CAR_Public/190201.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, February 1, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 24

                            Headlines

BOB EVANS FARMS: McKeel Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
BRANCH BANKING: Court Grants Final Approval of Cox Settlement
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Court Extends Briefing Schedule in Castillo
CAPITAL ONE BANK: McNeil Sues Over Bank's Deceptive Practices
CAPREIT INC: Court Stays Deadlines in Dominique FLSA Suit

CARROT EXPRESS: Avarado Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
CITRUS WORLD: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Axon Mislabeling Suit
CREE INC: Young Moves for Class Certification Under Rule 23 (b)
CRESCENT GUARDIAN: Quinn Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
DAVID SAXE: Court Certifies J. Bauman Class Under NDTPA

DEVOE GROCERY: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages
FERGUSON, MO: 8th Cir. Dismisses Interlocutory Appeal in Fant
FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES: Dominguez Seeks Final Approval of Settlement
G4S SECURE: Inks $100MM-$130MM Deal in Calif. Employee Class Action
GABI OPERATING: Pelon Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages

GC SERVICES: Court Grants Protective Order in Mullins
HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Judge Refuses to Pause Class Action Case
HERTZ CORPORATION: Aiyekusibe Sues Over Unpaid Wages
JOE & THE JUICE: Faces Class Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.
JPMORGAN CHASE: Alishaev Suit Alleges Commodity Exchange Act Breach

JPMORGAN CHASE: Braxton Appeals Ruling in Senegal Class Suit
JUDICIAL CORRECTION: 11th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Thurman
LEVINBOOK LAW: Faces Henriquez FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
LIBERTY HEALTH: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
LITTLE RIVER: Glenn Files Class Action in W.D. Texas

MAHOPAC FOOD: Escobar Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Allen Files Suit for Negligence
MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
MERIVALE PTY: Facing Class Action Threat Over "Underpayments"
MISSOURI: 8th Cir. Flips Denial of Sovereign Immunity From Suit

MODERNMASTERS FINE: Dawson Files ADA Class Action
MOURLOT COLLECTION: Dawson Suit in NY Asserts ADA Violation
MURCIA GROUP: Mazariegos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
NATHAN HOROWICZ: Dawson Sues Antique Store for ADA Breach
NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms TRO, Injunction Denial in Alves

NFL: Who Dat Nation Files Class-Action Lawsuit Over No-Call
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Seeks to Dismiss Defective Transmission Suit
NISSAN NORTH: Consolidation Bid Reply Due in Bashaw Moved to Feb. 7
NORTHERN LEASING: N.Y. App. Div. Affirms Class Certification Denial
NYU LANGONE: Arroyo Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under NYLL

ONG AMNUAY: Galindo Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
OREGON: Sued Over Short School Days for Special Ed Students
PACE EDITIONS: Dawson Suit Alleges Breach of Disabilities Act
PACE/MACGILL INC: Violates ADA, Dawson Suit Alleges
PALMYRA HERATIGE: Dawson Suit in NY Asserts ADA Violation

PAWS WHISKERS: Brown Seeks to Recoup Min., Overtime Pay Under FLSA
PERRIGO COMPANY: March 4 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
PHILIP COLLECK: Dawson Sues Antique Shop Under ADA
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration in "Rosales"
PREMIUM MERCHANT: Fabricant Suit Asserts TCPA Violation

RESOLUTE ENERGY: Faces Isensee Class Suit Over Sale to Cimarex
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: A. Bronson Can File 2nd Amended Complaint
SIERRA SERVICES: Day Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
SLSCO LTD: Does not Pay Workers Overtime Wages, Avila Suit Alleges
SOGOU INC: March 11 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Dismissal of Travel-Credit Suit Affirmed
SQUARETRADE INC: 2d Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Starke
STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE: Richardson Seeks Final Class Certification
STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE: Seeks to Decertify Class in Richardson Suit
TECHNICOLOR VIDEOCASSETTE: Court Won't Dismiss Sharp FCRA Suit

TENARIS SA: Atanasio Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
TETRA TECH: Class Plaintiffs Want Governor to Rescind Clean Up Deal
TIERRA LEASE: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Gonzales Says
TRANSUNION INTERACTIVE: M. Sporn's Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
UNIFIED LIFE: Court Overrules Objection to Class Action Amendment

UNILEVER US: Browning Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
UNITED STATES: Detained Children Used to Catch Undocumented Parents
UNITED STATES: Seeks Fed. Cir. Review of Ruling in Kane Cty. Suit
UNITED STATES: Tea Party Gets Class-Action Payout From IRS
UNIVERSAL COLLECTION: Berkowitz Suit Asserts Breach of FDCPA

V GAROFALO: Perez Suit Seeks to Recover Wages and Benefits
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Michelson Appeals Order in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Ragsdale Appeals Ruling in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
WASTE MANAGEMENT: Ables Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
WASTE MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Drivers' Overtime, Ayala Alleges

WAYFAIR INC: Brower Piven Files Securities Fraud Class Action Suit
WELLS FARGO: Baggett Seeks Overtime Pay for Call Center Workers
WINCO FOODS: Court Dismisses T. Haggard's Suit With Leave to Amend

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chevron Entitled to Recover From Bourgeois Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cleveland Mechanic Sues Over Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Elementis Liability to Marteney Affirmed on Appeal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: G. Liptow Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Huntington Owed Duty to Avoid Wanda's Injury

ASBESTOS UPDATE: J. Garner Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Shepard Couple Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tishman's Attempt to Appeal NYCAL Cases Denied


                            *********

BOB EVANS FARMS: McKeel Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
April McKeel, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., Bob Evans Farms,
LLC, and Bob Evans Restaurants LLC; and Doe Defendants 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00082-MRH (W.D. Pa., January 24, 2019)
is a collective action seeking to recover unpaid wages, pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

According to the complaint, the Defendants systematically and
willfully deprived Plaintiff and Tipped Employees all wages due and
owing in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA") and the Wage Payment and
Collection Law ("WPCL"), by, among other things, failing to satisfy
the notice requirements of the tip credit provisions of the FLSA
and PMWA.

Moreover, the Defendants also violated applicable wage and hour
laws by failing to calculate and pay Tipped Employees the proper
overtime rate due and owing for weeks when Tipped Employees worked
in both a tipped and non-tipped job capacity and worked in excess
of 40 hours that work week, says the complaint.

Plaintiff April McKeel was employed by Bob Evans as a "server" at
its New Stanton restaurant location.

Bob Evans Farms, Inc. is a publicly traded Delaware corporation
that is the parent corporation of Bob Evans Farms, LLC.

Bob Evans Farms, LLC is an Ohio limited liability company and a
wholly-owned subsidiary of BEF, Inc.

Bob Evans Restaurants, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company
that is wholly owned by the San Francisco-based private equity firm
Golden Gate Capital.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Ave, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Phone: 412-322-9243
     Fax: 412-231-0246
     Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

          - and -

     Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
     Robert J. Gray, Esq.
     CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY, LLP
     2200 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 275
     King of Prussia, PA 19406
     Phone: 610-822-3700
     Facsimile: 610-822-3800
     Email: gwells@cwg-law.com
            rgray@cwg-law.com


BRANCH BANKING: Court Grants Final Approval of Cox Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Beckley Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Settlement in the case
captioned WAYNE COX and KATHY COX, Individually and on behalf of a
class of persons, Plaintiffs, v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant. LATRICIA E. GOODWIN, individually and on behalf of a
class of persons Plaintiff, v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant. Civil Action Nos. 5:17-cv-01982, 5:16-cv-10501
(S.D.W.V.).

In these actions, Plaintiffs Wayne Cox, Kathy Cox, and Latricia
Goodwin (Plaintiffs), on behalf of a putative class of similarly
situated individuals, claimed that the Defendant violated the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) by threatening
legal action and the collection of foreclosure and attorney's fees.


The Court finds that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant have
completed all settlement notice obligations imposed in the Order
Preliminarily Approving Settlement as well as the Order Granting
Motion to Modify Settlement Agreement, Class Notice and Order
Preliminarily Approving Settlement. The class notice, which
included first-class mailed notice to each class member,
constitutes the the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, as required by Rule 23(c)(2). The amended class
notice, sent to a subset of the class, corrected the incorrect
settlement notice originally sent to these class members.

The settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Such approval typically involves a two-step process of preliminary
and final approval. In the first stage, the Parties submit the
proposed settlement to the Court for preliminary approval. In the
second stage, following preliminary approval, the Class is notified
and a fairness hearing scheduled at which the Court will determine
whether to approve the settlement. The Court has already granted
preliminary approval.

In determining whether a settlement meets the requirements of Rule
23, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a bifurcated analysis involving
inquiries into the fairness and adequacy of the settlement. A class
settlement is fair when it is reached as a result of good faith
bargaining at arm's length, without collusion. The Court should be
satisfied that the proposed settlement appears to be the product of
serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious
deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to
class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within
the range of possible approval.

In assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement, the Court must
look to the following factors: (1) posture of the case at the time
the settlement is proposed (2) extent of discovery that has been
conducted; (3) circumstances surrounding the negotiations and (4)
experience of counsel in the relevant area of class action
litigation.  

In determining the adequacy of the proposed settlement, the Court
must consider: (1) relative strength of Plaintiff's case on the
merits (2) existence of any difficulties of proof or strong
defenses Plaintiff is likely to encounter if the case proceeds to
trial (3) anticipated duration and expense of additional litigation
(4) solvency of defendant and likelihood of recovery of a litigated
judgment; and (5) degree of opposition to the settlement.

Consideration of the applicable factors reveals that the Parties'
proposed Settlement merits final approval. The Parties' Settlement
was indeed the product of serious, informed, arm's-length, and
non-collusive negotiations. At the time this action was settled,
the parties had engaged in written discovery, informal
negotiations, and three formal mediation sessions with a retired
United States Federal District Court Judge experienced in the
matters at issue in these actions.

By the time these sessions occurred, the Plaintiffs' Counsel and
the Defendant's Counsel, who are both experienced in prosecuting
and defending complex class action claims such as these, had a
clear view of the strengths and weaknesses" of their cases and were
in a strong position to make an informed decision regarding the
reasonableness of a potential settlement.  

The Settlement has no obvious deficiencies. All class members will
be compensated. The intrinsic value of the net settlement payment
to Class Members is readily apparent when one considers the risks
inherent in continued and protracted litigation, including that the
Court could deny a motion to certify class and foreclose any
possibility of class recovery, the costs and uncertainty of
litigation, and the expense and delay that accompany the appeal
process.

The Settlement is particularly valuable to absent Class Members
who, but for the Settlement, likely would be unaware of the
existence of their legal claims. Even if they were aware, given the
relatively small amounts of money involved, absent class members
and attorneys who may represent them would have little financial
incentive to prosecute individual actions. The alternative to
bringing this case as a class action is bringing hundreds of
individual claims. Realistically, the alternative to a class action
under the present circumstances is no action at all.

This action is hereby certified as a class action for settlement
purposes only on behalf of the following class:

     All West Virginia consumer automobile and/or home loan debtors
to whom Defendant, its agents, employees, or independent
contractors, sent (i) REC47 letters since January 17, 2013 (ii)
Notice of Sale letters since December 16, 2013 or (iii) FC001
letters since September 17, 2012. Excluded from the class are: (i)
any entity that is not a natural person including, but not limited
to, corporate entities, trusts and estates (ii) any person who
received a letter in connection with a bankcard debt, direct retail
loan debt, or deposit account related debt, as he or she is
required to arbitrate his or her dispute with BB&T pursuant to the
terms of the governing agreements for such products; and (iii)
counsel and Court personnel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd5yshmb from Leagle.com.

Latricia E. Goodwin, individually and on behalf of a class of
persons, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Frost, HAMILTON
BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD, Jed Robert Nolan, HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG &
POLLARD, Jonathan R. Marshall -- jmarshall@baileyglasser.com --
BAILEY & GLASSER, Patricia M. Kipnis, BAILEY & GLASSER, Ralph C.
Young, HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD & Steven R. Broadwater,
Jr., HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD.

Branch Banking and Trust Company, Defendant, represented by Albert
F. Sebok -- asebok@jacksonkelly.com -- JACKSON KELLY, Christopher
K. Robertson -- crobertson@jacksonkelly.com -- JACKSON KELLY,
Jonathan L. Anderson -- jlanderson@jacksonkelly.com -- JACKSON
KELLY & William James Holley, PARKER HUDSON RAINER & DOBBS, pro hac
vice.


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Court Extends Briefing Schedule in Castillo
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order extending Briefing Schedule on Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and Motion to Stay Action in the case captioned JUSTIN
CASTILLO, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION and
DESERT PALACE, LLC d/b/a CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO, Defendants.
Case No. 2:18-cv-2297-GMN-NJK. (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiff filed this action on August 2, 2018, as an individual
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, in the Superior
Court of California for the County of Marin, captioned Justin
Castillo v. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and Desert Palace,
LLC dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, Case No. CIV-1802716.
Service of the Complaint and Summons was made on Defendants on
August 22, 2018.

The Defendants requested an extension of time to respond to the
Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, which the Court initially
denied but then granted in part thereby extending the Defendants'
time to respond to the Plaintiff's Complaint up to and until
December 21, 2018.

The Defendants filed (1) an Answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint (2)
a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c)  and (3) a Motion to Stay This Action or,
Alternatively, to Stay Discovery. The Plaintiff's response to the
Defendants' Motion to Stay and the Rule 12(c) Motion was due
January 4, 2019, and the Defendants' deadline to file replies in
support of their motions was January 11, 2019.

Should the Plaintiffs' response deadline be extended, the
Defendants' counsel similarly seek a brief extension of the
Defendants' reply deadline to February 14, 2019 (two weeks instead
of one week in light of commitments in other cases in early
February of 2019, including an argument in the D.C. Circuit
involving members of the defense team.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycpo6d6b from Leagle.com.

Justin Castillo, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Danielle
Manning -- dmanning@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
pro hac vice, David C. OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C., Marc
Lawrence Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Mark Samuel Greenstone -- mgreenstone@glancylaw.com --
Greenstone Law APC & Michael Joe Jaurigue, Jaurigue Law Group.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation & Desert Palace, LLC, doing
business as Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, Defendants, represented
by Matthew T. Murchison -- matthew.murchison@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Melanie Marilyn Blunschi --
melanie.blunschi@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Adam J. Tuetken --
adam.tuetken@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Frank M.
Flansburg, III -- fflansburg@bhfs.com -- Browmstein Hyatt Farber
Schreck & Natalie Hardwick Rao -- natalie.rao@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.  


CAPITAL ONE BANK: McNeil Sues Over Bank's Deceptive Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bob McNeil, an individual, on behalf of himself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Capital One Bank, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00473 (E.D. N.Y., January 24, 2019) is
a consumer suit against Capital One, arising from a specific fee
generation practice that violates the Bank's contracts and/or is
deceptive.

The Defendant breaches its contracts and/or abuses its contractual
discretion by: (a) processing transactions when it knows that a
customer's account lacks sufficient funds; and (b) charging NSF
Fees and/or OD Fees upon each reprocessing of the same item. In
both instances, the customer has made no attempt to resubmit the
payment.

This practice not only violates Capital One's contracts and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but is also unfair and
deceptive under the consumer protection law of New York, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Bob McNeil is a citizen of New York.

Capital One is a national bank with its headquarters and principal
place of business located in Arlington, VA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Scott Martin, Esq.
     Steven M. Nathan, Esq.
     HAUSFELD LLP
     33 Whitehall St., 14th Floor
     New York, NY 10004
     Phone: (646) 357-1100
     Facsimile: (212) 202-4322
     Email: smartin@hausfeld.com
            snathan@hausfeld.com

          - and -

     James Pizzirusso, Esq.
     HAUSFELD LLP
     1700 K St., NW, Ste 650
     Washington, DC 20006
     Phone: 202-540-7200
     Facsimile: 202-540-7201
     Email: jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com

          - and -

     Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
     Andrea Gold, Esq.
     TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
     1828 L St NW, Suite 1000
     Washington, DC 20036
     Phone: 202-973-0900
     Facsimile: 202-973-0950
     Email: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
            agold@tzlegal.com

          - and -

     Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
     Sophia Gold, Esq.
     KALIEL PLLC
     1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, 10th Floor
     Washington, DC 20009
     Phone: 202-350-4783
     Email: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
            sgold@kalielpllc.com

          - and -

     Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
     Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
     KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
     One W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
     Phone: 954-525-4100
     Facsimile: 954-525-4300
     Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com
            streisfeld@kolawyers.com


CAPREIT INC: Court Stays Deadlines in Dominique FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Fort Myers Division, issued an Order granting Joint Motion
to Temporarily Stay All Court Deadlines By 90 Days in the case
captioned STUART FRITZ DOMINIQUE, an individual, and on behalf of
all other similarly situated individuals Plaintiff, v. CAPREIT,
INC., Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-231-FtM-38CM. (M.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff filed this class action case against the Defendant,
and filed an Amended Collective Action Complaint, alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Plaintiff
alleges the Defendant failed to pay him and other employees
overtime as required under the FLSA.  

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants.

Here, the Court finds good cause to grant the motion and stay the
CMSO deadlines for 90 days. The parties are seeking the stay in
order to attempt to fully settle the case, thereby rendering
discovery and all other CMSO deadlines unnecessary. The parties
state they have agreed to engage in targeted informal discovery and
settlement discussions in an effort to resolve this case.

Further, the requested stay is limited in time and scope and not
immoderate as the stay is limited to 90 days and for the purpose of
the parties executing their informal discovery and settlement plan.
Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances and because the
parties jointly filed the motion, the Court will stay the CMSO
deadlines for 90 days.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9dajwug from Leagle.com.

Stuart Fritz Dominique, an individual, and on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin
H. Yormak, Yormak Disability Law Group, Brett E. Von Borke --
vonborke@bucknermiles.com -- Buckner + Miles, David Marc Buckner --
david@bucknermiles.com -- Buckner + Miles & Seth Eric Miles --
seth@bucknermiles.com -- Buckner + Miles.

Capreit, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendant, represented by
Patrick G. DeBlasio, III -- pdeblasio@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, PC & Miguel Morel -- mamorel@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, PC.


CARROT EXPRESS: Avarado Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Jose Isabel Cortez Alvarado, and all others similarly situated v.
Carrot Express Inc., and Mario Laufer, Case No. 1:18-cv-25233 (S.D.
Fla., December 13, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that between the period of on or about March
10, 2016 through on or about November 10, 2018, Plaintiff worked an
average of 70 hours a week for Defendants and was paid an average
of $14.00 per hour but was not paid the extra half time rate for
any hours worked over 40 hours in a week as required by the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as cook from on or about
March 10, 2016 through on or about November 10, 2018.

The Defendant Carrot Express Inc., is a corporation that regularly
transacts business within Dade County. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      E-mail: zabogado@aol.com


CITRUS WORLD: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Axon Mislabeling Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Alexandra Axon filed an appeal from a court ruling in her
lawsuit styled ALEXANDRA AXON, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. CITRUS WORLD, INC. and FLORIDA'S NATURAL
GROWERS, Case No. 18-cv-4162, in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 4, 2019, the
District Court issued an Opinion and Order granting the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).

Florida's Natural sells a variety of orange juice products
(products) that contain trace amounts of glyphosate, an herbicide
used to kill weeds.  The Plaintiff alleges that the use of the term
natural in the Defendant's brand name is deceptive because
glyphosate is not a natural ingredient.

The appellate case is captioned as Alexandra Axon v. Florida's
Natural Growers, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-203, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Alexandra Axon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Kim E. Richman, Esq.
          RICHMAN LAW GROUP
          81 Prospect Street
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (212) 687-8291
          E-mail: krichman@richmanlawgroup.com

Defendant-Appellee Citrus World, Inc. is represented by:

          Tom M. Fini, Esq.
          CATAFAGO FINI LLP
          350 5th Avenue
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (917) 561-4143
          E-mail: tom@catafagofini.com


CREE INC: Young Moves for Class Certification Under Rule 23 (b)
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JEFF YOUNG, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. CREE Inc., Case No.
4:17-cv-06252-YGR (N.D. Cal.), moves for class certification under
Rule 23(b)(2)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court will commence a hearing on May 28, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., to
consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael McShane, Esq.
          S. Clinton Woods, Esq.
          Ling Y. Kuang, Esq.
          AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP
          711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
          San Francisco, CA 94102-3275
          Telephone: (415) 568-2555
          Facsimile: (415) 568-2556
          E-mail: mmcshane@audetlaw.com
                  cwoods@audetlaw.com
                  lkuang@audetlaw.com

               - and -

          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
          Joseph C. Bourne, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 389-0600
          Facsimile: (612) 389-0610
          E-mail: mweiner@pswlaw.com
                  jbourne@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
          Alexandra C. Warren, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 589-1813
          E-mail: claduca@cuneolaw.com
                  awarren@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Adam R. Gonnelli, Esq.
          Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP
          85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
          Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
          Telephone: (845) 483-7100
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: gonnellia@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                  sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com


CRESCENT GUARDIAN: Quinn Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled ANTHONY QUINN v. CRESCENT
GUARDIAN, INC. AND MARIAN H. PIERRE, Case No. 2:18-cv-03576-BWA-KWR
(E.D. La.), files with the Court his unopposed motion for
conditional certification of FLSA collective action class and
notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b).

The Defendants do not oppose the filing of this Motion, but reserve
all rights to move for decertification at the appropriate time or
to advance any defenses that they may have to the substantive
claims in this lawsuit.

The Parties agree to conditional certification of the Putative
Class of "All hourly employees who worked for Defendants as
security guards, but who were not paid at the federal minimum wage
rate for all hours worked as a result of Defendants' policy of
deducting costs of uniforms and equipment from employee paychecks."
(the "Putative Class Members").

The Defendants will provide the names and last known addresses for
the Putative Class Members no later than 30 days following the
Court's granting of the Order for Conditional Certification.  The
Plaintiff's counsel will send the Putative Class Members an initial
Notice and Consent form by regular First Class Mail.

The Putative Class Members will have 90 days from the initial
mailing of the Notice and Consent form to file the Consent form
with this Court to opt-in to the above captioned lawsuit (the
"opt-in period").  The Defendants will post a copy of the Notice in
a place readily visible to all employees at the office location
during this 90-day period.

The Plaintiff's Counsel will provide the Defendants' Counsel with
copies of the signed consent forms on a regular, rolling basis as
they are received and the Plaintiff's Counsel shall file signed
consent forms with the Court within 14 days of receipt.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON+JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599-5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988-6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net


DAVID SAXE: Court Certifies J. Bauman Class Under NDTPA
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
JEREMY BAUMAN, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID SAXE, et al., Defendants. Case No.:
14-cv-01125-RFB-PAL. (D. Nev.).

This is a proposed Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) class
action filed on behalf of individuals who received automated text
message advertisements from the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Saxe Defendants obtained the
cellular telephone numbers of the Plaintiffs when the Plaintiffs
reserved seats to shows produced by the Saxe Defendants. The Saxe
Defendants then collaborated with Defendant Twilio to develop,
implement, and maintain the telemarketing text message program,
which sent hundreds of thousands of unsolicited text messages
promoting shows produced by the Saxe Defendants. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Saxe Defendants harvested names, email addresses,
and phone numbers from their customer database and forwarded
telephone numbers and telemarketing messages to Defendant Twilio to
transmit.   

Class Definition

The Plaintiffs propose a class and a subclass. The proposed class
definition is:

     All past, present, and future customers of a Saxe Defendant
who reside in the United States or its territories and whose
cellular telephone numbers are or will be in the possession,
custody, or control of a Saxe Defendant.

The proposed subclass definition is:

     All Class Members whose cellular telephone numbers were sent a
text message by Defendant which promoted a product, good, or
service of a Saxe Defendant.  

