CAR_Public/190131.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, January 31, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 23

                            Headlines

A.H.D. HOUSTON: Ross Seeks Minimum & Overtime Pay for Dancers
ACT FAST: Pruitt et al. Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
ADVANCED MICRO: Court Certifies Class in Dickey et al Suit
ALLIANCE RESOURCE: 7th Circuit Appeal Filed in Leeper WARN Suit
ALLY FINANCIAL: Feb. 5 Settlement Fairness Hearing

AMAC INC: Faces Class Suit Over Non-Solicitation Agreements
AMERICAN FAMILY: 11th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Associates' Suit
ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Action
BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Court Grants Final Approval of Beck Settlement
BAY PARK CENTER: Clark Suit Moved to Southern District of New York

BLUE TORTILLA: Alvarez Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
BMW: Vasquez Sues over Misleading Motor Vehicle Recall
BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES: Court Won't Decertify Borum Class
BULL MOTORS: Rodriguez Sues over Unauthorized Text Messages
CAPE MAY, NJ: Court Narrows Claims in Docherty PLRA Suit

CCK CLEANERS: Chacon Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Warenski Sues over Unwanted Phone Calls
CHEETAH MOBILE: Sun Sues over Misleading Financial Report
CLEAR WATER: Aragon Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
COCA-COLA BEVERAGES: Silva et al. Suit Moved to S.D. Florida

COLLECTO INC: Court Certifies Class in Weismann Suit
COMMUNITY CARE: Court Certifies Class of Domestic Care Providers
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Rice Sues over Debt Collection Practices
COOPER UNION: Teachers Union's Suit Remains in District Court
DENNY'S INC: Wintjen Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees

DXC TECHNOLOGY: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
DXC TECHNOLOGY: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
DXC TECHNOLOGY: Feb. 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
FERROGLOBE PLC: Treankler Sues over Misleading Financial Report
FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Securities Suit

FOOD FOR LIFE: Elliott Sues Over Deceptive Cereal Product Labels
FREEDOM DOVE: Chunfeng Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
G6 HOSPITALITY: Cummings Suit Moved to S.D. California
GENOCEA BIOSCIENCES: Ruling in Emerson Securities Suit Appealed
GLOBAL RADAR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Sanders' Suit

GMC RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Joya et al. Claim
GODDARD RIVERSIDE: Faces West Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
GOLDEN FARM: Villaneuva Seeks OT Pay for Grocery Store Employees
HERSHEY CHOCOLATE: Koskie Minsky Files Child Labor Suit
HILTON WORLDWIDE: Ruddiman Seeks Unpaid Wages and Tips

HOME DEPOT: Hankey Suit Moved to Central District of California
HOME INSURANCE: Faces Class Action by Home Owners
HOME WARRANTY: Arbitration Unenforceability in Kernahan Affirmed
IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
JAFFAN INTERNATIONAL: Underpays Bartenders & Servers, Suro Says

JANI-KING INTERNATIONAL: Court Certifies Class of Cleaning Workers
JOHN GORE ORGANIZATION: Violates ADA, Castillo Suit Asserts
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Narrows Claims in "Hypoallergenic" Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Perrone Sues over Retirement Savings Plan
KAGOME INC: Faces Rosales Labor Suit in Sacramento

LENOVO INC: Court Dismisses Suit Over Defective Phab 2 Smartphone
LUCA C. ENTERPRISES: Underpays Laborers, Ramos-Lopez et al. Claim
LUKE'S A PLUS: Tracy Scarborough Seeks Minimum & Overtime Pay
LYONS SECURITY: Faces Butler Suit in Sacramento, California
MALCOLM CISNEROS: Aikens' Class Cert. Bid Denied as Moot

MARK DEBLOIS: Fails to Pay Tips & Service Charges to Drivers
MARK MURRAY FINE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
MARRIOTT INT'L: Faces Axelrod Suit Over Massive Data Breach
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Faces Savett et al. Suit in D. Maryland
MATCO TOOLS: Aguilera et al. Suit Moved to N.D. California

MCNEELY LAW: Court Grants Arbitration in K. Mona FDCPA Suit
MDL 2741: Nash-Boulden Suit v. Monsanto over Roundup Consolidated
MDL 2742: New York Court Certifies Securities Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Kacinski Suit Moved to E.D. New York
MILCO NATIONAL: Raines Seeks Unpaid Overtime

MONSANTO COMPANY: Nash Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MURCIA GROUP: Garcia Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum, OT Wages
MY1HR INC: Gallion TCPA Suit Asserts Invasion of Privacy
NCAA: Foote Suit Transferred to Northern District of Illinois
NCAA: McKinnie Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois

NEW MEXICO: State Worker Files Class Action Lawsuit vs CWA Union
NEW YORK: Escalera Sues Disability Assistance Office
NOBILIS HEALTH: Yang Sues over Misleading Financial Report
NOVA LIFESTYLE: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
NOVA LIFESTYLE: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit

NUTRISYSTEM INC: Walton Sues over Misleading Financial Report
NVIDIA CORP: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
ORION MARINE: Improper Disclosure Class Conditionally Certified
PBG DELIVERY: Mostel et al. Seek to Conditionally Certify Class
PIRGOS FOOD: Vasquez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages

PNS STORES: Wellons et al.'s Labor Class Suit Underway
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Paris et al. Seek to Certify Class
QIHOO 360: Depressed Value of ADRs, ODS Capital Alleges
R.J. REYNOLDS: Ct. Rejects Bid for New Trial in E. Starbuck's Suit
RESOLUTE ENERGY: Wong Balks at Merger Deal with Cimarex Energy

RESURGENT CAPITAL: Smith Sues over Debt Collection Practices
REVERA INC: Calgary Families Sue Nursing Homes Over Poor Care
SHARP ELECTRONICS: Brown, et al. Sue over Defective Microwaves
STITCH FIX: Salzberg Appeal Filed in Delaware Supreme Court
STOP & SHOP: Class Action Over Grocery Delivery Fees Rejected

SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY: Court Consolidates 3 Inmate Suits with Butler
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Mares Suit
TADLOCK ROOFING: Matthew Thrash Seeks Overtime Wages
TAYLOR NATION: Mary West Sues Online Store for ADA Breach
TD BANK: Refuses to Pay Properly Pay Employees, Rai Suit Claims

TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Sudano Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees
TEXAS: Court Denies Class Certification in J.L. Walker's Suit
TRACE STAFFING: Harake Sues over Violation of FCRA
TRANSDEV SERVICES: Court Won't Certify Berry Class of Drivers
TRIAD MEDIA: Spire Appeals Decision in Vazquez TCPA Class Suit

TRINITY CAPITAL: Parshall Sues over Misleading Financial Report
UNITED STATES: Underpays Border Protection Officers, Suit Says
WAL-MART STORES: Class Certification Bid in Pitre Suit Okayed
WALGREEN CO: Removes Morales Suit to N.D. California
WASTE MANAGEMENT: Reynold Vicente Seeks Overtime Pay for Drivers

WELLS FARGO: Sued over Failure to Maintain Zombie Homes
WESTERN DENTAL: Faces Pavlushkin Suit in Sacramento
WESTLAND, MI: Kochis Seeks to Certify Class
WHITE CASTLE: Cothron Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois
WILLIAM K. CONSTRUCTION: Bazan et al. Seek Unpaid OT Wages


                            *********

A.H.D. HOUSTON: Ross Seeks Minimum & Overtime Pay for Dancers
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROSLYN ROSS, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff(s), vs. A.H.D. HOUSTON, INC.,
individually and d/b/a CENTERFOLDS, the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-00159 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 15, 2019), seeks minimum wage and
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Specifically, Ross files this complaint on her behalf and on behalf
of other dancers who were misclassified as independent contractors
and who were not paid minimum wage and/or one and one-half times
their regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in the
workweek at any time from January 15, 2016, to the present.

According to the complaint, Ross worked as an exotic dancer at
Centerfolds. Centerfolds treated Ross as an independent contractor.
Centerfolds did not classify Ross as an employee. While performing
services for Centerfolds, Ross was only compensated through tips
received from patrons. Centerfolds did not permit Ross to retain
all of her tips, but routinely "fined" Ross and charged various
house fees for shifts worked. These fines and fees further reduced
Ross's pay below the statutory minimum wage.

Centerfolds owes Ross unpaid minimum wage under the FLSA for work
performed during the Relevant Time Period as well as reimbursement
for fines and fees. Additionally, on the date Ross was hired she
requested a copy of the agreement she signed with Centerfolds but
was told that it was company property and she could not have a
copy. She then requested a blank copy of the agreement she signed
with Centerfolds, but her request was denied again, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          G. Scott Fiddler, Esq.
          Jessica R. Lara
          FIDDLER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1004 Congress, 3rd Floor
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: 713-228-0070
          Facsimile: 713-228-0078
          E-mail: scott@fiddlerlaw.com
                  jlara@fiddlerlaw.com

ACT FAST: Pruitt et al. Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------
SANDRA PRUITT, JASMINE HUNTSBERRY, YUVANNDA WATSON, AYAN NUR, and
KAREN LAWSON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. ACT FAST DELIVERY, INC.; ACT FAST
COURIER OF TEXAS, INC.; ACT FAST DELIVERY OF HOUSTON, INC.; ACT
FAST OF COASTAL BEND, INC.; ACT FAST DELIVERY OF S.A., INC.; ACT
FAST DELIVERY OF TYLER, INC.; ACT FAST DELIVERY OF TRAVIS COUNTY,
INC.; and MIKE D. MILLER, the Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-00049
(W.D. Tex., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
from Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

According to the complaint, Act Fast violated the FLSA by employing
Plaintiffs and other similarly situated nonexempt employees for a
workweek longer than 40 hours but refusing to compensate Plaintiffs
for their employment in excess of 40 hours at a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which they are or were
employed. Act Fast also violated the FLSA by failing to maintain
accurate time and pay records for Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated nonexempt employees as required by 29 U.S.C. section
211(c) and 29 C.F.R. pt. 516.

Act Fast is a medical courier service. Act Fast employed Pruitt as
a courier from approximately August 2014 to September 2018. Act
Fast is liable to Plaintiffs for their unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29
U.S.C. section 216(b). If Act Fast classified Plaintiffs as exempt
from the overtime requirements of the FLSA, they was misclassified
because no exemption excuses the company's noncompliance with the
FLSA's overtime requirements, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          Bridget Davidson, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          Lyric Center
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739

ADVANCED MICRO: Court Certifies Class in Dickey et al Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned TONY DICKEY, et al., the
Plaintiffs, vs. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 4:15-cv-04922-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Haywood S.
Gilliam, Jr., entered an order on Jan. 17, 2019:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and
      certifies the following class:

      "all individuals who purchased one or more of the following
      AMD computer chips either (1) while residing in California
      or (2) after visiting the AMD.com website: FX-8120, FX-
      8150, FX-8320, FX-8350, FX-8370, FX-9370, and FX-9590";

   2. appointing Paul Parmer and Tony Dickey to represent the
      class, and appointing their attorneys at Edelson PC as
      class counsel.

   3. setting further case management conference on February 5,
      2019 at 2:00 p.m.; and

   4. directing the parties to meet and confer and submit a joint
      case management statement by January 29, 2019.

The Court said, "Defendant only contests superiority by positing
the difficulty of ascertaining the members of the purported class.
Plaintiffs exclusively bring California state law claims. Because
California law applies to out-of-state class members only based on
the terms of use on AMD's website, see Mot. at 4–6, individuals
must have visited the website prior to purchase in order to qualify
as class members. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs offer no
method to assess which class members visited the AMD website before
purchase. Opp. at 12. Defendant cites two cases, the first
rejecting a class based on the complexity of determining residency,
and therefore choice of law, of class members during the relevant
time period, and the second denying class certification where
identification of class members required a detailed review of each
potential class member's personnel file. These cases both predate
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Briseno, which held that
self-selection via affidavit is a viable means to ascertain class
members, and the defendant's interest in challenging individual
claims can be protected through the claims administration process.
Here, as in Briseno, the purported class can be self-identified. To
the extent that Defendant argues that self-identified class members
may not have visited AMD's website prior to their purchase, the
Court can rely "on claim administrators, various auditing
processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices to
explain the claims process, and other techniques tailored by the
parties and the court to avoid or minimize fraudulent claims."
Therefore, given that the expected recovery for each class member
is relatively low, the Court finds that a class action is the
superior method to adjudicate this matter."[cc]

ALLIANCE RESOURCE: 7th Circuit Appeal Filed in Leeper WARN Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Carl Leeper filed an appeal from a court ruling in his
lawsuit styled Carl Leeper v. Alliance Resource Partners, L.P., et
al., Case No. 3:16-cv-00250-NJR-DGW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan 18, 2019, the
District Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Mr. Leeper brings this putative class action against Defendants
Alliance Resource Partners, L.P. (Alliance) and Hamilton County
Coal, LLC (Hamilton), alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act).  He alleges that the
Defendants violated his rights and a class of similarly situated
persons' rights under the WARN Act by failing to provide timely
notice to workers who suffered an employment loss.

The appellate case is captioned as Carl Leeper v. Alliance Resource
Partners, L.P., et al., Case No. 19-1109, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript information sheet was due January 30, 2019;
      and

   -- Appellant's brief is due on or before February 25, 2019,
      for Carl Leeper.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CARL LEEPER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Kevin P. Green, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG, HELLER & ANTOGNOLI, P.C.
          2227 S. State Route 157
          Edwardsville, IL 62025-0959
          Telephone: (618) 656-5150
          E-mail: kevin@ghalaw.com

Defendants-Appellees ALLIANCE RESOURCE PARTNERS, L.P., and HAMILTON
COUNTY COAL, LLC, are represented by:

          Elizabeth Smith Muyskens, Esq.
          STOLL KEENON OGDEN PLLC
          300 W. Vine Street
          Lexington, KY 40507-1801
          Telephone: (859) 231-3626
          E-mail: elizabeth.muyskens@skofirm.com


ALLY FINANCIAL: Feb. 5 Settlement Fairness Hearing
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Western District of North
Carolina, Charlotte Division issued an Order setting Class Action
Settlement Fairness Hearing in the case captioned HOLLIE
ROUGEAUX-LUNA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALLY FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant. No.
3:18-cv-00321-FDW-DCK. (W.D. N.C.)

A hearing will be held before the undersigned on Tuesday, February
5, 2019 at 11:00 a.m. This hearing will be held in Courtroom 1-1 of
the Charles R. Jonas Federal Building, 401 W. Trade Street,
Charlotte, NC 28202. Parties are ordered to send notice of this
hearing to all individuals who have timely opted into this
lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc5bng5p from Leagle.com.

Hollie Rougeaux-Luna, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James B. Zouras, Stephan
Zouras, LLP, pro hac vice, Philip J. Gibbons, Jr. --
phil@gibbonsleis.com -- Gibbons Leis, PLLC, Teresa M. Becvar,
Stephan Zouras, LLP, pro hac vice & Ryan F. Stephan, Stephan
Zouras, LLP.

Ally Financial, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ann Herlocker Smith
-- Ann.Smith@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., David R.
Golder -- David.Golder@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., pro
hac vice, Justin Robert Barnes -- Justin.Barnes@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C., pro hac vice & Mary Claire Smith --
MaryClaire.Smith@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac
vice.


AMAC INC: Faces Class Suit Over Non-Solicitation Agreements
-----------------------------------------------------------
LARRY RICE and DUANE FERRELL, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. AMAC, INC., a Colorado Corporation,
UNITED STATES BEEF CORPORATION, an Oklahoma Corporation, ARBY'S
FRANCHISOR, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and DOES
1-10, inclusive, Case No. 1:19-cv-00131-NRN (D. Colo., January 19,
2019), seeks millions of dollars in lost wages, plus triple
damages, and interest, caused by the Defendants' alleged
long-standing and illegal mutual non-solicitation agreements that
were all entered into by Arby's franchises throughout Colorado and
that had the intended and actual effect of significantly reducing
Class Members' wages and salaries.

According to these agreements, Arby's franchisees could not solicit
for employment the employees of Arby's and/or of other Arby's
franchisees.  The genesis of the non-solicitation agreements at
issue were franchise agreements between Arby's and its franchisees,
and between its franchisees, including AMAC and US Beef, the
Plaintiffs assert.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
engaged in per se violations of the Sherman Act and the Colorado
Antitrust Act of 1992 by entering into non-solicitation agreements
for the express purpose of depressing and/or reducing market-based
wages and benefit increases for Class Members that are typically
associated with the active solicitation of employees and workers in
a competitive industry.

AMAC is a Colorado corporation and does business in Colorado as
Arby's, with its principal place of business located at 1701 E Main
Street, in Montrose, Colorado.  US Beef is a Colorado corporation
and does business in Colorado as Arby's with its principal place of
business located at 4923 E 49th Street, in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Arby's is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal
place of business located at 1155 Perimeter Center West in Atlanta,
Georgia.  Arby's is a franchisor.  Arby's is in the business of
fast food sandwich stores, which it franchises throughout Colorado
and the United States.  The true names and capacities of the Doe
Defendants are currently unknown to the Plaintiffs.

The Defendants are in the business of operating fast food sandwich
stores where sandwiches and other fast food items are prepared and
sold by crewmembers.  In order to operate, the Defendants owned
other stores in Colorado and hired crewmembers in their stores to
make and sell their sandwiches and fast food items.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian W. Denlinger, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          2602 North Proctor Street, #205
          Tacoma, WA, 98406
          Telephone: (253) 507-4619
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          E-mail: bd@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          Craig Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 S. Beverly Dr., Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 277-0614
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          E-mail: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          India Lin Bodien, Esq.
          INDIA LIN BODIEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          2522 North Proctor Street, #387
          Tacoma, WA 98406-5338
          Telephone: (253) 212-7913
          Facsimile: (253) 276-0081
          E-mail: india@indialinbodienlaw.com


AMERICAN FAMILY: 11th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Associates' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF COLUMBUS,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY HUBBARD, MARCUS JOHNSON, ANIBAL
ALCANTARA, DEBBIE CORT, GARARD MCCARTHY, JULIO LEATY, MARTIN
CONROY, Defendants-Appellants. No. 18-11869 (11th Cir.).

This appeal requires the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether the
district court erred in compelling a group of independent
contractors (associates) to arbitrate their claims against American
Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (Aflac).

The associates agreed in a contract to arbitrate their claims
against Aflac but now contend that the terms of the arbitration
agreement are unconscionable and thus unenforceable.   .

At a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, the associates
continued to argue that Aflac waived its right to enforce the
provision because it failed to file its papers in the case under
seal. They also repeated the arguments from their brief about why
the arbitration provision was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. The associates presented no evidence at the hearing
to support their unconscionability arguments and conceded that
there was sufficient evidence before the court for it to rule on
the motion to compel arbitration.

The district court entered an order granting Aflac's motion and
compelling the associates to arbitrate their claims. The court
determined that the arbitration provision in the Associate's
Agreement was enforceable and that Aflac had not waived its right
to arbitrate. The court also explained that the arbitration
provision was not unconscionable. The next day the court entered a
final judgment dismissing the case.

The associates moved for reconsideration, again arguing that the
arbitration provision was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. They asserted that the arbitration provision was
unconscionable because (1) the associates had no reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of the arbitration provision
before executing the Associate's Agreement, (2) the terms of the
arbitration provision were one-sided, (3) the requirement that the
associates pay certain fees and expenses made arbitration cost
prohibitive and deprived the associates of a neutral forum, and (4)
the requirement that the associates keep confidential any
arbitration decision gave an unfair informational advantage to
Aflac.

To support their position, some associates submitted affidavits
detailing that they had no meaningful opportunity to review the
Associate's Agreement before signing it and that they could not
afford to pay the party arbitrator's fees. The associates also
cited a law review article discussing the average fees involved in
arbitrations. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration, explaining that it would not consider the
associates' new evidence, which was available to the associates
when they filed their opposition to Aflac's motion to compel
arbitration.

The associates then filed a notice of appeal. The notice stated
that the associates were appealing the order denying their motion
for reconsideration as well as the district court's final
judgment.

The validity of an arbitration agreement is generally governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under the FAA, a written
provision in a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.

Here, there is no dispute that each associate signed an Associate's
Agreement, which included an arbitration provision, and that the
claims the associates sought to bring against Aflac would fall
within the scope of the provision. The associates nevertheless
argue that they should not be required to arbitrate because the
arbitration provision is unconscionable under Georgia law.

Under Georgia law an unconscionable agreement is one that no sane
man not acting under a delusion would make, and that no honest man
would take advantage of.

On appeal, the associates have raised no argument that the district
court abused its discretion when it refused to consider the new
evidence they submitted with their motion for reconsideration.

The associates thus have abandoned any argument that the district
court erred in refusing to consider such evidence.

The associates first argue that the district court erred in
compelling arbitration because the arbitration provision is
procedurally unconscionable. Their argument is based on the
assertion that Aflac did not give the associates any reasonable
opportunity to review the contractual terms, much less to
understand them.

To determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable,
Georgia courts consider various factors including the parties'
relative bargaining power, the conspicuousness and
comprehensibility of the contract language and the presence or
absence of a meaningful choice. The associates had the opportunity
to submit evidence about the circumstances surrounding their review
of the arbitration provision both when they filed their brief
opposing the motion to compel arbitration and at the hearing on the
motion. But they chose to submit no evidence to support their claim
that they were denied a reasonable opportunity to review the terms
of the arbitration provision. True, with the motion for
reconsideration some of the associates submitted affidavits
addressing the amount of time they had to review the Associate's
Agreement before signing it. But this evidence cannot establish
that the district court erred when it granted the motion to compel
arbitration because the affidavits were not before the court at
that point.

Given the absence of any evidence in the record when the court
granted the motion to compel, the associates failed to establish
that the arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable.

The associates next argue that the district court erred in
compelling arbitration because the arbitration provision is
substantively unconscionable. They argue three reasons why the
arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable: (1) its
terms did not impose mutual obligations to arbitrate on Aflac and
the associates (2) its cost sharing requirement effectively
precluded the associates from vindicating their rights in an
arbitral forum, and (3) its requirement to keep confidential any
decision of an arbitrator gave Aflac an unfair informational
advantage.

The Court is unpersuaded.

First, the Court considers the associates' argument that the
arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because it
did not impose mutual obligations to arbitrate. The associates
point out that the arbitration provision required associates to
arbitrate all potential claims against Aflac but did not impose a
reciprocal obligation on Aflac.

The Court must reject the associates' argument that this lack of
mutuality rendered the agreement substantively unconscionable. The
Court have previously held that under Georgia law an arbitration
provision is not unconscionable because it lacks mutuality of
remedy.

Second, the associates assert that the arbitration provision is
substantively unconscionable because it required the associates to
pay the expenses and fees for their party arbitrator. The
associates argue that this cost-sharing requirement rendered
arbitration so expensive that it precluded them from effectively
vindicating their rights.

The associates failed to carry their burden of showing that they
were likely to incur prohibitively expensive costs. The Court
acknowledge that the associates will incur some fees in arbitration
because they must cover their party arbitrator's fees and expenses.
But the associates failed to establish that these fees and expenses
would be prohibitively expensive. When the court decided the motion
to compel arbitration, the associates had introduced no evidence
regarding the amount of fees and expenses that they were likely to
incur in the arbitration and no evidence showing that any associate
would be unable to pay those fees and expenses. In the absence of
such evidence, the associates failed to carry their burden to show
that the arbitration is prohibitively expensive.  

The associates' final argument is that the arbitration provision is
unconscionable due to its confidentiality provision. The associates
waived this argument, however, because they failed to raise it in
their opposition to the motion to compel arbitration or at the
hearing on the motion.  

The Court has carefully considered the associates' arguments about
why the arbitration provision is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Given the evidentiary record that was before the
district court when it decided the motion to compel arbitration,
the district court properly enforced the arbitration provision
according to its terms.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the district court's judgment and
denial of the associates' motion for reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's January 7, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9jg5yhu from Leagle.com.

Lisa Helen Cassilly -- lisa.cassilly@alston.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dimitry Joffe, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jerry L. Sims, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brooks A. Suttle -- brooks.suttle@alston.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.


ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Pomerantz Files Securities Fraud Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Arlo Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: ARLO) and certain of its
officers and directors.   The class action, filed in United States
District Court, Northern District of California, and indexed under
19-cv-00372, is on behalf of a class consisting of all behalf of
persons and/or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Arlo
common stock pursuant or traceable to the Arlo's false and/or
misleading Registration Statement and Prospectus (collectively, the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with the Arlo's
August 3, 2018 initial public offering (the "IPO" or the
"Offering"), who were damaged thereby, and who seek to pursue
remedies under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
(the "Securities Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Arlo common stock pursuant
and/or traceable to Arlo's August 3, 2018, IPO, you have until
March 25, 2019, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff
for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Arlo was incorporated in 2018 and is headquartered in San Jose,
California.  The Company provides smart connected devices that can
purportedly monitor environments in real-time using its cloud-based
platform.  This is accomplished by using a Wi-Fi or cellular
network Internet connection in the Americas, Europe, the
Middle-East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific regions.  By using
Arlo’s cloud-based platform, consumers may engage in real-time
with their families and businesses from any location with an
internet connection.  Arlo also offers Wi-Fi- and LTE-enabled
cameras, advanced baby monitors, and smart security lights.

On August 6, 2018, Arlo filed its prospectus for its upcoming IPO
with the SEC, which forms part of the Registration Statement.  Arlo
sold 11,747,250 shares of common stock at $16.00 per share in its
IPO, for proceeds of approximately $167.4 million, net of
underwriting discounts and commissions, purportedly to be used for
general corporate purposes.

Arlo was a wholly-owned subsidiary of NETGEAR, Inc. ("NETGEAR")
before the IPO.  NETGEAR offers products enabling networking,
broadband access, and network connectivity.  NETGEAR owned
approximately 84.2% of the shares of Arlo’s outstanding common
stock after the IPO.

On November 30, 2018, Arlo announced its "flagship wire-free
security camera system" called Arlo Ultra ("Ultra").  The Company
touted a "newly designed rechargeable battery" that would
purportedly enable the Ultra product to provide 4K Ultra HD
resolution with high dynamic range, color night vision, and
advanced image processing.

The complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business, operational
and compliance policies.  Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:  (i)
there was a flaw and/or quality issue with Arlo's newly designed
battery for its Ultra camera systems; (ii) this flaw and/or quality
issue with the Ultra battery could result in a shipping delay of
Arlo's Ultra product; (iii) such a shipping delay endangered Arlo's
chances of launching the Ultra product in time for the crucial
holiday season; (iv) such a shipping delay would allow Arlo's
competitors to capitalize on the Ultra product's missed launch,
thereby increasing their own market share; (v) Arlo's consumers had
been experiencing battery drain issues and other battery-related
issues in connection with recent firmware updates; (vi) because of
the foregoing, Arlo's fourth quarter 2018 results and consumer base
would be negatively impacted; and (vii) as a result, Arlo's
Registration Statement was materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On December 3, 2018, Arlo reported a delay in shipments of Ultra,
citing "a quality issue with the battery from one of its suppliers"
that was discovered during the product’s final testing phase.  As
a result of the delay, Ultra also lowered its fourth-quarter 2018
financial guidance, advising investors that it anticipated "net
revenue to be in the range of $125 million to $130 million,
non-GAAP gross margin to be approximately 10%, and non-GAAP
operating loss to be approximately 20% of revenue."

Following this news, Arlo's stock price fell $2.75 per share, or
22.86%, to close at $9.28 on December 3, 2018.  This constituted a
decline of $6.72, or approximately 42%, from the IPO price of
$16.00 per share.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. See
www.pomerantzlaw.com

CONTACT:

Robert S. Willoughby
Pomerantz LLP
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com
888-476-6529 ext. 9980 [GN]


BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Court Grants Final Approval of Beck Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued a Judgment granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Lead Plaintiffs'
Awards and the parties' Joint Stipulation of Class Action and FLSA
Settlement and Release RHONDA BECK and STEPHANIE SINOPOLI, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. BANC OF CALIFORNIA N.A. dba, BANC HOME LOANS, f/k/a FIRST
PACIFIC TRUST BANK, FSB and PRIVATE BANK OF CALIFORNIA, and Does
1-10, Defendants. Case No. SACV 16-01676-CJC (JCGx). (C.D. Cal.).

Judgment in this matter is entered in accordance with, and
incorporates by reference the findings of, the Order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Lead Plaintiffs'
Awards and the parties' Joint Stipulation of Class Action and FLSA
Settlement and Release (Settlement Agreement).  

As provided by the Order, all Class Members who were mailed notice
of the settlement and did not timely opt out from the Settlement
are hereafter barred from pursuing, or seeking to reopen, any of
the Released Claims, as defined in the Settlement Agreement.

Without affecting the finality of the Judgment, the Court shall
retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the
above-captioned action and the parties, including all Class
Members, for the purposes of enforcing the terms of its Order, the
Settlement Agreement, and this Judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y83jdf7w from Leagle.com.

Rhonda Beck, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated & Stephanie Sinopoli, on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas D.
Haklar -- thaklar@haklarlaw.com -- Law Office of Thomas D Haklar &
Michael Dario Padilla , O'Mara and Padilla.

Banc of California N.A., doing business as Banc Home Loans formerly
known as First Pacific Trust Bank, FSB and Private Bank of
California, Defendant, represented by Jennifer Lindsay Katz --
jennifer.katz@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
and Stewart PC & Suzanne L. Martin -- suzanne.martin@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC.


BAY PARK CENTER: Clark Suit Moved to Southern District of New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Sherard Clark, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Bay Park Center For Nursing
and Rehabilitation, LLC doing business as: Bay Park Center For
Nursing And Rehabilitation; Benjamin Landa; Ben Philipson; Mayer
Fischl; Eli Grinspan; Chana Laerner; Berish Rubinstein; Naomi
Tessler; Sentosacare, LLC; and Does 1-25, the Defendants, Case No.
33378-2018E, was removed from the State Supreme Court, Bronx
County, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Foley Square) on Jan 17, 2019. The Southern District of New
York Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00506-VSB to the
proceeding. The suit alleges health care/pharmaceutical personal
injury violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Vernon S.
Broderick.[BN]

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Lori Rosen Semlies, Esq.
          WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ
          EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
          1133 Westchester Avenue
          White Plains, NY 10604
          Telephone: (914) 323-7000
          Facsimile: (914) 323-7001
          E-mail: lori.semlies@wilsonelser.com

BLUE TORTILLA: Alvarez Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIEL ALVAREZ on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated v. BLUE TORTILLA SELDEN INC. d/b/a BLUE TORTILLA
GRILLE, BURRITO LOCO COMMACK, INC. d/b/a BURRITO LOCO FRESH MEXICAN
GRILLE, MARJORIE GURBUZ, ERTUGRUL GURBUZ and AMIR YOUSEF, Case No.
2:19-cv-00285 (E.D.N.Y., January 19, 2019), is brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act to recover alleged unpaid minimum wages
and overtime owed to the Plaintiff and to recover alleged unpaid
spread of hours pay under the New York Labor Law.

Blue Tortilla is a domestic business corporation duly organized
under the laws of New York.  Burrito Loco is a domestic business
corporation duly organized under the laws of New York.  Marjorie
and Ertugrul Gurbuz are owners of the Restaurants.  Amir Yousef has
authority to make payroll and personnel decisions for the
restaurants.

The Defendants are engaged in the restaurant business, and are
doing business as Blue Tortilla Grille and Burrito Loco Fresh
Mexican Grille.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway, Suite B
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: promero@romerolawny.com


BMW: Vasquez Sues over Misleading Motor Vehicle Recall
------------------------------------------------------
WENDY VASQUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00144-KM-MAH (D.N.J., Jan. 4, 2019) alleges that the
Defendant provides false and misleading information to the
Plaintiff and the Class in the implementation of recalls of its
motor vehicles.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's motor vehicles are
subject safety recalls:(1) to repair the Blower Motor Wiring
Harness (the "Blower Motor Wiring Recall"), which may short circuit
and cause a vehicle fire; and (2) to repair the positive crankcase
ventilation (PCV) valve heater wiring (the "the PCV Heater
Recall"), which may also short circuit and cause a vehicle fire.

About 702,965 vehicles were subject to the Blower Motor Wiring
Recall.  About 740,561 vehicles were subject to the PCV Heater
Recall. The Defendant announced the subject recalls on or about
October 30, 2017.

