CAR_Public/190208.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, February 8, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 29

                            Headlines

1611 FOOD MART: Barrera Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Alexander Brings Suit Under FDCPA in Ark.
ACE HARDWARE: Haggar Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
ACORD CORP: Court Awards $1.597MM Defendants Attorney's Fees
ACRES GROUP: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Escudero Suit Says

ADVANCED MICRO: Court Certifies Dickey Class
ADVANTECH MANUFACTURING: Court OKs FLSA Class Settlement
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Connolly Moves for Certification of Class
AMERICAN IN-HOME: Gonzalez Seeks Overtime Pay for Healthcare Aides
APEX LIFE: Lofton Files Class Action in Calif. Super. Ct.

ATH HOLDING: Court Allows Class Certification Modification in Bell
BOB'S DISCOUNT: Guerrero Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
CAPSTONE RESTAURANT: Waters Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
CENTRAL CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit
CERTIFIED FLOORING: Did Not Pay Carpet Installers' OT, Couch Says

COCONINO, AZ: Montelongo-Morales Suit Moved to Arizona Court
COLLECTO INC: Court Grants Class Certification in Weissman Suit
CONCORDE INVESTMENT: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of PSLRA Suit
CONSTAR FINANCIAL: Cruz Files Suit under FDCPA in New York
CREDIT BUREAU: Certification of Class Sought in Johnson Suit

CREDITREPAIR.COM INC: Sued by Carranza Over Unsolicited Calls
DIAMOND RESORTS: Sold Unregistered Securities, Dropp et al. Claim
DUTY FREE: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Arteaga Says
ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC: Continues to Defend Merger-Related Suits
EXTREME NETWORKS: April 25 Hearing to Approve Settlement Set

FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Betner-Gray Files Class Action under FDCPA
FIRSTPOINT INC: $1.2-Mil. Settlement in Barnhill Suit Okayed
FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Agreement Inked in Fernandez-Cryer Suit
HARRIS CORP: Class Suits Challenge L3 Technologies Merger
IDAHO: Court Consolidates 4 Inmates Suits with Workman

IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Misled Shareholders, Robbins Arroyo Suit Says
INDIAN RIVER: $1.4MM Cooley Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
L'OREAL USA: CeraVe Products Don't Treat Eczema, Magill Says
LOS ANGELES, CA: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer to Evidence in Howard
LOUISIANA: Court Denies Atakapa Indian's TRO Bid

MAPLEBEAR INC: Lozano Files Class Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
MARY JANE ELLIOTT: Vanderkodde's Bid to Certify Class Declared Moot
MASSACHUSETTS: L Civil Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice
MDL 2672: Court Denies Administrative Bid to Seal Lytle Declaration
MDL 2785: Court Denies Bid for Sanofi to Produce Docs

MERCHANTS & MEDICAL: Faces Gambina FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
MICROSOFT CORP: Continues to Defend Moussouris Class Action
MONARCH RECOVERY: Betner-Gray Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Avery Files Personal Injury Class Action
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Crowe Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Cuevas Suit Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Battle Personal Injury Suit in Ind.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Brantley PI Class Action in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Owens Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Pierce PI Suit in Indiana Ct.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Georg Suit Alleges Claim for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Hailey Brings Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Hoffman Asserts Personal Injury Claim
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Johnson Alleges Claim for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Keck Class Suit Asserts Personal Injury

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Koronkiewicz Sues Over Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kunzelman Files Personal Injury Case in Ind.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Lott Files PI Class Suit in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Lucot Class Suit Asserts Personal Injury Claim
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Martin Files PI Class Action in Indiana

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: McCall Files Class Action for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: McKinney Files Personal Injury Lawsuit
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Perry Files Personal Injury Class Suit in Ind.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Presley Files PI Suit in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Randall Suit Asserts Personal Injury Claim

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Rhodes Files Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Slack Suit Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Stroud Files PI Suit in Indiana Ct.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Thorne Files PI Class Action in Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Van Doren Files Personal Injury Class Action

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Watson Files PI Suit in Indiana Court
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Williams Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Wilson Files Personal Injury Class Action
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Certification of Class Sought in Fote Suit
NCAA: Abe Mack Sues over Cameron Student-Athletes' Safety

NCAA: Calvin Lacy Sues over WIU Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Disregards Knoxville Student-Athletes' Safety, Hearn Claims
NCAA: Disregards NCCU Student-Athletes' Safety, Hillie Says
NCAA: Disregards Newberry Student-Athletes' Safety, King Claims
NCAA: Disregards UNA Student-Athletes' Safety, Green Claims

NCAA: Disregards Wabash Student-Athletes' Safety, Rickenbach Says
NCAA: Disregards WSSU Student-Athletes' Safety, Holloway Claims
NCAA: Disregards Wyoming Student-Athletes' Safety, Geist Claims
NCAA: Houghton Sues over UNC Pembroke Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Kives Sues over Northeastern Student-Athletes' Safety

NCAA: Lumpkin Sues over Millsaps College Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: McCann Sues over University of Akron Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Medley Sues over Hiram College Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Medley Sues over Hiram College Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Page Sues over Safety Issues of Elon Student-Athletes

NCAA: Pfeifer Sues over Cornell College Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Pledger Sues over Virginia Union Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Shoenfelt Sues over Gettysburg Student-Athletes' Safety
NCAA: Simons Sues over Safety of UIndy Student-Athletes
NEW BALANCE: $535K Dashnaw Settlement Has Preliminary Approval

NEW PROSPECT: Sued by Baker Over W-2 Workers' Unpaid Overtime
NOVARTIS AG: Sandoz and Fougera Continue to Defend Class Suits
OPTIMUM OUTCOMES: Ct. Stays Proceedings on Whalen's Bid to Certify
PENDRAGON NORTH: Chiu Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
PENSKE LOGISTICS: Rodriguez Settlement Has Final Court Approval

PORTER MCGUIRE: Court Denies Certification of FCDPA Class
QUICKEN LOANS: Hyde Sues over Unsolicited Marketing Text Message
RAPID TRANSIT: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Moreno
RIO RANCHO, NM: Students Searches Suit vs Individuals Dismissed
ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: Court OKs $9.25MM Singh Class Settlement

SHAW ACADEMY: Davidson Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Texts
SOLCO HEALTHCARE: Sued over Contaminated Generic Irbesartan
SORTIS FINANCIAL: Eisen Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
SOVEREIGN INDUSTRIES: Arce Suit Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
STEEG LAW: 5th Cir. Affirms Decertification in FDCPA Suits

TRACKIN CO: Meza Files Class Action in Calif. Super. Ct.
UXIN LIMITED: Lei Liang Sues over Stock Price Drop
WAGNER & WAGNER: Underpays Salespersons, Dela Cruz Suit Says
WELBILT INC: Faces Borel-Donohue Securities Suit in Florida
YANGTZE RIVER: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit

ZICAM LLC: Court Grants Final Approval of Melgar Class Settlement

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Claims Continue to Climb, AM Best Says
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Discovered at Dormant Quarry
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Material Used in Kuwaiti Thermos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Played Role in Shipyard Worker's Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Automaker Wins Review on Asbestos Liability Ruling

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Barrow Has Highest Asbestos Cancer Rate in UK
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burton Carpenter Dies of Asbestos Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chesham Woman Dies of Epithelioid Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Scolds County Over Judge's Asbestos Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Won't Compel Cos. to Pay Deposition Costs

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Had 29,089 Pending Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Pays $1.3MM Judgment in DeLisle Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fake Cigarettes Containing Asbestos Discovered
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Family Seeks Answer Over Member's Asbestos Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fired Worker May Pursue Whistleblower Claims

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Denies Claims Rail Asbestos Removal Unsafe
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Settles Asbestos Row Before $81MM Jury Award
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Laborer Blames Asbestos for Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Painter Dies of Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Shipyard Workers Get EUR51,000

ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Settles 7 Suits, Claims for $400K
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Mendez Recuses From Houston v. 3M Company
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Juni Ruling Dose of Reality to Asbestos Litigation
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaercher Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Arrested Over Asbestos Consulate Packages

ASBESTOS UPDATE: March 18 Maremont Plan Confirmation Hearing
ASBESTOS UPDATE: March 28 Oakfabco Plan Confirmation Hearing
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meritor Gains $31MM from Liability Reassessment
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meza Claims vs. BASF Catalysts Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Moroun Firm Cited for Asbestos Violations

ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Law Gives EPA Power to Ban Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Talc-Asbestos Lawsuit Goes to Trial
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY Court Hears Arguments in M. South Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Orleans Man Facing Charges for Dumping Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pa. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Youse Suit

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pathologist Testifies in Asbestos Talc Trial
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pinjarra Refinery Exposure Probe Continues
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rector Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Renovation Firm Fined for Asbestos Violations
ASBESTOS UPDATE: RFPC's Parent Company Defends Claims at Jan. 25

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Senators Ask Asbestos Info From Talc Firm CEO
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Son Sues Ameron Over Father's Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wash. Landslide Eroding Natural Asbestos Deposit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Widow's Asbestos Suit Remains in Federal Court
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Willful Asbestos Violations Results in $800K Fines



                            *********

1611 FOOD MART: Barrera Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ISMAEL CHINO BARRERA, JUAN CHINO BARRERA, and APOLINAR TAVERAS
PICHARDO, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v.
1611 FOOD MART INC. d/b/a DOLLAR DEAL, PADAM BAJAJ, and RAKHI
BAJAJ, Case No. 1:19-cv-00606 (S.D.N.Y., January 22, 2019), alleges
that pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Plaintiffs are
entitled to recover from the Defendants:

   (a) unpaid minimum wages;
   (b) unpaid overtime compensation;
   (c) liquidated damages;
   (d) prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and
   (e) attorneys' fees and costs.

1611 Food Mart Inc., doing business as Dollar Deal, is a domestic
business corporation organized under the laws of the state of New
York with a principal place of business in Bronx, New York.  The
Individual Defendants are joint owners, shareholders, officers,
directors, supervisors, managing agents and proprietors of Dollar
Deal.

The Defendants operate a dollar store named Dollar Deal.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          708 Third Avenue - 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: jcilenti@jcpclaw.com
                  pcooper@jcpclaw.com


ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Alexander Brings Suit Under FDCPA in Ark.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Absolute Resolutions
Corporation. The case is styled as Jason Alexander, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Absolute
Resolutions Corporation, Mark Naiman, Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC and W.
Anderson Woodford, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-03007-TLB (W.D.
Ark., January 25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Absolute Resolutions Corporation provides accounts receivable
solutions for the healthcare, bank card and finance, retail, and
telecom sectors. The company focuses on the recovery, purchase, and
sale of distressed accounts receivables. It offers custom services
and reporting in the areas of collection, including custom reports,
early out programs, standard collections, legal collections, and
skip tracing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Corey D. McGaha, Esq.
   Crowder McGaha, LLP
   5507 Ranch Drive, Suite 202
   Little Rock, AR 72223
   Tel: (501) 205-4026
   Fax: (501) 367-8208
   Email: cmcgaha@crowdermcgaha.com

      - and -

   William Thomas Crowder, Esq.
   CROWDER MCGAHA LLP
   5507 RANCH DRIVE, SUITE 202
   Little Rock, AR 72223
   Tel: (501) 205-4026
   Fax: (501) 367-8208
   Email: wcrowder@crowdermcgaha.com


ACE HARDWARE: Haggar Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
---------------------------------------------------------
ELIA HAGGAR; KYO HAK CHU, individually and on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated v. ACE HARDWARE CORPORATION; and
DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-00478-SVW-E (C.D. Cal.,
January 22, 2019), arises from Ace Hardware's failure to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its Web site --
https://www.acehardware.com/ -- to be fully and equally accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

Ace Hardware Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with its
headquarters in Illinois.  The Defendant conducts a large amount of
its business in California, and the United States as a whole.  The
Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names, identities, and
capacities of the Doe Defendants.

Ace Hardware operates as a wholesaler of hardware, paint, and other
related products in the United States and internationally.  The
Company offers lawn and garden equipment, paints and sundries, and
hand tools.  The Company also provides value-added services, such
as advertising, marketing, merchandising, and store location and
design services to its retail members.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


ACORD CORP: Court Awards $1.597MM Defendants Attorney's Fees
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued a Memorandum Opinion  and Order grating Defendants
Attorney’s Fees in the case captioned DALE SNYDER, et al.,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ACORD CORPORATION, a Delaware non-profit
corporation, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No.
1:14-cv-01736-JLK. (D. Colo.).

This matter before this Court is whether Joint Defendants are
entitled to an award against Plaintiffs' counsel personally under
28 U.S.C. Section 1927.

After dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims in this case, the Court
ruled that Joint Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney
fees under Colorado Revised Statute Section 13-17-201. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has since similarly concluded that
Joint Defendants are entitled to an award of their appellate
attorney fees under Section 13-17-201.The matters remaining for me
to determine are the amount of the attorney fees that were
reasonably and necessarily incurred by Joint Defendants in
defending this action, both at the trial level and on appeal, and
whether Joint Defendants are entitled to an award against
Plaintiffs' counsel personally under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.

Amount of the Attorney Fee Award under Colorado Revised Statute
Section 13-17-201

Left for the Court to determine is the amount of fees Joint
Defendants reasonably and necessarily incurred in defending the
action. To do so, the COurt must calculate the lodestar amount,
which is the product of the number of attorney hours reasonably
expended' and a reasonable hourly rate.

Joint Defendants' Opening Brief on the amount of the attorney fee
award calculated the total lodestar at $1,775,855.69. That amount
has since been reduced. Thus, the final award sought by Joint
Defendants is $1,597,602.66.  

Reasonableness of the Hours Expended

The court has summarized them as: (1) whether the tasks being
billed would normally be billed to a paying client (2) the number
of hours spent on each task, (3) the complexity of the case (4) the
number of reasonable strategies pursued (5) the responses
necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side,' and (6)
`potential duplication of services' by multiple lawyers.

The Court finds the most significant factor for determining the
proper amount of the present fee award is that Joint Defendants'
request includes only hours for which they were actually billed by
and paid their counsel. Mr. Shea gives great weight to this fact
and notes that such consideration is especially warranted since
Joint Defendants are sophisticated entities often with
long-standing relationships with their counsel.   These Defendants
could select the counsel of their choice and many negotiated
discounted rates. It is highly unlikely that counsel would
jeopardize these relationships by overbilling their clients. Still,
Joint Defendants do not seek total compensation for all of the
hours expended by their counsel or at the full rate paid.

The complexity of this case further supports the reasonableness of
the hours expended. Plaintiffs asserted 23 claims against each of
the 113 Defendants, alleging a broad, multi-decade conspiracy.

The case was disposed of at the earliest stage on a motion to
dismiss, yet there are still over 600 docket entries. It was fully
foreseeable and is reasonable that such a case would require
Defendants' counsel to expend thousands of hours defending it. The
Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that the blame lies
with Defendants for their rejection of Plaintiffs' qualified offers
to decrease the number of parties involved. Plaintiffs initiated
this litigation and were in control of its course. There is no
indication Defendants' counsel acted unreasonably or stepped
outside the bounds of competent representation of their clients.
Plaintiffs cannot now complain that the fees incurred by Defendants
are excessive because such an inordinate number were forced to take
part.

In any case, Joint Defendants have demonstrated that they worked
together as much as possible.

Since many are direct competitors, though, it was impossible for a
single firm or even a handful of firms to represent all.
Defendants' counsel reduced the overall number of hours expended by
joining motions and coordinating responses. Each could have filed
an independent motion to dismiss detailing every applicable
defense. Instead, however, they collaborated and joined other
Defendants' motions where possible. Of course, coordinating in such
a way could not have occurred without incurring fees for sending
emails, participating in conference calls, reviewing drafts, etc.

Reasonableness of the Claimed Rates

Finding the hours expended to be reasonable, the Court moves on to
the reasonableness of the rates sought. Mr. Shea capped the rates
on the invoices of Joint Defendants' counsel at $625 for
experienced partners, $425 for associates, and $200 for paralegals.
It is telling that some Joint Defendants valued the services of
their attorneys to such a degree that they compensated them at
substantially higher rates than $625 per hour.  But the Court
agrees that the rates put forward by Mr. Shea reflect those of
lawyers of comparable skill and experience practicing in this
District at present.  

The Plaintiffs challenge $625 as the maximum rate for fees in this
case claiming that the purpose of fee reimbursement is to attract
competent counsel, not any counsel Defendants wish. As the Court
explained above, if Joint Defendants have sought the Cadillac of
legal representation, it is because they reasonably viewed such
representation as necessary under the circumstances and were
willing to pay for it. Plaintiffs fail to identify a rate at which
other counsel of comparable skill and experience would have
represented Defendants and achieved the same outcome. Specifically,
they do not reference any factually similar, contemporaneous cases
in which courts in this region assigned a lower rate to such
experienced counsel.

Again, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants did not achieve
complete success because all but one of their motions to dismiss
were denied as moot. Defendants were forced to present various
motions because Plaintiffs asserted their claims against such a
diverse range of defendants, some of whom were not even involved in
the sale of homeowners' insurance. The resultant mootness of
certain motions has no bearing on the success achieved by
Defendants in this case. What matters is the result, and in the
instant case, the result' for Defendants was complete vindication.


Taking into account the skill of counsel, the prevailing market
rates in Denver, the complexity of the case, and the longstanding
relationships between many of Joint Defendants and their counsel,
the Court find the rates sought by Joint Defendants, as reduced by
Mr. Shea, are reasonable.

The Lodestar Amount

Since Joint Defendants have carried their burden of establishing
that the hours expended and the rates claimed are reasonable, the
lodestar amount is presumed to be a reasonable fee. That amount may
be modified, but no request for an enhancement or specific
adjustment is made here. By suing a drove of diverse parties,
Plaintiffs exposed themselves to liability for a multitude of fees.
They have imposed costs on virtually the entire insurance industry,
and under the law, they must shoulder the result. Joint Defendants
are, therefore, entitled to their attorney fees against.

Personal Liability under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927

The last matter the Court left unsettled in my order granting Joint
Defendants their attorney fees against Plaintiffs is whether
Plaintiffs' counsel should be held personally responsible for their
fees as well. The Tenth Circuit has held that Section 1927 does not
require a finding of bad faith and that any conduct, that viewed
objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of
the attorney's duties to the court, is sanctionable. This is an
extreme standard and a court should make such an award only in
instances evidencing a serious and standard disregard for the
orderly process of justice. The purpose of Section 1927 is to
incentivize attorneys to regularly re-evaluate the merits of their
claims and avoid prolonging meritless claims.

Recognizing that Section 1927 only authorizes sanctions in extreme
cases, the Court finds Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Josue Hernandez,
has without a doubt multiplied these proceedings unreasonably and
vexatiously. Examples of this behavior are his refusal to
acknowledge that the complaint was deficient under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8, his incessant filing of absurdly lengthy and
legally incorrect briefs,15 and his insistence on pursuing the case
even after my dismissal order.

Mr. Hernandez did not officially enter his appearance in this case
until October 17, 2014, but the record is clear that he had an
active role in the case prior to that date. Section 1927 does not
require that the attorney multiplying the proceedings be counsel of
record to be sanctioned, and it would be improper to incentivize
attorneys to delay entering an appearance in order to avoid
liability for their unreasonable and vexatious conduct.

The vexatiousness of the submissions generally was not in what they
purported to be; it was in their substance and form. The Court have
described them as prolix, meandering, full of unfounded supposition
and speculation, repetitive and convoluted almost to the point of
being maddening, etc. the Court needs not say more. The notices and
errata alone have required Defendants to turn circles and
backflips. Through his involvement in this case, Plaintiffs'
counsel has evidenced a serious and standard disregard for the
orderly process of justice.  

The Court cannot permit such an outcome. Consequently, the Court
concludes Mr. Hernandez is liable for fees under 28 U.S.C. Section
1927 from August 19, 2014, forward. This finding is limited to fees
incurred in defending the action at the district court level. Thus,
if Joint Defendants continue to seek an award against Plaintiffs'
counsel personally, they must submit on or before February 6, 2019,
the attorney fees which I have found to be reasonable they incurred
after August 19, 2014, and related to district court proceedings
only.

The Court is sensitive to the impact this Order will have both on
Plaintiffs and Mr. Hernandez, and the Court do not issue it
lightly. As Mr. Hernandez suggested at the March 2018 hearing,
individuals' health, families, and even dogs have been affected by
this litigation. The Court cannot ignore, however, the obstinate
pattern of behavior exhibited by Mr. Hernandez nor his and the
plaintiffs' complete disregard for the consequences of that
behavior. This ship could have been abandoned at many points along
the way, but it was not. Plaintiffs, with Mr. Hernandez at the
helm, have forced Defendants, not just Joint Defendants, to expend
enormous sums defending this action due to their senseless and
ineffective pleadings and filings. The apparent aim of this
litigation was to ensure fair business dealings by the insurance
industry unquestionably an honorable goal, but it has instead
unjustifiably cost the industry millions of dollars, a burden that
is likely to be passed on to the insureds it ostensibly sought to
protect.

Accordingly, as set out in the table above, Joint Defendants are
awarded their attorney fees to be paid by Plaintiffs under Colorado
Revised Statute Section 13-17-201. If Joint Defendants seek to
recover their fees from Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1927 as well, they are ORDERED to submit the amount of the
attorney fees each incurred after August 19, 2014, and related to
district court proceedings only. Since the Court have already
determined the fees that were reasonably and necessarily incurred,
upon receipt of Joint Defendants' submission, each will be awarded
the calculated amount against Plaintiffs' counsel, Josue Hernandez,
and will be entitled to recover that portion of its total fee award
from him or Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9w4ehot from Leagle.com.

Dale Snyder, Marilyn Snyder, Mary Ann Geldreich, Mary Harrow, DO,
Kenneth Dale Yoder, also known as Ken Yoder, Catherine Taylor, also
known as Ken Yoder, Martha Lemert, Gary Lemert, Jeffrey Ray, also
known as Jeff Ray, Jennifer Ray, Louise Creager, Janet Koch, Ian
Siemplenski, Tommy Meyer, Nicole Wright-Meyer, Sueham (I) Kay
Hoffman, individually, Sueham Kay Hoffman, as representative for
the, Laila (I) Saeda Urban, individually, Laila Saeda Urban, as
representative for the & Dorothy Wood Hammer, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Josue David Hernandez, Josue David Hernandez, Attorney at Law.

Acord Corporation, a Delaware non-profit corporation, Defendant,
represented by Charles Edmond Fuller -- CFuller@SennLaw.com -- Senn
Visciano Canges, P.C., Frank W. Visciano -- FVisciano@SennLaw.com
-- Senn Visciano Canges, P.C., Jeffrey Michael Theodore, Steptoe &
Johnson, LLP & Mark Frederick Horning, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP

Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, a Wisconsin corporation &
American Strategic Insurance Corp., a Florida corporation,
Defendants, represented by Jamey William Jamison, Harris Karstaedt
Jamison & Powers, PC & Thomas Howard Falivene, Thomas H. Falivene,
Attorney at Law


ACRES GROUP: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Escudero Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE BALDEMAR ESCUDERO, on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated individuals v. ACRES GROUP, and JAMES SCHWANTZ
Individually, Case No. 1:19-cv-00454 (N.D. Ill., January 22, 2019),
arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum
Wage Law and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act for the
Defendants' alleged failure to pay the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees overtime wages for all time worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

Acres Group is a corporation organized under the laws of the state
of Illinois and has its office and place of business in Barrington,
Illinois.  James Schwantz is the owner or president of Acres
Group.

Acres Group is a corporation specializing in landscape maintenance,
landscape installation, custom design build projects, and snow
removal.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael P. Persoon, Esq.
          DESPRES, SCHWARTZ & GEOGHEGAN LTD.
          77 W. Washington St., Suite 711
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-2511
          E-mail: mschorsch@dsgchicago.com

               - and -

           Alexandria Santistevan, Esq.
           FARMWORKER & LANDSCAPER ADVOCACY PROJECT
           33 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 900
           Chicago, IL 60602
           Telephone: (312) 784-3541
           E-mail: litigation@flapillinois.org


ADVANCED MICRO: Court Certifies Dickey Class
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned TONY DICKEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., Defendant. Case No.
15-cv-04922-HSG. (D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Tony Dickey and Paul Parmer filed the operative second
amended class action complaint alleging that Defendant Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) misrepresented the number of core
processors in its Bulldozer line of central processing units
(CPUs). Plaintiffs bring six causes of action, alleging violations
of California's (1) Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (2) Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) (3) False Advertising Law (FAL) as well as
(4) fraud in the inducement (5) breach of express warranty and (6)
negligent misrepresentation.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class:

     All individuals who purchased one or more of the following AMD
computer chips either (1) while residing in California or (2) after
visiting the AMD.com website: FX-8120, FX-8150, FX-8320, FX-8350,
FX-8370, FX-9370, and FX-9590.

The Defendant contends that certification of these classes is
inappropriate because the Plaintiff and the classes fail to satisfy
the commonality, predominance, and superiority requirements for a
Rule 23(b)(3) class. The Court addresses each in turn and finds
that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) have been met
in this case.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

The Plaintiffs contend that a conservative estimate places the
class size in the hundreds of thousands. The Defendant does not
contest that numerosity is satisfied in this proposed class. Rule
23(a)(1) requires that the putative class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. The Court finds that
numerosity is satisfied here because joinder of the estimated
hundreds of thousands of class members would be impracticable.

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class. A contention is sufficiently common where it
is capable of classwide resolution which means that determination
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

The Defendant disputes that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of
showing commonality of claims.

The Defendant contends that individual class members' understanding
of the term core could differ substantially the Defendant notes
that the Plaintiffs have not identified the reasonable consumer's
interpretation of the term core here at the class certification
stage, providing only evidence of how Named Plaintiffs understood
the term. The Defendant contends that no common understanding of
the term core can be established that supports the Plaintiffs'
arguments because a significant majority interpret core in ways
that are fully consistent with AMD's chips.

The Defendant's challenges are not persuasive. The central question
raised is whether a reasonable consumer would have been deceived by
the term core as used in the Defendant's advertising. Whether or
not the Plaintiffs' prevail on the merits of their challenge, the
answer to that question is common to all class members. To the
extent the Defendant contends that the evidence provided thus far
does not support the Plaintiffs' theory of liability, the
Defendant's arguments are premature and not appropriate for
resolution at the class certification stage. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the commonality requirement is met in this case.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. The test of typicality is whether other members have the
same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct
which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other
class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.

The Defendant does not contest the typicality of the Plaintiffs'
claims. The Plaintiffs' claims are both factually and legally
similar to those of the putative class because the 8-core
representation at issue is the same for all class members.
Plaintiff has not alleged any individual claims. This is sufficient
to satisfy the typicality requirement.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class. The Court must
address two legal questions: (1) whether the named plaintiffs and
their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other putative
class members, and (2) whether the named plaintiffs and their
counsel will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the
proposed class. This inquiry tends to merge with the commonality
and typicality criteria.

In part, these requirements determine whether the named plaintiff's
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests
of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence.

The Court is unaware of any actual conflicts of interest in this
matter and no evidence in the record suggests that either
Plaintiffs or proposed class counsel have a conflict with other
class members. The Court finds that proposed class counsel and
Plaintiff have prosecuted this action vigorously on behalf of the
class to date and will continue to do so. The adequacy of
representation requirement, therefore, is satisfied.

Rule 23(b)(3)

To certify a class, Plaintiff must also satisfy the two
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). First, questions of law or fact
common to class members must predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members. And second, a class action [must
be] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.The Court finds that both are met in
this case.

Predominance

The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.
This inquiry asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues
in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common,
aggregation-defeating, individual issues.

Materiality and Reliance

The Defendant contends that issues of falsity, materiality, injury
or reliance for each individual class member would predominate in
this case.  

With respect to the commonality prong, the consumer protection laws
at issue here evaluate materiality under a reasonable person
standard, and materiality is generally a question of fact.
Defendant's arguments, whether addressed to the commonality prong
or the predominance prong, are not persuasive at the class
certification stage. Because the issues of materiality and falsity
are not evaluated on an individualized basis, these questions do
not weigh against a finding of predominance.

Exposure

In cases alleging misrepresentation, common issues predominate when
plaintiffs are exposed to a common set of representations about a
product.

The present case involves a single message, which appeared across
all of the relevant advertising. Defendant does not dispute that
all class members were exposed to the same allegedly misleading
message; rather, Defendant argues that some class members may have
also been exposed to other information that would explain AMD's
definition of the term core.

The Defendant cites a number of cases in support of its proposition
that causation, materiality, and/or injury cannot be measured on a
class-wide basis where the evidence shows that materiality varies
across the putative class. These cases are inapposite because,
unlike the present case, they address the prospect of class members
being exposed to entirely different statements or to none at all.


The Defendant has, in essence, repurposed its argument that
different class members may hold different understandings of the
term core as a challenge to class-wide exposure. Because exposure
to the alleged misleading statements is uniform across the class,
and for the same reasons as discussed in Sections III(A)(ii) and
III(B)(i)(a) above, these individualized issues of each class
member's understanding are not at issue when materiality is
assessed on a class-wide basis under a reasonable consumer
standard.

Damages

With respect to the monetary relief sought by a putative class, the
predominance inquiry requires that damages are capable of
measurement on a classwide basis, in the sense that the whole class
suffered damages traceable to the same injurious course of conduct
underlying the plaintiffs' legal theory. As such, a model
purporting to serve as evidence of damages in a class action must
measure only those damages attributable to the relevant theory of
liability. While a proffered model need not be exact at the class
certification stage, it must be consistent with the plaintiff's
liability case.

The Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not provided a damages
model applicable on a class-wide basis. Plaintiffs' proposed model
measures the difference between the price paid for an AMD processor
marketed as 8-core and an AMD processor marketed as 4-core.
Plaintiffs have also provided an attorney declaration that
summarizes pricing evidence to provide an estimate of their damages
amount. Defendant, noting that Plaintiffs have provided no expert
testimony in support of their damages model, challenge the
admissibility of the supporting declaration and contend that
Plaintiffs were required to provide expert testimony to explain why
their methodology is a valid measure of economic harm.

The Court disagrees. So long as Plaintiffs demonstrate damages to
be measurable on a class-wide basis, expert testimony is not
required to support a damages model. Plaintiffs' model measures the
difference between the price paid for a product advertised as
8-core and the price paid for a product advertised as 4-core.  

Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated common exposure to the alleged
misrepresentations and Plaintiffs' damages model is sufficient at
this stage to show that damages traceable to the allegedly
misleading claims can be measured on a class-wide basis, the Court
finds that common questions of law predominate.

Superiority

The superiority requirement tests whether a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

The Defendant only contests superiority by positing the difficulty
of ascertaining the members of the purported class.4 Plaintiffs
exclusively bring California state law claims. Because California
law applies to out-of-state class members only based on the terms
of use on AMD's website, individuals must have visited the website
prior to purchase in order to qualify as class members.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs offer no method to
assess which class members visited the AMD website before purchase.
Defendant cites two cases, the first rejecting a class based on the
complexity of determining residency, and therefore choice of law,
of class members during the relevant time period, and the second
denying class certification where identification of class members
required a detailed review of each potential class member's
personnel file.

To the extent that Defendant argues that self-identified class
members may not have visited AMD's website prior to their purchase,
the Court can rely on claim administrators, various auditing
processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices to
explain the claims process, and other techniques tailored by the
parties and the court to avoid or minimize fraudulent claims.
Therefore, given that the expected recovery for each class member
is relatively low, the Court finds that a class action is the
superior method to adjudicate this matter.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and certifies the following class:

     All individuals who purchased one or more of the following AMD
computer chips either (1) while residing in California or (2) after
visiting the AMD.com website: FX-8120, FX-8150, FX-8320, FX-8350,
FX-8370, FX-9370, and FX-9590.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y72356ll from Leagle.com.

Tony Dickey, Plaintiff, represented by Lily E. Hough --
lhough@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin Scott Thomassen --
bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C. & Rafey Sarkis Balabanian --
rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Paul Parmer, Plaintiff, represented by Lily E. Hough, Edelson PC,
Rafey Sarkis Balabanian, Edelson PC, Todd M. Logan --
tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC & Benjamin Scott Thomassen,
Edelson P.C.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew
David Powers -- mpoweers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Edmundo
Clay Marquez -- cmarquez@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & Kelsey
M. Larson -- klarson@omm.com


ADVANTECH MANUFACTURING: Court OKs FLSA Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an Order granting Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Their Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
MARYBETH MEYER-VAN ZEELAND, Plaintiff, v. ADVANTECH MANUFACTURING
INC., Defendant. Case No. 18-cv-490-pp. (E.D. Wis.).

The parties have filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of
their class action settlement,  and a joint motion asking the court
to stay case deadlines pending settlement approval.

The court finds that the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable
and adequate, resolving a bona fide dispute between the parties.
The court grants the joint motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement and approves the joint stipulation to
conditionally certify a collective action pursuant to section
216(b) of the FLSA, the authorization of notice to the putative
collective action members and for class certification pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

For purposes of the proposed settlement, the court conditionally
certifies the following opt-in settlement class under 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b):

     The FLSA Class. All persons who are or have been employed by
Advantech Manufacturing, Inc. as an hourly employee between March
28, 2016 and March 28, 2018 who claim they have not been
compensated for all hours worked as a result of Advantech
Manufacturing, Inc.'s policy and practice.

For purposes of the proposed settlement, the court certifies the
following settlement class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure:

     The Wisconsin Class. All persons who are or have been employed
by Advantech Manufacturing, Inc. at its Wisconsin location as an
hourly employee between March 28, 2016 and March 28, 2018 who claim
they have not been compensated for all hours worked as a result of
Advantech Manufacturing, Inc.'s policy and practice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3lp4hf from Leagle.com.

Marybeth Meyer-Van Zeeland, Plaintiff, represented by David M.
Potteiger -- dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC,
James A. Walcheske -- jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske &
Luzi LLC & Scott S. Luzi -- sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske &
Luzi LLC.

Advantech Manufacturing Inc, Defendant, represented by Ann Barry
Hanneman -- ahanneman@vonbriesen.com -- von Briesen & Roper SC.


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Connolly Moves for Certification of Class
------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Connolly moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit entitled KEVIN CONNOLLY, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALLTRAN
FINANCIAL, LP, Case No. 2:19-cv-00129-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


AMERICAN IN-HOME: Gonzalez Seeks Overtime Pay for Healthcare Aides
------------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, and all others similarly situated under 29
U.S.C. 216(b), the Plaintiff(s), vs. AMERICAN IN-HOME CARE, LLC,
d/b/a ADVOCATE HOME CARE SERVICES, a foreign limited liability
company, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-20360-FAM (S.D. Fla., Jan.
25, 2019), seeks to recover all wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in an intentional
and unlawful scheme to misclassify Plaintiff, and all others
similarly situated, as independent contractors and deprived them
federal overtime compensation during the course of their
employment.

According to the complaint, the Defendant employs and has employed
within the past three years non-exempt employees to provide home
healthcare assistance to patients. The Plaintiff seeks each class
members' rightful and proper overtime wages, which would be
half-time that was not paid for all hours over 40 actually worked
in each work week within the past three years, an equal amount in
liquidated damages, judgment, attorney's fees, and costs.

