CAR_Public/190220.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, February 20, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 37

                            Headlines

3M CO: Class Action Plaintiffs May Increase to Hundreds
ACTAVIS LLC: Kentucky River Files RICO Class Action in N.D. Ohio
ALLSTATE CORP: Court Answers Corbin Certified Questions in Negative
AMAZON.COM.KSDC LLC: Final Approval of Christeson Deal Overruled
AMERICAN EAGLE: Denial of Judgment on Pleadings in Bedoya Affirmed

AMERICAN FAMILY: 6th Cir. Flips Judgment in Jammal ERISA Suit
APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Class Certification Bid in Shasta Suit Denied
BANK OF AMERICA: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Culpepper
BAVARIA INN: Court to Review Sever Provisions Ruling in Mantooth
BLACKHAWK MANAGER: Certification of Class Sought in Shao Suit

BOB EVANS RESTAURANTS: Williams Seeks to Certify Class Under FLSA
BYD COACH AND BUS: Montano Hits Missed Breaks, Claims Overtime
CALIFORNIA CHECK: Summary Judgment in Gilberg Suit Partly Affirmed
CAPITAL ONE: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brown Suit
CBRE GROUP: Quinn Seeks Overtime Pay for Integration Managers

CELL FIX: Lawshe Files Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing
CENER LINE, MI: Halpern 2012 Seeks to Certify Class
CHARTER NEX: Miller Moves to Certify 2 Workers Classes Under FLSA
CHERNE CONTRACTING: Court Narrows Claims in Parker Labor Suit
CHINA TECHFAITH: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action

CIT BANK: Must Face Force-Placed Insurance Class Action
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD FIREFIGHTERS: Chard Files Civil Rights Class Suit
COMBE INC: Just for Men Products Class Action Fails to Settle
CONAGRA FOODS: Allen Parties Directed to File New Class Cert. Bid
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Court OKs Dismissal of Flushable Wipes Suit

COVERALL NORTH: Bille Labor Suit Hits Misclassification
CREDIT SUISSE: Rubinstein Says Financial Report Misleading
CRETE CARRIER: Gonzalez Suit Moved to Western Dist. of Washington
D & J MOVING: Kelly Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
DIRECTV: Settlement in Jantos Suit Has Preliminary Approval

DUCKY JOHNSON: Shortchanges Nurse Aide's Overtime Pay, Says Suit
ECO SHIELD: Fanslau Moves to Certify Technicians Class Under FLSA
EQUIFAX INC: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
EXTRA SPACE: L. Kang Labor Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
FAMOUS BOURBON: Class of Waitresses Certified in Ramos Suit

FLINT, MI: 2 State Officials Dropped from Water Class Action
FLORIDA: Bilal Files Prisoner Civil Right Class Action
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Averts ERISA Class Action
GERBER PRODUCTS: Decertification of Labeling Class Action Upheld
GLASS FAMILY: Sued for Failing to Pay Drivers Correct Wages

GLOBAL TEL LINK: Godfrey Files Fraud Class Suit in E.D. Pa.
GRACIA MEXICAN KITCHEN: Zuniga Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
HAYS AND STELAR: Faces $50MM Class Action Over Casuals
HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Court Narrows Claims in Baccay
ILLINOIS: Appeals Court Revives Class Action v. Treasurer

INFRAREIT INC: Bushansky Seeks to Halt Onco Merger Deal
INUVO INC: Gainey McKenna & Egleston Files Class Action
JAMES M. LEBLANC: Ross Asks Court to Certify Class
LEPRINO FOODS: Court Allows Filing of 3rd Amended Vazquez Suit
LLOYD'S OF LONDON: Faces Insurance Class Action in Honolulu

LOEWEN DECOR: Does Not Pay Overtime Wages, Madrigal Suit Says
LUBRIZOL ADVANCED: Claim 1 in Kieu Suit Withdrawn Without Prejudice
MATRIX WARRANTY SOLUTIONS: Boger Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls
MATRIX WARRANTY: Class Claims in Bacon Suit Dismissed
MDL 1720: Class Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval

MDL 2566: Court Narrows Claims v. Base & Hughes in Telexfree Suit
MDL 2741: Campbell Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Gallimore Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2879: McGrath Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
MICHAEL C KOEHN: Wins Initial Okay of Class Settlement in Long Suit

MICHAEL DELL: Karp Hits Stock Retirement Ff. Management Buy-out
MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid to Certify Class in Hauptman Case Denied
MIDLAND CREDIT: Violates FDCPA and Nebraska CPA, Haworth Claims
MIDLAND FUNDING: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in May Suit
MORGAN STANLEY: Ex-Brokers Seek to Revive Discrimination Case

NATIONAL INDEMNITY: Certification of Class Sought in Muri Suit
NATIONWIDE MEDICAL: Killian Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages, Damages
NAVIENT CORP: Court Narrows Claims in Lord Abbett Securities Suit
OPKO HEALTH: Kerznowski Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
PCL CONSTRUCTION: Cinti Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages

PETERSON'S HARLEY: Thomas Seeks Class Certification
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES: Accused by Kokoszki of Violating Privacy Act
PMC HOME: Nelson Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
POCATELLO, ID: Faces $20MM Class Action Over Utility Fees
PREFERRED STAFFING: Class Certification Sought in Sanford Suit

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Wins Prelim. Nod of Marsh Class Settlement
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Pickles Sues over Debt Collection
REVENUE FRONTIER: Clough Seeks Certification of Subscribers Class
REVERA INC: Manitoba Families File Class Action in Ontario
ROBINS FOOD: Kalaitzidis Sues Over Withheld Wages, Overtime Pay

SACHS ELECTRIC: Griffin Seeks to Certify Classes
SEMPER BLUE: Springer Moves to Certify Class of SB Pro Officers
ST. LOUIS, MO: Ahmad Seeks to Certify Class of Protest Participants
SUNRUN INC: $5.5MM Slovin TCPA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
TRANSUNION, LLC: Rodriguez Sues over Credit Reports

TTEC SERVICES: Fox Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Appeal Court Rates Arbitration Clause One Star
UNITED STATES: Class of Young Immigrants Certified in JL Suit
WABASH VALLEY: Faces Prisoner Civil Rights Class Action
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Stays Anguiano-Tamayo Unpaid OT Suit

WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bogden Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
WEB.COM GROUP: Howard Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA, Wage Act
WELLS FARGO: Cert. of Store Managers Class Sought in Torres Suit
WELLS FARGO: Court Certifies Class & SubClass in Kang Suit
WILDHORSE RESOURCE: Bijlmer Seeks to Halt Chesapeake Merger Deal

YAHOO! INC: Prelim OK of Security Breach Suit Settlement Denied
ZIONS BANK: Accused of Assisting Ponzi Scheme, Lawsuit Claims
[*] Seyfarth Releases 15th Annual Workplace Class Action Report
[*] Seyfarth Shaw Reveals Key Trends in Workplace Litigation
[*] Value of Workplace Class Action Settlements Down 50% in 2018

[] CLC Director Skeptical at Introduction of Class Actions

                            *********

3M CO: Class Action Plaintiffs May Increase to Hundreds
-------------------------------------------------------
John Sammon, writing for Florida Record, reports that though the
number of plaintiffs in a lawsuit alleging exposure to fire
retardant chemicals caused people to develop cancer currently
stands at eight, their attorney said a class action could increase
the number of plaintiffs to hundreds.

"It is not just firefighters but others who have manifested
injuries, and hundreds of people are being monitored, so we expect
the class will grow," Jim Ferraro, attorney for the plaintiffs and
owner of the Ferraro Law Firm based in Miami, told the Florida
Record.

Former employees of the Florida State Fire College in Ocala joined
in a class suit against makers of fire retardant chemicals that
includes 3M Co., Tyco Fire Products and Chemguard, a Dec. 26 report
in the Tampa Bay Times said. The chemicals they produce are used in
fire prevention across the country including airports, industrial
sites and fire departments.

The complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida alleges that the retardant makers sold their
products knowing they were a toxic hazard to humans and could
pollute ground water sources.

The plaintiffs contend exposure to the substances caused them
develop a variety of illnesses including thyroid disease and kidney
and breast cancer.

"The foam (fire retardant) can get into the ground water and you
can come into contact with it by, for example washing your hands at
the college," Ferraro said. ,

According to the Tampa Bay Times report, the chemicals
perfluorooctane (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) are
suspected as carcinogens and a potential cause of some types of
cancer easily absorbed by the body.

Testing of wells at the college site by the Florida State Dept. of
Environmental Protection in October revealed levels PSOF and POFA
roughly 3,000 times higher than the advisable limit for drinking
water. Well testing at neighboring sites, including a mining
business, private home and a local fire station, also showed
elevated levels.

A majority of the plaintiffs claim they came into contact with the
chemicals through water at the college showers, appliances, sinks
and drinking water fountains.

The case could be moved to an MDL (multidistrict litigation) court
if it continues to grow, which Ferraro indicated is likely.

"This could become a case not just in Florida but all over the
country," he said. "The class action will grow into the hundreds
(of plaintiffs) if not the thousands."

The Fire College itself is not a party in the lawsuit. [GN]


ACTAVIS LLC: Kentucky River Files RICO Class Action in N.D. Ohio
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Actavis LLC, et al.
The case is styled as Kentucky River District Health Department,
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Actavis LLC,
Actavis Pharma, Inc. f/k/a Watson Pharma, Inc., Allergan PLC f/k/a
Actavis PLC, AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Amneal
Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Anda, Inc., Cardinal Health, Cephalon, Inc.,
Depomed, Inc., Does 1-100, Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., H.D. Smith, LLC f/k/a H.D. Smith Wholesale
Drug Co., Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC, Indivior PLC, Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Johnson &
Johnson, Mallinckrodt, LLC, Mallinckrodt, PLC, McKesson
Corporation, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Omnicare Distribution Center, LLC, Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Par
Pharmaceutical Purdue Pharma Inc., Purdue Pharma L.P., Quest
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Richie Pharmacal Co., Sandoz, Inc., Specgx,
LLC, TEVA Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company,
Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-op-45050-DAP (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

Actavis Generics is a global pharmaceutical company focused on
developing, manufacturing and commercializing branded
pharmaceuticals, generic and over-the-counter medicines, and
biologic products. Actavis has a commercial presence across
approximately 100 countries.

AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation distributes pharmaceuticals
products, equipment, and systems. The company provides global
product sourcing, generic purchasing programs, technology
solutions, pharmacy network and programs, and pharmaceutical
packaging solutions. The company serves healthcare providers,
independent retailers, and pharmacies. AmerisourceBergen Drug
Corporation was formerly known as AmeriSource Corporation and
changed its name to AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation in January
1995.

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a publicly traded generics and
specialty pharmaceutical company. The company is headquartered in
Bridgewater, New Jersey. It is considered as fastest growing
fortune 500 firm.

Anda, Inc. distributes generic, brand, specialty, and
over-the-counter pharmaceutical (OTC) products to retail
independent and chain pharmacies, nursing homes, mail order
pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and physician offices in the United
States.

Cardinal Health, Inc. operates as an integrated healthcare services
and products company in the United States and internationally. It
provides medical products and pharmaceuticals, and solutions that
enhance supply chain efficiency for hospitals, healthcare systems,
pharmacies, ambulatory surgery centers, clinical laboratories, and
physician offices.

Cephalon, Inc. engages in the discovery and development of
medicines for central nervous system disorders, pain, and cancer.

Depomed, Inc. is an American specialty pharmaceutical company which
mainly markets products for treatment in neurology, pain and
diseases of the central nervous system.

Endo Health Solutions Inc. provides specialty healthcare solutions
in the United States and internationally. The company's Endo
Pharmaceuticals segment offers branded prescription products,
including Lidoderm, Opana ER, Percocet, Voltaren Gel, Frova,
Supprelin LA, Vantas, Valstar, and Fortesta Gel for pain, urology,
endocrinology, and oncology.

Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. engages in the research and development,
production, sale, and marketing of branded and generic
pharmaceutical products primarily in the United States.

H. D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co. provides healthcare products.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals is a multinational pharmaceutical company
with headquarters in London, UK that manufactures non-branded
generic and in-licensed pharmaceutical products.

Indivior is a specialty pharmaceuticals business. It is listed on
the London Stock Exchange and is a constituent of the FTSE 250
Index.

Johnson & Johnson is an American multinational medical devices,
pharmaceutical and consumer packaged goods manufacturing company
founded in 1886. Its common stock is a component of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the company is listed among the Fortune
500.
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. manufactures and markets prescription
pharmaceutical products.

Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals is an Irish–tax registered
manufacturer of specialty pharmaceuticals, generic drugs and
imaging agents, that generated 90% of 2017 sales from the U.S.
healthcare system.

McKesson Corporation provides pharmaceuticals and medical supplies
in the United States and internationally. It operates in three
segments: U.S. Pharmaceutical and Specialty Solutions, European
Pharmaceutical Solutions, and Medical-Surgical Solutions.

Purdue Pharma L.P. is a privately held pharmaceutical company owned
principally by parties and descendants of Mortimer and Raymond
Sackler. The company's branches include Purdue Pharma Inc., The
Purdue Frederick Company, Purdue Pharmaceutical Products L.P., and
Purdue Products L.P.

Watson Laboratories, Inc. manufactures pharmaceutical drugs. The
company was incorporated in 1992 and is based in Corona,
California. Watson Laboratories, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of
ATeva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert K. Finnell, III, Esq.
     One West Fourth Avenue, Ste. 200
     P.O. Box 63
     Rome, GA 30162
     Phone: (706) 235-7272
     Fax: (706) 235-9461
     Email: bob@finnellfirm.com


ALLSTATE CORP: Court Answers Corbin Certified Questions in Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY A. CORBIN, MARGARET A. CORBIN, and ANNA
TRYFONAS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE ALLSTATE CORPORATION,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, ALLSTATE
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY, and ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 5-17-0296 (Ill. App.),
Judge Judy Cates of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth
District answered the certified following questions in the
negative: (1) Whether the Plaintiffs' claims regarding automobile
insurance rates filed with the Illinois Department of Insurance are
barred by the filed rate doctrine; and (2) Whether the Illinois
Department of Insurance and its Director have primary jurisdiction
to determine if the complained of conduct by a regulated automobile
insurance company constitutes unfair or deceptive trade practice.

The Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the
Defendants in the circuit court of Madison County.  They alleged
that Allstate engaged in deceptive and unfair business practices in
violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, and was unjustly enriched by charging its longtime, loyal
customers higher auto insurance premiums than other customers based
on undisclosed, non-risk-based factors.  

In count I, it is alleged that Allstate has engaged in unfair and
deceptive practices in developing rating methodologies and in
advertising, marketing, and selling their auto insurance products,
and thereby violated the Consumer Fraud Act.  Count II was also
brought under the Consumer Fraud Act and alleged that Allstate's
failure to disclose its use of price optimization is unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, and offends public policy. In count III,
it is alleged that Allstate has unjustly enriched itself by
employing hidden price optimization practices.  The Plaintiffs'
prayer for relief includes money damages, equitable and/or
injunctive relief, and restitution or disgorgement of ill-gotten
gains from unjust enrichment.

Allstate filed a motion to dismiss and argued, in part, that the
Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine and the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.  The circuit court denied Allstate's
motion to dismiss but granted its subsequent motion to certify the
two questions for interlocutory review under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 308(a).  Allstate filed an application for leave to appeal
under Rule 308, and the Court granted interlocutory review.

As to the first question, Judge Cates opines that the factual
allegations and issues in the present case arise in a very
different context.  Illinois has embraced open competition in
regard to rate setting for auto insurance.  In Illinois, insurers
such as Allstate are free to establish auto insurance rates in
response to their individual assessments of economic and market
conditions.  The Director has not been given any administrative
authority to set, approve, or disapprove of those rates. Under the
current scheme in Illinois, the auto insurance rates filed by
Allstate, or any other auto insurance company, are not subject to
regulatory approval by the Department of Insurance.  Thus, the
filed rate doctrine is not applicable.  Accordingly, she answered
the first certified question in the negative.

As to the second question, the Judge opines that Allstate failed to
establish that the Director or the Department of Insurance have any
specialized knowledge or technical expertise in regard to the
deceptive practices alleged in the complaint.  Additionally, the
allegations of unfair and deceptive business practices and unjust
enrichment come within the experience and conventional competence
of the Illinois courts.  Nothing within the statutory scheme
suggests otherwise, and the Judge does not believe it their
function to do what the legislature has chosen not to act upon.
For these reasons, she has answered the second question in the
negative.

Finally, she pauses briefly to address the scope of review in a
Rule 308 appeal.  As noted by the dissent, there are cases in which
the interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an
equitable result may lead a reviewing court to go beyond the
certified question and consider the propriety of the order that
gave rise to the appeal.  However, in an interlocutory appeal under
Rule 308, the scope of review is ordinarily limited to addressing
the questions certified by the trial court.  Except in those cases
where the interests of judicial economy and equity lie, the Court
simply answers the certified questions without considering the
propriety of the trial court's ruling on the underlying order.  In
this case, Jugde Cates has observed their limited scope of review
by answering the certified questions, and she does not believe it
appropriate to reach further and consider the propriety of the
circuit court's underlying order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Ft7RMi from Leagle.com.

Troy A. Bozarth -- tbozarth@heplerbroom.com -- Kathryn Modeer --
kmodeer@heplerbroom.com -- HeplerBroom LLC, 130 North Main Street,
Edwardsville, IL 62025-0510; Michael P. O'Day (pro hac vice),
Kathleen A. Birrane (pro hac vice), DLA Piper LLP (US), The Marbury
Building, 6225 Smith Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21209-3600, Attorneys
for Appellants.

Jay Angoff (pro hac vice), Cyrus Mehri (pro hac vice), Steven
Skalet (pro hac vice), Christine Monahan (pro hac vice), Mehri &
Skalet PLLC, 1250 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C.
20036; Thomas E. Kennedy III, Sarah Jane Hunt, Law Offices of
Thomas E. Kennedy, III, L.C., 906 Olive Street, Suite 200, St.
Louis, MO 63101; Andrea R. Gold, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, 1828 L
Street NW, Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20036; Peter Kahana (pro
hac vice), Jeff Osterwise (pro hac vice), Berger & Montague, P.C.,
1622 Locust Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 Attorneys for
Appellees.


AMAZON.COM.KSDC LLC: Final Approval of Christeson Deal Overruled
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WYATT CHRISTESON, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, v.
AMAZON.COM.KSDC, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 18-2043-KHV (D.
Kan.), Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas overruled the (i) Parties' Joint Motion To
Approve Settlement Agreement And Release; (ii) the Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion To Approve Fees, Costs, And Expenses; and (iii)
the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion To Approve Service Award.

Christeson brings suit against Amazon.com.ksdc, LLC to recover
unpaid wages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, costs and
attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), filed
Jan. 25, 2018.  The Defendant operates fulfillment centers for the
online retailer Amazon.com.  From Jan. 25, 2015 to March 31, 2018,
it employed eight IT Support Engineers, including the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff asserts that when an IT Support Engineer records more
than the maximum hours, a supervisor instructs the engineer to
revise his or her timesheet to reflect the permitted maximum.  He
further asserts that the engineer is not paid for such overtime
work.  The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff's claims.

On Jan. 25, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a putative FLSA collective
action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees
who regularly worked more than 40 hours per week and did not
receive compensation for overtime hours.  On Aug. 6, 2018, the
parties informed the Court that they reached a settlement
agreement.  On Dec. 10, 2018, the parties filed a motion for
settlement approval.

In accordance with the settlement agreement, the parties ask the
Court to certify a final collective action consisting of Christeson
and seven other IT Support Engineers who worked for the Defendant
at any time between Jan. 25, 2015, and March 31, 2018.  The
Defendant has agreed to pay each Collective Class Member who opts
in $250 plus $195.095 for each instance in which the Participating
Plaintiff recorded 40, 49 or 55 hours in a workweek.  Each
Participating Plaintiff will be entitled to between $250and $3,762,
depending on his or her timesheets.  If all seven IT Support
Engineers opt in and become Participating Plaintiffs, the Defendant
will pay up to $61,636, which includes the Plaintiff's request for
$35,000 in attorneys' fees, $2,467.62 in costs and a $5,000 service
award.  The Defendant has agreed to not challenge the Plaintiff's
request for attorneys' fees and costs, and any unclaimed funds will
revert to the efendant.

In addition, the agreement requires the Plaintiff and the
Participating Plaintiffs to agree to broad claim releases and
strict confidentiality provisions.  The agreement further requires
the Plaintiffs to keep the settlement terms "strictly
confidential."  For any breach of the Confidential General Release,
the Plaintiff must repay ten per cent of his service award.

As required by the FLSA, the parties now ask the Court for final
collective action certification and settlement approval.  The
Plaintiff asks the Court to approve his unopposed request for
attorneys' fees and costs and a service award.

Judge Vratil finds that the parties request that the Court certify
the lawsuit as a collective action and approve the parties'
settlement on behalf of the Plaintiff and a putative class of IT
Support Engineers.  The Plaintiff never filed a motion for
conditional certification, however, and the parties cite no
authority that would permit them to bypass the Tenth Circuit
two-step certification process for FLSA collective actions.  When
putative class members have not yet received notice of the lawsuit
and an opportunity to opt in, the Court cannot sustain a motion for
final settlement approval.

She holds that if the parties wish to proceed with the settlement,
they should file a motion for conditional certification of the
proposed settlement class, preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement and approval of the proposed notice to putative class
members.  If they submit these materials and the court approves the
parties' recommended procedure, the Court will order the parties to
send the approved notice to the putative class members and
establish a period during which putative class members may opt in.
Upon expiration of the opt-in period, the parties may file a motion
for final collective action certification and final settlement
approval.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge cannot approve the parties'
settlement agreement.

In anticipation of a renewed motion for settlement approval, the
Judge also addresses other defects in the proposed settlement.
among other things, she finds that (i) the parties have a bona fide
dispute; (ii) she is not satisfied that the settlement is fair and
equitable; (iii) the parties should revise and narrow the proposed
releases before resubmitting a new settlement proposal; (iv) the
settlement conditions Participating Plaintiffs' receipt of
settlement funds on their agreement to strict confidentiality
requirements; and (v) the Plaintiff's exercise of rights under the
FLSA cannot be conditioned on contract provisions which, if
enforced, would constitute impermissible retaliation under Section
215(a)(3).

Finally, as to the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion To Approve Service
Award, the Judge highlights two potential issues with the
Plaintiff's proposed awards.  First, under the proposed settlement,
the Defendant agreed to not oppose or object to the Plaintiff's
request for attorneys' fees and costs.  Second, the proposed
settlement provides that unclaimed funds revert to the Defendant.

For the reasons stated, Judge Vratil overruled the parties' request
for settlement approval and the Plaintiff's request for approval of
attorneys' fees and a service award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/iKZ2Xc from Leagle.com.

Wyatt Christeson, individually and on behalf of a class of similar
employees, Plaintiff, represented by Morgan L. Roach --
morgan@mccauleyroach.com -- McCauley & Roach, LLC.

Amazon.com.ksdc, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel B. Boatright
-- dboatright@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, Stefanie R.
Moll -- stefanie.moll@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Cullen Wallace --
cullen.wallace@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice.


AMERICAN EAGLE: Denial of Judgment on Pleadings in Bedoya Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVER BEDOYA; DIEGO GONZALES; MANUEL DECASTRO, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. AMERICAN
EAGLE EXPRESS INC., d/b/a AEX GROUP, v. KV SERVICE, LLC; M&J
EXPRESS, LLC; A&D DELIVERY EXPRESS, LLC American Eagle Express,
Inc., Appellant, Case No. 18-1641 (3d Cir.), Judge Patty Shwartz of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
District Court order denying AEX's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and certifying the order for interlocutory appeal.

The Plaintiff delivery drivers Bedoya, Gonzalez, and Decastro filed
a putative class action against the Defendant, alleging that AEX
misclassified them as independent contractors when they are
actually employees under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law
("NJWHL"), and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law ("NJWPL").

AEX is a logistics company that provides delivery services to
various medical organizations. The Drivers are New Jersey residents
who make deliveries for AEX.  The Drivers filed the putative class
action against AEX seeking, among other things, a judgment
declaring that they are employees of AEX, rather than independent
contractors, which entitles them to compensation under the NJWHL
and NJWPL.

AEX moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the FAAAA
preempts the Drivers' claims.  The District Court denied AEX's
motion, reasoning that there is no clear indication that Congress
intended for the FAAAA to preempt state wage laws, and that the
connection between regulation of AEX's workforce and the prices,
routes, and services" provided to its consumers is too attenuated
to justify preempting claims under the NJWHL and NJWPL.

Judge Schwart now considers AEX's interlocutory appeal of the order
denying the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).  The
question before her is whether the FAAAA preempts New Jersey's test
for determining employment classification for purposes of the NJWHL
and NJWPL.

She explains that The Supreme Court has also articulated several
principles that inform them about the breadth of FAAAA preemption.
First, the "related to" language from the FAAAA preemption clause
gives it a broad scope, encompassing any state actions that have "a
connection with, or make reference to rates, routes, or services"
of a motor carrier.  Drawing from case law examining similar
wording in the preemption provision of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, the Supreme Court has observed that
reading the phrase "related to" with "uncritical literalism" would
render preemption an endless exercise because everything is related
to everything else in some manner.

Second, FAAAA preemption reaches laws that affect prices, routes,
or services even if the effect "is only indirect."  However, where
a law's impact on carrier prices, routes, or services is so
indirect that the law affects them in only a tenuous, remote, or
peripheral manner, the law is not preempted.  Finally, preemption
occurs where a state law has a significant impact on carrier rates,
routes, or services.

Mindful of these principles, the Judge next reviews the case law
for guidance concerning whether a law has a direct or indirect
effect and whether it has a significant or insignificant effect.
From her review, she identifies factors courts examine and sets
forth those factors that may shed light on a law's directness and
those that may reflect the significance of the law's effect on the
regulated entities at issue.

In sum, she finds that to assess the directness of a law's effect
on prices, routes, or services, courts should examine whether the
law: (1) mentions a carrier's prices, routes, or services; (2)
specifically targets carriers as opposed to all businesses; and (3)
addresses the carrier-customer relationship rather than
non-customer-carrier relationships (e.g., carrier-employee).  If a
law has a direct impact on carriers' prices, routes, or services
with respect to the transportation of property, then it is
preempted unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions.
Though she can draw no firm line between laws whose effects on
rates, routes, or services are indirect and laws whose effects are
"tenuous, remote, or peripheral," these factors, and perhaps other
considerations, will guide courts in the inquiry.

To assess whether a law has a significant effect on a carrier's
prices, routes, or services, courts should consider whether: (1)
the law binds a carrier to provide or not provide a particular
price, route, or service; (2) the carrier has various avenues to
comply with the law; (3) the law creates a patchwork of regulation
that erects barriers to entry, imposes tariffs, or restricts the
goods a carrier is permitted to transport; and (4) the law existed
in one of the jurisdictions Congress determined lacked laws that
regulate intrastate prices, routes, or services and thus, by
implication, is a law Congress found not to interfere with the
FAAAA's deregulatory goal.  Other factors may also lead a court to
decide that a state law has a significant effect where the law
undermines Congress' goal of having competitive market forces
dictate prices, routes, or services of motor carriers.

The Judge has examined each of these considerations and concludes
that New Jersey's ABC classification test is not preempted as it
has neither a direct, nor an indirect, nor a significant effect on
carrier prices, routes, or services.  The New Jersey ABC
classification test does not have a significant effect on prices,
routes, or services either.  Thus, AEX has not shown that New
Jersey's ABC classification test has a "significant impact" on
Congress' deregulatory efforts with respect to motor carrier
businesses, nor are the NJWHL and NJWPL -- typical state wage and
hour laws -- the kinds of preexisting state regulations with which
Congress was concerned when it passed the FAAAA.

Accordingly, any effect the New Jersey ABC classification test has
on prices, routes, or services with respect to the transportation
of property is tenuous and insignificant.  As a result, the test is
not preempted.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Schwartz affirmed the District
Court's order denying AEX's motion for judgment on the pleadings
and remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/zDRURo from Leagle.com.

Harold L. Lichten [ARGUED], Lichten & Liss-Riordan, 729 Boylston
Street, Suite 2000, Boston, MA 02116. R. Andrew Santillo --
asantillo@winebrakelaw.com -- Peter D. Winebrake --
pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake & Santillo, 715 Twinning
Road, Suite 211, Twinning Office Center, Dresher, PA 19025, Counsel
for Plaintiff-Appellees.

Joseph C. DeBlasio -- Joseph.DeBlasio@jacksonlewis.com -- [ARGUED],
Jackson Lewis, 220 Headquarters Plaza, East Tower, 7th Floor,
Morristown, NJ 07960, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant.

Adina H. Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation Group, 1600 20th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20009, Counsel for Amicus Public
Citizen Inc.

Christopher W. Weber, Emily M. Bisnauth, Office of Attorney General
of New Jersey, Department of Law & Public Safety, Richard J. Hughes
Justice Complex, 25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112, Trenton, NJ 08625,
Counsel for Amicus New Jersey Department of Labor, and Workforce
Development.


AMERICAN FAMILY: 6th Cir. Flips Judgment in Jammal ERISA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JALID JAMMAL; KATHLEEN TUERSLEY; CINDA J. DURACHINSKY;
NATHAN GARRETT, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE
COMPANY; AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; AMERICAN FAMILY
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF
WISCONSIN; AMERICAN FAMILY TERMINATION BENEFITS PLAN; RETIREMENT
PLAN FOR EMPLOYEES OF AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE GROUP; AMERICAN
FAMILY 401K PLAN; GROUP LIFE PLAN; GROUP HEALTH PLAN; GROUP DENTAL
PLAN; LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN; AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE GROUP
MASTER RETIREMENT TRUST; 401K PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE;
COMMITTEE OF EMPLOYEES AND DISTRICT MANAGER RETIREMENT PLAN,
Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 17-4125 (6th Cir.), Judge Danny
Julian Boggs of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment that the Plaintiffs are
employees.

In the class action, the named Plaintiffs represent several
thousand current and former insurance agents for American Family.
The agents claim that American Family misclassified them as
independent contractors, while treating them as employees, in order
to avoid paying them benefits in compliance with the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

As with many insurance companies, American Family sells its
products primarily through a network of insurance agents.  It, in
keeping with common industry practice, classifies its agents as
independent contractors rather than employees.

Taking issue with this designation and the consequences it has on
their ability to enjoy the protections of ERISA, the Plaintiffs
brought a proposed class action against American Family in 2013,
alleging that the company misclassified them as independent
contractors.  They contended that their miscategorization deprived
them of the rights and protections guaranteed by state and federal
law to employees, including their rights under ERISA." They sought,
inter alia, a declaratory judgment that they are employees for all
purposes, including but not limited to ERISA, and that as employees
they are due benefits under ERISA.

Both parties filed several pre-trial motions, including motions by
American Family to dismiss and later for summary judgment.  The
Plaintiffs, for their part, moved for class certification.  The
district court granted the Plaintiffs' motion and denied each of
American Family's motions in whole or in part.  The company sought
permission from the Court to appeal the district court's order
granting class certification, but it denied the company's request.
The district court subsequently denied two motions by American
Family to decertify the class.

The case then proceeded to trial.  At the close of the trial, the
court presented the advisory jury with the following interrogatory:
Whether the Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that they are employees of Defendant American Family?  The jury
answered "yes."

After giving the parties a final opportunity to present their
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court issued
an opinion in which it acknowledged that although it was not bound
by the advisory jury's determination, it believed that the jury's
verdict comported with the weight of the evidence presented at
trial.  Accordingly, the district court determined that the agents
were employees for the purposes of ERISA.

The district court certified its ruling for an interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), and American Family filed a
petition for interlocutory review of the court's order.  The Court
granted permission to appeal, which American Family did, arguing
that the district court erred in determining that the Plaintiffs
are employees.

The sole issue in the interlocutory appeal concerns the nature of
the parties' legal relationship: whether the Plaintiffs are
employees or independent contractors for American Family.  

Because American Family properly classified its agents as
independent contractors, Judge Boggs reversed.  He finds that the
Agency Agreement states in wholly unambiguous terms that agents are
independent contractors who retain "full control" over several
facets of their business.  The district court correctly recognized
that the agreement favored independent-contractor status.  But it
apparently did not weigh this important component when reaching its
conclusion regarding independent-contractor status.  Had the lower
court given this express agreement proper consideration, it would
have further swung the balance in favor of independent-contractor
status.  For these reasons, the Judge reversed and remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with his holding.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/vWc4jW from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Pierre H. Bergeron, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP,
Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants.

Charles J. Crueger -- cjc@cruegerdickinson.com -- CRUGER DICKINSON
LLC, Whitefish Bay, Wisconsin, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Pierre H. Bergeron, Lauren S. Kuley --
lauren.kuley@squirepb.com -- Scott W. Coyle --
scott.coyle@squirepb.com -- Colter Paulson --
colter.paulson@squirepb.com -- SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP,
Cincinnati, Ohio, Gregory V. Mersol , Gilbert Brosky , BAKER &
HOSTETLER LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants.

Charles J. Crueger, Erin K. Dickinson, CRUGER DICKINSON LLC,
Whitefish Bay, Wisconsin, Gregory F. Coleman, GREG COLEMAN LAW PC,
Knoxville, Tennessee, Edward A. Wallace, Kara A. Elgersma, WEXLER
WALLACE LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Drew T. Legando, LANDSKRONER GRIECO
MERRIMAN, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.

J. Philip Calabrese -- pcalabrese@porterwright.com -- PORTER WRIGHT
MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, C. Darcy Copeland Jalandoni
-- djalandoni@porterwright.com -- PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR
LLP, Columbus, Ohio, Shay Dvoretzky, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C.,
Paulo B. McKeeby, Ronald E. Manthey, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
Dallas, Texas, Mary Ellen Signorille, AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION,
Washington, D.C., Seth R. Lesser, KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP, Rye
Brook, New York, for Amici Curiae.


APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Class Certification Bid in Shasta Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SHASTA LINEN SUPPLY, INC., on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS,
INC.; APPLIED UNDERWRITERS CAPTIVE RISK ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.;
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY; and APPLIED RISK SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants. PET FOOD EXPRESS LTD, and ALPHA POLISHING, INC. d/b/a
GENERAL PLATING CO., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC.;
APPLIED UNDERWRITERS CAPTIVE RISK ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.;
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and APPLIED RISK SERVICES,
INC., Defendants, Case Nos. 2:16-cv-158 WBS AC, 2:16-cv-1211 WBS AC
(E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California (i) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification; (ii) denied the Defendants' Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum; and (iii) denied as moot
the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Requests to Seal Documents and
Redact Filings.

The Plaintiffs initiated these actions against the Defendants,
alleging that the Defendants fraudulently marketed and sold
workers' compensation insurance program under the names EquityComp
and SolutionOne to California employers in violation of state and
federal law.  The Defendants filed this policy with the Bureau and
received approval from the Department of Insurance.  After the
program's policies took effect for the Plaintiffs, the Defendants
allegedly required the Plaintiffs to sign a Reinsurance
Participation Agreement ("RPA").

The Plaintiffs allege that the RPA modified the terms of the
existing insurance policies, including the rates, causing them to
incur significantly higher costs for the program than the
Defendants had marketed.  They contend that the Defendants used the
RPA to charge excessive rates and additional fees to the program
participants.  They further allege that defendants deliberately
misrepresented the costs of the program in their marketing
materials to induce them to rely on those costs and purchase the
program.

On Aug. 29, 2014, Shasta filed an administrative appeal with the
California Department of Insurance, challenging, among other
things, the legality of the RPA.

On Jan. 26, 2016, Shasta brought an action in the Court alleging
fraud and unfair competition against the Defendants for their
marketing and sale of the program and RPA.  The Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint to the extent it relied on Section 11735,
arguing that a rate is legal unless and until the Commissioner
holds a hearing and disapproves the rate, pursuant to Section
11737.

