: Accused by Bonaventure of Calling Without Consent
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EMMA BONAVENTURE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CMRE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Case No.
8:19-cv-00055-JLS-DFM (C.D. Cal., January 9, 2019), alleges that in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Defendant
makes calls using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") or
prerecorded voice to cellular telephone numbers whose owners have
not provided prior express consent to receive such calls.

CMRE Financial Services, Inc., is a California corporation with its
principal place of business in Brea, California.  The Defendant is
registered to do and is doing business in California and throughout
the United States.

CMRE provides accounts receivables management services to
healthcare organizations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Michael H. Pearson, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  mpearson@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                  jmurray@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Syed Ali Saeed, Esq.
          SAEED & LITTLE, LLP
          1433 North Meridian Street, Suite 202
          Indianapolis, IN 46202
          Telephone: (317) 614-5741
          Facsimile: 1-888-422-3151
          E-mail: ali@sllawfirm.com


COACH INC: Vaughn's Bid to Certify Denied; Jan. 29 Case Conf. Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Vince Chhabria denies the Plaintiff's renewed motion for
class certification in the lawsuit styled MARTHA VAUGHN v. COACH,
INC., Case No. 3:16-cv-04633-VC (N.D. Cal.).

A further case management conference is scheduled for January 29,
2019, at 1:30 p.m.  The parties must provide an updated case
management statement by January 22, 2019.

Judge Chhabria opines that Ms. Vaughn has not established that she
would be an adequate representative for the proposed class.  Most
glaringly, Judge Chhabria avers, the revised class definition
excludes Ms. Vaughn.  Judge Chhabria points out that Ms. Vaughn
cannot adequately represent the class if she is not a class
member.

Even if Ms. Vaughn were an adequate representative, she has not
established that common issues would predominate over individual
issues, Judge Chhabria also opines.  Judge Chhabria adds that Ms.
Vaughn has not shown that there is common proof of
misclassification.  Hence, the Motion is denied.[CC]


COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Davis Sues Over Deceptive Debt Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FELECIA DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC., PENDRICK CAPITAL
PARTNERS II, LLC and JOHN DOES 1-25, Case No. 2:19-cv-00296
(D.N.J., January 9, 2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by engaging in deceptive,
misleading and false debt collection practices.

Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc., is a "debt collector" with an
address at 245 Main Street, in Dickson City, Pennsylvania.
Pendrick Capital Partners II, LLC, is a "debt collector" with an
address at 6029 Ridge Ford Drive, in Burke, Virginia.  The
identities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to the
Plaintiff.

The Corporate Defendants use mail, telephone, and facsimile and
regularly engage in business the principal purpose of which is to
attempt to collect debts alleged to be due another.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


CORELOGIC INC: Stevens Files Petitions for Writ of Certiorari
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Robert Stevens, et al., filed with the Supreme Court of
United States petitions for a writ of certiorari in the matter
styled Robert Stevens, et al., Petitioners v. CoreLogic, Inc., Case
No. 18-878.

Responses are due on February 8, 2019.

The Lower Court Case is titled Robert Stevens, et al., Petitioners
v. CoreLogic, Inc., Case No. 16-56089, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The District Court case is
captioned Robert Stevens, et al., Petitioners v. CoreLogic, Inc.,
Case No. 3:14-cv-01158- BAS-JLB, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Robert Stevens, Steven Vandel, and Affordable Aerial Photography,
Inc., allege that Defendant CoreLogic, Inc. falsified, removed, or
altered the Plaintiffs' copyright management information in
violation of 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1202.  The Plaintiffs are professional
photographers who provide real estate photography services to real
estate brokers and agents.  CoreLogic, a Delaware corporation, is
the nation's largest provider of software and technology services
to real estate multiple listing services.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Robert Stevens, et al., are represented by:

          Joel Benjamin Rothman, Esq.
          SRIPLAW, PLLC
          21301 Powerline Road, Suite 100
          Boca Raton, FL 33433
          Telephone: (561) 404-4335
          E-mail: joel.rothman@sriplaw.com


CREDIT BUREAU: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Bassett FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KELLY M. BASSETT, individually and as heir of James M.
Bassett, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated;
Plaintiff, v. CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, INC., and C.J. TIGHE,
Defendants, Case No. 8:16CV449 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph F. Bataillon
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska (i) denied
the Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment; (ii) denied
the Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment; and
(iii) denied as moot the Defendants' motion to strike.

The case is a putative class action for violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the Nebraska Consumer
Practices Act ("NCPA").  The Plaintiff challenges a collection
letter sent to her by the Defendants.

On Oct. 3, 2016, Bassett, individually and as the heir of James
Bassett, brought an action against the Defendants, alleging that
the letter at issue is false or misleading because it: (1)
identified an appointment but did not identify the location of the
appointment; (b) identified a Norfolk address, but also listed a
P.O. Box in Fremont; and (c) stated that the Defendants would
proceed with collection efforts if the appointment was not kept.
She alleges the letter was confusing.

The record shows the Defendants sent at least 9,796 of the
challenged standard debt collection letters during the class
periods defined in the case.  Mr. Bassett passed away on Aug. 7,
2016.  The Plaintiff testified that she thought the Defendants'
letter was a threat to sue her if she did not pay.  Mrs. Bassett
expressed confusion several times during her deposition.  She
reiterates her confusion in her declaration.

One of the creditors listed on the collection letter at issue was
General Radiology.  Its manager testified that General Radiology
did not charge interest or add other charges on their accounts.
Defendant Tighe was unable to testify to a single "other charge"
associated with the Bassett account.  There is evidence that one of
the creditors listed in the letter to the Bassetts charges
interest.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment, and the Defendants' motion to dismiss and
for summary judgment.

The Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the issue of liability -- a
determination that the Defendants' collection complaints are false
and misleading as a matter of law.  She challenges the Defendant
CMS' routine practice of sending allegedly false and misleading
collections letters.

The principal legal question is whether the Defendants' use of
letters in the form of Exhibit A to the Complaint violated 15
U.S.C. Sections 1692e (generally prohibiting the use of any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of any debt), e(2)(A) (prohibiting the false
representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt), and e(10) (prohibiting the use of any false representation
or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt) and
the NCPA, which prohibits deceptive acts and practices. She seeks
statutory damages, declaratory relief, costs and attorney's fees.
She argues that the overall letter is false and misleading in
several respects: setting an appointment, stating there will be
further collection efforts, setting out two different addresses of
the collection company, failing to date the dates of service or to
identify the person who received the alleged services and asserting
that interest, along with other charges, accrues daily.  The
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Tighe can be held personally
liable for the violations.

The Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
contending that the Plaintiff lacks standing under Article III of
the United States Constitution to pursue her claim and a claim on
the decedent's behalf.  Further, they move to dismiss any claims
under Section 1692(g) for failure to state a claim, arguing that
the Plaintiff did not allege violations of that subsection in her
complaint.  The Defendants also move for summary judgment, arguing
that undisputed evidence shows the Plaintiff's claims fail as a
matter of law because the challenged correspondence is not false or
misleading.

Judge Bataillon first finds that the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment and to dismiss for lack of standing should be denied
because the Plaintiff has standing to sue.  He is satisfied that
the Plaintiff has alleged a concrete, particularized injury
sufficient to show standing to bring her claims.  He has also
reviewed the parties' submissions and finds that the evidence shows
a considerable level of subjective confusion on the part of the
Plaintiff.  Whether the letter would be objectively misleading or
deceptive to an unsophisticated consumer is a question for the
jury.  Also, viewed in the light favorable to the Plaintiff, the
evidence shows there are genuine issues with respect to whether the
letter was false in that it sought recovery of sums that were not
owed.

Conversely, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's motion for a
partial summary judgment on liability should also be denied.  The
issue is whether the correspondence, from the perspective of an
unsophisticated consumer, is false or misleading. Resolution of
that issue is a question of fact.  The Plaintiff has submitted
evidence that shows or tends to show that the collection letter
suffers from numerous defects that may violate the FDCPA.  In
particular, she has shown that she may not have owed any interest
or additional amounts on the debt, which were alleged to be
accruing daily.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bataillon (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment; (ii) denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss and for summary judgment; and (iii) denied as
moot the Defendants' motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/cf4Q2w from Leagle.com.

Kelly M. Bassett, individually and as heir of James M. Bassett, on
behald of herself and all other similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by O. Randolph Bragg -- rand@horwitzlaw.com -- HORWITZ,
HORWITZ LAW FIRM, Pamela A. Car -- pacar@cox.net -- CAR, REINBRECHT
LAW FIRM & William L. Reinbrecht, CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM.

Credit Bureau Services, Inc. & C. J. Tighe, Defendants, represented
by Joshua C. Dickinson -- jdickinson@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER,
FANE LAW FIRM & Shilee T. Mullin -- smullin@spencerfane.com --
SPENCER, FANE LAW FIRM.


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Levi & Korsinsky Files Class Actions Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Dentsply Sirona, Inc.
(NASDAQ: XRAY).  Shareholders interested in serving as lead
plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the court and
further details about the cases can be found at the links provided.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

Class Period: (i) all persons who purchased the common stock of
Dentsply Sirona, Inc. (NASDAQ: XRAY) between February 20, 2014 and
August 7, 2018; (ii) all Dentsply International Inc. shareholders
who held shares as of the record date of December 2, 2015 and were
entitled to vote with respect to the Acquisition at the January 11,
2016 special meeting of Dentsply International Inc. shareholders;
and (iii) all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the
common stock of Dentsply International in exchange for their shares
of common stock of Sirona in connection with the Acquisition

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: February 9, 2019

Join the action:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/dentsply-sirona-inc-loss-form?wire=3

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, Defendants
attributed the Company's financial performance to the Company's
"innovation," "operational improvement efforts," "new products,"
and "continued investments in sales and marketing" and told
investors that these factors helped the Company succeed despite the
"highly competitive" market for its products. In reality, the
Company's financial results had been buoyed by an anticompetitive
scheme among the Company's three primary distributors that
suppressed competition in the dental supply market and artificially
inflated the price of dental supplies sold by Dentsply. Further,
Defendants concealed that an exclusive distribution arrangement
that Sirona had with one of its distributors, Patterson Companies,
Inc. ("Patterson"), required Patterson to regularly make large
minimum purchases regardless of demand and, as a result, by 2015,
Patterson had been supplied with so much excess inventory that it
could not be sold. This channel-stuffing rendered the Company's
reported sales, financial results and guidance materially false and
misleading.  In addition, the Company represented that it reported
its financial statements, including its goodwill, in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. In fact,
the Company's reported goodwill was artificially inflated and not
reported in accordance with GAAP because it did not reflect the
financial impact of the anticompetitive scheme.

To learn more about the Dentsply Sirona, Inc. class action contact
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request the court
appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


DIAMOND RESORTS: Delara Action to Recover Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
Alberto Delara, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Diamond Resorts International Marketing, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00022 (D. Nev., January 2, 2019), seeks
to recover unpaid overtime compensation, plus an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Diamond Resorts operates under the trade name Diamond Resorts with
over 100 ownership resorts. Delara worked as a non-exempt,
commission-paid concierge at their resort in Florida frequently
working in excess of forty hours in a workweek without being paid
overtime pay, notes the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael N. Feder, Esq.
      DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
      8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200
      Las Vegas, NV 89113
      Telephone: (702) 550-4440
      Facsimile: (844) 670-6009
      Email: MFeder@dickinson-wright.com

             - and -

      Martin D. Holmes, Esq.
      Peter F. Klett, Esq.
      Fifth Third Center, Suite 800
      424 Church Street
      Nashville, TN 37219
      Telephone: (615) 244-6538
      Facsimile: (844) 670-6009
      Email: mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com
             pklett@dickinsonwright.com


DISKOLAB LLC: Accused by Rodriguez Class Suit of Violating TCPA
---------------------------------------------------------------
JORGE E. RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. DISKOLAB, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company, Case No. 0:19-cv-60060-FAM (S.D. Fla., January 8, 2019),
stems from the Defendant's alleged practice of knowingly and
willfully violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In order to drum up new business and drive consumers to its music
events, the Defendant sent him and others automated telemarketing
text messages, Mr. Rodriguez contends.  Through this action, he
seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's illegal conduct,
which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, loss of time,
harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of
thousands of individuals.  He also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available
legal or equitable remedies.

Diskolab, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company whose
principal office is located in Miami Beach, Florida.  DiskoLab
claims to be a multifaceted laboratory specializing in booking,
marketing, and producing nationwide electronic music events, tours,
and festivals. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its
business activities throughout the State of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott D. Owens, Esq.
          SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.
          3800 S. Ocean Dr., Suite 235
          Hollywood, FL 33019
          Telephone: (954) 589-0588
          Facsimile: (954) 337-0666
          E-mail: scott@scottdowens.com

               - and -

          Karl C. Gonzalez, Esq.
          KARL C. GONZALEZ, PLLC
          17113 Miramar Parkway, Suite #152
          Miramar, FL 33027
          Telephone: (833) 527-5529
          E-mail: karl@karlgonzalez.com


FAITH AND FREEDOM COALITION: Pickett Hits SMS Ad Blasts
-------------------------------------------------------
Amber Pickett, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Faith And Freedom Coalition, Inc., Ralph
Reed and Americans of Faith, Case No. 19-cv-00014, (D. Ariz.,
January 2, 2019), seeks statutory damages and any other available
legal or equitable remedies for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Faith and Freedom and Americans of Faith operate as non-profit
organizations. They transmitted multiple text messages with intent
to encourage its recipients to vote. At no point in time did
Pickett provide them with his express written consent to be
contacted using an automated dialer, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
      HIRALDO P.A.
      401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 400-4713
      Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

             - and -

      Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
      HEDIN HALL LLP
      1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900
      Miami, FL 33131
      Tel: (305) 357-2107
      Fax: (305) 200-8801
      Email: fhedin@hedinhall.com

             - and -

      Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
      IJH LAW
      14 NE First Ave., 10th Floor
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (786) 351-8709
      Email: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com

             - and -

      Michael Eisenband, Esq.
      EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
      515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 533-4092
      Email: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com


FCA US: Court Recommends Partial Dismissal of Canfield Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY CANFIELD, ANDREW CATTANO, JAMES LETT, DENNIS
PECK, STEVEN SPRATLEY, SUSAN STEBBINS, and YVETTE TAYLOR, on behalf
of themselves and all others Similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA
US LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-1789-MN-SRF (D. Del.),
Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware recommended that the Court grants in part
and denies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

FCA US is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in
Auburn Hills, Michigan.  The complaint alleges that FCA US is the
United States subsidiary of Italian multinational automaker Fiat
S.p.A.  FCA US designs, manufactures, and sells automobiles
throughout the United States under various brand names, including
the "Jeep," "Dodge," and "Chrysler" brands.

The Plaintiffs allege that Chrysler Town & Country, Dodge Grand
Caravan, Jeep Liberty, and Dodge Journey vehicles manufactured
after June 10, 2009 ("Class Vehicles") are equipped with a
defective component -- a copper-bearing aluminum 2000 series metal
alloy ("AL2000") valve stem and nut on vehicles equipped with a
tire pressure monitoring system ("TPMS").  They allege that the
valve stems are defective because they are subject to corrosion
when exposed to corrosive elements like road salt.  The Plaintiffs
allege that when a valve stern fails, air can be rapidly released
from the tire without warning," which poses a significant safety
risk.

The vehicles come with a 3-year/36,000 mile Basic Limited Warranty,
a 3-year/unlimited-mileage Corrosion Warranty, a 5-year/100,000
mile Outer-Body Corrosion Warranty, a 5-year/100,000 Powertrain
Warranty, and a 8-year/1000,000 mile Emissions Warranty.

On Oct. 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs initiated the action by filing a
class action complaint in the Superior Court of Delaware.  On Dec.
12, 2017, FCA US removed the action to the Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Sections 1441 and 1446.  On Jan. 18, 2018, FCA US moved to
dismiss the original complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  On Feb.
1, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint ("FAC") in
response to the motion.  On Feb. 15, 2018, FCA US filed the current
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).  The court heard oral argument on May 8, 2018.

On Aug. 3, 2016, Plaintiffs Spratley, Canfield, Cattano, Lett,
Peck, Stebbins, and Taylor filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York against FCA US.  On
Jan. 23, 2017, the Southern District of New York transferred the
case sua sponte to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York.  On Sept. 12, 2017, the Northern District of
New York dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction with the exception of one plaintiff, Thomas Hromowyk,
who is not a named plaintiff in the case at bar.  The case remains
pending before the Northern District of New York, as to Mr.
Hromowyk's claims.

Magistrate Judge Fallon recommended granting-in-part and
denying-in-part FCA US' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).  

She recommened that the motion be granted as to (i) Count II (Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act); (ii) Count III (Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act); (iii) Count IV (Michigan Consumer Protection Act);
(iv) Count V (Michigan Consumer Protection Act); and (v) Count X
(Express Warranty).  

She recommended that the motin be denied as to (i) Count I (New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); (ii) Count VI (Implied Warranty under
Michigan law); (iii) Count VII (Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act); (iv) Count VIII (Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act); and
(v) Count IX (Implied Warranty under Massachusetts law).

Among other things, the Magistrate finds that (i) the Plaintiffs
have adequately pleaded a claim for the violation of NJCFA under
the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b); (ii) the Plaintiffs have
adequately stated a claim under the OCSPA under Rule 8 standards;
(iii) the Plaintiffs do not present any additional arguments as to
why Peck's claims are not barred by the six-year statute of
limitations under the MCPA; and (iv) the Plaintiffs cite no
authority to support its Implied Warranty under Massachusetts Law
claim.

The Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR
72.1.  The parties may serve and file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. The objection and responses to the objections are
limited to 10 pages each.  The failure of a party to object to
legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo
review in the District Court.

The Magistrate directed the parties to the Court's Standing Order
For Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated Oct. 9, 2013.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Report & Recommendation
is available at https://is.gd/l1BVJG from Leagle.com.

Timothy Canfield, Andrew Cattano, Dennis Peck, Steven Spratley,
Susan Stebbins, Yvette Taylor, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated & James Lett, Plaintiffs, represented by
Peter Bradford DeLeeuw -- bdeleeuw@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal,
Monhait & Goddess, P.A., Jason S. Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com
-- Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey S. Goddess --
jgoddess@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A.,
Jennifer S. Goldstein -- jgoldstein@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson
& Mason LLP, pro hac vice & Nicholas A. Migliaccio --
nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro hac
vice.

FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, Defendant,
represented by Somers S. Price, Jr. -- sprice@potteranderson.com --
Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP, Kathy A. Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice
& Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson
Coburn LLP, pro hac vice.


FINISAR CORP: Davis Files Securities Suit Over Sale to II-VI Inc.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
William Davis, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Finisar Corporation, Robert N. Stephens,
Thomas E. Pardun, Michael C. Child, Roger C. Ferguson, Jerry S.
Rawls, Helene Simonet, Michael L. Dreyer and Michael E. Hurlston,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00271-WHO (N.D. Cal., January 16,
2019) is a class action by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the
other public holders of the common stock of Finisar Corporation
against the Company and the members of the Company's board of
directors for their violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the proposed acquisition of Finisar by
II-VI Incorporated.

On November 8, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which Finisar
shareholders will receive for each share of common stock, at the
shareholder's election and subject to proration, either: (i) $26.00
in cash; (ii) 0.5546 of a share of II-VI common stock; or (iii) a
combination of (A) 0.2218 of a share of II-VI common stock and (B)
$15.60 in cash, without interest.

On December 28, 2018, in order to convince Finisar shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Proxy Statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in violation
of the Exchange Act, asserts the complaint.

While the Defendants are touting the fairness of the Merger
Consideration to the Company's shareholders in the Proxy, they have
failed to disclose certain material information that is necessary
for shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby rendering certain statements in the Proxy
false and/or misleading, notes the complaint. In particular, the
Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning Finisar's financial projections, which were developed by
the Company's management and relied on by the Board to recommend
the Proposed Transaction, it adds.

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from holding the shareholder
vote on the Proposed Transaction and taking any steps to consummate
the Proposed Transaction unless, and until, the material
information is disclosed to Finisar shareholders sufficiently in
advance of the vote on the Proposed Transaction or, in the event
the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover damages
resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act.

Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times has been, a Finisar
shareholder.

Finisar is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal
executive offices at 1389 Moffett Park Drive, Sunnyvale, California
94089. Finisar's common stock is traded on the NASDAQ GS under the
ticker symbol "FNSR".

Robert N. Stephens has been a director of the Company since 2005
and as Chairman of the Board since January 2018.

Michael E. Hurlston has been a director of the Company and its
Chief Executive Officer since January 2018.