The Defendants represented to the Plaintiff and the Class that it
would provide them with no cost repairs of the motor vehicles and
loaner vehicles until the repairs were completed. Thus, the
Plaintiff and the Class would not have to operate their motor
vehicles at risk of catching fire, or avoid the risk by incurring
the cost of rental vehicles, while awaiting the promised repair.

The Defendant represented to the Plaintiff and the Class that it
would provide them with loaner cars until the required replacement
parts are available and it completes the safety repairs. The
Defendant's provision of loaner cars meant that the Plaintiff and
the Class would not have to choose between operating motor vehicles
at risk of fire or incurring the cost of obtaining replacement
vehicles. However, the Defendant has failed to provide the
Plaintiff and the Class with the promised loaner cars. Instead it
has attempted to avoid those obligations by falsely representing to
the Plaintiff and the Class that their vehicle repairs are not
covered by the PCV Heater Recall or the Blower Motor Wiring
Recall.

BMW of North America, LLC engages in the import and distribution of
BMW luxury/performance vehicles. BMW of North America, LLC operates
as a subsidiary of Bayerische Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roosevelt N. Nesmith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROOSEVELT N. NESMITH, LLC
          363 Bloomfield Avenue, Suite 2C
          Montclair, NJ 07042
          Telephone: (973) 259-6990
          Facsimile: (866) 848-1368
          E-mail: roosevelt@nesmithlaw.com


BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES: Court Won't Decertify Borum Class
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia issued a
Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant's Motion for Class
Decertification the case captioned ADRIANN BORUM, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES, L.P., et. al, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 16-1723 (RC). (D.D.C.).

The Defendants move for decertification of the class, arguing that
new developments have rendered named plaintiff Adriann Borum an
inadequate class representative.

The certified class of plaintiffs in this case are residents of
Brookland Manor, an affordable housing complex in the Brentwood
neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Defendants Brentwood Associates,
L.P., Mid-City Financial Corporation, and Edgewood Management
Corporation have put together a redevelopment plan for the complex
that reduces the number of three-bedroom apartments and fully
eliminates four- and five-bedroom apartments. The Plaintiffs are
residents of three, four, and five-bedroom apartments at Brookland
Manor who are at direct risk of being displaced from a three, four,
or five-bedroom apartment as a result of the proposed redevelopment
plan.

The Defendants move to decertify the class because the eviction
proceedings pending against Borum render her an inadequate class
representative. The Defendants argue that Borum is likely to be
evicted and that she cannot adequately represent the class because
she no longer has a long-term stake in the redevelopment of
Brookland.
   
The Plaintiffs retort that any potential conflict is hypothetical,
that Borum's eviction is unlikely, and that her interests remain
consistent with those of the class. The Plaintiffs also argue that
decertification would be an inappropriate remedy even if Borum was
an inadequate class representative. In their reply, the Defendants
point out that the pending eviction proceedings create a
disqualifying conflict for Borum regardless of the outcome of those
proceedings.  

The Eviction Proceedings Create a Present Conflict for Borum

First, the Court rejects, Plaintiffs' arguments that the pending
eviction proceedings raise an inherently speculative or
hypothetical conflict between Borum and the class. Speculative or
hypothetical conflicts will not defeat the adequacy requirement.
Plaintiffs state in their opposition that the pending eviction
proceeding do not create any conflict because all that Defendants
have offered is speculation that at some unknown point in the
future, Borum may no longer be a resident of Brookland Manor.

The Plaintiffs essentially argue that there can be no conflict
based on the eviction until the conclusion of the pending eviction
proceeding.  

However, as the Defendants argue in their reply, a verdict in the
eviction proceedings is not necessary for a conflict to arise
between Borum and the class. The Plaintiffs are correct that while
a clear conflict of interest would arise between Borum and other
classmembers after her eviction, such a conflict remains
hypothetical until she is actually evicted. However, the Defendants
point to a separate conflict between Borum and the class, based on
how a likely eviction would affect her current interests in
pursuing this case. If the possibility of eviction alters Borum's
interests to the point where they become antagonistic to those of
the class, Borum's representation becomes inadequate regardless of
the eventual outcome of the eviction suit.

For instance, if faced with virtually certain eviction within a
year, Borum could be incentivized to seek a quick end to the case
in order to ensure at least some recovery or preservation of her
tenancy, regardless of the wishes of the class. As Defendants point
out, Borum has received a notice of eviction and eviction
proceedings against her have already begun. Borum's status as a
long-term resident of Brookland Manor is therefore already at risk,
creating the possibility of a conflict with other members of the
class. Whether such a conflict sufficiently affects Borum's
interests to go to the heart of litigation, in part turns on the
likelihood of the eviction proceeding being successful. The Court
therefore considers the parties' argument regarding the eviction.

Borum's Eviction Is Not Certain

The Defendants argue that the three arrests and one conviction of
members of Borum's household are sufficient to evict her because
they trigger provisions of Borum's lease that prohibit engaging in
certain types of illegal conduct. Plaintiffs retort that Defendants
will bear the burden of proving that these allegations of illegal
conduct both occurred and warrant an eviction, when two of the
three cases resulting from the arrests were dismissed nolle
prosequi and the third one involved an incident eight months prior
to the notice to vacate and not taking place on Brookland Manor
grounds.  

The Plaintiffs separately argue that Defendants likely triggered a
statutory presumption that the eviction proceedings were initiated
in retaliation for Borum participating in the class action.  

On one hand, the criminal conduct allegedly engaged in by Trayvon
and Donta Borum provides a strong basis for eviction. As an initial
matter, the parties do not dispute that Borum's lease lawfully
authorizes eviction when a tenant or member of the tenant's
household engages in certain types of criminal activity. Borum's
lease prohibits, inter alia, drug related criminal activity engaged
in or on or near the premises and criminal activity that threatens
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises
by other residents or by persons residing in the immediate vicinity
of the premises both provisions that are common in leases under
Section 8 of the Fair Housing Act. Plaintiffs similarly do not
dispute the conviction or that the two other arrests occurred, and
instead argue that it will be a significant burden for Edgewood
Management to show that the underlying allegations of criminal
conduct warrant eviction.

The Court is unconvinced.

Irrespective of any government decision or policy4 against pursuing
charges for simple marijuana possession, the police report credibly
supports the allegation that Trayvon Borum engaged in drug-related
activity on Brookland Manor grounds, in further violation of
Borum's lease. Of course, Edgewood Management will have to prove
its case in court and may not prevail, but the documents Defendants
provide in support of their motion provide strong support for
Edgewood Management's arguments at least as to these two alleged
instances of criminal conduct.

On the other hand, the Court also finds some merit in Plaintiffs'
contention that the eviction could be barred as retaliatory. Under
D.C. law, there is a presumption of retaliation when a housing
provider takes action against a tenant less than six months after,
inter alia, the tenant either made an effort to secure or enforce
any of the tenant's rights under the tenant's lease or contract
with the housing provider or brought legal action against the
housing provider.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' institution of eviction
proceedings against Borum, the class representative in this case,
triggers the presumption of retaliation.  Defendants retort that
under D.C. law, the presumption of retaliation is overcome where a
landlord takes an action otherwise permitted by law and as a result
that any presumption is rebutted in circumstances such as those
presented here when the eviction is irrefutably permitted by law.
Defendants are incorrect because what matters is the landlord's
purpose in initiating eviction proceedings, rather than whether the
stated rationale for initiating eviction is lawful.

Here, the parties dispute Edgewood Management's ulterior motives in
their briefs and supporting documents. The Defendants point to a
declaration by the Senior Community Manager of Brookland Manor,
who, inter alia, states both that she was not aware of the January
2018 conviction and March 2018 arrest until July 2018, and that it
is common practice for Edgewood Management to issue a notice of
eviction to tenants who engage in criminal activity. Plaintiffs
challenge the timeline for issuance of the notice of eviction in
their opposition and the Court fully expects that Borum will
similarly challenge Edgewood Management's version of events in the
eviction proceedings. At this stage, the Court can only gather,
assuming the presumption of retaliation applies, that the defense
is not frivolous.

Ultimately, while there appear to be valid grounds for Borum's
eviction, Edgewood Management will have to contend both with the
evidentiary burden to prove the alleged criminal acts underlying
Trayvon and Donta Borum's arrests and conviction, and more
importantly with a potential retaliatory eviction defense that
would require it to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
initiated the eviction action with a legitimate purpose. The
outcome of the eviction proceedings is thus less than certain.

Borum's Current Interests Render her an Inadequate Class
Representative

First, the Defendants argue that the likelihood of future eviction
incentivizes Borum to seek relief that would maximize her own
interests rather than the interests of the class. Setting aside the
fact that Defendants' arguments are premised on the incorrect
assumption that Borum's eviction is essentially certain the Court
finds the argument unpersuasive.

Conflicts based on recovery incentives typically pit plaintiffs
with an immediate injury and an interest in seeking immediate
relief against other plaintiffs with an interest in delayed
compensation. In AmChem Prods., AmChem Prods., 521 U.S. at 626, the
Supreme Court upheld the decertification of a class of plaintiffs
injured by asbestos exposure because the named plaintiffs were
presently injured but some of the class members, while at risk of
developing future injuries, were not presently injured.  

Nonetheless, the Defendants posit that the central premise of
Amchem remains relevant here: plaintiffs with divergent interests
on the critical goals of the litigation are inadequate. Defendants
argue that because she is at risk of eviction and will not have to
live with the consequences of any policy decisions resulting from
this matter, Borum now has incentives to maximize her own interests
at the expense of the class.

The Court is unconvinced that the potential eviction incentivizes
Borum to change her strategy in this litigation. Defendants are
correct that courts typically reject as inadequate proposed class
representatives who are the subject of unique defenses because the
proposed representatives would have to direct at least some of
their litigation efforts to defeating those defenses,
disadvantaging the members of the class not subject to them.  

However, these cases typically involve circumstances where the
proposed class representative faces unique defenses directly linked
to the claims asserted in the class action, rather than the
circumstances here where Borum is faced with separate legal
proceedings that could operate to deny recovery, in a sort of
indirect defense to the claims in the class action.  

Borum is not subject to unique defenses that could become the focus
of this litigation. She brings FHA and DCHRA claims similar to
those of other class members, and Defendants do not argue that any
defense applies on her claims that does not apply to other class
members' claims. Rather, she is separately sued in an eviction
action in D.C. Superior Court that may ultimately operate to
preclude recovery in this case. This eviction defense will be
litigated in a separate proceeding, where Borum is represented by
separate counsel. There is therefore no risk that defending against
eviction could become Borum's sole focus in this litigation.

Decertification Is Not an Appropriate Remedy

The Defendants contend that decertification is the appropriate step
because it is unlikely that a substitute will be found. The
Plaintiffs reply that class decertification is not an appropriate
remedy when, as here, the class representative is found to be
inadequate after certification but no additional circumstances
warranting decertification exist.
  
The Court agrees.

The Supreme Court has explained that upon certification of a class,
the class of unnamed persons described in the certification
acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by
the representative. While this Circuit has not authoritatively
spoken on the issue, multiple circuit courts have correspondingly
held that, following disqualification of a class representative,
the next step is to provide for substitution rather than
decertification.

Here, the Defendants make several arguments for going beyond
substitution and for decertifying the class. None are persuasive.
First, Defendants argue that inadequacy of a class representative
regularly results in decertification. But the cases Defendants cite
in support of this proposition are easily distinguishable as
involving circumstances very different from the inadequacy issue in
this case.   Second, Defendants argue that, given the substantial
evidence that many residents disagree with the objectives of this
litigation, it is unlikely that a substitute will be found.

Because the Defendants offer no evidence beyond that presented in
their opposition to the motion for certification, and rejected by
the Court in its opinion granting the motion, the Court agrees that
this is nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt to revisit this
Court's prior certification decision. Finally, Defendants argue
that classes are decertified where class counsel has made no effort
to find a replacement representative. But of course here, the Court
is only just now finding that the current class representative is
inadequate, so Plaintiffs have not yet had the opportunity to seek
a replacement. Defendants' argument is premature, and the Court
rejects it as well. Instead, the Court will provide a reasonable
period of time for Plaintiffs to seek a replacement
representative.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycu46p5f from
Leagle.com.

ADRIANN BORUM & ORGANIZING NEIGHBORHOOD EQUITY IN SHAW AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Plaintiffs, represented by Hannah E.M.
Lieberman, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Kaetochi
Okemgbo -- kokemgbo@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Maureen
Frances Browne -- mbrowne@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Amber
M. Charles -- acharles@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Brian E.
Foster -- bfoster@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Brook
Allarick Hill, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS &
URBAN AFFAIRS, Catherine Cone, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Nooree Lee -- nlee@cov.com --
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Samuel F. Adriance, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen Petkis -- spetkis@cov.com -- COVINGTON
& BURLING LLP.

BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES, L.P., EDGEWOOD MANAGEMENT CORPORATION &
MID-CITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by Lisa
Schapira -- lisa.schapira@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice, Michael James Edney --
michael.edney@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US
LLP, Anne M. Rogers -- michael.edney@nortonrosefulbright.com --
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, Gerry Lowry --
gerry.lowry@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
& John Joseph Byron -- john.byron@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice.


BULL MOTORS: Rodriguez Sues over Unauthorized Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BULL MOTORS, LLC d/b/a
AUTONATION FORD MIAMI, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-20302-JLK
(S.D. Fla., Jan. 22, 2019), seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The case arises from Defendant's unauthorized text messages to
cellular subscribers who never provided Defendant with prior
express consent, as well as cellular subscribers who expressly
requested not to receive Defendant's text messages. As a result,
the Defendant caused thousands of text messages to be sent to the
cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members who either never
provided Defendant with consent to contact them or who had revoked
any prior express consent. The Defendant caused Plaintiff and Class
Members injuries, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation,
annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion, the
lawsuit says.

Defendant owns and/or operates a car dealership in Miami-Dade
County, Florida.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com
          Telephone: 954-400-4713

               - and -

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-4092
          E-mail: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com

CAPE MAY, NJ: Court Narrows Claims in Docherty PLRA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned EMILY DOCHERTY, GERALD DEARIE,
JERMAINE MILLS, AND FREDERICK SCHARTNER individually and on behalf
of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CAPE MAY COUNTY,
et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 15-8785 (RMB). (D.N.J.).

The Plaintiffs allege that overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at
the Cape May County Correctional Facility violate the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights of pretrial detainees (Count I) and
the Eighth Amendment rights of convicted inmates (Count II). Mills
alleges that Muslim inmates' and detainees' religious rights are
denied in violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendments (Count III), and the NJLAD (Count IV). Schartner alleges
that disabled inmates and detainees are discriminated against in
violation of NJLAD. (Count V).

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to suit as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

The Court finds that with the exception of the Plaintiffs'
allegations regarding overcrowding, each Plaintiff have failed to
properly exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA; however,
the administrative grievance procedures at Cape May County
Correctional Facility were unavailable to the Plaintiffs for the
issue of overcrowding.

Claims Under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD)

Counts IV and V of the Third Amended Complaint are brought under
the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. 10:5-12 et seq. The NJLAD does not require a
plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing an
action.

Plaintiff Emily Docherty

In the Third Amended Complaint, Docherty alleged female inmates are
not supplied with adequate feminine hygiene products or toilet
paper, and they do not receive such supplies in a timely fashion.
Further, in some instances, sanitary napkins were not provided at
all, forcing inmates to bleed into their clothing, which they are
forced to wear until clean clothing is provided.  She seeks relief
for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  

Docherty received the Inmate Handbook every time she arrived at the
Facility, except her last stay in 2018. Docherty was aware that she
was required to submit a Request Slip as part of the Facility's
Grievance Procedures. Docherty complained about the lack of toilet
paper and feminine hygiene pads for the female inmates at the
Facility.

Docherty was advised to submit a Request Slip for her concerns.
Docherty admitted that she only complained verbally and never
submitted a Request Slip. Docherty testified that she did not write
a Request Slip for toilet paper or pads because it would take two
days to get a response and she needed the supplies faster.  

The Court finds that when Docherty complained verbally about
insufficient toilet paper and pads, her issue was resolved by
supplying her with those items, thus resolving her complaint at
Step 1 of the Grievance Procedures. At best, Docherty's testimony
seems to be, not that she was denied sanitary pads and toilet
paper, but that she had to ask for these supplies when she ran out
and the correctional officers gave her a hard time. Docherty never
filed a Request Slip complaining about either the response time or
other actions of the correctional officers in response to her
requests for toilet paper and pads.

Docherty was familiar with the Facility's Grievance Procedures and
that the Handbook contained the procedures. She received the
Handbook every time she arrived at the Facility, except for her
stay in 2018.  Docherty has never taken her issues to the level of
a formal grievance at Step 3 of the written procedures in the
Handbook.  

Despite her knowledge that a Request Slip was a required step in
the Grievance Procedures and having submitted Request Slips for
certain requests, Docherty's inmate file contains no Request Slips
raising any issues or concerns of conditions of confinement which
are the subject of this litigation.

Plaintiff Jermaine Mills

Mills was incarcerated at the Facility in 2013 for a period and
returned to the Facility in September 2014. He remained at the
Facility until Summer of 2017. Mills was incarcerated when he filed
suit on behalf of all Muslims who were incarcerated at that time or
will become incarcerated at the Cape May County Correctional
Facility. He confirmed his status as the class representative for
Muslim inmates with respect to religious issues. Mills clarified
that he participated in Friday prayers with male inmates only.  

During his 2014-2017 incarceration at the Facility, Mills first
complained about being assigned to sleep on the floor rather than a
bunk. When he verbally complained to a tier officer, he was told
that the Facility was overcrowded. Mills made a written request to
be moved off the floor. He was advised that inmates are moved to
bunks in the order of admission to the Facility. He was not
provided a Grievance Form.

The next issue Mills complained about was not being on the list for
attending Friday prayer for Muslims, Jumu'ah. When he was advised
that he had to sign up for Jumu'ah, Mills submitted several Request
Slips. He was then added to the Jumu'ah list.  

When Mills went to Jumu'ah the first few times, he noticed there
were not many people attending, and one time he was alone. Mills
learned that people were not coming because they were given dirty
mats that people had wiped their feet on to use as prayer mats.  

After verbally complaining about the condition of the mats, Mills
submitted a Request Slip because he felt the mats were still
unsanitary. He also complained in the Request Slip about the
location of Jumu'ah because it was in an area where people
urinated. In response to his Request Slip, Mills spoke to
Lieutenant Denny. They spoke about all issues Mills had with
Jumu'ah. Lieutenant Denny said he would get back to Mills but Mills
never saw him again.  

Mills also complained verbally about the lack of religious study
time for Muslims in contrast to other religious groups who were
provided with religious study classes. He made a request for an
Imam to assist in the development of his faith. Mills admitted that
he received a response after having conversations with officers and
was advised that the Facility attempted to contact a mosque in
Atlantic City to arrange an Imam to provide services at the
Facility; however, that never came to fruition.

After indicating to officers his satisfaction with their promises
to resolve his complaints, Mills did not submit a Request Slip to
complain that an Imam was not provided for religious study, and
that more religious study time was not provided. Mills never
proceeded past Step 1 of the Grievance Procedures for his issues of
more religious study time and an Imam to assist in religious
study.

Plaintiff Frederick Schartner

Schartner was incarcerated at the Facility between May 28, 2016 and
October 14, 2016. Schartner entered this litigation as a
named-plaintiff in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Putative Class Action
Complaint filed on October 7, 2016. Schartner, who suffers diabetes
and vision impairment, was incarcerated when he filed suit on
behalf of all inmates with disabilities who were incarcerated at
that time or will become incarcerated at the Cape May County
Correctional Facility.

Plaintiff Gerald Dearie

Dearie was incarcerated at the Facility on numerous occasions
between 2004 and 2018. He was in the Facility in June 2016, October
2016 and March through September 2017.

Dearie has reviewed the Inmate Handbook and was familiar with the
Grievance Procedures at least since his incarceration at the
Facility in 2012.  Dearie was aware the Grievance Procedures
involved three or four steps. He was familiar with the first step
involving a verbal complaint by the inmate and tier officers'
efforts to resolve the issue at that stage. Dearie agreed that many
issues were resolved at Step 1 of the Grievance Procedures.

Dearie was familiar with the second step of the Grievance
Procedures and understood it required a written submission. He
understood that the written submission referenced in Step 2 of the
procedures referred to the Request Slips or Inmate/Staff
Correspondence. He also understood that an inmate had to submit a
Request Slip. Dearie was told overcrowding is not a grievable issue
because nothing can be done about it.  

Plaintiff Schartner's disability discrimination claims in the Third
Amended Complaint may proceed because they are brought solely under
the NJLAD, for which there is no PLRA exhaustion requirement.

Plaintiff Mills' religious claims under the NJLAD may proceed
because there is no PLRA exhaustion requirement.

Cape May County Correctional Facility's written grievance
procedures satisfied the requirements for PLRA exhaustion, pursuant
to Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1354 (3d Cir. 2002).

In practice, Plaintiffs were not permitted to use Cape May
Correctional Facility's Grievance Procedures to complain about
overcrowded conditions in the jail. Therefore, the Facility's
Grievance Procedures were unavailable to Plaintiffs for the issue
of overcrowding.

5Plaintiff Docherty failed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies for her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding
inadequate feminine hygiene products, toilet paper and clean
clothing, as required under the PLRA.

Plaintiff Dearie failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies
for his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding exposure
to mold, insect infestation and inadequate ventilation, as required
under the PLRA.

Plaintiff Jermaine Mills failed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies for his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding
violation of his religious rights, as required under the PLRA.

The Defendants have established the affirmative defense of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA for: Counts I and
II, Docherty's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding
inadequate feminine hygiene products, toilet paper and clean
clothing; Counts I and II, Dearie's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims for exposure to mold, insect infestation and inadequate
ventilation; and Count III, Mills' First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims regarding violation of his religious rights.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycxtx4kx from Leagle.com.

EMILY DOCHERTY, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated persons, JERMAINE MILLS, FREDERICK SCHARTNER & GERALD
DEARIE, Plaintiffs, represented by TIMOTHY J. MCILWAIN, MCILWAIN,
LLC & ROBERT A. MORLEY, Morley Law, LLC.

CAPE MAY COUNTY, A municipal corporation & CAPE MAY COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants, represented by RICHARD L.
GOLDSTEIN -- rlgoldstein@mdwcg.com -- MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER,
COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PA.


CCK CLEANERS: Chacon Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
ANA ROXANA PORTILLO CHACON, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CCK CLEANERS INC. (D/B/A
VALUCLEAN CLEANERS), YECHIAL KALLER, CHANIE KALLER, BENJAMIN
KALLER, and ELVIS ALEJANDRO SANTANDER, the Defendants, Case No.
7:19-cv-00485 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants own, operate, or control
a drycleaner, located at 401 W Route 59 Monsey, NY 10952 under the
name "Valuclean Cleaners". The Plaintiff was employed as an ironer
at the laundry service located at 401 W Route 59 Monsey, NY 10952.
The Plaintiff worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the
hours that she worked. Rather, the Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiff Portillo appropriately for any hours worked, either at
the straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium.
Furthermore, Defendants repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff Portillo
wages on a timely basis.

In addition, the Defendants made improper deductions from Plaintiff
Portillo's wages. Specifically, they deducted time from her wages
for meal breaks that she did not take. Defendants' conduct extended
beyond Plaintiff to all other similarly situated employees. The
Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff
Portillo and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week
without providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation
required by federal and state law and regulations, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Warenski Sues over Unwanted Phone Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALAN WARENSKI, indvidually and on behalf of all and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS d/b/a
SPECTRUM, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00101-RFB-NJK (D. Nev.,
Jan. 17, 2019), alleges that Defendant violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, by negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully placing automated calls to Plaintiff's cellular phone
without consent.

According to the complaint, beginning in or around June 2018, but
no later than December 17, 2018, and continuing into January 2019,
Plaintiff began receiving pre-recorded calls from Spectrum to his
cellular phone, regarding an account which did not belong to him.
The automated and pre-recorded calls from Spectrum were identified
through Plaintiff's caller identification as (844) 206-8573;
however, Spectrum may have also dialed calls from other numbers to
Plaintiff's cell phone ending 1954, which shall be uncovered
through discovery in this matter.

Alternatively, Spectrum's calls were placed by a third party at and
under Spectrum's direction, supervision and control, and Spectrum
is thus vicariously liable for the conduct of its agent. These
calls communicated with Plaintiff using "pre-recorded" messages or
messages which utilized an "artificial" or "pre-recorded" voice.
Because the calls were made about an account which did not belong
to Plaintiff, Spectrum never had Plaintiff's consent to make any
the prerecorded or autodialed calls. The Plaintiff suffered actual
harm and loss, since each of the unwanted calls depleted
Plaintiff's cell phone's battery, and the cost of electricity to
recharge the phone is a tangible harm. While small, this cost is a
real one, and the cumulative effect can be consequential, just as
is true for exposure to X-rays resulting from Defendant's unwanted
phone calls to Plaintiff's cell phone, the lawsuit says.

Charter Communications, Inc. is an American telecommunications and
mass media company that offers its services to consumers and
businesses under the branding of Spectrum.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          George Haines, Esq.
          Shawn Miller, Esq
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880 5554
          Facsimile: (702) 9385 5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com
                  ghaines@hainesandkrieger.com
                  smiller@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., Suite 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

CHEETAH MOBILE: Sun Sues over Misleading Financial Report
---------------------------------------------------------
HUANKE SUN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CHEETAH MOBILE INC., SHENG FU, KA WAI
ANDY YEUNG, YUK KEUNG NG, and VINCENT ZHENYU JIANG, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00637 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 22, 2019), seeks to recover
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities
laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is a federal securities
class action on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Cheetah securities between April 21, 2015 and
November 27, 2018, both dates inclusive.

According to the complaint, Cheetah is a mobile Internet company
with global market coverage. It has attracted hundreds of millions
of monthly active users through its mobile utility products such as
Clean Master and Cheetah Keyboard, casual games such as Piano Tiles
2, Bricks n Balls, and the live streaming product LiveMe. The
Company provides its advertising customers, which include direct
advertisers and mobile advertising networks through which
advertisers place their advertisements, with direct access to
highly targeted mobile users and global promotional channels. The
Company also provides value-added services to its mobile
application users through the sale of in-app virtual items on
selected mobile products and games. The Company was formerly known
as Kingsoft Internet Software Holdings Limited and changed its name
to Cheetah Mobile Inc. in March 2014. Cheetah was incorporated in
2009 and is headquartered in Beijing, People's Republic of China.

Cheetah's apps have been downloaded over 2 billion times since they
were launched beginning in September 2011. For example, Cheetah's
app Clean Master was launched in September 2012 and has since been
downloaded 1 billion times. Several of the Company's apps are among
the most popular productivity apps in the entire Google Play store.
Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(i) Cheetah's apps had undisclosed imbedded features which tracked
when users downloaded new apps; (ii) Cheetah used this data to
inappropriately claim credit for having caused the downloads; (iii)
the foregoing features, when discovered, would foreseeably subject
the Company's apps to removal from the Google Play store; (iv)
accordingly, Cheetah's Class Period revenues were in part the
product of improper conduct and thus unsustainable; and (v) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On November 26, 2018, BuzzFeed News reported that certain Cheetah
apps then available in the Google Play store were exploiting user
permissions as part of an ad fraud scheme. The BuzzFeed News
article stated that Cheetah's apps "tracked when users downloaded
new apps and used this data to inappropriately claim credit for
having caused the download." BuzzFeed News reported that two of
Cheetah's apps were removed from the Google Play store after
publication of the article. On this news, Cheetah's American
depositary receipt price fell $3.32, or nearly 37%, over the next
two trading sessions, closing at $5.48 on November 27, 2018. As a
result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Jonathan D. Lindenfeld, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20 th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com Email:
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

CLEAR WATER: Aragon Class Settlement Has Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting Final Approval on Class Settlement in the
case captioned THOMAS ARAGON, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. CLEAR WATER PRODUCTS LLC,
MILLS SOLIDS CONTROL CONSULTING, LLC, AQUA CLEAR SOLUTIONS LLC,
BRODY HANSEN, SCOTT FORKNER, WAYNE JEFFREY HUBBARD, JAY GARRETT
MILLS, and DANIELLE MILLS, Defendants. Civil Action No.
15-cv-02821-PAB-STV. Civil Action No. 15-cv-02821-PAB-STV. (D.
Colo.).

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and for the purposes of settlement only, the Settlement Class is
certified as follows:

     all persons who worked for Clear Water as solids control
technicians and were paid a day rate at any time from December 28,
2013 through March 5, 2018.

The Court finds, solely for the purposes of this settlement, that
the prerequisites for a class action under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied in
that: (a) the Members of the Settlement Class are so numerous that
joinder of all Settlement Class Members in the Action is
impracticable (b) there are questions of law and fact common to the
Settlement Class which predominate over any individual questions
(c) the claims of one or more of the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs'
Counsel have fairly and adequately represented and protected the
interests of all of the Settlement Class Members and (e) a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy, considering: (i) the
interests of the Members of the Settlement Class in individually
controlling the prosecution of the separate actions (ii) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by Members of the Settlement Class (iii) the desirability
or undesirability of continuing the litigation of these claims in
this particular forum; and (iv) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of the Action.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this Court finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Accordingly, the Court gives final approval to the
Settlement in all respects and authorizes and directs the Parties
to consummate the Settlement in accordance with the terms and
provisions of the Settlement and this Order.

The Court awards Class Counsel attorney's fees and costs in the
amount of $116,666.00. This amount shall be paid from the
Settlement Fund pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

The Court approves the payment of service awards to Plaintiff
Thomas Aragon in the amount of $7,000 and to opt-in plaintiffs
Michael Aragon, Raymond Romero, Kevin Shay, and David Yoho in the
amount of $2,750 each. These amounts shall be paid from the
Settlement Fund pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9l2z2mn from Leagle.com.

Thomas Aragon, on behalf of himself and all similarlysituated
persons, Plaintiff, represented by Brian David Gonzales, Brian D.
Gonzales, PLLC.

Clear Water Products LLC, Mills Solids Control Consulting, LLC,
Aqua Clear Solutions LLC, Brody Hansen, Scott Forkner, Wayne
Jeffrey Hubbard, Jay Garrett Mills & Danielle Mills, Defendants,
represented by Joshua B. Kirkpatrick -- jkirkpatrick@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, PC & Michelle Lynn Gomez -- mgomez@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, PC.


COCA-COLA BEVERAGES: Silva et al. Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Grisel Silva and Jose Coto, And Other Similarly Situated
Individuals, the Plaintiffs, vs. COCA-COLA BEVERAGES FLORIDA, LLC,
A Foreign Limited Liability Company, the Defendants, Case No.
18-042175-CA-01, was removed from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to
the U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) on
Jan. 22, 2019. The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-20299-RNS to the proceeding.

The suit alleges Family and Medical Leave Act violation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr.

Coca-Cola Beverages Florida, LLC distributes Coca-Cola beverages to
customers in Florida.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Jason Saul Remer, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          Court House Tower
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, Fl 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416-5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416-5005
          E-mail: jremer@rgpattorneys.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Jessica Malloy-Thorpe, Esq.
          MILLER AND MARTIN PLLC
          832 Georgia Avenue, Suite 1200
          Chattanooga, TN 37402-2289
          Telephone: (423) 756-6600
          Facsimile: (423) 785-8480
          E-mail: jessica.malloy-thorpe@millermartin.com

COLLECTO INC: Court Certifies Class in Weismann Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned NOSSON WEISSMAN, on behalf of
plaintiff and a class, the Plaintiff, vs. COLLECTO, INC. d/b/a EOS
CCA, the Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-4402 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Pamela K. Chen entered an order on Jan. 17, 2019:

   1. denying in part and granting in part Defendant's motion for
      summary judgment;

   2. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification:

      "all individuals who received the Debt Collection Notice
      from Defendant between and including July 25, 2016 and
      August 15, 2017";

   3. appointing Nosson Weissman as class representative, and
      appointing law firm of Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin
      LLC as class counsel; and

   4. directing Defendant to show cause, within 14 days from the
      issuance of the memorandum and order, why the Court should
      not grant summary judgment on the section 1692g claim in
      favor of Plaintiff and the certified class.

The Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff's section 1692g claim. Although the Debt
Collection Notice Defendant sent to Plaintiff did contain the
Validation and Disclosure Language required by law, that language
was rendered unclear -- if not wholly contradicted -- by the Letter
Language on the first page of the Debt Collection Notice that
directed Plaintiff to direct disputes to T-Mobile USA. As courts in
this Circuit have observed, "it is not enough for a debt collection
agency simply to include the proper debt validation in a mailing to
a consumer -- Congress intended that such notice be clearly
conveyed." Rumpler v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Ltd., 219 F. Supp.
2d 251, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  For this reason, "the inclusion of a
validation notice in a collection letter does not ensure compliance
with the FDCPA." Rather, "a debt collector violates the Act if its
communication is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading of
the required message," such as when "it conveys th[e] [required]
information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud
the required message with uncertainty."[CC]

COMMUNITY CARE: Court Certifies Class of Domestic Care Providers
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned MONETTA WILSON and PATRONELLA
HOLMES, on Behalf of Themselves and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. COMMUNITY CARE SERVICES,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01186-TAD-KLH (W.D. La.), the
Court entered an order on Jan. 17, 2019:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all Domestic Care Providers who worked for Community Care
      Services, Inc. at any time during the period of Sept. 10,
      2015 to the present who worked more than 40 hours in any
      given week but who did not receive overtime pay calculated
      at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay.";

   2. approving a proposed Notice Letter and Notice of Consent
      forms, for transmission to the class members;

   3. directing Defendant to provide counsel for Plaintiffs with
      the names, last known mailing address, email address, and
      telephone number for all class members as defined above.
      Defendant shall provide such information in electronic
      format on or before January 30, 2019. For those putative
      class members whose notices are returned as undeliverable,
      Plaintiffs may request the production of additional
      information from Defendant to assist them in reaching those
      individuals; and

   4. directing Plaintiffs' counsel to send a copy of the "Notice
      Letter" and "Notice of Consent" forms to all persons
      contained on the list within seven days of receiving the
      list from Defendant. The notice period shall be 70 days from

      the date Plaintiffs' counsel receives the Class List from
      Defendant. Thirty days prior to the expiration of the notice

      period, Plaintiffs may send a postcard or other reminder to
      potential class members who have not filed notices of
      consent.[CC]

CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Rice Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Carlie Rice, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00129-TLN-DMC (E.D. Cal., Jan. 22,
2019), seeks to recover damages as a result of Defendant's
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the
Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant regularly attempts to
collect time-barred debts from consumers in every state in the
country. The Defendant has devoted significant financial and legal
resources toward sustaining its business model involving the
collection of time-barred debts. The Defendant regularly includes
disclaimers in its collection letters regarding the time-barred
nature of the debts it collects.

When Defendant is assigned debts for collection, it receives dozens
of pieces of information regarding each debt, including the last
date on which a payment was made toward the debt and the date that
the debt became late or went into default. Accordingly, the
Defendant knew that any debt associated with Plaintiff's Sprint
account was time-barred at the time it was retained to collect it.

In connection with its attempt to collect on the Sprint account,
Defendant sent Plaintiff written communication dated July 2, 2018.
The Plaintiff received the Letter on or around July 7, 2018. In the
Letter, the Defendant asserts that the "total balance" and "amount
owed" on the Sprint account is $396.41. The Defendant then offers
to accept $79.28 as "settlement in full." The term "settlement
offer" is frequently used in the context of litigation. The least
sophisticated consumer, however, would not know that the debt was
outside the statute of limitations. The Letter could, therefore,
mislead the least sophisticated consumer into thinking that the
debt was enforceable by judicial means and making payment under a
false pretense. The Defendant reinforces this misperception by
indicating a sense of urgency and that accepting the settlement
offer is financial advantageous to the consumer, the lawsuit says.

Convergent Outsourcing offers business process outsourcing, revenue
cycle, and receivables management services. It also provides
receivables collection services to credit grantors in retail,
telecommunications, and utilities industries.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Elliot Rosenberger, Esq.
          Joshua Biletsky, Esq.
          Biletsky Rosenberger, Esq.
          Thompson Consumer Law Group
          7080 Hollywood Blvd., Ste. 1100
          Los Angeles, CA 90028
          Telephone: (424) 442-9243
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: erosenberger@thompsonconsumerlaw.com
                  jbiletsky@thompsonconsumerlaw.com

COOPER UNION: Teachers Union's Suit Remains in District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand the case captioned COOPER UNION FEDERATION OF COLLEGE
TEACHERS, LOCAL 2163, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO by its President DAY
GLEESON, Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. THE COOPER UNION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE AND ART, Respondent-Defendant. No.
18-CV-05891(VEC). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff asserts that the school's governance rules are
separate and independent from the parties' collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) and moves to remand the case to state court.

This case concerns Cooper Union Federation of College Teachers
(CUFCT)'s decision to reduce the number of class hours for certain
courses offered by the School of Engineering, allegedly in
violation of the school's internal governance rules for curriculum
revision. The Plaintiff, the labor union representing Cooper
Union's faculty, filed suit to vacate the school's decision in
state court. Cooper Union then removed the case to this Court
pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), which establishes federal jurisdiction over any state law
claim that substantially depends on an interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  

CUFCT, on behalf of the faculty, commenced an Article 78 proceeding
against Cooper Union in New York Supreme Court, arguing that the
Dean's decision violated the governance and should be vacated.

Invoking Section 301(a) of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. Section 185(a)),
Cooper Union removed the case to this Court. Cooper Union argues
that this Court has jurisdiction because the LMRA completely
preempts CUFCT's state law claim. CUFCT now moves to remand the
case to state court.  

Ordinarily, a federal preemption defense does not give rise to a
federal question, but the LMRA's preemptive force is so
extraordinary that it converts any preempted state law claim into a
federal claim removable to federal court. A state law claim is
completely preempted by Section 301(a) of the LMRA if resolution of
the claim requires substantial interpretation or analysis of the
CBA.

CUFCT's claim is substantially dependent on an analysis of the CBA.
Because the CBA expressly supersedes any conflicting governances,
any attempt to enforce a school governance will require the CBA to
be consulted to some degree. The dispositive question is whether
the required reference to the CBA in this case would rise to the
level of a substantial analysis sufficient to preempt the state
claim and confer jurisdiction on this Court under the LMRA.  

The problem for CUFCT, however, is that the CBA has another
residual provision that reserves customary management rights for
the school, which may conflict with the gap-filling function of
faculty governances. Article Thirty specifies that:

The Cooper Union retains its rights to exercise the ordinary and
customary rights of management, such as hiring, directing and
scheduling Faculty and Librarian work; planning, directing, and
controlling operations; utilizing facilities; modifying,
discontinuing, eliminating, instituting, reorganizing or combining
programs or other operations; promulgating reasonable rules and
regulations; and introducing any new or improved technique, method,
or facility.

It is not apparent from the face of Article Thirty that Cooper
Union does not retain an ordinary and customary right to decide
that instructional hours should match course credits. The Article
provides a non-exclusive list of examples, and it is not clear that
adjusting the amount of class time to match course credits is
entirely dissimilar from directing and scheduling Faculty work,
modifying and reorganizing programs or other operations,
promulgating reasonable rules and introducing any new method. Thus,
a state court adjudicating CUFCT's Article 78 claim would not only
have to refer to the CBA but would also have to consider the
parties' bargaining history and past practice and the language and
context of the CBA to determine whether Article Thirty grants
Cooper Union the authority to modify course hours an exercise that
amounts to a substantial analysis or interpretation of the CBA.

While the Court might otherwise be sympathetic to the argument that
the CBA, including Article Thirty, is silent as to curriculum
revision and therefore does not conflict with or preempt the
governance on such matters, CUFCT's complaint makes clear that this
case is, in fact, about so-called course contact hours. The
specific relief that CUFCT seeks is the vacatur of the Cooper
Union's decision to reduce course hours, not the Dean's direction
to the faculty to fit each course's content within those reduced
hours. Indeed, it would be quite bizarre if the faculty were
interested in a pyrrhic victory that allows professors to teach
truncated classes with old syllabi, thereby implicitly lopping off
the last quarter or so of the subject matter. Because a state court
cannot grant the type of relief that CUFCT seeks without first
defining the scope of Cooper Union's customary management
authority, CUFCT's claim is one that depends on substantial
analysis of the CBA and is preempted by the LMRA.

In sum, the Court concludes that determining whether Cooper Union
violated the Engineering School's governance requires ascertaining
the scope of the university's authority under Article Thirty of the
CBA, which is ambiguous. And because Cooper Union's liability under
state law hinges on how the CBA's ambiguity is resolved, CUFCT's
claim depends on a substantial analysis of the CBA and is preempted
under Section 301(a) of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. Section 185(a)).

This Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over this
action, and CUFCT's motion to remand is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9mes7op from
Leagle.com.

Cooper Union Federation of College Teachers, Local 2163, NYSUT,
AFT, AFL-CIO, by its President Day Gleeson, Plaintiff, represented
by Jennifer Anne Hogan, Law Office of Robert T. Reilly.

The Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, Defendant,
represented by Alychia Lynn Buchan -- abuchan@proskauer.com --
Proskauer Rose LLP & Michael J. Lebowich -- mlebowich@proskauer.com
-- Proskauer Rose LLP.


DENNY'S INC: Wintjen Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees
-------------------------------------------------------------
JULI WINTJEN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. DENNY'S, INC; and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00069-AJS (W.D. Pa., Jan. 22,
2019), alleges that Denny's systematically and willfully deprived
Plaintiff and Tipped Employees of minimum wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act,
specifically failing to satisfy the notice requirements of the tip
credit provisions of the FLSA and PMWA.

The case is a class and collective action brought on behalf of
"Tipped Employees" who work or have worked at restaurants operating
under the trade name Denny's that are owned and operated and/or
managed by Defendant Denny's Corporation, and have been subject to
unlawful practices. The employment practices complained occurred at
all of Denny's locations at issue, as Defendant utilized common
labor policies and practices at each of their locations.

Due to Defendant's unlawful failure to properly inform Tipped
Employees of its intention to utilize a "tip credit", Defendant has
improperly applied a "tip credit" against the wages paid to
Plaintiff and current and former Tipped Employees, thus paying them
less than the mandated minimum wage. Further, Denny's unlawfully
required Plaintiff and current and former Tipped Employees to
perform numerous non-tipped duties that are unrelated to their
tipped occupation. This includes but is not limited to, cleaning
tables, cleaning and vacuuming the restaurant floors, running
register, preparing takeout orders and online orders from the
Denny's website, slicing fruits for drinks such as lemons and
limes, rolling silverware, and preparing rolling bins for
silverware. Despite performing this unrelated non-tipped work,
Denny's paid Plaintiff and current and former Tipped Employees a
sub-minimum wage for performing this work. As a result of the
aforementioned pay practices, Plaintiff and the members of the
Classes were illegally under-compensated for their work, the
lawsuit says.

Denny's -- https://www.dennys.com/ -- is an international
restaurant chain, with over "over 1,700 locations."  These
locations are either corporate-owned or franchised-owned. In
Pennsylvania, there are at least 13 corporate restaurant locations
owned and operated by Defendant.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Ave, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: 412-322-9243
          Facsimile: 412-231-0246
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
          Robert J. Gray, Esq.
          CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY, LLP
          2200 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 275
          King of Prussia, PA 19406
          Telephone: 610 822-3700
          Facsimile: 610 822-3800
          E-mail: gwells@cwg-law.com
                  rgray@cwg-law.com

DXC TECHNOLOGY: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired DXC Technology Company (NYSE: DXC) securities
between February 8, 2018 and November 6, 2018 (the "Class Period").
Investors have until February 25, 2019 to apply to the Court to be
appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period defendants
made false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
adverse information regarding the company's business and prospects.
Specifically, defendants failed to disclose that the company had
changed or planned to change the operations of its sales teams,
deploying generalized sales teams as opposed to the specialized
teams that were better capable of delivering specialized services
to its clients; that the company's workforce optimization strategy
of sharply reducing staff while reducing costs was resulting in a
shortage of sales personnel who could execute on demand for
services, thereby risking and ultimately losing sales and revenue
opportunities; and that, as a consequence, the company's revenue
and financial performance guidance for fiscal 2019 was without a
reasonable basis.

If you purchased DXC Technology securities during the Class Period
or continue to hold shares purchased before the Class Period, have
information, would like to learn more about these claims, or have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters please;

         Brandon Walker, Esq.
         Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
         Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
         Telephone: (212) 355-4648
         Email: fortunato@bespc.com
                walker@bespc.com [GN]


DXC TECHNOLOGY: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notified investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against DXC Technology Company  and
certain of its officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or
otherwise acquired DXC shares between February 8, 2018 and November
6, 2018, both dates inclusive. Such investors are encouraged to
join this case by visiting the firm's site: bgandg.com/dxc.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose adverse information. Specifically, the complaint alleges
that defendants: (1) failed to disclose that the Company had
changed or planned to change the operations of its sales teams,
deploying generalized sales teams as opposed to the specialized
teams that were better capable of delivering specialized services
to its clients; (2) that the Company's workforce optimization
strategy of sharply reducing staff while reducing costs was
resulting in a shortage of sales personnel who could execute on
demand for services, thereby risking and ultimately losing sales
and revenue opportunities; (3) and that, consequently, the
Company's revenue and financial performance guidance for fiscal
2019 was without a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
bgandg.com/dxc or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in DXC you
have until February 26, 2019 to request that the Court appoint you
as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


DXC TECHNOLOGY: Feb. 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
---------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until February 25, 2019 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against DXC
Technology Company (NYSE:DXC), if they purchased the Company's
shares between February 8, 2018 and November 6, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). This action is pending in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

What You May Do

If you purchased shares of DXC and would like to discuss your legal
rights and how this case might affect you and your right to recover
for your economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you,
contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at 1-877-515-1850
or via email (lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-dxc/ to learn more. If you
wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you must
petition the Court by February 25, 2019.

                      About the Lawsuit

DXC and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On November 6, 2018, the Company revealed a range of adverse
financial news including the loss of sales to significant
customers, quarterly revenue shortfall in the hundreds of millions
of dollars, and an $800 million reduction to its 2019 revenue
outlook as well as a lack of growth in the digital space and
ineffective sales strategies.

On this news, the price of DXC's shares plummeted.

The case is City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System v. DXC
Technology Company, et al., No. 18-cv-1599.

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
         New Orleans, LA 70163  
         Telephone: 1-877-515-1850
         Email: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


FERROGLOBE PLC: Treankler Sues over Misleading Financial Report
---------------------------------------------------------------
LANCE TREANKLER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FERROGLOBE PLC, PEDRO LARREA, and
PHILLIP MURNANE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00629 (S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 22, 2019), seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The case is a class action on behalf of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Ferroglobe securities between August 21, 2018 and November 26,
2018, inclusive.

According to the complaint, Ferroglobe purports to produce silicon
metal, silicon-based alloys, and manganese-based alloys and to sell
products such as aluminum, silicone compounds, automotive parts,
photovoltaic cells, electronic semiconductors, and steel. On
November 26, 2018, the Company reported a net loss of $2.9 million
for the third quarter 2018, compared to a net profit of $66.0
million the prior quarter. On this news, the Company's share price
fell $2.97 per share, more than 62%, to close at $1.80 per share on
November 27, 2018, on unusually high trading volume.

The Defendants allegedly made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
there was excess supply of the Company's products; (2) that demand
for the Company's products was declining; (3) that, as a result,
the pricing of the Company's products would be materially impacted;
and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked of reasonable basis. As a
result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.

Ferroglobe is the largest producer of silicon metal in North
America and among the largest producers in the world.[BN]

Attorneys for Lance Treankler:

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: lportnoy@glancylaw.com

FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned ORGONE
CAPITAL III, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KEITH
DAUBENSPECK, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-1815. (7th
Cir.).

This contrast arises often in postmortems on once-fashiona-ble,
now-failed investment securities. The Plaintiffs filed a class
action complaint against the defendants alleging fraud, fraudulent
concealment of material information, breach of fiduciary duty, and
negligent misrepresentation in connection with their purchases of
Fisker securities. In the complaint, plaintiffs referenced a report
released by a private research firm, PrivCo, entitled FISKER
AUTOMOTIVE'S ROAD TO RUIN: How a Billion-Dollar Startup Became a
Billion-Dollar Disaster'. A press release accompanying this PrivCo
Report opined Fisker may go down as the most tragic venture
capital-backed debacle in recent history due to the sheer scale of
investment capital and government loan money.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint as barred
by Illinois's three-year statute of limitations, for
securities-based claims. The Defendants argued the notices provided
by PrivCo and Congress occurred in April 2013, but the plaintiffs
waited more than three years to file their complaint in October
2016.

The district court agreed and granted the defendants' motion based
upon the plaintiffs' straightforward factual disclosures regarding
the PrivCo Report and at the congressional hearings. To the
district court, these disclosures demonstrated plaintiffs must at a
minimum have known facts that, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, would have led to actual knowledge of their claims.

Although the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as
untimely, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend if they wished
to expressly contradict the court's conclusion about the dates that
they learned of the facts that would lead them to their claims.

The Defendants moved again for dismissal and judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (c).
They argued the plaintiffs' amended complaint suffers from the same
infirmities as the original and that the lawsuit remains
time-barred. The district court agreed, and concluded that the
plaintiffs' claims came under Illinois law, regardless of
plaintiffs' contention that Delaware law should apply.

Where a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish a statute
of limitations defense, the district court may dismiss the
complaint on that ground In the context of securities litigation,
if a plaintiff pleads facts that show its suit is barred by a
statute of limitations, it may plead itself out of court under a
Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as precluded by
Illinois securities law's three-year statute of limitations. On
appeal, the Court decide whether that limitations period applies,
and if so, whether it has expired.

A district court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the
statute of limitations of the forum state.

The Plaintiffs argue otherwise. Despite bringing securities-based
claims, they contend the Illinois securities laws do not govern
their lawsuit. They argue choice of law provisions contained in
some but not all of the Fisker securities purchase agreements they
executed required them to pursue their claims under Delaware law.
The Plaintiffs posit that because they are precluded from any
remedies under the Illinois securities law, they cannot be subject
to its three-year statute of limitations, and thus that their
lawsuit must be governed by Illinois's five-year statute of
limitations for "civil actions not otherwise provided for.

The Plaintiffs' argument is ambitious, but not supported by law. As
an initial matter, choice of law provisions did not bind the
plaintiffs. Nor do choice of law provisions automatically foreclose
the application of a forum state's laws. Rather, choice of law
issues may be waived or forfeited by declining to assert them in
litigation. The choice of law issue may be waived if a party fails
to assert it  Plaintiffs were likewise free to waive the Delaware
choice of law provisions they now invoke. Further, the Illinois
three-year statute of limitations applies to all actions brought
for relief under the Illinois securities laws or upon or because of
any of the matters for which relief is granted. Thus, claims that
do not directly invoke the Illinois securities laws may still fall
within its statute of limitations, including Delaware common law
claims, like those plaintiffs assert.

The Plaintiffs' position also suffers from forum shopping problems
because the outcome they propose would reward a stockholder who
fails to bring suit in the appropriate state in a timely manner.
the Plaintiffs concede that had they initiated their lawsuit in
Delaware under Delaware law, their claims would be subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. Likewise, had plaintiffs
initiated their lawsuit in Illinois under Illinois law, the same
three-year limit would be applied.

The Plaintiffs have offered no authority to support their
contention that by suing in Illinois under Delaware law, parties
get two additional years to sue.

The Plaintiffs cannot avoid Illinois's statute of limitations by
encasing their common law claims in a Delaware husk. Because the
Illinois securities law's three-year limitations period controls in
this case, Illinois's residual five-year statute of limitations
does not apply.  

The Plaintiffs' case concerns matters for which the Illinois
securities laws grant relief, and therefore falls within its
three-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs' claims against
the defendants accrued no later than April 2013, but they filed
their complaint in October 2016. Because plaintiffs failed to bring
this action within three years from the date their claims accrued,
their lawsuit was untimely filed and appropriately dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's January 7, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd9ukkv6 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth A. Wexler -- kaw@wexlerwallace.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Corey B. Rubenstein -- crubenstein@loeb.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Julian C. Wierenga, for Defendant-Appellee.

Sophie Hood -- shood@keker.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

M. Duncan Grant -- grantm@pepperlaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Todd S. Collins -- tcollins@bm.net -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kurt Olsen for Plaintiff-Appellant.


FOOD FOR LIFE: Elliott Sues Over Deceptive Cereal Product Labels
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ronnie Elliott individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Food For Life Baking Co., Inc., Case No.
1:19-cv-00249-FB-ST (E.D.N.Y., January 13, 2019), alleges that
certain of the Defendant's breakfast cereal products contain
misleading and deceptive statements and labels.

The Products are available in no fewer than nine varieties in boxes
of 16 oz. (454g): Almond Flake, Almond Sprouted Whole Grain,
Cinnamon Raisin Whole Grain, Flax & Chia Sprouted Flake, Flax
Sprouted Whole Grain, Original Flake, Raisin Flake and Original
Sprouted Whole Grain.  The back of the box declares that "Sprouting
is the only way to release all of the vital nutrients stored in
whole grains," and that their process "unlock[s] [in the grains]
dormant food energy and maximize nutrition and flavor."

This claim is misleading because by the time the sprouted grain is
dried, grounded into flour and heated, any nutritional benefits
which may have existed have been extinguished, the Plaintiff
alleges.

Food For Life Baking Co., Inc., is a California corporation with
its principal place of business in Corona, California (Riverside
County).  Food For Life manufactures, markets and distributes
breakfast cereal products (the "Products") under the brand,
"Ezekiel 4:9," sold to consumers by third-parties from
brick-and-mortar stores and online.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1 Penn Plaza, Suite 2527
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 792-0046
          E-mail: joshua@levinepstein.com


FREEDOM DOVE: Chunfeng Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
Chunfeng Xia, individually and on behalf all other employees
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Freedom Dove and "JOHN"
Huang (first name unknown), the Defendants, Case 718099/2018 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks to recover minimum wage, overtime
wages, spread of hours compensation, damages for failure to provide
wage statements, damages for failure to provide wage notice at the
time of hiring, reimbursement for expenses relating to tools of
trade, and liquidated damages, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees
for violations of the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate compensation for
the hours over 40 per week that he worked. The  Defendants failed
to maintain accurate records of the hours Plaintiff worked, failed
to pay Plaintiff appropriately for any hours worked over 40,
whether at the straight rate of pay, or for any additional overtime
premium. Further, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the required
"spread of hours" pay for any day in which he had to work over 10
hours per day, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Ken H. Maeng, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38TH AVENUE, STE 9E
          FLUSHING, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          E-mail: kmaeng@hanglaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          YUAN ZHENG & ASSOCIATES, LLC.
          136-56 39TH AVENUE STE 307
          FLUSHING, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 321-8088

G6 HOSPITALITY: Cummings Suit Moved to S.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
A case, Christina Cummings, an individual, on behalf of herself and
on behalf of all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. G6
Hospitality, LLC, a Limited Liability Company; Motel 6 Operating
L.P.,  a Limited Partnership; and Does 1-50, Inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 37-02018-00056207-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from
the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California (San Diego)
on Jan. 17, 2019. The Southern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-00122-GPC-LL to the proceeding. The suit
alleges labor-related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel.

G6 Hospitality LLC owns, operates, and franchises economy lodging
locations in the United States and Canada.

Attorneys for Christina Cummings:

          Shani Or Zakay, Esq.
          ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC
          5850 Oberlin Drive, Suite 230A
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 892-7095
          Facsimile: (858) 404-9203
          E-mail: shani@zakaylaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Timothy L. Johnson, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 990
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (858) 652-3100
          Facsimile: (858) 652-3101
          E-mail: tim.johnson@ogletreedeakins.com

GENOCEA BIOSCIENCES: Ruling in Emerson Securities Suit Appealed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Lirio Fiocchi, Scott C. Hartmann, Satya Kunapuli, Omer
Yuksel and Raul Zamudio filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
consolidated cases entitled Steven Emerson, et al. v. Genocea
Biosciences, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 1:17-cv-12137-PBS,
1:17-cv-12168-PBS and 1:17-1cv-12474-PBS, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 9, 2019, the
District Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss all counts for failure to state a
claim in the lead case.

In this proposed class action, two competing lead plaintiffs allege
securities fraud by a biopharmaceutical company.  The Plaintiffs
assert that Genocea Biosciences, Inc., and two officers
artificially inflated the company's stock price by reporting overly
optimistic prospects for a potential herpes treatment when, in
reality, the Company's finances could not support successful
regulatory approval of the drug.  When the Company later reported
that it was abandoning the treatment, its share price fell
precipitously.  This prompted several plaintiffs to sue under the
federal securities laws.

The appellate case is captioned as Yuksel, et al. v. Genocea
Biosciences, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-1036, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that Docketing
Statement, Transcript Report/Order form, and Appearance form are
due on January 29, 2019.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants OMER YUKSEL, LIRIO FIOCCHI, SCOTT C.
HARTMANN, SATYA KUNAPULI and RAUL ZAMUDIO, and Plaintiffs STEVEN
EMERSON, individually and on bahalf of all others similarly
situated, et al., are represented by:

          Stephanie A. Bartone, Esq.
          Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
          LEVI KORINSKY LLP
          733 Summer St., Suite 304
          Stamford, CT 06901
          Telephone: (203) 992-4523
          E-mail: sbartone@zlk.com
                  shopkins@zlk.com

               - and -

          Beth A. Kaswan, Esq.
          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Rhiana Swartz, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT LLP
          230 Park Ave., 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10174
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          E-mail: bkaswan@scott-scott.com
                  tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                  rswartz@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Amanda F. Lawrence, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT LLP
          156 S Main St.
          Colchester, CT 06415
          Telephone: (860) 537-5537
          E-mail: alawrence@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Jason Mathew Leviton, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          155 Federal St., Suite 400
          Boston, MA 02110-0000
          Telephone: (617) 398-5600
          E-mail: jason@blockesq.com

Plaintiff SHELDON GRONER is represented by:

          Richard W. Gonnello, Esq.
          ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI LLPP
          280 Park Avenue
          26th floor west
          New York, NY 10017-0000
          Telephone: (212) 894-7200
          E-mail: rgonnello@entwistle-law.com

               - and -

          Katherine M. Lenahan, Esq.
          Sherief Morsy, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 3rd Ave., 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: klenahan@faruqilaw.com
                  smorsy@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Mitchell J. Matorin, Esq.
          MATORIN LAW OFFICE LLC
          18 Grove St., Suite 2
          Wellesley, MA 02482
          Telephone: (781) 453-0100
          E-mail: mmatorin@matorinlawoffice.com

Plaintiffs BARRY HEANEY and MARK HANESS are represented by:

          Daryl DeValerio Andrews, Esq.
          Glen DeValerio, Esq.
          ANDREWS DEVALERIO
          265 Franklin St.
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 999-6473
          E-mail: daryl@andrewsdevalerio.com
                  glen@andrewsdevalerio.com

Defendants-Appellees GENOCEA BIOSCIENCES, INC., WILLIAM D. CLARK,
JONATHAN POOLE and SETH HETHERINGTON are represented by:

          Randall W. Bodner, Esq.
          Nicholas Pisegna, Esq.
          ROPES & GRAY LLP
          800 Boylston St.
          Boston, MA 02199-3600
          Telephone: (617) 951-7776
          E-mail: rbodner@ropesgray.com
                  Nicholas.Pisegna@ropesgray.com


GLOBAL RADAR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Sanders' Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Fort Myers Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in
the case captioned SHAWANA SANDERS, on their own and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals and KENYATTA WILLIAMS, on their
own and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. GLOBAL RADAR ACQUISTION, LLC, d/b/a GLOBAL HR
RESEARCH, a foreign for-profit corporation, f/k/a RADAR
POST-CLOSING HOLDING COMPANY, INC., f/k/a GLOBAL HR RESEARCH, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-555-FtM-99CM. (M.D. Fla.).

Naples Hotel Group operates hotels in several states and used the
services of an organization that provides employee staffing and
leasing services under the trade names Oasis Outsourcing and A1 HR
(A1 HR). Naples Hotel Group required that plaintiffs sign documents
titled Notice and Acknowledgment, purportedly authorizing Naples
Hotel Group to procure their consumer reports for employment
purposes. Global HR supplied the Notice and Acknowledgement forms,
which plaintiffs allege did not comply with the FCRA. Naples Hotel
Group used A1 HR's web-based portal to obtain plaintiffs' consumer
reports from Global HR; however, Naples Hotel Group never certified
compliance with the FCRA before obtaining the consumer reports from
Global HR.  

The FCRA provisions that the plaintiffs allege Global HR violated
by providing consumer reports for employment purposes without
certification from A1 HR's clients that they would abide by FCRA's
disclosure, authorization, and notice requirements are at 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681b(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
  
Congress created the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970 to ensure
fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the
banking system, and protect consumer privacy. In pursuit of this
goal, the Act imposes a host of requirements concerning the
creation and use of consumer reports, and makes any consumer
reporting agency that willfully violates one of these requirements
with respect to a consumer liable to that consumer for actual,
statutory, or punitive damages.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The Defendant asserts that plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead
the first and second requirements.

(1) Injury in Fact

The Defendant argues that the plaintiffs have only alleged a bare
procedural violation of the statute, without any resulting harm,
which is per se insufficient to establish standing. The Plaintiffs
respond that they have standing in part based upon an invasion of
privacy theory, and not upon a bare procedural statutory
violation.

To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is
concrete and particularized' and `actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.

In Spokeo, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560), the plaintiff filed a class-action complaint, alleging
certain procedural violations of the FCRA against an online people
search engine operator accused of creating inaccurate consumer
reports. The Spokeo case primarily concerned the injury-in-fact
element, addressing the concrete injury requirement. The Supreme
Court noted that a concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it
must actually exist.

Here, the FCRA is a consumer protection statute in which Congress
conferred upon all consumers the right to protection of their
private information unless certain conditions and procedures were
followed which plaintiffs seek to enforce. Congress has the power
to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed at common law
before. Thus, the Court finds that based on the allegations that
plaintiffs' consumer reports were divulged even though the FCRA was
not adhered to, plaintiffs have alleged a particularized and
concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.

Fairly Traceable

The Defendant argues that Naples Hotel Group's conduct breaks the
causal chain, relieving them of any duty it has to plaintiffs under
the FCRA. The Defendant relies on Frazier v. First Advantage
Background Services Corp., Civ. No. 3:18cv30, 2018 WL 4568612 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 24, 2018), a non-published, non-binding district court
opinion. The Frazier case involved similar facts to this case and
found that even if the injuries plaintiff suffered from the
allegedly inadequate disclosure and authorization forms were
concrete enough to constitute an injury in fact, plaintiff did not
plead facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the
injuries were fairly traceable to the actions of defendant because
an intermediary stood directly between plaintiff and the challenged
conduct that breaks the causal chain.

Even so, the FCRA does not limit a consumer's private right of
action to those offenders with whom consumers have direct contact.
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken definitely on this
exact issue, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that even a showing
that a plaintiff's injury is indirectly caused by a defendant's
actions satisfied the fairly traceable requirement. That standard
has been satisfied here, and the Court declines defendant's
invitation to look elsewhere.

The Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to fairly trace their
injuries to Global HR's actions.

The Plaintiffs allege that defendant provided the consumer reports
without the required authorizations (which the Court accepts as
true) in violation of the FCRA. Thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied
this element of standing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y94rdkz6 from
Leagle.com.

Shawana Sanders, on their own and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals & Kenyatta Williams, on their own and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew Ross Frisch -- afrisch@forthepeople.com --
Morgan & Morgan, PA, C. Ryan Morgan, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Craig C.
Marchiando, Consumer Litigation Associates P.C. & Marc Reed
Edelman, Morgan & Morgan, PA.

Global Radar Acquistion, LLC, doing business as Global HR Research,
Inc., Defendant, represented by John Drury, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP,
Pamela Q. Devata, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard Barton
Akin, II -- richard.akin@henlaw.com -- Henderson, Franklin, Starnes
& Holt, PA.


GMC RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Joya et al. Claim
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSE ANTONIO JOYA; JOSE A. VELASQUEZ; and JUAN JIMENEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. GMC RESTAURANT CORP. D/B/A GREGORIO'S PIZZERIA &
RESTAURANT; and GREGORY GELLUCCI, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00052 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) is an action against the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as an hourly paid,
non-exempt employees, performing functions as a food preparer,
cook, dishwasher and kitchen worker.