On June 20, 2016, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss to the extent Shasta relied on Section 11735.  Because
Shasta had not alleged that the Commissioner had held a hearing and
disapproved the RPA, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff did not
plausibly allege that the RPA was void.

On the same day as the Court's order of dismissal, the Commissioner
issued a Decision and Order in Shasta's administrative case,
holding that the RPA must be filed and approved by the Commissioner
pursuant to Section 11735 before use.  Because the Defendants did
not file the RPA before it took effect, the Commissioner stated,
the RPA is void as a matter of law.

Based on the Commissioner's Order, Shasta filed a motion for
reconsideration of the June 20 Order granting the motion to
dismiss.  The Court denied Shasta's motion for reconsideration,
holding that the Commissioner's Order did not control the Court and
its previous June 20 Order was not clearly erroneous.

Pet Food filed a separate class action against the Defendants in
state court asserting claims for unfair competition, rescission,
declaratory relief, and fraud.  The action was removed to federal
court on March 29, 2016. The Defendants, as they had in the Shasta
case, moved to dismiss the Pet Food complaint to the extent it
sought to invalidate the RPA because it is an unfiled rate or
rating plan in violation of Section 11735.  The Court denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss as moot because Pet Food's complaint
did not rely on Section 11735.

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiffs in both actions filed amended
complaints that are nearly identical.  The complaints asserted
claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") Act,under the California Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL"); and for quasi-contract.  On July 6, 2017, the Court
entered an order consolidating the actions for pre-trial purposes.


The Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.  The Court
granted the motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiffs' RICO claims and
as to the Plaintiffs' attempts to invalidate the RPA on the theory
that the Defendants violated Insurance Code Section 11735.  With
respect to the Plaintiffs' UCL claim based on Insurance Code
Section 11735, it reaffirmed its position that an unfiled rate is
not unlawful per se and determined that the Commissioner did not
conduct a formal rate disapproval hearing.  The Court denied the
motion to dismiss in all other respects.

Now, the Plaintiffs move to certify a class pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).  Their proposed class
consists of all California participants of Defendants' EquityComp
or SolutionOne single risk workers' compensation insurance Program
from the inception of the Program to the present time and who paid
monies or were billed and/or charged pursuant to a Reinsurance
Participation Agreement.  They seek appointment of Shasta Linen
Supply, Inc., Alpha Polishing, Inc., doing business as General
Plating Co., and Pet Food Express Ltd. as the class
representatives.  They further seek appointment of Berger Montague
PC2; Cummings and Page, LLP; Farmer Smith & Lane, LLP; and Law
Offices of John Douglas Moore as the class counsel.  The Plaintiffs
seek to certify all their remaining claims.

Judge Shubb finds that because the other actions involve a variety
of different claims in different forums, the parties would have to
formulate class notice that accounts for the fact that there may
not be complete overlap between the instant lawsuit and those other
actions.  The Advisory Committee has made clear that it is already
difficult enough to provide accurate and easily understood
information about class actions given the factual uncertainty,
legal complexity, and the complication of the class action
procedure.  Accordingly, this factor and all the "superiority"
factors considered together weigh against class certification.
Since a class action is not superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, the Judge
denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum for the failure to reply in strict reply.  They argue
that the Plaintiffs have misrepresented the record and that the
scope of the reply exceeds the scope of the original motion and
opposition.  To the extent the Defendants' arguments in favor of
this motion bear upon class certification, they have been
addressed.  Striking the Plaintiffs' reply in its entirety,
however, would be "markedly disproportional" to any offense
committed.  Accordingly, the Judge denied the Defendants' motion to
strike.

The Parties submitted separate requests to seal documents and
redact filings filed in connection with their respective briefings
on the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  They maintain
that these documents and redactions are covered by their protective
order, and contain confidential, proprietary, and commercially
sensitive information that could be harmful to either Applied, the
Plaintiffs, and/or non-parties if publicly disclosed.  The Judge
has not relied on as part of its order any of the documents the
parties have requested to seal.  Similarly, he has not relied on or
cited any redacted portions of the Plaintiffs' briefing.
Accordingly, the Judge denied the requests to seal documents and
redact filings as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/ns0jMW from Leagle.com.

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Craig E.
Farmer -- cfarmer@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith & Lane LLP,
Glen L. Abramson -- gabramson@bm.net -- Berger Montague PC, pro hac
vice & John L. Hall -- jhall@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith &
Lane LLP.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., a Nebraska Corporation, Applied
Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc., a British Virgin
Islands Company, California Insurance Company, a Registered
California Insurance Company & Applied Risk Services, Inc., a
Nebraska Corporation, Defendants, represented by Jeanette Barzelay
-- jeanette.barzelay@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, Spencer Y. Kook
-- skook@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Shand Scott
Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Travis
R. Wall -- twall@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., a Nebraska Corporation, Counter
Claimant, represented by Shand Scott Stephens, DLA Piper LLP &
Travis R. Wall, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Counter Defendant, represented by Craig
E. Farmer, Farmer Smith & Lane LLP, Glen L. Abramson, Berger
Montague PC, pro hac vice, John Douglas Moore, Law Office of John
Douglas Moore & John L. Hall, Farmer Smith & Lane LLP.


BANK OF AMERICA: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Culpepper
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued a Ruling and Order granting Plaintiff's motion for
conditional certification of a collective action under Section
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the case captioned AILEEN
CULPEPPER, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASS'N,
Defendant. No. 3:17-CV-00264 (VAB). (D. Conn.).

Aileen Culpepper filed a class action Complaint against Bank of
America, National Association (Bank of America) under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, asserting violations of the Connecticut Minimum
Wage Act. Ms. Culpepper, an Inbound Specialist, or customer service
agent, was responsible for answering customer calls at Bank of
America's Farmington, Connecticut call center. She and other
Inbound Specialists allege that the Farmington, Connecticut Bank of
America call center had a policy or practice of failing to pay
Inbound Specialists who reported to work early to perform necessary
pre-shift work, such as reviewing policy updates and launching
their computer systems.

Numerosity

The parties have jointly stipulated that Culpepper was employed by
the Defendant as one of approximately 100 Inbound Specialists in
Connecticut.  As a result, the numerosity requirement likely will
be satisfied in this case.

Commonality

Call center plaintiffs have been denied Rule 23 certification for
failing to satisfy the commonality requirement, particularly in
cases involving the unofficial and unsanctioned practices of
diverse supervisors.  

Ms. Culpepper asserts an unwritten and unsanctioned policy of
prompting, pressuring, and permitting Inbound Specialists to
complete pre-shift work, but she still must demonstrate that such
common questions are susceptible to common answers.

Typicality

Bank of America argues that Ms. Culpepper's claims are not typical
of the class's claims because she was only an Inbound Specialist I,
and the IIs and IIIs did not typically receive inbound calls. Ms.
Culpepper argues that she is a typical member of the class because
the Inbound Specialists had similar responsibilities and faced
similar time pressures.  

For typicality, under Rule 23, Ms. Culpepper must demonstrate that
her claims and the class claims are so interrelated that the
interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately
protected in their absence.

Predominance and Superiority

Though Rule 23(b) provides several avenues to certification, call
center cases tend to involve Rule 23(b)(3).  

Ms. Culpepper thus must show that common questions predominate over
the individual ones and that a class action is a superior method to
an individual action. While the court need not reach the question
of superiority, it is highly doubtful, that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. Indeed, the fact that the
differences among the potential class members in this case outweigh
the similarities, as stated supra, indicates that concentrating
this litigation in this forum will be undesirable, and managing the
class action will be quite difficult.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018 Ruling
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9vjgxmx from
Leagle.com.

Aileen Culpepper, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Richard Eugene
Hayber -- rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com -- The Hayber Law Firm, LLC &
Thomas J. Durkin, The Hayber Law Firm, LLC.

Bank of America, National Association, Defendant, represented by
Michael D. Mandel -- mmandel@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP,
pro hac vice, Nicole R. Cuglietto --
nicole.cuglietto@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Philip A. Goldstein --
pagoldstein@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP & Stephen P. Brown
-- stephen.brown@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker, LLP.


BAVARIA INN: Court to Review Sever Provisions Ruling in Mantooth
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting in part Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned CHADA MANTOOTH, GALE
RAFFAELE, ALEXIS NAGLE, and NICOLE BUJOK, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BAVARIA INN
RESTAURANT, INC., d/b/a Shotgun Willie's, and DEBRA MATTHEWS,
Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-cv-1150-WJM-MEH. (D. Colo.).

The Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration asking
the Court to revisit its decision to sever provisions under the
effective vindication doctrine based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619
(2018).  

Defendant Bavaria Inn Restaurant Inc. d/b/a/Shotgun Willie's
(Shotgun Willie's) and its owner Defendant Debra Matthews
(Defendants) improperly classified named Plaintiffs Chada Mantooth,
Gale Raffaele, Alexis Nagle, Nicole Bujok, in addition to opt-in
plaintiffs  (Plaintiffs) as independent contractors and underpaid
Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo.  (CWCA) and Colorado common law.

The Court previously granted in part the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration. The Court compelled arbitration but struck
certain fee-shifting and arbitrator selection clauses in the
parties' arbitration agreements, as well as the cost-shifting
clause of the agreements for Bujok, Nagle, Raffaele, and opt-in
plaintiff Alexandra Darr.

The Defendants argue that the Epic decision held that unless a
provision in an arbitration agreement directly conflicts with the
express language of a statute, it must be enforced as written.
Hence, the Supreme Court has now implicitly, if not directly,
rejected the imposition of policy-based reasons for invalidating
provisions in arbitration agreements such as the effective
vindication of rights doctrine.

The Effective Vindication Doctrine

The Supreme Court has developed a mechanism called the
effective-vindication rule to prevent arbitration clauses from
choking off a plaintiff's ability to enforce congressionally
created rights and bars applying such clauses only when they
operate to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal
claims. This judicially-created exception to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) allows courts to harmonize the FAA's policy
favoring arbitration with other federal statutory rights. The
doctrine exists to prevent prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies. Thus, federal courts generally compel
arbitration unless an arbitral forum prevents a prospective
litigant from effectively vindicating its statutory cause of
action, and as a consequence effectively prevents the federal
statute from serving its remedial and deterrent function.  

Supreme Court's Decision in Epic

In Epic, employees sought to litigate FLSA and state law claims
through class or collective actions in federal court,
notwithstanding contracts that mandated individualized arbitration
of their claims. The employees generally argued that the saving
clause removes the obligation to enforce arbitration agreements as
written when the arbitration agreement violates some other federal
law. The employees thus argued that the individualized arbitration
provision violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
guarantees workers the right to organize and bargain collectively.

The Court held that the savings clause applies to defenses that
apply to any' contract and by attacking (only) the individualized
nature of the arbitration proceedings, the employees' argument
seeks to interfere with one of arbitration's fundamental
attributes, namely the traditionally individualized and informal
nature of arbitration. More importantly, the Court found that
nothing in our cases indicates that the NLRA guarantees class and
collective action procedures, let alone for claims arising under
different statutes here, the FLSA and despite the express teachings
of the Arbitration Act. Because NLRA did not provide a right to
collective adjudication of FLSA claims, the NLRA did not override
the FAA's general mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as
written. The Court held that, under these circumstances, the
arbitration agreements like those before use must be enforced as
written and concluded that the employees could not bring collective
FLSA claims in arbitration.  

Impact of Epic on the Effective Vindication Doctrine

While Epic broadly favors enforcing arbitration agreements as
written, it has not been nor should it be construed so expansively
that it eliminates the long-standing effective vindication
doctrine. On its face, and contrary to Defendants' suggestion, Epic
does not directly reject the effective vindication doctrine.
Indeed, it never so much as mentions effective vindication.

Nor did Epic undermine the rationale for the effective vindication
doctrine, a policy-based exception to the FAA's general approach to
favoring arbitration. Rather, in striving to harmonize two federal
statutes, namely the NLRA and the FAA, the Court found that the
NLRA did not express approval or disapproval of arbitration nor
mention class or collective action procedures. Thus, the Court
merely concluded that the NLRA did not mandate that FLSA claims be
decided collectively, the employees could waive their right to
pursue claims collectively in arbitration, and the employees could
still pursue their statutory rights granted by the FLSA in
individual arbitration.  

In other words, the individual arbitration provision at issue did
not "choke off" the employees ability to enforce congressionally
created rights.

In conclusion, both the text of the Epic decision, as well as the
overwhelming weight of subsequent lower-court authority, fail to
support the Defendants' position on this issue in its
Reconsideration Motion. The effective vindication doctrine remains
viable after Epic. The Plaintiffs have made sufficient financial
showings that the burden of fees and costs will effectively and
prospectively prevent them from bringing their claims in
arbitration. Thus, the Court will not revisit its conclusion that
those provisions, as applied to the Plaintiffs, prospectively
prevent the Plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory
FLSA rights in arbitration and that severance of those provisions
is appropriate in this case.

Clarifying Scope of the Order

The Defendants raise a question about the scope of the Court's
prior Order. The Court ordered that the fee-shifting provision in
the arbitration clause are unenforceable and will be severed but
later stated that any portion of any Agreement that any Plaintiff
may have with the Defendants is severed to the extent it
establishes a fee-shifting obligation different from those
established under the FLSA. The Defendants argue that none of the
severed provisions directly conflict with the FLSA, and thus the
Court improperly severed the provisions. To the extent these
rulings have created any ambiguity on this point, the Court will
clarify its prior Order.

The Court previously found that the fee-shifting provisions, which
allowed the Defendants to recover fees and costs for arbitrating
the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims, erected a barrier to the effective
vindication of the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims. It was the Court's
intent to sever all fee- and cost-shifting obligations because they
prevented effective vindication of the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims, but
to nonetheless allow the Plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees and
costs in the event they are prevailing parties, consistent with the
private attorney general enforcement scheme of the FLSA.

In other words, the arbitrator will be free to award any manner of
relief otherwise available in the federal court litigation of FLSA
claims.

Therefore, the remainder of Defendants' Reconsideration Motion is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8kxmyc2 from Leagle.com.

Chada Mantooth, Gale Raffaele, Alexis Nagle & Nicole Bujok,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Joseph McNulty --
AMcNulty@KLN-law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP, Darold W.
Killmer -- DKillmer@KLN-law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP,
Liana Gerstle Orshan -- LOrshan@KLN-law.com -- Killmer Lane &
Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman -- MNewman@KLN-law.com -- Killmer
Lane & Newman, LLP.

Bavaria Inn Restaurant Inc., doing business as Shotgun Willie's &
Deborah Matthews, Defendants, represented by Jason Clayborn Astle,
Springer & Steinberg, P.C., Jeffrey Alan Springer, Springer &
Steinberg, P.C. & Matthew Rodney Giacomini, Springer & Steinberg,
P.C.


BLACKHAWK MANAGER: Certification of Class Sought in Shao Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled HONGBO SHAO, JIANRONG GUO,
WENWEI FAN, DONGHUI DENG, GUANGFENG LUO, GANG SUN, YU ZHANG, HONG
ZHANG, YIPING WU, BEILIN HE, RUIZHE JIANG, WU LIU, DONGMEI HAN, WEI
ZHANG, YANYAN LI, BING LI, DONG SU, SHAOHUA SUN, BO PENG, LIQIANG
SUN, QI DENG, RUI HU, PING CHEN, XIA LI, JINGYUAN ZHANG, HUA JIANG,
JING JIANG, JIAWEN JIANG, CHENGLONG JIANG, ZHAOXIN ZHENG, YUQIN
ZHAO, JIACHENG REN, WENJIE LIU, and YANLU LIU, individually and on
behalf of a class of other similarly-situated persons v. SEROFIM
MUROFF; RAYMOND KU; WINNER XING; DEBRA L. RIDDLE; RICHARD K. GETTY;
JERRY R. BARNETT; BLACKHAWK MANAGER, LLC; EQUITY RECAP ACCOUNT,
LLC; IDAHO STATE REGIONAL CENTER, LLC; BLACKHAWK GOLD, LLC; IDAHO
STATE GOLD COMPANY, LLC; THE R.K. GETTY CORPORATION; BLACKHAWK ON
THE RIVER, LLC D/B/A BLACKHAWK MATERIAL SUPPLY; LEMHI GOLD TRUST,
LLC; THE MCCALL ASSOCIATES LLC; CRANBERRY RIDGE LLC; DESERT ROSE
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.; WESTLEAD CAPITAL INC. D/B/A WESTLINK OR
WEST LINK; WORLDWAY GROUP; and DOES 1-10, Case No.
1:18-cv-00295-BLW (D. Idaho), moves for class certification
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This Motion is made on the grounds and reasons that the Plaintiffs
can demonstrate the proposed class meets the requirements of Rules
23(A) and 23(B) and there is good cause to certify class, the
Plaintiffs contend.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Walter H. Bithell, Esq.
          BITHELL LAW
          199 N Capitol Blvd., Suite 500
          Boise, ID 83702
          Telephone: (208) 336-4440
          Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
          E-mail: walter@bithelllaw.com

               - and -

          T.J. Angstman, Esq.
          Kylie L. Madsen, Esq.
          ANGSTMAN JOHNSON
          199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 200
          Boise, ID 83702
          Telephone: (208) 384-8588
          Facsimile: (208) 853-0117
          E-mail: tj@angstman.com
                  kylie@angstman.com

One of the Plaintiff's attorneys certifies that notice was sent to
these parties by electronic means:

   * Thomas J. Angstman, Esq. -- tj@angstman.com
   * Walter H. Bithell -- Walter@BithellLaw.com
   * Bradley R. Cahoon -- bcahoon@djplaw.com
   * Dennis M. Charney -- dennischarney@gmail.com
   * James D. Gilson -- jgilson@djplaw.com
   * Natalie C. Holzaepfel -- nholzaepfel@perkinscoie.com
   * Alison C. Hunter -- AlisonHunter@perkinscoie.com
   * Kylie L. Madsen -- kylie@angstman.com
   * Paul R. Mangiantini -- paul@mangiantinilaw.com
   * Sean T. Prosser -- sprosser@perkinscoie.com
   * Eric B. Swartz -- eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
   * Brian L. Webb -- brian@brianwebblegal.com


BOB EVANS RESTAURANTS: Williams Seeks to Certify Class Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled TIFFANY WILLIAMS and DOREEN
WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. BOB EVANS RESTAURANTS, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-01353-MRH
(W.D. Pa.), moves for an order granting conditional certification
and approving the proposed notice and opt-in procedure.

The lawsuit is brought for claims under Section 216(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
          Christopher J. Bendau, Esq.
          BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC
          P.O. Box 97066
          Phoenix, AZ 85060
          Telephone: (480) 382-5176
          E-mail: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com

               - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF SIMON & SIMON
          6000 Freedom Square Dr.
          Freedom Square II - Suite 165
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 525-8890
          Facsimile: (216) 642-5814
          E-mail: jameslsimonlaw@yahoo.com


BYD COACH AND BUS: Montano Hits Missed Breaks, Claims Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------------
Evelia Montano, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. BYD Coach and Bus LLC and Does 1
through 10, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00382 (C.D. Cal., January
17, 2019), seeks redress for Defendants' failure to pay overtime
and minimum wages, failure to provide meal breaks and proper wage
statements and failure to pay earned wages upon discharge including
waiting time penalties under the Unfair Business Practices statutes
of the California Business and Professions Code, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the California Labor Code and applicable Industrial
Welfare Commission Orders.

BYD Coach and Bus manufactures electric vehicles, including
automobiles, buses and trucks in Los Angeles County where Montano
worked in a data entry position in BYD's sales department. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sam Sani, Esq.
      SANI LAW, APC
      136 Main Street, Suite A
      El Segundo, CA 90245
      Tel: (310) 935-0405
      Fax: (310) 935-0409
      Tel: ssani@sanilawfirm.com


CALIFORNIA CHECK: Summary Judgment in Gilberg Suit Partly Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DESIREE GILBERG, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA CHECK
CASHING STORES, LLC, a California corporation; CHECKSMART
FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-16263 (9th Cir.), Judge Raymond
C. Fisher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order
granting CheckSmart's motion for summary judgment on both Gilberg's
California's Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act
("ICRAA") and sFair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") claims.

The widespread use of credit reports and background checks led
Congress to pass the FCRA to protect consumers' privacy rights.
  The appeal requires the Court to decide two questions: (1)
whether a prospective employer may satisfy FCRA's standalone
document requirement by providing job applicants with a disclosure
containing extraneous information in the form of various state
disclosure requirements; and (2) whether the specific disclosure
provided by the employer in this case satisfied the clear and
conspicuous requirement.

In the process of applying for employment with CheckSmart, Gilberg
completed a three-page form containing an employment application, a
math screening and an employment history verification.  Two weeks
later, Gilberg signed a separate form, entitled "Disclosure
Regarding Background Investigation," that is the subject of the
litigation.

After receiving Gilberg's signed disclosure form, CheckSmart
obtained a criminal background report, which confirmed that Gilberg
did not have a criminal record.  CheckSmart did not obtain a credit
report.  It hired Gilberg, who worked for CheckSmart for five
months before voluntarily terminating her employment.

Gilberg then brought the putative class action against CheckSmart,
alleging two claims: (1) failure to make a proper FCRA disclosure
and (2) failure to make a proper disclosure under ICRAA.
CheckSmart moved for summary judgment on both claims.  The district
court entered summary judgment against Gilberg, concluding that
CheckSmart's disclosure form complied with FCRA and ICRAA.  Gilberg
timely appealed.

Gilberg contends the relevant document for our analysis includes
every form she filled out in the employment process -- a total of
four pages.  Judge Fisher disagrees.  He finds that Gilberg does
not offer any judicial authority, legislative history or dictionary
definition to support her argument that the word "document," as
used in FCRA, encompasses the universe of employment application
materials furnished by an employer to a prospective employee.
Gilberg's three-page employment packet was distinct from the
one-page disclosure document.  The relevant form for the analysis,
therefore, is the disclosure form alone, not the entire four
pages.

Gilberg contends that CheckSmart's disclosure form violates FCRA's
standalone document requirement.  The Judge agrees.  He finds that
CheckSmart's disclosure contains extraneous and irrelevant
information beyond what FCRA itself requires.  The disclosure
therefore violates FCRA's standalone document requirement.  Even if
congressional purpose were relevant, much of the surplusage in
CheckSmart's disclosure form does not effectuate the purposes of
FCRA.  The district court therefore erred in concluding that
CheckSmart's disclosure form satisfies FCRA's standalone document
requirement.

As the parties appear to agree, the standalone document
requirements under FCRA and ICRAA are identical.  Thus, because he
concludes CheckSmart's disclosure violates FCRA, the Judge
concludes it violates ICRAA's standalone document requirement as
well.
Finally, the Judge finds that CheckSmart's disclosure form was not
"clear and conspicuous."  First, the disclosure form contains
language that a reasonable person would not understand.  Second,
the disclosure would confuse a reasonable reader because it
combines federal and state disclosures.  Therefore, that the
district court erred by deeming CheckSmart's disclosure form clear.
And because CheckSmart's disclosure form was not both clear and
conspicuous, the district erred in granting CheckSmart's motion for
summary judgment with regard to the FCRA and ICRAA "clear and
conspicuous" requirements.

Judge Fisher holds that the district court erred by concluding that
the standalone document requirements of FCRA and ICRAA were
satisfied.  He further holds that CheckSmart's disclosure satisfies
the FCRA and ICRAA requirements for conspicuousness but not for
clarity.  For these reasons, and the reasons stated in the Court's
contemporaneously filed memorandum disposition, he affirmed in part
and vacated in part the judgment of the district court, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with these
dispositions.  Each party will bear its own costs of appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Eg41dk from Leagle.com.

H. Scott W. Leviant -- scott@setarehlaw.com -- (argued), Thomas
Segal, and Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law
Group, Beverly Hills, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Timothy W. Snider -- twsnider@stoel.com -- (argued) and Chrystal S.
Chase -- crystal.chase@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives LLP, Portland,
Oregon; Bryan L. Hawkins -- bryan.hawkins@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives
LLP, Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees.


CAPITAL ONE: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order dismissing the case, ELLA S. BROWN, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A., Defendant-Appellee, Case
No. 18-1816 (4th Cir.).

Brown appeals from the district court's order dismissing her
putative class action suit against Capital One for alleged
violations of Maryland's Credit Grantor's Closed End Credit
Provisions.  The Court has reviewed the record included on appeal,
as well as the parties' briefs, and it finds no reversible error.
Accordingly, it denied Capital One's motion to file a surreply
brief, and affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court.
It dispensed with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 6, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/1eC3kb from Leagle.com.

Cory L. Zajdel -- clz@zlawmaryland.com -- Z LAW, LLC, Timonium,
Maryland, for Appellant.

Jon S. Hubbard -- jon.hubbard@troutman.com -- Richmond, Virginia,
S. Mohsin Reza -- mohsin.reza@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.


CBRE GROUP: Quinn Seeks Overtime Pay for Integration Managers
-------------------------------------------------------------
SUSAN QUINN, on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees,
the Plaintiff, vs. CBRE GROUP, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00138-CB (W.D. Pa., Feb. 7, 2019), seeks overtime pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage
Act, and comparable wage laws in states other than Pennsylvania.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has employed Plaintiff
since in or about November 2017 as an Integration Manager (also
frequently used interchangeably by the Defendant with the titles
"Implementation Manager," "Transition Manager" or "Project
Manager") reporting to the Defendant's Pittsburgh, PA, office. The
Plaintiff is paid a salary of about $79,000, plus bonuses.  The
bonuses paid to the Plaintiff are approximately 10% of her salary.
The bonuses are "non-discretionary" bonuses within the meaning of
the FLSA and the PMWA.

The Plaintiff has worked more than 40 hours in most workweeks since
the time she began her employment. The Plaintiff is not paid
overtime. Rather, the Defendant classifies Plaintiff as exempt from
overtime under the FLSA and PMWA. The Defendant has classified
Plaintiff as exempt as a matter of common policy based upon title
and salary rather than upon an evaluation of Plaintiff's actual job
duties. Defendant's policy of misclassifying Plaintiff, not
maintaining accurate time records and failing to pay overtime wages
due in overtime workweeks is a violation of the FLSA, the PMWA and
corresponding state wage laws.  The Defendant has knowingly and
intentionally violated the FLSA's explicit requirement at 29 U.S.C.
section 211(c), which requires that it maintain accurate records of
time worked, and at 29 U.S.C. section 207(a), which requires that
it pay a premium rate for overtime worked, the lawsuit says.

As an Integration Manager, the Plaintiff's primary duty is lease
services, including collecting lease documents, gathering customer
parameters/needs, setting and conducting meetings and entering data
in computer spreadsheets and databases. The chief products produced
by the Plaintiff are a lease database and a document referred to as
a Playbook. The Playbook identifies the Defendant's day-to-day
lease services provided to the customers. The Plaintiff is required
to use the Defendant's Lease Database with explicit checklists and
protocols in the performance of her duties.

CBRE Group, Inc., is a commercial real estate services and
investment firm based in Los Angeles, California, operating more
than 450 offices worldwide and serving clients in all 50 states and
more than 100 countries.  The Defendant maintains its headquarters
at 400 S. Hope Street, 25th Floor, Los Angeles, California
90071.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and all others similarly situated:

          Joseph H. Chivers, Esq.
          THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS GROUP, LLC
          100 First Avenue, Suite 650
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222-1514
          Telephone: (412) 227-0763
          Facsimile: (412) 774-1994
          E-mail: jchivers@employmentrightsgroup.com


CELL FIX: Lawshe Files Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing
------------------------------------------------------
Robert Lawshe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Cell Fix, Inc., a Florida Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00319-VMC-JSS (M.D. Fla., February 6,
2019) is an action against Defendant to secure redress for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

To promote its services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process, asserts
the complaint. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in
the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of
the daily life of thousands of individuals, the complaint adds.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Polk County,
Florida.

Defendant is a cellphone and tablet repairs center.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, PA
     19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: 305-975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


CENER LINE, MI: Halpern 2012 Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit HALPERN 2012, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CITY
OF CENER LINE, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-11887-NGE-DRG (E.D.
Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class;

   2. appointing himself as class representative; and

   3. appointing his counsel as class counsel.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has issued over 3,000
rental certificates to rental properties during the proposed class
period, all of which require an inspection and inspection fee which
is the subject matter of the lawsuit.[CC]

Attorney for Plaintiff:

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Road
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734) 287 3664
          E-mail: aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark K. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY P.C.
          2401 w. Big Beaver Road, Ste. 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 649 5667
          E-mail: markwasvary@hotmail.com

Attorney for Defendant:

          Michael J. Bonvolanta, Esq.
          40701 Woodward Ave., Ste., 105
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Telephone: (248) 433 2000
          E-mail: jetamm@odtlegal.com
                  mjbonvolanta@odtlegal.com

CHARTER NEX: Miller Moves to Certify 2 Workers Classes Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Parties in the lawsuit entitled Brandon Miller, et al., On
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated v. Charter Nex
Films - Delaware, Ohio, Inc., et al., Case No.
2:18-cv-01341-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), jointly ask the Court to
conditionally certify a collective action under Section 216(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and approve an agreed-upon notice that
may be directed to the collective classes defined as:

    i. All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of
       Charter NEX Films, Inc., Charter NEX Films - Delaware, OH,
       Inc., or Charter NEX Films - Bloomer, WI, Inc., who
       received a base hourly wage and shift differentials, shift
       premiums, and/or nondiscretionary bonus payments during
       any workweek that they worked over 40 hours beginning
       December 21, 2015 and continuing through the date of final
       disposition of this case (the "Additional Remuneration
       Subclass"); and

   ii. All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of
       Charter NEX Films, Inc., Charter NEX Films - Delaware, OH,
       Inc., or Charter NEX Films - Bloomer, WI, Inc., who since
       December 21, 2015 have worked at least forty hours in any
       workweek and were required to track their hours worked
       with the clock-in and clock-out time tracking system (the
       "Rounding Subclass").

The parties also jointly ask the Court to:

   (a) approve the form and substance of an agreed-upon Notice of
       Collective Action Lawsuit;

   (b) approve the form and substance of the Consent to Join;

   (c) approve a 90-day period for individuals to return their
       Consent Forms to join the case from the date the Notice
       and Consent Form are sent.

Under the Parties' Stipulation, the Defendants shall provide the
names, last known address, phone number (if available), and
facility for the putative collective class members to the
Plaintiffs' Counsel no later than 21 days from the date this
Stipulation is approved by the Court.

Subject to Court approval of this Stipulation, the Plaintiffs'
Counsel shall send the court-approved Notice Packet (containing the
agreed-upon Notice and Consent Form) by mail, and nothing further,
to the putative collective class members within seven days of
receiving the information from Defendants. Plaintiffs' Counsel
shall verify the date of postmark with Defendants' counsel within
one business day of mailing.

All Consent Forms sent to Plaintiffs' Counsel for filing with the
Court must be postmarked or otherwise returned within the Notice
Period.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Peter Contreras, Esq.
          CONTRERAS LAW, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 787-4878
          Facsimile: (614) 957-7515
          E-mail: peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Thomas Wyatt Palmer, Esq.
          Kelsey J. Mullen, Esq.
          THOMPSON HINE LLP
          41 South High Street, Suite 1700
          Columbus, OH 43215-6101
          Telephone: (614) 469-3200
          Facsimile: (614) 469-3361
          E-mail: Thomas.Palmer@ThompsonHine.com
                  Kelsey.Mullen@ThompsonHine.com

               - and -

          Josh Johanningmeier, Esq.
          Erin M. Cook, Esq.
          Aaron P. McCann, Esq.
          GODFREY & KAHN, S.C.
          833 East Michigan Street, Suite 1800
          Milwaukee, WI 53202-5615
          Telephone: (414) 273-3500
          Facsimile: (414) 273-5198
          E-mail: jjohanni@gklaw.com
                  mcook@gklaw.com
                  amccann@gklaw.com


CHERNE CONTRACTING: Court Narrows Claims in Parker Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's unopposed motion to dismiss the case, BEATRICE
PARKER, Plaintiff, v. CHERNE CONTRACTING CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-01912-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Parker worked for Cherne as an hourly, non-exempt driver from
approximately June 30, 2015 until Feb. 20, 2017.  The complaint
alleges putative class action claims based on violations of the
California Labor Code, Wage Order 16, and the California Business
and Professions Code, as well as Private Attorneys General Act
("PAGA") claims.  Each of Plaintiff's claims is based upon
allegations that the Plaintiff and the putative class members were
required to work outside their official shift hours without
compensation.  These allegedly uncompensated hours included hours
spent traveling and/or waiting for and/or operating
company-provided shuttles or buses to, from, and within worksites,
as well as meal periods during which the Plaintiff was made to
work.

Cherne entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the
Contra Costa County Building & Trades Council and its Affiliated
Local Unions in 2006 for work relating to the Tesoro Golden Eagle
Refinery Coker Modification Project.  That CBA purports to include
as signatories any Contractor (including Cherne) performing Covered
Work on the Tesoro project.

The Plaintiff's second cause of action asserts claims for unpaid
wages, overtime pay, and failure to pay a minimum wage under
California Labor Code sections 510, 1194 and 1194.2, as well as IWC
Wage Order 16-2001.  Her fourth cause of action asserts claims for
failure to provide meal periods under California Labor Code
sections 226.7 and 512, and IWC Wage Order 16-2001 section 10.

The Defendant moves to dismiss.  It contends that under California
Labor Code section 514 and IWC Wage Order 16-2001 section 3(H)(1),
the Plaintiff is exempted from the asserted statutes based on the
terms of the CBA.  It also contends that the Plaintiff's second and
fourth causes of actions are preempted by section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA").  As to the remaining causes of
action, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's UCL, PAGA,
waiting time penalty, and itemized wage statement claims each
derive from otherwise invalid Labor Code and IWC Wage Order claims,
and should be dismissed for that reason.  The Defendant moves to
compel the Plaintiff's remaining claims to the mandatory grievance
and arbitration procedure provided in the CBA.

Judge Gilliam granted the Defendant's unopposed motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh Causes of action without leave to
amend.  He likewise granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss
without leave to amend with respect to: (i) the Plaintiff's claims
brought under California Labor Code section 510 and IWC Wage Order
16-2001; and (ii) the Plaintiff's claims brought under Labor Code
sections 512 and 226.7, and IWC Wage Order 16-2001 section 10.

The Judge granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to
amend with respect to the Plaintiff's remaining causes of action
that do not rely on a section 1194 violation.  Any amended
complaint must be filed within 21 days of the date of the Order.

He denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to the
Plaintiff's claims under California Labor Code section 1194 seeking
the state law mandated minimum wage.  Among other things, the Judge
finds that the FAC, on its face, raises claims for unpaid minimum
wages under California Labor Code section 1194 that are separable
from the Plaintiff's overtime claims.  The Defendant asserts that
it is impossible for the Plaintiff to claim that damages, were it
determined that she worked off the clock, would be calculated based
on the state minimum wage rate and not the much higher rate set
forth in the CBAs.  This assertion is not supported by the FAC,
which alleges separate violations of multiple statutes based on the
same conduct.  If it becomes clear at a later stage that the
Plaintiff's minimum wage claim necessarily sounds in unpaid wages
inseparable from the CBA, the Defendant may bring a motion for
summary judgment on this basis.

The Judge denied the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.  As
to the claims already dismissed by the Court as preempted by
Section 301, he denied the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration
as moot.  As to the remaining claims, he holds that these claims
brought under California Labor Code section 1194 seeking the state
law mandated minimum wage do not arise under or otherwise rely upon
interpretation of the CBA.

The Judge set a case management conference for Feb. 12, 2019 at
2:00 p.m. to discuss case schedule and ADR.  He directed the
parties to file a joint case management statement including a
proposed schedule and proposed ADR deadlines by Feb. 5, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ixoWti from Leagle.com.

Beatrice Parker, on behalf of herself, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Eric A. Grover --
eagrover@kellergrover.com -- Keller Grover LLP & Robert William
Spencer -- rspencer@kellergrover.com -- Keller Grover LLP.