To summarize, the certified class will be divided into four
subclasses: (1) class members who received telemarketing text
messages from the Defendants before October 16, 2013 and did not
sign any form of written or electronic release, (2) class members
who received telemarketing text messages from the Defendants before
October 16, 2013 and signed some form of written or electronic
release, (3) class members who received telemarketing text messages
from the Defendants after October 16, 2013 and did not sign any
form of written or electronic release, and (4) class members who
received telemarketing text messages from the Defendants after
October 16, 2013 and did sign some form of written or electronic
release.   

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is satisfied when a class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable.  The Plaintiffs
include declarations indicating that based on the discovery they
have received up to this point, the Defendants sent 292,302 text
messages to 120,363 different telephone numbers. They also cite to
billing records that demonstrate that most of these text messages
were sent to cellular telephone numbers provided by cellular
telephone carriers.

Besides arguing that the proposed class is overly broad, which the
Court has already addressed, the Defendants argue that the inquiry
into which text messages were actually sent to cellular telephone
numbers and who each number belongs to is overly fact-intensive,
making the class too difficult to ascertain.  This argument fails,
however, because the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the
requirement that the plaintiffs provide an administratively
feasible way to identify all class members at the class
certification phase. The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendants
can still challenge individual class members when they file claims
for damages, but that such a requirement is not necessary at this
early stage in the proceedings.  

The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
numerosity requirement.

Commonality

The Ninth Circuit has explained that the commonality requirement is
to be construed permissively.

All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the
rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual
predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts
coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. Once the
class is narrowed to those members who actually received text
messages from the Defendants, there are common questions of law and
fact for all members of each subclass. These include whether the
Plaintiffs consented to receive the text messages, whether the
Defendants used an automated telephone dialing system to send their
text messages, and whether the text messages constitute
telemarking.

Therefore, the requirement of commonality is satisfied.

Typicality

The Defendants' arguments regarding typicality center on the
written consent issues. Once the class is divided into appropriate
subclasses, these issues are resolved. The Court is not persuaded
by the Saxe Defendants' argument that Plaintiff Razilou is not
typical of the class because he erased text messages and no longer
owns the phone the Defendants sent text messages to.

The Defendants' evidence of foul play is highly circumstantial.
Furthermore, it is likely that many class members no longer have
access to the text messages or cellular telephones by which the
Defendants contacted them. This does not bar these class members
from recovering, as long as they can prove their TCPA violation by
other means.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality
requirement for the third and fourth subclasses.

Adequacy

The adequacy analysis mirrors the typicality analysis in many ways.
The Court finds that dividing the class into subclasses resolves
the adequacy issues, and the Plaintiffs have leave to amend to add
adequate class representatives for the first two subclasses. The
Court is unconvinced by the Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff
Raziluou is an inadequate class representative. Therefore, the
Court finds that the Plaintiffs have met the adequacy requirement,
pending the addition of class representatives for the first two
subclasses.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Predominance

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation. Defendants essentially rehash their
ascertainability argument in asserting that individual factual
inquiries predominate over common questions of law or fact in this
case. As discussed above, the Court does not find this argument to
be compelling.

The Court finds that common questions of law and fact will
substantially predominate in this case, particularly once the class
has been divided into subclasses. Furthermore, the fact that the
TCPA provides for statutory damages resolves any differing
questions of causation or damages between the class members,
providing further support for the predominance of common questions.


The Court finds that the subclasses are sufficiently cohesive to
satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

Superiority

The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have met the superiority
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

This case involves thousands of potential class members, each of
whom was subjected to a similar text messaging program by the
Defendants, who would only have a $500 incentive to file a claim
against the Defendants individually. The Court has divided the
class into subclasses that each entail potentially differing legal
theories. It is much more efficient to answer these legal questions
in broad strokes than to require class members to argue these
claims individually.

The Plaintiffs have received through discovery what they allege to
be Defendant Twilio's transmission and accounting records that
aggregate all of the text messages sent on behalf of Defendant
Saxe.

This evidence will likely be necessary to adjudicate each potential
class member's claim, making it more efficient to analyze the
evidentiary issues en masse. Furthermore, there are no
manageability issues that make it overly difficult for this case to
proceed as a class action.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have met the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) as it relates to each subclass and will certify the
subclasses under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).

NDTPA Claims

The Defendants argue that certification is improper as to the NDTPA
claims because they present predominating individual issues of
causation. The Court agrees with the Defendants on this issue.

The NDTPA provides, An action may be brought by any person who is a
victim of consumer fraud. It allows prevailing claimants to recover
any damages that the claimant has sustained. Unlike the TCPA, which
provides statutory damages that can easily be adjudicated on a
class-wide basis, the NDTPA requires Plaintiffs to prove their
damages. The Court finds it likely that these individual causation
questions would predominate over any common questions under the
NDTPA and denies class certification as to the NDTPA claims.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class is granted in
part and denied in part.

The class is certified under Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) under the
following limited definition only:

     All past, present, and future customers of a Saxe Defendant
who reside in the United States or its territories and whose
cellular telephone numbers were sent a text message by Defendant
which promoted a product, good, or service of a Saxe Defendant.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request to certify the class under the
NDTPA is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7kcjd6k from
Leagle.com.

Bijan Razilou, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Amanda L. Stevens,
Bailey Kennedy, LLP, Dennis L. Kennedy, Bailey Kennedy, Matthew R.
Mendelsohn -- mmendelsohn@mazieslater.com -- Mazie Slater Katz &
Freeman, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul C. Williams, Bailey Kennedy, LLP &
Payam Shahian, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, pro hac vice.

Jeremy Bauman, Plaintiff, represented by Albert H. Kirby --
ahkirby@soundjustice.com -- Sound Justice Law Group, PLLC, Candice
Renka, Marquis & Aurbach & Phillip S. Aurbach, Marquis & Aurbach.

Saxe Management LLC, V Theater Group LLC & David Saxe, Defendants,
represented by James H. Corning -- jamescorning@dwt.com -- Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, Kenneth E. Payson --
kenpayson@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice &
Jeffrey A. Silvestri -- jsilvestri@mcdonaldcarano.com -- McDonald
Carano Wilson.

Saxe Theater, LLC, Defendant, represented by James H. Corning,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice & Kenneth E. Payson, Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice.


DEVOE GROCERY: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL ANGEL GONZALEZ RAMIREZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. DEVOE GROCERY STORE INC. (D/B/A DEVOE GROCERY
STORE), GENESIS GROCERY STORE INC. (D/B/A GENESIS GROCERY STORE),
JUAN C VALDEZ, FRANCIS S NUNEZ VARGAS (A.K.A. NUNEZVAGGAS) and NINO
DOE, Case No. 1:19-cv-00563 (S.D.N.Y., January 18, 2019), alleges
that, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law, the Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in excess of 40
hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and
spread of hours compensation for the hours that he worked.

Devoe Grocery Store Inc., doing business as Devoe Grocery Store, is
a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York.  Genesis Grocery Store Inc., doing business as
Genesis Grocery Store, is a domestic corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the state of New York.  The Individual
Defendants serve or served as owners, managers, principals, or
agents of the Defendant Corporations.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a grocery store, located at
342 Devoe Ave., in Bronx, New York, under the name "Devoe Grocery
Store", formerly doing business as "Genesis Grocery Store."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


FERGUSON, MO: 8th Cir. Dismisses Interlocutory Appeal in Fant
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, issued an
Opinion dismissing the Interlocutory Appeal in the case captioned
Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.;
Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris;
Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker; Tonya DeBerry, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, Defendant-Appellant. No. 18-1472.
(8th Cir.).

The district court denied the motion, and the City seeks
interlocutory review of this decision.

Keilee Fant and ten others brought a putative class action against
the City of Ferguson, alleging several constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The City moved to dismiss six of seven counts based on sovereign
immunity.  

The six counts at issue stem from the City's alleged detention of
plaintiffs for their inability to pay traffic fines. The City's
motion to dismiss argued that sovereign immunity barred those
claims because the alleged injuries are attributable to the
Ferguson Municipal Court, which the City says is an arm of the
State of Missouri.

The district court denied the motion, concluding the City is not
entitled to sovereign immunity, and that the amended complaint
sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs' injuries are attributable
to the City.

Sovereign immunity protects certain entities against the indignity
of suit and the burdens of litigation, but this justification for
an exception to the final order rule is inapplicable where the
claimed sovereign is not a party to the action. The City here does
not claim an immunity of its own and instead asserts immunity of
the Ferguson Municipal Court. The municipal court is not a party to
the action, and we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to address any
potential claim of immunity by the municipal court that might arise
in future litigation.

The City's interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.  

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yacsqogd from Leagle.com.

William A. Hellmich, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jeffrey Joseph Brinker -- jbrinker@brinkerdoyen.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

John J. Ammann -- ammannjj@slu.edu -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mauricio Alfredo Gonzalez -- mauricio.gonzalez@whitecase.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michelle Victoria Stallings, for Defendant-Appellant.

Nathaniel R. Carroll -- nathaniel@keanelawllc.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

John M. Reeves, for Defendant-Appellant.

Blake A. Strode -- bstrode@archcitydefenders.org -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.


FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES: Dominguez Seeks Final Approval of Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned RAFAEL DOMINGUEZ and CESAR
GRULLON, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly
Situated v. FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Case No. 3:16-cv-00144-SRU
(D. Conn.), move the Court for an order finally approving the
settlement of this class action as reflected in the parties'
Stipulation of Settlement.

The Stipulation of Settlement has been previously filed and
preliminarily approved by the Court.

According to the Motion, the Defendant's counsel has informed the
Plaintiffs' counsel that the Defendant intends to join this
Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Morneau, Esq.
          CONNOR & MORNEAU, LLP
          273 State Street
          Springfield, MA 01103
          Telephone: (413) 455-1730
          E-mail: jmorneau@cmolawyers.com


G4S SECURE: Inks $100MM-$130MM Deal in Calif. Employee Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
G4S plc, the global integrated security company announces that G4S
Secure Solutions (USA) Inc, (previously The Wackenhut Corporation),
has reached agreement for full and final settlement of a class
action relating to claims for meal and rest breaks under California
law, covering approximately 13,500 employees over the period 2001
to 2010. The amount to be settled is between US$100 million and
US$130 million with the precise amount to be determined during the
settlement administration process. The settlement agreement is
subject to the final approval of the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles.

This follows G4S' settlement in 2015 and 2017 of two class actions
in California, similar in nature and aggregate size, covering the
periods 2003 to 2016 and 2013 to 2018, which were settled in
aggregate for US$7.6 million.  Notwithstanding these earlier
settlements it has not been possible to settle this final class
action on similar terms and in view of developing trends in case
law in California, G4S has today reached agreement with the
claimants through mediation.

G4S has continuously updated its standard operating procedures in
California in order to eliminate the circumstances giving rise to
these labour claims.  The Group has no other significant labour
claims in California or elsewhere in the United States.

The company estimates that financial settlement will occur in the
second half of 2019. The appropriate provision for the cost of the
settlement will be recognised as a specific item in the 2018 full
year results. The Group re-iterates its guidance for full year
underlying 2018 PBITA to be in line with the prior year.

For further enquiries, please contact:

Helen Parris
Director of Investor Relations
+44(0) 7957 613243

Media enquiries:    

Sophie McMillan
Head of Media
+44(0) 759 5523483

Press office
+44(0) 207 9633333

This announcement contains inside information and the person
responsible for making this announcement is Celine Barroche,
company secretary.

G4S is the leading global, integrated security company,
specialising in the provision of security services and solutions to
customers. Our mission is to create material, sustainable value for
our customers and shareholders by being the supply partner of
choice in all our markets.

G4S is quoted on the London Stock Exchange and has a secondary
stock exchange listing in Copenhagen. G4S is active in around 90
countries and has over 560,000 employees. For more information on
G4S, visit www.g4s.com.

The full year 2018 results will be published on 12 March 2019.
[GN]


GABI OPERATING: Pelon Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ESTEBAN FLORES BARRETO PELON, ENRIQUE J. BALDERAS, and FRANCISCO
FLORES BARRETO, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. GABI OPERATING CORP. (D/B/A MARINARA PIZZA (F/D/B/A
SABA'S PIZZA)), BRITTGAB CORP. (D/B/A SABA'S PIZZA), JOHN DOE CORP.
(D/B/A MARINARA PIZZA MIDTOWN EAST) GABRIEL WEISER, MOTI VAKNIN,
and JONATHAN BANAYAN, Case No. 1:19-cv-00502 (S.D.N.Y., January 17,
2019), alleges that in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the New York Labor Law, the Plaintiffs worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that they worked.

Gabi Operating Corp., doing business as Marinara Pizza, formerly
doing business as Saba's Pizza, is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the state of New York.  Gabi
maintains its principal place of business at 1376 Lexington Avenue,
in New York City.  Brittgab Corp., doing business as Saba's Pizza,
is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the state of New York.  Brittgab maintains its principal place of
business at 1217 Lexington Avenue, in New York City.

John Doe Corp., doing business as Marinara Pizza Midtown East, is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York.  John Doe Corp. maintains its principal place of
business at 985 1st Avenue, in New York City, under the name
"Marinara Pizza Midtown East."  The Individual Defendants serve or
served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the Defendant
Corporations.

The Defendants own, operate, or control three pizzerias, located at
1376 Lexington Avenue, in New York City, under the name "Marinara
Pizza (f/d/b/a Saba's Pizza)"; at 1217 Lexington Avenue, in New
York City, under the name "Saba's Pizza"; and at 985 1st Avenue, in
New York City, under the name "Marinara Pizza Midtown East."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


GC SERVICES: Court Grants Protective Order in Mullins
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued an order granting Parties'
Stipulated Protective Order in the case captioned LISA MULLINS, on
behalf of herself and on behalf of a Class of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GC SERVICES Limited Partnership,
a Delaware Limited Partnership, Defendant. Case No.
8:17-cv-01601-CJC (JDEx). (C.D. Cal.).

Having reviewed the Parties' Stipulated Protective Order, the Court
grants the proposed Stipulated Protective Order submitted by the
Parties except to the extent it is contrary to the Local Rules of
this Court, in particular, Local Rule 79-5, which governs all
procedures for filing or seeking to file material under seal and to
the extent the Stipulated Protective Order purports to govern the
handling of any materials during trial, which shall be controlled
by the procedures directed by the District Court Judge.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yafkh7uu from Leagle.com.

Lisa Mullins, on behalf of herself and on behalf of a Class of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by George
Andrew Aloupas -- gaa@quintlaw.com -- Quintilone and Associates &
Richard E. Quintilone, II -- req@quintlaw.com -- Quintilone and
Associates.

GC Services LP, a Delaware Limited Partnership, Defendant,
represented by Joseph S. Leventhal -- joseph.leventhal@dinsmore.com
-- Dinsmore and Shohl LLP.


HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Judge Refuses to Pause Class Action Case
----------------------------------------------------------
Gene Maddaus, writing for Variety, reported that a judge denied
Harvey Weinstein's request to put a class action lawsuit on hold
pending the outcome of his criminal trial.

Ten women have sued Weinstein in federal court in the Southern
District of New York, accusing him of violating the federal sex
trafficking statute. The suit also alleges that an array of
Weinstein Co. board members and employees helped facilitate his
conduct, amounting to a racketeering enterprise. In November,
Weinstein's attorneys asked Judge Alvin Hellerstein to pause the
case, arguing that he would have to assert his 5th Amendment right
not to incriminate himself if deposed.

Hellerstein rejected that motion, allowing the case to proceed.
Weinstein is set to file a motion to dismiss by Jan. 28, and a
hearing on the motion is set for the afternoon of March 7, the same
day that Weinstein is due in state court on his criminal case.

Judge Hellerstein has already dismissed the class action once,
ruling in September that it did not adequately state its claims.
The judge allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint,
which they did.

The judge also denied a plaintiffs' motion to prevent the
disclosure of emails between Weinstein and his accusers.
Weinstein's lawyers obtained the emails through the Weinstein Co.
bankruptcy process, and have sought permission to use them in
defending him in his criminal and civil cases. Hellerstein had
earlier issued a protective order requiring Weinstein's lawyers to
consult with the plaintiffs' attorneys before disclosing any
emails, but the judge declined the plaintiffs' request to extend
the order.

"Judge Hellerstein stated to Mr. Weinstein's counsel that the
motion for stay was premature in light of the pending motions to
dismiss the Amended Complaint. Judge Hellerstein asked Mr.
Weinstein's counsel to file any motion to dismiss by January 28.
While the motion is marked denied, the Judge did not actually rule
on the merits of the motion to stay. It was clear that Judge
Hellerstein was not willing to get into the merits of a stay as the
case is only at the pleading stage and could very well be dismissed
in the coming months." [GN]


HERTZ CORPORATION: Aiyekusibe Sues Over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Bamidele Aiyekusibe, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated who consent to their inclusion v. The Hertz
Corporation, Case No. 2:18-cv-00816 (M.D. Fla., December 13, 2018),
is brought against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendant misclassified Plaintiffs and putative Class members
as "Exempt" and as such, did not receive a premium for any overtime
hours worked, and no overtime compensation under the FLSA for hours
that they worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per
workweek, notes the complaint.

The Plaintiff, Bamidele Aiyekusibe worked for Defendant from
November, 2017 until his termination on or about November 8, 2018,
where his job title was "Function Manager"; aka "Functional
Manager" as well as under the title of "Location Manager".

The Defendant Hertz Corporation is a for-profit corporation, which
owns and operates Hertz rental car facilities and locations across
the United States at airports and other non-airport locations, with
its principle place of business at 8501 Williams Road, Estero,
Florida 33928. Defendant Hertz Corporation can be served through
its registered agent, CT Corporation System, 1200 S. Pine Island
Road, Plantation, FL 33324. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
      FELDMAN WILLIAMS PLLC
      6940 W. Linebaugh Ave. #101
      Tampa, FL 33625
      Tel: (813) 639-9366
      Fax: (813) 639-9376
      E-mail: mitch@feldmanwilliams.com


JOE & THE JUICE: Faces Class Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Joe & The Juice US
Holdings. The case is styled as Alain Nelson de Villiers, an
individual, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Joe & The Juice US Holdings, a
corporation, Joe & The Juice New York, LLC a limited liability
company, Does 1 to 50 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC19573045
(Cal. Super. Ct., January 23, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as unfair
competition filed pursuant to the California Business and
Professions Code.

JOE & THE JUICE franchises and operates a juice bar chain. The
company also offers shakes, handmeals, shots, sandwich, and
coffee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
   Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik
   2255 Calle Clara
   La Jolla, CA 92037-3107
   Tel: (858) 551-1223
   Fax: (858) 551-1232
   Email: norm@bamlawca.com



JPMORGAN CHASE: Alishaev Suit Alleges Commodity Exchange Act Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuri Alishaev, Abraham Jeremias, and Morris Jeremias, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., John Edmonds, Michael Thomas Nowak, Robert Gottlieb, and John
Doe Nos. 1-18, Case No. 1:18-cv-11629 (S.D. N.Y., December 12,
2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act.

This case stems from the Defendants' unlawful and intentional
manipulation of pricing for precious metals futures contracts on
the commodities markets through "spoofing," i.e., the illegal
practice of "bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid
or offer before execution," gold and silver futures contracts on
the Commodity Exchange, Inc. ("COMEX"), and palladium and platinum
futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"), as
well as options on these futures contracts, during the period of
October 9, 2009, through at least December 31, 2015 (the "Class
Period"). During the Class Period, the Defendants routinely engaged
in multiple fraudulent transactions on the NYMEX and COMEX, which
were cancelled before execution, but which deceived the Plaintiffs
and the Class members to trade at prices that were unlawfully
manipulated by the Defendants, notes the complaint.

The Plaintiff Yuri Alishaev is a citizen of Monsey, New York. He
transacted in COMEX and NYMEX gold, silver, platinum, and palladium
futures contracts at artificially inflated prices.

The Plaintiff Abraham Jeremias is a citizen of Brooklyn, New York.
He transacted in COMEX and NYMEX gold, silver, platinum, and
palladium futures contracts at artificially inflated prices.

The Plaintiff Morris Jeremias is a citizen of Brooklyn, New York.
He transacted in COMEX and NYMEX gold, silver, platinum, and
palladium futures contracts at artificially inflated prices.

The Defendant JPM is a financial services company and investment
bank whose principal place of business is 270 Park Avenue, New
York, New York, 10007. JPM offers investment banking services to
individuals, institutions, and businesses throughout the world.
Throughout the class period, JPM employed Defendants Edmonds, Nowak
and John Does 1-18 as precious metals traders. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Mark D. Smilow, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      1500 Broadway, Suite 1601
      New York, NY 10036
      Tel: (212) 682-3025
      Fax: (212) 682-3010
      E-mail: msmilow@weisslawllp.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Braxton Appeals Ruling in Senegal Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Braxton, Forest Busby, Joshua Garnier, Quincy Goudeau and
Karl D. Graham filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
styled JEROME SENEGAL, ERIKA WILLIAMS, BRENT GRIFFIN, IRVIN NASH,
AMANDA JASON, and KELLIE FARRISH, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Case No.
1:18-cv-06006, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement
entered into by the parties to resolve the lawsuit.

The Settlement provides meaningful programmatic relief to increase
opportunities for a Class of African American and Black Financial
Advisors, employed by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, and JP
Morgan Securities, LLC, within Chase Wealth Management; a $19.5
Settlement Fund for Class Members Monetary Awards, attorneys' fees,
and Service Awards; and a $4.5 million Diversity and Reserve Fund
for Diversity Initiatives, Supplemental Monetary Awards, and
Administrative Costs.

Six current and former employees at the largest U.S. bank filed
what they asked to be a class action, alleging discrimination
that's "uniform and national in scope."  Instead of fighting it in
court, the Bank agreed to pay $19.5 million to the members of the
class.

The appellate case is captioned as Matthew Braxton, et al. v.
Jerome Senegal, et al., Case No. 19-1141, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript information sheet is due today, February 1, 2019;
      and

   -- Appellant's brief is due on or before February 27, 2019,
      for Matthew Braxton, Forest Busby, Joshua Garnier, Quincy
      Goudeau and Karl D. Graham.[BN]

Appellants MATTHEW BRAXTON, FOREST BUSBY, JOSHUA GARNIER, QUINCY
GOUDEAU and KARL D. GRAHAM are represented by:

          Benjamin L. Hall, III, Esq.
          HALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          530 Lovett Boulevard
          Houton, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 942-9600

Plaintiffs JEROME SENEGAL, ERIKA WILLIAMS, BRENT GRIFFIN, IRVIN
NASH and AMANDA JASON, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Linda Debra Friedman, Esq.
          STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD.
          303 W. Madison Street
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 431-0888
          E-mail: lfriedman@sfltd.com

Defendant-Appellee J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., is represented
by:

          Brad S. Karp, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019-6064
          Telephone: (212) 373-3316
          E-mail: bkarp@paulweiss.com


JUDICIAL CORRECTION: 11th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in Thurman
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the case captioned INDA
THURMAN and COURTNEE CARROLL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JUDICIAL
CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., and CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES,
INC., Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-14450. (11th Cir.)/

Plaintiffs-Appellants Linda Thurman and Courtnee Carroll appeal
from the district court's denial of their motion for partial
summary judgment and grant of Defendants-Appellees Judicial
Correctional Services, Inc. (JCS) and Correctional Healthcare
Companies, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.  

Plaintiff Courtnee Carroll received three tickets in Montgomery for
failing to use a child restraint, switching tags, and driving
without a license. In May 2010, Carroll pleaded guilty to all
charges. The municipal court imposed $25 fines for the first two
offenses and a $75 fine for the latter offense. The court also
imposed $113 in court costs for each offense. Rather than pay the
fees and fines in full at one time, Carroll opted for a payment
plan.

The court's order regarding the three tickets state that the court
referred Carroll to JCS.