Thomas E. Pardun has been a director of the Company since 2009.
Michael C. Child has been a director of the Company since 2010.
Roger C. Ferguson has been a director of the Company since 1999.
Jerry S. Rawls has been a director of the Company since 1989.
Helene Simonet has been a director of the Company since 2017.
Michael L. Dreyer has been a director of the Company since
2015.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     10866 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1470
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Phone: (424) 256-2884
     Fax: 424.256.2885
     Email: bheikali@faruqilaw.com

          - and -

     Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
     James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 983-9330
     Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
            jwilson@faruqilaw.com


FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses Wozniak Suit over Defective Lug Nuts
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSH WOZNIAK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-12794 (E.D. Mich.), Judge
Stephen J. Murphy, III of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' first amended class action
complaint.

On Dec. 5, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a 120-count amended class
action complaint.  They allege violations of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and violations of state law in each of the fifty
states on behalf of a nationwide class.

All claims arise from the Plaintiffs' interactions with Ford as
purchasers of Ford vehicles.  The Plaintiffs allege that Ford used
defectively-designed lug nuts.  The defect allegedly causes the lug
nuts to deform and swell, which makes them difficult to remove from
the tires and impedes changing a flat tire.  The Plaintiffs further
allege that Ford violated its New Vehicle Limited Warranty by
failing to repair or replace the defective lug nuts when customers
notified Ford of the issue.

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on Feb. 5, 2018.

The Court held a hearing on the Defendants' motion on Sept. 5,
2018.

Judge Murphy finds that the Plaintiffs allege six claims as
placeholders -- 24, 34, 41,45, 114, and 120 ("Place-Holder
Claims").  The Place-Holder Claims do not assert any claims at all.
Therefore, these claims must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.

He finds that the Plaintiffs allege violations of the laws of each
of the 50 states but present factual allegations on behalf of named
Plaintiffs in only 27 states.  The named Plaintiffs here do not
allege injuries in states other than their own or base their claims
on the application of other states' laws.  They therefore lack
standing to bring claims under the laws of the remaining 23 states.
Thus, claims 5, 9, 18, 19, 25, 26, 35, 36, 40, 58, 65, 69, 74, 83,
88, 96, 97, 98, 109, and 1131 must therefore be dismissed for lack
of standing.

Next, he finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
sufficient to plead a breach of warranty claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or under the laws of any of the states
in which they allege breaches of an express warranty.  The
Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a breach because they
have not pleaded that the named Plaintiff presented their vehicles
to a Ford dealership before the earlier of three years or 36,000
miles occurred.  Because the warranty expires upon the earlier of
the time or mileage limits, they must allege both the timeline
between the start of the warranty period and the sought-after
repairs and the mileage on their vehicles at the time of
presentment.

The Judge then finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
sufficient to plead state-law fraud or consumer protection claims.
The Plaintiffs' complaint is devoid of any state-law fraud or
consumer protection claims based on a misrepresentation theory.
They simply have not pleaded any representations related to lug
nuts.

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert unjust enrichment claims under the
laws of several states.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs fail,
however, to allege facts sufficient to establish that Ford obtained
any benefit from the complained-of conduct.   Because the
Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to plead any unjust
enrichment claim, claims 4, 8, 14, 17, 22, 29, 33, 39, 44, 47, 51,
56, 61, 64, 68, 72, 77, 81, 86, 91, 94, 102, 105, 108, 112, 116,
and 119 must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Judge Murphy concludes that the Plaintiffs have
presented no legally viable claims, and he must dismiss the case in
its entirety.  Therefore, he granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' first amended class action complaint.  The
case is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/lE4fnv from Leagle.com.

Josh Wozniak, Angel Castaneda, Raj Chauhan, Robert Desotelle,
Samantha Ellis, Donald Lycan & David Mathias, Plaintiffs,
represented by Dennis A. Lienhardt, The Miller Law Firm, P.C., E.
Powell Miller -- epm@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm, Sharon
S. Almonrode --  ssa@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C.,
Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP & Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Justin McZeal, Ralph Bents, Lisa Thornburg, Alexander Horton,
Dillon Zacharias, Christopher Hutchison, Katherine Cando, Teia
Barron, Frank Ay, Michael Raiford, Nathan Petrashek, Joseph Thomas,
Steven Brown, Patricia Bonarrigo, Andrew Jackson, Bruce Rahlf,
William Sangster, Joseph Nyiri, Gary Beatty, Jr. Randy Maurer, Amy
Nace, Kimberly VanderMeeden, Caroline Garland, Toby Elwin, William
Brooks, Gregory Johnson, Daniel Wood, Grant Dahlke & John Law,
Plaintiffs, represented by Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Jessica Vartanian
Currie, Bush Seyferth and Paige PLLC & Stephanie A. Douglas --
douglas@bsplaw.com -- Bush Seyferth & Paige.


FTS USA: Eleventh Circuit Appeal Filed in Estrada FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Orlando Estrada filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Orlando Estrada v. FTS USA, LLC, Case No.
1:14-cv-23388-KMM, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendant for failure to pay overtime and
minimum wages for work performed in excess of 40 hours weekly.

The appellate case is captioned as Orlando Estrada v. FTS USA, LLC,
Case No. 18-15336, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before February 5, 2019;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief; and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before January 24, 2019, as to Appellee FTS USA, LLC.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ORLANDO ESTRADA, and all others similarly
situated under 20 U.S.C. 216(b), is represented by:

          Stephen Michael Fox, Jr., Esq.
          Rivkah F. Jaff, Esq.
          Jamie H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, PA
          300 71st St., Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          E-mail: stephenmfoxjr@gmail.com
                  rivkah.jaff@gmail.com
                  zabogado@aol.com

Defendant-Appellee FTS USA, LLC, is represented by:

          Susanne Mary Calabrese, Esq.
          Dori Katrine Stibolt, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD, LLP
          777 S Flagler Dr., Suite 1700w
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6148
          Telephone: (561) 804-4468
          E-mail: scalabrese@foxrothschild.com
                  dstibolt@foxrothschild.com

               - and -

          Colin D. Dougherty, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD, LLP
          10 Sentry Pkwy., Suite 200
          PO Box 3001
          Blue Bell, PA 19422-3001
          Telephone: (610) 397-7974
          E-mail: cdougherty@foxrothschild.com


GENMARK DIAGNOSTICS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Fulinara Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
EDDIE FULINARA, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated v. GENMARK DIAGNOSTICS, INC., a
Delaware Company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
37-2019-00000877-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., January 7,
2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the California Labor
Code by not paying overtime, meal period premiums, rest period
premiums and minimum wages.

GenMark Diagnostics, Inc., is a Delaware corporation.  The true
names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are unknown to the
Plaintiff.

GenMark, a molecular diagnostics company, develops and
commercializes molecular tests based on its proprietary eSensor
electrochemical detection technology.  The Company provides ePlex
instrument and respiratory pathogen panel, which integrates
automated nucleic acid extraction and amplification with its
eSensor detection technology to enable operators using ePlex system
to place patient sample directly into its test cartridge and obtain
results.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh, Esq.
          Daniel J. Park, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101
          Pasadena, CA 91103
          Telephone: (818) 230-7502
          Facsimile: (818) 230-7259
          E-mail: dhan@justicelawcorp.com
                  statavos@justicelawcorp.com
                  dpark@justicelawcorp.com


GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Bid to Dismiss Wilcox ERISA Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the Geogetown's motion to dismiss the
case, DARRELL WILCOX and MICHAEL MCGUIRE, individually and as
representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries in and
on behalf of the GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
RETIREMENT PLAN and the GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT PLAN, Plaintiffs, v. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-422 (RMC) (D. D.C.).

Wilcox and McGuire work for Georgetown University.  Each man has an
individual investment account in each of the two retirement plans
offered by the University.  They allege that Georgetown imprudently
selected and retained certain investment options that caused
excessively high administrative fees and that it failed to manage
the plans' investments prudently, in violation of the University's
fiduciary duties to the plans' participants.  

Georgetown in Washington, D.C. provides two retirement plans for
its faculty and staff members: the Georgetown University Defined
Contribution Retirement Plan and the Georgetown University
Voluntary Contribution Retirement Plan.  The Plans are defined
contribution, individual account employee pension plans governed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").

Georgetown contributes an amount up to 10% of an employee's annual
salary into the Defined Contribution Plan and employees can
contribute, as they choose, up to 3% more to the Voluntary Plan.
Each participant has his own account in each Plan and decides
personally how to invest its funds across a wide array of
investment options, according to individual choice. Georgetown is
the designated Plan Administrator for both Plans.  It manages the
Plans and their assets, including selecting, monitoring, and
removing investment options.  The Plans are organized under Section
403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Plaintiffs Darrell Wilcox and Michael McGuire are participants in
both Plans.  They filed the lawsuit on Feb. 23, 2018 and challenge
the expenses of the Plans, which they say are detrimental to the
interests of the Participants, wasteful, and breach the fiduciary
duties of the Plans' fiduciaries.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs
attack the expense of separate recordkeeping services that maintain
the Plans; the expense of some of the investment options that are
available; the number of investment options that are offered; and
the inclusion in the Plans of certain investment options.

Plaintiff Wilcox has invested in the TIAA Traditional Annuity, the
CREF Bond Account, and eleven of the TIAA mutual funds. Plaintiff
McGuire is invested in the CREF Stock Account, the CREF Equity
Index Account, the TIAA Real Estate Account, the CREF
Inflation-Linked Bond Fund Account, the CREF Bond Market Account,
and the TIAA-CREF Growth and Income Account.

Count I of the Complaint alleges that Georgetown breached its duty
of prudence by selecting and retaining investment options and
services without engaging in a prudent process to avoid
inappropriately high administrative fees and expenses charged to
the Plans.  Count II alleges that Georgetown breached its duty of
prudence by failing to manage prudently the Plans' investment
portfolios.

The University and Messrs. Augustini and Chatas deny that they
violated any duty to the Plans' Participants and move to dismiss
the Complaint.  They argue that the Plaintiffs have no standing to
make some of their claims and that others fail to state a claim on
which relief can be granted.

Judge Collyer holds that dismissal will be granted on the Complaint
allegations concerning the Vanguard funds, the 2.5% withdrawal
charge from the TIAA Traditional Annuity, and the TIAA Real Estate
Account.  The dismissal will also be granted as to Mr. McGuire's
claims concerning the requirement of the TIAA Traditional Annuity
requirement that funds be re-allocated over a 10-year period
because Mr. McGuire has never invested in the TIAA Traditional
Annuity; he therefore also lacks standing to represent other Plan
Participants who did.

As to the Plaintiffs' CREF Stock Account, the Judge finds that the
CREF Stock Account, with its deliberate mix of foreign and domestic
investments, may not have performed as some purely domestic
accounts with different investments does not indicate imprudence on
the part of the Defendants.  Again, the Plaintiffs ignore the facts
of the case in apparently adopting allegations from other cases
that are unsuited to the Plans.  Notably, the independent analyst
Morningstar rated the CREF Stock Account as a 5-start investment
option, which also counters the Plaintiffs' allegations of
imprudence.

Finally, with respect to the recordkeeping fees, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs fail to identify a single one of the "any
number of university plans that provide for a single recordkeeper
with investment choices offered by multiple fund managers, much
less one that offers the TIAA Traditional Annuity and other
investment platforms through a single recordkeeper.  To the
contrary, the Plaintiffs only identify multiple cases in which
district courts have found such allegations sufficient to proceed
to discovery.  While a plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable
inferences that may arise from the facts asserted in his complaint,
the Plaintiffs provide no factual support at all for their
assertion that the Plans should pay only $35/year per participant
in recordkeeping fees.

For the aforementioned reasons, Judge Collyer granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  A memorializing Order accompanies
the Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Pn4UB7 from Leagle.com.

DARRELL WILCOX, individually and as representatives of a class of
participants and beneficiaries in and on behalf of the GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT PLAN, the GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT PLAN, Plaintiff,
represented by Ellen Toporoff Noteware -- ENOTEWARE@BM.NET --
BERGER MONTAGUE PC, Eric Lechtzin -- elechtzin@bm.net -- BERGER
MONTAGUE PC, James A. Bloom -- jbloom@schneiderwallace.com --
SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP, pro hac vice, Todd
S. Collins -- tcollins@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC & Garrett
Webster Wotkyns -- gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com -- SCHNEIDER
WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP.

MICHAEL MCGUIRE, individually and as representatives of a class of
participants and beneficiaries in and on behalf of the GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT PLAN, the GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT PLAN, Plaintiff,
represented by Ellen Toporoff Noteware, BERGER MONTAGUE PC, James
A. Bloom, SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP, pro hac
vice, Eric Lechtzin, BERGER MONTAGUE PC, Kyle G. Bates, SCHNEIDER
WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP, Michael McKay, SCHNEIDER
WALLACE COTRELL KONECKY WATKYNS LLP, Todd S. Collins, BERGER
MONTAGUE PC & Garrett Webster Wotkyns, SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, CHRISTOPHER AUGOSTINI & GEOFF CHATAS,
Defendants, represented by Brian D. Netter --
bnetter@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, Matthew Allyn Waring --
mwaring@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, Michelle Nicole Webster
-- mwebster@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN PLLC, Nancy G. Ross --
nross@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, pro hac vice & Richard E.
Nowak -- rnowak@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP, pro hac vice.


GOD'S MOVING: Kenneth Woodson Seeks Minimum & OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH WOODSON, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs GOD'S MOVING, INC. and TODD HUFFORD,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00049-JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind., Jan. 7,
2019), seeks to recover minimum and overtime wages under Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The case is a proposed collective action brought on behalf of all
former and current truck drivers of Defendants against God's
Moving, Inc. and Todd Hufford. Each member of the Class and
Collective Class is or was a mover of Jay's at all times relevant
to this action.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to pay the members
of the Mover Class and Collective Class all of the hours that they
worked which included minimum, regular and overtime hours. The
Defendant deducted monies out of the wages of the members of the
Damages Class. While the members of the Collective Class were paid
overtime hours for work beyond 40 hours in a workweek, the members
of the Collective Class were not paid at least minimum and overtime
wages for all hours that they worked each workweek. Rather,
Defendants would deduct time from their hours that the Collective
Class members worked each week. The Defendants willfully failed to
pay members of the Collective Class at least minimum wages for each
hour worked and certain overtime hours. The members of the Movers
Class were not paid for all hours worked each workweek. Rather,
Defendants would deduct time from their hours that the Movers Class
worked each week, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Ronald E. Weldy, Esq.
          WELDY LAW
          8383 Craig Street, Suite 330
          Indianapolis, IN 46250
          Telephone: (317) 842-6600
          Facsimile: (317) 288-4013
          E-mail: weldy@weldylegal.com

GOLDMAN SACHS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
("Goldman Sachs" or the "Company") (NYSE: GS) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise
acquired Goldman Sachs shares between February 28, 2014 through
December 17, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such
investors are encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's
site: bgandg.com/gs.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Goldman Sachs participated in a fraud and
money-laundering scheme in collusion with 1Malaysia Development
Bhd., a Malaysian state-owned investment fund; (2) the foregoing
conduct, when revealed, would foreseeably subject Goldman Sachs to
heightened regulatory investigations and enforcement; and (3) as a
result, Goldman Sachs's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
bgandg.com/gs or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Goldman
Sachs you have until February 19, 2019 to request that the Court
appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


GOLDWATER BANK: Fabricant Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY FABRICANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GOLDWATER BANK, N.A. a/k/a "GOLDWATER BANK, N.A. INC."
a/k/a "GOLDWATER BANK, N.A. INCORPORATED," Case No. 2:19-cv-00164
(C.D. Cal., January 8, 2019), alleges that in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Defendant sent telemarketing
calls without prior express written consent.

Goldwater Bank, N.A., is an Arizona corporation with its principal
place of business located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The Defendant does
business in California and throughout the United States, including
sending telemarketing calls into this District.

The Defendant is a mortgage lender and one of its strategies for
marketing its services and generating new customers is
telemarketing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jon B. Fougner, Esq.
          FOUGNER LAW
          600 California Street, 11th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 577-5829
          Facsimile: (206) 338-0783
          E-mail: jon@FougnerLaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Stempler, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT STEMPLER, APC
          8200 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (323) 486-0102
          E-mail: socalconsumerlawyer@gmail.com


HOLTGER BROS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Workers
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JACOB MCCHESNEY, the
PLAINTIFF, vs. HOLTGER BROS., INC., the DEFENDANT, Case No.
4:17-cv-00824-KGB (E.D. Ark.), the Hon. Judge Kristine G. Baker
entered an order:

   1. conditionally certifying case as a collective action and
      proposes the following language as the class of individuals
      to receive notice:

      "all current and former hourly-paid field workers employed
      by Defendant Holtger Bros., Inc. at any time since December
      13, 2014, and who performed work for Defendant Holtger
      Bros., Inc. within Arkansas";

   2. directing parties to inform the Court in writing whether the

      proposed language is acceptable, in the light of the Court's

      other rulings in this matter, or to propose alternate
      language for consideration that accounts for the Court’s
      rulings, in ten days from entry of the Order;

   3. granting Mr. McChesney's motion for equitable tolling;

   4. directing Holtger to provide Mr. McChesney's counsel the
      names, last known home and work addresses, and all known
      email addresses for potential opt-in plaintiffs within 21
      days of the date of the Order to facilitate notice;

   5. directing Holtger to provide information to Mr. McChesney’s

      counsel via Microsoft Word or Excel formatting; and

   6. directing McChesney within 90 days to distribute notice and
      file opt-in consent forms with the Court.

The Court said, "The Court grants Mr. McChesney's motion to the
extent he seeks to provide potential opt-in plaintiffs with notice
via U.S. Mail. Accordingly, Mr. McChesney may send one written
notice and consent form to the potential opt-in plaintiffs, as well
as one follow-up written notice, all via U.S. Mail. Mr. McChesney's
proposed written notice, consent, and follow-up forms are
acceptable. Furthermore, the Court grants Mr. McChesney's motion to
the extent he seeks permission to send potential opt-in plaintiffs
one e-mail with notice of the action and another from
www.Rightsignature.com with an electronic consent form. The
proposed emails are acceptable to the Court. The Court denies
without prejudice Mr. McChesney's request to send notice, consent,
and follow-up information to the potential opt-in plaintiffs via
text message.[CC]

HOME ATTENDANT VENDOR: Home Aides Claim Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Zilola Yusupova, Inna Coral, Dmitriy Lashman and Tatyana Spivak, on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Home Attendant Vendor Agency, Inc. and John Does 1-25, Defendants,
Case No. 19-cv-00028 (E.D. N.Y., January 2, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation, redress for failure to provide
employees with accurate wage statements, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor laws.

Home Attendant Vendor Agency employed Plaintiffs as full-time home
attendants. They worked regularly in excess of 60 hours per
workweek without overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Isl David A. Feinerman, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. FEINERMAN
      2765 Coney Island Avenue, 2nd Floor
      Brooklyn, NY 11235
      Tel: (718) 646-4800


INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Arroyo Moves to Certify Class and Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled ELISA ARROYO, as an individual
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. INTERNATIONAL
PAPER COMPANY, a New York corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Case No. 5:17-cv-06211-BLF (N.D. Cal.), asks the Court
to certify these Class and Subclasses:

   a. All non-exempt manufacturing employees who were employed
      by Defendants in the State of California at any time from
      September 27, 2013, through the present, and who paid for
      uniform expenses (the "Expense Reimbursement Class");

   b. All non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendants in
      the State of California and who were paid overtime wages at
      any time from January 27, 2017, through the present (the
      "Wage Statement Class"); and

   c. All non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendants in
      the State of California and who were provided wage
      statements containing payment for overtime wages and were
      created from data from the Workbrain system at any time
      from January 27, 2017, through the present (the "Workbrain
      Wage Statement Sub-Class").

Ms. Arroyo also seeks an order finding her to be an adequate
representative and certifying her as class representative, and
finding her counsel and their firms as adequate class counsel and
certifying them as class counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on February 14, 2019, at 9:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  kagnew@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

               - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com


JA SOLAR: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP disclosed that on December 20, 2018, it filed
a securities class action lawsuit on behalf of its client ODS
Capital LLC ("ODS Capital") against JA Solar Holdings Co. Ltd.
(NASDAQ:JASO) ("JA Solar" or the "Company") and certain of its
executives (collectively, "Defendants"). The action, captioned  ODS
Capital LLC v. JA Solar Holdings Co. Ltd, No. 18-cv-12083
(S.D.N.Y.), asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, on behalf of
all former stockholders and former owners of JA Solar stock and ADS
who sold shares, and were damaged thereby, during the period
between December 11, 2017 and July 16, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

On July 16, 2018, JA Solar, purported to be one of the world's
largest manufacturers of high-performance solar power products,
completed its merger (the "Merger") with JASO Top Holdings Limited
("JASO Top"), JASO Holdings Limited ("Holdco"), JASO Parent Limited
("Parent"), and JASO Acquisition Limited ("Merger Sub") pursuant to
the agreement and plan of merger dated November 17, 2017 by and
among the parties. As a result of the Merger, the Company ceased to
be a publicly traded company on the NASDAQ stock exchange.