Cherney Contracting Corporation, Defendant, represented by Arthur
James Rooney, III -- Arthur.Rooney@bakermckenzie.com -- Baker &
McKenzie LLP, pro hac vice & Michael E. Brewer --
Michael.Brewer@bakermckenzie.com -- Baker & McKenzie LLP.


CHINA TECHFAITH: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Jan. 9
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of China Techfaith Wireless
Communication Technology Limited (NASDAQ:CNTF) from July 12, 2018
through December 19, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for China Techfaith investors
under the federal securities laws.

To join the China Techfaith class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1483.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) China Techfaith's
agreement to sell its wholly-owned subsidiary would not be as
lucrative as it led investors to believe; (2) China Techfaith
failed to adequately disclose that changing market conditions would
negatively impact profitability; and (3) as a result, defendants'
statements about its business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than March 11,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1483.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm
was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number
of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


CIT BANK: Must Face Force-Placed Insurance Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Housing Wire's Jessica Guerin, citing New Jersey Law Journal,
reports that a federal judge in New Jersey denied a motion to
dismiss a class action lawsuit over force-placed insurance policies
for reverse mortgage borrowers.

According to an article in the New Jersey Law Journal, the suit
claims that CIT Bank, CIT's former subsidiary Financial Freedom,
and three insurance companies -- QBE Insurance, QBE First Insurance
Agency and MIC General Insurance -– conspired to defraud
borrowers by charging excessive fees for the forced-placed
insurance applied to their properties in order to comply with the
terms of their reverse mortgage loans.

While all five companies face charges of conspiracy to defraud, CIT
and Financial Freedom face additional counts for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and violation of the Truth in Lending Act.

On Dec. 28, U.S. District Judge Renee Bumb dismissed a count for
tortious interference against the insurance companies but greenlit
the rest of the suit.

The lawsuit alleges that Financial Freedom received kickbacks for
buying forced-placed insurance from the insurance company
defendants, and that the cost of the insurance and the kickback was
charged to the borrowers.

The only named plaintiff is Monica Gray, executor of the estate of
her deceased father, Earl Gray. Earl Gray obtained a reverse
mortgage from Financial Freedom for his house in Cinnaminson, New
Jersey, but failed to maintain hazard insurance on the property,
which he left to his grandchildren in a trust upon his passing.

While the suit does not contest the lender's right to assign
forced-placed insurance to protect its interests in the property,
it asserts that Financial Freedom schemed with the insurance
companies to manipulate borrowers, including Gray.

"Defendants' practices have resulted not only in imposing
unwarranted and excessive charges for insurance and inspection fees
on the reverse mortgage loans it services, but also led to
unprecedented rates of reverse mortgage foreclosures and the
eviction of elderly consumers from their homes," the lawsuit
claims.

While CIT and Financial Freedom made a number of arguments to
dispute the claims against them, Judge Bumb concluded that those
arguments were not enough to warrant dismissal of the charges at
this stage. [GN]


CITY OF HOLLYWOOD FIREFIGHTERS: Chard Files Civil Rights Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Board of Trustees
of the City of Hollywood Firefighters' Pension System, City of
Hollywood. The case is styled as Russell Chard on behalf of himself
and similarly situated individuals and Retired Firefighters Legal
Defense Fund, Inc., Plaintiff v. The Board of Trustees of the City
of Hollywood Firefighters' Pension System, City of Hollywood,
Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-60323-JEM (S.D. Fla., Feb. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The Board of Trustees of the City of Hollywood Firefighters'
Pension System provide oversight for the investment and
reinvestment of the assets of the pension fund for the sole and
exclusive purpose of funding, in whole or part, the benefits to
which all members of the plan are entitled.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James Franklin Brantley, Esq.
     Donnelly Gross
     2421 NW 41st Street, Suite A-1
     Gainesville, FL 32606
     Phone: (352) 374-4001
     Fax: (352) 374-4046
     Email: jim@donnellygross.com

          - and -

     Paul Andrew Donnelly, Esq.
     Donnelly Gross
     2421 NW 41st Street, Suite A-1
     Gainesville, FL 32606
     Phone: (352) 374-4001
     Fax: (352) 374-4046
     Email: paul@donnellygross.com


COMBE INC: Just for Men Products Class Action Fails to Settle
-------------------------------------------------------------
Madison-St. Clair Record reports that U.S. District Judge David
Herndon managed a mass action over hair dye with mediation for more
than two years and has retired without a settlement.

He left behind about 500 claims that Just for Men products damaged
skin.

After a status conference on Jan. 4, he wrote, "Without blame to
either side, that particular point at which any piece of litigation
can be compromised because each side sacrifices some and gains some
could not be reached here."

Judge Herndon ordered plaintiffs and dye maker Combe Incorporated
to pay mediation fees of former Madison County judge Dan Stack and
Randi Ellis of Baton Rouge, La.

Attorney John Driscoll of St. Louis started the litigation in
February 2016, proposing a national class action against Combe
Incorporated.

Mr. Driscoll claims Garnett Davis of East St. Louis suffered a
severe reaction including but not limited to redness, irritation,
sores, blisters, and burning.

The suit alleges negligent and wrongful conduct in design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
distribution, and labeling, and claims that Combe knew or should
have known that its products created unnecessary risk of burns,
scars, allergic reactions, and depigmentation.

It also claims that Combe failed to warn that African Americans
were at dramatically higher risk of an acute reaction than those of
Caucasian descent.

The suit seeks compensatory and punitive damages, interest,
penalties, and fees.

As Mr. Driscoll continued filing suits, Judge Herndon ordered
coordination for discovery and pretrial purposes.

He ordered automatic coordination of future cases.

He appointed Kristine Kraft of St. Louis as interim lead counsel
for plaintiffs, and Stephen Strauss of Bryan Cave in St. Louis as
lead counsel for Combe.

He wrote in his final order that, "With encouragement from the
court, and substantially prior to the completion of discovery, the
parties all agreed informally to a cessation of the discovery
process to concentrate on mediation."

Judge Herndon appointed Stack in November 2016, and directed the
parties to meet and confer at least once a month.

At some point, the parties executed a tolling agreement, suspending
statutes of limitations for plaintiffs and future plaintiffs.

Herndon held status conferences every other month, and the docket
otherwise remained quiet.

After a conference last June, he appointed Randi Ellis as mediation
facilitator.

He bestowed power on her to do all things necessary, "including but
not limited to fact gathering and documentary proof of plaintiffs
who wish to be considered as part of this mass action."

He encouraged her to "assist progress of this legal action by
contacting potential plaintiffs who have not yet filed cases, who
may have an interest in participating in this ongoing litigation."


Judge Herndon wrote that she should attempt to obtain signatures to
the tolling agreement by those parties wishing to participate.  

In July, Judge Herndon set an Aug. 15 deadline for plaintiffs to
conduct careful and thorough assessments of every case in their
inventory, filed or unfiled.

He set an Aug. 31 deadline for plaintiffs to serve fact sheets for
each case subject to the tolling agreement, ordering their counsel
to upload all medical records, photographs, and other documentation
to a litigation manager.

Mr. Driscoll moved for an extension on Aug. 30.

On Sept. 17, Judge Herndon gave him a week to produce complete
information for each individual on a spreadsheet Ellis would
provide.

He set a Sept. 28 deadline for fact sheets, authorizations,
responsive documents, and photographs.

After that, the docket went quiet until the Jan. 4 event.

"This hearing represented a culmination of a year plus of mediating
intensely and frequently in order to attempt in every way to reach
a compromise of this litigation," Herndon wrote.

He wrote that he urged mediation because all parties were
interested in pursuing compromise rather than engaging in costly
discovery.

He also wrote that Stack and Ellis mediated insurance issues,
saving the court a great deal of time and resources in avoiding
declaratory action or intervention.

"There is much work to be accomplished, which is rare in cases with
a lengthy time on file already," he wrote.

Although Mr. Driscoll filed class allegations in the complaint for
original plaintiff Garnett Davis, he hasn't moved to certify a
class.

Combe counsel Strauss moved to strike class allegations in 2017.

"It is apparent from the complaint that the class plaintiff
purports to represent, made up of unidentifiable individuals who
supposedly suffered highly individualized 'personal injuries' and
whose claims will be governed by different state laws, could never
be certified," Mr. Strauss wrote.

He wrote that Davis couldn't adequately represent absent class
members who purchased different products and supposedly suffered
different injuries, and that the proposed class was too vague to be
ascertainable because it turned in part upon whether an individual
suffered a personal injury.  

"Is mild redness a personal injury?" he wrote. "Is irritation a
personal injury?" [GN]


CONAGRA FOODS: Allen Parties Directed to File New Class Cert. Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit ERIN ALLEN, et al., the Plaintiffs, vs.
CONAGRA FOODS, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO
(N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick denied ConAgra's
motion to certify December 10 Order and vacated a February 13, 2019
hearing on that motion.

Judge Orrick said, "On July 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for
class certification and a related motion to seal. Since that time,
I have granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their
complaint and add seven new named plaintiffs. I amended the class
certification briefing schedule to allow ConAgra an opportunity to
file a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, and I have
since ruled on that motion. Given these developments, Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and related motion to seal shall be
terminated as moot. The Plaintiffs shall file a renewed motion for
class certification on or by March 1, 2019."

On March 21, 2013, Allen filed a complaint proposing a nationwide
putative class of people who purchased Parkay Spray believing it to
be a fat- and calorie-free alternative to butter.  The class argues
that ConAgra deceptively labels and markets Parkay Spray by using
artificially small serving sizes.  Instead of being zero calorie
and zero fat, each bottle contains 832 calories and 93 grams of
fat.

In his Dec. 10 ruling, Judge Orrick granted, in part, and denied,
in part, ConAgra's renewed motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs' asterisk
claim and all common law claims asserted under the laws of states
other than California were dismissed with prejudice.  The remainder
of ConAgra's motion to dismiss is denied.[CC]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Court OKs Dismissal of Flushable Wipes Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned THE PRESERVE AT CONNETQUOT HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, CVS
HEALTH CORPORATION, KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, THE PROCTOR &
GAMBLE COMPANY, TARGET CORPORATION, WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC.,
AND WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendants. No. 17-CV-7050 (JFB)(AYS).
(E.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated
entities that own and/or operate sewage or wastewater treatment
plants or facilities, filed this action against the Defendants,
alleging that the defendants' products labeled as flushable have
caused and will continue to cause injury under strict products
liability, nuisance, trespass, negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation tort theories, breach of express warranty, and
breach of implied merchantability contract theories, and that the
advertising of such products as flushable violates Sections 349 of
the New York General Business Law (NYGBL).

The Defendants argue that the plaintiff lacks standing because it
has failed to allege any imminent injury-in-fact and because any
injury is not fairly traceable to each named defendant's conduct.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this
action because plaintiff has failed to allege facts that satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement and, thus, does not reach the
additional question of whether the Complaint should also be
dismissed for lack of standing because any hypothetical injury
would not be traceable to the defendants.

Article III Standing

To meet Article III's injury-in-face requirement, plaintiff's
alleged injury must be 'concrete and particularized' as well actual
or imminent, not conjectural of hypothetical. Furthermore, the
alleged injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way to confirm that the plaintiff has a personal stake
in the controversy and avoid having the federal courts serve as
merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public
grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding. A
plaintiff seeking to represent a class must personally have
standing.  

Application

The Court notes that the plaintiff is not alleging an actual,
present injury and there are no allegations that the plaintiff is
actually aware of continued flushable wipe usage by residents of
The Preserve. Instead, the theory of the case is that flushable
wipes have caused harm to wastewater facilities or treatment plants
and can, at any given moment, cause harm in the form of clogs. The
question is not whether the flushable products will cause damage to
wastewater facilities or treatment plants, but when that damage
will occur. The question of imminence, or when that damage may
occur, is at any moment.

The Plaintiff does not dispute in its papers nor at oral argument,
that the only injury The Preserve has suffered was a clog,
purportedly attributable to flushable wipes, in The Preserve sewage
treatment system in 2012. Further, though not specifically pled in
the Complaint, the plaintiff asserts in its papers that, after the
2012 clog and to combat future clogs, shutdowns, equipment
failures, and remedy past damages to sewage treatment plant
equipment, The Preserve installed new equipment, including pumps
and a filtering system. Plaintiff further asserts that it has an
ongoing directive via the issuance of a letter to residents of The
Preserve to refrain from flushing purportedly flushable wipes down
their toilets and that in an additional attempt to prevent further
damages to its sewage treatment plant, The Preserve issued a
pamphlet to homeowners asking them not to flush so-called flushable
wipes.  

The Defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement because the plaintiffs have failed to
establish the imminence requirement of a future injury because (1)
having gone six years without any incident allegedly attributable
to the defendants' products, the plaintiff does not plead a single
fact to suggest why harm is suddenly imminent today (2) the
plaintiff has applied the wrong standard of imminence applying a
likely to suffer future injury standard rather than a certainly
impending injury standard (3) the passage of time since injury
weakens the plaintiff's claim of imminence and (4) the plaintiffs
ongoing directive to homeowners to refrain from flushing flushable
wipes further suggests there is no imminent injury to the
plaintiffs.  

In the case at bar, the plaintiff does not allege that it has
experienced repeated clogs, numerous back-ups, or any ongoing
problems with its sewage treatment plant at all, let alone
continuing problems arguably attributable to flushable wipes. The
plaintiff alleges only one clog, in 2012, attributable to flushable
wipes, and the plaintiff conceded at oral argument that it has not
performed any tests of its sewage system to determine current
levels of clogging and does not even know if residents of The
Preserve have continued to flush the flushable wipe products in
violation of the directive to the residents.

The plaintiff in the case at bar attempts, albeit unsuccessfully,
to establish standing to seek injunctive relief as the owner and
operator of a sewage treatment plant, and relies heavily on cases
claiming clogging of municipal sewage systems and their machinery
in support of its standing argument.  

In sum, accepting all allegations in the Complaint as true, the
Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to plead any facts from
which the Court could conclude that it will suffer harm of any kind
attributable to flushable wipes, let alone imminent harm sufficient
to confer Article III standing.

Instead, the Complaint alleges: (1) the plaintiff is a homeowners
association consisting of only forty units and alleges only one
instance of past injury a single clog in 2012 that was purportedly
attributable to flushable wipes; (2) since 2012, plaintiff has made
modifications to its sewage treatment system in an attempt to
mitigate the damage that flushable wipes allegedly cause to the
system and has issued a directive to all of its residents to cease
flushing flushable wipe products; and (3) The Preserve residents
fund the sewage treatment system themselves through homeowners
association dues, which cover maintenance and repairs to the
system. As conceded at oral argument, plaintiff could have, but has
not, surveyed the residents of The Preserve to see if any household
is still flushing these products at all, nor has The Preserve
tested its sewage treatment system to see if the system is
experiencing any degree of clogging.

Thus, the plaintiff has not only failed to plead facts showing why
it is again at risk of a likely injury from flushable wipes, but
has entirely failed to show that flushable wipes are being flushed
at all by residents (who have every incentive not to flush the
wipes because of the risk of increasing their homeowners
association dues to fund repairs to the system), or that the sewage
system is compromised in any way after six clog-free years. In
other words, even though there is an allegation of past harm, there
are insufficient allegations in the current Complaint to support a
reasonable inference that there is a substantial risk, or any
likelihood, that a clog will occur again.

Therefore, because the plaintiffs claimed harm is not concrete and
particularized, but is instead conjectural or hypothetical,
plaintiffs have not alleged an injury-in-fact, and thus, do not
have standing. Accordingly, plaintiff's Complaint must be
dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants' joint motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack of standing, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3o8936
from Leagle.com.

The Preserve at Connetquot Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Mark S. Reich -- mreich@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP & Mario Claudio Lattuga --
MLattuga@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant, represented by Courtney
Elizabeth Scott -- cscott@tresslerllp.com -- Tressler LLP, John Q.
Lewis -- john.lewis@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac
vice, Karl A. Bekeny -- karl.bekeny@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Ruttinger --
michael.ruttinger@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac vice
& William Berglund -- william.berglund@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

CVS Health Corporation, Defendant, represented by Courtney
Elizabeth Scott, Tressler LLP & Rebecca Briggs --
rbriggs@hinckleyallen.com -- Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP.


COVERALL NORTH: Bille Labor Suit Hits Misclassification
-------------------------------------------------------
Caribe Bille and Quincy Reeves, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. Coverall North
America, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00092 (D. Conn., January
17, 2019), seeks to recover business-related expenses unlawfully
deducted, and to collect all applicable statutory penalties, for
violations of the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act.

Coverall employed Bille and Reeves as cleaning workers for its
commercial customers in Connecticut. Plaintiffs claim that Coverall
required them to sign "franchise agreements" that classified them
as independent contractors, rather than employees and charged them
franchise fees, interest, insurance and administration charges
deducted from their pay and deprived reimbursement of their
necessary business expenditures for cleaning supplies and
equipment. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard E. Hayber, Esq.
      HAYBER LAW FIRM, LLC
      221 Main Street, Suite 502
      Hartford, CT 06106
      Tel: (860) 522-8888
      Email: rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
      Adelaide H. Pagano, Esq.
      LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
      729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
      Boston, MA 02116
      Tel: (617) 994-5800
      Email: sliss@llrlaw.com
             apagano@llrlaw.com


CREDIT SUISSE: Rubinstein Says Financial Report Misleading
----------------------------------------------------------
JULIAN RUBINSTEIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG,
CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT SUISSE INTERNATIONAL, CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC, TIDJANE THIAM, DAVID R. MATHERS, JANUS
HENDERSON GROUP PLC, JANUS INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC, and
JANUS DISTRIBUTORS LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01069
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 4, 2019), is a federal securities class action on
behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired ZIV ETNs
between June 30, 2017 and February 5, 2018. The Standard & Poor's
500 Index is a capitalization-weighted index tracking the
performance of 500 large market capitalization companies based on
the total market value of their outstanding shares. Put and call
options on the S&P 500 Index ("SPX options") are financial
derivatives created and made available to investors on the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Incorporated ("CBOE") to bet on a downward
or upward move in the level of the S&P 500 Index.

According to the complaint, the Class Period begins on June 30,
2017, when Credit Suisse filed a prospectus supplement with the SEC
on Form 424B2 for the offer and sale of the Inverse ETNs, which
incorporated and formed part of an F-3 registration statement, and
was subsequently amended by a prospectus supplement filed on
January 29, 2018. The Registration Statement was signed by
defendants Thiam and Mathers. The Registration Statement
represented that the Inverse ETNs were "intended to be a trading
tool for sophisticated investors to manage daily trading risks."
Similarly, the Registration Statement stated that the XIV was
"designed to achieve [its] stated investment objectives on a daily
basis." Indeed, the Registration Statement represented that the XIV
was suitable for a wide-range of investor objectives.

Credit Suisse Group AG is a Swiss multinational financial service
holding company with its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. It
owns 100% of the equity interest in Credit Suisse AG, its primary
operating subsidiary.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

               Jeffrey S. Abraham, Esq.
               Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
               ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
               One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805
               New York, NY 10119
               Telephone: (212) 279-5050
               Facsimile: (212) 279-3655
               E-mail: JAbraham@aftlaw.com
                       MGuarnero@aftlaw.com

CRETE CARRIER: Gonzalez Suit Moved to Western Dist. of Washington
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, John P. Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Crete Carrier Corporation, a
Nebraska corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 19-00002-00231-0-SEA,
was removed from the King County Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for Western District of Washington (Seattle) on Feb.
7, 2019.  The Western District of Washington Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 2:19-cv-00186 to the proceeding. The suit alleges labor
related violation.

Crete Carrier offers dry van services; coast-to-coast
temperature-sensitive truckload services to candy, confection, and
beverage industries; and flatbed, drop-deck, RGN, and curtain side
transportation services for agricultural and construction
materials/equipment, and commodity that requires flatbed
equipment.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Brian Walter Denlinger, Esq.
          Craig Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          2602 NORTH PROCTOR STREET, STE 205
          Tacoma, WA 98406
          Telephone: (253) 507-4619
          E-mail: bd@ackermanntilajef.com
                  cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          India Lin Bodien, Esq.
          INDIA LIN BODIEN LAW
          2522 N PROCTOR ST No. 387
          TACOMA, WA 98406-5338
          (253) 212-7913
          E-mail: india@indialinbodienlaw.com

Attorneys for Crete Carrier Corporation:

          Jaime N Cole, Esq.
          Laurence A Shapero, Esq.
          OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART (SEA)
          1201 Third Avenue, Ste 5150
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 693-7057
          Facsimile: (206) 693-7058
          E-mail: jaime.cole@ogletree.com
                  laurence.shapero@ogletree.com

D & J MOVING: Kelly Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
Marisha Kelly, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. D & J Moving, LLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-60318 (S.D. Fla.,
February 6, 2019) is an action against Defendant to secure redress
for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Defendant caused thousands of text messages to be sent to the
cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members who either never
provided the Defendant with consent to contact them or who had
revoked any prior express consent.

The Defendant caused Plaintiff and Class Members injuries,
including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Broward County,
Florida.

Defendant is a moving and storage service company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, PA
     19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: 305-975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


DIRECTV: Settlement in Jantos Suit Has Preliminary Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES JANTOS, individually, and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. DIRECTV, a Delaware
Corporation; DIRECTV, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Corporation; and QWEST CORPORATION d/b/a CENTURYLINK QC, a Colorado
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00413-TSZ (W.D. Wash.),
Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Parties' renewed joint
motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement.

On Dec. 12, 2018, the Parties executed an Amended Class Action
Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims.  The Agreement
settles all Released Claims that have been or could have been
brought in this putative class action.  It provides for a
nationwide class settlement of the Released Claims concerning the
alleged online accessibility by others of certain information of
the Plaintiff and the other Settlement Class Members found in their
CenturyLink bills, which is the subject of the litigation ("Federal
Action") and in a corresponding lawsuit, Case No. 17-2-12346-3,
brought by the Plaintiff in King County Superior Court for the
State of Washington ("State Action").  The nationwide Settlement
Class includes one subclass; namely, the DIRECTV Subclass.

Judge Zilly preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement and
corresponding Settlement.  He approved the form and content of the
proposed Class Notice and FAQ with the following modifications:

     a. In Paragraphs 10 and 12 of the proposed Class Notice, and
Paragraph 17 of the FAQ, the Parties have included language
suggesting that the Final Approval Hearing might occur on a date
different from the one set forth in the Class Notice and that the
Final Approval Hearing could be rescheduled without notice to the
Settlement Class Members.  These passages should be deleted because
they do not reflect the Court's views.  If the Final Approval
Hearing must be continued for any reason, the Court will require
that notice be sent to all Settlement Class Members.

     b. In the last sentence of Paragraph 13 of the proposed Class
Notice, the Parties suggest that Settlement Class Members will
receive settlement benefits if the Court approves the Settlement,
but they have not mentioned the possibility of an appeal or
appellate decision affecting the Settlement, and the statement is
therefore inaccurate and potentially misleading, and it must be
revised.

Promptly following the entry of the Order, the Parties and
Settlement Administrator will prepare final versions of (i) the
Class Notice, and (ii) FAQ, incorporating into each of them the
Court's amendments, the Final Approval Hearing date, and the dates
and deadlines set forth in Paragraphs III(D) and IV of the Order.

By March 14, 2019, the Defendants will file with the Court the
Settlement Administrator's declaration of compliance with the plan
of notice, including a statement regarding the number of persons to
whom the Class Notice was mailed and/or emailed.

By May 23, 2019, the Parties will file any motion for final
approval of class action settlement, and will note such motion for
June 7, 2019.  The Parties will file with such motion the
Settlement Administrator's declaration summarizing and attaching
the list of all Settlement Class Members who submitted Requests for
Exclusion and any objections received by the Settlement
Administrator from the Settlement Class Members.  Any response to
such motion will be filed by June 3, 2019. Any reply will be filed
by 8:00 a.m. on June 7, 2019.

The Settlement Administrator will perform the following functions
in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Order, and
subsequent orders that might be entered by the Court in the case:

     a. Establish, on Feb. 21, 2019, a Settlement Website that
enables Settlement Class Members to: (a) Read the Class Notice,
FAQ, Class Counsel's Fee Application, Settlement Agreement,
relevant pleadings related to the Settlement, and relevant orders
of the Court; and (b) complete, review, and submit a Request for
Exclusion online.

     b. Send or cause to be sent, by first-class United States
Mail, on Feb. 28, 2019, the Class Notice to every Settlement Class
Member.  CenturyLink will obtain or cause to be obtained address
updates utilizing a National Change of Address database (Updated
Addresses).  The Settlement Administrator will use any Updated
Addresses thus obtained.  The Settlement Administrator will forward
Settlement Notices that are returned by the U.S. Postal Service
with a forwarding address.

     c. Send or cause to be sent, via electronic mail, on Feb. 28,
2019, a copy of the Class Notice to every Settlement Class Member
whose email address Defendants can reasonably identify.

     d. Process requests for exclusion from the Settlement.

     e. Process objections to the Settlement.

     f. At least three days before the deadline set forth in
Paragraph III(D)(3), provide to the Defendants' Counsel a
declaration of compliance with paragraphs III(D)(5)(a)-(c).

     g. By May 10, 2019, provide to all the counsel a list of all
Settlement Class Members who submitted Requests for Exclusion, any
objections received by the Settlement Administrator from Settlement
Class Members, a list of the Settlement Class Members to whom
notice was not delivered, and a declaration summarizing the
exclusions, objections, and notification failures.

The Judge scheduled for June 7, 2019, at 11:00 a.m., a Final
Approval Hearing.  The members of the Settlement Class who wish to
be excluded from the Settlement must mail, email, or submit online
their requests for exclusion no later than April 30, 2019.  Any
exclusion that is sent via first-class United States Mail must be
postmarked by April 30, 2019.  Any objections to certification of
the Settlement Class, the designation of the Plaintiff as the class
representative, the service award requested by the Plaintiff, the
appointment of the Class Counsel, the Settlement, the Settlement
Agreement, or the amount of fees and expenses that the Class
Counsel might request at the Final Approval Hearing, may be made in
writing and submitted to the Settlement Administrator by April 30,
2019.

In conjunction with any motion for final approval of class action
settlement, the parties will file a proposed Final Approval Order,
and will attach a Word compatible file containing such proposed
Final Approval Order to an email sent to
ZillyOrders@wawd.uscourts.gov.

On March 14, 2019, the Class Counsel will file any motion for
attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses, and will
note such motion for June 7, 2019.  Any response will be filed by
June 3, 2019, and any reply will be filed by 8:00 a.m. on June 7,
2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/pr19MY from Leagle.com.

James Jantos, individually, and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Chris Robert Youtz --
chris@sylaw.com -- SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER, Michael
David Myers -- mmyers@myers-company.com -- MYERS & COMPANY &
Richard E. Spoonemore -- rspoonemore@sylaw.com -- SIRIANNI YOUTZ
SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER.

DirecTV, a Delaware corporation & DirecTV LLC, a California limited
liability corporation, Defendants, represented by Emily J. Harris
-- eharris@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG
& MOORE LLP & Jordann Hallstrom, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Qwest Corporation, a Colorado corporation, Defendant, represented
by Erin K. Earl -- EEarl@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE, Jennifer
J. Oxley -- Oxley@wtotrial.com -- WHEELER TRIGG O'DONNELL LLP, pro
hac vice, Kathryn A. Reilly, WHEELER TRIGG O'DONNELL LLP, pro hac
vice, Todd M. Hinnen, PERKINS COIE & Amanda J. Beane, PERKINS
COIE.


DUCKY JOHNSON: Shortchanges Nurse Aide's Overtime Pay, Says Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Bliss, and other similarly situated current and former
laborers, Plaintiff, v. Ducky Johnson Home Elevation, LLC, Jeremy
Patterson, Gregory Patterson, Charlie Johnson, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-00353, (E.D. N.Y., January 16, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime compensation and earned wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

Ducky Home Elevation is into the demolition, excavating and
repairing of properties. Bliss worked as a nurse's aide from
October 24, 2014 to January 29, 2016. He claims to have worked from
6:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. He was never
paid time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty per
week. He also never received a wage notice, says the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JASON TENENBAUM P.C.
      595 Stewart Avenue, Suite 400
      Garden City, NY 11750
      Tel: (516) 750-0595


ECO SHIELD: Fanslau Moves to Certify Technicians Class Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned MATTHEW FANSLAU, ANTHONY
HOUSTON, and JOSHUA CRUZ, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ECO SHIELD PEST CONTROL CHICAGO, LLC, ECO
SHIELD PEST CONTROL CORPORATE, LLC, MIKE SAWTELLE, ROBERT DOUG
CARDON, RYAN J. BUCHANAN, GREGORY NYGREN, and GANES MCCULLOCH, Case
No. 1:18-cv-07181 (N.D. Ill.), seeks an order granting conditional
certification and court-facilitated notice under Section 216(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The proposed collective class is defined as:

     All individuals who were employed or are currently employed
     by the Defendants as service technicians, or any other
     similarly-titled position, at any time during the three (3)
     years prior to the date of the commencement of this action
     through the date of judgment in this action, and who were
     not properly compensated for time worked in excess of 40
     hours in given workweeks.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to:

   (1) order court-facilitated notice of this collective action
       to the FLSA Class;

   (2) order the Defendants to produce a computer-readable data
       file containing the names, addresses, e-mail addresses,
       telephone numbers, dates of employment, social security
       numbers, and dates of birth of the FLSA Class;

   (3) order the posting of the collective action notice at a
       location in Defendants' offices where members of the FLSA
       Class are likely to view it; and

   (4) authorize the Plaintiffs to send the notice, at their
       expense, by U.S. First Class mail and e-mail to all
       members of the FLSA Class to inform them of their right to
       opt-in to this lawsuit.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          Anna M. Ceragioli, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  hjenkins@stephanzouras.com
                  aceragioli@stephanzouras.com


EQUIFAX INC: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting in
part and denying in part Defendant's Joint Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned IN RE EQUIFAX INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. Civil
Action No. 17-CV-3463-TWT. (N.D. Ga.).

This case arises out of a massive data breach incident. The
Defendant Equifax Inc. announced that it was the subject of a data
breach affecting more than 148 million Americans (Data Breach).
Criminal hackers breached Equifax's Computer network and obtained a
vast amount of personally identifiable information in the company's
custody. The Lead Plaintiff, Union Asset Management Holding AG,
seeks to represent a putative class of investors that purchased the
securities of Equifax. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
committed fraud in connection with the Data Breach that caused a
loss in value of the class's investments.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made
multiple false or misleading statements and omissions about the
sensitive personal information in Equifax's custody, the
vulnerability of its internal systems to cyberattack, and its
compliance with data protection laws and cybersecurity best
practices.

False or Misleading Statements

The Adequacy of Equifax's Data Security

The Defendants argue that the statements touting the strength of
Equifax's data security systems and the adequacy of Equifax's
efforts to promote cybersecurity do not constitute material
misrepresentations. In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants made a variety of material misrepresentations
as to the state of Equifax's data security and Equifax's efforts to
promote cybersecurity.  

The Defendants make two main arguments for why these statements are
not material misrepresentations. First, they argue that the alleged
statements are not actually false or misleading because the facts
pleaded do not show that Equifax's data security was actually
inadequate. Second, they contend that these statements constitute
inactionable puffery.  

Falsity

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff has failed to plead the
falsity of each of the alleged statements concerning the strength
of Equifax's systems. They argue that the Plaintiff has not shown
that the statements boasting of the strength and complexity of
Equifax's cybersecurity are actually false. Instead, according to
the Defendants, the Plaintiff has only alleged that Equifax was the
victim of a criminal attack that was out of its control. They
contend that the fact that a company suffered a significant
cyberattack does not necessarily mean that its cybersecurity was
deficient, and thus does not render its prior statements about its
commitment to data security false.

Overall, the Plaintiff alleges that, among other things, Equifax:
(1) failed to implement adequate patching processes (2) failed to
create adequate encryption measures to protect the information in
its custody (3) failed to implement adequate authentication
measures to ensure that parties attempting to access its networks
were authorized to do so (4) failed to establish mechanisms for
monitoring its networks for security breaches; (5) stored personal
data in easily accessible public channels (6) relied on outdated
and obsolete software and (7) failed to warehouse obsolete personal
information. Together, according to the Plaintiff, each of these
shortcomings created an inadequate cybersecurity system.

Given the dangerously deficient state of Equifax's cybersecurity,
the Court concludes it was false, or at least misleading, for
Equifax to tout its advanced cybersecurity protections. In contrast
to the Defendants' representations that, among other things,
Equifax employed a highly sophisticated data information network
and advanced security protections. Equifax's data security was
dangerously lacking. While it is true that the mere occurrence of a
data breach may not necessarily mean that a company's data security
systems are inadequate, the Plaintiff here does not rely solely
upon the occurrence of the Data Breach to establish that the
Defendants' statements were false. Instead, the Plaintiff has
pleaded a variety of facts showing that Equifax's cybersecurity
systems were outdated, below industry standards, and vulnerable to
cyberattack, and that Equifax did not prioritize data security
efforts.

Puffery

Next, the Defendants argue that many of the challenged statements
concerning Equifax's commitment to data security constitute
inactionable puffery. Alleged misrepresentations must be based upon
a material fact to give rise to a securities law violation.
Subjective characterizations of a company's current performance or
predictions about future performance, absent a false misstatement
of fact, are generally not actionable. Such statements of corporate
optimism or puffery are not actionable because they both lack an
underlying factual basis and also fail the materiality requirement
of Rule 10b-5.

However, the Court finds that these alleged statements are not
inactionable puffery. An alleged misstatement or omission must be
so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable
minds could not differ on the question of their importance to be
deemed inactionable puffery. For example, in the context of a
drilling company's statements concerning its safety and training
efforts, one court noted that it could not say, as a matter of law,
that Transocean's representation that such efforts were extensive
was `obviously unimportant' to GSF shareholders since in an
industry as dangerous as deepwater drilling, it is to be expected
that investors will be greatly concerned about an operator's safety
and training efforts. Likewise, the Court cannot say, as a matter
of law, that Equifax's representations that its cybersecurity
efforts were extensive or that it was committed to data security
were so obviously unimportant to its shareholders that they should
be considered immaterial.  

Failure to Disclose the Data Breach

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's allegations based
upon their purported failure to disclose the Data Breach earlier.
In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that some of the
alleged statements were or became misleading by omission because
the Defendants did not publicly disclose the Data Breach until
September 7, 2017. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants'
statements after March 2017 lauding Equifax's data security were
false or misleading because Equifax knew or recklessly disregarded
that hackers had already penetrated its databases.

However, the Court concludes that the Defendants were under no duty
to disclose the Data Breach prior to becoming aware of the incident
in July 2017. The Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendants
knew about the Data Breach before July 29, 2017, but instead argues
that they were reckless as to its occurrence. It bases its argument
upon warnings that the Defendants allegedly received as to the
deficient state of Equifax's cybersecurity, its failure to employ
adequate patching processes, and its failure to use proper network
monitoring. These warnings might demonstrate that the Defendants
knew of, or were reckless as to, Equifax's ability to prevent or
detect a breach. However, these warnings do not establish that the
Defendants knew, or were reckless to the existence of, the specific
Data Breach at issue here. The allegations also do not demonstrate
that the Defendants knew of, or were reckless as to the existence
of, Equifax's failure to patch the Apache Struts vulnerability.
Therefore, the Defendants were under no duty to disclose the
existence of the Data Breach before they knew it had occurred.

Statements About Cybersecurity Risks

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's allegations
regarding Equifax's warnings of its cybersecurity risks. In the
Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Equifax, Smith, and
Gamble made false or misleading statements in SEC filings
concerning the cybersecurity risks that Equifax faced.  

The Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim
because, through these statements, the Defendants warned of the
precise risk that caused the Plaintiff's losses. The Court finds
that these statements are not actionable. The difference between
disclosing that Equifax could be vulnerable" and that it was highly
vulnerable would not mislead a reasonable investor in making an
investment decision. The Defendants warned that Equifax could be
vulnerable to a data breach, but they did not fail to disclose the
existence of a breach when they made that statement. Therefore, the
Court finds these risk statements inactionable.