Carroll and a JCS employee each signed the order but the signature
block for the municipal court judge remained blank. A separate JCS
document entitled Reporting for Probation instructed Carroll not to
contact the court with any questions about her case but to contact
her probation officer. Carroll did not appeal the obligations set
forth in the order of probation in state court and, instead,
Carroll paid off her financial obligations in January 2011.

Plaintiff Linda Thurman received a citation in Montgomery for
failing to possess or display insurance. The municipal court
ordered Thurman to pay $279 in court costs for this offense. Rather
than pay the costs in full at one time, Thurman opted for a payment
plan.

Thurman signed an Order of Probation issued on the municipal
court's letterhead. The order directed Thurman to pay $279 in court
costs for her infraction and to pay $140 per month on any amount
she owed. The order contained the same probation conditions as
those in Carroll's order, including the obligation to pay JCS a $10
set-up fee and $40 per month while on probation. Thurman and a JCS
employee signed the order of probation. Municipal court Judge
Hayes's last name was handwritten on the order, along with a set of
initials. Thurman did not appeal the obligations set forth in the
order of probation in state court. In August 2012, Thurman paid off
her financial obligations under the probation order. Like Carroll,
Thurman also received a JCS document entitled Reporting for
Probation instructing her not to contact the court with any
questions about her case but to contact her probation officer.

The Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint as a putative
class action alleging both diversity and federal question
jurisdiction. As relevant on appeal, the Plaintiffs asked the
district court to declare: (1) JCS violated state and federal law
by commanding probationers to pay fines and fees pursuant to
documents that were not lawful orders of probation (2) JCS violated
state and federal law by commanding or coercing money payments from
individuals above the relevant statutory maximums (3) JCS violated
state and federal law by imposing probation for periods longer than
the relevant statutory maximums (4) JCS was unjustly enriched by
its conduct and (5) JCS obstructed justice and violated Plaintiffs'
equal protection rights.  

Regarding the unjust enrichment claims, the district court
determined they were also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Plaintiffs contend Rooker-Feldman does not apply for two
reasons. First, the Plaintiffs contend they are not seeking review
of a state court decision. Second, the Plaintiffs argue the
Defendants obstructed access to meaningful state court review.

Are the Plaintiffs' orders of probation state court orders?

First, the Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in
concluding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred their claims because
they are not seeking review of a state court decision. The
Plaintiffs contend the orders of probation are not valid orders
because a judge did not sign the documents ordering them to pay
probation fees. The Plaintiffs conclude, if the orders are not
signed by a judge, they are incomplete and therefore cannot be
final judgments subject to Rooker-Feldman.

In response, the Defendants contend Rooker-Feldman applies because
the Plaintiffs' claims require this Court to determine whether the
orders of probation were valid based on Alabama state law, which is
precisely the action the Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a state court order.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. The doctrine prevents the lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state
court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced. The doctrine bars federal
jurisdiction where the issue before the federal court is
inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment so that (1)
the success of the federal claim would effectively nullify the
state court judgment, or that (2) the federal claim would succeed
only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues.

By all appearances, the probation orders the Plaintiffs seek to
invalidate are state court orders. The documents are titled Order
of Probation. The documents are printed on Municipal Court of
Montgomery, AL letterhead. The documents state, "by virtue of the
authority vested in me as a Municipal Court Judge. I hereby order."
The Plaintiffs signed the documents acknowledging they received a
copy of this ORDER. And perhaps most critically, the Plaintiffs
conceded at oral argument that if the probation orders were signed
by a judge, the orders would be valid probation orders.

The Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief and claim for unjust
enrichment expressly rest on the Defendants' enforcement of state
court orders and require this Court to conclude that those orders
are not lawful orders of probation without a signature. Such a
request is precisely what Rooker-Feldman proscribes because it
complains of injuries caused by state-court judgments and invites
review and rejection of those judgments. Accordingly, the district
court properly held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Did the Plaintiffs have a reasonable opportunity to raise their
federal claim in state court?

The Plaintiffs argue Rooker-Feldman is not applicable because JCS
obstructed the Plaintiffs' access to state court review when JCS
included the following language in its Reporting for Probation
document: "The following person will be your probation officer. All
questions concerning your case should be directed to him/her. Do
not contact the Municipal Court they will be unable to help you."

The Plaintiffs argue this language discouraged them from contacting
the municipal court and was tantamount to a warning not to file an
appeal with it.

In response, the Defendants argue the statement was not designed to
discourage an appeal but rather to communicate that JCS was
better-positioned to answer the probationer's questions about
probation. The Defendants argue further, even if the evidence
supported discouragement, discouraging the exercise of legal
process does not establish that the discouraged party lacked
meaningful access to the process.

Here, the Plaintiffs do not assert that they did not have a chance
to present their claims in state court or that their claims could
not have been decided by a state court. They merely contend the
language in the document from JCS was effectively suppressive. The
Plaintiffs failed to explain how the instruction, "Do not contact
the Municipal Court they will be unable to help you," deprived them
of a reasonable opportunity to contest the probation fees, given
that the instruction and the document more broadly makes no
reference to a probationer's ability to appeal, let alone a state
court's ability to decide such an appeal. Instead, the document
instructs probationers to report to JCS offices to meet with his or
her probation officer, identifies the probation officer, and
provides the date, time, and amount of fees and fines due at the
appointment. Reading the instruction in this context makes clear
the instruction is about contacting a probation officer with
questions, not about a probationer's opportunity to appeal the
conditions of one's probation.

Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs failed to raise their
challenge to the probation fees on direct appeal and now belatedly
attempt to litigate their claim in federal court by relying on
language in a document that does not address whether the claim
"could have been decided by the state court.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb22hasr from Leagle.com.

Wilson Franklin Green, for Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Leon Jackson, for Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher Boyce Hood -- james.hood@hoodlaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

William Lewis Garrison, Jr., 2224 1st Avenue North, Birmingham,
Alabama 35203, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Larry Logsdon, P.O. Box 530910, Birmingham, AL 35253, for
Defendant-Appellee.

Anna Maurine Carroll, 2224 1st Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama
35203, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


LEVINBOOK LAW: Faces Henriquez FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Levinbook Law
Firm, P.C. The case is styled as Juan R. Henriquez, Jr.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. The Levinbook Law Firm, P.C., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00452 (E.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Levinbook Law Firm, P.C. is a law firm in Hauppauge, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


LIBERTY HEALTH: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP announces that
purchasers of Liberty Health Sciences Inc. (OTC: LHSIF) filed a
class action complaint against the company for alleged violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 between June 28, 2018
and December 3, 2018. Liberty Health produces and distributes
medical cannabis primarily in the State of Florida.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/liberty-health-sciences-inc/

Liberty Health Accused of Scheming to Benefit Its Insiders at
Shareholders' Expense

According to the complaint, Liberty engaged in a scheme with
cannabis distributor Aphria Inc. by making fraudulent acquisitions
to provide undue benefits to both companies’ insiders. The
illicit dealings came to light on December 3, 2018, when a research
report claimed that Aphria was "part of a scheme orchestrated by a
network of insiders to divert funds away from shareholders into
their own pockets."  The article further detailed an investigation
into Aphria's latest poor quality investments, including an
abandoned building on dilapidated property in Jamaica. On this
news, Liberty's stock fell nearly 34% on December 4, 2018. Then, on
December 6, 2018, when another article revealed that Liberty
officials ran multiple pump and dump schemes, Liberty's stock fell
7% further, closing at $0.66 per share on December 7, 2018.

Liberty Health Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leo Kandinov at
(800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the shareholder
information form on the firm’s website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP is a nationally recognized leader in shareholder
rights law. The firm represents individual and institutional
investors in shareholder derivative and securities class action
lawsuits, and has helped its clients realize more than $1 billion
of value for themselves and the companies in which they have
invested.

CONTACT: Leo Kandinov, Esq.
Robbins Arroyo LLP
5040 Shoreham Place
San Diego, CA 92122
LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com
(619) 525-3990 or Toll Free (800) 350-6003
www.robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


LITTLE RIVER: Glenn Files Class Action in W.D. Texas
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Little River
Healthcare Holdings, LLC. The case is styled as Ernie Glenn, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Little River Healthcare Holdings, LLC, Compass Pointe Holdings,
LLC, Timberlands Healthcare, LLC, King's Daughters Pharmacy, LLC,
Rockdale Blackhawk, LLC, Little River Healthcare - Physicians of
King's Daughters, LLC, Cantera Way Ventures, LLC and Little River
Healthcare Management, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-06001-rbk (W.D.
Tex., January 23, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Recovery of
money/property.

Little River Healthcare Holdings, LLC, is an acute care rural
healthcare hospital, which offers surgical, imaging, and radiology
services. The company was founded in 1974 and is based in Rockdale,
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeff P. Prostok, Esq.
   Forshey & Prostok, LLP
   777 Main St., Ste. 1290
   Ft. Worth, TX 76102
   Tel: (817) 877-8855
   Email: jprostok@forsheyprostok.com



MAHOPAC FOOD: Escobar Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Santos Arnulfo Escobar, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Mahopac Food Corp. (f/d/b/a
Associated f/d/b/a Pioneer) and Darhan Darhan, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00510 (E.D. N.Y., January 25, 2019) seeks unpaid minimum
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law ("NYLL"), and
the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the New York
Commissioner of Labor, including applicable liquidated damages,
interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiff Escobar and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours
per week without providing the minimum wage and overtime
compensation required by federal and state law and regulations,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Escobar is a former employee of Defendants.

Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a supermarket, located at
530-86 86th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11209 under the name "Associated"
and formerly known as "Pioneer".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE &ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Allen Files Suit for Negligence
-------------------------------------------------------
Stacey K. Allen and Matt Jordan, individually and on behalf of a
class of all others similarly situated v. Marriott International,
Inc., and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide LLC, Case No.
3:18-cv-02050 (D. Conn., December 13, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for negligence.

Between at least 2014 and September 2018, the Defendants were
subject to one of the longest-running and largest data breaches in
history. During this time period, intruders gained access to and
had years of unabated access to the personally identifiable
information and Payment Card Data of approximately 500 million
guests who made a reservation at one of Marriott’s Starwood
properties.

The Plaintiff Stacey K. Allen is a citizen of the State of Georgia.
During the Class Period, Plaintiff Allen provided Defendants her
PII and Payment Card Data for the rental of hotel rooms though the
Starwood reservation system.

The Plaintiff Matt Jordan is a citizen of the State of
Pennsylvania. During the Class Period, Plaintiff Jordan provided
Defendants his PII and Payment Card Data for the rental of hotel
rooms though the Starwood reservation system.

The Defendant Marriott International, Inc., a Montgomery County,
Maryland resident, is the world's largest hotel chain. Marriott is
a Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal place of
business at 10400 Fernwood Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20817.

The Defendant Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC is an
indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Marriott. On September 23,
2016, Marriott completed the acquisition of Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide, LLC, formerly known as Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
      SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
      The Helmsley Building
      230 Park Ave., 17th Floor
      New York, NY 10169
      Tel: (212) 223-6444
      Fax: (212) 223-6334
      E-mail: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com


MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES: Kessler Topaz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP announces that a
securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado against Maxar
Technologies Inc. (NYSE:  MAXR) ("Maxar") on behalf of purchasers
of Maxar securities between March 29, 2018 and January 7, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

Important Deadline:  Investors who purchased Maxar securities
during the Class Period may, no later than March 15, 2019, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class. For
additional information or to learn how to participate in this
litigation please visit
www.ktmc.com/maxar-securities-class-action.

According to the complaint, Maxar is a leading global provider of
advanced space technology solutions for commercial and government
markets including satellites, Earth imagery, geospatial data and
analytics.  On October 5, 2017, Maxar (doing business under the
name MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. at the time)
purchased DigitalGlobe, Inc. ("DigitalGlobe"), an American
commercial vendor of space imagery and geospatial content, for $2.4
billion dollars.  As part of the purchase, Maxar acquired
DigitalGlobe's satellites, called the "WorldView Legion," including
the WorldView-4 satellite ("WorldView-4").  WorldView-4 is equipped
with control moment gyros ("CMGs"), which are attitude control
devices generally used in spacecraft attitude control systems.

The Class Period commences on March 29, 2018, when Maxar filed an
annual report on a Form 40-F with the SEC, announcing Maxar's
financial and operating results for the year ended December 31,
2017.  Appended to the annual report was Management's discussion
and analysis ("MD&A"), dated February 22, 2018.  The MD&A stated
that Maxar acquired "intangible assets, consisting of customer
relationships, backlog, technology, software, and other
intellectual property" in its 2017 acquisition of DigitalGlobe.
More specifically, the MD&A stated that Maxar incurred $1.439
billion in intangible assets related to the acquisition of
DigitalGlobe, and an additional $1.668 billion in goodwill.

According to the complaint, on August 7, 2018, Spruce Point Capital
Management ("Spruce Point") published a research report on Maxar.
The report alleged, in part, that Maxar "has pulled one of the most
aggressive accounting schemes Spruce Point has ever seen to inflate
Non-IFRS earnings by 79%." Specifically, the report asserted that
Maxar used its acquisition of DigitalGlobe "to inflate [its]
intangible assets" and had "amended its post-retirement benefit
plan to book one-time gains" in a manner that "was not fully
disclosed across its investor communications."  Following this
news, the price of Maxar common stock fell $5.97 per share, or
13.44%, to close at $38.44 on August 7, 2018.

Then, on January 7, 2019, Maxar disclosed that WorldView-4
experienced a failure in its CMGs, preventing it from collecting
imagery due to the loss of an axis of stability. It was further
disclosed that the WorldView-4 satellite will likely not be
recoverable and will no longer produce usable imagery. Following
this news, Maxar's stock price fell $5.69 per share, or 48.5%, over
the subsequent two trading days, to close at $6.03 per share on
January 8, 2019.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Maxar improperly inflated the value of its
intangible assets, among other accounting improprieties; (ii)
Maxar's highly-valued WorldView-4 was equipped with CMGs that were
faulty and/or ill-suited for their designed and intended purpose;
and (iii) as a result, Maxar's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

If you wish to discuss this securities fraud class action lawsuit
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests with respect to this litigation, please contact Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check (James Maro, Jr., Esq. or Adrienne Bell,
Esq.) at (888) 299–7706 or (610) 667–7706, or via e-mail at
info@ktmc.com.

Maxar investors may, no later than March 15, 2019, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member.  A lead plaintiff is
a representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation.  In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class.  Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world.  The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars).  The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information
about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visit www.ktmc.com.

CONTACT:

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
James Maro, Jr., Esq.
Adrienne Bell, Esq.
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
(888) 299-7706
(610) 667-7706
info@ktmc.com [GN]


MERIVALE PTY: Facing Class Action Threat Over "Underpayments"
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Marin-Guzman, writing for Financial Review, reported that
Merivale is facing a potential class action over claims its
billion-dollar hospitality empire was underpaying workers in breach
of workplace laws for years.

Law firm Adero has confirmed it is investigating legal action
against Merivale after alleging the company misclassified workers
and failed to pay them the legal hourly rate even under its
long-expired WorkChoices enterprise agreement.

Adero principal Rory Markham said the firm's three months of due
diligence on Merivale had indicated "potential systemic
underpayments of employees since 2013".

Merivale, whose boss is multi-millionarie Justin Hemmes, is
reviewing its workforce and operational arrangements to adapt to
the award's higher pay and conditions.

He said the firm was accepting class action registrations to
recover any underpayments for all current and former Merivale
employees.

"We have received a surprisingly high level of interest from
Merivale employees expressing their frustration with low, flat
rates of pay while working predominantly on nights, weekends and
public holidays," Mr. Markham said.

He said the firm believed Merivale's pay rates left many workers
"significantly worse off than they otherwise would be under the
hospitality modern award".

The potential class action is a double hit for Merivale at a time
when it is already reviewing the viability of its business
practices after Fair Work on Monday ordered it to transition from
its expired EA to the more costly hospitality award by March 5.

The 2007 EA legally allowed Merivale to not pay 3000 workers full
overtime, evening, weekend and public holiday rates for almost a
decade, giving its more than 70 pubs, hotels and restaurants in
Sydney a significant commercial advantage.

However, even with an expired agreement, the Fair Work Act still
requires employers to apply the base hourly rates in an industry
award.

Adero is understood to be alleging Merivale only increased casuals'
base rates to the award level of an introductory hospitality
employee, a classification that only runs for three months, instead
of the level 1 classification with 25 per cent casual loading.

United Voice, the hospitality union, raised similar concerns in its
case to terminate the EA on behalf of two employees.

Despite working at Merivale significantly longer than three months,
the two workers were allegedly paid introductory rates their entire
service -- leaving them 68¢ an hour worse off.

The difference allegedly climbed to $1 an hour for level 2
casuals.

The union also alleged Merivale had paid casuals the same for
weekday and weekend work since 2016, despite the EA saying workers
should received a higher rate on weekends, and had also paid below
the EA's 140 per cent rate for public holidays.

Adero's potential lawsuit is understood to raise complex and
largely untested legal issues over rates owed in expired agreements
made before the Fair Work Act.

A Merivale spokeswoman said claims of illegal underpayments were
"absolutely incorrect" and that even its lowest base rate was
higher than the award's first three classifications.

A Fair Work Ombudsman wage audit in mid-2018 found that Merivale
was compliant with its legal obligations.

The spokeswoman said Adero was relying on "a creative, novel and
strained interpretation of the industrial instrument, which is
contrary to the FWO's interpretation".

"Given the absence of any underpayment, the only winners out of any
proposed class action, as always, will be lawyers and litigation
funds," she said.

She urged employees to contact Merivale "where any queries can be
dealt with confidentially and within a guaranteed 14 days".

Rosters to change

Merivale, whose boss is multimillionarie Justin Hemmes, is
reviewing its workforce and operational arrangements to adapt to
the award's higher pay and conditions.

The spokeswoman said the review would focus on shifts and rosters
"in certain venues at certain times/days of the week, how staff can
move between venues within shifts and how we can accommodate many
casual staff who have individual shift requests that the new award
doesn't contemplate or allow".

"To be clear, these are in-venue administrative and operational
reviews and are not assessments as to the ongoing financial
viability of any individual Merivale venue or the business as a
whole."

Adero's potential Merivale class action is the first indication
that the Canberra-based law firm is turning its sights to alleged
underpayments in the retail and hospitality sector.

In the past six months the firm has launched multimillion-dollar
class actions against BHP, Hays Recruitment, and other labour hire
firms over alleged underpayments in the mining industry. [GN]


MISSOURI: 8th Cir. Flips Denial of Sovereign Immunity From Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, issued an Order
reversing the District Court's judgment denying Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned Shondel Church; Randall Lee Dalton;
Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. State of Missouri; Michael L. Parson, in his official capacity
as Governor of the State of Missouri, Defendants-Appellants,
Michael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A.
Crista Hogan, Defendants. No. 17-2857. (8th Cir.).

The plaintiffs alleged that the State has failed to meet its
constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with
meaningful representation. The plaintiffs allege: The State's
indigent defense budget is shockingly inadequate. Without
sufficient funding, overstretched and under-resourced MSPD
attorneys are forced to handle far too many cases and to devote far
too few hours to each case. They argue they have suffered and
continue to suffer the denial of adequate counsel at critical
stages of their criminal cases due to these systemic caseload
problems among MSPD attorney.

They seek a declaratory judgment stating that their right to
counsel is being violated and an order enjoining the ongoing
violation of their rights and requiring Defendants to propose a
remedial plan to the court.

The State of Missouri invokes sovereign immunity for itself. This
court reviews de novo questions of sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without
its consent. The Eleventh Amendment is one particular
exemplification of that immunity.

The plaintiffs assert both a waiver and a common-law exception,
contending that sovereign immunity does not apply in Missouri when
a plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief to enforce the
State's affirmative duty or obligation. Plaintiffs assert a
recognized common law exception to sovereign immunity.  

The State counters, with arguments based on the law or equity
phrase in the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court's words in
an Eleventh Amendment case that sovereign immunity applies
regardless of whether a private plaintiff's suit is for monetary
damages or some other type of relief.  The have often made it clear
that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant
to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.

The plaintiffs argue that even if sovereign immunity bars
prospective injunctive relief, the State can be sued directly for
equitable relief for failing to comply with a federal
constitutional obligation, here, the Sixth Amendment. Congress may
also abrogate state sovereign immunity by providing an enforcement
mechanism for constitutional violations: the courts have held also
that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the
States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been
preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress
may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant
to its Section 5 enforcement power. By imposing explicit limits on
the powers of the States and granting Congress the power to enforce
them, the Amendment fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution. When Congress enacts
appropriate legislation to enforce this Amendment, federal
interests are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over
the States which would be otherwise unauthorized by the
Constitution.

The governor asserts sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs argue that
sovereign immunity does not shield the governor because he is an Ex
parte Young defendant. Under the Ex Parte Youngdoctrine, a private
party can sue a state officer in his official capacity to enjoin a
prospective action that would violate federal law. The doctrine
rests on the premise less delicately called a fiction that when a
federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than
refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for
sovereign-immunity purposes.

Ruling that the governor is an Ex parte Young defendant, the
district court identified three connections to the enforcement of
the State's Sixth Amendment obligation to provide indigent
defendants with adequate counsel.

The district court noted the governor's general-enforcement
authority. The Missouri Constitution says, The supreme executive
power shall be vested in a governor and The governor shall take
care that the laws are distributed and faithfully executed, and
shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.

The district court concluded that these provisions make the
Missouri governor like the Georgia governor in Luckey v. Harris,
860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). There, indigent defendants sought
injunctive relief against a governor to remedy Sixth Amendment
violations. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. The Eleventh Circuit held
that Georgia's governor had some connection and was an appropriate
party against whom prospective relief could be ordered because:

According to the Georgia constitution, the governor is responsible
for law enforcement in that state and is charged with executing the
laws faithfully. The governor further has the residual power to
commence criminal prosecutions, and has the final authority to
direct the Attorney General to institute and prosecute on behalf of
the state.

The governor here argues that this court's Calzone decision trumps
Luckey. The Calzone plaintiff sought an injunction against the
Missouri governor in a challenge to the constitutionality of a
state statute. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 869. This court held that
neither the statute nor the Missouri Constitution's
general-enforcement provision make the governor an Ex parte Young
defendant: "No provision in Chapter 304 or the statutes defining
his executive authority specifically authorizes the governor to
enforce the vehicle inspection statutes. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Section
26.010-.225. The Missouri Constitution confers upon the governor
the duty to take care that the laws are distributed and faithfully
executed, Mo. Const. art. IV, Section 2, but such a general
executive responsibility is an insufficient connection to the
enforcement of a statute to avoid the Eleventh Amendment."

In Bruning, the Nebraska governor and attorney general were Ex
parte Young defendants in a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state
constitutional amendment. Bruning, 455 F.3d at 864. This court
found a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the amendment
because the Governor and the Attorney General have broad powers to
enforce the State's Constitution and statutes.

The decision means that a governor's general-enforcement authority
is some connection if that authority gives the governor methods of
enforcement. Nor does the governor here. The district court's
reliance on section 27.030 is insufficient because that provision
covers aiding prosecution, not defense. The governor's
general-enforcement authority is not some connection to enforcement
of the State's Sixth Amendment obligation.  

The district court ruled the governor had some connection because
he appoints all seven members of the MSPD Commission. The district
court cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Eu,where a bar
association sued a governor to challenge a state statute that
limited the number of judges in a county. Eu, 979 F.2d at 699. The
governor had a duty to appoint judges to any newly-created judicial
positions, which the Ninth Circuit considered to be a specific
connection to the challenged statute, placing the governor within
Ex parte Young's scope.

Invoking Eu, the plaintiffs argue: although the Governor alone
cannot solve the indigent defense crisis in this state, his role in
the ongoing violation of those Sixth Amendment rights through his
appointment of MSPD Commissioners, in addition to his ability to
profoundly affect MSPD caseload, is sufficient for Ex parte Young
purposes.