Contrary to the Company's repeated reassurances about no
substantial changes to its structures or relisting following the
Merger, only a few days after its delisting from the NASDAQ, it was
announced that the now controller of JA Solar had signed an
"Important Assets Reorganization Intention Agreement" with
Chinese-based company Tianye Tolian for the purchase of 100 percent
equity of JA Solar via issuance of shares. This deal, operating as
a "backdoor listing," would allow JA Solar to return to the stock
market by relisting on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange at a multiple,
to the detriment of shareholders who unknowingly sold JA Solar's
stock and ADS at substantially deflated values during the Class
Period as part of the scheme.

The Complaint alleges that JA Solar shareholders were misled into
accepting consideration from the Merger that was well below fair
value for their JA Solar shares. Specifically, defendants failed to
disclose: (1) that the Company's Proxy materials misrepresented
and/or omitted material information that was necessary for Company
shareholders to make an informed decision concerning whether to
vote in favor of the Merger; (2) that contrary to the
representations in the Proxy, the Company already had plans to
relist its shares in China prior to closing the Merger and its
delisting from the NASDAQ; and (3) as a result, the Company's
statements about its business, operations, and prospects lacked a
reasonable basis.

If you sold JA Solar stock or ADS during the Class Period, and was
damaged thereby, you are a member of the "Class" and may be able to
seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff. Lead Plaintiff motion papers
must be filed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York no later than February 19, 2019. The Lead
Plaintiff is a court-appointed representative for absent members of
the Class. You do not need to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff to
share in any Class recovery in this action. If you are a Class
member and there is a recovery for the Class, you can share in that
recovery as an absent Class member. You may retain counsel of your
choice to represent you in this action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit, you may contact:

         Francis P. McConville, Esq.
         Labaton Sucharow
         Telephone: 800-321-0476
         Website: www.labaton.com.
         Email: fmcconville@labaton.com [GN]


JEFFERSON PARISH, LA: Partial Summary Judgment in Mellor Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, issued an Opinion
reversing the partial grant of summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs in the appeals case captioned WILLIAM MELLOR, ET AL, v.
THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON. No. 18-CA-390. (5th Cir.).

Defendants/appellants, appeal a trial court judgment which granted
in part and denied in part a motion for partial summary judgment
filed by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs, William Mellor, et al., represent a class of persons
who received civil traffic tickets for allegedly violating the
Jefferson Parish School Bus Safety Enforcement Program (SBSEP),
pertaining to the overtaking and passing of a school bus that has
activated its visual signals.  The Plaintiffs filed this class
action suit seeking a declaration that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional and an order for defendants to immediately return
all money  collected via enforcement of the SBSEP.

In a judgment dated, the trial court: (1) granted summary judgment
in favor of plaintiffs on the part of the motion which sought to
have all SBSEP tickets issued for violations occurring within the
incorporated Jefferson Parish municipalities of the City of Gretna,
the City of Harahan, the City of Kenner, and the City of Westwego
(collectively the Cities) declared to have been issued illegally
(2) denied summary judgment on the part of the motion which sought
to have the SBSEP tickets issued in the adjoining parishes of
Orleans and St. Charles declared to have been issued illegally
and(3) denied summary judgment on the part of the motion in which
plaintiffs sought immediate return of the SBSEP fees and fine
monies alleged to have been illegally collected.

On appeal, the appellants argue that the trial judge erred in
relying on the case of State v. Meche, supra, to support the
plaintiffs' argument that enforcement of the ordinance in the
Cities was illegal.

In their motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs argued
that the Cities, being independent and autonomous legal entities
distinct from the Parish, had given neither the Parish of Jefferson
nor the School Board permission to enforce a parish ordinance
within their municipal boundaries, as evidenced by ONGO's responses
to plaintiffs' requests for admissions.

They argued that without express permission from the Cities to
enforce the ordinance within their municipal borders, appellants
were without authority to cite violators within the Cities'
boundaries, and the tickets for violations occurring within those
boundaries were therefore issued illegally.

In Meche, the issue before the court was whether the unified
City-Parish government of Lafayette could enforce a parish criminal
ordinance within the municipal boundaries of Carencro, an
incorporated municipal government specifically exempted by statute
(La. R.S. 33:1391) from the unified City-Parish government of
Lafayette. The City of Carencro had enacted a municipal ordinance
regulating the same behavior as the parish ordinance. The court,
after considering constitutional provisions (La. Const. Article VI,
Sections 20 and 44), as well as La. R.S. 33:1324 and 33:361, and
Attorney General opinions, concluded that the powers of the
parishes, municipalities, and other political subdivisions of the
state are otherwise separate unless there is an agreement to act
jointly or in cooperation with another subdivision.

The court found no such agreement existed in that case. Further,
the court found that no statute gave concurrent exercise of the
police power to the parish and municipalities, other than La. R.S.
33:1324. The court held that because the City-Parish government of
Lafayette excluded the municipality of Carencro, it had no
authority to exercise its legislative powers within the territory
of Carencro, and thus had no authority to prosecute charges
alleging the violation of its City-Parish ordinances arising within
the municipality of Carencro, absent an agreement between the two
political subdivisions. The court further held that "it is not
necessary that a conflict exist between parish and municipal
ordinances in order for the parish to be denied jurisdiction within
an incorporated municipality; a parish simply cannot enforce its
ordinances upon the citizens of an incorporated municipality.

While Meche is pertinent, it is not wholly on point with the facts
in the present matter. In the present case, at issue is the
enforcement of a parish civil ordinance within the territorial
boundaries of the Cities where the record evidences no explicit
agreement between the Parish (and the School Board and/or the
Sheriff's Office) to cooperatively enforce the Ordinance. In Meche,
however, both the Lafayette unified government and Carencro had
similar ordinances prohibiting the same conduct. Here, this record
is devoid of any examination of whether any or all of the Cities
may have enacted concurrent school bus ordinances, and whether the
existence or nonexistence of concurrent ordinances might be an
issue of material fact to be considered by the trial court in its
analysis.

Considering this, the Court finds that plaintiffs/appellees, as
movers for partial summary judgment, did not carry their burden of
showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact
outstanding, and thus we find that they are not entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law at this time. Accordingly, the partial
summary judgment that was granted in favor of plaintiffs/appellees
is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's December 27, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yar7gkop from Leagle.com.

Anthony S. Maska, Joseph R. McMahon, III, COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, WILLIAM MELLOR, ET AL.

E. John Litchfield, Kathy L. Torregano, Michael J. Marsiglia,
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD AND
ONGO LIVE, INC.


JOY GLOBAL: Duncan Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an Order granting Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement in the case captioned STEVEN DUNCAN, PETER
CAHILL and CHARLES CAPARELLI, Individually and on Behalf of All
others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOY GLOBAL INC., EDWARD
L. DOHENY II, JOHN NILS HANSON, STEVEN L. GERARD, MARK J. GLIEBE,
JOHN T. GREMP, GALE E. KLAPPA, RICHARD B. LOYND, P. ERIC SIEGERT
and JAMES H. TATE, Defendants. Case No. 16-cv-1229-pp. (E.D.
Wis.).

The court authorizes and directs implementation of the terms and
provisions of the Stipulation, as well as the terms and provisions
of this order. The court orders that the case and all claims
contained therein and all of the released claims as against the
released persons is dismissed with prejudice and without costs.

The court will enter separate orders regarding the proposed Plan of
Allocation and Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees as allowed
by the court. Any plan of allocation submitted by Lead Counsel or
any order entered regarding any attorneys' fee application shall in
no way disturb or affect this Order and shall be considered
separate from this Order.

The court finds that during the Litigation, the Settling Parties
and their respective counsel at all times complied with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycc6td3m from Leagle.com.

Pamela Mayhew & Betsy Farnsworth, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Mark A. Toor,
MARK A. TOOR.

Loved Ones In Home Health Care, LLC & Donna Skeen, Defendants,
represented by Andrew L. Ellis, WOOTON DAVIS HUSSELL & ELLIS,
Charles Whittaker Neely, NEELY & CALLAGHAN, Michael O. Callaghan,
NEELY & CALLAGHAN & Richard Neely, NEELY & CALLAGHAN.


KPMG LLP: Court Won't Certify for Interlocutory Appeal in Jones
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi, Southern Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal in the case
captioned THOMAS JONES, JOSEPH CHARLES LOHFINK, SUE BEAVERS,
RODOLFOA REL, and HAZEL REED THOMAS, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and, MARTHA EZELL LOWE,
individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
employees, Consolidated Plaintiff, v. KPMG, LLP and TRANSAMERICA
RETIREMENT SOLUTIONS CORP., Defendants. Cause No. 1:17CV319-LG-RHW.
(S.D. Miss.).

This putative class action arose out of the alleged under-funding
of the Singing River Health System Employees' Retirement Plan and
Trust. Lowe has sued KPMG, the company that audited the annual
financial statements of Singing River Health System, and the Plan.
The sole claim against KPMG is that it knowingly participated in
and/or aided and abetted in a breach of fiduciary duty by the
Individual Trustees in its 2010 and 2011 audit reports by allowing
or failing to correct misleading statements that attributed the
Trust's under-funding to returns on investments and changed
actuarial assumptions.

KPMG filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, that no
Mississippi court has ever recognized a claim of aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty. When denying KPMG's Motion, the
Court assumed, based on a prior case decided by this Court, that
Mississippi state courts would recognize a cause of action for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty under the Restatement
of Torts Section 876(b).  

Permissive interlocutory appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C. Section
1292(b), which creates a narrow exception to the final judgment
rule. Therefore, an interlocutory appeal is available only in
limited circumstances.

KPMG requests certification of the following question: Was it error
for the district court to make an Erie guess as to the existence of
an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim under
Mississippi law?

In Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 89 So.2d 799, 820-24 (Miss.
1956), a corporation sued several individuals, including former
corporate officer C. Alberta Luter, seeking to recover profits that
the individuals obtained by leasing trucks to the corporation KPMG
claims that the Knox decision did not actually create a cause of
action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, but the
following excerpt of the opinion belies KPMG's assertion:

The Court holds, that Miss Luter actively participated and joined
C.R. Underwood, with actual knowledge of the breach of his
fiduciary duties, in obtaining profits by truck rentals from
complainant corporation, and that she is liable for the net profits
received by her from the truck rentals on and after January 1,
1952. All of these and other circumstances render it manifest that
C. R. Underwood and Luter were close personal friends and business
associates, and that she knowingly participated with him and E. F.
and J. H. Underwood in the breach of their fiduciary duties to the
corporation, by the continuance in effect of the leases by her to
the corporation after Roy's death. She comes clearly within the
universally accepted rule that one who participates with a
fiduciary in a breach of his duties, with knowledge that he is
violating his obligations, is liable for the profits received from
the corporation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7cfw6px from Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Joseph Charles Lohfink, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Sue Beavers, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Rodolfoa Rel, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated & Hazel Reed Thomas, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by David G. Wirtes, Jr., CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W.
Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R.
Reeves, Jr., REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice & Leilani Leith Tynes, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

KPMG, LLP, Defendant, represented by Amelia Toy Rudolph --
amyrudolph@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US)
LLP, pro hac vice, Patricia Anne Gorham --
patriciagorham@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND
(US) LLP, pro hac vice, R. David Kaufman -- dkaufman@brunini.com --
BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC & Taylor B. McNeel --
tmcneel@brunini.com -- BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC.


KROGER CO: Brooks Sues for Invasion of Privacy
----------------------------------------------
Derrick Brooks, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. The Kroger Co., Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00106-AJB-MDD (S.D. Cal., January 15, 2019) seeks to: (1)
stop Defendant's practice of placing calls using an automatic
telephone dialing system ("ATDS") to the cellular telephones of
consumers nationwide without their prior express written consent;
(2) stop Defendant's practice of placing calls using an artificial
or prerecorded voice to the cellular and landline telephones of
consumers nationwide without their prior express written consent;
(3) enjoin Defendant from continuing to place calls using an ATDS
to consumers who did not provide their prior express written
consent to receive them; and (4) obtain redress for all persons
injured by its conduct.

The Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) autodialed
calls to consumers' telephones without the prior express written
consent of the call recipients. In so doing, Defendant not only
invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the
putative Classes, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated
the TCPA, says the complaint.

Derrick Brooks is a resident of San Diego, California, and a
citizen of the State of California.

The Kroger Co. is a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio,
with a principal place of business at 1014 Vine Street, Cincinnati,
OH 45202-1100. Kroger conducts business in this District and
throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
     Walnut Creek, CA 94596
     Phone: (925) 300-4455
     Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
     Email: ltfisher@bursor.com

          - and -

     Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     2665 S. Bayshore Dr. Ste. 220
     Miami, FL 33133-5402
     Phone: (305) 330-5512
     Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
     Email: scott@bursor.com


L.L. BEAN: Court Dismisses Berger Suit Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANITA BERGER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. L.L. BEAN, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 18-CV-1280 (ENV) (SMG) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Eric N. Vitalaino of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (i)
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and (ii) dismissed
without prejudice the Plaintiff's complaint.

Berger, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, has filed a putative class action complaint, demanding
damages and equitable relief for harm supposedly arising out of
changes in L.L. Bean's "satisfaction guarantee" policy.  On behalf
of a nationwide class, consisting of herself and all other persons
in the United States and its territories who purchased, other than
for resale, products from L.L. Bean prior to Feb. 9, 2018, she
alleges (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3)
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Separately, she asserts claims on behalf of a New York subclass,
consisting of all persons in the State of New York who purchased,
other than for resale, products from L.L. Bean prior to Feb. 9,
2018.  On behalf of the New York subclass, she alleges (1)
violation of New York General Business Law Section 349 and (2)
violation of New York General Business Law Section 350.

For much of its history, L.L. Bean provided a "100% Satisfaction
Guarantee" on its products, promising that if something's not
working or fitting or standing up to its task or lasting as long as
one thinks it should, the company would] take it back.  It
advertised that this guarantee had no conditions and no end date.

Then came the change that sent the Plaintiff sprinting for the
courthouse.  On Feb. 9, 2018, L.L. Bean modified its satisfaction
guarantee policy.  It announced that customers who purchase L.L.
Bean products on or after Feb. 9, 2018 and who are not 100%
satisfied may return the products within one year of purchase for a
refund.  After one year, L.L. Bean will consider any items for
return that are defective due to materials or craftsmanship.  Going
forward, L.L. Bean announced, its lifetime guarantee would now be
largely limited to one year.

However, the change in L.L. Bean's guarantee was not retroactive.
Although the Plaintiff alleges that certain provisions of the
guarantee were changed retroactively, she does not dispute that the
guarantee applicable to her purchases remains of lifetime duration.
Rather, she alleges that the guarantee was changed retroactively
only insofar as all returns, including returns of Prior Purchases,
are now subject to a mandatory proof of purchase requirement and
various Special Conditions unilaterally declared by the Defendant.
That is, if the Plaintiff wishes to return a purchase made prior to
the change in policy, she must produce proof of purchase.
Moreover, as relevant to the Plaintiff's action, the new special
conditions include the requirement that products not be damaged by
misuse, abuse, improper care or negligence, or accidents

Berger is a long-time L.L. Bean customer who, on Nov. 16, 2016
purchased an "Ultrawarm Coat" from the company.  On Feb. 28, 2018,
less than three weeks after the announced policy change, she filed
the instant complaint, despite the fact that she had never tried to
return her jacket and had no intention of doing so.  On June 11,
2018, the parties filed their fully briefed motion.  In the
intervening time, courts in the Northern District of Illinois,
Bondi v. L.L. Bean, Inc., No. 18-cv-1101 (RWG), 2018 WL 3157712
(N.D. Ill. June 28, 2018), and the Northern District of California,
Shirley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., No. 18-cv-2641 (YGR) (N.D. Cal. Aug.
15, 2018), have dismissed similar actions.

L.L. Bean has moved (1) to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and (2) to strike
the class allegations.

Judge Vitaliano finds that though she contorts her pleadings to
show otherwise, it is evident that Berger has not suffered a
concrete injury-in-fact.  To the extent the Plaintiff's injury is
her purported future inability to return her jacket, she has not
satisfied the requirements of Article III standing.

Because the new conditions are no more restrictive than the
implicit conditions of the original policy, the Judge finds that
Berger has not shown that her jacket decreased in value.  On the
other approach to standing, given that she has not attempted to
return the jacket, she has not shown that L.L. Bean will not accept
her return.  Having made neither of these showings, Berger has not
established injury-in-fact and does not have Article III standing.

On a final note, the Judge holds that the fact that some unnamed
class members may have suffered injuries-in-fact does not create
subject matter jurisdiction.  Therefore, Berger's argument, based
primarily on social media posts, that other class members' returns
have been refused is of no moment.  Subject matter jurisdiction
remains wanting.

To the extent that Berger seeks declaratory relief, her claim is
unripe, the Judge finds.  Berger's purported injury rests upon
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.  Substantial uncertainty exists as to
whether L.L. Bean would accept a return of the Plaintiff's coat,
but that uncertainty is due entirely to the Plaintiff's failure to
attempt to return her coat.  The Judge holds there is no hardship
to the Plaintiff of withholding judicial consideration at this
time.  If she should ever attempt to return her coat and find her
return denied, she may seek relief at that time.  Given the present
uncertainty and the availability of future judicial intervention,
her claim is unripe.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Vitaliano granted the Defendant's
motion, and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's complaint.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to
close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5BXi7q from Leagle.com.

Anita Berger, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Correy Ann Kamin --
kamin@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, Erich
P. Schork, Barnow and Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, Janine Lee
Pollack -- pollack@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman &
Herz LLP, Alen Richard Beerman, Roseman, Beerman & Beerman, LLP,
Anthony L. Parkhill, Barnow and Associates, P.C., pro hac vice &
Michael Milton Liskow -- liskow@whafh.com -- The Sultzer Law Group
P.C.

L.L. Bean, Inc., Defendant, represented by Evan Glassman , Steptoe
& Johnson LLP, Anthony J. Anscombe -- aanscombe@steptoe.com --
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Raymond --
draymond@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice,
Darlene Alt -- dalt@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac
vice, Mary E. Buckley -- mbuckley@cgwg.com -- Sedgwick LLP, Meegan
Brooks -- mbrooks@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac
vice & Stephanie Sheridan -- ssheridan@steptoe.com -- Steptoe &
Johnson LLP, pro hac vice.


MADISON COUNTY, MS: Court Won't Certify MCSD Discrimination Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LATOYA BROWN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. MADISON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI, ET AL., Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:17-cv-347-WHB-LRA (S.D. Miss.), Judge William H. Harbour, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Northern Division, (i) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification; and (ii) dismissed without prejudice the Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Plaintiffs in the civil action are all Black residents of
Madison County, Mississippi, who allege that they have been
subjected to one or more racially-discriminatory policing policy.
According to the Plaintiffs, for the past 20 years the Madison
County Sheriff's Department ("MCSD") has implemented a "coordinated
top-down program" under which Blacks are methodically targeted for
suspicionless searches and seizures.

According to the Plaintiffs, the racially discriminatory policing
policies about which they complain were initiated in the 1980's,
and were adopted and expanded at the time Randall Tucker became
Sheriff of Madison County, in 2012.  For example, they allege that
Tucker has maintained the preexisting General Roadblocks Policy
that allows MCSD deputies to "conduct random roadblocks."  The
Plaintiffs challenge this policy on the grounds that it does not
place explicit, neutral limitations on conduct that can be used by
deputies when performing the roadblocks, and it does not require
deputies to use race-neutral criteria when selecting roadblock
locations.  The Plaintiffs also allege that Tucker has exhibited
deliberate indifference toward the constitutional violations
resulting from the policing policies.  Based on these allegations,
the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Court seeking relief under
42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 2000(d) against Madison County, Sheriff
Tucker, and multiple John Doe Deputies.  

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs first request that they be
permitted to proceed as the class of people who (1) are, or who
appear to be, Black and those in their company, and (2) were, are,
or will be in Madison County, and (3) were, are, or will be subject
to the MCSD's policy, custom, and/or practice of systematically
executing unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes,
cars, and property on the basis of race.  

As to themselves and the putative class members, the Plaintiffs
request relief under Section 1983 on claims that their
constitutional rights, as protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, have been violated because the policing policies and
practices used by the MCSD are targeted at Blacks, and have
resulted in unreasonable searches and seizures (i.e. searches and
seizures that are conducted without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, and are often accompanied by the use of excessive
force).  The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class,
also request relief under 42 U.S.C. Section  2000(d) on the grounds
that the subject policing polices have been partially funded with
federal dollars.

In addition to seeking declaratory relief, the Plaintiffs request
that the Court issue an injunction:

     (1) barring the MCSD from continuing its policy, practice,
and/or custom of unreasonably searching and seizing persons in the
absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause and on the basis
of race.