Equifax's Compliance With Data Protection Laws

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims concerning
statements about Equifax's compliance with data protection laws,
regulations, and best practices. In the Amended Complaint, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made various statements
assuring that Equifax complied with relevant data protection laws,
regulations, standards, and best practices.  

The Defendants argue that these alleged statements described
Equifax's ongoing efforts to comply with data protection laws and
standards, and that the statements did not guarantee compliance.

According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has not adequately
alleged the falsity of these statements because the fact that they
were not in compliance does not mean that they were not making
efforts to comply. However, in the alleged statements, Equifax did
more than just say that it made efforts to comply with these laws
and standards. It stated that it monitored regulatory activities to
remain in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations,"
that it reviewed its security protocols to ensure that they
continue to meet or exceed established best practices and that it
took great care to ensure that it handled personal data in a way
that complied with regulations. These statements go beyond merely
stating that it made an effort to comply with laws, regulations,
and industry standards, and instead assured that Equifax took steps
to remain in compliance with laws and regulations and meet industry
standards. According to the allegations in the Amended Complaint,
Equifax in reality failed to live up to these assurances.

Statements Concerning Internal Controls

The Defendants next move to dismiss the Plaintiff's allegations
concerning the Defendants' various statements about Equifax's
internal controls. In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
that Smith and Gamble certified in SEC filings, pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that Equifax maintained a system of internal
controls that would provide reasonable assurance regarding
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or
disposition of our assets that could have a material effect on the
financial statements.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to show that
these statements are false. The Plaintiff fails to allege that
Equifax had flawed internal controls over its financial reporting.
Even if Equifax's data breach protocol was vastly deficient, this
does not establish that it had insufficient internal controls over
financial reporting. The Plaintiff has not raised any allegations
concerning the accuracy of Equifax's accounting, books, or
financial reporting.

Therefore, the Plaintiff has not established that Equifax, Smith,
or Gamble's statements concerning Equifax's internal controls over
financial reporting were false. A reasonable investor would
understand that certifications under Sarbanes-Oxley such as these
are in the context of financial accounting scandals, and would
recognize that it related to Equifax's financial reporting. A
reasonable investor would not take assurances of internal controls
to detect improprieties in accounting and bookkeeping to guarantee
that there were systems in place to deal with cybersecurity
breaches. Since the Plaintiff has not alleged that Equifax's
financial reports were inaccurate in any way, its claims concerning
Smith and Gamble's certification of proper internal controls
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley fail.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims are dismissed to the extent that
they rely upon statements guaranteeing adequate internal controls
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley.

Statements of Opinion and Belief

The Defendants contend that many of the challenged statements are
inactionable opinions or statements of belief. First, the
Defendants contend that almost all of the alleged statements are
inactionable, in part, because they are opinions. However, many of
these statements that the Defendants contend are inactionable are
not, in fact, opinions. For example, the Defendants contend that
the following statement is an inactionable opinion.

The Plaintiff contends that this statement, even if an opinion, is
actionable because it did not align with the information in his
possession. Certain opinions may be actionable because if the real
facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will
mislead its audience. An investor expects not just that the issuer
believes the opinion but that it fairly aligns with the information
in the issuer's possession at the time. Opinion statements can be
misleading in context and thus actionable if they conflict with
what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself.

The Plaintiff only alleges that Smith not the other Individual
Defendants was given specific information as to the deficiencies in
Equifax's cybersecurity. Without this knowledge, these opinion
statements are not actionable. Furthermore, any opinion statements
Smith made before receiving these warnings would also not be
actionable.

Scienter

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to plead facts
that give rise to a strong inference of scienter on the part of any
of the Defendants. To state a section 10(b) claim, the PSLRA
requires a plaintiff to plead with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendants either intended to
defraud investors or were severely reckless when they made the
allegedly materially false or incomplete statements. A strong
inference is an inference that is cogent and at least as compelling
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.

To move beyond the pleading state, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficiently demonstrating each defendant's state of mind regarding
his or her alleged violations. But, the PSLRA does permit the
aggregation of facts to infer scienter. The factual allegations,
taken as a whole, must give rise to this strong inference as to
each Defendant and each alleged violation.281Circumstantial
evidence can be sufficient to establish a strong inference of
scienter. Since scienter is highly fact-intensive inquiry, such
questions are most appropriate for a fact finder.

In sum, the reviewing court must ask: When the allegations are
accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person
deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing
inference?

Here, the Plaintiff attempts to plead scienter by alleging, among
other things, that: (1) the Defendants received numerous warnings
concerning the inadequacies of Equifax's cybersecurity (2) the
Defendants were aware of the breach by late July 2017, but failed
to disclose the breach and continued to make false statements until
September 7, 2017 (3) the false and misleading statements concerned
one of the most significant issues and severe risks that Equifax
faced (4) the Defendants were in charge of cybersecurity and
received routine updates about the state of Equifax's data security
(5) the egregiousness of the deficiencies in Equifax's data
security practices supports an inference of scienter (6) the sudden
departure of high-ranking officers at Equifax after disclosure of
the Data Breach supports a finding of scienter and (7) suspicious
stock sales by Gamble and Ploder support an inference of scienter.

Since scienter is an essential element of a securities fraud claim,
the Plaintiff must create a strong inference one that is cogent and
compelling that the Defendants knew about the deficiencies in
Equifax's cybersecurity, or were severely reckless in not knowing
about it, when they made the allegedly false or misleading
statements.The Court concludes that the allegations in the Amended
Complaint establish a strong inference of scienter as to Equifax
and Smith. However, these facts, even when taken together, do not
give rise to a strong inference of scienter as to Gamble, Dodge,
and Ploder.

Knowledge of the Data Breach

Next, the Plaintiffs argue that Equifax Senior Management's
knowledge of the Data Breach raises a strong inference of scienter.


First, the Defendants argue that each of the challenged statements
attributed to Gamble, Ploder, and Dodge, and all but one of the
statements attributed to Smith, are alleged to have been made on or
before July 27, 2017. Thus, as to these statements, the Individual
Defendants could not have known or been severely reckless as to the
risk of misleading investors since they did not know of the
existence of the Data Breach. The Court agrees. The Plaintiff has
not shown that Gamble, Dodge, or Ploder made any of the challenged
statements after they allegedly became aware of the Data Breach in
late July 2017. Thus, these Individual Defendants' knowledge of the
Data Breach does not establish scienter as to any of their specific
alleged violations.

However, these allegations do support a finding of scienter as to
Smith. On August 16, 2017, after discovery of the Data Breach,
Smith made comments regarding Equifax's data security in a speech
at the University of Georgia. The factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint support a finding that Smith made these
statements with the requisite scienter. By this point, Mandiant had
already informed Smith that it was likely that a large amount of
personally identifiable information had been compromised in the
Data Breach. Furthermore, Smith had personally overseen the
previous Mandiant investigation in March 2017, in which Mandiant
concluded that Equifax's cybersecurity practices were grossly
inadequate. Thus, Smith, despite knowing that the sensitive data
had been compromised in the Data Breach, and despite personally
overseeing this previous investigation by Mandiant, nonetheless
stated that data security is a huge priority for us and that it was
his number one worry.

These allegations are sufficient to raise a strong inference that
Smith made this statement with the requisite scienter.

Egregiousness of Cybersecurity Deficiencies

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's allegations as to the
egregiousness of the shortcomings in Equifax's data security fail
to support a strong inference of scienter.  Instead, according to
the Defendants, these allegations merely constitute hindsight
criticism as to the manner in which Equifax managed
cybersecurity.The Plaintiff argues that the magnitude, scope, and
duration of the deficiencies in Equifax's cybersecurity systems
were such that they could not have escaped the notice of the
Defendants and other senior management, and that this supports an
inference of scienter. And, according to the Plaintiff, this is
compounded by the fact that the Defendants allegedly represented
that they were closely monitoring Equifax's data security.

The Court concludes, however, that the egregiousness of Equifax's
cybersecurity problems, without more specific allegations, fails to
establish scienter. Once again, as discussed above, the Plaintiff
has failed to establish that Dodge, Gamble, or Ploder knew of or
were severely reckless as to these egregious deficiencies. The
severity of these problems, if taken into account with other
specific factual allegations supporting scienter, could help
establish an inference of scienter. However, here those other
allegations are absent. Without those allegations, the Plaintiff
has failed to establish an inference that is cogent and compelling,
and just as likely as other, more innocent explanations. Even if
these problems were severe and widespread, it is still more
plausible to infer that these Individual Defendants were negligent,
rather than something more insidious.

Sudden Resignations of Equifax Officers

Next, the Plaintiff contends that the sudden departures of
high-ranking Equifax executives support an inference of scienter.
On September 15, 2017, about a week after public disclosure of the
Data Breach, Chief Security Officer Susan Mauldin and Chief
Information Officer David Webb resigned from Equifax. On September
26, 2017, Smith retired from Equifax, without severance, effective
immediately.

Some courts have concluded that the resignation of corporate
officers, in certain contexts, can support an inference of
scienter. However, in those cases, the context of the executives'
resignations was important. The fact that an executive resigned, on
its own, does not support an inference of scienter. Instead, the
circumstances of the resignation must suggest that intentional or
reckless misconduct had occurred. The court noted that although the
decision to terminate the defendants does not negate the
possibility of mere negligence in mismanaging the Section 956
issue, it more likely suggests a higher level of wrongdoing
approaching recklessness or even conscious malfeasance.

In contrast, the context of the resignations here does not suggest
that Gamble, Ploder, or Dodge knew of, or were severely reckless as
to, the false or misleading nature of their statements. The
Plaintiff fails to explain how the resignations of Smith, Mauldin,
and Webb show that Gamble, Ploder, or Dodge acted with the
requisite state of mind. Nothing about the context of these
resignations would lead one to infer that Gamble, Ploder, or Dodge
must have known about the deficient state of Equifax's
cybersecurity. Without such allegations, the resignations of Smith,
Mauldin, and Webb fail to establish scienter as to these Individual
Defendants.

Thus, the Plaintiff fails to adequately plead scienter under the
stringent requirements set forth in the PSLRA.

Loss Causation

Next, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to
adequately allege loss causation. he Plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating that the Defendants' misrepresentations caused the
losses for which the Plaintiff seeks to recover.

To prove loss causation in a section 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must
offer `proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation
and the investment's subsequent decline in value. Essentially, the
Plaintiff must show that the Defendants' fraud, and not some other
factor, proximately caused its alleged losses.

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the market for
Equifax's securities was efficient and that the market for Equifax
stock promptly digest current information regarding Equifax from
all publicly available sources and reflected such information in
Equifax's stock price. Thus, according to the Plaintiff, it is
entitled to a presumption of reliance.  

The Defendants argue that the announcements to the public of the
Data Breach on and following September 7, 2017 did not reveal that
the prior statements concerning Equifax's data security were false,
and thus were not a corrective disclosure. Specifically, the
Defendant contends that: (1) the initial announcement of the
incident on September 7, 2017 did not reveal that prior statements
referencing Equifax's commitment to data security, efforts to
protect data, and compliance with laws and regulations were false
(2) the revelations on September 11, 2017 that Equifax lacked an
effective data breach crisis management plan did not show that any
of the challenged statements were false or misleading (3) the
revelations on September 12, 2017 that 11.5 million customers
signed up for the identity protection plan offered by Equifax does
not reveal the falsity of any prior statements and (4) revelations
on September 13 and 14, 2017 that the Apache Struts vulnerability
caused the Data Breach did not reveal that any of the challenged
statements were false or misleading.

However, as noted above, a disclosure need not precisely mirror an
earlier misrepresentation, but instead must relate to the
misrepresentation and not other negative information about the
company. Furthermore, a corrective disclosure can come from any
source, and can take any form from which the market would absorb
the information and accordingly react. The Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has adequately alleged loss causation. Rule 8 is
satisfied if plaintiff provides `a short and plain statement
adequate to give defendants some indication of the loss and the
causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.

The Plaintiff alleges that the initial disclosure of the Data
Breach, along with subsequent disclosures that Equifax's poor
cybersecurity played a part in the incident, that Congress would be
conducting a probe into Equifax's general cybersecurity practices,
that millions of consumers were affected, and that a failure to
implement a patch that had been available since March 2017 caused
the Data breach, all combined to disclose the truth to investors.
This, along with the wide variety of news reporting on the incident
detailing Equifax's cybersecurity problems, slowly revealed the
truth about the prior misstatements. This adequately puts the
Defendants on notice as to the causal connection between the
Defendants' misrepresentations and the class's losses.

Section 20(a) Claims

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's section 20(a) claims fail
to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act extends liability for violations of Rule 10b-5 to
controlling persons in the company.

To show control person liability under Section 20(a), a plaintiff
must allege that: (1) the company violated Section 10(b) (2) the
defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the
company and (3) the defendant had the power to control the specific
corporate policy that resulted in the primary violation.

The Defendants first argue that the Plaintiff's failure to plead
any primary violation of section 10(b) by Equifax requires
dismissal of the section 20(a) claims. However, as discussed above,
the Plaintiff has adequately pleaded some of its section 10(b)
claims as to Equifax. The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiff
fails to adequately plead that the Individual Defendants control
specific corporate policy that resulted in the alleged primary
violations of section 10(b).

The Court agrees that the Plaintiff has failed to allege that
Gamble, Ploder, or Dodge exercised control over the specific
cybersecurity policies that resulted in the alleged violations, or
that they exercised control over any of the unattributed statements
made or statements made by other Individual Defendants. Thus, the
Plaintiff's section 20(a) claims should be dismissed as to these
Individual Defendants. The Court concludes, however, that the
Plaintiff has adequately alleged a section 20(a) claim as to Smith.
Smith, as CEO, had the power to control the general affairs of
Equifax. Smith also had the power to control the specific corporate
policy that resulted in the section 10(b) violations. Smith had
both the power to control Equifax's cybersecurity policy and the
statements made by Equifax and the other Individual Defendants as
to these cybersecurity policies. Thus, the Plaintiff has
sufficiently stated a claim for control liability as to Smith.

The Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb9ujjsd from
Leagle.com.

Hampden Kuhns, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Andrew Bain --
dbain@bain-law.com -- Law Offices of David A. Bain, LLC, Eduard
Korsinsky -- ek@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice &
James Harrod -- jim.harrod@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
& Grossmann, LLP, pro hac vice.

Patrick Groover, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Harrod, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP, pro hac vice, Jeremy A. Lieberman
-- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP & Joseph Alexander Hood
II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP.

Equifax Inc., Defendant, represented by Israel Dahan --
idahan@kslaw.com -- Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft, LLP, pro hac
vice, B. Warren Pope -- wpope@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP,
Benjamin Lee -- blee@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP & Michael R.
Smith -- mrsmith@kslaw.com, King & Spalding, LLP.

Richard F. Smith, Defendant, represented by David M. Chaiken --
david.chaiken@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders, LLP, Meghan A.
McCaffrey -- meghanmccaffrey@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Michael E. Liftik --
michaelliftik@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP & Steven G. Madison -- stevemadison@quinnemanuel.com
-- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.


EXTRA SPACE: L. Kang Labor Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge of Josephine L. Staton the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Western Division, remanded the
case, LUCIA KANG and JOSE GARCIA, as individuals and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EXTRA SPACE MANAGEMENT
INC., a Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive
Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01340-JLS-KES (C.D. Cal.), to the
Superior Court for the State of California for the County of
Orange.  The Parties have stipulated to remand the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6gINLM from Leagle.com.

Lucia Kang, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jose Garcia, individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Simon Kwak --
skwak@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm, PC, Jessica L. Campbell
-- jcampbell@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm PC, Kashif Haque --
khaque@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm PC & Samuel A. Wong --
swong@aegislawfirm.com -- Aegis Law Firm PC.

Extra Space Management, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendant,
represented by Frances Mary Kelly Hernandez --
fhernandez@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and
Hampton LLP & Ruben David Escalante --
rescalante@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and
Hampton LLP.


FAMOUS BOURBON: Class of Waitresses Certified in Ramos Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jane Triche Milazzo grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Class Certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act
in the lawsuit captioned BROOKE RAMOS, ET AL. v. FAMOUS BOURBON
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., ET AL. Case No. 2:18-cv-06573-JTM-DMD (E.D.
La.).

The class is defined as:

    "All waitresses employed by Defendants since December 2015
     who were subjected to an invalid tip credit policy because
     they were required to kick back a portion of their tips to
     Defendants' owners and managers in violation of the Fair
     Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. ("FLSA")."

Judge Milazzo ordered the Defendant to provide the Plaintiffs the
names, last known addresses, e-mail addresses, and telephone
numbers of potential collective action plaintiffs in the form of a
computer-readable database within 30 days of this Order.

The Plaintiffs shall file a revised notice form that complies with
this Order within 10 days of this Order.  The class members seeking
to opt in to this case shall have 90 days from the date on which
the notice and consent forms are mailed to opt in to the
lawsuit.[CC]


FLINT, MI: 2 State Officials Dropped from Water Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
ABC12 News reports that two top state officials facing trial on
charges from the Flint water crisis can't be held personally liable
in a civil lawsuit, a court ruled.

A panel of U.S. Court of Appeals judges dropped former Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services Director Nick Lyon and
former Chief Medical Executive Eden Wells as defendants in the
lawsuit.

Genesee County District Court judges bound both Lyon and Wells over
to full trials late last year after year-long preliminary hearings
in criminal cases separate from the civil case.

The class action case was filed on behalf of Flint residents
affected by the water crisis. Hundreds of plaintiffs have signed up
seeking a financial judgment for damages caused by the water
crisis.

Federal court judges previously removed former Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality Director Dan Wyant and state employees
Nancy Peeler and Robert Scott from the civil lawsuit.

Flint Public Works Director Howard Croft, former Flint emergency
managers Darnell Early and Gerald Ambrose, current and former
Department of Environmental Quality employees Liane Shekter-Smith,
Stephen Busch, Michael Prysby and Brad Wurfel are still listed as
defendants. [GN]


FLORIDA: Bilal Files Prisoner Civil Right Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kaupasta, et al. The
case is styled as Jamaal Ali Bilal also known as: John L. Burton
also known as: Superman and all other FCCC residents similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Rebecca Kaupasta, Secretary, Florida
Department of Children & Families, Dr. Donald Sawyer, Ph. D.,
Director, FCCC, Emily Selema Psy.D. Assistance Clinical Director,
Kristen Kanner Secretary, SVP Program, Wellpath Inc., Correct Care,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00073-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla., Feb. 6,
2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Prison Petitions for Prisoner Civil
Rights.

Rebecca Kaupasta is the secretary of the Florida Department of
Children and Families which is a state agency of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Averts ERISA Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that Georgetown University on Jan. 8 became the
latest school to beat a proposed Employee Retirement Income
Security Act class action over its retirement plans' fees and
investments. [GN]


GERBER PRODUCTS: Decertification of Labeling Class Action Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Duvall, Esq., Bety Javidzad, Esq., Anastasiya Menshikova,
Esq., of Dentons, in an article for JDSupra, report that the US
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decertification of a
class in Zakaria v. Gerber Prods., following an order originally
issued by Judge John Kronstadt of the US District Court for the
Central District of California.1 According to the decertification
order, the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate basis to
calculate restitution under California's Unfair Competition Law
(UCL), False Advertising Law (FAL) or Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA). The plaintiff also failed to provide an adequate basis to
calculate actual damages under the CLRA.

The suit, filed in early 2015, alleged that Gerber deceptively
marketed its baby formula as the "1st and Only" formula to protect
against allergies. After initially certifying a class, the district
court granted the defendant's motion to decertify because the
plaintiff expert's conjoint analysis only showed how much consumers
subjectively valued the "1st and Only" labeling, but failed to
account for marketplace realities and supply-side considerations
that would affect the product's pricing. Under California law,
those factors must be part of class-wide restitution and damages
models.

The plaintiff expert's report also did not provide evidence that a
higher price or "price premium" was actually paid because of the
allegedly deceptive labeling. Gerber also provided uncontroverted
evidence that it had not raised the price of its baby formula
because of the "1st and Only" labeling.  Thus, the plaintiff could
not establish restitution or actual damages (defined as the
difference between the actual value provided by a consumer and the
value that person actually received) on a class-wide basis.

Zakaria v. Gerber Prods., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32240 (9th Cir. Nov.
14, 2018), affirming 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221124 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
9, 2017) [GN]


GLASS FAMILY: Sued for Failing to Pay Drivers Correct Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stacie Holt and Sarah Day, On behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated v. Glass Family Pizza, Inc., John Glass, and
John Doe 1-10, Case No. 1:19-cv-00079-TSB (S.D. Ohio, January 30,
2019), arises from the Defendants' alleged willful failure to
compensate the Plaintiffs and similarly situated delivery drivers
with minimum wages and overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Ohio's Prompt Pay Act.

Glass Family Pizza, Inc., is a domestic corporation authorized to
do business under the laws of Ohio.  John Glass is an owner and
operator of the Glass Domino's restaurants and Glass Family Pizza,
Inc.  The Doe Defendants own an interest and/or have operational
control over the Glass Domino's stores that also qualify as the
Plaintiff's "employer" under the FLSA.

The Defendants operate 39 Domino's Pizza franchises in Ohio and
Kentucky.  The Defendants employ or employed delivery drivers,
including the Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          OF COUNSEL TO MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 200
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 604-8759
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com

               - and -

          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Philip J. Krzeski, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          OF COUNSEL TO MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Cincinnati, OH 45209
          Telephone: (513) 715-8711
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: akimble@billerkimble.com
                  pkrzeski@billerkimble.com


GLOBAL TEL LINK: Godfrey Files Fraud Class Suit in E.D. Pa.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Global Tel Link
Corporation. The case is styled as Linda Godfrey individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Global Tel
Link Corporation, DSI-ITI, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00533-NIQA (E.D. Penn., Feb. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Global Tel Link, formerly known as Global Telcoin, Inc. and Global
Tel*Link Corporation, is a Reston, Virginia-based
telecommunications company, founded in 1980, that provides Inmate
Calling Service.

DSI - ITI, LLC provides criminal justice and public safety
automation software solutions. The company specializes in
automating corrections' agencies business practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Marc H. Edelson, Esq.
     EDELSON & ASSOCIATES, LLC
     3 Terry Dr Suite 205
     Newtown, PA 18940
     Phone: (215) 867-2399
     Fax: (267) 685-0676
     Email: medelson@edelson-law.com


GRACIA MEXICAN KITCHEN: Zuniga Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jose Zuniga, Individually and on behalf of of all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. Gracia Mexican Kitchen, LLC, Matthew L
Hoeg, Brian Smith, David Martinez and Adrian Hembree, Case No.
19-cv-00019 (S.D. Tex., January 16, 2019), seeks to recover minimum
compensation, overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees
and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act.

Gracia operates a restaurant in Corpus Christi, Texas, where Zuniga
worked as a dishwasher. He claims that he did not receive overtime
compensation at the required rate of time-and-one-half for all
hours worked over forty each workweek. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Clif Alexander, Esq.
      Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
      Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
      Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
      Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq,
      George Schimmel, Esq.
      ANDERSON2X, PLLC
      819 N. Upper Broadway
      Corpus Christi, TX 78401
      Tel: (361) 452-1279
      Fax: (361) 452-1284
      Email: clif@a2xlaw.com
             lauren@a2xlaw.com
             carter@a2xlaw.com
             austin@a2xlaw.com
             geordie@a2xlaw.com


HAYS AND STELAR: Faces $50MM Class Action Over Casuals
------------------------------------------------------
David Marin-Guzman, writing for Australian Financial Review,
reports that class actions worth up to $50 million have hit top
labour hire companies Hays and Stellar Recruitment over their
allegedly unlawful use of casuals in the mining industry.

Canberra based law firm Adero Law launched the actions in the
Federal Court at the end of last year, claiming the companies had
underpaid thousands of workers leave and other entitlements for
years.

The class actions kick off what is expected to be a barrage of
legal cases over the next two months targeting the mining
industry's allegedly systemic abuse of casual employment.

Miners in the black coal industry were underpaid millions of
dollars, a class action law firm claims. James Davies

Hays, whose chief client was BHP Mitsubishi Alliance, is facing
claims it was underpaying up to 1500 workers since at least 2014
because it engaged them as casuals rather than as permanent
employees.

Under the black coal industry award, the use of casual employees is
prohibited except through an enterprise agreement.

But despite Hays' expertise, the company bizarrely did not
negotiate an EA that would have allowed it to legally use casuals.

While the class action has not specified a final compensation
figure, lawyers estimate that Hays could be forced to pay between
$30 million and $35 million.

Adero principal Rory Markham said Hays' lack of an EA was "bizarre
given the liability continued to accrue".

"It seems odd that despite the amounts being claimed, they continue
to engage people as casuals even when we put them on notice."

'Strongly believe action has no merit'
A Hays spokesperson said the company "intends to vigorously defend
this action".

"We place the utmost importance on regulatory compliance, and are
committed to best practice in staffing and recruitment," he said.

"While we are unable to comment on specific details as it is now
before the courts, we strongly believe the action does not have
merit."

Hays is expected to use an "offset" argument in its defence and its
spokesman said casuals were paid a higher rate including 25 per
cent loading "in lieu of permanent employment benefits".

"To allow what is effectively double dipping would have severe
negative implications for Australian businesses."

However, Mr Markham said to use the offset argument Hays needed to
specify in its contracts that a 25 per cent loading was in lieu of
permanent entitlements, which it had not done.

"They have the weakest contracts in the resources industry," he
said, adding it was also investigating legal action over Hays'
supply of casuals in the iron ore sector.

After Adero first flagged it was investigating Hays, the
recruitment firm belatedly sought an EA but workers voted the
agreement down late last year.

Stellar facing $15m claim
Stellar Recruitment is also facing an estimated $10 million to $15
million in alleged underpayments for similar reasons in a class
action representing 500 workers.

The company supplied casuals to major black coal industry clients
BMA and Glencore but had no EA between 2012 and the first half of
2015. It did not respond to requests for comment.

The Adero labour hire class actions, which include ones filed
against BHP and Chandler McLeod last year, have already shaken up
the mining industry.

BHP announced late last year it had decided to stop using
contractors and would set up its own labour hire subsidiaries after
the bulk of its labour suppliers were targeted by Adero.

Mr Markham said Adero also planned to file its long-awaited class
action against WorkPac and Programmed in early February.

However, the class actions could hinge on a Federal Court challenge
pursued by WorkPac that seeks to overthrow the so-called Skene
precedent, which allows regular casuals to claim both loading and
permanent entitlements.

Industrial Relations Minister Kelly O'Dwyer has intervened in the
case, expected to be heard next month, and also issued regulation
at the end of last year that sought to bar "double dipping".

But Mr Markham said the regulation was unlikely to be an obstacle
as even its explanatory memorandum said it was "merely declaratory
of the existing law".[GN]


HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Court Narrows Claims in Baccay
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned JOSEPHINE E. BACCAY, on behalf of
herself, all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEARTLAND
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
HEARTLAND PAYMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES
1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-07779
(FLW) (LHG). (D.N.J.).

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment from the
Defendants seeking dismissal of all claims in the Complaint of
Plaintiff Josephine E. Baccay, on the basis that Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring certain federal claims and that the remaining
state law claims lack sufficient factual allegations.

The Plaintiff's Complaint, brought as a putative class action,
includes one federal and three state causes of action related to
the employment application that Plaintiff completed before taking a
job with HPS: (1) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), violation of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies
Act (ICRAA), violation of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies
Act (CCRAA) and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
(UCL).

The Defendants first move for summary judgment on the ground that
the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her stand-alone disclosure
claims. As standing is jurisdictional in nature, I turn to this
argument first before moving to the Plaintiff's remaining state law
claims.

Article III Standing

To show standing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an
injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

To allege injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must claim the invasion of a
concrete and particularized legally protected interest resulting in
harm that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. A
harm is concrete only if it is de facto; that is, it must actually
exist it cannot be merely abstract.

Standing in Stand-Alone Disclosure Cases

Here, the Plaintiff seeks to establish that she has standing to
assert her stand-alone disclosure claims under the FCRA. The FCRA's
disclosure provision requires that the employer's intent to obtain
a background check be disclosed conspicuously, in a dedicated,
stand-alone document:

An employer or prospective employer cannot procure, or cause a
consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with
respect to any consumer, unless  (i) a clear and conspicuous
disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time
before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a
document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer
report may be obtained for employment purposes and(ii) the consumer
has authorized in writing he procurement of the report by that
person.

The sole allegation in Defendant's stand-alone disclosure claim is
that the alleged inclusion of release language in the Disclosure
Form violated the requirement that such a document consist solely
of the disclosure of the intent to obtain a background check. Thus,
Plaintiff has alleged a violation of one of the purely formal
requirements of FCRA, as she does not factually allege any harm
aside from the statutory violation itself. A procedural violation
of the FCRA's disclosure provision does not automatically implicate
these substantive rights, however. The issue is not whether
technical or procedural requirements may cause concrete harm, but
whether the violation has caused such harm an analysis that is
situation-dependent. Thus, the Court must determine, based on the
particular facts of the case, whether Defendants' alleged violation
of the disclosure provision caused Plaintiff either informational
or privacy-related harms. For the following reasons, the Court
answers these questions in the egative.

Informational Injury or Invasion of Privacy

The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff suffers an injury in
fact when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be
publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. Thus, in the context of a
claim alleging violations of the FCRA disclosure requirement, a
plaintiff can establish standing by showing that a disclosure form
containing extraneous information actually deprived a plaintiff of
the information that an employer sought to obtain a consumer report
on the potential employee.

Here, the Plaintiff's assertion of informational injuries fails
because she has not established that the extraneous language,
allegedly contained in the Disclosure Form, caused any actual
confusion about whether her personal information would be made
available for a background check. In fact, the undisputed evidence,
including Plaintiff's own testimony in her deposition, demonstrates
exactly the opposite: Plaintiff testified explicitly that she
understood that the Disclosure Form contained language regarding a
background check that could include checking your employment
history, education, driving record, and criminal history, saw
nothing wrong with such a background check, and, in, fact,
explicitly authorized it.  

Thus, the Plaintiff does not have standing to assert her
stand-alone disclosure claim under the FCRA.

Plaintiff's Remaining State Law Claims

In addition to the FCRA claim, the Plaintiff also brings a litany
of state law claims that have no factual basis at all. Indeed,
according to the Defendants, the Plaintiff's counsel appear to have
cut-and-pasted into the Complaint numerous allegations from other
cases in which they appear as counsel, despite those cases having
nothing to do with this case. In an apparent recognition of their
obvious carelessness, the Plaintiff offers to withdraw these claims
were the Court to find that the Plaintiff has standing to assert
her stand-alone disclosure claims. Alternatively, anticipating that
the Court might find that no standing exists over the FCRA claim,
the Plaintiff argues that the entire case should be remanded to
state court, rather than dismissed. The entire case need not be
remanded, however, as Plaintiff does not contest Defendant's CAFA
basis for removal of these state law claims, so subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims exists.  

The Court find the Plaintiff's claim to be meritless, as the Court
would for the Plaintiff's FCRA claim if the Court had jurisdiction
to reach the merits, as it is undisputed that any allegedly
extraneous release language was located not in the Disclosure Form,
but in a different document that Plaintiff reviewed and signed
separately. The statute is clear that only the document containing
the disclosure must be free from extraneous language, and Plaintiff
cites no authority suggesting otherwise. Thus, Plaintiff's ICRAA
claim is dismissed.

In sum, as the Plaintiff fails to assert even colorable arguments
in support of her state law claims, they all must be dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for summary judgement is
granted, in part, and denied, in part. The Plaintiff's Counts II
(ICRAA), III (CCRAA), and IV (UCF) are dismissed, and the
Plaintiff's Count I (FCRA) is remanded to the Superior Court of
California, Sacramento.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycz3zhtx from Leagle.com.

JOSEPHINE E. BACCAY, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES STUART NOTIS,
GARDY & NOTIS & JENNIFER SARNELLI, GARDY & NOTIS, LLP.

HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, L.L.C. & HEARTLAND PAYMENT SOLUTIONS,
INC., Defendants, represented by AMBER M. SPATARO --
aspataro@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON PC & JILLIAN LEE
SZYMONIFKA -- jszymonifka@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON PC.


ILLINOIS: Appeals Court Revives Class Action v. Treasurer
---------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
federal appeals panel has again tossed a ruling from a Chicago
federal judge, saying he ignored its earlier opinion in an ongoing
dispute over how much the Illinois Treasurer's Office owes to
people whose unclaimed property it sold.

On Jan. 2, the three-judge panel of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals delivered their ruling in a matter that goes back to a
federal class action filed in March 2016 against Illinois Treasurer
Michael W. Frerichs, arguing the Illinois Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act violates the Fifth and 14th amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.

Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinion, in which
he said District Judge Charles P. Kocoras wrongly declined to
certify the proposed class of plaintiffs because he overlooked an
earlier Seventh Circuit opinion holding people are entitled to
receive interest on their held property, less reasonable custodial
fees. According to Judge Easterbrook, Judge Kocoras determined
"owners of property in the state's custody are entitled to be
compensated for the time value of money only if the property was
earning interest at the moment the state took it into custody,"
creating divisions among would-be class members.

After that decision, Judge Kocoras granted summary judgment to the
state against one of the named plaintiffs, S. David Goldberg, whose
property hadn't been earning interest at the time the state took
possession. Goldberg's appeal of that partial final judgment is
what gave rise to the Jan. 2 opinion.

Judge Easterbrook said Judge Kocoras "relied principally on Cwik v.
Topinka," a 2009 Illinois Third District Appellate Court decision
preceding two more recent Seventh Circuit opinions and also one
that interprets a state law instead of the U.S. Constitution's
Takings Clause.

"The proposition is untenable, as we have already explained,"
Easterbrook wrote, citing his panel's own 2017 opinion in Kolton v.
Frerichs and adding "what the property earns in the state's hands
does not depend on what it had been earning in the owner's hands."

The money in question was a $100 check made out to Goldberg but
which he hadn't claimed. If the state used smaller amounts like
that to pool into a larger sum in order to make an investment, the
panel said, Goldberg and other property owners would be entitled to
proportional returns.

The panel vacated Judge Kocoras' judgment and remanded the case for
further proceeding. In so doing, Easterbrook wrote, it is possible
the state will invoke Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court said a state isn't obligated to give
earnings to people whose principal amounts are small enough so as
to have not been able to generate net interest if held privately.
He explained those property owners couldn't have lost anything
because their money alone couldn't have earned enough interest to
cover administrative expenses. So long as their capital is
returned, they are made whole.

However, Easterbrook clarified, that opinion has no connection to
the issue with whether the principal was generating interest before
the state took possession.

"All we decide is that it does not matter under Brown, or any other
decision by the Supreme Court or this court, whether property that
is able to earn net interest was in an interest-bearing account
before its transfer to the state," Easterbrook wrote. "This
conclusion also may lead the district court to reconsider its
ruling on class certification."

Seventh Circuit Judges Michael Kanne and Ilana Rovner concurred in
the opinion.

Goldberg is represented in the action by attorneys Terry Rose
Saunders, of The Saunders Law Firm; attorney Arthur Susman; and
Thomas A. Doyle, of Wexler Wallace LLP, all of Chicago.

Mr. Frerichs' office is represented by the Illinois Attorney
General. [GN]


INFRAREIT INC: Bushansky Seeks to Halt Onco Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Bushansky, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. InfraREIT, Inc., David A. Campbell, John
Gates, Storrow M. Gordon, Trudy A. Harper, Hunter L. Hunt, Harold
R. Logan, Jr., Harvey Rosenblum and Ellen C. Wolf, Defendants, Case
No. 19-cv-00135 (N.D. Tex., January 17, 2019), seeks to enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating or closing the acquisition of
InfraREIT by Oncor, rescinding it in the event defendants
consummate the merger, rescissory damages, costs of this action,
including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and
experts' fees and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

InfraREIT will be acquired by Oncor for $21.00 in cash per
InfraREIT common share. The proposed transaction is valued at
approximately $1.275 billion, excluding InfraREIT's net debt.