Gmc Restaurant Corp. d/b/a Gregorio's Pizzeria & Restaurant
operates as a restaurant network managing company in the State of
New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591


GODDARD RIVERSIDE: Faces West Suit under ADA in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
Goddard Riverside Community Center is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Mary West, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Goddard Riverside Community Center,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00562 (S.D. N.Y., January 18, 2019).

Goddard Riverside's housing units provide homes for some of New
York City's most vulnerable populations, including older adults,
formerly homeless people and those with mental illness. Residents
receive on-site services ranging from benefits assistance to mental
health care to social activities that help ensure that individuals
stay connected to their community.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com



GOLDEN FARM: Villaneuva Seeks OT Pay for Grocery Store Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
TRANQUILINO VILLANEUVA, the Plaintiff, vs. GOLDEN FARM CORP., and
KI R. CHUNG, individually, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00771-KM-JBC (D.N.J., Jan. 20, 2019), alleges that
Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey
State Wage and Hour Law.

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendants as a
collective action on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated -- grocery store employees -- who suffered
damages for damages as a result of Defendants' violations of the
FLSA.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff regularly worked
approximately 66 hours per week. The Plaintiff was not paid one and
one half times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 in each work week. The Defendants have engaged in a
widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the FLSA and
NJWHL, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants operate a retail grocery store, buying and selling
products that move through interstate commerce.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Andrew I. Glenn, Esq.
          Jodi J. Jaffe, Esq.
          JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP, P.A.
          301 N. Harrison Street, Ste9F, No. 306
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (201) 687-9977
          Facsimile: (201) 595-0308
          E-mail: AGlenn@JaffeGlenn.com
                  JJaffe@JaffeGlenn.com

HERSHEY CHOCOLATE: Koskie Minsky Files Child Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Koskie Minsky LLP has commenced a class action against the Hershey
Chocolate Company on behalf of consumers who unwittingly purchased
chocolate bars that were made using child labour and slavery.

Hershey is the manufacturer of well-known chocolate bars such as
Reese's Peanut Butter Cups, Skor, Oh Henry! and Kisses. The
statement of claim alleges that slavery and child labour is used to
produce the cocoa in these popular treats.

Hershey sources much of its cocoa from the Ivory Coast. It is well
documented that cocoa production in that country uses slave labour,
child labour, child slaves and trafficked children. It is alleged
that Hershey encourages and benefits from these practices. It is
further alleged that Canadian consumers would not buy Hershey
products if they were aware of the conditions in which they are
produced.

The lawsuit seeks $500 million in damages, plus an additional $50
million in punitive damages.

"Canadian consumers have been duped and deceived into buying these
products. Canadians have no knowledge that the products are
produced in some of the worst conditions imaginable. There are
children literally being sold into slavery to work on these cocoa
plantations. Hershey is one of the world's largest cocoa buyers. It
is one of the world's most successful chocolate companies. If its
success and profits come at the expense of child labourers and
child slaves, it has a duty to inform Canadian consumers of this
very material fact." said Kirk Baert, the lawyer leading the case
at Koskie Minsky LLP.

         Kirk Baert, Esq.
         Koskie Minsky LLP
         20 Queen St W, Toronto ON M5H 3R3
         Ontario, Canada
         Email: kmbaert@kmlaw.ca [GN]


HILTON WORLDWIDE: Ruddiman Seeks Unpaid Wages and Tips
------------------------------------------------------
HARRY RUDDIMAN, Individually, and on Behalf of All Employees
Similarly Situate, the Plaintiff, vs. HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS,
INC.; GEM HOSPITALITY, LLC; SHIRAZ MANAGEMENT LLC A/K/A HILTON PALM
BEACH AIRPORT, the Defendants, Case No. 9:19-cv-80084-DMM (S.D.
Fla., Jan. 22, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages and tips earned
and due pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all others similarly
situated were non-exempt employees of the Defendants. In
particular, the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated worked
for the Defendants as tipped workers. The Defendants agreed to pay
the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated an hourly rate of
pay in addition to their tips.

The Defendants deducted 30 minutes from shifts for bona fide meal
breaks even though the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated
did not take meal breaks because they were not allowed to. At the
same time, the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and all
others similarly situated for this time that they actually worked.
In addition to failing to pay its employees for time worked, the
Defendants' fraudulent timekeeping practices were done to cover up
the fact they did not allow their employees to take a 30-minute
meal break, the lawsuit says.

Hilton Worldwide is an American multinational hospitality company
that manages and franchises a broad portfolio of hotels and
resorts.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Christine M. Tomasello, Esq.
          GORDON & PARTNERS, P.A.
          3309 Northlake Boulevard, Suite 207
          Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33403
          Telephone: (561) 799-5070
          Facsimile: (561) 799-5763
          E-mail: ctomasello@fortheinjured.com
                  kmclaughlin@fortheinjured.com

HOME DEPOT: Hankey Suit Moved to Central District of California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Richard W. Hankey individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. The Home Depot USA, Inc., a
Delaware Corporation and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
30-02018-01027364-CU-OE-CXC, was removed from the Orange County
Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California (Southern Division - Santa Ana) on Jan. 17, 2019. The
Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case. No.
8:19-cv-00096-DOC-ADS to the proceeding. The suit alleges
labor-related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
David O. Carter.

Home Depot is an American home improvement supplies retailing
company that sells tools, construction products, and services.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Gregory E. Mauro, Esq.
          James R Hawkins, Esq.
          Michael J S Calvo, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  james@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Dorothy Frances Kaslow, Esq.
          Donna M Mezias, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER AND FELD LLP
          580 California Street Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 765-9500
          Facsimile: (415) 765-9501
          E-mail: dkaslow@akingump.com
                  dmezias@akingump.com

HOME INSURANCE: Faces Class Action by Home Owners
-------------------------------------------------
Buffalo homeowner Dan Thomas has owned and insured three homes with
the same company. On Sept. 21, 2018, a tree fell on Thomas' garage,
did structural roof damage and tore down the electrical service to
the garage.

Thomas called his insurance company to file a claim and an adjuster
came to take pictures of the damage. A few hours later, the
insurance company emailed their estimate and called looking to send
out payment and settle the claim.

Thomas noticed the insurance company was only compensating for OSB
roof sheathing, a cheaper alternative to plywood sheathing and
3-tab shingles, a cheaper alternative to architectural shingles.
There was no compensation for restoring the electrical and labor
for only one person to do all the work, which included installing
27-foot trusses by themselves. In addition, they only compensated
to haul away all the roof debris in one pickup truck load for
$124.33.

Thomas notified the adjuster of the inaccuracies and was sternly
told that "this is all we can do for you." Thomas said he felt
pressured and forced into accepting their low-ball offer, which he
could not adequately restore his garage with.

When searching the internet, Thomas found thousands of complaints
and realized he was not alone. Thomas was surprised to find former
employees admitting how they are instructed to "Deny, Delay and
Defend" the insurance company.

It has been more than three months since the damage occurred and
Thomas has yet to come to an agreement with his insurance company
or receive any compensation. Thomas has still not received any
estimate or acknowledgment that he will be compensated for the
appropriate building materials and labor to restore his garage.
"These were not the hands I thought I'd be in when I filed my
claim," Thomas stated. "They have used every tactic in their book
to delay and deny my claim, hoping that I'd settle for their
low-ball offer with all the wrong and cheap building materials.
This is bad faith practices at their finest. The insurance company
only cares about their profits."

Thomas has missed countless days from work trying to meet with
contractors to get estimates that meet what the insurance company
is looking for only to be told every time they need it more
detailed, which he believes is a stall tactic. Thomas was told by
several contractors that they cannot write estimates that break
down every cost of every single part and bit of labor as it would
take eight hours to write each estimate.

Thomas has launched www.HomeOwnersClassAction.com to start
gathering evidence from homeowners who feel their insurance company
did not properly compensate them to restore their home to its
original condition.

The website explains building material differences and why an
insurance company may tend to favor cheaper alternatives as opposed
to what was installed on the home. The website will continue to
document the hundreds of ways an insurance company might fail to
properly indemnify a homeowner on a claim.

Many homeowners are forced into settling for lesser-grade building
materials than were installed on their home. Thomas says this is
bad faith and a tactic insurance companies use to increase their
profits by hundreds of millions of dollars.

Homeowners who feel their insurance company acted in bad faith by
choosing their profits over properly restoring their property
should submit their case at www.HomeOwnersClassAction.com. [GN]


HOME WARRANTY: Arbitration Unenforceability in Kernahan Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of New Jersey issued an Opinion affirming the
judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the District Court's
Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
Amanda Kernahan, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Home Warranty
Administrator of Florida, Inc. and Choice Home Warranty,
Defendants-Appellants. Nos. A-15 September Term 2017, 079680
(N.J.).

The trial court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint,
finding in the language of the provision no mutuality of assent to
have formed an agreement to arbitrate. The Appellate Division
affirmed.

The Plaintiff purchased a home service agreement from defendants
Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., and Choice Home
Warranty. The agreement was essentially a consumer contract whereby
the defendants would pay for and arrange for a certified contractor
to repair or replace certain home appliances at the plaintiff's
property in Orlando, Florida, in exchange for the contract term
price of $1050.  Becoming dissatisfied, the plaintiff cancelled the
contract in June 2015 and received a refund of the purchase price.
In November 2015, she filed the instant complaint alleging that the
defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA); the
Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) and
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice in favor of arbitration, citing the agreement's
alternative dispute resolution provision.

The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in an oral
opinion, concluding that the arbitration provision is
unenforceable. The court found the provision both ambiguous and
noncompliant with Atalese in either its form or its function. The
trial court reasoned that the provision does not contain clear
language that would inform the consumer she is agreeing to
arbitrate all disputes and that she is waiving her right to a jury
trial.

On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendants again argued
that the arbitration provision is enforceable. The Plaintiff
advanced largely the same arguments that she did before the trial
court.

In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the
trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint. Relying on Atalese,
the panel reasoned that an arbitration provision that fails to
clearly and unambiguously signal to parties that they are
surrendering their right to pursue a judicial remedy renders such
an agreement unenforceable. The panel determined the provision to
be unenforceable because just stating that arbitration is the
exclusive remedy is not sufficient to inform a consumer that she is
waiving her right to a jury trial.

In their petition for certification, the defendants asserted that
Atalese requires a valid arbitration clause to contain a clear and
unambiguous statement that waives the right to proceed in court.
Thus, according to the defendants, Atalese was preempted by the FAA
in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kindred
Nursing. Kindred Nursing was decided roughly one month before the
Appellate Division's decision in this matter.

The Defendants argue that the Appellate Division should have
recognized that an arbitration provision that explicitly states
that it is the exclusive remedy to resolve disputes satisfies
clarity requirements, thereby placing consumers on notice that
their only remedy is arbitration.

The Defendants assert that the Appellate Division erred in not
reading the provision as a whole and instead parsing the provision
improperly by focusing on the word exclusively.

Amicus New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) urges that the
Court affirm of the Appellate Division decision because the
arbitration provision contains misleading terms and lacks waiver
language.

The NJSBA also distinguishes Kindred Nursing from our decision in
Atalese. The NJSBA warns that reversing Atalese will cause
consumers to be presented with confusing and difficult to
understand arbitration provisions that fail to place the consumer
on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional or statutory
right.

Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a
question of law, and the Court need not defer to the interpretative
analysis of the trial or appellate courts unless we find it
persuasive.

Section two of the FAA promotes those goals by prescribing that
arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. Section two's savings clause permits
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but
not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.

In this matter, the Court again reviews consumer contract language
to determine whether there was mutuality of assent to form an
agreement to arbitrate. But, unlike in Atalese, the question in
this case is whether mutuality of assent is achieved when a
provision confusingly and unpredictably shifts between the terms
arbitration and mediation and the procedures for the two types of
proceedings.

In this instance, the Court examine the use of the word arbitration
in the context of the contract to determine if its meaning is
apparent, and whether it can therefore supply the mutual assent
required for the provision to constitute a meeting of the minds.
The Court finds that the meaning of the provision is not apparent
from the manner in which it relayed information to the consumer who
signed the contract. Although the Court is not expecting a specific
recitation of words to effect a meeting of the minds to create an
agreement to arbitrate, the construct and wording of the instant
provision are too confusing and misleading to meet simple plain
wording standards demanded by the public policy of this state for
consumer contracts.

The Plaintiff has argued throughout these proceedings that the
arbitration agreement lacks sufficient clarity to be enforced. She
points to the multiple ambiguities and inconsistencies within the
provision. She advances a compelling argument that the arbitration
provision's inconspicuous location and confusing, inconsistent and
contradictory terms are unenforceable.

A consumer cannot be required to arbitrate when it cannot fairly be
ascertained from the contract's language that she knowingly
assented to the provision's terms or knew that arbitration was the
exclusive forum for dispute resolution. In light of that concern,
Atalese stands for the proposition that an arbitration agreement is
clearly enforceable when its terms affirmatively state, or
unambiguously convey to a consumer in a way that he or she would
understand, that there is a distinction between agreeing to resolve
a dispute in arbitration and in a judicial forum.  

Where Atalese discussed the distinction between resolving suits in
arbitration versus a judicial forum, here, the ambiguity that
affects the mutuality of assent question focuses on the overall
language of this provision and whether the instant
plaintiff-consumer fairly should have known that by signing her
contract, she was knowingly assenting to arbitration as an
exclusive remedy.

The Court thinks not.

On a macro level, the contract fails to signal to consumers that it
contains an arbitration provision affecting their rights because
the alternative dispute resolution provision's arbitration
agreement is located within a section labeled MEDIATION. Even when
located, the small size of the print makes the provision burdensome
to read and appears to violate the font size requirements of the
PLA.

As for the substance of the provision, its terms are contradictory.
The internal sentences refer to the use of the AAA's Commercial
Mediation Rules, which cannot be reconciled with arbitration.

The provision's terms cannot be read to provide clarity to a
consumer that she was agreeing to arbitration, or what that term,
in the context of confusing references to mediation or mediation
rules, actually meant. Indeed, mediation and arbitration are
distinct and different procedures.

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-2, mediation is a process in which a mediator
facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist
them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.
Mediation communications are privileged under N.J.R.E. 519 because
honesty in communications is imperative in order to reach a
settlement. Public policy favors settlement of disputes in part
because it spares the parties the risk of an adverse outcome and
the time and expense both monetary and emotional of protracted
litigation. Of utmost importance, if mediation sessions fail, the
parties can proceed in court to resolve their dispute.

On the other hand, the object of arbitration is the final
disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious, and perhaps
less formal manner, of the controversial differences between the
parties.

Arbitration involves a process that results in an adverse outcome
for one party.  
In sum, mediation stands in stark contrast to formal adjudication
and arbitration.  

The Defendants initially petitioned asking this Court to hold that
our decision in Atalese runs afoul of Kindred Nursing an argument
now abandoned. Even if the defendants maintained that argument, the
Court would not need to address any perceived conflict between
those cases because the threshold issue of whether the instant
provision's language contains sufficient clarity to form any
agreement about arbitration is easily answered. This provision does
not meet the rudiments for showing a mutual assent to have
arbitration be the only means of dispute resolution permitted to
plaintiff, necessarily foreclosing her from pursuing her right to
bring an action in court.

To be enforceable as a contractual undertaking, an agreement must
be sufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be
rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty. The shortcomings of the provision in issue here are, as
noted, three-fold: (1) the inconspicuous location of the agreement
to arbitrate under a section labeled MEDIATION (2) its small-font
text and confusing ordering of sentences; and (3) the invocation of
the Commercial Mediation Rules.

Despite the title MEDIATION, the bold-faced text that follows
prescribes a two-step dispute resolution process: The parties agree
to mediate in good faith before resorting to mandatory arbitration
in the State of New Jersey. The provision does not next outline the
scope of the proceedings, but instead first includes a waiver of
class proceedings. The provision then prescribes that any and all
disputes, claims and causes of action arising out of or connected
with this Agreement including but not limited to whether a
particular dispute is arbitrable hereunder shall be resolved
exclusively through the American Arbitration Association in the
state of New Jersey under its Commercial Mediation Rules.
Controversies or claims shall be submitted to arbitration
regardless of the theory under which they arise, including without
limitation contract, tort, common law, statutory, or regulatory
duties or liability.

Reading the provision as a whole, the references to arbitration
cannot be harmonized with the title of the section and the intended
use of the Commercial Mediation Rules in order to give rise to an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Should a diligent and prudent
consumer read defendants' form contract in full, a reader could,
and most likely would, reasonably understand subsection two to
prescribe that the Commercial Mediation Rules exclusively govern
any and all disputes. The small typeface, confusing sentence order,
and misleading caption exacerbate the lack of clarity in
expression. It is unreasonable to expect a lay consumer to parse
through the contents of this small-font provision to unravel its
material discrepancies.

The Plain Language Act requires that more be done in the setting of
consumer contracts to make them understandable for a lay person.  

Because the contract contains material discrepancies that call into
question the essential terms of the purported agreement to
arbitrate, mutual assent is lacking.

The Court holds that this arbitration agreement is not
enforceable.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's January 10, 2018
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pa26b2 from
Leagle.com.

Lori Grifa, argued the cause for appellants (Archer & Greiner,
attorneys; Lori Grifa, of counsel and on the briefs, and Michael J.
Plata and Josiah Contarino, 21 Main Street, Suite 353, Hackensack,
NJ, 07601, on the briefs).

John E. Keefe, Jr. -- jkeefe@keefe-lawfirm.com -- argued the cause
for respondent (Keefe Law Firm and Law Office of Jonathan Rudnick,
attorneys; Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr. -- ssullivan@keefe-lawfirm.com
-- and Jonathan Rudnick -- jonr@jonrudlaw.com -- on the briefs).

David R. Kott -- dkott@mccarter.com -- argued the cause for amici
curiae New Jersey Business and Industry Association, Commerce and
Industry Association of New Jersey and New Jersey Chamber of
Commerce (McCarter & English, attorneys; David R. Kott, Edward J.
Fanning, Jr. -- efanning@mccarter.com -- and Zane C. Riester, of
counsel and on the briefs, and Steven H. Del Mauro --
sdelmauro@mccarter.com -- on the briefs).


IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Immunomedics, Inc. (NASDAQ: IMMU) from August 23,
2018 through December 20, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Immunomedics investors under
the federal securities laws.

To join the Immunomedics class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1484.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that the FDA cited Immunomedics in August 2018 for a host of
violations observed at its Morris Plains, NJ facility. According to
the complaint, these violations included the manipulation of
bioburden samples, misrepresentation of an integrity test procedure
in the batch record, and the backdating of batch records. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than February
25, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1484.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm, on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm/.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com[GN]


JAFFAN INTERNATIONAL: Underpays Bartenders & Servers, Suro Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN SURO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JAFFAN INTERNATIONAL LLC d/b/a CRAVE
RESTAURANT & BAR, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00050 (M.D. Fla.,
Jan. 8, 2019) is an action against the Defendant for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Suro was employed by the Defendant as
bartender/server.

Jaffan International LLC d/b/a Crave Restaurant & Bar operates a
restaurant and bar in Tampa, Florida.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 N. Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com


JANI-KING INTERNATIONAL: Court Certifies Class of Cleaning Workers
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled SIMON MUJO, et al., the
Plaintiffs, vs. JANI-KING INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-01990-VAB (D. Conn.), the Hon. Judge
Victor A. Bolden entered an order on Jan. 9, 2019, granting
Plaintiffs' motion with respect to class certification of "all
individuals who have performed cleaning work for Jani-King in
Connecticut since December 5, 2010."

Plaintiffs argue that class action is superior to individual cases
because common practices affect the class members and some
individuals may only have a small recovery that limits their
ability to vindicate their rights on an individual basis. And a
class action would eliminate the risk that the common question of
law would be decided differently in each lawsuit. Defendants
respond by arguing that resolution of the class issues is not
susceptible to common evidence nor do the facts lend themselves to
class-wide proof. Rather, according to Defendants, individualized
factual considerations are better suited to satisfy any claims.

The Court disagrees with Defendants, holding that the class action
is the superior method for adjudication of the controversy, because
(1) class members may fear reprisal and would not be inclined to
pursue individual claims; (2) the cost of individual litigation is
prohibitive, and (3) a class action would eliminate the risk that
the question of law common to the class will be decided differently
in each lawsuit. Current class members may also still work for
Jani-King, raising the possibility of retaliation for the filing of
individual claims. Moreover, the individual claims are too small to
bring absent the class action; they are the small claims that are
"the very core of the class action mechanism." Finally, a class
would eliminate the risk that individual lawsuits would have
different outcomes for common questions of law and fact that
predominate the class members. The Court therefore holds that the
Plaintiffs meet rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority.[CC]

JOHN GORE ORGANIZATION: Violates ADA, Castillo Suit Asserts
-----------------------------------------------------------
The John Gore Organization, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Evelyn Castillo, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The John Gore Organization, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00388 (E.D. N.Y., January 18, 2019).

The John Gore Organization, formerly known as Key Brand
Entertainment, is a producer and distributor of live theater in
North America, as well as an e-commerce company, focused on
theater. KBE was founded in the UK in 2004 by 13-time Tony Award
winning Producer John Gore who is the company's Chairman, CEO and
Owner.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com




JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Court Narrows Claims in "Hypoallergenic" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the second amended
complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim in the case captioned AUSTIN RUGG and JENNIFER FISH,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, Defendant. Case No.
17-cv-05010-BLF. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Austin Rugg and Jennifer Fish are consumers who allege
that they were misled by the term hypoallergenic on labels of baby
products manufactured by Defendant Johnson & Johnson (J&J).

The Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims on behalf themselves and other
consumers of J&J baby products, specifically, a Nationwide Class
and a California Class.

The Plaintiffs assert the following claims on behalf of the
Nationwide Class or, in the alternative, the California Class: (1)
Breach of Express Warranty under unspecified law (2) Unjust
Enrichment under unspecified law (3) Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices under California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal.
Civ. Code Sections 1750-1785 and similar statutes (4) Violations of
California's False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17500 et seq. and similar statutes and (5) Violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17200 et seq., and similar statutes.

J&J seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) with respect to all claims
based on unpurchased products, claims based on unseen websites or
advertisements, and claims for injunctive relief. J&J argues that
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue those claims.

The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.

In considering whether unpurchased products are sufficiently
similar to purchased products to satisfy Article III, the Court
considers factors that include whether the challenged products are
of the same kind, whether they are comprised of largely the same
ingredients, and whether each of the challenged products bears the
same alleged mislabeling.

The twenty-eight products at issue fall into three general
categories: washes and wash cloths; hair; and lotions and creams.
These twenty-eight products are formulated with different
combinations of sixty-seven ingredients that are known skin
sensitizers. The Court expressed concern at the hearing that, given
the products' different purposes and different formulations,
Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing that the four
purchased products are sufficiently similar to the twenty-four
unpurchased products to confer standing on Rugg and Fish to sue on
the unpurchased products.  

If the Plaintiffs' claims clearly were limited to allegations that
the inclusion of one or more of the four ingredients identified
above rendered false J&J's labeling of baby products as
hypoallergenic, the Court might be persuaded to find that the
Plaintiffs have standing to sue on the unpurchased products, even
though the products have different uses. However, Plaintiffs'
claims are not so limited as currently framed. It appears to the
Court that Plaintiffs' claims are based not just on the presence of
one or more of the four ingredients identified above, but also on
the presence of widely varying combinations of sixty-three other
ingredients. The Court declines to find the requisite similarity if
that is Plaintiffs' theory.

Accordingly, J&J's motion to dismiss all claims based on
unpurchased products is granted with leave to amend.

In its prior dismissal order, the Court observed that it was
unclear whether the Plaintiffs assert false advertising or other
fraud-based claims based on advertisements or websites. The Court
held that to the extent that they do assert such claims, the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they viewed and relied on
such advertisements or websites. In the SAC, the Plaintiffs
continue to refer to alleged misrepresentations on J&J's website
and advertising, but they have not added any facts suggesting that
they viewed or relied on the website or advertising. In their
opposition, the Plaintiffs clarify that they are suing based on
these on-the-label hypoallergenic representations.

J&J's motion to dismiss claims based on J&J's website and
advertising is granted without leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs assert in their opposition that even though they do
not assert claims based on J&J's website and advertisements, their
allegations regarding the website and advertisements bear on their
labeling claims. The Court has not stricken those allegations. The
relevance of J&J's website and advertising to labeling claims is
not an issue amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional
standing separately for each form of relief requested. To establish
standing to seek injunctive relief or declaratory relief, a
plaintiff must show he is under threat of suffering `injury in fact
that is concrete and particularized and that the threat must be
actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.

Under certain circumstances, a previously deceived consumer who
brings a false advertising claim can allege that her inability to
rely on the defendant's future advertising can constitute an injury
sufficient to grant Article III standing to seek prospective
relief. Davidson, 889 F.3d at 967. In Davidson, the Court found
that the plaintiff, who had brought suit based on the defendant's
allegedly false representations that its bathroom wipes were
flushable, had standing to seek injunctive relief where she alleged
that she: continued to desire to purchase wipes suitable for
disposal in a household toilet; would purchase truly flushable
wipes manufactured by the defendant if it were possible; regularly
visited stores where the defendant's flushable wipes were sold; and
continually saw the defendant's flushable wipes packaging but had
no way of determining the truth of the representation that the
wipes were flushable.  

J&J argues that, unlike the plaintiff in Davidson who could not
determine whether the defendant's wipes were flushable by looking
at the packaging, Rugg and Fish can determine whether a particular
baby product contains one or more of the identified ingredients
simply by looking at the packaging. This argument is unpersuasive
because, as discussed below, Plaintiffs do not allege that the
presence of the identified ingredients in any amount renders a
product non-hypoallergenic. Plaintiffs allege that the presence of
such an ingredient in sufficiently high concentrations renders a
product non-hypoallergenic. The packaging does not specify the
amount or concentration of each ingredient.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for
injunctive relief for lack of standing is denied.

The Plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as true for
purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  

Even so, J&J asserts that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
because their definition of hypoallergenic is unreasonable and they
have not alleged facts sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b).  

The Plaintiffs alleged that consumers believe that a hypoallergenic
product does not contain any skin sensitizers. The Plaintiffs
defined skin sensitizer as a substance that causes sensitization by
skin contact in a substantial number of persons based on human
evidence or appropriate animal testing.

The Plaintiffs also asserted that consumers believe and expect that
a product that is labeled as hypoallergenic contains no ingredients
known to produce a negative reaction, skin irritation, skin
corrosion, eye damage, birth defects, cancer, genetic mutations,
etc. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs' definition of
hypoallergenic was wholly unrelated to the concept of allergic
reaction, which is at the heart of the dictionary definitions of
hypoallergenic.

In the SAC, the Plaintiffs set forth a Reasonable consumer
definition of hypoallergenic as follows: A reasonable consumer
believes that a product labeled as hypoallergenic does not contain
skin allergens in an amount that can be reasonably be expected to
induce an allergic response in a significant number of people. The
Court finds this definition to be reasonable and plausible.

However, the SAC does not stop there. In the next paragraph, the
Plaintiffs allege the dictionary definition of hypoallergenic. In
the paragraph after that, Plaintiffs allege the scientific and
regulatory definition of hypoallergenic. The following paragraphs
contain a bewildering amount of information regarding Category 1
skin sensitizers. The SAC also alleges that J&J's hypoallergenic
products all contain known skin or eye irritants, carcinogens,
teratogens, mutagens, or pollutants.

The Court raised the disconnect between the definition of
hypoallergenic set forth in paragraph 53 and other allegations in
the SAC. Plaintiffs' counsel stated that the only definition of
hypoallergenic asserted by Plaintiffs is that set forth in
paragraph 53, and stated that he would accept the Court's
invitation to amend the complaint to remove or delete other
allegations that made that unclear.  

The motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend.

J&J argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal for
failure to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires that where
a claim is grounded in fraud, the circumstances constituting the
fraud must be alleged with particularity.

The Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims that is, all claims except Claim
1 for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b). Among other things, the Court
found that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged which of the
products at issue contained which of the ingredients at issue.
Plaintiffs have cured that defect by providing a chart identifying
which ingredients are contained in which products.

J&J argues that the Plaintiffs' chart is insufficient because it
does not allege what amount of each ingredient is required to
render it an allergen, and does not allege what amount of each
ingredient is contained in each of the accused products. The Court
is not persuaded that the degree of specificity suggested by J&J is
required at the pleading stage. The Court understands Plaintiffs to
be alleging that the identified ingredients are present in the
identified products in amounts sufficient to cause an allergic
response, and thus that the identified products are not properly
labeled as hypoallergenic.

The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have standing to
pursue claims based on unpurchased products. However, that is a
deficiency separate from J&J's challenge based on failure to allege
fraud with sufficient particularity. The motion to dismiss for
failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb3obol3 from Leagle.com.

Austin Rugg, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Searles --
dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman, P.C., James A.
Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis and Mailman,
P.C., Stephanie R. Tatar -- stephanie@thetatarlawfirm.com -- Tatar
Law Firm, APC & Yvette Y. Golan, The Golan Firm, pro hac vice.

Jennifer Fish & Karen Sanchez, Plaintiffs, represented by James A.
Francis, Francis and Mailman, P.C.

Johnson & Johnson, Defendant, represented by Kathrina Szymborski --
kszymborski@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua Adam Kipnees -- jkipnees@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap
Webb Tyler LLP & Mark A. Neubauer -- mneubauer@carltonfields.com --
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, LLP.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Perrone Sues over Retirement Savings Plan
------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL PERRONE, as a participant in and on behalf of the Johnson &
Johnson Savings Plan, and on behalf of a class of all others who
are similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, PETER
FASOLO, DOMINIC J. CARUSO, and JOHN DOES 1-20, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00923 (D.N.J., Jan. 22, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants are in violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.

The Plaintiff, a participant in the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan,
brings this action in a representative capacity on behalf of the
Savings Plan, and as a class action on behalf of all other
similarly situated participants in and beneficiaries of the Savings
Plan and other defined contributions plans sponsored by Johnson &
Johnson through which participants purchased or held stock of
Johnson & Johnson, including the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan for
Union Represented Employees and the Johnson & Johnson Retirement
Savings Plan.

According to the complaint, Johnson & Johnson, the Plans' sponsor,
is liable for the Individual Defendants' fiduciary breaches because
the Individual Defendants were acting within the course and scope
of their employment when they engaged in the fiduciary misconduct
at issue, and because Defendant Johnson & Johnson actively and
knowingly participated in the Individual Defendants' fiduciary
breaches.

The Plans are designed to help Johnson & Johnson's employees save
for retirement. Each of the Plans is a defined contribution plan.
In defined contribution retirement plan like the Plans, the plan
"provides for an individual account for each participant and for
benefits solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's
account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses which may be
allocated to such participant's accounts." Thus, unlike traditional
defined benefit pensions, in defined contribution plans like the
Plans, at retirement participants are entitled to no more than the
balance in their individual accounts. As the Supreme Court
explained in 2015, in defined contribution plans like the Plans,
employees' benefits at retirement "are limited to the value of
their own individual investment accounts, which is determined by
the market performance of employee and employer contributions, less
expenses."

Each of the Plans has included as an investment option shares of
stock of Johnson & Johnson, the Plans' sponsor and the employer of
the participants in the Plans. The Plaintiff owned and purchased
Johnson & Johnson stock through his account in the Savings Plan
during the Class Period. However, for many years Johnson &
Johnson's stock price has been artificially inflated. One of
Johnson & Johnson's flagship products, its talc Baby Powder,
contains asbestos, a known carcinogen. For decades, Johnson &
Johnson's senior leadership has known that its talc contained
asbestos, but took no action to disclose that information to the
public. Indeed, Johnson & Johnson's senior leadership has
endeavored to hide from the public the truth about asbestos in its
talc powder products. These efforts were successful, and the public
was and has been generally unaware that Johnson & Johnson's talc
powder contained asbestos. To date, Johnson & Johnson has not
publicly acknowledged that its talc powder contains asbestos, the
lawsuit says.