     (2) requiring Madison County to establish an independent
civilian complaint review board to investigate complaints against
the MCSD, and to empower that board with the authority to (a)
investigate the policies and practices of the MCSD, (b) subpoena
documents and hear testimony during the course of its
investigations, and (c) take binding disciplinary action against
MCSD deputies who are found to have violated any individual's civil
rights;

     (3) requiring that Madison County and Tucker institute
training, discipline, and promotion policies that are designed to
eliminate the current policies and practices of MCSD that have
caused the constitutional rights violations about which they
complain;

     (4) requiring that Madison County and Tucker appropriately and
adequately supervise MCSD personnel;

     (5) requiring that Madison County and Tucker implement
measures under which deputies would be required to document, among
other things, the locations and results (i.e. number and nature of
issued citations/arrests, and the race and gender of those
cited/charged) of roadblock and checkpoint stops;

     (6) requiring that Madison County and Tucker retain the
documentation referenced above in a computerized database;

     (7) requiring that Madison County and Tucker publically
disclose data gathered through the above referenced documentation;

     (8) requiring that Madison County and Tucker monitor and audit
the policies and practices of the MCSD to ensure they comply with
constitutional and statutory requirements;

     (9) requiring that Madison County and Tucker (1) acknowledge
the role of policing in past and present injustice and
discrimination" and (2) acknowledge "how it is a hurdle to the
promotion of community trust; and

     (10) requiring that Madison County and Tucker embrace a
guardian mind set to build public trust and legitimacy by adopting
procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and
external policies and practices to guide their interactions with
the citizens they serve.

The Plaintiffs have now moved for certification of their class
action claim.

Judge Harbour finds that the class and the subclasses proposed by
the Plaintiffs in the case cannot now be certified because the
members of the subclasses are not ascertainable, and it has not
been shown that all of the members of Targeting Class, which would
necessarily include class representatives Khadafy and Quinnetta
Manning, have been harmed by the allegedly discriminatory policy
that forms the common question with respect to that class.  As
opposed to dismissing the class action claim at this time, however,
he will grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint to
attempt to cure the defects in their allegations.  As the
Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend their Complaint, the
Motions of Defendants for Summary Judgment will be dismissed,
without prejudice, thereby permitting Defendants to again seek
summary judgment after the amended complaint is filed or the time
period for so doing has expired.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.  The Plaintiffs are granted 30 days, up to
and including Feb. 4, 2019, to file an Amended Complaint in this
case setting forth the proposed classes they seek to certify, and
correcting the pleading deficiencies identified in this Opinion and
Order.

The Judge dismissed without prejudice the Motions of Defendants for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims thereby permitting
Defendants to again seek summary judgment after the amended
complaint is filed, or the time period for so doing has expired.

All other motions filed in conjunction with the class certification
issue are dismissed as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/i2B42F from Leagle.com.

Latoya Brown, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua F. Tom --
Ejtom@aclu-ms.org -- ACLU OF MISSISSIPPI, Brooke Jarrett --
bonnie.jarrett@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher K. Shields -- christopher.shields@stblaw.com
-- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Ezekiel Edwards,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC., pro hac vice,
Isaac Rethy -- irethy@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT,
LLP, pro hac vice, Janet A. Gochman -- jgochman@stblaw.com --
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan K.
Youngwood -- jyoungwood@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT,
LLP, pro hac vice, Kavitha Satya Sivashanker --
kavitha.sivashanker@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP,
pro hac vice, Landon P. Thomas , ACLU OF MISSISSIPPI, Nihara Karim
Choudhri, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice & Paloma
Wu -- pwu@aclu-ms.org -- SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, pro hac
vice.

Lawrence Blackmon, individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated, Khadafy Manning, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Quinnetta
Manning, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, Nicholas Singleton, individually and on behalf
of a class of all others similarly situated, Steven Smith,
individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly
situated, Bessie Thomas, individually and on behalf of a class of
all others similarly situated & Betty Jean Williams Tucker,
individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua F. Tom, ACLU OF
MISSISSIPPI, Brooke Jarrett, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher K. Shields, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP,
pro hac vice, Ezekiel Edwards, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, INC., pro hac vice, Isaac Rethy, SIMPSON, THACHER &
BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Janet A. Gochman, SIMPSON, THACHER &
BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan K. Youngwood, SIMPSON,
THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Kavitha Satya Sivashanker,
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Landon P. Thomas,
ACLU OF MISSISSIPPI & Nihara Karim Choudhri, SIMPSON, THACHER &
BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice.

Herbert Anthony Green, individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated & Marvin McField, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Joshua F. Tom , ACLU OF MISSISSIPPI, Brooke Jarrett,
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher K.
Shields, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice, Ezekiel
Edwards, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC., pro hac
vice, Isaac Rethy, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice,
Janet A. Gochman , SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac vice,
Jonathan K. Youngwood , SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, pro hac
vice, Kavitha Satya Sivashanker, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP,
pro hac vice & Nihara Karim Choudhri, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Madison County, Mississippi & Sheriff Randall S. Tucker, in his
official capacity, Defendants, represented by Charles E. Cowan --
cec@wisecarter.com -- WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY, PA, Charles E.
Ross -- cer@wisecarter.com -- WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY, J.
Lawson Hester -- lhester@pbhfirm.com -- PETTIS, BARFIELD & HESTER,
PA, James Earl Graves, III -- jeg@wisecarter.com -- WISE, CARTER,
CHILD & CARAWAY, PA, Jason Edward Dare --  jdare@pbhfirm.com --
PETTIS, BARFIELD & HESTER, PA, Katherine Bryant Snell , KATIE
BRYANT SNELL, PLLC, Michael B. Wallace -- mbw@wisecarter.com --
WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY, PA, Rebecca B. Cowan --
bcowan@curriejohnson.com -- CURRIE, JOHNSON & MYERS, PA & T.
Russell Nobile -- trn@wisecarter.com -- WISE, CARTER, CHILD &
CARRAWAY, PA.

Madison County Sheriff's Deputies, in their individual capacities &
John Does 1-6, in their individual capacities, Defendants,
represented by Charles E. Ross, WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY,
James Earl Graves, III, WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY, PA,
Katherine Bryant Snell, KATIE BRYANT SNELL, PLLC & Michael B.
Wallace, WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY, PA.

Town of Flora Police Department, Interested Party, represented by
William I. Gault, Jr., NIPPES, HEALY & GAULT, PLLC.


MARRIOTT INT'L:  Failed to Secure Private Info, Durant Sues Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nitya Bodhi Durant, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Marriott International, Inc., a
Delaware corporation, and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide LLC,
a Maryland limited liability company, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00084-MPS (D. Conn., January 15, 2019) is a consumer class
action against Defendants, operators of the world's largest hotel
chain, for their failures to secure and safeguard their customers'
private information, including payment card data information, which
Defendants collected at the time Plaintiff and other members of the
Classes made reservations at any of Marriott's Starwood hotel
properties; as well as Defendants' failure to remedy its data
security failures subsequent to the data breach, and Defendants'
failure to detect the breach for approximately four years.

On September 8, 2018, Defendants discovered that criminals breached
the entirety of Marriott's Starwood network of hotels, resulting in
the unauthorized access of up to approximately 383 million
customers worldwide. Strikingly, the Data Breach remained
undetected for approximately four years, running active from 2014
to September 10, 2018.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and similarly situated consumers,
seeks to recover damages, equitable relief including injunctive
relief to prevent a reoccurrence of the data breach and resulting
injury, restitution, disgorgement, reasonable costs and attorneys'
fees, and all other remedies this Court deems proper, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Nitya Bodhi Durant is a resident of Kerby, Oregon and was
an Oregon resident during the period of the Marriott Data Breach.

Marriott International, Inc. is a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Bethesda,
Maryland.

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide LLC ("Starwood") is a limited
liability company incorporated in Maryland with its principle place
of business in Stamford, Connecticut. On September 23, 2016,
Marriott acquired Starwood, which was formerly known as Starwood
Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Erin Green Comite, Esq.
     Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
     156 South Main Street
     P.O. Box 192
     Colchester, CT 06415
     Phone: 860-537-5537
     Facsimile: 860-537-4432
     Email: ecomite@scott-scott.com
            jguglielmo@scott-scott.com

          - and -

     Timothy J. Peter, Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     1617 JFK Boulevard, Suite 1550
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: 215-277-5770
     Facsimile: 215-277-5771
     Email: tpeter@faruqilaw.com


MERIDIAN PAIN: Sent Unsolicited Text Messages, Alvarez Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Meridian Pain & Diagnostics, Inc.
d/b/a Meridian Medspa, a Florida Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-20219-CMA (S.D. Fla., January 16, 2019) is an action
against Defendant to secure redress for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Defendant is a medical spa. To promote its services, the
Defendant sent text messages to Plaintiff'cellular telephone. The
Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm,
including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text
messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his
daily life, says the complaint.

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, statutory
damages on behalf of herself and members of the class, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

Defendant is a Florida corporation whose principal office is
located at 6 Aragon Avenue, Miami, FL 33134. Defendant directs,
markets, and provides its business activities throughout the State
of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, PA
     19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: 305-975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


MIDWAY IMPORTING: Court Enters Final Judgment in Prudencio Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Balmore Prudencio and Michelle Quintero, individually
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and John
Does (1-100) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Midway Importing, Inc. and Grisi USA, LLC
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01469-AB-RAO (C.D. Cal.), Judge Andre
Birotte, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California entered Final Judgment in favor of the Defendants.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action
Complaint came on for hearing on Dec. 14, 2018 at 8:00 a.m.  On
Dec. 19, 2018, after full consideration of the Motion and the
arguments of the counsel, the Judge granted the Defendants' Motion,
and dismissed the Second Amended Class Action Complaint with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/MIloc5 from Leagle.com.

Nicky Rivera & John Does (1-100), on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by David R.
Shoop, Shoop APLC & Thomas S. Alch, Shoop APLC.

Balmore Prudencio & Michelle Quintero, individually on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Adam R. Gonnelli, The Sultzer Law Group PC, pro hac
vice, David R. Shoop, Shoop APLC & Thomas S. Alch, Shoop APLC.

Midway Importing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amy P. Lally --
alally@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP, Michael L. Mallow --
MMALLOW@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Alexandria V. Ruiz --
ARUIZ@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Rachel Aleeza Straus --
RSTRAUS@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Grisi USA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Rachel Aleeza Straus,
Sidley Austin LLP.


MONEY STORE: Court Refuses to Reconsider Asberry Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned DARRELL ASBERRY, MICHAEL F.
CORDES, SHIRLEY PIATT, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE MONEY STORE, TMS MORTGAGE,
INC., HOMEQ SERVICING CORP., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants.
Case No. 2:18-CV-01291-ODW (PLAx). (C.D. Cal.).

Darrel Asberry, Michael F. Cordes, and Shirley Piatt (Plaintiffs)
bring this putative class action on behalf of themselves and two
subclasses seeking damages for Defendants' allegedly fraudulent
lending practices.  

The Court found the Plaintiffs' Fee Split Class II claims barred by
res judicata and Late Fee Class II claims barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation, absent some form of tolling.  The Court
found tolling unavailable under Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974), but possibly available for California residents
under California's equitable tolling laws.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Late Fee Class II's claims of
non-California residents and the individual claims of Shirley
Piatt, a non-California resident, without leave to amend. The Court
granted leave to amend to Asberry, Cordes, and the California
members of the Late Fee Class II, to the extent they could allege
additional facts that would bring their claims within the reach of
California's equitable tolling laws.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court's dismissal of certain claims,
without leave to amend, is clear error and contrary to controlling
authority. Defendants respond that the Court committed no error,
and that Plaintiffs' Motion is procedurally improper and merely
rehashes arguments previously made, or which could have been made,
in Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss.  

The Plaintiffs move for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) and Local Rule 7-18.  

Rule 59(e) provides a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be
filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Rule
59(e) clearly contemplates entry of judgment as a predicate to any
motion. Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's Order on
Defendants' motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, not
a judgment. Because Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of an
interlocutory order rather than a judgment, Rule 59(e) is not an
appropriate basis for Plaintiffs' Motion.  

The Plaintiffs fail to address Local Rule 7-18's requirements.
Plaintiffs do not provide a material difference in fact or law from
that initially presented to the Court or claim the emergence of new
material facts. Nor do Plaintiffs establish a manifest failure of
the Court to consider material facts presented to it before issuing
its Order.   

Instead, the Plaintiffs argue only that the Court erred, improperly
rehashing arguments asserted in their prior opposition or raising
new arguments or authority that could have been raised previously.
A]motion for reconsideration cannot be used to ask the Court to
rethink what the Court has already thought through merely because a
party disagrees with the Court's decision.

The Plaintiffs do precisely what Local Rule 7-18 prohibits.
Disagreement with the rulings of this Court is not a proper ground
for reconsideration.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8lutqzt from Leagle.com.

Shirley Piatt, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Darrell Asberry, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Michael Cordes, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert J.
Girard, II, Girard Bengali APC, Paul S. Grobman, The Law Offices of
Paul Grobman, pro hac vice & Omar H. Bengali --
obengali@girardbengali.com -- Girard Bengali APC.

The Money Store, TMS Mortgage Inc, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. & HomEq
Servicing Corporation, Defendants, represented by Amy P. Williams
-- amy.williams@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice
& Jessica Rose Ellis Lohr -- jessica.lohr@troutmansanders.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP.


NANO: Faces Fabian Suit Over Lost Investment
--------------------------------------------
James Fabian, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Nano (f/k/a Raiblocks, Hieusys), Colin
Lemahieu, Mica Busch, Zach Shapiro, Troy Retzer, BG Services,
S.R.L. (f/k/a Bitgrail S.R.L., Webcoin Solutions) and Francesco
"The Bomber" Firano, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00054 (N.D. Cal.,
January 3, 2019), seeks to recover rescissory, compensatory,
punitive and injunctive relief for breach/rescission of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, aiding and abetting fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
constructive fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment, conspiracy and
violation of Sections 12(a)(1) and 15(a) of the Securities Act of
1933.

Nano, LeMahieu, Busch and Shapiro promoted a cryptocurrency called
"Nano," formerly known as RaiBlocks (XRB), and listed it on
BitGrail, an Italian-based cryptocurrency exchange. However, it was
never been registered as a security with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and is not exempt from registration.

On or about February 8, 2018, over 15 million XRB, bearing a market
value of approximately $170 million were "lost" under the BitGrail
platform.

Fabian owned and held a total of 23,033 XRB in his BitGrail wallet
with an estimated market value of approximately $275,000 as of
February 8, 2018. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rosanne L. Mah, Esq.
      LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
      44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 373-1671
      Facsimile: (415) 484-1294

             - and -

      Donald J. Enright, Esq.
      John A. Carriel, Esq.
      LEVI &KORSINSKY, LLP
      1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
      Washington, D.C. 20007
      Telephone: (202) 524-4290
      Facsimile: (202) 333-2121
      Email: denright@zlk.com
             jcarriel@zlk.com

             - and -

      David C. Silver, Esq.
      Jason S. Miller, Esq.
      Todd R. Friedman, Esq.
      SILVER MILLER
      11780 W. Sample Road
      Coral Springs, FL 33065
      Telephone: (954) 516-6000
      E-mail: DSilver@SilverMillerLaw.com
              JMiller@SilverMillerLaw.com
              TFriedman@SilverMillerLaw.com


NATURAL HEALTH: Sued by Kauffman Over Pyramid Scheme in China
-------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL KAUFFMAN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NATURAL HEALTH TRENDS CORP., CHRIS T. SHARNG, and
TIMOTHY S. DAVIDSON, Case No. 2:19-cv-00163 (C.D. Cal., January 8,
2019), alleges that the Plaintiff acquired Natural Health Trends
securities at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period
and was damaged upon the revelation of corrective disclosure.

The quarter reports, annual reports and other statements filed by
the Defendants with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission were materially false and/or misleading because they
misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts
pertaining to Natural Health Trends' business, operations, and
prospects, the Plaintiff alleges.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
Natural Health Trends was operating as a pyramid scheme in China,
which is contrary to Chinese law; (2) consequently, Natural Health
Trends was not in compliance with applicable Chinese law; and (3)
as a result, Defendants' statements about Natural Health Trends'
business, operations, and prospects, were false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

Natural Health Trends operates as an international direct-selling
and e-commerce company.  Natural Health Trends is a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Rolling Hills Estates, California.

Chris T. Sharng has served as the Company's President since
February 2007, and as a director since March 2012.  Timothy S.
Davidson has served as the Company's Chief Financial Officer and
Senior Vice President since February 2007.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


NCAA: Staggs' Injury Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
--------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Sarah Staggs, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jeffery Hugh Staggs, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00013, (S.D. Cal.,
September 19, 2018), was transferred to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on January 2, 2019,
under Case No. 19-cv-00013.

Staggs played football at SDSU from 1965 to 1966 as a linebacker.
While playing football, Staggs was knocked unconscious and suffered
numerous serious concussions. The NCAA failed to provide
appropriate medical treatment for these incidents despite the fact
that Staggs often reported these injuries to the team staff. Staggs
eventually underwent a neuropsychological evaluation and was
diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment. Staggs ultimately passed
away in September 2014. Daughter-in-law Sarah Staggs seeks
economic, monetary, actual, consequential, compensatory and
punitive damages for past, present, and future medical expenses,
other out of pocket expenses, lost time and interest, lost future
earnings and death for negligence and breach of contract. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd Logan, Esq.
      EDELSON PC
      123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
      San Francisco, CA 94107
      Telephone: (415) 212-9300
      Facsimile: (415) 373-9435
      Email: tlogan@edelson.com


NEVADA GOLD: D'Arcy Wants to Halt Maverick Merger, Seeks Financials
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter D'Arcy, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc., William J.
Sherlock, William G. Jayroe, Frank Catania, Francis M. Ricci,
Rudolph K. Kluiber and Shawn W. Kravetz, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-00025, (D. Nev., January 3, 2019), seeks (i) to enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating or closing the proposed acquisition
of Nevada Gold by Maverick Casinos LLC, or rescinding it in the
event defendants consummate the merger, (ii) rescissory damages,
(iii) costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for
plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees, and (iv) such other and
further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Each share of Nevada Gold common stock will be converted into the
right to receive $2.50 in cash.

Nevada Gold is a gaming company involved in financing, developing,
owning, and operating gaming properties and projects gaming
facility operations in Washington State and Nevada.

Merger Agreement includes a "no solicitation" provision barring
Nevada Gold from soliciting or encouraging the submission of a
competing acquisition proposal. In addition, the proxy statement
fails to provide any of the company's financial projections that
were needed in the valuation analyses in connection with the
proposed buyout, asserts the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Martin A. Muckleroy, Esq.
     MUCKLEROY LUNT, LLC
     6077 S. Fort Apache Rd., Ste. 140
     Las Vegas, NV 89148
     Phone: (702) 907-0097
     Fax: (702) 938-4065
     Email: martin@muckleroylunt.com

              - and -

     Michael J. Palestina, Esq.
     Christopher R. Tillotson, Esq.
     KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC
     206 Covington Street
     Madisonville, LA 70447
     Tel: (504) 455-1400
     Fax: (504) 455-1498
     Email: michael.palestina@ksfcounsel.com
            Christopher.tillotson@ksfcounsel.com


NEVADA GOLD: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Notice is hereby given that Monteverde & Associates PC has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:18-cv-11286-PGG, on
behalf of public common shareholders of  Nevada Gold & Casinos,
Inc. ("Nevada Gold" or the "Company") (NYSE American: UWN) who hold
Nevada Gold securities and have been harmed by Nevada Gold and its
board of directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") in connection with the sale of the Company to
Maverick Casinos, LLC (the "Proposed Merger").

Under the terms of the Proposed Merger, Nevada Gold shareholders
are only anticipated to receive $2.50 in cash for each share of
Nevada Gold common stock they own (the "Merger Consideration"). The
complaint alleges that the Merger Consideration is inadequate and
that the proxy statement regarding the Proposed Merger (the
"Proxy") provides shareholders with materially incomplete and
misleading information regarding the Proposed Merger, in violation
of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, the
Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the Company's financial projections; (ii) the
valuation analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor,
Rossoff & Company, LLC, in support of its fairness opinion; and
(iii) the background of the Proposed Merger. The special meeting of
Nevada Gold shareholders is quickly approaching as the Proposed
Merger is expected to close early 2019.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than February 19, 2019. Any member of the putative class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

Click here for more information:
https://monteverdelaw.com/case/nevada-gold-casinos-inc. It is free
and there is no cost or obligation to you.

         Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
         Monteverde & Associates PC
         The Empire State Building
         350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
         New York, NY 10118
         United States of America
         Telephone: (212) 971-1341
         Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com [GN]


OPKO HEALTH: Adsport Securities Suit Transferred to S.D. Fla.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Adsport, Inc., on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OPKO Health, Inc. and
Phillip Frost, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-08456 (S.D. N.Y.,
September 17, 2018), was transferred to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on January 2, 2019,
under Case No. 19-cv-20003.