The proxy statement filed in relation to the transaction omitted
InfraREIT's financial projections relied upon by the its financial
advisor Evercore Group LLC in its analyses, the data and inputs
underlying the financial valuation analyses that support the
fairness opinion provided by Evercore, the background process
leading to the sale, and the potential conflicts of interest faced
by Evercore, asserts the complaint.

InfraREIT owns and leases rate-regulated electric transmission
assets in Texas while Oncor operates the largest transmission and
distribution system in Texas, delivering electricity to over 3.6
million homes and businesses. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Federman, Esq.
      FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
      10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
      Oklahoma City, OK 73120
      Telephone: (405) 234-1560
      Email: wbf@federmanlaw.com

            - and -

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Tel: (212) 682-3025
      Fax: (212) 682-3010


INUVO INC: Gainey McKenna & Egleston Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on Jan. 8 disclosed that it filed a class
action lawsuit against Inuvo, Inc. ("Inuvo" or the "Company") (NYSE
American: INUV) and its board of directors (the "Board"), on behalf
of a class consisting of all public stockholders of Inuvo who have
been harmed by Inuvo in connection with alleged violations of
Sections 14(d)(4), 14(e) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").  The action seeks to enjoin the
expiration of a tender offer (the "Tender Offer") on the proposed
transaction, pursuant to which Inuvo will be acquired by
ConversionPoint Technologies, Inc. ("CPT Parent") through
ConversionPoint's wholly-owned subsidiary CPT Merger Sub, Inc.,
("CPT Merger Sub") and CPT Cigar Merger Sub, Inc., a direct
wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent ("Inuvo Merger Sub") (the
"Proposed Transaction").

The Complaint alleges, that on December 17, 2018, in order to
convince Inuvo's public common stockholders to vote in favor of the
Proposed Transaction, Parent filed a materially incomplete and
misleading Form S-4 Registration Statement (the "Proxy") with the
SEC, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
As stated in the Proxy, upon completion of the Proposed
Transaction, current Inuvo stockholders will own approximately
29.24% of the combined company and current CPT stockholders will
own approximately 70.76% of the combined company (the "Merger
Consideration"). The Proxy contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning: (i) the valuation analyses
prepared by the Company's financial advisor, Canaccord Genuity LLC
("Canaccord"), in support of their fairness opinion and (ii) the
potential conflicts of interest faced by the Board during the sales
process leading up to the Proposed Transaction.

Additionally, although the Proxy does not yet set the date for the
special meeting of Inuvo's stockholders to vote on the Proposed
Transaction (the "Stockholder Vote"), the Proxy does state the
merger parties' intention to conclude this merger during the first
quarter of 2019. It is therefore imperative that the material
information that has been omitted from the Proxy is disclosed prior
to the Stockholder Vote so Inuvo stockholders can properly exercise
their corporate suffrage rights.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the March 11, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]


JAMES M. LEBLANC: Ross Asks Court to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Ira Jerome Ross, the Plaintiff, vs.
James M. LeBlanc, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00824-JWD-EWD
(N.D. La.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order granting
class certification.[CC]

The Plaintiff appears pro se and may be reached at:

          Ira Jerome Ross
          Ailen Correctional Center
          3751 Lauderdale Woodyard Road
          Kinder, LA 70648
          Telephone: 337 639 2943


LEPRINO FOODS: Court Allows Filing of 3rd Amended Vazquez Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISAIAS VAZQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00796-AWI-BAM (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAullife of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California granted Plaintiffs Vazquez
and Hefke's Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

On May 8, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the wage and hour class action
on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated non-exempt,
hourly employees at the cheese processing plant at Leprino's
Lemoore West dairy/cheese processing facility.  Leprino removed the
action to the Court on June 12, 2017.

The action currently proceeds on Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC"), filed on Aug. 30, 2018, alleging five causes of
action: (1) failure to pay reporting time pay in violation of IWC
Order 8-2001, Section 5 (and other applicable wage orders); (2)
illegal policy requiring hourly workers to remain on call during
meal and rest periods; (3) failure to properly itemize pay stubs in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 226(a) and 226(e); (4)
conversion; and (5) violation of California Business and
Professions Code Sections 17200, et seq.

In the SAC, the Plaintiffs allege that until May of 2017, Leprino
had a policy of "de crewing" on days when more workers arrived at
the West Lemoore Plant than were needed for production.  The policy
involved sending workers home prior to the start of their scheduled
shift without pay.  When sending workers home without, Leprino
would require that those workers to fill out Time Off Request forms
("TOR").  Those workers who did demand pay were ordered to forfeit
a vacation day if they wished to be paid in lieu of Leprino paying
them four hours of Reporting Time Pay ("RTP").

The Plaintiffs also allege that the case is a class action to
recover premium wages for all meal and rest periods during the
statutory period of the action.  They contend that Leprino had a
policy of requiring the Plaintiffs and workers to remain on call
and subject to return to discuss business matters and/or return to
their work stations if called upon to do so during their rest and
meal breaks by supervisory personnel.

The class that the Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as all
nonexempt hourly workers who are currently employed, or formerly
have been employed, as nonexempt hourly employees at Defendants'
Lemoore West facilities in Lemoore, California, at any time within
four years prior to the filing of the original complaint until
resolution of the action.

On Jan. 4, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave
to amend, arguing that pursuant to the liberal amendment policy of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, they should be allowed to amend
in order to expand upon their existing claim for failure to
properly itemize wage statements.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs
move to allege that at the end of the day -- and after the
conclusion of paid time by the Defendants -- the Plaintiffs and the
class members were required to answer work-related calls from the
Defendants' supervisors and employees without pay to which they are
entitled under California law.  Based on this additional factual
allegation, the Plaintiffs also seek to include corresponding
claims for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to compensate for
all hours worked, failure to pay overtime wages and unpaid wages
and waiting time penalties.  

Leprino opposed the motion on Jan. 18, 2019, arguing that the
Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because they failed to seek
leave for modification of the Scheduling Order deadline for
amendments to the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16, and there is no good cause to modify the Scheduling Order.  It
also argues that the Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because of
unreasonable delay and prejudice to the Defendants under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

Magistrate Judge McAullife finds that the Plaintiffs have not
unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend.  Although they initiated
the action in June 2017, discovery did not open until early 2018,
and a scheduling order did not issue until April 2018.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs filed the motion shortly after their
counsel reportedly learned of the additional basis for liability
and before expiration of the relevant amendment deadline.  The
Plaintiffs also filed the motion months before expiration of the
deadline for class certification non-expert discovery and prior to
commencement of merits discovery or the setting of a trial date.
Nonetheless, even if the Court were to find the delay substantial,
this factor alone is not a sufficient ground for denial of leave to
amend.  The Judge concludes that Leprino has not demonstrated
prejudice sufficient to support a denial of the motion.

Although Leprino correctly suggests that additional discovery may
be required to address any new allegations or claims, the Judge
does not find the necessary prejudice to support denial of the
motion to amend.  Moreover, at this stage in the litigation, the
deadline for completion of class certification discovery has not
expired, and a schedule for merits discovery has not been
established.  Additionally, Leprino admits that it has so far
deposed only one of the named Plaintiffs, Hefke, and the Plaintiffs
confirm that this is the sole deposition taken by Leprino to date.
There also is no assertion that Leprino is unable to serve
additional written discovery addressing the narrow allegations at
issue.

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge McAullife granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.
Within seven days of the date of the Order, they will file their
Third Amended Complain.  The Defendants will file an answer or
other responsive pleading to the Third Amended Complaint in
compliance with the time frames of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and any relevant Local Rules following service of the
Third Amended Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qUUBVO from Leagle.com.

Isaias Vasquez, on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals & Linda Hefke, on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Cory Lee, The
Downey Law Firm, LLC, Philip A. Downey, The Downey Law Firm, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert Gibson, Law Offices of Robert W. Sink, pro hac
vice, Eric Daniel Rouen -- rouenlaw@att.net -- Law Office of Eric
D. Rouen & Randall Martin Rumph -- rmrlaw10@sbcglobal.net -- Law
Office of Randy Rumph.

Leprino Foods Company, a Colorado corporation & Leprino Foods Dairy
Products Company, a Colorado corporation, Defendants, represented
by Lisa M. Pooley -- lpooley@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett
LLP, Sandra L. Rappaport -- srappaport@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson
Bridgett LLP & Kyle Aaron Mabe -- kyle.a.mabe@gmail.com -- Hanson
Bridgett LLP.


LLOYD'S OF LONDON: Faces Insurance Class Action in Honolulu
-----------------------------------------------------------
John Burnett, writing for Hawaii Tribune-Herald, reports that a
federal class-action lawsuit alleges that Lloyd's of London and its
affiliated insurance brokers unlawfully steered Hawaii homeowners
in lava-ravaged areas away from comprehensive home insurance
coverage established by the state.

The lawsuit, filed Dec. 21 in U.S. District Court in Honolulu,
claims Lloyd's and its agents deceived consumers, offering surplus
lines insurance without performing the due diligence required under
Hawaii law to sell surplus lines insurance.

Surplus lines insurance, also called excess lines insurance, allow
customers to seek coverage from out-of-state carriers --which
aren't covered by the state's insurance guaranty fund -- for a risk
that standard or traditional insurers are unwilling or unable to
assume.

The named plaintiffs in the suit are Stephen and Lucina Aqulina and
Audra Lane and Scott Lane, two couples in their 60s who lost homes
in Leilani Estates as a result of the lower East Rift Zone eruption
that destroyed more than 700 homes between May and August last
year. Because the suit is class action, it also covers others whose
situations are similar enough to those allegedly faced by the
Aquilinas and Lanes to make comparable claims.

According to the civil complaint, Lloyd's and its agents knew that
they weren't allowed to place surplus lines insurance unless other
insurance was unavailable, and the insurance coverage amounts
exceeded the coverage available through traditional insurance
carriers, including the government-established insurance coverage
offered through Hawaii Property Insurance Association.

Consumers could have qualified for HPIA-sponsored insurance, but
Lloyd's and its agents deceived them by artificially inflating
coverage limits beyond the $350,000 dwelling coverage limit offered
through HPIA, the suit alleges.

The filing further states that Hawaii homeowners were steered "into
purchasing Lloyd's surplus lines homeowner's insurance to insure
their homes against peril. These Lloyd's surplus lines insurance
policies, which contained numerous exclusions, including a lava
exclusion, are essentially worthless -- amounting to no coverage at
all."

In addition, the 60-page lawsuit alleges that insurance brokers
"received kickbacks from Lloyd's for steering (homeowners) to the
Lloyd's surplus lines policies in the form of increased
commissions."

It further alleges the kickback scheme was set up so that
"commissions were directly tied to the amount of premium steered to
Lloyd's, thereby incentivizing the broker defendants to maximize
the amount of surplus lines insurance placed with Lloyd's."

The Lanes saw their dwelling coverage limit increased to $351,000,
according to the complaint, exactly $1,000 over the government's
coverage limit of $350,000. The suit alleges the Lanes' Kupono
Street property was valued at $263,000 in 2017, and Lloyd's and
their brokers, Monarch E&S Insurance Services and Pyramid Insurance
Centre Ltd., artificially inflated the Lanes' coverage limits. The
suit also claims the Lanes were never told about HPIA.

The Lanes' yearly premium was $2,230.24, and after their home was
destroyed, their claim was denied under a lava exclusion in their
policy.

The suit claims the Aquilinas' dwelling coverage limit was
$252,000, less than the coverage limit under HPIA, but more than
the Alapai Street property's 2017 market value of $196,800. Despite
that, according to the complaint, Lloyd's -- along with Monarch and
Moa Insurance Services Hawaii -- "improperly steered" the Aquilinas
"to a Lloyd's surplus lines insurance policy that contained a lava
exclusion."

The Aquilinas "were not aware that other homeowner's insurance
policies were available to them," the suit states.

The Aquilinas' yearly premium was $1,300.68, and their claim to
cover losses suffered as a result of the eruption was also denied
under a lava exclusion.

"In the absence of defendants' unlawful scheme, plaintiffs and the
class would have been offered more comprehensive insurance,
including insurance through HPIA, which provides for coverage
against 16 perils, including fire and volcanic eruption," the suit
states.

The suit claims Lloyd's is the top writer of surplus lines
insurance in the United States -- writing 23 percent of the U.S.
surplus lines policies nationwide in 2017, totaling $10.3 billion
in premiums.

According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
and the Center for Insurance Policy and Research, in 2017, Lloyd's
syndicates wrote approximately $52 million in surplus lines premium
in Hawaii.

A copy of lawsuit can be found at PunaClaims.com.

Hawaii homeowners seeking further information can reach Foster Law
Offices by visiting PunaClaims.com or calling 808-348-7800, or
Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law at
https://scott-scott.com/hawaii-homeowners or calling 800-404-7770.
[GN]


LOEWEN DECOR: Does Not Pay Overtime Wages, Madrigal Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ernaldo D. Molina Madrigal, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Loewen Decor, Inc., Andres D. Lowentraut, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-20483 (S.D. Fla., February 6, 2019) is an action
arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully and
intentionally refused to pay Plaintiff's overtime wages as required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act as Defendants knew of the overtime
requirements of the FLSA and recklessly failed to investigate
whether Defendants' payroll practices were in accordance with the
Act.

The Plaintiff was resident of Dade County, Florida.

Loewen Decor, Inc., is a corporation that regularly transacts
business within Dade County.

Andres D. Lowentraut is a corporate officer and/or owner and/or
manager of the Defendant Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J.H. Zidell, Esq.
     J.H. Zidell, P.A.
     300 71st Street, Suite 605
     Miami Beach, FL 33141
     Phone: (305) 865-6766
     Fax: (305) 865-7167


LUBRIZOL ADVANCED: Claim 1 in Kieu Suit Withdrawn Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NGHIA PHUOC KIEU, an individual, on behalf of himself
and on behalf of all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. LUBRIZOL ADVANCED MATERIALS, INC. a Delaware Corporation;
EXTRUMED, INC. dba VESTA; a California Corporation; and DOES 1 to
100, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-02010-SVW-SP (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Eastern Division, (i) granted the
Parties' Joint Stipulation and Request for Entry of Order to Amend
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint so as to Withdraw Plaintiff's
FLSA Claim and Remanding the Action; and (ii) remanded to the
Superior Court for Riverside County.

Claim 1 of the Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint is deemed
withdrawn without prejudice to the right of the Plaintiff to assert
such a claim at a later date.

In light of the amendment of the Plaintiff's Complaint so as to
withdraw the Plaintiff's sole federal claim, the Court is divested
of federal question subject matter jurisdiction, and the Judge
exercises his discretion to remand the instant action to the state
court where it originated.  The Clerk is therefore directed to
remand the case to the Superior Court for Riverside County,
Historic Courthouse, 4050 Main Street, Riverside, California,
92501, Case No.: RIC1816157.  After the remand has been effected,
the Clerk is directed to close the case.

Each of the Parties will bear his/her/its own attorneys' fees and
costs with respect to the removal and subsequent remand of the
instant action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wCEqGw from Leagle.com.

Nghia Phuoc Kieu, an individual, on behalf of himself, and on
behalf of all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Richard E. Quintilone, II, Quintilone and
Associates, George Andrew Aloupas -- gaa@quintlaw.com -- Quintilone
and Associates & John D. Trieu, Law Offices of John D. Trieu APC.

Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc., a Delaware Corporation &
Extrumed, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendants, represented
by Sage R. Knauft -- sknauft@wfbm.com -- WFBM LLP & Reyna E. Macias
-- rmacias@wfbm.com -- Walsworth Franklin Bevins and McCall LLP.


MATRIX WARRANTY SOLUTIONS: Boger Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Boger on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Matrix Warranty Solutions, Inc. and Hard Tack, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00170, (D. Md., January 17, 2019), seeks
damages, attorneys' fees, costs together with other relief for
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Matrix Warranty Solutions, Inc. hired Hard Tack, Inc. to make
telemarketing calls for the purposes of advertising Matrix Warranty
goods and services using an automated dialing system and a
prerecorded message. Matrix Warranty provides extended warranty
services to consumers. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Stephen H. Ring, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN H. RING P.C.
      9901 Belward Campus Drive, Suite 175
      Rockville, MD 20850
      Tel: (301) 563-9249
      Fax: (3010 563-9639
      Email: shr@ringlaw.us

             - and -

      Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
      BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
      99 High St., Suite 304
      Boston, MA 02110
      Telephone: (508) 221-1510
      Email: anthony@broderick-law.com


MATRIX WARRANTY: Class Claims in Bacon Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADRIAN BACON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MATRIX WARRANTY SOLUTIONS, INC.,
a Texas corporation; and DOE INDIVIDUALS, inclusive, and each of
them, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01784-JLS-DFM (C.D. Cal.), Judge
Josephine L. Staton of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Southern Division, (i) dismissed without
prejudice all putative class action allegations and claims; and
(ii) dismissed with prejudice all individual allegations and claims
on behalf of Plaintiff Bacon.

No Party will be entitled to costs or attorneys' fees because of
the Order of Dismissal.  

Based on the factors identified in Diaz v. Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 876 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989), the dismissal of
the class allegations may be made, and is made, without notice to
the putative class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/AOxYfq from Leagle.com.

Adrian Bacon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly,
Plaintiff, represented by John P. Kristensen --
john@kristensenlaw.com -- Kristenen Weisberg LLP & David Levi
Weisberg -- david@kristensenlaw.com -- Kristensen Weisberg LLP.

Matrix Warranty Solutions, Inc., a Texas corporation, Defendant,
represented by Neil Thakor -- neil.thakor@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon
Marder LLP.


MDL 1720: Class Settlement Has Preliminary Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Class Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Settlement Preliminary Approval in the case
captioned IN RE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE FEE AND MERCHANT DISCOUNT
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, This document refers to: ALL ACTIONS. No.
05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO). (E.D.N.Y.).

A putative Rule 23(b)(3) class of over twelve million nationwide
merchants brought an antitrust action under the Sherman Act and
state antitrust laws, against Defendants Visa and Mastercard
networks, as well as various issuing and acquiring banks.
Plaintiffs are merchants that accept(ed) Visa- and
Mastercard-branded cards, and have alleged that Defendants harmed
competition and charged the merchants supracompetitive fees by
creating unlawful contracts and rules and by engaging in various
antitrust conspiracies.

Adequate representation by class representatives and class counsel

In its review of the prior settlement approval, the Second Circuit
concluded that class members of the (b)(2) class were inadequately
represented in violation of both Rule 23(a)(4) and the Due Process
Clause. The Second Circuit held that the class representatives had
interests antagonistic to those of some of the class members they
were representing, because the (b)(3) damages class would want to
maximize cash compensation for past harm, while the (b)(2)
injunctive class would want to maximize restraints on network rules
to prevent harm in the future and thus, the class counsel and class
representatives who negotiated and entered into the Settlement
Agreement were in the position to trade diminution of (b)(2) relief
for increase of (b)(3) relief. In addition, the Second Circuit held
that the issue of unitary representation was exacerbated because
the members of the worse-off (b)(2) class could not opt out.

The structural defect of unitary representation no longer exists as
the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes now have separate interim Class
Counsel, with the Robins Group serving as interim Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Counsel. The (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes also now have separate
class representatives, i.e., Class Plaintiffs. The named Rule
23(b)(3) Class Plaintiffs seek to represent a finite class that
desires and will receive the same type of relief damages for past
harm. Thus, all Rule 23(b)(3) Class Plaintiffs and members of the
Rule 23(b)(3) class will have the same incentive to "maximize cash
compensation for past harm.

The Court finds that the bifurcation of the (b)(2) and (b)(3)
classes and their Class Counsel sufficiently addresses the Second
Circuit's concern and that this factor will likely weigh in favor
of a grant of final approval.

Arms-length negotiations

Although the Second Circuit held that even an intense, protracted,
adversarial mediation, involving multiple parties, including
'highly respected and capable' mediators and associational
plaintiffs, does not 'compensate for the absence of independent
representation,' the Court nevertheless acknowledged that a
court-appointed mediator's involvement in pre-certification
settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were
free of collusion and undue pressure.

The parties have engaged in protracted discovery for over a decade.
In addition, two highly qualified mediators have assisted both sets
of settlement negotiations in this action.  Since the separation of
the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes, both mediators have been involved in
the (b)(3) class action to restart mediation for the damage claims
only. Over the course of more than a year, the parties have engaged
in twelve mediation sessions, including six day-long sessions. On
June 2, 2018, the mediators issued a mediators' proposal to the
parties, and on June 5, 2018, received unanimous consent from the
parties to move forward. The settlement negotiations were extended,
extraordinarily complicated, and contentious. On several occasions
the discussions were on the verge of collapsing. Counsel involved
in these mediation sessions are among the most knowledgeable,
sophisticated and accomplished attorneys in the fields of
antitrust, class actions, and complex litigation.

The Court finds that this factor will likely weigh in favor of
granting final approval.
Costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal

The complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation

This case is complex and costly. The present litigation has been
active for over a decade, and has involved litigation in both
district and appellate courts. The proposed class include millions
of putative members, and encompasses alleged injuries from 2004,
approximately fourteen years ago.   

The first phase of MDL discovery alone involved 370 depositions,
and multiple expert reports, and according to Class Counsel, Class
Plaintiffs have reviewed and analyzed more than 65 million pages of
documents. Class Counsel's lodestar figure of attorneys' fees
through November of 2012 approximated $160 million. In the
litigation prior to the Original Settlement Agreement, the parties
filed several motions, including Daubert motions, class
certification motions, motions to dismiss, and motions for summary
judgment, which the Court never decided.  

Because of the complexity and difficulty of the issues in this
case, it requires, and would continue to require, costly counsel
and experts, and a wealth of time. This subfactor will likely weigh
in favor of granting final approval.

The risks of establishing liability

This factor does not require the Court to adjudicate the disputed
issues or decide unsettled questions; rather, the Court need only
assess the risks of litigation against the certainty of recovery
under the proposed settlement.

Based on the fact that the parties have briefed motions to dismiss,
Daubert motions, class certification motions, and motions for
summary judgment, Class Counsel has had to consider the
requirements for and risks of establishing liability in this case.
If the case were to proceed to trial, many of these motions would
have to be relitigated, and they present challenges to recovery.
Indeed, these motions would have to be briefed and argued again,
given the significant legal and factual developments, and
additional discovery since their original briefing and argument
over six years ago.

In assessing the risks of further litigation, Charles B. Renfrew
has highlighted the Defendants' intention to exclude as
inadmissible one of the Plaintiffs' economic experts, warning that:
"if this testimony is excluded there may be little, if any,
evidence to establish plaintiffs' theory that they suffered injury
or measurable damages as a result of the establishment of the
default interchange rates and merchant acceptance rules, or that
the establishment of definitive interchange rates and merchant
acceptance rates had an anti-competitive effect in any marked
degree to Class Plaintiffs."

Renfrew raises other hurdles that the Class Plaintiffs would likely
face, including the effect that the Visa and Mastercard initial
public offerings would have on their theories of anticompetitive
behavior. Renfrew further notes the issue of whether the release
from a prior settlement agreement covers the scope of the Class
Plaintiffs' claims. Although Renfrew does not assess the merits of
Class Plaintiffs' or Defendants' arguments, and equally emphasizes
that litigation risks exist for Defendants, his submission
highlights that there is substantial litigation risk for Class
Plaintiffs.

The Court finds that this subfactor will likely weigh in favor of
granting final approval.

The risks of establishing damages

As Judge Gleeson noted in his final approval decision, even if
liability is established, Class Plaintiffs would still face the
problems and complexities inherent in proving damages to the jury.
These damages-related issues may not be insurmountable, but they
are formidable. The parties previously submitted competing expert
reports on damages, and at a trial, damages would likely be heavily
contested. Dr. Sykes concluded that plaintiffs face considerable
difficulty in proving their damages and that the approaches they
used would be subject to substantial challenges. In assessing the
risks of proving damages, former Judge Renfrew also predicted that
it will be a battle of experts. He noted that Defendants have moved
to exclude as inadmissible, the opinion of plaintiffs' economic
expert, Dr. Alan S. Frankel regarding injury and damages attributed
to the challenged conduct of defendants. Dr. Frankel's testimony is
highly supportive of Class Plaintiffs' theory and is some of the
strongest evidence that they have as to essential elements of their
antitrust claims.

Based on the opinions of multiple experts, there will be risks
associated with establishing damages in this case. The Court finds
that this subfactor will likely weigh in favor of granting final
approval.

The risks of maintaining the class through the trial

Class Plaintiffs previously moved for class certification over
Defendants' objection, but the Court never ruled on the motion,
instead approving the Original Settlement Agreement. If the case
were to proceed to trial, Defendants could and likely would move
for decertification of any class that the Court might ultimately
certify. Although Class Counsel has provided enough information for
the Court to determine that it will likely be able to certify the
class at the final approval stage for settlement purposes, there is
no guarantee that the class could be certified if the parties
proceeded with the litigation, and Defendants have indicated that
they are only consenting to class certification for the purposes of
settlement.  

The Court finds that this subfactor will likely weigh in favor of
granting final approval.

Effectiveness of distributing relief to the class

This factor requires courts to look at the method of processing
class-member claims. To warrant approval, the plan of allocation
must also meet the standards by which the settlement was
scrutinized namely, it must be fair and adequate. An allocation
formula need only have a reasonable, rational basis, particularly
if recommended by experienced and competent class counsel.

Class Counsel, who are experienced and competent in complex class
actions, prepared the Plan of Administration and Distribution.
Under its terms, the Class Administrator will estimate the
interchange fees paid by each claimant during the class period, and
each claimant will receive a pro rata share of the settlement fund
based on its interchange fees paid. Claimants will have the
opportunity to contest the accuracy of the statement or estimates
made by the Class Administrator.

If the Court grants final approval, and once claims are estimated,
the Class Administrator will disseminate a claim form. According to
Class Counsel, the majority of the claim form can be pre-populated
with data provided by Visa and potentially other Defendants. Once a
claim form is received, the Class Administrator will commence its
audit, and claimants whose claims are denied, or who disagree with
the final calculation of their claims, may challenge such denials
or final calculations in writing, together with supporting
documentation, mailed or emailed to the Class Administrator within
thirty days after receipt of the notice of the denial or final
calculation. A website containing relevant documents and forms in
multiple languages, and telephone support will be available to
obtain information and request documents related to the claims
process.

The Court finds that at this stage, the Plan of Administration and
Distribution appears to be an effective form of relief
distribution, and that this factor will likely weigh in favor of
granting final approval.  

The terms of any proposed award of attorneys' fees

Class Counsel intend to apply for an Attorneys' Fee Award in a
reasonable amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the Total Cash
Consideration and for Expense Awards comprising all reasonable
expenses and costs incurred not to exceed $40 million. Courts may
award attorneys' fees in common fund cases under either the
lodestar' method or the 'percentage of the fund' method. However,
the trend in this Circuit is toward the percentage method, which
'directly aligns the interests of the class and its counsel' and
provides a powerful incentive for the efficient prosecution and
early resolution of litigation.

In cases with large settlement awards, courts have noted that
smaller percentage awards of attorneys' fees are reasonable.

The proposal by Class Counsel to seek up to ten percent of any
settlement is comparable to the percentage of attorneys' fees
previously awarded by Judge Gleeson in this action. The Court is
aware that Rule 23(b)(3) Class Counsel have expended enormous time
and effort in litigating this action and should be rewarded for
those efforts.

The Court finds that this subfactor does not weigh against
preliminary approval. The Court will engage in a full analysis at
the final approval stage or thereafter, taking into consideration
the mega-case nature of the suit, as well as the six Goldberger
factors.

Equitable treatment of class members relative to one another

Consideration under this Rule 23(e)(2) factor could include whether
the apportionment of relief among class members takes appropriate
account of differences among their claims, and whether the scope of
the release may affect class members in different ways that bear on
the apportionment of relief.

The Court finds that the pro rata distribution scheme is
sufficiently equitable. Further, the scope of the release applies
uniformly to putative class members, and does not appear to affect
the apportionment of the relief to class members, apart from
securing the opportunity to participate in the (b)(2) action.
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor will likely weigh in
favor of granting final approval.

The Court preliminarily approved the Superseding Settlement
Agreement and preliminarily granted class certification for the
purposes of settlement,

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8ovls7a
from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil action American
Booksellers Association v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al, Plaintiffs,
represented by K. Craig Wildfang -- KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Richard J. Kilsheimer --
rkilsheimer@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Thomas M.
Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman --
wblechman@knpa.com -- Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder --
jshinder@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon LLP.

Plaintiffs in civil action National Association of Convenience
Stores et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil
action National Grocers Association et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et
al, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder, Constantine
Cannon LLP, Richard J. Kilsheimer, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Thomas M. Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman,
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Defendants in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al, Defendant, represented by Mark E. Tully --
mtully@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP, Peter Edward Greene,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, William Harry Rooney --
wrooney@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Andrew J.
McDonald, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Brian A. Herman --
brian.herman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockuis, LLP, David
Sapir Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, Douglas
Melamed, Eric H. Grush, Sidley Austin LLP, Erica Fenby --
erica.ghali@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Gary R.
Carney, Jr. -- gcarney@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garison, LLP, James T. Shearin -- jtshearin@pullcom.com
-- Pullman & Comley, LLC, James M. Sulentic --
James.Sulentic@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP, John P. Passarelli
-- John.Passarelli@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP.


MDL 2566: Court Narrows Claims v. Base & Hughes in Telexfree Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: TELEXFREE SECURITIES LITIGATION, MDL No.
4:14-md-02566-TSH (D. Mass.), Judge Timothy S. Hillman of the U.S.
District Court for the District Court of Massachusetts granted in
part and denied in part the Base Commerce, LLC and John Hughes'
motion to dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint.

TelexFree was a pyramid scheme that operated from February 2012 to
April 2014, and involved approximately 2 million participants
worldwide, nearly a million of whom suffered a net financial loss.
Several Plaintiffs filed actions in federal district courts across
the United States seeking to recover their losses against dozens of
the Defendants, ranging from financial service providers, payment
processing companies, (such as Base and Hughes) and the principles
of the fraudulent scheme.  As the actions involved common questions
of fact, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation joined the
actions into a multi-district litigation, and ordered transfer of
all actions to the District of Massachusetts for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Base provided payment processing services to TelexFree from April
2013 until Dec. 31, 2013.  During this time the Defendant Hughes
was Base Commerce's President, and principal contact with
TelexFree.  Base Commerce was compensated for these services in
excess of $2.5 million.

The SCAC alleges that these services were provided with full
knowledge that TelexFree was a pyramid scheme.  It also alleges
that Hughes was aware that TelexFree's predecessor corporation
(Common Cents Communication, Inc.) had been accused of being a
Ponzi scheme.
The SCAC seeks recovery against Base and Hughes for aiding and
abetting in violation of M.G.L. Ch 93 Section 12 and 69 and M.G.L.
Ch 93A § 2A and 11 (Third Claim for Relief), Unjust Enrichment
(Fourth Claim for Relief), Conspiracy (Fifth Claim for Relief),
Tortious Aiding and Abetting (Tenth Claim for Relief).

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the counts against them
alleging that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient injury-in-fact, to
confer Article III standing.  Specifically, they argue that the
Plaintiffs have not alleged how much money they invested, withdrew,
or when they invested.  

The Defendants also claim that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Base and Hughes because both are Arizona
residents and neither has had sufficient contacts with
Massachusetts to satisfy the Massachusetts Long Arm Statute and the
Due Process Cause of the Constitution.  Finally, they allege that
the SCAC fails to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).


Judge Hillman finds that the SCAC sufficiently alleges that
Plaintiffs Rita D. Dos Santos and Celio Da Silva invested funds in
TelexFree and were swindled when TelexFree converted those funds
which went to various Defendants.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
financial services providers such as Base and Hughes aided and
abetted TelexFree and the so called "Operational Defendants" by
knowingly providing substantial assistance in accepting,
processing, and misappropriating the funds that they invested into
TelexFree.  Those allegations are sufficient to establish subject
matter jurisdiction.

Next, he finds that Base and Hughes were served and named in a
putative class action filed in the District of Arizona which was
served on them and transferred to the Court on Oct. 20, 2015 as a
part of the present MDL.  They both admit to being residents of the
State of Arizona and thus both are subject to the jurisdiction of
the Arizona transferor court.  They provide no basis in law for
their assertion that the Plaintiffs filing and serving them on a
duplicate of the Third Consolidated Amended Complaint in the
District of Arizona somehow waived the Plaintiffs argument that
Section 1407 confers Nationwide personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the court has personal jurisdiction over Base and
Hughes for all pre-trial purposes.

The Judge also finds that Chapters 93 and 93A do not explicitly
enumerate private "aiding and abetting" liability.  Second, the
cases where courts in the district have held that parties may incur
liability under Chapters 93 and 93A specifically refer to the
"breach of fiduciary duty," and not Section 69, which covers
illegal Multi-Level Distribution Company actions.  Accordingly, he
finds that there is no separate Cause of Action under the facts of
this case for Aiding and Abetting M.G.L. C. 93 Section 12 and 69,
and C. 93A Section 2 and 11 and grants the Defendants' Motion as to
the Third Claim for Relief.

He further finds that the Plaintiff's claims are based upon the
Defendants' receipt of fees for payment processing services.  It
was TelexFree, not the Plaintiffs, which conferred the alleged
benefit on the Defendants.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claims are dismissed.

Finally, the Judge he denies the Defendant's Motion as to the Fifth
and Tenth Claims for Relief.  He finds that the Plaintiffs'
allegations in the SCAC are sufficient to withstand the Defendant's
motion on the knowledge requirement.  The Defendant Hughes openly
acknowledges the accusations in the Aug. 28, 2013 email.  Despite
these clear warnings, Base applied to offshore banks on TelexFree's
behalf, continued to advise TelexFree regarding payment methods and
in September 2013, against Synovus's instructions, authorized $5
million in transfers to TelexFree.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Hillman granted the Defendant's
Motion as to the Third and Fourth Claims for Relief and denied as
to the Fifth and Tenth Claims for Relief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lVsrQF from Leagle.com.

Felicia Guevara, Plaintiff, represented by Adriana Contartese,
Cadio Zirpoli, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Carl
Hammarskjold, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Michael J.
Gayan, Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard
Alexander Saveri -- rick@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro
hac vice, Robert J. Bonsignore -- rbonsignore@class-actions.us --
Bonsignore, LLC. & William L. Coulthard --
w.coulthard@kempjones.com -- Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, pro hac
vice.

Todd Cook, Individually and behalf of others similarly situated
(14-40154), Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Tate, Tate Law Group,
LLC, Cadio Zirpoli, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Carl
Hammarskjold , Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Michael J.
Gayan, Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard
Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice & William L.
Coulthard, Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice.

Todd Cook, Individually and behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Bonsignore, Bonsignore, LLC.

Anthony Cellucci, putative class representatives and those
similarly situated, Jamilly Lake, putative class representatives
and those similarly situated & Gerivaldo Pacheco, putative class
representatives and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Martin B. Dropkin, Dropkin and Leavitt, P.A., Robert
J. Bonsignore, Bonsignore, LLC., Ronald A. Dardeno --
rdardeno@dardeno.com -- Law Offices of Frank N. Dardeno LLP, Cadio
Zirpoli, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Carl Hammarskjold,
Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Michael J. Gayan,Kemp, Jones &
Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri &
Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice & William L. Coulthard, Kemp, Jones &
Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice.

Waldermara Martin, putative claims representatives and those
similary situated (14-40095), Reverend Jeremiah Githere, Joseph
Shikhman, Christopher McCormick & Edivaldo Reis, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert J. Bonsignore, Bonsignore, LLC., Cadio
Zirpoli , Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Carl Hammarskjold,
Saveri & Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice, Michael J. Gayan, Kemp, Jones
& Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri &
Saveri, Inc., pro hac vice & William L. Coulthard , Kemp, Jones &
Coulthard, LLP, pro hac vice.

James M. Merrill, Defendant, represented by Robert M. Goldstein .

Carlos N. Wanzeler, Defendant, represented by John J. Commisso,
Commisso Law P.C., Paul V. Kelly -- Paul.Kelly@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis PC & Sarah W. Walsh -- Sarah.Walsh@jacksonlewis.com
-- Jackson Lewis PC.

