/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/190226.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, February 26, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 41

                            Headlines

99 THAI: Monter Seeks Minimum Wage and Overtime Compensation
A & W CONCENTRATE: Sharpe Files Fraud Class Action in NY
AARGO SERVICES: Singleton Files Class Suit in NY State Court
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
AEROFLOT: Family Files Class Action After Missing Flight

AMN HEALTHCARE: Can Compel Arbitration in Posephny Labor Suit
ANGELS IN YOUR HOME: Court Narrows Claims in Hardgers-Powell
ARIZONA: Dept. of Child Safety Fights Class-Action Status
AV HOMES: Denial of Gundel's Bid to Dismiss Counterclaim Quashed
B&S WHOLESALE: Luttrell & Roan Seek Wages & OT for Gun Smiths

BEAVERTON FOODS: Class Action Over Preservatives Against It Fails
BUSINESS INFORMATION: $3.3MM Kelly FCRA Suit Deal Has Final OK
CANADA: 2nd Class Action Mulled Over Trudeau Airport Pollution
CANARY CONNECT: Faces Class Action Lawsuit
CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over High Pot Ordinance Fines

CICERO, IL: Adair et al. Seek to Certify Class of Female Detainees
COOK COUNTY, IL: Bid for Class Certification Denied in Shyne Suit
DAIMLER AG: Court Narrows Claims in Mercedes-Benz Emissions Suit
DELTA AIRLINES: Settles FCRA Class Action for $2.3MM
DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Portela OK'd

DIVERSIFIED MAINTENANCE: Underpays Store Staff, Spratt Claims
FACEBOOK INC: Australian Businesses Mull Class Action
FCA US: Bid for Counsel Fees/Costs in Rasnic Overruled as Untimely
FEDEX GROUND: Junious Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Delivery Drivers
FERROGLOBE PLC: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action

FIRST STUDENT: Humes 4th Subclass Certification Denial Flipped
FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Berman Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
FRESH MARKET: Arvilla Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
FRIEDRICH PETZEL: Matzura Alleges Disabilities Act Breach
FXCM INC: Effex & Dittami Dismissed from Nguyen Suit w/o Prejudice

FYRE MEDIA: Fyre Festival Ticket Holders Fail to Get Money Back
G4S: Settles Employees' Class Action for $130MM
GEELY LLC: Melanie Johnson Seeks Overtime Pay
GEORGE ADAMS: Matzura Alleges Breach Under Disabilities Act
HALSTED FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Judge Denies Request to Pause Class Action
HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Can Compel Arbitration in Bitton FCRA Suit
HOOK INVESTMENTS: Jonathan Jones Seeks Overtime Pay
INNOVATION COMPOUNDING: Must Address Rule 23 Changes Implications
KERN COUNTY, CA: E.D. Cal. Issues TRO in Wonderly FLSA Suit

KERN COUNTY, CA: Eastern Dist. Cal. Issues TRO in Ashely FLSA Suit
KEURIG DR PEPPER: Heffler Claims Issues Statement on Settlement
LANIBALOO CREATIONS: Violates Disabilities Act, Slade Suit Alleges
LIBERTY HEALTH: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
M CULINARY: Flores Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages

MALIBU BOATS: Bishop Suit Alleges Violation of Disabilities Act
MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES: Wolf Haldenstein Files Class Action Lawsuit
MDL 2090: Order on Cost Judgment Review Bids Issued
MDL 2672: Administrative Bids to Seal Confidential Docs Denied
MDL 2672: Volkswagen's Renewed Bid to Seal in Clean Diesel Suit OKd

MDL 2765: Rousseau Appeals Ruling in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
MDL 2804: Kalamazoo County to Join Opioid Crisis Class Action
MG MEDIA: Failed to Pay Overtime Wages, Oczeus & Dozier Claim
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
MIDLAND CREDIT: Smith Sues Over Debt Collection Practices

MONSANTO COMPANY: Gurley Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MORENO'S MEXICAN: Nafarrate Seeks OT Pay for Restaurant Workers
MOUNTAIRE CORP: Reconsideration of Gag Order in Cuppels Suit Denied
NETGEAR INC: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Klebba Suit
NEW YORK: Sued Over Mentally Ill Inmates Post-Release Housing

NFL: New Orleans Saints Season Ticketholders File Suit
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY: Derr Files Civil Rights Class Action
OC TRANSPO: Class Action Lawsuit Seeks $60MM in Damages
OCWEN LOAN: Franklin May Ask Class-Wide Award of Damages Up to $5K
ONTARIO: Data Breach-Affected ODSP Recipients File Class Action

P&G CO: Tufco, P&G & PDI Dismissed from Suit Over Flushable Wipes
P.C. RICHARD: Averts Class Action Over Sales Receipts
PANATTE LLC: $5K Aikens Suit Settlement with MDS Has Final Approval
PAUL ROSENBERG: Matzura Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
PICKFORD REAL: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Virgilio Suit Reversed

QUALCOMM INC: Judge Koh Stays $5-Bil. Consumer Class Action
RCN MANAGEMENT: Kiler Files ADA Class Action in New York
REGRESO FINANCIAL: Karcauskas Case Settlement Wins Initial Okay
SCHRADER YACHT: Faces Bishop ADA Class Action in NY
SCOTTS CO: $1.07MM Deal in Hamsher FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval

SEA TOW SERVICES: Faces Class Suit in New York for ADA Breach
SEABRING MARINE: Thorne Asserts Claim Under Disabilities Act
SHEPHERD GALLERY: Violates ADA, Matzura Suit Asserts
SI FINANCIAL: Karp Balks at Merger Deal with Berkshire Hills
SM ENERGY: Chieftain Royalty Seeks to Certify Class

SNACKS INNOVATIONS: Product Has No Real White Chocolate, Suit Says
SNAP INC: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
SPANIERMAN GALLERY: Matzura Suit Asserts ADA Violation
SRAH BAKERY: Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought
SSC CARMICHAEL: Can Compel Arbitration in Farfan FLSA Suit

STONE POINT: Gottlieb Sues Over Delisting of AmTrust's Stocks
SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY: Class Certification Denial in Young Affirmed
SUNDARAM TAGORE: Matzura Asserts Claim under ADA in New York
TITLEMAX OF NEW MEXICO: Arbitration Ruling in Romero Suit Affirmed
TRANSWORLD SYSTEM: Azizbayev Files Class Suit Over FDCPA Breach

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Koskie Minsky Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
UNION PACIFIC: Must Answer Interrogatory Questions in Harris Suit
UNITED STATES: Accused of Using Immigrant Children as Bait
UNITED STATES: Bid to Dismiss Refugee Disability Suit Denied
UNITED STATES: Calif. Court Certifies Children's Class in J.L. Suit

UNITED YACHT: Bishop Asserts Breach Under Disabilities Act
VAN DE WEGNE: Faces Class Suit in NY for ADA Breach
VAN DORENWAXTER: Matzura Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
VENATOR MATERIALS: Fails to Disclose Plant Fire Damage, Suit Says
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Integrity Head Open to Class Action Rules

WELLS FARGO: Settlement in Nakamura Suit Has Prelim Approval
WOODHAVEN DISCOUNT: Underpays Liquor Salesmen, Kumar Claims
YALE UNIVESRITY: Employees Seek Class Action Certification
YELP INC: Sapan Class Certification Bid Nixed
[*] Calif. Accounts for More Than 50% of Class Actions in U.S.

[*] Freshfields Attorney Discusses Employment Class Actions

                            *********

99 THAI: Monter Seeks Minimum Wage and Overtime Compensation
------------------------------------------------------------
RODOLFO MONTER HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. 99 THAI PLAYGROUND LLC
(D/B/A THAIMEE TABLE (F/K/A NGAM)), INSPIRED HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT
LLC (D/B/A THAIMEE TABLE (F/K/A NGAM)), HONG THAIMEE, SUNG H. CHOI,
NGAMPROM THAIMEE, CHAI THAIMEE, LUIGI DOE, and MATT DOE, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2019), seeks
minimum wage and overtime compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a former employee of
the Defendants. From approximately June 2012 until on or about
October 2014, the Plaintiff was employed ostensibly as a delivery
worker; and, from approximately October 2014 until on or about
February 1, 2019, the Plaintiff was employed as a food preparer at
the restaurant located at 99 3rd Ave, New York, NY 10003. From
approximately June 2012 until on or about October 2014, the
Plaintiff was ostensibly employed as a delivery worker. However, he
was required to spend a considerable part of his work day
performing non-tipped duties, including but not limited to washing
dishes, sweeping and mopping, washing the bathroom, kitchen and
restaurant floors, taking out the trash and recycling, cleaning the
kitchen ventilator, windows, drains, preparing and cooking food,
putting together delivery packages, bringing up all sorts of items
from the basement to the kitchen, bringing down and stocking
delivered items into the refrigerator. The Plaintiff worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that he worked.

Rather, the Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of
the hours worked and failed to pay Plaintiff Monter appropriately
for any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any
additional overtime premium. Further, the Defendants failed to pay
the Plaintiff the required "spread of hours" pay for any day in
which he had to work over 10 hours a day. The Defendants paid
Plaintiff Monter at a rate that was lower than the required
tip-credit rate, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Thai restaurant, located
at 99 3rd Ave, New York, NY 10003 under the name "Thaimee Table
(f/k/a Ngam)."[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES , P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

A & W CONCENTRATE: Sharpe Files Fraud Class Action in NY
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against A & W Concentrate
Company. The case is styled as Lashawn Sharpe, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. A & W
Concentrate Company and Keurig Dr Pepper Inc., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00768 (E.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as Fraud, filed
pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act.

A&W Concentrate Company manufactures and sells root beer and
Sunkist soda floats flavors. Its products are available at retail
outlets in the United States. The company is based in Plano, Texas.
A&W Concentrate Company operates as a subsidiary of Dr Pepper
Snapple Group, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Spencer I. Sheehan, Esq.
   Sheehan & Associates, P.C.
   505 Northern Boulevard, Suite 311
   Great Neck, NY 11021
   Tel: (516) 303-0552
   Fax: (516) 234-7800
   Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


AARGO SERVICES: Singleton Files Class Suit in NY State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against AARGO Services, Inc.,
in the New York Supreme Court for Bronx County on February 8, 2019.
The case is styled as Lashay Singleton, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AARGO Services, Inc.
and Herbert D. Freeman, individually, Defendants, Case No.
22468/2018.

Aargo Services Inc was founded in 1989. The company's line of
business includes providing detective, guard, and armored car
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
   400 Jericho Turnpike, Ste. 226
   Jericho, NY 11753
   Tel: (516) 742-4949

The Defendant is represented by:

   TRIVELLA & FORTE, LLP
   1311 Mamaroneck Avenue, Suite 170
   White Plains, NY 10605
   Tel: 914-949-9075
   Email: http://www.tfsllp.com


ACTIVISION BLIZZARD: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Activision Blizzard, Inc. ("Activision Blizzard" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:  ATVI) and certain of its officers.  The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Central District of
California, and docketed under 19-cv-00423, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Activision securities between August 2, 2018 and
January 10, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"),
seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company
and certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Activision Blizzard
securities between August 2, 2018, and January 10, 2019, both dates
inclusive, you have until March 19, 2019, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and number of shares purchased.

Activision Blizzard develops and distributes content and services
on video game consoles, personal computers (PC), and mobile
devices.

On April 29, 2010, the Company announced its entry, through its
wholly-owned subsidiary Activision Publishing, Inc., into an
agreement with Bungie, Inc. ("Bungie"), the developer of
blockbuster game franchises including Halo, Myth, and Marathon.
The agreement with Bungie gave Activision Blizzard exclusive rights
to publish and distribute video games developed by Bungie for the
next ten years.

The partnership between Activision Blizzard and Bungie yielded the
commercially successful Destiny franchise, a series of science
fiction-themed video games.  In September 2014, Activision Blizzard
released Destiny, the first installment in the franchise, developed
by Bungie.  Activision Blizzard announced that the Company sold
$500 million of Destiny into retail stores and first parties
worldwide on the first day of its release, making the game the
largest video game franchise launch in history at that time.  Over
the following two years, Bungie developed and Activision Blizzard
released four expansions for Destiny.  In September 2017,
Activision Blizzard released a full sequel, Destiny 2.  On
September 15, 2017, Activision Blizzard announced that Destiny 2
had "surpassed the original's records for engagement and digital
sales in launch week."  To date, Bungie has developed and
Activision Blizzard has released three expansions for Destiny 2.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that:  (i) the termination of Activision
Blizzard and Bungie's partnership, giving Bungie full publishing
rights and responsibilities for the Destiny franchise, was
imminent; (ii) the termination of the two companies' relationship
would foreseeably have a significant negative impact on Activision
Blizzard's revenues; and (iii) as a result, Activision Blizzard's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On January 10, 2019, Activision Blizzard and Bungie announced the
end of their business relationship.  That same day, in an
Securities and Exchange Commission filing, Activision Blizzard
stated that Bungie "would assume full publishing rights and
responsibilities for the Destiny franchise.  Going forward, Bungie
will own and develop the franchise."

Following these announcements, the Company's stock price fell $4.81
per share, or 9.37%, to close at $46.54 on January 11, 2019.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]

AEROFLOT: Family Files Class Action After Missing Flight
--------------------------------------------------------
Fahad Shabbir, writing for UrduPoint, reports that a family who
missed a connecting flight from Moscow to Chicago has filed a class
action lawsuit against Russia's Aeroflot and Finland's Finnair with
an Illinois court, according to a court filing.

Dmitry, Svetlana and Alexander Badurin seek damages in excess of
$32,439 from the two airlines "jointly and severally, for delay in
international air transportation," the complaint, obtained by
Sputnik, reads.

The three argue that last August they missed their flight from
Moscow to Helsinki where they were to change to a Chicago-bound
Finnair flight after standing a long line to register at Moscow's
Sheremetyevo airport.

They said this left them with little time to go through security
checks and reach the gate, a road with many transitions, turns and
stairs which proved to be challenging for Svetlana Bandurina, who
suffers from an in-born hip condition.

Aeroflot's Deputy CEO Vladimir Aleksandrov said the company was
looking into the lawsuit. He described it as an attempt to generate
publicity by plaintiffs to get the upper hand in the future
settlement.

"We think that the sum of damages and the nature of the accusations
suggest an attempt to put pressure on the airline, including in the
media, to get advantage in the out-of-court process. We have always
protected Aeroflot's good name and will continue to do so," he
said.

Sputnik does not have a comment by Finnair, which is a co-defendant
in the case. The complaint also asserts claims against the two
airlines under the US Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). [GN]


AMN HEALTHCARE: Can Compel Arbitration in Posephny Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICOLE POSEPHNY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMN HEALTHCARE
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-06284-KAW (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Defendants' motion
to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs filed the instant putative class action against the
Defendants, asserting various violations of California labor law.
The Defendants are in the business of healthcare staffing,
recruiting and hiring registered nurses to staff hospitals during
labor disputes and strikes.  Healthcare workers are directly
employed by Defendant Healthsource Global Staffing, Inc. ("HSG");
the Defendants assert that the remaining Defendants do not employ
any healthcare workers.

To be eligible for employment by Defendant HSG, the applicant
creates an account through Defendant HSG's website using a unique
e-mail address and password.  Defendant HSG maintains a database of
all applicants who have created an account.  After creating an
account, the applicant must "build a profile," providing
information on his or her licenses, certifications, skills,
experience, qualification, and availability.  Whenever an applicant
logs into his or her account, the applicant is presented with a
"Main Menu" screen that contains action items for the applicant to
complete.

Defendant HSG updates its database so that applicants can view
potential strike assignments.  An interested applicant can
"nominate" himself or herself for consideration.  After nominating
himself or herself, the applicant will be prompted by the "Action
Advisor" to complete his or her profile if the profile is not
already complete.  The action items include completing human
resources forms, including an "Arbitration Agreement - Mandatory
Forum Selection."  Other forms include acknowledgment of receipt of
Defendant HSG's policies and procedures and consent to conduct
background checks and substance abuse tests.

The Arbitration Agreement states that an applicant has 30 days to
revoke the agreement so that neither Defendant HSG nor the
applicant would be bound by the terms of the agreement. The
revocation could be e-mailed to
"humanresroucesdepartment@healthsourceglobal.com" or mailed to a
physical address.  Completion of the Arbitration Agreement is not
required for an applicant to be considered for an assignment.
Instead, an applicant can complete the Arbitration Agreement and
other human resources forms after being selected for an assignment
and arriving at the assignment location.  Upon arrival at the
assignment location, the applicant completes the remainder of
pre-employment paperwork, and interviews with clinical personnel to
confirm qualifications.  Defendant HSG then offers the applicant
employment after completing all interviews and pre-hire paperwork.

Posephny created her HSG account on June 16, 2016.  On April 29,
2018, she nominated herself for assignment to an anticipated UC
strike set for May 2018, and electronically signed the Arbitration
Agreement.  She, however, states that she does not remember seeing
or signing an arbitration agreement.

Plaintiff Baret Sloley-Sarchet created her HSG account at an
unknown time.  On Sept. 30, 2016, Plaintiff Sloley-Sarchet
nominated herself for assignment to a November 2016 strike.  On
Nov. 18, 2016, she electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement.
She also states that she does not recall seeing or signing an
arbitration agreement.  On Dec. 5, 2017, Plaintiff Sloley-Sarchet
nominated herself for assignment to the UC strike.

Plaintiff LaQuita Knight created her HSG account on Oct. 22, 2009.
On Nov. 16, 2016, she nominated herself for assignment to a
November 2016 strike.  On Nov. 19, 2016, she electronically signed
the Arbitration Agreement.  She states that she does not remember
seeing or signing an arbitration agreement.  On Dec. 5, 2017,
Plaintiff Knight nominated herself for assignment to the UC
strike.

Plaintiff Carmen Sistrunk created her HSG account on Dec. 20, 2017.
That same day, she nominated herself for assignment to the UC
strike.  On Jan. 22, 2018, she electronically signed the
Arbitration Agreement.  Plaintiff Sistrunk states that she does not
recall seeing or signing an arbitration agreement.

Finally, Plaintiff Georgina Benson created her HSG account on Dec.
12, 2015. On Nov. 17, 2016, she nominated herself for assignment to
a November 2016 strike, and electronically signed the Arbitration
Agreement.  Sge states that she does not remember seeing or signing
an arbitration agreement.  On Dec. 5, 2017, Plaintiff Benson
nominated herself for assignment to the UC strike.

The Plaintiffs were selected to work the UC Strike.  When they
arrived at the strike location, the Plaintiffs were required to
sign a Temporary Employment Agreement ("TEA").

On May 31, 2018, the Plaintiffs state that they learned of the
existence of the Arbitration Agreement, and that the Arbitration
Agreement contained a 30-day revocation period.  They informed
their attorney that they wished to revoke the agreement.  On June
1, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel sent a revocation letter to
Defendant HSG at "humanresroucesdepartment@healthsourceglobal.com,"
the e-mail address listed in the Arbitration Agreement.  Because
the e-mail address appeared to be misspelled, the Plaintiffs'
counsel also sent a revocation letter to
"humanresourcesdepartment@healthsourceglobal.com," as well as
sending a revocation letter to the physical address.  The e-mail to
"humanresroucesdepartment@healthsourceglobal.com" was returned as
undeliverable.

The Plaintiffs then filed the instant suit in state court,
asserting violations of various California labor statutes.  On Oct.
12, 2018, the Defendants removed the case.  On Nov. 21, 2018, they
filed a motion to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs do not challenge the terms of the Arbitration
Agreement.  Instead, they argue that there is no binding
arbitration agreement because the Arbitration Agreement was
superseded by the TEA.  also contend that the Arbitration They
Agreements were extinguished by novation.  Alternatively, the
Plaintiffs assert that they revoked the Arbitration Agreement.

Magistrate Judge Westmore granted the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration because the Plaintiffs are bound by the Arbitration
Agreement.
She concludes that the TEA is not a complete and exclusive
statement of the agreement between the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants, and that the Arbitration Agreement survives.  Because
there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, the she
must compel Plaintiffs' claims to arbitration.
  
The Magistrate also finds that novation does not apply.  Novation
requires the substitution of a new obligation between the same
parties with the intent to extinguish the old obligation, but the
Plaintiffs do not identify what new obligation has been substituted
in place of the obligation to arbitrate.

Finally, she concludes that the Plaintiffs did not revoke the
Arbitration Agreement, and are bound by its terms.  The arbitration
agreement is a standalone document that was electronically signed
by the Plaintiffs, as required by an "Action Advisor" prior to
being employed.  The Plaintiffs also do not dispute that they did
not attempt to opt-out until after the opt-out period expired.
Thus, regardless of whether the opt-out address was correct, their
opt-out was untimely.

The Magistrate stayed the proceedings in the instant case pending
resolution of the arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/eDxsQJ from Leagle.com.

Nicole Posephny, Baret Sloley-Sarchet, Laquita Knight, Carmen
Sistrunk & Georgia Benson, Plaintiffs, represented by Hunter Pyle
-- hunter@hunterpyleaw.com -- Hunter Pyle Law, Chad A. Saunders --
csaunders@hunterpyelaw.com -- Sundeen Salinas & Pyle & Vincent
Lloyd Chen -- vchcn@hunterpylclaw.com -- The Law Offices of Rachel
Folberg.

AMN Healthcare Inc., AMN Healthcare Services, Inc., AMN Healthcare
Allied, Inc. & Healthsource Global Staffing, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Amanda E. Beckwith -- abeckwith@sheppardmullin.com
-- Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Paul Scott Cowie --
pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP, Thomas Roy Kaufman -- tkaufman@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP & Brian Samuel Fong --
bfong@sheppardmullin.com  -- Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton.


ANGELS IN YOUR HOME: Court Narrows Claims in Hardgers-Powell
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSE HARDGERS-POWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANGELS IN
YOUR HOME LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-6612-FPG (W.D.
N.Y.), Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York (i) granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class; (ii) granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment; and (iii) granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.

Plaintiffs Hardgers-Powell and Yolanda Clay bring a putative class
action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL").  The
Plaintiffs are home health care workers who allege that the
Defendants failed to pay overtime at the correct rate under state
and federal law and failed to comply with a state wage-notice
requirement.

The case involves three types of home health care workers who
allegedly did not receive overtime pay at the legally required rate
from Defendants, their putative employers.  The three types of
workers are "Consumer Directed Personal Assistance Program" Aides
("CDPAPs"), "Personal Care" Aides ("PCAs"), and "Home Health" Aides
("HHAs").  A CDPAP is an aide who works in the Medicaid Consumer
Directed Personal Assistance Program, a regulatory regime.  HHAs
are certified nursing assistants who have more specialized training
than PCAs.  All of these workers provide care and services to
individuals in their homes.  Plaintiff Hardgers-Powell is a CDPAP
who has been employed by the Defendants since August 2015.
Plaintiff Clay is a PCA who was employed by the Defendants from May
2013 to May 2015.

The central dispute in the litigation concerns the rate at which
the Plaintiffs and other home health care workers were required to
be paid for overtime work in 2015.  Generally, under the FLSA, an
employer must pay an employee at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which the employee is employed
for any hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek.  The FLSA
contains a number of exemptions to this overtime rule, one of which
is known as the companionship services exemption.  This exemption
applies to any employee employed in domestic service employment to
provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age
or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves.

The NYLL provides another layer of complexity to the issue of
proper overtime wages.  The NYLL incorporates FLSA's companionship
exemption, with some variations.  Specifically, the NYLL provides
that Exempt employees must be paid 1.5 times the minimum wage,
while Non-Exempt employees must be paid 1.5 times their regular pay
rate.  Thus, under both FLSA and the NYLL, the default rule is that
Non-Exempt employees are paid 1.5 times their regular pay rate for
overtime work.

The Plaintiffs raise three claims in their amended complaint.
First, they contend that, between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31, 2015, the
Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime wages at
the correct rate -- one and one-half times the regular rate ("FLSA
Overtime claim").  Second, the Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendants violated the NYLL on the same basis ("NYLL Overtime
claim").  Third, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants
violated NYLL Section 195, which, among other things, requires
every employer to provide, at the time of hiring, a notice
containing certain wage information ("NYLL Wage-Notice claim").
The Plaintiffs seek to bring these claims as class actions.

On April 14, 2017, the Court conditionally certified a class on the
FLSA Overtime claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  Now
before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to certify two
subclasses for the NYLL Overtime and Wage-Notice claims pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  In addition, both sides have
moved for partial summary judgment on various matters.

The Plaintiffs propose the NYLL Overtime Subclass of all current or
former employees of the Defendants who provided care, assistance or
companionship to individuals within their homes during the period
Jan. 1, 2015 through Dec. 31, 2015, and who were paid by the hour
but not paid at least one and one-half times their regular hourly
rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in a single workweek.

They also propose the NYLL Wage-Notice Subclass of all current or
former members of the Overtime Class who at any time six years
prior to the filing of the action through the entry of final
judgment in the matter, did not receive proper written notices as
required under the Wage Theft Prevention Act.

Judge Geraci granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify Class.  The motion is granted insofar as the
Court certifies the NYLL Overtime Subclass.  The subclass is
defined as all current or former employees of the Defendants who
provided care, assistance or companionship to individuals within
their homes during the period Jan. 1, 2015 through Dec. 31, 2015,
and who were paid by the hour but not paid at least one and
one-half times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in
excess of forty in a single workweek.  The motion is denied insofar
as the Court declines to certify the NYLL Wage-Notice Subclass.

The Plaintiffs' counsel -- Justin M. Cordello and Robert L. Mullin
-- are appointed as the class counsel.  The parties are ordered to
confer and submit a jointly acceptable notice that is consistent
with the Decision and Order and may be sent to subclass members.
The parties will submit a joint motion to the Court with the
proposed notice by April 8, 2019.  If the parties cannot come to an
agreement, they will submit competing proposed notices.

The Judge granted in part, denied in part and denied in part
without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.  The motion is granted insofar as the Plaintiffs are
entitled to summary judgment against David Wegman on the issue of
liability for the NYLL Overtime claim.  The motion is denied
insofar as the Plaintiffs request summary judgment against David
Wegman on the NYLL Wage-Notice claim.  The motion is denied without
prejudice insofar as the Plaintiffs request summary judgment on the
issue of compensatory damages, liquidated damages, interest,
attorney's fees, and costs for the NYLL Overtime claim.

By April 8, 2019, the Plaintiffs may, after they have met and
conferred with the Defendants, file a renewed motion for summary
judgment with respect to damages on the NYLL Overtime Claim.  

The Judge ordered the parties as follows:

      i. By March 4, 2019, the parties will meet and confer
regarding the amount of unpaid overtime wages owed to each member
of the NYLL Overtime Subclass;

      ii. By April 8, 2019, the parties will jointly submit a
memorandum to the Court.  That memorandum will contain the
following:

            1. As to amounts that the parties agree are owed to
subclass members, the memorandum will identify (1) the name of each
subclass member, and (2) the amount of unpaid wages owed to that
subclass member;

            2. As to amounts over which the parties disagree, the
memorandum will identify (1) the name of each subclass member, (2)
the amount that the Plaintiffs allege is owed to that subclass
member, supported by citations to specific record evidence, and (3)
the amount that the Defendants allege is owed to that subclass
member, supported by citations to specific record evidence; and

            3. The memorandum will contain the parties' respective
proposals for how the Court should proceed to resolve any damages
issues that are not susceptible to resolution on summary judgment.

Finally, the Judge granted in part, denied in part and denied in
part without prejudice the Defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment.  The motion is granted insofar as Defendants Angels In
Your Home LLC and Andy Wegman are entitled to summary judgment on
all claims.  The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these two
Defendants from the action.

The motion is denied without prejudice insofar as the Defendants
request summary judgment on various damages issues.  By April 8,
2019, the Defendants may, after they have met and conferred with
the Plaintiffs, file a renewed motion for summary judgment as to
damages.  The motion is otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/WcA6LC from Leagle.com.

Rose Hardgers-Powell & Yolanda Clay, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Justin M.
Cordello -- justin@cordellolaw.com -- Cordello Law PLLC & Robert L.
Mullin -- rlmullin@FerrMullinLaw.com -- Ferr and Mullin.