The Defendant uniformly treats its home healthcare aides as
employees in the entire State of Florida, as it relates to payment
of wages. The Plaintiff and the class members performed the same or
similar job duties as one another in that they worked as home
healthcare aides for the Defendant within the past three years
without receiving proper overtime wage pay for hours worked in each
work week during employment. The Plaintiff and the class members
were subjected to the same unlawful pay provisions in that they
suffered or were permitted to work hours but not properly paid at
the correct rate for all hours worked, the lawsuit says.

American In-Home Care, LLC provides elder care and in-home care
services for seniors.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Jordan Richards, Esq.
          USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS -
          JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
          805 E. Broward Blvd. Suite 301
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  melissa@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  jake@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  livia@jordanrichardspllc.com

APEX LIFE: Lofton Files Class Action in Calif. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Apex Life Sciences
LLC. The case is styled as Brittnee Lofton, individually and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,
and on behalf of aggrieved employee, pursuant to the Private
Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Plaintiff v. Apex Life Sciences LLC A
Delaware Company and Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No. CGC19573175
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., January 25, 2019).

Apex Systems is an IT staffing and workforce solutions firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Han, Esq.
   Justice Law Corporation
   411 N Central Ave, Ste 500
   Glendale, CA 91203-2095
   Tel: (818) 230-7502
   Fax: (818) 230-7259
   Email: dhan@justicelawcorp.com



ATH HOLDING: Court Allows Class Certification Modification in Bell
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division issued an Entry granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify Class Certification in the case captioned MARY
BELL, JANICE GRIDER, CINDY PROKISH, individually and as
representatives of a class of similarly situated persons of the
Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan), JOHN HOFFMAN, and PAMELA LEINONEN, Plaintiffs, v.
PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, ATH HOLDING COMPANY,
LLC, and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants, VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Interested Party. Case No.
1:15-cv-02062-TWP-MPB. (S.D. Ind.).

In the operative Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by causing the
Plaintiffs' retirement plan to pay excessive investment and
management fees to Vanguard, and also invested in an imprudent
money market fund, resulting in tens of millions of dollars of Plan
losses. Plaintiffs summarize their allegations against Defendants
as follows: (1) Defendants provided investment options charging
unreasonable management fees compared to available superior
institutional investment products (2) Defendants failed to monitor
and control the excessive administrative expenses paid to Vanguard
(3) Defendants provided the Money Market Fund as the Plan's sole
capital preservation option even though it did not provide any
meaningful retirement benefits and (4) Defendants failed to
prudently and regularly monitor the Money Market Fund.  

The Plaintiffs initially sought certification of the following
classes:

     Administrative Fee and Investment Management Fee Class: All
participants and beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly
the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) from December 29,
2009 through the date of judgment, excluding the Defendants.

     Money Market Fund Class: All participants and beneficiaries of
the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan) who, from December 29, 2009 through the date of
judgment, excluding the Defendants, invested in the Vanguard Money
Market Fund.

The Plaintiffs now seek certification of the following subclasses
to the Administrative Fee and Investment Management Fee Class:

     Flat Fee Subclass: All participants and beneficiaries of the
Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan) who had an account balance greater than $1,000.00 at
any time from July 22, 2013 through the date of judgment, excluding
the Defendants.Revenue Sharing SubclassAll participants and
beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint
401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) whose accounts held one or more
investments that made revenue sharing payments to The Vanguard
Group at any time from December 29, 2009 through July 21, 2013,
excluding the Defendants.

     Or, alternatively: All participants and beneficiaries of the
Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan) who had a reduction in the value of their account
balance at a rate of more than $30.00 per year due to revenue
sharing payments to The Vanguard Group at any time from December
29, 2009 through July 21, 2013, excluding the Defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 54(b) motion is to be used where the Court has patently
misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has
made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A manifest
error is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing
party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.

Under Rule 23(c)(1)(C), the court retains authority to modify or
vacate a class certification at any time prior to final judgment.
The district court has the power at any time before final judgment
to revoke or alter class certification if it appears that the suit
cannot proceed consistent with Rule 23's requirements.

The Plaintiffs seek to cure these deficiencies by narrowing their
proposed class. The the Plaintiffs seek to certify subclasses,
dividing their initial proposed class temporally one class would
cover the revenue sharing fee structure (Revenue Sharing Fee
Subclass), from December 29, 2009 to July 22, 2013, and the other
would cover the flat fee structure (Flat Fee Subclass), from July
22, 2013 to the date of judgment. The Plaintiffs have narrowed the
proposed Flat Fee Subclass to only those participants and
beneficiaries who had an account balance greater than $1,000.00,
since everyone else did not pay fees at all. And for the Revenue
Sharing Fee Subclass, Plaintiffs suggest that if the Court still
does not find it satisfies the typicality requirement because some
participants paid lower than the market rate of $30.00 under that
scheme, the Court could narrow the class to include only those
participants and beneficiaries who had a reduction in the value of
their account balance at a rate of more than $30.00 per year due to
revenue sharing payments.

However, the Plaintiffs do not believe the Court must mandate the
last limitation because under the Plaintiffs' theory of the case,
participants were injured—even if they paid less than the $30
benchmark due to Defendants' failure to obtain rebates of the
excessive revenue sharing payments to Vanguard.

The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a
modification of the September 14th Order because they could have
proposed these same subclasses in their initial Motion for Class
Certification.

They contend some of the Plaintiffs' arguments, such as the
proposal that participants who paid less than $30.00 in fees under
the revenue sharing structure were injured because they did not
receive a rebate for excessive fees, were already raised and did
not move the Court. Defendants also argue that the new proposed
subclasses still do not satisfy the typicality requirement.  

The Plaintiffs' motion clearly attempts to respond to the September
14th Order by curing some of the problems the Court pointed out
with its proposed Administrative Fee and Investment Management Fees
Class. Although Plaintiffs have not identified new evidence or
overlooked precedent that cast doubt on the September 14th Order,
Rule 23(c)(1)(C) allows the Court to amend or alter an order that
grants or denies class certification. The Court previously found
that the proposed class satisfied three of the four Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, but found the proposed definition was overbroad
concerning typicality. Allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to cure
an intra-class conflict is permissible.  Moreover, the Court
retains authority to modify or vacate a class certification at any
time prior to final judgment.

Accordingly, the Court will determine whether the new proposed
subclasses satisfy the typicality requirement.

To certify a class, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3)
requires that the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. A claim is
typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of
conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and
[is] based on the same legal theory.

Proposed Flat Fee Subclass

The Defendants argue the proposed Flat Fee Subclass does not
satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement because there are
many participants in the proposed Flat Fee subclass (approximately
56%) who prefer keeping the bundled fee structure because they
would have paid less had the Plan done so. According to defendants,
those participants would not have preferred the Plan's flat fee
structure of $42.00 per participant because they would have paid
less under the Plan's revenue sharing structure.

But, as Plaintiffs point out, regardless of whether an individual
would prefer a different fee structure altogether, once the
structure was changed, all participants who paid the flat fee would
prefer to be charged $30 (or less) per year rather than $42 per
year. The Plaintiffs' claim is not doomed because there is another
fee structure that a majority of putative class members might have
preferred. Plaintiffs argue that under the fee structure the Plan
actually imposed, every member of the putative class, including the
representative plaintiffs, would have been better off paying
$30.00, a fee they view as reasonable, instead of $42.00, a fee
they view as unreasonable.

Hypothetical fee arrangements that the Plan could have, but chose
not to use starting in 2013, are irrelevant to the Plaintiffs'
claims.

Every participant with an account balance over $1,000.00 paid a
flat recordkeeping fee of $42.00 regardless of which funds they
invested in. This group of participants includes the representative
plaintiffs and all members of the proposed subclass, which is now
limited to those participants with an account balance of over
$1,000.00. Because the representative plaintiffs' alleged injuries
arise out of the same conduct as the class at large, and because
their claims are based on the same legal theories, their claims are
typical of the class.  

Plaintiffs Bell, Hoffman, and Leinonen are representative
plaintiffs with claims typical of the proposed Flat Fee Subclass.

Proposed Revenue Sharing Subclass

The Plaintiffs assert those participants are nevertheless
appropriate members of the class because they suffered harm when
the Plan failed to demand rebates from Vanguard, which would have
been distributed pro rata to participants. Plaintiffs allege the
Plan's failure to demand these rebates was a breach of Defendants'
fiduciary duty, and all participants were injured by this breach
because all of them would have received a rebate in proportion to
the recordkeeping fee they had paid.

The Defendants argue that because Vanguard funds did not provide
rebates as a matter of policy, the Court should not accept the
Plaintiffs' argument as a basis for modifying the September 14th
Order. Plaintiffs argue that whether rebates were available to
participants is a merits issue inappropriate for consideration on
certification. They also argue that whatever Vanguard's official
policy, the Plan's $5 billion asset size places it among the very
largest defined contribution plans in the United States, and
afforded Defendants tremendous leverage to demand an exception to
Vanguard's supposed policy, lest Anthem decide to take its business
elsewhere.

The Plaintiffs may be correct that Anthem's size would be
sufficient leverage to convince a finder of fact that rebates were
available to participants. But that does not solve their typicality
problem. Plaintiffs' proposed Revenue Sharing Subclass divides into
two groups: participants whose claims arise because the Plan paid
unreasonable fees to Vanguard, and participants whose claims arise
because the Plan failed to obtain rebates for the excessive fees it
paid to Vanguard. The named plaintiffs are typical of only one
group the participants whose claims arise because the Plan paid
unreasonable fees to Vanguard. Bell, Hoffman, and Leinonen each
paid more than $30 in recordkeeping fees while the revenue sharing
structure was in place and thus are not typical of participants
whose claims arise solely because the Plan failed to obtain rebates
from Vanguard.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Partially Reconsider or Modify Class
Certification Order is granted.

The Court certifies the Administrative Fee and Investment
Management Fee Class with the following subclasses:

     Flat Fee Subclass: All participants and beneficiaries of the
Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan) who had an account balance greater than $1,000.00 at
any time from July 22, 2013 through the date of judgment, excluding
the Defendants.Revenue Sharing SubclassAll participants and
beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint
401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) who had a reduction in the value of
their account balance at a rate of more than $35.00 per year due to
revenue sharing payments to The Vanguard Group at any time from
December 29, 2009 through July 21, 2013, excluding the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8wx3qtv from Leagle.com.

MARY BELL, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg --
abraitberg@uselaws.com -- SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac
vice, Andrew D. Schlichter -- aschlichter@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Heather Lea -- hlea@uselaws.com
-- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J.
Schlichter -- jschlichter@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff --
kstruckhoff@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael A. Wolff -- mwolff@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Sean Soyars --
ssoyars@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, pro hac vice
& Troy A. Doles -- tdoles@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

JANICE GRIDER & CINDY PROKISH, individually and as representatives
of a class of similarly situated persons of the Anthem 401(k) Plan
(formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan),
Plaintiffs, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg , SCHLICTHER
BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew D. Schlichter , SCHLICHTER
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice,Heather Lea , SCHLICHTER, BOGARD
& DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter , SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff ,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael A. Wolff ,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice & Troy A. Doles ,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, ATH HOLDING COMPANY,
LLC & BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Ada W. Dolph -- adolph@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW
LLP, pro hac vice, Ian Hugh Morrison -- imorrison@seyfarth.com --
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, Jason Priebe, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac vice &
Megan E. Troy -- mtroy@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP.

VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Interested Party, represented by Laura Hughes
McNally -- laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS
LLP.


BOB'S DISCOUNT: Guerrero Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
---------------------------------------------------------------
RICARDO GUERRERO JR. on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, vs. BOB'S
DISCOUNT FURNITURE, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH01046 (Ill.
Cir. Ct., Cook Cty.), alleges that Defendant violated the Biometric
Information Privacy Act by disclosing or otherwise disseminating
Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints to Defendant's
time-keeping vendor without first obtaining their consent for that
disclosure or dissemination.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was an hourly employee at
Defendant's warehouse in Shorewood, Illinois from approximately
April 18, 2017 to July 24, 2018. Throughout his employment,
Defendant required him and other hourly paid employees to use a
biometric time clock system to record their time worked. The
Defendant required Plaintiff and other hourly employees to scan
their fingerprints in Defendant's biometric time clock when they
started working a shift, stopped for lunch, returned from lunch,
and finished working a shift. Unlike an employee identification
number or employee identification card, fingerprints are unique and
permanent identifiers. By requiring employees to use their
fingerprints to record their time, instead of identification
numbers or badges only, Defendant ensured that one employee could
not clock in for another. Thus, there's no question that Defendant
benefited from using a biometric time. But there's equally no
question that Defendant placed employees at risk by using their
biometric identifiers to "punch the clock."

The Defendant collected, stored, used, and transferred the unique
biometric fingerprint identifiers of Plain iff and others similarly
situated without following the detailed requirements of the
Biometric Information Privacy Act. As a result, the Defendant
violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act and compromised the
privacy and security of the biometric identifiers and information
of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, the lawsuit says.

Bob's Discount Furniture is an American furniture store
headquartered in Manchester, Connecticut. Bob's Discount Furniture
was founded in 1991 with its first store in Newington, Connecticut
and is ranked 12th in sales among United States furniture stores
according to Furniture Today's list of Top 100 Furniture
Stores.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS, P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  zflowerree@flsalaw.com

CAPSTONE RESTAURANT: Waters Sues over Use of Biometric Identifiers
------------------------------------------------------------------
MICHEAL WATERS on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, vs. CAPSTONE RESTAURANT
GROUP, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH01082 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Cook Cty., Jan. 25, 2019), alleges that Defendant violated
Biometric Information Privacy Act and compromised privacy and
security of the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiff
and others similarly situated.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was an hourly employee at
Defendant's Hardee's restaurant in Rushville, Illinois from
approximately July to August 2017. Throughout his employment,
Defendant required him and other hourly paid employees to use a
biometric time clock system to record their time worked. The
Defendant required the Plaintiff and other hourly employees to scan
their fingerprints in Defendant's biometric time clock when they
started working a shift, stopped for a break, returned from break,
and finished working a shift. Unlike an employee identification
number or employee identification card, fingerprints are unique and
permanent identifiers. By requiring employees to use their
fingerprints to record their time, instead of identification
numbers or badges only, the Defendant ensured that one employee
could not clock in for another. Thus, there's no question that
Defendant benefited from using a biometric time. But there's
equally no question that Defendant placed employees at risk by
using their biometric identifiers to "punch the clock."

In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois
legislature recognized that biologically unique identifiers, like
fingerprints, can never be changed when compromised, and thus
subject a victim of identity theft to heightened risk of loss. As a
result, Illinois restricted private entities, like Defendant, from
collecting, storing, using, or transferring a person's biometric
identifiers and information without adhering to strict
informed-consent procedures established by the Biometric
Information Privacy Act. The Defendant collected, stored, used, and
transferred the unique biometric fingerprint identifiers of
Plaintiff and others similarly situated without following the
detailed requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the
lawsuit says.

Capstone Restaurant Group is a collection of affiliated companies
that operates and franchise over 300+ restaurants in 16 states
through a variety of brands.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS, P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  zflowerree@flsalaw.com


CENTRAL CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Julain Rozani moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit styled JULIAN ROZANI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CENTRAL CREDIT SERVICES
LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00130-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that
the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant
the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules
setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and
supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CERTIFIED FLOORING: Did Not Pay Carpet Installers' OT, Couch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY COUCH, Plaintiff, for himself, and all others similarly
situated v. CERTIFIED FLOORING INSTALLATION, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-00059-TSB (S.D. Ohio, January 24, 2019), is brought
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, and Kentucky Revised Statute on behalf of carpet
installers arising from the Defendant's alleged failure to
compensate them at time and one-half times their regular rates for
all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek.

Certified Flooring is a Kentucky corporation doing business in the
Southern District of Ohio.

Certified Flooring is a carpet installation company that installs
carpets on behalf of Home Depot.  Customers purchase the carpets
from Home Depot and are given the option of having Carpet
Installers from the Defendant come to their home and install the
carpet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradley L. Gibson, Esq.
          Brian G. Greivenkamp, Esq.
          GIBSON LAW, LLC
          9200 Montgomery, Rd., Suite 11A
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Telephone: (513) 834-8254
          E-mail: brad@gibsonemploymentlaw.com
                  brian@gibsonemploymentlaw.com


COCONINO, AZ: Montelongo-Morales Suit Moved to Arizona Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Jose Montelongo-Morales as an individual, an on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. James Driscoll,
Coconino County Sheriff, in their official capacities and Matt
Figueroa, Jail Commander of the Coconino County Jail; in their
official capacities, the Defendants, Case No. S0300CV201900012, was
removed from the Coconino County Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona (Prescott Division) on
Jan. 25, 2019. The District of Arizona Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-08025-ROS-DMF.  The case is assigned to the Hon. Senior
Judge Roslyn O. Silver.

Coconino County is located in the north central part of the U.S.
state of Arizona. The population was 134,421 at the 2010 census.
The county seat is Flagstaff. The county takes its name from
Cohonino, a name applied to the Havasupa.[BN]

Attorneys for Jose Montelongo-Morales:

          Lee Brooke Phillips, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF LEE PHILLIPS PC
          209 Elden St.
          Flagstaff, AZ 86001
          Telephone: (928) 779-1560
          Facsimile: (928) 779-2909
          E-mail: leephillips@leephillipslaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Sherrod Malone , Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT S MALONE
          209 N Elden St.
          Flagstaff, AZ 86001
          Telephone: (928) 779-1560
          E-mail: bobsmalone@gmail.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Derek Ryan Graffious, Esq.
          John T. Masterson, Esq.
          Justin Michael Ackerman, Esq.
          Michele Molinario, Esq.
          JONES SKELTON & HOCHULI PLC
          40 N Central Ave., Ste. 2700
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 263-1748
          E-mail: dgraffious@jshfirm.com
                  jmasterson@jshfirm.com
                  jackerman@jshfirm.com
                  mmolinario@jshfirm.com

COLLECTO INC: Court Grants Class Certification in Weissman Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned NOSSON WEISSMAN, on
behalf of plaintiff and a class, Plaintiff, v. COLLECTO, INC. d/b/a
EOS CCA, Defendant. No. 17-CV-4402 (PKC) (LB). (E.D.N.Y.).

Nosson Weissman commenced this action, on behalf of himself and a
class, alleging unlawful debt collection by Collecto, Inc. d/b/a
EOS CCA  in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). T-Mobile USA placed with Defendant a debt account in
Plaintiff's name bearing an account number with the last four
digits 1202 for collection. A few days later, Defendant mailed and
Plaintiff thereafter received a letter from Defendant regarding the
debt Plaintiff owed to T-Mobile USA (Debt Collection Notice).

Rule 23(a) Requirements

In determining whether class certification is appropriate, a
district court must first ascertain whether the claims meet the
preconditions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation.  

Numerosity

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) requires a class to be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. Numerosity is presumed for
classes larger than forty members. In discovery, Defendant
disclosed that the class consists of 35,630 persons. The numerosity
requirement is therefore satisfied.

Commonality

The commonality requirement is met if there is a common question of
law or fact shared by the class.

Here, the common question on which all class members' claims rest
is whether the Debt Collection Notice that each class member
received complies with the FDCPA. The Court therefore concludes
that the commonality requirement is satisfied.

Typicality

The typicality requirement requires that the claims or defenses of
the representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), and is satisfied when each
class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and
each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the
defendant's liability. The question underlying Plaintiff's claim
whether the Debt Collection Notice violates the FDCPA—is typical
of the questions that underlie the claims of the other class
members. Typicality is therefore satisfied.  

Adequacy

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) requires the representative parties to
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Generally, adequacy of representation entails inquiry as to
whether: 1) plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to the interest
of other members of the class and 2) plaintiff's attorneys are
qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation. In this
case, both Plaintiff and the other class members seek damages as a
result of alleged FDCPA violations stemming from receipt of the
Debt Collection Notice. Plaintiff has testified to his familiarity
with and commitment to his obligations as a class representative
and there do not appear to be any conflicts of interest between
Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent. Furthermore, the
Court observes that there is no evidence in the record that
Plaintiff's counsel has ever been accused of misconduct and that
Plaintiff's counsel has participated in FDCPA class actions before.


The adequacy requirement is satisfied.

Rule 23(b) Requirements

Predominance

The predominance requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation. Its purpose is to ensure that the
class will be certified only when it would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness
or bringing about other undesirable results.

Here, the salient questions that predominate over any other
questions affecting individual class members are whether the Debt
Collection Notice failed to notify each class member of her FDCPA
rights and whether the notice was materially misleading.  

Superiority

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be superior
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy, and requires consideration of the class members'
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions, the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members, the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum and the likely
difficulties of managing a class action.

Given the economies of scale at issue and the benefit of avoiding
conflicting outcomes with respect to the claims of Plaintiff
vis-a-vis those of the other class members, the Court finds that
the superiority requirement is satisfied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yctkfvpt
from Leagle.com.

Nosson Weissman, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Katz & Tiffany
N. Hardy, Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Collecto, Inc., doing business as EOS CCA, Defendant, represented
by Lori Jean Quinn -- ljquinn@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin.


CONCORDE INVESTMENT: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of PSLRA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned SUSAN
NIELEN-THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCORDE INVESTMENT
SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-2875. (7th
Cir.).

Susan Nielen-Thomas, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, filed a complaint in Wisconsin state court alleging she
and other class members were defrauded by their investment advisor.


Defendants Fortune, TD Ameritrade, and Concorde moved to dismiss
Nielen-Thomas's nine state-law claims as barred by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and SLUSA.
Specifically, defendants argued this suit qualified as a covered
class action that was both removable and precluded by SLUSA.

Nielen-Thomas opposed these motions and sought to remand the case
because, she argued, her case did not fall within SLUSA's ambit;
she claimed that because her proposed class contained fewer than
fifty members, it could not be a covered class action as defined by
the statute.

The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court
noted that SLUSA's language was confusing, but concluded its
legislative history clears things up the lawsuit was not a covered
class action under 15 U.S.C. Section 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(I) because
her proposed class had fewer than fifty members, but her lawsuit
met SLUSA's definition of a covered class action in 15 U.S.C.
Section 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(II) because she brought her action on
behalf of unnamed parties in a representative capacity.

SLUSA thus precluded her state-law claims, and the district court
dismissed them with prejudice. Nielen-Thomas appeals.

SLUSA amends the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, both of which regulate federal securities to promote
honest practices in the securities market. Congress had previously
amended these two laws when it passed the PSLRA in 1995,
principally to stem perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in
litigation involving nationally traded securities.

Specifically, nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket
defendants, vexatious discovery requests, and manipulation by class
action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent had
become rampant, such that abusive class-action litigation was
injuring the entire U.S. economy.

SLUSA precludes specified securities class actions from proceeding
under state law. Specifically, no covered class action based upon
the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may
be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party if
that party alleges either a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security or that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.

Nielen-Thomas does not dispute that her class action claims are
based on state law, involve a covered security, and allege
misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of that
covered security. Instead, she maintains her lawsuit is not
precluded by SLUSA because it is not a covered class action as that
term is defined.

Under SLUSA, a single lawsuit qualifies as a covered class action
when subject to certain exceptions not applicable here: (I) damages
are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class
members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or
members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of
individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission,
predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or
members or(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on
a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed
parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to
those persons or members of the prospective class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual persons or members.

Nielen-Thomas also proposes two alternative interpretations of
SLUSA's covered class action definition. Under either one, her case
would not be included in SLUSA's preclusive scope because her
proposed class is alleged to contain fewer than fifty members.
However, both of these proposed interpretations run contrary to the
statutory text.

First, Nielen-Thomas says Subparagraphs (I) and (II) are separate,
independent bases for excluding securities class actions from
SLUSA's proscriptions. By this reading, if a proposed putative
class contains fewer than fifty people, it is exempted under
Subparagraph (I) without the need to go further and consider
whether Subparagraph (II) might also apply. This interpretation
completely reads Subparagraph (II) out of the statute, though, and
we do not read statutes in ways that make entire provisions
superfluous. As previously discussed, the definition of covered
class action for single lawsuits includes two subparagraphs
separated by a disjunctive or. A single lawsuit can therefore be a
covered class action under either section, and our analysis cannot
stop after determining that a lawsuit does not meet the criteria
set out in Subparagraph (I).

Alternatively, Nielen-Thomas claims the fifty-person threshold
identified in Subparagraph (I) must also apply to Subparagraph (II)
to avoid making the former superfluous. This interpretation is
similarly untenable; it attempts to read words from one part of the
statute into another part where they do not appear, contravening
the plain text. By including the fifty-person threshold in
Subparagraph (I) but omitting it from (II), Congress must have
intended that it would only apply to (I). Indeed, Congress also
included the fifty-person threshold in the group lawsuit covered
class action definition in Section 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii), directly
below Section 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i), while excluding it from
Subparagraph (II). We cannot rewrite the statute that Congress has
written to impute the fifty-person threshold where it does not
appear.

Nielen-Thomas argues these interpretations find support in
statements by both the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit indicating
that class actions brought on behalf of fewer than fifty persons
are not covered by SLUSA.  

These statements appear, in isolation, to support Nielen-Thomas;
they reference only the fifty-person threshold from Subparagraph
(I) and suggest that only sizable class actions pursued on a
representative basis are within SLUSA's scope. But in context, it
is clear neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit is making any
interpretive statement regarding the scope of the covered class
action definition because that was not the issue these cases
addressed.  

The Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit in these cases did not
have the opportunity or need to opine on the contexts in which
Subparagraphs (I) or (II) could apply. Thus, all of these
statements defining covered class action solely in relation to the
fifty-person requirement in Subparagraph (I) are merely dicta
rather than an interpretation of SLUSA that we are bound to follow.


In sum, SLUSA's definition of covered class action unambiguously
precludes Nielen-Thomas's suit. She is a named plaintiff seeking to
bring claims on a representative basis and alleges that common
questions of law or fact predominate. Thus, Section
78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(II) applies, the suit is a covered class action,
and SLUSA precludes it from proceeding in both state and federal
court.

To the extent the identities of any of the other putative class
members are known, and these individuals wish to pursue claims on
their own behalf in state court under state law, nothing in SLUSA
prevents them from doing so provided there are fewer than fifty
such plaintiffs for which common questions of law or fact
predominate. What SLUSA does preclude these individuals from doing
is continuing to pursue their claims in the form of a class
action.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's January 24, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yauvyp7p from Leagle.com.

Ted Waskowski -- twaskowski@staffordlaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Donald Albert Daugherty, Jr. -- ddaugherty@gklaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Michael H. Schaalman -- mhs@hallingcayo.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sarah A. Zylstra -- szylstra@boarmanclark.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Andrew W. Erlandson -- aerlandson@hurleyburish.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Peyton Barkley Engel -- pengel@hurleyburish.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Ami Annette Regele, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


CONSTAR FINANCIAL: Cruz Files Suit under FDCPA in New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Constar Financial
Services, LLC. The case is styled as John Cruz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Constar
Financial Services, LLC, Empereon-Constar, Empereon International
Member, LLC, Navient Solutions, LLC and John Doe, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00609 (E.D. N.Y., January 30, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Constar Financial Services, LLC provides debt collection services.
It offers accounts receivable management services to Fortune 100
and 500 companies. It caters to consumer auto finance,
telecommunication, and direct lending industries. The company is
based in Phoenix, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
   775 Park Avenue, Ste. 255
   Huntington, NY 11743
   Tel: (631) 335-1107
   Email: mpash@verizon.net


CREDIT BUREAU: Certification of Class Sought in Johnson Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Jumoka Johnson moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit captioned JUMOKA JOHNSON, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CREDIT BUREAU
COLLECTION SERVICES, INC., d/b/a CBCS, Case No. 2:19-cv-00133-LA
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that th Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CREDITREPAIR.COM INC: Sued by Carranza Over Unsolicited Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
ERIKA CARRANZA, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. CREDITREPAIR.COM, INC., a Florida Limited
Liability Company; and DOE INDIVIDUALS, inclusive, and each of
them, Case No. 3:19-cv-00164-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal., January 24, 2019),
alleges that the Defendants conducted (and continue to conduct)
wide scale telemarketing campaigns and repeatedly made unsolicited
calls to consumers' telephones -- whose numbers appear on the
National Do Not Call Registry -- without consent, all in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

CreditRepair.com, Inc., is organized under the laws of the state of
Florida.  The Company maintains its principal place of business in
Salt Lake City, Utah.  The true names and capacities of the Doe
Defendants are currently unknown to the Plaintiff.

Credit Repair is a company that sells solutions to improve personal
credit scores.  In an effort to solicit potential customers,
CreditRepair.com, Inc. recruited, or employed call centers, to
place telephone calls, en masse, to consumers across the
country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John P. Kristensen, Esq.
          David L. Weisberg, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN WEISBERG, LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
          E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com
                  david@kristensenlaw.com

               - and -

          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          W. Craft Hughes, Esq.
          HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP
          2700 Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 1120
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 554-2377
          Facsimile: (888) 995-3335
          E-mail: jarrett@hughesellzey.com
                  craft@hughesellzey.com


DIAMOND RESORTS: Sold Unregistered Securities, Dropp et al. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH M. DROPP, MARYE. DROPP, ROBERT LEVINE, SUSAN LEVINE, and
KAARINA PAK.KA, lndividually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. DIAMOND RESORTS INTERNATlONAL, INC.;
DIAMOND RESORTS HOLDINGS, LLC; DIAMOND RESORTS CORPORATION; DIAMOND
RESORTS INTERNATIONAL CLUB, INC., a/k/a THE CLUB OPERATING COMPANY;
DIAMOND RESORTS U.S. COLLECTION DEVELOPMENT, LLC; DIAMOND RESORTS
U.S. COLLECTION MEMBERS ASSOCIATION; APOLLO MANAGEMENT VITI, L.P.,
APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, MICHAEL FLASKEY; and KENNETH SIEGEL,
the Defendants, Case No. CV 19-00050 SOM-KJM (D. Nev., Jan. 25,
2019), Case No. 1:19-cv-00050-SOM-KJM, alleges that Defendants
violated the Securities Act of 1933 by selling unregistered
securities.

According to the complaint, Diamond Resorts is in the business of
selling "points," which are marketed to prospective purchasers as
an investment which will appreciate in value and can be easily
resold. These "points" are aggregated in exchange pools. Every
purchaser of points simultaneously becomes a member of one or more
vacation Associations or Clubs, which enables the owner of the
points to reserve rooms in one of Diamond's resort or hotel
properties. Diamond sells points to new point purchasers, as well
as existing owners, in person, at sales centers in several Diamond
resorts throughout the United States. The common practice utilized
by the Diamond sales operation throughout the United States is as
follows: Prospective purchasers (including new purchasers as well
as existing owners to whom Diamond seeks to sell additional points)
are typically provided with some kind of conditional benefit or
incentive, such as a gift certificate, free vacations, free tickets
to shows or a reduced room rate at a condominium or hotel. In order
to realize such a benefit, the prospective purchaser is required to
attend a 60 to 90 minute sales presentation. No contract or other
official DRI document describing the terms of the point investment
is provided to the prospective purchasers until the time of
closing.

Prospective purchasers are organized by DRI depending upon their
characteristics and the perceived likelihood that they will agree
to purchase points. DRI then assigns these prospective purchasers
to work with DRI salespeople who are also called vacation
counselors. The sales presentations exceed 90 minutes and often
last five to six hours in length or longer. Moreover, DRI tells
prospective purchasers that they will forfeit their benefits if
they leave the sales presentation before the respective salespeople
agree that the presentation is over. Prospective purchasers are not
permitted to take any contract, information sheets, Purchase and
Security Agreements ("PSAs" or "Agreements"), Credit Sales
Contracts, notes, or other written materials with them off premises
prior to closing, nor are prospective purchasers given time to
consult with their own advisors, attorneys or any other person
during the sales presentation.

DRI salespeople's common practice is to pitch the points to
prospective purchasers (including Plaintiffs and the other members
of the Class) as more than just a way to vacation. Rather, DRI
pitches its points as an investment that will appreciate in value
due to continuing improvements made by Diamond in the quality and
number of its resort and hotel properties, the general appreciation
of real estate in the future and the managerial skill that DRI
provides in operating the properties it holds in its Collections.
DRI salespeople tell their unwitting targets -- over the course of
hours-long, high pressure sales pitches -- that, by purchasing
points "now," the purchasers will receive a discounted purchase
price that is only available on the day of the sales presentation;
they are investing in their future; their points will increase in
value; they can use their points to pay annual maintenance fees;
they can bequeath the points to their heirs as an inheritance; and
they can sell their points -- at a profit -- at any time. Thus,
these "points" are actually investment contracts, and therefore
securities, under the United States securities laws.

Once the prospective purchasers succumb to the sales pitches and
agree to purchase points, they are individually shepherded to a
sales center "quality control" person (or otherwise labeled
individual), whose job it is to obtain the purchaser's signature on
a lengthy, densely-worded sales contract (the PSA) and to instruct
the purchaser to initial numerous items on a lengthy information
sheet (often the initials are generated electronically by the sales
people for the purchasers' "convenience").

In reality, purchasers are not given sufficient time to read the
documents, nor are they permitted to take the documents with them
off premises before the closing, nor may purchasers discuss the
terms and conditions of the PSAs, and/or any other contracts or
documents given to them by DRI with any other person prior to
signing and initialing these documents. Moreover, by the time that
the typical purchaser goes through the closing process, he or she
is too exhausted to read or understand the provisions of these
documents and is not capable, by training, to understand the
substance or legal ramifications of executing them. The closing
documents contradict parts of what the prospective purchasers are
told and/or shown during the sales presentations, the lawsuit
says.

Unfortunately for Plaintiffs and other Class members, Defendants'
sales pitches regarding the investment value of the points are
false. DRI points do not increase in value, there is no viable
secondary market for them, and DRI severely restricts the resale of
points. Rather than receiving a return on their investment,
Plaintiffs and other Class members are on the hook for massive
annual maintenance fees that keep going up and up each year. This
is in addition to the exorbitant cost of the points themselves.
Moreover, these DRI contracts or PSAs last in perpetuity. There is
no way for the DRI member to sell their membership. In fact, DRI
memberships are liabilities not assets. The Securities Act of 1933
requires all sellers of securities to register those securities
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to prevent
precisely the types of abuses perpetrated by Defendants in
connection with the sale of their "points", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          G. Mark Albright, Esq.
          D. Chris Albright, Esq.
          ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRJGHT
          801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
          Las Vegas, NV 89106
          Telephone: 702 384.7111
          Facsimile: 702 384.0605
          E-mail: gma@albrightstoddard.com
                  dca@albrightstoddard.com

DUTY FREE: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Arteaga Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER ARTEAGA, and other similarly situated individuals v. DUTY
FREE RETAIL GROUP LLC, SANFREE OF MIAMI, LLC d/b/a ONI ESSENCE;
MARCOS BORDONI, FERNANDO LUPICA-TONDO, Case No. 1:19-cv-20290-UU
(S.D. Fla., January 21, 2019), alleges that the Defendants
willfully and intentionally refused to pay the Plaintiff overtime
wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Corporate Defendants are Florida companies, having their main
place of business in Miami-Dade County, Florida.  The Corporate
Defendants have their main business office in Hialeah, Florida.
The Corporate Defendants share common ownership, common management,
centralized control of labor relations, and common offices and
interrelated operations.  The Individual Defendants are and were,
at all times relevant, persons in control of the Corporate
Defendants' financial affairs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Suite 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC: Continues to Defend Merger-Related Suits
------------------------------------------------------------
Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 30,
2019, for the quarterly period ended December 29, 2018, that the
company continues to defend multiple class action suits related to
its merger agreement with MKS Instruments, Inc. and EAS Equipment,
Inc.