Joseph H. Craft, also known as & Craft Financial Solutions, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr. --
tdwyer@dwyer-llc.com -- Dwyer LLC & Jonathan C. Crafts --
jcrafts@dwyer-llc.com -- Dwyer LLC.

Randy N. Crosby, Defendant, represented by Scott P. Lopez --
splopez@lawson-weitzen.com -- Lawson & Weitzen.

Stephen B. Darr as Trustee of the Chapter 11 Estates of TelexFree,
Inc. and TelexFree, LLC, Intervenor, represented by Charles R.
Bennett, Jr. -- cbennett@murphyking.com -- Murphy & King, PC.


MDL 2741: Campbell Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DAVID CAMPBELL, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00084 (Filed Jan. 16,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 7, 2019. The
Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00654-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Campbell case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The Plaintiff alleges that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. Plaintiff also alleges that
the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in
particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Russell W. Lewis IV, Esq.
          Kori Westbrook, Esq.
          JOHNSON LAW GROUP
          1019 16th Avenue South
          Nashville, TN 37212
          Telephone: (615) 200-1122
          Facsimile: (866) 902-8647
          E-mail: rlewis@johnsonlawgroup.com
                  kwestbrook@johnsonlawgroup.com

MDL 2741: Gallimore Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ANTHONY L. GALLIMORE, the
Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00034
(Filed Jan. 14, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 7,
2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-00647-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Gallimore case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The Plaintiff alleges that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. Plaintiff also alleges that
the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in
particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jennifer A. Moore, Esq.
          Ashton Rose Smith, Esq.
          MOORE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          One Riverfront Plaza
          401 West Main Street, Suite 1810
          Louisville, KY 40202
          Telephone: (502) 657-7100
          Facsimile: (502) 657-7111
          E-mail: jennifer@moorelawgroup.com
                  ashton@moorelawgroup.com

MDL 2879: McGrath Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DENNIS MCGRATH, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs,
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., ARNE M. SORENSON, KATHLEEN KELLY
OBERG, and BAO GIANG VAL BAUDUIN, the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-06845 (Filed Dec. 1, 2018), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for Eastern District of New York, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on Feb. 7,
2019. The District of Maryland  Court Clerk assigned Case No.
8:19-to the proceeding.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of
Marriott from November 9, 2016 through November 29, 2018, both
dates inclusive. The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages
caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The McGrath case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re:
Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019. These
actions -- which are putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer
class actions -- share factual issues concerning a
recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest reservation
database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb. 6, 2019 Order, the MDL
Panel found that the factual overlap among these actions is
substantial, as they all arise from the same data breach, and they
all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place reasonable data
protections. Many also allege that Marriott did not timely notify
the public of the data breach. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of
the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead case is
8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, New York 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Jason Jacob Mendro, Esq.
          Jeffrey Saul Rosenberg, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Ste. 200
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 887-3726
          Facsimile: (202) 530-9626
          E-mail: jmendro@gibsondunn.com
                  jsrosenberg@gibsondunn.com

MICHAEL C KOEHN: Wins Initial Okay of Class Settlement in Long Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William C. Griesbach grants preliminary approval to the
Class Settlement Agreement in the lawsuit captioned BRUCE LONG,
individually on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. MICHAEL C. KOEHN and, JOHN AND JANE DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 10,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00943-WCG (E.D. Wisc.).

The "Settlement Class" is defined as:

     All persons to whom Michael C. Koehn mailed an initial
     written communication to an address in the State of
     Wisconsin, between June 21, 2017 and July 12, 2018, which
     stated a static amount as being the amount due even though
     the debts were accruing interest.

The "Class Claims" are defined as those Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claims arising from Koehn's collection letters in the
form of Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint.

Judge Griesbach appoints the Plaintiff as the Class Representative,
Stern Thomasson LLP as Class Counsel, and Class-Settlement.com as
the Settlement Administrator to send notice of the Settlement to
Class Members and administer the Settlement.

The Court approves the Parties' proposed Class Notice and directs
that it be mailed to the last known address of Class Member as
shown in Koehn's business records.  The Settlement Administrator
shall mail the Class Notice to Class Members on or before February
22, 2019.

Class Members shall have until April 8, 2019, to exclude themselves
from, or object to, the Settlement.

A final hearing on the fairness and reasonableness of the Agreement
and whether final approval shall be given to it and the requests
for fees and expenses by Class Counsel will be held on May 6, 2019,
at 11:30 a.m.[CC]


MICHAEL DELL: Karp Hits Stock Retirement Ff. Management Buy-out
---------------------------------------------------------------
Howard Karp, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Michael Dell, Egon Durban, Simon Patterson, David
Dorman, William Green, Ellen Kullman, MSDC Denali Investors, L.P.,
MSDC Denali EIV, LLC, Susan Lieberman Dell Separate Property Trust
and Silver Lake Group LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2019-0032, (Del.
Ch., January 22, 2019), seeks damages resulting from breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with the transfer of at least $10
billion in value away from Dell's Class V stockholders and to
Michael Dell and Silver Lake.

Dell was a publicly traded company for twenty-five years until it
was taken private by Michael Dell and Silver Lake in 2013 in a
management buy-out valued at approximately $25 billion. The
transaction retired Dell's Class V Common Stock. Howard Karp was a
Class V stockholder of Dell. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      James S. Notis, Esq.
      Jennifer Sarnelli, Esq.
      GARDY & NOTIS, LLP
      126 East 56th Street, 8th Floor
      New York, NY 10022
      Tel: (212) 905-0509
      Fax: (212) 905-0508
      Email: jnotis@gardylaw.com
             jsarnelli@gardylaw.com

             - and -

      Michael J. Barry, Esq.
      Christine M. Mackintosh, Esq.
      GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
      123 Justison Street
      Wilmington, Delaware 19801
      Tel: (302) 622-7000
      Email: mbarry@gelaw.com
             cmackintosh@gelaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid to Certify Class in Hauptman Case Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action captioned as, GEORGE HAUPTMAN, the Plaintiff,
vs. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., the Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00976 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Charles R. Norgle
entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration;

   2. denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion to certify class;

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an
      amended class action Complaint; and

   4. dismissing and terminating the civil case without prejudice.

The Court said, "The Defendants request the court to dismiss this
action rather than stay it pending the arbitration. Generally, the
FAA requires federal district courts to stay, rather than to
dismiss an action, pending an arbitration. However, there is a
"growing trend favoring dismissal of a case when all of the claims
are subject to arbitration." HTG Capital Partners. LLC v. Doe, No.
15 C 02129,2016 WL 612861, at 8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16,2016). "Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed district courts'
decisions to dismiss suits where all claims are arbitrable."
Chambers v. Aviva Life & Annuit), Co., No. 12 C 9589, 2013 WL
1345455, at 5 G\f.D. Ill. Mar. 26,2013) (collecting cases). Several
circuits have found that 'Judicially-created exception to the
general rule which indicates district courts may, in their
discretion, dismiss an action rather than stay it where it is clear
the entire controversy between the parties will be resolved by
arbitration." Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l. Inc., 653 F.3d
766,769-70 (8th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). Here, all of
Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration should be resolved by
arbitration. Accordingly, the Court joins the "growing trend" in
dismissing this matter."[CC]

MIDLAND CREDIT: Violates FDCPA and Nebraska CPA, Haworth Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ELLIOTT K. HAWORTH and DALLAS R. BROWN, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC and MESSERLI & KRAMER, P.A., Case No.
8:19-cv-00046-JMG-MDN (D. Neb., January 30, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the
Nebraska Consumer Protection Act in connection with their debt
collection communications and practices.

MCM is a Kansas corporation engaged in the business of collecting
debts due or alleged to be due to others across the state of
Nebraska, with its principal place of business located in San
Diego, California.  MCM has direct involvement in the actions
challenged in this lawsuit because it is the servicer of the
alleged accounts for Midland Funding.

Midland Funding is a Delaware corporation and is in the business of
purchasing, acquiring or claiming to purchase or acquire allegedly
defaulted debts originally owed to others and incurred for
personal, family or household purposes.  Midland Funding pays only
pennies on the dollar of the face value for the alleged debts it
purchases or claims to purchase.

M&K is a law firm with its principal offices located in Plymouth,
Minnesota, with a Nebraska office in Omaha.  M&K is engaged in the
business of using the mails and telephone to collect debts
originally owed to others as attorneys for MCM and/or Midland
Funding as well as filing debt collection lawsuits against Nebraska
residents.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Pamela A. Car, Esq.
          William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
          CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., LLO
          2120 S. 72nd Street, Suite 1125
          Omaha, NE 68124
          Telephone: (402) 391-8484
          Facsimile: (402) 391-1103
          E-mail: pacar@cox.net
                  billr205@gmail.com

               - and -

          O. Randolph Bragg, Esq.
          HORWITZ, HORWITZ & ASSOC.
          25 East Washington St., Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-8822
          Facsimile: (312) 372-1673
          E-mail: rand@horwitzlaw.com


MIDLAND FUNDING: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in May Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: FREDDY MAY and AMBER MAY, Chapter 13, Debtors.
FREDDY MAY and AMBER MAY, Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC and
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants, Case No.
4:17-bk-10970, Ap No. 4:18-ap-01057 (E.D. Ark.), Judge Richard D.
Taylor of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Little Rock Division, granted Midland's request for
summary judgment solely as to the issue of the enforceability of
the agreed contractual class action waiver.

Freddy May opened a Lowe's credit card account financed through
Synchrony Bank on May 5, 2013.  According to the Debtors, Synchrony
received notice of their bankruptcy filing and then transferred
data about those debts to Midland under a written agreement.
Thereafter, Midland filed a proof of claim for an amount in excess
of the scheduled debt.  Despite representations that the proof of
claim amount did not include interest or other charges, the Debtors
assert that Midland knows that interest and fees are in the claim
amount, but Midland directs its employees to file Proofs of Claim
that assert no interest or fees are in the claim amount.

The Debtors contend that this practice violates three provisions of
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001: (1) section (a) for
"failing to file a Proof of Claim that conforms substantially to
the Official Form because it failed to accurately disclose that
interest, fees, expenses, or charges were included in the claim
amount"; (2) section (c)(1) based on the alleged failure of Midland
to adequately provide the written document underlying its claim;1
and (3) section (c)(2) for failure "to file with its Proof of Claim
an itemized statement of the interest, fees, expenses or charges
that were incurred.  Further, they assert that the aggregate of
these alleged transgressions violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Debtors seek relief primarily in the context of statutory
damages and fees attendant to a class action.  The bankruptcy
specific prayer is in the nature of injunctive relief preventing
inaccurate proofs of claim being filed in the future, requiring an
amended proof of claim with supporting documentation in the instant
case, and disallowing the claim if not properly amended.

The Debtors filed a Class Action Complaint on May 4, 2018.  The
Defendants filed their Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and
to Strike Class Allegations and Memorandum in Support ("Motion") on
June 25, 2018, which drew the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Strike Class
Allegations ("Response") on July 25, 2018, each supplemented by
sur-replies.  Reserving all other matters, the Court heard the
Motion and Response solely as to the request for arbitration on
Aug. 30, 2018, and took the matter under advisement.  In its
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on Oct. 3, 2018, the Court
denied Midland's request for arbitration.

Thereafter, in its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, entered on Nov.
1, 2018, the Court denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support filed on June 25, 2018, and directed Midland
to file an answer within 21 days.  Midland filed their Defendants'
Answer and Defenses to Plaintiffs' Class Action Adversary Complaint
("Answer") on Nov. 23, 2018.  Therein, it reasserted that the
Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the binding arbitration provision
and class-action waiver included in the credit card account
agreement that governs the Account, which Midland is entitled to
enforce by virtue of its purchase and assignment of the Account
from Synchrony.

Thus, left unresolved is the class action issue raised in Midland's
original Motion and renewed in their Answer.  Between the Motion
and Answer, the Court, on Nov. 7, 2018, issued its Order Setting
Motion for Summary Judgment Deadlines indicating that Midland's
request to strike the class action allegations contained in the
original Complaint would be treated as a request for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056.  Pursuant
to that order, all parties filed supplements on Nov. 5, 2018.

Specifically, Midland supplemented their original Motion and Answer
by filing the Defendants' Supplemental Letter Brief in Support of
Motion to Strike Class Allegations; the Debtors filed their letter
response.  The Debtors expanded their initial letter response by
filing their Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Strike Class
Allegations on Dec. 3, 2018.  Completing the pleadings, Midland
filed their Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Strike
Class Allegations on Dec. 12, 2018.  The Court took the matter
under advisement.

Judge Taylor finds that the fact that the prerequisite language in
both Rules 23 and 42 specifically makes no mention of whether a
class action is preferred by the parties should not be given
dispositive effect.  The parties' preferences are seldom
contemplated in most rules or statues.  Further, the Court
absolutely concurs that Rule 23 governs procedural matters before
it.  That conclusion, however, does not resolve whether a class
action can be appropriately waived by the parties.  

The line of cases culminating in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
suggests it can, independently or when intertwined with an
arbitration clause.  Shady Grove is distinguishable as involving a
state statute that prohibited class action waivers in specified
instances whether or not the parties, particularly the Defendant,
had agreed or contracted otherwise.  The New York statute under
consideration in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Company, told federal courts they could not use
Rule 23, a procedural rule, in their court while applying New York
substantive law.  In the instant case, no such obstacle or
intrusion exists.  Unquestionably, the Judge holds that the Court
can use Rule 23.  Equally and dispositively, it must respect the
parties' valid and voluntary agreement to waive class actions,
which is a result fully consonant with the line of cases including
Shady Grove and culminating in Epic.

For the reasons stated, Judge Taylor granted Midland's request for
summary judgment solely as to the issue of the enforceability of
the agreed contractual class action waiver.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/yfmIv8 from Leagle.com.

Freddy May & Amber May, Plaintiffs, represented by William Thomas
Crowder -- crowdermcgaha.com -- CROWDER MCGAHA, LLP, Thomas J.
Diaz, Rainwater, Holt & Sexton, P.A. & William Marshall Hubbard,
RAINWATER HOLT & SEXTON, PA.

Midland Funding LLC & Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Mary-Tipton Thalheimer -- mthalheimer@qgtlaw.com --
Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC, Jason B. Tompkins --
jtompkins@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP & Geoffrey B. Treece --
gtreece@qgtlaw.com -- QUATTLEBAUM, GROOMS & TULL PLLC.


MORGAN STANLEY: Ex-Brokers Seek to Revive Discrimination Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
AdvisorHub reports that A group of former Morgan Stanley employees
who lost their attempt to be certified as a class in a case
alleging racial discrimination are seeking to renew their case by
filing an amended complaint with new evidence, according to court
filings.

Kathy Frazier and the six other plaintiffs have asked Judge Richard
Sullivan in the Southern District of New York to reconsider their
case, which argues among other claims that Morgan Stanley
discriminated in its account distribution and teaming policies.

They want to present new evidence and allegations from advisors in
14 states to address the judge's ruling that their complaint
offered "insufficient and anecdotal instances of discrimination,"
according to a court document filed the day after Christmas by
their lawyer, Linda Friedman of Stowell & Friedman in Chicago.

The case, which was first filed in February 2016, has drawn
attention because of the contentious allegations and because it
touches on employees' rights to bring their claims in court at a
time when Morgan Stanley and other firms have argued successfully
in other cases that they are bound to arbitrate disputes.

After filing three amended complaints with substantial updates,
including new plaintiffs to support the case's class claim, a
further revision would be improper and a waste of resources, Morgan
Stanley responded on January 4.

"Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are futile and an improper attempt
to seek reconsideration," Mark S. Dichter --
mark.dichter@morganlewis.com -- a lawyer at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
wrote the court on behalf of Morgan Stanley. "Plaintiffs repeat
many of the same legal arguments they made in their opposition to
defendants' motion and that this court already rejected."

Friedman, who has argued that Morgan Stanley never employed more
than 125 African American "tenured FAs" among its 16,000 brokers,
said in her letter to the court that she would present new evidence
of discriminatory practices. "Every day white FAs -- who are
disproportionately on teams -- are awarded higher compensation, and
African American FAs -- who are intentionally and
disproportionately excluded from teams -- have their individual
compensation rates artificially capped," she wrote.

Mr. Dichter responded that her claims are outdated, referencing
prior litigations and expert opinions that are more than ten years
old and that predated two discrimination settlements and a consent
decree that has led to policy changes.

"Similarly, the alleged 'statistics' about the African American
representation rate in Defendants' workforce provide no support for
the claims that the teaming or account distribution policies
intentionally discriminate or result in a disparate impact," he
wrote.

He also dismissed Ms. Friedman's citing of the Obama-era Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act as irrelevant since it protects plaintiffs with pay
discrimination claims and does "not extend to claims regarding
policies like defendant's teaming and pooling policies."

The lead plaintiff, Frazier, worked in Morgan Stanley's Honolulu,
Hawaii, office from 2007 until she resigned in November 2013. She
alleged that "lucrative accounts were routinely 'steered' to male,
non-African American FA" and said her complaints of discrimination
led to hostility, poaching of her clients and continued exclusion,
according to the ruling.

Judge Sullivan ruled in November that the facts presented  "do not
support an inference of a pattern or practice of discriminatory
treatment" and "fall short of support for the inference that
intentional discrimination was…standard operating procedure'" for
Morgan Stanley. [GN]


NATIONAL INDEMNITY: Certification of Class Sought in Muri Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marc J. Muri moves the Court to certify the action titled MARC J.
MURI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Case No. 8:17-cv-00178-JMG-CRZ (D.
Neb.), as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and/or
(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proposed Class is defined as:

     All persons who were participants in or beneficiaries of the
     Plan at any time from January 1, 2015 up to and including
     the date of judgment in this action and whose Plan accounts
     included investments in the Fund.

The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as class representative and
the appointment of Zamansky LLC as Class Counsel, and Burg Simpson
Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C. as Liaison Counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel E. Bonderoff, Esq.
          Jacob H. Zamansky, Esq.
          Edward H. Glenn, Jr., Esq.
          Justin Sauerwald, Esq.
          ZAMANSKY LLC
          50 Broadway, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 742-1414
          Facsimile: (212) 742-1177
          E-mail: samuel@zamansky.com
                  jake@zamansky.com
                  eglenn@zamansky.com
                  justin@zamansky.com

               - and -

          Brian K. Matise, Esq.
          BURG SIMPSON ELDREDGE HERSH & JARDINE, P.C.
          40 Inverness Drive East
          Englewood, CO 80112
          Telephone: (303) 792-5595
          Facsimile: (303) 708-0527
          E-mail: BMatise@burgsimpson.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Paul Ondrasik, Esq.
          Eric Serron, Esq.
          Andrew Sloniewsky, Esq.
          Osvaldo Vazquez, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
          1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 429-3000
          Facsimile: (202) 429-3902
          E-mail: pondrasik@steptoe.com
                  eserron@steptoe.com
                  asloniewsky@steptoe.com
                  ovazquez@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Shawn D. Renner, Esq.
          Tara A. Stingley, Esq.
          CLINE WILLIAMS WRIGHT JOHNSON & OLDFATHER, L.L.P.
          Sterling Ridge
          12910 Pierce St., # 200
          Omaha, NE 68144
          Telephone: (402) 397-1700
          Facsimile: (402) 397-1806
          E-mail: srenner@clinewilliams.com
                  tstingley@clinewilliams.com


NATIONWIDE MEDICAL: Killian Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages, Damages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gi'Anna Killian, Plaintiff, v. Nationwide Media Licensing, LLC and
Alexis McGuire, Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-00233 (M.D. Fla.,
February 6, 2019) is an action against Defendants seeking to
recover unpaid wages, compensation and damages.

According to the complaint, the Defendants did not pay Plaintiff
time and one half Plaintiff's regular rate of pay for overtime
hours worked in violation of the FLSA. By reason of the
intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff has
suffered damages, and will continue to incur costs and attorneys'
fees, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
demands judgment against  Defendants for all unpaid wages,
liquidated damages, attorney's fees and costs and demands a trial
by jury for all issues so triable.   

Plaintiff worked for Defendants from approximately October 16,
2017, to October 22, 2018, as a Licensing Consultant.

Nationwide Media Licensing, LLC was Plaintiff's employer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd W. Shulby, Esq.
     TODD W. HULBY, P.A.
     1792 Bell Tower Lane
     Weston, FL 33326
     Phone: (954) 530-2236
     Facsimile: (954) 530-6628
     Email: cshulby@shulbylaw.com


NAVIENT CORP: Court Narrows Claims in Lord Abbett Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORD ABBETT AFFILIATED FUND, INC., et al.,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. NAVIENT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, C.A. No.
16-112-MN (D. Del.), Judge Maryellen Noreika of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.

Navient is one of the country's largest servicers of student loans.
The Individual Defendants are officers and/or directors of
Navient.  The Underwriter Defendants served as underwriters on two
debt offerings made by Navient between April 17, 2014 and Dec. 28,
2015.

The Lead Plaintiffs, referred to collectively as the Lord Abbett
Funds, allege that the Defendants made false and misleading
disclosures during the Class Period.  Specifically, the Second
Amended Complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and
15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

Navient is a loan management, servicing, and assert recovery
business.  Its stock price went from a high of $21.40 on Feb. 27,
2015 to a low of $11.46 on Dec. 28, 2015, the last day of the Class
Period.  Several Plaintiffs sued alleging that the loss in stock
price can be attributed to false and misleading disclosures made by
Defendants during the Class Period.

On July 1, 2016, those actions were consolidated, and, on Sept. 28,
2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in the consolidated
class action.  The Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Court granted the
motion to dismiss because the Amended Complaint improperly relied
on puzzle pleading that failed to set forth a "short and plain"
statement of their claims.

On Nov. 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended
Complaint, which is the subject to the current motion to dismiss.
Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint assert claims under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, respectively.  Counts 3, 4, and 5
assert violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the
Securities Act, respectively.  Liability under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act is predicated on
first finding liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Sections 11 or 12 of the Securities Act.

Consistent with that framework, the Defendants have confined their
arguments on the motion to dismiss to whether the Complaint pleads
a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Sections 11 and
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.

Among other things, Judge Noreika finds no argument, with citations
to supporting case law, addressing the materiality of Navient's
loan quality statements.  Because materiality is the only element
at issue with respect to the Securities Act claims, the Defendants
have not shown that the Complaint fails to plead a Securities Act
claim based on the loan quality statements.  The Defendants' motion
to dismiss the portion of the Securities Act claims based on the
loan quality statements is denied.  Unless the Defendants can show
that the Complaint fails to adequately plead scienter, the Judge
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the portion of the
Exchange Act claims based on the loan quality statements.

She also finds that the Defendants have not shown that the
Complaint fails to adequately plead the falsity of the statements
regarding the loan loss provisions.  Their motion to dismiss the
parts of the Securities Act claims based on statements about the
loan loss provisions is denied.  Unless they can show that the
Complaint fails to adequately plead scienter, the Judge also denies
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the portion of the Exchange Act
claims based on statements about the loan loss provisions.

The Defendants have also not shown that the Complaint fails to
plead a Securities Act claim based on the SOX Certifications.  The
Defendants' motion to dismiss the portion of the Securities Act
claims based on the SOX Certifications is denied.  Unless
Defendants can show that the Complaint fails to plead scienter, the
Judge denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the portion of the
Exchange Act claims based on the SOX Certifications.

Finally, even after setting aside the allegations based on motive
and opportunity, the Judge cannot conclude at this time that the
remaining allegations in the Complaint, considered holistically,
fail to support a reasonable inference of scienter with respect to
the loan statements.  The Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Exchange Act claims based on the loan statements is denied.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Noreika granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Their motion
is granted as to all claims based on the compliance statements and
the Exchange Act claims based on the credit facility statements.
The Defendants' motion is denied in all other respects.  The
Securities Act and Exchange Act claims based on the compliance
statements are dismissed with prejudice.  The Exchange Act claims
based on the credit facility statements are dismissed without
prejudice.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/kssbGy from Leagle.com.

Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Karen
L. Morris -- kmorris@morrisandmorrislaw.com -- Morris & Morris LLC,
Bruce W. Leppla -- bleppla@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel P. Chiplock --
dchiplock@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael J. Miarmi -- mmiarmi@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick Francis Morris --
pmorris@morrisandmorrislaw.com -- Morris & Morris LLC, R. Michael
Lindsey -- rmlindsey@morrisandmorrislaw.com -- Ballard Spahr LLP,
Richard M. Heimann -- rheimann@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Sharon M. Lee -- slee@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice & Steven E.
Fineman -- sfineman@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Lord Abbett Equity Trust - Lord Abbett Calibrated Mid Cap Value
Fund & Lord Abbett Investment Trust - Lord Abbett High Yield Fund,
Plaintiffs, represented by Karen L. Morris, Morris & Morris LLC,
Bruce W. Leppla, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel P. Chiplock, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
pro hac vice, Michael J. Miarmi, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick Francis Morris, Morris &
Morris LLC, Richard M. Heimann, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, pro hac vice, Sharon M. Lee, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice & Steven E. Fineman, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice.

Lord Abbett Bond Debenture Fund, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Karen L. Morris, Morris & Morris LLC, Bruce W. Leppla, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel P.
Chiplock, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael J. Miarmi, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac
vice, Patrick Francis Morris, Morris & Morris LLC, Richard M.
Heimann, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice,
Sharon M. Lee, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac
vice & Steven E. Fineman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Lord Abbett Bond Debenture Fund, Inc., Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff,
represented by Patrick Francis Morris, Morris & Morris LLC.

Tore Heniz Markus Jagrelius, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Norman M.
Monhait, Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A., Mary K. Blasy, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Samuel H. Rudman, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice.

George A. Menold, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Peter B. Andrews,
Andrews & Springer LLC, Craig J. Springer, Andrews & Springer LLC &
David M. Sborz, Andrews & Springer LLC.

Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, Plaintiff,
represented by Joel E. Friedlander, Friedlander & Gorris, P.A.,
Christopher P. Quinn, Friedlander & Gorris, P.A. & Jeffrey M.
Gorris, Friedlander & Gorris, P.A.

Navient Corporation, Defendant, represented by Kelly E. Farnan --
farnan@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger, PA, Abid R. Qureshi --
abid.qureshi@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Blake
Rohrbacher -- rohrbacher@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger, PA,
Christopher Harris -- christopher.harris@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins
LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher S. Turner --
christopher.turner@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice &
Peter A. Wald -- peter.wald@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP.

John F. Remondi, John Kane, Somsak Chivavibul, William M.
Diefenderfer, III., Ann Torre Bates, Diane Suitt Gilleland, Linda
Mills, Barry A. Munitz, Steven L. Shapiro, Jane J. Thompson & Barry
L. Williams, Defendants, represented by Kelly E. Farnan, Richards,
Layton & Finger, PA.

Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, Defendant, represented by John M.
Seaman, Abrams & Bayliss LLP, Adam S. Hakki, Shearman & Sterling
LLP, pro hac vice, Anthony D. Marinello, Shearman & Sterling LLP,
pro hac vice, Daniel C. Lewis, Shearman & Sterling LLP, pro hac
vice & Kevin G. Abrams, Abrams & Bayliss LLP.

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, RBC
Capital Markets LLC, Barclays Capital Inc., Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, RBS Securities
Inc. & Wells Fargo Securities LLC, Defendants, represented by John
M. Seaman, Abrams & Bayliss LLP & Kevin G. Abrams, Abrams & Bayliss
LLP.


OPKO HEALTH: Kerznowski Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
A case, JASON KERZNOWSKI, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OPKO HEALTH, INC., PHILLIP
FROST, ADAM LOGAL, AND JUAN F. RODRIGUEZ, et al, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-13834, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida (Miami) on Feb. 7, 2019.  The
Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-20502-JLK to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge James Lawrence King.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities, other than Defendants and
their affiliates, who purchased publicly traded OPKO securities
from September 26, 2013 through September 7, 2018, both dates
inclusive, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of federal securities laws and pursue
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Laurence Matthew Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Attorneys for OPKO Health, Inc.:

          Benjamin Reid Joelson, Esq.
          Akerman LLP
          666 Fifth Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10103
          Telephone: (212) 880-3815

Attorneys for AMIDEX Funds, Inc.:

          John A. Macoretta, Esq.
          SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF PC
          2001 Market Street, Suite 3420
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 496-0300
          Facsimile: (215) 496-6611

Attorneys for Erste Asset Management GmbH:

          Michael Thomas Gray Long, Esq.
          LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC
          One Lowenstein Drive
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 597-2500

PCL CONSTRUCTION: Cinti Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Nicolas Cinti, individually, and as class representatives of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PCL Construction Services. Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00112, (M.D. Fla., January 17, 2019),
seeks to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime wages, monies due
and owing, liquidated damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs for violations of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

PCL is a construction company with its principle place of business
in Denver, Colorado where Cinti was employed as a field engineer in
their Orlando location. He regularly worked in excess of forty
hours per week without payment of overtime premiums. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Peter L. Tragos, Esq.
      TRAGOS, SARTBS & TRAGOS, PLLC
      601 Cleveland Street, Suite 800
      Clearwater, FL 33755
      Tel: (727) 441-9030
      Facsimile: (727) 441-9254
      Email: petertragos@greeklaw.com
             yaima@greeklaw.com


PETERSON'S HARLEY: Thomas Seeks Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit DERRICK THOMAS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
PETERSON'S HARLEY DAVIDSON OF MIAMI, L.L.C., a Florida limited
liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-61723-BB (S.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. granting class certification;

      "all persons who, between July 26, 2014 and the date of
      class certification, (1) were sent at least one invitation
      text message (2) to their cellular telephone number (3) by
      Peterson's, or Media Group on Peterson's behalf, (4) using
      the same text messaging platform used to send Peterson's
      invitation text messages to Plaintiff";

   2. appointing him as representative of the Class;

   3. appointing Kaufman P.A. as class counsel; and

   4. establishing a deadline for submission of a proposed class
      notice and notice plan.

Excluded from the Class is the Judge presiding over this case and
her staff, Peterson's, Peterson's directors and officers, immediate
families of Peterson's directors and officers, or the legal
representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-interests
or assignees of any such excluded person.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Avi R. Kaufman,. Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26 TH Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES: Accused by Kokoszki of Violating Privacy Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK KOKOSZKI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case
No. 2:19-cv-10302-BAF-RSW (E.D. Mich., January 30, 2019), accuses
the Defendant of violating Michigan's Preservation of Personal
Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, between January 30, 2016 and July 30,
2016, Playboy rented, exchanged, and/or otherwise disclosed
personal information about Mr. Kokoszki's Playboy magazine
subscription to data aggregators, data appenders, data
cooperatives, and list brokers, among others, which in turn
disclosed his information to aggressive advertisers, political
organizations, and non-profit companies.  As a result, Mr. Kokoszki
received a barrage of unwanted junk mail.

Playboy is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business located in Los Angeles, California.  Playboy publishes a
lifestyle magazine and creates content for distribution through
television networks, Web sites, mobile platforms, and radios in the
United States and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: jmarchese@bursor.com
                  pfraietta@bursor.com

               - and -

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          David W. Hall, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 357-2107
          Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com
                  dhall@hedinhall.com

               - and -

          Nick Suciu III, Esq.
          BARBAT, MANSOUR & SUCIU PLLC
          1644 Bracken Road
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302
          Telephone: (313) 303-3472
          E-mail: nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com


PMC HOME: Nelson Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------
KALEB NELSON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PMC HOME & AUTO INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC,
a Florida company, the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00332 (M.D.
Fla., Feb. 7, 2019), seeks to stop PMC from violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by making unsolicited, autodialed calls to
consumers without their consent, including calls to consumers
registered on the national Do Not Call registry.

PMC provides extended warranty contracts to consumers, doing
business as Protect My Car.  PMC relies heavily on leads generated
by third parties. PMC uses an autodialer to calls these leads even
when it does not have consent to call them, regardless of whether
their phone numbers are registered on the national Do Not Call
registry.

According to the complaint, PMC made repeated unsolicited,
autodialed calls to Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff having registered
his phone number with the DNC to prevent such calls. To make
matters worse, PMC continued to call Plaintiff even after Plaintiff
made it clear he wanted the calls stopped.  The calls were
solicitations for an extended vehicle warranty. The Defendant
continued to make autodialed calls to Plaintiff more than 30 days
after Plaintiff registered his phone number on the DNC, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the putative Classes:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

               - and -

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          1072 Madison Ave. No.
          Lakewood, NJ 08701
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

POCATELLO, ID: Faces $20MM Class Action Over Utility Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
Matt Guilhem, writing for Boise State Public Radio, reports that
the City of Pocatello could be liable for more than $20 million if
a class-action lawsuit centering on utility fees proceeds.

The lawyer representing the plaintiffs in the suit, Nathan Olsen,
says Pocatello owes city utility customers millions for overpaying
sewer, water and sanitation bills between 2005 and 2014.

When Pocatello was facing budget issues in 2005, it instigated a
new policy of treating its public utilities like for-profit
businesses. The community charged the utilities property taxes,
they passed along the cost to users and then the profits from the
fee were put in the city's general fund to be used on anything.

According to the Idaho State Journal, in late 2006 questions about
the legality of the arrangement were raised. By February of 2007, a
deputy attorney general weighed in telling officials the
arrangement violated an Idaho Supreme Court decision. The tax and
fee were deemed inappropriate, but the city continued implementing
them for five more years.

The Idaho Supreme Court officially ruled the tax and fee scheme
unreasonable in 2014. Between when it was implemented in 2005 and
the court ruling in 2014, Pocatello collected about $28.4 million
through the arrangement.

Last May, a judge granted class-action status to a lawsuit
challenging the city's former financial policy, and in November he
ruled the city must repay rate-payers.

Olsen, the lawyer representing the plaintiffs, says actual damages
are around $10 million, but since interest has been accruing for
years, the city owes something more in the neighborhood of $20
million.

Pocatello officials say they're exploring their options. [GN]


PREFERRED STAFFING: Class Certification Sought in Sanford Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled ALLEN SANFORD, BRYANT DILL
IRAIDA BABLITCH, and JOE MALLORY Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. PREFERRED STAFFING, INC., STAFFWORKS,
INC., and KLEEN TEST PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Case No.
2:17-cv-01071-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), move the Court for an order
granting class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Allen Sanford, Bryant Dill Iraida Bablitch and Joe Mallory also ask
the Court to appoint them as class representatives, and to appoint
Lubar & Lanning, LLC, and the Law Office of Adam M. Kent as class
counsel.  They further seek Court approval of their proposed
notice.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam M. Kent, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ADAM M. KENT
          7670 N. Port Washington Road, Suite 105
          Milwaukee, WI 53217-3174
          Telephone: (414) 446-5331
          Facsimile: (888) 509-8232
          E-mail: Attorney@adamkentlegal.com

               - and -

          Steven Lubar, Esq.
          LUBAR & LANNING, LLC
          7670 N. Port Washington Road, Suite 105
          Milwaukee, WI 53217-3174
          Telephone: (414) 375-4795
          Facsimile: (866) 240-6284
          E-mail: Steven@lubarlanning.com


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Wins Prelim. Nod of Marsh Class Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Manuel L. Real grants preliminary approval of the
Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement entered into by
the parties in the lawsuit styled CASSIDY MARSH, on behalf of
himself, and all others similarly situated and as an "aggrieved
employee" on behalf of other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE
PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, case No. 2:18-cv-04944-R-E (C.D. Cal.).

For purposes of this Settlement only, the Court conditionally
certifies:

   (1) The 8 Hour Class, defined as:

       All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who
       were employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products
       Company in California at any time from April 10, 2014
       through preliminary approval, who were regularly scheduled
       to work 8 hour shifts; and

   (2) The 12 Hour Class, defined as:

       All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who
       were employed by The Procter & Gamble Paper Products
       Company in California at any time from April 10, 2014
       through preliminary approval, who were regularly scheduled
       to work rotating 12 hour night/day shifts.