Adsport seeks to recover compensable damages caused by violations
of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

OPKO, a healthcare company, engages in the diagnostics and
pharmaceuticals business in the United States and internationally.
Phillip Frost has been its Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
since March 2007.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to disclose that
Frost and OPKO were involved in orchestrating the acquisition of
large quantities of stock at steep discounts and after securing a
substantial ownership interest in them, engaged in illegal
promotional activity and manipulative trading to artificially boost
its stock price and to give the stock the appearance of active
trading volume and eventually dump their shares into the inflated
market, reaping millions of dollars at the expense of unsuspecting
investors.

On this news, shares of OPKO fell $1.01 or over 18%, before NASDAQ
halted the trading of OPKO on September 7, 2018, at $4.58. To date,
trading in OPKO remains halted, making the stock illiquid and
virtually worthless.

Adsport purchased Opko publicly traded common stock and lost
substantially. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
     Jeffrey P. Campisi, Esq.
     KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER, LLP
     850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10022
     Tel: (212) 687-1980
     Fax: (212) 687-7714
     Email: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com
            jcampisi@kaplanfox.com

OPKO Health is represented by:

     Jared Mitchell Gerber, Esq.
     CLEARY GOTTLIEB
     One Liberty Plaza
     New York, NY 10006
     Tel: (212) 225-2507
     Email: jgerber@cgsh.com


OVERTON RUSSELL: Luci Appeals Consumer Suit Ruling to 2nd Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Patrick Luci filed an appeal from a District Court order
issued on November 26, 2018, in his lawsuit entitled Luci v.
Overton, Russell, Doerr and Donovan, LLP, et al., Case No.
18-cv-360, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Syracuse).

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed in March 2018.

Overton Russell provides online payment services.  The Company
offers medical and commercial payment collection services.

The appellate case is captioned as Luci v. Overton, Russell, Doerr
and Donovan, LLP, et al., Case No. 18-3837, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Patrick Luci, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Anthony Joseph Pietrafesa, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ANTHONY J. PIETRAFESA
          210 Bell Court
          Schenectady, NY 12303
          Telephone: (518) 218-0851
          Facsimile: (518) 514-1241
          E-mail: ajp@ajp1law.com

               - and -

          Evan Rothfarb, Esq.
          SCHLANGER LAW GROUP
          9 East 40th Street
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 500-6114
          E-mail: erothfarb@consumerprotection.net

               - and -

          Daniel Adam Schlanger, Esq.
          KAKALEC & SCHLANGER, LLP
          85 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 500-6114
          E-mail: dschlanger@consumerprotection.net

Defendants-Appellees Overton, Russell, Doerr and Donovan, LLP,
Thomas R. McCormick, Brian S. Strohl and Linda L. Donovan are
represented by:

          Paul Andrew Sanders, Esq.
          BARCLAY DAMON, LLP
          2000 Five Star Bank Plaza
          100 Chestnut Street
          Rochester, NY 14604
          Telephone: (585) 295-4426
          E-mail: psanders@barclaydamon.com


PACIFIC BIOSCIENCES: Speiser Balks at Merger Deal with Illumina
---------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID SPEISER, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated. The Plaintiff, vs. PACIFIC BIOSCIENCES OF CALIFORNIA,
INC., MICHAEL HUNKAPILLER, DAVID BOTSTEIN, WILLIAM ERICSON,
CHRISTIAN HENRY, RANDY LIVINGSTON, JOHN F. MILLIGAN, MARSHALL L.
MOHR, KATHY ORDONEZ, and LUCY SHAPIRO, the Defendants, Case No.:
3:19-cv-00072 (W.D. Cal., Jan. 4, 2019), seeks to enjoin vote on a
proposed merger transaction pursuant to which Pacific Biosciences
will be acquired by Illumina, Inc. through its wholly owned
subsidiary, FC Ops Corp.

The case is a class action brought on behalf of the public
stockholders of Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. against
Pacific Biosciences and the members of its Board of Directors for
their violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

According to the complaint, on November 1, 2018, Pacific
Biosciences and Illumina issued a joint press release announcing
they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated
November 1, 2018 to sell Pacific Biosciences to Illumina. Under the
terms of the Merger Agreement, Pacific Biosciences stockholders
will be entitled to receive $8.00 per share in cash. The Proposed
Transaction has a total enterprise value of approximately $1.2
billion on a fully diluted basis. On December 18, 2018, Pacific
Biosciences filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A with
the SEC. The Proxy Statement, which recommends that Pacific
Biosciences stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction,
omits and/or misrepresents material information concerning, among
other things: (i) the data and inputs underlying the financial
valuation analyses that support the fairness opinion provided by
the Company's financial advisor, Centerview Partners LLC; (ii) the
background process leading to the Proposed Transaction; and (iii)
Company insiders’ potential conflicts of interest. The failure to
adequately disclose such material information constitutes a
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act as
Pacific Biosciences stockholders need such material information in
2 order to cast a fully-informed vote or seek appraisal in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

In short, unless remedied, Pacific Biosciences' public stockholders
will be forced to make a voting or appraisal decision on the
Proposed Transaction without full disclosure of all material
information concerning the Proposed Transaction being provided to
them. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the stockholder vote on the
Proposed Transaction unless and until such Exchange Act violations
are cured, the lawsuit says.

Pacific Biosciences is a biotechnology company founded in 2004 that
develops and manufactures systems for gene sequencing and some
novel real time biological observation. PacBio describes its
platform as single molecule real time sequencing, based on the
properties of zero-mode waveguides.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: 310 208-2800
          Facsimile: 310 209-2348
          E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

PARTNERS REIT: Gets Court Approval of Settlement of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Partners Real Estate Investment Trust ("Partners REIT" or the
"REIT") (TSX:PAR.UN) is pleased disclosed that the terms of the
Class Action settlement previously announced on October 31, 2018
between, among others, certain former trustees and a former officer
of Partners REIT, have been approved by the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice. Pursuant to those terms, the Class Action will be
formally dismissed on or around January 28, 2019. The REIT is not a
defendant in the Class Action.

                        About Partners REIT

Partners REIT is a real estate investment trust that manages a
portfolio of retail and mixed-use community and neighbourhood
shopping centres located in both primary and secondary markets
across Canada. [GN]


PERSONAL-TOUCH: Cucinotta Hits Misclassification, Claims Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Cucinotta, for herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Personal-Touch Home Care of N.Y., Inc.,
Personal-Touch Home Care of Baltimore, Inc., Robert Marx and Felix
Glaubach, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00057 (E.D. N.Y., January 3,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages and related penalties and
damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the
Maryland Wage and Hour Law and the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law.

Personal-Touch provides home health care services in Maryland where
Cucinotta worked as a full-time registered nurse from March 2013 to
September 2017. She was allegedly misclassified as exempt from
overtime compensation claiming she would receive the same salary
each week, regardless of the duration of each visit. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
      Alan Quiles, Esq.
      SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, PA
      1515 S. Federal Highway, Suite 404
      Boca Raton, FL 33432
      Tel: (561) 447-8888
      Fax: (561) 447-8831
      Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
             aquiles@shavitzlaw.com

             - and -

      Michael J. Palitz, Esq.
      SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
      830 3rd Avenue, 5th Floor
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (800) 616-4000
      Email: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

             - and -

      James B. Zouras, Esq.
      Teresa M. Becvar, Esq.
      Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
      STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
      205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Email: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
             tbecvar@stephanzouras.com


PHELAN HALLINAN: Pa. Super. Affirms Demurrer Order in Johnson Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDELLA JOHNSON (A/K/A EDELLA ROBINSON A/K/A EDELLA
ROBINSON JOHNSON), ERIC JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED FORMER AND CURRENT HOMEOWNERS IN
PENNSYLVANIA. Appellants, v. PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG, LLP, Case
No. 359 WDA 2017 (Pa. Super.), Judge Mary Jane Bowes of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's Feb. 6,
2017 order sustaining the preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer filed by Phelan.

The Johnsons, individually and on behalf of other
similarly-situated, are former and current homeowners in
Pennsylvania.  On May 23, 2002, the Johnsons executed a mortgage
and associated promissory note in the amount of $74,000.  The
mortgage was secured by property located at Collins Avenue,
Pittsburgh, Allegheny County.  That instrument was duly delivered,
recorded, and subsequently assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon
Trust Co.

In December 2008, the Johnsons defaulted on the mortgage.  On March
31, 2009, Mellon, through its counsel, Phelan, filed a complaint in
mortgage foreclosure.  In the complaint, Mellon asserted, inter
alia, that the Johnsons owed $1,300 in attorney fees.  After a
non-jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Mellon. The
Johnsons appealed that decision.

On March 23, 2012, while the foreclosure action was pending, the
Johnsons initiated the instant class action against Phelan.  In
their complaint, the Johnsons alleged, inter alia, that Phelan
violated section 406 of the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and
Protection Law, by pursuing an award of attorney fees in the
mortgage foreclosure action that were not actually incurred.  They
argued further that the same harm had been suffered by other former
and current Pennsylvania homeowners against whom Phelan had filed
foreclosure complaints.  In reliance on section 502 of Act 6,3
which provides remedies for violations of section 406, the Johnsons
claimed that they and other similarly-situated mortgagors were
entitled to treble damages for excess attorney fees assessed by
Phelan.

Phelan filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer,
contending that section 406 applies solely to "residential mortgage
lenders," and not to their foreclosure counsel.  On May 2, 2012,
the trial court sustained Phelan's preliminary objections, and
consolidated the matter for appeal with another case raising
similar issues, Glover v. Udren Law Offices, P.C., docketed in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas at GD-11-18015.

In the consolidated appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's
order.  Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that foreclosure counsel constituted a "person" for
purposes of section 502, and, thus, a borrower may recover under
section 502 from any entity -- not solely the residential mortgage
lender -- that collects excessive attorney's fees in connection
with a foreclosure.  However, the High Court offered no opinion
regarding the term "collected," as used in section 502, and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.

On remand, Phelan again filed preliminary objections in the nature
of a demurrer.  However, for the first time, it asserted that the
Johnsons were barred from pursuing relief under Act 6 because their
$74,000 mortgage did not qualify as a "residential mortgage" under
section 101 of the Act, as their mortgage exceeded the $50,000
statutory limit in effect at the time it was executed in 2002.  The
Johnsons maintained that the court should apply the version of
section 101 in effect in 2009, at the time the foreclosure action
was commenced, which raised the limit for a "residential mortgage
from $50,000 to $217,873.

On Nov. 30, 2016, the trial court sustained Phelan's preliminary
objection based on collateral estoppel.  The Johnsons filed a
motion for reconsideration.  The trial court granted
reconsideration so that the three remaining preliminary objections
could be ruled upon.

On Feb. 6, 2017, the trial court sustained the first preliminary
objection on the basis that the version of section 101 in effect at
the time the mortgage was executed was controlling, and the
Johnsons were precluded from bringing an action against Phelan
under Act 6 because their mortgage was not a "residential mortgage"
under the Act.  In so finding, the trial court determined that,
when the legislature amended section 101 in 2008, it did not
manifest an intent that the amendment apply retroactively.

The Johnsons filed a timely notice of appeal.  Since the trial
court did not order the Johnsons to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, the court did
not isssue a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, and instead entered an
order indicating its reliance on its Feb. 6, 2017 opinion and
order.

The Johnsons contend that the trial court erred by applying the
version of section 101 in effect at the time their mortgage was
executed in 2002, rather than the version of section 101 in effect
at the time the foreclosure action was initiated in 2009.  They
also challenge the trial court's reliance on Murphy and Trunzo, on
the basis that those cases applied federal decisional law that did
not involve foreclosure actions.  Finally, the Johnsons argue that
the trial court's interpretation of Act 6 fails to effectuate the
Act's remedial purpose, and would leave an enormous number of
homeowners without protection under Act 6.

Judge Bowes concludes that the Johnsons' mortgage is not a
residential mortgage protected by Act 6. The mortgage simply did
not meet section 101's definition of a "residential mortgage"
because the principal amount exceeded the $50,000 limit for
residential mortgages in place at the time the transaction was
consummated in 2002.  The 2008 amendment to Act 6 cannot be
retroactively applied to their 2002 mortgage.  Since the Johnsons'
mortgage is not a "residential mortgage" under the Act, they are
without a predicate violation of Act 6 for which they can recover
under section 502.  She therefore holds that the trial court did
not err in sustaining Phelan's preliminary objections in the nature
of a demurrer on the basis that the Johnsons failed to state a
claim under the Act.  Accordingly, she affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Opinion is available at
https://is.gd/tgozqD from Leagle.com.

Michael P. Malakoff, for Appellants, Eric Johnson and EdElla
Johnson.

Rachel Anne Labush, Community Legal Services of Philadelphia, for
Amicus, Regional Housing Legal Services,  Philadelphia Legal
Assistance, Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network, Neighborhood Legal
Services Association, Community Legal Services and Community
Justice Project.

Jonathan J. Bart -- jbart@wilentz.com -- Wilentz, Goldman &
Spitzer, P.A., for Appellee, Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg LLP.


PLAINS ALL: Santa Barbara County Property Owners File Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Barbara Edhat reports that an amended class action and
individual lawsuits were filed against Plains All American Pipeline
by Santa Barbara County property owners who have easement contracts
with Plains and whose properties were impacted during the 2015
Refugio oil spill. (Grey Fox, LLC et. al v. Plains All American
Pipeline, L.P., et. al, U.S. District Court, Central District, Case
Number 2:16-cv-03157-PSG-JEM, December 17, 2018).

Plains built pipelines to transport crude oil and other liquids
from the California coast to inland refinery markets in California.
The pipelines, Lines 901 and 903, were built in 1991 after property
owners signed easement contracts with Plains' predecessor Celeron
Pipeline Company of California. Plains is seeking to construct a
second pipeline, Lines 901R and 903R, using the existing easement
contracts that were negotiated almost 30 years ago.

The Plains construction proposal, according to the complaint,
contemplates construction of an entirely new pipeline system, using
three separate crews, each using 87 vehicles and more than 200
employees, working 13 to 24 hours per day, six days a week. A
fourth crew of 27 employees and 27 vehicles will be utilized to
flush, clean and stabilize the existing system before abandoning it
in place. Even by Plains' own estimates, this construction process
will take between 15 and 21 months with more than 336 vehicles,
transporting up to 740 employees, with more than 350 round trips to
and from the job site each day.

"Plains is claiming rights in its construction permits that far
exceed those granted in the easements," says A. Barry Cappello,
Esq. -- abc@capellonoel.com -- managing partner of Cappello & Noël
LLP and lead trial attorney for the plaintiffs. "Just about every
contract expressly limits Plains to one pipeline on the easements.
These easements do not allow for the construction of an entirely
new pipeline, and certainly do not allow prolonged and disruptive
construction."

The easement contracts state that Plains would maintain, operate
and repair the pipeline as needed. "Clearly this was not done,"
says Cappello. "Besides everything else, there is obviously a trust
issue." After the 2015 oil spill, Plains was convicted of nine
counts of criminal wrongdoing including one felony conviction
related to its negligent operation of the pipeline, which resulted
in the oil spill.

The plaintiffs, among other demands, are seeking an injunction
prohibiting Plains from attempting to utilize the existing
easements for the construction and maintenance of a second
pipeline. They are also demanding that Plains be required to
provide appropriate compensation to the plaintiffs for any
additional property rights, property cleanup, ongoing risk, burden
and access needed to complete the construction process and
consistently maintain the pipeline in a sound manner. [GN]


PONTILLO'S PIZZERIA: Ragaglia Seeks Overtime Pay, Hits Tip Pool
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Ragaglia, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Pontillo's Pizzeria-Gates, Pontillo's
Pizzeria-Spencerport, Joe Stephens, in his official and individual
capacity, and Does 1–50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-06006 (W.D. N.Y., January 2, 2019), seeks unpaid overtime
compensation, withheld tips, including redress for failure to
provide wage statements, liquidated damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
New York Labor Law.

Defendants operate pizzerias in New York under the name "Pontillo's
Pizzeria" where Ragaglia worked as a delivery man. He regularly
worked in excess of 40 hours per week without being paid overtime
pay. Pontillo's also took out a tip credit from his tips without a
proper tip credit notice requirement, says the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin Weisenberg, Esq.
      THE OTTINGER FIRM, P.C.
      401 Park Avenue South
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 571-2000
      Fax: (212) 571-0505
      Email: benjamin@ottingerlaw.com


PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED: Martinez et al. Suit Moved to D.N.M.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A case, Diane Martinez and Erin Martin, individually and on behalf
of other similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs. vs.
Progressive Preferred Insurance Company, Progressive Classic
Insurance Company, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company,
Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Advanced
Insurance Company, Progressive Specialty Insurance Company, and
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, the Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-03583, was removed from the Second Judicial District Court,
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico on Jan.
4, 2019. The District of New Mexico Court Clerk Assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00004-JHR-KBM to the proceeding. The suit alleges insurance
contract related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Magistrate Judge Jerry H. Ritter.

Progressive Preferred Insurance Company provides personal and
commercial property-casualty insurance products. Progressive
Classic Insurance Company, Inc offers property and casualty
insurance products.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Corbin Hildebrandt, Esq.
          CORBIN HILDEBRANDT, P.C.
          1400 Central Ave. S.E.
          Albuquerque, NM 87106
          Telephone: (505) 998-6626
          Facsimile: (505) 998-6628
          E-mail: corbin@hildebrandtlawnm.com
                  Sycamore Square, Suite 2000

               - and -

          David A. Freedman, Esq.
          Jeremy Daniel Farris, Esq.
          FREEDMAN BOYD HOLLANDER GOLDBERG URIAS & WARD P.A.
          20 First Plaza, Suite 700
          Albuquerque, NM 87102
          Telephone: (505) 842-9960
          Facsimile: (505) 842-0761
          E-mail: daf@fbdlaw.com
                  jdf@fbdlaw.com

               - and -

          Kedar Bhasker, Esq.
          1400 Central Avenue SE, Suite 2000
          Albuquerque, NM 87106
          Telephone: (505) 720-2113
          E-mail: kedar@bhaskerlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Meena H Allen, Esq.
          ALLEN LAW FIRM, LLC
          6121 Indian School Rd. NE, Suite 230
          Albuquerque, NM 87110
          Telephone: (505) 298-9400
          E-mail: mallen@mallen-law.com

RECIPES INC: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, Withheld Tips, Says Fabry
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Leah Fabry and Lauren Connors, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Recipes Inc. and Trung
Huynh, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-10020 (E.D. Mich., January 3,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation and illegally
withheld tips under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938.

Leah Fabry and Lauren Connors are former servers of Recipes Inc., a
restaurant with three Michigan locations, owned and operated by
Trung Huynh. Recipes is accused of failing to pay staff for time
spent in mandatory work meetings and cleaning at the end of the
closing shift and of compelling their wait staff to contribute a
portion of their tips to a pool, which were in turn distributed to
non-tipped employees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Megan A. Bonanni, Esq.
      Channing Robinson-Holmes, Esq.
      PITT MCGEHEE PALMER & RIVERS, P.C.
      117 W. Fourth Street, Suite 200
      Royal Oak, MI 48067
      Tel: (248) 398-9800
      Email: mbonanni@pittlawpc.com


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Collazo Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Lindsey Collazo, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Resurgent Capital Services L.P., and LVNV
Funding, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-06050-EAW (W.D. N.Y.,
January 16, 2019) brought this action for damages arising from
Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").

In its initial communication with a consumer, a debt collector must
state "that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and
that any information obtained will be used for that purpose."

On or about November 14, 2018, Defendant had its initial
communication with Plaintiff by mailing her a letter. This letter
does not state that it is an attempt to collect a debt, and that
any information obtained will be used for that purpose. By
neglecting to disclose these pieces of information, Resurgent
violated the FDCPA, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages for the Defendants'
FDCPA violation.

Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Chili, New York.
Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined in the FDCPA.

Resurgent is a limited partnership formed under the laws of
Delaware, the principal purpose of whose business is the collection
of debts, with a principal place of business at 55 Beattie Place,
Suite 110, Greenville, South Carolina, 29601.

LVNV is an LLC formed under the laws of Delaware, whose principal
business purpose is the collection of debts, with its principal
office located at 200 Meeting Street, Suite 206, Charleston, South
Carolina, 29401-3187.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alexander J. Douglas, Esq.
     DOUGLAS FIRM, P.C.
     36 West Main Street, Ste 500
     Rochester, NY 14614
     Phone: (585) 568-2224
     Fax: (585) 546-6185
     Email: alex@lawroc.com


RUSS DARROW: Court Consolidates 2 FLSA Suits
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Consolidation in the cases captioned TIFFANY UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff,
v. RUSS DARROW GROUP INC., RUSS DARROW GREENFIELD LLC, and RUSS
DARROW DODGE LLC, Defendants. TIFFANY UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff, v. RUSS
DARROW DODGE LLC, Defendant. Case Nos. 18-CV-1527-JPS,
18-CV-1528-LA (E.D. Wis.).

The Plaintiff filed two civil actions. The first is a class action
asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the
Wisconsin Wage Payment and Collection Laws (WWPCL), with respect to
employees of the Defendants' Business Development Center.  The
second complaint alleges the same theories, but this time for
Plaintiff herself on an individual basis.

The Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion and the
time in which to do so has expired. Civ. L. R. 7(h).  

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to consolidate, 18-CV-1527 and
18-CV-1528 be and the same is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya74sqg6 from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Underwood, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Potteiger --
dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC, James A.
Walcheske -- jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC &
Scott S. Luzi -- sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC.

Russ Darrow Group Inc, Russ Darrow Greenfield LLC & Russ Darrow
Dodge LLC, Defendants, represented by Jesse R. Dill, Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC & Keith E. Kopplin, Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC.


SANTA CLARA, CA: Summary Judgment in Estorga FLSA Suit Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT ESTORGA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SANTA CLARA
VALLEY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant, Case No.
16-cv-02668-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, (i) granted in part and denied in part VTA's motion for
summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part Estorga's
motion for summary judgment.

On May 17, 2016, Estorga filed the complaint in this action on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging that
Defendant willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
by failing to compensate Estorga and those similarly situated at
one and one-half times their regular rate for certain hours
"worked" in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.  The Plaintiffs are
seeking overtime pay for "hours worked" for start-end travel and
split-shift travel.  Under the current collective bargaining
agreement, the bus drivers are paid an agreed amount for that
travel time but it does not count toward overtime premium pay.

In the start-end scenario, bus drivers begin and end their shifts
at different locations throughout the district; not at their home
yard.  In split-shift situations, a bus driver's morning shift
might end at one location and hours later the bus driver may begin
the next portion of the shift at a different location.

On Sept. 12, 2016, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' original
complaint with leave to amend.  Estorga subsequently filed his
first amended complaint ("FAC") on Sept. 30, 2016.

On June 15, 2017, the Court granted Estorga's motion to
conditionally certify an FLSA collective action as to persons who
are or have been employed by VTA and perform or performed services
as a bus operator who are not members of the Rai settlement class.
The opt-in plaintiffs filed notices of consent to join the
collective action between Aug. 4, 2017 and Sept. 11, 2017.

The parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment on
Sept. 13, 2018.  On Nov. 1, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the
motions for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs move for summary judgment of two issues: whether (1)
"start-end" travel time and (2) "split-shift" travel time
constitute "hours worked" and are thus compensable under the FLSA.
They seek overtime compensation for those two types of travel time
only.

The Defendant moves for summary judgment of the same two issues as
the Plaintiffs, as well as two additional issues: whether (1) the
Defendant may offset any liability with the overtime premiums it
pays which are more generous than what is required by the FLSA; and
(2) that it acted in good faith and did not willfully violate the
FLSA.

The parties' motions are effectively cross-motions with respect to
whether start-end travel time or split-shift travel time is
compensable under the FLSA.  Thus, Judge Freeman addresses the
following issues: (A) background principles concerning "hours
worked" under the FLSA; (B) whether the drivers' start-end travel
time is compensable under the FLSA; (C) whether the drivers'
split-shift travel time is compensable under the FLSA; (D) whether
VTA is entitled to offset any resulting liability with other
overtime premium payments; and (E) whether VTA acted in good faith
and did not willfully violate the FLSA.

The Judge For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (i)
granted in part and denied in part VTA's motion for summary
judgment, and granted in part and denied in part Estorga's motion
for summary judgment.  

The Judge granted VTA's motion for summary judgment that the
Plaintiffs' start-end travel time is not compensable under the
FLSA, and denied Estorga's motion for summary judgment that the
start-end travel time is compensable.  She granted Estorga's motion
for summary judgment that the Plaintiffs' split-shift travel time
is compensable under the FLSA, and denied VTA's motion for summary
judgment that the split-shift travel time is not compensable.  She
also granted VTA's motion for summary judgment with respect to
offsetting start-end/split-shift overtime liability with other
premium payments it makes to the extent those other payments
include elapsed time payments, daily overtime payments, weekly
overtime payments based on sick leave, and holiday pay as described
in her Opinion.  Finally, she granted VTA's motion for summary
judgment that it has acted in good faith and did not willfully
violate the FLSA.

Judge Freeman finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' start-end travel time
is not compensable under the FLSA; (ii)  the Plaintiffs'
split-shift travel time is compensable under the FLSA; (iii) VTA's
elapsed time payments are a premium paid for hours in excess of the
employee's normal working hours or regular working hours, or in
pursuance of the CBA, for work outside of the hours established by
the CBA as the basic, normal, or regular workday; and (iv) the
"extra" compensation paid by VTA for both daily overtime and weekly
overtime where sick leave is counted for purposes of the overtime
calculation qualifies for an offset under 29 U.S.C. Section
205(e)(5).

She also finds that VTA's actions with respect to its FLSA legal
obligations were reasonable, or at the very least, not reckless,
and accordingly cannot be deemed willful; and agrees that the
Defendant has demonstrated good faith.  Moreover, she finds that
the Plaintiffs failed to respond to the Defendant's good faith
argument in their Opposition brief -- a single mention of "good
faith" appears, but in the Plaintiffs' willfulness argument.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Z4OIWL from Leagle.com.

Robert Estorga, on behalf of himself and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Kerl Lunch --
unch@neyhartlaw.com -- Neyhart Anderson Flynn & Grosboll., Tanisha
Maria Shafer, Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn and Grosboll & William James
Flynn -- wflynn@neyhartlaw.com -- Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn and
Grosboll.

Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, Defendant, represented
by Arthur A. Hartinger -- ahartinger@publiclawgroup.com -- Renne
Sloan Holtzman Sakai LLP, Kevin P. McLaughlin --
mclaughlin@publiclawgroup.com -- Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai LLP &
Paul D. Ahn -- paul.ahn@vta.org -- Office of the General Counsel.


SC DATA: 8th Cir. Vacates Schumacher FCRA Suit Settlement Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ria Schumacher, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SC Data Center, Inc., doing business
as Colony Brands, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 17-3112 (8th
Cir.), Judge L. Steven Grasz of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit vacated the district court's approval of the settlement
agreement, and remanded the case.

After the parties reached a tentative settlement in the purported
class action, SC Data moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the class representative, Schumacher, lacked standing.  However,
the district court enforced the settlement between the parties
without deciding the standing issue.  SC Data appeals, arguing the
district court erred by not deciding standing first.

In February 2016, Schumacher filed a purported class action in the
Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, alleging that SC Data
committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA").  SC Data removed the case to federal court.

In May 2016, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement
during mediation.  Four days later, the Supreme Court released its
opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, holding that the Ninth Circuit failed
to properly analyze Article III standing in assessing a claim
brought under the FCRA.

Subsequently, in July 2016, SC Data moved to dismiss the action for
lack of standing.  The district court denied the motion, concluding
that Schumacher's standing to bring the FCRA claims underlying the
settlement is irrelevant to whether she has standing to enforce the
parties' settlement agreement.  The district court ordered the
parties to submit their settlement agreement for approval under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and they complied.  The district court
approved the settlement, and SC Data timely appealed the decision.

Judge Grasz agrees with SC Data that the district court erred by
not assessing standing before enforcing the settlement agreement.
Article III standing must be decided first by the court and
presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a federal
court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.  Thus,
because the district court's act in approving a class settlement
was a court judgment, it erred when it did not first assess
standing.

Because there is no finding in the record regarding whether
Schumacher had standing to pursue her claims, the Judge vacated the
district court's approval of the settlement agreement and remanded
the case for a decision on whether Schumacher has standing.  He
expresses no view on whether the Seventh Circuit's opinion on FCRA
standing or one of the competing approaches in other circuits is
best applied to the facts of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cfqQ8Q from Leagle.com.

John T. Walsh, for Defendant-Appellant.

Charles Jason Brown -- cbrown@gsbblaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jayson A. Watkins, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Paul E. Benson -- pebenson@michaelbest.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Michelle L. Dama -- mldama@michaelbest.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

James P. Sanders -- jsanders@reedsmith.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Amy O. Bruchs -- aobruchs@michaelbest.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.


SCOTT SEMPLE: Judge Rejects Efforts By State To Dismiss Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Will Healey, writing for Journal Inquirer, reports that a U.S.
District Court judge has rejected efforts by the state to strike
down a class-action lawsuit brought against Correction Commissioner
Scott Semple in July.

The lawsuit, which currently has five plaintiffs, accuses Semple of
refusing to provide sufficient medical treatment to state prison
inmates with hepatitis C.

The lawsuit, brought by Hartford lawyers Kenneth J. Krayeske, Esq.
-- attorney@kenkrayeske.com -- and DeVaughn L. Ward, Esq. says the
Correction Department does not have census numbers for how many of
its patients have hepatitis C, which can lead to serious health
problems including liver failure and ultimately death.

It also says that Semple, in his official capacity as head of the
Department of Correction, has failed to provide inmates with access
to medications that can cure hepatitis C.

Semple has said that treating the state's inmate population for
hepatitis C is challenging, given several factors such as the
different variations of the illness, and how much time an inmate is
in the state's custody. He's also said the high cost of the
medication is an issue.

The ruling, issued by U.S. District Court Judge Michael P. Shea,
grants Krayeske and Ward's Nov. 20 motion to amend their original
complaint, brought by inmate Robert Barfield, and add inmates
Darnell Tatem, Jason Barberi, John Knapp, and Curtis Davis in the
action against Semple, who is represented by the state Office of
the Attorney General.

Shea wrote in his ruling that the state's argument that the amended
complaint contains irrelevant and unnecessary allegations about
medical issues and interactions with non-defendants is "irrelevant
to allegations of deliberately indifferent medical care, which may
require an understanding of a person's medical history, or to
allegations of a failure to supervise, which may require an
understanding of interactions with subordinates."

Shea also rejected the state's assertion that the plaintiffs' money
damages claims are futile on the grounds of a lack of supervisory
liability, a lack of standing, and Semple's entitlement to
qualified immunity. Shea cited a 1995 court decision that provides
for supervisory liability in certain instances, and wrote that a
determination about qualified immunity at this stage in the
litigation would be "premature."

Shea also rejected the state's opposition to the joining of the
plaintiffs in the action against Semple in his individual capacity,
citing a federal rule that allows for defendants to be joined in an
action if any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
arising out of the same "transaction," or if any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

The lawsuit is one of several brought against the Correction
Department by Krayeske and Ward. Another inmate they represented,
Wayne World, who had claimed that his cancer was misdiagnosed and
not treated in an timely manner, settled with the state for $1.3
million in August. [GN]


SELDAT INC: Misclassified Security Guards, D'Carpio Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
DOMENICO D'CARPIO, Individually and On Behalf of all Others
Similarly Situated v. SELDAT, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00174 (C.D.
Cal., January 8, 2019), alleges that while working as a security
guard for Seldat, the Plaintiff was improperly classified as an
independent contractor, although the work he performed for Seldat
was that of an employee both under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the California Labor Code.

As a result of this misclassification, the Plaintiff and the class
were unlawfully deprived of overtime pay; deprived of meal and rest
breaks; and not given proper wage statements, according to the
complaint.

Seldat, Inc., is a self-described "supply chain" company with its
headquarters in the state of New Jersey, which maintains work
locations and offices in several communities in the state of
California including Compton, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Kevin F. Ruf, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  kruf@glancylaw.com


SIGMA TRANSPORTATION: Johnson Seeks to Recover Minimum & OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DUSTON JOHNSON individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated who were employed by SIGMA TRANSPORTATION, INC.
v. SIGMA TRANSPORTATION, INC. and MANDIP SINGH, Case No.
150131/2019 (N.Y. Sup., New York Cty., January 7, 2019), is brought
to recover alleged unlawful deductions, unlawful charges, and
unpaid wages and overtime compensation pursuant to the New York
Labor Law.

Based in West Hempstead, New York, Sigma Transportation, Inc., is a
domestic business corporation incorporated under the laws of the
state of New York and authorized to do business in New York.
Mandip Singh, a resident of New York, is an owner, principal
shareholder and/or director of Sigma.

Sigma is an ambulette transportation company.  Sigma is a
non-emergency medical transportation service.  Sigma transports
patients from different hospitals, doctors and their houses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
          Jack L. Newhouse, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080
          Facsimile: (212) 943-9082
          E-mail: lambinder@vandallp.com
                  jnewhouse@vandallp.com


SMILEMAKERS INC: S. Wainess' TCPA Suit Remains in Dist. Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Transfer or Strike the class allegations in
the case captioned P. STEVEN WAINESS, DDS, individually and as the
representative of a class, Plaintiff, v. SMILEMAKERS, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 18-12177. (E.D. Mich.).

This is a case under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
involving junk faxes. Plaintiff P. Steven Wainess, DDS (Wainess) is
suing defendant Smilemakers alleging that it received two
unsolicited faxes which did not comply with the TCPA. Wainess also
seeks class action status.

Motion to Transfer

Absent the forum selection clause, the Eastern District of Michigan
would be a proper venue for bringing this case. Wainess brought
this action under the TCPA and thus the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.  

Here, Smilemakers relies primarily, if not exclusively, on the
forum selection clause found in the Terms and Conditions to argue
transfer is appropriate. The forum selection clause is entitled to
some weight. The Supreme Court has directed that in evaluating a
motion for transfer of venue, courts should consider whether the
parties agreed to an enforceable forum selection clause.  

Smilemakers says that under section 2-207, Wainess agreed to the
forum selection clause by accepting goods from it. Wainess says
that the forum selection clause is an additional and material term
which does not become a part of the contract under 2-207.

The dispositive issue is therefore whether the forum selection
clause added to the back of Smilemaker's invoices materially
altered the parties' contract or became a part of the contract.  

Here, it appears that the Terms and Conditions with the forum
selection clause first surfaced in the parties' contractual
relationship after Smilemakers was acquired by Oriental Trading
Company in 2014 and appeared in three invoices from Wainess'
purchases in 2015 and 2016. Consistent with the above authority,
the Court similarly concludes that the the forum selection clause
contained in fine print on the back of the invoices is a material
alteration and therefore is not a part of the contract between the
parties. As such, transfer cannot be based on the existence of a
forum selection clause.

As to the several other transfer factors, the fact that Smilemakers
is located in South Carolina does not weigh in favor of transfer. A
court should not transfer a case where the transfer would simply
exchange the inconvenience of one party for that of the other.
While South Carolina may be a more connient forum for Smilemakers,
Michigan is a more convenient forum for Wainess.

Motion to Strike

Smilemakers has not shown that Wainess' class allegations should be
stricken based on the waiver provision. Smilemakers has not argued
that the complaint contains redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous allegations. Rather, Smilemakers contends, under the
guise of a motion to strike, that Wainess cannot bring a class
action against Smilemakers in light of the waiver provision.

Putting aside Wainess' argument that the class action waiver, like
the forum selection clause, is an additional material terms which
is not part of the contract under section 2-207, the issue of
whether the class action waiver is valid is far from clear. One
district court has held in the context of a claim under the Fair
Labor Standards Act that class waivers without an arbitration
provision are not valid.

Smilemakers cites Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228 (2013), to support its argument that the class action waiver is
enforceable. The issue in Am. Express was whether a contractual
waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost of individually
arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential
recovery. The Supreme Court held that, under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), the courts must rigorously enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms, including the
rules under which that arbitration will be conducted. The rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted in Am. Express
precluded class arbitration, and the Supreme Court enforced that
rule.
  
Unlike the above authority, there is no arbitration agreement at
issue in this case. The additional Terms and Conditions on the back
of the three invoices Smilemakers relies on do not call for
arbitration of any claims. Rather, the waiver provision purports to
require that any claims be filed individually in a court of
competent jurisdiction in Spartanburg, South Carolina.

Far from requiring arbitration under certain rules, thus
implicating the FAA, the additional terms and conditions prohibit
arbitration and require adjudication by a court. Neither party has
cited a case in which a court considered whether a class action
waiver unaccompanied by an arbitration provision is valid in a case
claiming a violation of the TCPA. In any event, Smilemakers'
argument is more appropriate as a response to a motion for class
certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 27, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd4tgam3
from Leagle.com.

P. Steven Wainess, DDS, Plaintiff, represented by Ross M. Good --
rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca & Ryan M. Kelly --
rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca.

Smilemakers, Inc., Defendant, represented by Margaret Schuchardt,
Jaszczuk P. C. & Martin Wojslaw Jaszczuk, Jaszczuk PC.


SOLARIS HEALTHCARE: Swinson Claims Overtime for Hrs. Worked Over 40
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Teresa Swinson, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Health Services of Palatka, Inc., Solaris Healthcare
Palatka LLC and Duane S. Gallagher, individually, Defendants, Case
No. 19-cv-00001 (Fla. Cir., January 2, 2019), seeks unpaid overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs and
other relief for violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Health Services of Palatka operated 180-bed skilled nursing home
and rehabilitation center located in Palatka, Florida before it was
purchased by Solaris Healthcare. Swinson was employed by the
Defendants as a dietary aide. She claims to have worked in excess
of 40 hours per workweek but was not paid the required overtime
rates for hours in excess of the 40 hours. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jay P. Lechner, Esq.
      Jason M. Melton, Esq.
      WHITTEL & MELTON, LLC
      11020 Northcliffe Boulevard
      Spring Hill, FL 34608
      Telephone: (352)683-2016
      Facsimile: (352) 600-7533
      Email: Pleadings@theFLlawfirm.com
             lechnerj@theFLlawfirm.com
             pls@theFLlawfirm.com


SOUTH CAROLINA: Suit Settlement Calls for Testing Hep C Testing
---------------------------------------------------------------
A proposed partial settlement of a civil rights class action
lawsuit has received preliminary approval from a Federal Court here
in South Carolina; it will provide Hepatitis C testing to all
current and future inmates incarcerated in the South Carolina
Department of Corrections (SCDC).

According to the terms of a proposed agreement in Russell Geissler
et al. v. Bryan P. Stirling et al., almost 20,000 current inmates
will be tested along with future inmates of the SCDC.

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
has set a fairness hearing on the settlement for February 12, 2019
at 11:00 AM in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina in Columbia. That hearing has been scheduled by
United States Senior District Court Judge, Margaret Seymour.

The settlement does not waive personal injury claims and the
litigation will go forward with regard to claims for the treatment
of Hepatitis C. The partial settlement was the result of
significant fact discovery including document production and
depositions.

The class is represented by Christopher Bryant, Esq. --
chris@yarboroughapplegate.com-- of Yarborough Applegate LLC located
in Charleston, SC and Reuben Guttman, Esq. --
rguttman@gbblegal.com-- of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks PLLC in
Washington, D.C., Justin Brooks, Esq. -- jbrooks@gbblegal.com --
Traci Buschner, Esq. -- tbuschner@gbblegal.com -- Caroline Poplin
MD/JD, -- cpoplin@gbblegal.com -- and Paul Zwier of Guttman, Esq.
-- PZwier@gbblegal.com -- Buschner & Brooks PLLC also worked on the
litigation.

Counsel representing the class praised opposing counsel for working
toward this partial resolution marking an inroad toward addressing
a public health crisis.

National statistics show that nearly 17 percent of nation's inmate
population has Hepatitis C, a bloodborne pathogen which can lead to
death. Prior to the litigation, the SCDC had failed to test inmates
for the disease, leaving them without the full awareness necessary
to prevent its transmission.

The litigation will continue as plaintiffs press for the treatment
of those who already have the disease. Today, several medications
exist to treat and cure the condition.

"This is a terrific result, but we still have our work cut out for
us to complete the litigation. This is not just a prison health
issue; it's a public health issue," said Christopher Bryant, Esq.
counsel for the class.

"This is a win for all citizens of the State of South Carolina and
elsewhere. Treating inmates in prisons before they re-enter society
is the type of prevention that will save lives and and save
precious healthcare dollars," said class counsel, Reuben Guttman,
Esq..

Guttman, Buschner & Brooks PLLC is a nationally recognized boutique
complex litigation law firm; in the healthcare area alone it has
represented whistleblowers under the False Claims Act in cases
which have returned over $5.5 billion to government treasuries.
More information about the firm and its members can be found at
gbblegal.com.

Yarborough Applegate LLC is a plaintiff's law firm primarily
focused on catastrophic personal injury, including traumatic brain
injuries, dram shop/drunk driving cases, trucking cases, and
wrongful death. More information on the firm, representative
results, and its members can be found at yarboroughapplegate.com.
[GN]


SOUTH FLORIDA COURIER: Da Silva Files Labor Class Suit in NY
------------------------------------------------------------
Djalma Lourenco Da Silva, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. South Florida Courier Systems,
Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Gonzalo Ochoa, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-20227-KMW (S.D. N.Y., January 16,
2019) seeks to recover compensation and other relief under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee hired by the Defendants on
an hourly basis, but the Defendants willfully refused to compensate
the Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated, for time and one
half for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours per work week, as
required under Federal law, the complaint asserts.

Plaintiff was and is presently a resident of this judicial
district.

Defendants were the employers of the Plaintiff, and were conducting
business in this judicial district and were 'employers' under the
FLSA.