The district court concluded the governor met the some connection
requirement because of his appropriation-reduction authority:

Governor Greitens's predecessor, Governor Nixon, affirmatively used
his executive authority to withhold roughly $7 million in funding
allocated by the Missouri Legislature to the MSPD, thereby
demonstrating an even more direct connection to the challenged
conduct. Governor Greitens has since upheld Governor Nixon's
withholding of funds allocated to the MSPD.

In addition to arguing that his appropriation-reduction authority
is not some connection, the governor asserts legislative immunity.

State legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for
their legislative acts. Officials outside the legislative branch
are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative
functions. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the
act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing
it. The act must be legislative in substance, bearing all the
hallmarks of traditional legislation and in form, involving
integral steps in the legislative process.

The district court, however, ruled that it was premature to apply
legislative immunity because it is unclear what the terms of any
injunction entered would include. That finding is subject to change
should the Plaintiffs request any remedies that would violate Gov.
Greitens' immunity from acts integral to the legislative process.

The governor counters: legislative immunity is an immunity from
suit, not merely an immunity from the award of certain types of
relief. The district court's rationale would enable any plaintiff
to defeat legislative immunity merely by making a vague and
indefinite request for injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Supreme Court's decision in Consumers Union addresses this
issue. There, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in addition to its
inherent authority, used its statutory authority to promulgate a
professional ethics code. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 721. The
Virginia legislature vested in the court virtually its entire
legislative or regulatory power over the legal profession. The
court also had the power to enforce its professional ethics code.


The plaintiffs believed that the code's provision on attorney
advertisement violated the First Amendment. They sued the Virginia
Court and its chief justice in his personal and official capacity
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, seeking a declaration that the
provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against its
enforcement. The chief justice and the court asserted legislative
immunity. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Virginia court's
promulgation of the professional ethics code was a legislative act,
(2) the Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when
acting in their legislative capacity and (3) legislative immunity
applies to suits for equitable relief.  

The Supreme Court, however, did not apply legislative immunity: If
the sole basis for appellees' Section 1983 action against the
Virginia Court and its chief justice were the issuance of, or
failure to amend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would
foreclose suit against appellants. But the Court concluded that the
Virginia court's enforcement authority was a non-legislative act:
the Virginia Court performs more than a legislative role with
respect to the State Bar Code. It also hears appeals from lower
court decisions in disciplinary cases, a traditional adjudicative
task; and in addition, it has independent enforcement authority of
its own. For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were
proper defendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.

To the extent the plaintiffs claim that the governor's
general-enforcement authority and appointment authority are
non-legislative acts that lead to a constitutional violation, the
governor is subject to sovereign immunity for those acts because
they do not satisfy Ex parte Young.

That leaves as the sole basis for the plaintiffs' action against
the governor his appropriation reduction a legislative act meaning
legislative immunity forecloses suit against him. The Supreme Court
used the word suit, not remedy. This approach is consistent with
how the Supreme Court treats sovereign immunity: Sovereign immunity
does not merely constitute a defense to monetary liability or even
to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity from
suit.

Even if the governor's appropriation-reduction authority is not
shielded by sovereign immunity through Ex parte Young, legislative
immunity, a separate defense, forecloses suit against the governor.
Short of the exceptional case, it is unlikely that Ex Parte Young
is broad enough to abrogate legislative immunity and authorize suit
against a legislator acting in a purely legislative capacity.

The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydfhfz9a from Leagle.com.

Michael Desranleau Quinlan, 2526 Barrett Springs Dr, Ballwin, MO,
63021-3817, for Defendant-Appellant.

Charles Douglas Shull, 11 North Fifth StreetColumbia, MO 65201, for
Defendant-Appellant.

Anthony E. Rothert, 454 Whittier, St. Louis, MO 63108, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dean John Sauer, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jason D. Williamson, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Martinich-Sauter -- michael.martinich-sauter@ago.mo.gov --
for Defendant-Appellant.

Gillian R. Wilcox, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


MODERNMASTERS FINE: Dawson Files ADA Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Modernmasters Fine Art Brokerage, LLC is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled as Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Modernmasters Fine Art
Brokerage, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00677 (S.D. N.Y.,
January 23, 2019).

Modernmasters Fine Art Brokerage, LLC is in the Art Gallery,
Commercial business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal




MOURLOT COLLECTION: Dawson Suit in NY Asserts ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
Mourlot Collection, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Mourlot Collection, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00679 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

Mourlot Collection is an official partner of Artspace, the premier
marketplace for contemporary art for sale.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


MURCIA GROUP: Mazariegos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Enio L. Mazariegos and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. Murcia Group Inc. d/b/a Don Arturo Restaurant & Bar
and Alfredo Murcia, individually, Defendants, Case No.
0:19-cv-60209-RNS (S.D. Fla., January 24, 2019) seeks to recover
from Defendants minimum wages, overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, and the costs and reasonable attorney's fees under the
provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

While employed by the Defendants, Plaintiff worked more than 40
hours weekly, however he was not properly compensated for overtime
and regular hours as established by the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a covered employee for purposes of the Act.

Murcia Group Inc. d/b/a Don Arturo Restaurant & Bar is a Latin
restaurant specialized in Spanish, Cuban and Colombian traditional
food, having a place of business in Broward County, Florida.

Alfredo Murcia was and is now, the owner, president, and manager of
Defendant Corporation Don Arturo Restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Phone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


NATHAN HOROWICZ: Dawson Sues Antique Store for ADA Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Horowicz, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Nathan Horowicz, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00680 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

Nathan Horowicz, Inc. is an Antique store in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms TRO, Injunction Denial in Alves
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's Order denying Joseph
Aruanno's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary
Injunction in the appeals cases captioned RAYMOND ALVES; MICHAEL
CULBRETH; DERRICK SESSOMS; Individually and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, v. MERRIL MAIN, Ph.D., in his official
capacity as Clinical Director of the Special Treatment Unit;
COMMISSIONER NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; LYNN A.
KOVICH, in her official capacity as Assistant Commissioner and
Deputy Director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and
Addiction Services; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Appellant. No. 18-1691, 18-3039 (consolidated). (3rd Cir.).

Joseph Aruanno appeals from two orders of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, each of which denied
his post-judgment motions for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction and for appointment of a special master.

Aruanno is a civilly committed sexually violent predator and a
frequent litigant. The underlying matter (Alves) concerns a class
action on behalf of residents at New Jersey's Special Treatment
Unit (STU).  

Aruanno subsequently filed two post-judgment motions for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and for
appointment of a special master. The District Court denied the
first of those motions in an order entered on February 21, 2018.
Aruanno's timely appeal of that order was docketed at C.A. No.
18-1691. The District Court denied the second motion in an order
entered on August 1, 2018.  

Assuming the post-judgment motions were properly filed, the
District Court properly denied them.

The Court agrees with the District Court that they did not warrant
the extraordinary relief requested. The affidavits in support of
Aruanno's post-judgment motions contain a litany of alleged
constitutional violations on the part of the STU, ranging from a
refusal to grant daily visitation from family, loved ones, and
friends by DOC and DHS, to the policy and practice of locking
civilian residents in a cell for long periods of the day.

The District Court did not err in denying the motions, as the
conclusory statements in his affidavits do not indicate a strong
likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable injury that
would support injunctive relief.  

The Court will affirm the District Court's order.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's January 10, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7bruarh from Leagle.com.


NFL: Who Dat Nation Files Class-Action Lawsuit Over No-Call
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kristine Froeba, writing for Uptown Messenger, reported that Saints
fans have filed a lawsuit in state court to compel the commissioner
of the National Football League, Roger Goodell, to implement Rule
17, Section2, Article 1 and 3, which gives the commission the power
of "reversal of the game's result or rescheduling a game either
from the beginning or the point in which the extraordinary act
occurred."

The suit is in direct relation to the NFL's referee's no-call, or
refusal to flag, a PI, or pass interference, and helmet-on-helmet
violation -- witnessed by over 30 million people during Sunday's
Divisional game between the New Orleans Saints and the Los Angeles
Rams.

Civil District Court in New Orleans, located on Poydras Street, has
published a copy of the lawsuit on its online database, and local
attorneys are already discussing the outcome.

The caption of the lawsuit reads:

Badeaux, Tommy, New Orleans Saints Ticket Holders, New Orleans
Saints National Fan Base a/k/a the Who Dat Nation versus NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell, et al.

An observation by New Orleans attorney Duris Holmes is that the
NFL's attorney is usually the same attorney retained by the Bensons
and the Saints football team.

A Writ of Mandamus was also filed, "a writ directing a public
officer or a corporation or an officer thereof to perform" certain
duties. That duty for a corporation includes, "the performance of
other duties required by the corporate charter or bylaws," as
explained by leading attorney Duris Holmes via social media.

New Orleans social media is abuzz at the legal ramifications and is
already Monday morning quarterbacking the possible court rulings.

Due to jurisdictional issues the case will likely be removed to
federal court. [GN]


NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Seeks to Dismiss Defective Transmission Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
William Sassani at Legal News Line reported that an auto maker is
seeking to dismiss a class action lawsuit over allegations that
certain years of Nissan Altimas have defective transmissions.

Nissan North America filed the motion to dismiss plaintiff Robert
H. Weinberg's second amended class action lawsuit before the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division on Dec. 17.

In the 31-page motion filed by Nissan, the company argues that
Weinberg fails for several reasons to make a viable claim for a
class action. Nissan argues that Weinberg's express warranty claim
over an alleged defect in the vehicle design fails because the
warranty only applies to defects in workmanship and materials.  

Another reason given by Nissan is that Weinberg's claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not work because "Weinberg has not stated a
claim for breach of warranty under Illinois state law."

Additionally, it says that the breach of implied warranty of
mechantability claim made by Weinberg does not apply because the
claim is time-barred.

Weinberg had originally submitted a 26-page class action lawsuit
against Nissan North America on Oct. 25, 2018, regarding Nissan
Altima model years 2013-2015.

He alleged he purchased a brand-new 2013 Nissan Altima SL from a
dealership in Gurnee, Illinois, in 2012. While he owned the
vehicle, he alleges he "experienced problems" with the
transmission, which caused the vehicle to shudder. He alleges the
issue stemmed from a defective continuously variable automatic
transmission.

Weinberg alleges that he attempted to have the vehicle repaired at
a Nissan dealership while still in the authorized time frame of the
warranty. However, he alleges that Nissan did not fix the problem
and that Weinberg continues to have problems with his transmission.
Weinberg alleges that he did not get the full value of vehicle he
purchased.

Nissan North America is represented by Drinker Biddle and Reath in
Chicago and Dallas. Weinberg is represented by Barnow and
Associates in Chicago and Blood Hurst and O'Reardon in San Diego.
[GN]


NISSAN NORTH: Consolidation Bid Reply Due in Bashaw Moved to Feb. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CATHY BASHAW, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. and
NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-07292-HSG (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, has issued a
stipulated order modifying the briefing schedule for the
Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation and Appointment of Interim
Class Counsel.

On Nov. 30, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action
Complaint against Defendants Nissan North America. ("NNA") and
Nissan Motor.

On Jan. 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Consolidation and
Appointment of Interim Class Counsel which, among other things,
seeks consolidation of the action with Kerkorian v. Nissan North
America, Inc. et al., No. 4:18-cv-07815-HSG (N.D. Cal. filed Dec.
31, 2018).  The Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation is set for
hearing on March 14, 2019.

NNA's opposition or statement of nonopposition pursuant to Civil
L.R. 7-3(b) is currently due on Jan. 17, 2019, and the Plaintiff's
reply is currently due on Jan. 24, 2019.

The Plaintiff and NNA have met and conferred through the counsel
and have agreed to modify the briefing schedule for the Plaintiff's
Motion for Consolidation.  The stipulated modifications to the
briefing schedule will not alter the March 14, 2019 hearing date or
otherwise impact any other deadlines already set by the Court.

Through their respective counsel, the parties have stipulated, and
Judge Gilliam granted, that the briefing schedule for the
Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation will be modified as follows:
(i) the deadline for NNA's opposition or statement of nonopposition
will be extended to and including Feb. 7, 2019; and (ii) the
deadline for the Plaintiff's reply will be extended to and
including Feb. 28, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan 16, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1HOin5 from Leagle.com.

Cathy Bashaw, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Dashiell Smith --
jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Frederick J. Klorczyk,
III -- fklorczyk@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, P.A. & Lawrence
Timothy Fisher -- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Nissan North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew Jacob
Adler -- matthew.adler dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle Reath LLP.


NORTHERN LEASING: N.Y. App. Div. Affirms Class Certification Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First
Department, issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's
judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned BRADLEY C. ALDRICH, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., Defendants-Respondents.
8079, 602803/07. (N.Y. App. Div.).

The Plaintiffs appeals the Supreme Court denial of its motion to
strike defendant Jay Cohen's answer and for class certification,
partial summary judgment, and sanctions, and granted defendants'
cross motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs Michael
Arnold and Estela Salas's first cause of action, Salas and
plaintiff Bradley C. Aldrich's fourth cause of action, and all
plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action, unanimously modified,
on the law, to deny the cross motion as to Arnold's first, fifth,
and sixth causes of action, Aldrich's fourth, fifth, and sixth
causes of action, and Salas's fourth and fifth causes of action and
so much of her sixth cause of action as is based on lack of
notice.

The Plaintiffs allege that some of the business practices of
defendant Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. (NLS), a New York
corporation that leases out equipment such as machines used by
merchants to swipe credit cards, violate the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) and the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act (NYFRCA)
(General Business Law (GBL).

The Defendants may argue for the first time on appeal that the FCRA
preempts the NYFCRA, as this is a question of statutory
interpretation   However, on the merits, the argument is
unavailing. The FCRA does not prevent states from giving consumers
more protection than the federal statute affords.

The fourth through sixth causes of action allege violations of GBL
380-b(b). These causes of action asserted by plaintiff Aldrich
should not have been dismissed on the ground that Aldrich is a
Texan. Unlike GBL 349(a), GBL 380-b(b) is not, by its terms,
restricted to this State. Thus, it applies to NLS, a New York
business that requested consumer credit reports (CCRs) on non-New
Yorkers.

An issue of fact precludes summary dismissal of the fourth through
sixth causes of action asserted by plaintiff Salas, another Texan,
on the ground that Salas's CCR was requested by a non-New York
business. Defendants submitted an affidavit by NLS's Lina Kravic
saying that nonparty MBF Leasing, LLC (MBF), an Illinois entity,
accessed Salas's CCR. However, Salas submitted an affidavit saying
that NLS had accessed her CCR. The Court do not find that Kravic's
affidavit contradicts her deposition.

The Plaintiffs improperly raise the best evidence rule for the
first time on appeal.

The Plaintiffs argue that the defendants lacked a permissible
purpose for pulling Arnold's CCRs. This argument has merit insofar
as an issue of fact exists whether Arnold's signature on his
personal guaranty was forged. At his deposition, Arnold testified
that he signed only the Lease Acceptance" box not the Personal
Guaranty box. The boxes were on separate pages of the lease. By
contrast, Salas, to whom this argument also applies if NLS pulled
her CCR, testified that she signed only a one-page document; this
testimony raises no inference that Salas's signature on the
guaranty was forged. Plaintiffs' remaining contentions as to lack
of a permissible purpose are unavailing. It is permissible for a
person to run a credit search on the guarantor of a debt.

In view of this, as the first cause of action alleges that NLS
violated the FCRA by accessing plaintiffs' CCRs without a
permissible purpose and the sixth cause of action alleges that NLS
negligently violated the NYFRCA by obtaining plaintiffs' CCRs
without a permissible purpose and without providing the required
notice, Arnold's first and sixth causes of action should not have
been dismissed. However, Salas's first cause of action and sixth
cause of action to the extent it alleges impermissible purpose were
correctly dismissed.

The Defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claim that they
negligently violated GBL 380-b(b) by obtaining the plaintiffs' CCRs
without giving advance written notice (the fifth cause of action)
fails because the plaintiffs did not show that they sustained
actual damages as a result of the violation, as required by GBL
380-m. This argument also applies to the sixth cause of action,
which alleges a negligent violation of GBL 380-b(a) and (b), and,
because 15 USC Section 1681o imposes a similar requirement for
negligent violation of the FCRA, to the first cause of action.
However, the record on appeal, which does not include the expert
reports mentioned by the motion court and plaintiffs, is
insufficient to permit review of defendants' argument. Further, the
Court is loath to consider the argument because defendants did not
cross-appeal from the parts of the order adverse to them.

The insufficiency of the record also precludes summary judgment in
the plaintiffs' favor on the fifth cause of action.

The Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the fourth
cause of action willful violation of GBL 380-b[b] by obtaining CCRs
without giving the required notice, for which actual damages are
not required and punitive damages may be awarded, because it cannot
be said as a matter of law that defendants' conduct was reckless,
as opposed to merely careless.

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying class
certification on the fourth and fifth causes of action. Common
questions of law or fact do not predominate because it will be
necessary to look at each class member's lease/personal guaranty to
see if it gave advance notice that the member's CCR would be
accessed. NLS and its affiliated companies use more than 247
different forms of lease/personal guaranty.  

A full-text copy of the N.Y. App. Div.'s January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd4nhmpp from Leagle.com.

Chittur Law Offices, P.C., Ossining (Krishnan Chittur --
kchittur@chittur.com -- of counsel), for appellants.

Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, New York (Thomas J. Kavaler --
tkavaler@cahill.com -- of counsel), for respondents.


NYU LANGONE: Arroyo Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under NYLL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
IVAN ARROYO, for himself and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NYU LANGONE HOSPITALS, Case No. 150525/2019 (N.Y. Sup.,
New York Cty., January 18, 2019), is brought pursuant to the New
York Labor Law and New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations to
recover alleged unpaid wages, including overtime compensation owed
to the Plaintiff and similarly situated security guards.

NYU Langone Hospital is a domestic not-for-profit corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York with
a principal place of business in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
          James Emmet Murphy, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080
          E-mail: lambinder@vandallp.com
                  jmurphy@vandallp.com


ONG AMNUAY: Galindo Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Guillermo Fernandez Galindo, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Ong Amnuay Inc. (d/b/a Chaamlex),
Thanya Ong and Narong Piemtongkam (a.k.a. Pui), Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00771 (S.D. N.Y., January 25, 2019) seeks unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law
("NYLL"), and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the
New York Commissioner of Labor, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiff Fernandez and other employees to work in excess of 40
hours per week without providing the minimum wage and overtime
compensation required by federal and state law and regulations,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff Fernandez is a former employee of Defendants. Defendants
own, operate, or control a Thai restaurant, located at 34 Lexington
Ave, New York, NY 10010 under the name "Chaamlex".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE &ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


OREGON: Sued Over Short School Days for Special Ed Students
-----------------------------------------------------------
Betsy Hammond, writing for The Oregonian, reported that Oregon is
denying hundreds of students with disabilities the right to a full
school day in violation of federal laws, and state education
officials need to ensure that schools can and do provide them the
complete and meaningful education to which they are entitled, say
the advocates and parents behind a federal class action lawsuit.

The lawsuit, brought on behalf of four Oregon children whose
parents say they have been denied the right to go to school for
some or all of the day and all others like them, names Gov. Kate
Brown, who is also the state's superintendent of education, state
schools chief Colt Gill and the Oregon Department of Education as
defendants.

One 6-year-old boy with a hearing impairment, identified as J.N,
was limited to an hour of school a day as a kindergartner, the suit
says. Ten-year-old Elijah, who lives in Yamhill, reads at grade
level and loves math, but has to leave school early every afternoon
because school officials haven't found a way to deal with his
autism, including his urge to leave the classroom when upset, said
his mother, Alicia Overstreet, who is a party to the suit.

And they are far from alone, advocates for children with
disabilities say. FACT Oregon, an advocacy organization that
operates a helpline for Oregon parents, received 260 unduplicated
reports of children with disabilities subjected to shortened school
days due to their behaviors from September 2016 to November 2018,
the lawsuit says.

"Shortening the school day of a child with a disability is not an
appropriate substitute for providing the academic and behavioral
services and supports that would enable that child to learn and
progress socially during a full school day," the lawsuit says.
"When children are subjected to shortened days, they frequently
fall behind academically and miss out on critical social
opportunities in which they can practice appropriate behaviors."

Marc Siegel, communications director for the state education
department, said in a statement, "Oregon Department of Education is
committed to equity and excellence for every learner." He said
department officials don't comment on active lawsuits.

The Oregonian/OregonLive first called attention to the issue of
special education students being denied full school days nearly
three years ago. The news outlet highlighted the case of a Portland
high school student with autism whom district officials ordered
sent home at 11:15 a.m. each day.

Students whose disabilities can lead to tantrums and outbursts at
school need more help from their schools, not less, the state
education department says. Many schools limit students like that to
shortened school days, a possible violation of the students' civil
rights.

At the time, the state education department issued a strongly
worded memo telling schools that practice was not appropriate and
must stop.

But since then, despite being notified that many special education
students in Oregon, particularly in small and rural districts, were
denied a full academic schedule, the department hasn't taken
actions to stop it, said Joel Greenberg, a senior attorney for
Disability Rights Oregon, who works on many such cases and is a
party to the class action suit.

Most of the students who are allowed to go to school or to receive
tutoring at home for as little as a few hours a week have behaved
in ways that scared people, damaged property or even hurt others at
their schools, the suit acknowledges. But advocates say the onus is
on schools to figure out what triggers the challenging behavior,
what frustrates the student, what the student is trying to
accomplish -- and create a learning environment in which disruptive
behavior is prevented or at least effectively addressed before it
escalates.

Oregon isn't alone in cutting special education students' class
hours based on behaviors caused by their disabilities, said Lewis
Bossing, a senior staff attorney for the Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, who has been involved with several landmark special
education cases. But, partly due to Greenberg's work, the Oregon
Department of Education has been made aware the problem is serious
and widespread -- but hasn't taken steps to correct that, Bossing
said.

"What is unfortunate is this problem has been called to the state's
attention over and over again," he said.

Many steps lie ahead before a judge might certify the suit as a
class action, let alone hold a trial or help mediate a settlement,
lawyers said. The plaintiffs' lawyers filed the suit in U.S.
District Court in Eugene.

Oregon has more than 70,000 special education students, and
advocates say the number of complaints they field suggest several
hundred and potentially thousands of them had their instructional
hours cut by their schools over their parents' objections.

But Bossing said he and others recently helped reach a settlement
with the Ohio's education agency to have the state provide systemic
supports to 14 large urban districts that have sent too many of
their special education students to separate classrooms or
segregated schools where they got poor-quality education. A judge
could order Oregon to provide similar expertise, training,
technical assistance and oversight to Oregon districts.

A unanimous 2017 U.S. Supreme Court decision known as Endrew raised
the bar for what public school benefits special education students
are entitled to. The justices overruled an 80s-era Supreme Court
decision that students were only entitled to "some" educational
benefit and instead ruled students deserve "meaningful" education.
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the court that a child's
"educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of
his circumstances" and that "every child should have the chance to
meet challenging objectives."

In light of that decision, Bossing said, "Oregon has to show that
(special education students subjected to shortened school days) are
receiving a free and appropriate education. And I don't think they
can do it."