On October 29, 2018, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger with MKS Instruments, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation
(MKS) and EAS Equipment, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of MKS (Merger Sub). The Merger Agreement provides
for, subject to the terms and conditions of the Merger Agreement,
the acquisition of the Company by MKS at a price of $30.00 per
share in cash, without interest and subject to deduction for any
required withholding tax, through the merger of Merger Sub into the
Company, with the Company surviving the Merger as a wholly owned
subsidiary of MKS.

On November 29, 2018, the Company and members of the Board of
Directors were named as defendants in a complaint filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon by alleged stockholders
of the Company in connection with the proposed Merger. The
complaint was dated November 29, 2018 and was captioned Brian
Morris et. al. v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. et al.

Five additional complaints were subsequently filed, two in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon and three in the
Multnomah County Circuit Court in the State of Oregon. The cases
filed in the U.S. District Court were dated December 6, 2018 and
December 12, 2018 and captioned Melvyn Klein et al. v. Electro
Scientific Industries, Inc. et al. and Donald Mager et al. v.
Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. et al., respectively.

The complaints filed in Multnomah County Circuit Court were dated
December 5, 2018, December 5, 2018 and December 13, 2018 and
captioned Michael Kent et al. v. Electro Scientific Industries,
Inc. et al., Christopher Stanley et al. v. Electro Scientific
Industries, Inc. et al. and Eduardo Colmenares et al. v. Electro
Scientific Industries, Inc. et al.

These lawsuits are purported class actions brought on behalf of
Company stockholders, asserting various claims against members of
the Board of Directors, MKS, and Merger Sub, including breach of
fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.
The lawsuits allege that the Merger does not appropriately value
the Company, and that the Company's Merger related disclosures fail
to disclose certain material information regarding the Merger.
These complaints purport to seek unspecified damages and may seek
injunctive relief preventing the consummation of the Merger.

The Company believes that the claims in these complaints are
without merit and intends to vigorously defend this litigation. The
Company provided supplemental Merger related disclosures to
eliminate the burden and expense of litigation and to avoid any
possible disruption to the Merger that could result from further
litigation. An adverse judgment for monetary damages could have an
adverse effect on the operations of the Company. A preliminary
injunction could delay or jeopardize the completion of the Merger,
and an adverse judgment granting permanent injunctive relief could
indefinitely enjoin completion of the Merger.

Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, supplies laser-based microfabrication solutions for
the microtechnology industry worldwide. Electro Scientific
Industries was founded in 1944 and is headquartered in Portland,
Oregon.


EXTREME NETWORKS: April 25 Hearing to Approve Settlement Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Extreme Networks, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 30, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2018, that the hearing on the
motion for preliminary approval of the settlement in the case, In
re Extreme Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation, No.
3:15-CY-04883-BLF, is set for April 25, 2019.

On October 23 and 29, 2015, punitive class action complaints
alleging violations of securities laws were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California against the
Company and three of its former officers (Charles W. Berger,
Kenneth B. Arola, and John T. Kurtzweil).

Subsequently, the cases were consolidated (In re Extreme Networks,
Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 3:15-CY-04883-BLF). Plaintiffs
allege that defendants violated the securities laws by
disseminating materially false and misleading statements and
concealing material adverse facts regarding the Company's financial
condition, business operations and growth prospects.

Plaintiffs seek unspecified damages on behalf of a purported class
of investors who purchased the Company's common stock from
September 12, 2013 through April 9, 2015. On June 28, 2016, the
Court appointed a lead plaintiff. On September 26, 2016, the lead
plaintiff filed a consolidated complaint. On November 10, 2016, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted with
leave to amend on April 27, 2017.

On June 2, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
which, on July 10, 2017, defendants again moved to dismiss. In a
March 21, 2018 Order, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the defendants' motion. The March 2018 Order narrowed the scope of
the case, but allowed certain claims to proceed.  The parties have
agreed to settle the litigation.   

On November 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement, and on December 6, 2018,
Extreme filed a statement of non-opposition.  The motion presently
is set for hearing on April 25, 2019.

Extreme Networks, Inc. provides software-driven networking
solutions for enterprise customers worldwide. Extreme Networks,
Inc. was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in San Jose,
California.


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Betner-Gray Files Class Action under FDCPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Recovery
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Chandra Betner-Gray,
individually and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Financial Recovery Services, Inc., LVNV Funding LLC and John Does
1-25, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02488 (D. N.J., January 30,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Financial Recovery Services, Inc. provides debt collection services
to consumer creditors, finance companies, and debt buyers. It
serves bank and retail credit card, installment loan and DDA,
payday loans, purchased debt service contracts, and utility
markets. The company was founded in 1996 and is based in Edina,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   YAAKOV SAKS, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
   Fax: (201) 282-6501
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


FIRSTPOINT INC: $1.2-Mil. Settlement in Barnhill Suit Okayed
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Loretta C. Biggs grants the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Certification of Class and Preliminary Approval of Settlement
Agreement in the lawsuit captioned LARA BARNHILL, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated individuals v. FIRSTPOINT,
INC. d/b/a FIRSTPOINT INFORMATION RESOURCES and FIRSTPOINT
COLLECTION RESOURCES, INC., Case No. 1:15-cv-00892-LCB-LPA
(M.D.N.C.).

Lara Barnhill initiated this putative class action, on her own
behalf and others similarly situated, against the Defendants
alleging violations of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act
and the North Carolina Collection Agency Act.

The parties participated in a mediated settlement conference during
which Plaintiff, on behalf of the putative class, "reached
agreement as to all material terms of settlement with all
Defendants."  The Defendants shall deposit or cause to be deposited
the aggregate amount of $1,200,000 into the Settlement Fund with
the Financial Institution within 20 days following the Effective
Date.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
settlement purposes only, the action is certified as a class
action, and the Settlement Class is certified as:

     All natural persons residing in the United States (including
     all territories and other political subdivisions of the
     United States) who (a) within the three-year period
     preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency,
     i.e. between October 21, 2012 and the date of the entry of
     this Order (b) were contacted by any Defendant through
     facsimile, telephone, and/or written communications (c) for
     purposes of collecting upon a consumer debt (d) that had
     previously been discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy pursuant
     to 11 U.S.C. Section 727.

Gary W. Jackson, Esq., and Christopher R. Bagley, Esq., of Law
Offices of James Scott Farrin, PC, and Edward H. Maginnis, Esq.,
and Karl S. Gwaltney, Esq., of Maginnis Law, PLLC, are appointed as
Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.

Lara Barnhill is appointed as Class Representative for the
Settlement Class.

The Settlement Agreement and Release, executed August 13–14,
2018, is preliminarily approved.

The proposed notice to be sent to all members of the proposed
Settlement Class, as amended pursuant to the Court's Order, is
approved and shall be distributed to the members of the certified
Settlement Class in accordance with the schedule.

The Final Fairness Hearing shall be held on May 28, 2019, at 11:00
a.m.[CC]


FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Agreement Inked in Fernandez-Cryer Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Franklin Resources, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 30, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 30, 2018, that on December 3, 2018,
Franklin elected to enter into an agreement-in-principle to resolve
the Fernandez-Cryer consolidated lawsuit.

In July 2016, a former employee filed a class action lawsuit
captioned Cryer v. Franklin Resources, Inc., et al. in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
against Franklin, the Franklin Templeton 401(k) Retirement Plan
("Plan") Investment Committee ("Investment Committee"), and unnamed
Investment Committee members.

The plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), alleging
that the defendants selected mutual funds sponsored and managed by
the Company (the "Funds") as investment options for the Plan when
allegedly lower-cost and better performing non-proprietary
investment vehicles were available. The plaintiff also claims that
the total Plan costs, inclusive of investment management and
administrative fees, are excessive.

The plaintiff alleges that Plan losses exceed $79.0 million and
seeks, among other things, damages, disgorgement, rescission of the
Plan's investments in the Funds, attorneys' fees and costs, and
pre- and post-judgment interest.

In November 2017, a second former employee, represented by the same
law firm, filed another class action lawsuit relating to the Plan
in the same court, captioned Fernandez v. Franklin Resources, Inc.,
et al. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in February 2018,
naming the same defendants as those named in the Cryer action, as
well as the Franklin Board of Directors, the Plan Administrative
Committee, individual current and former Franklin directors, and
individual current and former Investment Committee members.

The plaintiff in this second lawsuit asserts the same ERISA breach
of fiduciary duty claim asserted in the Cryer action, as well as
claims for alleged prohibited transactions by virtue of the
Plan’s investments in the Funds and for an alleged failure to
monitor the performance of the Investment Committee. The plaintiff
alleges that Plan losses exceed $60.0 million and seeks the same
relief sought in the Cryer action. In April 2018, the court
consolidated the Fernandez action with the existing Cryer action.

Franklin Resources said, "While management strongly believes that
the claims asserted in the consolidated litigation are without
merit, in order to avoid protracted litigation, on December 3,
2018, Franklin elected to enter into an agreement-in-principle to
resolve the matter for a cash payment of $13.9 million, which the
Company accrued as of December 31, 2018. In addition, Franklin
agreed, among other Plan changes, to increase its existing matching
contributions from 75% to 85% for eligible participant salary
deferrals for a period of three years. The agreement is subject to
court approval."

Franklin Resources, Inc. is a publicly owned asset management
holding company. Through its subsidiaries, the firm provides its
services to individuals, institutions, pension plans, trusts, and
partnerships. Franklin Resources, Inc. was founded in 1947 and is
based in San Mateo, California with an additional office in
Hyderabad, India.


HARRIS CORP: Class Suits Challenge L3 Technologies Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
Harris Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 30, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended December 28,, 2018, that the company is
facing multiple class action suits related to its merger agreement
with L3 Technologies, Inc.

On October 14, 2018, the company announced that on October 12,
2018, the company entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the
"Merger Agreement"), with L3 Technologies, Inc. (L3) and Leopard
Merger Sub Inc., the company's wholly owned subsidiary ("Merger
Sub"), pursuant to which the company and L3 have agreed to combine
in an all-stock merger of equals.

In connection with the company's pending merger with L3, two
putative class action lawsuits and one individual lawsuit were
filed against L3 and its directors (together, the "L3 Parties") in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
between December 19, 2018 and January 15, 2019, and a third
putative class action lawsuit, Kent v. L3 Technologies, Inc., et
al., was filed against the L3 Parties and Harris Corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary, Leopard Merger Sub Inc. (Harris
Corporation and Leopard Merger Sub Inc., the "Harris Parties"), in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on January 4,
2019.

The complaints in the lawsuits contain substantially similar
allegations contending, among other things, that the registration
statement on Form S-4 in support of the pending merger misstates or
fails to disclose certain allegedly material information in
violation of federal securities laws.

The complaint in the Kent lawsuit further alleges that the Harris
Parties are liable for these violations as "controlling persons" of
L3 within the meaning of federal securities laws.

The complaints in all four lawsuits generally seek injunctive
relief enjoining the merger, damages and costs, among other
remedies. Additional lawsuits in connection with the merger may be
filed in the future.

Harris said, "Although the ultimate resolution of these lawsuits
cannot be predicted with certainty, and an adverse ruling in any
such lawsuit may cause the merger to be delayed or not to be
completed, which could cause us not to realize some or all of the
anticipated benefits of the merger, we believe that these lawsuits
are without merit and intend to defend vigorously against them and
any other lawsuits challenging the pending merger. Therefore, at
this time, we do not believe the ultimate resolution of these
lawsuits will have a material adverse effect on us or the merger."

Harris Corporation provides technology-based solutions that solve
government and commercial customers’ mission-critical challenges
in the United States and internationally. The company operates in
three segments: Communication Systems, Electronic Systems, and
Space and Intelligence Systems. Harris Corporation was founded in
1895 and is headquartered in Melbourne, Florida.


IDAHO: Court Consolidates 4 Inmates Suits with Workman
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to
Consolidate the cases captioned PHILIP A. TURNEY, an individual;
BILLY RAY BARTLETT, an individual; MICHAEL A. McCALL, an
individual; and REUBEN J. CORTES, an individual, Plaintiffs, v.
HENRY ATENCIO; RONA SEIGERT; JOHN G. MIGLIORI; MURRAY F. YOUNG;
APRIL C. DAWSON; JOHN and JANE DOES A-Z; CORIZON, INC.; and IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Defendants. Case Nos. 1:18-cv-00001-BLW,
1:18-cv-00097-BLW, 1:18-cv-00099-BLW, 1:18-cv-00100-BLW (D.
Idaho).

Five pro se prisoners in custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction (IDOC), Philip A. Turney, Billy Ray Bartlett, James S.
Hendrickson,1 Michael A. Hall, and Reuben J. Cortes (Plaintiffs)
filed a joint Complaint about inadequate prison medical treatment
for their Hepatitis C conditions, seeking monetary and injunctive
relief.

The case that the Plaintiffs seek to consolidate with this case is
Workman, et al. v. Atencio, et al., No. 1:16-CV-00309-BLW, which
was filed on July 8, 2016, about two years before the Turney
plaintiffs filed their pro se lawsuit. In Workman, prisoners
Kenneth Workman and Ray Nichols sought Hepatitis C treatment. They
alleged that, even though Hepatitis C can now be cured with a
costly new drug, a non-interferon direct-action antiviral
medication (DAA), IDOC/Corizon withholds that treatment from all
but the prisoners with the most severe symptoms because of the
financial cost. Workman and Nichols asserted that prison officials
instead should treat all prisoners infected with Hepatitis C to
cure them before their symptoms become severe. In their complaint,
Workman and Nichols sought only injunctive and declaratory relief.

The parties in Workman agree that Workman recently has been treated
and essentially cured of Hepatitis C. Workman asserts that the lack
of past treatment caused permanent liver damage.

Nichols has not been treated because his symptoms are not severe,
but he would like to be cured before his symptoms worsen.

Standard of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) permits consolidation of
actions that share a common question of law or fact.  

Consolidation may take the form of a court order to (1) join for
hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions (2)
consolidate the actions or (3) issue any other orders to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay. In addition, for convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a
separate trial of one or more separate issues or claims.

The Workman case is two years older than the Turney case, but the
Workman case took an irregular course. Plaintiffs, rather than
Defendants, first filed a pro se motion seeking summary judgment,
but did so without adequate supporting evidence. Disclosure and
discovery disputes existed at the time of the summary judgment
filing, and disputes remain outstanding today even though the Court
previously ordered Defendants to supplement their disclosures.
Defendants have now filed for summary judgment on some claims, but
the motion will not dispose of all claims in that case.

Thus, Workman is not procedurally much farther ahead than the
Turney case. The Turney case needs a new comprehensive case
management plan, given the parties' outstanding requests, which
range from amendment to class action status to preliminary
injunctive relief. Consolidation of these similar cases will serve
judicial efficiency. An overarching case management plan regarding
disclosure, discovery, and all other outstanding requests will
reduce duplicative attorney time spent on tasks on both sides. In
addition, the same expert witnesses and other evidence likely can
be used in all the cases, reducing the attendant costs of
litigation for the parties.

No party has shown that prejudice will occur because of
consolidation. Nor has any party shown that inconveniences
associated with consolidation will be greater than the benefits.
The only difficulty is that one plaintiff remains pro se; however,
the Rules of Civil Procedure provide the Court with authority to
issue orders catering to the particular needs of the claims and
cases within a consolidated action.

Accordingly, the Court has concluded that consolidation of these
cases is appropriate.

Hereinafter, the Workman and Turney cases will be referred to as
the Turney case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8cs4qjx from Leagle.com.

Reuben J Cortes, Plaintiff, represented by Richard A. Hearn, HEARN
LAW, PLC.

Henry Atencio, Director, Idaho Department of Correction, in his
official capacity & Rona Siegert, RN, CCHP-RN, in her individual
and her official capacities for actions under color of law as
Health Services Director, IDOC, Defendants, represented by Brady
James Hall -- brady@melawfirm.net -- Moore Elia Kraft & Hall, LLP.

John Migliori, Dr, MD, in his individual and his official
capacities for actions under color of law as treating physician at
ISCC, Murray Young, Dr, MD, in his individual and his official
capacities for actions under color of law as treating physician at
SICI, April Dawson, Dr, MD, in her individual and her official
capacities for actions under color of law as treating physician at
SBWCC & Corizon Incorporated, Defendants, represented by Dylan
Alexander Eaton -- deaton@parsonsbehle.com -- Parson Behle &
Latimer & J. Kevin West -- kwest@parsonsbehle.com -- PARSONS BEHLE
& LATIMER.


IMMUNOMEDICS INC: Misled Shareholders, Robbins Arroyo Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP disclosed that
purchasers of Immunomedics, Inc. (NASDAQGM: IMMU) filed a class
action complaint against the company for alleged violations of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 between August 23, 2018 and
December 20, 2018. Immunomedics, a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical
company, focuses on the development of monoclonal antibody-based
products for the targeted treatment of cancer.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/immunomedics-inc-jan-2019/

Immunomedics Accused of Data Integrity Breach

According to the complaint, on December 17, 2018, FDAnews.com
published an article, stating that "[t]he FDA cited Immunomedics
for a host of violations -- including its handling of a data
integrity breach -- observed at its Morris Plains, New Jersey, drug
substance manufacturing facility between August 6 and 14." The
breach purportedly included "manipulated bioburden samples,
misrepresentations of in integrity test procedure in the batch
record, and backdating of batch records, such as dates of
analytical results." On December 20, 2018, Favus Institutional
Research issued its own report discussing the data integrity
breach. On this news, Immunomedics's stock fell 20% to close at
$14.17 on December 20, 2018.

Immunomedics Shareholders Have Legal Options

         Contact:         
         Leonid Kandinov, Esq.
         Robbins Arroyo LLP
         600 B Street, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 525-3990
         Email: LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com [GN]


INDIAN RIVER: $1.4MM Cooley Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Class and Proposed Class
Settlement in the case captioned CHARLES W. COOLEY, GRADY ANDERSON,
and NICHOLAS MARONE on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs. v. INDIAN RIVER TRANSPORT CO., a
Florida Corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendant. No.
1:18-cv-00491. (E.D/ Cal.).

Presently before the court is plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the proposed class and proposed class
settlement.

Plaintiffs Charles W. Cooley, Grady Anderson, and Nicholas Marone
were formerly employed by Indian River Transport Co., as truck
drivers. They brought this putative class action on behalf of
themselves and similarly aggrieved employees. They allege that
Indian River committed various violations of California law1 by
failing to inform its drivers they were entitled to paid meal or
rest breaks, not compensating them for rest breaks and other time
they were working but not driving, and by providing them with wage
statements that did not include all the information required by the
Labor Code.  

Here, the court performs only the preliminary step of class
settlement approval. Before turning to the propriety of the
proposed settlement, however, the court must first determine
whether certification of the settlement class is proper.  

Class Certification

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Numerosity

A proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. Though there is no definite threshold for
determining numerosity, the requirement is presumptively satisfied
by a proposed class of at least forty members.  Here, plaintiffs
seek to represent a class of approximately 2,303 Indian River
employees and former employees. The numerosity requirement is
easily satisfied by the proposed settlement class.

Commonality

Commonality hinges on whether the class members' claims depend upon
a common contention that is capable of classwide resolution which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke.

Here, the settlement classes are comprised of all California and
non-California resident drivers employed by Indian River who
performed work in California for at least one full day from 4 years
prior to the filing of this complaint to the present. The members
of the putative class, like the named plaintiffs, would be alleging
that defendant failed to notify them of their right to meal and
rest breaks, failed to separately pay them for rest periods, failed
to compensate them for time spent in the sleeper berth, and failed
to provide them with accurate pay stubs as required by law. These
contentions arise out of a common core of salient facts and
constitute a shared set of allegations regarding the legality of
defendant's conduct vis-à-vis California's wage and hours laws.

Since the class's claims implicate common issues of law, the
putative class satisfies the commonality requirement.

Typicality

Rule 23(a) also requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. The Ninth Circuit has held that to meet the typicality
requirement, the named plaintiffs' claims must be reasonably
coextensive with those of absent class members. In evaluating the
named plaintiffs' typicality, courts must look to whether other
members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is
based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and
whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
conduct.

The putative class members allege a set of facts that is
essentially identical to those alleged by the named plaintiffs.
Both the class members and the named plaintiffs were employed by
the Indian River as truck drivers and allege that they were injured
by defendant's wage and wage statement policies. The mere fact that
class members may have worked for varying lengths of time and may
therefore have suffered to varying degrees does not mean that the
injuries of the named plaintiffs are atypical of the class. The
proposed class therefore meets the typicality requirement.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a) requires that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. Resolution of two
questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs
and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class
members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel
prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?

The Plaintiffs' counsel are experienced attorneys with significant
knowledge of class actions, specifically wage and hour class
actions. Class counsel also indicate that the decision to settle
this case was reached after considerable deliberation, review of
hundreds of documents, and an all-day mediation session on
September 8, 2018. As such, the court can safely assume that
plaintiff's counsel has vigorously sought to maximize the return on
its labor and to vindicate the injuries of the entire class.
Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
counsel are adequate representatives of the class, and therefore
that plaintiffs have satisfied all of the requirements for
certification set forth in Rule 23(a).

Rule 23(b)

The Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1) the
court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over questions affecting only individual members and
(2) that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Predominance

Because Rule 23(a)(3) already considers commonality, the focus of
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the balance between
individual and common issues.

Here, the plaintiffs' allegations concern Indian Rivers' alleged
failure to inform drivers about their right to paid breaks, as well
as its practices regarding driver compensation for rest breaks,
meal breaks, and time spent in the sleeper berths. The evidence
therefore demonstrates that a common nucleus of facts and potential
legal remedies dominates this litigation. Insofar as individualized
issues remain in the litigation, those issues largely relate to the
amounts that individual drivers were allegedly underpaid.
Discrepancies in the amount of underpayment are damages questions
that do not undermine a finding of predominance.  

To the extent that any further individual issues may exist, there
is no indication that those issues would be anything more than
local variants of a generally homogenous collection of causes,
related to the named plaintiff's allegations. These divergences,
therefore, are not sufficiently substantive to predominate over the
shared claims. Accordingly, the court finds the predominance
requirement is satisfied.

Superiority

In addition to the predominance requirement, Rule 23(b)(3) permits
class certification only upon a showing that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. It sets forth four non-exhaustive
factors that courts should consider in making this determination.
They are: (A) the class members' interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a
class action. Since the parties settled this action prior to
certification, factors (C) and (D) are inapplicable.  

The court is unaware of any concurrent litigation regarding the
issues presented here against Indian River. Given the lack of
ongoing competing lawsuits, it is unlikely that other individuals
have an interest in controlling the prosecution of this action or
other actions against Indian River for related claims, although
objectors at the fairness hearing may reveal otherwise. At this
stage, and in light of the above considerations, the class action
appears to be the superior method for adjudicating this
controversy.

Preliminary Settlement Approval

Having determined that the proposed class preliminarily satisfies
the requirements of Rule 23, the court will now examine whether the
terms of the parties' settlement appear fair, adequate, and
reasonable. This process requires the court to balance a number of
factors, including: the strength of the plaintiff's case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the
risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the
amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel;
the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Since many of these factors cannot be considered until the final
fairness hearing, the court need only conduct a preliminary review
so as to resolve any glaring deficiencies' in the settlement
agreement before authorizing notice to class members.

Amount Recovered and Distribution

The proposed gross settlement amount of $1.4 million is just over
11% of the estimated potential recovery in this case. Class counsel
represents that the $12 million pretrial recovery does not account
for the delay of litigation; the risk that the class may not be
certified; or the possibility that some claims may not proceed on
the merits. Though this settlement represents far less than
plaintiffs could have potentially secured had the case gone to
trial, it is not plainly deficient.  

The amount of the attorney's fee award and the amount of
plaintiff's incentive award do give the court pause. Nonetheless,
the court cannot conclude at this stage that either award is
excessive, let alone so grossly excessive that it imperils the
fairness or adequacy of this settlement. Accordingly, because the
settlement appears fair, reasonable, and adequate, Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(2), the court will preliminarily approve the settlement
agreement pending a final fairness hearing.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for preliminary certification
of a conditional settlement class and preliminary approval of the
class action settlement be, and the same is, granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycvshzxn from Leagle.com.

Charles W. Cooley, Grady Anderson & Nicholas Marone, Plaintiffs,
represented by Aashish Y. Desai -- aashish@desai-law.com -- Desai
Law Firm, P.C. & Maria Adrianne De Castro -- adrianne@desai-law.com
-- Desai Law Firm PC.

Indian River Transport Co., a Florida Corporation, Respondent,
represented by Alexandra Hemenway -- ahemenway@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Britney Noelle Torres --
btorres@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Richard H. Rahm --
btorres@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


L'OREAL USA: CeraVe Products Don't Treat Eczema, Magill Says
------------------------------------------------------------
DUSTIN MAGILL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. L'OREAL USA, INC.; BAUSCH HEALTH
COMPANIES INC.; and DOES 1-20, the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00450-JCS (N.D. Cal., Jan. 25, 2019), contends that
L'Oreal, USA, Inc., Bausch Health Companies Inc. (formerly known as
Valeant Pharmaceuticals), and others unknown to Plaintiff at this
time, advertise, market, label, sell, and represent their skin care
products as drugs that treat or mitigate eczema and its symptoms.
In particular, Defendants sell products under the brand name
"CeraVe (TM)." These products all prominently feature on the front
label the word "Eczema" and other representations that indicate
that the products are drugs that will treat or mitigate eczema and
its symptoms. Unfortunately for consumers, the Products do not meet
any of the requirements for being sold as eczema drugs under
California law.  The Products have not been subject to a New Drug
Application process. Nor do they comply with the monograph for
eczema drugs as none of the Products contain colloidal oatmeal as
an ingredient. Thus, the Products are unlawfully sold as drugs in
California, and are misbranded and falsely advertised in violation
of the Sherman Law.

The case concerns four CeraVe (TM) products: Eczema Soothing Body
Wash, Eczema Body Wash, Eczema Soothing Creamy Oil, and Eczema
Creamy Oil.

L'Oreal USA manufactures and markets cosmetics for consumer and
professional markets. It provides skincare, haircare, and
makeup.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark N. Todzo, Esq.
          Lucas Williams, Esq.
          LEXINGTON LAW GROUP
          503 Divisadero Street
          San Francisco, CA 94117
          Telephone: (415) 913-7800
          Facsimile: (415) 759-4112
          E-mail: mtodzo@lexlawgroup.com
                  lwilliams@lexlawgroup.com

LOS ANGELES, CA: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer to Evidence in Howard
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Five,
issued an Opinion affirming the District Court’s Order sustaining
the Defendant's Demurrer to Evidence in the case captioned  RICHARD
HOWARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent. No. B282538. (Cal. App.).

Plaintiff Richard Howard appeals from a judgment following the
entry of an order sustaining the demurrer of defendant the County
of Los Angeles (the County) to the second amended complaint without
leave to amend.

The County contracts with red-light camera operators to implement,
and collection agencies and courts to enforce, red-light camera
traffic tickets. The County contracted with, among others, GC
Services to perform on its behalf such collection services. A
notice to appear on citation number C144793, on Judicial Council
Form TR-115, was sent to plaintiff at an address on Avalon
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California.The notice advised, You have
been issued a citation that charges you with a traffic infraction.
It listed the date of violation and ordered plaintiff to appear on
January 10, 2008, at the Santa Monica courthouse. Plaintiff never
received the notice.

The Plaintiff challenges each of the alternative grounds upon which
the trial court based its order, including the trial court's
conclusion that his complaint was barred by the litigation
privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)
(section 47(b)). He also contends the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend to state a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983).

Standard of Review

When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determine whether the
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion
and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion,

Here, the gravamen of each of plaintiff's claims is the
communicative act by the County's agent, GC Services, of sending
the collection letter in an effort to collect on a red-light camera
traffic citation that had issued, but had not yet been reduced to a
judgment or otherwise levied upon. The collection letter was sent
in furtherance of an ongoing judicial proceeding, namely, the
traffic citation proceeding that commenced with the mailing of the
notice to appear.  

That GC Services sent the collection letter prior to the filing of
a judgment does not change the analysis. And, the fact that the
collection letter was allegedly sent in violation of County policy
does not alter this conclusion, as the privilege extends to
communications in furtherance of litigation that may be false or
misleading, such as, for example, the allegedly false declarations
of service at issue. Similarly, the fact that plaintiff was not the
traffic violator, but a victim of identity theft, does not alter
the privilege analysis. Regardless of whether the collection letter
was sent to plaintiff in error, it forms the basis for his
individual and class claims against the County and was sent as part
of a collection process directly connected to the County's
red-light camera citation procedure. Therefore, erroneous or not,
it was a communicative act in furtherance of litigation that was
presumptively protected by the privilege.

Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the contract between GC Services
and the County, whereby GC Services agreed to collect debt for the
County and which allegedly imposed upon the County a duty to review
and approve collection letters prior to mailing, is not the type of
contract that California courts have held to be outside the scope
of the litigation privilege, e.g., releases or waivers of claims
and confidentiality agreements. Under the applicable authorities,
the privilege does not extend to those types of contracts because
to do so would not further the policies underlying the privilege,
i.e., it would not advance or promote the right of litigants and
witnesses to have free access to the courts without fear of being
harassed subsequently by derivative actions.

Unlike a release or confidentiality agreement, each of which
operates as an implied waiver of the privilege, the purpose of the
provision at issue in this case to ensure compliance with the
County's policies and procedures regarding the processing of
red-light traffic tickets would not be frustrated by applying the
privilege to bar plaintiff's breach of contract claim. To the
contrary, permitting plaintiff to sue for receipt of a letter sent
in connection with a traffic citation proceeding would undermine
the purpose of the litigation privilege, that is, the ability of
the County to cite and fine traffic violators. The Court finds no
compelling reason to exclude the County's contract with GC Services
from the bar of the privilege.

The Court rejects plaintiff's assertion that the gravamen of his
claims is noncommunicative conduct the County's alleged failure to
review and approve collection letters which is not subject to the
litigation privilege. As explained above, each of plaintiff's
claims is based upon the collection letter plaintiff received from
GC Services which allegedly breached the County's underlying duty
to review and approve such letters. Because the County's alleged
wrongful conduct in failing to preapprove the letter is necessarily
related to the communicative act of sending it out unapproved, the
litigation privilege extends to that alleged conduct as well.

The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party
is to bear its own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s January 24, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9xaezxe from Leagle.com.

Law Offices of Ron Bochner, Ron Bochner -- robolaw@justice.com --
for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell -- thurrell@hurrellcantrall.com
-- and Melinda Cantrall -- mcantrall@hurrellcantrall.com -- for
Defendant and Respondent.


LOUISIANA: Court Denies Atakapa Indian's TRO Bid
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana issued a Ruling denying Plaintiffs' Application for
Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction in the case
captioned ATAKAPA INDIAN de CREOLE NATION, ET AL., v. GOVERNOR JOHN
BEL EDWARDS, ET AL. Civil Action No. 19-28-SDD-EWD. (M.D. La.).

This matter is before the Court on the Application for Emergency
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction1 filed by Plaintiff "the
CHRISTIAN EMPEROR, Edward Moses Jr., Trust Protector of the
American-l'iberian Indian Tribe of Moses also known as the Atakapa
Indian de Creole Nation."

The Plaintiff seeks relief from, inter alia, the Government
shutdown which has allegedly injured an entire nation of American
Aboriginal Indigenous people falsely labeled African Americans and
Bozal, Latino, Ladinos, Latinos women and children together with
roughly 800,000 Federal Employees by unlawfully withholding their
income for work performed when many of these people are his
Majesty's citizen's, subjects or assigns; protection from a
wrongful injury and restraint upon his liberty to be free from
prosecution for failure to obtain an Alarm User Permit; both known
and unknown erosion of his Majesty's right to be free from injury
and relief from the defendants named in the verified complaint
engaging in anti-trust monopolistic commercial activity that
further injures the Royal Crown.

STANDARD FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

In order to obtain a TRO, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial
threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs
the threatened harm to the defendant, and (4) that granting the
preliminary injunction will not deserve the public interest.

Because a temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy,
it should be granted only if Plaintiff clearly carries his burden
of persuasion as to all four factors.

Rule 65(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or
oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A)
specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result
to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition
and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made
to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

The Plaintiff has failed to satisfy both requirements set forth in
Rule 65(b)(1).

The Plaintiff submits to the Court a purported Verified Complaint
with a preceding Affidavit wherein Edward Moses attests that he
personally appeared before a Notary and, after being duly sworn,
did depose and state: That he is petitioner in the above and
foregoing petition and that all of the allegations of fact
contained therein are verified, true, and correct to the best of
his information, knowledge and belief. The Notary's signature is
illegible, there is no notary stamp or seal, no notary number, and
no identification of what state and parish/county under which the
Notary is commissioned. The Court cannot determine the identity of
the Notary. Thus, the purported Affidavit is invalid. Further, the
purported Affidavit is substantively deficient. Following Fifth
Circuit precedent, this Court has held that verified pleadings must
be based on personal knowledge alone not verified only on
knowledge, information, and belief. The Plaintiff does not attest
that the facts alleged are based on his personal knowledge.

Also lacking is the certification required by counsel regarding
attempted notice efforts or a reason why notice should not be
provided. Indeed, the issue of notice is simply ignored by
Plaintiff altogether. There is nothing before the Court to indicate
that Plaintiff had made good faith efforts to comply with his
obligation to act equitably when seeking such an extraordinary
equitable remedy.

The Plaintiff's conclusory, unsubstantiated, and often outlandish
allegations also fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits. First, the Court has serious doubts that it has subject
matter jurisdiction and/or personal jurisdiction over many of the
named Defendants. Plaintiff states that this Court has personal
jurisdiction over each of the Defendants by virtue of their
business activities in this District. This statement is woefully
insufficient to demonstrate jurisdiction, particularly in a case
involving Defendants who are foreign sovereign nations/leaders and
local and federal sovereign who enjoy sovereign immunity in many
instances.   

This has not been demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction to
entertain the drastic remedy of a TRO.

Having failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65, Plaintiff's
Motion shall be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Ruling is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya7vw764 from Leagle.com.

Atakapa Indian de Creole Nation, Plaintiff, represented by Edward
Moses, Jr. -- edward@moses-lawfirm.com -- Moses Law Firm.