Gonzalo Ochoa, individually, acted directly in the interests of his
employer, the Defendants, SFCS, in relation to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey P. Gale, Esq.
     JEFFREY P. GALE, P.A.
     9999 N.E. 2nd Avenue, Suite 304
     Miami Shores, FL 33138
     Phone: (305) 758-4900
     Fax: (305) 758-4949
     Primary Email: jeffgalelaw@bellsouth.net
     Secondary Email: kellygale@yahoo.com


SSC KERRVILLE: Can't Compel Arbitration in Passmore FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSARIO PASSMORE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; BRENDA L. CHAFTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; MARIA WEAKS, JO ANN VEGA,
KELLY SLAPE, Plaintiffs, v. SSC KERRVILLE HILLTOP VILLAGE OPERATING
COMPANY LLC, SSC KERRVILLE EDGEWATER OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, SSC
KERRVILLE ALPINE TERRACE OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, Defendants, Case
No. SA-18-CV-00782-FB (W.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S.
Chestney of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, San Antonio Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration.

Plaintiffs Passmore and Brenda L. Chafton, formerly known as Brenda
Agbeye, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, originally filed the action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended, on July 28, 2018.  In addition
to asserting individual employment claims under the FLSA and Texas
state law, the Named Plaintiffs also seek to represent a putative
class of similarly-situated individuals regarding their claims
under the FLSA, including certain opt-in Plaintiffs who have
already filed consents to join in the action.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have failed to pay their
registered nurses and licensed vocational nurses overtime wages for
time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, as required by the
FLSA.  The Named Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime compensation on
behalf of themselves and all other registered nurses and licensed
vocational nurses who worked for the Defendants during the past
three years and were not paid at a rate of not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

On July 28, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration, which is the subject of the Order.  By their motion,
the Defendants argue that the case is subject to binding
arbitration based on arbitration agreements signed by the Named
Plaintiffs as a condition of their employment with the Defendants.


The Plaintiffs moved to conditional certify the class on Oct. 29,
2018.  To date, three opt-in Plaintiffs have filed consents to join
the action: Maria Weaks, Jo Ann Vega, and Kelly Slape.

The Defendants filed a motion to strike or, in the alternative, to
stay the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification on Nov.
14, 2018.  On Nov. 15, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied
in part that motion, staying briefing on the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification, as well as all discovery, until the
Court has ruled on the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

Magistrate Judge Chestney finds that while the Defendants have met
their burden of demonstrating that the parties entered into a valid
arbitration agreement, the arbitration agreement's plain and
unambiguous language excludes the class and the collective actions
from mandatory arbitration.  Thus, the motion compel arbitration of
the putative collective action wil be denied.

In accordance with the foregoing, she denied the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration .  The Defendants must file a
response to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification
within 21 days of the date of the Order.  The parties confer and
submit proposed scheduling order deadlines within 30 days of the
date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3kEjSG from Leagle.com.

Rosario Passmore, Individually and On behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Brenda L. Chafton, Individually and On Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated formerly known as Brenda Agbeye,
Maria Weaks, Jo Ann Vega & Kelly Slape, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel Anthony Verrett -- daniel@morelandlaw.com -- Moreland
Verrett, P.C. & Edmond S. Moreland, Jr. -- edmond@morelandlaw.com
-- Moreland Verrett, P.C.

SSC Kerrville Hilltop Village Operating Company LLC, SSC Kerrville
Edgewater Operating Company, LLC & SSC Kerrville Alpine Terrace
Operating Company, LLC, Defendants, represented by Jeffrey C. Londa
-- jeffrey.londa@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
& Stewart, P.C., Lara Cardin de Leon --
lara.deleon@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart & Mark A. McNitzky -- mark.mcnitzky@ogletreedeakins.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC.


STARBUCKS CORP: Court Dismisses Amster Suit Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dolly M. Gee of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California (i) dismissed without prejudice the case,
SHAYNA AMSTER, an individual, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION; and Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
CV 18-8327-DMG (KSx) (C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Plaintiff's individually-based claims against the
Defendant are dismissed without prejudice.  The Plaintiff has
elected, at this time, not to proceed with her individual claims
under the California Labor Code or the class claims so that her
non-arbitrable Private Attorney General Act claims may be pursued
first.  The Plaintiff reserves her right to file her individual
claims at a later time.

The parties, therefore, have stipulated that the action will be
dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice, as to the Plaintiff's
individual claims and as to the claims alleged on behalf of other
persons similarly situated as a class action.

Judge Gee dismissed without prejudice the claims asserted by the
putative class against the Defendant.  The Plaintiff's claims
against the Defendant based on PAGA remain and are remanded to the
Los Angeles County Superior Court.

The parties will bear her/its own costs, including attorneys' fees.
The Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand Case to
State Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/VzLFwY from Leagle.com.

Shayna Amster, an indiviual, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similary situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aparajit
Bhowmik -- aj@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De
Blouw LLP, Jonathan M. Lebe -- jlebe@bdgfirm.com -- Lebe Law APLC,
Kyle R. Nordrehaug -- kyle@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, Norman B. Blumenthal -- norm@bamlawca.com --
Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, Janine R. Menhennet --
janine@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP,
Ruchira Piya Mukherjee -- piya@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal
Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP & Victoria Bree Rivapalacio --
victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw
LLP.

Starbucks Corporation, Defendant, represented by Keith A. Jacoby --
kjacoby@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Rachael Sarah Lavi --
rlavi@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC, Tina Sundar --
tsundar@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC & Judy M. Iriye --
jiriye@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Somerset FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIE SOMERSET, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN EINSTEIN &
ASSOCIATES, P.C. and STEPHEN EINSTEIN, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-07539 (ADS)(ARL)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (i) denied
the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and (ii) granted the Plaintiff's
motion to amend the Complaint.

Plaintiff Somerset initiated the putative class action against the
Defendants for damages stemming from alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The Plaintiff is a
citizen of the State of New York from whom the Defendants attempted
to collect a consumer debt allegedly owed by the Plaintiff.

On Jan. 10, 2017, the Defendants drafted and mailed an "Income
Execution" directed to the Plaintiff's employer and forwarded to
the Plaintiff.   The Plaintiff alleges that she received said
Income Execution, and that the Income Execution was the first and
only communication received by the Plaintiff from the Defendants.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Income Execution lacks the
language required by FDCPA Sections 1692e(11) and 15 USC 1692g(a).

In addition, the Amended Complaint claims that the Income Execution
falsely indicated that there was a valid judgement against the
Plaintiff from a company called Rushmore Recoveries X, LLC.  The
Plaintiff also claims that no attorney meaningfully reviewed the
Income Execution prior to serving it, and that the Defendants knew
or should have known that the service obtained by SamServe was
invalid.

On May 24, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York approved a class action settlement vacating more than
200,000 default judgments obtained by the Mel Harris Firm and
SamServe.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were aware of
the Sykes case, but chose to actively pursue a default judgment
emanating from the Mel Harris/SamServ operation.

On Dec. 27, 2017, the Plaintiff commenced the action against the
Defendants alleging violations of FDCPA Sections 1692e, 1692e(3),
1692e(10), 1692e(11), 1692f(1), 1692f(6)(A), 1692g(a).  She seeks
to bring the action on behalf of herself and a class consisting of
all consumers residing in the State of New York who, according to
the Defendants' records received an income execution materially
identical or substantially similar to the one she received.

On March 26, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

On April 19, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the Sept.
16, 2005 default judgment against her in the New York State
District Court of the County of Suffolk. ECF 21, Ex. B.

On April 20, 2018, the Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss and
filed a motion seeking leave to amend the Complaint.  The proposed
Amended Complaint withdrew the Plaintiff's claims under GBL Section
349.

On May 4, 2018, the Defendants filed a reply in support of their
motion to dismiss.  They limited their opposition to the
Plaintiff's motion to amend to the argument that any such amendment
would be futile.

On May 30, 2018, the Plaintiff submitted a letter motion informing
the Court that the New York State District Court of the County of
Suffolk vacated the default judgment against her.

Judge Spatt denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Among other
things, he finds that (i) the Income Execution was the initial
communication with the Plaintiff, and it need not decide whether
the Income Execution would comply with the FDCPA as a subsequent
communication; (ii) the fact that the debt collector does not
control the form of the document seems less important, considering
the statute's protections will only apply due to the debt initial
failure to effect service; and (iii) the Defendants' arguments fall
short in the context of the Section 1692e(3) claims.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff cannot assert a
violation of Section 1692f based on the same conduct underlying
Section 1692e claims.  The Judge explains that the Second Circuit
has expressly rejected the argument that sections 1692e and 1692f
are mutually exclusive and that the same conduct by a debt
collector cannot violate both sections at once.  The cases drawn by
the Defendants all predate this on point authority from the Second
Circuit.  Therefore, he denied the motion to dismiss based on
alleged duplicative claims.

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint.
He directed the Plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint no later
than 10 days from the issuance of the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 4, 2019 Memorandum Decision and
Order is available at https://is.gd/R2O6OQ from Leagle.com.

Julie Somerset, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian L. Bromberg, Bromberg Law
Office, P.C. & Joseph Mauro -- JoeMauroesq@hotmail.com -- The Law
Office of Joseph Mauro, LLC.

Stephen Einstein & Associates, P.C. & Stephen Einstein, Defendants,
represented by Joseph L. Francoeur --
joseph.francoeur@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser, Anthony Scott
Poulin, Stephen Einstein & Associates, Hilary Felice Korman --
hkorman@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP & Scott Evan Wortman --
swortman@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP.


STITCH FIX: Faces Fischler Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web site
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN FISCHLER, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. STITCH FIX, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-00119
(E.D.N.Y., January 7, 2019), arises from the Defendant's failure to
design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web site --
http://www.StitchFix.com/-- to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

Stitch Fix is a foreign business corporation that is organized
under Delaware law, and authorized to do business in the state of
New York.

Stitch Fix is an online subscription service that offers
personalized shopping for men, women and children.  On the Web
site, one can create an account and answer questions about style
preferences.  A stylist will then select clothes to be delivered by
mail to the recipient.  The recipient can choose to purchase the
clothes or return them at no additional cost.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
                  chris@lipskylowe.com


SWEPI LP: 6th Cir. Compels Arbitration in Ohio Landowners' Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gail Jankowski, Esq., at Carlton Fields, in an article for The
National Law Review, reported that the Plaintiff entered into a
lease agreement with Defendants (Shell Oil entities) governing
extraction of oil and gas from his five-acre property located in
Guernsey County, Ohio. The agreement provided a signing bonus to
Plaintiff of $5,000 per acre, contingent upon Shell's timely
verification that he possessed good title to the property. The
lease also contained a broad arbitration clause providing that any
dispute under the lease was to be resolved by binding arbitration.
Plaintiff brought suit, individually and on behalf of other
landowners having similar contracts with Shell, for breach of
contract after Shell allegedly failed to pay the signing bonus. The
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio subsequently
denied Shell's motion to compel arbitration, and Shell appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, compelling arbitration and
a directing the district court to decide whether the lease allowed
for class-wide arbitration. The panel found that the district court
failed to address the threshold issue of who decides arbitrability
and further reasoned that Plaintiff did not attack the
enforceability of the "specific arbitration clause" but rather
"argued that much of the contract, which happens to include the
arbitration clause, is unenforceable."  In so finding, the panel
determined that the arbitration clause was triggered at signing,
leading to the applicability of the severability doctrine and the
determination that an arbitrator must consider the issue first. As
to the class-wide arbitration question, the Panel reasoned that
because the parties did not identify a provision in the contract
that clearly and unmistakably gave the arbitrator the power to
decide the matter, and in light of "the importance of this issue to
the case, given that the class could include hundreds of Ohio
landowners," that question would be for the district court to
decide upon remand. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore opined
that the district court was the proper body to decide whether the
dispute should be arbitrated in light of the lease agreement's two
distinct triggering events -- the signing of the agreement and the
payment of the bonus. As such, Judge Moore opined that only after
payment of the bonus would the arbitration clause apply.

Rogers v. Swepi LP, No. 18-3229 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018). [GN]


TASKRABBIT INC: Diaz Sues Over Non-Blind Friendly Website
---------------------------------------------------------
Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Taskrabbit, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00071,
(S.D. N.Y., January 3, 2019), seeks preliminary and permanent
injunction, compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this
action together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such
other and further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights
Law.

Taskrabbit is an online marketplace connecting customers with local
service providers through www.taskrabbit.com. Plaintiff is legally
blind and claims that Defendant's website cannot be accessed by the
visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
      Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
      GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
      150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
      New York, NY 10003-2461
      Telephone: (212) 228-9795
      Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
      Email: nyjg@aol.com
             danalgottlieb@aol.com

             - and -

      Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
      COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
      300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
      Brooklyn, NY 11201
      Tel: (929) 575-4175
      Fax: (929) 575-4195
      Email: Joseph@cml.legal


TD AMERITRADE: Judge Denies Class Action Certification
------------------------------------------------------
Alex Padalka, writing for Financial Advisor IQ, reports that TD
Ameritrade scored a win in the courts, with a federal judge denying
a motion by clients of its subsidiary TD Ameritrade Futures & Forex
for class certification of their lawsuit.

A group of investors had sued the firm alleging that their
investments were unreasonably liquidated, as per an unwritten
policy that TDAFF applied to all of their accounts, according to an
order from U.S. District Judge Cecilia Altonaga of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

The investors asserted that their class is made up of 231 members
whose investments TDAFF liquidated in after-hours trading starting
in February, according to the court document.

The company denied the existence of any such policy, according to
the order. Furthermore, TDAFF pointed out that there were 888
different and unique options owned by the putative class members,
that their expectations were varied, that the market conditions
during which the investments were liquidated also varied greatly,
and that the decisions for liquidating the positions were made
individually by 16 TDAFF associates, court documents show.

Altonaga ruled that within the case, "individual issues predominate
over common issues" -- particularly when it came to how plaintiffs
were calculating damages, according to her order.

Furthermore, the judge said, "class action treatment is not a
superior method for adjudication of this controversy," court
documents show. [GN]


TEMPLE UNIVERSITY: Reaches $5.4MM Settlement in Students' Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Will Bleier, writing for Temple News, reports that Temple
University settled a class action lawsuit by Fox School of Business
students in excess of $4 million on Dec. 21, after the school
admitted it had misreported rankings data to U.S. News & World
Report.

Online MBA students involved with the class action lawsuit will
receive $4 million and claims from students in the Executive MBA,
Global MBA, Part-time MBA, and the MS in Human Resource Management,
MS in Digital Innovation in Marketing and Online Bachelor of
Business Administration programs will receive more than $1.4
million.

"It's an unfortunate situation to have arisen with the rankings,
but this lets everybody put this behind Temple, which is in the
best interest of everybody," said Jason Brown, Esq. an attorney at
JTB Law Group in New Jersey who is representing the students.
"Because the longer this endures as a piece of litigation I think
the worse off it is for everybody."

The money will be paid from available insurance coverages and
reserves, Kevin Feeley, a Temple spokesman said. Feeley could not
specify if tuition dollars would be included in this sum.

The settlement does not include any admission of liability, the
university said in a release.

A $5,000 ethics scholarship will be established for a student
interested in studying ethics in business and is enrolled in one of
the programs involved in the suit, per the terms of the
settlement.

The Fox School of Business remains under investigation by the U.S.
Department of Education and the state Attorney General's office.
The investigations are to determine if Temple intentionally
misrepresented itself and misled students.

An independent report paid for by the university found that
officials in the Fox School of Business had knowingly submitted and
falsified data to the U.S. News & World Report for its Online MBA
and other programs. The Online MBA program had been ranked No. 1 in
the country for several years.

The falsified data was part of a broader environment in the
business school, focused on achieving high rankings, the report
determined. Since then, its longtime dean Moshe Porat was fired
from his post and Provost JoAnne Epps added multiple safeguards to
ensure data can not be falsified to ranking agencies again.

"As I have said in the past, I remain firm in my belief that our
Online MBA program, and the Fox School as a whole, is one of the
best in the nation," University President Richard Englert said in
an email to students on Dec. 20. "It remains an excellent choice
for students who want an exceptional education in a vibrant urban
environment."

The settlement was sent to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for its review. [GN]


TENARIS SA: Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------
The Fabricator reports that New York-based Scott+Scott Attorneys at
Law LLP is notifying investors that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against steel pipe products manufacturer and supplier Tenaris
S.A. and certain of its officers and directors, related to alleged
violations of federal securities laws.

The lawsuit alleges that defendants made false or misleading
statements or failed to disclose that Tenaris' CEO and Chairman
Paolo Rocca knew that one of his company's executives paid cash to
government officials from 2009 to 2012 to expedite compensation
payments for the sale of Sidor; that this conduct would lead to
Rocca being charged in a graft scheme, and subject Tenaris, its
affiliates, and executives to heightened governmental scrutiny; and
that, as a result, Tenaris' public statements were materially false
or misleading at all relevant times [GN]


TESARO INC: Scarantino Balks at Merger Deal with GlaxoSmithKline
----------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TESARO, INC., DAVID MOTT,
LAWRENCE ALLEVA, JAMES ARMITAGE, EARL COLLIER, JR., MARY LYNNE
HEDLEY, LONNIE MOULDER, GARRY NICHOLSON, KAVITA PATEL, BETH
SEIDENBERG, PASCALE WITZ, PVKG INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS INC., and PVKG
MERGER SUB, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00023-UNA (D.
Del., Jan. 4, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated Sections
14(e), 14(d), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with a solicitation statement.

The action stems from a proposed transaction announced on December
3, 2018, pursuant to which Tesaro, Inc. will be acquired by
GlaxoSmithKline plc and Adriatic Acquisition Corporation. On
December 3, 2018, Tesaro's Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with GlaxoSmithKline.
Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, merger sub commenced
a tender offer to acquire all of Tesaro's outstanding common stock
for $75.00 per share in cash. The Tender Offer is provided to
expire on January 14, 2019. On December 14, 2018, the Defendants
filed a solicitation/recommendation statement with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the
Proposed Transaction. The solicitation statement omits material
information with respect to the proposed transaction, which renders
the solicitation statement false and misleading, the lawsuit says.

Tesaro is a public pharmaceutical company based in Waltham,
Massachusetts. They focus on drug development for cancer. In
December 2018, GlaxoSmithKline announced it would acquire the
company for $5.1 billion.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

TOYOTA AUSTRALIA: Class Action Over DPF Issues Being Considered
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Collie, writing for CarAdvice, reports that Toyota Australia
is facing a class action lawsuit over issues with the Diesel
Particulate Filters (DPF) in 2015-18 HiLux, Prado and Fortuner
vehicles powered by the 2.8-litre turbo-diesel engine.

According to the legal firm considering the claim, its clients have
experienced "increased fuel consumption and a loss of power of the
vehicle" because "hard deposits accumulating on the DPF oxidisation
catalyst" stop it reaching the necessary temperature.

The claim says the DPF may be defective because the HiLux, Fortuner
and Prado don't burn particulate matter in normal urban conditions,
where many owners spend time, creating particulate matter buildup,
DPF blockage, foul-smelling emissions from the exhaust, increased
fuel use, and greater wear and tear on the engine.

It acknowledges Toyota contacted owners offering to clean or
replace the DPF in affected vehicles, and retro-fit a manual
regeneration switch, but says some owners have been dealing with
the issues for a number of years, causing "unnecessary
inconvenience and expense".

Earlier this year, the company made a manual regeneration switch
standard fit on the vehicles included in this recall.

At the moment, the law firm is investigating possible
contraventions of Australian Consumer Law (ACL) regarding
"misleading and deceptive conduct" and "omissions equating to
misleading and deceptive conduct".

A potential claim would encompass any repairs that weren't covered
under warranty, a loss of income for tradies with vehicles that
were taken off the road by the issue, compensation for any
measurable increase in fuel consumption or loss of power, and
coverage for any excessive depreciation because of the problem.

In a statement, Toyota Australia said it "launched the latest in a
series of initiatives, a customer service campaign, to resolve the
potential DPF issue" in October.

"All customers with potentially affected vehicles have been, or are
in the process of being, contacted by letter and are requested to
make contact with their closest/preferred Toyota dealer," the
company said.

"Toyota dealers will reprogram the engine control module, ensure
the DPF has been regenerated and conduct a smoke test. If the smoke
test is negative, the DPF will be replaced. All inspection work and
replacement, if required, will be completed free of charge to the
customer." [GN]


UNION PACIFIC: Ct. Won't Certify Classes in Landing Agreement Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LIL' MAN IN THE BOAT, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-00904-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied Lil'
Man's motion to certify two classes of commercial vessel
operators.

In the putative class action, Plaintiff Lil' Man complains against
the Defendants about a recently-amended landing agreement to use
South Beach Harbor ("2016 Landing Agreement") the Defendants
require commercial vessels to sign.  Lil' Man complains that the
agreement imposes excessive fees and charges and places regulations
and restrictions on vessels, with the greatest unjustified
imposition on commercial charter vessels engaged in interstate
commerce as a condition of landing at the Port, and that the fees
charged by the Defendants bear no relationship to the costs
generated or to the services provided by Defendants to commercial
vessels.  Lil' Man contends the agreement is an unlawful
infringement of its constitutional rights and asks the Court to
declare the agreement unconstitutional and to order Defendants to
pay damages and restitution.