According to the complaint, the Defendants had ample authority, and
every opportunity to correct the record and make the truth about
asbestos in Johnson & Johnson's talc products known to the public.
Had they done so, the Plans' participants could have avoided
millions of dollars of losses from the loss in value of the Johnson
& Johnson stock in their Plan accounts.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joseph J. DePalma, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Todd Schneider, Esq.
          James A. Bloom, Esq.
          Kyle G. Bates, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Ste. 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          E-mail: tschneider@schneiderwallace.com
                  jbloom@schneiderwallace.com
                  kbates@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Garrett W. Wotkyns, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          8501 North Scottsdale Road, Suite 270
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253
          Telephone: (480) 428-0141
          E-mail: gwotkyns@schneiderwallace.com

KAGOME INC: Faces Rosales Labor Suit in Sacramento
--------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Kagome, Inc. The case is captioned as RAMIRO ROSALES, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KAGOME
INC., and DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00247973-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., Jan. 8,
2019).

Kagome Inc. manufactures and supplies sauces, spreads, juices, and
other food products. The company was founded in 1988 and is based
in Los Banos, California. Kagome Inc. operates as a subsidiary of
Kagome Co., Ltd. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021


LENOVO INC: Court Dismisses Suit Over Defective Phab 2 Smartphone
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Western Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned TAMER HASSAN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LENOVO
(UNITED STATES), INC., Defendant. No. 5:18-CV-105-BO. (E.D.N.C.).

The Plaintiff, a New York resident, purchased a Phab 2 smartphone
from defendant's website for $149.99. Upon receiving the phone, the
plaintiff realized that no sound was coming from what he believed
to be one of the phone's two speakers. In fact, the phone contained
only one speaker and what the plaintiff believed to be a
malfunctioning speaker was actually a microphone. The Plaintiff
initiated this putative class action lawsuit. The Plaintiff alleges
that the defendant designed, manufactured and marketed a product
that gives the appearance that the Phab series of phones has two
speakers, even thought only has one speaker.  

The Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: (1) unjust
enrichment (2) violations of state consumer fraud and deceptive
trade practices statutes (3) deceptive practices in violation of
New York General Business Law Section 349 (4) false advertising in
violation of New York General Business Law Section 350 (5) common
law fraud (6) breach of express warranty (7) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability (8) breach of implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose; (9) violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 and (10)
violation of North Carolina General Statutes Section 75-1.1.  

The Court finds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to claim
violations of other states' consumer-protection statutes, so his
second and sixth causes of action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiff is a resident of New York and resided in New York at
all times relevant to this litigation. He purchased his Phab 2
phone on the internet, received it in New York, and used it in New
York. In his second and sixth causes of action, the plaintiff
attempts to state claims on behalf of a nationwide class of
purchasers for violations of the consumer-protection statutes of
all fifty states and the District of Columbia. But as a resident of
New York, the plaintiff only has standing to state claims for
violations of New York's consumer-protection laws, and his second
and sixth causes of action must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) to
the extent that he attempts to state claims for violations of other
states' consumer-protection laws. The Plaintiffs argument that this
issue is one that should be put over to the certification stage is
unavailing. The Plaintiff cannot allege that he has suffered an
injury under the consumer-protection statute of any state but New
York, so he is not entitled to have this Court decide the merits of
hypothetical violations of other states' consumer-protection laws.


Thus, the plaintiffs second and sixth causes of action must be
dismissed.

The Plaintiff concedes that New Yark law is applicable to his third
and fourth causes of action for violations of New Yark General
Business Law Sections 349-50. He argues that North Carolina law
should govern the remaining claims under the
most-significant-relationship test. But it is New York, not North
Carolina, that enjoys the most significant relationship to the
litigation.

The Plaintiff bought the Phab 2 phone online while residing in New
Yark and received the phone in New York. He likely saw the
advertisements that he relied upon in New Yark. He used the phone
in New York. He continues to reside in New Yark, and it is New York
that is most concerned with protecting him from the harms that he
alleges defendant caused. This is not the first time that a federal
court has determined that New York possesses the most significant
relationship to litigation spawned by a New York resident who buys
a product from a North Carolina company online. The fact that
Lenovo's U.S. headquarters is in North Carolina is not enough to
give North Carolina a more significant relationship with the
underlying events that gave rise to the instant case.

Thus, New York law will govern all of plaintiffs claims.

Rule 9(b) requires that the plaintiff allege with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.  To meet this
standard, [plaintiff] must, at a minimum, describe the time, place,
and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity
of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained
thereby. Even construing plaintiffs complaint generously, there are
no specific allegations of fraud sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b).
Plaintiffs first cause of action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for common-law fraud must also
satisfy Rule 9(b). To state a claim for fraud under New York law,
plaintiff must allege a misrepresentation or a material omission of
fact which was false and known to be false by the defendant, made
for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it,
justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or
material omission, and injury. In the same way that plaintiff has
failed to make specific allegations of fraud giving rise to
defendant's alleged unjust enrichment, plaintiff has failed to make
such allegations to support his cause of action for common-law
fraud.

His fifth cause of action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs third cause of action is for deceptive practices in
violation of New York General Business Law Section 349, which
declares unlawful deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.

To state a claim, plaintiff must allege (1) that defendant's act or
practice was consumer-oriented (2) that the act or practice was
misleading in a material way and (3) that plaintiff suffered injury
as a result of the deceptive act. Plaintiffs fourth cause of action
for violation of New York General Business Law Section 350 relates
specifically to deceptive advertising but otherwise requires him to
satisfy the same requirements as his Section 349 claim.

The Plaintiff alleges that defendant materially deceived him as to
the number of speakers in the Phab 2 phone. But, even viewing the
complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor, none of defendant's
representations to plaintiff were false or misleading. Plaintiff
does not allege that, at any point prior to his purchase of the
Phab 2, defendant represented to him that the phone contained two
speakers. Rather, plaintiff argues that the two "grills" on the
phone, one being the speaker and the other being a microphone,
"indicat[ed] the presence of two speakers.

Accurate pictures of the phone with the two grills cannot be
materially misleading, whether those grills are indicative of two
speakers (as plaintiff believed) or one speaker and one
microphone.

And the plaintiff did not receive the allegedly misleading user
guide until after he'd already purchased the phone: In short,
plaintiff cannot state claims under either Section 349 or Section
350 because he cannot establish that defendant's acts or practices
were materially misleading.

They simply manufactured, marketed, and sold a phone that contained
only one speaker and plaintiff bought it under the mistaken belief
that it had two speakers. Plaintiffs third and fourth causes of
action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs tenth cause of action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for breach of express warranty
requires him to establish (1) the existence of a material statement
amounting to a warranty (2) the buyer's reliance on this warranty
as a basis for the contract with the immediate seller (3) breach of
the warranty and (4) injury to the buyer caused by the breach.

The Plaintiff must further establish that the warranty was relied
on. But plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish
that he relied upon an express warranty from defendant that the
Phab 2 had two speakers; instead, he continues to rely on
defendant's advertisements and accurate pictures of the phone with
its two grills. Even drawing reasonable inferences in plaintiffs
favor, he has not alleged that he relied on an express warranty
that defendant breached.

Thus, plaintiffs sixth cause of action for breach of express
warranty must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs seventh cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability must also be dismissed. The implied
warranty of merchantability is simply a seller's guarantee that a
particular product is fit for its ordinary purpose. A seller does
not breach the implied warranty if a product is not fit for each of
a consumer's particular expectations, provided it meets some
minimum level of quality. Here, defendant has not breached the
implied warranty by selling plaintiff a phone with just one
speaker. Other courts have rejected claims for breach of the
implied warranty on more serious allegations involving smartphones.
Defendant's Phab 2 was fit for its ordinary purpose even without
two speakers.

The Plaintiffs seventh cause of action must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs eighth cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be dismissed, The
warranty comes into play where the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. While
plaintiff alleges that he and others purchased the phone with the
specific purpose of having phones with two speakers and reasonably
relied on defendant in selecting the product to fit their specific
intended use, plaintiff alleges no facts that indicate defendant
knew or had reason to know about his particular purpose. Unless
defendant knew or had reason to know of plaintiffs particular
purpose, the claim must be dismissed. Even drawing reasonable
inferences in plaintiffs favor, there are no allegations that
defendant knew or had reason to know of plaintiffs particular
purpose beyond the ordinary purposes of using the phone for gaming,
videos, music, and so on.

The Plaintiffs eighth cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs ninth cause of action for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act must also be dismissed because the basis
for a breach of the statute lies in state law. Magnuson-Moss
provides that a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a
supplier or warrantor to comply with any obligations under the Act,
or under a written warranty or implied warranty may bring suit for
damages in federal court. Here, because plaintiffs breach of
express and implied warranty claims all fail as a matter of state
law, there is no underlying breach of warranty on which plaintiff
can base his federal Magnuson-Moss claim. Thus, plaintiffs ninth
cause of action must be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9z2osuz from Leagle.com.

Tamer Hassan, Plaintiff, represented by Brian L. Kinsley, Crumley
Roberts LLP, Daniel F. Schreck, Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell &
Associates, Gabriel O. Koppell, Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell &
Associates & Timothy A. Sheriff, Crumley Roberts LLP.

Lenovo (United States) Inc., Defendant, represented by Hayden J.
Silver, III -- jay.silver@wbd-us.com -- Womble Bond Dickinson (US)
LLP, Jonathon D. Townsend -- jonathon.townsend@wbd-us.com -- Womble
Bond Dickinson (US) LLP & Raymond M. Bennett --
ray.bennett@wbd-us.com -- Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.


LUCA C. ENTERPRISES: Underpays Laborers, Ramos-Lopez et al. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ABELAIDO RAMOS-LOPEZ; and HUGO LOPEZ-CHAVEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LUCA C.
ENTERPRISES, INC.; and NICU COSTACHE, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00130-MHC (N.D. Ga., Jan. 7, 2019) is an action against the
Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as laborers.

Luca C. Enterprises, Inc. operates as a stucco, exterior insulation
finishing system and masonry supply and design company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1 Glenlake Parkway, N.E., Suite 650
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (678) 330-2909
          Facsimile: (678) 638-6201
          E-mail: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com


LUKE'S A PLUS: Tracy Scarborough Seeks Minimum & Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Scarborough, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Luke's A Plus Moving
Services, Inc. and Lucas Horder, the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00147-L (N.D. Tex., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks minimum wage
and/or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Luke's is in the moving business. The  Plaintiff worked for
Defendants as a manual labor moving furniture and equipment.
According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was paid on an hourly
basis at a straight time rate of $19.00 per hour, but was not paid
at an overtime rate for any of the hours. The Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees regularly worked in excess of 40 hours
a week but was paid only straight time. For example, during the
summer months of 2018 Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per week
but was only paid straight time. The Defendants did not provide
check stubs showing the hours worked. Many times Defendants made
payments in cash. The Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, and
similarly situated employees, time-and-one-half their regular rate
of pay for the hours that Plaintiff and similarly situated
employees worked over 40 hours a week. In fact, Defendants did not
and does not pay statutory overtime to any of their employees. The
Defendants knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard
carried out its illegal pattern and/or practice of failing to pay
the minimum wage and/or overtime compensation with respect to
Plaintiff and similarly situated employees, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff, Esq.

          Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
          1360 N. White Chapel, Suite 200
          Southlake, TX 76092-4322
          Telephone: 817 416-5060
          Facsimile: 817 416-5062
          E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com

LYONS SECURITY: Faces Butler Suit in Sacramento, California
-----------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Lyons Security Service, Inc. The case is captioned as STEPHEN
BUTLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LYONS SECURITY SERVICE, INC.; KATHLEEN E.
GUIDICE, and DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00247846-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., Jan. 7,
2019).

Lyons Security Service, Inc. provides security services to clients
in the Northern California region. The company was founded in 1982
and is based in Orange, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary R. Basham, Esq.
          BASHAM LAW GROUP
          8801 Folsom Boulevard, Suite 177
          Sacramento, CA 95826
          Telephone: (916) 282-0841
          Facsimile: (916) 266-7478
          E-mail: gary@bashamlawgroup.com


MALCOLM CISNEROS: Aikens' Class Cert. Bid Denied as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Delia Aikens, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Malcolm
Cisneros, A Law Corporation, the Defendant, Case no.
5:17-cv-02462-JLS-SP (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Josephine L.
Staton entered an order on Jan. 9, 2019:

   1. denying as moot Plaintiff's pending motion for class
      certification and appointment of class counsel;

   2. vacating remaining case deadlines set forth in the
      Scheduling Order issued July 11, 2018, as they apply to
      Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant; and

   3. directing Plaintiff to file her anticipated motion for
      preliminary approval of the parties' class action
      settlement no later than February 1, 2019.

The Court said, "The Order has no effect on the third-party
complaint filed by Defendant against third-party defendants
Panatte, LLC and Special Default Services, Inc. The hearing on
Panatte, LLC's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, remains
scheduled for February 22, 2019."[CC]

MARK DEBLOIS: Fails to Pay Tips & Service Charges to Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------
SEAN FEENEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MARK DEBLOIS and COREY WE NOLAND, the
Defendants, Case No. 19-185 (Mass. Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 2019), is
brought by a delivery driver employed by Papa Gino's, Inc., for
whom the Defendants served as President and Chief Financial
Officer. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and
all similarly-situated delivery drivers, alleging unlawful
retention of service charges paid by customers, in violation of
M.G.L. c. 149, section 152 A; failure to pay the minimum wage in
violation of M.G.L. c. 151, including failure to pay the regular
minimum wage for inside work and failure to pay for all
transportation expenses; and failure to pay all wages due in
violation of M.G.L. c. 149, section 148.  As a result of
Defendants' policies and practices, Massachusetts delivery drivers
do not receive all tips and service charges, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Stephen S. Churchill, Esq.
          Brant Casavant, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607-6230
          E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com
                  brant@fairworklaw.com

MARK MURRAY FINE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
DESHAWN DAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MARK MURRAY FINE PAINTINGS, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00528 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2019), wants
changes to Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. Plaintiff uses the terms
"blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual
impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they
have a visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x
200. Some blind people who meet this definition have limited
vision. Others have no vision.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind’s 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

The Defendant allegedly failed to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its website to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.
Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its goods and services offered thereby and in
conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Because Defendant's website, www.markmurray.com, is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the ADA.

Mark Murray Fine Paintings is a New York gallery specializing in
buying and selling 19th Century, early 20th Century and
Impressionist Art.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, N.Y. 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

MARRIOTT INT'L: Faces Axelrod Suit Over Massive Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------
LISA AXELROD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. And STARWOOD HOTELS AND
RESORTS WORLDWIDE, LLC, Case No. 0:19-cv-60131-BB (S.D. Fla.,
January 19, 2019), stems from the Defendants' alleged abject
failure to adequately protect their customers' information from a
massive data breach.

Marriott International, Inc., is a global hospitality company with
over 6,700 properties located throughout the world.  In 2017,
Marriott reported $22 billion in revenue.  Marriott is
headquartered just outside of Washington, DC, in Bethesda,
Maryland.

Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide was an entity independent
from Marriott until September 2016 when Marriott completed a $13
billion acquisition of Starwood.  The combined entity created the
world's largest hotel chain and includes, among others, the
following major hotel brands: Marriott, JW Marriott, Courtyard,
Ritz-Carleton, Element Hotels, Aloft Hotels, The Luxury Collection,
Tribute Portfolio, Le Meridien Hotels & Resorts, Four Points by
Sheraton and Design Hotels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Detra Shaw-Wilder, Esq.
          KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON LLP
          2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9th Floor
          Miami, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 372-1800
          Facsimile: (305) 372-3508
          E-mail: dps@kttlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas E. Loeser, Esq.
          Shelby R. Smith, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: toml@hbsslaw.com
                  shelby@hbsslaw.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Faces Savett et al. Suit in D. Maryland
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Marriott
International, Inc. The case is captioned as ADAM SAVETT, and
EDWARD SCHWARTZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 8:19-cv-00059-PX (D. Md., Jan. 7, 2019). The case is
assigned to Judge Paula Xinis.

On January 18, 2019, the Defendant filed a Motion for Entry of
Stipulated Order Suspending Proceedings Pending Decision by
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

Marriott International, Inc. operates, franchises, and licenses
hotel, residential, and timeshare properties worldwide. Marriott
International, Inc. was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in
Bethesda, Maryland. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric R Harlan, Esq.
          Paul Mark Sandler, Esq.
          SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT AND SANDLER
          250 West Pratt Street, Suite 2000
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 385-4218
          Facsimile: (410) 539-7611
          E-mail: erh@shapirosher.com
                  pms@shapirosher.com

               - and -

          Joseph Richard Saveri, Esq.
          JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM INC.
          601 California St. Suite 1000
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 500-6800
          E-mail: jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com

               - and -

          Kevin E Rayhill, Esq.
          JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM
          505 Montgomery St Ste 625
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 500-6800
          Facsimile: (415) 500-6803
          E-mail: krayhill@saverilawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Gilbert S Keteltas, Esq.
          BAKER AND HOSTETLER LLP
          1050 Connecticut Ave. NW Ste. 1100
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 861-1530
          Facsimile: (202) 861-1783
          E-mail: gketeltas@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel R Warren, Esq.
          Lisa M Ghannoum, Esq.
          BAKER AND HOSTETLER LLP
          Key Tower 127 Public Square Ste. 2000
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 861-7145
          Facsimile: (216) 696-0740
          E-mail: dwarren@bakerlaw.com
                  lghannoum@bakerlaw.com


MATCO TOOLS: Aguilera et al. Suit Moved to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A case, Emanuel Aguilera, Rocio Aguilera, and Simon Goro,
individuals, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Matco Tools Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No.: RG18931359, was removed from
the Alameda County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for
the California Northern District (San Francisco) on Jan. 18, 2019.
The California Northern District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00321 to the proceeding. The suit alleges labor-related
violation.

Matco Tools, Inc. is an American professional tool distribution
franchise for the automotive and other industries and is based in
Stow, Ohio, United States. This includes more than 13,000 different
tools such as wrenches, screw drivers, gauges, and specialty
tools.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

Attorneys for Matco Tools Corporation:

          Eric Michael Lloyd, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          560 Mission Street, Suite 3100
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 544-1060
          Facsimile: (415) 397-8549
          E-mail: elloyd@seyfarth.com

MCNEELY LAW: Court Grants Arbitration in K. Mona FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
KIMBERLY K. MONA, Plaintiff, v. MCNEELY LAW GROUP, P.C., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-CV-12848. (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Kimberly Mona of Rochester Hills, Michigan, applied to
OneMain Financial Group, LLC (OneMain) in neighboring Troy,
Michigan, for a $4,000 loan, the reason for the loan being pool for
backyard. Plaintiff indicated on the loan application that she was
indebted to approximately twenty creditors, including her mortgage
lender, various retailers, banks, credit unions, and credit card
companies. According to plaintiff's complaint, by sending this
letter defendant violated a provision of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) because the letter allegedly does not, as
required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(2), indicate the name of the
creditor to whom the debt is owed.

However, the defendant does not seek dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a claim. Rather, the defendant seeks dismissal on
the grounds that the plaintiff's claim is subject to an arbitration
agreement.

The Plaintiff opposes this motion on the grounds that the defendant
is not a party to the loan agreement (or to the incorporated
arbitration agreement), and therefore cannot invoke it; that the
defendant has not shown it was acting as OneMain's agent when it
sent the plaintiff the offending letter; that the defendant, as a
nonsignatory to the loan agreement, cannot compel the plaintiff to
arbitrate; that the plaintiff's FDCPA claim is independent from the
loan agreement; and that, for all of these reasons, the defendant
cannot enforce the class action waiver provision of the loan
agreement.

Arbitration agreements are enforceable and, indeed, favored by the
federal courts as a speedy, fair, and efficient alternative to
litigation. For this reason, arbitration agreements can encompass
nonparties to the arbitration agreement who are related to an
arbitrable dispute.

In the present case, the arbitration provision of the loan
agreement is worded quite broadly. It encompasses all claims and
disputes arising out of, in connection with, or relating to the
loan agreement, including any claim based on or arising under any
federal, state, or local law and any claim for damages or
attorneys' fees and any claim for injunctive, declaratory, or
equitable relief. Plainly, the instant dispute has a connection
with and relates to the loan agreement, as defendant's letter to
plaintiff was prompted by the plaintiff's failure to repay the loan
as required by the loan agreement. Although the defendant is not a
party to the loan agreement, the defendant is nonetheless
encompassed by the arbitration provision, which covers any claim or
dispute between the plaintiff and any of Lender's agents. In
writing the letter at issue in this case, the defendant was acting
as OneMain's agent because, as the defendant stated therein,
OneMain Financial Group, LLC has "requested that our firm contact
you regarding your past due account."

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd6gbdgm from
Leagle.com.

Kimberly K. Mona, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald S. Weiss, Ronald
S Weiss & James L. Davidson -- jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com --
Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC.

McNeely Law Group, P.C., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey R.
Hicks, The Meridian Law Group & Theresa M. Asoklis --
theresa.asoklis@ceflawyers.com -- Collins, Einhorn.


MDL 2741: Nash-Boulden Suit v. Monsanto over Roundup Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled STEPHEN STANLEY NASH-BOULDEN,
Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-02028
(Filed Dec. 5, 2018), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Jan. 9,
2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-00118-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Nash-Boulden case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Plaintiffs each allege that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that
the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in
particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Erik L. Hansell, Esq.
          190 Carondelet Plaza, Suite 600
          St. Louis, MO 63105-3441

MDL 2742: New York Court Certifies Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned IN RE: SUNEDISON, INC.
SECURITIES LITIGATION. Nos. 16-md-2742 (PKC), 16-cv-7917 (PKC)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Lead plaintiff the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of
Michigan (MERS) and co-plaintiff Arkansas Teacher Retirement System
(ATRS) move for class certification.

The Plaintiffs' claims are brought under sections 11, 12(a)(2) and
15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections77k, 77l, section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

The proposed class would consist of all persons and entities who
purchased shares of common stock in SunEdison, Inc. (SunEdison, or
the Company) between September 2, 2015 and April 4, 2016, and all
persons and entities who purchased shares of SunEdison's preferred
stock pursuant to or traceable to a registered public offering
between August 18, 2015 and April 4, 2016 (Preferred Offering).

The Proposed Class Satisfies Numerosity

The Plaintiffs point out that 650,000 shares of preferred stock
were issued in connection with the Preferred Offering. They contend
that the volume of outstanding shares satisfies the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23(a) and makes joinder impracticable.

The Underwriter Defendants urge that the size of the class cannot
be calculated based on the 650,000 shares issued, and that only 22
investor families directly purchased shares from the Underwriter
Defendants in the initial offering. The phrase investor family is
defined by the Underwriter Defendants to include asset managers,
broker dealers, or individual entities or persons that are
unaffiliated with an asset manager or broker dealer and is used by
defendants' witness Kevin Gold, a vice president at Analysis Group,
Inc. who specializes in financial and statistical analysis, and was
retained by defendants to reviewing trading records and identify
purchasers in the Preferred Offering.  

The Defendants have failed to show the relationship among the
different entities within each family. Many, but not all, of the
families consist of entities with similar names (e.g., Greenlight
Capital (Gold), LP, Greenlight Capital Offshore Master (Gold),
Ltd., etc.). Some appear to be collections of unrelated entities.
The Allianz family includes plaintiff ATRS, Baptist Health South
Florida, Inc., Lockheed Martin and the Virginia Retirement System,
among others. The Oregon Public Employees Retirement Fund is listed
as being in a KKR family. A family identified as Omega includes
entities labeled Omega Advisors, Inc (SS Texas Teachers) and Omega
Advisors Inc (State Street Russell).

By contrast, the Greenlight Capital family has seven entities with
Greenlight in their names and might plausibly be viewed as a single
purchaser. (Id.) But in several instances, an entity's affiliation
with its family has not been demonstrated. For example, there has
been no showing of the nature of the relationship between American
Beacon Funds and its family, Calamos Investments.

The Plaintiffs assert that certain entities that superficially
appear to be affiliated actually have separate owners.  

Numerosity is presumed when a class has more than 40 members.
Assuming that the list of families identified by the Underwriter
Defendants is accurate and complete, the existence of at least 42
potential class members establishes a presumption of numerosity.
The number of potential class members is likely far higher because
the Gold Declaration does not account for transactions on the
secondary market that would be traceable to the Preferred
Offering.

A purchaser who does not buy a security directly from the issuer
may have an actionable claim to relief under section 11, provided
that the security is traceable to the allegedly misleading
registration statement. Based on data available on Bloomberg,
plaintiffs assert that from August 19, 2015 to July 22, 2016,
1,000,621 shares traceable to the Preferred Offering traded on a
secondary market. A significant number of shares likely traded
prior to November 9, 2015.

The Plaintiffs also point out that Gold has likely undercounted the
number of beneficial owners who directly participated in the
Preferred Offering, because broker-dealers who purchased Preferred
Shares acted on behalf of beneficial owners not identified in the
trading records, but who would be identified in the
claims-administration process.  

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs have made a showing
sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement. At the
certification stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove the exact
number or identity of all potential class members.  

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the
members are such that joinder is impracticable. Rule 23(a)(1).

The Proposed Class Satisfies Commonality

The proposed class satisfies the commonality requirement because
all claims turn on a single set of alleged misstatements and
omissions and common methodology for determining losses. Any such
misstatements and omissions would have the identical effect on all
class members. All class members' entitlement to relief would turn
on whether the misstatements and omissions were false, misleading
and material, and whether purchasers of the preferred shares
suffered losses resulting therefrom.

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs have satisfied the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).

ATRS's Claims Are Typical of the Proposed Class Members.

Typicality requires that the disputed issues of law or fact occupy
essentially the same degree of centrality to the named plaintiff's
claim as to that of other members of the proposed class.

The Underwriter Defendants urge that ATRS does not satisfy the
typicality requirement because it purchased the preferred shares on
August 18, 2015, and corrective disclosures were made on August 25,
October 7 and November 9, 2015. They urge that proposed class
members who acquired shares after those dates had varying levels of
knowledge about the alleged misstatements and omissions, rendering
ATRS's claims atypical.  

Here, unlike IPO, there is no contention of widespread knowledge
among members of the investing community about a scheme perpetuated
by defendants. In any event, IPO treated the issue of investors'
knowledge as going to predominance, not typicality. And unlike the
plaintiff in Newman, there is no contention that ATRS would
potentially be subject to a unique defense.

The Court concludes that ATRS satisfies the typicality requirement.
Its claims are typical of the class members because they all relate
to omissions and misstatements concerning the existence and terms
of SunEdison's borrowing arrangements. ATRS's claims about such
statements occupy the same degree of centrality as those of any
class member who purchased shares directly in or traceable to the
Preferred Offering.  

ATRS Has Demonstrated that It Can Adequately Represent the Class

Under Rule 23(a)(4), adequacy is twofold: the proposed class
representative must have an interest in vigorously pursuing the
claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the
interests of other class members.

ATRS has demonstrated that it is an adequate class representative.
It is a public retirement fund with $15.5 billion in assets, and
purchased shares in the Preferred Offering. ATRS claims damages due
to the alleged omissions and misrepresentations made in the
registration statement of the Preferred Offering. To date, ATRS
has, through its counsel at Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman
LLP (Bernstein Litowitz), brought Securities Act allegations that
partially survived defendants' motion to dismiss, advanced the case
through a contentious discovery process, and filed this motion for
class certification. ATRS has vigorously pursued claims on behalf
of the class and there is no contention that its interests are
antagonistic to other class members.

The Court concludes that ATRS satisfies the adequacy requirement of
Rule 23(a)(4).

Common Questions Predominate over Individual Ones

To satisfy predominance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
substantial aspects of the litigation are susceptible to
generalized proof for all class members, as opposed to individual
issues.  

The Plaintiffs assert that common questions predominate because
proving liability turns on the materiality of any omissions or
misstatements made in connection with the Preferred Offering and
that each proposed class member's claims will rise or fall based on
common proof related to offering documents.  

In opposition, the Underwriter Defendants urge that the proposed
class members had differing degrees of knowledge about the
Company's financing arrangements. They argue that because an
investor's knowledge of misstatements and omissions is a defense
against a Securities Act claim, differences in knowledge among
purchasers would cause individual issues to predominate. They point
to evidence that some large investors who purchased directly from
the Underwriter Defendants were able to conduct due diligence in
advance of the Preferred Offering because they were wall crossed in
a manner that gave them direct access to internal Company
information.
  
As to Greenlight Capital, the defendants note that its CEO, David
Einhorn, sometimes communicated with SunEdison management. They
cite a series of e-mails within SunEdison that refer to Einhorn.
One internal e-mail refers to a call with this guy and Greenlight,
and requests supplemental detail on the Company's prior quarterly
revenues.  Another e-mail chain discusses the importance of market
stability in finalizing the Preferred Offering, and includes the
sentence. An e-mail chain datd August 10, 2015 requests background
on Einhorn and Greenlight in order to prepare for a meeting, and a
later e-mail that day says that good progress was made with
Einhorn. In e-mails of August 19 and 20, Einhorn wrote to Chatila
outlining criticisms of SunEdison's business strategy, including
its over-reliance on the capital markets, opaque financial
statements and the Company's relationship with the Terraform Power
YieldCo. The same e-mail chain includes correspondence from the
following November, where Einhorn asks to speak to Chatila and
subsequently indicates frustration with Chatila's failure to
respond.  

These e-mails are evidence that Greenlight's CEO closely monitored
SunEdison's business, believed that its financial statements lacked
clarity and worried that some of its strategies were unproductive.
But they do not show awareness of the alleged misstatements and
omissions that are the subjects of the Securities Act claims.
Einhorn does not appear to reference any loans taken by the
Company. His communications with Chatila, and SunEdison management
do not defeat the predominance of common questions.

As to Highbridge Capital, the defendants have come forward with
evidence that it had actual knowledge of the Margin Call and
received payment of the collateral posted by the Company. Gold's
declaration states that Highbridge purchased 5,000 shares in the
Preferred Offering. A person or persons with a Highbridge e-mail
address received an August 10, 2015 e-mail from a SunEdison
executive giving notice that the Company "intends to post cash
collateral as it relates to the above margin call. An August 7,
2015 e-mail from a Deutsche Bank employee states that Highbridge
was due $8,378,423.11 in collateral under the Margin Call, and that
SunEdison's payment to Highbridge would be allocated through
Deutsche Bank. Defendants have demonstrated that Highbridge Capital
had knowledge the Margin Call, the existence of which is alleged to
be a material omission from the offering documents.

Highbridge's knowledge of the Margin Call does not defeat
predominance, however. Defendants have not submitted evidence that
other members of the proposed class knew of the Margin Call or had
a financial stake in it, such that individual questions permeate
the litigation. The common questions of whether offering documents
contained material omissions and misstatements remain more
prevalent or important" than the individualized questions related
to Highbridge. As the Supreme Court has stated, certain class
members may be ineligible for relief here or there, but that "does
not cause individual questions to predominate.

The Defendants have not come forward with evidence that potential
class members other than Highbridge were aware of any alleged
omissions and misstatements in the offering documents, while
plaintiffs have demonstrated that common questions predominate the
purchaser's entitlement to relief. The Court therefore concludes
that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied as
to the proposed Securities Act sub-class.

A Class Action Is the Superior Method of Adjudication

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires the movant to demonstrate that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Generally, securities
actions easily satisfy the superiority requirement because the
alternatives are either no recourse for thousands of stockholders
or a multiplicity and scattering of suits with the inefficient
administration of litigation which follows in its wake.

The Court concludes that the plaintiffs have satisfied the
superiority requirement in light of the efficiencies of class wide
adjudication.

The Statute of Repose Is Not a Barrier to Certification

The Underwriter Defendants urge that class certification should be
denied because the claims of any class members would be barred by
the three-year statute of repose for Securities Act claims. They
argue that because any class would be certified more than three
years after the Preferred Offering of August 2015, the statute of
repose bars recovery as to any class member. They do not urge that
this action was commenced by the class representative outside the
limitations period.

The commencement of an action by an individual plaintiff on behalf
of a putative class is implicitly authorized by Rule 23. Upon
certification of the class, the claims of the class members are
deemed to have been asserted on the date that the individual
plaintiff commenced the action.

That the timeliness of an absent class member's claim is measured
from the date that the class representative filed suit, rather
than, for example, the date of the Court's certification order,
does no offense to the three-year repose period. An absent class
member's claims are deemed to have been asserted on the date the
class representative filed the action. This is a traditional
judicial determination of when a claim is interposed by a person
and not the application of any tolling doctrine.