Angels In Your Home LLC, Angels in your home, Andy Wegman,
individually and in his role as owner of ANGELS IN YOUR HOME and/or
ANGELS IN YOUR HOME LLC, & David Wegman, individually and in his
role as owner of ANGELS IN YOUR HOME and/or ANGELS IN YOUR HOME
LLC; Defendants, represented by Scott M. Mooney --
smooney@boylancode.com -- Boylan Code LLP & Terence Lee Robinson,
Jr. -- trobinson@boylancode.com -- Boylan Code LLP.


ARIZONA: Dept. of Child Safety Fights Class-Action Status
---------------------------------------------------------
Mary Jo Pitzl, writing for AZCentral.com, asks, "Are all children
in Arizona's foster-care system at risk of harm, requiring the
state to reform the way it cares for them?"

That is the central question being deliberated by a three-judge
panel at the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Its ruling could
have broad social and financial consequences: If the appeals court
agrees with a lower-court ruling, the case will go forward as a
class-action lawsuit.

That means if the state loses, its Department of Child Safety would
be obliged to reform its practices for all 14,500 children
currently in the system, as well as all children who enter foster
care in the future. That likely would involve increased funding for
everything from housing to behavioral-health care to more
caseworkers in order to lower workloads.

In deliberations on Jan. 17, attorneys for both sides made their
arguments for why class-action status does, or does not, apply.
Until that issue is decided, the underlying case is on hold.

                    'Shocks The Conscience'

That case, filed four years ago, cites lapses in the foster-care
system so severe that it "shocks the conscience."

The plaintiffs are led by Children's Rights, a New York-based firm
that has successfully waged court battles to reform foster-care
systems in several states. The Arizona Center for Law in the Public
Interest also represents the plaintiffs in the case.

Originally, the case involved 10 foster children who have been
denied a variety of services, from behavioral-health treatment to
proper housing to adequate attention from caseworkers. As the
lawsuit has moved through the federal court system, all but two of
those children have left foster care, either because they were
adopted or have turned 18, the age at which foster care no longer
applies.

The state has argued that the dwindling number of children named in
the case undercuts the need for a class-action designation. U.S.
District Court Judge Roslyn Silver rejected that argument in
September 2017.

        AZ Foster-Care Lawsuit Gets Class-Action Status

State officials also argue the system has already been reformed,
citing declines in the number of children in foster care (there are
14,500 today, compared with 17,000 when the suit was filed) as well
as systemwide improvements that have reduced caseloads and steered
children away from group-home placements.

But the plaintiffs cite ongoing deficiencies, such as continued
turnover among caseworker ranks, the lack of a coordinated system
for getting medical, dental and behavioral-health services to kids,
and ongoing issues with safe placement for foster kids. Too many
children, they argue, are separated from their siblings when they
enter foster care.

                   DCS: Not All Kids Risk Harm

Attorneys for the state said there is not a common harm faced by
all kids in foster care. Rather, any problems merit a case-by-case
determination, not class-action treatment, they said.

Attorney Rob Ellman, Esq.-- rle@elgarizona.com -- representing DCS
Director Greg McKay, said the child advocates who brought the
original suit have wrongly relied on the result of another Arizona
class-action suit, this one involving prison inmates and their
medical care.

That case, Parsons v. Ryan, created an overly broad class of
plaintiffs by wrongly saying they were bound together by being at
equal risk of harm from state policies, Ellman argued. Likewise,
there is no policy or practice at DCS that places all foster kids
at risk of harm, he said.

                      Argument Shut Down

The Parsons decision is a problem, Ellman argued, that will
continue to bedevil defendants until it is overturned.

"What is the problem?" Judge Lynn S. Adelman asked. "It's the
law."

Adelman said the court is bound by the class-certification criteria
determined in the Parsons case. The three-judge panel can't
overturn a decision made by another 9th Circuit panel, he said.

Because of that, the three judges quickly shut down Ellman's
efforts to argue the deficiencies in the Parsons case.

"We're just a way station here; we really can't help you with
that," Judge Michelle Friedland said.

                  AHCCCS: Health Care Available

That left the state to argue that one group of foster children --
those who qualify for Medicaid -- is also an overly broad class
that plaintiffs can't defend.

Attorney Nicholas Acedo, Esq. -- nacedo@strucklove.com -- argued
there is no proof that all children in foster care were denied
health services through AHCCCS, Arizona's Medicaid program. In
fact, he told the judges, one of the key plaintiffs in the case --
a child identified as "B.K." -- was never denied services, so it's
not credible to argue she was at any substantial risk of harm.

Acedo is representing AHCCCS, or the Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System.

AHCCCS' responsibility is to make health screenings and
behavioral-health services available to children in foster care,
Acedo said, not to actually deliver the services. AHCCCS contracts
with outside providers to deliver those services.

Plaintiffs: Heavy caseloads harm kids

But that argument makes too fine of a distinction, attorney Harry
Frischer, Esq. said. He represents Children's Rights.

DCS caseworkers are overburdened with heavy caseloads, Frischer
said. That limits their ability to ensure kids get the screening
and health care, putting all children at risk of harm, he said.

"It's not sufficient for the Medicaid system to have services
actually available," Frischer said. The state must show children
actually received the services, which it has failed to do, he
said.

Judge Friedland paged through the plaintiffs' brief, looking for
examples of such denials.

"Where do you show that any of these children that have asked for
Medicaid have been refused Medicaid?" she asked.

That is not a requirement at this stage of the case, Frischer
said.

For now, it's important to show there are common risks that apply
to all children in foster care, he said. He cited testimony from
outside experts hired by the plaintiffs to show that risk exists.

The judges took the case under advisement and said they would try
to expedite their decision so the underlying case can proceed.

Why wait?

During arguments on Jan. 17, Judge John Clifford Wallace suggested
the underlying lawsuit might be able to move forward, even as the
appeals court decides whether it should be considered a class
action.

In prior cases, the court has stated that a serious issue can
proceed to trial without waiting for the side issue of class action
to be decided, he said.

However, he did not elaborate further, and attorneys said they
would have to wait and see if the appeals court weighs in on that
topic in future rulings. [GN]


AV HOMES: Denial of Gundel's Bid to Dismiss Counterclaim Quashed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NORMAN GUNDEL; WILLIAM MANN; and BRENDA N. TAYLOR,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons,
Petitioners, v. AV HOMES, INC. and AVATAR PROPERTIES, INC.,
Respondents, Case No. 2D18-899 (Fla. Dist. App.), Judge Anthony K.
Black of the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Second
District granted the Residents' motion for a writ of certiorari
quashing the trial court's order denying their motion to dismiss
the counterclaim filed by Avatar Properties.

Residents Gundel, Mann, and Taylor filed a class action complaint
against AV Homes and Avatar Properties alleging violations of
Florida's Homeowners' Association Act, and Florida's Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act, and seeking declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and damages.

Avatar Properties is the developer of Solivita, the community in
which the Residents own homes.  In their complaint, the Residents
claimed that Avatar Properties and AV Homes violated the law when
they created both the Solivita Community Association and the Club
Plan, each of which require Solivita homeowners to pay fees.  The
Residents claim that the imposition of both of these fees is not
legal and that certain marketing for the community was deceptive.
In creating Solivita, Avatar Properties also established two
community development districts ("CDDs") to fund infrastructure
within the community through additional assessments on homeowners.

The Residents' lawsuit arose after Avatar Properties proposed to
sell the Club amenities, as established by the Club Plan, to the
CDDs at a cost of $73.7 million.  The purchase would be financed
through the issuance of bonds, to be repaid by Solivita homeowners
including the Residents.  The Residents expressed concerns about
the proposed sale and publicly commented on the propriety of the
$73.7 million suggested purchase price and bond validation
proceedings.  They posted on Internet blogs, spoke at Solivita CDD
meetings, distributed handouts at CDD meetings, commented at other
local meetings at which Solivita homeowners were present, and
circulated a petition to have the Club amenities appraised. The
Residents obtained an appraisal setting the fair market value of
the Club amenities at $19.25 million.  The Residents also posted on
the Internet information about the Bond Validation Case, the
mechanism by which the CDDs would be granted the bonds to purchase
the amenities.  The posts included links to the court filings and
summaries of the allegations.

After a failed motion to dismiss the Residents' lawsuit, Avatar
Properties filed its answer and a counterclaim.  The counterclaim
raised three counts which the Residents allege seek to hold the
Residents liable for damages based on constitutionally protected
conduct: engaging in free speech, defending and prosecuting
lawsuits, and engaging in discourse with governmental entities, the
CDDs.
Count I of the counterclaim alleged that the Residents breached
the purchase and sale agreements by actively and vocally contesting
the validity and enforceability of: (1) the mandatory nature of the
membership in the Club; (2) the Club Dues and Membership Fees; and
(3) Avatar Properties' right to sell the Club amenities at its sole
discretion.

Count II alleged that the Residents breached the affirmative
covenant running with the land—the requirements of membership in
the Club Plan -- by contesting the validity of the Club Plan,
Avatar Properties' right to collect Club Dues, and Avatar
Properties' right to sell the Club amenities.

Count III of the counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment finding
that the Club amenities (and the fees associated therewith) are not
subject to chapter 720.

Count IV claimed tortious interference with contractual relations,
alleging that the Residents unjustifiably interfered with Avatar
Properties'] agreement with the CDDs by contesting the
enforceability of the Club Plan.

Each count realleged the paragraphs outlining the Residents'
conduct: (1) engaging in "extra-judicial conduct aimed at
frustrating" the sale of the Club amenities to the CDDs, including
posting "misleading information" on the Solivita blog, "handing out
fliers to residents that included inaccurate information, and
contesting Avatar Properties' right to collect Club dues"; (2)
attending meetings of local clubs/classes for homeowners and
contesting the sale of the Club amenities to the CDDs for the
requested price; (3) asking residents "to sign petitions contesting
Avatar Properties' right to sell the Club amenities"; and (4) "by
virtue of the lawsuit" continuing to frustrate Avatar Properties'
"contractual interests."

Avatar Properties claimed damages of increased attorneys' fees in
the Bond Validation Case, as well as the delay, frustration, and
potential loss of the planned sale to the CDDs, and it argued that
the Residents unjustifiably interfered with Avatar Properties'
agreement with the CDDs.  The purchase agreement between Avatar
Properties and the CDDs, dated Dec. 1, 2016, was included in the
attachments to the counterclaim.

In their answer, the Residents admitted that they posted
information on the Solivita blog and that they distributed handouts
at CDD public meetings; they admitted to attending classes for
residents held by a local club and speaking about the proposed sale
of the Club amenities to the CDDs; they admitted that they sought
and obtained signatures on a petition for a fair market value
appraisal of the Club amenities; and they admitted that Avatar
Properties is trying to sue the Residents for filing the above
styled class action.  The Residents also admitted that they vocally
contested the validity of certain aspects of the Club Plan and the
proposed sale of the Club [amenities], as asserted in the official
court records in the Bond Validation Case.

The Residents filed the affidavit of Mr. Gundel, one of the
Residents. Mr. Gundel averred that he made comments and distributed
handouts about the proposed purchase of the Club amenities at
public CDD meetings "in late 2015 or 2016"; that he posted on the
Solivita blog about the Bond Validation Case; that he attended a
Feb. 10, 2017, CDD meeting and distributed information about the
proposed purchase; that he attended a March 15, 2017, CDD meeting
and presented the appraisal petition; and that he attended an April
19, 2017, CDD meeting and presented the appraisal report and
another handout.  He further averred that after the class action
lawsuit was filed, he attended three more meetings of the CDD and
spoke about the proposed purchase.

Simultaneously with their answer, the Residents also filed a Motion
to Dismiss, For Judgment on the Pleadings or For Summary Judgment
on Counterclaim and For Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under
Florida's Anti-SLAPP Statutes.  The motion alleged that Avatar
Properties' counterclaim openly violates Florida's Anti-SLAPP
Statutes because it seeks damages from the Residents because they
assembled, engaged in free speech, and sought redress before their
government, citing sections 768.295 and 720.304.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered its order denying the
Residents relief.  The court treated the Residents' motion only as
a motion to dismiss, stating that the Residents could not
substitute a motion to dismiss for either a motion for summary
judgment or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  As a result,
the court did not consider the motion as a motion for summary
judgment or motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Based only on
the allegations of Avatar Properties' counterclaim, the court found
that the Residents failed to show that their conduct fell within
the protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute and that the Residents
failed to establish that their conduct was made "in connection
with" an existing judicial proceeding.

The Residents seek a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court's
order denying their motion to dismiss the counterclaim filed by
Avatar Properties in their class action lawsuit against Avatar
Properties and its parent company, AV Homes.  They assert that by
failing to adhere to the language of sections 720.304 and 768.295,
Florida Statutes (2017), and by not dismissing the counterclaim as
a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ("SLAPP") suit the
court departed from the essential requirements of law.

Judge Black finds that because the statute allows for the filing of
either or both a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary
judgment, and because the motions may be filed within one document
under an alternative heading, the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of the law in declining to consider the
Residents' motion as a motion for summary judgment.  The motion
should be heard on the evidence and pleadings on record as of the
date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss.

Moreover, he finds that the vagueness of Avatar Properties'
allegations as to the dates of specific conduct and as to the
conduct itself prevents the trial court from determining from the
face of the counterclaim that the Residents' actions constitute
"free speech in connection with public issues" or instruction of
representatives of government.  Thus, while it may be clear from
the face of the counterclaim that Avatar Properties has based some
part of its claims on the filing of the class action and on the
Residents' opposition to the Bond Validation Case, the trial court
could not determine that Avatar Properties' claims were primarily
based on protected activities, as the Anti-SLAPP statute requires.
T he Residents' motion and supporting affidavit attempt to provide
the facts necessary to support dismissal.  The trial court must
expeditiously address the merits of the Residents' motion under the
appropriate standard.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Black granted the Residents' petition
for writ of certiorari.  He quashed the order denying the
Residents' Motion to Dismiss, For Judgment on the Pleadings or For
Summary Judgment on Counterclaim and For Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs Under Florida's Anti-SLAPP Statutes for the reasons he
stated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/RiGEw9 from Leagle.com.

Kristin A. Norse -- knorse@kmf-law.com -- and Stuart C. Markman --
smarkman@kmf-law.com -- of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A., Tampa;
and Kenneth G. Turkel -- kturkel@bajocuva.com -- and Shane B. Vogt
-- shane.vogt@bajocuva.com -- of Bajo Cuva Cohen & Turkel, P.A.,
Tampa, for Petitioners.

Daniel J. Fleming and Christian M. Leger of Gray Robinson, P.A.,
Tampa, for Respondents.


B&S WHOLESALE: Luttrell & Roan Seek Wages & OT for Gun Smiths
-------------------------------------------------------------
LELAND LUTTRELL and CODY ROAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. B&S WHOLESALE, INC.,
PAUL PEDDLE, KRYSTLE PEDDLE, and BEVERLY MELTON, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00331-N (N.D. Tex., Feb. 9, 2019), alleges that
the Defendants employed Plaintiffs and other workers like them as
gun smiths, but failed to pay them (i) for all hours worked and
(ii) overtime for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

As gun smiths, the Plaintiffs' primary job duties included
cleaning, repairing, and customizing guns. The Plaintiffs routinely
worked 55 or more hours per week during their employment with
Defendants. The Defendants frequently forced the Plaintiffs to
continue working after they clocked out.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          www.4overtimelawyer.com
          2820 McKinnon, Suite 5009
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: 214 790 4454
          E-mail: jack@siegellawgroup.biz

               - and -

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          5438 Rutherglenn Drive
          Houston, TX 77096
          Telephone: (512) 417-5716
          E-mail: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

BEAVERTON FOODS: Class Action Over Preservatives Against It Fails
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Salls, writing for Legal News Line, reports that Beaverton
Foods Inc. is asking the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York to dismiss a class action lawsuit over
allegations of false advertising related to its Inglehoffer
Original Stone Ground Mustard.

In its motion to dismiss the lawsuit on Aug. 16, 2018, Beaverton
Foods argued that "neither (lead plaintiff Daniela Quiroz) nor her
purported expert make any allegations regarding the quantity or
source of citric acid in the product, nor do either include a
single fact supporting the notion that citric acid actually
functions in this specific product as a preservative, as they
must."

In addition, Beaverton Foods said in the motion that "plaintiff
also expresses no qualms about having consumed trace amounts of
citric acid."

The motion said Quiroz backs up her claims with allegations that
"citric acid is per se a preservative," and that, as a result,
Beaverton Foods should be found guilty of violating New York's
General Business Law "and common law protections against fraud."

Beaverton Foods said Quiroz's claim related to citric acid's role
as a preservative in the mustard in question are based on a
category to which citric acid has been assigned in Food and Drug
Administration labeling guidelines.

Despite this classification, Beaverton Foods said in the motion
that "the FDA, in enforcing its regulations regarding the labeling
of preservatives, has also made clear that the mere presence of
citric acid in a product does not mean that citric acid is acting
as a preservative in that product."

"There are no facts whatsoever in (Quiroz's amended complaint) that
support a claim that citric acid functions in the product as a
preservative, nor facts that even indicate the quantity of citric
acid it contains relative to other ingredients to add any modicum
of plausibility to this case," the motion said.

Quiroz filed her suit in December 2017 over allegations she was
injured and deceived by the "no preservatives" label on the mustard
when the product has citric acid as an ingredient.[GN]


BUSINESS INFORMATION: $3.3MM Kelly FCRA Suit Deal Has Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL KELLY, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, v. BUSINESS INFORMATION GROUP, INC, Civil
Action No. 15-6668 (E.D. Pa.), Magistrate Judge David R.
Strawbridge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted both the Plaintiff's (i) Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, and (ii) Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses.

Kelly brought a consumer class action against Defendant BIG under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") on Dec. 17, 2015 on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated in relation to consumer
report background checks furnished by BIG for employment purposes.
Kelly alleged he was denied employment opportunities due to adverse
public record information that was included in a consumer report
that BIG furnished to his employer in December 2013.  He
characterized the report as having contained materially false
information, as it stated that a court case had been filed against
him for an unpaid debt that did not, in fact, belong to him.
Moreover, he was not given any notice by BIG that a credit report
with this adverse public record item was being produced to his
employer.

In Count One, Kelly asserted an individual claim under 15 U.S.C.
Section 1581e(b), which requires that consumer reporting agencies
"follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy
of the information" concerning the individual who is the subject of
a report.  Count Two asserted a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section
1681k, which concerns additional obligations of consumer reporting
agencies that produce for employment purposes consumer reports that
contain public record information.  Count Two consisted of Kelly's
individual claim for relief under Section 1681k as well as a class
claim under Rule 23, which sought to include the Section 1681k
claims of those as to whom BIG had produced a consumer report for
employment purposes that contained a public record where BIG did
not mail to the subject of the inquiry a same-day written notice
that it was furnishing the subject report to the particular
recipient.

BIG answered the complaint on April 1, 2016.  On Oct. 3, 2016, BIG
filed both a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking
the dismissal of the claim brought under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681k at
Count Two of the complaint, and a Motion to Strike Class
Allegations.  Following briefing, the Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order, granting the motion to dismiss Count Two based
upon defects in Kelly's pleading as to the nature of the defective
public record item reported as to him and in light of the text of
§ 1681k(a)(2), which provides a cause of action only for a report
that was not "complete and up to date."  The motion to strike the
class allegations was denied without prejudice as moot.

Having been granted leave to do so, Kelly filed an amended
complaint on Jan. 17, 2017.  The amended complaint repeated the
allegations of the Section 1681e(b) claim previously asserted in
Count One but adjusted the allegations of the proposed class claim
under Section 1681k in Count Two.  

The amended complaint sought the designation of two classes: the
Satisfied Judgment Class and the Incomplete Identifiers Class.  The
class definitions built off of the definition used in the original
complaint, but as to the Satisfied Judgment Class, it pertained to
reports produced that contained at least one record of "an
unsatisfied civil judgment" when the actual courthouse or clerk's
file for that record showed that the judgment had been satisfied at
least 30 days before the consumer report was furnished.  The
Incomplete Identifiers Class was to apply to the circumstances
where the actual courthouse or clerk's file for that record showed
that the judgment was the responsibility of a person who had a
different middle name, middle initial, date of birth and/or social
security number than the one Defendant's files showed to belong to
the subject of the consumer report.

BIG filed a motion on Feb. 24, 2017 to dismiss the amended
complaint, again asserting that the pleading of a Section 1681k
claim in Count Two was defective.  It also again moved to strike
the class allegations asserted in Count Two.  Following briefing,
the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on June 22, 2017
denying the motion.  It concluded that Count Two adequately pled
that the public record item reported as to Kelly was not "complete
and up to date."  It also denied the motion to strike the class
allegations.

Following resolution of these preliminary motions, BIG filed its
answer to the amended complaint and the Court issued a scheduling
order.  Within a few months, however, the parties agreed to
participate in class-wide settlement discussions and scheduled a
session with a private mediator.  Accordingly, at the request of
the parties, in November 2017 the Court stayed many of the
deadlines set forth in the scheduling order.  The parties continued
to update the Court on the status of their settlement efforts over
a period of the next six months until, on May 17, 2018, the
Plaintiff filed his Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Notice to Class.
Pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, BIG will change its
practice in one of the areas that gave rise to the suit by
providing "same time" notice to the consumer of that fact that a
prospective employer would be receiving from BIG a credit report
containing public record information sourced by Trans Union LLC
concerning bankruptcy filings, liens, or civil judgments.  This
obligation will remain in effect for five years from the effective
date of the agreement, which is defined in paragraph 1.9 of the
agreement.  

The agreement also provides for a dispute resolution process if any
settlement class member has a claim or dispute regarding BIG's
compliance with its obligations under the injunctive order that it
asks the Court to issue.  Pursuant to the agreement, BIG will also
establish a Settlement Fund of $3.3 million to be used for monetary
compensation to two of the three sets of settlement class members
established through the agreement, for costs of notice and
settlement administration, for an individual settlement and service
award to Mr. Kelly as the Class Representative, and for fees and
costs for the Class Counsel.

The settlement classes are defined as:

     a. The Injunctive Relief Settlement Class: All natural persons
residing in the United States (including all territories and other
political subdivisions of the United States) (i) who were subject
to at least one BIG consumer report sourced from Trans Union from
Dec. 17, 2010 to the date of the order for preliminary approval of
the Settlement is entered by the Court, (ii) whose report contained
a public record.

     b. The Rule 23(b)(2) Subgroup Settlement Class, a subgroup of
the Injunctive Relief Class: All Injunctive Relief Settlement Class
Members, (i) who were subject to at least one BIG consumer report
dated Dec. 17, 2013 to June 27, 2016, (ii) where the consumer
report contained a public record, other than a bankruptcy, sourced
from Trans Union, and (iii) where BIG's records do not reflect the
Settlement Class Member filed any dispute with BIG with respect to
the above-referenced report.

     c. The Automatic Payment Settlement Class:All natural persons
residing in the United States (including territories and other
political subdivisions of the United States) (i) who were subject
to at least one BIG consumer report dated Dec. 17, 2013 to June 27,
2016, (ii) where the consumer report contained a public record
sourced from Trans Union (iii) where BIG's records reflect that the
Settlement Class Member filed a dispute with BIG with respect to
the above-report.

The Settlement Agreement provided that monetary compensation would
be allocated to Settlement Class Members based upon their
membership in either the Automatic Payment Settlement Class or the
Rule 23(b)(2) Subgroup Settlement Class.  The Settlement allocates
$1.5 million to the Automatic Payment Class.  Payments will be
awarded to members of the Automatic Payment Class on a pro rata
basis on a point awarded system.  Each member of the Automatic
Payment Class will receive 1 point by virtue of their inclusion
within that Class. Each member of the Automatic Payment Settlement
Class who (i) returns a claim form that identifies a specific
public record or records included within their BIG report and (ii)
attests to the inaccuracy of those records as they relate to that
Class Member will be awarded an additional 9 points.  Each member
of the Automatic Payment Class that submits documentary evidence
demonstrating that the Class Member has suffered damages as a
result of the publication of the public record(s) at issue will be
awarded an additional 10 points.  The Settlement separately
allocates $500,000 to the Rule 23(b)(2) Subgroup.  Members of the
Subgroup will receive a payment on a pro rata basis if they file a
claim form averring that their report was either incomplete or
outdated as to the public record information and that they suffered
harm as a result.  This group need not identify the particular
public record nor describe the harm in order to qualify for their
payment as a Rule 23(b)(2) Subgroup class member.

Following oral argument on June 28, 2018, the Court granted
preliminary approval of the parties' settlement of the Section
1681k claim and directed that notice be made to the classes.  The
Court scheduled a fairness hearing for Nov. 1, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Strawbridge finally certified the three classes as
they satisfied the criteria of Rule 23(a).  The proposed Rule
23(b)(2) Subgroup Settlement Class and the Automatic Payment
Settlement Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3), and the third proposed
class, the Injunctive Relief Class, satisfied Rule 23(b)(2).
Therefore, all three proposed classes are appropriate for
certification.

He also concluded that the settlement reached on behalf of these
three classes is fair, adequate, and reasonable.  After multiple
conferences with the parties about the progress of the litigation,
two rounds of briefing to address the Defendant's efforts to
dismiss the Plaintiff's class claim, and the recent hearing
concerning the proposed settlement and class certification, he is
satisfied that the settlement was a result of hard-fought,
arm's-length negotiation.  He entered orders granting the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and the Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Reimbursement of Expenses.  He also entered an Injunctive Relief
Order that substantially complies with that proposed by the
Plaintiff.  He dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to the
parties' agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/QVBXFp from Leagle.com.

MICHAEL KELLY, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by JOHN SOUMILAS, FRANCIS &
MAILMAN, P.C., KRISTI C. KELLY -- kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com --
KELLY & CRANDALL PC, LEONARD A. BENNETT -- lenbennett@clalegal.com
-- CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES PC, MATTHEW J. ERAUSQUIN,
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, PC, DAVID A. SEARLES, FRANCIS &
MAILMAN, P.C., LAUREN K.W. BRENNAN, FRANCIS & MAILMAN PC & JAMES A.
FRANCIS -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- FRANCIS & MAILMAN, PC.

BUSINESS INFORMATION GROUP, INC., Defendant, represented by CHAD J.
KALDOR -- ckaldor@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON PC, DANIEL
SHANAHAN -- dshanahan@wc.com -- WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, ROD M. FLIEGEL
-- rfliegel@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON PC & WILLIAM J.
SIMMONS -- wsimmons@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C..


CANADA: 2nd Class Action Mulled Over Trudeau Airport Pollution
--------------------------------------------------------------
CBC News reports that a group of Montreal homeowners who live along
the flight paths of Trudeau International Airport is seeking leave
to launch a second class-action suit to fight air pollution caused
by airline traffic.

The same citizens' group, Les Pollues de Montreal-Trudeau, already
has a lawsuit before the courts, alleging noise caused by airplanes
flying over their homes is ruining their quality of life.

A recent McGill University study found a high number of airborne
particles floating around the airport grounds -- including
nanoparticles of heavy metals that are harmful to human health.

"This is another major concern of our members, and it has been
since our foundation," said Pierre Lachapelle, the group's
president.

In an update on the group's first lawsuit, approved last April, Mr.
Lachapelle said they are seeking a series of declaratory judgments
on curfew times and public consultations on a planned airport
expansion, which will include 15 new gates.

"The citizens are telling us they want to be able to sleep at night
and benefit from the daily rest that's essential to their health,"
said Mr. Lachapelle in a statement.

Right now, planes are not allowed to land at Trudeau airport
between 1 a.m. and 7 a.m. and take off is prohibited between
midnight and 7 a.m.

According to the Pollues, exemptions to this curfew are only
supposed to be made for medical emergencies, delays beyond the
carrier's control and during bad weather conditions.

"The practice seems much more expansive," the group's statement
reads.

The Pollues also want to ensure there are public consultations for
residents affected by the proposed $2.5 billion expansion and the
increased air traffic that could accompany it.