In February 2017, Lil' Man initiated the litigation by filing a
putative class action complaint in the Northern District of
California.  Its first complaint stated four claims under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983: violation of the Tonnage Clause of the United States
Constitution by assessing a "Duty of Tonnage"; violation of Lil'
Man's First Amendment right to petition by virtue of the
agreement's exculpation provision; and violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and Rivers and Harbors Act, respectively, based on
the same provisions.  Lil' Man also asserted claims under the Bane
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 52.1; for unjust enrichment; and
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Defendants moved to dismiss Lil' Man's complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  The
Court dismissed Lil' Man's Bane Act claim but allowed the other
causes of action to proceed.  

Lil' Man then filed an amended complaint.  The Defendants then
moved for judgment on the pleadings solely as to Lil' Man's claims
for violation of California Business and Professions Code Section
23300 and Lil' Man's Section 1983 claim based on a denial of its
right to petition.  The Court granted that motion.

The following month, Lil' Man filed its motion for class
certification on its remaining claims.  Now before the Court is
Lil' Man's motion to certify two classes of commercial vessel
operators: those who were asked to sign the 2016 Landing Agreement,
and those who paid fees pursuant to that agreement.

Because neither of Lil' Man's proposed classes is sufficiently
numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), Judge Tigar denied its motion
for class certification.  He finds that (i) the number of potential
class members by itself does not establish impracticability of
joinder; (ii) neither the class size nor the numerosity factors
favor certifying Lil' Man's Damages Class; and (iii) Lil' Man only
claims 18 members for the class, and provides no argument beyond
that supporting its Damages Class as to why the class would satisfy
the numerosity requirement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2guFxF from Leagle.com.

Lil' Man in the Boat, Inc., a California Corporation, Plaintiff,
represented by David Raymond Ongaro -- dongaro@ongaropc.com --
Ongaro PC.

City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco Port Commission,
operating under the title Port of San Francisco, Elaine Forbes,
Interim Executive Director, Peter Daley, Deputy Director, Maritime
the San Francisco Port, Jeff Bauer, Deputy Director of Real Estate,
the San Francisco Port & Joe Monroe, Harbormaster, South Beach
Harbor, Pier 40, Defendants, represented by Tara M. Steeley, San
Francisco City Attorney's Office.


UNION PACIFIC: Settlement in Fowler Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Richard Fowler; Rick Hollis, Plaintiffs, v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., Defendant, Case No. EDCV 17-02451 JGB (SPx)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge Jesus G. Bernal of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Eastern Division, granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

He awarded (i) the Class Counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of
$28,800; (ii) the Class Counsel costs in the amount of $5,000; and
(iii) $3,000 to Plaintiff Hollis.  He also ordered payment of (i)
$2,632.50 to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency;
and $13,000 to the claims administrato.  The case is dismissed with
prejudice

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/Zms5So from Leagle.com.

Richard Fowler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig J. Ackermann --
cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and  Tilajef PC, David S.
Winston -- david@employmentlitigators.com -- Winston Law Group,
P.C., Jonathan Melmed -- jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group PC &
Sam Vahedi -- cja@ackermanntilajef.com  -- Ackermann and Tilajef
PC.

Rick Hollis, Plaintiff, represented by Craig J. Ackermann,
Ackermann and Tilajef PC, David S. Winston, Winston Law Group,
P.C., Jonathan Melmed, Melmed Law Group PC, Sam Vahedi, Ackermann
and Tilajef PC & Avi Melech Kreitenberg , Ackermann and Tilajef PC

Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Amanda C. Sommerfeld -- asommerfeld@jonesday.com --
Jones Day, Donald J. Munro -- dmunro@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro
hac vice & Koree Blyleven -- kblyleven@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


UNITED STATES: Prison Employees Hit Gov't Shutdown
--------------------------------------------------
Justin Tarovisky and Grayson Sharp, on their own behalves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The United
States of America, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-02007 filed in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims on January 2, 2019, seeks all rights,
privileges, protections and compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Tarovisky and Sharp worked for the Bureau of Prisons and were
affected by the government shutdown on December 22, 2018. They were
not compensated on their scheduled payday and therefore seek
monetary and liquidated damages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Heidi R. Burakiewicz, Esq.
      Zachary R. Henige, Esq.
      Robert DePriest, Esq.
      KALIJARVI, CHUZI, NEWMAN & FITCH, P.C.
      818 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1000
      Washington, DC 20006
      Tel: (202) 331-9260
      Fax: (877) 219-7127
      Email: hburakiewicz@kcnlaw.com
             zhenige@kcnlaw.com
             rdepriest@kcnlaw.com

             - and -

      David Borer, Esq.
      AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
      80 F Street, N.W.
      Washington, DC 20001
      Tel: (202) 639-6424
      Fax: (202) 639-6441
      Email: borerd@afge.org

             - and -

      Judith Galat, Esq.
      AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
      80 F Street, N.W.
      Washington, DC 20001
      Tel: (202) 639-6424
      Fax: (202) 639-6441
      Email:galatj@afge.org


USAA FEDERAL: Faces Eiess Class Suit Over Illegal NSF Fees
----------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH EIESS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, Case No. 3:19-cv-00108-LB
(N.D. Cal., January 8, 2019), arises from the assessment of
multiple Non-Sufficient Funds Fees ("NSF Fees") on the same
transaction, which is barred by the account contract and is
deceptive.

In violation of its contract and reasonable consumer understanding,
USAA often charges more than one $29 NSF Fee on the same
transaction, even though the contract states -- and reasonable
consumers understand -- that the same transaction can only incur a
single NSF Fee, Ms. Eiess alleges.  She contends that these double
and triple penalties crush accountholders already struggling to
make ends meet.

USAA is a federal savings association with its headquarters and
principal place of business located in San Antonio, TX. Among other
things, USAA is engaged in the business of providing retail banking
services throughout California to consumers, including Plaintiff
and members of the putative classes, which includes the issuance of
debit cards for use by its customers in conjunction with their
checking accounts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1350 Columbia St., Suite 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 762-1900
          E-mail: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia G. Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Andrea Gold, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  agold@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Annick M. Persinger, Esq.
          Tanya S. Koshy, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          The Tower Building
          1970 Broadway, Suite 1070
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 254-6808
          Facsimile: (510) 210-0571
          E-mail: apersinger@tzlegal.com
                  tkoshy@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  streisfeld@kolawyers.com


WELLS FARGO: Court Approves $480MM Settlement
---------------------------------------------
Ben Lane, writing for HousingWire, reports that Wells Fargo will
pay $480 million to a group of the bank's shareholders as part of a
class action settlement for allegedly lying about the sales
practices that led to the bank's massive fake accounts scandal.

The settlement stems from actions taken in 2016 by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the city and county of Los Angeles to fine the bank
$150 million for more than 5,000 of the bank's former employees
opening as many as 2 million fake accounts in order to get sales
bonuses.

The action also led to class action lawsuit being brought on behalf
of the bank's customers who had a fake account opened in their
name. That lawsuit led to a $142 million fake accounts class action
settlement for those customers.

But they weren't the only ones who sued.

A group of the bank's shareholders also sued the bank, claiming
that the bank and its executives made "misrepresentations and
omissions" about the bank's "cross-selling" business model, where
bank employees were rewarded for getting customers to open up
multiple accounts.

Those rewards and bonuses led to employees opening up fake accounts
in customers' names in order to get bonuses.

The shareholders claimed that bank committed securities fraud by
not being wholly honest in its statements about its sales
practices.

And earlier this year, the bank agreed to a settlement that will
see the bank pay $480 million to those shareholders.

And now, a federal judge has given final approval to the
settlement, which means that those shareholders will soon see their
share of the $480 million payout.

According to the bank, the settlement class covers all persons and
entities that purchased Wells Fargo common stock from Feb. 26, 2014
through Sept. 20, 2016.

"Wells Fargo is pleased the case has received final approval by the
court," the bank said in a statement. "The company remains focused
on rebuilding trust and transforming into the most
customer-focused, efficient, and innovative Wells Fargo ever, for
all of its stakeholders."

Wells Fargo said that fully accrued the settlement amount earlier
this year, and paid that amount into a settlement escrow.

Wells Fargo also said that it maintains its denial of the claims
and allegations made by the shareholders, but settled the lawsuit
in order to "avoid the cost and disruption of further litigation."

Eligible shareholders have until Jan. 23, 2019 to submit their
claim to take part in the settlement.[GN]


WORLDWIDE TILE: Ayala Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
Carlos Nunez Ayala and Jose Ricardo Mejia on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. Worldwide Tile
Corp. and Jose Goncalves, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00293 (E.D.
N.Y., January 15, 2019) is an action brought on behalf of
Plaintiffs and a putative class of individuals who provided labor
for Defendants and/or other related entities to recover unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
and the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State
Department of Labor Regulations, ("NYLL").

Plaintiff Ayala was employed by Defendants as a construction
laborer from in or about February 2014 to in or about October 2017.
Plaintiff Mejia was employed by Defendants as a construction
laborer from in or about April 2017 to in or about January 2018.

Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week but were
not paid premium overtime compensation for the hours they worked
after 40 hours per week. Defendants paid the Plaintiffs at their
regular rate of pay for all hours worked, including those hours
worked after 40 hours per week. The Defendants also failed to
provide each Plaintiff with an accurate statement of his wages each
pay period setting forth the regular hourly rate of pay, overtime
rate of pay, and number of hours worked, says the complaint.

Worldwide Tile Corp., is a domestic business corporation with
offices at 511 Latham Road, Mineola, New York 11501.

Jose Goncalves, is and/or was an officer or owner of Worldwide Tile
Corp., had authority to make payroll and personnel decisions for
Worldwide Tile Corp., and was active in the day to day management
of Worldwide Tile Corp., including the payment of wages to the
Plaintiffs and determining what wages were paid to Plaintiffs, and
is liable to Plaintiffs as an "employer" within the meaning of
federal and state law for the unpaid wages they seek to
recover.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Peter A. Romero, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
     825 Veterans Highway, Suite B
     Hauppauge, NY 11788
     Phone: (631) 257-5588
     Email: Promero@RomeroLawNY.com


WYNDHAM HOTEL: Website Violates Disabilities Act, Breeze Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
BYRON BREEZE, JR., on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WYNDHAM HOTEL GROUP, LLC, a foreign
limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00176
(D.N.J., Jan. 7, 2019), seeks injunctive relief, and payment of
attorneys' fees and litigation costs, including but not limited to
disbursements, court expenses and other fees, pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination (NJLAD).

According to the complaint, the Defendant owns and/or operates a
hotel known as the Days Inn by Wyndham Atlantic City
Oceanfront-Boardwalk located at 3000 Boardwalk At Morris Ave,
Atlantic City, New Jersey 08401.  The Defendant owns and/or
controls and Hotel's website, located at
www.wyndhamhotels.com/days-inn/atlantic-city-new-jersey/days-inn-atlantic-city-oceanfront-boardwalk/overview
The Hotel takes reservations through the Website and provides
information regarding available guestrooms and Hotel amenities.

As of March 15, 2012, the Defendant was required to ensure that all
of its reservation systems, including its online reservation
systems (a) identify and describe disabled accessible features of
the Hotel in detail; (b) identify and describe accessible features
of ADA compliant guest rooms in detail; (c) permit disabled
individuals to independently assess whether the Hotel and its
available guestrooms meet their individual accessibility needs (by
describing accessible and inaccessible features); and (d) allow
reservations to be taken for accessible guestrooms in the same
manner as for non-accessible guestrooms. The Defendant has not
complied, the lawsuit says.

Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC owns, operates, and franchises a chain of
hotels in the United States and internationally.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Erik M. Bashian, Esq.
          BASHIAN & PAPANTONIOU, P.C.
          500 Old Country Road, Ste. 302
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 279-1554
          Facsimile: (516) 213-0339
          E-mail: eb@bashpaplaw.com

XPO LOGISTICS: Bernstein Liebhard Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of those who purchased or acquired the securities
of XPO Logistics, Inc. ("XPO" or the "Company") (NYSE: XPO) between
February 26, 2014 and December 12, 2018, both dates inclusive (the
"Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover XPO shareholders'
investment losses.

If you purchased XPO securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit XPO Shareholder Class Action
Lawsuit or contact Daniel Sadeh toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
dsadeh@bernlieb.com.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) XPO's highly touted aggressive M&A strategy had yielded
only minimal returns to the Company; (2) XPO was utilizing improper
accounting practices to mask its true financial condition,
including, inter alia, under-reporting of bad debts and aggressive
amortization assumptions; and (3) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On December 12, 2018, Spruce Point Capital Management ("Spruce
Point") published a report regarding XPO, entitled "Trucking
Ridiculous; End of the Road."  The Spruce Point report asserted
that a "forensic investigation" into XPO had revealed, "financial
irregularities that conveniently cover [the Company's] growing
financial strain and inability to complete additional acquisitions
despite repeated promises."  Spruce Point reported that it had
uncovered, among other issues, "concrete evidence to suggest
dubious tax accounting, under-reporting of bad debts, phantom
income through unaccountable M&A earn-out liabilities, and
aggressive amortization assumptions: all designed to portray
glowing ‘Non-GAAP' results."  The Spruce Point report further
stated that "XPO insiders have aggressively reduced their ownership
interest in the Company since coming public, and recently enacted a
new compensation structure tied to ‘Adjusted Cash Flow Per
Share'—defined in such a non-standard way that it is practically
meaningless."  Spruce Point also reported that "[i]n our opinion,
XPO has used a nearly identical playbook from [URI] leading up to
its SEC investigation, executive felony convictions, and share
price collapse."

On this news, XPO's stock fell $15.77 per share or approximately
26% to close at $44.50 per share on December 13, 2018, damaging
investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than February 12, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased XPO securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/xpo-logistics-inc-xpo-lawsuit-class-action-fraud-stock-101
        
         Daniel Sadeh,Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         10 East 40th Street, New York
         New York 10016
         Telephone: (877) 779-1414
         E-mail: dsadeh@bernlieb.com [GN]


XPO LOGISTICS: Robbins Arroyo Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP disclosed that
purchasers of XPO Logistics (NYSE: XPO) filed a class action
complaint against the company's officers and directors for alleged
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between February
26, 2014 and December 12, 2018. XPO Logistics provides
transportation and logistics services domestically and
internationally.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/xpo-logistics-inc/

XPO Accused of Dubious Tax Accounting To Cover Financial Strain

According to the complaint, Fortune Magazine noted that XPO "has
grown from $177 million in sales in 2011 to $17 billion today,
thanks largely to an incredible run of acquisitions." CEO and
Chairman of the Board Bradley Jacobs' tenure at XPO has been
characterized by an aggressive mergers and acquisition strategy. On
August 2, 2017, Jacobs announced plans to earmark up to $8 billion
for additional acquisitions. On December 12, 2018, Spruce Point
Capital Management published a report asserting that XPO was
covering financial irregularities, and that it had evidence to
suggest XPO was utilizing dubious tax accounting methods and
aggressive amortization assumptions amongst other factors to
portray glowing 'Non-GAAP' results. By Spruce Point's calculations,
XPO's acquisitions had "generated $73m of cumulative adjusted free
cash flow in an expansionary economic period… [and is] indicative
of a failed business strategy yielding a paltry 1.2% return on
invested capital." Following the publication of the Spruce Point
report, XPO's stock price fell $15.77, or 26.17%, to close at
$44.50.

XPO Logistics Shareholders Have Legal Options

         Leonid Kandinov, Esq.
         Robbins Arroyo LLP
         600 B Street, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 525-3990
         Toll Free: (800) 350-6003
         Website: www.robbinsarroyo.com
         Email: LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


YOUNIQUE LLC: Ct. Certifies Ca., Fla., Ohio Classes in "Schmitt"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James V. Selna grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit entitled
Megan Schmitt v. Younique LLC, Case No. 8:17-cv-01397-JVS-JDE (C.D.
Cal.).

Judge Selna grants in part the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the
California, Florida and Ohio classes.  Judge Selna denies the
Plaintiff' motion to certify the Tennessee class.

This case concerns the marketing and sales of Younique's mascara
product, Moodstruck 3D Fiber Lashes (the "Lash Enhancer") from
October 2012 until July 2015.  The Lash Enhancer consists of two
components, a "Transplanting Gel" and "Natural Fibers."  Younique
represented that the Natural Fiber component was "natural" and
consisted of "100% Natural Green Tea Fibers" on the Lash Enhancer's
label, according to the Court's Civil Minutes.

However, the Plaintiffs allege that the Natural Fiber component did
not actually contain any green tea leaves and instead was composed
of ground-up nylon.  The Plaintiffs allege that a reasonable person
would not consider nylon "natural."

The Plaintiffs sought certification of four state classes:
California, Tennessee, Ohio, and Florida. The proposed class
definitions are:

   * California Class:

     All California consumers who purchased stand-alone
     Moodstruck 3D Fiber Lashes between October 2012 and July
     2015 for personal, family or household use.

   * Tennessee Class:

     All Tennessee consumers who purchased stand-alone Moodstruck
     3D Fiber Lashes between October 2012 and July 2015 for
     personal, family or household use.

   * Ohio Class:

     All Ohio consumers who purchased stand-alone Moodstruck 3D
     Fiber Lashes between October 2012 and July 2015 for
     personal, family or household use.

   * Florida Class:

     All Florida consumers who purchased standalone Moodstruck 3D
     Fiber Lashes between October 2012 and July 2015 for
     personal, family or household use.[CC]


ZIMMER BIOMET: Court Partly Stays J. Carl's FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES KARL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; ZIMMER US, INC., a Delaware corporation;
BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company; and BIOMET, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendants,
(N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants'  motion to stay pending resolution of its petition
for writ of mandamus.

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), Judge Alsup finds the
Defendants' motion is suitable for submission without oral
argument, and therefore vacated the hearing scheduled for Jan. 10,
209.

In August 2015, Karl signed a sales associate agreement with the
Defendants and thereafter began working for them as a sales
representative in California.  The agreement classified the
Plaintiff and other California-based sales representatives as
independent contractors and included a forum-selection clause
identifying Indiana as the exclusive forum.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants misclassified him and
other sales representatives as independent contractors rather than
employees.  As such, he raises claims for relief for violations of
the FLSA, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 4-2001, the
California Labor Code for unpaid wages and overtime premiums, and
related California Labor Code claims, including: meal and rest
period violations, failure to provide itemized wage statements,
failure to reimburse business expenses, and related civil and
statutory penalties.

An order dated Nov. 6, 2018, the Court denied the Defendants'
motion to transfer the instant action to the Northern District of
Indiana pursuant to the forum-selection clause found in the sales
associate agreement based on California Labor Code Section 925,
which makes forum-selection clauses voidable per public policy.
The order also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss and
strike.

On Nov. 29, 2018, the Defendants filed a petition for writ of
mandamus with the court of appeals in connection with the order
denying the Defendants' motion to transfer.  The Defendants now
move to stay proceedings pending resolution by our court of appeals
of the writ petition.  The Plaintiff opposes.

Judge Alsup finds that while the Defendants have not made a strong
showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits, they have shown
irreparable harm absent a stay to a certain extent.  His Order
therefore finds that the balance of equities weigh in favor of
granting a partial brief stay.

A stay on discovery, however, he says is not warranted.  The
Defendants have not shown the requisite irreparable harm due to
reasonable discovery.  Though they argue that discovery would be
burdensome as their witnesses are located in Indiana, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiff -- who chose the venue -- should bear the
burden of deposing relevant witnesses in Indiana.  The gravamen of
the Defendants' alleged discovery woes are thus moot anyway.

The case will go forward somewhere -- whether in California or in
Indiana -- so the Court might as well make progress on discovery
while the petition remains unresolved.  So, the discovery will be
useful even if the action is ultimately transferred to the Northern
District of Indiana.

Therefore, to the extent stated, Judge Alsup granted in part the
Defendants' request for a stay pending the court of appeals' ruling
on the writ petition.  The Plaintiff will file his motion for
conditional certification of an FLSA action by March 28, 2019 by
noon.  The Defendants' motion is otherwise denied.  The discovery
will proceed as scheduled.  The hearing scheduled for Jan. 10, 2019
is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 8, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ReKfMV from Leagle.com.

James Karl, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of a class of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alec Llewellyn
Segarich -- alec.segarich@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich
LLP, Denis S. Kenny -- denis@sfcounsel.com -- Scherer & Smith, LLP
& Jason Shelton Lohr -- jason.lohr@lrllp.com -- Lohr Ripamonti &
Segarich LLP.

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Zimmer US,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Biomet Inc., an Indiana Corporation,
Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company & Biomet Biologics, LLC, an Indiana limited liability
company, Defendants, represented by Eric Meckley --
eric.meckley@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP &
Joseph Raymond Lewis -- joseph.lewis@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis.



                            *********

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