It is undisputed that the class action complaint seeking relief
under the Securities Act was filed within the three-year statute of
repose. The Court therefore concludes that the statute of repose is
not a barrier to the class members attaining relief.

The Motion for Class Certification Is Granted as to the Securities
Act Claims

The Proposed Exchange Act Class Satisfies Rule 23

The Proposed Class Satisfies Numerosity

According to the plaintiffs' expert, during the proposed class
period for the Exchange Act claims, SunEdison had approximately
336.7 million shares of common stock outstanding, and an average
daily trading volume of 46.9 million shares. Chatila does not
dispute that the proposed class satisfies numerosity.

The Court concludes that joinder would be impracticable, and that
plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity requirement for the
proposed Exchange Act class.

The Proposed Class Satisfies Commonality

Any injury suffered as a result of Chatila's alleged misstatement
would have caused the same injury to all prospective class members
and would turn on the same proof. Specifically, the claim would
turn on evidence of whether Chatila's statement of September 2,
2015 was materially false and misleading, its effect on the price
of SunEdison common stock, and the effect of any corrective
disclosures. The resolution of these issues would affect all
potential class members and are common issues that would drive
resolution of the litigation.  

The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs has satisfied the
commonality requirement for the proposed Exchange Act class.

MERS's Claims Are Typical of the Proposed Class Members

MERS's claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and that of the
proposed Exchange Act class members are identical. MERS endeavors
to prove that the September 2 statement was materially false and
misleading and artificially inflated the price of SunEdison's
common stock, and that share price declined when the market learned
the truth about the Company's prospects for generating cash. Each
class member's claims would arise from the same events, and turn on
identical legal arguments and evidence to prove Chatila's
liability. MERS has the incentive to prove all elements of these
claims.  

The Court therefore concludes that MERS has satisfied the
typicality requirement for the proposed Exchange Act class.

MERS Has Demonstrated that It Can Adequately Represent the Class

MERS has demonstrated that it has an interest in pursuing the
claims of the class, and that it does not have interests that are
antagonistic to other class members. MERS is a public-employee
retirement fund that purchased shares of SunEdison common stock and
claims it was damaged on the basis of Chatila's alleged
misstatement of September 2, 2015. MERS, through its attorneys at
Bernstein Litowitz, has pursued this claim under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 through a motion to dismiss, advanced the claim through
discovery and filed this motion for class certification. MERS has
vigorously pursued the claim, and there is no contention that its
interests are antagonistic to other class members.

The Court therefore concludes that MERS has satisfied the adequacy
requirement for the proposed Exchange Act class.

Common Questions Predominate over Individual Ones

The Court concludes that questions common to the class predominate
over individual ones. They include whether Chatila's statement to
Bloomberg on September 2, 2015 was a material misstatement and
whether Chatila made that statement with scienter. Additional
common questions include the damages caused to SunEdison's
shareholders and the effects of any corrective disclosures.

Chatila disputes predominance on grounds already discussed as to
the proposed class period applicable to the Exchange Act claim. He
urges that shareholders who acquired SunEdison shares after the
November 10, 2015 statement would have had idiosyncratic reasons
for doing so in reliance on the September 2 statement and would
fracture the class. For the reasons already discussed, however,
Chatila has not met the burden required to rebut the Basic
presumption of shareholder reliance, and to the extent that news of
the truth credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of
prior misstatements proof of that sort is a matter for trial and
presumably also for a summary-judgment motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. If the evidence later establishes that the
November 10 statement fully corrected the alleged misstatement of
September 2, subsequent purchasers would have no claim for relief
and any damages would be limited accordingly.  

The Court therefore concludes that common questions predominate
over any individual questions between potential class members.

A Class Action Is the Superior Method of Adjudication

The Plaintiffs have demonstrated that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The efficiency of classwide adjudication is superior
to individual adjudication in light of the large number of
potential claimants and the relatively small damages of each
potential class member. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have
satisfied the superiority requirement in light of the efficiencies
of class-wide adjudication.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9xrbqvp from
Leagle.com.

Dina Horowitz, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James J. Rosemergy, CAREY AND
DANIS & Maurice B. Graham, Gray, Ritter & Graham, P.C.

The Zecher Family Group, Plaintiff, represented by Norman E. Siegel
-- siegel@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP.

Municipal Employees Retirement System of Michigan, Plaintiff,
represented by Adam David Hollander -- adam.hollander@blbglaw.com
-- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Katherine Mccracken
Sinderson -- katherine@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, Maurice B. Graham, Gray, Ritter &
Graham, P.C., Max Wallace Berger -- MWB@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Salvatore Jo Graziano
SGraziano@blbglaw.com, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

The Zecher Family Group, Movant, represented by Norman E. Siegel,
Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP.

SUNEDISON, INC., Defendant, represented by Charles N. Insler --
cinsler@heplerbroom.com -- HEPLER BROOM, Glenn E. Davis --
glenn.davis@heplerbroom.com -- HEPLER BROOM, Hille R. Sheppard --
hsheppard@sidley.com -- SIDLEY AND AUSTIN, pro hac vice, Jaime
Allyson Bartlett -- JBARTLETT@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP, pro
hac vice, Norman Jeffrey Blears -- NBLEARS@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY
AUSTIN LLP, pro hac vice & Sara B. Brody, Sidley Austin LLP, pro
hac vice.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Kacinski Suit Moved to E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A case, Laurie Kacinski, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Midland Credit Management,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 611779/2018, was removed from the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Central Islip) on Jan. 22, 2019. The
Eastern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-00422 to the proceeding. The suit demands $501,000 and
alleges Fair Debt Collection Act violation.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Midland Credit Management, Inc.:

          Han Sheng Beh, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: hbeh@hinshawlaw.com

MILCO NATIONAL: Raines Seeks Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------
KRISTOPHER RAINES, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. MILCO NATIONAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00138-DKC (D. Md., Jan. 14, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime and other damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Milco National Constructors, Inc.
failed to pay Mr. Raines and other workers like him, overtime as
required by the FLSA; and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. Instead,
Milco pays Raines, and other workers like him, the same hourly rate
for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek, the lawsuit says.

Raines is an hourly employee of Milco. Milco is a construction firm
that provides construction services to clients across the United
States.[BN]

Attorneys in charge for Plaintiff:

          Taylor Jones, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          William R. Liles, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352-1100
          Facsimile: 713 352-3300
          E-mail: tjones@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  wliles@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 877-8788
          Facsimile: 713 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Nash Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
LEWIS NASH, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00269-RK (E.D. Pa., Jan. 18, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of
the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with
the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Heather K. D'On rio, Esq.
          THE D'ONOFRIO FIRM, LLC
          10 Beatty Road, Suite 200
          Media, PA 19063
          Telephone: 484 443-8922
          Facsimile: 484 443-8132
          E-mail: hdonofrio@donofriofirm.com

               - and -

          Kori Westbrook, Esq.
          JOHNSON LAW GROUP
          2925 Richmond Ave., Suite 1700
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (713) 626-9336
          Facsimile: (713) 583-9460
          E-mail: kwestbrook@johnsonlawgroup.com

MURCIA GROUP: Garcia Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum, OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA DEL CARMEN MOREIRA GARCIA and all others similarly situated
under 29 U.S.C. 216(b) v. MURCIA GROUP, INC. d/b/a DON ARTURO
RESTAURANT & BAR, ALFREDO MURCIA, AURA MURCIA, Case No.
0:19-cv-60106-RNS (S.D. Fla., January 11, 2019), is brought on
behalf of the Defendants' cooks, dishwashers and others, who have
not been paid overtime and/or minimum wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act for work performed in excess of 40 hours weekly.

Murcia Group, Inc., doing business as Don Arturo Restaurant & Bar,
is a corporation that regularly transacts business within the
Southern District of Florida.  The Individual Defendants are
corporate officers, owners or managers of the Defendant
Corporation.

The Defendants own or operate Don Arturo Restaurant & Bar, a Cuban
restaurant serving up traditional recipes & drinks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com


MY1HR INC: Gallion TCPA Suit Asserts Invasion of Privacy
--------------------------------------------------------
STEVE GALLION, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MY1HR, INC. d/b/a HEALTH OPTIONS USA; MY1HR d/b/a
HEALTH OPTIONS USA; KLONOWSKI AGENCY, INC.; INSXCLOUD; SCOTT
KLONOWSKI; PAUL ILIE; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of
them, Case No. 5:19-cv-00099 (C.D. Cal., January 16, 2019), arises
from the Defendants' alleged illegal actions in negligently,
knowingly and willfully contacting the Plaintiff on his cellular
telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
thereby, invading his privacy and causing him to incur unnecessary
and unwanted expenses.

MY1HR, INC., doing business as HEALTH OPTIONS USA, is a company in
the business of sales of cloud-based software to health insurance
issuers and brokers.  MY1HR, doing business as HEALTH OPTIONS USA,
is company in the business of sales of cloud-based software to
health insurance issuers and brokers.

KLONOWSKI AGENCY, INC., is company in the business of sales of
cloud-based software to health insurance issuers and brokers.
INSXCLOUD is company in the business of sales of cloud-based
software to health insurance issuers and brokers.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Corporate Defendants.
The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently
unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


NCAA: Foote Suit Transferred to Northern District of Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, DANIEL FOOTE, the Plaintiff, vs. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, AND THE IVY LEAGUE CONFERENCE, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03664 (Filed Nov. 21, 2018), was
transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Jan. 22, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00438 to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Honorable John Z. Lee. The Lead case is Case No.: 1:16-cv-08727.

The NCAA controls almost every aspect of collegiate football, the
nation's most popular collegiate sport, and as a result college
football generates hundreds of millions of dollars in annual
revenues for the NCAA and its member conferences. In exercising
this dominion and control, the NCAA promulgates, and is supposed to
enforce through its member conferences, the rules regarding player
safety. The NCAA and its member conferences have used this
authority to compel all football players to follow the NCAA's
policies, rules, and regulations with an iron fist. Unfortunately,
the NCAA's (and member conferences') policies in practice and as
enforced have severely damaged many of the players the NCAA was
supposed to protect, including Plaintiff. As the governing body of
college football, the NCAA held and holds itself out as the
"guardian" of, and ultimate authority on player safety. It
unilaterally acknowledged a duty to provide for all players'
safety. Player safety is supposed to be safeguarded with rules,
information, and best practices that protect the athletes as much
as possible from short-term and long-term health risks. But they
did not, because for the past several decades the NCAA and its
member conferences placed profits far ahead of player safety, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Daniel Foote:

          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          CIRCELLI WALTER & YOUNG PLLC
          500 East 4th St., Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (682) 703-2019
          E-mail: vinny@cwylaw.com

The Defendants appear pro se.

NCAA: McKinnie Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
A case, MARCUS MCKINNIE, the Plaintiff, vs. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, AND THE BIG TEN CONFERENCE, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03672 (Filed Nov. 21, 2018), was
transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Jan. 22, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00449 to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Honorable John Z. Lee. The Lead case is Case No. 1:16-cv-08727.

The NCAA controls almost every aspect of collegiate football, the
nation's most popular collegiate sport, and as a result college
football generates hundreds of millions of dollars in annual
revenues for the NCAA and its member conferences. In exercising
this dominion and control, the NCAA promulgates, and is supposed to
enforce through its member conferences, the rules regarding player
safety. The NCAA and its member conferences have used this
authority to compel all football players to follow the NCAA's
policies, rules, and regulations with an iron fist. Unfortunately,
the NCAA's (and member conferences') policies in practice and as
enforced have severely damaged many of the players the NCAA was
supposed to protect, including Plaintiff. As the governing body of
college football, the NCAA held and holds itself out as the
"guardian" of, and ultimate authority on player safety. It
unilaterally acknowledged a duty to provide for all players'
safety. Player safety is supposed to be safeguarded with rules,
information, and best practices that protect the athletes as much
as possible from short-term and long-term health risks. But they
did not, because for the past several decades the NCAA and its
member conferences placed profits far ahead of player safety, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Daniel Foote:

          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          George Parker Young, Esq.
          Kelli L. Walter, Esq.
          CIRCELLI WALTER & YOUNG PLLC
          500 East 4th St., Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (682) 703-2019
          E-mail: vinny@cwylaw.com
                  gpy@cwylaw.com
                 kelli@cwylaw.com

The Defendants appear pro se.

NEW MEXICO: State Worker Files Class Action Lawsuit vs CWA Union
----------------------------------------------------------------
National Right to Work Foundation reports that a New Mexico state
employee has filed a class action lawsuit in federal court because
union officials violated his First Amendment rights through a
scheme to require him and other state employees to pay money to the
union as a condition of employment.

IT technician David McCutcheon, employed by New Mexico's Department
of Information Technology (DoIT), filed the lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico against the
Communication Workers of America (CWA) union, CWA Local 7076 union,
and New Mexico Personnel Office Director Justin Najaka on Dec. 20
with free legal aid from National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation staff attorneys.

McCutcheon's suit states that CWA officials seize unauthorized
membership dues out of his paycheck and refuse to allow workers to
opt out of union payments except during a union dictated "window
period." The lawsuit asks the court to end this scheme and seeks a
refund of union membership dues and fees for all New Mexico public
workers who were similarly victimized.

Union officials forced McCutcheon to pay nonmember union fees to
keep his job beginning in April 2017. However, in Janus v. AFSCME
on June 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional
to require any public employee to pay union membership dues or fees
without his or her explicit consent.

Following the Janus ruling, McCutcheon informed union officials in
writing that he did not consent to any deduction of union fees.
Union officials responded that his request had been "submitted for
processing."

But, instead of halting deductions, union officials began seizing
full membership dues, rather than the lesser nonmember fees, from
McCutcheon's wages without his permission starting in September.
According to union officials, under the union contract McCutcheon
could only stop these larger deductions by again revoking
authorization during the annual two-week December "window period."

Because union officials refused to respect his legitimate request,
McCutcheon has asked the district court to recognize his First
Amendment rights to free speech and free association in accord with
Janus and strike down this unconstitutional "window period" scheme.
McCutcheon also seeks a refund of membership dues and fees seized
from himself and the likely hundreds of other public employees in
New Mexico who have been similarly victimized during the past three
years.

"Contrary to the wishes of New Mexico union bosses and their allies
in state government, First Amendment rights cannot be limited to
just a couple of weeks per year," said Mark Mix, president of the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. "All civil
servants should be able to exercise their rights to free speech and
free association by cutting off union payments whenever they choose
without interference by union officials."

"Unfortunately, even after the Foundation-won Janus decision by the
Supreme Court, it appears more legal action is necessary to force
union officials to end their ‘massive resistance' and respect the
rights of the very workers they claim to represent," added
Mix.[GN]


NEW YORK: Escalera Sues Disability Assistance Office
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the New York State
Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance.  The case is
captioned as ABIGAIL ESCALERA, and her next friend and grandson,
C.M., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. SAMUEL D. ROBERTS, as Commissioner of the New York
State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Defendant,
Case No. 99/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Albany Cty., Jan. 7, 2019).

The New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance is
responsible for supervising programs that provide assistance and
support to eligible families and individuals.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Susan Antos, Esq.
          119 Washington Ave., 3rd Floor
          Albany, NY 12210
          Telephone: (518) 935-2850

The Defendant is represented by:

          Letitia James, Esq.
          DEPARTMENT OF LAW
          Albany, NY 12224-0341


NOBILIS HEALTH: Yang Sues over Misleading Financial Report
----------------------------------------------------------
ZHANG YANG, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NOBILIS HEALTH CORP., HARRY FLEMING,
DAVID YOUNG, and KENNETH J. KLEIN, the Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00145 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 14, 2019), seeks to recover damages
caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Nobilis securities between May 8, 2018 through
November 15, 2018, both dates inclusive.  According to the
complaint, the Defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
the Company overstated its accounts receivables and revenue; (2)
consequently, the Company would be required to delay the filing of
its quarterly report on Form 10-Q; (3) such a delay would result in
the Company falling in non-compliance with the New York Stock
Exchange listing requirements; and (4) that, as a result the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On August 2, 2018, the Company reported that its revenue for the
second quarter 2018 was reduced due, in part, to a $2.4 million
adjustment to its accounts receivable. On this news, the Company's
share price fell $0.20 per share, more than 17%, to close at $0.95
per share on August 2. Then, on November 9, 2018, the Company
disclosed that it is "re-evaluating the Net Realizable Value on its
Accounts Receivable and intends to make a significant adjustment to
the carrying value of accounts receivable, primarily on out of
network claims greater than 365 days old." The Company filed for
additional time to file its 10-Q for the period ended September 30,
2018 while the Company and the auditor completed  their review of
the financial statements. On this news, the Company's share price
fell $0.18 per share, more than 25%, to close at $0.52 per share on
November 12, 2018.

Then, on November 15, 2018, the Company announced that it had
received notice from the NYSE that the Company is not in compliance
with the NYSE's continued listing requirements due to its failure
to timely file its 10-Q. On this news, the Company's share price
fell $0.07 per share, more than 12%, to close at $0.48 per share on
November 16, 2018. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and
omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.

Nobilis is a full-service healthcare development and management
company, with more than 30 locations across Texas and Arizona,
including hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, and
multi-specialty clinics. In addition, the Company partners with
more than 30 facilities across the country. Marketing nine
independent brands, Nobilis purports to deploy a unique patient
acquisition strategy driven by proprietary, direct-to-consumer
marketing technology, focusing on a specified set of procedures
that are performed at its facilities by local physicians. Nobilis'
business model is designed to connect patients with physicians and
delivers the highest quality healthcare.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sammy Ford IV, Esq.
          AHMAD, ZAVITSANOS, ANAIPAKOS, ALAVI & MENSING PC
          1221 McKinney, Suite 2500
          Houston, TX 77010
          Telephone: (713) 655-1101
          Facsimile: (713) 655-0062
          E-mail: sford@azalaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY  10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

NOVA LIFESTYLE: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Nova Lifestyle, Inc. ("Nova" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: NVFY) in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California on behalf of a class consisting of investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of Nova between
December 3, 2015 and December 20, 2018, both dates inclusive (the
"Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges that defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Nova Lifestyle
overstated its purported "strategic alliance" with Shanxi Wanqing
to operate as lead designer and manufacturer for all furnishings in
Shanxi Wanqing's planned $460 million senior care center in China;
(2) Nova Lifestyle inflated its reported sales in 2016 and 2017
with Shanxi Wanqing and Merlino Lewis LLP; and (3) as a result,
Nova Lifestyle's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the February 26, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action please;

          Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
          Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
          Gainey McKenna & Egleston
          Telephone: (212) 983-1300
          E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                  gegleston@gme-law.com [GN]


NOVA LIFESTYLE: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, has filed a
class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the securities of
Nova Lifestyle, Inc. (NASDAQ:NVFY) from December 3, 2015 through
December 20, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
seeks to recover damages for Nova Lifestyle investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Nova Lifestyle class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1475.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Nova Lifestyle
overstated its purported "strategic alliance" with Shanxi Wanginq
to operate as lead designer and manufacturer for all furnishings in
Shanxi Wanginq's planned $460 million senior care center in China;
(2) Nova Lifestyle inflated its reported sales in 2016 and 2017
with Shanxi Wangqing and Merlino Lewis LLP; and (3) as a result,
Nova Lifestyle's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than February
26, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1475.html

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


NUTRISYSTEM INC: Walton Sues over Misleading Financial Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH WALTON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NUTRISYSTEM, INC., MICHAEL J. HAGAN,
ROBERT F. BERNSTOCK, JAY HERRATTI, BRIAN P. TIERNEY, PATRICIA HAN,
DAWN M. ZIER, PAUL GUYARDO, MICHAEL D. MANGAN, ANDREA WEISS, and
BENJAMIN A. KIRSHNER, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00112-UNA
(D. Del., Jan. 18, 2019), asserts claims against Defendants for
contraventions of (i) Rule 14a-9; and (ii) Regulation G, 17 C.F.R.
section 244.100, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin and/or delay Defendants
from holding the shareholder vote on the Proposed Transaction,
scheduled for March 5, 2019, unless and until the material
information is disclosed to Nutrisystem shareholders sufficiently
in advance of the vote on the Proposed Transaction or, in the event
the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover damages
resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act.

The case is brought as a class action by Plaintiff on behalf of
himself and the other public holders of the common stock of
Nutrisystem, Inc. against the Company and the members of the
Company's board of directors for their violations of Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in connection
with the proposed merger of Nutrisystem with Tivity Health, Inc. On
December 9, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger pursuant to which Nutrisystem
shareholders will receive $38.75 in cash and 0.2141 shares of
Tivity common stock for an aggregate merger consideration of $47
per Nutrisystem share. On January 7, 2019, to convince Nutrisystem
shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the
Board authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and
misleading Registration Statement on Form S-4 with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act.

In particular, the Proxy contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning Nutrisystem's financial
projections, which were developed by the Company's management and
relied on by the Board to recommend the Proposed Transaction. It is
imperative that the material information that has been omitted from
the Proxy is disclosed to the Company's shareholders prior to the
forthcoming shareholder vote on March 5, 2019, so that they can
properly exercise their corporate suffrage rights, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com
                  mvangorder@faruqilaw.com

NVIDIA CORP: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against, NVIDIA Corporation ("NVIDIA" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
NVDA) and certain of its officers.  The class action, filed in
United States District Court, Northern District of California, and
indexed under 18-cv-07783, is on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities, other than Defendants and their
affiliates, who purchased or otherwise, acquired NVIDIA securities
between August 10, 2017 through November 15, 2018, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased NVIDIA securities between
August 10, 2017, and November 15, 2018, both dates inclusive, you
have until February 19, 2019, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action, contact
Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

NVIDIA is a computer technology company founded in 1993 and is
headquartered in Santa Clara, California. NVIDIA designs and sells
graphics processing units ("GPUs") and software, traditionally in
the computer gaming market. NVIDIA's business has since expanded to
include GPUs used in connection with, inter alia, cryptocurrencies.
NVIDIA's business in the cryptocurrency market, infamous for its
growth and volatility, became especially integral to investors.

Defendants represented to investors that NVIDIA could competently
navigate the cryptocurrency market throughout the Class Period. For
example, Defendants assured investors that NVIDIA and its
executives are "masters at managing [the Company's] channel" and
"understand the channel very well," despite analysts' increasing
qualms regarding NVIDIA's inventory management in that market.
NVIDIA also consistently downplayed the Company's growing reliance
on cryptocurrency-related sales, representing to investors that the
cryptocurrency market made up little of NVIDIA's revenue.
Defendants also touted the strong demand for its computer gaming
GPUs, assuring investors that NVIDIA's computer gaming customer
base would compensate for any decline in revenue from
cryptocurrency-related sales.

NVIDIA's shares began to trade at record highs as analysts digested
these repeated assurances to investors. Meanwhile, NVIDIA's senior
executives were concurrently selling their own shares in
significant amounts, including, inter alia, Jen-Hsun Huang
("Huang"), NVIDIA's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). Huang sold
110,000 personally-held NVIDIA shares during the Class Period,
profiting by over $18 million.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
NVIDIA's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) NVIDIA's growth in its gaming
GPU revenue was driven, as repeatedly denied by Defendants, in
significant part by the spiked demand for those GPUs among
cryptocurrency miners; (ii) NVIDIA did not have, as Defendants
asserted, visibility into its inventory channel; (iii) NVIDIA was
unable to adapt to the volatility of cryptocurrency markets; (iv)
as cryptocurrency prices dropped, NVIDIA hid halting growth from
cryptocurrency miners by continuing to push mid-range GPUs into the
channel; (v) this would foreseeably cause an oversupply of gaming
card inventory levels on the market and ultimately lead to over
three months of excess inventory in NVIDIA's channel; and (vi) as a
result, NVIDIA's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On November 15, 2018, NVIDIA disclosed that its revenue would
decline by over 7% for the fourth fiscal quarter, sharply cutting
its revenue guidance. This was in marked contrast to the 17% growth
Defendants had previously led investors to expect. NVIDIA blamed
the poor financial results on lower demand from
cryptocurrency-related purchasers, which resulted in an
oversupplied inventory of midrange GPUs. This inventory of GPUs had
stored up in the channel before cryptocurrency-related demand for
NVIDIA's GPUs rapidly declined.

On this news, NVIDIA shares declined by $57.69, or 28.5% over the
next two trading sessions.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


ORION MARINE: Improper Disclosure Class Conditionally Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN KELLY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ORION MARINE CONSTRUCTION, INC. d/b/a
ORION MARINE GROUP, the Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-01400-CEH-CPT
(M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell entered an
order on Jan. 9, 2019:

   1. granting joint motion for preliminary approval of mediated
      class action settlement;

   2. preliminary approving proposed settlement; and

   3. conditionally certifying, for settlement purposes only,
      Improper Disclosure Class:

      "all applicants for employment with and employees of Orion
      Marine Construction, Inc., as to whom Orion Marine
      Construction, Inc., procured a background check, including a
      consumer report, from May 5, 2016 (two years before the
      filing of the original complaint), through October 5, 2018
      (the date of the mediated settlement).

In connection with this conditional certification, the Court makes
these preliminary findings for settlement purposes only:

   A. The Settlement Class of approximately 932 members appears to
      be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

   B. There appear to be questions of law or fact common to the
      Settlement Class for purposes of determining whether this
      Settlement should be approved.

   C. Plaintiff Jordan Kelly’s claims appear to be typical of
the
       claims being resolved through the proposed settlement.

   D. Plaintiff Jordan Kelly appears to be capable of fairly and
      adequately protecting the interests of the Settlement Class
      Members in connection with the proposed settlement.

   E. Attorney Brandon Hill and the firm of Wenzel Fenton Cabassa,

      P.A., have experience in class action litigation under the
      FCRA and are qualified to handle the class members' claims.

   F. Common questions of law and fact appear to predominate over
      questions affecting only individual persons in the
      Settlement Class. Accordingly, the Settlement Class appears
      to be sufficiently cohesive to warrant settlement by
      representation.

   G. Certification of the Settlement Class appears to be superior

      to other available methods for the fair and efficient
      resolution of the claims of the Settlement Classes.

   H. Court appoints Matthew K. Fenton and Brandon J. Hill of
      Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, P.A. as Class Counsel for the
      Settlement Class.

   I. Court appoints Plaintiff Jordan Kelly as Class
      Representative for the Settlement Class.

   K. A Final Approval Hearing is set for Thursday, April 18,
      2019, at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 13A, Sam M. Gibbons
      U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa,
      Florida 33602.[CC]

PBG DELIVERY: Mostel et al. Seek to Conditionally Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned ADAM MOSTEL and DREW
PORTALATIN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. PBG DELIVERY DUDES LLC, a Florida
limited liability company, and MICHAL SKARZYNSKI, individually, the
Defendants, Case No. 9:18-cv-81495-BB (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order:

   a. conditionally certifying collective action under section
      216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act:

      "all delivery drivers of Defendant PBG Delivery Dudes LLC,
      at any time since November 1, 2015, who were not paid full
      and proper minimum wages and/or overtime compensation for
      all hours worked for Defendant in one or more workweeks.";

   b. directing Defendant to produce a list in Excel spreadsheet
      format containing the names of all individuals who worked
      for Defendant as "delivery drivers" from November 1, 2015
      through the current date, along with their last-known
      address and email address, if known (the "Class List"), no
      later than 10 days after the effective date of the order and

      upon delivery of this list, and further directing Defendant
      to promptly file a notice of compliance with this part of
      the Court's Order;

   c. directing Plaintiffs' counsel to mail and email, to the
      extent available, the Court-approved Notice and Consent to
      all individuals identified on the Class List, by no later
      than 15 days after receipt of the Class List. The envelopes
      mailed to the individuals identified on the Class List will
      state the mailing information for the addressee along with
      the words "Notice of Collective Action." The email to the
      individuals identified in the Class List shall state "Notice

      of Collective Action" in the subject line and shall only
      attach the Court-approved Notice and Consent. Upon mailing
      and emailing the Court-approved Notice and Consent,
      Plaintiffs' Counsel shall promptly file a notice of
      compliance with this part of the Court's Order;

   d. directing Defendant to also prominently post Court-approved
      Notice and Consent in a conspicuous location next to any
      posting of employment law notices throughout the entirety of

      the opt-in period so that it can be seen by any current
      delivery drivers; and

   e. directing any individuals who wish to opt into this
      collective action as Plaintiffs to return the Consent forms
      to Plaintiffs' counsel by no later than 90 days after the
      date of mailing of the Notice, in order to avoid undue
      burden on the Clerk of Court, and rather than file the
      Consents on a piecemeal basis, Plaintiffs' counsel shall be
      responsible for filing any and all executed and timely
      Consents as a single filing at the conclusion of the Notice
      period. Notwithstanding, for statute of limitations
      purposes, the date of filing of each individual Consent
      shall be the date of execution of the Consent.

According to the complaint, on or about November 1, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants (1) employed Plaintiffs and
continue to employ individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs as
delivery drivers; (2) suffered or permitted to be suffered, with
knowledge, hours of service by Plaintiffs and these similarly
situated employees, including in excess of 40, during one or more
workweeks, for which Defendants failed to properly pay minimum
wages and overtime premiums; and (3) misclassified Plaintiffs and
these similarly situated individuals as 1099 independent
contractors to evade the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements
of the FLSA (as well as Florida minimum wage law).[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Daniel R. Levine, Esq.
          Erica A. Gonsalves, Esq.
          PADULA BENNARDO LEVINE, LLP
          3837 NW Boca Raton Blvd., Suite 200
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 544-8900
          Facsimile: (561) 544-8999
          E-mail: DRL@PBL-Law.com
                  EG@PBL-Law.com

Counsel for Defendants:

          Ignacio J. Garcia, Esq.
          Karen E. Smeda, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          100 N. Tampa Street, Suite 3600
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 289-1247
          Facsimile: (813) 289-6530
          E-mail: ignacio.garcia@ogletree.com
                  karen.smeda@ogletree.com

PIRGOS FOOD: Vasquez Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
DOMINGO OCAMPO VAZQUEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PIRGOS FOOD CORP. (D/B/A
MOONSTRUCK DINER), JOHN KAPETANOS, and ORLANDO DOE, Case No.
1:19-cv-00530 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants own, operate, or control
a diner, located at 244 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017 under
the name "Moonstruck Diner". The Plaintiff was employed as a
delivery worker at the restaurant. However, he was required to
spend a considerable part of his work day performing non-tipped
duties, including but not limited to cleaning the bathroom,
restaurant and kitchen, taking out the trash and recycling, cutting
vegetables, organizing new merchandise, washing dishes, sweeping
the floors and wrapping utensils in napkins to place on tables.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for the
hours that he worked. Rather, the Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiff appropriately for any hours worked, either at the
straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium. The
Defendants employed and accounted for Plaintiff as a delivery
worker in their payroll, but in actuality his duties required a
significant amount of time spent performing the alleged non-tipped
duties. The Defendants paid Plaintiff at a rate that was lower than
the required tip-credit rate.

However, under both the FLSA and NYLL, Defendants were not entitled
to take a tip credit because Plaintiff's non-tipped duties exceeded
20% of each workday, or 2 hours per day, whichever is less in each
day. The Defendants employed the policy and practice of disguising
Plaintiff's actual duties in payroll records by designating him as
a delivery worker instead of as a non-tipped employee. This allowed
the Defendants to avoid paying Plaintiff at the minimum wage rate
and enabled them to pay him at the tip-credit rate (which they
still failed to do), the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES , P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

PNS STORES: Wellons et al.'s Labor Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------
PNS Stores, Inc., which operates as a subsidiary of Big Lots Inc.,
is defending against a class action lawsuit alleging violations of
labor laws.  The case is entitled, S. WELLONS; C. ARREDONDO; S.
DAVIS; T. DEFOREEST; W. DUBA; S. HALL; G. KILGORE; N. LOPEZ; S.
MEJIA; T. SELTZER; S. SHARMA; M. SIMS; J. SMITH; K. TOFT; C.
TOLLIVER; M. VIRAMONTES; M. WALTERS; L. WARNER; D. WILLIAMS; and J.
WRIGHT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. PNS STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-02913-DMS-WVG (S.D. Cal., Dec. 31, 2018).  The lawsuit was
originally filed in the Superior Court of California, of San Diego,
case number 37-02018 00015587-CU-OE-CTL, and was removed to the
federal district court on Dec. 31.  Judge Dana M. Sabraw and
Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo are assigned to the case.
Wellons has filed a Motion to Remand to State Court.