As a start, Greenberg said, the state should begin tracking all
cases in which a school limits a special education student to
partial school days due to disability-related behaviors so that it
knows where and at what magnitude the problem is occurring. [GN]


PACE EDITIONS: Dawson Suit Alleges Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pace Editions, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Pace Editions, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00681 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

Pace Editions Inc operates as an art publishing services company.
The Company's services include selling and displaying art, gallery
services, and hosting shows and exhibitions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PACE/MACGILL INC: Violates ADA, Dawson Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------
Pace/Macgill, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Pace/Macgill, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00682 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

The Pace/MacGill Gallery was founded in 1983, which specializes in
photographs and is run by Peter MacGill.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PALMYRA HERATIGE: Dawson Suit in NY Asserts ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Palmyra Heratige Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Palmyra Heratige Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00684 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

Palmyra Heratige Inc. is an Antique store in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



PAWS WHISKERS: Brown Seeks to Recoup Min., Overtime Pay Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paws, Whiskers &
Wags, LLC. The case is styled as Clarke Brown, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Paws,
Whiskers & Wags, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00395-AT (N.D.
Ga., January 23, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as non-payment of
minimum wage or overtime compensation filed pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Paws, Whiskers & Wags, LLC offers pet cremation services in
Charlotte, North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin M. Scott, Esq.
   Scott Employment Law, P.C.
   246 Sycamore St., Suite 150
   Decatur, GA 30030
   Tel: (404) 781-1100
   Fax: (404) 781-1101
   Email: jscott@scottemploymentlaw.com


PERRIGO COMPANY: March 4 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
----------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Perrigo Company plc.  If you
suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to
request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

Perrigo Company plc (NYSE: PRGO)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: March 4, 2019
Class Period: November 8, 2018 and December 20, 2018

Get additional information about PRGO:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/perrigo-company-plc-loss-submission-form?wire=3


To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
Fax. 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


PHILIP COLLECK: Dawson Sues Antique Shop Under ADA
--------------------------------------------------
Philip Colleck of London LTD. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Deshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Philip Colleck of London LTD.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00685 (S.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

Philip Colleck of London LTD. is an Antique furniture store in New
York City, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal



PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration in "Rosales"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sharon Johnson Coleman grants the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration in the lawsuit styled IRIS ROSALES v. PORTFOLIO
RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-00997 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiff's motion for class certification is denied, and the
case is dismissed without prejudice.

Iris Rosales brought this class action complaint against Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC, alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.  The lawsuit arises from
Portfolio's alleged attempt to collect an unpaid bill connected to
a consumer credit card.  Portfolio purchased the rights to the debt
from the original creditor, World Financial Network National Bank
(now known as Comenity Bank).[CC]


PREMIUM MERCHANT: Fabricant Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Terry Fabricant, a California resident, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff,
v. Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00758 (S.D. N.Y., January 25, 2019) brings this action
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Defendant made automated telemarketing calls to Plaintiff using
equipment prohibited by the TCPA, even though it did not have his
prior express written consent to do so, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Terry "Luke" Fabricant, is an individual and a citizen
of California, residing in Los Angeles, California.

Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC is a New York limited liability
company headquartered at 40 Wall Street Suite 501, New York, New
York 10005.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kim E. Richman, Esq.
     RICHMAN LAW GROUP
     81 Prospect Street
     Brooklyn, NY
     Telephone: (212) 687-8291
     Email: krichman@richmanlawgroup.com

          - and -

     Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
     Tod A. Lewis, Esq.
     David M. Oppenheim, Esq.
     Mara A. Baltabols, Esq.
     BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
     134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 658-5500
     Fax: (312) 658-5555
     Email: tod@classlawyers.com


RESOLUTE ENERGY: Faces Isensee Class Suit Over Sale to Cimarex
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN ISENSEE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. RESOLUTE ENERGY CORPORATION, RICHARD F. BETZ, NICHOLAS
J. SUTTON, JAMES E. DUFFY, TOD C. BENTON, JOSEPH CITARRELLA, WILKIE
S. COLYER, THOMAS O. HICKS, JR., GARY L. HULTQUIST, JANET W.
PASQUE, ROBERT J. RAYMOND, and WILLIAM K. WHITE, Case No.
1:19-cv-00551 (S.D.N.Y., January 18, 2019), arises from the
proposed sale of the Company in a cash and stock transaction to
Cimarex Energy Co. through its wholly owned subsidiaries CR Sub 1
Inc. and CR Sub 2 Inc.

On November 19, 2018, Resolute announced that it had entered into a
definitive agreement with Cimarex.  Under the terms of the
definitive merger agreement, Resolute shareholders will have the
right to receive 0.3943 shares of Cimarex common stock, $35 per
share in cash, or a combination of $14 per share in cash and 0.2366
share of common stock.

The Plaintiff contends that the Registration Statement filed in
connection with the Proposed Transaction contains the financial
analyses and opinion of Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC, concerning the
Proposed Transaction, but fails to provide material information
concerning such.  The Plaintiff asserts that the Registration
Statement fails to disclose: (i) the basis for using discount rates
ranging from 10.5% to 12.5%; and (ii) ranges of implied values of
(a) the present value of estimated mark to market commodity hedges
and earnouts, (b) the present value of general and administrative
costs, (c) other corporate expenses, (d) the estimated face value
of Resolute's net debt as of December 31, 2018, and (e) the present
value of taxes payable by Resolute.

Resolute is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive
offices located in Denver, Colorado.  The Individual Defendants are
directors and officers of the Company.

Resolute is an independent oil and gas company engaged in the
acquisition, exploitation, exploration for, and development of oil
and gas properties in the United States.  The Company's principal
project area is located in the Delaware Basin portion of the
Permian Basin, which is located in Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
          LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
          821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 493-9780
          Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
          E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: A. Bronson Can File 2nd Amended Complaint
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File a Second Amended Complaint in the case captioned  ALEXIS
BRONSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. and SAMSUNG
ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., Defendants. No. C 18-2300 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Alexis Bronson purchased one of defendants' 51-inch
plasma Smart 3D HDTV televisions in August 2013. The television
proved defective. It displayed colored lines on the screen, a
problem defendants fixed once under warranty, but the colored lines
returned. Plaintiff filed this putative class asserting diversity
jurisdiction and alleging violations of Section 1793.03(b) of the
California Civil Code under the Song-Beverly Consumer Protection
Act and Section 17200 of California's Business and Professions
Code. Plaintiff amended his complaint in June 2018 primarily adding
a claim against defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (but
not defendant Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.) for violating
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

FRCP 15(a)(2) permits a party to amend its pleading with the
court's leave, advising that the court should freely give leave
when justice so requires. In ruling on a motion for leave to amend,
courts consider: (1) bad faith (2) undue delay (3) prejudice to the
opposing party (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether plaintiff
has previously amended his complaint.
  
CLAIM UNDER THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

As to the statute itself, Section 1793.03(b) provides: "Every
manufacturer making an express warranty with respect to an
electronic or appliance product   shall make available to service
and repair facilities functional parts to effect the repair of a
product for at least seven years after the date a product model or
type was manufactured, regardless of whether the seven-year period
exceeds the warranty period for the product."

The Defendants put a strict gloss on reading the statute,
contending Section 1793.03(b) merely requires manufacturers to make
functional parts available. The Plaintiff has a more expansive
view. At this moment, this order will not rule on the scope of the
statute. Such discussion will instead occur after discovery and the
development of a factual record.

The same applies to the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's
amendment is lacking because the plaintiff does not allege that he
requested a repair from the service facility. Requesting such a
repair is predicated on requirements anchored in Section 1793.02,
not Section 1793.03. While the two statutes may interconnect as two
parts of a larger piece, such discussion will occur after discovery
and the development of a factual record. Leaving these matters of
law to be decided at a later stage, this order allows the pleading
forward without endorsing either extreme reading of the statute.

The proposed amendment as to Section 1793.03(b), therefore, is
neither futile nor frivolous and the claim has been sufficiently
amended at this stage.

CLAIM UNDER SECTION 17200

Equitable in nature, Section 17200 of the California Business and
Professions Code provides claims for unlawful, unfair, and
fraudulent activity. Damages cannot be recovered. Instead, remedies
are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. Even
still, though restitution is possible, injunctions are the primary
form of relief available under the UCL to protect consumers from
unfair business practices, while restitution is a type of ancillary
relief.

The proposed amended complaint solely alleges a claim under the
unlawful prong of Section 17200.

This claim is entirely derivative of the claim under the
Song-Beverly Act and therefore, can move forward. Precisely due to
the equitable nature of Section 17200, defendants' arguments as to
Section 17200 standing should be re-asserted at a later stage, when
the specter of injunctive relief under Section 17200 looms larger.
At this stage, due to the unique nature of the Section 1793.03(b)
claim alleged here, ruling on Section 17200 standing makes little
sense.

THE INTERVENTION AND AMENDMENT OF PLAINTIFF CRYSTAL HARDIN

The Plaintiff proposes to intervene and amend the first amended
complaint with another plaintiff who alleges the same claims with
nearly identical facts. Defendants oppose this addition for two
reasons. First, because the purpose of the motion for leave to
amend is to determine whether or not plaintiff Bronson has
satisfied amending the complaint, not to allow intervention.
Second, defendants argue the motion for leave to amend should not
be utilized as a vehicle for a different plaintiff to pursue an
entirely new claim.

These arguments are unavailing. Both plaintiffs purchased a
television that proved defective because of colored lines and when
they called an authorized repair facility were told the parts were
unavailable. The intervention and amendment of plaintiff Hardin
therefore will neither greatly alter the nature of the litigation
nor require defendants to undertake, at a late hour, an entirely
new course of defense.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya92qmcg from Leagle.com.

Alexis Bronson, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Rothstein, 626 NE
1st Street Gainesville, FL 32601, pro hac vice & Alan J. Sherwood,
Law Office of of Alan J. Sherwood.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc. & Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.,
Defendants, represented by Shannon Suzanne Broome --
sbroome@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Beth Sharon
Coplowitz -- bcoplowitz@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP,
Michael J. Mueller -- mmueller@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth
LLP & Thomas Richard Waskom -- twaskom@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP.


SIERRA SERVICES: Day Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Sheldon Day, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Sierra Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00066-FB (W.D. Tex., January 25, 2019) is a collective
action seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages from Defendant.

The Defendant violated the FLSA by employing Plaintiff and other
similarly situated nonexempt employees "for a workweek longer than
forty hours but refusing to compensate them for their employment in
excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which, they are or were employed", says
the complaint.

Day is an individual who resides in Atascosa County, Texas and who
has been employed by Sierra Services during the last three years.

Sierra Services, LLC is a Texas limited liability company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Melissa Moore, Esq.
     Curt Hesse, Esq.
     Bridget Davidson, Esq.
     MOORE & ASSOCIATES
     Lyric Center
     440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 222-6775
     Facsimile: (713) 222-6739


SLSCO LTD: Does not Pay Workers Overtime Wages, Avila Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
Yester Avila, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SLSCO, Ltd., DRC Emergency Services, LLC, and The
Ironsides Group, LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00426 (S.D. Tex., December
12, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Puerto Rico Wage Payment
Statute.

The Plaintiff and the other workers like him regularly worked for
the Defendants in excess of 40 hours each week. But these workers
never received overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
single workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the
FLSA, the Defendants improperly classified Plaintiff and those
similarly situated as independent contractors and paid them a daily
rate with no overtime compensation, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Yester Avila is an individual residing in Miami,
Florida. He worked for the Defendants as a quality assurance
manager from approximately July 2018 until September 2018.

Following the massive devastation caused by Hurricane Irma and
Hurricane Maria, FEMA and other state and federal governmental
departments implemented programs, such as the STEP Program, for
clean-up and repair of homes and businesses. The Defendants are the
companies that were either awarded the contracts or provided work
under those contracts.

The Defendant SLSCO, Ltd. is a corporation based in Galveston,
Texas.

The Defendant DRC Emergency Services, LLC is a foreign limited
liability company with its corporate headquarters in Galveston,
Texas.

The Defendant The Ironsides Group, LLC is a domestic limited
liability company that may be served by serving its registered
agent for service of process, Kevin Leland, 8606 Rosehedge Terrace
Way, Richmond, TX 77406. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 352-1100
      Fax: (713) 352-3300
      E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
              adunlap@mybackwages.com


SOGOU INC: March 11 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-----------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Sogou Inc.  If you suffered
a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to request that
the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

Sogou Inc. (NYSE: SOGO)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: March 11, 2019
Class Period: Purchasers of American Depositary Shares pursuant
and/or traceable to Sogou's false and misleading Registration
Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with the Company's
initial public offering on November 9, 2017

Get additional information about SOGO:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/sogou-inc-loss-submission-form?wire=3


To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
Fax. 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Dismissal of Travel-Credit Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued a
Memorandum affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JEAN SHREM; MARNI
FISCHER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY, a
Texas corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-15896. (9th Cir.).

Plaintiffs-appellants Jean Shrem and Marni Fischer (Plaintiffs)
appeal the district court's dismissal of their putative class
action alleging that defendant-appellee Southwest Airlines Company
(Southwest) breached its ticketing contract with Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs challenge Southwest's travel-credit policy, which
generally allows customers to use the full price of a cancelled
flight towards the purchase of another Southwest flight for up to
one year from the original purchase date. However, if a customer
uses the travel credit to purchase a new flight and then cancels
that new flight, the expiration date of the entire credit from the
new flight is one year from the purchase date of the original
ticket. Plaintiffs call this the hidden exception to the Reusable
Funds Agreement, and they seek to represent a class of individuals
who have forfeited travel credits because of this exception.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may generally
consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits
attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial
notice.

The Plaintiffs allege that regulations enacted under the federal
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), provide the rules of contract
construction for interpreting airline contracts and, therefore, if
their contract with Southwest does not comply with ADA regulations,
Southwest has breached the contract. In addition to arguing that
the ADA regulations apply to all airline contracts, the Plaintiffs
also argue that a provision in Southwest's 40-page contract of
carriage (COC), which Southwest contends is incorporated into the
ticketing contract, incorporates ADA regulations into the COC.  

The Plaintiffs further assert that Southwest cannot rely on the
fact that the COC explains the travel-credit policy in detail,
because Southwest did not properly incorporate the COC by reference
under Sections 253.4, 253.5.

Even assuming that Southwest cannot rely on the full COC terms
because Southwest did not properly incorporate the COC, Plaintiffs
have not alleged a violation of Section 253.7. Plaintiffs' tickets
themselves, which are attached to the complaint, show that the
expiration date of the travel credits was clearly indicated in a
prominent position on the first page of the tickets. And the
following statement appears on the second and third pages of the
tickets: All travel involving funds from this Confirmation Number
must be completed by the expiration date. Thus, it is clear from
the complaint and documents attached to the complaint that
Plaintiffs received conspicuous notice of the salient features of
the travel-credit policy. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
that Southwest breached ADA regulations.  

The district court therefore properly dismissed the Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's January 10, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yacr8mf3 from Leagle.com.


SQUARETRADE INC: 2d Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Starke
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment denying Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned ADAM J. STARKE,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SQUARETRADE, INC., Defendant-Appellant,
Docket No. 17-2474-cv. (2nd Cir.).

Defendant-Appellant, SquareTrade, Inc., sells protection plans for
consumer products. Plaintiff-Appellee Adam J. Starke purchased one
such protection plan. Starke filed this putative class action,
seeking to hold SquareTrade accountable for alleged violations of
consumer protection laws.

In determining whether Starke had reasonable notice of the
Post-Sale T&C and manifested assent to such terms and conditions,
the district court applied the test adopted in Berkson v. Gogo LLC,
97 F.Supp.3d 359, 402-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Under that test, according to the district court, the court
assesses four factors: (1) whether Starke was aware that he was
binding himself to more than an offer of goods or services in
exchange for money; (2) whether the design and content of the
SquareTrade confirmation email made the Post-Sale T&C readily and
obviously available; (3) whether SquareTrade required any
affirmative manifestation of agreement to the Post-Sale T&C; and
(4) whether SquareTrade clearly drew the consumer's attention to
the Post-Sale T&C in general or the arbitration provision in
particular.

As to the first factor, the district court concluded that Starke
had reasonable notice that some contractual terms would be
forthcoming because he set out to purchase a service contract. But,
the district court noted, Starke's knowledge of the existence of
some contractual terms did not necessarily mean that he could
reasonably be expected to discern and agree to all of the
contractual terms to which SquareTrade intended to bind him.

The second, third, and fourth factors, according to the district
court, counseled against finding reasonable notice and
manifestation of assent. The district court found that the design
and content of the SquareTrade confirmation email did not make the
Post-Sale T&C readily and obviously available, because it did not
draw any attention to the inconspicuously placed Terms & Conditions
hyperlink in small font at the very bottom of the email. Rather, a
reasonable person in Starke's position would have thought that the
body of the email constituted the contract itself. Given that the
terms of the contract were obscured and minimized, the district
court held that Starke could not have evidenced a clear
manifestation of assent. Lastly, the district court noted that
SquareTrade did not draw Starke's attention to the arbitration
provision buried in the Post-Sale T&C.

The district court, therefore, held that SquareTrade failed to
establish an enforceable arbitration agreement with Starke, and
denied its motion to compel arbitration.

Reasonable Notice of the Arbitration Provision

Several things about the transaction and the email Starke received
from SquareTrade following the Amazon confirmation email lead us to
conclude that Starke did not have reasonable notice of the
arbitration provision, which was contained only in the Post-Sale
T&C.

First, SquareTrade never directed Starke's attention to the Terms &
Conditions hyperlink that contained the Post-Sale T&C. The first
screen Starke encountered during the course of the transaction, the
Amazon purchase page, did not provide Starke with notice that terms
governing the sale would be provided via hyperlink. Instead, the
Amazon purchase page notified Starke that he would receive
something called a Service Contract via email. Then, Starke
received an email from Amazon, notifying him that he would receive
a service agreement from SquareTrade. Starke subsequently received
an email from SquareTrade indicating that his Contract was
enclosed. None of these various communications put Starke on notice
that his Service Contract would come in the form of a hyperlink,
rather than in the body of the email.

Second, when Starke opened the email from SquareTrade he was
presented with a chart titled Your Protection Plan. The chart
described the particular Protection Plan that Starke purchased, and
identified the Coverage Amount, Protection Plan Price, Coverage
Type, Covered Product, Deductible, Quantity, Coverage Term,
Coverage Start Date, Coverage End Date and Waiting Period. This
information took up approximately half of the email.10 Nothing else
in the email stands out as obviously being related to Starke's
Protection Plan, and none of the language in the cluttered email
directed Starke's attention to the hyperlink containing the
Post-Sale T&C.

Third, the SquareTrade email bears more resemblance to the Amazon
order page in Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237 than to the uncluttered
screen in Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78. The Terms & Conditions hyperlink
is some of the smallest text in the email and comes after several
prompts unrelated to the enclosure of the contract, including a
Need help? hyperlink, a button for Starke to log in to his
SquareTrade account, a hyperlink for Starke to submit the receipt
for his CD player, the chart with details of the plan, and a banner
urging Starke to review the Protection Plan on Amazon. Like the
interface in Nicosia, and in sharp contrast with the screen in
Meyer, the interface here is cluttered with diverse text, displayed
in multiple colors, sizes and fonts, and features various buttons
and promotional advertisements that distract the reader from the
relevant hyperlink.

Moreover, unlike in Meyer, the SquareTrade email in no way signals
to Starke that he should click on the link, and it does not advise
him that he would be deemed to agree to the contract terms in the
document to be found by clicking that link. Nor does the email
instruct him that the hyperlink is where his promised service
contract can be found. The Terms & Conditions hyperlink appears
without any language advising Starke to click on it or a clear
prompt directing Starke to read the Terms and Conditions, Meyer,
868 F.3d at 79. The hyperlink was buried at the bottom of the email
directly above the email footer. Far above the hyperlink, the
second sentence of the email told Starke You're all set!
encouraging him to look no further. The placement of the Terms &
Conditions hyperlink in the email makes it hard to escape the
inference that SquareTrade hoped the reader's eye would be drawn
elsewhere.

Starke's Prior Course of Dealing with SquareTrade

SquareTrade points to the prior course of dealing between Starke
and SquareTrade to demonstrate that Starke was on inquiry notice of
terms and conditions that he would receive via email.

SquareTrade relies on Register.com, 356 F.3d 393, where this Court
found that a prior course of dealing between the parties supported
the conclusion that they had agreed to certain terms and
conditions.

In Register.com, the party challenging the applicability of the
terms and conditions was a sophisticated corporate customer that
had made daily use of its counter-party's services subject to the
terms and conditions, and had been fully aware of the terms and
conditions that the counter-party sought to enforce. The Court
compared the situation before us then to one in which a person
maintains a roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples with a
sign at the exit of the fruit stand telling customers that the
apples are 50 cents each.  The Court said that a visitor who comes,
takes an apple, bites into it, and does not see the sign until he
exits may well believe he has no obligation to pay for the apple
because he had no notice when he bit into it that 50 cents was
expected in return. However, if the visitor returns to the apple
stand on a daily basis, each day taking an apple without paying for
it, he cannot later use the same defense.

Based on his prior transactions, he knows full well that the owner
is offering apples in exchange for 50 cents.  

Unlike the apple stand visitor, who learns of the terms governing
his contract with the owner and feigns ignorance that the same
terms will apply in future transactions, Starke was not put on
notice of SquareTrade's terms and conditions through his prior
transactions. Although Starke had transacted with SquareTrade on
six prior occasions, SquareTrade never gave Starke clear and
conspicuous notice that the transaction would subject him to
binding arbitration. Each time Starke purchased a SquareTrade
protection plan through Amazon, he received a confirmation email
from SquareTrade which looked just like the confirmation email at
issue here. The fact that Starke received emails with the same
inconspicuous hyperlink on more than one occasion does not lead us
to conclude that Starke had either actual or inquiry notice of the
Post-Sale T&C.

The Court AFFIRMS the order of the district court, denying
SquareTrade's motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybuygmuj from Leagle.com.

SOLOMON N. KLEIN (Bradley J. Nash, Schlam Stone & Dolan LLP); Mark
Schlachet -- markschlachet@me.com -- Law Offices of Mark Schlachet,
Cleveland, OH, on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

DOUGLAS A. WINTHROP -- douglas.winthrop@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold
& Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, San Francisco, CA (Michael D. Schissel
-- michael.schissel@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP, New York, NY; Elisabeth S. Theodore --
elisabeth.theodore@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP Washington, DC, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant.


STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE: Richardson Seeks Final Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lorena Richardson and the conditionally certified collective of
opt-in Plaintiffs move for final certification and ask the Court to
permit their case captioned as LORENA RICHARDSON, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, LLC F/K/A STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. AND D/B/A
OXFORD HEALTHCARE, Case No. 1:17-cv-00060 (N.D. Ill.), to continue
to proceed on a collective basis.

On January 4, 2017, Ms. Richardson filed this case on behalf of
herself and other similarly situated home health care workers
employed by Oxford pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  On July 14, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Conditional Class Certification, certifying this
collective class:

     All Home Health Care Workers, Licensed Practical Nurses,
     Certified Nursing Assistants, Home Health Aides, Hourly Paid
     Registered Nurses, (or Similar Titles) who are or have been
     employed by Statewide Healthcare Services, LLC f/k/a
     Statewide Healthcare Services, Inc. and d/b/a Oxford
     Healthcare since three years prior to filing the Complaint
     until the date of final judgment in this matter, except for
     staffing or frontline supervisors.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Rachhana T. Srey, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          80 South Eighth Street, Suite 4600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 215-6870
          E-mail: srey@nka.com

               - and -

          Christine E. Webber, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: cwebber@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Carol V. Gilden, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1705
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 357-0370
          Facsimile: (312) 357-0369
          E-mail: cgilden@cohenmilstein.com


STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE: Seeks to Decertify Class in Richardson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the lawsuit entitled LORENA RICHARDSON,
individually, on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC f/k/a STATEWIDE HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC. and d/b/a OXFORD HEALTHCARE, Case No. 1:17-cv-00060
(N.D. Ill.), ask the Court to decertify the Plaintiff's
conditionally-certified collective.

The variety of positions that are affected by the Plaintiff's
proposed class and the uncontroverted evidence regarding the nature
of that variety demonstrate that this action is inappropriate for
class treatment, the Defendants contend.  Specifically, the
Defendants add, the overtime qualification requirements vary
dramatically based on the nature of the individual branch contract
with the state agency involved, the type of work being performed by
the home care provider, and the actual job title of the provider.