Should for whatever reason the Settlement not become final, the
fact that the Parties were willing to stipulate to certification of
the 8 Hour Class and the 12 Hour Class as part of the Settlement
shall have no bearing on, nor be admissible in connection with, the
issue of whether a class should be certified in a non-settlement
context.

For Settlement purposes only, the Court appoints Named Plaintiff
Cassidy Marsh as the class representative for the combined Class.
Further, the Court preliminarily approves a Service Award to Named
Plaintiff in the amount of $15,000.

For Settlement purposes only, the Court appoints David Spivak,
Esq., and Caroline Tahmassian, Esq., of The Spivak Law Firm and
Walter Haines of the United Employees Law Group as Class Counsel
for the combined Class.  Further, the Court preliminarily approves
a Fees Award not to exceed $216,666 and a Costs Award not to exceed
$20,000.  The Fees Award and Costs Award shall be for all claims
for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation costs past,
present and future incurred in the prosecution and resolution of
the Claims and neither Class Counsel, nor any other counsel, shall
be permitted to petition the Court, or to accept any payments, for
fees and costs relating to the prosecution and resolution of the
Claims other than the Fees Award and Costs Award.

The Court appoints Simpluris, Inc., as the Settlement Administrator
to administer the Settlement of this matter as more specifically
set forth in the Settlement Agreement and further preliminarily
approves Settlement Administration Costs of $20,000.

The Court approves, as to form and content, the proposed Notice of
Settlement.

The Final Approval Hearing will be held on July 1, 2019, at 10:00
a.m.[CC]



RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Pickles Sues over Debt Collection
----------------------------------------------------------
HELEN PICKLES f/k/a HELEN WOERPEL, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RECEIVABLES
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Washington Limited Liability
Company, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-14038-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
Feb. 7, 2019), alleges that the Defendant violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff resides in Saint Lucie County, Florida. Receivables
Performance Management is a Washington Limited Liability Company
engaged in the business of collecting consumer debts, which
operates from offices located at 20816 44th Avenue West, Lynnwood,
Washington 98036. The Defendant regularly uses the United States
Postal Service and telephone in the collection of consumer debts.
The Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect consumer
debts for other parties. The Defendant sought to collect a consumer
debt from Plaintiff arising from an alleged delinquency on a cable
and/or satellite service bill. The debt was incurred primarily for
personal, household or family use.

On or about September 14, 2018, the Defendant mailed, or caused to
be mailed, a written communication to Plaintiff seeking payment of
an alleged debt. The "Demand Letter" states in part: Your Dish
account has been placed in our collection office and is due
immediately.  The Defendant's statement "[y]our Dish account has
been placed in our collection office and is due immediately."
overshadows Plaintiff's verification rights provided by 15 U.S.C.
section 1692g(a). The Defendant's Demand Letter demanding immediate
payment of the alleged debt overshadows Plaintiff's verification
rights provided by the FDCPA. The Demand Letter is misleading and
confusing because its demand for immediate payment contradicts
Plaintiff's verification rights, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff:

          Leo W. Desmond, Esq.
          DESMOND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          5070 Highway A1A, Suite D
          Vero Beach, FL 32963
          Telephone: 772 231 9600
          Facsimile: 772 231 0300
          E-mail: lwd@desmondlawfirm.com

REVENUE FRONTIER: Clough Seeks Certification of Subscribers Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned ROBERT W. CLOUGH, II on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. REVENUE
FRONTIER, LLC, SUPREME DATA CONNECTIONS, LLC, and WILLIAM ADOMANIS,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00411-PB (D.N.H.), moves the Court for an order
certifying this case as a class action with this class:

     (1) All persons in the United States who are the users or
     subscribers of the approximately 18,937 cellular telephones
     identified in Anya Verkovshkaya's report (2) to which
     cellular telephone numbers a text message was sent (4) using
     the SDC Messaging Application, employing the Sendroid
     software (5) within four years of the filing of the
     complaint.

Mr. Clough also moves for his appointment as class representative
and appointment of his counsel as class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
          99 High St., Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 680-0049
          E-mail: ted@broderick-law.com
                  anthony@broderick-law.com

               - and -

          Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE
          1 South Avenue, Suite 3
          Natick, MA 01760
          Telephone: (508) 655-1415
          E-mail: mmccue@massattorneys.net

               - and -

          Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
          Jeremy Cohen, Esq.
          CW LAW GROUP, P.C.
          188 Oaks Road Framingham, MA 01701
          Telephone: (508) 309-4880
          E-mail: alex@cwlawgrouppc.com
                  Jeremy@cwlawgrouppc.com


REVERA INC: Manitoba Families File Class Action in Ontario
----------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that Five Manitoba families are part of
a massive lawsuit against an Ontario-based company that operates
care homes for seniors.

The families claim that Revera Inc. did not treat their loved ones
properly and put their health at risk.

The Manitoba families who filed claims say their loved ones were
cared for in three different facilities in the province. Lawyers
working for the families say there are 80 such claims across
Canada.

None of the allegations have been tested in court.

A Revera official did not respond to the specific allegations but
says company employees provide compassionate, high quality care.
[GN]


ROBINS FOOD: Kalaitzidis Sues Over Withheld Wages, Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
Louis Kalaitzidis, individually and on behalf of all other
employees similarly situated v. Robins Food Corporation d/b/a Uncle
Bill's Diner, Alexandra Botos, and Akis Botos, jointly and
severally, Case No. 1:19-cv-00592 (E.D.N.Y., January 30, 2019),
alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law.

Mr. Kalaitzidis brings this action under the FLSA in order to
remedy the Defendants' alleged wrongful withholding of his earned
wages and overtime compensation.  He also alleges violations of
minimum wage and overtime wage requirements, spread-of-hours pay,
and notice and record-keeping requirements of NYLL.

Robins Food Corporation, doing business as Uncle Bill's Diner, is a
domestic business corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the state of New York, formed on June 24, 2003.

Robins Food operates a Greek diner with the name "Uncle Bill's
Diner," located at 30-17 Stratton Street, in Flushing, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ariadne Panagopoulou, Esq.
          PARDALIS & NOHAVICKA, LLP
          950 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (718) 777-0400
          Facsimile: (718) 777-0599
          E-mail: ari@pnlawyers.com


SACHS ELECTRIC: Griffin Seeks to Certify Classes
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Justin Griffin, an individual, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and as
representative of aggrieved employees, the Plaintiff, vs. Sachs
Electric Company, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
5:17-cv-03778-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court
for an order on March 13, 2019:

   1. determining that a class action is proper as to the First,
      Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action contained in the
      Consolidated Complaint pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
      Rules of Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification

      Civil Procedure;

   2. certifying these classes:

      Sachs Unpaid Wages Class - Class 1:

      "all non-exempt employees of Sachs Electric Company who
      worked on the construction of the California Flats Solar  
      Project at any time within the period from April 27, 2013  
      through the date of class certification who were not paid  
      for all time from when they entered the Security Gate  
      Entrance of the Solar Site to when they began to be paid and

      from when they stopped being paid to when they arrived back

      at the Security Gate Entrance";

      Sachs Termination Pay Sub-Class – Class 2:

      "all Class 1 class members whose employment with Sachs  
      Electric Company terminated within the period beginning  
      April 27, 2014 to the date of class certification";

      McCarthy Unpaid Wages Class – Class 3:

      "all non-exempt employees of McCarthy Building Companies,  
      Inc. or of any of the subcontractors of McCarthy Building  
      Companies, Inc. who worked on the construction of the  
      California Flats Solar Project at any time within the period

      from April 27, 2013 through the date of class certification

      who were not paid for all time from when they entered the  
      Security Gate Entrance of the Solar Site to when they began

      to be paid and from when they sto ped being paid to when  
      they arrived back at the Security Gate
      Entrance"; and

      McCarthy Termination Pay Sub-Class – Class 4:

      "all Class 3 class members whose employment with McCarthy  
      Building Companies, Inc. or of any of the subcontractors of

      McCarthy Building Companies, Inc. terminated within the  
      period beginning April 27, 2014 to the date of class  
      certification"

   3. finding that Plaintiff Justin Griffin is an adequate
      representative and certifying him as the Class  
      representative; and

   4. finding that Plaintiff's counsel and their respective firms,

      Peter R. Dion-Kindem of Peter R. Dion-Kindem, P.C. and  
      Lonnie C. Blanchard III of The Blanchard Law Group, APC, are

      adequate class counsel and certifying them as class counsel.

      [CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff Justin Griffin:

          Peter R. Dion-Kindem, Esq.
          THE DION-KINDEM LAW FIRM
          PETER R. DION-KINDEM, P.C.
          2945 Townsgate Road, Suite 200
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone: (818) 883-4900
          E-mail: peter@dion-kindemlaw.com

               - and -

          Lonnie C. Blanchard, III
          THE BLANCHARD LAW GROUP, APC
          3579 East Foothill Blvd., No. 338
          Pasadena, CA 91107
          Telephone: (213) 599-8255
          Facsimile: (213) 402-3949
          E-mail: lonnieblanchard@gmail.com

SEMPER BLUE: Springer Moves to Certify Class of SB Pro Officers
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled JOSHUA SPRINGER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. SEMPER BLUE
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Case No. 4:18-cv-00968-BP (W.D. Mo.),
asks the Court to conditionally certify a Fair Labor Standards Act
collective consisting of:

     All current and former SB Pro officers who have worked for
     Defendant at any time during the last three years.

Mr. Springer further prays that the Court direct the Defendant to
provide a list of all Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, including their
names, job classifications, last known mailing address, phone
number, e-mail address, if known, and Social Security numbers in an
Excel spreadsheet format.  He also asks that Court-authorized
notice be sent to all Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs informing them of
their right to join this action and assert claims under the
FLSA.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew B. Protzman, Esq.
          Ben Stelter-Embry, Esq.
          PROTZMAN LAW FIRM, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2430
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 421-5100
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5101
          E-mail: andy@protzmanlaw.com
                  ben@protzmanlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Rachel H. Baker, Esq.
          Shannon D. Johnson, Esq.
          SEIGFREID BINGHAM, P.C.
          2323 Grand Blvd., Suite 1000
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 421-4460
          Facsimile: (816) 474-3447
          E-mail: rbaker@sb-kc.com
                  sjohnson@sb-kc.com


ST. LOUIS, MO: Ahmad Seeks to Certify Class of Protest Participants
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled MALEEHA AHMAD, et al. v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, Case No. 4:17-cv-02455-CDP (E.D. Mo.),
move the Court to certify a Plaintiff Class consisting of those
individuals, who will participate in expressive activity that is
intended or perceived as a protest of police at a traditional
public or designated public forum within the City of St. Louis.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives and to appoint their attorneys as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anthony E. Rothert, Esq.
          Jessie Steffan, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          906 Olive Street, #1130
          St. Louis, MO 63108
          Telephone: (314) 652-3114
          Facsimile: (314) 652-3112
          E-mail: trothert@aclu-mo.org
                  jsteffan@aclu-mo.org

               - and -

          Gillian R. Wilcox, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          406 West 34th Street, # 420
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 470-9938
          Facsimile: (314) 652-3112
          E-mail: gwilcox@alcu-mo.org


SUNRUN INC: $5.5MM Slovin TCPA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LYNN SLOVIN, an individual, on her own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SUNRUN,
INC., a California corporation, CLEAN ENERGY EXPERTS, LLC, a
California limited liability company doing business as SOLAR
AMERICA, and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
4:15-cv-05340-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted
the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Conditional Class
Certification, Notice to Class Members and Entry of Scheduling
Order.

The parties filed a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, which,
together with the Amendment to Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement, and the exhibits thereto, as modified by the Court sets
forth the terms and conditions for the settlement (and release of
certain claims against the Defendants.  The Settlement Agreement
was entered into only after extensive arm's-length negotiation by
experienced counsel and in mediation under the guidance of the
Honorable Edward A. Infante (Ret.), JAMS mediator Bruce Friedman,
Esq., and Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley.

Judge Rogers granted the Unopposed Motion.  Pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for the
purposes of settlement only, the Settlement Class is preliminarily
certified, consisting of all persons in the United States, from
Nov. 20, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2018, who received from or on behalf of
Sunrun and/or CEE, or from a third party generating leads for
Sunrun and/or CEE: (1) one or more calls on their cellphones, or
(2) at least two telemarketing calls during any 12-month period
where their phone numbers appeared on a National or State Do Not
Call Registry or Sunrun's and/or CEE's Internal Do Not Call List
more than 30 days before the calls.

Plaintiffs Lynn Slovin, Samuel Katz, Jeffrey Price, and Justin
Birkhofer are appointed the Representative Plaintiffs; David C.
Parisi, Esq. Suzanne Havens Beckman, Esq. PARISI & HAVENS LLP 212
Marine Street, Suite 100 Santa Monica, CA 90405 Yitzchak Lieberman,
Esq. Grace Parasmo, Esq. PARASMO LIEBERMAN LAW 7400 Hollywood
Boulevard, #505 Los Angeles, CA 90046, are appointed as the Class
Counsel; and Kurtzman Carson Consultants as the Settlement
Administrator.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Sunrun/CEE will deposit a
total of $5.5 million into the Settlement Fund when the Settlement
becomes Final, as per the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The
Settlement Fund will be maintained by the Settlement Administrator
for the benefit of the Settlement Class and Class Counsel.  All of
the monies deposited by Sunrun/CEE into the Settlement Fund will be
placed in an interest bearing escrow account established and
maintained by the Settlement Administrator.  The interest
generated, if any, will accrue to the benefit of the Settlement
Class and is to be added into the Settlement Fund.

Sunrun/CEE will make deposits into the Settlement Fund in
accordance with the following schedule:

     a. Within 15 days of the entry of the Preliminary Approval
Order, Sunrun/CEE will disburse to the Settlement Administrator
$250,000 of the Settlement Fund to be used by the Settlement
Administrator for preliminary Settlement Administration Costs,
including the costs to complete the Class Notice, establish and
maintain the Settlement Website, establish and maintain a toll-free
number for questions by class members, as well as any other initial
administration costs to the Parties.  To the extent that additional
Settlement Administration Costs are incurred after the initial
payment, but before the Effective Date, the Settlement
Administrator will bill, and Sunrun/CEE will pay, such additional
costs.  For any additional costs of Settlement Administration that
are paid by Sunrun/CEE, Sunrun/CEE will receive a credit against
the amounts required to be paid into the Settlement Fund.

     b. All Settlement Administration Costs will be drawn from the
Settlement Fund by the Settlement Administrator, subject to the
written approval of Sunrun/CEE (via their counsel) and the Class
Counsel.

     c. Sunrun/CEE will disburse to the Settlement Administrator
the remainder of the Settlement Fund within 15 days following the
Effective Date.

The Settlement Fund will constitute Sunrun/CEE's exclusive payment
obligation under the Settlement Agreement and will be used to pay:
(a) Cash Benefits paid to Settlement Class Members, as prescribed
by the Settlement Agreement; (b) Attorneys' Fees and Costs, as
awarded by the Court; (c) any Incentive Award awarded to Lynn
Slovin, Samuel Katz, Jeffrey Price, and Justin Birkhofer; (d)
Settlement Administration Costs, including costs of notice
(including CAFA Notice); and (e) any cy pres payment to Electronic
Frontier Foundation pursuant to the procedures described in Section
7.4 of the Settlement Agreement.  No portion of the Settlement Fund
will be returned to Sunrun/CEE, except as provided in Section 11 of
the Settlement Agreement, Termination of the Agreement.

The Judge approved the notices in all respects, including the
proposed forms of notice and the notice provisions of the
Settlement Agreement, and orders that notice be given in
substantial conformity therewith.  The costs of disseminating the
Class Notice will be paid from the Settlement Fund in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement.

All costs of providing the Class Notice, including the costs of
identifying address information for Settlement Class Members and
the costs of printing, web hosting and/or publishing the Class
Notice, will be paid for out of the Settlement Fund, subject to the
terms in the Order.  In the event that the Settlement Agreement is
terminated pursuant to its terms, Sunrun/CEE will bear any costs of
providing the Class Notice already incurred.

The Judget approved the form, content and requirements of the Class
Notices annexed to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibits B and D and
the procedure for notice set forth under Section 6 in the
Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class Members who wish to be excluded from
Settlement Class will mail a written Request for Exclusion to the
Settlement Administrator, so that it is postmarked no later than 90
days after the entry of the Notice Date.

The Class Counsel will file a Motion for Final Approval, and
respond to any objections to the Settlement, no less than 14 days
before the Final Approval Hearing.

No less than seven calendar days prior to the Final Approval
Hearing, the Settlement Administrator will file with the Court and
serve both the Class Counsel and the Defendants' Counsel a
declaration stating that the Class Notice required by the
Settlement Agreement has been completed in accordance with the
terms of the Preliminary Approval Order.

No less than 35 days prior to the Claim Deadline, the Class Counsel
will file and serve (i) a motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and
(ii) any application for an Incentive Awards to the Representative
Plaintiffs.

Therefore, the Judge set the following Deadlines:

     a. Class Notice Mailed (and emailed March 1, 2019 where email
addresses are available) by:

     b. Class Counsels' Fee and Cost Application - April 5, 2019

     c. Objection/Opt-Out/Claims must be electronically submitted
or postmarked by May 31, 2019

     d. Final Approval Submissions to be filed by June 18, 2019

     e. Final Approval Hearing - July 9, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. in
Courtroom One

If a Settlement Class Member wants to appear at the Final Approval
Hearing and be heard with respect to objecting to the Settlement,
that person or entity must file no later than 90 days after entry
of the Preliminary Approval Order.

The Order terminates Docket No. 189.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mrTt8F from Leagle.com.

Lynn Slovin, an individual, on her own behalf and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak
Hillel Lieberman -- ylieberman@parasmoliebermanlaw.com --
ParasmoLiebermanLaw, Alan Himmelfarb -- consumerlaw1@earthlink.net
-- Law Offices of Alan Himmelfarb, David Christopher Parisi --
dcparisi@parisihavens.com -- Parisi & Havens LLP, Ethan Mark
Preston -- ep@eplaw.us -- Preston Law Offices, Grace E. Parasmo --
gparasmo@parasmoliebermanlaw.com -- Parasmo Lieberman Law, pro hac
vice, Suzanne Havens Beckman -- shavens@parisihavens.com -- Parisi
& Havens LLP & Suzanne L. Havens Beckman --
shavens@parisihavens.com -- Parisi & Havens LLP.

Samuel Katz, Jeffery Price & Justin Birkhofer, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alan Himmelfarb, Law Offices of Alan Himmelfarb,
Ethan Mark Preston, Preston Law Offices, Grace E. Parasmo, Parasmo
Lieberman Law, Suzanne L. Havens Beckman, Parisi & Havens LLP &
David Christopher Parisi, Parisi & Havens LLP.

Sunrun, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant, represented by
Dong Eun Lee -- clee@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye and Warren LLP,
Edward James Mullins, III, Edward J. Mullins III, Esq. LLC, Lauri
Anne Mazzuchetti, Kelley Drye Warren LLP & Lee Scott Brenner,
Kelley Drye and Warren LLP.

Clean Energy Experts, LLC, a California limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Catherine Dong Eun Lee, Kelley Drye and
Warren LLP, Glenn T. Graham, Kelley Drye Warren LLP, Jeffrey S.
Jacobson, KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN, LLP & Lauri Anne Mazzuchetti,
Kelley Drye Warren LLP.

Sean Bozarth, Movant, represented by Reuben D. Nathan --
rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com -- Nathan & Associates, APC.


TRANSUNION, LLC: Rodriguez Sues over Credit Reports
---------------------------------------------------
JESSE RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TRANSUNION, LLC and EVERGREEN
PROFESSIONAL RECOVERIES, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00184 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 7, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants prepared credit reports concerning the Plaintiff and
class members for impermissible purpose in violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.

The Plaintiff further alleges Transunion failed to follow
reasonable procedures to ensure that its customers, such as
Evergreen, have a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports
on individuals such as Plaintiff and the class.

According to the complaint, sometime in 2018, the Plaintiff
incurred an alleged debt to Seattle Municipal Court for a supposed
driving ticket. Sometime thereafter, Evergreen was hired to attempt
to collect the alleged debt.  Evergreen routinely collects unpaid
debts owed to government and administrative entities, including for
unpaid driving violations. As part of that process, Evergreen
routinely seeks information from consumer's credit reports with the
hopes of finding assets or bank accounts to attach, or to locate a
place of employment. Indeed, Evergreen's website highlights that
they do collection work in, inter alia, the following areas:
"Government -- Court" and "Government -- Non-Court." Beginning
around March of 2018, Evergreen began regularly requesting from
Transunion Plaintiff's credit report to assist them in collecting a
debt. Evergreen continued to request, and Transunion continued to
provide them, a copy of Plaintiff's credit report, for the purpose
of assisting them in collecting the debt for the Driving Ticket,
the lawsuit says.

Transunion is one of the largest credit reporting agencies in the
United States, and is engaged in the business of assembling and
disseminating credit reports concerning hundreds of millions of
consumers.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Brubaker, Esq.
          Brubaker Law Group PLLC
          11925 110th Ave NE
          Kirkland, WA 98034
          Telephone: (206) 335-8746
          E-mail: michael@brubakerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          Ari M. Marcus, Esq.
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          E-mail: Ari@MarcusZelman.com
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.

TTEC SERVICES: Fox Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------
Kasey Fox, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. TTEC Services Corp., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00037,
(E.D. Ark., January 17, 2019) seeks monetary damages, liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees as a result of failure to pay lawful overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage
Act.

TTEC provides customer contact management services via a customer
service call center located in Sherwood where Fox worked as an
hourly-paid licensed health care advocate. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      Chris Burks, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      One Financial Center
      650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
             chris@sanfordlawfirm.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Appeal Court Rates Arbitration Clause One Star
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul-Erik Veel, Esq. -- pveel@litigate.com -- of Lenczner Slaght
LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that Heller v Uber
Technologies Inc highlights the tension between two competing
adjudicative mechanisms, each of which legislatures have
encouraged: private arbitration and class actions. Justice Perell's
decision gave primacy to parties' ability to agree to arbitration
and thereby opt out of class actions, affirming the policy goals
underlying arbitration legislation. By contrast, the Ontario Court
of Appeal's decision took the opposite approach, affirming the
importance of ensuring that arbitration clauses do not defeat the
ability of individuals to bring class actions to vindicate the
rights of a group.

A frequently litigated issue in Canadian class actions is the
extent to which parties can agree in advance to opt out of class
actions in favour of private arbitration. In the context of
consumer protection claims, provincial legislatures have generally
eliminated the ability of defendants to defeat class actions
through arbitrations by declaring clauses requiring the parties to
submit such disputes to private arbitrations to be void.  However,
it has remained an open question as to whether and when courts
would enforce arbitration clauses in other contexts, where the
effect of such enforcement would be to defeat a proposed class
proceeding.

In the employment context, it appeared that at least some courts
were prepared to enforce arbitration clauses in contractor
agreements, thereby defeating the ability by individuals who
claimed that they had been systemically misclassified as
independent contractors rather than employees to bring class
actions to claim rights under employment standards legislation. As
I blogged about last year, Justice Perell's decision in Heller v
Uber Technologies Inc signalled that courts could and would enforce
arbitration clauses in independent contractor agreements.

However, in its first decision of 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal
reversed Justice Perell's decision and allowed the proposed class
action against Uber to proceed.

The background to the decision is set out in my previous blog post.
In brief, David Heller, an Ontario resident and Uber driver,
brought a proposed class action against a series of Uber companies,
alleging that he and other proposed class members were improperly
classified as "independent contractors" instead of "employees" and
that they were thus deprived of the statutory benefits provided by
Ontario's Employment Standards Act. In order to become an Uber
driver, Mr. Heller had entered into two contracts with two
different Uber companies. Each of these contracts contained a
clause requiring that disputes be submitted to arbitration. Uber
brought a pre-certification motion to stay the proceedings, arguing
that Mr. Heller's agreements required him to submit any disputes
arising under his agreements to arbitration in the Netherlands.

In a decision released in January of 2018, Justice Perell accepted
Uber's position and stayed the proposed class proceeding in favour
of arbitration in the Netherlands. Giving expression to the policy
goals of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017,
Justice Perell held that the agreements between Uber and its
drivers were "international commercial agreements" to which the Act
applied. Consequently, he held the arbitration clauses were
presumptively valid and that any challenges to the arbitrator's
jurisdiction should be made before the arbitrator. He also held
that the arbitration clauses were not unconscionable.

Mr. Heller appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. In a unanimous
decision, the Court of Appeal set aside the stay and permitted Mr.
Heller's proposed class action to continue.

The Court of Appeal first held that Justice Perell's decision was
subject to review on a correctness standard. The Court applied this
standard of review for two reasons: first, because the central
issues regarding the interpretation of various arbitration statutes
were questions of law; and second, because the Court was
interpreting arbitration clauses in a standard form contract.

The Court of Appeal then held that the arbitration clauses in the
agreements between Uber and their drivers were invalid, because
they represented an unlawful contracting out of protections granted
to employees under the Employment Standards Act. Specifically, the
Court held that the arbitration clauses would eliminate the right
of an Uber driver to make a complaint to the Ministry of Labour, as
permitted under the Employment Standards Act. Because the
arbitration clause would have eliminated a right that the drivers
had under the ESA, it was unlawful and unenforceable. Importantly,
the Court of Appeal held that the arbitration provision was
unenforceable, even though the plaintiff was seeking to bring a
proposed class action, rather than make a complaint to the Ministry
of Labour.

The Court of Appeal also independently held that the arbitration
clauses were invalid on the basis that they were unconscionable. In
so doing, the Court relied heavily on the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Douez v Facebook, Inc, where the Supreme Court
of Canada declined to apply a forum selection clause in favour of
California that would have defeated a proposed privacy class action
in British Columbia. The Court of Appeal in Heller held that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable because:

   -- The arbitration clause represented a substantially
improvident or unfair bargain, including because it effectively
required claimants to pay large up-front costs to take advantage of
the arbitration process;
   -- There was no evidence the claimant had received any legal
advice;
   -- There was a significant inequality of bargaining power
between the claimant and Uber; and
   -- Uber included the arbitration clause in the agreement in
order to favour itself.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal concluded that the arbitration
clauses were invalid and unenforceable. As a result, it set aside
the stay of Mr. Heller's proposed class action.

As I noted previously, the Heller case highlights the tension
between two competing adjudicative mechanisms, each of which
legislatures have encouraged: private arbitration and class
actions. Justice Perell's decision gave primacy to parties' ability
to agree to arbitration and thereby opt out of class actions,
affirming the policy goals underlying arbitration legislation. By
contrast, the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision took the opposite
approach, affirming the importance of ensuring that arbitration
clauses do not defeat the ability of individuals to bring class
actions to vindicate the rights of a group.

The Court of Appeal's decision may strike many as intuitively fair,
given the difficulties that individual class members would have in
pursuing their claims in private arbitrations.  Yet if that is
judged to be desirable, it seems strange that the legislature would
not have explicitly precluded the availability of arbitrations for
employment disputes, as it has in the consumer protection context.


Indeed, the natural consequence of the Court of Appeal's decision
would appear to be that any arbitration clause in an employment
agreement is unenforceable, since any such arbitration clause would
preclude an individual from making a complaint to the Ministry of
Labour. To hold that all arbitration clauses in employment
contracts are unenforceable would not be a sensible result: there
are many circumstances where both employers and employees would
have legitimate interests in resolving their employment-related
disputes in private.

Given the difficult competing policy issues at play, this remains
an area that cries out for legislative clarification. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Class of Young Immigrants Certified in JL Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Nathanael M. Cousins grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the lawsuit styled J.L., et al. v. LEE
FRANCIS CISSNA, et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-04914-NC (N.D. Cal.).

The Class consists of:

     Children who have received or will receive guardianship
     orders pursuant to California Probate Code Section 1510.1(a)
     and who have received or will receive denials of their SIJ
     status petitions on the grounds that the state court that
     issued the SIJ Findings lacked jurisdiction because the
     court did not have the authority to reunify the children
     with their parents.

Lee Francis Cissna is the Director of the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services.

The Plaintiffs are a group of young immigrants who allege that the
Defendants -- the United States Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS"), and individual officers in charge of those departments
-- have adopted a new, unlawful requirement for obtaining Special
Immigrant Juvenile status.

The Court appoints J.L., M.G.S., M.D.G.B., and J.B.A. as class
representatives.  The Court Appoints Manatt, Phelps & Phillips,
LLP; Public Counsel; and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the
San Francisco Bay Area as class counsel.

The Court also orders the Plaintiffs to show cause why M.V.B.
should not be terminated as a named plaintiff in this case and
whether the caption should be updated accordingly.  The Defendants
had until February 15, 2019 to respond.[CC]



WABASH VALLEY: Faces Prisoner Civil Rights Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Richard Brown, Rober
E. Carter, Jr., and Dawn Ammerman. The case is styled as Austin
Eckes individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Richard Brown, Warden, in his official capacity, Rober
E. Carter, Jr., Commissioner, Dawn Ammerman, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00063-JPH-DLP (S.D. Ind., Feb. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Prison Condition for Prisoner Civil
Rights.

Richard Brown is the Warden at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Stays Anguiano-Tamayo Unpaid OT Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANA ANGUIANO-TAMAYO, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART
ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-04598-JSC
(N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (i) denied
the Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and in the
alternative, (ii) stayed the action because it is duplicative of
the pending action in Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., N.D. Cal.
Case No. 5:17-cv-00062-LHK.

Anguiano-Tamayo brings the action on her own behalf and as a
putative class action against Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for alleged failure to provide accurate wage
statements in violation of California wage-and-hour law.

In December 2016, plaintiff Roderick Magadia filed a putative class
action in state court against Wal-Mart alleging four causes of
action, including failure to provide accurate wage statements under
California Labor Code Section 226(a)(9) related to an overtime wage
payment identified as "OVERTIME/INCT" on wage statements issued to
the putative class.   The plaintiff specifically alleged that the
wage statements violated section 226(a)(9) because they failed to
include the hourly rate and hours worked applicable to the
OVERTIME/INCT item of pay.

Wal-Mart removed the case to the District pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Ac.  The district court granted class certification
on Jan. 9, 2018, certifying a class consisting of all current and
former California non-exempt employees of Wal-Mart who received
'OVERTIME/INCT,' at any time between Dec. 2, 2015, through the
present.

On May 11, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment on their Private Attorney General Act
("PAGA") claim based on Wal-Mart's wage statements' violation of
California Labor Code Sections 226(a)(6) and 226(a)(9).  On June
25, 2018, the district court denied the plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaint to add a new theory of liability for violation of
Labor Code Section 226(a)(6) related to the OVERTIME/INCT item of
pay.  It held a bench trial beginning on Nov. 30, 2018 and ending
Dec. 4, 2018.  The matter is pending.

Anguiano-Tamayo's wage-and-hour class action alleges that the
Defendants failed to provide their non-exempt California employees
accurate itemized wage statements based on their arguments set
forth in Magadia regarding the OVERTIME/INCT item of pay.  In
particular, she alleges that because the Defendants have
conclusively admitted [in Magadia] that the 'OVERTIME/INCT' item of
pay is a wage payment for various prior pay periods, the wage
statements containing that item violate California Labor Code
Section 226(a)(6) because they do not list the actual pay period
dates for which the 'OVERTIME/INCT' is being paid.  The wage
statements issued to the Plaintiff and putative class members that
contain the OVERTIME/INCT item of pay instead list only the current
pay period dates.

The Plaintiff's proposed class consists of all current and former
California non-exempt employees of the Defendants who received
'OVERTIME/INCT,' at any time between July 30, 2017, through the
present.

The Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in the action on July 30,
2018, five days after the district court denied leave to amend the
complaint in Magadia.  

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on Oct. 9, 2018.  The
Plaintiff then filed the FAC on Oct. 11, 2018, adding a claim under
PAGA, pursuant to Labor Code Section 2698, et. seq.  The Defendants
moved to dismiss thereafter.  The Court heard oral argument on Jan.
24, 2019.

The Defendants insist that the Plaintiff's claim fails because
Peabody v. Time Warner Cable and Soto v. Motel 6 Operating, L.P.,
compel the conclusion that the OVERTIME/INCT pay was not earned
until it was payable and that employers cannot attribute wages paid
in one pay period to prior periods.

Magistrate Judge Corley is not persuaded.  She finds that Peabody
does not compel any conclusion about how adjusted overtime payments
are to be identified on wage statements under Labor Code section
226(a).  At the very least, given Peabody's very different factual
and legal scenario, she cannot conclude on the record that it
disposes of the Plaintiff's theory as a matter of law.  Soto too
does not answer the question presented in the lawsuit for the same
reasons Peabody is not dispositive -- it presents a different legal
and factual scenario.  Accordingly, she denies the Defendants'
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Defendants argue in the alternative that dismissal is warranted
because the Plaintiffs must bring all claims arising out of a
common set of facts in a single lawsuit, and the Plaintiff is a
member of the Magadia OVERTIME/INCT class and her complaint
challenges the same wage statements at issue in Magadia.   

The Magistrate finds that it is clear that the instant action and
the OVERTIME/INCT claim in Magadia could conveniently be tried
together.  The plaintiff in Magadia acknowledged as much when he
told the district court that his proposed amendment to add the
section 226(a)(6) claim at issue here to that case is not a new
claim or cause of action, but an alternative theory of liability in
response to Walmart's attempt to raise a new affirmative defense.
The parties to the instant suit and the suit in Magadia are the
same or in privity for purposes of preclusion, and thus, claim
splitting is present.  Accordingly, the Magistrate, in her
discretion stays the action pending the resolution of Magadia.  A
stay rather than dismissal is warranted because Magadia is a class
action and no judgment has issued; thus, it is not certain that the
Plaintiff will be bound by that judgment because the class could be
decertified by the trial court or on appeal.

For the reasons she set forth, Magistrate Judge Corley denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and in the
alternative, stayed the action because it is duplicative of the
suit in Magadia.  The Defendants will file a written status update
with the Court by Aug. 1, 2019.  The Order disposes of Docket No.
23.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TL4b9J from Leagle.com.

Ana Anguiano-Tamayo, individually and on behalf of all of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Larry W. Lee --
lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C.

Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Aaron Thomas Winn -- atwinn@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP &
Meredith Proctor Grant -- mpgrant@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris,
LLP.


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bogden Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
----------------------------------------------------
James Bogden, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Waste Management Of Colorado, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00198 (S.D. Tex., January 17, 2019),
seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees
and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Colorado
Wage Claim Act and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act.

Waste Management of Colorado, Inc. provides waste disposal services
in the state of Colorado where Bogden worked as a driver, driving
waste disposal trucks, hauling waste, recycling and other refuse to
various landfill or disposal sites throughout Colorado. Waste
Management automatically deducts 30 minutes a day for a meal-period
break from the "on-the-clock" hours, regardless of whether the
driver actually took a break or not. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Clif Alexander, Esq.
      Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
      Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
      Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
      Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq,
      George Schimmel, Esq.
      ANDERSON2X, PLLC
      819 N. Upper Broadway
      Corpus Christi, TX 78401
      Tel: (361) 452-1279
      Fax: (361) 452-1284
      Email: clif@a2xlaw.com
             lauren@a2xlaw.com
             carter@a2xlaw.com
             austin@a2xlaw.com
             geordie@a2xlaw.com


WEB.COM GROUP: Howard Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA, Wage Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Casey Howard, and Phil Martinez, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Web.com Group, Inc., A Florida
Corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-00513-DJH (D. Ariz., January 30,
2019), seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages, and
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Arizona Fair Wages and Healthy
Families Act.