The lawsuit targets the airport authority, Aeroports de Montreal,
as well as the federal Ministry of Transport and Nav Canada, the
corporation that runs Canada's civil air navigation service.

When the lawsuit was granted, Gerard Samet, the lawyer representing
the group, said he considered the green light a big victory -- a
first in Quebec for an airport the size of Montreal's.

"This judgment is an extremely new development. Before aeronautical
activities were strictly overseen by the federal government," said.
"Now, they can no longer be ignored by [civil] law." [GN]


CANARY CONNECT: Faces Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------
Timothy J. Pastore, Esq. -- tpastore@dsllp.com -- writing for
Security InfoWatch, reports that on Dec. 5, 2018, a putative class
action lawsuit was filed in federal court in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York known as Jeffrey B.
Reifman et al. v. Canary Connect Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-11365-PGG.
The central allegation against Canary is that it wrongfully duped
customers into purchasing its products and services without
disclosing additional charges for select features, for which Canary
now charges customers $9.99 per month.

Specifically, the six plaintiffs allege that, around Oct. 3, 2017,
Canary unilaterally removed or altered the following key features
from what was initially included in the purchase price of their
home security systems:

   -- Removed the ability to view full-length videos of motion
detected activities captured by the system;

   -- Removed the ability to receive alerts of motion-detected
activities when users are at home during the day-time with the
system disarmed;

   -- Changed video retention of intrusions from unlimited to 10
seconds and finally to 30 seconds;

   -- Removed the ability to download recordings;

   -- Removed access to any videos older than 24 hours;

   -- Removed the ability to receive alerts of motion-detected
activities when users are at home and asleep, based on their
customized sleep; and

   -- Removed the ability to access previously stored content.

The plaintiffs claim that the removal of these features
"drastically altered the efficacy of the [system] as a home
security device." Further, the plaintiffs allege that, if Canary
had fully disclosed the cost of its service and not engaged in
purportedly deceptive advertising, these customers, and others
similarly situated to them, would not have purchased the products
marketed by Canary or would not have paid as much for them.

The lawsuit is characterized as a "consumer protection class
action" intended to seek redress on their behalf (and for consumers
at large) under the common law and a series of state consumer
protection statutes. Among the 12 claims cited in the lawsuit are:
Breach of implied contract; breach of implied warranty of
merchantability; along with violations of consumer protection-type
laws in Washington, Oregon, California, Pennsylvania, Ohio and
Illinois.

Why This May Never See a Courtroom

A 40-page, 12-count complaint may seem imposing, and it is. The
lawsuit should be taken seriously; at the same time, Canary may
have a perfectly reasonable defense. This case is in its early
stages, and Canary has not yet answered the complaint. If and when
it does, more will be known about its defense strategy.

In litigation, sometimes the merits are secondary -- meaning the
other factors, such as cost, risk inconvenience, adverse publicity,
etc. -- motivate the resolution of the case. Here, the merits may
never be adjudicated -- for the following reasons:

1. Class actions are feared by corporate America. Defending class
actions can be costly, and the risk of an adverse judgment can be
even more costly. Some companies choose to settle these types of
claims as quickly as possible -- even where the company has no
liability. I offer no insight into whether Canary will or should do
so here.

2. A class of six plaintiffs is not significant; however, the six
plaintiffs here are merely the lead plaintiffs if class
certification is achieved (which is not assured because it must be
approved by the court). The class could grow to include all the
customers who purchased security systems from Canary within the
claim period. While each plaintiff may have a relatively low-value
claim, the prospect of a cumulative claim -- through a certified
class -- presents great risk to Canary. Here, the number of
similarly situated customers could be quite large. Accordingly, the
possible damages could also be large.

3. A successful class action can sometimes lead to the payment of
attorneys' fees; in fact, in some cases, the attorneys' fees can
far exceed the actual recovery to the class. That may be true here
– depending on the size of the class and the length of the
litigation.

4. Another potentially problematic aspect of this case for Canary
is the plaintiffs' assertion of claims under state consumer
protection laws. It is very common in the security industry and
other industries to see such claims. Indeed, I have defended these
claims in over a dozen states. These statutes are highly favored by
plaintiffs' lawyers because they typically allow for the recovery
of attorneys' fees and the possibility of treble damages -- while
allow a judge to triple the amount of the actual/compensatory
damages to be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. The risk of an
adverse judgment under such a statute makes a corporate defendant
far more pliable for settlement -- especially as the case proceeds
to trial.

5. The state consumer protection claims are potentially concerning
for another reason. Genuine violations of such laws can sometime
catch the attention of state regulators, such as a state Attorney
General. If a state Attorney General takes note of these claims,
and pursues an independent civil or criminal complaint against the
company, that enhances the leverage of the private plaintiffs and
adds to the pressure on the company. Again, I know of no basis for
state regulators to take action here -- as Canary's business
practices may be perfectly legitimate.

6. Finally, a company like Canary has to worry about the impact
that this lawsuit will have on its sales and business. A long and
public dispute with customers is not a welcome experience for any
company -- particularly when deceptive business practices are
alleged.

Protect Yourself

Unfortunately, deceptive sales tactics and consumer fraud are not
new issues for security service providers. Case in point: In
January of 2018, Vivint paid ADT $10 million to settle a lawsuit
which accused the company of engaging in deceptive sales practices
to mislead ADT customers into signing long-term contracts (Read the
details at www.securityinfowatch.com/12389421).

As you run your company and reflect on your risk, it is wise to
confer carefully with legal counsel ahead of time -- to protect
against, or at least reduce the risk that any of your sales or
business practices could be alleged to be fraudulent or deceptive
in any way.

Regular attention to these issues -- in close coordination with a
capable attorney -- could save you from the time, expense and
aggravation now being imposed on Canary.[GN]


CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over High Pot Ordinance Fines
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Churney, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a woman
has lodged a lawsuit saying Chicago's marijuana ordinance should go
up in smoke, because it allegedly violates the Illinois
constitution by coming down too hard on those who take a toke, in
comparison to what the state imposes.

Ranae Rashford, of Chicago, filed a class action complaint Jan. 11
in Cook County Circuit Court, requesting an injunction against
Chicago City Hall, and accusing city officials of unjustly
enriching city coffers at the expense of marijuana users. She is
represented by Chicago lawyers Steven R. Smith and Nathaniel A.
Frenkel.

Ms. Rashford said she was cited in 2017 by Chicago police for
having less than 10 grams of marijuana, for which she paid a $250
fine the same year.

Ms. Rashford pointed out the city exacts a fine of between $250 and
$500 for anyone caught with up to 40 grams of marijuana, and $500
for any subsequent violations within 30 days. In contrast, the
state lessened marijuana penalties in 2016, designating possession
of less than 10 grams a civil violation, punishable by a minimum
fine of $100 and a maximum of $200.

As a consequence, the complaint asserts Chicago exceeds its
authority and violates the Illinois constitution by fining people
more than the state does. Ms. Rashford's city citation called for a
minimum $250 fine, while the state, at most, would have demanded a
$200 penalty or as little as $100, according to the suit.

Ms. Rashford's attorneys argued municipal ordinances must give way
when they conflict with state law. According to the attorneys, the
Illinois Supreme Court supported this position in 1998.

"The legislature can permit concurrent local legislation, but only
within limits that are consistent with the statutory scheme.
Surely, if the state is permitted to exclude local governments from
areas where the state has acted it also should be able to restrict
the nature and extent of concurrent local activity," the attorneys
said, quoting the state high court.

Ms. Rashford wants the ordinance, which allows fines of $250 or
more, declared unconstitutional, with such fines rendered void and
unenforceable. Further, Ms. Rashford wants the city barred from
continuing to impose the fines.

Ms. Rashford's complaint does not specify the number of people who
might be included in her proposed class of additional plaintiffs.
But the complaint said the number of people she alleges were
wrongfully fined can be obtained from city records.

According to Cook County court records, the case is assigned to
Associate Judge Neil Cohen. [GN]


CICERO, IL: Adair et al. Seek to Certify Class of Female Detainees
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit LESIA ADAIR, et al., the Plaintiffs,
vs. TOWN OF CICERO, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03526 (N.D.
Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order on Feb. 8, 2019:

   1. certifying the case as a class action on behalf of:

      "all females detainees who were or will be in the future
      detained at the Town of Cicero Police Department lock-up
      facility for eight hours or more during the time period of
      May 18, 2016, to the present";

   2. appointing Plaintiffs' attorneys as class counsel.

According to the complaint, Lesia Adair, Anita Donato, Veronica
Garcia, Jordan Garcia, and Areceli Vega are five women who were
detained in the Town of Cicero Police Department's lock-up
facility.  While detained, the Plaintiffs had no choice but to use
the bathroom facilities in the female lock-up cells. Those
bathrooms are situated in such a way that male employees walking by
the cells can see the genitals of the detainees using the bathroom.


In addition, male employees monitor a video camera that captures
female detainees using the bathroom and provides a view of their
genitals. The Plaintiffs allege that the configuration of the
cameras and the layout of the lock up facility constitutes a policy
that causes lock-up employees to engage in unreasonable searches of
female detainees in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and damages on behalf of the
class against the Town of Cicero.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Adele D. Nicholas, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ADELE D. NICHOLAS
          5707 W. Goodman Street
          Chicago, IL 60630
          Telephone: 847-361-3869

               - and -

          Mark G. Weinberg, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARK G. WEINBERG
          3612 N. Tripp Ave.
          Chicago, IL 60641
          Telephone: 773-283-3913

               - and -

          Richard Dvorak, Esq.
          DVORAK LAW OFFICES LLC
          6262 Kingery Highway, Suite 305
          Willowbrook, IL 60527
          Telephone: 630-568-3190

COOK COUNTY, IL: Bid for Class Certification Denied in Shyne Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Martenia Shyne, et al., the Plaintiffs,
vs. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, et al., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-01231 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Andrea R. Wood
entered an order denying, without prejudice, the Plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction and motion for class certification.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on February 8,
2019, in light of the stay of proceedings ordered on June 18, 2018
and re−affirmed on Nov. 8, 2018, as well as the filing of the
first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint are denied
without prejudice.[CC]

DAIMLER AG: Court Narrows Claims in Mercedes-Benz Emissions Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE MERCEDES-BENZ EMISSIONS LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. 16-881 (JLL)(JAD)(D. N.J.), Judge Jose L. Linares of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey (i) granted in part
and denied in part Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler
AG's motion to dismiss the Fourth Consolidated and Amended Class
Action Complaint ("FAC"); and (ii) denied Defendant Robert Bosch
LLC's motion to dismiss the FAC.

The case is a putative class action involving allegations that
Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler AG ("Mercedes"),
together with Bosch GmbH and Bosch, LLC ("Bosch") have unlawfully
mislead consumers into purchasing certain "BlueTEC diesel" vehicles
by misrepresenting the environmental impact of these vehicles
during on-road driving.

According to the Plaintiffs, Mercedes' advertisements, promotional
campaigns, and public statements represented that the Polluting
Vehicles had high fuel economy, low emissions, reduced NOx by 90%,
had lower emissions than comparable diesel vehicles, and had lower
emissions than other comparable vehicles.  However, Mercedes, with
help of Bosch, installed an electronic control unit in the
Polluting Vehicles known as the EDC17.

The EDC17 allegedly functions as a defeat device, meaning it turned
off or limited emissions reductions during real-world driving
conditions.  This defeat device was only discoverable when
conducting over-the-road testing that is not part of the
certification protocol.  The Polluting Vehicles also allegedly
failed to perform up to their touted environmental standards in
other situations, such as when ambient temperatures drop below
50°F/10°C—a defect Mercedes has acknowledged.

The Plaintiffs contend that Mercedes never disclosed the existence
of the defeat device, nor the fact that the BlueTEC engines emit
emissions substantially higher than those of gasoline vehicles, and
thus, defrauded its customers by omission, and engaged in fraud and
unfair and deceptive conduct under federal and state law.  Had they
known of the emissions issues associated with the Polluting
Vehicles, they would not have purchased those vehicles, or they
would have paid substantially less for them.

As to Bosch, the FAC sets forth that Mercedes and Bosch entered
into a scheme to evade U.S. emissions requirements and to deceive
the public into believing the Polluting Vehicles were clean
diesels, in order to bolster revenue, augment profits and increase
Mercedes' share of the diesel vehicle market.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of a national class and state subclasses,
now assert claims for violation of the RICO Act, as well as
violations of state consumer protection statutes, and fraudulent
concealment.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Feb. 18, 2016.  On May 6,
2016, they filed the Consolidated and Amended Class Action
Complaint ("CAC").  Mercedes moved to dismiss the CAC on July 8,
2016.  The Court granted that motion on Dec. 6, 2016.  The Court
found that the Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing
because the CAC did not allege that their injury was fairly
traceable to Mercedes' conduct.  In particular, the Court found
that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that they actually viewed any
category of advertisements that contained the alleged
misrepresentations. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the CAC
without prejudice.

The Plaintiffs then filed a third consolidated and amended class
action complaint on March 3, 2017, and finally, they filed the
operative FAC on Sept. 25, 2017 adding Bosch as a Defendant and the
accompanying RICO allegations.  Mercedes and Bosch now move
separately to dismiss the FAC arguing that the Plaintiffs lack
Article III standing, that the Plaintiffs' state-law claims are
preempted by the Clean Air Act or, alternatively, fail to state a
claim, and finally that the Plaintiffs fail to state a RICO claim.

Judge Linares finds that the Plaintiffs have established an injury
in fact that can serve as the basis for Article III standing.
Accepting the Plaintiffs' allegations as true, they paid a higher
price for the BlueTEC clean diesel engines, which, in reality,
polluted at levels far higher than would be expected.  In other
words, they paid for a product which did not operate in the way
they believed it did.  Claims of overpayment for a misrepresented
product are classic forms of injury in fact, that are] concrete and
particularized.

Next, the Judge finds that the Defendants' traceability arguments
also fail.  While the Court is very cognizant of its previous
Opinion dismissing the CAC on traceability grounds, he now finds
that the FAC addresses these concerns, in light of the Plaintiffs
amendments and a spate of recent decisions in other districts
addressing Article III standing in very similar cases which support
a finding that the Plaintiffs have established Article III
standing.  The Judge rejects Mercedes' arguments regarding the
deficiencies of the named Plaintiffs' claims as to Article III
standing.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have established Article
III standing as to their claims against Bosch.

With respect to RICO claims, the Judge finds that (i) the
Plaintiffs' allegations that they overpaid for the Polluting
Vehicles as a result of Defendants' deceptive conduct constitute
injuries to property; (ii) the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
that their injuries were fairly traceable to Mercedes' conduct;
(iii) the Plaintiffs have established a sufficiently direct
relationship between Bosch and the alleged RICO injury for purposes
of RICO causation; (iv) the FAC sufficiently puts Bosch on notice
of the claims made against it; (v) the Plaintiffs' allegations are
sufficient to show a relationship between the Defendants beyond a
normal business relationship; and (vi) the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged the Defendants' intent to defraud and have
adequately established a pattern of racketeering activity based on
the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.

Bosch argues that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a RICO
conspiracy because they failed to plead a substantive RICO
violation.  As the Plaintiffs have adequately plead their
substantive RICO claim and that Bosch had knowledge of the
racketeering activity, the Judge finds that they have adequately
plead a RICO conspiracy.

As to preemption, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' state-law
claims are not expressly preempted by the CAA.  He also finds that
the Plaintiffs' claims do not "exist solely by virtue" of the
alleged violations of the EPA's emissions standards.  The core
allegation of their state-law tort claims is that the Defendants
lied to and deceived consumers, and so Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Committee does not preempt these claims.

To the extent that the Plaintiffs' state-law consumer protection
claims are based solely on affirmative misrepresentations, those
affirmative misrepresentation claims are dismissed.

The Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claims.  When looking at the
Plaintiffs' allegations concerning the Defendants' omissions, the
Judge finds that they have sufficiently notified Mercedes and Bosch
of the precise misconduct with which they are charged.  He will not
dismiss the Plaintiffs' state-law fraudulent concealment claims for
failure to meet the standards of Rule 9(b).

As to the Plaintiffs' state statutory claims, the Judge finds that
Mercedes' arguments regarding causal nexus and false, deceptive, or
misleading statements have been adequately addressed in the
Opinion.  As to the existence of a causal nexus, the Court
conducted an in-depth analysis of the causal link between Mercedes'
alleged unlawful conduct and the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries in
the portions of the brief discussing Article III standing and RICO
causation.  With respect to whether the Plaintiffs have adequately
pled false, deceptive, or misleading statements, that has been
discussed throughout, but particularly in reference to the
Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims supra Section III.E.  The Judge
also notes that Duramax analyzed the state consumer protection
claims in conjunction with the state common law fraud claims
without meaningful distinction.

Finally, he finds that the FAC indicates that the Plaintiffs each
purchased and/or leased their vehicle from an authorized car
dealership, that they entered into the purchase or lease agreement
with that dealership, and that the agreement contained only the
dealership's name and Andary and Feller's names.  Accordingly,
there is no relationship, let alone a close one, that indicates
that the Court should permit Mercedes to enforce the arbitration
agreements.  As such Mercedes' motion to compel arbitration is
denied.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Linares granted in part and denied
in part Mercedes' motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint;
and (ii) denied Bosch's motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint.  An appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/BUWVrv from Leagle.com.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, Mediator, pro se.

ULYANA LYNEVYCH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, JOHN LINGUA, Jimmy Bird, Jonathan Mose, Arthur Daschke,
Richard Yanus, Walter Louis, Keith Caniero, Caroline A. Ledlie,
Chandrakant Patel, Tiffany Knight, Susan Albers, Craig Thorson,
Shelby A. Jordan, Gwendolyn Andary, Scott Morgan, HENRY SILVERIO,
Dedrick Watkins, Terrence Garmey, Wendell Dingle, Seid Dilgisic,
Jorge Salvador Servin, ANDREW DEUTSCH, Devin Downs, Freddie T.
Holbrook, Geoffrey C. Cunningham, Billy Fox, Lorrie Vidal, James
Edwards, Sheila Reed, Zbigniew Kurzawa, Janice Sheehy, Bradford
Smith, Gustavo Fraga-Errecart, Robert Trepper, James Schafer,
Vincent Minerva, Henry Silverado, Jeff Findlay, Andrew H. Rubey,
Christopher Gates, DARRELL FELLER, STEPHEN CARROLL, David I.
Ashcraft, Lars Dannenberg, ADRIAN CLIVE ROBERTS & RANDOLPH ROLLE,
Plaintiffs, represented by CAROLINE F. BARTLETT --
cbartlett@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE & JAMES E. CECCHI --
JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C.

ANTHONY CAPUTO, CATHERINE ROBERTS, KEITH HALL, FLAVIO MOY, A. ERIC
NGWASHI, BOBBY HAMILTON, MARYANA MELNYK, PAUL HERRMANN, LYNN
DOHERTY MUNOE, BRENDA ONEAL, CHARLES WOLFORD, THOMAS WEISS, JOHN
LAURINO, ANDREW DEUTSCH, MICHAEL MEDLER, DR. GREGORY CHAN & LARS
DANNBERG, Plaintiff Consolidateds, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI,
CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

HASSAN ZAVAREEI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by CHRISTOPHER L.
AYERS -- cayers@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS LLP, CHRISTOPHER A.
SEEGER -- cseeger@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS LLP, DAVID R.
BUCHANAN -- dbuchanan@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS, LLP, SCOTT
A. GEORGE -- sgeorge@seegerweiss.com -- SEEGER WEISS, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

DAIMLER AG, Defendant, represented by LUCAS CODY TOWNSEND --
ltownsend@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP.

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION &
Calstar Motors, a Mercedes Benz Dealer, Defendant Consolidateds,
represented by LUCAS CODY TOWNSEND, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP.


DELTA AIRLINES: Settles FCRA Class Action for $2.3MM
----------------------------------------------------
Scott Anderson, Esq. -- scott.anderson@wbd-us.com -- writing for
Womble Bond Dickinson's FCRAland, reports that earlier in January,
a class representative for employees and prospective employees at
Delta Airlines reached a proposed settlement with Delta.  The
settlement is awaiting court approval, but provides helpful context
of the issues involved in high-stakes FCRA litigation.

The case, Schofield v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., N.D. Cal. Case No.
3:18-cv-00382-EMC, involves allegations that Delta violated FCRA as
well as three California statutes by failing to include sufficient
disclosures in the forms that Delta used to disclose its use of
background checks conducted for current and prospective employees.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the disclosure forms were not
clear and conspicuous, and that the forms contained impermissible
extraneous information.

The settlement would provide for payment of $2.3 million to the
class, which is composed of approximately 44,100 individuals.  If
approved, between one quarter and one third of the settlement will
be paid in attorney fees and costs, the lead plaintiff would
receive an extra award of $10,000, and the settlement administrator
would receive approximately $70,000.  This would lead to a recovery
of over $30 for each class member (out of a total settlement fund
of over $50 for each class member). [GN]

DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Portela OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DIEGO F. PORTELA, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS, INC. and
JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-3431 (D. N.J.),
Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the DCI's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

The matter involves alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the "FDCPA").  On Dec. 9, 2016, the Plaintiff
allegedly incurred a debt obligation to Verizon Wireless.  The debt
was then referred to DCI for collection.  When the debt was
referred to DCI, the Verizon obligation was past due and in
default.  In a letter dated Dec. 9, 2016, the Defendant wrote to
the Plaintiff in an attempt to collect payment for the debt.  

After receiving the Debt Collection Letter, the Plaintiff filed the
putative class action, alleging violations of the FDCPA in his
one-count Complaint.  Portela alleges that the Debt Collection
Letter violates two sections of the FDCPA: Section 1692e(10) and
Section 1692g(a)(3).  The Plaintiff contends that he and others
similarly situated were sent letters, which would have affected
their decision-making with regard to the debt and have suffered
harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair
collection practices described.  Namely, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Debt Collection Letter fails to properly inform the least
sophisticated consumer that an effective dispute of the debt must
be in writing.  He adds that the least sophisticated consumer would
be misled into believing that he could call DCI's toll-free
telephone number to dispute the debt.

The Defendant filed the instant motion on March 20, 2018, which the
Plaintiff opposed.  The Defendant replied on April 30, 2018.  Since
the motion was fully briefed, the Defendant filed five letters
containing supplemental authority, to which the Plaintiff.  The
Plaintiff also filed a letter that contained supplemental authority
in support of his arguments on Jan. 24, 2019, and the Defendant
filed a letter in response.

Judge Vazquez concludes that the Debt Collection Letter contains
the required validation notice under Section 1692g(a) and does not
violate Section 1692g(a) in substance or form because nothing in
the Debt Collection Letter overshadows or contradicts the
validation notice.  He finds that the Debt Collection Letter does
not leave the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her
rights under the FDCPA.

In addition, the Plaintiffs' allegations regarding a violation of
Section 1692e are based on the same facts as those supporting the
alleged violation of Section 1692g.  When claims based on the same
conduct are brought under both Section 1692g and 1692e, the 1692g
analysis "is usually dispositive."  Thus, the Judge concludes that
the Plaintiff also fails to state a violation of Section 1692e.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Vazquez granted the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.  Because the
Plaintiff cannot change the language in the Debt Collection Letter,
any attempted amendment to the Complaint would be futile.  As a
result, judgment is entered in the Defendant's favor for the FDCPA
claim and the Complaint is dismissed.  An appropriate Order
accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/L8hjA4 from Leagle.com.

DIEGO F PORTELA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES --
jkj@legaljones.com -- Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC & BENJAMIN JARRET
WOLF, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS, INC., Defendant, represented by AARON
RAPHAEL EASLEY -- aeasley@sessions.legal -- SESSIONS, FISHMAN,
NATHAN & ISRAEL, LLC, ANDREW JOSHUA BLADY -- ablady@sessions.legal
-- SESSIONS, FISHMAN, NATHAN & ISRAEL & ROSS STEVEN ENDERS,
SESSIONS FISHMAN NATHAN & ISRAEL LLC.


DIVERSIFIED MAINTENANCE: Underpays Store Staff, Spratt Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH SPRATT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. DIVERSIFIED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 151407/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, 2019).
seeks to recover damages and other legal and equitable relief
against Defendant for violations of the New York State Labor Law,
the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, and the New York Wage
Theft Prevention Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was throughout his entire
employment with Defendant, a covered, non-exempt employee within
the meaning of the NYLL. As such, Plaintiff was, and is, entitled
to be paid in full for all hours worked. The Plaintiff was employed
by Defendant performing maintenance from approximately March 2016
to August 27, 2018. The Plaintiff's rate of pay was from $10 to $13
per hour during his employment, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant provides maintenance and cleaning services to various
department stores throughout New York State. The Defendant
maintained control, oversight, and direction over Plaintiff, and
those similarly situated, in regards to timekeeping, payroll, and
other employment practices, and functioned as an employer pursuant
to the NYLL.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Mark Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          400 Jericho Turnpike Suite 226
          Jericho, NY 11753
          Telephone: (516) 742-4949
          Facsimile: (516) 742-1977

FACEBOOK INC: Australian Businesses Mull Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Dominic Powell, writing for SmartCompany.com.au, reports that
Australian small businesses selling hemp foods and products have
been banned from advertising their products on Facebook and
Instagram, despite hemp being legal to grow and sell in the
country.

These businesses, who sell products ranging from hemp clothing to
hemp seed milk, have told SmartCompany their businesses have been
crippled by the advertising ban, leaving them unable to reach new
customers on social media. As a result, some business owners have
told SmartCompany they are considering a "David vs Goliath" class
action lawsuit.

Heidi Peuten runs Sydney-based healthfoods business Ulu Hye
alongside her lifelong best friend and co-founder Vasia Vogias. The
duo launched their business just one year ago, offering sustainable
plant-based milk alternatives, or 'mylk'.

Ulu Hye has two products, a nut-based mylk and a hemp seed-based
mylk. However, Peuten tells SmartCompany her business has been
"hugely set back" by Facebook's policies, claiming not only have
her ads been banned, but her page's reach restricted also.

"Facebook and Instagram are our number one places to advertise and
promote, but we've been permanently barred from advertising on
there," she says.

In correspondence seen by SmartCompany, Ulu Hye was told by support
staff at Instagram and Facebook its ads did not follow the
company's advertising policies and had therefore been disabled.

"There's no further action you may take here. We don't support ads
for your business model," Facebook told the business.

"Please consider this decision final."

               Advertising Policies Inaccurate

The advertising policies set out by Facebook on its website contain
rules relating to both restricted and prohibited content. According
to the policy, companies may not promote the sale or use of
"illegal, prescription or recreational drugs", including a number
of examples of images which would lead to the ads being banned.

However, these advertising policies do not apply to hemp products,
as selling hemp products in Australia has been legal for decades,
with the sale of hemp seed food legalised by the Department of
Health in November 2017. Additionally, the only restrictions placed
by the Department of Health on the marketing of hemp products is
that the advertisements have no "reference to psychoactive
activity".

Hemp is a variety of the cannabis plant, grown specifically for
industrial purposes, with the seeds of the hemp plant being
recognised as a health food due to its high protein, omega-3 and
omega-6 content.

Most importantly, hemp does not contain (or only contains in very
low levels), delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a psychoactive
substance which is present in high doses in marijuana plants. The
hemp plant is also highly sustainable and eco-friendly, being able
to be grown in many conditions across the world.

Despite this, misconceptions have caused hemp to be lumped in with
its illicit cousin, marijuana, and global legislation has
frequently conflated the two, causing great harm to the hemp
industry.

                     Class Action Considered

Darius Dunn is the managing director at Made in Hemp, an online and
bricks-and-mortar hemp-product retailer, which has been selling
things such as hemp-based clothes, skincare and homewares since
2004.

He tells SmartCompany his company's advertising has also been
restricted by Facebook, believing that as far as the social media
giant is concerned, "hemp is cannabis".

Dunn says he's far from the only business affected by the ban, with
he and other SMEs in the industry currently considering a class
action lawsuit against the company, being left with no other viable
advertising channels, and with concerns his page may be permanently
shut down.