MAPLEBEAR INC: Lozano Files Class Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Maplebear Inc. The
case is styled as Sarah Lozano, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individually, Plaintiff v. Maplebear Inc. d/b/a
Instacart and Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No. CGC19573177 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., January 25, 2019).

Maplebear Inc., doing business as Instacart, provides online
grocery delivery services primarily in the San Francisco Bay area,
New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Dallas, Los Angeles,
Knoxville, Aldenwood Park, Knox County, Woodland Acres, Farragut,
Concord, Amherst, Wooded Acres, Solway, Karns, Wood Creek West,
Contra Costa, Alameda, Solano, Napa, Sonoma, and Washington, D.C.
The company facilitates users to connect with personal shoppers in
their area who pick up and deliver groceries from local stores. It
allows users to order groceries on mobile or web and get them
delivered to their door steps. The company was incorporated in 2012
and is based in San Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Robert Stephen Arns, Esq.
   The Arns Law Firm
   515 Folsom St 3FL
   San Francisco, CA 94105
   Tel: (415) 495-7800
   Fax: (415) 495-7888
   Email: rsa@arnslaw.com


MARY JANE ELLIOTT: Vanderkodde's Bid to Certify Class Declared Moot
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Paul L. Maloney rules that these remaining motions
filed in the lawsuit captioned DANIEL VANDERKODDE, et al. v. MARY
JANE ELLIOTT, P.C., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00203-PLM-RSK (W.D.
Mich.), are moot:

   (1) Plaintiffs' motion for class certification;

   (2) Defendant Mary Jane Elliott P.C.'s motion for partial
       dismissal of state-law claims; and

   (3) Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended
       complaint.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege injuries arising from allegedly
erroneous interest rates contained in writs of garnishment issued
following adverse state-court judgments.  The Plaintiffs alleged
claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and two
Michigan statutes.  The Court first resolved motions to dismiss
filed by Defendant Mary Jane Elliott, P.C. and Defendant Berndt and
Associates.  The Court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precluded jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim.

Concurrent with this Order, the Court has issued an order granting
the remaining Defendants' motion to dismiss, which raises the same
argument.

The Court finds that all of the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by
Rooker-Feldman, not just the FDPCA claims.  All of Plaintiffs'
claims are premised on the same conduct, allegedly inaccurate,
misleading or untrue statements made as part of an attempt to
collect a debt, Judge Maloney notes.[CC]


MASSACHUSETTS: L Civil Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Leo T. Sorokin issued an order in the lawsuit titled L, et
al. v. CHARLIE BAKER, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-11674-LTS (D.
Mass.):

   -- allowing the Defendants' motions to dismiss, Doc. Nos. 39,
      41, 45, 52;

   -- dismissing in its entirety the amended complaint against
      all the Defendants;

   -- denying as moot the pending motions by the Plaintiffs, such
      as the motions for a preliminary injunction and to certify
      a class; and

   -- denying Attorney Ilya Liviz's motion for sanctions against
      counsel for the Defendants, filed as part of his opposition
      to the motions to dismiss.

The civil class action is dismissed with prejudice.  Judge Sorokin
also rules that insofar as Attorney Liviz' January 16 filing, Doc.
No. 57, constitutes a motion to transfer the case, that motion is
also denied as moot.

The Court (1) directs the Clerk to provide the Board of Bar
Overseers ("BBO") of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts a copy of
this decision and a transcript of the January 22, 2019 hearing for
its consideration and (2) refers this matter of potential attorney
misconduct to the presiding judge of this Court, as defined in
Local Rule 83.6.5(c)(2), for review and possible further action.

Charlie Baker is the Governor of Massachusetts.

Judge Sorokin opines that Attorney Liviz has, again, failed to
comply with the Court's Orders.  Attorney Liviz has not identified
any plaintiff as Parent A, B, C, D, or E, he has not provided the
full name and mailing address of each of the five named plaintiffs,
and he has not provided a retainer agreement from any named
plaintiff.

"Providing the names and addresses of the plaintiffs in this case
is not a mere technicality.  Without actual plaintiffs, there is no
case or controversy, no subject matter jurisdiction, and no
lawsuit," Judge Sorokin says, among other things.  Judge Sorokin
adds that the conduct of Attorney Liviz raises serious
concerns.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ilya Liviz, Esq.
          LIVIZ LAW OFFICE
          200 Street No. 1
          Lowell, MA 01852
          Telephone: (978) 221-6385
          E-mail: ilya.liviz@gmail.com


MDL 2672: Court Denies Administrative Bid to Seal Lytle Declaration
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying the Administrative Motion to
Seal in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. MDL
No. 2672 CRB (JSC). (N.D. Cal.)

Volkswagen has moved to file under seal certain exhibits to the
declaration of Jay R. Lytle, a declaration that was submitted in
support of Defendants' omnibus opposition to Plaintiffs' motions to
remand.  

In support of its request, Volkswagen states that Exhibits A-D to
the Lytle declaration contain information about various Plaintiffs
that they may consider sensitive and private, including Vehicle
Identification Numbers and other vehicle transaction data
associated with the vehicles plaintiffs purchased or leased.

Volkswagen did not file a proposed redacted version of the Exhibits
with its motion. It instead requested authority to file under seal
unredacted versions of Exhibits A-D, and to file publicly a version
that redacts the information reflected therein that was obtained
from non-public sources.

The proposed approach, whereby Volkswagen would file a redacted
version of Exhibits A-D only after the motion to seal is resolved,
prevents the Court from meaningfully evaluating whether the
information sought to be sealed justifies sealing. Although the
Court has some sense of what information Volkswagen seeks to seal
(e.g., it is clear that Volkswagen seeks to seal Vehicle
Identification Numbers the request to seal all information that was
obtained from non-public sources" is too opaque to be evaluated.

The Court therefore denies the motion without prejudice and
instructs Volkswagen to renew its motion, within seven days of this
order, and to include with its renewed motion a proposed redacted
version of Exhibits A-D.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycvj88ns from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker -- ctucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang --
dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC,
Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com -- Womble
Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer --
wscherer@conradscherer.com -- Conrad and Scherer, LLP, J. Randolph
Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com --
Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com
-- Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg --
jrugg@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer
Marino Thibodaux -- jthibodaux@gibbonslaw.com -- Gibbons PC.


MDL 2785: Court Denies Bid for Sanofi to Produce Docs
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
an Memorandum Opinion denying The Mylan Defendants' Motion to
Compel Sanofi to Produce Documents and Amended Request for
Admission Responses in the case captioned IN RE: EpiPen
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices and
Antitrust Litigation, This Document Applies to the Sanofi Case. MDL
No. 2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.).

Mylan issued 145 Requests for Admission to Sanofi, along with both
its Seventh Set of Document Requests and its Third Set of
Interrogatories. Three days later, Mylan served its Eighth Set of
Document Requests on Sanofi. Sanofi timely responded to the
discovery, and on November 14, 2018, Mylan sent a letter to Sanofi
describing deficiencies it perceived in Sanofi's responses and
modifying certain of its requests. The parties continued to engage
in written and oral communication in an attempt to resolve their
differences. Based on the parties' efforts, the Court finds they
have complied with the requirements of D. Kan. R. 37.2.

Sanofi has refused to produce documents responsive to RFP No. 7 of
Mylan's Seventh Set of Document Requests, which seeks documents
related to the Lovenox litigation. Sanofi bases its refusal on the
grounds that the request violates an earlier discovery order and
belatedly seeks reconsideration of that order, the request is not a
genuine discovery demand and Mylan would not be prejudiced without
the discovery, and responding to the request would be unduly
burdensome to Sanofi and disproportionate. Mylan argues the
documents are highly relevant, whereas Sanofi's objections are
boilerplate and unsupported by evidence demonstrating that
producing responsive documents would be unduly burdensome.

Mylan contends Sanofi's responses to 88 of its Requests for
Admission are evasive, fail to answer the request, or contain
extraneous statements that should be stricken. Sanofi argues that
Mylan's generalized criticism of the majority of the RFAs it
addresses does not warrant relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36, that its responses comply with Rule 36, and that
Mylan's RFAs are improper attempts to have the court prematurely
adjudicate merits disputes.

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) sets out the general scope
of discovery and provides as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues
at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources,
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 governs requests for admission.
It allows a party to serve on any other party a written request to
admit "the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)
relating to: (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions
about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described documents.

RFP No. 7 of Seventh Set of Document Requests

RFP No. 7 seeks the following: All documents filed under seal, all
transcripts from court proceedings, and all transcripts and
exhibits from depositions taken in Eisai, Inc. v. SanofiAventis
U.S., LLC, No. 3:08-cv-4168 (D.N.J.) and No. 14-2017 (3d Cir.). In
Eisai, Sanofi was accused of antitrust violations in connection
with its anticoagulant drug Lovenox.  

In response, Sanofi objected (1) on the basis of relevancy,
proportionality, and that the request falls outside the scope of
the Court's earlier other products ruling (2) the request is
untimely and seeks information available from other sources and (3)
the request is unduly burdensome to the extent it would require
Sanofi to review and redact documents that contain other parties'
confidential information that may be subject to a protective order
in Eisai.

Mylan contends the requested materials are highly relevant to its
defense because in Eisai,Sanofi was alleged to have engaged in
conduct analogous to the conduct it challenges in its complaint
against Mylan here and have engaged in such conduct with respect to
a Sanofi product Lovenox that had a dominant market share. Mylan
asserts it is entitled to conduct discovery on what position Sanofi
took in defending its conduct, given that Sanofi now alleges
Mylan's similar conduct is illegal.

In its Memorandum and Order ruling on Mylan's motion to compel, the
Court found that in general, information pertaining to rebates
Sanofi paid is relevant on its face, at least with respect to the
exclusive dealing claim Sanofi asserts against Mylan.  Although the
Court found Mylan's original request overbroad, the Court went on
to assess the narrowed version of RFP 24 Mylan had proposed. Mylan
asserted its proposal would provide relevant information concerning
the structure and circumstances of the industry, as well as
discovery of the rebate agreements Sanofi itself has claimed
constitute lawful, procompetitive price competition. With respect
to four of the twelve Sanofi products included in Mylan's proposal,
the Court was able to discern from other submissions the likely
reason Mylan included them was that each was the subject of one or
more government investigations relating to pricing and trade
practices. However, Mylan did not explain why it included the other
eight products or how they may have been relevant to the rebate
issue in the motion to compel, and the Court denied Mylan's motion
to compel insofar as it sought information related to Lovenox and
seven other products.

Now that Mylan is once again seeking discovery related to Lovenox,
it addresses the Court's other products ruling, describing it as
neither compelling nor prohibiting such discovery, but simply
holding that Mylan had not explained how Lovenox might be relevant.
Mylan contrasts its current briefing in which it provides an
explanation of the Lovenox litigation. The Court has quoted that
explanation in part, but now sets it forth in full:

The requested materials are highly relevant to Mylan's defense. In
Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, Sanofi was alleged to have
engaged in conduct analogous to the conduct it challenges in its
complaint against Mylan here and to have engaged in such conduct
with respect to a Sanofi product, Lovenox, that had a dominant
market share. Indeed, there, a Sanofi competitor alleged Sanofi
provided increased discounts to purchasers when Sanofi had an
overall market share in the drug class of 81% to 92%. Eisai, Inc.
v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2016).
Mylan is entitled to discovery into what position Sanofi took in
defending its conduct, given that Sanofi now alleges Mylan engaged
in similar conduct and that that conduct is illegal.

Mylan's explanation contains nothing new. Sanofi's allegations are
the same now as they were when Mylan filed its earlier motion to
compel. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that discovery into
Lovenox has become relevant. The Court denies Mylan's motion
insofar as it seeks to compel Sanofi to produce all documents in
its possession responsive to Request No. 7 of Mylan's Seventh
Requests for Production.

Requests for Admission

Mylan asks the Court to review and find insufficient dozens of
Sanofi's responses to Mylan's Requests for Admission. Mylan claims
some of Sanofi's responses are evasive and fail to answer the
request, while others contain extraneous, non-responsive
statements. Although Mylan seeks to challenge 88 of Sanofi's
responses, its briefing discusses only sixteen RFAs, ten of which
share a common response.  

Whether certain responses are evasive and fail to answer

Mylan complains that in response to RFA Nos. 110 and 138
respectively, Sanofi did not state whether it had performed a study
to establish Auvi-Q as therapeutically equivalent to EpiPen, nor
did Sanofi confirm it had conducted no study to support the claim
that Auvi-Q can withstand higher temperatures than EpiPen.

Instead, Mylan alleges, Sanofi responded with a discussion of
whether the devices are bioequivalent and with its recommended
temperature for storing Auvi-Q device. Mylan contends these
responses fail to directly answer the RFAs presented. And with
respect to RFA No. 103, Mylan describes Sanofi's response as
evasive because Sanofi objects that the phrase Sanofi sales
representative is vague and ambiguous, but then adds a number of
other statements including a claim that Sanofi has hundreds of
sales representatives.

Requests are not appropriate for argument. They should not put
forward the requester's legal or factual contentions on the premise
that, in the requester's view, they ought to be admitted. Requests
for admissions should be made only if the requesting party has a
reasonable expectation that the opponent should in good faith admit
them. With respect to factual matters, a request is appropriate
when the evidence at hand indicates that the matter is not
reasonably disputable and that proof at trial may thereby be
limited or facilitated.

Considering RFA Nos. 110, 138, and 103 as written, the Court finds
Sanofi has complied with Rule 36 in responding to each request. In
asking Sanofi to admit to comparisons between Auvi-Q and EpiPen in
the manner stated in RFA Nos. 110 and 138, it seems unlikely Mylan
had a reasonable expectation that Sanofi would admit them. For its
part, Sanofi had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry to determine
its ability to admit or deny and upon determining neither was
possible, to provide a detailed explanation to describe its
inability with a response that fairly meets the substance of the
requested admission. The Court finds Sanofi's responses to RFA Nos.
110 and 138 fairly meet the substance of each request. Similarly,
asking Sanofi to admit in RFA No. 103 that a sales representative
paid money to incentivize a physician may seem to Mylan like a
request that ought to be admitted. But the statement is an overly
broad minefield of undefined terms that a party should expect would
draw a qualified response that explains why it cannot admit or
deny. A request for admission is meant to be answered with a simple
admission or denial. RFA No. 103 does not call for a simple
admission or denial, and Sanofi's response complies with Rule 36.

The Court denies Mylan's motion insofar as it challenges the
sufficiency of Sanofi's responses to RFA Nos. 110, 138, and 103.

The Mylan Defendants' Motion to Compel Sanofi to Produce Documents
and Amended Request for Admission Responses is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycd2dkbq
from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, represented by Amanda Klevorn --
aklevorn@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro hac vice,
Korey Nelson -- knelson@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro
hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller -- pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp --
rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson --
rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns --
wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin --
adam.levin@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US, LLP, pro hac vice,
Benjamin Frederick Holt -- benjamin.holt@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries -- bfries@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage LLP, Brian R. Richichi -- brian.richichi@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US, LLP, pro hac vice, Carolyn Anne DeLone --
carrie.delone@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US, LLP, pro hac
vice, Chad E. Blomberg -- cblomberg@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage, LLP, Christopher D. Edelman, Hogan Lovells US, LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel Thomas Graham -- graham@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill,
PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster -- david.foster@hoganlovells.com
-- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, James Moloney --
jmoloney@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop Gage LLP.


MERCHANTS & MEDICAL: Faces Gambina FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Merchants & Medical
Corporation, Inc. The case is styled as Carmen Gambina,
individually and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Merchants & Medical Corporation, Inc. and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02436 (D. N.J., January 30, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Merchants & Medical Corporation, Inc. is a Medical billing service
in Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   YAAKOV SAKS, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
   Fax: (201) 282-6501
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


MICROSOFT CORP: Continues to Defend Moussouris Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Microsoft Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 30, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Moussouris v.
Microsoft.

Current and former female Microsoft employees in certain
engineering and information technology roles brought this class
action in federal court in Seattle in 2015, alleging systemic
gender discrimination in pay and promotions. The plaintiffs moved
to certify the class in October 2017. Microsoft filed an opposition
in January 2018, attaching an expert report showing no
statistically significant disparity in pay and promotions between
similarly situated men and women.

In June 2018, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  Plaintiffs sought an interlocutory appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was granted in
September 2018.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Microsoft Corporation develops, licenses, and supports software,
services, devices, and solutions worldwide. The company was founded
in 1975 and is headquartered in Redmond, Washington.


MONARCH RECOVERY: Betner-Gray Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Chandra Betner-Gray,
individually and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Monarch Recovery Management, Inc. and John Does 1-25, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-02473 (D. N.J., January 30, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., an accounts receivable
management company, provides financial recovery solutions. It
offers collection and payment processing services in various asset
classes and industry sectors, including auto deficiencies,
commercial paper, credit union accounts, government receivables,
student loan receivables, bank credit card receivables, retail
credit card receivables, sub-prime credit card receivables, debt
buyer paper, lines of credit, skip to collect, mortgage
delinquencies, direct merchant accounts, dismissed bankruptcy, and
department of defense.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   YAAKOV SAKS, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
   Fax: (201) 282-6501
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Avery Files Personal Injury Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Jarryn Avery,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00444-JRS-TAB (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Crowe Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Wesley Crowe,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Thomas
More University, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00439-TWP-MJD
(S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Cuevas Suit Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Eric Cuevas,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Texas
Lutheran University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00321-JMS-TAB
(S.D. Ind., January 26, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Battle Personal Injury Suit in Ind.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Khiry Battle,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00453-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Brantley PI Class Action in Indiana
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Johnathan Brantley,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00408-RLY-DML (S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Owens Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Andre Owens,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Howard
University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00364-RLY-DML (S.D. Ind.,
January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Faces Pierce PI Suit in Indiana Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Sean Pierce,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Marist
College, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00437-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind.,
January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com




NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Georg Suit Alleges Claim for Personal Injury
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Kyle Georg,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Mount St.
Joseph University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00389-TWP-TAB (S.D.
Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Hailey Brings Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Kenneth Hailey,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00449-JRS-DML (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Hoffman Asserts Personal Injury Claim
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Jeffrey Hoffman,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00446-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Johnson Alleges Claim for Personal Injury
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Brian Johnson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Millikin
University, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00359-TWP-DLP (S.D. Ind.,
January 26, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Keck Class Suit Asserts Personal Injury
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Gary Keck, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00440-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Koronkiewicz Sues Over Personal Injury
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as David Koronkiewicz,
Jr., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00363-JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kunzelman Files Personal Injury Case in Ind.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Ryan Kunzelman,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and The
University of Findlay, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00434-JRS-DLP
(S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Lott Files PI Class Suit in Indiana
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Adam Lott, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association and Millikin University,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00356-SEB-MPB (S.D. Ind., January 26,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Lucot Class Suit Asserts Personal Injury Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as James Lucot,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00442-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Martin Files PI Class Action in Indiana
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as David Martin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Northwood
University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00318-JRS-MPB (S.D. Ind.,
January 26, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: McCall Files Class Action for Personal Injury
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Shedrick McCall,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Maryville
College, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00438-RLY-DML (S.D. Ind.,
January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: McKinney Files Personal Injury Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Matthew McKinney,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Thiel
College, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00360-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind.,
January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Perry Files Personal Injury Class Suit in Ind.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Leon Perry,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Baldwin
Wallace University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00361-JPH-TAB
(S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Presley Files PI Suit in Indiana
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Jonathan Presley,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00447-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com




NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Randall Suit Asserts Personal Injury Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Kyshawn Randall,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Chowan
University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00391-SEB-DML (S.D. Ind.,
January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Rhodes Files Personal Injury Suit in Indiana
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Nicholas Rhodes,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00394-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com




NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Slack Suit Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Kevin Slack,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00451-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Stroud Files PI Suit in Indiana Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Larry Stroud,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and
Charleston Southern University, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00362-SEB-DLP (S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Thorne Files PI Class Action in Indiana
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Kyle Thorne,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Hofstra
University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00390-JRS-DLP (S.D. Ind.,
January 26, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Van Doren Files Personal Injury Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Matthew Van Doren,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Lafayette
College, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00355-JPH-DLP (S.D. Ind.,
January 26, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Watson Files PI Suit in Indiana Court
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Bryan Watson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00366-TWP-DLP (S.D. Ind., January 27, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Williams Asserts Claim for Personal Injury
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Lorenzo Williams,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00454-JRS-DML (S.D. Ind., January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Wilson Files Personal Injury Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Ryan Wilson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Guilford
College, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00435-JRS-MPB (S.D. Ind.,
January 28, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as personal
injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Certification of Class Sought in Fote Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Fote moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled JOSEPH FOTE, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. NATIONAL ENTERPRISE
SYSTEMS INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00131-JPS (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NCAA: Abe Mack Sues over Cameron Student-Athletes' Safety
---------------------------------------------------------
ABE MACK IV, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00249-SEB-DLP (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Cameron University ("CU") student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, CU football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other CU football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former CU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Calvin Lacy Sues over WIU Student-Athletes' Safety
--------------------------------------------------------
CALVIN LACY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00263-RLY-DML (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Western Illinois University ("WIU")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, WIU football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other WIU football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former WIU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards Knoxville Student-Athletes' Safety, Hearn Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
QUENTIS HEARN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and KNOXVILLE COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.:
1:19-cv-00334-JRS-DLP (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Knoxville College
("Knoxville") student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Knoxville football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Knoxville football players from the long-term dangers
associated with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Knoxville football players suffered brain and
other neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards NCCU Student-Athletes' Safety, Hillie Says
------------------------------------------------------------
CALVIN HILLIE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00262-TWP-TAB (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of North Carolina Central University ("NCCU")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, NCCU football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other NCCU football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former NCCU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards Newberry Student-Athletes' Safety, King Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
JON KING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00328-SEB-DLP (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Newberry College student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Newberry football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Newberry football players from the long-term dangers
associated with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Newberry football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com


NCAA: Disregards UNA Student-Athletes' Safety, Green Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
ADRIAN GREEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00252-JPH-MJD (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of University of North Alabama ("UNA")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at twenty-five miles per hour and
weren't wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield
would be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, UNA football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other UNA football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UNA football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: 415.212.9300
          Facsimile: 415 373 9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards Wabash Student-Athletes' Safety, Rickenbach Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD RICKENBACH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and WABASH COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00323-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Wabash College
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Wabash football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students for the rest of their lives.
Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other Wabash football players
from the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so
knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Wabash football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards WSSU Student-Athletes' Safety, Holloway Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
TERRILL HOLLOWAY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00341-JMS-MPB (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Winston-Salem State University ("WSSU")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, WSSU football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other WSSU football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former WSSU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Disregards Wyoming Student-Athletes' Safety, Geist Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT GEIST, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00308-JMS-TAB (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of University of Wyoming ("UW") student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, UW football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other UW football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UW football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: 415.212.9300
          Facsimile: 415 373 9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Houghton Sues over UNC Pembroke Student-Athletes' Safety
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER HOUGHTON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00265-JRS-MJD (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of University of North Carolina, Pembroke ("UNC
Pembroke") student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, UNC Pembroke football players were under
Defendant's care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the
off-field consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff
Geist, for the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of
a vast body of scientific research describing the danger of
traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced,
Defendant failed to implement adequate procedures to protect
Plaintiff and other UNC Pembroke football players from the
long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly and
for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UNC Pembroke football players suffered brain and
other neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Kives Sues over Northeastern Student-Athletes' Safety
-----------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN KIVES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00339-JPH-DLP (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Northeastern University
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at twenty-five miles per hour and
weren't wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield
would be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Northeastern football players were under
Defendant's care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the
off-field consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff
Geist, for the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of
a vast body of scientific research describing the danger of
traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced,
Defendant failed to implement adequate procedures to protect
Plaintiff and other Northeastern football players from the
long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly and
for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Northeastern football players suffered brain and
other neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com


NCAA: Lumpkin Sues over Millsaps College Student-Athletes' Safety
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JED LUMPKIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00326-SEB-MJD (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Millsaps College student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Millsaps football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Millsaps football players from the long-term dangers
associated with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Millsaps football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: McCann Sues over University of Akron Student-Athletes' Safety
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ALONZO MCCANN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION the Defendant, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00254-JPH-MJD (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of University of Akron student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Akron football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Akron football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Akron football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Medley Sues over Hiram College Student-Athletes' Safety
-------------------------------------------------------------
JASON RASMUSSEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and and TRUSTEES OF THE HAMLINE UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA, the Defendants, Case No.: 1:19-cv-00325-JRS-TAB (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained a result
of Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Hamline University student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Hamline football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Hamline football players from the long-term dangers
associated with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Hamline football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Medley Sues over Hiram College Student-Athletes' Safety
-------------------------------------------------------------
JACK MEDLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and HIRAM COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.:
1:19-cv-00254-JPH-MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Hiram College
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Hiram football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Hiram football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Hiram football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Page Sues over Safety Issues of Elon Student-Athletes
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOVON PAGE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and ELON UNIVERSITY, the Defendant, Case No.:
1:19-cv-00332-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Elon University ("Elon")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Elon football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students, like Plaintiff Geist, for
the rest of their lives. Despite knowing for decades of a vast body
of scientific research describing the danger of traumatic brain
injuries ("TBIs") like those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant
failed to implement adequate procedures to protect Plaintiff and
other Elon football players from the long-term dangers associated
with them. They did so knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Elon football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Pfeifer Sues over Cornell College Student-Athletes' Safety
----------------------------------------------------------------
PHIL PFEIFER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and CORNELL COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00333-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Cornell College
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, Cornell football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students for the rest of their lives.
Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other Cornell football players
from the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so
knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former Cornell football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Pledger Sues over Virginia Union Student-Athletes' Safety
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA PLEDGER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and VIRGINIA UNION UNIVERSITY, the Defendants, Case
No.: 1:19-cv-00331-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress
for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard
for the health and safety of generations of Virginia Union
University student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, VUU football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students for the rest of their lives.
Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other VUU football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former VUU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Shoenfelt Sues over Gettysburg Student-Athletes' Safety
-------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES SHOENFELT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and GETTYSBURG COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00324-JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Gettysburg College ("GC")
student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, GC football players were under Defendant's care.
Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students for the rest of their lives.
Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other GC football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former GC football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NCAA: Simons Sues over Safety of UIndy Student-Athletes
-------------------------------------------------------
RENALDO SIMONS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and UNIVERSITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00335-JPH-TAB (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2019), seeks redress
for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard
for the health and safety of generations of University of
Indianapolis ("UIndy") student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players -- often mere teenagers --
are riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when
playing, are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

While in school, UIndy football players were under Defendant's
care. Unfortunately, Defendant did not care about the off-field
consequences that would haunt students for the rest of their lives.
Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other UIndy football players
from the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so
knowingly and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UIndy football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, the lawsuit
says.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

NEW BALANCE: $535K Dashnaw Settlement Has Preliminary Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Motion Seeking Preliminary Approval of the Amended Settlement
Agreement in the case captioned SHEILA DASHNAW et al., Plaintiff,
v. NEW BALANCE ATHLETICS, INC., Defendant. Case No. 17cv159-L(JLB).
(S.D. Cal.).

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege consumer fraud
relating to made in USA representations on certain New Balance
athletic shoes in violation of California False Advertising Law,
including violation of Section 17533.7 relating to the sale of
goods produced abroad; Consumer Legal Remedies Act; California
Unfair Competition Law; breach of express warranty; negligent
misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment.

The Court certifies for settlement purposes a Class comprised of:

     All persons who purchased any and all Made in USA Shoes from
New Balance and/or its Authorized Retailers in California from
December 27, 2012 up to and including January __, 2019 (Class
Period). `Made in USA' Shoes means the New Balance's Made in USA
labeled shoes purchased as new by Class Members during the Class
Period.

     Excluded from the Class are: (a) New Balance's board members
and employees, including its attorneys (b) any persons who
purchased the Made in USA Shoes for the purposes of resale (c)
distributors or re-sellers of Made in USA Shoes (d) the judge and
magistrate judge and their immediate families presiding over this
action (e) governmental entities; and (f) persons or entities who
or which exclude themselves from the Class as provided in the
notice.

The Settlement provides for injunctive and monetary relief. The
injunctive relief requires Defendant to more accurately disclose
the domestic content of its shoes. The monetary relief portion of
the Settlement provides for a fund of approximately $535,000 for
payment of claims. Each Class member can recover a maximum of $10
per qualifying pair of shoes, up to $50 for 5 or more pairs or $100
per household. In the event funds remain after all valid claims are
paid, or any claim payment checks remain encashed, the remainder
will be distributed in equal parts to the Public Justice Foundation
and Consumer Federation of California as cy pres recipients. On the
other hand, if valid claims exceed the fund, the claim payments
will be reduced pro rata. The $10 per pair of shoes represents
Plaintiffs' maximum recovery based on their experts' opinion, if
they prevail on their theory that Defendant charged a $10 premium
based on the allegedly inaccurate Made in USA representation.

In addition to disputing liability altogether, Defendant countered
with its own expert opinions to dispute the $10 premium. In order
to receive $10 per pair of shoes, approximately 5% of the Class
members would have to submit valid claims. A more common, albeit
very low, claim rate is between 10 and 15%. If 10 to 15% of Class
members submit valid claims, they will recover between $3.62 and
$5.43 per pair. When balanced against the cost and uncertainty
associated with further litigation, the Court finds that the terms
of the Settlement are within the range of possible approval as
fair, reasonable and adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e), and that there is a sufficient basis for notifying the Class
of the Settlement. Accordingly, the Court grants preliminary
approval of the Settlement.

If the Settlement is ultimately approved, any Class members who did
not choose to be excluded shall be bound by the Settlement, as well
as all subsequent orders and judgment in this action. As provided
in Paragraph 16 of the long form notice, they will release certain
claims as fully stated in the Release and Waiver of Claims
(Released Claims). In addition, they shall be preliminarily
enjoined pending final approval of the Settlement from filing,
commencing, prosecuting, maintaining, intervening in, participating
in, conducting, or continuing litigation as class members, putative
class members, or otherwise against New Balance or against any of
its related parties or affiliates, and/or from receiving any
benefits from, any lawsuit, administrative, or regulatory
proceeding or order in any jurisdiction asserting any Released
Claims.

No later than May 13, 2019, Plaintiffs shall file their motion for
final approval of the Settlement. In addition to the required and
customary filings, the motion papers shall include (1) any
communications received from any government official in response to
notice under 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 and (2) the Claim
Administrator's affidavit regarding compliance with its duties
under the Settlement and this Order. The Claim Administrator's
affidavit must include a report as outlined in the Finegan
Declaration at Paragraphs 16 through 26, as well as copies of the
long form and summary notice, press release, and internet ads used
in the Notice dissemination process, the number of putative Class
members submitting claims, objections or requests for exclusion
including any untimely or disputed claims, objections and exclusion
requests; the number of Class members to whom a payment will be
made; calculation on the estimated payment per pair of Made in USA
Shoes; and the estimated amount of the cy pres award, if any.

The final approval hearing is set for June 10, 2019 at 10:30 a.m.
in Courtroom 5B of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, located at 221 West Broadway, San
Diego, California 92101 (Hearing), to determine all necessary
matters concerning the Settlement, including whether to grant final
certification to this action as a class action for settlement
purposes, whether to approve the proposed Settlement as fair,
adequate, and reasonable and whether to grant the motion for
attorney's fees and costs of Class Counsel and for enhancement
payments to Plaintiffs.

Any member of the Class may object to the Settlement (Objectors).
Objectors may present evidence and/or file briefs, if any, relevant
to the issues to be determined by the Court. Objectors are
encouraged no later than May 6, 2019 to comply with the
instructions in the long form notice. Any interested party may file
and serve a reply to objections, which shall not exceed ten (10)
pages in length, no later than May 30, 2019. If a member of the
Class intends to speak at the Hearing, he or she is encouraged no
later than June 3, 2019 to submit to the Settlement Administrator
and file with the Court a Notice of Intent to Appear.

Any motions for discovery filed by Class members pending final
approval of the Settlement shall be directed to Magistrate Judge
Jill L. Burkhardt, including any request by the parties to
condition their response to a Confidentiality Agreement attached as
Exhibit 10 the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8cf7tk6 from Leagle.com.

Sheila Dashnaw, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, William Meier, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Sherryl Jones, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jason
Hoon Kim, O'Melveny and Myers, Todd M. Schneider --
tschneider@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Brayton Konecky LLP & Aubry Wand -- awand@wandlawfirm.com -- The
Wand Law Firm.

New Balance Athletics, Inc., a corporation, Defendant, represented
by Elizabeth E. Brenckman -- brenckman@fr.com -- Fish & Richardson
P.C., pro hac vice, Garrett K. Sakimae -- sakimae@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., Laura B. Najemy -- najemy@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., pro hac vice, Mark Puzella, Fish & Richardson
P.C., pro hac vice, Richard David Hosp -- hosp@fr.com -- Fish &
Richardson P.C., pro hac vice & Sheryl K. Garko -- garko@fr.com --
Fish & Richardson P.C., pro hac vice.

The Attorney General of the State of California, Miscellaneous
Party, represented by Timothy Dean Lundgren


NEW PROSPECT: Sued by Baker Over W-2 Workers' Unpaid Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
TOMMY BAKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NEW PROSPECT COMPANY, Case No. 2:19-cv-00063-NBF (W.D.
Pa., January 22, 2019), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and
all other similarly situated workers, who NPC classified as W-2
employees and paid a day-rate with no overtime compensation, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act, the Ohio Prompt Pay Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act.

NPC is an oil and natural gas staffing company operating throughout
the United States, including in Pennsylvania and Ohio.  To provide
services to many of its customers, NPC contracts with certain
companies to provide them with personnel to perform their necessary
work.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          William R. Liles, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  wliles@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST, P.C.
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Telephone: (412) 766-1455
          Facsimile: (412) 766-0300
          E-mail: josh@goodrichandgeist.com


NOVARTIS AG: Sandoz and Fougera Continue to Defend Class Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Novartis AG said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 29, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that Sandoz Inc. and Fougera
Pharmaceuticals Inc. continue to defend multiple class action suits
related to the price fixing of generic drugs.

Since the third quarter of 2016, Sandoz Inc. and Fougera
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fougera) have been sued alongside other
generic pharmaceutical companies in more than 20 individual and
putative class action complaints by direct and indirect purchasers
and Attorneys General for 45 states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico.  Plaintiffs claim that defendants, including Sandoz,
engaged in price fixing and market allocation of generic drugs in
the US market and seek damages and injunctive relief.

The actions contain product-specific complaints as well as
complaints alleging the existence of an over-arching industry
conspiracy, and assert violations of federal and state antitrust
laws as well as consumer protection laws. The cases have been
consolidated for pretrial purposes in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa.) and the claims are
being vigorously contested.

Novartis AG researches, develops, manufactures, and markets a range
of healthcare products worldwide. The company's Innovative
Medicines segment offers patented prescription medicines to enhance
health outcomes for patients and health-care providers. Novartis AG
has collaboration agreements with Xencor; QIAGEN N.V.; Surface
Oncology; Intellia Therapeutics; Caribou Biosciences; Bristol-Myers
Squibb; IBM Watson Health; Amgen; Allergan plc; Science 37, Inc.;
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; PEAR Therapeutics; Pfizer; and
Conatus Pharmaceuticals Inc. Novartis AG was founded in 1895 and is
headquartered in Basel, Switzerland.