Hence, the Defendants note, the second stage certification
standards militate against final certification.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Siobhan M. Murphy, Esq.
          John J. Michels, Jr., Esq.
          Dawn L. Johnson, Esq.
          Daniel K. Cetina, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          550 West Adams Street, Suite 300
          Chicago, IL 60661
          Telephone: (312) 345-1718
          Facsimile: (312) 345-1778
          E-mail: siobhan.murphy@lewisbrisbois.com
                  John.Michels@lewisbrisbois.com
                  dawn.johnson@lewisbrisbois.com
                  daniel.cetina@lewisbrisbois.com


TECHNICOLOR VIDEOCASSETTE: Court Won't Dismiss Sharp FCRA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Western Division, issued an Order denying Defendant
Technicolor Videocassette of Michigan, Inc.'s (Technicolor) renewed
partial motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the plaintiff's Third
Amended Complaint in the case captioned ROBERT SHARP, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. TECHNICOLOR VIDEOCASSETTE OF MICHIGAN, INC., and STAFFING
SOLUTIONS SOUTHEAST, INC., Defendants. No. 2:18-cv-02325-cgc. (W.D.
Tenn.).

In the Third Amended Complaint, Sharp alleges that Technicolor
willfully violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring a
consumer report on Sharp without complying with the FCRA's
disclosure and authorization requirements. Specifically, in Count
1, Sharp asserts that Technicolor violated 15 U.S.C. Section
1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by procuring a consumer report on Sharp without
first disclosing its intent to do so in a document consisting
solely of the disclosure. In Count 2, Sharp contends that
Technicolor violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) procuring
a consumer report on Sharp without Sharp's authorization as is
required under the FCRA.

The FCRA imposes distinct obligations on three types of entities:
(1) consumer reporting agencies (2) users of consumer reports and
(3) furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.

Under the FCRA, an employer may only procure a consumer report for
employment purposes if the employer provides a clear and
conspicuous disclosure made in writing to the consumer at any time
before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a
document that consists solely of the disclosure. A consumer report
is used for employment purposes if it is used for the purpose of
evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or
retention as an employee.

The plain language of FCRA states that when an employer uses a
consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse
action based in whole or in part on the report, the person
intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer
to whom the report relates (i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a
description in writing of the rights of the consumer under the
FCRA. This statutory requirement plainly establishes that a
consumer is permitted to receive a copy of the consumer report used
for employment purposes prior to adverse action being taken, which
is in direct conflict with the concluding phrase in Technicolor's
Applicant Release form.

Technicolor's argument regarding the intent of the extraneous
information is also without merit.

The extraneous information contained in the Applicant Release
misconstrues an applicant's right to review his or her consumer
report prior to an adverse employment action being taken against
the applicant on the basis of a consumer report.

Finally, Technicolor's contention that it included all of the
necessary language required under the FCRA does not, by itself,
support its claim that Sharp failed to raise a viable claim within
the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6). Although Technicolor correctly
asserts that the FCRA permits the inclusion of a disclosure within
the same document as an authorization, the court must still
determine whether the disclosure and authorization language in the
Applicant Release was sufficiently clear and conspicuous. While
Technicolor's arguments may be appropriate for summary judgment
review after a factual record has been developed, upon construing
the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and
accepting all factual allegations as true to determine whether they
suggest an entitlement to relief, the court finds that Sharp's
Third Amended Complaint plausibly states claims upon which relief
can be granted under the FCRA.  

Accordingly, Technicolor's motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of
Sharp's Third Amended Complaint is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8opj669 from Leagle.com.

Robert Sharp, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Marc Reed Edelman,
MORGAN & MORGAN, PA, Brian C. Winfrey, Morgan & Morgan & Brian
Christopher Winfrey, THE WINFREY FIRM.

Technicolor Videocassette of Michigan, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Angie C. Davis -- angiedavis@bakerdonelson.com -- BAKER DONELSON
BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, Emma Redden Davis --
erdavis@bakerdonelson.com -- BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN COALDWELL &
BERKOWITZ & Zachary B. Busey -- zbusey@bakerdonelson.com -- BAKER
DONELSON.

Staffing Solutions Southeast, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Audrey M. Calkins -- audrey.calkins@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Justin Matthew Dean --
justin.dean@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART,
PC, pro hac vice.


TENARIS SA: Atanasio Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
--------------------------------------------------------------
Charles M. Atanasio, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Tenaris S.A., Paolo Rocca, and Edgardo
Carlos, Case No. 1:18-cv-07059 (E.D. N.Y., December 12, 2018),
seeks to recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants'
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of
Tenaris from May 1, 2014 through November 27, 2018, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period").

The Plaintiff alleges that on April 30, 2014, after market hours,
Tenaris filed a Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2013 with the SEC, which provided the Company's year-end financial
results and position. The 2013 20-F was signed by Defendant Carlos.
The 2013 20-F also contained signed certifications pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by Defendants Rocca and Carlos attesting
to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any
material changes to the Company's internal controls over financial
reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. However, the statements
referenced were materially false and misleading because they
misrepresented and failed to disclose adverse facts pertaining to
the Company's business, operational and financial results, which
were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Company's securities at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period.

The Defendant Tenaris produces and sells seamless and welded steel
tubular products and related services for the oil and gas industry,
and other industrial applications. The Company is incorporated and
based in Luxembourg. It is a holding of Techint Holdings S.a.r.l.
The Company's securities are traded on the New York Stock Exchange
under the ticker symbol "TS."

The Defendant Paolo Rocca has served as the Company's Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer throughout the Class Period. Rocca also
serves as Chairman of Ternium S.A.

The Defendant Edgardo Carlos has served as the Company's Chief
Financial Officer since July 1, 2013. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Phillip Kim, Esq.
      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 686-1060
      Fax: (212) 202-3827
      E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
              pkim@rosenlegal.com


TETRA TECH: Class Plaintiffs Want Governor to Rescind Clean Up Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CBS SF reported that Plaintiffs in a $27 billion class action
lawsuit against Tetra Tech, the firm accused of falsifying soil
samples at San Francisco's former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, are
demanding that Gov. Gavin Newsom rescind a contract with the firm
to clean up fire damage in Butte County.

On Martin Luther King Jr. Day 2019, attorney Charles Bonner, who's
representing the lawsuit's 3,000 plaintiffs, said Newsom is
rewarding Tetra Tech with the latest contract, when instead he
should be punishing them for the alleged falsified samples.

Tetra Tech was paid $280 million by the Navy to clean up radiation
at the former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard in 2002 as the area was
slated for redevelopment.

Claims that soil samples from the site had been falsified and
manipulated in order to minimize evidence of soil contamination
gained traction in September 2017 when the Navy released a
preliminary analysis of the cleanup specifically at two of the
site's numerous parcels. According to the findings, nearly half of
the samples taken from the sites had been falsified or
manipulated.

In a statement, Tetra Tech called the rally a "publicity stunt" and
said it would "prevail following an impartial and transparent legal
and scientific review of the facts."

Tetra Tech also clarified that while parent company Tetra Tech,
Inc. is the owner of a separate legal entity Tetra Tech, EC, Inc.,
it was Tetra Tech, Inc. that was awarded the contract to clean up
the Camp Fire debris, not Tetra Tech, EC, Inc. that cleaned up the
shipyard sites.

Last week, the U.S. Justice Department sued Tetra Tech EC Inc.,
accusing the engineering company of submitting false billing claims
to the U.S. Navy, based on falsified soil and building test data.
The suit by the Justice Department replaces three so-called
"whistleblower" lawsuits filed under seal in 2013 and 2016 by
several former radiation technicians hired by Tetra Tech
subcontractors.

Those lawsuits allege that those responsible for the fraud are not
only two field supervisors, Stephen Rolfe and Justin Hubbard, who
were criminally convicted in 2017, but also other higher-level
managers, including Tetra Tech President Andrew Bolt.

Rolfe and Hubbard pleaded guilty under seal in federal court in San
Francisco in 2017 to falsifying records by exchanging, or directing
subordinates to exchange, soil samples from potentially
contaminated areas for samples from clean areas to submit for
laboratory testing and each was sentenced last year to eight months
in prison.

Tetra Tech has stood by its work, saying, "misleading claims
alleged at Hunters Point against Tetra Tech EC stem from isolated
acts by two rogue employees during the 2011-2012 timeframe" caused
the company to conduct an investigation and correct a number of
actions. [GN]


TIERRA LEASE: Fails to Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Gonzales Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SONNY GONZALES, on behalf of himself and others similarly-situated
v. TIERRA LEASE SERVICE, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00024 (S.D. Tex.,
January 18, 2019), arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to
comply with the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Tierra Lease Service, LLC, is a Texas limited liability company
with its principal place of business in Texas, and doing business
in Texas.  Tierra provides equipment and personnel to oil drilling
operators in Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com


TRANSUNION INTERACTIVE: M. Sporn's Suit Transferred to N.D. Ill.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and
granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer the case captioned MICHAEL
SPORN, Plaintiff, v. TRANSUNION INTERACTIVE, INC., Defendant. Case
No. 18-cv-05424-YGR. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Michael Sporn brings this putative class-action lawsuit
against defendant TransUnion Interactive, Inc. (TUI) for alleged
violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act
(CCCRAA), (Count I); the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL),
(Count II); the California False Advertising Law (FAL), (Count
III); and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).
Plaintiff alleges that TUI charged consumers for and misled
consumers regarding credit scores that were not derived from a
credit scoring model that is widely distributed to lenders but,
instead, were based on a vastly inferior and inaccurate credit
scoring model that is essentially useless to consumers.

The Plaintiff avers that this lawsuit fails to meet the third
requirement, diversity of citizenship. Specifically, the plaintiff
asserts that TUI is not, as the defendant represents in its notice
of removal, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois but instead maintains its principal place of
business in San Luis Obispo, California.  

In its notice of removal and supporting declaration, TUI averred
that it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Illinois, and therefore a citizen of those two states.
TUI explained that the company's three directors, including its
President, Executive Vice President-Chief Financial Officer, and
Executive Vice President, Assistant Secretary, all work and live
primarily in Illinois and typically act by written consent signed
in Illinois. TUI also asserted that the company's administrative
functions, including accounting, payroll, and human resources, are
located in Illinois. Moreover, TUI points to its 2018 filings with
the secretaries of State of California and Illinois, which identify
an address in Chicago, Illinois as its principal executive office
and principal address, respectively.  

In his motion for remand, the plaintiff argues that TUI holds its
principal place of business in California and is therefore a
California corporation for the purposes of establishing diversity
of citizenship under CAFA jurisdiction. TUI filed a declaration in
which a representative of the defendant stated that TUI is a
business corporation incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters
in San Luis Obispo, California. The Plaintiff also points to a
service agreement attached to the declaration which instructed
parties to the agreement "to send any notices or other
communications regarding our Site, your membership, products or
services to Trans Union Interactive, Inc., 100 Cross Street, Suite
202, San Luis Obispo, CA 93401" and noted that TrueCredit is a
trademark of Trans Union Interactive, Inc., a Delaware corporation
based in San Luis Obispo, California.

Here, all three of TUI's directors, (its President, Executive Vice
President/Chief Financial officer, and Executive Vice
President/Assistant Secretary) work and live primarily in Illinois
and typically act by written consent signed in Illinois.  Moreover,
TUI operates several administrative functions, including
accounting, finance, tax, payroll, and human resources, primarily
from Illinois.  

Finally, TUI's 2018 filings with the Secretaries of State in
California and Illinois, which each identify an address in Illinois
as TUI's principal executive office and principal address,
respectively, and list each of the five officers and directors
identified in the filings as working at the same Illinois address
provide additional evidence that Illinois is TUI's nerve center.

Accordingly, the Court finds that TUI's nerve center, and therefore
its principal place of business for the purposes of determining
jurisdiction, is Illinois. Accordingly, the Court denies the
plaintiffs' motion to remand.

TUI moves to transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.  First, NDIL has subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA. Second, TUI is subject to personal
jurisdiction in the NDIL because its "nerve center" is in Illinois.
Similarly, venue is proper in NDIL pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
1391(c0(2), (d), and (e)(1)(A) because TUI's "nerve center" is in
Illinois. Accordingly, this case may have been brought in NDIL.
For these reasons, Court finds that the first-to-file rule applies.

Accordingly, the Court grants the defendant's motion to transfer.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y87huw5u from Leagle.com.

Michael Sporn, Plaintiff, represented by George Volney Granade,
Reese Llp & Michael Robert Reese, Reese LLP.

TransUnion Interactive, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joshua
Douglas Anderson -- janderson@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP,
Michael C. O'Neil -- Michael.oneil@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith,LLP,
Terence N. Hawley -- thawley@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Bruce
Robert Van Baren -- bvanbaren@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP &
Timothy Robert Carwinski -- tcarwinski@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith
LLP.


UNIFIED LIFE: Court Overrules Objection to Class Action Amendment
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Billings Division, issued an Order overruling Defendant Unified
Life Insurance Company's objection to Judge Cavan's order granting
the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to add a class action
count in the case captioned CHARLES M. BUTLER, III and CHOLE
BUTLER, Plaintiffs, v. UNIFIED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; HEALTH PLANS
INTERMEDIARIES HOLDINGS, LLC, doing business as Health Insurance
Innovations, Inc.; ALLIED NATIONAL, INC.; NATIONAL BROKERS OF
AMERICA, INC.; THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF EMPLOYERS, INC.; and DOES
1-10, Defendants. No. CV 17-50-BLG-SPW.(D. Mont.)

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(a), a party may object to the magistrate's order and
the district court may modify or set aside the order if it is
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
  
Unified Life argues an order granting leave to amend to add a class
action count is analytically akin to an order to permit maintenance
of a class action, and its objection should therefore be reviewed
de novo. But a motion to amend the complaint and a motion to
certify a class are not analytically akin because they require
different standards.  

It is quite possible for a plaintiff to satisfy the first standard
only to fail the second.  

The proper standard to review Judge Cavan's order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.

The Court has read the parties' briefs, Judge Cavan's order, and
Unified Life's objection, and concludes Judge Cavan's order
granting leave to amend to add a class action count is not clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.

The objection is overruled.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yauxaub6 from Leagle.com.

Charles M. Butler, III & Chole Butler, Plaintiffs, represented by
John M. Morrison -- john@mswdlaw.com -- MORRISON, SHERWOOD, WILSON
& DEOLA, PLLP & Scott L. Peterson -- speterson@mswdlaw.com --
MORRISON, SHERWOOD, WILSON & DEOLA, PLLP.

Unified Life Insurance Company & Allied National, Inc, Defendants,
represented by Robert L. Sterup -- rsterup@brownfirm.com -- BROWN
LAW FIRM, P.C.

Health Plans Intermediaries Holdings, LLC., doing business as
Health Insurance Innovations & Health Insurance Innovations, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Monique P. Voigt --
mvoigt@crowleyfleck.com -- CROWLEY FLECK PLLP.

The National Congress of Employers, Inc, Defendant, represented by
Katherine Huso, MATOVICH, KELLER & HUSO, P.C.


UNILEVER US: Browning Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Kaylee Browning and Sarah Basile filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit titled KAYLEE BROWNING; SARAH BASILE,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v.
UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC., Case No. 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Santa
Ana.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 8, 2019, the Hon.
Andrew J. Guilford granted the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment.  Judge Guilford denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and the Defendant's motions to strike experts as
moot.

Plaintiffs Kaylee Browning and Sarah Basile are users of the
Defendant's St. Ives Apricot Scrub.  This "Scrub" is an exfoliant
and like all such products is necessarily abrasive.  The Plaintiffs
claim that the Scrub causes "micro-tears" and speeds up the aging
process.  The Plaintiffs allege Unilever failed to disclose the
scrub's negative side effects before selling it to the public and
misled consumers into believing it was dermatologist recommended.

The Plaintiffs claims are for (1) unfair and deceptive acts and
practices in violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act ("CLRA"); (2) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); (3) fraud; (4) deceptive acts or practices in violation of
New York General Business Law ("GBL"); (5) false advertising in
violation of New York GBL; and (6) breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability.

The appellate case is captioned as Kaylee Browning, et al. v.
Unilever United States, Inc., Case No. 19-55078, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- February 15, 2019 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- March 18, 2019 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- April 26, 2019 -- Appellant's opening brief and excerpts of
      record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- May 28, 2019 -- Appellee's answering brief and excerpts of
      record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellee's brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


UNITED STATES: Detained Children Used to Catch Undocumented Parents
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Raychel Lean at Daily Business Review reported that nonprofit legal
group Southern Poverty Law Center has taken on a nationwide class
action lawsuit against the federal government, claiming on behalf
of more than 10,000 undocumented children that the Office of
Refugee Resettlement used its policies to ensnare parents and other
sponsors into providing fingerprints and other information that was
then given to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

According to the lawsuit, the two federal agencies share such
information with the intent of discouraging migrants from crossing
the Mexican border, not to check the suitability of the sponsors,
as was claimed.

The complaint filed in the Eastern District of Virginia stems from
a 2017 memorandum of agreement between the refugee resettlement
office and immigration officials, which was leaked.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Office of Refugee
Resettlement did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The memo outlined alleged unconstitutional intentions behind the
agencies' "zero tolerance" policies and information sharing,
according to plaintiffs lawyer Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg, legal
director of the immigrant advocacy program at the Legal Aid Justice
Center in Virginia.

"The government is doing something for one reason and claiming it's
doing it for a completely opposite reason," Sandoval-Moshenberg
said in a call with reporters.

The case stems from a similar complaint filed in August 2018 by the
Legal Aid Justice Center on behalf of four immigrant children and
their sponsors. That case applied only to Virginia.

Of the 12 named plaintiffs in the latest complaint, three live in
Florida. The suit places blame on a detention center in Homestead,
among others.

The complaint includes stories of detained children, including an
11-year-old referred to as J.A.T.L., who's been detained in Texas
since August 2018.

According to Sandoval-Moshenberg, the child's mother wanted to
sponsor him, but backed out when she was required to provide
fingerprints. Her sister has since stepped forward as a sponsor.
But meanwhile a psychiatrist who evaluated the child, who's still
in custody, said the boy was "anxious, frightened and alone."

The complaint attempts to show a pattern. It claims another child's
father was arrested and sent back to Guatemala within days of
applying to be a sponsor and providing fingerprints.  That child
remains in custody, according to the lawsuit.

The more sponsors who are put off, Sandoval-Moshenberg claimed, the
longer children spend in detention centers. But the complaint
alleges that this was the government's plan all along: to put off
potential immigrants with detention-center horror stories.

A hearing is set for Feb. 15. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Seeks Fed. Cir. Review of Ruling in Kane Cty. Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant United States of America filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Kane County, Utah v. US, Case Nos.
1:17-cv-00739-EDK and 1:17-cv-01991-EDK, in the United States Court
of Federal Claims.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit was filed against the United States of America in
June 2017. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Elaine D.
Kaplan.

The appellate case is captioned as Kane County, Utah v. US, Case
No. 19-1432, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Entry of Appearance is due today, February 1, 2019;
   -- Certificate of Interest is due today, February 1, 2019;
   -- Docketing Statement is due on February 19, 2019; and
   -- Appellant's brief is due on March 19, 2019.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee KANE COUNTY, UTAH, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Alan Irving Saltman, Esq.
          SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK LLP
          1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 452-2140
          Facsimile: (202) 775-8217
          E-mail: aisaltman@smithcurrie.com

Defendant-Appellant UNITED STATES is represented by:

          Agatha Koprowski, Esq.
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 480
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 616-0467
          E-mail: agatha.m.koprowski@usdoj.gov


UNITED STATES: Tea Party Gets Class-Action Payout From IRS
----------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Hennessy at News-Press Now reported that the St. Joseph Tea
Party Patriots were one of 100 political organizations nationwide
that received checks totaling $3.5 million from the Federal
government after a case was settled against the Internal Revenue
Service based on political beliefs.

The class-action lawsuit's lead lawyer Edward Greim of Graves
Garrett, LLC, a Kansas City, Missouri law firm, argued the IRS
targeted groups based on their political affiliation --
specifically if they were conservative in nature.

"There's no love lost between the taxpayers and the IRS, but in
this case, the IRS reached a new low," Greim said. "They targeted
citizens based on their political views, and that's the lowest of
the low."

Political groups can file for tax-exempt status and those with
conservative identities saw longer application timelines, according
to a 2016 opinion by United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Judge Raymond Kethledge in a case that took place in Ohio.

Greim explained the system behind the payments as being around
"$1,000 for each unlawful inspection." He also said he was glad a
group from St. Joseph received part of the settlement.

The St. Joseph Tea Party Patriots plans to use the money for
educational purposes and will be holding an open meeting Wednesday,
Jan. 23 at 7 p.m. at the East Hill Library to discuss how to best
spend the money. Virginia Weigum is a coordinator for the local
conservative group. She admitted when she first saw the check she
thought it was a hoax.

"I was opening all my mail and there was a check that came in the
envelope and it was for a few thousand dollars," Weigum said.

She would like an apology to go along with the settlement, but also
considered the check may be the appropriate way for the IRS to
express that sentiment.

"As a citizen of the United States, our Constitution is written for
everyone," Weigum said. "It isn't written just for the Democrats,
or the Republicans, or the Green Party, or any party. It is there
to protect you as a lawful citizen of our country." [GN]


UNIVERSAL COLLECTION: Berkowitz Suit Asserts Breach of FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Universal Collection
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Stacy Berkowitz, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Universal Collection Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00453 (E.D. N.Y., January 23, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Universal Collection Systems, Inc. was founded in 1983. The
company's line of business includes collection and adjustment
services on claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


V GAROFALO: Perez Suit Seeks to Recover Wages and Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------
ARIEL PEREZ and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated who were employed by, V. GAROFALO
CARTING, INC, MARIO GAROFALO and ROBERT GAROFALO and/or other
entities affiliated or controlled by V. GAROFALO CARTING, INC,
MARIO GAROFALO and ROBERT GAROFALO vs. V. GAROFALO CARTING, INC.,
and/or other entities affiliated or controlled by V. GAROFALO
CARTING, INC, MARIO GAROFALO and ROBERT GAROFALO, Case No.
600801/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Nassau Cty., January 17, 2019), seeks to
recover wages and benefits for work performed in connection with
various public works contracts.

V. Garofalo Carting, Inc., is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the state of New York with its principal location in
Wantagh, New York.  The Individual Defendants are officers and
shareholders of VGC.

VGC provides garbage collection and refuse management
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
          Leonor H. Coyle, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9081
          E-mail: lambinder@vandallp.com
                  lcoyle@vandallp.com


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Michelson Appeals Order in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Party Deborah Michelson filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the matter titled In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain Product Liability
Litigation, Case No. 2-16-cv-02765, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
accuses the automakers of concealing defective timing belt
tensioning systems in their vehicles.  The defect can cause
vehicles to lose power at any time, placing occupants at risk,
according to the suit.

The suit claims that, based on pre-production testing, design
failure mode analysis and consumer complaints to dealers, the
defendants knew of the premature failure of the tensioning system
in class members' vehicles but fraudulently concealed them from
class members.  In addition, according to the suit, the Defendants
knowingly omitted material facts about the defective tensioning
system and its corresponding safety risk, and misrepresented to
buyers the standard, quality or grade of class vehicles.