"We are being considerably limited in our ability to advertise.
I've worked in advertising before, and as far as I'm concerned
Facebook and Instagram are the best ways to advertise," he says.

"They've got no clue, and no interest in fixing it."

Dunn and his business have had extensive correspondence with
Facebook about the ban, with the business owner being told the
reason his posts were being banned was due to the possibility of
his ads appearing in countries where hemp was illegal.

Correspondence seen by SmartCompany shows Made in Hemp being
advised that hemp is "illegal in many parts of the world" as
reasoning for the ads being banned.

"Firstly, show me where in the world hemp clothing is illegal," he
says.

"Secondly, I'm using Facebook's own system to target people within
50 kilometres of my shop, it shouldn't be shown overseas at all."

"And if it were so controversial, why should my page be able to
exist in the first place? Anyone can come and look at it."

However, despite Facebook's ban, Made in Hemp says some of its ads
are approved randomly and "out of the blue", further confusing the
business owner over the reasoning and consistency behind Facebook's
ban.

Facebook clarifies ban on "ingestible hemp"

In a statement to SmartCompany, a Facebook spokesperson said its
global advertising policy "does not permit any ads for ingestible
hemp".

"Products which advertise ingestible hemp — such as seeds or
hemp-based products — are therefore not permitted. Even if hemp
is legally allowed to be sold in some countries, it may still be
illegal to advertise or sell in other countries and so our policy
on this remains strict," the spokesperson says.

"We are always reviewing and improving our policies so this may be
an area we review further in the future."

However, this response does little to answer Dunn's questions, as
much of Made in Hemp's products do not involve ‘ingestible' hemp,
such as his skincare products and clothing products.

"We've been trying to get advertising up about the shop itself,
just saying we're called ‘Made in Hemp' and we're at this
address. That's not promoting food or anything ingestible," he
says.

SmartCompany understands Facebook considers ads about
non-ingestible hemp products as acceptable, so long as the ad
itself does not allude to the inclusion of hemp in the product.

In response, Dunn questions the point of the ads if they can't
include references to hemp.

"This is something that you want to be promoted, not restricted,"
he says.[GN]


FCA US: Bid for Counsel Fees/Costs in Rasnic Overruled as Untimely
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAWRENCE RASNIC AND REBECA LOPEZ-RASNIC, Plaintiffs,
v. FCA US LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-2064-KHV (D. Kan.),
Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas overruled the Plaintiffs' Motion For An Award Of Costs
And Attorneys' Fees, filed Dec. 28, 2018, as untimely.

On Jan. 12, 2017, Rasnic and Lopez-Rasnic filed a complaint in
state court against FCA US, alleging a nationwide class action.  On
Feb. 2, 2017, the Defendant removed the case to the Court.  On
Sept. 17, 2018, it notified the Court that the Plaintiffs intended
to pursue only their individual claims.

On Sept. 18, 2018, the Defendant tendered an offer of judgment to
the Plaintiffs.  On Oct. 2, 2018, the Plaintiffs informed the Court
that they accepted an offer from the Defendant in which they would
receive payment of $5,000 without a return of the vehicle; plus,
taxable costs accrued as of the date of the offer of judgment and a
reasonable attorneys' fee as agreed to by the parties; or in the
absence of an agreement, determined by the Court.

On Nov. 5, 2018, the Clerk of the Court entered judgment in
accordance with the parties' agreement.  On Dec. 28, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed their Motion For An Award Of Costs And Attorneys
Fees and a Statement Of Consultation And Declaration Pursuant To
Local Rule 54.2(a).  They request $45,000 in attorneys' fees and
$1,349.21 in costs and litigation expenses.

Judge Vratil finds that on Nov. 5, 2018, the Clerk of the Court
entered judgment.  Thus, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(2)(B)(i), the deadline for the Plaintiffs to file a motion
for attorney's fees was Nov. 19, 2018, i.e. 14 days after entry of
judgment.  The Plaintiffs did not file their motion for attorney's
fees until Dec. 28, 2018, i.e. 53 days after entry of judgment, and
did not request an extension of time.  Thus, their motion for
attorneys' fees is untimely.

For these reasons, she overruled the Plaintiffs' Motion and granted
them leave to amend their motion for costs in accordance with D.
Kan. Rule 54.1.  No later than Feb. 19, 2019, the Plaintiffs may
file a bill of costs with the Clerk in accordance with D. Kan. Rule
54.1(a)(1).

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/pCD8Mv from Leagle.com.

Lawrence Rasnic & Rebeca Lopez-Rasnic, Plaintiffs, represented by
Ashley Scott Waddell, Waddell Law Firm LLC, Benjamin C. Fields,
Stucky & Fields, LLC, Bryce B. Bell -- Bryce@belllawkc.com -- Bell
Law, LLC & Mark W. Schmitz, Bell Law, LLC.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Craig S. Laird --
claird@kuminlaw.com -- Robert A. Kumin, PC, Kathy A. Wisniewski,
Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice, Sharon Rosenberg --
srosenberg@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice
& Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson
Coburn LLP, pro hac vice.


FEDEX GROUND: Junious Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Delivery Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tiffany Junious, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FedEx Ground Package System Inc. and
Burnette Enterprises Inc., the Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00381-RBH (D. S.C., Feb. 9, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants violated unpaid overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action as a collective action,
individually and on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees of the the Defendants who worked as delivery drivers and
who suffered damages because of the Defendants' violations of the
FLSA.  Burnette employs delivery drivers to deliver FedEx packages.
The Plaintiff, as well as similarly situated delivery drivers, are
employed jointly by Burnette and FedEx.

According to the complaint, the delivery drivers are paid a fixed
rate per day. They routinely works six days and more than 40 hours
in any given week. The Defendants do not compensate the Plaintiff
and similarly situated delivery overtime pay when they work more
than 40 hours in any given week, the lawsuit says.

FedEx, is an American multinational courier delivery service
company headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. FedEx provides
expedited shipping, package tracking, and door-to-door delivery of
packages.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff

          Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
          MULLANEY LAW
          1037-D Chuck Dawley Blvd, Suite 100
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone (843) 588-5587
          Facsimile (843) 593-9334
          E-mail: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net

FERROGLOBE PLC: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") on Jan. 23 disclosed that it
has filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, captioned Treankler v.
Ferroglobe PLC et al., (Case No. 1:19-cv-00629), on behalf of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Ferroglobe PLC (NASDAQ: GSM) ("Ferroglobe" or the "Company")
securities between August 21, 2018 and November 26, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from January
23, 2019, the date of this notice to move the Court to serve as
lead plaintiff in this action.

On November 26, 2018, the Company reported a net loss of $2.9
million for the third quarter 2018, compared to a net profit of
$66.0 million the prior quarter. On this news, the Company's share
price fell $2.97 per share, more than 62%, to close at $1.80 per
share on November 27, 2018, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that there was excess supply of the Company's
products; (2) that demand for the Company's products was declining;
(3) that, as a result, the pricing of the Company's products would
be materially impacted; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Ferroglobe securities during the Class Period, you
may move the Court no later than 60 days from January 23, 2019, the
date of this notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead
plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you need not take any action
at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no
action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you wish to
learn more about this action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire,
of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California
90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased.
[GN]


FIRST STUDENT: Humes 4th Subclass Certification Denial Flipped
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELORES HUMES; DIANE ABELLA, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FIRST
STUDENT, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-17072 (9th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's class certification denial of the fourth
subclass.

Named Plaintiffs Humes and Abella filed suit in state court on
behalf of a putative class of First Student bus drivers who worked
out of a Fresno location and allegedly suffered a range of state
labor violations.  The district court denied class certification in
full.

Humes appeals only the denial of the fourth subclass, Fresno
drivers who received deficient wage statements in violation of
California Labor Code Section 226 at any time from Oct. 28, 2011,
and continuing to the present.

The Court finds that the Subclass easily meets the commonality
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) -- that
there are questions of law or fact common to the class.  There is
no question that all the class members' claims depend upon the
common contention that First Student provided deficient wage
statements in violation of Section 226.  The harder question is
whether all putative members suffered the same injury.

A 2013 amendment to the California Labor Code clarified that an
employee is deemed to suffer injury for purposes of Section 226 if
the employer fails to provide accurate and complete information as
required and the employee cannot promptly and easily determine from
the wage statement alone the mandated disclosures.  Because the
amendment applies to all the class members' claims, all members
will have suffered the same injury.  As a result, there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, and Rule 23(a)(2) is
satisfied.

For similar reasons, the Court finds that the proposed Subclass
meets the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).  Because the
class members are deemed injured by the receipt of a deficient wage
statement, Humes has alleged class-wide injury suffered by all,
including the named Plaintiffs, and thus has established typicality
sufficient for class certification.

Finally, in its supplemental briefing, First Student raised for the
first time the possibility that some putative members' claims might
be time-barred.  But Subclass members' claims for other remedies
available under Section 226 are not.  Because these matters were
raised only briefly in supplemental briefing, the Court declines to
resolve them at this juncture.  Instead, it remands to the district
court to determine the proper time limitations, if any, applicable
to members of the Subclass, and, if appropriate, to redefine the
Subclass so that it is limited to individuals with non-time-barred
claims.

For these reasons, the Court reversed and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/A4YzVR from Leagle.com.


FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Berman Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit DANIEL BERMAN, the Plaintiff, vs.
FREEDOM FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC, FREEDOM DEBT RELIEF, LLC, FLUENT,
INC., and LEAD SCIENCE, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-01060-YGR (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court
for an order on April 9, 2019:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons in the United States to whom: (a) Drips made
one
      or more calls and/or sent one or more text messages
      reflected in the documents produced in this litigation under

      Bates stamp LEADSCIENCE_677.csv and/or LEADSCIENCE_677.txt
      (b) to a cellular telephone number (c) through the use of an

      ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (d) in order to
      market Freedom's products (e) between February 14, 2018, and

      April 17, 2018, appointing inclusive";

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as class representative;

   3. appointing the Plaintiff's undersigned counsel as Class
      Counsel; and

   4. directing Class Counsel to submit a proposed notice plan and

      form of notice within a reasonable time.[CC]

The action challenges a telemarketing campaign promoting Freedom
Financial Network, LLC and Freedom Debt Relief, LLC by Lead
Science, LLC and Fluent, Inc. by means of autodialed text messages
and prerecorded voice calls, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Jon B. Fougner, Esq.
          FOUGNER LAW
          600 California Street, 11th Fl.
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 577-5829
          Facsimile: (206) 338-0783
          E-mail: jon@fougnerlaw.com

               - and -

          Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
          Anthony I. Paronich, Es
          BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
          99 High Street, Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 738-7080
          Facsimile: (617) 830-0327
          E-mail: ted@broderick-law.com
                  anthony@broderick-law.com

               - and -

          Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. McCUE
          1 South Avenue, Suite 3
          Natick, MA 01760
          Telephone: (508) 655-1415
          Facsimile: (508) 319-3077
          E-mail: mmccue@massattorneys.net

FRESH MARKET: Arvilla Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
-------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit BETH ARVILLA, PATRICK RYAN, CHRISTINE
THOM, THOMAS BROOKS, THOMAS LEE SOUZA, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. THE FRESH
MARKET, INC., a foreign profit corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
8:18-cv-03129-VMC-AAS (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an order on Feb. 8, 2019:

   1. ordering Defendant to provide, within 10 days, a list of
      current and former hourly workers who worked one or more
      weeks during the three years from the filing of the
      Complaint, including most recent mailing addresses,
      telephone numbers and email addresses;

   2. permitting and supervising notice to the Defendant's current

      and former hourly workers of their "opt-in" rights; and

   3. preliminarily certifying this action as a collective action
      under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The representative class consists of:

   "hourly workers who were regularly required to work in excess
   of 40 hours a workweek but were not paid overtime compensation
   as required by the FLSA because of the unlawful pay practices,
   including but not limited to: all hours worked are/were not
   properly paid; time punches are/were being manipulated by upper

   management so as not to show any overtime; and lunch breaks
   are/were being entered as unpaid time even when Plaintiffs and
   others similarly situated worked through their lunch breaks
   ("Unlawful Pay Practices")."[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jay P. Lechner, Esq.
          William J. Sheslow, Esq.
          WHITTEL & MELTON, LLC
          11020 Northcliffe Boulevard
          Spring Hill, FL 34608
          Telephone: (352)683-2016
          Facsimile: (352) 600-7533
          E-mail: lechnerj@theFLlawfirm.com
                  will@theFLlawfirm.com
                  nichole@theFLlawfirm.com

FRIEDRICH PETZEL: Matzura Alleges Disabilities Act Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Friedrich Petzel Gallery Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Friedrich Petzel Gallery Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01210-AJN (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Friedrich Petzel Gallery Inc. is an Art gallery in New York City,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


FXCM INC: Effex & Dittami Dismissed from Nguyen Suit w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VANTALIE NGUYEN, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. FXCM INC., FOREX CAPITAL
MARKETS, LLC, FXCM HOLDINGS, LLC, DROR NIV, WILLIAM AHDOUT, JOHN
DITTAMI, and EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC, Defendants. ARTHUR P. CARDI,
BIKRAM RANDHAWA, MARK GOVERS, STEVEN PLUNGER, and ROSIMARA TADROUS,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FXCM INC., FOREX CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, FXCM
HOLDINGS, LLC, DROR NIV, WILLIAM AHDOUT, JOHN DITTAMI, and EFFEX
CAPITAL, LLC, Defendants, Case Nos. 1:17-cv-2729-PAC-HBP,
1:17-cv-4699-PAC-HBP (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Paul A. Crotty of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (i) denied
Defendants Effex and Dittami's motion to strike references to
settlements with the CFTC and NFA; and (ii) granted their motion to
dismiss the six counts at issue pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without prejudice.

The case is a consolidated securities class action, alleging that
Defendants failed to disclose a conflict with Effex, the leading
foreign currency exchange trading platform for FXCM, Forex Capital,
and FXCM Holdings.  According to the Plaintiffs, FXCM hired
Defendant Dittami to create the forex trading platform Effex, which
FXCM spun off but retained control over.  FXCM presented its forex
trading system as designed to produce better results for customers
because, unlike the "dealing desk" model, it was inherently
conflict-free.  But the Plaintiffs claim that these representations
hid an obvious conflict with Effex, which was winning the majority
of orders over banks and other "market makers" because it had
secret access to view customers' orders, despite FXCM's promises of
anonymity.  The Plaintiffs also allege that FXCM, through Effex,
took positions opposite clients in stark contradiction with FXCM's
marketing and engaged in harmful practices that violated the duties
and obligations owed to its customers.  According to the
Plaintiffs, Effex and Dittami acted under the direction of FXCM and
aided and abetted FXCM's fraud.

In 2017, FXCM entered into settlements with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC") and National Futures Association
("NFA") regarding these practices and undisclosed relationship with
Effex, and FXCM agreed to withdraw from operating in the United
States.

On Oct. 26, 2017, the Court stayed the action pending arbitration
as to claims against Defendants FXCM, Niv, and Adhout, but not with
respect to claims against Defendants Effex and Dittami.
Accordingly, only the six counts (out of 11 total) alleged against
Effex and Dittami are at issue: Counts II (Aiding and Abetting a
Violation of the Commodity Exchange Act), III (Principal/Agent
Liability), IV (New York General Business Law Section 349), V
(California Unfair Competition Law Section 17200 et seq.), VI
(Unjust Enrichment), and X (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary
Duties and the Duty of Best Execution).

Defendants Effex and Dittami move to strike references to
settlements with the CFTC and NFA and move to dismiss the six
counts at issue pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Crotty concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead
with particularity violations of the CEA against Effex and Dittami
as required under Rule 9(b).  The Plaintiffs have also failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)
for violations of the CEA, New York General Business Law,
California Unfair Competition Law, Unjust Enrichment, or Aiding and
Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Best
Execution.

For these reasons, he denied the Defendants' motion to strike
references to CFTC and NFA settlements, but granted their motion to
dismiss without prejudice under Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6).  The
Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Dkt. 55, enter
judgment in favor of the Defendants, and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/d9z8SK from Leagle.com.

Vantalie Nguyen, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory M. Egleston --
gegleston@gme-law.com -- Gainey McKenna & Egleston, Shannon Lee
Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Thomas James
McKenna -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- Gainey McKenna & Egleston.

Hien Tran, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Quynh Pham, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Shannon Lee Hopkins,
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Arthur P. Cardi & Bikram Randhawa, Consolidated Plaintiffs,
represented by Gregory M. Egleston, Gainey McKenna & Egleston,
Thomas James McKenna, Gainey McKenna & Egleston & Shannon Lee
Hopkins, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Mark Govers, Steven Plunger & Rosimara Tadrous, Consolidated
Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory M. Egleston, Gainey McKenna &
Egleston & Thomas James McKenna, Gainey McKenna & Egleston.

FXCM Inc., Forex Capital Markets, LLC., FXCM Holdings, LLC, Dror
Niv & William Ahdout, Defendants, represented by Israel Dahan --
idahan@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP.

John Dittami & Effex Capital, LLC, Defendants, represented by
Joseph Noah Paykin -- jpaykin@pka-law.com -- Hinman, Howard &
Kattell, LLP..


FYRE MEDIA: Fyre Festival Ticket Holders Fail to Get Money Back
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lia Beck, writing for Bustle, reports that nearly two years ago the
disaster that was Fyre Festival occurred, and now, there are two
documentaries about it. Hulu released Fyre Fraud on Jan. 14, and
Netflix is releasing Fyre on Jan. 18. The documentaries answer a
lot of questions, but something viewers and non-viewers alike might
still be wondering is whether Fyre Festival ticket holders got
their money back. After all, some of these people spent thousands
of dollars and ended up experiencing a night in a hurricane tent, a
night in an airport, or absolutely nothing at all if they didn't
make it to the Bahamas before the event was called off.

Soon after Fyre Festival happened (or, "happened"), the organizers
told ticket holders they could either get a refund or get tickets
to Fyre Festival 2018, as reported by Mic. They also offered a
two-for-one deal (or, "deal"). The refund form reportedly read,
"Would you prefer to exchange your 2017 ticket(s) for additional
2018 VIP passes, as opposed to receiving a refund? (Ex: If you
purchased three passes for 2017 you would receive six total 2018
VIP passes.)"

Obviously, Fyre Festival 2018 didn't happen. The co-creator of the
festival and owner of Fyre, a talent booking company, Billy
McFarland is currently serving a six-year prison sentence for
fraud, per NPR. The other co-creator, Ja Rule, has stood by his
vision for the festival. Anyway, it was immediately clear to
everyone on the outside that no more Fyre Festivals would ever
happen.

Netflix

But regardless of whether they asked for a refund or more tickets,
just because ticketholders filled out form, that doesn't mean they
actually got anything in return. Moneyish reported on Jan. 15 that
no one at Fyre Festival has been refunded, but that an attendee
they spoke with, Dylan Caccamesi, said that he was able to get the
money back through his credit card company after he disputed the
charge. Similarly, a ticket holder named Shivi Kumar told the New
York Times that her bank refunded the money she'd added to her Fyre
Festival wristband, which was meant to be used in place of cash at
the event.

A $100 million class action lawsuit was filed against the
organizers soon after the event. As reported by the Los Angeles
Times, it was initiated by ticket holder Daniel Jung, who is
represented by celebrity lawyer Mark Geragos. This case has not yet
been settled, but two attendees were awarded $5 million in a
separate lawsuit in July 2018, according to Vice. The publication
reports that one issue is whether imprisoned McFarland, who was
also sentenced to $26 million in restitution, has the money. One of
the men's lawyers, Stacy Miller, told Vice, "I think there's going
to be a lot of people looking to collect, but we'll be first."

So, it seems that while some ticket holders were refunded, they got
their money back from their banks or credit card companies. Fyre is
shut down and McFarland and is prison, but with the class action
lawsuit still in play, these documentaries still aren't the last
anyone will hear of Fyre Festival.

Bustle Digital Group acquired Mic in late 2018. Mic is a
co-producer on Fyre Fraud. [GN]


G4S: Settles Employees' Class Action for $130MM
-----------------------------------------------
Alex Daniel, writing for City A.M., reports that G4S revealed late
on Jan. 22 it has agreed a settlement of up to $130m in a class
action against the firm in the US.

The FTSE 250 company said its US secure solutions arm had agreed to
settle the class action case, centering around claims for meal and
rest breaks for 13,500 employees between 2001 and 2010.

The agreement follows two similar class action settlements for
G4S's US business in 2015 and 2017.

G4S said the financial settlement will be paid in the second half
of 2019, and would be recognised as a specific item in its full
year results in March.

City A.M. understands the company is to give details on a potential
spin-off of its armoured cash truck business in the results. The
original announcement saw shares jump 10 per cent in December.

The company said it is "reviewing options" for the separation of
its cash solutions business, following the establishment of a cash
solutions division on 1 January.

The group has two main divisions, a security arm and a cash
guarding arm. It said separating the two "has the clear potential
to enhance the focus and success of both businesses and thus to
unlock substantial shareholder value". [GN]


GEELY LLC: Melanie Johnson Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------
Melanie R. Johnson, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Geely LLC, DBA The Taste of Asian
Bistro and Meechang Chan individually, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00380-DCN (D. S.C., Feb. 8, 2019), is a class action on
behalf of all employees who work in excess of 40 hours in any given
work week, but who have not received overtime compensation for the
hours worked within the last three years, in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff has been employed by the
Defendants as a cook from November 2017 to December 2018. The
Plaintiff's primary duties were to cook items contained on The
Taste of Asian Bistro's menu for restaurant patrons. The Plaintiff
was a non-exempt employee.  Her duties did not include creating or
designing unique dishes. The Plaintiff does not have four-year
culinary arts degree.  She did not perform any management
functions. The Plaintiff did not supervise employees. The Plaintiff
did not have the authority to hire or fire other employees. Nor
were her suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing,
advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other
employees given weight.

The Defendants paid the Plaintiff, as well as similarly situated
employees, a fixed rate pay per day, regardless of whether, she
worked more than 40 hours in any given week.  The Defendants did
not compensate Plaintiff, and similarly situated employees,
overtime pay when she worked more than 40 hours in any given week,
the lawsuit says.

The Defendants own and operate The Taste of Asian Bistro located at
10645 Dorchester Rd, Summerville, South Carolina.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
          MULLANEY LAW
          1037-D Chuck Dawley Blvd, Suite 100
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 588-5587
          Facsimile: (843) 593-9334
          E-mail: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net

GEORGE ADAMS: Matzura Alleges Breach Under Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
George Adams Gallery LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. George Adams Gallery LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01202 (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

George Adams Gallery LLC is an Art gallery in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


HALSTED FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JOSEPH FOTE, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
HALSTED FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC and RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00207-DEJ
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order on Feb. 8,
2019, certifying classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Judge Denies Request to Pause Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
ABC News reports that Harvey Weinstein suffered a setback on Jan.
22 when a judge in New York denied his request to pause a class
action suit brought against him in June by 10 of his female
accusers, according to court documents obtained The Hollywood
Reporter.

Mr. Weinstein argued there was an overlap between the civil case,
and should he be called to testify in an early deposition, he might
have to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination. His lawyers insisted that he should not be
"forced to make the difficult choice between being prejudiced in
the civil litigation, if he asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege
or from being prejudiced in the criminal litigation if he . . .
waives that privilege in the civil litigation."

The plaintiffs in the civil case responded by arguing it would be
them experiencing prejudice due to the depletion of Weinstein's
financial resources to pay a possible judgment.

"At this stage in the litigation, Weinstein's Fifth Amendment
concerns are merely speculative," the plaintiffs' attorneys stated
in court documents. "No testimony is required of Weinstein at this
early pleading stage. The briefing and hearing on any motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint will not implicate
Weinstein's Fifth Amendment rights whatsoever."

On Jan. 22, U.S. District Court Judge Alvin Hellerstein sided with
the women, directing Weinstein to file his motion to dismiss on or
before January 28. Oral arguments will take place on March 7 -- the
same date of the next hearing in the movie mogul's criminal case.

Mr. Weinstein received better news when it came to the women's
request to restrain his use of documents obtained in discovery in
the bankruptcy proceeding. The women contended that Weinstein was
"using their private information to wage a public battle,"
according to THR. Weinstein insisted that the First Amendment
"allowed him to defend himself and that such an order would amount
to a veritable gag order." Judge Hellerstein ruled in favor of
Weinstein on this issue.

Mr. Weinstein's facing five criminal counts in New York of rape and
sexual assault, all of which he's denied. A sixth count against the
film producer was dismissed in October after prosecutors revealed
to the defense that they'd discovered a written account from his
accuser that suggested the encounter that prompted the count
against him was consensual.

Mr. Weinstein's trial is set for May 6. [GN]


HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Can Compel Arbitration in Bitton FCRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MACHELLE BITTON and KHISHA BADGER, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HEALTHCARE
SERVICES GROUP, INC., and JD PALATINE, LLC, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 17-2580 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Chad F. Kenney of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
Defendant HSG's Motion to Stay the Proceedings and Compel
Arbitration.

Plaintiff Bitton originally filed a three-count Complaint in June
2017, which asserted various class and individual claims against
Defendant JD Palatine and only one individual claim against
Defendant HSG.  The original Complaint was never served and two
months later, in August 2017, Bitton filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint, which again asserted class claims against JD Palatine
and added Plaintiff Badger along with two additional claims against
JD Palatine.  On Dec. 13, 2017, the Court entered the first
Scheduling Order in the case.

The Plaintiffs first served written discovery on Jan. 18, 2018.
They filed a Motion to Compel Responses to those discovery requests
on April 2, 2018, which the Court granted on April 11, 2018.  Two
weeks later, on April 25, 2018, the parties jointly reported that
they had agreed to mediate the case and the Court accordingly
entered the first of a series of stays in this matter, this time
for 90 days, pending the outcome of the mediation.  Between April
25, 2018, and Sept. 30, 2018, the parties jointly requested and
were granted three stays totaling over 160 days.  After mediation
failed to resolve the case, the Court lifted the stay on Oct. 3,
2018.  At the joint request of the parties, the Court also extended
the deadlines set forth in the original Scheduling Order, including
the deadlines for leave to amend the pleadings, to complete
discovery, and to move for class certification.

On Oct. 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint, which the Court granted on Oct. 23, 2018.  That same
day,  the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, which
for the first time in this case asserted a brand new "Class Claim"
under Federal Rule 23 against Defendant HSG in Count VI.  Similar
to the individual claim originally pled against HSG in the original
Complaint, the Plaintiffs averred in the Second Amended Complaint
that on Sept. 2, 2016, HSG received a background report from
Defendant JD Palatine in connection with Plaintiff Bitton's
employment with HSG, which was used "for employment purposes."
Plaintiff Bitton alleges her employment was terminated on Sept.16,
2016, after the report "adjudicated Ms. Bitton as not being
eligible for continued employment at HSG.  

The Plaintiffs define "The Healthcare Services Group Class" as all
employees or prospective employees of Healthcare Services Group in
the United State (including all Territories and political
subdivisions of the United States) who were the subject of a
consumer report procured from JD Palatine and whom JD Palatine
scored as not eligible for employment (e.g., declined).

Defendant HSG contends that the Plaintiffs' new class claim is
subject however to a "Mutual Arbitration Agreement" between HSG and
Plaintiff Bitton.  The new counsel for HSG entered their
appearances between Nov. 1 and 5, 2018.  On Nov. 6, 2018, HSG files
its Motion to Dismiss Claim VI of the Second Amended Complaint and
Compel Arbitration, or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings.

The Plaintiffs, who did not dispute the existence and
enforceability of the Agreement nor its application to the claims
at hand in either its Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration or during oral argument held on the matter on
Dec. 6, 2018, argue that the subject arbitration provision does not
compel arbitration as to Plaintiff Bitton because HSG has waived
its right to arbitrate because for the last 17 months HSG has acted
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate.

Judge Kenney finds that Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.
factors -- (i) the timeliness of the motion to arbitrate; (ii) the
degree to which the party seeking to compel arbitration has
contested the merits of its opponent's claims; (iii) whether the
party has informed its adversary of the intention to seek
arbitration even if it has not yet filed a motion to stay the
district court proceedings; (iv) the extent of its non-merits
motion practice; (v) its assent to the district court's pretrial
orders; and (v) the extent to which both parties have engaged in
discovery -- weigh against finding of waiver.