OPTIMUM OUTCOMES: Ct. Stays Proceedings on Whalen's Bid to Certify
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin grants the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification in the
lawsuit captioned THOMAS WHALEN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. OPTIMUM OUTCOMES INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-00132-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On January 24, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.
At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly
refers to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In
this motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in
the complaint but also moved the Court to stay further proceedings
on that Motion.

Judge Duffin notes that in Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d
891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), the court suggested that class‐action
plaintiffs "move to certify the class at the same time that they
file their complaint."  "The pendency of that motion protects a
putative class from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."
However, because parties are generally unprepared to proceed with a
motion for class certification at the beginning of a case, the
Damasco court suggested that the parties "ask the district court to
delay its ruling to provide time for additional discovery or
investigation."

The Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted.  The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c).

"Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary that the
Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for class certification.
However, this motion will be regarded as pending to serve its
protective purpose under Damasco," Judge Duffin rules.

Plaintiff Thomas Whalen previously moved the Court to certify the
class described in the complaint, and further asked that the Court
both stay the motion for class certification and to grant him (and
the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to
be filed with the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


PENDRAGON NORTH: Chiu Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Paul Chiu filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Paul Chiu v. Pendragon North America, Inc., et
al., Case No. 8:18-cv-01568-AG-DFM, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Santa Ana.

The appellate case is captioned as Paul Chiu v. Pendragon North
America, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-80009, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner PAUL CHIU, an Individual; and all other
members of the general public similarly situated, is represented
by:

          Ronald Zambrano, Esq.
          CARLIN & BUCHSBAUM, LLP
          555 E. Ocean Blvd.
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 432-8933
          E-mail: ronald@CarlinBuchsbaum.com

Defendant-Respondent PENDRAGON NORTH AMERICA, INC., a California
Corporation, DBA Hornburg Jaguar Land Rover Santa Monica, AKA
Hornburg Land Rover Hollywood, DBA Hornburg Los Angeles, DBA Jaguar
Land Rover Mission Viejo, DBA Jaguar Land Rover Newport Beach, is
represented by:

          Nathan Vern Okelberry, Esq.
          Todd Scherwin, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLP
          444 South Flower Street, Suite 1500
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 330-4500
          E-mail: nokelberry@fisherphillips.com
                  tscherwin@fisherphillips.com

Defendant-Respondent INDIGO AUTO GROUP CALIFORNIA LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, DBA Land Rover Rancho Mirage, is
represented by:

          Danielle Hultenius Moore, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLP
          4747 Executive Drive
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (858) 597-9600
          E-mail: dmoore@fisherphillips.com

Defendant-Respondent BRITISH MOTOR CARS DISTRIBUTORS, LTD., a
California corporation, DBA Land Rover San Francisco, is
represented by:

          Christian Scali, Esq.
          THE SCALI LAW FIRM
          800 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 239-5622
          E-mail: cscali@scalilaw.com

Defendants-Respondent AUTONATION, INC., a Delaware corporation, DBA
Land Rover Encino, DBA Land Rover South Bay; ANAHEIM HILLS JAGUAR
LAND ROVER, INC., a California corporation, DBA Jaguar Land Rover
Anaheim Hills; RP AUTOMOTIVE, INC., a California corporation, DBA
Penske Jaguar Land Rover Cerritos; TERRY YORK MOTOR CARS, LTD., a
California Corporation, DBA Land Rover Encino; HOEHN MOTORS, INC.,
a California corporation, DBA Jaguar Land Rover Carlsbad; HOLMAN
AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., a New Jersey corporation, DBA Land Rover
San Diego; LAND ROVER SAN JOSE, an unknown business entity; LAND
ROVER SANTA BARBARA, an unknown business entity; LIVERMORE LAND
ROVER JAGUAR, an unknown business entity; LAND ROVER JAGUAR
VENTURA, INC., an unknown business entity; LAND ROVER REDWOOD CITY;
and GILLIAN PENITENTI, an Individual, are represented by:

          Jade F. Jurdi, Esq.
          THE SCALI LAW FIRM
          800 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 892-9200
          E-mail: jjurdi@scalilaw.com

Defendants-Respondents SYMES MOTORS, INC., a California
Corporation, DBA Range Rover Land Rover Pasadena; LAND ROVER MARIN,
an unknown business entity; LAND ROVER ROCKLIN, an unknown business
entity; HARON MOTOR SALES, INC., a California corporation, DBA
Haron Jaguar Land Rover; LAND ROVER SACRAMENTO, an unknown business
entity; NIELLO IMPORTS OF ROCKLIN, INC.; and NIELLO IMPORTS II,
INC., are represented by:

          Robert Walter Thompson, Esq.
          Charles Scott Russell, Esq.
          CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN & CAUDILL, LLP
          2601 Main Street, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 261-2872
          E-mail: rthompson@ctsclaw.com
                  crussell@ctsclaw.com


PENSKE LOGISTICS: Rodriguez Settlement Has Final Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
CHARLES RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated current and former employees, Plaintiff, v. PENSKE
LOGISTICS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability company, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants. No. 2:14-cv-02061-KJM-CKD. (E.D.
Cal.).

Named plaintiff Charles Rodriguez worked for defendant Penske as a
driver for nearly fifteen years, during which he worked as a
non-exempt employee, paid on a by-the-mile or piece rate basis.
Rodriguez asserts eight claims on behalf of the putative class: (1)
failure to pay minimum wages, Cal. Lab. Code Section 510, 1194 (2)
failure to provide paid ten-minute rest periods (3) failure to
provide duty-free rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof (4)
failure to provide duty-free meal periods or compensation in lieu
thereof (5) knowing and intentional failure to provide itemized
wage statements (6) failure to pay wages at termination (7)
violations of the Unfair Competition Law and (8) violations of the
Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).

Under Rule 23(a), before finally certifying a class, the court must
be satisfied that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class (commonality) (3) the claims or
defenses of representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class (typicality) and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class (adequacy of representation).

Here, Rodriguez seeks final certification of the same class
identified preliminarily:
All California-based non-exempt truck driver employees who worked
under a `piece rate' or `pay-by-the-mile' compensation policy from
September 5, 2010 through to the earlier of (a) Preliminary
Approval of the Court or (b) November 1, 2016.

Numerosity

In its order granting preliminary approval, the court found the
numerosity requirement satisfied because the parties agreed the
putative class had 723 potential plaintiffs. Although there is no
absolute numerical threshold for numerosity, courts have approved
classes as small as, for example, thirty-nine, sixty-four, and
seventy-one plaintiffs. The class here is now 796, larger than
initially estimated, and is large enough to satisfy the numerosity
requirement.  

Commonality

In preliminarily approving the class, the court found the
commonality requirement satisfied because there were common class
issues and questions.  

To satisfy the commonality requirement, plaintiff must do more than
show that the class members have all suffered a violation of the
same provision of law. Class claims must depend upon a common
contention and must be of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.

Here, the parties agree the class is subject to common compensation
policies, and the court granted preliminary approval in this
respect. The issues raised continue to be based on common facts,
the assessment of which will resolve the class's California Labor
Code and unfair competition claims. The court finds these common
issues satisfy the commonality requirement.  

Adequacy of Representation

To determine whether the named plaintiff does in fact protect the
interests of the class, the court must explore two factors: (1)
whether the named plaintiff and counsel have any conflicts of
interest with the class as a whole, and (2) whether the named
plaintiff and counsel vigorously pursued the action on behalf of
the class.  

With respect to the first factor, nothing in the record now before
the court suggests the representative plaintiff or counsel have any
conflicts of interest with the other class members. Because
plaintiff's class-wide claims appear to be completely aligned with
those of the class, the court concludes there is no basis for
finding a conflict.

With respect to the second factor, although there are no fixed
standards by which vigor can be assayed, considerations include
competency of counsel and, in the context of a settlement-only
class, an assessment of the rationale for not pursuing further
litigation. In addition, a named plaintiff will be deemed adequate
as long as the plaintiff has some basic knowledge of the lawsuit
and is capable of making intelligent decisions based upon the
plaintiff's lawyers' advice.

Accordingly, the court finds the adequacy of representation
requirement satisfied.

Predominance

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation. Although predominance is similar to Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement, it is more demanding. To determine whether
common questions predominate, the court must consider the
relationship between the common and individual issues by looking at
the questions that pre-exist any settlement.  

In the preliminary order, the court identified several aspects of
the impact of AB 1513 that could potentially destroy the
predominance of common issues.  Its primary concern was the
difference in the class period and the safe harbor period and
whether those outside the safe harbor period should be compensated
differently. Prelim. After hearing further explanation from
plaintiff's counsel on the effect of AB 1513 on the class, the
court was persuaded for preliminary approval purposes that the
differences did not undermine the predominance of common issues.
Thus, the calculation of individual damages was the only
individualized inquiry that may arise, and the amount of damages is
invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action
treatment.

Here, notwithstanding AB 1513, resolving the issues on a class
basis promotes judicial economy.

The predominance requirement is satisfied.

Superiority

In ultimately resolving Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority inquiry, the
court should consider class members' interests in pursuing separate
actions individually, any litigation already in progress involving
the same controversy, the desirability of concentrating the
litigation in one forum, and potential difficulties in managing the
class action, although the last two considerations are not relevant
in the settlement context.  

As in the preliminary approval order, the court concludes here that
if all 796 class members each brought suit, they would bring
essentially the same claims for relatively small sums and likely
would have to expend substantial resources to cover litigation
costs. If defendant took advantage of the AB 1513 safe harbor
provision for all California drivers, it would pay $775,272,  which
means each putative class member would receive an average payment
of just over $1,000, an amount too small to incentivize individual
litigation.  Because, as explained below, the average claim value
under the terms of the proposed settlement is $715.03, class
members could have a chance at a greater recovery under AB 1513.
Nevertheless, the court is persuaded that class treatment for this
action is superior. Class members stand to receive more in this
action than under the safe harbor, and the proposed settlement
agreement offers an economic adjudication of the class members'
claims that avoids duplication of efforts and resources. The
proposed settlement agreement also offers guaranteed recovery to
class members without additional complication or the uncertainty of
further litigation.-

In sum, the court finds plaintiff satisfies Rules 23(a) and 23(b),
and final approval of the class is appropriate.

THE SETTLEMENT AND FAIRNESS

Legal Framework

A court must balance a number of factors in determining whether a
proposed settlement is in fact fair, adequate, and reasonable: (1)
the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk
of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the
amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed
and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of
counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8)
the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.  

The Strength of Plaintiff's Case

While defendant denies committing any illegal or wrongful acts, all
parties agree further litigation would be protracted and expensive.
This agreement that the litigation is not capable of speedy
disposition suggests the strength of plaintiff's claims. That the
parties reached the proposed settlement after exchanging
information through discovery and several months of arm's-length
negotiation further supports the strength of plaintiff's case on
the issues of liability and class certification. Because the
settlement achieves full and immediate compensation to class
members who have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits, this factor favors approving the settlement.

The Risk of Further Litigation and Maintaining Class Status

Here, the parties have reached a reasonable voluntary agreement
that will provide class members with immediate substantial relief
while avoiding delays in continued litigation, which could be
prolonged and expensive. While this wage and hour class action is
not particularly complex, the certain amount offered in settlement
likely renders an equally or more favorable result than at trial,
especially considering the newness and uncertainty surrounding AB
1513. This factor favors approval.

The Amount Offered in Settlement

Based on the parties' settlement agreement, the class administrator
calculated the average claim value to be $715.03. The range of
payments is estimated to be $1.11 to $2,556.25. The class members
will be given their back wages, which plaintiff describes as the
gold standard' for wage and hour class action settlements because
it imposes almost no burden on the employee while distributing
virtually all of the settlement fund. On balance, without blessing
the gold standard characterization, the court finds this factor
favors approval.

The Extent of Discovery and the Stage of Proceedings

Plaintiff's counsel represents that the parties engaged in
extensive investigation and made repeated efforts to resolve the
case. As explained above, while the record on this case is sparse
and Rodriguez did not file any discovery-related motions, his
counsel has explained that is due to the pendency and then passage
of AB 1513.  

The court is satisfied the formal and informal discovery that was
conducted was sufficient to inform plaintiff's assessment of the
case, and that it enabled the parties to reach a meaningful
settlement agreement. This factor favors approval.

The Experience and Views of Counsel

In considering the adequacy of the terms of settlement, the court
is entitled to, and should, rely upon the judgment of experienced
counsel for the parties. This reliance is warranted because parties
represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts
to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party's expected
outcome in the litigation.

Here, class counsel Aashish Desai is an experienced practitioner
who has successfully litigated many similar cases. In addition to
the numerous class actions counsel has litigated, he has also
written extensively on California overtime class actions and has
been awarded multiple honors for his work in class action
litigation. Based on this experience, class counsel believe the
settlement is fair and should be approved.  

The Reaction of the Class Members to Proposed Settlement

The absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class
action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a
proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class
members. Where there are no objections, as here, the presumption is
particularly strong.  

Here, while five class members out of 796, or just over 0.6%, opted
out of the settlement, there were no objections to the proposed
settlement agreement. This factor weighs in favor of approving the
settlement.

All of the relevant factors reviewed above weigh in favor of
approval of settlement. The court proceeds to determine whether
collusion has occurred.

The Possibility of Collusion

Where the parties negotiate a settlement agreement before formal
class certification, as in the instant case, the court must
evaluate the settlement for evidence of collusion with a higher
level of scrutiny. A few such signs may include: (1) a
disproportionate distribution of the settlement to counsel (2) a
clear-sailing provision, under which the defendant agrees not to
oppose an attorney's fee award up to a certain amount and (3) when
the parties arrange for fees not paid to revert to defendant rather
than to be added to the class fund.

Here, class counsel seeks $265,000.00, or 31.2% of the GSA. In the
preliminary order, the court noted because the proposed fee award
is above the percentage-of-recovery benchmark rate of 25%,
plaintiff would need to show why this upward adjustment is
appropriate at this final approval stage. Prelim. Order at 18. As
explained below, the record now before the court bolsters counsel's
claim for a 31.2% share. Class counsel took the case on a
contingency-fee basis without compensation and risked losing on the
merits if the case proceeded to trial. Despite this, and as
explained in more detail below, class counsel obtained a favorable
settlement relatively early, all things considered, in the face of
the uncertainty raised by AB 1513 and the safe harbor it provides
for trucking companies . This factor favors finding no collusion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yat8bkor from Leagle.com.

Charles Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Aashish Y. Desai --
aashish@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm, P.C.

Penske Logistics, LLC, Defendant, represented by Adam C. Smedstad
-- asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson &
Feary, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew J. Butcher --
abutcher@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson and
Feary, PC, pro hac vice, Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr. --
cmcnatt@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
LLP, James H. Hanson -- jhanson@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin
Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice & Megan E. Ross --
mross@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary.


PORTER MCGUIRE: Court Denies Certification of FCDPA Class
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Deny Class Certification in
the case captioned BENITA J. BROWN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. PORTER
McGUIRE KIAKONA & CHOW, LLP, a Hawaii limited liability
partnership, as an individual entity; THE ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT
OWNERS OF TERRAZZA/CORTBELLA/LAS/BRIAS/TIBURON, as an individual
entity and on behalf of all others similarly situated; DOE
DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants. Civil 17-00554 LEK-KSC. (D. Haw.).

Before the Court is Defendant the Association of Apartment Owners
of Terrazza/Cortebella/Las Brisas/Tiburon's (Terrazza AOAO) Motion
to Deny Class Certification.

The Third Amended Complaint asserts the following claims: a claim
against all defendants (PMKC, the Terrazza AOAO, and the proposed
defendant class) for a declaratory judgment that, during the
relevant period, a homeowner association without a mortgage
containing a power of sale could not use Chapter 667, Part I (Count
I); a wrongful foreclosure claim against the Terrazza AOAO and the
proposed defendant class, based on the improper use of Chapter 667,
Part I (Count II); a Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(FDCPA),claim against all defendants (Count III); a Haw. Rev. Stat.


Chapter 480 unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP) claim
against the Terrazza AOAO and the proposed defendant class (Count
IV); and an improper foreclosure claim against the Terrazza AOAO
and the proposed defendant class, based on the failure to obtain
adequate prices for the properties in foreclosure (Count V).  

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 states, in pertinent part: "(a) Prerequisites.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if:(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and(4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class."

Numerosity

Brown argues numerosity is met as to both proposed classes because
the members of the proposed Plaintiff Class were subject to 107
foreclosures and there are 38 members of the proposed AOAO Class.
The proposed Plaintiff Class satisfies the numerosity requirement.
The number of proposed AOAO Class members is very close to forty
and, in light of the fact that there are no absolute limits for the
numerosity requirement, this Court also finds that the proposed
AOAO Class satisfies the numerosity requirement.

Commonality and Typicality

This district court has stated: "Commonality exists where class
members' situations share a common issue of law or fact, and are
sufficiently parallel to insure a vigorous and full presentation of
all claims for relief."  

All of the claims against the proposed AOAO Class involve the issue
of whether condominium associations could use the Chapter 667, Part
I nonjudicial foreclosure process. However, that issue alone is not
to satisfy the commonality and typicality analysis. The analysis of
the claims against the proposed AOAO Class will require examination
of the homeowners deeds and each AOAO's governing documents, such
as the by-laws and the declaration of condominium property regime.


Further, consideration of the claims by the proposed Plaintiff
Class would involve the unique factual circumstances of each
foreclosure, including the amount of the purchase price in the
foreclosure sale and other circumstances relevant to the
reasonableness of the sale process. For these reasons, Brown's
claims do not have sufficient commonality with the claims of the
other members of the proposed Plaintiff Class to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2), nor are Brown's claims typical of the claims of the other
members of the proposed Plaintiff Class. Similarly, commonality and
typicality are not present as to Brown's claims against the
Terrazza AOAO and the claims against the other members of the
proposed AOAO Class.

Adequacy

The Ninth Circuit has stated: "The adequacy [of representation]
inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest
between named parties and the class they seek to represent."

Depending on various aspects of each foreclosure, including, inter
alia, the amount of the lien for unpaid condominium assessments,
the foreclosure sale price, and the existence and amount of other
encumbrances on the unit, the interests of the individual members
of the proposed Plaintiff Class may vary greatly. Further, it
appears that Brown and her husband used the Unit as their primary
residence at one point.   

However, other members of the proposed Plaintiff Class may never
have used their condominium unit as their primary residence. These
differing interests have the potential to create serious conflicts
of interest between Brown and the other members of the proposed
Plaintiff Class. The same factors, as well as others, including
unique provisions of the governing documents, create different
levels of liability exposure for the individual members of the
proposed AOAO Class, which have the potential to create serious
conflicts of interest between the Terrazza AOAO and the other
members of the proposed AOAO Class. This Court therefore concludes
that Brown would not be an adequate representative of the proposed
Plaintiff Class and the Terrazza AOAO would not be an adequate
representative of the proposed AOAO Class.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Terrazza AOAO's Motion to Deny
Class Certification is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9zvv9jc from Leagle.com.

Benita J. Brown, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chanelle M.C.
Fujimoto, Imanaka Asato, LLC, Isam C. Khoury -- Ikhoury@ckslaw.com
-- Cohelan Khoury & Singer, pro hac vice, James J. Hill --
jhill@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury & Singer, pro hac vice, Michael
L. Iosua, Imanaka Asato, LLLC, Steven K.S. Chung, Imanaka Asato,
LLLC, Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst &
O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice, Timothy D. Cohelan --
tcohelan@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury & Singer, pro hac vice &
Margaret LeAnn Webster, Imanaka Asato LLLC.

Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP, a Hawai'i limited liability
partnership, as an individual entity, Defendant, represented by
Duane R. Miyashiro -- Dmiyashiro@cwlfirm.com -- Cox, Wootton,
Lerner, Griffin & Hansen LLP & Jamie Christine S. Madriaga --
Jmadriaga@cwlfirm.com -- Cox, Wootton, Lerner, Griffin & Hansen
LLP.

The Association of Apartment Owners of Terrazza/Cortebella/Las
Brisas/Tiburon, as an individual entity and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Defendant, represented by David R. Major --
DMajor@LegalHawaii.com -- Bays Lung Rose & Holma, Harvey J. Lung --
mHLung@LegalHawaii.com -- Bays Lung Rose & Holma & James G. Diehl
-- JDiehl@LegalHawaii.com -- Bays Lung Rose and Holma.


QUICKEN LOANS: Hyde Sues over Unsolicited Marketing Text Message
----------------------------------------------------------------
GAYLE HYDE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. QUICKEN LOANS INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 0:19-cv-00196 (D. Minn., Jan. 27, 2019), seeks to recover
damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or
equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant
in negligently and/or intentionally contacting Plaintiff on her
cellular telephone, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy.

According to Quicken Loan's website, an individual can sign up for
Quicken Loans Text Alerts by texting AMAZE to the short code
262-93. Sometime prior to November 2018, Ms. Hyde went onto
QuickenLoans.com to compare rates using Quick Loans' Mortgage
Calculator, a free service. At no time did Ms. Hyde text AMAZE to
the short code 262-93, or consent to receive text messages in any
other way.

On or about November 26, 2018, at approximately 4:34 p.m., Quicken
Loans sent Ms. Hyde a marketing text message to her cellular
telephone ending in "3058", from the short code 262-93. Ms. Hyde
had received several marketing text messages identical to the one
above for the past two months. Each time that Plaintiff received
this text in the past, she responded with "Stop."

However, such requests went unheeded, as Ms. Hyde received another
text message on November 26, 2018. Having no other option, on
November 26, 2018, Ms. Hyde yet again responded to the text message
with "Stop". Despite this clear revocation of consent -- if consent
had existed in the first instance -- and Quicken Loans
acknowledgment of the revocation, on December 4, 2018, at
approximately 12:34 p.m., Quicken Loans sent Ms. Hyde another text
message from its SMS short code soliciting their business, the
lawsuit says.

Quicken Loans is a mortgage lending company headquartered in the
One Campus Martius building in the heart of the financial district
of downtown Detroit, Michigan.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff:

          Adam R. Strauss, Esq.
          TARSHISH CODY, PLC
          6337 Penn Avenue South
          Minneapolis, MN 55423
          Telephone: (952) 361-5556
          Facsimile: (952) 361-5559
          E-mail: ARS@ATTORNEYSINMN.COM

               - and -

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Suite D1
          Costs Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

RAPID TRANSIT: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Moreno
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued a Show Cause Order in the case captioned PAMELA
MORENO, Plaintiff, v. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT
DISTRICT, Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-02911-JSC. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the parties' class action
settlement and motion for attorneys' fees came before the Court.  

The Court cannot grant the motion for final approval until
Defendant verifies that it has provided the notice required by 28
U.S.C. Section 1715(b). The Court has issued multiple orders to
this effect and Defendant agreed to provide the requisite notice to
the California Attorney General's Office and United States
Attorney's Office. Defendant, however, has not filed a statement
indicating that it provided such notice and failed to appear at the
hearing to respond to questions regarding the same.

The Defendant is ordered to show cause as to (1) whether it in fact
served the requisite entities with notice as ordered and the date
it did so, and (2) why Defendant should not be ordered to pay
Plaintiff's costs for appearing at the hearing.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaoqksto from Leagle.com.

Pamela Moreno, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Rafey Sarkis Balabanian --
rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Eve-Lynn J. Rapp --
erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson LLC, pro hac vice, John Aaron Lawson
-- alawson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice & Todd M. Logan
-- tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, a public entity,
Defendant, represented by Gordon James Calhoun --
Gordon.Calhoun@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith
LLP & Rene I. Gamboa -- Rene.Gamboa@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith.


RIO RANCHO, NM: Students Searches Suit vs Individuals Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued an Order granting Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Count II of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint on
the Basis of Qualified Immunity in the case captioned DENNIS WOODS,
as guardian and next friend of T.W. and D.W. and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RIO RANCHO PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, THE RIO RANCHO PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, RICHARD
BRUCE, MIKE BAKER, LINDA KITTS, B.J. HARTFORD, MIKE LAWTON, CHRIS
BECK, and KIM FULTON Defendants. Case No. 17-CV-492-WJ-JHR.
(D.N.M.)

This matter comes before the Court on Individual Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action
Complaint on the Basis of Qualified Immunity, which seeks to
dismiss all Fourth Amendment claims brought in Count II against
Defendants Linda Kitts, B.J. Hartford, Mike Lawton, and Kim
Fulton.

The salient facts are as follows: Dennis Woods, as the guardian and
next friend of minor Plaintiffs T.W. and D.W., and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, seeks to represent a class of no fewer
than 23 middle school students alleging that they were all
subjected to unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. The
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of an official
policy of the Rio Rancho Public Schools alleging that the policy,
which allows for searches and seizures in school under certain
circumstances, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and
the Plaintiffs seek to bring a cause of action under the New Mexico
Tort Claims Act.  

The Plaintiffs allege that on April 16, 2015, approximately
twenty-three Rio Rancho Middle School students were subjected to
three separate searches: a search (1) in the cafeteria (2) in the
girls' restroom and (3) in the principal's office.  

Search in the Cafeteria

The Plaintiffs state that the students were in a classroom at Rio
Rancho Middle School located in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. At one
point a student reported to the teacher that someone allegedly
stole $210 from her in the form of ten (10) twenty-dollar bills and
one (1) ten-dollar bill. As a response, the teacher requested that
a security guard come to the classroom. Defendant Mike Lawton, one
of the school's security guards, responded to the request and
discussed the situation with the student that reported the money
stolen. Defendant Linda Kitts, the school's principal, and
Defendant Chris Beck, an officer for the Sandoval County Sheriff's
Department and the school resource officer for the school, arrived
at the classroom shortly after Defendant Lawton responded.
Defendant Kitts instructed the students to place their head on
their desks, and stated that the person responsible could confess
by raising her hand and return the money without consequence.  No
student raised their hand.  

Shortly after, Defendant Kitts instructed the students to walk to
the cafeteria to be searched. From that point on, a search occurred
on the students. Plaintiffs state that either Defendant Lawton,
Defendant Kim Fulton, a security guard at the school, or Defendant
B.J. Hartford, an assistant principal at the school, conducted the
searches on the students. The searches included forcing the
students to turn out their pockets, remove their shoes, show the
bottoms of their feet, and subject themselves to a pat down search.
in an attempt to find the money. Furthermore, Plaintiffs state that
each student, including T.W. and D.W., had their backpacks searched
and the contents of their backpacks removed.  At this point, the
money was not found on any of the students or inside of their
backpacks.  

Search in the Restroom

The Plaintiffs allege that shortly after the cafeteria search,
Defendant Kitts decided to conduct additional, more invasive
searches on certain members of the class. Defendant Fulton then
confronted female students in the girls' restroom. Fulton then
conducted additional searches of female students by ordering the
female students to pull their shirts and bras away from their
chests and shake their bras. The complaint states that the named
plaintiffs refused to comply with Defendant Fulton's request.  

Search in the Principal's Office

After searching the restroom, Defendant Fulton took two of the
students, not T.W. or D.W., found at the restroom to Defendant
Kitts' office. Defendant Kitts instructed Defendant Fulton to
search the students' entire persons for the money. This search
included Defendant Kitts asking at least some [students] to pull
their bras and shirts away from their chests, in an apparent
attempt to see if anything would fall out.The complaint does not
identify the students found in the restroom.

The Plaintiffs again state that this search did not reveal the
money.

STANDARD

The Defendants have asserted the defense of qualified immunity,
which shields government officials from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a person acting
under color of state law who subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured.  

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Plaintiffs must
allege sufficient facts to show the deprivation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show
that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of law.   There is no respondeat superior liability under Section
1983 and a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show that each
defendant, through his or her own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.  

Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that, the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.

In a public-school setting, what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place and requires some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed
to justify a search. Accordingly, the constitutionality of a
student search depends on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search and involves a two-fold inquiry: (1)
whether the school search was justified at its inception and (2)
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.

Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school. Searches on students are reasonable
in scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

The Court will address the search (1) in the cafeteria, (2) in the
7th grade girls' restroom, and (3) in the principal's office and
their constitutionality in that order.

First, as alleged in the second amended complaint, twenty-three
students were in a classroom when one informed the teacher that
money was stolen from her. When the money was not returned upon
Defendant Kitts' request, the students were ordered to walk to the
cafeteria where all the students were subjected to a search at
which point all students were asked to turn out their pockets,
remove their shoes, and show the bottoms of their feet. The
students' backpacks were also searched, and the students were
subjected to full-body pat downs. Nothing more is alleged in the
complaint.

These allegations, taken as true and in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, do not sufficiently state a claim for an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment. The search was justified at its
inception because Defendants possessed reasonable suspicion that
one of the twenty-three students potentially possessed the alleged
stolen money.
  
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' conclusory statement that the students
were subjected to a full-body pat down is insufficient to state a
claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs fail to specify
which defendant allegedly patted-down which student, what the pat
down consisted of and if any of the named defendants touched T.W.
or D.W.  

Second, T.W. and D.W. were present in the restroom, however, at no
point do Plaintiffs point to facts particular to T.W. or D.W that
indicate a constitutional violation. In fact, T.W. and D.W. refused
to consent to the search and the complaint does not state whether
they were subjected to any search. As a result, Plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim as to the search inside the restroom, as
well.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss Count
II of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint on the
Basis of Qualified Immunity is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybscck59 from Leagle.com.

Dennis Woods, as guardian and next friend of T.W. and D.W. and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Mark Walsh Allen, Law Office of Mark W. Allen.

Rio Rancho Public Schools, Rio Rancho Public Schools Board of
Education, V. Sue Cleveland, Richard Bruce, Mike Baker, Linda
Kitts, B.J. Hartford, Mike Lawton & Kim Fulton, Defendants,
represented by Jerry A. Walz -- jerryawalz@walzandassociates.com --
Walz and Associates.


ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: Court OKs $9.25MM Singh Class Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of a Class Action Settlement in the case captioned JABIR
SINGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC;
CENTRAL CAL TRANSPORTATION, LLC; and MORGAN SOUTHERN, INC.,
Defendants. No. 1:15-cv-01497-DAD-BAM. (E.D. Cal.).

FINAL CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTION

The court conducted an examination of the class action factors in
considering preliminary approval of the settlement and found
certification warranted. Since no additional issues concerning
whether certification is warranted have been raised, the court will
not repeat its prior analysis here, but instead reaffirms it and
finds final certification appropriate. The following class is
therefore certified: all current and former California residents
who worked for the defendants in the position of owner-operator
and/or independent contractor truck driver at any time from
February 9, 2011 through April 15, 2018.

FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Class actions require the approval of the district court prior to
settlement. This requires that: (i) notice be sent to all class
members; (ii) the court hold a hearing and make a finding that the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; (iii) the parties
seeking approval file a statement identifying the settlement
agreement; and (iv) class members be given an opportunity to
object.  The settlement agreement was previously filed on the court
docket and class members have been given an opportunity to object
thereto. The court now turns to the adequacy of notice and its
review of the settlement following the final fairness hearing.

Notice

Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement
under Rule 23(e). Any notice of the settlement sent to the class
should alert class members of the opportunity to opt-out and
individually pursue any state law remedies that might provide a
better opportunity for recovery.

It is important for class notice to include information concerning
the attorneys' fees to be awarded from the settlement, because it
serves as adequate notice of class counsel's interest in the
settlement.

The court previously reviewed the notice of class certification at
the preliminary approval stage and found it to be satisfactory. No
material changes were made to the notice of class certification
when the court granted a modification to the order granting
preliminary approval.  

Following the grant of preliminary approval, the settlement
administrator mailed the notice of settlement to 896 class members
on the class list. Seventy-nine notices, which were less than one
percent of all the notices sent, were initially returned to the
settlement administrator. After resending the notices to forwarding
addresses and performing skip trace searches, only eighteen of the
class notices remained undeliverable.  

The court concludes adequate notice was provided to the class here.
The court accepts the reports of the settlement administrator and
finds sufficient notice has been provided satisfying Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1).

Final Fairness Hearing

In assessing the fairness of a class action settlement, courts
balance the following factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs'
case (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of
further litigation (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial (4) the amount offered in settlement (5) the
extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings (6)
the experience and views of counsel (7) the presence of a
governmental participant and (8) the reaction of the class members
to the proposed settlement.

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

When assessing the strength of plaintiffs' case in this context,
the court does not reach any ultimate conclusions regarding the
contested issues of fact and law that underlie the merits of this
litigation. The court cannot reach such a conclusion, because
evidence has not been fully presented.  Instead, the court is to
evaluate objectively the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the
litigation and the impact of those considerations on the parties'
decisions to reach these agreements.

Here, class counsel acknowledges that recovery on the merits in
this case is uncertain due to several issues of unsettled law.
First, defendants may be able to assert various affirmative
defenses to plaintiffs' claims, which may detract from plaintiffs'
recovery. Second, plaintiffs state that it is unsettled whether the
California Labor Code may be applied to work performed outside of
the state, which could subject drivers to less favorable
out-of-state laws. Third, plaintiffs note that defendants would
likely argue that their piece-rate formula was nearly identical to
a pay formula found to be lawful in another federal case involving
a truck driver compensation system.

Therefore, while plaintiffs potentially have meritorious claims, it
is far from certain that they would have prevailed on those claims,
given the unsettled nature of relevant case law.
Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation, and Risk of Maintaining

Class Action Status Through Trial

There is a strong judicial policy that favors settlements,
particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned. As
a result, approval of settlement is preferable to lengthy and
expensive litigation with uncertain results.

Here, plaintiffs continue to voice their serious concerns regarding
the impact of prolonged class action litigation on defendants'
financial condition and, in turn, upon defendant's ability to pay
the settlement. Moreover, class certification remains highly
contested between the parties, and absent a settlement, would
likely result in continued litigation, delays, and potential
appeals.

By contrast, the proposed settlement in this action provides
compensation that is available now, without the additional time and
risk of a decision that would likely be subject to a lengthy
appeals process.

The Amount Offered in Settlement

To determine whether a settlement falls within the range of
possible approval a court must focus on substantive fairness and
adequacy, and consider plaintiffs' expected recovery balanced
against the value of the settlement offer.

Here, the proposed settlement is for a common fund of $9.25 million
dollars. The common fund provides for: (1) $7,500 enhancement
awards to each of the representative plaintiffs (2) payment of
attorneys' fees to class counsel in the amount of one-third (1/3)
of the common fund ($3,083,333.33) (3) class counsel's costs and
expenses of approximately $76,149.55 (4) settlement administration
fees to CPT Group, Inc. of $12,000; and (5) a PAGA payment to the
California Labor and Work Force Development Agency not to exceed
$75,000.00.    

After these deductions from the gross common fund, plaintiffs
report that the net settlement amount will be an estimated amount
of $5,868,517.01, which will be allocated to class members on a
pro-rata basis. Because there are now 896 members in the class, the
court calculates that, on average, each class member would receive
an individual settlement payment of approximately $6,550. The court
has previously assessed the risks faced by plaintiffs here, and has
found the amount offered in settlement of these actions to weigh in
favor of final approval.