PNS Stores operates as a community retailer.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David J. Gallo, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID J. GALLO
          12702 Via Cortina, Suite 500
          Del Mar, CA 92014
          Telephone: (858) 509-3652


PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Paris et al. Seek to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned MICHAEL PARIS, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of HENRY PARIS, JR., and PATRICIA
PARIS, deceased, and CHISTIE HEGEL, the Plaintiffs, vs. PROGRESSIVE
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, and PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE
COMPANY, and PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-02735-MSS-AAS (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an order certifying a class consisting of:

      "all Progressive American insureds under a Florida insurance
      policy for private passenger auto containing the same
      operative material language who, during the time period from

      five years before the filing of the Complaint until the date

      of any certification Order, made a claim adjusted and
      covered by Defendants or related entities as a total loss
      and whose claim resulted in an actual cash value (ACV)
      payment that did not include at least one of the following:
      a) full total-loss vehicle value sales tax; b) title
      transfer fees; and/or c) tag transfer fees"

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court abate any Order on
class certification until after a time of discovery is conducted
and supplemental briefing following such discovery process is
filed. Hegel seeks to represent Progressive Select insureds in an
otherwise identically-defined class. Excluded from the class are 1)
Defendants and their agents, employees, parents, subsidiaries,
contractors, and related entities; 2) any presiding judge and their
immediate family members; 3) counsel for both parties and their
immediate families; and 4) any insured whose ACV payment was based
on and equal to an applicable Stated Limit in the insured's
governing Declaration Sheet.

According to the complaint, the case concerns a simple question --
does a promise to pay the ACV of a total-loss vehicle include
coverage for unavoidable costs in procuring a vehicle, namely sales
tax and title/tag transfer fees? This is not only a pure question
of law, the lawsuit says, but, because Defendants' business
practice concerning payment of ACV is uniform and because
Defendants' policy language is materially identical for all class
members, it is also a question whose resolution will identically
impact every class member claim. Either Defendants must pay
transfer fees or not; either Defendants must pay sales tax in an
amount equal to 6% of the vehicle value (plus local surtax) or not.
Either way, however, the answer resolves every class members' claim
-- as well as the Plaintiffs -- in a single stroke.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL, 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  service@normandpllc.com
                  ed@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Christopher J. Lynch, Esq.
          CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH, P.A.
          6915 Red Road, Suite 208
          Coral Gables, FL 33143
          Telephone: (305) 443-6200
          Facsimile: (305) 443-6204
          E-mail: Clynch@hunterlynchlaw.com
                  Lmartinez@hunterlynchaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 N.E. 1st Ave., Ste. 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
          efilings@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          19495 Biscayne Blvd., #607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-975-3320
          Scott@edelsberglaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          Marcy Levine Aldrich, Esq.
          Bryan T. West, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          Three Brickell City Centre
          98 Southeast Seventh Street
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: 305 374-5600
          Facsimile: 305 374-5095
          E-mail: marcy.aldrich@akerman.com
                  bryan.west@akerman.com

QIHOO 360: Depressed Value of ADRs, ODS Capital Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------
ODS CAPITAL LLC, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. QIHOO 360 TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD., HONGYI
ZHOU, XIANGDONG QI and ERIC X. CHEN, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00501 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2019), concerns a scheme by Qihoo
360 and certain of its officers and/or directors to depress the
value of Qihoo 360's stock and American Depositary Share (ADS) in
order to avoid paying a fair price to Qihoo 360's shareholders
during a transaction to take the Company private, in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a securities class action is brought on behalf of all
former owners of Qihoo 360 stock and American Depositary Shares who
sold shares, and were damaged thereby, during the period between
January 11, 2016 and July 15, 2016, inclusive. Excluded from the
Class are Defendants, members of the immediate family of Individual
Defendants, any subsidiary or affiliate of Qihoo 360, and the
directors and officers of Qihoo 360 and their families and
affiliates at all relevant times, and anyone who filed a petition
or pursued appraisal rights of their Qihoo 360 stock pursuant to
Cayman Law. The Defendants executed this scheme by failing to
provide shareholders adequate disclosure of all material
information related to the Merger, and making false assurances
about the fair value of Qihoo 360's stock and ADS. As a result,
Qihoo 360 shareholders were misled into accepting consideration
from the Merger that was well below fair value for their Qihoo 360
shares.

According to the complaint, Incorporated in 2005 under the laws of
the Cayman Islands, Qihoo 360, formerly known as Qihoo Technology
Company Limited, is purported to be the leading internet company in
the People's Republic of China. On December 18, 2015, Qihoo 360
announced that it had entered into a definitive merger agreement 1
pursuant to which it would be acquired by a consortium of investors
in an "all-cash transaction valued at approximately $9.3 billion,
including the redemption of approximately $1.6 billion of debt."
Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, "each of the
Company's class A and class B ordinary shares issued and
outstanding immediately prior to the effective time of the merger
will be cancelled and cease to exist in exchange for the right to
receive US$ 51.33 in cash without interest, and each ADS of the
Company, every two ADSs representing three class A ordinary shares,
will be cancelled in exchange for the right to receive US$ 77.00 in
cash without interest," except for certain Shares.  The Merger was
authorized and approved by a shareholder vote on March 30, 2016
during an extraordinary general meeting and became effective on
July 15, 2016.

Prior to the shareholder vote, Defendants issued a Preliminary
Proxy Statement on January 11, 2016, an Amended Proxy Statement on
February 8, 2016 ("Amendment No. 1"), a Second Amended Proxy
Statement on February 26, 2016 ("Amendment No. 2"), a Third Amended
Proxy Statement on March 3, 2016 ("Amendment No. 3") (collectively,
the "Proxy") and a Final Amended Proxy Statement on July 15, 2016,
all filed with the SEC in connection with the Merger. Between
December 18, 2015 and July 15, 2016, in order to convince Qihoo 360
stockholders to vote in favor of the Merger, Defendants authorized
the filing of materially false and misleading statements with the
SEC, in violation of Sections 10(b), and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
The Proxy statements and Annual Report contained materially
incomplete and/or misleading disclosures. Specifically, the Proxy
and Annual Report are deficient and misleading as they fail to
provide adequate disclosure of all material information related to
the Merger. The Proxy and Annual Report also failed to disclose
Qihoo 360's upcoming plan to relist its shares in the People's
Republic of China.

Contrary to the Company's repeated reassurances about no
substantial changes to its structures or relisting following the
Merger, shortly after the going-private deal was closed, media news
outlets reported on the Company's relisting plans. For example, the
Financial Times reported on February 28, 2017, that materials used
in fundraising "for the privitisation of Qihoo 360" also discussed
the "return to the A Shares" market in China. This article
described the "return to investors" upon an "exit" (i.e., a
transaction allowing those taking Qihoo 360 private to "exit" their
position through a relisting), stating that the return "may be as
high as 5 [times]" the going-private price.

This deal, operating as a "backdoor listing," would allow Qihoo 360
to return to the stock market by relisting on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange at a multiple, to the detriment of shareholders who
unknowingly sold Qihoo 360's stock and ADS at substantially
deflated values during the Class Period as part of the scheme.
Formally announced on November 6, 2017, the deal involved
Shanghai-listed elevator-maker SJEC agreeing to buy Qihoo 360
through an asset swap and cash injection. As a result of these
material misrepresentations and omissions, Qihoo 360 shareholders
were misled into accepting consideration from the Merger that was
well below fair value for their Qihoo 360 shares, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for ODS Capital LLC:

          Christopher J. Keller, Esq.
          Eric J. Belfi, Esq.
          Francis P. McConville, Esq.
          Hui M. Chang, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 818-0477
          E-mail: ckeller@labaton.com
                  ebelfi@labaton.com
                  fmcconville@labaton.com
                  hchang@labaton.com

R.J. REYNOLDS: Ct. Rejects Bid for New Trial in E. Starbuck's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'
Wife Motion for New Trial in the case captioned EDDIE O. STARBUCK,
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF WILLIAM STARBUCK,
Plaintiff, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
Cause No. 3:09-cv-13250-WGY-HTS. (M.D. Fla.).

A jury of seven concluded after an eight-day trial that
now-deceased William Starbuck was not addicted to cigarettes
containing nicotine, resulting in a verdict in favor of Defendants
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(Defendants). Plaintiff Eddie O. Starbuck, William's wife, seeks a
new, fourth trial on the grounds that the jury's verdict flies in
the face of the evidence.

The Engle Cases

A Florida trial court certified as a nationwide class action a
group of smokers and their survivors, defining the class as: All
United States citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have
suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and
medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that
contain nicotine." Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle III), 945
So.2d 1246, 1256 (Fla. 2006)  Florida's intermediate appellate
court affirmed the order certifying the class, but reduced the
class to include only Florida smokers.  The trial court issued a
trial plan, dividing trial proceedings into three phases:  

Phase I consisted of a year-long trial to consider the issues of
liability and entitlement to punitive damages for the class as a
whole.  

Phase II was divided into two subparts: Phase II-A was intended to
resolve compensatory damages for the three individual class
representatives while Phase II-B was to result in a jury
determination of a total lump sum punitive damage award, if any, to
be assessed in favor of the class as a whole.   

At the conclusion of Phase II-A, the jury determined the three
individual class representatives were entitled to compensatory
damages in varying amounts, totaling $12.7 million. The jury
subsequently determined in Phase II-B that the punitive damages
lump-sum for the entire class was $145 billion, without allocation
to any class member. In Phase III, new juries were to decide the
individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each class
member, estimated at 700,000 people. The plan then contemplated the
punitive damages would be divided among successful class members.


The Florida Supreme Court held that giving preclusive effect to
these Phase I findings did not violate the due process rights of
tobacco companies. As a result, Engle progeny plaintiffs may use
the Engle jury findings to establish the conduct elements for the
strict liability, negligence, breach of express and implied
warranty, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently
conceal claims alleged by the Engle class.  

Plaintiff William Starbuck began smoking regularly when he was
fourteen or fifteen years old and continued to do so for four
decades.   He suffered from both lung cancer, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), before he ultimately died in
October 2016.

The Plaintiff insists a new trial is warranted in light of the
overwhelming evidence presented by her expert, Dr. Neil Grunberg
and the unconvincing evidence presented by the defense expert, Dr.
Christopher Ticknor, on the question of addiction.  

The Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the question of
addiction is a quintessential fact issue and in the absence of a
specific legal definition that the jury was instructed to apply,
the verdict should stand.  

The Defendants have the better argument.

A new trial is not warranted for a number of reasons, least of
which is that the defugalties surrounding the term addiction come
as no surprise. Not only was the matter thoroughly addressed by
Judge Bennett in his 56-page order but the parties were
specifically asked at the September 2018 final pretrial conference
whether addiction should be defined for the jury. Despite this
ominous foreshadowing, both sides emphatically rejected the Court's
suggestion and the idea that the Court instruct the jury on a legal
definition of addiction, insisting that there would be a battle of
the experts at trial, with each side weighing in on the fact
question of what it means to be addicted in the context of this
case.  Nor did Plaintiff seek any ruling as matter of law on the
question of addiction, either pretrial or through a Rule 50 motion.
Thus, the question of addiction was a disputed fact question, which
fell squarely within the purview of the jury.

But, the Plaintiff argues the jury could not have reached the
verdict it did based on the evidence presented. There is no real
dispute that Dr. Grunberg, in addition to Plaintiff's other
experts, provided testimony upon which the jury could conclude that
William Starbuck was addicted to the nicotine in cigarettes. But
that alone is insufficient to obtain relief on the present motion;
Plaintiff must show that the contrary conclusion, i.e., that
William Starbuck was not addicted, is against the clear weight of
the evidence.

As argued by the Defendants, because the jury was not provided with
a legal definition of addiction, it was required to suss out the
concept on its own. And, contrary to the Plaintiff's contention,
Dr. Ticknor provided an alternative view of addiction through the
DSM-V and its criteria for a substance abuse disorder. While
Plaintiff presented evidence potentially undermining Dr. Ticknor's
conclusions and the application of the DSM-V in this context,
weighing that evidence and Dr. Ticknor's credibility fell directly
within the jury's purview. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Ticknor's
testimony is at odds with direct, undisputed evidence, and with
reality itself.

But Dr. Ticknor directly addressed the propriety of using the DSM-V
to assess nicotine addiction and dependence and the relationship
between the DSM-V and Plaintiff's proposed framework provided by
NIDA. As made clear during cross-examination, Dr. Ticknor took the
position that the DSM-V and the NIDA definition have recently
become more consistent. He also reviewed William Starbuck's medical
records and interviewed him personally before drawing his
conclusions.  Ultimately, Dr. Ticknor's testimony provided a basis
upon which the jury could conclude that William Starbuck was not
addicted to cigarettes.

As argued by the Defendants, in the absence of a legal definition
of addiction or finding that William Starbuck was addicted as a
matter of law, the jury had both the opportunity and obligation to
make a factual determination regarding what addiction means and
whether William Starbuck was addicted to the nicotine in
cigarettes. In so doing, the jury considered competing expert and
fact testimony that it was free to accept or reject. It ultimately
determined that he was not addicted. This is not the exceptional
case where that decision must be set aside.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yamekgon from Leagle.com.

Eddie O. Starbuck, as personal representative of the ESTATE OF
WILLIAM STARBUCK, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew R. Kaufman,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Chafica A.
Singha -- chafica@singhalaw.com -- Singha Law Group -- Donald A.
Migliori dmigliori@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice, LLC, pro hac
vice, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Frederick C. Baker -- fbaker@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice,
LLC, pro hac vice, James W. Ledlie -- jledlie@motleyrice.com --
Motley Rice, LLC, pro hac vice, John T. Spragens, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, individually and as successor by
merger to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the
American Tobacco Company, Defendant, represented by Alexandra Bach
Lagos -- alagos@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Dana G.
Bradford, II -- dgbradford@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell,
LLP, David M. Monde -- dmmonde@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac
vice, David Clifford Reeves -- dcreeves@mppkj.com -- Moseley,
Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones, Edward M. Carter --
emcarter@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Emily Baker --
ecbaker@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Jacqueline Marie Pasek --
jmpasek@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice, James B. Murphy,
Jr., Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Jeffrey Alan Yarbrough --
jyarbrough@mppkj.com -- Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight &
Jones.


RESOLUTE ENERGY: Wong Balks at Merger Deal with Cimarex Energy
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHNNY WONG, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RESOLUTE ENERGY CORPORATION, TOD C.
BENTON, RICHARD F. BETZ, JOSEPH CITARRELLA, WILKIE S. COLYER, JAMES
E. DUFFY, THOMAS O. HICKS, JR., GARY L. HULTQUIST, JANET W. PASQUE,
ROBERT J. RAYMOND, NICHOLAS J. SUTTON, and WILLIAM K. WHITE, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00183-JLK (D. Colo., Jan. 22, 2019),
alleges that Resolute Energy and the members of Resolute Energy's
Board of Directors violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, and seeks to enjoin a vote on a proposed merger
transaction, pursuant to which Resolute Energy will be acquired by
Cimarex Energy Co. through its wholly owned subsidiaries, CR Sub 1,
Inc. and CR Sub 2 LLC.

According to the complaint, on November 18, 2018, Resolute Energy
and Cimarex issued a joint press release announcing they had
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated November 18,
2018 to sell Resolute Energy to Cimarex. Pursuant to the terms of
the Merger Agreement, Resolute Energy's stockholders may elect to
receive, subject to proration: (i) $14.00 in cash and 0.2366 shares
of Cimarex common stock; (ii) $35.00 in cash; or (iii) 0.3943
shares of Cimarex common stock for each share of Resolute Energy
they own. The Merger Consideration is subject to proration so that
the aggregate consideration paid consists of 60% Cimarex common
shares and 40% cash, based on the closing sale prices for Cimarex
shares on November 16, 2018. The Proposed Transaction is valued at
approximately $1.6 billion.

On December 14, 2018, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the SEC in connection with the Proposed Transaction.
The Registration Statement, which recommends that Resolute Energy
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits or
misrepresents material information concerning, among other things:
(i) Resolute Energy's and Cimarex's financial projections; (ii) the
data and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that
support the fairness opinions provided by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
and Petrie Partners Securities, LLC; (iii) the background process
leading to the Proposed Transaction; and (iv) potential conflicts
of interest faced by Goldman and Petrie. The failure to adequately
disclose such material information constitutes a violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act as Resolute Energy
stockholders need such information in order to make a fully
informed decision whether to vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction or seek appraisal. In short, unless remedied, Resolute
Energy's public stockholders will be forced to make a voting or
appraisal decision on the Proposed Transaction without full
disclosure of all material information concerning the Proposed
Transaction being provided to them, the lawsuit says.

Resolute Energy Corporation, an independent oil and gas company,
engages in the acquisition, exploitation, exploration for, and
development of oil and gas properties in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 308-5858
          Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
          E-mail: fortunato@bespc.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          WEISS LAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682-3010
          E-mail: racocelli@weisslawllp.com

RESURGENT CAPITAL: Smith Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Johanna Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Resurgent Capital Services, LP,
Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC and John Does 1-25, the Defendant(s),
Case No. 5:19-cv-00048-XR (W.D. Tex., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief under the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, some time prior to January 18, 2018, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to Verizon Wireless for phone
services.  Pinnacle, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of
the Verizon Wireless debt, contracted the Defendant Resurgent to
collect the alleged debt. The Defendants collect and attempt to
collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for
personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using
the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet.

The Plaintiff incurred an informational injury because Defendant
falsely describes the requirements for a dispute, thus leaving the
consumer confused as to the proper procedures to dispute her debt.
Defendant's false statement overshadowed Plaintiff's sec. 1692g
right to dispute or validate the debt because it misleads Plaintiff
to believe she must supply additional information and detail rather
than simply notify Defendant of her dispute. As a result of
Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection
practices, Plaintiff has been damaged, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501

REVERA INC: Calgary Families Sue Nursing Homes Over Poor Care
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Labby, writing for CBC News, reported that a confiscated
wheelchair, unused, expired medications and threats of eviction --
that's how Isabel Nelson's daughter describes her mother's stay at
a long-term care home owned by Ontario-based Revera Inc.

The company is facing as many as 85 lawsuits across the country,
alleging it breached its duty of care for its elderly residents in
Ontario and western Canada.

Most families are seeking between $1.75 million to $3 million in
damages and court costs. The total amount across the country is
estimated to be between $150 million to $175 million.

At least four Calgary families are making similar claims in
documents filed last month with the Court of Queen's Bench,
including two who say the negligence and deficiencies in care by
the defendants caused or materially contributed to the death of
their loved ones.

Eviction

Leslie Armstrong, Isabel Nelson's daughter, doesn't think her
mother's care contributed to her death, but the experience left a
lasting mark.

"It was an emotional beatup that she never completely bounced back
from," she said.

Nelson died in February 2018, two years after she was evicted from
the Revera facility in Okotoks, Alta. She was 85.

She spent nearly 2-1/2 years at the facility, and according to her
daughter was constantly being threatened with eviction.

All four Calgary families' stories are laid out in court documents,
describing what their loved ones experienced at Revera's homes in
Bowness, McKenzie Towne and Okotoks.

None of the allegations have been proven in court.

Wheelchair taken away

According to Nelson's claim, her electric wheelchair was taken away
after she bumped into a glass door and broke it.

The family says the chair was "confiscated" for about two weeks,
during which time they say Nelson was "essentially trapped in
place," and completely reliant on staff to move her -- even when
she needed to use the washroom.

Armstrong says this was being done to her mother as punishment for
damaging the door, even though the family had paid for the repairs.


The statement also says that Nelson "repeatedly had difficulty
obtaining her medication in a timely fashion, or was given the
wrong medication, or was not given her medication at all."

During an "asthmatic episode," Nelson rang the call bell for staff
to bring her [Ventolin] medication -- but no one responded, the
claim states.

Nelson "was forced to go to the front desk during the episode and
instruct Revera staff to urgently obtain the Ventolin," said the
claim. The claims says "the nurse did not appear to recognize what
Ventolin was, or what to look for.

"The plaintiff was afraid for her life, given the delay in getting
the Ventolin to the plaintiff," it read.

The family is seeking at least $500,000 in damages.

Company can't comment

Revera hasn't been formally served with the lawsuits, but company
spokesperson Larry Roberts said in a statement to CBC News that
privacy laws preclude them from discussing any details about
residents.

"At this time, we have not been served with any new claims. We will
deal with any legal actions presented to us at the appropriate time
and through proper legal channels," he said.

"At Revera, we are committed to providing a safe, caring and
supportive environment in which all our residents are treated with
dignity and respect. Revera believes that serving older adults is
not only a great privilege, but also a great responsibility."

Poor treatment, falls, physical assaults

The families of Nadezda Marenich and Mary Gerber allege the
negligence and deficiencies in care by the defendants caused or
materially contributed to the deaths of their loved ones at two
separate homes in August, 2017.

Marenich's claim says that she suffered falls that resulted in
injuries "because she was not properly cared for by staff," during
her eight year stay at the Revera facility in McKenzie Towne.

The claim also says Marenich developed a urinary tract infection
that "was not properly managed by staff" and that she was
physically assaulted by staff and/or other residents, she was not
sufficiently fed or hydrated and was forced to live in unsanitary
condtions.

Gerber's statement alleges that she had open sores and wounds on
her legs that were not sufficiently treated, causing her pain and
suffering during her 10-year stay at the Bow-Crest care home.

Her family also alleges that her physicians breached their duty of
care to her.

The family of Emmet De Grood, who was also a resident at Bow-Crest,
is making similar allegations against Revera.

They allege:

   -- De Grood suffered an undetected UTI that required an extended
period of hospitalization.

   -- He was subjected to bullying and harrassment by management
and staff.

   -- He was not sufficiently fed or hydrated.

   -- He suffered multiple falls, which caused serious injuries,
including fractures, bruises, cuts and abrasions.

One of the lawyers handling the families' claims would not say when
the court documents will be served.

"That's gonna be a strategy decision on our part, how we choose to
do that," said Melissa Miller with the Toronto-based firm.

'General, poor care'

Miller said an application for class action status was discontinued
last year. The plaintiffs are proceeding under mass tort status,
she said, which means each family will have a separate lawsuit
against Revera but the cases will be dealt with as a group.

Miller says the claims are similar but still shocking to hear.

"Most of the calls that I get seem to revolve around just general
poor care. People are calling me about bedsores that aren't getting
taken care of... malnutrition, dehydration are huge," she said.

"And then of course there's some actual abuse and some falls, but
generally speaking it's the day-to-day care that we're seeing
problems with.

"It's an unfortunate reality that there doesn't seem to be enough
staff in these homes for the level of care that people need."

'There was never enough staff'

Armstrong hopes to see changes to the way the long-term care homes
are run and she believes a positive step would be an increase in
staffing.

"They [caregivers] were spread too thin and they were working
ridiculous hours and some of them I know were working three and
four jobs because they couldn't afford to just work the one that
they had," she said.

"I mean they really did care about the seniors they were looking
after, at least in my experience. That was the case but there was
never enough staff." [GN]


SHARP ELECTRONICS: Brown, et al. Sue over Defective Microwaves
--------------------------------------------------------------
JILL BROWN and AUSTIN RUSSELL, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00371 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 22, 2019), alleges that Sharp's
Microwaves cannot be used safely for their intended purpose of
preparing meals at home.

According to the complaint, Sharp's kitchen appliance portfolio
includes multiple different types of microwaves, including
microwave drawers. On its website, Sharp boasts that it "has been
innovating microwave cooking for decades and holds 11 patents on
the Microwave Drawer platform alone. Engineered for consistency and
built with the finest quality materials, great cooks trust the
Microwave Drawer to deliver great results every time." Over the
course of several decades, Sharp has gained the trust of consumers,
who reasonably believe that Sharp products are made with quality
materials, and that the Sharp products can be used safely, as
intended.

Microwave drawers, as described by Sharp, "offer flexible placement
options so you can focus on the design elements you prefer by
maximizing sight-lines and enabling more design versatility than
typical built-in, over-the-range or countertop microwaves." Sharp's
microwave drawers are intended by Sharp to be installed within
cabinets, under countertops, or adjacent to wall ovens. Sharp has
offered six models for its microwave drawers, and currently offers
five of those six: SMD2470AH, SMD2470AS, SMD3070AS, SMD2480CS,
KB6524PS, and KB6525PS 2 (collectively, the "Microwaves"). The
designs of these Microwaves are substantially similar and each 3
model is the subject of this class action lawsuit.

The cost of the Microwaves is between $1,000.00 and $1,700.00 MSRP.
The Microwaves all contain a defect that makes them unreasonably
dangerous, as they are susceptible to catching fire, and unsuitable
for their intended use. More specifically, the Microwaves are
defectively designed and/or manufactured such that, under normal
and intended use, the electromagnetic waves generated by the
magnetron tube are unable to properly move through the waveguide
into the cooking cavity, resulting in buzzing, smoking,
overheating, and eventual destruction of the magnetron, leading to
scorching of the waveguide.

Indeed, rather than providing consumers with new, non-defective
Microwaves after their Microwaves overheated, Sharp either replaced
each defective Microwave with another defective Microwave,
improperly denied the warranty claim, and/or forced the consumer to
sign a waiver or buy an extended warranty as a remedy. Sharp failed
to disclose the known defect or provide the customer with a
non-defective replacement product. The replacement Microwaves also
fail, or are likely to fail in the same manner, leaving consumers
fearful of additional smoke and fire caused by the Microwaves, and
with Microwaves that do not function as intended. As a direct and
proximate result of Sharp's concealment of the defect, its failure
to warn customers about the defect before their purchase of the
Microwaves, and its failure to recall the Product or remedy the
defect, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated customers purchased
and used Sharp's defective Microwaves when they otherwise would not
have made such purchases or would not have paid as much for the
defective Microwaves, the lawsuit says.

Sharp is one of the largest technology companies in the world. It
designs, manufactures and sells a variety of technological
products, including kitchen appliances such as microwaves.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Andrea Gold, Esq.
          Annick Persinger, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L. Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, D.C 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  agold@tzlegal.com
                  apersinger@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          Rachel Soffin, Esq.
          Lisa A. White, Esq.
          Adam A. Edwards, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: 865-247-0080
          Facsimile: 865-522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  rachel@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  adam@gregcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          Harper T. Segui, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: 919-600-5000
          E-mail: dan@wbmllp.com
                  harper@wbmllp.com

STITCH FIX: Salzberg Appeal Filed in Delaware Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW B. SALZBERG, JULIE M.B. BRADLEY, TRACY BRITT COOL, KENNETH
A. FOX, ROBERT P. GOODMAN, GARY R. HIRSHBERG, BRIAN P. KELLEY,
KATRINA LAKE, STEVEN ANDERSON, J. WILLIAM URLEY, MARKA HANSEN,
SHARON MCCOLLAM, ANTHONY WOOD, RAVI AHUJA, SHAWN CAROLAN, JEFFREY
HASTINGS, ALAN HENDRICKS, NEIL HUNT, DANIEL LEFF, and RAY ROTHROCK,
the Defendants Below-Appellants, and BLUE APRON HOLDINGS, INC.,
STITCH FIX, INC. and ROKU, INC., the Nominal Defendants
Below-Appellants, vs. MATTHEW SCIABACUCCHI, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff Below-Appellee,
Case No. 25-2019 (Del.) is an appeal filed in the Supreme Court of
Delaware from a lower court decision in Case No. 2017-0931-JTL
(Del. Ch.).[CC]

Attorneys for Katrina Lake, Steven Anderson, J. William Gurley,
Marka Hansen, Sharon McCollam, Anthony Wood, Ravi Ahuja, Shawn
Carolan, Jeffrey Hastings, Alan Hendricks, Neil Hunt, Daniel Leff,
Ray Rothrock, Stitch Fix, Inc. and Roku, Inc.:

          William B. Chandler, Esq.
          Bradley D. Sorrels, Esq.
          Lindsay Kwoka Faccenda, Esq.
          Andrew D. Berni, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
          222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 800
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 304-7600

               - and -

          Boris Feldman, Esq.
          David J. Berger, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
          650 Page Mill Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94304
          
Attorneys for Matthew B. Salzberg, Julie M.B. Bradley, Tracy Britt
Cool, Kenneth A. Fox, Robert P. Goodman, Gary R. Hirshberg, Brian
P. Kelley and Blue Apron Holdings, Inc.:

          Catherine G. Dearlove, Esq.
          Sarah A. Galetta, Esq.
          RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7700

               - and -

          Michael G. Bongiorno, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 937-7518

               - and -

          Timothy J. Perla, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP
          60 State Street
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 526-6000

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Kurt M. Heyman, Esq.
          Melissa N. Donimirski, Esq.
          Aaron M. Nelson, Esq.
          HEYMAN, ENERIO, GATTUSO & HIRZEL LLP
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 200
          Wilmington, DE 19801

STOP & SHOP: Class Action Over Grocery Delivery Fees Rejected
-------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Hamilton at New York Law Journal reported that a potential
class action that claimed fees on Stop & Shop LLC's Peapod grocery
delivering service were in fact tips owed to employees was shut
down January 22 by U.S. District Judge Lorna Schofield of the
Southern District of New York.

The suit principally alleged violations of New York's labor law by
the grocery chain. The plaintiffs claimed that the delivery fees
incurred by customers should be treated as tips. They claim the
online ordering process fails to properly alert customers to the
fact the fee is not gratuity. They pointed to the fact that the
website is without the ability to include a tip and tells customers
that tipping is optional.

Schofield disagreed, finding that the complaint failed to
sufficiently plead that a reasonable customer understood the
delivery fee to be gratuity. Most obviously, the judge noted, one
is simply not a synonym for the other. The website itself
"expressly distinguishes" between the two -- the fee being
mandatory, while tipping is noted as optional "but always
appreciated."

The plaintiffs pointed to state regulatory opinions regarding the
hospitality industry, but Schofield held that the guidance related
to very specific scenarios -- service charges in banquet contracts
and food service work -- and therefore was inapplicable to grocery
deliveries.

Schofield also ruled against an individual plaintiff who brought a
claim under the state's Wage Theft Prevention Act. Stop & Shop
employee Anthony McAllister alleged that he believed the company
was out of compliance with the law by not providing him proper pay
notice, while stating he never electronically signed
employment-related forms.

The court earlier in the litigation indicated its intention to
convert the initial motion to dismiss claim by the defendants into
one for summary judgment. In her decision Tuesday, Schofield found
Stop & Shop provided "undisputed evidence" McAllister was provided
proper wage notice, each of which was acknowledged through
electronic signature by McAllister.

The court pointed to the fact that, under state law, an electronic
signature carries the same validity and effect as a physical one.
Without some alternative explanation for how the signature came to
be, simply not believing he had done was insufficient to defeat
summary judgment.

The plaintiffs were represented by Thomas & Solomon partner Michael
Lingle. Stop & Shop and the other defendants were represented by a
legal team led by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius partner Brendan Killeen.
Neither sets of attorneys responded to a request for comment.

A spokeswoman for Stop & Shop likewise did not respond to a request
for comment. [GN]


SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY: Court Consolidates 3 Inmate Suits with Butler
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued separate orders consolidating the cases captioned JAMES
J. NICOSIA, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
RIVERHEAD, Defendant. No. 18-CV-7305(JS)(GRB). (E.D.N.Y.); DENARD
WHITTY, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
(RIVERHEAD and YAPHANK), Defendant. No. 18-CV-7418(JS)(GRB).
(E.D.N.Y.); and SUNDIATA EVANS, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, Defendant. No. 18-CV-7414(JS)(GRB).
(E.D.N.Y.), with the case captioned Butler, et al. v. DeMarco, et
al., No. 11-CV-2602 (JS)(GRB) (Consolidated Action).

The Plaintiffs in the three actions will become a member of the
certified classes in Butler (11-CV-2602). Any claims in the three
Complaints that are not included in the Consolidated Amended
Complaint in Butler will be severed and the Plaintiffs, as a member
of the class, will be represented by pro bono counsel, Shearman &
Sterling LLP.

If the Plaintiffs do not wish to proceed as members of the
Consolidated Action, they must so indicate in a letter to the Court
within thirty (30) days of receiving a copy of this Order. Upon
receipt of such a letter, the Court will direct the Clerk of the
Court to sever this Complaint from the Consolidated Amended
Complaint and reopen and reinstate his individual pro se action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order in
Nicosia is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybkgarsh from
Leagle.com.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order in
Whitty is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7trvpxa from
Leagle.com.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order in
Evans is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pa26b2 from
Leagle.com.