He finds that (i) the case was stayed for a significant number of
those seventeen months by mutual agreement of all parties who were
seeking an amicable resolution through mediation; (ii) HSG has not
engaged in any merits-based motion practice; (iii) HSG informed the
Plaintiffs and the Court of its intention to compel arbitration
within two weeks of the filing of the Second Amended Complaint;
(iv) possible prejudice will be minimal as non-merits motions were
not substantial in nature; (v) even though attending a pretrial
conference and complying with a scheduling order is inconsistent
with the intent to arbitrate, HSG's assent to the Court's
scheduling orders and more importantly the Court's series of stays
in the case, is not of the nature typically found by courts to
constitute waiver; and (vi) neither party has engaged in the level
of discovery required for a finding of waiver.

Finally, the Judge finds that in addition to the fact that five, if
not all six, of the Hoxworth factors weigh against a finding that
HSG has waived its right to compel arbitration as to Claim VI of
the Second Amended Complaint, the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint would have revived HSG's right to compel arbitration
because the conversion of Plaintiff Bitton's individual claim
against HSG into a class claim significantly widened the scope of
the claim alleged against HSG.  Accordingly, even if the Court
found that HSG had waived its right to compel arbitration, the
Plaintiffs' filing of the Second Amended Complaint revived any such
right to compel arbitration as to Claim VI.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kenney granted HSG's Motion to
Stay the Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.  An appropriate Order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/U6Iuho from Leagle.com.

MACHELLE BITTON & KHISHA BADGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by DAVID A.
SEARLES -- info@consumerlawfirm.com -- FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.,
JEFFREY B. SAND -- js@atlantaemployeelawyer.com -- WEINER & SAND
LLC & JAMES A. FRANCIS -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- FRANCIS &
MAILMAN, PC.

HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP, INC., Defendant, represented by DAVID
YUDELSON -- dyudelson@constangy.com -- CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH
PROPHETE LLP, JOHN E. MACDONALD -- jmacdonald@constangy.com --
CONSTANGY BROOKS & SMITH LLP, MATTHEW SCHOLL --
mscholl@constangy.com -- CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH PROPHETE LLP,
NAVEEN KABIR -- nkabir@constangy.com -- CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH &
PROPHETE LLP & STEVEN W. MOORE -- smoore@constangy.com -- CONSTANGY
BROOKS SMITH & PROPHETE LLP.

JD PALATINE, LLC, Defendant, represented by JOANNA M. RODRIGUEZ --
Joanna.Rodriguez@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS, P.C. & MARLA N.
PRESLEY -- Marla.Presley@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS, P.C..


HOOK INVESTMENTS: Jonathan Jones Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN JONES, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HOOK INVESTMENTS, INC., JEFF HOOKER
and IVY HALL, INC., the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 4:19-cv-00105-BSM
(E.D. Ark., Feb. 8, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff performed towing services
for the Defendants solely within the State of Arkansas. The
Plaintiff worked until February or March 2017. The Plaintiff worked
more than 40 hours per week from time to time. The Plaintiff was
not paid for all the off-the-clock hours he worked over 40 per
week. The Plaintiff's off-the-clock work includes time spent
working through lunch and after-hours work, the lawsuit says.

Hook Investments operates a towing services company based in North
Little Rock, under the business name of JHook Towing and
Recovery.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Joshua West, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: west@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

INNOVATION COMPOUNDING: Must Address Rule 23 Changes Implications
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOMA CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., a Florida corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. INNOVATION COMPOUNDING,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-256-FtM-38MRM (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Sheri Polster Chappell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, ordered the parties to
address any implications that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e) amendment may have on their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) dismissal and provide any documentation that the
Court may require.

Before the Court is the parties' Joint Stipulation of Dismissal
filed on Feb. 4, 2019.  They seek to dismiss the action under Rule
41.  Yet the case is a class action lawsuit, and it is potentially
impacted by a recent amendment to Rule 23.  Thus, the parties are
ordered to address any implications that the Rule 23 amendment may
have on their Rule 41 dismissal and provide any documentation that
the Court may require.  The parties are ordered to respond to the
Court within seven days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sQxAlq from Leagle.com.

Scoma Chiropractic, P.A., a Florida corporation, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiff, represented by Ryan M. Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com
-- Anderson & Wanca & Ross M. Good -- rgood@andersonwanca.com --
Anderson & Wanca.

Innovation Compounding, Inc., a Georgia corporation, Defendant,
represented by Brian E. Dickerson --
Brian.Dickerson@fisherbroyles.com -- FisherBroyles LLP & Robert
Graham Menzies -- robert.menzies@fisherbroyles.com -- FisherBroyles
LLP.


KERN COUNTY, CA: E.D. Cal. Issues TRO in Wonderly FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARREN WONDERLY, individually and behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-01621 JLT (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Defendant's emergency
motion for a temporary restraining order precluding the Plaintiff's
counsel from conducting meetings (to occur on Jan. 18 and 19)
promoted by advertisements the Plaintiff's counsel -- or someone on
their behalf -- had been running seeking communication with the
prospective members of the class.

In the litigation, the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant failed to
comply with the FLSA and pay him as required by law.  Initially,
they were represented by Mr. Petersen, who has since died.

From the outset, the Plaintiffs in these cases took the position
that notice to the potential collection should not be given.  Mr.
Petersen reported at the scheduling conference that there was very
little interest in these cases by the Plaintiffs' coworkers and, in
fact, there was opposition to the Wonderly action by the union
representing the deputies.  At the scheduling conference, Mr.
Petersen reported that he anticipated no deputies would join the
Wonderly action and no more than 15 detention deputies would join
the Ashely action.  Because the counsel did not believe there was
much interest in the cases, he did not want to bother with
providing notice and the Court was forced to order that notice be
given to the prospective collection members.  Consistent with Mr.
Petersen's predictions, as of the signing of the order, 15
detention deputies have joined the Ashely matter and no deputies
have joined the Wonderly action.

Pursuant to the Court's order that notice would be given, Mr.
Petersen stipulated to the notice that would be sent to prospective
collection members.  The notice read in pertinent part, "If you
join this lawsuit and Sheriff Youngblood wins, you will receive
nothing and will be bound by the result. Under some circumstances,
Sheriff Youngblood may make a motion to try to recover some portion
of his litigation costs and expenses."  Likewise, it advised, "You
will not be retaliated against for participating in this lawsuit.
Federal law prohibits Sheriff Youngblood from firing or retaliating
against you because of your decision to join the lawsuit."  This
notice was not sent due to Mr. Petersen's illness.

Eventually, Ms. Odenbreit appeared in the cases.  In November 2018,
the counsel submitted a stipulated amended notice to be sent to
prospective collection members.  The notice reads, "If you join
this lawsuit and Sheriff Youngblood wins, you will receive nothing
and will be bound by the result.  Under some circumstances, Sheriff
Youngblood may make a motion to try to recover some portion of his
litigation costs and expenses."  It states further, "You will not
be retaliated against for participating in this lawsuit. Federal
law prohibits Sheriff Youngblood from firing or retaliating against
you because of your decision to join the lawsuit."  The Court
required the counsel to mail the notices no later than Nov. 30,
2018 and that opt-ins to be received by Feb. 28, 2019.

On Jan. 15, 2019, the counsel for the Plaintiff began running an
advertisement in at least one local newspaper.  Sometime on Jan.
15, 2019, the defense counsel, Mr. Austin, received an email from
his client with a copy of the advertisement attached.  The next day
at 2:39 p.m., Mr. Austin emailed Ms. Odenbreit and Ms. Kim and
expressed concerns about the ad and demanded that they withdraw the
ad.  Mr. Austin indicated that if they did not confirm by 5:00 p.m.
that they would withdraw the ad, he would seek "court intervention.
Mr. Austin received no response.

Ms. Odenbreit was occupied with other matters and did not respond.
Ms. Kim offers no explanation why she did not respond.  The next
morning, at 10:15 a.m., Mr. Austin telephoned and spoke to Ms.
Odenbreit.  He asked her to withdraw the ad and cancel the
meetings.  The counsel did not come to agreement so Mr. Austin told
Ms. Odenbreit he would file a motion for temporary restraining
order.

On Jan. 17, 2019, Mr. Austin emailed Ms. Odenbreit and Ms. Kim to
report that he had learned that the Court does not hold hearings on
temporary restraining orders.  He indicated that if he learned the
Court would hold a hearing, he would let them know.  Mr. Austin
filed the motion at 8:01 p.m. and the Court provided immediate,
automatic email notice of the filing through its CM/ECF computer
system.  However, Ms. Odenbreit did not review the filing until the
next morning.

On the morning of Jan. 18, 2019, the Court learned of the filing
and set up a telephonic conference with the counsel to discuss the
motion.  After hearing from the counsel, the Court made oral note
of its findings and prohibited the meetings from going forward and
memorialized its findings and orders in a written order.  It set
the matter for further briefing and for argument.

The Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the TRO should not have been
granted because the defense counsel failed to comply with the
strict rules in the Eastern District.  In particular, the counsel
objects to the moving party's failure to complete a "TRO
Checklist."

Magistrate Judge Thurston finds that Mr. Austin filed the motion on
Jan. 17, 2019 and it was served automatically via email by the
Court at 8:01 p.m.  It was served only to Ms. Odenbreit because Ms.
Kim had not associated into the case and was not an attorney of
record.  The fact that Ms. Odenbreit did not review the motion
until Jan. 19, 2019, does not obviate that she received proper
notice of the filing of the motion.  Then, due to the emergent
nature of the situation, the next morning, the Court, after
verifying the availability of the counsel and providing notice,
conducted a telephonic conference.  Thus, the Magistrate does not
find there was a substantive failure to comply with the Court's
orders, its Local Rules or Rule 65 and the objections on these
grounds are overruled.

Next, the Magistrate holds that the Court is obligated to ensure
that prospective collection members receive accurate information so
they may decide whether to opt in.  The notice, which was
stipulated to by Ms. Odenbreit, accurately told prospective members
the information they need to decide whether to join the litigation,
where they can go for further information and their rights related
to the various possible outcomes of the litigation.  Because the
advertisement failed to provide accurate information about the
cases, the motion is granted.  The Plaintiffs' counsel will not
communicate with potential collection member in a manner that is
false, inaccurate or misleading, whether the communication is in
writing, in an electronic medium or in person.

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that the deadline for opt-in should
be extended 14 days due to the fact the Court refused to allow the
meetings on January 18 and 19 to proceed.  They argue that the TRO
should be lifted and the parties respectfully should get a brief
continuation of the deadline by which to opt-in commensurate with
the number of days between Jan. 18, 2019 and the hearing date in
the matter (or at least 14 days).  The potential opt-ins can be
notified by postcard sent by the class action administrator
informing them of the continued deadline and briefly explaining why
the continuance occurred.

The Magistrate denied this request because there remains sufficient
time for potential opt-ins to weigh their options and to obtain
legal advice while doing so.  Also, she concludes that mailing a
postcard telling the prospective collection members of the Court's
findings would likely undermine the confidence the collection
members may have in the litigation and in the counsel and would
discourage them from joining the litigation for reasons apart from
the merits of the cases.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Xma7oU from Leagle.com.

Darren Wonderly, Plaintiff, represented by Katherine J. Odenbreit
-- kodenbreit@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group, APC & Briana
Minsun Kim -- briana@brianakim.com -- Briana Kim, PC.

Sheriff Donny Youngblood, individually and in his official capacity
& County of Kern, a Municipal Entity of California, Defendants,
represented by Cepideh Roufougar --
Cepideh.Roufougar@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., Evan
Donald Beecher -- Evan.Beecher@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis,
P.C. & Nathan Wade Austin -- austinn@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C..


KERN COUNTY, CA: Eastern Dist. Cal. Issues TRO in Ashely FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK ASHELY, individually and behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-01638 JLT (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Defendant's emergency
motion for a temporary restraining order precluding the Plaintiff's
counsel from conducting meetings (to occur on Jan. 18 and 19)
promoted by advertisements the Plaintiff's counsel -- or someone on
their behalf -- had been running seeking communication with the
prospective members of the class.

In the litigation, the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant failed to
comply with the FLSA and pay him as required by law.  Initially,
they were represented by Mr. Petersen, who has since died.

From the outset, the Plaintiffs in these cases took the position
that notice to the potential collection should not be given.  Mr.
Petersen reported at the scheduling conference that there was very
little interest in these cases by the Plaintiffs' coworkers and, in
fact, there was opposition to the Wonderly action by the union
representing the deputies.  At the scheduling conference, Mr.
Petersen reported that he anticipated no deputies would join the
Wonderly action and no more than 15 detention deputies would join
the Ashely action.  Because the counsel did not believe there was
much interest in the cases, he did not want to bother with
providing notice and the Court was forced to order that notice be
given to the prospective collection members.  Consistent with Mr.
Petersen's predictions, as of the signing of the order, 15
detention deputies have joined the Ashely matter and no deputies
have joined the Wonderly action.

Pursuant to the Court's order that notice would be given, Mr.
Petersen stipulated to the notice that would be sent to prospective
collection members.  The notice read in pertinent part, "If you
join this lawsuit and Sheriff Youngblood wins, you will receive
nothing and will be bound by the result. Under some circumstances,
Sheriff Youngblood may make a motion to try to recover some portion
of his litigation costs and expenses."  Likewise, it advised, "You
will not be retaliated against for participating in this lawsuit.
Federal law prohibits Sheriff Youngblood from firing or retaliating
against you because of your decision to join the lawsuit."  This
notice was not sent due to Mr. Petersen's illness.

Eventually, Ms. Odenbreit appeared in the cases.  In November 2018,
the counsel submitted a stipulated amended notice to be sent to
prospective collection members.  The notice reads, "If you join
this lawsuit and Sheriff Youngblood wins, you will receive nothing
and will be bound by the result.  Under some circumstances, Sheriff
Youngblood may make a motion to try to recover some portion of his
litigation costs and expenses."  It states further, "You will not
be retaliated against for participating in this lawsuit. Federal
law prohibits Sheriff Youngblood from firing or retaliating against
you because of your decision to join the lawsuit."  The Court
required the counsel to mail the notices no later than Nov. 30,
2018 and that opt-ins to be received by Feb. 28, 2019.

On Jan. 15, 2019, the counsel for the Plaintiff began running an
advertisement in at least one local newspaper. Sometime on Jan. 15,
2019, the defense counsel, Mr. Austin, received an email from his
client with a copy of the advertisement attached. The next day at
2:39 p.m., Mr. Austin emailed Ms. Odenbreit and Ms. Kim and
expressed concerns about the ad and demanded that they withdraw the
ad.  Mr. Austin indicated that if they did not confirm by 5 p.m.
that they would withdraw the ad, he would seek "court
intervention."  Mr. Austin received no response.

Ms. Odenbreit was occupied with other matters and did not respond.
Ms. Kim offers no explanation why she did not respond.  The next
morning, at 10:15 a.m., Mr. Austin telephoned and spoke to Ms.
Odenbreit.  He asked her to withdraw the ad and cancel the
meetings.  The counsel did not come to agreement so Mr. Austin told
Ms. Odenbreit he would file a motion for temporary restraining
order.

On Jan. 17, 2019, Mr. Austin emailed Ms. Odenbreit and Ms. Kim to
report that he had learned that the Court does not hold hearings on
temporary restraining orders.  He indicated that if he learned the
Court would hold a hearing, he would let them know.  Mr. Austin
filed the motion at 8:01 p.m. and the Court provided immediate,
automatic email notice of the filing through its CM/ECF computer
system.  However, Ms. Odenbreit did not review the filing until the
next morning.

On the morning of Jan. 18, 2019, the Court learned of the filing
and set up a telephonic conference with the counsel to discuss the
motion.  After hearing from the counsel, the Court made oral note
of its findings and prohibited the meetings from going forward and
memorialized its findings and orders in a written order.  It set
the matter for further briefing and for argument.

The Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the TRO should not have been
granted because the defense counsel failed to comply with the
strict rules in the Eastern District.  In particular, the counsel
objects to the moving party's failure to complete a "TRO
Checklist."

Magistrate Judge Thurston finds that Mr. Austin filed the motion on
Jan. 17, 2019 and it was served automatically via email by the
Court at 8:01 p.m.  It was served only to Ms. Odenbreit because Ms.
Kim had not associated into the case and was not an attorney of
record.  The fact that Ms. Odenbreit did not review the motion
until Jan. 19, 2019, does not obviate that she received proper
notice of the filing of the motion.  Then, due to the emergent
nature of the situation, the next morning, the Court, after
verifying the availability of the counsel and providing notice,
conducted a telephonic conference.  Thus, the Magistrate does not
find there was a substantive failure to comply with the Court's
orders, its Local Rules or Rule 65 and the objections on these
grounds are overruled.

Next, the Magistrate holds that the Court is obligated to ensure
that prospective collection members receive accurate information so
they may decide whether to opt in.  The notice, which was
stipulated to by Ms. Odenbreit, accurately told prospective members
the information they need to decide whether to join the litigation,
where they can go for further information and their rights related
to the various possible outcomes of the litigation.  Because the
advertisement failed to provide accurate information about the
cases, the motion is granted.  The Plaintiffs' counsel will not
communicate with potential collection member in a manner that is
false, inaccurate or misleading, whether the communication is in
writing, in an electronic medium or in person.

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that the deadline for opt-in should
be extended 14 days due to the fact the Court refused to allow the
meetings on January 18 and 19 to proceed.  They argue that the TRO
should be lifted and the parties respectfully should get a brief
continuation of the deadline by which to opt-in commensurate with
the number of days between Jan. 18, 2019 and the hearing date in
the matter (or at least 14 days).  The potential opt-ins can be
notified by postcard sent by the class action administrator
informing them of the continued deadline and briefly explaining why
the continuance occurred.

The Magistrate denied this request because there remains sufficient
time for potential opt-ins to weigh their options and to obtain
legal advice while doing so.  Also, she concludes that mailing a
postcard telling the prospective collection members of the Court's
findings would likely undermine the confidence the collection
members may have in the litigation and in the counsel and would
discourage them from joining the litigation for reasons apart from
the merits of the cases.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Vv4sEv from Leagle.com.

Mark Ashely, Plaintiff, represented by Katherine J. Odenbreit --
kodenbreit@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group, APC & Briana
Minsun Kim -- briana@brianakim.com -- Briana Kim, PC.

Donny Youngblood, Sheriff & County of Kern, Defendants, represented
by Cepideh Roufougar -- Cepideh.Roufougar@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C., Evan Donald Beecher --
Evan.Beecher@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Nathan Wade
Austin -- austinn@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..


KEURIG DR PEPPER: Heffler Claims Issues Statement on Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Heffler Claims Group
regarding the Canada Dry Ginger Ale Class Action Settlement.

Two proposed class action Settlements have been reached in cases
alleging Canada Dry Ginger Ale Products, packaged and labeled with
the words "Made from Real Ginger" were false and deceptive. The
Settlements resolve two lawsuits: in California, Fitzhenry-Russell,
et al. v. Keurig Dr Pepper, et al., No. 5:17cv564 (U.S. District
Court for Northern District of Cal.); and in 49 other states,
George, et al. v. Keurig Dr Pepper, et al., No. 1822-CC11811
(Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, MO). The Settlements
require Defendants to change the label and compensate consumers.
Defendants deny any wrongdoing.

                       Who is a Class Member?

You may be an eligible Settlement Class Member if you purchased
Canada Dry Ginger Ale Products in California between December 28,
2012, and June 26, 2018, or in the other 49 United States, between
January 1, 2013, and December 19, 2018.

What are the Benefits?

The Settlements require Defendants to permanently remove the label
claim "Made from Real Ginger." They permit labeling that includes
statements such as, "real ginger taste" and "made with real ginger
extract," among other combinations of those label claims.
Settlement Class Members who file a claim will receive $0.40 per
Unit purchased, up to 13 Units or $5.20 per Household without proof
of purchase, and up to 100 Units or $40.00 per Household with proof
of purchase. Every Valid claim will receive a minimum payment of
$2.00. The total Benefit for the 49-State Class Members is capped
at $11,200,000, so Class Members there may receive per Unit less
depending on how many Valid Claims are actually submitted. There is
no cap on total benefits for the California Settlement.

                      What are my rights?

You may make a Claim, Object, Opt-Out, or do nothing. To receive a
payment, you must submit a Claim, online or by mail, by March 19,
2019. If you Opt-Out of the Settlement, you may pursue a separate
lawsuit, but you will receive no payment. Your Opt-Out request must
be received by the Settlement Administrator by March 19, 2019. If
you do not Opt-Out, you give up your right to bring a separate
lawsuit. To object, you must submit a written Objection that
complies with the requirements in the applicable Settlement Notice
available at www.CDGAsettlement.com. Your Objection must be filed
with the Court by March 19, 2019. Do nothing, and you will not
receive a payment and you will release claims against Defendants
that relate to the allegations in the lawsuits.

Each Court presiding over the cases will hold a Fairness Hearing to
review its respective Settlement. The California Settlement will be
heard on April 10, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, 280 S. 1st St., San Jose, CA
95113, before the Honorable Nathanael Cousins. The 49-State
Settlement will be heard on April 8, 2019, in the Circuit Court for
the City of St. Louis, MO, Civil Courts Bldg., 5th floor, 10 N.
Tucker Blvd, St. Louis, MO 63101, before the Honorable Mark Neill.
Each Court will decide whether to approve the Settlement and to
make certain awards to be paid by Defendants. The Missouri Court
will decide whether to award Attorneys' Fees and Costs of up to
$1,200,000, plus $1,000 per named Plaintiff as Class Representative
Service Awards. The California Court will decide whether to award
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses of up to $2,250,000, plus $5,000 per
named Plaintiff as Class Representative Service Awards. The
Applications for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses will be posted on
www.CDGAsettlement.com after they are filed. You may, but don't
have to, attend the hearings. Benefit Checks will be issued to the
Class Members only if the Settlements are approved and any
Objections are resolved. Please be patient.

For more information visit: www.CDGAsettlement.com
              
         Contact:
         The Settlement Administrator
         Telephone: 1-833-305-3916

         Heffler Claims Group
         Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.
         P.O. Box 58097, Philadelphia
         PA 19102-8097

Please do not telephone the Courts to inquire about the
Settlements. [GN]


LANIBALOO CREATIONS: Violates Disabilities Act, Slade Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
Lanibaloo Creations, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Linda Slade, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Lanibaloo Creations, LLC doing
business as: Simple Sugars, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01221-GHW
(S.D. N.Y., February 8, 2019).

Lanibaloo Creations LLC is in the Toiletries, Cosmetics, and
Perfumes business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


LIBERTY HEALTH: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A Professional
Corporation, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Liberty Health
Sciences, Inc. (Other OTC: LHSIF) ("Liberty" or the "Company")
securities during the period between June 28, 2018 through December
03, 2018 inclusive (the "Class Period").  Investors who wish to
become proactively involved in the litigation have until March 08,
2019 to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will be
selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Liberty securities during the Class Period.  Members
of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and counsel
chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been certified in
the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that Liberty, in
conjunction with Aphria Inc. ("Aphria"), was involved in a scheme
whereby numerous fraudulent acquisitions and transactions were made
to provide undue benefits to both companies' insiders.

According to the complaint, following a December 3, 2018 report
that Aphria was involved in the acquisition of shell companies at
artificially inflated prices, and December 6, 2018 news reports of
Liberty's connection to Aphria's illicit dealings, the value of
Liberty shares declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Liberty securities purchased on or after June 28, 2018 and held
through the revelation of negative information during and/or at the
end of the Class Period and would like to learn more about this
lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead plaintiff,
without cost or obligation to you please;

         Charles J. Piven
         Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
         1925 Old Valley Road
         Stevenson, Maryland 21153
         Telephone: 410-415-6616
         Email: hoffman@browerpiven.com [GN]


M CULINARY: Flores Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
LUIS ENRIQUE PALMA FLORES, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. M CULINARY CONCEPTS, INC.
(D/B/A BITE), NOVEL FOODS INC. (D/B/A BITE), A.M. CATERING
SOLUTIONS, INC. (D/B/A BITE), AMICHAI MELAMED (A.K.A. AMI MELAMED),
and SAMAR SAJJAD, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01229 (S.D.N.Y.,
Feb. 8, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York
Labor Law.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of M Culinary Concepts, Inc. The
Defendants own, operate, or control a Middle Eastern &
Mediterranean restaurant, located at 62 West 22nd Street, New York,
New York 10010 under the name "Bite." The Plaintiff  worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that he worked. Rather, the Defendants failed to maintain
accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to pay
Plaintiff Palma appropriately for any hours worked, either at the
straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium.
Further, the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the required
"spread of hours" pay for any day in which he had to work over 10
hours a day.  The Defendants also repeatedly failed to pay
Plaintiff Palma wages on a timely basis.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES , P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

MALIBU BOATS: Bishop Suit Alleges Violation of Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
Malibu Boats, Inc. d/b/a Pursuit Boats is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Malibu Boats, Inc. d/b/a Pursuit
Boats, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01260 (S.D. N.Y., February 8,
2019).

Malibu Boats, Inc. designs, manufactures, distributes, markets, and
sells recreational powerboats. The company offers performance sport
boats under the Malibu and Axis brand names; and sterndrives and
outboard boats under the Cobalt brand name. Its boats are used for
water sports, including water skiing, wakeboarding, and wake
surfing, as well as general recreational boating. The company also
offers various accessories and aftermarket parts. It operates
through a network of independent dealers in North America, South
America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand markets. Malibu
Boats, Inc. was founded in 1982 and is based in Loudon,
Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES: Wolf Haldenstein Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors United States
District Court for the District of Colorado that purchased or
otherwise acquired Maxar Technologies Ltd. ("Maxar" or the
"Company") (NYSE: MAXR; TSX: MAXR) securities between March 29,
2018 and January 7, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Shareholders who purchased shares of Maxar Technologies Ltd. and
suffered losses on United States and/or Canadian exchanges are
urged to contact the firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or
(800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may obtain additional
information concerning the action on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in the shares of Maxar Technologies
Ltd., you may, no later than March 15, 2019, request that the Court
appoint you lead plaintiff of the proposed class. Please contact
Wolf Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an investor in
March 15, 2019.     

The filed complaint in this class action alleges that the
defendants failed to disclose that:

Maxar improperly inflated the value of its intangible assets, among
other accounting improprieties;

Maxar's highly-valued WorldView-4 was equipped with CMGs that were
faulty and/or ill-suited for their designed and intended purpose;
and as a result, Maxar's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On August 7, 2018, Spruce Point Capital published a report claiming
that Maxar "has pulled one of the most aggressive accounting
schemes Spruce Point has ever seen to inflate Non-IFRS earnings by
79%," and that the Company's "$3.7 billion of rising debt with
almost no cash and free cash flow" necessitates that Maxar
"eliminate its dividend immediately, or risk wiping out equity
holders."

On this news, Maxar's share price fell more than 13% on August 7,
2018, thereby injuring investors.

Then, on January 7, 2019, Maxar disclosed that WorldView-4 had
experienced a failure in its CMGs, preventing the satellite from
collecting imagery due to the loss of an axis of stability.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $5.69 per share, or
48.5%, over the following two trading sessions, to close at $6.03
on January 8, 2019.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case please;

         Kevin Cooper, Esq.
         Gregory Stone
         Director of Case and Financial Analysis       
         Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
         Telephone: (800) 575-0735
                    (212) 545-4774
         Email: gstone@whafh.com
                kcooper@whafh.com
                classmember@whafh.com [GN]


MDL 2090: Order on Cost Judgment Review Bids Issued
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Wholesale Grocery Products Antitrust Litigation,
This Order Relates to All Actions, Court File No. 09-MD-2090
ADM/TNL (D. Minn.), Judge Ann D. Montgomery of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota (i) granted in part and denied
in part SuperValu, Inc.'s Motion for Review of Cost Judgments; (ii)
granted in part and denied in part C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc.'s
Motion for Review of Cost Judgment; (iii) denied DeLuca Corp.'s
Motion for Review of Cost Judgment; (iv) granted in part and denied
in part JFM Market, Inc. and MFJ Market, Inc. ("Village Market")'s
Motion for Review of Cost Judgment as specified; and (v) granted in
part and denied in part Village Market and DeLuca's Joint Motion
for Review of Cost Judgment as specified.