The named plaintiff in the timing chain tensioner case, David
Zimand of Englewood, leased a 2009 Volkswagen Jetta in April 2009,
and then purchased the car in 2012 when his lease ended.  In March
2014, the car experienced tensioning system failure, which resulted
in catastrophic failure of the engine, the suit says.  He was
forced to replace the camshaft, chain, chain tensioner, valves and
numerous other engine parts, which he paid for out of pocket, and
he was without a vehicle for two weeks, the complaint claims.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain
Product Liability Litigation, Case No. 19-1122, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Not Party-Appellant DEBORAH MICHELSON represents herself:

          Deborah Michelson, Esq.
          MILLER GOLER FAEGES LAPINE LLP
          1301 East 9th Street, Suite 2700
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 696-3366
          E-mail: Michelson@MGFL-law.com

Plaintiff-Appellee DAVID ZIMAND, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO PC
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: JCecchi@CarellaByrne.com

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN PC
          210 Summit Avenue
          Montvale, NJ 07645
          Telephone: (201) 391-7000
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com

               - and -

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          361 West Lancaster Avenue
          One Haverford Centre
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 645-4712
          E-mail: mds@chimicles.com

               - and -

          Thomas P. Sobran, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS P. SOBRAN
          7 Evergreen Lane
          Hingham, MD 02043
          Telephone: (781) 741-6075
          E-mail: tsobran@sobranlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees VOLKSWAGEN AG, VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA
INC. and AUDI AG are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Chase, Esq.
          CHASE KURSHAN HERZFELD & RUBIN LLC
          354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1100
          Livingston, NJ 07039
          Telephone: (973) 535-8840

               - and -

          Homer B. Ramsey, Esq.
          HERZFELD & RUBIN PC
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 471-8517
          E-mail: HRamsey@herzfeld-rubin.com


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Ragsdale Appeals Ruling in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Non-party M. Clay Ragsdale filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain Product Liability
Litigation, Case No. 2-16-cv-02765, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
accuses the automakers of concealing defective timing belt
tensioning systems in their vehicles.  The defect can cause
vehicles to lose power at any time, placing occupants at risk,
according to the suit.

The suit claims that, based on pre-production testing, design
failure mode analysis and consumer complaints to dealers, the
defendants knew of the premature failure of the tensioning system
in class members' vehicles but fraudulently concealed them from
class members.  In addition, according to the suit, the Defendants
knowingly omitted material facts about the defective tensioning
system and its corresponding safety risk, and misrepresented to
buyers the standard, quality or grade of class vehicles.

The named plaintiff in the timing chain tensioner case, David
Zimand of Englewood, leased a 2009 Volkswagen Jetta in April 2009,
and then purchased the car in 2012 when his lease ended.  In March
2014, the car experienced tensioning system failure, which resulted
in catastrophic failure of the engine, the suit says.  He was
forced to replace the camshaft, chain, chain tensioner, valves and
numerous other engine parts, which he paid for out of pocket, and
he was without a vehicle for two weeks, the complaint claims.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain
Product Liability Litigation, Case No. 19-1123, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Not Party-Appellant M. CLAY RAGSDALE, of Birmingham, Alabama,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee DAVID ZIMAND, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO PC
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: JCecchi@CarellaByrne.com

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN PC
          210 Summit Avenue
          Montvale, NJ 07645
          Telephone: (201) 391-7000
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com

               - and -

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          361 West Lancaster Avenue
          One Haverford Centre
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 645-4712
          E-mail: mds@chimicles.com

               - and -

          Thomas P. Sobran, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS P. SOBRAN
          7 Evergreen Lane
          Hingham, MD 02043
          Telephone: (781) 741-6075
          E-mail: tsobran@sobranlaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew R. Mendelson, Esq.
          MAZIE SLATER KATZ & FREEMAN LLC
          103 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 207
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 228-9898
          E-mail: mmendelsohn@mazieslater.com

               - and -

          Christopher A. Seeger, Esq.
          SEEGER WEISS LLP
          55 Challenger Road, 6th Floor
          Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660
          Telephone: (973) 639-9100
          E-mail: cseeger@seegerweiss.com

               - and -

          Roland K. Tellis, Esq.
          BARON & BUDD PC
          15910 Ventura Boulevard
          Suite 1600, Encino Plaza
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 839-2333
          E-mail: rtellis@baronbudd.com

Defendants-Appellees VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC. and AUDI AG
are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Chase, Esq.
          CHASE KURSHAN HERZFELD & RUBIN LLC
          354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1100
          Livingston, NJ 07039
          Telephone: (973) 535-8840

               - and -

          Homer B. Ramsey, Esq.
          HERZFELD & RUBIN PC
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 471-8517
          E-mail: HRamsey@herzfeld-rubin.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Ables Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK ABLES, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF TENNESSEE, Case No.
4:19-cv-00199 (S.D. Tex., January 17, 2019), seeks to recover
overtime wages and liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee is a foreign for-profit
corporation and an employer as defined by the FLSA.  Waste
Management is not registered with the Texas Secretary of State and
its principal office is located in Houston, Texas.

Waste Management is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waste Management,
Inc., and provides waste disposal services under the Waste
Management trade name umbrella in the state of Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Drivers' Overtime, Ayala Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS AYALA, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ARIZONA, INC., Case No.
4:19-cv-00196 (S.D. Tex., January 17, 2019), alleges that Waste
Management violates the Fair Labor Standards Act by knowingly and
deliberately failing to compensate the Plaintiff and other Waste
Disposal Drivers for all hours worked in excess of 40 each week on
a routine and regular basis.

Waste Management of Arizona, Inc., is a foreign for-profit company,
licensed to and doing business in Texas, with its corporate
headquarters located in Houston, Harris County, Texas.

Waste Management is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waste Management,
Inc., and provides waste disposal services under the Waste
Management trade name umbrella in the state of Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com


WAYFAIR INC: Brower Piven Files Securities Fraud Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A Professional
Corporation, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
commenced in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on behalf of purchasers of Wayfair Inc. (NYSE: W)
("Wayfair" or the "Company") Class A common stock during the period
between August 2, 2018 and October 31, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  Investors who wish to become proactively involved in the
litigation have until March 11, 2019 to seek appointment as lead
plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will be
selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Wayfair securities during the Class Period.  Members
of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and counsel
chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been certified in
the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that Wayfair had been
experiencing significantly diminished demand for its online product
offerings and had significantly increased advertising spending to
grow sales.

According to the complaint, following a November 1, 2018 press
release announcing its financial results, which disclosed that the
advertising expenses had skyrocketed, the value of Wayfair shares
declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Wayfair securities purchased on or after August 2, 2018 and held
through the revelation of negative information during and/or at the
end of the Class Period and would like to learn more about this
lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead plaintiff,
without cost or obligation to you, please contact Brower Piven
either by email at hoffman@browerpiven.com or by telephone at (410)
415-6616.

Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s.  If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of your
choice.  You need take no action at this time to be a member of the
class.

Charles J. Piven
Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
1925 Old Valley Road
Stevenson, Maryland 21153
Telephone: 410-415-6616
hoffman@browerpiven.com [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Baggett Seeks Overtime Pay for Call Center Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHERYL BAGGETT, individually and on behalf of a class of persons
similarly situated v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No.
4:19-cv-00071 (E.D. Mo., January 17, 2019), arises under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Missouri law from the Defendant's alleged
failure to pay the Plaintiff and other call center workers all
overtime pay for all time worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

Wells Fargo is an international bank that offers services related
to banking, loans and credit, insurance, investing and wealth
management.  Wells Fargo operates telephone call centers in St.
Louis, Missouri; Charlotte, North Carolina and Salt Lake City,
Utah; and, possibly, in other locations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David T. Butsch, Esq.
          Christopher E. Roberts, Esq.
          BUTSCH ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES LLC
          South Bemiston Ave., Suite 260
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 863-5700
          Facsimile: (314) 863-5711
          E-mail: Butsch@butschroberts.com
                  Roberts@butschroberts.com

               - and -

          James X. Bormes, Esq.
          Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
          8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 201-0575
          E-mail: jxbormes@bormeslaw.com
                  cpsons@bormeslaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas M. Ryan, Esq.
          Law Office of Thomas M. Ryan, P.C.
          35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 726-3400


WINCO FOODS: Court Dismisses T. Haggard's Suit With Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned TEVIS HAGGARD, Plaintiff,
v. WINCO FOODS, LLC, Defendant. No. 2:18-cv-01797-MCE-EFB. (E.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Tevis Haggard, on behalf of himself and a putative class,
seeks damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief and
restitution from Defendant WinCo Foods, LLC, as a result of alleged
unpaid wages and lack of rest periods while the Plaintiff was
working for the Defendant.

The Plaintiff asserts seven claims.  The first six, based on
California Labor Code violations, are wage and hour class claims:
(1) failure to pay all straight time wages (2) failure to pay all
overtime wages (3) failure to provide meal periods (4) failure to
authorize and permit rest periods (5) knowing and intentional
failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions
and (6) failure to pay all wages due at the time of termination of
employment. Plaintiff further asserts a seventh claim for unfair
competition under California law.  

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's FAC in its entirety
for failure to state a claim for relief. Primarily, the Defendant
argues that the Plaintiff provides virtually no factual details to
corroborate his claims and that the FAC thus includes nothing more
than a recitation of the elements of the causes of action.

Plaintiff's First Through Fourth Causes of Action

First, the FAC alleges that the Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff
for all time worked and for every day he worked without a meal
period.  Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant had a
practice of engaging in what he refers as shaving time, which
occurred when the Defendant deducted time that was actually worked.
As a result, the Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant
failed to pay for these deductions.  

However, that is where the allegations end. The Plaintiff fails to
assert facts related to the times when the Defendant failed to pay
the straight time wages.  The Plaintiff also fails to include dates
when hours were purportedly deducted. Instead, the Plaintiff's
claim only recites the elements of the cause of action in the form
of conclusory statements before stating that each particular
element applies to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff fails, for example,
to provide even one specific occasion when off-the-clock work was
required, why it was required, and the amount of time he
purportedly worked "off-the-clock."

In sum, the FAC does not allege facts that would help this Court
determine when the failure to pay wages took place, and his First
Cause of Action is therefore dismissed with leave to amend.

The Plaintiff's second, third, and fourth causes of action allege
that the Defendant failed to pay overtime wages when employees
worked over eight hours per day or more than forty hours per week
and allege that the Defendant also failed to provide meal and rest
periods. Those arguments likewise fail. The FAC lacks any facts
identifying any instances when the Plaintiff actually worked
overtime without compensation or was not provided required meal and
rest breaks.

Accordingly, his Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action are
dismissed as well.

Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action

By way of his Fifth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff argues that the
Defendant failed to provide itemized wage statements that included,
among other things, gross wages earned, total hours worked by the
employee, deductions, net wages earned, and all applicable hourly
rates, in violation of Labor Code sections 226(b) and 1174.
According to the Defendant, however, this claim must be dismissed
because (1) the Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a claim for relief (2) his claim is untimely (3) there
is no private right of action for failure to provide an itemized
employee wage statement and (4) the Plaintiff's claim is derivative
of claims that already fail absent facts sufficient to constitute a
claim for relief.

The Court agrees that this claim is untimely. According to the FAC,
the Plaintiff concluded his employment with Defendant some time in
November of 2016. Itemized wage statement violations are governed
by a one-year statute of limitations.  Since the Plaintiff filed
the present action on May 29, 2018, his claim falls outside the
limitations period. Tacitly conceding this point, Plaintiff makes
no argument in opposition to dismissal.

Given this statutory bar, which the Plaintiff does not contend can
be cured, the Fifth Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to
amend.

Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action, which
alleges that the Defendant did not timely pay the Plaintiff
straight, overtime or meal/rest period wages owed at the time of
his termination, for the following reasons: (1) failure to state
facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief, and (2) the
Plaintiff's claim is derivative of claims which already fail to
allege facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief.

Again, the Court agrees with the Defendant. This claim is entirely
dependent on the Plaintiff successfully articulating the foregoing
causes of action for failure to pay wages or provide breaks.
Because this Court has already determined that the Plaintiff has
failed to state sufficient facts to support those causes of action,
the Sixth Cause of Action is also dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant's failure to pay the
Plaintiff, and members of the proposed class, is a false, unfair,
fraudulent, and deceptive business practice under the Unfair
Competition Law, Section 17200 of the California Business and
Professions Code (UCL). The Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief for this alleged violation.  

The instant claim fails for two reasons. First, if the Plaintiff
seeks to recover penalties or monetary damages for a violation of
the UCL, the Plaintiff cannot recover such amounts as this claim
permits only the recovery of injunctive relief and/or restitution.
Second, the Plaintiff's UCL claim, like his Sixth Cause of Action,
is derivative of his substantive claims.

Because these claims have been found to not meet the minimum
pleadings requirements under Landers, this cause of action is also
dismissed with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 10, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydysjgqq
from Leagle.com.

Tevis Haggard, Plaintiff, represented by Jamie Kathryn Serb --
jserb@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC & William
Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm,
APLC.

Winco Foods, LLC, Defendant, represented by Julie Grace Yap --
jyap@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Rabia Zubaida Reed --
rreed@boutinjones.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Simon Lee Yang --
syang@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chevron Entitled to Recover From Bourgeois Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Barry W. Ashe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana has issued an Order and Reasons regarding
cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, Chevron
Oronite Company LLC, and the defendant, Jacobs Field Services North
America, Inc. in the case entitled Chevron Oronite Company LLC,
Successor-in-interest to Chevron Chemical Company, v. Jacobs Field
Services North America, Inc., Successor-in-interest to J.E. Merit
Constructors, Inc., Section "M" (4), Civil Action No. 18-2279,
(E.D. La.).

The action arises out of series of contracts between Chevron
Chemical Company, which Chevron Oronite succeeds in interest, and
J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., which Jacobs succeeds in interest.
Chevron Oronite is a subsidiary of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. From 1989
through 1993, Chevron Chemical engaged J.E. Merit to perform
maintenance work, including providing welders, at Chevron
Chemical's Belle Chasse facility. Each contract contained a
provision requiring J.E. Merit to indemnify Chevron Chemical
against loss, damage, injury, liability, or death caused by J.E.
Merit or connected with the contract or J.E. Merit's performance
under the contract.

Wayne Bourgeois worked as a welder for J.E. Merit (Jacobs) from
1989-1994. In 2016, Bourgeois was diagnosed with mesothelioma. In
March 2017, Bourgeois sued various companies for which he worked,
alleging exposure to asbestos. Bourgeois alleged in relevant part
that he was exposed to asbestos while working for J.E. Merit at
Chevron Chemical's facility in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Chevron
Oronite tendered the lawsuit to Jacobs on July 24, 2017. The next
day, Bourgeois died.

In its motion for summary judgment, Chevron Oronite contends that
Jacobs must indemnify it for amounts Chevron Oronite incurred in
defending and settling the Bourgeois lawsuit and in pursuing the
instant action, with pre- and post-judgment interest. Because
Bourgeois' alleged exposure to asbestos occurred while he was
employed by J.E. Merit at a Chevron facility, Chevron Oronite
argues that Jacobs must honor its contractual obligation to
indemnify Chevron Oronite.

In its own cross-motion for summary judgment, Jacobs argues that it
received insufficient notice to defend the suit, thus requiring
Chevron Oronite to prove actual liability, which it cannot. Jacobs
contends that Chevron Oronite failed to give it an opportunity to
defend itself by requesting defense only after Chevron Oronite
elicited Bourgeois' testimony that was harmful to J.E. Merit, and
only after Bourgeois died, affording Jacobs no opportunity to cross
examine Bourgeois, whose testimony, Jacobs claims, supplies "the
entire factual basis on which Chevron Oronite's indemnity claim
depends."

In opposition, Chevron Oronite contends that it was not required to
give Jacobs notice of the Bourgeois suit because the indemnity is
bottomed on written contracts. Regardless, Chevron Oronite
maintains that it gave reasonable notice of the suit, providing
Jacobs with ample opportunity to defend and to participate in
settlement negotiations. Chevron Oronite dismisses Jacobs'
evidentiary qualms, arguing first, that Chevron need demonstrate
only its potential liability, and second, that the testimony in
question does not amount to inadmissible hearsay as it is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that is, to prove
actual liability), but instead is offered only to demonstrate the
potential for liability.

While it is undisputed that the contracts containing the applicable
indemnity provisions are written, nevertheless, the Court need not
consider whether the existence of a written contract alone suffices
to trigger the potential liability standard because the Court holds
that the summary judgment evidence establishes the sufficiency of
Chevron Oronite's tender under the applicable law. The Court finds
that Chevron Oronite tendered the defense of the Bourgeois suit to
Jacobs by letter on July 24, 2017. However, the letter erroneously
demanded indemnification pursuant to a contract for warehouse
workers, not for welders. Thus, Jacobs denied the first tender on
Sept. 19, 2017, on the grounds that the contract did not apply to
Bourgeois' employment as a welder, and alternatively, because any
indemnification provision would not apply.

The Court also finds that after Jacobs refusal to the first tender,
Chevron Oronite contacted Jacobs on at least nine separate
occasions regarding indemnification, communicating the range of
proposed settlements and issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
relevant contracts between Chevron Chemical and J.E. Merit for
welding services.

On Oct. 31, 2017, Jacobs produced to Chevron Oronite the contracts
applying to Bourgeois' employment. Chevron Oronite issued a second
demand letter on Nov. 7, 2017 (approximately one week after
receiving the relevant contracts from Jacobs), referencing this
time the correct contracts and noting that settlement was imminent,
given that Bourgeois' industrial hygiene expert had testified in
deposition of Bourgeois' significant exposure to asbestos at the
Belle Chasse facility. Jacobs again denied tender. In November and
December of 2017, Chevron Oronite continued to keep Jacobs informed
of settlement negotiations and invited Jacobs to participate.
Chevron settled the Bourgeois lawsuit on Jan. 24, 2018, for
$550,000 -- approximately two months after its second demand.

Jacobs argues that Chevron Oronite's delay in tendering the
Bourgeois suit unfairly disadvantaged Jacobs in its ability to
defend the suit because Jacobs was not present for Bourgeois'
perpetuation deposition and Bourgeois subsequently died. However,
the Court determines that Jacobs has submitted no summary judgment
evidence to demonstrate that it would have or could have elicited
any different information in the discovery of the Bourgeois suit
had it been involved at an earlier juncture. Moreover, the Court
finds Jacobs' concern about its inability to conduct discovery
misplaced: it is undisputed that Bourgeois worked for Jacobs, and
that his answers to interrogatories reflected this from the outset
of litigation, before Bourgeois' perpetuation deposition. Thus,
Bourgeois' testimony is not "the entire factual basis on which
Chevron Oronite's indemnity claim depends."

The Court concludes Chevron Oronite tendered its defense to Jacobs
approximately one week after receiving the relevant contracts from
Jacobs and Chevron Oronite continually kept Jacobs apprised of
settlement negotiations, even after Jacobs rejected the initial and
subsequent tenders. Therefore, Jacobs had opportunity to defend and
settle the Bourgeois suit on its own terms, but chose not to.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the potential liability is
the appropriate standard to apply in assessing Jacobs' indemnity
obligation under the contracts at issue here.

Because the claims in the Bourgeois suit seek recovery for
Bourgeois' alleged exposure to asbestos while working for J.E.
Merit during the period the contracts were in effect, there is no
doubt, if allegations alone are sufficient, that they implicate the
contracts or the work performed under the contracts so as to
trigger Jacobs' indemnity obligation. The Court finds that the
indemnity agreements were in effect when Bourgeois was allegedly
exposed to asbestos while employed for J.E. Merit at Chevron's
Belle Chasse facility, and Chevron Oronite has shown it was
potentially liable to Bourgeois. Thus, Chevron Oronite has met its
first hurdle to indemnification. Chevron Oronite must next show
that the settlement was reasonable -- an issue both parties agree
remains to be tried. Accordingly, in rendering summary judgment,
the Court does not reach the issue of the reasonableness of the
settlement.

Jacobs contends that the contract does not explicitly provide for
"costs" nor for attorney's fees in the context of defending tort
claims like those asserted in Bourgeois. Jacobs argues that the
phrase in Section 3.4 "reasonable attorneys' fees relating to any
of the foregoing" does not apply to all three of the preceding
disjunctive clauses, but must be limited to the immediately
preceding clause, "loss or damage arising from liens, attachments
or patent infringement." Hence, Jacobs argues, because the
Bourgeois suit does not involve claims arising "from liens,
attachments or patent infringement," the contracts do not provide
for an award of attorney's fees in a case such as this, which
involves a tort action. Jacobs asks that the contract be
interpreted against the drafter (said to be Chevron Oronite) to
deny any recovery of attorney's fees.

Under the principles of contract interpretation, the Court holds
that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 3.4 provides
that reasonable attorney's fees should be awarded in connection
with Chevron Oronite's defense and settlement of the Bourgeois suit
and its pursuit of the instant suit. While Jacobs correctly notes
that Section 3.4 nowhere expressly authorizes the recovery of
"costs," it cites no authority for narrowly interpreting the word
"loss" as used in Section 3.4 to exclude ordinary "costs" of
litigation. To the extent Chevron Oronite seeks to recover costs
outside the ambit of ordinary costs, the Court holds that the
indemnity agreement makes no provision for such recovery.

As with the reasonableness of the settlement, Chevron Oronite
agrees to leave for further litigation the "exact amounts for fees
and costs" it seeks to recover from Jacobs. Thus, while the Court
holds that Chevron Oronite is entitled to recovery attorney's fees
it incurred in defending and settling the Bourgeois suit and in
prosecuting this action, the reasonableness and amount of such
recovery is left to be determined.

A copy of the Order and Reasons, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7np5fd9 from Leagle.com.

Chevron Oronite Company LLC, Successor in interest to Chevron
Chemical Company, Plaintiff, represented by McCann Elizabeth LeFeve
-- McCann.LeFeve@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP,
Edwin S. Gault, Jr. -- win.gault@formanwatkins.com -- Forman,
Watkins, & Krutz, LLP, pro hac vice & Spencer M. Ritchie --
spencer.ritchie@formanwatkins.com -- Forman, Watkins, & Krutz, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc., Successor in interest to
J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arthur H.
Leith -- aleith@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC & Sarah
Elizabeth McMillan -- semcmillan@mcglinchey.com --  McGlinchey
Stafford, PLLC.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cleveland Mechanic Sues Over Mesothelioma
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION. DONALD JORDONEK,
Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.; et al., Defendants,
Case No. N19C-01-100 ASB, filed with the Superior Court of the
State of Delaware, Donald Jordonek, a resident of Cleveland, Ohio,
alleges that during his employment, he was wrongly exposed to,
inhaled, ingested, and otherwise absorbed asbestos fibers emanating
from various sources which were mixed, mined, manufactured,
distributed, sold, supplied, removed, installed, and/or used by the
Defendants including, but not limited to brakes, clutches and
gaskets.

The Plaintiff's former employers include, but are not limited to:

   a. Sohio Station -- located in Maple Heights, OH from
approximately 1958 to 1962 as a Gas Station Attendant and Brake
Repairman;

   b. United States Army -- located in White Sands, NM from
approximately 1959 to 1961 as a Mechanic;

   c. Sohio Station -- located in Bedford, OH from approximately
1962 to 1966 as a Mechanic and Manager;

   d. National Safety Brake -- located in Maple Heights, OH from
approximately 1964 to 1964 as a Mechanic;

   e. Miller Buick -- located in Cleveland, OH from approximately
1964 to 1964 as a Mechanic;

   f. Tom Ganley AMC -- located in OH from approximately 1965 to
1965 as a Mechanic;

   g. Doherty Rambler -- located in Cleveland, OH from
approximately 1967 to 1968 as a Mechanic;

   h. Easy Way Rambler -- located in OH from approximately 1968 to
1970 as a Mechanic; and

   i. Goodyear Tire -- located in OH from approximately 1972 to
2002 as a Mechanic.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, the Plaintiff
suffers from an asbestos-related disease(s) including, but not
limited to, mesothelioma.  The Plaintiff first became aware that he
suffered from said disease(s) on or about November 13, 2018, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

OF COUNSEL:

      WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
      700 Broadway
      New York, NY 10003
      Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Elementis Liability to Marteney Affirmed on Appeal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Four affirms the trial court's determination of Elementis
Chemicals, Inc.'s liability for damages on Respondents wrongful
death claims in the case styled Bruce Marteney et al., Plaintiffs
and Respondents, v. Elementis Chemicals Inc., Defendant and
Appellant, No. B283411., (Cal. Ct. App.).