Extent of Discovery Completed

The court must consider whether the process by which the parties
arrived at their settlement is truly the product of arm's length
bargaining, rather than collusion or fraud.   A settlement is
presumed fair if it follows sufficient discovery and genuine
arms-length negotiation.

Here, the parties engaged in significant and comprehensive written
discovery and took nearly thirty depositions, including those of
the plaintiffs, witnesses, defendants' current and former
employees, and persons most knowledgeable in California and
Georgia. Class counsel represents that this discovery took
considerable time and effort to obtain and was critical to
informing the settlement discussions. Based on these
representations by counsel, the court is satisfied that the
parties' negotiation constituted genuine, informed, arm's length
bargaining.

Experience and Views of Counsel

Co-class counsel Daniel M. Kopfman and Brian S. Kabateck have filed
declarations in support of the motion for preliminary approval,
detailing extensive experiences in litigating wage and hour class
actions, especially in the transportation context. Based on their
experience and qualifications, investigation of the disputed
factual and legal issues involved in this case, and evaluation of
the risks of continued litigation, both attorneys Kopfman and
Kabateck conclude that the settlement is fair and reasonable.
Consideration of class counsel's experience and expressed opinions
in this regard also weigh in favor of final approval of the
settlement.

Reaction of the Class to Proposed Settlement

The absence of objections to a proposed class action settlement
supports the conclusion that the settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.  

According to the declaration of Emilio Cofinco, case manager at CPT
Group, Inc., no member of the class has filed an objection to the
settlement pending before the court for final approval. Similarly,
no class members appeared at the final fairness hearing to raise
any objections to the settlement. Accordingly, consideration of
this factor weighs significantly in favor of granting final
approval.

Subtle Signs of Collusion

The court now turns to a review of whether any of the more subtle
signs of collusion noted by the Ninth Circuit are present here.
The award of attorneys' fees sought here one-third of the
settlement fund is on the high end of amounts typically awarded in
the Ninth Circuit. That said, the proposed attorneys' fees award is
not disproportionate to the monetary distribution that the class
will receive, and there is no reversionary clause in the settlement
agreement.

However, the settlement agreement does include a clear sailing
provision, in which defendant has agreed not to object to, oppose,
or otherwise contest class counsel's award of attorneys' fees or
costs. Although the very existence of a clear sailing provision
increases the likelihood that class counsel will have bargained
away something of value to the class, the existence of a clear
sailing provision is not necessarily fatal to final approval.
Rather, when confronted with a clear sailing provision, the
district court has a heightened duty to peer into the provision and
scrutinize closely the relationship between attorneys' fees and
benefit to the class. In the analysis of attorneys' fees undertaken
below, the court finds that the requested fees are justified and do
not betray the class's interests.

On balance, the court is satisfied that the settlement is not the
product of collusion, and therefore concludes that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7yl8l7x from Leagle.com.

Jabir Singh, Bany Lopez, Julio Vidrio, James Sliger, Derrick Lewis,
Jerry Leininger, Kristopher Spring & Jerry Wood, Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew Butler Jones -- ajones@wagnerjones.com --
Wagner and Jones, Brian S. Kabateck -- bsk@kbklawyers.com --
Kabateck LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner -- ck@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck
Brown Kellner LLP, Daniel M. Kopfman, Wagner and Jones, Shant
Arthur Karnikian -- sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP, Angela Elizabeth Martinez, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian
LLP, Lawrence Mark Artenian, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP
& Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia
LLP.

Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC, Central Cal Transportation,
LLC & Morgan Southern, Inc., Defendants, represented by A. Jack
Finklea -- JFINKLEA@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light
Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice, Adam C. Smedstad --
asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr. -- CMCNATT@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, LLP, James H. Hanson --
JHANSON@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
P.C., pro hac vice, Megan E. Ross -- mross@scopelitis.com --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary & Alaina Cathrine Hawley --
AHAWLEY@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, P.C.


SHAW ACADEMY: Davidson Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Texts
------------------------------------------------------------
Deric Davidson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Shaw Academy Limited, Case No. 5:19-cv-00146 (C.D.
Cal., January 24, 2019), accuses the Defendant of sending
unauthorized automated telemarketing text messages to the
Plaintiff's cellular phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Shaw Academy Limited is an Irish company headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.

Shaw Academy is a business that provides a wide array of online
courses.  Shaw Academy regularly sends out automated,
template-based telemarketing text messages to consumers advertising
promotions and sales regarding Shaw Academy classes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trinette G. Kent, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          1333 Stradella Road
          Los Angeles, CA 90077
          Telephone: (480) 247-9644
          Facsimile: (480) 717-4781
          E-mail: tkent@lemberglaw.com


SOLCO HEALTHCARE: Sued over Contaminated Generic Irbesartan
-----------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN WINEINGER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SOLCO HEALTHCARE U.S., LLC, PRINSTON
PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., and WAL-MART STORES, INC., the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-01070 (D. N.J. Jan. 24, 2019), contends that Solco
and Prinston manufactured and distributed irbesartan and
irbesartan-containing generic prescription medications contaminated
with N-nitrosodiethylamine ("NDEA"), a carcinogenic and
liver-damaging impurity. In turn, Defendant Walmart sold this
contaminated generic medication to Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated consumers.

According to the complaint, originally marketed under the brand
name Avapro, irbesartan is primarily used to control high blood
pressure and to treat heart failure. Additionally, a combination of
irbesartan and hydrochlorothiazide, originally marketed under the
brand name Avalide, is primarily used to control high blood
pressure. However, due to manufacturing defects originating from
overseas laboratories in China, certain generic formulations have
become contaminated with NDEA. The contaminated irbesartan
medication was introduced into the United States market and sold to
consumers, including Plaintiff, nationwide.

NDEA is an organic chemical. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") reports that NDEA is found in "air pollution, and
industrial processes, and has been classified as a probable human
carcinogen as per international Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC) classification." NDEA is also classified as a Group 2A
carcinogen (probable human carcinogen) by the World Health
Organization. NDEA is acutely toxic when consumed orally. Solco and
Prinston recall their irbesartan-containing medications due to the
presence of an impurity, NDEA, resulting from manufacturing defects
from an overseas supplier in China.

On January 18, 2019, FDA announced a voluntary recall of "one (1)
lot of Irbesartan and seven (7) lots of Irbesartan HCTZ Tablets to
the consumer level due to the detection of trace amount of an
unexpected impurity found in an active pharmaceutical ingredient
(API) manufactured by Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceuticals." The
medications were found to "contain NDEA above the acceptable daily
intake levels released by the FDA." The FDA's announcement notes
that NDEA "has been classified as a probable human carcinogen as
per International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
classification.

To date, the following products are subject to the recall:

-- IRBESARTAN 300MG 90CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 300MG/12.5MG 30CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 300MG/12.5MG 30 CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 300MG/12.5MG 90CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 300MG/12.5MG 90CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 150MG/12.5MG 30CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 150MG/12.5MG 90CT TABLETS
-- IRBESARTAN/HCTZ 150MG/12.5MG 30CT TABLETS

The Patients affected by the recall (i.e., Plaintiff and Class
members) were instructed to "contact their pharmacist or physician
who can advise them about an alternative treatment." The
Defendants' irbesartan generic medications are not of equal quality
and safety to brand-name drugs. Generic drugs reach the market when
the brand-name version of the drug comes off patent, and other
competitors are able to seek approval for, market, and sell
bioequivalent versions of the brand-name drug. These generic
equivalents are supposed to be of equal quality and equal safety.
According to the FDA, "all generic drugs approved by the FDA have
the same high quality, strength, purity, and stability as
brand-name drugs."

The Irbesartan-containing drugs manufactured and distributed by
Defendants Solco and Prinston are supposed to be equivalent to the
brand-name drugs. However, they are not because they suffer from a
manufacturing defect which caused their generic irbesartan to
become contaminated with NDEA, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Andrew J. Obergfell, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: aobergfell@bursor.com

SORTIS FINANCIAL: Eisen Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sortis Financial,
Inc. The case is styled as Shaya Eisen, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sortis Financial, Inc
formerly known as: Clearspring Loan Services, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00507 (E.D. N.Y., January 25, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Sortis Financial, Inc. provides financial services. The Company
offers mortgage loan, business lending, banking, and debt
collection services. Sortis Financial serves customers in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is presented by:

    Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
    Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
    735 Central Avenue
    Woodmere, NY 11598
    Tel: (516) 668-6945
    Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


SOVEREIGN INDUSTRIES: Arce Suit Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Arce, Jorge Luis Acuna, Cristian Jarquin, Miguel Acaro,
Rafael Ramirez, and Cosme Terrero Santana, on behalf of themselves
and all other persons similarly situated v. Sovereign Industries
Group Inc. and John Does #1-10, Case No. 1:19-cv-00489 (E.D.N.Y.,
January 24, 2019), alleges that pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Plaintiffs are entitled to:

    (i) unpaid wages from the Defendants for overtime work for
        which they did not receive overtime premium pay as
        required by law; and

   (ii) liquidated damages because the Defendants' violations
        lacked a good faith basis.

Sovereign Industries Group Inc. is a New York corporation with a
principal place of business in Flushing, New York.  The Doe
Defendants represent the owners, officers, directors, members,
and/or managing agents of Sovereign, whose identities are unknown
at this time.

The Defendants owned and operated a construction company in Queens.
The Plaintiffs worked on construction projects in Manhattan and
Queens for the Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Stein, Esq.
          SAMUEL & STEIN
          38 West 32nd Street, Suite 1110
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 563-9884
          E-mail: dstein@samuelandstein.com


STEEG LAW: 5th Cir. Affirms Decertification in FDCPA Suits
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court’s judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the appeals cases
captioned NICOLE REYES, individually and as Representative of two
classes, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class and the
Louisiana usurious class, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEEG LAW,
L.L.C.; MARGARET V. GLASS, Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-30849. (5th
Cir.).

The plaintiff appeals from the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant law firm and decertifying a class of
plaintiffs under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Nicole Reyes filed a class action lawsuit against Steeg Law and one
of its associates, Margaret Glass. She alleged repeated violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Reyes alleges
that the letters Steeg Law sent to her and others who belong to
condominium associations represented by Steeg Law constitute facial
violations of the FDCPA. That is because Steeg Law's standard form
letter demands payment within seven days, rather than the thirty
days the Act provides.  

Her primary argument is that the defendant is a debt collector for
the purposes of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.   A material fact is one that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law. A dispute regarding a
material fact is genuine when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

The FDCPA imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain
prohibited debt collection practices. It regulates interactions
between a debtor and a debt collector, the latter being defined as
any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to
be owed or due another. Attorneys qualify as debt collectors for
purposes of the FDCPA when they regularly engage in consumer debt
collection, including but not limited to litigation on behalf of a
creditor client.

During the three years before Reyes filed her complaint, less than
1.3% of Steeg Law's overall revenue was attributable to fees
accrued through the representation of condominium associations in
perfecting and enforcing liens and recovering delinquent balances.
During that same period, all of the work that Steeg Law attorneys
undertook for its condominium association clients constituted less
than 1.5% of the firm's total billable hours. Even adopting an
expansive definition of debt collection activity, that activity
constituted less than 3.5% of that 1.5%. Neither this court's
precedent nor common sense compel a determination that these
circumstances constitute regularly engaging in debt collection
activity. The district court did not err in holding that Steeg Law
is not a debt collector as defined by the Act.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's January 17, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybj88keh from Leagle.com.

Judy Lynn Burnthorn -- jburnthorn@deutschkerrigan.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

William Everard Wright, Jr. -- wwright@wrightlaw.net -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Todd Gregory Crawford, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John Steven Garner, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew Taylor Biggers, for Defendant-Appellee.

Andrew J. Baer -- abaer@deutschkerrigan.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


TRACKIN CO: Meza Files Class Action in Calif. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trackin, Co. The case
is styled as Adina Meza, an individual, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Trackin, Co. and Does 1
thru 50, Defendants, Case No. CGC19573185 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco Cty., January 25, 2019).

Trackin, Co. offers a range of vehicle tracking devices for
personal and business use.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
   16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200
   Encino, CA 91436



UXIN LIMITED: Lei Liang Sues over Stock Price Drop
--------------------------------------------------
LEI LIANG, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. UXIN LIMITED, KUN DAI, ZHEN ZENG, RONG
LU, JULIAN CHENG, DOU SHEN, HAINAN TAN, MORGAN STANLEY & CO.
INTERNATIONAL PLC, GOLDMAN SACHS (ASIA) L.L.C., J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC, CHINA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL CORPORATION HONG KONG
SECURITIES LIMITED, and CHINA RENAISSANCE SECURITIES (HONG KONG)
LIMITED, the Defendants, Index No. 650509/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan.
25, 2019), is a federal securities class action on behalf of
persons and/or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Uxin
American depositary shares pursuant or traceable to the Company's
false and/or misleading Registration Statement and Prospectus
issued in connection with the Company's June 27, 2018 initial
public offering, who were damaged thereby.

According to the complaint, on June 28, 2018, the Company filed its
prospectus for its IPO with the SEC, which forms part of the
Registration Statement. The Company sold 25,000,000 ADSs at a price
of $9.00 per share in its IPO. Each ADS represents three shares of
Class A common stock. The Company received proceeds of
approximately $205.1 million from the IPO, net of underwriting
discounts and commissions. The proceeds from the IPO were
purportedly to be used to improve the Company's transaction service
capabilities, research and development, and general corporate
purposes.

On November 20, 2018, Uxin reported that the transaction volume of
its 2B business had declined 8.5% year-over-year and the gross
merchandise value ("GMV") had declined 14.8% year-over-year due to
the Company's decision to stop providing services such as
inspections for its customers. Following this news, Uxin's share
price fell $4.50 per share, or approximately 50%, to close at $4.50
on November 20, 2018. This constituted a decline of 50% from the
IPO price of $9.00 per share.

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, the Registration Statement was materially
false and misleading and omitted to state that the Company was
likely to stop providing complementary services such as inspections
to its customers; that, instead, the Company would connect
consumers to dealers who would provide such complementary services;
that, as a result, the Company's 2B business would be materially
impacted; and that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
statements in the Registration Statement regarding Uxin's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially false and/or misleading,
the lawsuit says.

Uxin is a used car e-commerce platform in China. The Company has
two segments: Uxin Auction (or 2B business) sells used cars to
dealers, and Uxin Used Car (or 2C business) sells used cars to
consumers.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Matthew M. Guiney, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: 212 545-4600
          Facsimile: 212 686-0114
          E-mail: guiney@whafh.com

WAGNER & WAGNER: Underpays Salespersons, Dela Cruz Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
JEAN DELA CRUZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WAGNER & WAGNER AUTO SALES, INC.; MCGOVERN
AUTO GROUP CORP SERVICES, INC.; MARK W. WAGNER; RONALD W. WAGNER;
and MATT MCGOVERN, Defendants, Case No. 19-0130E (Mass. Cmmw.,
Suffolk Cty., Jan. 14, 2019) is an action against the Defendants'
failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Dela Cruz was employed by the Defendants as
salesperson.

Wagner & Wagner Auto Sales, Inc., doing business as Wagner Motor
Sales, operates as an automobile dealer. The Company engages in the
retail sale of new and used automobiles, as well as provides
automobile financing, auto parts, repair, and maintenance services.
Wagner Motor Sales serves clients in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephanie C. Ozahowski, Esq.
          Raven Moeslinger, Esq.
          Nicholas F. Ortiz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NICHOLAS F. ORTIZ, P.C.
          99 High Street, Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 338-9400
          E-mail: sco@mass-legal.com
                  rm@mass-legal.com
                  nfo@mass-legal.com


WELBILT INC: Faces Borel-Donohue Securities Suit in Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPH BOREL-DONOHUE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. WELBILT, INC., HUBERTUS M. MUEHLHAEUSER, JOHN
O. STEWART and HARESH SHAH, Case No. 8:19-cv-00191 (M.D. Fla.,
January 24, 2019), alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies, in violation of securities laws.

Specifically, the Defendants made false and misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Welbilt's internal financial
reporting controls were lacking and ineffective; (ii) Welbilt was
incorrectly recording the tax basis, as well as amortization of
intangible assets, of foreign subsidiaries; (iii) as a result of
the conduct, Welbilt's previous financial statements could not be
relied upon; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Founded in 1902, Welbilt is a Delaware corporation with its
principal executive offices located in New Port Richey, Florida.
The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the
Company.

Welbilt designs, manufactures, and supplies foodservice equipment
for the global foodservice industry.  Welbilt was formerly known as
"Manitowoc Foodservice, Inc." and changed its name to "Welbilt,
Inc." in February 2017.  Welbilt operates in 38 locations in 12
countries serving customers in 100 countries around the globe.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James L. Davidson, Esq.
          Alexander D. Kruzyk, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33486
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com
                  akruzyk@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com


YANGTZE RIVER: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Yangtze River Port and Logistics Limited (NASDAQ:
YRIV) from February 2, 2016 through December 5, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for
Yangtze River investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Yangtze River class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1476.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Yangtze's purported
lease of the Wuhan Yangtze River Newport Logistics Center, the
company's main asset, was a fabrication; (2) Yangtze's only
operating subsidiary, Wuhan Yangtze River Newport Logistics Co.,
Ltd., was declared insolvent in China due to a number of default
judgments against it; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements
about its business, operations, and prospects, were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than March 4,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1476.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


ZICAM LLC: Court Grants Final Approval of Melgar Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Final Approval on Class
Settlement in the case captioned YESENIA MELGAR, on Behalf of
Herself and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ZICAM LLC
and MATRIXX INITIATIVES, INC. Defendants. Case No.
2:14-cv-00160-MCE-AC. (E.D. Cal.).

This Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed class
action settlement between the parties (Stipulation of Settlement).

The Court also provisionally certified a nationwide Settlement
Class for settlement purposes, approved the procedure for giving
notice and forms of Notice, and set a final approval hearing to
take place on November 15, 2018. The Settlement Class is defined
as: all residents of the United States of America who, from
February 15, 2011 through June 5, 2018, purchased any of the Zicam
Products (Zicam RapidMelts Original, RapidMelts Ultra, Oral Mist,
Ultra Crystals, Liqui-Lozenges, Lozenges Ultra, Soft Chews,
Medicated Fruit Drops, and Chewables).  

The Court held a duly noticed final approval hearing to consider:
(1) whether the terms and conditions of the Stipulation of
Settlement are fair, reasonable and adequate (2) whether a judgment
should be entered dismissing the complaint on the merits and with
prejudice in favor of Defendants and against all persons or
entities who are Settlement Class members herein who have not
requested exclusion from the Settlement Class and (3) whether and
in what amount to award attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to
Class Counsel and whether and in what amount to make an incentive
award to Plaintiff Yesenia Melgar.

The Court finds that the prerequisites for a settlement class under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 23(a) and (b)(3)
have been satisfied, for purposes of settlement only, in that: (a)
the number of Settlement Class Members is so numerous that joinder
of all members thereof is impracticable (b) there are questions of
law and fact common to the Settlement Class (c) the claims of the
Representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the
Settlement Class she seeks to represent (d) the Representative
Plaintiff has and will fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the Settlement Class (e) the questions of law and fact
common to the Settlement Class Members predominate over any
questions affecting any individual Settlement Class Member and (f)
a class action is superior to the other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), the Court hereby awards Class
Counsel attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of
$5,619,859.97. The Court also orders payment of an incentive
award(s) in the amount(s) of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff Yesenia
Melgar. These amounts are to be paid in the time and manner
described in the Stipulation of Settlement.

This Settlement Approval Order and Final Judgment constitutes a
judgment within the meaning and for purposes of Rule 54 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Without affecting the finality of
the Settlement Approval Order and Final Judgment in any way, this
Court hereby retains continuing jurisdiction over: (a) the
disposition of the settlement benefits; (b) the settling parties
for purposes of construing, enforcing and administering the
Stipulation of Settlement and (c) enforcement of the Stipulation
and Order Regarding Undertaking Re: Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 17, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybxbfdql from Leagle.com.

Yesenia Melgar, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph I. Marchese --
jmarchese@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A., pro hac vice,
Lawrence Timothy Fisher -- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and
Fisher, PA, Scott A. Bursor -- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor &
Fisher PA & Thomas Andrew Reyda -- treyda@bursor.com -- Bursor &
Fisher, P.A.

Zicam LLC & Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Alan J. Lazarus -- Alan.Lazarus@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP, Ashley Neglia -- ashley.neglia@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, Kathryn Michelle Jackson -- katie.jackson@dbr.com --
Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Leslie M. Smith --
leslie.smith@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice,
Robyn E. Bladow -- rbladow@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP &
William A. Hanssen -- william.hanssen@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle and
Reath LLP.

Patrick S. Sweeney, Claimant, pro se.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Claims Continue to Climb, AM Best Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
PropertyCasualty360 reported that it’s been more than four
decades since asbestos consumption piqued in the United States as
well as worldwide, and three decades since the Environmental
Protection Agency banned asbestos manufacturing in the U.S.

Nonetheless, A.M. Best recently reported that asbestos and
environmental contamination claims continue to rise.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Discovered at Dormant Quarry
------------------------------------------------------
WFMZ Allentown reported that Bucks County residents turned out in
force to talk about the Rockhill Quarry in Perkasie Township.

Pennsylvania Representatives Steve Santarsiero, Craig Staats and
Congressman Brian Fitzpatrick hosted the town hall at Bucks
Community College after asbestos was discovered at the quarry.

Hanson Aggregates owns the quarry which was dormant for 40 years
until R.E. Pierson got a $224 million contract to expand the
Pennsylvania Turnpike in 2017.

Hanson leased the quarry and re-opened it.

Since then, residents say they've had to deal with noise, heavy
truck traffic and concerns about water and air quality due to
dust.

After the asbestos was discovered the DEP shut down operations
pending testing.

At the time, Hanson released a statement saying:

"Naturally occurring asbestos in the rock does not indicate unsafe
levels in the air and there are no indications that the employees
or surrounding community were at risk."

Karen Drum has lived next to the quarry since 2008. She says she
hopes it doesn't re-open.

"There goes our peace and tranquility as well as so many other
things. Environmental issues and infrastructure issues and the
value of our home," said Drum.

Residents say they are also concerned about whether the quarry met
regulatory requirements to operate. It's something lawmakers say
they will be looking at closely.

"I will be working daily to make sure that the DEP does in fact do
what it should do and enforce the law in Pennsylvania as it exists
right now," said Rep. Santasiero.

Congressman Fitzpatrick has asked Governor Tom Wolf to suspend
further development at the Rockhill Quarry until a more thorough
environmental review is conducted.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Material Used in Kuwaiti Thermos
----------------------------------------------------------
Arab Times Kuwait English Daily reported that the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry recently circulated the names of 5 types of
thermos to all relevant authorities to prevent their sale or
import, after discovering that they did not comply with the
specifications, because they contain the asbestos material that
causes the cancer, reports Al-Qabas daily.

The sources pointed out the ministry just before receiving the
warning issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the
discovery of a number of types of thermos harmful to health, to
comb the markets through its inspection and emergency teams, in
cooperation with the Public Authority for Industry, to ensure the
safety of consumers.

The same sources said the ministry has taken many procedures to
hold the agents and distributors of those products responsible and
summoned them to the ministry headquarters to take appropriate
legal action which would prevent the recurrence of such problems in
future.

The Ministry has also addressed the Union of Cooperative Societies
and sent a list of the five products with the aim of circulating
the list to all cooperative societies to withdraw these products
from their shelves which it called an urgent matter.

The sources summarized the ministry's procedures to deal with this
matter as follows: Issuing a decision prohibiting the import of any
products containing asbestos; Coordinating with the Public
Authority for Industry to introduce thermos in the national
conformity system; combing the markets and commercial centers to
ensure that the products are free of prohibited material; Calling
the agents and distributors and holding them legally accountable.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Played Role in Shipyard Worker's Death
----------------------------------------------------------------
NW Evening Mail reported that a coroner said exposure to asbestos
played a "significant "role in the death of a former shipyard
worker.

Gordon Gibson died aged 86 on August 17 last year.

At an inquest held into his death at Barrow Town Hall, assistant
coroner Paul O'Donnell ruled Mr Gibson died as a result of
industrial disease.

The inquest heard the Dalton man worked in the testing area at the
shipyard between 1959 and 1992, originally joining as a plumber.

His son Steve said he had heard stories of how his dad and his
colleagues played with the toxic material at work.

He said: "They made snowballs out of asbestos and threw them at
each other.

"They would also make asbestos pillows and sleep on them during
night shifts."

The inquest was told Mr Gibson died from heart failure, but
asbestos was a major contributing factor in his death, the ruling
by the coroner noted.

Barrow has the highest rate of asbestos-related cancer in the
country.

And the inquest followed the forming of a new support group, the
Cumbria & Lancashire Asbestos Support Advice Group.

Graham Ding, chairman of the Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum
said the kind of behaviour Mr Gibson's son described was a familiar
story.

He said: "I the work I have done it has become a common story of
people playing with asbestos in this way.

"These people have been mostly the young apprentices who would not
have been aware how dangerous it was."

Speaking after the hearing, Steve said Gordon was "very good" dad
and a keen sportsman who played football and cricket.

"He was very active until about the last two years of his life and
then he became ill," Steve added.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Automaker Wins Review on Asbestos Liability Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that Ford Motor Co. and other businesses have
convinced the New Jersey Supreme Court to review a ruling that
manufacturers may be held liable for failure to warn about the
risks of asbestos.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Barrow Has Highest Asbestos Cancer Rate in UK
--------------------------------------------------------------
NW Evening Mail reported that Barrow has the highest rate of an
asbestos related cancer in the UK, statistics show.

At the official launch of the Cumbria & Lancashire Asbestos Support
Advice Group (CLASAG) at Barrow and District Disability
Association, it was highlighted the town has the highest rates of
mesothelioma in the UK, which is nearly always caused by asbestos
exposure.

Latest statistics from the National Mesothelioma audit run by the
Royal College of Physicians show that from 2014-2016 there was a
minimum of 75 cases of mesothelioma recorded within the Morecambe
Bay NHS Trust, which includes Furness General Hospital.

Further to this, statistics from the Health and Safety Executive
show that in 2015 such cases were three times the national
average.

Although these occurrences have dropped slightly from when it was
4.3 times the national average between the years 1981-2015, it
still makes Barrow the highest in the UK.

Speaking at the event Albert Brennan, 78 from Walney, who worked
for 18 years as a BAE contractor said: "I've seen a lot of our lads
that I've worked with taken ill with it and within 12 months they
were gone.

"We know how big a killer it is and it's not finished yet -- people
are still suffering.

"I thought I got away with it then bang I was diagnosed. It's like
having a concrete overcoat around your lung, your breathing just
gets worse and worse and there is no long term survivors of it."

The formation of the group will however provide critical support
for people with asbestos conditions.

Formally known as Cumbria Asbestos Related Disease Support (CARDS)
chaired by Bob Pointer, the new group run by Disability First will
hold meetings on the third Monday of each month at the Barrow &
District Disability Association. They will also be able to provide
independent advice about welfare benefits and compensation through
the home visiting service.

Alan Reid, CEO of Disability First, said: "We are thrilled and very
proud to be asked by Bob and the group to continue all the hard
work that has been achieved."

Graham Dring, chair of the Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum
UK, said: "It is crucial that local people have access to
independent, expert advice on benefits and compensation and ongoing
support so the establishment of CLASAG is welcome news for victims
of asbestos diseases."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burton Carpenter Dies of Asbestos Death
--------------------------------------------------------
Derbyshire Live reported that An elderly Burton ex-carpenter did
not develop signs of a "horrible" asbestos-related disease until
half a century after he was exposed to it, an inquest heard.

Timothy Swift died at his home address of Shelley Avenue,
Horninglow, on November 9, 2018.

The 81-year-old former carpenter joiner was diagnosed with
malignant mesothelioma, a type of cancer which develops in the
lining of the body's organs.

Typically, this is linked with exposure to asbestos.

An inquest into Mr Shelley's death held at Burton Town Hall heard
that his only known exposure to asbestos came between 1967 and
1969.

Despite this he did not show any symptoms of mesothelioma until 50
years later, in March or April 2018.

Details from his family, read out at the inquest, said: "He worked
all his life as a carpenter joiner for a company in Burton.

"He worked from around 1967 to 1969 at a carpenters, where he was
exposed to others cutting asbestos sheets."

They added that Mr Swift was not known to have been exposed to
asbestos outside the workplace.

Concluding, South Staffordshire coroner Andrew Haigh said: "In the
early part of last year as a result of Mr Swift becoming unwell he
was diagnosed with the horrible condition of mesothelioma.

"There is no effective treatment, that condition is almost always
associated with exposure to asbestos dust and commonly with a long
latency period between exposure and symptoms.

"Overall on balance I am satisfied that this death was from
mesothelioma, this has been caused by exposure to asbestos dust.

"The exposure to asbestos dust is likely to have occurred at the
workplace so this should be considered an occupational linked
death."

Mr Haigh ruled Mr Swift's death was caused by mesothelioma , with
type two diabetes a contributing factor.

The Coroner concluded death was due to industrial disease.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chesham Woman Dies of Epithelioid Mesothelioma
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bucks Free Press reported that a 60-year-old woman died of cancer
just before Christmas after being exposed to asbestos while she was
working at a factory, an inquest found this week.

Pauline McGowan, from Chesham, was diagnosed with epithelioid
mesothelioma in August 2016 and sadly died on December 10, 2018.

It came after she worked in a factory making parts for airplane
seats in Chesham, which had asbestos in the roofs of all its
buildings.

She worked for Flying Service Engineering and Equipment, based in
Springfield Road for a number of years, saying in a statement read
out to the court by the coroner's officer that the roofs of all six
factory buildings were corrugated asbestos.

In the statement, which she gave in January 2017, she said she also
worked closely with plastic sheets for parts, making sure not even
a speck of dust was left on them to avoid them being rejected under
quality control.

According to the British Lung Foundation's website, the main cause
of mesothelioma is breathing in asbestos dust.

The use of products containing asbestos was banned in the UK in
1999 but Mrs McGowan worked for the factory prior to this, and for
a number of years starting in 2000, when she said the roofs of the
buildings had hugely deteriorated.

The BLF says it is normal for people to get the first symptoms of
mesothelioma 30 to 40 years after they were first exposed to
asbestos.

Mrs McGowan is believed to have undergone treatment for the
condition.

The medical cause of death was found to be epithelioid mesothelioma
and senior coroner Crispin Butler said Mrs McGowan died as a result
of the condition.

The cause of death was recorded as an industrial disease.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Scolds County Over Judge's Asbestos Death
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mesothelioma.net Blog reported that James Farris died of malignant
peritoneal mesothelioma suddenly and without warning. He had been
feeling ill for some time but had not pursued a diagnosis. Then, in
2004 he gave a speech to a gathered group, went home and told his
wife he couldn't continue with his work, went to the hospital and
died nine days later. His illness was only identified upon his
death.  A few months after, his widow filed suit against 39
defendants that provided asbestos to his workplace, as well as
against Jefferson County, Texas, where Farris had served as an
elected judge for nearly 30 years. The courthouse was renovated and
restored through a variety of projects between the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and Mrs. Farris' claim argued that the county was
partially responsible for his exposure and subsequent death. She
won her case against the county, but the county appealed on a
variety of grounds. In ruling against them, the court took pointed
issue with the county's argument.

Judge Calls Defendant's Argument "Irrational"

Though the judges of the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District,
Houston were unified in their position affirming the trial court's
order in the mesothelioma case, Justice Terry Jennings took the
opportunity to take special issue with the county's argument. He
wrote separately to "note the irrationality of the argument of
appellant, Jefferson County, Texas" that the widow had not provided
them of "timely notice." In the county's argument, they had
indicated that the late judge's claim should have been provided
within months of the last date of exposure. The justice noted that
Judge Farris died almost eight years after his last exposure and a
mere nine days after he first began to exhibit symptoms of his
illness.

Widow Faces Same Challenge As Other Mesothelioma Victims
The justice wrote, "Based on Jefferson County's logic, Judge Farris
would have been required to provide it with notice of a premature
and speculative claim." This is frequently an issue for
mesothelioma patients who have been victims of asbestos exposure,
but the situation became even more apparent to the justices when it
was one of their own who was affected.

When a person is exposed to asbestos, they are at risk for
malignant mesothelioma, but there is no way of telling whether they
will actually develop the disease until years and sometimes decades
later. If you or someone you love has been affected by this
difficult illness, contact the Patient Advocates at
Mesothelioma.net at 1-800-692-8608.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Won't Compel Cos. to Pay Deposition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that a California state court has
refused to issue an order compelling defendants to pay costs
related to the depositions of plaintiffs in several asbestos cases,
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to persuade the court
that good cause exists for it to compel the defendant to pay the
court reporter fees and costs sought by the plaintiff.

In the Dec. 20 order, the California Superior Court for San
Francisco County denied the plaintiffs' argument that "trial
preservation deposition" was separate from the discovery portion of
the same deposition of the same individual.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Had 29,089 Pending Claims at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Crane Co. has 29,089 pending asbestos-related claims as of December
31, 2018, according to the Company's Form 8-K filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for January 28, 2019.

The Company states, "Of the 29,089 pending claims as of December
31, 2018, approximately 18,000 claims were pending in New York,
approximately 100 claims were pending in Texas, approximately 400
claims were pending in Mississippi, and approximately 200 claims
were pending in Ohio, all jurisdictions in which legislation or
judicial orders restrict the types of claims that can proceed to
trial on the merits.

"The Company has tried several cases resulting in defense verdicts
by the jury or directed verdicts for the defense by the court.  The
Company further has pursued appeals of certain adverse jury
verdicts that have resulted in reversals in favor of the defense."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/i6Aa39


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Pays $1.3MM Judgment in DeLisle Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
Crane Co. disclosed in its Form 8-K filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for January 28, 2019, that it has paid the
judgment in the Richard DeLisle case on December 28, 2018.

The Company states, "On September 17, 2013, a Fort Lauderdale,
Florida state court jury in the Richard DeLisle claim found the
Company responsible for 16% of an US$8 million verdict.  The trial
court denied all parties' post-trial motions, and entered judgment
against the Company in the amount of US$1.3 million.  The Company
appealed and oral argument on the appeal took place on February 16,
2016.  On September 14, 2016 a panel of the Florida Court of
Appeals reversed and entered judgment in favor of the Company.
Plaintiff filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for rehearing
and/or certification of an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,
which the Court denied on November 9, 2016.  Plaintiffs
subsequently requested review by the Supreme Court of Florida.
Plaintiffs' motion was granted on July 11, 2017.  Oral argument
took place on March 6, 2018.  On October 15, 2018, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed and remanded with instructions to
reinstate the trial court's judgment.  The Company paid the
judgment on December 28, 2018.  That payment is reflected in the
fourth quarter 2018 indemnity amount."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/i6Aa39


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fake Cigarettes Containing Asbestos Discovered
---------------------------------------------------------------
LADbible reported that officials have warned consumers about a
large number of fake cigarettes found in the UK that contain
dangerous substances like arsenic, rat droppings, asbestos and
human faeces.