The multi-district litigation consolidated four putative class
action lawsuits brought in 2009 by retail grocers in New England
and the Midwest.  The Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants C&S and
SuperValu conspired to allocate customers and territories in the
New England and Midwest wholesale grocery markets, and that they
used the allocation to eliminate competition and charge the
retailers supra-competitive prices.

The Consolidated Class Action Complaint alleged two broad putative
classes: (1) retailers who purchased products or related services
from Defendants in the Midwest market ("Midwest Class"); and (2)
retailers who purchased such products or services in the New
England market ("New England Class").  Retailer D&G, Inc. ("D&G")
was a named Plaintiff in the Midwest Class, and DeLuca's was a
named Plaintiff in the New England Class.  Both classes included a
subclass of retailers who were party to an arbitration agreement
with a Defendant during the class period.  Village Market was a
named plaintiff in the New England arbitration subclass.

In December 2009, the Court entered a pretrial order appointing
three firms as Co-Lead Counsel in the case.   Among the firms
appointed as the Co-Lead Counsel was DeLuca's individually-retained
counsel.

In July 2011, while the parties were engaged in fact discovery, the
Court dismissed the claims of Village Market and other arbitration
subclass Plaintiffs in favor of arbitration, and continued
adjudicating the claims of the two lead Plaintiffs, D&G and
DeLuca's.  Village Market appealed the dismissal of its claims to
the Eighth Circuit.

On July 16, 2012, the Court denied class certification of both
proposed classes, determining that the Plaintiffs could not show
class-wide impact through common evidence.  It found that the
"formulaic nature" of SuperValu's pricing method used in the
Midwest market made a better case for certification of the Midwest
Class than the New England Class.  Nevertheless, the Midwest Class
could not prove impact by common evidence because each of
SuperValu's distribution centers across the Midwest inserted
different values into the pricing formula, requiring an analysis of
each distribution center's fees and competitive conditions.

Following this ruling, D&G requested leave to move for
certification of a narrower Midwest class of grocers who were
charged using formulaic pricing and supplied by SuperValu's
Champaign, Illinois distribution center.  DeLuca's made no request
for a narrower New England class.

On Jan. 11, 2013, the Court granted summary judgment for C&S and
SuperValu against D&G and DeLuca's.  Based on the grant of summary
judgment to the Defendants, the Court denied D&G's request for
renewed class certification of the narrower Midwest Class as moot.
D&G appealed both the summary judgment ruling and the denial of
Midwest class certification.  DeLuca's did not appeal the January
2013 Order.

On Feb. 13, 2013, while the summary judgment and Midwest Class
certification appeal was pending, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of the arbitration subclass Plaintiffs and remanded with
instructions to consider whether some of these Plaintiffs'
arbitration agreements, including Village Market's agreement, were
enforceable under a "successor-in-interest" theory.  The Court
later ruled, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, that arbitration was
not compelled under a successor-in-interest theory.

On Feb. 15, 2013, SuperValu and C&S timely filed Bills of Costs
against D&G and DeLuca's.  Due to the pendency of D&G's appeal and
the remand of Village Market and other plaintiffs' claims at that
time, the Court held the 2013 Bills of Costs in abeyance.

In May 2014, the Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment against
D&G and remanded to the district court to consider whether to
certify a narrower class of Midwest Plaintiffs that was based on
which Midwest distribution center a plaintiff utilized.

Following the reversal of summary judgment against D&G, the Midwest
Plaintiffs' claims proceeded on a different schedule than the New
England Plaintiffs' claims.  Additionally, the Midwest Plaintiffs
continued to be represented by Lead Counsel, but New England
plaintiff Village Market was represented by its individual counsel,
Dangel & Mattchen.  Nevertheless, the New England and Midwest
Plaintiffs agreed to coordinate discovery of their cases.

On Sept. 7, 2016, the Court certified five classes of Midwest
Plaintiffs.  In July 2017, a settlement was reached between D&G on
behalf of the Champaign DC Non-Arbitration Class and Supervalu.
Under the Settlement Agreement SuperValu agreed to pay $8.75
million, and further agreed that with respect to the Action,
including the Settlement Agreement, Supervalu will bear its own
costs and attorneys' fees.  In return, D&G and the Champaign
Non-Arbitration Class agreed to release their claims against
SuperValu.  The Court granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement on Nov. 16, 2017.

The Midwest Plaintiffs continued to litigate their claims against
C&S, and Village Market continued to litigate its claims against
SuperValu.

In April 2018, the Court held a jury trial on the Midwest
Plaintiffs' claims against C&S.  The jury returned a verdict for
C&S on April 19, 2018.  An amended final judgment for C&S was
entered on May 23, 2018.  C&S timely filed a 2018 Bill of Costs
against the Midwest Plaintiffs and renewed its request for the
costs itemized in its 2013 Bill of Costs.

On July 27, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment to SuperValu
on Village Market's claims.  The Judgment for SuperValu was entered
on July 30, 2018.  SuperValu timely filed a 2018 Bill of Costs
against Village Market and renewed its request for the costs
itemized in its 2013 Bill of Costs.

On Nov. 26, 2018, the Court entered Cost Judgments on the
Defendants' 2013 and 2018 Bills of Costs.  The Motions to review
the Cost Judgments have been filed by DeLuca's, Village Market, and
both the Defendants.

DeLuca's seeks review of the Cost Judgment awarding $33,585.07
jointly and severally against DeLuca's and the Midwest Plaintiffs
for amounts claimed in C&S' 2013 Bill of Costs.  It argues that it
should not be held liable on the Cost Judgment.  DeLuca's states
that the Midwest Plaintiffs do not object to DeLuca's being removed
as a liable party.


Judge Montgomery denied DeLuca's Motion for Review of C&S' Cost
Judgment against it.  She holds that DeLuca's has not met its
burden of showing that the Court should depart from the default
rule of joint and several liabilities.  Similarly unpersuasive is
DeLuca's argument that it will potentially suffer financial
hardship if the Midwest Plaintiffs prevail on appeal and DeLuca's
is forced to pay the Cost Judgment on its own.  DeLuca's has not
provided an affidavit or other evidence showing that it is
financially incapable of satisfying the Cost Judgment, and even if
it had, financial hardship is not a defense to a cost award.

The Judge will award $41,129.45 for ESI-related expenses requested
in C&S' 2013 Bill of Costs as the costs of making copies, and will
award $1,049.29 for ESI-related expenses requested in C&S' 2018
Bill of Costs as fees for exemplification.  She finds that of the
$372,206.83 requested for ESI in C&S' 2013 Bill of costs,
$41,129.45 was incurred for scanning, converting files to TIFF
images, and OCR'ing documents.  These services fall within the
purview of "making copies" and will be awarded.  The remaining
services were broadly described as "ESI processing" or pertained to
preliminary steps that were taken to produce the electronic
discovery.  Additionally, C&S provides no explanation of the tasks
or processes performed in the subset of costs described as "ESI
processing."  Nor do the underlying invoices offer insight on the
nature of the services and which, if any, equated to making
electronic copies in the agreed-upon format.  Thus, these services
will not be taxed.

With respect to expert deposition fees, the Judge finds that the
amount of expert witness fees in C&S' 2013 Bill of Costs that were
incurred during the expert's deposition is $2,925 charged by expert
John Johnson for his March 2, 2012 deposition.  These costs will be
taxed against the Midwest Plaintiffs and DeLuca's.  C&S also
incurred $296.05 in allowable travel expenses for expert Kenneth
Elzinga.  Thus, total expert witness deposition fees of $13,521.05
($13,225 plus $296.05) will be taxed against the Midwest
Plaintiffs.

To the extent that the costs requested in SuperValu's 2013 Bill of
Costs are taxable, Village Market and DeLuca's will be jointly and
severally liable for one half of those costs, and the other half is
deemed to have been satisfied by SuperValu's Settlement Agreement
with D&G and the Champaign Non-Arbitration Class.  SuperValu's Cost
Judgments will be amended to reflect this pro rata allocation.

The Judge will award $19,047.51 for ESI-related expenses requested
in SuperValu's 2013 Bill of Costs as the costs of making copies.
Together with the $1,078.74 awarded for paper copies, SuperValu's
total award for costs for copies based on its 2013 Bill of Costs is
$20,126.25.

The Judge will also award SuperValu $1,462.50 for expert witness
deposition fees requested in its 2013 Bill of Costs.  These fees
constitute half of the costs charged to SuperValu for the time
expert John Johnson spent being deposed on March 2, 2012.  Village
Market and DeLuca's are jointly and severally liable for this
amount.  SuperValu is also awarded expert witness deposition fees
in its 2018 Bill of Costs of $9,050.  Village Market is solely
liable for this amount.

Based on the foregoing, and all the files and records therein,
Judge Montgomery (i) granted in part and denied in part SuperValu's
Motion for Review of Cost Judgments; (ii) granted in part and
denied in part C&S' Motion for Review of Cost Judgment; (iii)
denied DeLuca's Motion for Review of Cost Judgment; (iv) granted in
part and denied in part Village Market's Motion for Review of Cost
Judgment as specified; and (v) granted in part and denied in part
Village Market and DeLuca's Joint Motion for Review of Cost
Judgment as specified.

C&S' Cost Judgment against the Midwest Plaintiffs and DeLuca's is
amended to award costs as follows: (i) Fees of the clerk - $400;
(ii) Fees for transcripts - $24,214.90; (iii) Fees for copies -
$50,079.62; and (iv) Expert witness deposition fees - $2,925.

C&S' Cost Judgment against the Midwest Plaintiffs is amended to
award costs as follows: (i) Fees for transcripts - $43,471.51; (ii)
Fees for witnesses - $5,792.85; (iii) Fees for copies - $16,203.31;
and (iv) Expert witness deposition fees - $13,521.05.

SuperValu's Cost Judgment against Village Market is amended to
award costs as follows: (i) Fees for transcripts - $5,861.32; (ii)
Fees for copies - $380.74; and (iii) Expert witness deposition fees
- $9,050.

SuperValu's Cost Judgment against Village Market and DeLuca's is
amended to award costs as follows: (i) Fees for transcripts -
$17,051.64; (ii) Fees for copies - $20,126.25; and (iii) Expert
witness deposition fees - $1,462.50.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lyi8ZZ from Leagle.com.

Plaintiff's Co-Lead Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel B.
Allanoff, Meredith & Cohen, Daniel Kotchen -- dkotchen@kotchen.com
-- Kotchen & Low LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Low -- dlow@kotchen.com
-- Kotchen & Low LLP, pro hac vice, Edward T. Dangel, III, Dangel &
Mattchen, Elizabeth R. Odette -- erodette@locklaw.com -- Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP, Joel C. Meredith, Meredith & Associates,
Jonathan R. Voegele -- jvoegele@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller &
Flexner LLP, Kate M. Baxter-Kauf -- kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Matthew J. Henken --
mhenken@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Richard B.
Drubel -- rdrubel@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP,
Steven J. Greenfogel, Meredith Cohen Greenfogel & Skirnick & W.
Joseph Bruckner -- wjbruckner@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen PLLP.

Plaintiff's Liaison Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth R.
Odette, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Kate M. Baxter-Kauf,
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP & W. Joseph Bruckner, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Supervalu, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eric Barstad --
EBarstad@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Geoffrey H. Kozen
-- GKozen@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
L.L.P., Gordon J. MacDonald, Nixon Peabody LLP, pro hac vice, James
S. Harrington, Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi LLP, Jeffrey Sullivan
Gleason -- JGleason@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, K. Craig
Wildfang -- KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Lisa
L. Beane -- LBeane@RobinsKaplan.com -- Martin R. Lueck --
MLueck@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP & Stephen P. Safranski
-- SSafranski@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP.

C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron S.
Rabinowitz, Baker Botts L.L.P, Andrew Leader Lucarelli, Baker Botts
LLP, David J. Lender, Weil Gotshal & Manges, Eric Shaun Hochstadt,
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, Erik Koons, Hollman, Baker Botts,
L.L.P., Luna Ngan Barrington, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, Nicole M.
Moen, Fredrikson & Byron, PA & Todd A. Wind, Fredrikson & Byron,
PA.


MDL 2672: Administrative Bids to Seal Confidential Docs Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, This Order Relates
To: Dkt. Nos. 3789, 3790, 3791, 3792, 3795, 3796, 3798, 3801, Case
No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge Charles R. Bryer of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied the
Plaintiffs' administrative motions to seal.

The Plaintiffs in eight cases with pending remand motions have
moved to file under seal certain documents attached to those
motions and to seal descriptions of, or quotes from, those
documents in the motions.  The basis for the request is that the
documents at issue were designated as confidential by Volkswagen
pursuant to a protective order.

The Judge explains that documents that are designated as
confidential pursuant to a protective order are not always
sealable.  Thus, when a party is seeking to file under seal a
document designated as confidential by the opposing party pursuant
to a protective order, the designating party, within four days of
the motion to seal, must file a declaration establishing that all
of the designated material is sealable.

From the record, it does not appear that Volkswagen, as the
designating party, filed such a declaration; and the absence of
such a declaration leaves the Judge without the means to determine
whether the requested sealing would be appropriate.  He therefore
denied the motions to seal.  The Plaintiffs may file unredacted
versions of the documents sought to be sealed no earlier than four
days, and no later than 10 days, after the date of the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/7lliYB from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker -- ctucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang --
dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC,
Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com -- Womble
Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer --
wscherer@conradscherer.com -- Conrad and Scherer, LLP, J. Randolph
Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com --
Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com
-- Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg --
jrugg@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer
Marino Thibodaux -- jthibodaux@gibbonslaw.com -- Gibbons PC.


MDL 2672: Volkswagen's Renewed Bid to Seal in Clean Diesel Suit OKd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, This Order Relates
To: Dkt. No. 5834, Case No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Charles R. Bryer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted Volkswagen's renewed motion to
seal.

Volkswagen previously moved to file under seal portions of exhibits
to the declaration of Jay R. Lytle, a declaration that it submitted
in support of its omnibus opposition to the Plaintiffs' motions to
remand.  Because Volkswagen did not file proposed redacted versions
of the exhibits, the Court denied the motion without prejudice and
instructed Volkswagen to renew its motion.

Volkswagen has renewed its motion and has now provided proposed
redacted versions of Exhibits A, B, and C to the Lytle declaration.
It seeks to redact only a small category of information in the
exhibits: Vehicle Identification Numbers ("VINs") that Volkswagen
obtained from non-public sources for certain Plaintiffs' vehicles.

Judge Bryer finds compelling reason for sealing VINs that are
obtained from non-public sources.  As the Federal Trade Commission
previously stated in the MDL, VINs can be used to further identify
theft.  The public has a strong interest in preventing identify
theft, which is a pernicious practice.  And indeed, in Kamakana v.
City & Cty. of Honolulu, a magistrate judge concluded that
preventing identify theft was a compelling reason supporting the
sealing of home addresses and social security numbers -- and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Because a compelling reason justifies sealing the VINs in question,
the Judge granted Volkswagen's motion to seal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/69FRtg from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker -- ctucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang --
dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC,
Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com -- Womble
Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer --
wscherer@conradscherer.com -- Conrad and Scherer, LLP, J. Randolph
Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com --
Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com
-- Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg --
jrugg@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer
Marino Thibodaux -- jthibodaux@gibbonslaw.com -- Gibbons PC.


MDL 2765: Rousseau Appeals Ruling in Faulty Timing Belt Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Non-party David J. Rousseau filed an appeal from a Court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain Product
Liability Litigation, Case No. 2-16-cv-02765, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Volkswagen Timing Chain
Product Liability Litigation, Case No. 19-1324, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 1,
2019, Non-parties Deborah Michelson and M. Clay Ragsdale filed
separate appeals from a court ruling in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit accuses the automakers of concealing defective timing
belt tensioning systems in their vehicles.  The defect can cause
vehicles to lose power at any time, placing occupants at risk,
according to the suit.

The suit claims that, based on pre-production testing, design
failure mode analysis and consumer complaints to dealers, the
defendants knew of the premature failure of the tensioning system
in class members' vehicles but fraudulently concealed them from
class members.  In addition, according to the suit, the Defendants
knowingly omitted material facts about the defective tensioning
system and its corresponding safety risk, and misrepresented to
buyers the standard, quality or grade of class vehicles.

The named plaintiff in the timing chain tensioner case, David
Zimand of Englewood, leased a 2009 Volkswagen Jetta in April 2009,
and then purchased the car in 2012 when his lease ended.  In March
2014, the car experienced tensioning system failure, which resulted
in catastrophic failure of the engine, the suit says.  He was
forced to replace the camshaft, chain, chain tensioner, valves and
numerous other engine parts, which he paid for out of pocket, and
he was without a vehicle for two weeks, the complaint claims.

Not Party-Appellant DAVID J. ROUSSEAU, of Lake View, New York,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee DAVID ZIMAND, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO PC
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: JCecchi@CarellaByrne.com

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN PC
          210 Summit Avenue
          Montvale, NJ 07645
          Telephone: (201) 391-7000
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com

               - and -

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Matthew R. Mendelson, Esq.
          MAZIE SLATER KATZ & FREEMAN LLC
          103 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 207
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 228-9898
          E-mail: mmendelsohn@mazieslater.com

               - and -

          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          361 West Lancaster Avenue
          One Haverford Centre
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 645-4712
          E-mail: mds@chimicles.com

               - and -

          Christopher A. Seeger, Esq.
          SEEGER WEISS LLP
          55 Challenger Road, 6th Floor
          Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660
          Telephone: (973) 639-9100
          E-mail: cseeger@seegerweiss.com

               - and -

          Thomas P. Sobran, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS P. SOBRAN
          7 Evergreen Lane
          Hingham, MD 02043
          Telephone: (781) 741-6075
          E-mail: tsobran@sobranlaw.com

               - and -

          Roland K. Tellis, Esq.
          BARON & BUDD PC
          15910 Ventura Boulevard
          Suite 1600, Encino Plaza
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 839-2333
          E-mail: rtellis@baronbudd.com

Defendants-Appellees VOLKSWAGEN AG, VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA
INC. and AUDI AG are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Chase, Esq.
          CHASE KURSHAN HERZFELD & RUBIN LLC
          354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1100
          Livingston, NJ 07039
          Telephone: (973) 535-8840

               - and -

          Homer B. Ramsey, Esq.
          HERZFELD & RUBIN PC
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 471-8517
          E-mail: HRamsey@herzfeld-rubin.com


MDL 2804: Kalamazoo County to Join Opioid Crisis Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Knef, writing for Newschannel 3, reports that the Kalamazoo
County Commission signed a document that declared opioids a public
nuisance and signed a contract to join a national class-action
lawsuit opioid against pharmaceutical companies during the Jan. 15
board meeting.

Opioids cost people jobs, tear families apart, and, according to
data provided by the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services, killed 44 people in Kalamazoo County in 2017.

"I have at least one person, either a patient or a family member,
every month frankly, that faces these issues," said Kalamazoo
County Commission Chair Julie Rogers, who is also a physical
therapist at Borgess at Woodbridge Hills.

Ms. Rogers said the declaration of opioids a public nuisance came
at the advice of the law firm the county hired, as it prepares to
take on the companies that produce these drugs.

"This is a health problem, and it's a crisis reaching an emergent
level, and sounding the alarm bells throughout our county, which we
already kind of knew, but it just gives it a little bit more
teeth."

In addition to signing the declaration, Ms. Rogers signed a
contract to join the national class-action opioid lawsuit against
pharmaceutical companies. She said the two go hand in hand, and
passed through the board 10-1.

"People ask is this all about the money? And I say, absolutely not.
To me, it's about injunctive relief," she said.

Ms. Rogers said the reason for entering into the lawsuit was to
help try to change the behavior of drug manufacturers. She said, in
the last year, providers have become a little more cautious, but
there is much room for improvement.

Ms. Rogers played a big role in the county's research into the
opioid crisis, along with the county health department.

The study found the number of accidental opioid related deaths
doubled from 2015 to 2016. [GN]


MG MEDIA: Failed to Pay Overtime Wages, Oczeus & Dozier Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROSELANDE OCZEUS and JAMIE DOZIER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly-situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MG MEDIA
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation and MICHAEL G.
NADERI, the Defendants, Case No. 9:19-cv-80193-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
Feb. 8, 2019), alleges that the Defendants failed to lawfully pay
overtime wages to the Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

According to the compliant, Naderi and MG jointly employed the
Plaintiffs. Oczeus was employed by the Defendants from on or about
October 29, 2017, until August 31, 2018, and worked at the
Defendants' principal place of business. Dozier was employed by the
Defendants from on or about November 8, 2017, until August 31,
2018, and worked at the Defendants' principal place of business.

Both Oczeus and Dozier regularly worked over 40 hours per work
week, including working "off the clock" and on the weekends. The
Defendants failed to pay Oczeus and Dozier the lawful, mandatory
minimum overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular
hourly rates for the hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours
per work week, and instead, either paid them their regular hourly
rates, i.e., "straight time," or failed to pay them at all for
those hours, the lawsuit says.

MG Media Solutions Inc. is in the communication services
business.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          James C. Solomon, Esq.
          SCOTT WAGNER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          www.ScottWagnerLaw.com
          250 S. Central Blvd., Suite 104-A
          Jupiter, FL 33458
          Alt. Address: 101 Northpoint Pkwy
          West Palm Beach, FL 33407
          Telephone: (561) 653-0008
          Facsimile: (561) 653-0020
          E-mail: jcsolomon@scottwagnerlaw.com
                    mail@scottwagnerlaw.com

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP (www.blockesq.com), a Boston based securities
litigation firm representing investors nationwide, on Jan. 23
informed investors that it has filed a securities fraud class
action against Micron Technology Inc. ("Micron Technology" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: MU) and certain of its officers alleging
violations of the federal securities laws. Class members interested
in serving as lead plaintiff are required to move for appointment
by March 25, 2019, and are encouraged to contact Block & Leviton
LLP to learn more.

The Complaint filed in the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York, located at 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY
10007, and captioned Kniffin v. Micron Technology Inc., Case No.
19-cv-00678 alleges that throughout the Class Period the Defendants
misled investors by failing to disclose that Micron Technology was
engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy with Samsung Electronics and
SK Hynix, and that such unlawful behavior could lead to severe
sanctions against the Company. A judge has not yet been assigned to
the case.

If you have purchased or otherwise acquired Micron Technology
securities and have questions about your legal rights, or possess
information relevant to this investigation, you are encouraged to
contact Block & Leviton LLP at (617) 398-5660, by email at
info@blockesq.com or by visiting http://shareholder.law/micron.

Block & Leviton LLP was recently ranked 4th among securities
litigation firms by ISS for recoveries in 2017. The firm represents
many of the nation's largest institutional investors and numerous
individual investors in securities litigation throughout the
country. Indeed, its lawyers have recovered billions of dollars for
its clients. [GN]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Smith Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc.  The case is styled as Ida Smith, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Midland
Credit Management, Inc., Midland Funding LLC and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02098 (W.D. Ten., February 8, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   STEIN SAKS, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601-2726
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Gurley Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
RUTH GURLEY, Individually and as ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of
DOUGLAS N. GURLEY, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00192-JAR (E.D. Mo., Feb. 8,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241-8111
          Facsimile: 314 241-5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723-4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723-4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com

MORENO'S MEXICAN: Nafarrate Seeks OT Pay for Restaurant Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Edgar Nafarrate, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Moreno's Mexican Grill, L.L.C.;
Moreno's Mexican Grill, Number Two, L.L.C.; Moreno's Mexican Grill
Number Three, L.L.C.; Moreno's Mexican Grill Number Four, L.L.C.;
Moreno's Mexican Grill Number Five, L.L.C.; Moreno's Mexican Grill
Number Six, L.L.C.; Moreno's Mexican Grill Number Seven, L.L.C.;
Moreno's Mexican Grill Number Eight, L.L.C.; Jose Angel Moreno; and
Martina Moreno, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00828-JAT (D.
Ariz., Feb. 8, 2019), alleges that the Defendants did not pay
overtime to their hourly restaurant workers pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Arizona Wage Law. Instead, the
Defendants pay them the same hourly rate for all hours worked,
including those worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Because the
Defendants' payroll practice violates the overtime provisions of
the FLSA and the requirements of Arizona's wage statutes.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employed and/or jointly
employed Nafarrate and the Class Members to prepare and serve food
and clean in the Defendants' chain of Mexican restaurants known as
"Moreno's Mexican Grill."  Nafarrate and the Class Members
routinely worked many hours in excess of 40 per week. They often
worked 60 hours or more in a workweek. Accordingly, Nafarrate and
the Class Members had a reasonable expectation they would be paid
overtime wages. The Defendants knew Nafarrate and the Class Members
worked more than 40 hours in a workweek.  The Defendants knew this
because they track hours worked in a timekeeping system, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes:

          Daniel L. Bonnett, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONNETT, P.L.L.C.
          4647 N. 32nd Street, Suite 185
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Telephone: (602) 240-6900
          Facsimile: (602) 240-2345
          E-mail: dbonnett@martinbonnett.com

               - and -

          David I. Moulton, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: dmoulton@brucknerburch.com

MOUNTAIRE CORP: Reconsideration of Gag Order in Cuppels Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY and ANNA-MARIE CUPPELS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MOUNTAIRE
CORPORATION, an Arkansas corporation, MOUNTAIRE FARMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, and MOUNTAIRE FARMS OF DELAWARE, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Defendants, C.A. No. S18C-06-009 (Del.
Super.), Judge Richard F. Stokes of the Superior Court of Delaware
granted the Defendants' Nov. 12, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration of
Commissioner's Order on Motion for a Gag Order.

On June 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants,
the operators of chicken processing plants.  The Plaintiffs allege
physical injuries and property contamination have resulted from the
Defendants' method of disposing of wastewater and sludge from their
plants.  They also claim harm from air pollution associated with
the Defendants' business.

A related Superior Court case is State of Delaware Department of
Natural Resources & Environmental Control v. Mountaire Farms of
Delaware, Inc., C.A. No. S18M-06-002.  This case is an
environmental regulatory enforcement action brought by the Delaware
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC")
and alleges violations of state statutes, state regulations, and
permits. DNREC and Defendants have negotiated a consent decree in
that action.  However, Court approval of the consent decree is
still pending.  The Plaintiffs and others have sought to intervene
in that case.

After initiating the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs' counsel and their
paid consultants held a televised press conference in which the
Plaintiffs' representatives made statements about the Defendants'
conduct that were set forth as fact.  In fact, these comments
constituted the opinions of the Plaintiffs' legal team.

The Defendants' representatives began releasing public statements
questioning the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims and the quality of
their legal representation.  Moreover, the Defendants commenced
purchasing print, radio, and television advertisements.  This
advertising campaign allowed them to communicate directly to
constituents who comprise the potential jury pool in the case.

The counsel exchanged emails concerning the nature of the comments
representatives of both parties were making but were unable to
reach an agreement as to the appropriateness of the public
statements.

On Sept. 20, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Gag Order.
In it, they alleged the Defendants' advertisements contained
language and knowledge the Defendants do not use in their normal
course of business or marketing.  Thus, the Plaintiffs surmised,
the advertising campaign was likely the product of the Defendants'
discussions with their legal counsel.  By way of the Motion, they
sought a gag order prohibiting the Defendants and their counsel
from making any further public statements about the proposed
consent decree, efforts to improve its wastewater processing
facility, and any other matters material to either the consent
decree or the class action case.