Web.com, Inc., is a Foreign for-profit corporation and is not
registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission.  Web.com
provides website development and marketing services to its clients
at its call centers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nicholas J. Enoch, Esq.
          Corey Feltre, Esq.
          Stanley Lubin, Esq.
          LUBIN & ENOCH, P.C.
          349 North Fourth Avenue
          Phoenix, AZ 85003-1505
          Telephone: (602) 234-0008
          Facsimile: (602) 626-3586
          E-mail: nick@lubinandenoch.com
                  corey@lubinandenoch.com
                  stan@lubinandenoch.com

               - and -

          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 North Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: austin@a2xlaw.com
                  clif@a2xlaw.com


WELLS FARGO: Cert. of Store Managers Class Sought in Torres Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Ata Rouhi moves the Court for an order in the lawsuit
entitled JAIME TORRES, ATA ROUHI, and ELIZABETH ROMERO,
individual(s) and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, GEORGE SARKIS, RAUL VASQUEZ, and DOES 1 through
50 inclusive, Case No. 2:17-cv-09305-DMG-RAO (C.D. Cal.):

   -- certifying the first claim in the First Amended Complaint
      for failure to pay wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code
      Sections 510, 1194, 558 and 1198;

   -- certifying the second claim in the First Amended Complaint
      for failure to provide meal periods and authorize and
      permit rest breaks in violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections
      226.7 and 512;

   -- certifying the third claim in the First Amended Complaint
      for failure to provide accurate wage statements in
      violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 226 and 1174;

   -- certifying the fourth claim in the First Amended Complaint
      for waiting time penalties pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code
      Sections 201-203 et. seq.; and

   -- certifying the fifth claim in the First Amended Complaint
      for Unfair Competition in Violation of Cal. Bus. Code
      Section 17200 et seq., for this proposed class:

      All California based salaried Store Managers (aka Branch
      Managers) classified as exempt from overtime who worked at
      any time during the period of October 25, 2013 to January
      1, 2017 who were not part of the Settlement Class in the
      Wells Fargo Bank Manager Wage and Hour Cases JCCP No. 4723.

Mr. Rouhi also asks the Court to appoint him as class
representative, and to appoint Matthew Righetti, Esq., and John
Glugoski, Esq., as Class Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on May 17, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.,
to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew Righetti, Esq.
          John Glugoski, Esq.
          RIGHETTI GLUGOSKI, P.C.
          456 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94101
          Telephone: (415) 983-0900
          Facsimile: (415) 397-9005
          E-mail: matt@righettilaw.com
                 jglugoski@righettilaw.com


WELLS FARGO: Court Certifies Class & SubClass in Kang Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JAMES C. KANG, the Plaintiff, vs. WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., the Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-06220-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an order on Feb.
6, 2019 granting Plaintiff's motion to certify:

   Class:

   "all non-exempt employees of Wells Fargo who at any time during
   the period beginning October 27, 2013 through the date notice
   is mailed to the Class worked for Wells Fargo in California
   in the job titles of Home Mortgage Consultant, Home Mortgage
   Consultant, Jr., Private Mortgage Banker, or Private Mortgage
   Banker, Jr"; and

   Vacation/Separation Pay SubClass:

   "all non-exempt employees of Wells Fargo who at any time during

   the period beginning October 27, 2013 through the date notice
   is mailed to the Class worked for Wells Fargo in California in
   the job titles of Home Mortgage Consultant, Home Mortgage
   Consultant, Jr., Private Mortgage Banker, or Private Mortgage
   Banker, Jr, and whose employment with Wells Fargo
   terminated."

Employees who were hired or rehired on or after December 11, 2015
are excluded from the Class.[CC]

WILDHORSE RESOURCE: Bijlmer Seeks to Halt Chesapeake Merger Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johan Bijlmer, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Wildhorse Resource Development Corporation,
Jay C. Graham, Anthony Bahr, Brian A. Bernasek, Jonathan M.
Clarkson, Scott A. Gieselman, David W. Hayes, Stephanie C.
Hildebrandt, Grant E. Sims, Martin W. Sumner and Tony R. Weber,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00511, (S.D. N.Y., January 17, 2019),
seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons acting in concert with
them from proceeding with, consummating or closing the acquisition
of WildHorse by Chesapeake Energy Corporation through its
wholly-owned subsidiary Coleburn Inc., rescinding it in the event
defendants consummate the merger, rescissory damages, costs of this
action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys'
and experts' fees, and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, each issued and
outstanding share of WildHorse common stock will be converted into
the right to receive either 5.336 shares of Chesapeake common stock
and $3.00 in cash or 5.989 shares of Chesapeake common stock.
Transaction is valued at approximately $3.977 billion.

The complaint asserts that the proxy statement filed in line with
the transaction omitted WildHorse's and Chesapeake's financial
projections made by Tudor Pickering Holt and Co. Advisors LP and
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC in their financial analyses including the
data and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses and the
background process leading to the merger.

WildHorse is an independent oil and natural gas company focused on
the acquisition, exploration, development and production of oil,
natural gas and natural gas liquids in East Texas.

Chesapeake is an independent exploration and production company
engaged in the acquisition, exploration and development of
properties for the production of oil, natural gas from underground
reservoirs. Chesapeake's common stock is traded on the New York
Stock Exchange. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Tel: (212) 682-3025
      Fax: (212) 682-3010
      Email: racocelli@weisslawllp.com

             - and -

      Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
      BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE P.C.
      885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
      New York, NY 10022
      Telephone: (212) 308-5858
      Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
      Email: fortunato@bespc.com


YAHOO! INC: Prelim OK of Security Breach Suit Settlement Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order denying Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned IN RE: YAHOO! INC. CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION. Case No. 16-MD-02752-LHK. (N.D. Cal.).

The instant lawsuit involves three data breaches that occurred from
2013 to 2016. According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants did not
use appropriate safeguards to protect users' personal
identification information (PII) and the Plaintiffs' PII was thus
exposed to hackers who infiltrated the Defendants' systems.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege three separate data breaches: a
breach that occurred in 2013, a breach that occurred in 2014, and a
breach that occurred in 2015-2016.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege
that Yahoo "made a conscious and deliberate decision not to alert
any of Yahoo's customers that their PII had been stolen."

The Court denies the motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement on several bases.

First, the settlement inadequately discloses the release of claims
related to any unauthorized access of data in 2012.

Second, the release of the 2012 claims is improper.

Third, the proposed notice inadequately discloses the size of the
settlement fund.

Fourth, the settlement appears likely to result in an improper
reverter of attorneys' fees.

Fifth, the settlement inadequately discloses the scope of
non-monetary relief.

Sixth, the settlement inadequately discloses the size of the
settlement class. Any of these bases would be sufficient to deny
the motion for preliminary approval.

Legal Standard Regarding Inadequate Disclosures

Due process requires adequate notice before the claims of absent
class members are released.

Notice must be written in plain, easily understood language and
generally describe the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail
to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
forward and be heard.

A district court's approval of a class-action settlement must be
accompanied by a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate. The Ninth Circuit has listed several factors that the
district court should consider in determining whether a settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate, including inter alia, the
strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial and the amount offered in
settlement.  

Release of 2012 Claims

Inadequate Disclosures

The proposed notice to class members fails to provide reasonable
notice that the settlement agreement releases claims arising from
any unauthorized access of data in 2012. The proposed notice
explains that the settlement relates only to the 2013, 2014, and
2015-2016 data breaches.

The proposed notice fails to disclose that claims related to any
unauthorized access of data in 2012 are also being released even
though the settlement releases such claims.

The parties must provide sufficient information for the Court to
review the settlement and for class members to make informed
decisions as to their participation in the settlement based on any
unauthorized access of data in 2012. The current record is devoid
of such information. The Plaintiffs did not allege any claims
related to any data breaches prior to 2013 in the Consolidated
Class Action Complaint (CAC) and the First Amended Complaint (FAC)
even though the CAC and FAC alleged inadequate security measures as
early as 2008. Moreover, the CAC, FAC, settlement agreement, and
motion for preliminary approval do not state what happened with
Yahoo users' data in 2012 or identify any harm to any group of 2012
Yahoo users. Yahoo has never disclosed any such harm to its users
and continues to deny any data breach prior to 2013. Accordingly,
the Court and class members have no basis to evaluate the 2012
claims and their release.

Improper Release of Claims

Independent of the inadequate disclosures regarding the release of
2012 claims, the Court concludes that the release of these claims
conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent, which only allows release
of claims where the released claims are based on the identical
factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled
class action. Specifically, the settlement releases claims on
behalf of all users in 2012, but the FAC does not assert claims
based on any incidents prior to the 2013 data breach. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that the settlement releases claims that are
not based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the
claims in the settled class action. Accordingly, any future
settlement must amend the FAC.

Failure to Adequately Disclose Size of the Settlement Fund

The proposed notice fails to disclose the total size of the
settlement fund. As a result, class members cannot assess the
reasonableness of the settlement.  

The proposed notice discloses $50 million to cover out-of-pocket
costs, alternative compensation, paid user costs, and small
business user costs.  In addition, the proposed notice discloses
that class counsel may apply for attorneys' fees of up to $35
million, costs and expenses of up to $2.5 million, and service
awards of up to $7,500 each for settlement class representatives,
to be paid separately from the settlement fund. The proposed notice
does not disclose the costs of credit monitoring services or costs
for class notice and settlement administration, and does not
disclose the total size of the settlement fund. Without knowing the
total size of the settlement fund, class members cannot assess the
reasonableness of the settlement.

Reverter of Attorneys' Fees

The Court concludes that the settlement may allow for unreasonably
high attorneys' fees, and therefore any unawarded attorneys' fees
may improperly revert to the Defendants. The proposed settlement
authorizes up to $35 million in attorneys' fees, to be paid
separate and apart from the Settlement Fund. Because attorneys'
fees do not come from the Settlement Fund, any amount not awarded
by the Court would effectively revert to Defendants rather than to
the benefit of the class.

Lodestar Method

Class counsel provided a lodestar figure of $22 million for
38,278.81 hours of work. By the Court's count, the Plaintiffs'
lodestar covers 143 attorneys from 32 firms.  However, the parties
seek attorneys' fees for 24 firms in the instant MDL case and 8
firms in the JCCP case.

The First Amended Complaint (FAC) also included thirteen counts,
which substantially overlapped with the CAC. The FAC added one
count for Deceit by Concealment under Cal. Civil Code Section 1709,
1710; two counts for violations of the California Customer Records
Act; and alleged separate violations of the California Unfair
Competition Law for Unlawful Business Practice and Unfair Business
Practice. Unlike the CAC, the FAC did not allege violations of the
Data Breach Notification Law, Online Privacy Protection Act, Stored
Communications Act, or allege Fraudulent Inducement.

In addition to filing two complaints, class counsel filed
oppositions to two motions to dismiss. Finally, class counsel filed
a motion for class certification and a motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement. Class counsel also prepared
four expert reports, took seven Yahoo depositions, and reviewed 9
million pages of discovery.

As the Plaintiffs argued, their opposition to the second motion to
dismiss substantially overlapped with their opposition to the first
motion to dismiss.  For example, the Plaintiffs explained that the
Defendants argue again that their services are not really services
under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and California common law;
argue that money users paid to Yahoo for supposedly secure services
does not grant standing under the Unfair Competition Law when this
Court already held that it does and argue again that the
Plaintiffs' PII is not covered under the California Customer
Records Act this time under Cal. Civ. Code Section 1798.81.5. The
Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' description of the opposition to
the second motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court finds that
both motions to dismiss addressed questions related to standing
under the Unfair Competition Law, adequacy of claims under the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, adequacy of claims under the Customer
Records Act, adequacy of California breach of contract claims,
adequacy of negligence claims, application of the economic loss
rule to negligence claims, and adequacy of declaratory judgment
claims.

The Court concludes that the settlement may allow for improper
reverter of funds to the Defendants.  

Percentage of Recovery Method

In their supplemental filing, class counsel explains that
attorneys' fees were only calculated based on the lodestar. This is
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's guidance that the district
court should employ both the lodestar and percentage-of-recovery
methods to cross-check their calculations of attorneys' fees and
ensure that the fees are reasonable The Ninth Circuit specifically
instructs that the percentage-of-recovery method is still
applicable as a cross-check, even when the parties relied solely on
the lodestar method.Accordingly, the Court calculates attorneys'
fees based on the percentage of recovery method despite the
parties' failure to do so.

The only numbers to which the parties commit in the settlement
agreement, motion for preliminary approval, and proposed notice are
$50 million for the settlement fund, up to $35 million in
attorneys' fees, and up to $2.5 million in attorneys' costs and
expenses, for a total of $87.5 million.  Based on these numbers,
attorneys' fees would be 40% of the settlement fund. Taking account
of the additional funds the parties disclosed under seal in their
supplemental filing, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees
request remains much greater than the 25% benchmark standard used
in this Circuit. Even using the lower percentage that takes into
account the additional funds disclosed in the parties' supplemental
filing, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees award may be
unreasonably high as calculated using the percentage-of-recovery
method.

Under both the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods, the
Court finds that the maximum attorneys' fee award may be
unreasonably high. As a result, the Court finds that the settlement
creates a potential reverter to Defendants rather than to the
benefit of the class. The Court finds that the potential reverter
is not in the class best interest as part of the settlement
package.

Failure to Adequately Disclose the Scope of Non-Monetary Relief

The Court finds that the parties fail to adequately disclose the
scope of non-monetary relief. The settlement agreement does not
commit to any specific increases in budget or number of employees
to improve information security. With respect to business practices
to enhance security, the settlement agreement states that
Defendants shall maintain the business practice commitments related
to information security to safeguard current users' and Settlement
Class Members' Personal Information as set forth in Exhibit 2 for a
period of no less than three years. The Court finds that the
referenced exhibit, filed under seal, is vague as to Yahoo's
specific commitments to enhance its security. As a result of the
lack of specific increases in budget or number of employees and the
vague commitments as to changed business practices, the Court
cannot adequately consider the benefits offered to the class in
settlement.  

Misleading Estimate as to the Size of the Settlement Class

The Court finds that the parties' supplemental filings have
disclosed a misleading estimate of the size of the settlement
class. As a result, the Court is unable to adequately assess
whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  

The parties represent that the data breaches affected 3 billion
user accounts worldwide, with approximately 1 billion user accounts
in the U.S. and Israel, and that the class size is approximately
200 million U.S. and Israeli individuals.  

However, Yahoo cites the number of active users publicly when
disclosure suits Yahoo's interests. For example, Yahoo CEO Marissa
Mayer's July 25, 2016 press release, announcing Verizon's
acquisition of Yahoo, claims that Yahoo reaches a global audience
of more than 1 billion monthly active users.

Based on Yahoo's own representations, the Court finds that Yahoo's
public estimate of the class size is inaccurate and that there are
more accurate means of estimating the class size. The parties'
inadequate disclosure of the size of the affected class prevents
the Court from adequately assessing the strength of the plaintiffs'
case and the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the
trial.  

Comparison to Anthem settlement

During the hearing, the parties compared the preliminary settlement
agreement favorably to the settlement approved in In re Anthem,
Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299 (2018). The Court
disagrees.

Anthem involved about 79 million victims and a $115 million
settlement. Defendants there timely disclosed the data breaches to
affected users and provided two years of free credit monitoring to
users prior to any settlement of litigation. Moreover, in addition
to the clear and specific terms of the settlement fund in that
case, Defendants in Anthem committed to tripling their budget for
data security for three years and very specific business practice
changes to improve data security.

In contrast, this case involves allegedly 200 million users
according to Yahoo's public estimates, which Yahoo admits are not
accurate. Yahoo's user database was breached multiple times over a
period of many years, and Yahoo denied any knowledge of
unauthorized access of personal data in its filings with the SEC
and delayed notification to users even when it had contemporaneous
knowledge of the breaches. As a result, users were unaware of the
need to take any steps to protect themselves against potential
misuse of their data, and Yahoo has not provided any credit
monitoring on its own up to this point.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycyjsstc from Leagle.com.

In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,
Plaintiff, represented by Harlan Stuart Miller, III, Miller Legal
P.C., pro hac vice.

Ronald Schwartz, Plaintiff, represented by Joel H. Bernstein --
jbernstein@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, John A. Yanchunis
-- jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Michael
Walter Stocker -- mikes@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Ariana J. Tadler -- atadler@milberg.com -- Milberg Tadler
Phillips Grossman LLP, Corban S. Rhodes -- crhodes@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy P. Antullis --
dantullis@ rgrdlaw.coin -- Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Gayle
Meryl Blatt -- gmb@cglaw.com -- Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla
Blatt & Penfield LLP, Henry J. Kelston -- hkelston@milberg.com --
Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP, Jason Henry Alperstein --
jalperstein@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP

Yahoo! Inc., Defendant, represented by Ann Marie Mortimer --
amortimer@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Jason M. Beach
-- jbeach@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP, Theodore J.
Boutrous, Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP,Corey Anthony Lee -- leec@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP, pro hac vice, David A. Wheeler --
dwheeler@chapmanspingola.com -- Chapman Spingola, LLP, Jason
Jonathan Kim -- kimj@huntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP,
Joshua Aaron Jessen -- jjessen@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Michael Li-Ming Wong -- mwong@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Rachel S. Brass --
rbrass@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Robert Andrew
Chapman -- rchapman@chapmanspingola.com -- Chapman & Spingola LLP &
Shannon Therese Knight  -- sknight@chapmanspingola.com -- Chapman
Spingola, LLP.


ZIONS BANK: Accused of Assisting Ponzi Scheme, Lawsuit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cristina Flores, writing for KUTV, reports that a class-action
lawsuit says Zions Bank assisted in a scheme that stole $200
million from victims.

Attorneys from Utah, and other states, joined forces to file a
class-action lawsuit against Zions Bank claiming the bank
perpetuated a scheme that bilked victims out of $200 million.

The lawsuit comes after the state of Utah and the CFTC filed a suit
again Gaylen Rust of Rust Rare Coins, alleging that he duped about
400 people into investing a combined $200 million into silver, when
in fact it was all a Ponzi scheme where investor money was used to
pay new investors to keep the fraud going.

Rob Brough, Zions Bank executive vice president, issued the
following statement regarding the legal action:

"As a general practice, we do not comment on pending litigation. We
became aware of this complaint and are in the process of reviewing
the allegations. After completing our review we may have further
comment, although our comments may be limited due to the ongoing
nature of the litigation. Subsequent to litigation filed against
Mr. Rust and Rust Rare Coin in November, we have been actively
reviewing all our interactions with Rust Rare Coin and have been
cooperating with the receiver and authorities."

The victims, in their lawsuit against Zions Bank, allege there were
plenty of red flags that money deposited by Gaylen Rust, was
ill-gotten.

"We think the evidence will shows he bank was aware the money was
being used for a Ponzi scheme," said Attorney Bart Goplerud.

Attorney Alan Rosca of Cleveland, said the bank should have known
fraud was happening because there were a lot of payments going into
the Silver Pool account, but not much money going out for normally
business expenses.

He said like most Ponzi schemes, victims were lured into the scam
because they trusted Rust and were impressed by his reputation as a
local businessman and a philanthropist.

Some victims, like Patrick Springer, said he invested a lot of
money and lost big -- including money that he'd promised his
daughter for college.

His parents, in their 80s were left in financial ruin after they
gave all the equity of their home to the scheme.

"It devastated us," he said.

Other victims, like Travis and Nicole Gregory of Taylorsville, said
they started with a smaller amount -- $4,000. As they began to see
returns on their investment, they gave more and more money.

Nicole said she had a lot of questions along the way about the
silver that she was said to be investing but Rust told them he was
keeping it in a secured vault and for security reasons he couldn't
take them to the vault.

Travis said Rust would give them small silver coins to assure them
everything was OK.

Travis said he kept the coin displayed on a shelf as a reminder of
his goals to retire.

Now, with all the losses, retirement is not a reality

"I'll be working 15 years beyond retirement. I feel cheated, "he
said.

Attorneys in the class action lawsuit said most of the victims are
from Utah, but others are from states like Montana and California.

Many of the victims were members of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints and knew each other through church or were family
members. [GN]


[*] Seyfarth Releases 15th Annual Workplace Class Action Report
---------------------------------------------------------------
Seyfarth Shaw LLP has released its 15th annual edition of the
Workplace Class Action Litigation Report, which is recognized as
the nation's most complete guide to workplace-related complex
litigation. In its largest edition ever, Seyfarth analyzed a record
number of 1,453 class action rulings on a circuit-by-circuit and
state-by-state basis to capture key themes from 2018 and emerging
litigation trends facing U.S. companies in 2019.

Over the span of its 15 years, Seyfarth's Report has developed the
industry's most comprehensive class action database featuring
analyses of 13,500 cases. Described as the "definitive source of
information on employment class action litigation" and a resource
that "no practitioner who deals with employment claims. . . should
be without" by EPLiC Magazine, Seyfarth's Report is the sole
compendium in the U.S. dedicated exclusively to workplace class
action litigation. This year's 852-page Report is the "go to"
research and resource guide for businesses and their corporate
counsel facing complex litigation in the coming year.

"Fueled by the Supreme Court's key rulings this year and the 'Me
Too' movement, employment litigation generated unprecedented
attention in 2018 -- unlike anything we have studied or seen in our
Report's 15-year history," said Seyfarth partner and author of the
Report, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. "Overall, we saw a surprisingly
sharp drop in settlement values this past year. Combined with the
Supreme Court's decision to grant employers their most powerful
tool in decades to limit class action exposure in the Epic Systems
ruling, 2019 presents several new dynamics for employers to
navigate as we continue to keep a close watch on the shifting
priorities of the White House as well."

Expanding on these developments, the Seyfarth Report details five
key employment litigation trends for corporations in 2019:

SCOTUS Takes Center Stage: As predicted in Seyfarth's 2018 Report,
the U.S. Supreme Court continued to play an unusually active role
in reshaping employment law and class action dynamics during the
past year with several key opinions. The Epic Systems ruling, which
upheld the legality of class action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements, has proven transformative for employers and
marks the most important SCOTUS decision for employers in nearly
two decades. Following the appointments of Justices Neil Gorsuch
and Brett Kavanaugh, the class action playing field for employers
may shift even further in 2019.                       
Government Enforcement Litigation Hits Three-Year High But
Settlement Payouts Drop Sharply: Despite the transition to a more
business friendly Trump Administration, government enforcement
litigation rose again to a new three-year high in 2018. The EEOC
filed 199 lawsuits last year, up from 184 in 2017 but the value of
the top government settlements cratered, dropping from $485.25
million in 2017 to $126.7 million in 2018.     
               
Plaintiffs' Win Percentage Reaches Record Level: For the first time
in the Report's 15-year history, the plaintiffs' bar posted a
record high certification success rate in 2018 of 79% in the
largest category of workplace litigation: wage & hour litigation.
Employer efforts to successfully decertify these cases also dropped
by 11% as employers won only 52% of "second stage" decertification
rulings, down from 63% in 2017.       
                  
Settlement Values Collapse: After reaching an all-time record high
of $2.72 billion in 2017, the monetary value of the top workplace
class action settlements decreased by more than 50% in 2018.
Settlements sank to a five-year low of $1.32 billion in 2018,
experiencing a record one-year drop of $1.4 billion. Even with a
better success rate in 2018, settlements shrank across the board as
plaintiffs failed to monetize class action victories at the same
rate as 2017.                     

'Me Too' Movement: This past year provided the first annual look at
how the Me Too movement is gaining momentum in workplace
litigation. In particular, 74% of the U.S. EEOC's Title VII filings
this past year targeted sex-based discrimination, up from 65% in
2017. Also rising were the EEOC's 2018 sex discrimination lawsuits
including claims of sexual harassment, which grew to 41 lawsuits,
up from 33 in 2017.

To view additional videos, charts and data from the Workplace Class
Action Litigation Report please visit
www.workplaceclassactionreport.com, where you may also request a
copy. Available as a downloadable eBook, the Seyfarth Report is
fully searchable, compatible with all major devices, allows readers
to bookmark useful sections for easy future reference, and includes
a number of other features, such as note-taking, highlighting and
more.

                     About Seyfarth Shaw LLP

Seyfarth Shaw has more than 850 attorneys in 15 offices providing a
broad range of legal services in the areas of labor and employment,
employee benefits, litigation, corporate and real estate.
Seyfarth's clients include over 300 of the Fortune 500 companies
and reflect virtually every industry and segment of the economy. A
recognized leader in delivering value and innovation for legal
services, Seyfarth has earned numerous accolades from a variety of
highly respected industry associations, consulting firms and media.
[GN]


[*] Seyfarth Shaw Reveals Key Trends in Workplace Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------
Gerald Maatman, Esq., of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in an article for
CFO.com, reports that the prosecution of workplace class-action
litigation by plaintiffs' attorneys -- often posing unique
"bet-the-company" risks for employers -- continues to escalate, as
it has over the past decade.

As has become readily apparent in the #MeToo era, an adverse
judgment in a class action can eviscerate a company's market share
and even has the potential to bankrupt a business. Further, the
ongoing defense of a class action can drain corporate resources
long before the case even reaches a decision point.

Companies that do business in multiple states are also susceptible
to "copy-cat" class actions, whereby plaintiffs' lawyers create a
domino effect of litigation filings that challenge corporate
policies and practices in numerous jurisdictions at the same time.

Hence, workplace class actions can impair a company's business
operations, jeopardize or cut short the careers of senior
management, and cost millions of dollars to defend.

Skilled plaintiffs' class-action lawyers and governmental
enforcement litigators are not making this challenge any easier for
companies. They are continuing to develop new theories and
approaches to the successful prosecution of complex employment
litigation and government-backed lawsuits.

New rulings by federal and state courts have added to this
patchwork quilt of compliance problems and risk management issues.

In turn, the events of the past year in the workplace class action
world demonstrate that the array of litigation issues facing
businesses continues to accelerate at a rapid pace while also
undergoing significant change.

Notwithstanding the transition to new leadership in the White House
with the Trump Administration, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other federal agencies continue
their aggressive enforcement litigation. Regulatory oversight of
workplace issues remains a high priority.

Conversely, litigation issues stemming from the U.S. Department of
Labor reflect a slight pullback from previous efforts to push a
pronounced pro-worker/anti-business agenda.

Furthermore, changes to government priorities are being carried out
by new leaders at the agency level who were appointed over the past
year. Many of the changes represent stark reversals in policy that
are sure to have a cascading impact on private class-action
litigation.

Key 2018 Trends
An overview of workplace litigation in 2018 reveals five key
trends:

First, the U.S. Supreme Court continued its recent trend of
accepting more cases for review, and therefore issuing more
rulings, than it had previously.

Some key decisions on complex employment litigation and
class-action issues were arguably more pro-business than those in
the past. Among them, the ruling in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis —
which confirmed that companies can legally bar employees from
collective arbitration and require individual arbitration in
employee-employer disputes — was one of the most important
workplace class-action rulings in the last two decades.

The decision, coupled with President Trump's Supreme Court
appointees, may well reshape the playbook for prosecuting and
defending class actions.

Second, the plaintiffs' bar was successful in getting classes
certified at the highest rates ever in the areas of ERISA and
wage-and-hour hour litigation. The lawyers continued to craft
refined class certification theories to counter the stringent
requirements established in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011).

Plaintiffs won 196 of 248 conditional certification rulings (79%)
and lost only 13 of 25 decertification rulings (52%). By
comparison, in 2017 plaintiffs won 170 of 233 conditional
certification rulings (73%) and lost 15 of 24 decertification
rulings (63%).

Third, filings and settlements of government enforcement litigation
did not reflect a head-snapping pivot from the ideological
pro-worker outlook of the Obama Administration.

Instead, compared with 2016 (Obama's last year in office),
government enforcement litigation actually increased in 2018. The
EEOC alone brought 199 lawsuits last year, compared with 184 in
2017 and just 86 in 2016.

However, the value of the top 10 settlements in government
enforcement cases decreased dramatically, from $485.25 million in
2017 to $126.7 million in 2018.

Explanations for the increased government enforcement cases
compared with expectations are varied. They include:

   -- The time lag between Obama-appointed enforcement personnel
vacating their offices and Trump-appointed personnel taking charge
of agency decision-making power

   -- The number of lawsuits "in the pipeline" that were filed
during the Obama Administration that came to conclusion in the past
year

   -- The "hold-over" effect whereby Obama-appointed policy-makers
remained in their positions long enough to continue their
enforcement efforts before being replaced in the last half of
2018.

These factors are crucial to employers, as both the DOL and the
EEOC have focused on big-impact lawsuits against companies, thereby
"leading by example" in terms of areas that the private plaintiffs'
bar aims to pursue.

As 2019 opens, it appears that the content and scope of enforcement
litigation undertaken by the DOL and the EEOC in the Trump
Administration will tilt away from the previous
pro-employee/anti-big business mindset. Trump appointees at both
agencies are slowly but surely peeling back positions previously
advocated under the Obama Administration.

As a result, it appears inevitable that both the volume of
government enforcement litigation and value of settlement numbers
from those cases will decrease in 2019.

Fourth, there was a sharp decrease in the monetary value of the top
workplace class-action settlements. These numbers had been
increasing annually over the past decade and reached all-time highs
in 2017.

While the plaintiffs' employment class-action bar and governmental
enforcement litigators were exceedingly successful in monetizing
their case filings into large class-wide settlements this past
year, they did so at decidedly lower values in 2018 than in
previous years.

The top 10 settlements in various employment-related class-action
categories totaled $1.32 billion in 2018, down from more than $2.72
billion in 2017 and 1.75 billion in 2016. Whether this was the
beginning of a long-range trend or a short-term aberration remains
to be seen as 2019 unfolds.

Fifth, as the #MeToo movement continues to gain momentum worldwide,
it's fueling employment litigation issues in general and workplace
class-action litigation in particular.

On account of new reports and social media, it has raised the level
of awareness of workplace rights and emboldened many to utilize the
judicial system to vindicate those rights.

Several large sexual harassment class-based settlements were
effectuated in 2018 that stemmed at least in part from #MeToo
initiatives. Likewise, the EEOC's enforcement litigation activity
in 2018 focused on the filing of #MeToo lawsuits while riding the
wave of social media attention to such workplace issues.

In fact, three-quarters (74%) of EEOC Title VII filings last year
targeted sex-based discrimination, compared with 65% in 2017). And
41 of the filings included claims of sexual harassment, up from 33
the prior year. Employers can expect more of the same in the coming
year.

Gerald Maatman is a partner with law firm Seyfarth Shaw LLP. This
article is excerpted from the firm's "Annual Workplace Class Action
Litigation Report: 2019 Edition." [GN]


[*] Value of Workplace Class Action Settlements Down 50% in 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sue Reisinger, writing for Corporate Counsel, reports that
employers and their general counsel saw good news and bad in
workplace class action legal trends in 2018, according to a new
report from Seyfarth Shaw. The good news: After reaching an
all-time high of $2.7 billion in 2017, the value of top workplace
class action settlements decreased by more than 50 percent in 2018,
sinking to a five-year low of $1.3 billion.

The bad news for employers is for the first time in the report's
15-year history, plaintiffs posted a record-high certification
success rate in 2018 of 79 percent in wage-and-hour litigation,
which is the largest category of workplace lawsuits.
The law firm said its 2019 Workplace Class Action Litigation Report
is its largest edition ever, with attorneys analyzing a record
1,453 class action rulings in state and federal courts.

Seyfarth partner Gerald Maatman said the most significant event
last year was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in a case involving
software giant Epic Systems Corp. The court ruled that corporations
can enforce employee arbitration agreements, thereby prohibiting
employees from bringing class action suits in disputes over pay and
workplace conditions.

Mr. Maatman said the ruling "will be with us for years to come, and
will change the dynamics of class litigation. It is already having
an impact, with plaintiffs' lawyers sending demand letters trying
to negotiate settlements on behalf of people [employees] who are
susceptible to a motion for arbitration."

Plaintiffs lawyers typically start with one or two complaining
clients, he explained, and then file a motion for class
certification and a class list to enlarge the group. But if those
clients have signed arbitration agreements, "then they [plaintiffs
lawyers] can't get a big enough group to pursue a claim," Mr.
Maatman said.

He added, "It's going to be interesting in 2019 to see the impact
on the number of class action cases filed, the number certified,
and their level of value. The Epic ruling should cut down on the
number of lawsuits and certifications, and make the cases worth
less money."

But Mr. Maatman suggested companies might see a stronger pro-worker
push in Congress in the next two years, as well as in the next
presidential election, in an effort to overturn the Epic decision.

"The #MeToo movement has placed the arbitration issue in the
spotlight," the attorney added. It was reported that many women
involved in high-profile sexual harassment cases at corporations
had signed agreements that kept details of their situations
confidential and often prohibited class actions.

"Is it good policy or bad policy for a company to use these
agreements?" Mr. Maatman asked. "It is not a one-size-fits-all
decision. Each company must weigh the factors."

The law firm issued a report that noted the significant impact of
the #MeToo movement on litigation in 2018.

In the more recent class action report, the law firm noted a
surprisingly sharp drop in settlement values this year.

Mr. Maatman said several factors contributed to the dip, including
the impact of the Epic case, and employers doing a more thorough
job of following workplace laws.

"We are on the downside of a bell jar curve on settlement value,"
he explained. "I think in 2019 we'll see lower values again. I
don't know for how long the values will keep dropping. That could
depend on whether there is a legislative response to the Epic
Systems ruling."

In other findings, the report said:

   * Despite the transition to a more business-friendly Trump
administration, government enforcement litigation rose again to a
new three-year high in 2018. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission filed 199 lawsuits last year, up from 184 in 2017.

   * The value of the top government settlements also plunged,
dropping from $485 million in 2017 to $126.7 million in 2018.

   * The success of employer efforts to decertify class action
cases dropped by 11 percentage points, as employers won only 52
percent, down from a 63 percent success rate in 2017. [GN]


[] CLC Director Skeptical at Introduction of Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------
RTL Today reports that the new minister for consumer protection,
Paulette Lenert, announced on Jan. 8 that filing class action
lawsuits will soon become a possibility in the Grand Duchy.

The Luxembourg Trade Confederation (CLC) and the Luxembourg
Consumer Assocation (ULC) have both reacted to the announcement.

The CLC: sceptical of attached risks

The director of the Luxembourg Trade Confederation, Nicolas
Henckes, expressed his scepticism at the introduction of class
action suits, citing the risks linked to these. According to
Mr. Henckes, this is an incredibly complex subject and Luxembourg
should not be seeking purely Luxembourgish solutions. Instead,
Henckes stressed that class actions lawsuits should only be
regulated on a European level. The CLC is above all concerned that
the government will go its own way.

Mr. Henckes went on to recommend that the government take up
discussions with both consumers and company bosses, as the latter
will have concerns. He went on to explain that certain sectors have
specific issues and that a quick introduction of class action
lawsuits would not be desirable for these.
As an example of one of the risks that such an introduction could
bring, Mr. Henckes cited a possible wave of complaints from outside
of Luxembourg. If Luxembourg gains a reputation as having
legislation incredibly favourable towards consumers, external
consumers could begin 'forum shopping' in Luxembourg, which would
be detrimental towards Luxembourgish companies.

He also stressed the need to clarify specific legislative aspects,
such as protecting companies' rights to the presumption of
innocence. Finally, Mr. Henckes stressed that he hoped the
government would not only open discussions with the ULC, but also
include company bosses. The CLC will wait for the new minister to
contact the federation, which has not yet happened.

The ULC: full of optimism

The Luxembourg Consumer Association is one of the privileged
partners in the initial discussions concerning the upcoming
legislation, according to Minister Paulette Lenert. The ULC has
already expressed its joy at the creation of an independent
ministry for consumer protection. Nico Hoffmann, the president of
the ULC, also welcomed the announcement of introducing class action
suits.
The association has been waiting for a minister to take the path of
class action suits for a long time. As for the concerns expressed
by company bosses, Hoffmann responded that everybody should wait to
see the actual reality of the announcement before jumping to
conclusions.

For instance, Hoffmann is confident that the legislation will not
lead to a trend of class action suits. Citing the VW Dieselgate
file, Hoffmann explained that four people had to file lawsuits on
their own, which costs time, money, and nerves. In this case, a
class action suit could be an effective solution.

As for Mr. Henckes' proposal for a European solution, Hoffmann
believed that this process would take too long and that consumers
should not have to wait that long to access their rights. With the
European elections in May, Hoffmann believes that a European
solution could be further delayed.

Globally, the ULC is delighted at the creation of the ministry for
consumer protection. It shows that consumer protection is a measure
which becomes more visible and important, no longer an afterthought
for a different ministry. [GN]



                            *********

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