James J. Nicosia, Plaintiff, pro se.

Denard Whitty, Plaintiff, pro se.

Sundiata Evans, Plaintiff, pro se.


SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Mares Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Sadashiv Mares filed an appeal from a court ruling in his
lawsuit titled Sadashiv Mares v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:15-cv-07920-VAP-KK, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
alleges he and members of a putative class worked for the
Defendant, a trucking company, and were paid piece rate according
to the number of miles they drove.  The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant failed to authorize and permit rest periods in accordance
with section 226.7 of the California Labor Code.

The appellate case is captioned as Sadashiv Mares v. Swift
Transportation Co., Inc., et al., Case No. 19-55065, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by February 14, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on March 18, 2019;

   -- Appellant Sadashiv Mares' opening brief is due on April 25,
      2019;

   -- Appellees Does and Swift Transportation Co., Inc. (AZ)'s
      answering brief is due on May 28, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant SADASHIV MARES, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph Clapp, Esq.
          AIMAN-SMITH & MARCY
          7677 Oakport Street, Suite 1150
          Oakland, CA 94621
          Telephone: (510) 817-2665
          E-mail: jc@asmlawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (AZ) is
represented by:

          Babak G. Yousefzadeh, Esq.
          Paul Scott Cowie, Esq.
          John Ellis, Esq.
          Patricia Jeng, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          4 Embarcadero Center
          San Francisco, CA 94111-4106
          Telephone: (415) 774-3191
          E-mail: byousefzadeh@sheppardmullin.com
                  pcowie@sheppardmullin.com
                  jellis@sheppardmullin.com
                  pjeng@sheppardmullin.com


TADLOCK ROOFING: Matthew Thrash Seeks Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW THRASH, on behalf of himself and all employees similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TADLOCK ROOFING, INC., f/k/a DALE
TADLOCK ROOFING, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00038-MW-MJF
(N.D. Fla., Jan. 18, 2019), seeks to recover from Defendant unpaid
overtime wages and other relief, as well as an additional amount as
liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant intentionally and
willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees
their overtime wages as Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff's and
similarly situated employees' schedules and the overtime hours that
Plaintiff and similarly situated employees worked, and showed
reckless disregard by failing to comply with the provisions of the
FLSA concerning the payment of overtime wages. Defendant used
formulas in a spreadsheet to record erroneous hours worked, rather
than record the actual hours worked by Plaintiff and those
similarly situated. Such actions show Defendant's knowledge of the
obligation to keep accurate time records but an intent to keep
false records to avoid the obligation to keep accurate time records
and pay proper overtime pay to Plaintiff and those similarly
situated. The Defendant did not act in good faith when it refused
and failed to pay appropriate overtime, the lawsuit says.

Defendant is a for-profit Florida corporation engaged in the
business of installing and repairing roofs using materials and
supplies imported from without the State of Florida and otherwise
regularly engages in interstate commerce.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sean Culliton, Esq.
          SEAN CULLITON, ESQ., LLC
          150 John Knox Road
          Tallahassee, FL 32303
          Telephone: (850) 385-9455
          Facsimile: (813) 441-1999
          E-mail: Sean.Culliton@gmail.com

               - and -

          John C. Davis, Esq.
          Law Office of John C. Davis
          623 Beard Street
          Tallahassee, FL 32303
          Telephone: (850) 222-4770
          Facsimile: (850) 222-3119
          E-mail: john@johndavislaw.net

TAYLOR NATION: Mary West Sues Online Store for ADA Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Nation, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary
West, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Taylor Nation, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00389
(E.D. N.Y., January 18, 2019).

Taylor Nation, LLC is an Online store for exclusive Taylor Swift
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com



TD BANK: Refuses to Pay Properly Pay Employees, Rai Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ASHA RAI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v.
TD BANK, N.A., Case No. 501009/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., January
19, 2019), alleges that during the Class Period, the Defendant
systematically failed and refused to pay the Plaintiff and other
employees for all compensable hours worked, including overtime, in
violation of the New York Labor Law.

TD Bank, N.A., provides retail, small business, and commercial
banking products and services in the United States.  The Company
offers personal banking services that include online banking and
bill pay, mobile banking, checking accounts, savings and money
market accounts, CDs, IRAs, credit cards, mortgage, and home equity
loans and lines, as well as debit cards, gift cards, and TD Go
cards.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis Ginsberg, Esq.
          THE LAW FIRM OF LOUIS GINSBERG, P.C.
          1613 Northern Boulevard
          Roslyn, NY 11576
          Telephone: (516) 625-0105
          E-mail: lg@louisginsberglawoffices.com


TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Sudano Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
RENEE SUDANO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TEXAS ROADHOUSE INVESTMENTS OF BEAVER
PA, LLC., TEXAS ROADHOUSE INVESTMENTS OF BUTLER PA, LLC., TEXAS
ROADHOUSE INVESTMENTS OF GREENSBURG PA, LLC., TEXAS ROADHOUSE
INVESTMENTS OF WASHINGTON PA, LLC., ROBERT P. LANGLEY, and DOE
1-10, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00064-MPK (W.D. Pa., Jan.
22, 2019), alleges that Defendants systematically and willfully
deprived Plaintiff and other Tipped Employees of minimum wages in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act, and the Wage Payment and Collection Law.

According to complaint, the Defendants employ individuals in a
tipped capacity, namely "servers" ("waiters and "waitresses"),
"server assistants/bussers," and "bartenders" (collectively,
"Tipped Employees"), who are and/or were subjected to Defendants'
unlawful pay practices. As Tipped Employees, these individuals were
primarily responsible for interacting with Defendants' customers
by, among other things, taking customers' orders and/or serving
them their food/drink.

Due to Defendants' unlawful failure to properly inform Tipped
Employees of its intention to utilize a "tip credit", the
Defendants have improperly applied a "tip credit" against the
wages paid to Plaintiff and current and former Tipped Employees,
thus paying them less than the mandated minimum wage. Further,
Defendants required Plaintiff and current and former Tipped
Employees to perform numerous job duties when there was no
possibility for that employee to generate tips. For example, Tipped
Employees who were opening the restaurant were required to be at
the restaurant one hour prior to the restaurant opening to the
public. Similarly, Tipped Employees who were responsible for
closing the restaurant were required to perform their assigned
break-down work after the last customer had left, the lawsuit
says.

Texas Roadhouse is in the steak restaurant business.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA
          & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Ave, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: 412-322-9243
          Facsimile: 412-231-0246
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
          Robert J. Gray, Esq.
          CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY, LLP
          2200 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 275
          King of Prussia, PA 19406
          Telephone: 610 822-3700
          Facsimile: 610 822-3800
          E-mail: gwells@cwglaw.com
                  rgray@cwglaw.com

TEXAS: Court Denies Class Certification in J.L. Walker's Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
Tyler Division issued a Memorandum denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned JOHNNIE LEE WALKER, v.
LORIE DAVIS, ET AL. Civil Action No. 6:17cv166. (E.D. Tex.).

The Plaintiff Johnny Lee Walker, proceeding pro se, filed this
civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 complaining of
alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division.
  
The Plaintiffs and similarly situated prisoners aver that class
certification is proper because thousands (1,000's) will be
affected, and the request for a special master has merit due to the
complexity of the federal questions and the volume of discovery and
dispositive issue that the matter will generate.

The Magistrate Judge observed that the motion addressed the
numerosity requirement but failed to satisfy any other section of
Rule 23 and thus could not support certification of a class, citing
McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 162 (5th
Cir. 1995), plaintiff's motion for class certification which
alleged that there were numerous other inmates having an interest
in his action, but not addressing any of the other requirements of
Rule 23, was insufficient and Songer v. Dillon Res., Inc., 569
F.Supp.2d 703, 707 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2008) (conclusory
allegations were insufficient to support class certification).

In his objections, the Plaintiff argues that he has met the
requirements of Rule 23, citing numerosity, commonality, and
typicality. the Plaintiff argues that: the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, citing the
approximately 500 signatures offered in support of the motion for
class certification; the requirement of commonality was met by the
issue of whether the Defendants' policies of not permitting
adequate sleep, subjecting prisoners to extreme living conditions
such as heat, filth, and overcrowding amount to deliberate
indifference to the totality of the living conditions of the class
members; and that he has shown typicality in that the class
representatives have been subjected for years to the
unconstitutional living conditions and have suffered seizures,
broken ankles, increase in blood pressure, and other painful and
debilitating injuries as well as ongoing risks of serious harm.

Even assuming these new arguments are properly before the Court,
however, the Plaintiff's contentions still lack merit. His
typicality argument invokes specific physical ailments such as
seizures and broken ankles but offers nothing to suggest that these
ailments are common to or typical of the class rather than
individual to him.

The Plaintiff's objections essentially concede the lack of adequacy
of representation, arguing that he is seeking appointment of a
special master and intervention by the U.S. Department of Justice.
He has not shown entitlement to appointment of counsel or a special
master, and intervention by the U.S. Department of Justice is too
speculative to support the conclusion that the class
representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.  

The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that class action certification
is appropriate or warranted.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for class certification is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybhsrysh from Leagle.com.

Johnny Lee Walker, Plaintiff, pro se.

Lorie Davis, Texas Criminal Justice Board, Bryan Collier, Jerry
Catoe, Jeffrey Richardson & Patrick Cooper, Defendants, represented
by Amber Lynne McKeon-Mueller, Texas Municipal League & Jeanine
Marie Coggeshall, Office of The Attorney General - Law Enforcement
Defense Div.


TRACE STAFFING: Harake Sues over Violation of FCRA
--------------------------------------------------
MOHAMMAD HARAKE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRACE STAFFING SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 83020394 (Fla. Cir., Hillsborough Cty., Jan. 8, 2019)
alleges violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Trace Staffing Solutions operates as an employment recruiting
agency. The Company offers career placement, permanent, and
temporary staffing services. Trace Staffing Solutions serves
customers in the State of Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 N. Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com


TRANSDEV SERVICES: Court Won't Certify Berry Class of Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the captioned HOWARD BERRY and DAVID BERRY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC. d/b/a VEOLIA TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES INC., TRANSDEV NORTH AMERICA, INC. f/k/a VEOLIA SERVICES,
INC., and FIRST TRANSIT, INC., Defendants. Case No. C15-01299-RAJ.
(W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs, Howard Berry and David Berry, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against Defendants,
Transdev Services, Inc., Transdev North America, Inc. (Transdev),
and First Transit, Inc. (First Transit). The Defendants jointly
operate the paratransit service for the King County Accessible
Services Division. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed
to provide their employees, drivers for the paratransit service,
with rest and meal breaks in violation of Washington law and in
violation of their contracts with King County.  The Plaintiffs also
claim that Transdev failed to compensate their drivers for all of
the hours that they worked.  

The Plaintiffs move that the Court certify a class under the
following definition:

     All persons who, at any time between July 14, 2009 and the
date of final disposition of this action, worked as drivers for a
King County paratransit service operated by Transdev as the service
provider and First Transit as the control center.

The Plaintiffs allege that the proposed class consists of more than
600 current and former paratransit drivers. Defendants do not
dispute that Plaintiffs' proposed class meets the requirement of
numerosity.

Rule 23(a)

The Plaintiffs list several factual and legal issues that they
allege arise out of the Defendants' systemic practice of wage and
hour abuses, and that they contend satisfy the commonality
requirement of class certification. Among these issues are whether
First Transit is a joint employer of the Plaintiffs and the
proposed class members, whether the Plaintiffs are third-party
beneficiaries to the service contracts between King County and the
Defendants, and whether the Plaintiffs were injured by any breach
of those contracts by each Defendant.

The Court disagrees that these issues would resolve issues central
to the validity of each of the Plaintiffs' claims. At most these
questions answer whether First Transit can be liable for these
alleged violations of Washington law, whether the Plaintiffs can
bring a breach of contract action against the Defendants, and if
the Plaintiffs' are third-party beneficiaries to the relevant
service contracts, whether the Plaintiffs were injured by any
alleged breach by each Defendant. While these issues are all
tangentially related, the Plaintiffs base their claims on the
paratransit drivers' alleged missed rest and meal breaks.

The above common questions do not arise out of the Defendants'
alleged policy of preventing drivers from taking their meal and
rest breaks.

The Plaintiffs also contend that there is a common issue of whether
the Defendants have a uniform policy and practice of failing to
provide drivers with rest breaks and ensuring that drivers take the
rest and meal breaks to which they are entitled. Whether the
Defendants do have a common policy or practice of failing to meet
their obligations regarding rest and meal breaks under Washington
law, is a question that is central to all of the Plaintiffs'
claims. Setting aside the Plaintiffs' contentions regarding First
Transit's status as a joint employer and the Plaintiffs' status as
third-party beneficiaries to the Defendants' service contracts, the
existence of such a policy or practice is an underlying issue for
all of the Plaintiff's claims.

While the answer to this common question would drive the resolution
of this litigation, consideration of the evidence presented and the
nature of Plaintiffs' claims make clear that this common issue does
not predominate over questions affecting individual class members
and thus, does not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b).

Rule 23(b)

Predominance

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a class may be certified under this
subdivision if common questions of law and fact predominate over
questions affecting individual members. To meet the predominance
requirement, common questions of law and fact must be a significant
aspect of the case that can be resolved for all members of the
class in a single adjudication.

Washington law places an affirmative obligation on employers to
provide employees with rest and meal breaks, and to ensure that
those breaks comply with WAC 296-126-092.  An employee asserting a
meal break violation under WAC 296-126-092 can meet his or her
prima facie case by providing evidence that he or she did not
receive a timely meal break. The employer may then rebut this by
showing that in fact no violation occurred or a valid waiver
exists.

Despite the Plaintiffs' contention, it is unclear whether the
Defendants engaged in a common policy or practice of failing to
provide drivers with rest and meal breaks, as their policies
changed several times during the relevant period. Except for a
posting at each King County terminal, until March of 2015, Transdev
did not have a written policy regarding meal and rest breaks. Prior
to that time, First Transit scheduled meal breaks but did not
schedule rest breaks for drivers. Even after the new policy was
implemented, breaks were not scheduled in a uniform manner until
September of 2015. Transdev also represents that on February 3,
2016, they distributed another, more detailed policy regarding rest
breaks. Not all of the potential class members were subject to the
same policies at the same time, and if one particular policy is
found to be in violation of Washington law, determining either
Defendant's liability would require an individualized inquiry as to
each driver's experience and time of employment.

The Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Defendants' policies related
to rest breaks would also necessitate individualized inquiries.
Prior to March of 2015, the Defendants allege that the slack built
into the drivers' daily schedules provided drivers with the time
required to take intermittent rest breaks. The Plaintiffs allege
that Transdev's policies related to slack time do not allow drivers
to use this time to take breaks because they must ask for
authorization to leave their vehicle and because they must arrive
at the opening of their pick-up window. The Plaintiffs make
separate arguments regarding First Transit's policies, stating that
First Transit's instruction to add trips to routes with slack time
impeded drivers' ability to take breaks.

The Plaintiffs' uncompensated work claims are similarly not
appropriate for certification because Plaintiffs have not shown
that Transdev has a practice of failing to pay the proposed class
members for all of the hours that they worked. The Plaintiffs'
uncompensated work claim is based on time records from the
biometric time clock that the drivers use to clock-in and clock-out
for their shift. The Plaintiffs assert that Transdev does not
permit drivers to clock-in more than five minutes before the start
of their shifts and requires them to clock out no later than five
minutes after arriving at the Transdev terminal at the end of a
shift. As with the Plaintiffs' meal break claims, the Plaintiffs
base this assertion on declarations from individual drivers as well
as individual payroll records. There is little to support a finding
that this is an actual Transdev policy and not the experience of
individual drivers.

Based on the evidence presented, assessment of the Plaintiffs'
claims would require an individualized inquiry as to whether each
driver begins work as soon as they clock-in, what types of actions
constitute compensable work, and in some cases, a comparison of the
drivers' manifest cover sheets to the relevant time records to
assess whether each driver was paid for all time worked.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs do not meet their burden to show that the
requirement of predominance is met for their uncompensated work
claim.

Superiority

The Court must next consider whether the class is superior to
individual suits. A class action is the superior method for
managing litigation if no realistic alternative exists. This
superiority inquiry requires a comparative evaluation of
alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution. Rule 23(b)(3)
provides a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the
superiority analysis.

The Court finds that this class action would be unmanageable given
the predominance of the individual issues necessary to establish
either Trandev's or First Transit's liability. The resources that
would be expended on litigating the separate issues underlying each
class member's right to recover would far exceed those saved by
classwide determination of the common issues present in this case.
Further, Plaintiffs' brief comment that it is likely that most
proposed class members lack the resources necessary to seek
individual redress for Defendants' misconduct is not persuasive
without more explanation or argument. The difficulties in managing
such a wide-ranging factual inquiry persuade the Court that class
treatment is not a superior method for resolution of the class
members' potential claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that class
treatment is not superior to individual suits as a means to
adjudicate this dispute.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 7, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y823d43w from Leagle.com.

Howard Berry & David Berry, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey
Lowell Needle -- jneedlel@wolfenet.com -- Jennifer Rust Murray --
jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
Toby James Marshall -- tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Erika L. Nusser --
enusser@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Transdev Services, Inc., formerly known as Veolia Transportation
Services Inc & Transdev North America, Inc., formerly known as
Veolia Services Inc, Defendants, represented by Anthony Todaro --
anthony.todaro@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US LLP, Austin M.
Rainwater -- austin.rainwater@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US LLP,
Lianna M. Bash -- lianna.bash@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US LLP &
Stellman Keehnel -- stellman.keehnel@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US
LLP.

First Transit, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel L. Thieme --
dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell --
dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON & William J. Kim --
wkim@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON.

Transdev Services, Inc. & Transdev North America, Inc., Cross
Claimants, represented by Anthony Todaro, DLA PIPER US LLP, Austin
M. Rainwater, DLA PIPER US LLP, Lianna M. Bash, DLA PIPER US LLP &
Stellman Keehnel, DLA PIPER US LLP.

First Transit, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel L.
Thieme, LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell, LITTLER
MENDELSON & William J. Kim, LITTLER MENDELSON.


TRIAD MEDIA: Spire Appeals Decision in Vazquez TCPA Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Spire Vision LLC and Zeta Interactive Corp. filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Norma Vazquez v.
Triad Media Solutions Inc., et al., Case No. 2-15-cv-07220, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 18, 2019, the
District Court granted Cross-Claim Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case.

Cross-claim plaintiff TriAd Media Solutions, Inc. (TriAd) and
cross-claim defendants Zeta Interactive Corporation (Zeta) and
Spire Media LLC (Spire) (Zeta/Spire) each move for summary judgment
on all cross-claims asserted by TriAd under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.

Plaintiff Vazquez filed a putative class action complaint against
TriAd on September 30, 2015, alleging that TriAd sent Vazquez an
unsolicited marketing text message in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Norma Vazquez v. Triad Media
Solutions Inc., et al., Case No. 19-1124, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee NORMA VAZQUEZ, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph J. DePalma, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com

Defendant-Appellee TRIAD MEDIA SOLUTIONS INC, A New Jersey
Corporation, is represented by:

          Kenneth J. Cesta, Esq.
          BUDD LARNER PC
          150 John F. Kennedy Parkway, 3rd Floor
          Short Hills, NJ 07078
          Telephone: (201) 379-4800
          E-mail: kcesta@hoaglandlongo.com

               - and -

          Michael D. Margulies, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, P.A.
          830 Morris Turnpike, 4th Floor
          Short Hills, NJ 07078
          Telephone: (973) 828-2611
          E-mail: mmargulies@carltonfields.com

               - and -

          Mark M. Tallmadge, Esq.
          BRESSLER AMERY & ROSS PC
          325 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 301
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 514-1200
          E-mail: mtallmadge@bressler.com

Defendants-Appellants ZETA INTERACTIVE CORP and SPIRE VISION LLC
are represented by:

          Peter G. Siachos, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP
          18 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 220
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 549-2500
          E-mail: psiachos@grsm.com


TRINITY CAPITAL: Parshall Sues over Misleading Financial Report
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PAUL PARSHALL, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TRINITY CAPITAL CORPORATION,
GREGORY G. ANTONSEN, JAMES F. DEUTSCH, JAMES E. GOODWIN JR., JOHN
S. GULAS, JEFFREY F. HOWELL, SAMUEL T. HUBBARD JR., ARUTHUR B.
MONTOYA, JR., LESLIE NATHANSON JURIS, ANTHONY R. SCAVUZZO, CHARLES
A. SLOCOMB, and ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00066 (D.N.M., Jan. 22, 2019), stems
from a proposed transaction announced on November 1, 2018, pursuant
to which Trinity Capital Corporation will be acquired by Enterprise
Financial Services, Inc.

On November 1, 2018, Trinity's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with
Enterprise.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement,
shareholders of Trinity will receive $1.84 in cash and 0.1972
Enterprise common shares for each share of Trinity they own. On
December 21, 2018, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Registration
Statement, which scheduled a stockholder vote on the Proposed
Transaction for February 5, 2019, omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading, the lawsuit says.  The Plaintiff
contends that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Trinity is the parent company of Los Alamos National Bank ("LANB").
LANB is one of the largest locally-owned banks in New Mexico with
current assets of $1.3 billion. LANB offers a full range of banking
services to businesses and residents in Northern New Mexico and the
Albuquerque metro area.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Nicholas Koluncich III, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF
          NICHOLAS KOLUNCICH III, LLC
          500 Marquette Avenue NW, Suite 1200
          Albuquerque, NM 87102
          Telephone: (505) 881-2228

               - and -

          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310

               - and -

          RM LAW, P.C..
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800

UNITED STATES: Underpays Border Protection Officers, Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERT VIEIRA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case
No. 19-40C (Fed. Cl., Jan. 7, 2019) seeks to recover from the
Defendant unpaid overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Plaintiff Vieira is employed by the United States Department of
Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as a Customs
and Border Protection Officer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory D'duden, Esq.
          Larry J. Adkins, Esq.
          Paras N. Shah, Esq.
          NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
          1750 H Street, N.W.
          Washington, D.C. 20006
          Telephone: (202) 572-5500
          Facsimile: (202) 572-5645
          E-mail: greg.oduden@nteu.org
                  larry.adkins@nteu.org
                  paras.shah@nteu.org


WAL-MART STORES: Class Certification Bid in Pitre Suit Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned RANDY PITRE, the Plaintiff,
vs. WAL-MART STORES, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 8:17-cv-01281-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal.), the Hon.
David O. Carter entered an order on Jan. 17, 2019:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification.
      Specifically, the Court certified:

      a Class defined as:

      "All of DEFENDANTS' current, former and prospective
      applicants for employment in the United States who applied
      for a job with DEFENDANTS at any time during the period for
      which a background check was performed beginning five years
      prior to the filing of this action and ending on the date
      that final judgment is entered in this action"; and

      Two Subclasses defined as:

      "Sub-Class 1: all members of the Class who applied for
      employment prior to November 5, 2015"; and

      "Sub-Class 2: all members of the Class who applied for
       employment on or after November 5, 2015"; and

   2. granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to add additional
      class representatives Cassandra Walters and Desirae Wilson.

The Court said, "Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not meet
superiority because resolving whether each class members incurred
an Fair Credit Reporting Act would be an individualized inquiry,
and because Plaintiff fails to show how the Court will trial his
disclosure theories on a class-wide basis. The Plaintiff argues
that the central issue is whether the form sets Wal-mart utilized
during the class period are lawful, and trying that issue on a
class-wide basis is superior and manageable. A class action must be
"superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). "The
purpose of the superiority requirement is to assure that the class
action is the most efficient and effective means of resolving the
controversy." In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869
F.3d 737 (9th 7 Cir. 2017). The factors relevant to determining
superiority include: "(A) the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties
in managing a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 23(b)(3) (A–D).
Class action is the superior method to adjudicate the FCRA and
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act claims. As Plaintiffs
highlight, whether Defendant's form disclosures were lawful is a
singular question that can be adjudicated based on the disclosures
themselves rather than individualized inquiries as to each class
member's experience. Accordingly, class action would be manageable
as well as a superior method of adjudicating Plaintiff's FCRA and
ICRAA claims. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff meets the
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)."

WALGREEN CO: Removes Morales Suit to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ALFRED MORALES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WALGREEN CO.,
Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco (Case No.
CGC- 18-570597) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on January 7, 2019. The clerk of court for
the Northern District of California assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-00085-YGR. The case is assigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez
Rogers.

Walgreen Co. owns and operates drugstores in the United States. It
offers prescription drugs and refills, contact lenses, color
lenses, disposables, multifocal lenses, toric lenses, vial lenses,
solutions and drops, cases, and eye health supplements. Walgreen
Co. was formerly known as C. R. Walgreen and Co. and changed its
name to Walgreen Co. in April 1916. The company was founded in 1901
and is based in Deerfield, Illinois. Walgreen Co. operates as a
subsidiary of Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ray Edwin Gallo, Esq.
          Dominic R. Valerian, Esq.
          GALLO LLP
          1604 Solano Avenue, Suite B
          Berkeley, CA 94707
          Telephone: (415) 257-8800
          Facsimile: (415) 257-8844
          E-mail: rgallo@gallo.law
                  dvalerian@gallo.law

               - and -

          Edward Joseph Wynne, Esq.
          George Ryan Nemiroff, Esq.
          WYNNE LAW FIRM
          80 E. Sir Francis Drake Blvd., Suite 3G
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 461-6400
          Facsimile: (415) 461-3900
          E-mail: ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com
                  gnemiroff@wynnelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Nathaniel Merton Simons, Esq.
          Gibson Robb & Lindh LLP
          2235 Melvin Road
          Oakland, CA 94602
          Telephone: (210) 218-5395
          E-mail: nsimons@gibsonrobb.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Christopher J. Archibald, Esq.
          Allison Clare Eckstrom, Esq.
          Michael Edward Olsen , Jr., Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1500
          Irvine, CA 92612-4414
          Telephone: (949) 223-7000
          Facsimile: (949) 223-7100
          E-mail: christopher.archibald@bclplaw.com
                  Allison.Eckstrom@bclplaw.com
                  michael.olsen@bclplaw.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Reynold Vicente Seeks Overtime Pay for Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
REYNOLD VICENTE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00218 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 18, 2019),
seeks to recover overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs under Sections 207 and 216(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the California Labor Code.

Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are current and former
non-exempt employees of Waste Management of California, Inc. who
have worked as Waste Disposal Drivers and were responsible for
hauling waste and garbage to the appropriate facilities such as
landfill and transfer facilities throughout California at any time
during the relevant statutes of limitation. The Plaintiff and the
Putative Class Members routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek. Waste Management knowingly and deliberately failed to
compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours
worked in excess of forty each week on a routine and regular basis.
Specifically, Waste Management's regular practice including during
weeks when and the Putative Class Members worked in excess of 40
hours (not counting hours worked off-the-clock) was (and is) to
automatically deduct a 30-minute meal-period from Plaintiff and the
Putative Class Members' daily time even though they regularly
worked (and continue to work) "off-the-clock" through their
respective meal-period breaks.

Waste Management of California Inc. operates as a subsidiary of
Waste Management, Inc.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com

WELLS FARGO: Sued over Failure to Maintain Zombie Homes
-------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN O'CONNOR, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. WELLS FARGO & CO., WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. d/b/a
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL, WELLS FARGO
FINANCIAL AMERICA, WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC. d/b/a AMERICA'S
SERVICING COMPANY, OCWEN FINANCIAL CORP., OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC,
OCWEN SERVICES LLC, and any other related entities, the Defendants,
Case No. 606673/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks to
recover or damages and injunctive relief from Defendants for their
failure to maintain houses, condominiums, and apartments that they
have acquired through foreclosure proceedings in the state of New
York, which has caused quantifiable harm to neighboring homeowners
in the form of decreased home values, increased servicing fees and
out-of-pocket costs, and deterioration of living conditions in
their neighborhoods. The Defendants have breached their duty to
maintain the premises of foreclosed homes, thereby causing
financial damage to Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals in
the state of New York.

The Defendants have similarly failed to maintain foreclosed and
zombie homes throughout the state of New York, including the
subject property. The Plaintiff and other similarly situated
individuals were harmed by Defendants failure to maintain these
premises, especially class members located in close proximity to
the zombie homes that Defendants failed to maintain in a reasonable
state of repair.

Judge Thomas Feinman will hold a hearing Feb. 28, 2019, to consider
a motion to dismiss the complaint.

Wells Fargo & Co. is a banking holding company, of which Defendant
Wells Fargo is a wholly-owned subsidiary.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873-9550

               - and -

          Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
          Adam Gonelli, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP
          85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
          Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
          Telephone: (845) 483-7100

WESTERN DENTAL: Faces Pavlushkin Suit in Sacramento
---------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Western Dental Services, Inc. The case is captioned as VENERA
PAVLUSHKIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WESTERN DENTAL SERVICES INC., and DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00247875-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super.,
Sacramento Cty., Jan. 7, 2019).

Western Dental Services, Inc., a dental and oral health maintenance
organization, provides dental and oral health care services in
California, Arizona, Nevada, and Texas. Western Dental Services,
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Premier Dental Services Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David R. Ongaro, Esq.
          ONGARO PC
          50 California Street, Suite 3325
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 433-3900
          Facsimile: (415) 433-3950


WESTLAND, MI: Kochis Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned THOMAS R. KOCHIS, and those
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs., vs. CITY OF WESTLAND, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-11455-NGE-MKM (E.D. Mich.), the
Plaintiff ask the Court for an Order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons and entities who have been charged/levied Fees
      by the City under Section 22-132 of the Property Maintenance

      Code and Section 42-72 and 42-73 of the Environment
      Ordinance from June 2012 through final judgment in this
      matter, or such longer period as may be allowed by law";

   2. appointing Plaintiff as class representative and appointing
      Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Rd.
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734) 287 3665

               - and -

          Mark K. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY, PC
          2401 w. Big Beaver Rd, STE 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: 248 649 5667

WHITE CASTLE: Cothron Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Latrina Cothron, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. White Castle System, Inc.
d/b/a White Castle and Cross Match Technologies, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 2018-CH-15233, was removed from the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Jan. 18, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00382 to the proceeding. The suit alleges labor-related
violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. John J. Tharp, Jr.

White Castle owns and operates a chain of restaurants. The Company
offers hamburgers, french fries, soft drinks, sliders, desserts,
and other fast food products.

Cross Match manufactures biometric identity management solutions to
defense, finance, government, law enforcement, retail, restaurant,
and enterprise markets worldwide. It offers authentication and
verification solutions, such as DigitalPersona Altus, an
authentication solution for access to networks, applications, and
digital data; hardware, such as fingerprint readers, OEM modules,
and embedded sensors; and professional services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Cross Match Technologies, Inc.:

          Mark Steven Mester, Esq.
          Kathleen Patricia Lally, Esq.
          Peter A. Shaeffer, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          330 N. Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Tel: (312) 876-7700
          E-mail: mark.mester@lw.com
                  kathleen.lally@lw.com
                  peter.shaeffer@lw.com

WILLIAM K. CONSTRUCTION: Bazan et al. Seek Unpaid OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
JOSE YSLA BAZAN, ANGEL ARENAS, JAVIER GRANADOS and LORENZO ARENAS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. WILLIAM K. CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., WILLIAM K.
CONSTRUCTION & ROOFING, INC., WILLIAM K. CONSTRUCTION, INC. d/b/a
WILLIAM K. CONSTRUCTION GROUP, WILLIAM KRKUTI, EDMONT KRKUTI, and
PETRIT KRKUTI, Jointly and Severally, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00508 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs are former construction
workers, demolition workers, roofers, glaziers, bricklayers,
suspended scaffold employees, and general laborers for Defendants'
general construction and structural repair and restoration company.
For their work, despite the fact that Plaintiffs and Defendants'
other non-exempt employees worked more than 40 hours per week, the
Defendants paid Plaintiffs on a "daily rate" or hourly basis
without overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a given
workweek, the lawsuit says.

William K. Construction specializes in structural repair, historic
restoration and exterior cleaning on buildings both private and
commercial.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the putative FLSA Collective and
Class:

          Brent E. Pelton, Esq.
          Taylor B. Graham, Esq.
          PELTON GRAHAM LLC
          www.PeltonGraham.com
          111 Broadway, Suite 1503
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 385-9700


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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