The Motion for a Gag Order was heard by a Superior Court
Commissioner on Oct. 26, 2018.  By way of written order dated Oct.
30, 2018, the Commissioner granted a Limited Gag Order.  The Order
prohibits the attorneys, experts, consultants, and witnesses for
both parties, the Plaintiffs, the Defendants' officers, and any
persons or entities acting on behalf of the Defendants in a public
relations capacity from publicly commenting on this case, except in
accordance with Delaware's Professional Conduct Rule 3.6.1

The Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 132.  They contend that the
Order is based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.
They argue the Order failed to acknowledge that one of the
challenged communications was excused by Comment 7 to Rule 3.6.
They also maintain the Order mischaracterizes an advertisement
released by them.  Finally, the Defendants protest that they have
not sought a change of venue, as the Order implies they intend to
do.

Judge Stokes concludes the factual findings made by the
Commissioner are supported by the record.  The purpose of the Order
is to provide guidance to the parties going forward.  The
Commissioner's finding that the intent of the Defendants' print
advertisement was to sway public opinion in favor of the Defendants
is supported by the text of the advertisement itself.  Finally, the
Order reference to a motion to change venue is made in context of
considering alternative ways to remove prejudice from the
proceedings if the parties were to continue to try to the case in
the media.  The record buttresses the need for the Court to step in
and restrict public comment in the case.

The Defendants also argue the Order is contrary to law and an abuse
of discretion.  In so doing, they argue the gag order is not
narrowly tailored to protect their First Amendment rights and is
not the least restrictive means necessary.  Finally, they quibble
that the terms of the Order are overly broad and lacking in
direction.

Again, the Judge disagrees.  The Commissioner found that, if the
parties continued trying the case in the media, finding an
impartial jury may be impossible.  The Commissioner reviewed other
options and deemed them insufficient to address this risk.  The
Commissioner's decision to restrict language designed to influence
the potential jury pool ensures a fair trial.  Further, the
determination is a balanced one as its terms apply to both
litigants.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Stokes denied the Defendants' Motion
for Reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/zYlQYw from Leagle.com.


NETGEAR INC: Court Grants Bid to Compel Arbitration in Klebba Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RYAN KLEBBA, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NETGEAR, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-CV-438-RP (W.D. Tex.), Judge Robert Pitman of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division,
granted in part and denied in part Netgear's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims.

In August 2017, Klebba bought online a baby monitor from Netgear
called the Arlo Baby.  Klebba lives in Austin, Texas; Netgear is
headquartered in Cailfornia and incorporated in Delaware.  The Arlo
Baby allegedly did not work as advertised: the video and audio
stream was unreliable, and the camera frequently disconnected from
the display. Netgear also never produced a companion tablet that
would connect to the monitor without an active internet connection.


Accordingly, Klebba has now sued Netgear for violations of Texas,
California, and federal laws governing express and implied
warranties; violations of California false advertising and unfair
competition statutes; and unjust enrichment.  He seeks to represent
a class of similar dissatisfied consumers.

Anyone who buys an Arlo Baby has to create an Arlo account on
Netgear's website or through a smartphone app.  Klebba created an
Arlo account online.  To create an Arlo account online, a customer
must visit a sign-in webpage in which he or she must populate a set
of fields: first and last name, email address, and password.  At
the bottom of that page, beneath the fields, is an empty checkbox
next to the words "I agree to the Terms of Service."  The words
"Terms of Service" are hyperlinked to a different webpage
containing Netgear's terms of service for the Arlo Baby.  Beneath
that checkbox is a button labeled "Next," which appears grey and
does not operate until the customer clicks on the checkbox. If a
customer clicks on the "Terms of Service" hyperlink, Netgear's
webpage containing its terms of service opens in a new browser
window.  At the bottom of the terms-of-service page is a green
button labeled "Agree" and a black button labeled "Disagree."  If a
customer clicks "Agree," he or she returns to the sign-in page,
where the checkbox is automatically checked.  Once the customer
checks the checkbox, either by reading the Terms and selecting
"Agree" or simply checking the box without reading the Terms, the
"Next" button turns blue and becomes operative, and the customer
can proceed with creating his or her Arlo account.  A customer
cannot create an Arlo Account without agreeing to the Terms by
checking the checkbox.

The Terms advise customers that they agree to the Terms by using
the Arlo Baby.  The Terms contain arbitration, choice-of-law, and
venue provisions, along with a class action waiver.  Netgear now
seeks to enforce that arbitration provision.  Klebba objects that
he never agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and that even if he did,
his agreement is unenforceable.

Judge Pitman finds that because determining whether Klebba formed a
contract is a question of state law, the Court's task is to predict
Texas law, not create it.  Texas courts recognize the validity of
clickwrap agreements.  Because Klebba created an Arlo account, he
must have either checked the checkbox or clicked the "Agree" button
at the bottom of the Terms.  Although Klebba insists that he did
not know about the arbitration clause, parties to a contract have
an obligation to protect themselves by reading what they sign and,
absent a showing of fraud, cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of failing to meet that obligation.  Klebba concedes
that fraud is not at issue.  He may therefore not excuse himself
from his obligation to have read the Terms.  The Judge finds that
Klebba formed an agreement to arbitrate when he checked the
checkbox next to the words "I agree to the Terms of Service."
Klebba therefore agreed to delegate the determination of his
remaining disputes regarding the arbitration clause's validity and
scope to an arbitrator.

Netgear asks the Court to dismiss the action rather than stay it
for the duration of arbitration.  The Judge finds that the
arbitration agreement's scope remains in dispute, and an arbitrator
may conclude that Klebba's false advertising claim is not subject
to arbitration.  He therefore finds that a stay, rather than
dismissal, is appropriate.

For these reasons, Judge Pitman granted in part and denied in part
Netgear's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Claims.  Netgear's motion is granted insofar as Klebba's claims are
stayed pending arbitration; all other relief requested in Netgear's
motion, including dismissal and transfer, is denied.  Netgear's
motion for a hearing, is also denied.  The parties will file a
joint status reports detailing the status of the arbitration
proceedings on June 5, 2019, and every 120 days thereafter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/aX838l from Leagle.com.

Ryan Klebba, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Alexander D. Kruzyk --
akruzyk@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC & Aaron D.
Radbil -- aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil
PLLC.

Netgear, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lee Landa Kaplan --
lkaplan@skv.com -- Smyser, Kaplan & Veselka, L.L.P., Melissa C.
Hughes -- mhughes@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Quyen
L. Ta -- qta@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner LLP & Razvan
Ungureanu -- rungureanu@skv.com -- Smyser Kaplan & Veselka, LLP.


NEW YORK: Sued Over Mentally Ill Inmates Post-Release Housing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Hamilton, writing for Law.com, reports that indigent inmates
with significant mental health issues are forced to remain
incarcerated past their release dates because of a lack of
community-based housing available from the state, according to a
new class action filed on Jan. 23 in Manhattan federal court.

The complaint alleges that the failure of two state agencies --the
Office of Mental Health and the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision -- have effectively, and illegally, extended
the plaintiffs' period of imprisonment by months and sometimes
years because the state has not ensured that enough supportive
housing is available upon release.

Despite serving their time, the plaintiffs say they remain locked
in secure prison facilities under the same restrictions as any
other prisoner, including infractions that can lead to solitary
confinement or even the revocation of a previously approved
release.

According to the complaint, approximately 2,050 people with serious
mental health issues are discharged every year. OMH takes the lead
in working with these inmates who may be homeless upon release to
find a suitable residency. DOCCS, which is involved in the
selection process, has final say over whether a proposed location,
such as a homeless shelter, has the appropriate services to support
the inmate's needs.

According to the suit, proposed references are often rejected for
these reasons. But in doing so, those inmates with serious mental
health issues that the state believes will become homeless upon
release are left with a single option for housing identified by
OMH. Unless and until that housing option becomes available, these
inmates are forced to stay behind bars despite having served their
time.

According to Stefen Short, staff attorney for the Legal Aid
Society's Prisoners Rights Project, the situation shows the
"woefully insufficient" amount of appropriate housing provided for
by the state, despite state law mandating prisoners with serious
mental health issues be released into appropriate housing.

"OMH is not meeting that need," he said. "That's really what's
causing it."

A spokesman for DOCCS did not respond to a request for comment.

In a statement, a spokeswoman for OMH said the agency couldn't
comment on the specifics of the lawsuit. She did, however, defend
the state's overall handling of support for people with mental
illnesses. The state invests close to $400 million a year on
community-based housing, including more than 44,000 units statewide
for the population.

She went on to note that a commitment by the state for some 6,000
or more units of supportive housing for homeless individuals the
state plans to construct by 2021. Of these, 120 are expected to be
reserved for individuals released from incarceration.

The suit makes claims for two classes of individuals. The first, a
general class, are those individuals who continue to be
incarcerated past their release dates, including the end of their
prison sentences, approved conditional release dates, and open
dates for parole release. This class makes claims against the state
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.

The second subclass of individuals is those who remain behind bars
past the maximum expiration dates of their court-imposed prison
sentences. This class brings additional constitutional claims
against the state under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

According to the Legal Aid Society's Short, the goal of the
litigation is to force the state to allocate the appropriate amount
of resources to ensure inmates can be released in a timely way,
into appropriate housing that offers the help they need.

"We're really seeking an expansion of the community-based mental
health system," he said.

Legal Aid was joined by Disability Rights New York in filing the
lawsuit, G. v. Cuomo, 19-cv-00639. [GN]


NFL: New Orleans Saints Season Ticketholders File Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Sabrina Canfield, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that New Orleans Saints season ticketholders filed a class action
against the NFL on Jan. 22, saying the blown pass-interference call
that cost the Saints the NFC championship cast doubt on the
league's "integrity and fairness." And they say, three members of
the officiating crew had previously been accused of "biased rulings
on the field."

The blown pass-interference call at the 7-yard line, with less than
1:40 left in the fourth quarter has been seen more than 1 million
times on YouTube. In it, viewers can see Los Angeles Rams
cornerback Nickell Robey-Coleman slamming Saints wide receiver
Tommylee Lewis in a helmet-to-helmet hit, knocking him out of
bounds as the ball arrives on target.

There was no call of pass interference, though the videos, taken
from various angles, show it as a textbook case of that infraction.
A correct call would have given the Saints a first down at the
7-yard line.

Lead plaintiffs Tommy Badeaux and Candis Lambert sued on behalf of
New Orleans Saint Season Ticket Holders, et al. The lead defendant
is NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell.

Mr. Goodell has the discretion, as commissioner, to investigate and
take appropriate measures if it appears that any "extraordinarily
unfair" circumstance distorts a game's outcome, the plaintiffs
lawsuit say.

In fact, under NFL Rule 17, Section2, Article 3, Mr. Goodell has
the power to reverse the game's result "either from the beginning
or from the point at which the extraordinary act occurred."

"The blatant infraction and deliberate act of Los Angeles Rams
cornerback, Robey-Coleman was admitted by the player to avoid a
touchdown by New Orleans Saints, wide receiver, Tommylee Lewis. The
non-call of the actions of Robey-Coleman was later admitted by NFL
officials to New Orleans Saints coach, Sean Payton, as a blunder.
The impact of the non-call is egregious sand demands recourse," the
Saints fans say.

The complaint quotes Saints Coach Sean Payton asking whether there
was ever "more obvious pass interference."

"It's frustrating, you know," Mr. Payton said. The National
Football League "blew the call, there were a lot of opportunities
though. But that call makes it first end ten, we're on our knee
three plays, and it's a game changing call. It's where it's at.
It's disappointing."

Los Angeles Rams defensive back Robey-Coleman, "additionally
applied an illegal helmet-to-helmet hit on a defenseless receiver,"
the complaint states. "Inexplicably, neither penalty was called.
The scrutiny arising from the non-call has led to the appearance of
foul play by the officiants: Todd Prukop, backup judge, is from Los
Angeles, Gary Cavaletto, side judge, is from Los Angeles; Bill
Vinovich, officiant, and his team, were the subject of a petition
to be removed in the official capacity as referee in the NFC
Championship game for previously alleged biased rulings on the
field," the complaint states.

"Whether or not the bias is intentional, there is too much evidence
to demonstrate a pattern, and for a corporation as big as the NFL
not to see the pattern is highly unlikely. The magnitude of this
game is too large and the referees should be neutral and enforce
the rules, plain and simple."

It continues: "As a direct result of the said incident, plaintiffs
herein, have been left bereft and with no faith in the National
Football League for fairness despite the leagues own rules to
correct such errors, along with emotional anguish, monetary loss
for ticket holders, who purchased tickets with the presumption of
integrity and fairness."

Roger Goodell's office did not reply to a telephone call seeking
comment on Jan. 22.

Plaintiff's attorney Frank D'Amico Jr. seeks an immediate hearing
on the matter, in Orleans Parish Court. [GN]


NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY: Derr Files Civil Rights Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Northumberland County
Children and Youth Services. The case is styled as Grace M. Derr,
William J. Derr and Stephen A. Derr and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Northumberland County Children and Youth
Services, Nourthumberland County Commissioners, Families United
Network, Richard J. Schoch Northumberland County Commissioner,
individually and in his official capacity, Samuel J. Shicacatano,
Northumberland County Commissioner, individually and in his
official capacity, Kimberly Best, Northumberland County
Commissioner, individually and in her offical capacity, Katrina
Gownley, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Cathy
Gemberling, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity,
Selissa Mauger, NCCYS, individually and her official capacity, Lisa
Schafferr, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Marie
Milke, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Amanda
Williard, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Kathy
Hollabaough, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Jill
Snyder, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Shawn
Homan NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity, Monika
Homan, NCCYS, individually and in her official capacity and
Kimberly Bills Carpenter, NCCYS, individually and in her official
capacity, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00215-MWB-WIA (M.D. Penn.,
February 7, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as violation of the
Civil Rights Act.

Northumberland County Children and Youth Services is Social
services organization in Sunbury, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.



OC TRANSPO: Class Action Lawsuit Seeks $60MM in Damages
-------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Duffy, writing for Ottawa Citizen, reports that an Ottawa
law office has launched a class action lawsuit seeking financial
compensation for people injured and traumatized in last week's OC
Transpo bus crash at Westboro station.

The Merchant Law Group, a national law firm with offices in Ottawa,
filed a notice of action on Jan. 17 at the Ottawa courthouse --
less than one week after the crash that killed three OC Transpo
passengers and injured 23 others.

It asks the court to award $60 million in damages to crash victims,
and to the families of those injured and killed.

"There were a lot of frightening elements to the experience of
being on that bus or being on the Westboro platform," said Evatt
Merchant Esq. -- emerchant@merchantlaw.com -- a Merchant Law Group
partner based in Ottawa.

"Some people were trapped on the second floor of that bus, and I
can't imagine what it was like to go through that," he said.

Merchant said the law firm was approached earlier this week by a
passenger on the Route 269 bus that crashed into the platform at
Westboro station. The Kanata resident is now the representative
plaintiff in the case, launched under the class action law that
came into effect in Ontario in January 1993.

The plaintiff, Merchant said, wants to ensure that changes are made
to better protect passengers on double-decker buses. The buses have
been involved in two fatal crashes in Ottawa during the past six
years.

"He believes there's a safety elements that needs to be centre
stage," he said. "It's not just these two accidents that have
raised questions about the double-decker buses: these buses have
been blown over in high winds in Ottawa."

Merchant Law Group has pioneered the use of class action lawsuits
in Canada, but the high-profile firm has also attracted criticism.
The federal government continues to pursue a civil suit against the
firm for alleged billing irregularities during its negotiation of
the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, and several
Ontario judges have also questioned the firm's sharp-elbowed
tactics.

The law firm has pursued class action suits on behalf of people
affected by many wrongs, including faulty hip implants, lead paint
and the 2008 listeriosis outbreak that killed 22 Canadians.

A class action lawsuit can be brought by one person on behalf of
others (known as a class) who have suffered similar harm. A judge
must decide whether to certify a case and allow it to proceed as a
class action.

Following the 2013 OC Transpo-VIA Rail crash that killed six bus
passengers and injured dozens more, the City of Ottawa faced 39
individual lawsuits that sought more than $26 million in damages.

David White, deputy city solicitor, said 35 of those lawsuits had
been settled for $9.7 million.

Two city insurance policies were triggered by the payments — one
for general liability and the other for transportation. Both
policies have $3-million deductibles, which means city taxpayers
will pay a maximum of $6 million in connection with the 2013 damage
claims.

Some of the lawyers involved in those lawsuits say there's no doubt
the city will again bear liability in the Westboro bus crash.

"In a case like this, the city has to be liable: I can't see a
scenario where the city's not liable," personal injury lawyer
Howard Yegendorf Esq. -- info@yegendorf.com -- said in an
interview.

After the 2013 crash, Yegendorf represented two injured passenger
and the family of victim Michael Bleakney, 57, a federal government
geotechnical engineer. The family's statement of claim, filed in
January 2014, sought damages of $1.8 million and was settled out of
court.

In the most recent OC Transpo crash, Yegendorf said, all potential
explanations for the accident point to some kind of negligence on
the part of the city or its transit service.

"In this case, they have control over the Transitway; it's their
bus, and it's their driver," Yegendorf said. "So something wrong
happened: Either the conditions on the Transitway were hazardous,
maybe there was something wrong with the bus -- maybe the brakes
didn't work properly -- or the driver made an error."[GN]


OCWEN LOAN: Franklin May Ask Class-Wide Award of Damages Up to $5K
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY FRANKLIN, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-03333-SI (N.D. Cal.), Judge Susan
Illston of the U.S. District Court Court for the Northern District
of California (i) granted the Plaintiff's motion for clarification;
(ii) clarified that the Court's Nov. 13, 2018 Order does not limit
recovery in the case to $5,000 class-wide but that the Plaintiff
may seek a class-wide award of statutory damages in an amount up to
$5,000 per class member; and (iii) denied as moot the Plaintiff's
request for a certificate of appealability.

Franklin brings suit against the Defendant, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, for the alleged violation
of California Penal Code Section 632.7.  The case involves numerous
phone calls that the Defendant, which was servicing the Plaintiff's
home mortgage, placed to the Plaintiff between 2011 and 2015.

The Plaintiff alleges that only after he provided his personal
identification information and verified his account information
would the Defendant inform him that the telephone call was being
recorded.  He further alleges that on some occasions, the Defendant
did not tell him the telephone call was being recorded at all.

The Plaintiff brings one claim for relief, for illegal recording of
cellular phone conversations pursuant to California Penal Code
Section 632.7.  He brings the suit on behalf of himself and a
proposed class consisting of all persons in California whose
cellular telephone conversations were recorded without their
consent by the Defendant and/or its agent/s from Nov. 11, 2011
through the date of filing the Complaint.

In the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff requested injunctive
relief and statutory damages of $5,000 per violation, citing
California Penal Code Section 637.2.

On Aug. 30, 2018, the Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's
claim for $5,000 damages per violation, arguing that remedy was not
available for calls made before 2017, when a new version of Section
637.2 went into effect.  The Court held a hearing on Nov. 2, 2018.
On Nov. 13, 2018, the Court issued an Order finding that the
statute before 2017 did not allow damages on a per violation basis.
As such, it granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's claim for statutory damages on a per violation basis,
without leave to amend.

That Order is the subject of the Plaintiff's present motions.  He
now seeks to clarify whether the Court's ruling permits each
individual class member to seek up to $5,000 in damages for
violations of Section 637.2, predating Jan. 1, 2017.  In the event
that the Court finds that the maximum statutory recovery in the
case is capped at $5,000 for the entire class rather than for each
class member, the Plaintiff seeks a certificate of appealability
because the purported dismissal of statutory damages for each
putative class member will have a significant impact on the rights
of the proposed class.  The Defendant opposes both motions.

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), Judge Illston finds the matter
appropriate for resolution without oral argument and vacated the
hearing set for Feb. 8, 2019.

The Judge explains that for the Court to hold that its Nov. 13,
2018 Order limits the Plaintiff to $5,000 in class-wide damages
would put the Court out of step with the numerous courts that have
approved class action settlements in CIPA cases.  These
settlements, approved during the prior iteration of Section 637.2,
provided for well over $5,000 to the class.  She could not locate
any cases capping class recovery under Section 637.2 at $5,000.
Nor does the Defendant cite to any case in which a judge has
imposed the $5,000 class-wide cap that it urges.  The Defendant
argues, without citation, that the $5,000 damages provision of
Section 637.2 is in effect a 'bounty' for bringing an action and
that there was no need to multiply the $5,000 bounty by thousands
of violations to come up with a multi-million dollar award in the
absence of any actual harm.  This argument, she says, does not
persuade her to part ways from the numerous other courts that have
overseen CIPA class action cases.

Accordingly, the Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion for
clarification.  She clarified that the Court's Nov. 13, 2018 Order
does not limit recovery in the case to $5,000 class-wide but that
the Plaintiff may seek a class-wide award of damages in an amount
up to $5,000 per class member, under Cal. Penal Code Section 637.2.
Because the Plaintiff moved for interlocutory appeal only out of
an abundance of caution in the event the Court dismissed the claim
for statutory damages for each class member, the Judge denied as
moot the Plaintiff's motion for a certificate of appealability.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cuWXGf from Leagle.com.

Gregory Franklin, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan Lee McBride
--ryan@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, Abbas Kazerounian --
ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law Group, APC, Emily C. Headlee --
emily@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, APC & Seyed Abbas
Kazerounian -- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, APC.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant, represented by Edward Dean
Totino -- edward.totino@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, Mandy Chan
-- mandy.chan@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Perrie Michael
Weiner, Esq. -- perrie.weiner@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP.


ONTARIO: Data Breach-Affected ODSP Recipients File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joshua Freeman, writing for CP24.com, reports that several Ontario
Disability Support recipients whose data was compromised in a
recent breach have signed onto a class action lawsuit seeking
compensation from the provincial government.

Lawyers with the Toronto law firm Rochon Genova LLP served notice
on Jan. 23 to the ministries of social services and the attorney
general, indicating that they plan to take legal action on behalf
of the thousands of people whose data was compromised.

"The letter puts the government on notice that we will commence
legal action in 60 days on behalf of the 45,000 people who are
affected by the beach," lawyer Ron Podolny, a partner at the firm,
told CTV News Toronto.

The action stems from a breach on Dec. 20 last year at a
Mississauga ODSP office. An email that was sent out to inform 100
members about changes to a web portal also contained an Excel
spreadsheet listing the names, client identification numbers and
email addresses of 45,000 ODSP clients.

The ministry has blamed the mistake on human error and has said
that it is working to ensure that all 100 recipients delete the
email.  So far, 75 have complied, while 25 have not responded.

Those whose information was compromised were notified of the breach
in a letter sent out about a month later.

Mr. Podolny said it's up to the government to correct the
situation.

"The government has to make it right," Mr. Podolny told CTV News
Toronto. "It has to fix the consequences of this data breach. It
has to investigate who received this information and to make sure
the information is deleted, to make sure that the information has
not been forwarded or misused."

Mr. Podolny said those affected should also be compensated for the
distress the breach has caused

Reacting to news of the breach on Jan. 22, Minister of Children,
Community and Social Services Lisa MacLeod said she has apologized
for the breach.

"We have taken aggressive and decisive action and I have apologized
to the 45,000 people who were part of the breach."

She said it underlines the need to improve the government's use of
current technologies.  

"It proves we need to reform our social assistance model to keep up
with modern day technology," Ms. MacLeod said.

Ms. MacLeod's ministry did not return calls for comment on the
lawsuit on Jan. 23. Neither did the Ministry of the Attorney
General nor the Premier's Office. [GN]


P&G CO: Tufco, P&G & PDI Dismissed from Suit Over Flushable Wipes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF WYOMING, MINNESOTA; VILLAGE OF HOLMEN,
WISCONSIN; CITY OF ELK RIVER, MINNESOTA; CITY OF MANKATO,
MINNESOTA; CITY OF PERHAM, MINNESOTA; CITY OF PRINCETON, MINNESOTA;
CITY OF FERGUS FALLS, MINNESOTA; SAUK CENTRE PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION; and CHISAGO LAKES JOINT SEWAGE TREATMENT COMMISSION, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY; KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION; NICE-PAK
PRODUCTS, INC; PROFESSIONAL DISPOSABLES INTERNATIONAL, INC.; TUFCO
TECHNOLOGIES INC.; and ROCKLINE INDUSTRIES, Defendants, Civil No.
15-2101 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.), Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Settling Defendants.

The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action in April 2015
against companies marketing and selling "flushable wipes."  They
allege that the wipes do not degrade as advertised and have caused
damages to sewer systems and wastewater treatment plants.

Several Defendants have reached settlements with the Plaintiffs.
Settling Defendants Tufco, P&G, Nice-Pak, and Professional
Disposables International ("PDI") all filed stipulations for
dismissal jointly with the Plaintiffs.  Defendants Kimberly-Clark
and Rockline objected.  The Court rejected the Settling Defendants'
stipulations because they were not signed by all parties as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).

The City of Wyoming and all the Defendants jointly filed a
Stipulation of Dismissal of the City of Wyoming's claims against
all the Defendants, also pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  The
Court found that the stipulation was valid because it was signed on
behalf of all parties.

The Plaintiffs' have now filed a Motion to Dismiss the Settling
Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
They represent that they reached a settlement with Tufco because it
is a contractmanufacturer of flushable wipes and does not make
labeling decisions, thus it was unlikely to be held liable.  They
represent that they reached a settlement with P&G because its share
of the flushable wipes market is so small.  The Plaintiffs
represent that Nice-Pak and PDI paid to settle.  They now seek to
dismiss their claims against the Settling Defendants with
prejudice.

The Settling Defendants, who join the Plaintiffs' Motion, argue
that they have fulfilled their obligations under the settlement
agreements but have yet to receive what they bargained for: an end
to this litigation.  They argue that they remain in the litigation
as a side-effect of a protracted discovery dispute between
Kimberly-Clark, Rockline, and the Plaintiffs.

Kimberly-Clark and Rockline do not oppose dismissal of the Settling
Defendants; However, they ask that the Court imposes two
conditions: (1) requiring the Plaintiffs to provide settlement
related discovery, and (2) retaining personal jurisdiction over the
Settling Defendants.

Judge Tunheim finds that any potential prejudice to Kimberly-Clark
and Rockline would not be caused by dismissal of the Settling
Defendants, but rather by the Plaintiffs' refusal to produce
settlement-related discovery.  This discovery dispute is more
properly suited to a discovery motion, which the Court would refer
to U.S. Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung.  Because the discovery
dispute at issue can be resolved without the Settling Defendants,
and because the requested condition would not prevent any prejudice
to Kimberly-Clark and Rockline caused by the dismissal of the
Settling Defendants, he will not impose the discovery condition.

In addition, discovery has closed and the deadline for disclosing
witnesses has passed.  Thus, the Judge sees no need to retain
personal jurisdiction over the Settling Defendants so that it can
issue further discovery orders on them beyond the end of the
discovery period.  The Plaintiffs agree that the evidence that has
been gathered through discovery in the case is now the universe of
evidence that exists for trial.  The Judge will hold the Plaintiffs
to this statement and notes that he will not permit any attempts to
"surprise" Kimberly-Clark and Rockline with late-disclosed
witnesses or evidence without a very strong reason.

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and
proceedings, Judge Tunheim granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Dismiss Settling Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Ya2m56 from Leagle.com.

City of Mankato, Chisago Lakes Joint Sewage Treatment Commission,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Sauk
Centre Public Utilities Commission, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Village of Holmen, Wisconsin, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, City of Fergus
Falls, City of Elk River & City of Princeton, Plaintiffs,
represented by Anthony D. Shapiro -- tony@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman, pro hac vice, Brant D. Penney -- b.penney@rwblawfirm.com --
Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, Charles J. Kocher --
ckocher@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro
hac vice, Daniel E. Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com --
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, David M. Cialkowski --
david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Garrett D.
Blanchfield, Jr. -- g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt
Wendorf & Blanchfield, James P. Watts -- james.watts@zimmreed.com
-- Zimmerman Reed, LLP, Jason S. Kilene , Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Joshua J. Rissman, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, June Pineda Hoidal,
Zimmerman Reed LLP, Kristin J. Moody, Berman Tabacco, Mark
Reinhardt, Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, Patrick Howard, Saltz,
Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro hac vice, Raina Borrelli
-- rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Roberta A.
Yard -- r.yard@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield &
Simon Bahne Paris -- sparis@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett
Bendesky, PC, pro hac vice.