The illegal cigarette trade is thought to cost the UK more than
GBP2 billion ($2.6bn) each year in unpaid duty. That's before we
get to the fact that it isn't exactly useful for people who are
trying to give up smoking for good.

The Local Government Association (LGA), the organisation
responsible for 370 local councils in England and Wales, wants
courts to impose larger fines on those found guilty of selling
dodgy fags.

In recent times, officials have used sniffer dogs to hunt down
hauls of hooky cigs. They've been found stashed away in all sorts
of places, including inside walls and underneath the floors of
shops, stuck inside boxes of other products, and even inside the
cistern of a toilet.

Yum. Toilet fags that might already contain human poo. How much?

Durham Council has released pictures of some fake cigs. Credit: PA

Simon Blackburn, a representative of the LGA, said: "The sale of
cheap, illegal tobacco is funding organised criminal gangs and
damaging legitimate traders.

"It is also making it easier for young people to get hooked, which
undermines efforts to help people quit.

"Fake cigarettes contain even higher levels of cancer-causing
toxins than standard cigarettes.

"Bigger fines need to be imposed by the courts to deter the sale of
illegal tobacco."

Cigarettes aren't the only fake product causing a bit of trouble at
the minute. In the past few weeks, police have discovered a load of
fake vodka in the Yorkshire city of Hull.

Radanoff vodka is thought to have been made with industrial
strength alcohol that can cause blindness or death if consumed.

The local authority for the city tweeted: "Warning: If you spot
'Radanoff' vodka for sale, do not buy or drink it. Radanoff is a
fake brand seized recently in Hull.

"It could contain industrial alcohol which can cause blindness or
death. If you see Radanoff, contact Trading Standards on 01482 300
300."

The statement continued: "Tests are still to be carried out on the
bottles seized - until those are complete there's no way of knowing
what's in the bottles.

"However, we do know this product has no customs duty stamp and the
barcode doesn't link to a real product."

Fake alcohol is not only dangerous -- in some cases car screenwash
and anti-freeze have been used as ingredients -- it's also costly.
It's thought that alcohol fraud costs the UK GBP1bn ($1.3bn) each
year.

Make sure whatever you're getting is the real deal, guys.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Family Seeks Answer Over Member's Asbestos Death
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Northern Echo reported that the family of a woman who died of
asbestos-related cancer is appealing to her former workmates to
help them get answers on how she was exposed to the material.

Tina Handley, who was from Durham but moved to Northallerton in
2004, died last August a year after she was diagnosed with
mesothelioma– a lung cancer commonly associated with exposure to
asbestos.

The 64-year-old's family has instructed specialist asbestos-related
disease lawyers at Irwin Mitchell’s Newcastle office to
investigate her illness and whether it was related to her work
history.

Solicitors want to know if she was exposed to asbestos during her
time as an office worker for Durham County Council in the late
1990s and early 2000s or as a nurse at Dryburn hospital in the
early 1990s and want to hear from anyone who worked alongside her.

Emma Dumbleton, who is representing Mrs Handley's family, said:
"Just a few months on from Tina's death, her loved ones remain
understandably devastated by their loss.

"The family have a number of questions regarding how she developed
mesothelioma and are keen to get more information on the issues."

Mrs Handley worked as a clerk, typist and personal assistant within
the social services department at Durham County Council between
1998 and 2004, based at County Hall in the city.

She was an auxiliary nurse at Dryburn Hospital in the gynaecology
and ENT departments, between 1992 and 1995.

Her son Toby, 42, said: "It was devastating to see how mesothelioma
affected mum and ultimately led to a major decline in her health.
She was clearly in a lot of pain and it was very hard to see.

"We all loved her so much and are just desperate to get the answers
we feel she deserved regarding her illness. We would be hugely
grateful to anyone who may be able to help us."

Helen Lynch, Durham County Council's head of legal and democratic
services, said: "We are saddened to hear of the passing of Tina
Handley and offer our condolences to Tina’s family.

"Durham County Council is currently engaged in legal proceedings
with regards to this matter and is unable to comment any further at
this stage."

Anyone with information can contact Emma Dumbleton at Irwin
Mitchell's Newcastle office on 0191-2790105 or email
Emma.Dumbleton@IrwinMitchell.com


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fired Worker May Pursue Whistleblower Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg Environment reported that a public employee fired after
he told a supervisor he would report the presence of asbestos in
his workspace may pursue whistleblower claims, a Kentucky appeals
court ruled.

The claims under Kentucky's Whistleblower Act aren't preempted by
the state Occupational Safety and Health Act, which allows only for
reinstatement and back pay, the court said.

Wesley Stover may proceed with claims against the city of
Louisville, Ky., and Jefferson County, Ky., the court said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Denies Claims Rail Asbestos Removal Unsafe
----------------------------------------------------------------
WAtoday reported that FMG has denied claims by the Australian
Manufacturing Workers' Union that workers are being put at risk by
a major project to remove asbestos from thousands of its
China-imported rail carriages.

The mining giant in 2017 discovered the deadly fibre in its rail
carriage friction wear plates and reported the find to Worksafe.

The safety watchdog responded by issuing FMG with an improvement
notice, requiring it remove the asbestos within two years, or by
November 2019.

The Union claims FMG is not doing enough to protect workers from
asbestos found in some of its rail carriages.

It also issued a warning for other businesses that owned or
operated rail carriages purchased between 2007 and 2014 to have
their wear plates tested for asbestos.

"They were thought to be asbestos-free and the wear plates have not
needed replacing since the carriages were acquired," the warning
read.

"Testing by a National Association of Testing Authorities
accredited laboratory in Australia has found that the wear plates
contain chrysotile (white) asbestos."

WA's North West has nearly 80,000 rail carriages, although it is
not clear how many have been impacted by the asbestos discovery.

AMWU assistant state secretary Glenn McLaren inspected FMG's rail
maintenance facility in Thomas Yard, where he claimed asbestos
removal of the rail carriages was taking place.

He said the deadly fibres were not being removed quick enough and
in an unsafe manner, putting workers at risk.

"FMG has disgracefully allowed an untold number of workers over
years to be exposed to asbestos," Mr McLaren said.

“The Union and workers have been raising this issue time and time
again, only for FMG to completely disregard the safety of its
workforce.

“These railcars are still in circulation and are still exposing
workers to asbestos."

However, FMG chief executive Elizabeth Gaines said the safe removal
of the asbestos had become the mining giant's number one priority
since the fibres were first discovered.

"The first wear plate was replaced on 3 October 2018 following an
extensive period of consultation with regulators, our workforce and
the engagement of an expert contractor to complete the work," she
said.

"Since October, 958 of the 3384 cars impacted have had their parts
safely changed.

"We are well on track to meet the WorkSafe improvement notice which
runs until September 2019."

Ms Gaines said the company had engaged an asbestos-certified
contractor to complete the work and had also hired an expert
consultant to independently oversee the project.

“Independent monitoring from the outset identified an extremely
low risk of exposure for employees and periodic monitoring has
continued to reinforce this," she said.

"We will continue this periodic monitoring for at least 12 months
following the completion of the replacement of all parts later this
year.”

Worksafe recommends companies have products independently tested
for asbestos before being shipped to Australia.

Asbestos was banned from use in Australia in 2003.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Settles Asbestos Row Before $81MM Jury Award
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that Honeywell International said it had agreed to
settle claims that its automotive brakes caused a mechanic's fatal
mesothelioma, reaching the deal before an Arkansas federal jury
held the company guilty.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Laborer Blames Asbestos for Cancer
----------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Record reported that a former laborer alleges exposure to
asbestos in Connecticut caused him to develop cancer.

James Coe filed a complaint on Dec. 21 in the St. Louis 22nd
Judicial Circuit Court against CBS Corp., et al. alleging strict
liability, negligence and other counts

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that at various
times during his career beginning in 1959 at locations in
Connecticut, he was exposed to and inhaled or ingested asbestos
fibers emanating from certain products manufactured, sold,
distributed or installed by defendants. The suit states that on or
about Nov. 9, 2017, he first became aware that he developed lung
cancer, an asbestos-induced disease, and that the disease was
wrongfully caused.

The plaintiff holds CBS Corp., et al. responsible because the
defendants allegedly negligently included asbestos fibers in their
products when adequate substitutes were available and failed to
provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning the dangers
of working with or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks actual and
compensatory damages of more than $50,000, plus costs, interest and
all further relief that the court deems just and equitable. He is
represented by Benjamin R. Schmickle and Matthew C. Morris of SWMW
Law LLC in St. Louis.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1822cc11909


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Painter Dies of Asbestos Exposure
---------------------------------------------------------
Lancashire Telegraph reported that a former painter and decorator
died on holiday from a heart attack, with asbestos being a
contributing factor, an inquest heard.

William Frederick Logan, from Loveclough, was taken to the Queen
Elizabeth Hospital in King's Lynn, Norfolk, on August 12, after
suffering with pneumonia.

The inquest heard tests were taken at the hospital and results
showed the 73-year-old had asbestos in his blood. Mr Logan died the
following day.

East Lancashire coroner Richard Taylor said when reading through Mr
Logan's GP statement, there was no mention of heart problems or
knowledge of asbestosis -- the long-term lung condition caused by
prolonged exposure to asbestos.

He said the only mention of asbestos was made the day before he
died.

Mr Logan's wife, Glenice Logan, did not know he was suffering from
the effects of being exposed to asbestos.

She said: "After 11-12pm I never spoke to him again, he was just
confused, this was caused by pneumonia.

"I knew he hadn't had a stroke."

When discussing asbestos, Mrs Logan said: "No one had told us about
the lung disease, I never knew."

Histologist Ray Lonsdale, said Mr Logan had died from an acute
myocardial infarction, commonly known as a heart attack, with
asbestos being a contributing factor.

The inquest heard Mr Logan's job as a painter and decorator
involved working on buildings which contained asbestos, and would
have sanded down door frames and other items that would have
contained the mineral.

Mrs Logan said her husband, who lived on Burnley Road, Loveclough,
was a life-long non smoker.

In his conclusion, Mr Taylor said: "I repeat Dr Lonsdale's
statement, the asbestos is a contributing factor in Mr Logan's
death.

"His exposure to asbestos was during his work life.

"The cause of death was in his heart, but asbestos was a
contributing factor to it.

"William Logan died at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in King's Lynn
on August 13, 2018, from heart problems having been exposed to
asbestos during his working life.

"I offer all my sincere condolences to the family and I thank you
for coming here."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Former Shipyard Workers Get EUR51,000
------------------------------------------------------
MaltaToday reported that the court has awarded 17 former shipyard
workers and their heirs compensation after they were exposed to the
carcinogenic asbestos at their place of work.

The workers, some of whom are now deceased, had sued the Director
General of Public Health, the CEO of the Occupational Health and
Safety Authority and the Attorney General in 2015.

They claimed to have been exposed to the carcinogenic material
without adequate safety precautions being taken, despite it being a
known fact that inhaling asbestos fibres caused cancer.

The First Hall of the Civil Court in its Constitutional
jurisdiction, presided by Madam Justice Anna Felice was asked to
declare that by failing to provide a safe system of work or a safe
working environment, the defendants had committed a breach of their
right to life and private family life and liquidate damages
accordingly.

The defendants had argued that there was no evidence that the
exposure was the sole reason for their health problems.

The court noted that none of the applicants were diagnosed with
cancer, but with other less serious conditions caused by asbestos.

The first law protecting workers was introduced in 2003 although
asbestos had been banned from importation in the 1980s.

The court said that it was convinced on the basis of probability
that the applicants had been exposed to asbestos dust during their
time at the shipyards on the basis of expert testimony and other
court decisions on the matter.

Quoting case law on the subject, the court said the Maltese
government knew or ought to have known of the dangers arising from
exposure to asbestos at least as from the early 1970s.

Although many of the plaintiffs had complained of shortness of
breath they were also advanced in years and none of them had
testified as to how the condition had affected their life, observed
the court.

These factors led the court to arrive at a figure of €3,000 each
as compensation for the suffering caused.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Settles 7 Suits, Claims for $400K
--------------------------------------------------------------
H.B. Fuller Company reported that for the year ended December 1,
2018, seven asbestos-related lawsuits and claims were settled for
US$400,000, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 1, 2018.

The Company states, "We have been named as a defendant in lawsuits
in which plaintiffs have alleged injury due to products containing
asbestos manufactured more than 30 years ago.  The plaintiffs
generally bring these lawsuits against multiple defendants and seek
damages (both actual and punitive) in very large amounts.  In many
cases, plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they have suffered
any compensable injuries or that the injuries suffered were the
result of exposure to products manufactured by us.  We are
typically dismissed as a defendant in such cases without payment.
If the plaintiff presents evidence indicating that compensable
injury occurred as a result of exposure to our products, the case
is generally settled for an amount that reflects the seriousness of
the injury, the length, intensity and character of exposure to
products containing asbestos, the number and solvency of other
defendants in the case, and the jurisdiction in which the case has
been brought.

"A significant portion of the defense costs and settlements in
asbestos-related litigation is paid by third parties, including
indemnification pursuant to the provisions of a 1976 agreement
under which we acquired a business from a third party.  Currently,
this third party is defending and paying settlement amounts, under
a reservation of rights, in most of the asbestos cases tendered to
the third party.  

"In addition to the indemnification arrangements with third
parties, we have insurance policies that generally provide coverage
for asbestos liabilities (including defense costs).  Historically,
insurers have paid a significant portion of our defense costs and
settlements in asbestos-related litigation.  However, certain of
our insurers are insolvent.  We have entered into cost-sharing
agreements with our insurers that provide for the allocation of
defense costs and settlements and judgments in asbestos-related
lawsuits.  These agreements require, among other things, that we
fund a share of settlements and judgments allocable to years in
which the responsible insurer is insolvent.

"We do not believe that it would be meaningful to disclose the
aggregate number of asbestos-related lawsuits filed against us
because relatively few of these lawsuits are known to involve
exposure to asbestos-containing products that we manufactured.
Rather, we believe it is more meaningful to disclose the number of
lawsuits that are settled and result in a payment to the plaintiff.
To the extent we can reasonably estimate the amount of our
probable liabilities for pending asbestos-related claims, we
establish a financial provision and a corresponding receivable for
insurance recoveries.  

"Based on currently available information, we have concluded that
the resolution of any pending matter, including asbestos-related
litigation, individually or in the aggregate, will not have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial
condition or cash flow.  However, adverse developments and/or
periodic settlements could negatively impact the results of
operations or cash flows in one or more future periods."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/FnvSL0


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Mendez Recuses From Houston v. 3M Company
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California recuses himself as the judge for the case
captioned Sherrie Houston, Plaintiff, v. 3M Company, et al.,
Defendants, No. 2:19-cv-157 JAM-DB, (E.D. Cal.). The Clerk of the
Court will reassign the case to another judge for all further
proceedings and will make appropriate adjustment in the assignment
of civil cases to compensate for this reassignment.

A copy of the Recusal Order, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycp98x38 from Leagle.com.

Sherrie Houston, individually and as successor-in-interest to the
Estate of George Houston, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald J.
Shingler -- info@shinglerlaw.com -- Shingler Law.

The Boeing Company, improperly denominated as The Boeing Company,
individually and as successor in interest to McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, individually and as successor in interest to McDonnell
Aircraft Co., the Douglas Aircraft Company and McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Sy, Defendant, represented by Brent Marshall Karren --
bkarren@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP.

Goodrich Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Michael
Glaspy -- dglaspy@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross & Massenburg LLP.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Juni Ruling Dose of Reality to Asbestos Litigation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph A. D'Avanzo and Zachary Levy, writing for Law.com, reported
that In 1965, Ralph Nader's "Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In
Dangers of the American Automobile" was published, raising the
public's conscientiousness of the auto industry's disregard for
safety in favor of profits. The book's title was purposefully
provocative, and its hyperbole was effective in grabbing the
public's attention. But in the world of toxic torts, "unsafe at any
level" is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of liability
in most jurisdictions in the United States. See, e.g., Lawrence G.
Cetrulo, Toxic Tort Litigation Guide Appendix 33-A, Court Decisions
re: "Single Fiber Theory" (November 2018).

While New York also requires some proof of "dose" to bottom an
expert's opinion on causation in toxic tort cases (Parker v. Mobile
Oil, 7 N.Y.3d 434 (2006); Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, 22
N.Y.3d 762 (2014)), until recently, asbestos cases seemed to have
been the exception to this requirement. Lustenring v. AC&S, 13
A.D.3d 69 (1st Dep't 2004), lv. den. 4 N.Y.3d 708 (2005). But this
past November, the New York Court Appeals affirmed the setting
aside of an $11 million verdict in an asbestos case against Ford
Motor Company for, what they said, was insufficient proof of
causation. Matter of NY City Asbestos Litig. (Juni v. A.O. Smith
Water Products), __ N.Y.3d __, 2018 Slip Op 08059 (Nov. 27, 2018).
The court affirmed the First Department's holding that a plaintiff
who seeks damages for contracting mesothelioma based on exposure to
a defendant's asbestos-containing products must satisfy the
standards expressed in Parker v. Mobil Oil and Cornell v. 360 W.
51st St. Realty, by offering evidence that, if it does not provide
an exact mathematical quantification of that exposure, it at least
provides some "scientific expression" (Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 449) of
the level of exposure to toxins in defendant's products that was
sufficient to have caused the disease. In re New York City Asbestos
Litig., 148 A.D.3d 233, 48 N.Y.S.3d 365 (1st Dep't 2017), aff'd sub
nom. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., ____ N.Y.3d ___, 2018
Slip Op 08059 (Nov. 27, 2018). Rejected by the trial court and the
First Department was the plaintiff's attempt to rely upon the
notion that asbestos is "unsafe at any level."

NY's Evolving Position on Requiring Proof of Dose

In what would become a significant precedent in the development of
New York's toxic tort case law, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts held in a benzene exposure case called
Sutera v. The Perrier Group of America, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655 (D.
Mass. 1997) that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to
establish that his exposure (from trace amounts revealed by testing
and prompting an FDA recall) caused his Acute Myeloid Leukemia
(AML).

Sutera offered the expert opinion of an oncologist: that Sutera's
AML was more likely than not caused by benzene exposure based on
the then popular methodology known as the "unsafe at any level" or
the "non-linear threshold" models. As would be summed up by the
Second Department's decision in Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. several
years later: "In layman's terms, this approach, referred to as a
linear non-threshold model, assumes that if a lot of something is
bad for you, a little of the same thing, while perhaps not equally
bad, must be so in some degree. The model rejects the idea that
there might be a threshold at which the neutral or benign effects
of a substance become toxic." Parker v. Mobil Oil, 16 A.D.3d 648,
652 (2d Dept. 2005), aff'd on other grounds, 7 N.Y.3d 434 (2006)
(internal quotes and citations omitted). The District Court Judge
in Massachusetts held that the oncologist's opinion was (following
an analysis under Daubert) inadmissible, concluding that it was not
based on reliable scientific evidence, and generally rejecting the
overall reliability of the "unsafe at any level" model. Sutera, 986
F. Supp. at 662. The Sutera court noted that the plaintiff's
expert's methodology (i.e., unsafe at any level) fails Daubert's
requirement that it be "generally accepted" by the scientific
community and the opinion was based on studies where the victims or
subjects had a significantly higher level of exposure, both in the
dosage level and the duration of exposure, than Sutera did from
drinking Perrier. Id. at 662-63. Therefore, the court found that
there was no support for the notion that the low dose of benzene in
Perrier's water was itself a substantial factor in causing Sutera's
illness. Id. at 662.

The rejection of the "unsafe at any level" model first started to
gain traction in New York courts in the Second Department's
decision in Parker v. Mobil Oil, where the plaintiff alleged he had
contracted AML from exposure (via inhalation and skin contact) to
benzene in gasoline while working as a gas station attendant for
nearly two-decades. Parker, 16 A.D.3d at 648. Relying in part on
Sutera, the Second Department reversed the trial court's denial of
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and held that the
plaintiff had failed to establish causation because his causation
expert's opinion was based on the "unsafe at any level" model.
Notably, Parker's expert never even quantified Parker's level of
exposure to benzene, thus making it impossible to establish that
his level of exposure was a significant cause in developing AML.
Id. at 652. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's
reversal and the exclusion of Parker's expert's opinion, agreeing
that Parker's expert had failed to demonstrate how Parker's
specific exposure caused him to develop AML. It is here where New
York's "scientific expression" standard for toxic tort cases was
born; a plaintiff's expert is not required to pinpoint the
plaintiff's exposure to the toxin with exact precision, "an opinion
on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin,
that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness
(general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient
levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)."
Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 448. Assertions, for example, that the
plaintiff was "frequently exposed to excessive amounts" of the
toxin without more specificity are insufficient to meet this
standard. Id.

The Parker "scientific expression" standard played a key role in
the Court of Appeal's decision in Cornell v. 360 West 51st Street
Realty, where the plaintiff sued her landlord alleging that she
suffered personal injuries from mold exposure in her apartment, and
held that plaintiff's expert's failure to make any effort to
quantify the level of exposure and identify the disease-causing
agent rendered the opinion insufficient on the issue of causation.
Cornell, 22 N.Y.3d at 784-86.

Presenting Exposure in NY Asbestos Cases

Largely due to the fact that mesothelioma is a "signature" injury
of asbestos exposure, asbestos plaintiffs in New York,
historically, had a relatively low burden to establish causation,
and could almost always establish liability, in essence, by
presenting the following: (1) the plaintiff worked on a site where
there were products containing asbestos; (2) the asbestos products
released a cloud of dust when they were manipulated or handled by
the plaintiff or others working close by on the site; and (3) the
plaintiff inhaled the dust. As illustrated by the First
Department's 2004 decision in Lustenring v. AC&S, 13 A.D.3d 69 (1st
Dep't 2004), lv. den., 4 N.Y.3d 708 (2005), affirming a
multi-million dollar jury verdict for two dockworkers who developed
mesothelioma, the court summed up the necessary proof to establish
liability: "both plaintiffs worked all day for long periods in
clouds of dust raised specifically by manipulation and crushing of
defendant's packing and gaskets, which were made with asbestos, and
valid expert testimony indicated that such dust, raised from
asbestos products and not just from industrial air in general,
necessarily contains enough asbestos to cause mesothelioma." Id. at
69. Typically, plaintiff will present the testimony of a qualified
expert who will opine that the presence of visible dust is a
scientifically recognized way of identifying the presence of
air-borne asbestos in amounts generally recognized with the
scientific community as toxic to humans, and that it is the
"cumulative exposure" to asbestos that increases the risk of
contracting mesothelioma. Further demonstrating just how embedded
this formulaic, and very generalized, approach to proving causation
was in New York jurisprudence, the court even denied the
defendants' request for an evidentiary hearing to challenge the
conclusions of the plaintiffs' expert, finding that the defendants'
presentation of alternative ways for the plaintiffs to have
contracted mesothelioma to be of no moment. Id. at 70.

Bringing NY Asbestos Cases in Line With Other Toxic Torts

Judge Jaffe's decision In the Matter of New York City Asbestos
Litigation (Juni), 48 Misc.3d 460 (Sur. Ct., NY County 2015), may
signify a massive shift in what New York courts will require for an
asbestos plaintiff to establish causation. In Juni, the plaintiff
developed, and later died from, mesothelioma as a result from his
exposure to asbestos while working with various brakes, clutches
and gaskets (collectively, brakes or brake products) manufactured
by Ford, over the course of his long career as an auto mechanic.
Id. at 461-62.

In support of their case, the plaintiffs (the decedent's estate and
widow) offered two experts. One expert was charged to establish
general causation (i.e., that the dust from Ford's brake products
contained harmful asbestos), and the other to prove specific
causation (i.e., that the asbestos dust that the plaintiff inhaled
caused him to develop mesothelioma). Id. at 464-68. The trial court
held that both expert opinions, which both generally employed a
variant of the "unsafe at any level" model, were inadmissible, set
aside an $11 million jury verdict in the plaintiffs' favor, and
ultimately ordered that judgment be entered in favor of Ford. Id.
at 491.

Before ruling that the plaintiffs' experts' opinions were
inadmissible, the trial court set forth a detailed history of New
York's case law on toxic tort causation, focusing particularly on
Parker, Cornell, and Lustenring (and its progeny). Judge Jaffe was
quite critical of Lustenring and it progeny, noting that in none of
these cases did the court actually explain its finding that the
plaintiff, through his or her expert, had established causation. In
re: New York City Asbestos Litig., 48 Misc.3d at 478. Ultimately,
the court held that Parker and Cornell, and not Lustenring, are
controlling precedent in deciding whether the opinion of
plaintiffs' experts are sufficient to prove causation as a matter
of law in all toxic tort matters, including asbestos cases. Judge
Jaffe would go on to hold that both plaintiffs' experts failed to
meet this "new" standard.

Starting with the plaintiffs' general causation expert, the court
noted that the studies he relied on merely showed an "association"
between garage mechanics and mesothelioma, and under New York law,
"association" does not equate to "causation." Id. at 482-83.
Likewise, the general causation expert failed to identify a single
study that established that asbestos contained in brake products
can cause mesothelioma. Id. at 484. To the contrary, the expert's
report referenced, and (unsuccessfully) tried to refute, 21 studies
that found that there was no increased risk of developing
mesothelioma from occupational exposure to break products. Id. This
could perhaps be because, as conceded by the expert, "during the
brake manufacturing process, when asbestos fibers are mixed with
certain resins, they become ‘nonrespirable', and the ‘vast
majority' of studies assessing the composition of debris formed
from work on brakes reflects that 99 percent of the asbestos is
converted to a non-toxic substance during the process." Id. at 486.
Due to these deficiencies and others, the trial court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish general causation. Id. at 485.

The plaintiffs' specific causation expert fared no better.
Particularly, the expert failed the "scientific expression" of dose
requirement in Parker. Id. The trial court was also critical of the
fact that the expert did not even analyze the dust that the
plaintiff was said to have inhaled, and therefore was unaware if it
actually contained asbestos or not, and if so, what level. Id. As a
result, not only did the expert fail to quantify the plaintiff's
level of exposure but could not compare the plaintiff's level of
exposure to asbestos to other case studies finding a particular
level of exposure necessary to significantly contribute to the
development of mesothelioma. Id. at 485-86.

Significant to asbestos practitioners is that aspect of Judge
Jaffe's decision that rejects the "cumulative exposure" theory,
which is based on the notion that every single exposure to asbestos
(an established dangerous substance) constitutes a significant
contributing factor to developing disease. Id. at 487-91. Notably,
the court found that such an approach is irreconcilable with the
well-recognized scientific requirement that causation be
established based on consideration of the amount, duration and
frequency of the plaintiff's exposure (i.e., a "dose-response"
relationship). Id. at 487.

The Appellate Division affirmed Judge Jaffe's decision, and further
confirmed that Parker and Cornell are controlling in asbestos
cases. In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Juni), 148 A.D.3d at
235-36. Likewise, the Appellate Division agreed with the rejection
of cumulative exposure theory. Id. at 239. On Nov. 27, 2018, the
New York Court of Appeals, in a 4-1 memorandum opinion, affirmed
the Appellate Division's application of Parker and Cornell to this
asbestos case and agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
their burden of proof for causation. Matter of New York City
Asbestos Litig. (Juni), 2018 Slip Op. 08059 at *1. Chief Judge
DiFiore and Judges Stein, Fahey and Wilson joined the majority's
opinion. Judge Rivera dissented. Judges Garcia and Feinman took no
part. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Wilson commented that
although the proof was "more than sufficient to establish that
[Juni's] exposure to asbestos caused his [mesothelioma] and death,"
plaintiffs did not produce an expert to rebut Ford's argument "that
the physical properties of the asbestos in Ford's friction products
had been so radically altered as to render conventional asbestos
toxicology irrelevant." Id. (Wilson, J., concurring). As such,
Judge Wilson saw this as "simply a gap in proof as to the toxicity
of the products at issue." Id., citing Parker, 7 N.Y.3d at 449-50.
The dissent, by Judge Rivera, stated that it was error for the
trial court to set aside a jury verdict in which it was clear that
the jury did not credit Ford's proof of the inert nature of its
friction products and that Ford failed to meet its burden of
showing that the verdict was "utterly irrational." Id. (Rivera, J.,
dissenting), citing Killon v. Parrotta, 28 N.Y.3d 101, 108 (2016),
quoting Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505, 510 (1994).
Judge Rivera noted with significance that internal Ford documents
revealed that its friction products "overexposed" mechanics to
carcinogenic asbestos fibers and that Ford took steps to protect
its own employees from exposure to dust from these products. Id.
The solo dissent, however, did not carry the day and the trial
court's vacatur of the jury's verdict was left undisturbed.

Conclusion

The opinions in Juni present a sea change in the presentation of
evidence on the issue of causation in New York asbestos cases.
Plaintiffs will need to evaluate their proof on this issue to
ensure that it meets the requirements of Parker and Cornell.
Defendants would do well to learn from Ford's defense team's
presentation of evidence calling into question the actual contents
of the dust allegedly inhaled by the plaintiff or the decedent.
Both sides will need to factor this development into their
evaluation of the defendant's liability exposure and the pros and
cons of resolving the action by settlement or trial.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaercher Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Record reported that a Texas couple alleges the husband
developed lung cancer as a result of exposure to asbestos in the
1960s and 1970s.

Rickey Kaercher and Lillie Kaercher filed a complaint on Jan. 8 in
the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court against Borg-Warner Morse
TEC LLC, et al. alleging negligence and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that at various
times during Rickey Kaercher's career at various locations in
Missouri, Texas and Arkansas, he was exposed to and inhaled or
ingested asbestos fibers emanating from certain products
manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by defendants. The
suit states that on or about Aug. 27, 2017, he first became aware
that he developed lung cancer, an asbestos-induced disease, and
that the disease was wrongfully caused.

The plaintiffs hold Borg-Warner Morse TEC LLC, et al. responsible
because the defendant allegedly negligently included asbestos
fibers in their products when adequate substitutes were available
and failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning
the dangers of working with or around products containing asbestos
fibers.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek compensatory and
punitive damages of no less than $25,000 and all further relief as
the court may deem just and equitable. They are represented by
Wilson D. Sikes of Napoli Shkolnik PLLC in Edwardsville, Illinois.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1922cc00070


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Arrested Over Asbestos Consulate Packages
--------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. News & World Report reported that Australian police arrested a
man after 38 packages allegedly containing asbestos were sent to
foreign consulates in the cities of Melbourne, Canberra and
Sydney.

Savas Avan, 48, was arrested at his home in Shepparton, Victoria
state, and charged with sending dangerous articles to be carried by
a postal service.

He appeared in Melbourne Magistrates Court to face the charge,
which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. Commonwealth
prosecutor Matthew Simpson told the court the deliveries contained
asbestos.

Avan, who was not required to enter a plea, did not apply for bail.
He will appear again on March 4.

Around 10 diplomatic missions, mostly in Melbourne, reported the
delivery of suspicious packages, some of them labelled "asbestos."
The missions included those from the United States, Britain, India,
South Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Switzerland and Greece.

This followed the discovery and removal of a suspicious package at
the Argentinian Consulate in Sydney.

Australian Federal Police and Victoria Police said in a joint
statement they will allege the substance in the packages was
sourced from the man's home.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: March 18 Maremont Plan Confirmation Hearing
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware will hold a hearing on March 18, 2019, at
1:00
p.m. (Prevailing Eastern Time) 5th Floor, Courtroom #5 at 824
North
Market Street in Wilmington, Delaware, to approve the adequacy of
the disclosure statement explaining the pre-packaged Chapter 11
plan of reorganization of Maremont Corporation and its
debtor-affiliates, and confirm the Debtors' pre-package Chapter 11
plan.

Objections, if any, must be filed no later than 4:00 p.m.
(Prevailing Eastern Time) on March 4, 2019.

The centerpiece of the Plan is the creation of the Asbestos
Personal Injury Trust under Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code
and the Asbestos Personal Injury Channeling Injunction that will
channel all Asbestos Personal Injury Claims to the Asbestos
Personal Injury Trust.

The Asbestos Personal Injury Trust will be funded with up to $50
million in cash (consisting of cash held by the Debtors and a
settlement payment).  It is also currently anticipated that
Reorganized  Maremont will own a commercial property worth
approximately $1.4 million.  Additional consideration will be
contributed under the Plan by the Debtors and by Meritor on behalf
of itself and certain other "protected parties" pursuant to the
"restructuring transactions", and the Asbestos Personal Injury
Trust will receive 100% of the new common stock of Reorganized
Maremont.  The assets of the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust will
be
used to resolve all Asbestos Personal Injury Claims in accordance
with the terms of the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust Distribution
Procedures.

Assuming an Initial funding of not less than $58 million, holders
of Asbestos Personal Injury Claims are estimated to have a 29.1
percent recovery under the Plan.  Should the initial funding be
between $58 million and $65 million, the initial payment
percentage
will increase proportionately.  To the extent the Asbestos
Personal
Injury Trust is funded with less than $58 million or more than $65
million the initial payment percentage may be adjusted.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: March 28 Oakfabco Plan Confirmation Hearing
------------------------------------------------------------
The Bankruptcy Court has approved the amended disclosure statement
explaining the Second Amended Plan of Liquidation proposed by
Oakfabco, Inc.

Ballots/Acceptance or Rejection to Plan are due by March 11.
Objections to Confirmation are due by March 13.

The confirmation hearing will be held on March 28, 2019 at 10:30
AM.

Class 4: Asbestos PI Claims are impaired. Class 4 includes
Oakfabco
Asbestos PI Claims, most of which have not been liquidated, as
well
as Indirect Asbestos PI Claims, Derivative  Liability Asbestos PI
Claims and Direct Action Claims. All Asbestos PI Claims will be
liquidated according to the Plan and  Trust Distribution
Procedures.  Holders of Allowed Asbestos PI Claims shall receive a
distribution on their Claims in the amounts to be determined by
the
Liquidating Trust through the application of Trust Distribution
Procedures.

Funding of the Liquidating Trust. On the Effective Date, the
Debtor
will transfer the Trust Assets to the Liquidating Trust. The Trust
Assets shall include, without limitation: Excess Cash; all rights
under Approved Asbestos Insurance Settlement Agreements; the
Asbestos Insurance Rights; and the Qualified Settlement Fund. The
assets in the Liquidating Trust shall be administered for the
benefit of the Holders of Asbestos PI Claims.