In August 2012, Marty and Marie Marteney commenced the underlying
action, asserting claims for negligence, breach of warranties,
strict liability, and loss of consortium against Elementis, Union
Carbide Corporation, and other defendants involved in the
manufacture and marketing of asbestos-containing products. Their
complaint alleged that Marty suffered from mesothelioma due to his
exposure to asbestos from the defendants' products.

Prior to trial, Marty and Marie entered into settlements with
several defendants totaling $2,390,000. As a result of the
settlements and other dispositions, at the commencement of jury
selection, Union Carbide and Elementis were the only defendants to
appear at trial. In July 2013, a jury returned special verdicts in
favor of Marty and Marie on their claim for strict liability, and
awarded them damages totaling $1,525,000. That sum comprised
$400,000 in economic damages to Marty and Marie, $375,000 in
non-economic damages to Marty, and $750,000 in non-economic damages
to Marie. The jury also allocated Union Carbide a 5% share of
comparative fault, and Elementis a 3% share of comparative fault.

In August 2013, Marty and Marie sought determinations of Union
Carbide's and Elementis' liability for damages. The trial court
(Judge John J. Kralik) found that 20% of the settlement funds were
reasonably allocated to future wrongful death claims.

In October 2013, the trial court entered a judgment awarding
damages totaling $56,250 against Union Carbide, and damages
totaling $33,750 against Elementis, reflecting its determinations
that they were liable solely for noneconomic damages proportionate
to their respective shares of comparative fault. Later, in December
2013, the judgment was amended to include an award of costs. Union
Carbide and Elementis noticed an appeal from the judgment.

On Jan. 16, 2015, while Elementis' appeal from the judgment on
those claims was pending, Marty Marteney died. In July 2015, Marie,
acting as an individual and as representative of Marty's estate,
together with Respondents Bruce Marteney, Steve Marteney, and
Chrystal Dahlstein (the adult children of Marty and Marie), filed a
First Amended Complaint for wrongful death (FAC) against Union
Carbide and Elementis, asserting claims for negligence, breach of
warranties, and strict liability.

After Elementis answered the FAC, the parties stipulated to a stay
of proceedings regarding the FAC until remittitur issued in the
appeal. Later, in an unpublished opinion (Marteney v. Union Carbide
Corporation, et al.(Oct. 10, 2015, B252711), the Court of Appeals
of California for the Second District affirmed the judgment in
favor of Marty and Marie. The Court issued its remittitur on Dec.
31, 2015.

In October 2016, Elementis requested a determination of settlement
credits. After concluding that Elementis was entitled to a credit
based solely on respondents' settlement with Union Carbide -- and
not on Marty's and Marie's settlements -- the trial court found
that Elementis was liable for economic damages totaling $154,149.
In February 2017, the court amended the judgment to reflect that
finding.

In March 2017, Elementis filed a motion to vacate the judgment in
favor of respondents as void, contending the appeal from the 2013
judgment in favor of Marty and Marie foreclosed all proceedings
relating to the FAC. The trial court denied Elementis' motion and
this appeal followed.

On appeal, Elementis contends that the 2017 judgment in favor of
respondents is void. Before the trial court and on appeal,
Elementis has offered two distinct arguments in support of its
contention that the 2017 judgment is void for want of jurisdiction.
Elementis maintains (1) that the appeal from the 2013 judgment in
favor of Marty and Marie removed the court's jurisdiction to permit
the filing of the FAC, and (2) that the underlying action "was
dead" after the Court affirmed the 2013 judgment and Elementis paid
the damages owed to Marty and Marie.

The crux of Elementis' contention is that due to the automatic stay
triggered by the appeal from the 2013 judgment, the filing of the
FAC was a jurisdictional error rendering the 2017 judgment void.
Because the FAC contained wrongful death claims, Elementis'
contention implicates the principles governing those claims.
Generally, wrongful death claims are legally distinct from claims
for personal injury and loss of consortium. Elementis's contention
also implicates the trial court's authority to permit amendments to
the original complaint, as the FAC introduced new claims and
parties into the action.

The Court concludes that notwithstanding Elementis' appeal from the
2013 judgment, the filing of the FAC reflected no jurisdictional
error sufficient to render the 2017 judgment void. The Court has
focused on respondents' wrongful death claims in the FAC, as such,
any error capable of invalidating the 2017 judgment -- if it exists
-- must relate to those claims. That is because the 2017 judgment
encompassed only respondents' claims, which were separate from
Marie's wrongful death claim, which she dismissed prior to trial on
the FAC.

The Court explains that the appeal from the 2013 judgment did not
remove the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the FAC,
insofar as it asserted respondents' wrongful death claims. By
accepting the FAC for filing, the trial court effectively permitted
respondents -- who were not parties to the original action -- to
intervene in order to assert their wrongful death claims. The Court
clarifies that because respondents' claims were based on their
father Marty's post-judgment death and were separate from Marie's
wrongful death claim, they did not implicate the 2013 judgment in
favor of Marty and Marie in any way. Accordingly, the appeal did
not deprive the trial court of subject matter judgment over
respondents' claims.

Moreover, even had the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
permitting respondents to assert their claims while the appeal was
pending, the Court finds that Elementis failed to preserve any such
contention of error. Although respondents appear to have filed the
FAC without obtaining leave from the trial court, the Court
determines that Elementis answered the FAC, agreed to the
stipulation regarding the FAC, and following the Court's
remittitur, participated without objection in the wrongful death
proceedings. Elementis challenged the filing of the FAC only after
the entry of the 2017 judgment, when it asked the trial court to
vacate that judgment as void. Accordingly, Elementis may not
challenge the 2017 judgment on the basis of procedural
irregularities constituting errors in excess of jurisdiction.
Generally, the failure to object in a timely manner to the
assertion of new claims bars contentions of error predicated on
that irregularity.

Thus, the Court concludes that any jurisdictional error capable of
rendering the 2017 judgment void must attach to respondents' claims
in the FAC, as that judgment resolved only respondents' claims.
Because respondents became parties to the action after the 2013
judgment, the Court sustains that the FAC effectively constituted
their original complaint, as it marked "the beginning of a new
action for a new cause" by them. The FAC thus did not implicate the
2013 judgment, insofar as the FAC contained respondents' claims. In
sum, Elementis has failed to show any basis for invalidating the
2017 judgment due to the filing of the FAC.

On appeal, Elementis' principal contentions focus on whether
respondents may recover from Marie's settlement funds allocated to
future wrongful death actions. In opposing Elementis' request for
settlement credits, respondents submitted declarations stating (1)
that they were not parties to the litigation of Marty's and Marie's
claims, (2) that they had no proprietary interest in those claims,
(3) that they did not participate in the negotiation of Marty's and
Marie's settlements, (4) that they lacked prior knowledge of those
settlements, and (5) that they never authorized Marty and Marie to
settle their wrongful death claims. However, Elementis offered no
evidence contradicting those declarations, and argued only that
respondents did not state that they received no funds from the
settlements. The Court determines that the trial court reasonably
concluded that Elementis had not shown that the settlements bound
respondents.

Elementis suggests that Marty and Marie, in negotiating the
settlements, acted as respondents' agents because the settlements
secured funds intended to resolve prospective wrongful death
actions. But the Court rejects such a theory because respondents
are bound by Marty's and Marie's settlements only if they ratified
them -- that is, accepted the settlement funds. Because there is no
evidence that respondents created the appearance that Marty and
Marie were negotiating the settlements on respondents' behalf,
Elementis' theory thus fails, as Elementis offered no evidence to
the trial court that respondents obtained settlement funds.

Nonetheless, Elementis also suggests that respondents did, in fact,
receive settlement funds, pointing to their trial testimony that
their parents gave them cash "gifts" totaling $114,000 shortly
before and after Marty died. However, the Court finds that
Elementis has never directed the trial court's attention to
respondents' trial testimony, and that contention has not been
preserved for appeal. Furthermore, the Court rejects to consider
Elementis' contentions, as ratification through the acceptance of
benefits requires knowledge of the relevant circumstances. However,
the Court finds nothing in respondents' trial testimony implies
that the gifts reflected settlement funds or that respondents had
any knowledge of the source of the gifts. In sum, the trial court
did not err in denying Elementis a section 877 credit based on
Marty's and Marie's settlements.

A copy of the Opinion, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdefdjb
from Leagle.com.

Dehay & Elliston, William H. Armstrong -- barmstrong@dehay.com --
Jennifer D. Fitzpatrick -- jfitzpatrick@dehay.com -- and Catherine
M. Reichhold -- creichhold@dehay.com -- for Defendant and
Appellant.

Weitz & Luxenberg, Benno Ashrafi , and Josiah Parker for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: G. Liptow Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma Death
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION. GLORIA LIPTOW,
Individually, and as proposed administrator of the estate of ROBERT
J. LIPTOW, deceased, Plaintiff, v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants, Case No. N19C-01-171 ASB, filed with the Superior Court
of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Gloria Liptow, the proposed
administrator of the estate of Robert J. Liptow, alleged that
during his employment, Mr. Liptow was wrongly exposed to, inhaled,
ingested, and otherwise absorbed asbestos fibers emanating from
various sources which were mixed, mined, manufactured, distributed,
sold, removed, installed, and/or used by the Defendants including,
but not limited to: pumps, valves, boilers, pips, pipe-covering,
electrical equipment, turbines, HVAC units, compressors, brakes,
gaskets, clutches, punch presses and various types of Military
exposure during his Basic Training in Fort Carson, CO from
approximately 1955 to 1957.

Mr. Liptow's former employers include, but are not limited to:

   a. Kelsey Hayes Wheel Co. -- located in Monroe, MI from
approximately 1948 to 1950 as a Maintenance Man; and

   b. Ford Motor Company -- located in Monroe, MI from
approximately 1950 to 1985 as a Maintenance Man and Pipefitter.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Mr. Liptow
suffered from an asbestos-related disease(s) including, but not
limited to, Mesothelioma.  He first became aware that he suffered
from said disease(s) in or about October 17, 2018, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.  As a result of developing Mesothelioma, Mr. Liptow
endured, great physical pain and suffering, mental anguish,
emotional pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
ultimately died on October 28, 2018.

Mr. Liptow is survived by his spouse, Gloria Liptow, and his two
children.  As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, which
was the direct and proximate cause of the decedent's
asbestos-related Mesothelioma, the Plaintiff, Individually, and his
children, as surviving heirs, have suffered a loss of society,
together with related mental anguish and grief, all of which will
continue into the future.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

OF COUNSEL:

      WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
      700 Broadway
      New York, NY 10003
      Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Huntington Owed Duty to Avoid Wanda's Injury
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia entered an order of certification requesting that the
Supreme Court of Virginia to exercise jurisdiction and answer
discretion to consider this dispositive question of law: "Does an
employer owe a duty of care to an employee's family member who
alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of an employee,
where the family member alleges the employer's negligence allowed
asbestos fibers to be regularly transported away from the place of
employment to the employee's home?"

In the instant case entitled Wesley Quisenberry, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Wanda Quisenberry, Deceased, v.
Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Record No. 171494, (Va.),
Plaintiff alleges that from approximately 1942 to 1977, Wanda
Quisenberry's father, Bennie Plessinger, was employed by Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, now known as Huntington Ingalls
Incorporated, in various capacities in which he was routinely
exposed to asbestos and in which asbestos dust adhered to his
clothing. He brought home asbestos fibers and his car was
contaminated with these fibers. His daughter, Wanda, lived in his
home and was exposed to asbestos beginning in 1942. Beginning in
1954, she regularly helped launder her father's clothes, shaking
off and breathing in asbestos dust in the process.

In December 2013, Wanda Quisenberry was diagnosed with malignant
pleural mesothelioma, caused by exposure to asbestos dust and
fibers. She died from the disease three years later. Her son,
Wesley Quisenberry, administrator of her estate, brought the action
in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News.

The complaint alleges that in the years Wanda was exposed to
asbestos, particularly between 1950 and 1969, the Shipyard knew or
had reason to know of the dangers that asbestos posed to workers'
family members and members of the public, including Wanda. The
complaint alleges Huntington was negligent in choosing not to
exercise reasonable care to, among other things, sufficiently warn
workers not to wear work clothes home; educate workers about
safeguards such as coveralls; provide a locker room, showers, or
laundry service; and adhere to various statutes, regulations, and
guidelines, which negligence proximately resulted in Wanda's death.


The Supreme Court of Virginia, through an Opinion of Justice Leroy
F. Millette, Jr., reaffirms the principles of duty in general
negligence claims under such circumstances in Virginia as
established in RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 275, 764 S.E.2d 8,
16 (2014). The Court explains that "general negligence principles
require a person to exercise due care to avoid injuring others."
The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until
it is established that the man who has been negligent owed some
duty to the person who seeks to make him liable for his negligence.
In defining those to whom a duty is owed, the Court has said in RGR
that this general duty is owed "to those within reach of a
defendant's conduct."

However, the certified question in the case characterizes
Huntington and Wanda as having "no relationship." The pleadings
clearly indicate they lack a contractual, familial,
employer-employee, or agency-agent relationship, or facts giving
rise to a "special relationship." They are, generally speaking,
strangers under the law.

Where no relationship exists, it is axiomatic that there is no
duty. However, as set forth in both RGR, the Court held that "in
order for the actor to be negligent with respect to the other, his
conduct must create a recognizable risk of harm to the other
individual, or to a class of persons -- as, for example, all
persons within a given area of danger -- of which the other is a
member." Thus, the only 'relationship' which must exist for a duty
to arise is a sufficient juxtaposition of the parties in time and
space to place the plaintiff in danger from the defendant's acts.
This "juxtaposition of time and space" does not require actual
interaction between the parties, but sufficient relation to place
plaintiff within reach of defendant's conduct.

In this case, the Court determines Wanda is alleged to be one such
person within a "given area of danger." Thus, the artificial hazard
created by Huntington -- asbestos dust -- was allegedly released
through Huntington's course of conduct and moved to place Wanda in
danger. The nature of the hazard allegedly created by Huntington's
conduct was that asbestos fibers, the inhalation of which could
cause mesothelioma, regularly accumulated on the clothes of workers
during the day and were released again when those workers returned
home and had their clothes washed, thus placing Wanda and others
similarly situated within reach of Huntington's conduct and within
the "zone of danger." This created a "recognizable risk of harm" to
those sharing living quarters with the workers, resulting in a duty
of ordinary care to that class of persons.

As pled, (a) workers accumulated asbestos dust on their clothes;
(b) in the absence of on-site laundry, lockers, or warning to the
contrary, these individuals would regularly wear those clothes into
their home environment and have them laundered there; (c) the
fibers traveled on the clothes of persons who worked with asbestos,
and the fibers posed a danger to individuals who breathed in the
asbestos dust in the home environment. The Court finds the
pleadings support a "recognizable risk of harm" to a class of
persons "within a given area of danger" of defendant's conduct,
including Wanda and the class of persons similarly situated.

The Court determines that by virtue of Wanda's father's regular
accumulation of asbestos fibers on his work clothes, Huntington was
placed in such a position with regard to Wanda that if it did not
use ordinary care and skill, it would subject Wanda to regular
danger of injury from asbestos fibers. Accordingly, the Court
concludes a duty arose to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
injury to Wanda, as well as other persons similarly situated.

Huntington argues that, in this case, no duty can lie because
asbestos dust traveled on the backs of employees.

As pled, the workers were not informed of the dangers of the
asbestos dust. Thus, the Court points out that absent knowledge,
the workers were simply vehicles or carriers of the asbestos dust:
they were a means of dispersal yielding various foreseeable and
unforeseeable routes of exposure to the hazard created by
Huntington's conduct in engaging in industrial practices that
create asbestos dust. Accordingly, because the Court finds a duty
does indeed lie to such persons in the recognizable and foreseeable
area of risk, the Court answers the certified question, as
restated, in the affirmative.

A copy of the Opinion, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycs8hbto
from Leagle.com.

Leslie Kendrick ( Peter Kraus ; Jonathan George ; Charles S. Siegel
, on briefs), for petitioner.

Alexandra B. Cunningham -- acunningham@HuntonAK.com -- Richmond (
Stuart A. Raphael -- sraphael@HuntonAK.com -- Wendy C. McGraw --
wmcgraw@HuntonAK.com -- Norfolk; Merideth Snow Daly --
mdaly@HuntonAK.com -- Richmond; Hunton & Williams, on brief), for
respondent.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Asbestos Firm ( William W.C. Harty --
wharty@pwhd.com -- Robert R. Hatten -- RRHatten@pwhd.com -- Hugh B.
McCormick, III -- HughMcCormick@pwhd.com -- Erin E. Jewell --
ejewell@pwhd.com -- Newport News; Jeanette Dodson-O'Connell ;
Spencer Reiss; Richard S. Glasser -- richardg@glasserlaw.com --
William H. Monroe, Jr. -- bill@glasserlaw.com -- Marc C. Greco  --
marcg@glasserlaw.com -- Kip A. Harbison -- kip@glasserlaw.com --
Norfolk; Greg Webb ; Kyle McNew -- kmcnew@michiehamlett.com --
Charlottesville; Kevin P. Bilms ; Thomas F. Burris, III ; Patten,
Wornom, Hatten & Diamonstein; Glasser & Glasser; Michie Hamlett PC,
on briefs), in support of petitioner.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Trial Lawyers' Association ( E. Kyle McNew
-- kmcnew@michiehamlett.com -- J. Gregory Webb  --
gwebb@michiehamlett.com -- MichieHamlett, on briefs),
Charlottesville, for petitioner.

Amici Curiae: Virginia Chamber of Commerce, Virginia Manufacturers
Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, National Association of
Manufactuers, American Tort Reform Association, American Insurance
Association, and NFIB Small Business Legal Center ( Mark A. Behrens
-- mbehrens@shb.com -- Shook Hardy & Bacon, on brief), in support
Of respondent.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J. Garner Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma Death
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION. JIMMYE GARNER, Individually and as
Executrix for the Estate of JAMES B GARNER, deceased, v. A.O. SMITH
CORPORATION; CLEAVER-BROOKS, INC.; CRANE CO.; FOSTER WHEELER LLC;
GOULDS PUMPS, LLC; ITT LLC; NOOTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. N19C-01-180 ASB, filed
with the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Jimmye
Garner, James B. Garner's widow, alleged that during her husband's
employment, he was wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and
otherwise absorbed asbestos fibers emanating from various sources
which were mixed, mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed,
installed, and/or used by the Defendants including, but not limited
to: removing, repairing and installing asbestos-containing boilers,
pumps, valves, pipes, insulation, gaskets, packing, firebrick,
cement, spray and cloth.  Mr. Garner was also exposed as a
bystander to other workers using the above listed
asbestos-containing products in his vicinity.

Mr. Garner's former employers include, but are not limited to, the
following:

   a. Bowen Plumbing -- located in San Angelo, TX from
approximately the late 1940's to 1950 as a Plumber;

   b. Mack's Plumbing -- located in Midland, TX from approximately
the 1950's to 1960's as a Journeyman, Plumber and Foreman;

   c. Garner Brothers -- located in Odessa, TX, from approximately
1960 to 1963 as an Owner, Journeyman, Plumber and Foreman;

   d. Beard Plumbing Company -- located in Dallas, TX from
approximately 1966 to 1970 as a Journeyman, Plumber and Foreman;
and

   e. Continental Mechanical Corporation -- located in Dallas, TX
from approximately 1970 to 1991 as the General Foreman of
Plumbing.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Mr. Garner
suffered from an asbestos-related disease(s) including, but not
limited to, Mesothelioma. He first became aware that he suffered
from said disease(s) in or about September of 2017, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused. As a result of developing Mesothelioma, Mr. Garner endured,
great physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional pain
and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and ultimately died on
November 11, 2017.

Mr. Garner is survived by his widow and his daughter.  As a result
of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, which was the direct and
proximate cause of the decedent's asbestos-related Mesothelioma,
the Plaintiff and his daughter have suffered a loss of society,
together with related mental anguish and grief, all of which will
continue into the future.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

OF COUNSEL:

      WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
      700 Broadway
      New York, NY 10003
      Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Shepard Couple Sues Over Husband's Mesothelioma
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION. MARTIN H. SHEPARD and
DEBRA SHEPARD, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. ABB, INC., as successor to
ITE CIRCUIT BREAKERS, INC.; et al., Defendants, Case No.
N19C-01-133 ASB, filed with the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware, Plaintiffs Martin H. Shepard and Debra Shepard, residents
of Wells, Maine, alleged that during his employment, Plaintiff
Martin H. Shepard was wrongly exposed to, inhaled, ingested, and
otherwise absorbed asbestos fibers emanating from various sources
which were mixed, mined, manufactured, distributed, sold, removed,
installed, and/or used by the Defendants including, but not limited
to pumps, boilers, valves, electrical products, turbines, HVAC
equipment, refrigeration equipment, electrical products, pipe and
block insulation, insulating cement, joint compound, ceiling tiles,
floor tiles, generators, distillation equipment, gaskets and
plaster.

Plaintiff Martin H. Shepard's former employers include, but are not
limited to, the following:

   a. Slumberland Motel -- located in Wells, ME from approximately
Summer of 1972 to Summer of 1975 as a Grounds Keeper;

   b. Coastal Cleaners -- located in Kittery, ME from approximately
1972 to 1974 as a Cleaner;

   c. Wells Police Department -- located in Wells, ME from
approximately January 1974 to October 1974 as a Police Officer;

   d. Noble & Matthews -- located in York County, ME from
approximately January 1975 to May 1975 as an Electrician
Apprentice;

   e. Service Master of Southern Maine -- located in Southern, ME
from approximately May 1975 to September 1975 as a Cleaner; and

   f. U.S. Government -- located in Kittery, ME from approximately
September 1975 to 2001 as an Electrician.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff Martin
H. Shepard suffers from an asbestos-related disease(s) including,
but not limited to, Mesothelioma.  He first became aware that he
suffered from said disease(s) on or about July of 2018, and,
subsequently thereto, became aware that the same was wrongfully
caused.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq.
     Ipek K. Medford, Esq.
     Andrew C. Dalton, Esq.
     Michael C. Dalton, Esq.
     DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     Cool Spring Meeting House
     1106 West Tenth Street
     Wilmington, DE 19806
     Tel: (302) 652-2050
     Email: IMedford@BDaltonlaw.com

          - and -

     Adam Balick, Esq.
     Patrick J. Smith, Esq.
     BALICK & BALICK, LLC
     711 North King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Tel: (302) 658-4265
     Email: abalick@balick.com

OF COUNSEL:

      WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
      700 Broadway
      New York, NY 10003
      Tel: (212) 558-5500


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tishman's Attempt to Appeal NYCAL Cases Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York has denied Defendant-appellant Tishman Liquidation
Corporation's motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals
from the decision and order of the Court, entered on March 22,
2018, (Appeal Nos. 6079-6080), in the case styled In Re New York
City Asbestos Litigation. All NYCAL Cases. Business Council of New
York State; Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York; New York Insurance
Association, Inc.; Northeast Retail Lumber Association; Coalition
for Litigation Justice, Inc.; Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America; National Association of Manufacturers; NFIB
Small Business Legal Center; American Tort Reform Association;
Washington Legal Foundation; and American Insurance Association,
Amici Curiae, 782000/17, Motion No. M-6024, Index Nos. 40000/88,
(N.Y. App. Div.).

A copy of the Order, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb8qtoyu
from Leagle.com.



                            *********

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