The United States Trustee formed an official Committee of Asbestos
Claimants (the "Asbestos Claimants Committee"). The Asbestos
Claimants Committee hired the law firm of Frank Gecker LLP as its
counsel. It also engaged R.M. Fields as its insurance
archeologist,
Colin Gray as its insurance erosion specialist, and Dennis
Connolly
as a testifying expert on insurance  issues. Section 11.5 of the
Plan provides that the Asbestos Claimants Committee shall continue
in existence after the Confirmation Date and until the Effective
Date, with the Debtor to pay the fees and expenses of the Asbestos
Claimants Committee and its counsel through the Effective Date in
such amounts as approved by the Bankruptcy Court. Upon the
Effective Date, the Asbestos Claimants Committee shall be
dissolved, and the members, attorneys, and other Professionals of
that committee shall be released and discharged of and from all
further authority, duties, responsibilities, liabilities and
obligations related to, or arising from, their service on or to
the
Asbestos Claimants Committee in the Chapter 11 Case.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meritor Gains $31MM from Liability Reassessment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc. (NYSE: MTOR) said on Jan. 29, 2019, that it has
recognized US$31 million of income related to re-measuring of the
Maremont asbestos liability to the Maremont prepackaged plan of
reorganization in the first fiscal quarter ended Dec. 31, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Company's press release on its
First-Quarter Fiscal Year 2019 Results is available for free at
https://is.gd/yynbIT


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Meza Claims vs. BASF Catalysts Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Michael W. Fitzgerald of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, having considered the stipulation
between plaintiffs Harold Meza and Barbara Meza and defendant BASF
Catalysts LLC, approves the stipulation and orders that all claims
against defendant BASF Catalysts LLC, are dismissed from the case
styled Harold Meza and Barbara Meza, Plaintiffs, v. 3M Company, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00334-MWF-SK, (C.D. Cal.).

A copy of the Order, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaabv36q
from Leagle.com.

Harold Meza & Barbara Meza, Plaintiffs, represented by Crystal
Gayle Foley -- cfoley@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy LLC,
Brent J. Zadorozny , Simmons Hanly Conroy & Melissa C. Schopfer --
mschopfer@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy.

BASF Corporation, Defendant, represented by Michael Laurence
Mandell -- mmandell@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

The Boeing Company, Defendant, represented by Kristi Leigh Kasey
Young -- kyoung@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross and Massenburg LLP &
Brent Marshall Karren -- bkarren@mgmlaw.com -- Manion Gaynor and
Manning LLP.

Cytec Industries Inc. & Wyeth Holdings Corporation, Defendants,
represented by John R. Lawless, Jr. -- jlawless@kslaw.com -- King
and Spalding LLP, Peter A. Strotz -- pstrotz@kslaw.com -- King and
Spalding LLP & Vincent Frank Tremonti, II -- vtremonti@kslaw.com --
King and Spalding LLP.

The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Defendant, represented by
David M. Uchida -- David.Uchida@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard and Smith LLP & Patrick James Foley --
Patrick.Foley@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and
Smith LLP.

Rohr Inc., doing business as Goodrich Aerospace, Defendant,
represented by David M. Glaspy -- dglaspy@mgmlaw.com -- Manning
Gross and Massenburg LLP.

United Technologies Corporation, Defendant, represented by Justin
E. Garratt -- justin.garratt@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP &
Lance D. Wilson -- lance.wilson@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis
LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Moroun Firm Cited for Asbestos Violations
----------------------------------------------------------
Detroit Free Press reported that a company owned by the family of
shipping magnate Manuel "Matty" Moroun is alleged to have violated
state law and federal standards in how its contractors handled
asbestos-containing materials during ongoing demolition at the
former McLouth Steel site in Trenton, according to the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality.

The DEQ issued a Notice of Violation to Crown Enterprises Inc., a
Warren-based development firm run by Matthew Moroun, son of Matty
Moroun, and to 21st Century Salvage/Next Generation Environmental
Inc., an Ypsilanti-based contractor doing demolition work at the
now Crown-owned McLouth Steel site off West Jefferson Avenue.

The long-standing, chronically problematic brownfield site in
Trenton is being eyed by the Morouns for a new transportation
facility that would fit into the family’s vast shipping and
trucking empire. Among the family's most prominent holdings are the
Ambassador Bridge and, until its sale in June 2018 to Ford Motor
Co. for a new headquarters, the Michigan Central Station.

The DEQ's Air Quality Division, in a Jan. 11 inspection, found
multiple locations at the demolition site where asbestos-containing
products were "friable," or in a dry, crumbling condition, in
violation of both the federal National Emission Standard for
Asbestos and the state Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act, according to the agency's violation notice.

DEQ Air Quality Division analyst Jeremiah Brown, in the violation
notice, notes that when he arrived at the site, he saw contractors
removing galvanized metal siding from a mill building on the
property, covered in an asbestos product, without wetting the
material as required during abatement, causing it to flake and
crumble. A dumpster was also full of friable asbestos, he stated.

Similar problems were found at a former maintenance and spare parts
warehouse on the property.

Breathing asbestos particles, particularly over a long term, can
lead to lung cancer and other lung disorders, according to the
federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

The DEQ is requiring  the companies to respond by Feb. 12 with:

An explanation of the causes and duration of the violations
Whether the violations are ongoing
A summary of the actions that have been taken and are proposed to
correct the violations
The date by which the actions will take place
What steps are being taken to prevent a recurrence
Michael Samhat, president of Crown Enterprises, told the Free Press
that it is not doing the work on-site at McLouth itself, but
through contractors including 21st Century/Next Generation.

"We're very confident in the vendors we picked -- and that was done
with a lot of consultation with the EPA and the DEQ," he said.
"We've worked with this company quite a bit. But this is a large,
very complicated site, with many different conditions."

The contractor, working with Crown's on-site consultants, will
craft a response to the DEQ, Samhat said.

"If it's accurate, it's going to get resolved," he said. "If it's
not accurate, we're going to try to get the differences (between
the companies and regulators) resolved."

A message left with 21st Century/Next Generation's offices was not
returned Thursday.

Wendy Pate lives about a block from the McLouth site.

She said residents had put their trust in 21st Century/Next
Generation and she was "very disappointed that they have already
been cited for a violation within a few weeks of working at the
site."

She said the contractor should "stop immediately, reassess how they
are handling materials at the site, if it's being done properly,
and if it's not, what they can do to fix this."

Lawmakers also responded to the news.

"As the McLouth Steel project proceeds, ensuring Downriver
residents are safe will always be our No. 1 priority," said U.S.
Rep. Debbie Dingell, D-Dearborn,

"Although these reports of increased asbestos levels are deeply
disturbing, the system worked -- MDEQ was on-site even though the
EPA is shut down. As soon as asbestos was found, immediate steps
were taken to correct the problem and a violation notice was
issued."

State Rep. Darrin Camilleri, D-Brownstown Township, said a proper
cleanup of the McLouth site "is critical to the public health of
our community."

“While it’s deeply frustrating that problems are arising so
quickly in this demolition process, I’m glad the MDEQ inspected
the site and sounded the alarm," he said. "I will continue to
monitor the situation closely to ensure that these companies are
held liable for any damages to our community."

Michigan asbestos laws are clear, said state Sen. Stephanie Chang,
D-Detroit.

"There’s no excuse to expose employees and Downriver residents to
this toxic substance, not to mention potentially contaminating the
Detroit River,” she said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Law Gives EPA Power to Ban Asbestos
--------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Working Group reported that concern among members of
Congress over the Trump administration's implementation of the
updated federal chemicals law burst across the aisle this week,
with both the top Republican and Democrat on a key House
environment subcommittee calling for oversight hearings.

Rep. Paul Tonko, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee's Subcommittee on the Environment and Climate Change, and
Rep. John Shimkus, R-Ill., the ranking Republican on the panel,
plan to hold an oversight hearing to get answers from the
Environmental Protection Agency about how it's executing the
agency's beefed-up authority to protect the public from toxic
chemicals.

Anthony Adragna of Politico Pro reported this week that Tonko and
Shimkus are eager to get answers from the EPA about how it is
protecting public health from dangerous chemicals.

"The spirit and letter of those reforms should be implemented to
the nth degree," Tonko said. "I agree with former Chairman Shimkus
that we need to do oversight and we need to revisit how it's being
implemented."

"I think now it's time to have an oversight hearing to see where
they're at and get some real numbers," Shimkus said. "How many new
chemicals do we have and how many do we have a decision on."

"We applaud this bipartisan call for oversight," said EWG Senior
Vice President for Government Affairs Scott Faber. "There is ample
evidence showing that the Trump EPA is cooking the books to allow
some of the most hazardous chemicals in existence to remain in use,
putting millions of people at further risk of exposure."

In 2016, Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act, which amended the woefully
weak Toxic Substances Control Act. The new law gives the EPA power
to finally ban asbestos and other dangerous chemicals.

Since the Trump administration came to power, a number of troubling
decisions by former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt and current
Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler show an agency bending both the
spirit and letter of the new chemicals law to benefit the chemical
industry.

Among the most egregious actions is the EPA's decision to ignore
the many ways that people are exposed to chemicals that put
vulnerable populations, such as young children and communities near
factories, at even greater risk.

The new law requires the EPA to consider all uses of a chemical
when evaluating it for safety. Despite this clear directive,
Wheeler is ignoring key exposures to asbestos in the agency's
safety assessment, likely in violation of the law.

Wheeler appears to be laying the groundwork for the agency to find
that asbestos is safe and should remain legal. Other chemicals the
EPA is dragging its feet to restrict or ban include the lethal
paint-stripping chemical methylene chloride and the notorious
industrial solvent trichloroethylene, or TCE.

Under the Trump administration, the EPA is retreating from an
earlier proposal to ban key uses of TCE, and it is excluding water,
air and soil pollution from a safety assessment under the new
chemicals law.

"The mission of the EPA is to protect human health and the
environment, not the profits of the chemical industry," Faber
added. "There are a lot of questions about how the EPA is
implementing the chemicals law, and Chairman Tonko and Ranking
Member Shimkus deserve answers on behalf of all Americans."

The Environmental Working Group is a nonprofit, non-partisan
organization that empowers people to live healthier lives in a
healthier environment. Through research, advocacy and unique
education tools, EWG drives consumer choice and civic action.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Talc-Asbestos Lawsuit Goes to Trial
--------------------------------------------------------
Citizen Truth reported that the first of dozens of lawsuits last
scheduled for 2019 over the presence of talc in Johnson & Johnson
baby powder began.

Opening statements began in a lawsuit claiming that Johnson &
Johnson's (J&J) talc baby powder causes cancer. The jury heard in
opening statements arguments over whether J&J's talc products
contain asbestos and the company knew it could cause cancer in
users.

About 11,700 lawsuits have been filed against the company over
allegations that its baby powder causes cancer. The lawsuits link
J&J's baby powder to ovarian cancer, lung cancer and mesothelioma.

The latest lawsuit was filed Terry Leavitt, who is represented by
Joseph Satterley, who alongside other lawyers won a $117 million
compensation verdict in April 2018 for a man who claimed his
mesothelioma was caused by J&J's talc products. That ruling is
under appeal.

Leavitt's lawsuit was filed at the Alameda Superior Court in
Oakland, where Satterley argued in his opening statements that J&J
intentionally marketed contaminated baby powder knowing fully well
it caused cancer.

J&J Admits Talc Mined In Its Korean Mine Contained Asbestos That
Were Harmless

Diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2017, Leavitt claimed her parents
applied J&J talc powders on her during her early years in the
Philippines where she was born. She claims the product they used
was manufactured with talc mined from South Korea. Leavitt's
parents moved back to the United States in 1968.

Satterley argued in court that independent investigations showed
that Korean talc mined in the 1960s and 1970s tested positive for
asbestos, just like talc mined in the U.S. within the same period.
But J&J countered in court filings that fibers found in the Korean
talc mined at this period were not asbestos and cannot be
classified as such since their experts ruled they were harmless.

Geologists agree that it is possible for cancer-causing asbestos
and harmless asbestos known as “non-asbestiform” rock to occur
together within the same talc deposits.

J&J's Shares Fell Following a Damning Report of Concealing Asbestos
Information

Joined as a co-defendant in the lawsuit is Imerys Talc America, an
affiliate of French Imerys SA. Representatives for Imerys denied
that their talc contained asbestos, caused cancers, or was
responsible for Leavitt's ailment.

J&J claims that over several decades rigorous tests had been
carried out on their talc and no asbestos contamination had ever
been caused. Both J&J and Imerys maintained that numerous studies
vindicate their products as safe and uncapable of causing cancer.

However, Leavitt's lawsuit is the first to come after a Reuters
special report published in December 2018 revealed numerous J&J
internal documents from the 1970s to early 2000s which seemed to
show that the company was aware its talc contained asbestos but
deliberately hid this fact from the public.

Following the December report, J&J's stocks dropped significantly.
The prospect of courts awarding several millions of dollars against
the company in future talc cases worried investors, so many sold
off their stakes. Last Monday, the company's shares closed at $127
-- 14% lower than what its value on December 13.

Of the 11 cases so far against J&J alleging their products
contained asbestos, three have resulted in wins for the plaintiffs
and three have been ruled in J&J's favor. The other five cases
resulted in hung juries. Of the three cases ruled against J&J
damages were awarded as high as $4.69 billion, which came in a July
2018 ovarian cancer verdict brought by multiple plaintiffs. J&J has
appealed all of the rulings against them.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY Court Hears Arguments in M. South Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law.com reported that the New York Court of Appeals heard arguments
about whether a decades-old settlement release signed by an
individual can be enforced to prohibit that person from bringing a
second lawsuit against the company after he developed
mesothelioma.

The court will be tasked with deciding whether a section of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act nullifies a settlement release
signed by the plaintiff nearly 20 years ago, which would allow him
to sue the company a second time over claims of injury resulting
from asbestos exposure.

The employee, Mason South, sued Texaco in 2014 after he developed
mesothelioma that was allegedly caused by his exposure to asbestos
while he served as a seaman in the Merchant Marine for nearly four
decades. South died of his mesothelioma in 2015 and his wife was
substituted as the plaintiff in the case.

It's the second time South had been involved in litigation against
the company. He was first part of a group of more than 100
defendants who sued Texaco in federal court in the 1990s for
damages that allegedly resulted from their exposure to asbestos and
second-hand smoke on merchant ships. South was suing over a
pulmonary injury at the time.

Texaco settled that case with South and the other defendants, who
also signed a release as part of the settlement. According to
Texaco, part of the release included an acknowledgement from South
that he "understands that the long term effects of exposure to
asbestos . . . may result in obtaining a new and different
diagnosis from the diagnosis as of the date of this release."

The release also said South was "giving up the right to bring an
action against [Texaco] in the future for any new or different
diagnosis" related to asbestos exposure, according to the company.
Texaco was represented before the Court of Appeals by Meir Feder, a
partner at Jones Day in Manhattan.

"The decision below should be reversed because the release here was
a straightforward settlement of Mr. South's asbestos claims that
he'd asserted in a lawsuit," Feder said.

But even though the release appeared to prohibit South from
bringing litigation based on a future diagnosis, his attorneys
argue that the agreement is unenforceable under federal law. Louis
Bograd, a member at Motley Rice in Washington, D.C., said a section
of FELA prohibits contracts that would exempt a company from
liability before an injury is known. South was not diagnosed with
mesothelioma until more than a decade after the first settlement.

Bograd also argued that, outside of FELA, the release itself
shouldn't preclude South from suing over the newly diagnosed
mesothelioma.

"There's also the facts of this release, which never mentions
cancer and never mentions mesothelioma," Bograd said. "This is a
boilerplate release that Texaco put forward in the case. Texaco
said, 'Well, as long as we're settling that case, why don't we also
exempt ourselves from any potential future liability?'"

Feder, meanwhile, argued that the release was valid regardless of
FELA. He said the language of the agreement was clear that Texaco
intended to exclude itself from future liability claims brought by
South based on the same alleged conduct.

"When you have a less serious injury based on tortious conduct, you
can still settle anything arising out of that conduct, including
future, more serious injury," Feder said.

The lower courts have sided with South in the case. Manhattan
Supreme Court Justice Peter Moulton said FELA barred Texaco from
enforcing the settlement release and that federal court precedent
prevented such an agreement from exempting liability for future,
unknown risks.

Moulton, in his decision said Texaco "offered no proof . . . that
Mason South intended to release a future claim for mesothelioma."

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed that decision
last year, saying that at the time of the settlement, there was no
way to know whether South would develop mesothelioma and that, as a
result, the release wasn't enforceable under FELA.

"Rather, the lack of an actual diagnosis reveals the language in
the release as mere boilerplate, and not the result of an agreement
the parameters of which had been specifically negotiated and
understood by South," the panel wrote.

A decision in the case is expected to be handed down in February.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Orleans Man Facing Charges for Dumping Asbestos
----------------------------------------------------------------
13WHAM-TV reported that an Orleans County man is facing charges
after allegedly dumping asbestos-laden materials in a wildlife
management area.

Carl Rivers, 49, of Albion, faces up to four years in prison if
convicted. He’s facing charges of endangering public health,
safety or the environment and a violation charge of unlawfully
disposing of waste.

Rivers allegedly dumped the materials in the Tonawanda Wildlife
Management Area on Alabama.

The charges come after a months-long investigation by DEC
officials.

In addition to prison time, Rivers could face a fine of up to
$150,000 if convicted of the endangering charge. He is due back in
court in March.

A contractor was hired by DEC Spills Unit to clean up the
materials.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pa. Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Youse Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that a Pennsylvania federal court
has retained jurisdiction over an asbestos cosmetic talcum powder
lawsuit, rejecting the plaintiff's position that Wal-Mart is a
Pennsylvania corporation for complete diversity purposes.

In the same Jan. 16 opinion, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Imerys Talc America's
motion to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds, concluding that
registration to do business in the state is sufficient to create
general personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Carrie Youse contended that she was diagnosed with
papillary mesothelioma as a result of exposure to
asbestos-containing products, including cosmetic talcum powder
products.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pathologist Testifies in Asbestos Talc Trial
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that a pathologist fielded questions in a
California courtroom from jurors considering whether Johnson &
Johnson baby powder contained asbestos that caused a dying woman's
cancer.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pinjarra Refinery Exposure Probe Continues
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mandurah Mail reported that nearly nine months on, workers
allegedly exposed to asbestos at Alcoa's Pinjarra refinery still
don’t have answers from a Department of Mines, Industry
Regulation and Safety investigation.

On Monday, the department told the Mandurah Mail officers still had
not finalised their probe into the incident that occurred on the
evening of May 3, 2018.

At the time, it is understood several workers were in the
refinery's powerhouse to remove lagging.

The lagging, which contained asbestos, was removed within an area
that allegedly provided no protection from the potentially lethal
fibres.

Alcoa closed the powerhouse and notified the department of the
incident that night.

According to the department, the alleged exposure was isolated to
one building, which meant the rest of the refinery could continue
to operate as normal.

Department investigation officers attended the site the following
day.

After a preliminary technical analysis was undertaken by the
officers, the powerhouse was released for work to continue.

There have been seven instances of potential contamination reported
to the [DMIRS] in the past 12 months from the Peel region.

Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety mines safety
director Andrew Chaplyn
An Alcoa spokeswoman said the results of all air monitoring
undertaken shortly after the incident were within the Safe Work
Australia workplace exposure standards.

She also told the Mail the company had not received any follow-up
investigation reports issued by the department.

The department’s mines safety director Andrew Chaplyn told the
Mail the specific details from the investigation couldn't be
publicly released.

He did reveal, however, that the incident wasn't an isolated case
in the region.

"There have been seven instances of potential contamination
reported to the Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety
(DMIRS) in the past 12 months from the Peel region," he told the
Mail.

"Following these reports, the department has conducted inspections
and taken appropriate enforcement measures to address safety
concerns and protect workers."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rector Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------
Inside INdiana Business reported that a husband and wife are suing
dozens of companies, alleging failure to warn and negligence in the
use of asbestos products caused the husband's lung cancer.

Ronald Rector and Christine Rector filed a complaint Dec. 18 in St.
Clair County Circuit Court against the multiple defendants,
alleging failure to exercise reasonable care and caution for the
safety of others.

According to the complaint, at various times during Ronald Rector's
work, beginning in 1965, he was exposed to and inhaled or ingested
asbestos fibers emanating from certain products manufactured, sold,
distributed or installed by defendants. On July 23, 2016, the suit
says, Rector first became aware that he had developed lung cancer,
an asbestos-induced disease, and that the disease was wrongfully
caused.

Christine Rector says she has been deprived of her husband's
consortium, society and services.

The plaintiffs allege the defendants negligently included asbestos
fibers in their products when adequate substitutes were available
and that they failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions
concerning the dangers of working with or around products
containing asbestos fibers.

The Rectors seek trial by jury, actual compensatory damages of not
less than $50,000 and all further just and equitable relief. They
are represented by attorney Randy L. Gori of Gori, Julian &
Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court Case number 18-L-812


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Renovation Firm Fined for Asbestos Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Business Insurance reported that charges of improper and unsafe
handling of asbestos at a home being renovated in Seattle have
resulted in $789,200 fines for two business owners and their
companies, the Washington Department of Labor & Industries
announced Wednesday.

The businesses and owners -- James Thorpe, of Seattle-based 3917
Densmore LLC, registered by Northlake Capital & Development LLC,
and Chris Walters -- have each been cited for 11 willful and
serious violations in four separate investigations, according to a
statement.

L&I opened the inspection following a complaint from a neighbor
living near the residential renovation project on Densmore Road in
Lynnwood, Washington, according to the statement. Several workers
were improperly removing exterior asbestos tiles from the home over
a weekend. When a neighbor confronted him, Mr. Walters said he was
the homeowner and promised to remove the asbestos correctly.
However, two neighbors took videos that showed the workers
committing several violations, according to the statement.

An investigation by L&I revealed that Mr. Walters was part of a
complex corporate partnership created to renovate and flip the
residence, according to the statement.

The home was initially purchased by Seattle company Northlake
Capital & Development, owned by Mr. Thorpe. Northlake is a real
estate property company that primarily focuses on buying old homes,
renovating them and selling for a profit. After the purchase, Mr.
Thorpe created 3917 Densmore LLC and established Mr. Walters, a
Northlake employee, as the sole member of the new corporation,
claiming that Mr. Walters was the homeowner, and that he intended
to live in the home, according to the statement.

During parts of the investigation, Mr. Walters and Mr. Thorpe
shifted responsibility from LLC to LLC and from person to person.
Eventually, L&I cited both men and the companies they oversee for
the same violations. The fines vary, primarily due to the number of
workers each entity was responsible for. Mr. Thorpe and Northlake
each received $214,100 in fines, and Mr. Walters and 3917 Densmore
each received $180,500 in fines, according to the statement.

The violations included using uncertified workers to remove
asbestos, not using a certified asbestos supervisor and not
obtaining an asbestos good faith survey prior to beginning work.
They were also cited for not using water and not keeping the
shingles intact during removal (the workers were breaking the tiles
with hammers), for lacking proper personal protective equipment for
workers, for not monitoring the air during removal and for not
having a written accident prevention program, according to the
statement.

"These two men endangered their workers and people who live nearby
this project, including children," Anne Soiza, L&I’s assistant
director for the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, said
in the statement. "On top of that, they tried to avoid
responsibility by creating a legal web of confusion over who was
responsible. I hope this sends a strong message that we take worker
safety and public health very seriously."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: RFPC's Parent Company Defends Claims at Jan. 25
----------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Systems Holdings Inc. disclosed in its Form S-1
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Jan. 25,
2019, that it defends itself against asbestos-related claims in the
U.S.

The Company states, "Claims have been filed against the Company and
certain of its affiliates in various jurisdictions across the
United States by persons alleging bodily injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing products.  Most of these claims
have been made against our wholly owned subsidiary, Railroad
Friction Products Corporation (RFPC), and are based on a product
sold by RFPC prior to the time that the Company acquired any
interest in RFPC.

"Most of these claims, including all of the RFPC claims, are
submitted to insurance carriers for defense and indemnity or to
non-affiliated companies that retain the liabilities for the
asbestos-containing products at issue.  We cannot, however, assure
that all these claims will be fully covered by insurance or that
the indemnitors or insurers will remain financially viable.  Our
ultimate legal and financial liability with respect to these
claims, as is the case with most other pending litigation, cannot
be estimated."

A full-text copy of the Form S-1 is available at
https://is.gd/3X7Gcs


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Senators Ask Asbestos Info From Talc Firm CEO
--------------------------------------------------------------
FiercePharma reported that Johnson & Johnson has been battling
lawsuits and damaging headlines linking its talc powder to cancer
-- and claiming it hid evidence of asbestos in the product -- and
now it'll have to answer a prominent senator's questions, too.

In a letter to J&J CEO Alex Gorsky, Sen. Patty Murray, ranking
member of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions, said she's "troubled" by recent developments, including a
report in Reuters that J&J covered up asbestos in its talc for
decades.

In the letter (PDF), Sen. Murray requested documentation from J&J
about past asbestos testing and for decades of communication with
the FDA about the product and its safety. The iconic baby powder
has come under fire in recent years as thousands of plaintiffs have
claimed the product causes cancer, but J&J has denied any link.

Biopharma is a fast-growing world where big ideas come along daily.
Our subscribers rely on FiercePharma as their must-read source for
the latest news, analysis and data on drugs and the companies that
make them. Sign up today to get pharma news and updates delivered
to your inbox and read on the go.

In December, Reuters reported that J&J hid details about asbestos
in its talc for decades. After the report, J&J’s share prices
fell more than 10%, and the stock hasn’t fully recovered. But J&J
has denied that its product is unsafe, and after the Reuters
report, Gorsky went on video to reassure consumers about the
product.

RELATED: J&J stock tumbles after Reuters reports it hid asbestos in
talc

"For over 100 years, Johnson & Johnson has known that the talc in
our baby powder is the purest, safest pharmaceutical-grade talc on
earth," the CEO said.

"Very importantly, if we believed our products were unsafe, they
would be off the shelves and out of the market immediately," Gorsky
added. "Thousands of tests by global authorities, universities and
independent experts repeatedly confirm our talc is safe."

Murray apparently isn't fully convinced. She asked Gorsky to hand
over certain documents to "understand more about efforts by Johnson
& Johnson to determine whether there were possible carcinogens in
its baby power and how it presented that information to regulators
and consumers."

Documents have shown that J&J debated internally about talc purity,
and some talc tests turned up with asbestos in years past, Murray
wrote. Still, it's "unclear whether the company disclosed to the
FDA that some of its tested samples contained contaminants."

The senator pointed out that J&J has edited some materials to
indicate that its talc may not have always been asbestos-free.
Murray wants J&J to respond by Feb. 11 to show how it can say its
talc is now asbestos-free and why it can’t say that was always
the case. She also has demanded all of the company's communications
with the FDA on the subject -- dating back to 1966 -- plus
promotional materials for the product and documentation to back up
the safety claims in promo materials.

A J&J spokeswoman said the company stands behind talc safety and
looks forward to responding to the letter.

Sen. Murray's interest is just another challenge for J&J as it
fends off thousands of lawsuits claiming talc caused cancer.
Already, J&J has suffered losses in court worth hundreds of
millions of dollars, but it's been able to have verdicts reversed
in many cases. In the costliest loss to date, a jury in July
ordered the drugmaker to pay $4.7 billion after a trial that
combined the claims of 22 plaintiffs. The company said it would
appeal and that it was confident it could get the verdict
overturned.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Son Sues Ameron Over Father's Death
----------------------------------------------------
Madison County Record reported that a deceased man's son is suing
Ameron International Corporation and other asbestos products
manufacturers, citing alleged failure to warn and negligence.

Michael Farrell, individually and as special representative of the
estate of David Farrell, deceased, filed a complaint on Jan. 9 in
the St. Clair County Circuit Court against the defendants alleging
that they failed to exercise reasonable care and caution for the
safety of others.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that at various
times during David Farrell's work between 1958 and 2000, he was
exposed to and inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers emanating from
certain products manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by
the defendants. On or about Sept. 9, 2016, he first became aware
that he developed lung cancer, an asbestos-induced disease, and
that the disease was wrongfully caused. He died on Jan. 10, 2017.

The plaintiff holds Ameron International Corporation and other
defendants responsible because they allegedly negligently included
asbestos fibers in their products when adequate substitutes were
available and failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions
concerning the dangers of working with or around products
containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks compensatory and
economic damages of more than $50,000 and all further relief as the
court deems just and equitable. He is represented by Randy L. Gori
of Gori, Julian & Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 19-L-0027


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Wash. Landslide Eroding Natural Asbestos Deposit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Asbestos.com reported that Swift Creek flows down Sumas Mountain
and feeds the Sumas River in Whatcom County, Washington, near the
Canadian border.

An active landslide is eroding a natural asbestos deposit in the
mountain, sending the toxic mineral through Swift Creek and far
downstream.

The creek carries the most common type of asbestos -- chrysotile.

Also known as white asbestos, chrysotile was once a common
ingredient in construction materials and machine parts. Its
cancer-causing effects became public knowledge in the late 1960s.

Though it is used much less in manufacturing now, asbestos can
still be found abundantly in natural land formations.

Asbestos fibers are lighter than most of the other minerals that
make up Swift Creek's sediment. While sand and gravel settle along
the creek bed quickly, chrysotile stays suspended in the water for
a long time. This allows it to travel for miles along the Sumas and
eventually across the border into Canada.

For more than a decade, local residents have grappled with the
risks that come with the white mud of their river.

Naturally Occurring Asbestos in Swift Creek

The landslide on Sumas Mountain has been active since the 1930s,
but it wasn't until 2006 that health officials realized there was
asbestos in the creek sediment.

Every year, local governments dredge the creek to prevent flooding
during the wet season. The dredge spoils -- made of crumbled rocks
and sediment from the creek bed -- used to be left in piles beside
the creek.

The banks of Swift Creek are a popular area for horseback riding
and dirt biking, and locals often hauled the dredge spoils away to
fill in their yards and driveways.

But since officials discovered the dredge spoils contain up to 4
percent asbestos, they have been buried at a local landfill.
Dredging workers must wear proper safety gear in accordance with
asbestos-disposal regulations.

2009 Sumas River Flood Contamination

At first, most locals shrugged off the traces of naturally
occurring asbestos in Swift Creek. But then unusually wet weather
in January 2009 brought the risks of asbestos exposure right to
their doorsteps.

Flood water flowed into the yards and basements of people living
all along the Sumas River. When the water receded, residents found
their land caked with white-colored mud.

Unfortunately, officials from the Environmental Protection Agency
did not come to analyze the sediment until months later. By that
time, residents had already cleaned up their properties as best
they could.

Laboratory tests revealed many of the locals had been handling soil
that was up to 27 percent asbestos.

Working with loose asbestos fibers at that concentration is like
working with the asbestos insulation products that were popular in
the 1950s.

Asbestos is most dangerous when it gets into the air as dust.
Microscopic asbestos fibers have no scent and cause no immediate
symptoms when you inhale them.

But when they accumulate in your lungs, it increases your risk of
developing deadly diseases much later in life.

Asbestos is the primary cause in about 6,000 American cases of lung
cancer each year. Mesothelioma, a rare cancer caused almost
exclusively from asbestos exposure, kills about 2,500 Americans
each year.

People living near the Sumas River took the news of the asbestos
contamination in a variety of ways.

Some residents brushed it off, insisting asbestos is not dangerous
once it is buried beneath a layer of clean soil. Others left the
area completely, even when it meant surrendering their homes to
foreclosure.

Local officials have had to walk a fine line: They want residents
to take the risks seriously, but they do not want land values to
fall any more than they already have. The asbestos contamination
has diminished economic development in the region.

Exposure Risks in Both Wet and Dry Weather

While flood waters can bring asbestos onto people's properties,
periods of drought can help that asbestos go airborne by drying the
land out.

Whatcom County officials post advisories about asbestos when there
is low water flow in Swift Creek and the Sumas River.

Dusty conditions raise the risk of asbestos exposure for farm
workers in areas that have been flooded. Some locals have also been
known to take off-road vehicles into the Swift Creek bed when it
dries out, kicking up asbestos-laden dirt in the process.

So far, health officials have not noted an elevated rate of lung
diseases in Whatcom County.

In 2016, however, the U.S. Geological Survey released a study
confirming that sediment carried by the Sumas River can be up to 37
percent asbestos.

Since asbestos-related diseases can take between 20 and 50 years to
develop, time will tell just how dangerous the river of chrysotile
is for residents of Whatcom County.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Widow's Asbestos Suit Remains in Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that a Rhode Island woman's decadelong fight
against CBS, among other companies, over her husband's death from
an asbestos-related illness belongs in federal court, a district
judge ruled, denying her request to remand her lawsuit to the state
court.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Willful Asbestos Violations Results in $800K Fines
-------------------------------------------------------------------
WorkersCompensation.com reported that improper and unsafe handling
of asbestos at a Seattle area home-flipping site put workers and
neighbors at risk, and has left two business owners and their
companies facing numerous citations and hundreds of thousands of
dollars in fines from the Department of Labor & Industries (L&I).

James Thorpe, Northlake Capital & Development, 3917 Densmore LLC,
and Chris Walters have each been cited for 11 willful and serious
violations. In total, the fines for the four separate
investigations add up to $789,200.

"These two men endangered their workers and people who live nearby
this project, including children" said Anne Soiza, L&I's assistant
director for the Division of Occupational Safety and Health. "On
top of that, they tried to avoid responsibility by creating a legal
web of confusion over who was responsible. I hope this sends a
strong message that we take worker safety and public health very
seriously."

L&I opened the inspection following a complaint from an alert
neighbor living near the residential renovation project on Densmore
Road in Lynnwood. Several workers were improperly removing exterior
asbestos tiles from the home over a weekend. When two neighbors
confronted Chris Walters, the man who said he was the homeowner,
Walters promised to remove the asbestos correctly. However, the
neighbors took videos that showed the workers committing several
violations.

An extensive investigation by L&I revealed that Walters was
actually part of a complex corporate partnership created to
renovate and flip the residence.

The home was initially purchased by Seattle company Northlake
Capital & Development, owned by James Thorpe. Northlake is a real
property company that primarily focuses on house flipping. After
the purchase, Thorpe created 3917 Densmore LLC and established
Walters, a Northlake employee, as the sole member of the new
corporation, claiming that Walters was the homeowner, and that he
intended to live in the home.

During the investigation neither Walters nor Thorpe accepted
responsibility for the violations as they shifted responsibility
from LLC to LLC and from person to person. Eventually, L&I cited
both men and the companies they oversee for the same violations.
The fines vary, primarily due to the number of workers each entity
was responsible for. Thorpe and Northlake each received $214,100 in
fines and Walters and 3917 Densmore each receive $180,500.

The violations included using uncertified workers to remove
asbestos; not using a certified asbestos supervisor; and not
obtaining an asbestos good faith survey prior to beginning work.
They were also cited for not using water and not keeping the
shingles intact during removal (the workers were breaking the tiles
with hammers); for the lack of proper personal protective equipment
for workers; not monitoring the air during removal; and for not
having a written accident prevention program.

Asbestos is extremely hazardous and can cause potentially fatal
diseases like asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung cancer. Only a
certified abatement contractor that follows the specific asbestos
related safety and health rules may remove and dispose of
asbestos-containing building materials.

An employer has 15 business days from the time a citation is
received to appeal, and each of these citations is currently under
appeal.

Penalty money paid as a result of a citation is placed in the
workers' compensation supplemental pension fund, helping injured
workers and families of those who have died on the job.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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