Procter & Gamble Company, Defendant, represented by Claire Catalano
Dean -- ccdean@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice,
Cortlin Hall Lannin -- clannin@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP,
pro hac vice, Emily Johnson Henn -- ehenn@cov.com -- Covington &
Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Henry B. Liu -- hliu@cov.com --
Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice & Nicole M. Moen --
nmoen@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA.

Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Defendant, represented by Alexander B.
Porter, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Eamon P. Joyce, Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Kara L. McCall, Sidley Austin LLP, pro
hac vice, S. Jamal Faleel, Blackwell Burke PA & Tracy J. Van
Steenburgh, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA.

Nice-Pak Products, Inc. & Professional Disposables International,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Chelsea M. Croy Smith, Tucker
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Dustin Bradley Rawlin, I, Tucker Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, George W. Soule, Soule & Stull LLC, Jennifer L.
Mesko, Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, John Q. Lewis, Tucker Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, Karl A. Bekeny, Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac vice,
Melissa R. Stull, Soule & Stull LLC & Michael J. Ruttinger, Tucker
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

Tufco Technologies Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron D. Van
Oort, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP & Cicely R. Miltich, Dentons US
LLP.

Rockline Industries, Defendant, represented by Charmaine K. Harris,
Blackwell Burke PA, Emily A. Ambrose, Blackwell Burke PA, Jerry W.
Blackwell, Blackwell Burke PA, Kara L. McCall, Sidley Austin LLP,
Mary S. Young, Blackwell Burke PA & S. Jamal Faleel, Blackwell
Burke PA.


P.C. RICHARD: Averts Class Action Over Sales Receipts
-----------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for Law.com, reports that Kelley Drye &
Warren has notched a victory on behalf of appliance retailer P.C.
Richard & Son in a class action lawsuit over sales receipts that
conveyed too much information about customers.

The ruling in Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son could halt the spread of
litigation for technical violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transaction Act of 2003 in state courts. FACTA provides statutory
damages of up to $1,000 for each technical violation, a standard
met when a retailer prints more than 5 digits of a customer's
credit card number on a store receipt.

FACTA class actions have found federal courts less friendly since
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2016 ruling in Spokeo v. Robins. Now, the
P.C. Richard decision suggests that New Jersey courts aren't
rolling out the red carpet either.

Judge James Den Uyl of Ocean County Superior Court granted the
defense motion to dismiss the P.C. Richard case Jan. 17 on finding
that individual treatment in small claims court, not a class
action, is the optimal setting for FACTA claims. Judge Den Uyl's
decision relied on a 2011 Appellate Division ruling involving the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Local Baking Products v. Kosher
Bagel Munch. P.C. Richard's lawyer, William Gyves --
wgyves@kelleydrye.com -- of Kelley Drye in Parsippany, argued that
pursuing a FACTA class action in a New Jersey court is contrary to
the Appellate Division's analysis of the superiority requirement of
R. 4:32-1(b)(3) in Local Baking.

The Baskin case was brought on behalf of two New York residents and
one New Jersey resident who claimed their sales receipts from
purchases at P.C. Richard revealed too much of their credit card
numbers. An earlier case filed on behalf of the New York plaintiffs
in a New York federal court was dismissed in 2017 for lack of
standing. Because state courts in New York are prohibited by
statute from hearing FACTA cases, the New York plaintiffs partnered
with a New Jersey resident to bring a case in New Jersey Superior
Court.

None of the three plaintiffs suffered any actual harm from the
allegedly noncomplying register receipts. P.C. Richard claimed that
technical violations of FACTA are not appropriately adjudicated as
class actions under New Jersey law.

The plaintiffs maintained that Local Baking should not apply
because the TCPA is not analogous to FACTA. The TCPA has no
requirement that violations be willful in order to seek recovery,
and FACTA provides for fee-shifting, indicating the Legislature did
not intend for such claims to be brought in small claims court by
individuals representing themselves.

But there is no controlling authority in New Jersey concerning
FACTA class action claims, Judge Den Uyl said. Therefore, the
reasoning behind the Appellate Division's decision in Local Baking
is perfectly applicable to the instant motion.

He cited the Local Baking decision's statement that "by imposing a
statutory award of $500, a sum considerably in excess of any real
or sustained damages, Congress has presented an aggrieved party
with an incentive to act in his or her own interest without the
necessity of class action relief. Thus, it follows that the
prevailing law in New Jersey is that adjudication of claims on an
individual basis in small claims court is 'a far superior method to
vindication of any rights and protection of the public than any
certification or class action' in situations where a statutory
damage award incentivizes a party to act in his or her own
interest."

Consequently, plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden under
4:32-1 that a class action is superior to other methods of pursuing
the claims at issue, Judge Den Uyl said.

Judge Den Uyl notes that New Jersey's judiciary provides help with
the small claims process on its website and through an ombudsman in
each county courthouse.

Mr. Gyves of Kelly Drye declined to comment about the ruling. He
represented P.C. Richard along with Glenn Graham --
ggraham@kelleydrye.com -- of the same firm. Lawrence Friscia of
Friscia & Associates in Newark and Glendale, California, attorney
Chant Yedalian, who represented the plaintiff and class members,
did not respond to requests for comment. [GN]


PANATTE LLC: $5K Aikens Suit Settlement with MDS Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELIA AIKENS, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PANATTE, LLC, LAND HOME FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01519-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert S. Lasnik of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motions to finally
approve the parties' proposed settlement and to approve the class
counsel's award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

On March 19, 2018, the Plaintiff filed her unopposed motion to
preliminarily approve the parties' proposed class settlement.  On
Sept. 7, 2018, the Court preliminarily approved the parties'
proposed settlement.  On Sept. 28, 2018, First Class, Inc.
distributed notice of the parties' proposed class settlement, as
ordered.

On Oct. 26, 2018, the Plaintiff filed her unopposed motions to
finally approve the parties' proposed settlement and to approve
class counsel's award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.  The
Court held the Fairness Hearing regarding the Plaintiff's and MDS'
proposed settlement on Jan. 10, 2019

Having considered the Plaintiff's unopposed motion, Judge Lasnik
finally approved the proposed settlement.  

He confirmed the certification for settlement purposes of the
class, under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
of all persons (1) with a Washington or California address, (2) to
whom Mortgage Default Services, LLC sent an initial written
communication, (3) between Oct. 10, 2016 and Oct. 10, 2017, (4) in
connection with the collection of a consumer debt, (5) that did not
disclose that Mortgage Default Services, LLC is a debt collector
who is attempting to collect a debt and that any information
obtained would be used for that purpose, and/or (6) that demanded
payment on the debt within 30 days of the date of the written
communication, and/or (7) that failed to include: (i) a statement
that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; and/or
(ii) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector
in writing within the 30-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification
of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy
of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by
the debt collector; and/or (iii) a statement that, upon the
consumer's written request within the 30-day period, the debt
collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of
the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

The Judge also affirmed the previous appointment of Delia Aikens as
the class representative for the class, and the following attorney
and law firm as the class counsel for class members: Jesse S.
Johnson Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC 5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
Boca Raton, Florida 33431

He appoved the terms of the parties' settlement, the material terms
of which include, but are not limited to:

     1. MDS will create a settlement fund in the amount of
$5,051.22, which will be distributed on a pro-rata basis to each
class member who did not exclude himself or herself;

     2. MDS will separately pay to the Plaintiff $1,000 pursuant to
15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i); and

    3. MDS will separately pay the costs of notice and
administration of the settlement, up to $2,610.

The Judge approved the releases set forth in the class action
settlement agreement between the Plaintiff and MDS.  The released
claims are consequently compromised, settled, released, discharged,
and dismissed with prejudice by virtue of these proceedings and the
Order.

He awarded a total of $13,500 for the class counsel's costs,
expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred with respect to the
Plaintiff's and the class members' claims against MDS.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as to all other issues
concerning the Plaintiff's and the class members' claims against
MDS.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order and Final
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/9nuh43 from Leagle.com.

Delia Aikens, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Wieting --
chris@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC, Drew Davis --
drew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC, Jesse S. Johnson --
jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, pro hac
vice, Milena Marie Vill -- milena@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP &
Mathew J. Cunanan -- matthew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW
LLC.

Mortgage Default Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Bruce
John Blohowiak & J. Scott Miller, MILLER DEVLIN & MCLEAN.


PAUL ROSENBERG: Matzura Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Paul Rosenberg & Company L.P. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Paul Rosenberg & Company L.P., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01207 (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Paul Rosenberg & Company L.P. is an art French dealer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



PICKFORD REAL: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Virgilio Suit Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALFONSE VIRGILIO, Trustee, etc. et al., Plaintiffs and
Respondents. v. PICKFORD REAL ESTATE, INC., et al., Defendants and
Appellants, Case No. D073216 (Cal. App.), Judge William S. Dato of
the Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth District,
Division One, reversed the trial court's order denying the
Defendants' petition to compel arbitration with directions to enter
a new order granting the petition.

The Plaintiffs are a class of residential home sellers who employed
Pickford, a California real estate broker, between July 2009 and
July 2011.  For clarity, the various Defendants can be organized
into three separate groups: (1) Pickford, David M. Cabot
(Pickford's former President and CEO) and Samuel H. Kraemer
(Pickford's former officer and general counsel) ("Broker
Defendants"); (2) Fidelity National Home Warranty Co., Ticor Title
Co. of California, Chicago Title Co., Fidelity National Title Co.,
and Fidelity National Disclosure Source, LLC (all of whom are
wholly-owned subsidiaries of nonparty Fidelity National Financial,
Inc. ("FNF")), and Stephen J. Murnin, FNF's vice president
("Fidelity Defendants"); and (3) certain Pickford real estate
agents: Nancy J. Brown, Moureen A. Hardy, Kathleen P. Kanan, Doris
E. Lipscomb, Le Anne McDermott, Leonora Mauger, Maria R. Turfler,
and Kristin A. Young ("REA Defendants").

After selecting Pickford to help sell their home, each Plaintiff
and Pickford entered into a Residential Listing Agreement ("RLA").
The RLAs are a ubiquitous feature of residential real estate
transactions, giving the broker an exclusive period to market the
property and use the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") that
amplifies the search. The RLAs set the terms of the broker's
compensation, and they grant the broker authority to contract with
third parties for relevant real estate services.

Each Plaintiff also entered into a Residential Purchase Agreement
("RPA").  Whereas the RLAs help to initiate the broker-client
relationship and set the terms of the broker's compensation, the
RPAs have numerous functions for several parties.  The RPAs contain
the arbitration clause.

In February 2015, Janet and Michael Bologna filed a putative class
action against the Broker Defendants in San Diego County.  After
the Defendants moved to compel arbitration, the Bolognas dismissed
their suit without prejudice.  In February 2016, the Bolognas
joined by other Plaintiffs then brought suit for the same claims in
Contra Costa County, and the court transferred the action to San
Diego County.

The Plaintiffs' claims all stem from a principal allegation: the
Defendants acted in concert to effectuate a fraudulent scheme in
which Pickford selected the Fidelity Defendants as the Plaintiffs'
real estate service providers in exchange for kickbacks styled as
sublicensing fees.  The Plaintiffs further allege that the
kickbacks disguised as sublicensing fees were paid pursuant to
sublicensing agreements, the Defendants used specific software
called TransactionPoint to help carry out the fraud, and the
Plaintiffs were entirely unaware of the scheme throughout the real
estate transactions.

The Plaintiffs brought specific claims for: (1) breaches of the
broker's fiduciary duty for failure of disclosure and for accepting
undisclosed payments; (2) aiding and abetting breaches of the
broker's fiduciary duty; (3) violation of Civil Code section 1710,
subdivision (3); (4) violation of Business & Professions Code
section 17200; (5) Constructive Fraud; (6) Unjust Enrichment; and
(7) Accounting.

In September 2017, the Defendants filed a petition to compel
arbitration of all claims against all Defendants.  The trial court
denied the motion.  It found that while the Defendants who were
signatories or agents of signatories had a valid basis for
compelling arbitration, the nonsignatory Defendants did not.  And
in the face of potentially inconsistent results, the court invoked
Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c) to deny
arbitration as to all the Defendants.

In the dispute between a putative class of home-seller Plaintiffs
and a real estate broker, its agents, and several real estate
service providers, the Defendants appeal from this order denying
their petition to compel arbitration.  The Defendants' appeal
requires that the Court considers three major issues: (1) whether
the Plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement contained in either the RLAs or RPAs; (2) whether the
Broker Defendants and the REA Defendants are entitled to compel
arbitration as signatories and agents of signatories; and (3)
whether equitable estoppel allows the Fidelity Defendants to compel
arbitration.

Judge Dato finds that (i) the arbitration clause in the RPA is
valid and covers the Plaintiffs' claims; (ii) the RPA's arbitration
clause is enforceable by the Broker Defendants and REA Defendants;
and (iii) equitable estoppel allows the non-signatory Fidelity
Defendants to compel arbitration against the Plaintiffs.  

He concludes that because the Plaintiffs' claims against the
non-signatory Defendants are dependent on and inextricably
intertwined with the terms and obligations of the agreement
containing the relevant arbitration provision, equitable estoppel
allows the non-signatory Defendants to compel arbitration.  Thus,
all of the Plaintiffs' claims are properly subject to arbitration
and the trial court erred in denying the Dfendants' petition to
compel.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Dato reversed the order denying the
Defendants' petition to compel arbitration with directions to enter
a new order granting the petition.  The Defendants are entitled to
costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/jj7gVH from Leagle.com.

Hahn Loeser & Parks, Steven A. Goldfarb -- sagoldfarb@hahnlaw.com
-- and Michael J. Gleason -- mgleason@hahnlaw.com -- for Defendants
and Appellants Ticor Title Company of California, Fidelity National
Home Warranty Company, Chicago Title Company, Fidelity National
Title Company, Fidelity National Disclosure Source, LLC, and
Stephen Murnin.

Barnes & Thornburg, Kevin Dale Rising -- kevin.rising@btlaw.com --
Joel Robert Meyer -- joel.meyer@btlaw.com -- and Karoline E.
Jackson -- karoline.jackson@btlaw.com -- for Defendants and
Appellants Pickford Real Estate, Inc., David M. Cabot, Samuel H.
Kraemer, Nancy J. Brown, Moureen A. Hardy, Kathleen P. Kanan, Doris
E. Lipscomb, Le Anne McDermott, Leonora Mauger, Maria R. Turfler,
and Kristin A. Young.

June Babiracki Barlow and Neil Kalin -- neilk@car.org -- for
California Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Appellants.

Bottini & Bottini, Francis A. Bottini, Jr. -- mail@bottinilaw.com
-- Albert Y. Chang, and Yury A. Kolesnikov, for Plaintiffs and
Respondents Alfonse Virgilio, Trustee of the Virgilio Family Trust,
Janet and Michael Bologna, Lesley L. Hubbard, Gregory E. and Mary
R. Stewart, Philip and Wendy Thummel, Kevin Roberts, and Christine
McCormick.


QUALCOMM INC: Judge Koh Stays $5-Bil. Consumer Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scott Graham, writing for Law.com, reports that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is going to weigh in on a $5 billion
consumer class action against Qualcomm Inc. over its IP licensing
practices.

A two-judge motions panel granted Qualcomm's petition for an
interlocutory appeal on Jan. 23. Qualcomm asked the Ninth Circuit
to intervene last October, saying the class of some 250 million
cellphone purchasers is unprecedented and that U.S District Judge
Lucy Koh, who is overseeing the case, had "casually dismissed the
due-process and manageability issues" it would present.

The order comes as Judge Koh is hearing a bench trial in the
Federal Trade Commission's antitrust case against Qualcomm, which
accuses the chip giant of inflating mobile device prices through
heavy-handed licensing tactics.

The consumer class relies on many of the same antitrust theories
advanced by the FTC. Trial in the class action had been scheduled
for June, but Judge Koh stayed the case on Jan. 23, pending a
ruling from the Ninth Circuit.

The Jan. 23 order was issued without substantive comment and is not
a ruling on the merits, which will probably be decided by a
different panel of judges. Still, it's a likely signal that at
least one of the judges had some concerns about the class
certification order, said Ben Feuer of the California Appellate Law
Group.

"The Ninth Circuit has definitely been smacked down for allowing
unusually large or unwieldy class actions in the past," said Mr.
Feuer, a former Ninth Circuit clerk, pointing to Wal-Mart Stores v.
Dukes as one example. Mr. Feuer said he "wouldn't be delighted" if
he were in the consumers' shoes.

The consumers accuse Qualcomm of having inflated prices by, among
other things, threatening to cut off the supply of cellphone modem
chips to manufacturers who balk at licensing Qualcomm patents that
are essential to meeting wireless industry standards. Consumers and
the FTC call the practice "no license, no chips."

Judge Koh certified a class of nearly 250 million purchasers last
September, describing the evidence they advanced as "substantial,"
"strong" and "compelling."

Qualcomm went to the Ninth Circuit the next month. Judge Koh's
analysis was "deficient in process, reasoning, and result," the
company argued in a petition signed by Keker, Van Nest & Peters
partner Robert Van Nest.

Specifically, Van Nest accused Judge Koh of improperly applying
California antitrust law to a nationwide class contrary to Ninth
Circuit precedent; relying on a "pass-through" theory that other
courts have rejected, and dismissing due process and manageability
concerns.

The consumers are led by Susman Godfrey partner Kalpana Srinivasan
and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy partner Joseph Cotchett. They argued
that Judge Koh's order was correct and that any appeal could have
waited until after trial. "If ever a defendant had the resources to
litigate a class action through trial and appeal if it so chooses,
it is Qualcomm," Ms. Srinivasan had argued in opposition. [GN]


RCN MANAGEMENT: Kiler Files ADA Class Action in New York
--------------------------------------------------------
RCN Management Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Marion Kiler, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RCN Management Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00806 (E.D. N.Y., February 8, 2019).

RCN Corporation, through its subsidiaries, provides digital cable
television, Internet, and voice services to residential and
business customers. It offers video services, which includes basic
and signature services comprising basic programming package, such
as local broadcast television stations, local community
programming, and limited satellite-delivered and non-broadcast
channels; and signature programming package, including additional
channels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


REGRESO FINANCIAL: Karcauskas Case Settlement Wins Initial Okay
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit POVILAS KARCAUSKAS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. REGRESO
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:15-cv-09225-FMO-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Fernando M.
Olguin entered an order on Feb. 8, 2019:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification and
      preliminary approval of settlement agreement;

   2. preliminarily certifying a class for the purposes of
      settlement:

      "(i) all persons having an address within the state of
      California (ii) who were sent a communication from Defendants

      Goldsmith & Hull or William I. Goldsmith (iii) when a wage
      garnishment order had not been obtained (iv) to recover a
      debt incurred for personal, family, or household purposes (v)

      which was not returned undelivered by the United States
      Postal Service (vi) during the period of time one year prior

      to the filing of the Complaint through Preliminary Approval
      Date";

   3. preliminarily appointing the Plaintiff as class
      representative for settlement purposes;

   4. preliminarily appointing Robert Stempler of Consumer Law
      Office of Robert Stempler and O. Randolph Bragg of Horwitz,
      Horwitz & Associates as class counsel for settlement
      purposes;

   5. preliminarily finding that the terms of the Settlement are
      fair, reasonable and adequate, and comply with Rule 23(e) of

      the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

   6. directing Parties to carry out settlement and claims process

      according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement;

   7. directing First Class, Inc. to complete dissemination of
      class notice, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, no

      later than April 5, 2019;

   8. directing any class member who wishes to: (a) object to the
      settlement, including the requested attorney's fees, costs
      and incentive award; or (b) exclude him or herself from the
      settlement, to file his or her objection to the settlement or

      request for exclusion no later than June 4, 2019, in
      accordance with the Settlement Agreement, and Notice;

   9. directing any class member who wishes to appear at the final

      approval (fairness) hearing, either on his or her own behalf

      or through an attorney, to object to the settlement,
      including the requested attorney's fees, costs and incentive

      award, to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Appear at

      Fairness Hearing no later than June 4, 2019;

  10. scheduling final approval (fairness) hearing on August 22,
      2019, at 10:00 a.m. in 20 Courtroom 6D of the First Street
      Courthouse, to consider the fairness, reasonableness, and
      adequacy of the Settlement as well as the award of attorney's

      fees and costs to class counsel, and service award to the
      class representative;

  11. directing the Plaintiff to file a motion for an award of
      class representative incentive payment and attorney's fees
      and costs no later than May 3, 2019; and

  12. directing Plaintiff, no later than July 18, 2019, to file
      and serve a motion for final approval of the settlement and a

      response to any objections to the settlement.

The settlement agreement provides for payment to plaintiff
Karcauskas of $2,000 in statutory damages pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, as well as $5,000 for his services as the class
representative.[CC]

SCHRADER YACHT: Faces Bishop ADA Class Action in NY
---------------------------------------------------
Schrader Yacht Sales, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Schrader Yacht Sales, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01315 (S.D. N.Y., February 11, 2019).

Schrader Yacht Sales, Inc. is a Boat dealer in Point Pleasant, New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



SCOTTS CO: $1.07MM Deal in Hamsher FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERAMIE HAMSHER, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. THE SCOTTS COMPANY, LLC,
and EG SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants, No. 17-CV-4206 (VSB) (S.D. N.Y.),
Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, (a) granted the Plaintiff's requests
for (i) preliminary approval of the Class and Collective Action
Settlement Agreement; (ii) certification of the proposed class for
settlement purposes; (iii) appointment of Kennedy Hodges, LLP as
the Class Counsel; and (b) denied the Plaintiff's proposed Notice
of Class Action Settlement.

The Plaintiff filed a Collective Action and Class Action Complaint
on June 5, 2017.  The Complaint asserted collective and class
action claims against the Defendants.  Specifically, the Plaintiff
alleged that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and/or the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), and the
supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations by, inter
alia: (1) failing to pay proper minimum wages, and (2) failing to
pay proper overtime.

On Jan. 18, 2018, the parties participated in a mediation before
Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman.  Following the mediation, the
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 22, 2018.  The
Amended Complaint removed the minimum wage violations and provided
additional factual allegations related to the Plaintiff's claims of
violations of the Wage Theft Prevention Act.

The parties have settled the wage and hour class and collective
action for $1,070,000.  On July 30, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the
instant unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class
settlement and supporting materials.

Having reviewed the Plaintiff's submissions, including the proposed
Class and Collective Action Settlement Agreement, Judge Broderick
concludes that the Settlement Agreement is the result of
substantial investigative efforts, arm's-length negotiations, and
the assistance of a neutral mediator, and that the terms are within
the range of possible settlement approval.  As such, he
preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement.

He provisionally certified for settlement purposes the following
settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e):
individuals who were employed by the Defendants as Territory
Service Representatives in the State of New York who were provided
overtime compensation pursuant to the "fluctuating workweek" method
at any point between June 5, 2011 and Dec. 31, 2016, who do not opt
out of the class.

In addition, he appointed the Plaintiff's counsel, Kennedy Hodges,
as the class counsel, concluding that they meet the requirements of
Rule 23(g).

Finally, after review of the Notice, he concludes that it does not
satisfy all of the elements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).  Specifically,
rather than define the class certified, the Notice merely states
that the lawsuit "concerns the calculation of overtime pay of the
Plaintiff and other employees of Scotts located in New York, and it
also concerns claims related to wage notices and wage statements.
Based on Scotts' payroll records, you are covered by this Lawsuit.
As such, you are considered a 'Class Member' in the Lawsuit."  He
holds that to ensure that the Notice complies with the requirements
of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), it should clearly define the class as
individuals who were employed by the Defendants as Territory
Service Representatives in the State of New York who were provided
overtime compensation pursuant to the "fluctuating workweek" method
at any point between June 5, 2011 and Dec. 31, 2016, who do not opt
out of the settlement class.

Furthermore, rather than state "that a class member may enter an
appearance through an attorney if the member so desires," the
Notice merely identifies Kennedy Hodges as the Class Counsel and
informs recipients that nothing prohibits them from speaking with
other lawyers about the Lawsuit or the Notice.  To ensure that the
Notice complies with the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), it
should clearly state that a class member may enter an appearance
through an attorney if the member so desires.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Broderick granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiff's motion.  Specifically, the
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the Class and
Collective Action Settlement Agreement, for certification of the
proposed class for settlement purposes, and to appoint Kennedy
Hodges as Class Counsel is granted.  The Plaintiff's motion for
approval of the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement is
denied.  The Plaintiff will submit a revised proposed notice that
addresses the deficiencies identified in the Opinion & Order within
30 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/xOZOot from Leagle.com.

Geramie Hamsher, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Don Foty, Kennedy Hodges,
L.L.P. & Galvin B. Kennedy -- gkennedy@kennedyhodges.com -- Kennedy
Hodges, LLP.

The Scotts Company, LLC & EG Systems, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Juan C. Enjamio -- jenjamio@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams,
Ryan Ayers Glasgow -- rglasgow@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton & Williams
LLP & Shawn Patrick Regan -- sregan@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton &
Williams, LLP.


SEA TOW SERVICES: Faces Class Suit in New York for ADA Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sea Tow Services International, Inc. is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled as Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sea Tow Services International,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01313 (S.D. N.Y., February 11,
2019).

Sea Tow is an international marine assistance provider
headquartered in Southold, NY. Presently Sea Tow operates over 120
independently owned franchise locations in the United States,
Europe, the Bahamas and Puerto Rico.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



SEABRING MARINE: Thorne Asserts Claim Under Disabilities Act
------------------------------------------------------------
Seabring Marine Industries, Inc. d/b/a Monterey Boats is facing a
class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is styled Braulio Thorne and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Seabring
Marine Industries, Inc. d/b/a Monterey Boats, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01299 (S.D. N.Y., February 11, 2019).

Seabring Marine Industries Inc., doing businesss as Monterey Boats,
manufactures boats. The Company produces a variety of motor boats
such as sport boats, cruisers, and yachts. Seabring Marine
Industries serves customers internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


SHEPHERD GALLERY: Violates ADA, Matzura Suit Asserts
----------------------------------------------------
Shepherd Gallery, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Shepherd Gallery, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01203 (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Shepherd Gallery, LLC is an art gallery in New York featuring 19th
and early 20th century european paintings, drawings, and
sculpture.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


SI FINANCIAL: Karp Balks at Merger Deal with Berkshire Hills
------------------------------------------------------------
SELWYN KARP, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SI FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., MARK D.
ALLIOD, RHEO A. BROUILLARD, ROGER ENGLE, DONNA M. EVAN, MICHAEL R.
GARVEY, ROBERT O. GILLARD, KEVIN M. MCCARTHY, KATHLEEN A. NEALON,
DENNIS POLLACK, ROBERT C. CUSHMAN, SR., and BERKSHIRE HILLS
BANCORP, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00199 (D. Conn.,
Feb. 8, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and United States
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9, in connection with
the acquisition of SI FI by Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc.

On December 11, 2018, SI FI and Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc.
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, pursuant to which (i)
SI FI will merge with and into BHBI, with BHBI surviving the
merger, and (ii) the separate corporate existence of the Company
shall cease.  According to the complaint, to convince SI FI's
public common stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, BHBI on January 4, 2019, filed a materially incomplete
and misleading Form S-4 Registration Statement with the SEC, in
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The
Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning the valuation analyses prepared by the Company's
financial advisor, Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc. (KBW), in support
of their fairness opinion. Additionally, although the Proxy does
not yet set the date for the special meeting of SI FI's
stockholders to vote on the Proposed Transaction , the Proxy
does state the merger parties' intention to conclude this merger
during the second quarter of 2019. It is therefore imperative that
the material information that has been omitted from the Proxy is
disclosed prior to the Stockholder Vote so SI FI stockholders can
properly exercise their corporate suffrage rights, the lawsuit
says.

SI Financial Group, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Savings Institute Bank and Trust Company that provides various
financial services to consumers.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

          James C. Riley, Esq.
          WHITMAN BREED ABBOTT & MORGAN LLC
          500 West Putnam Avenue
          Greenwich, CT 06830
          Telephone: (203) 869-3800
          Facsimile: (203) 869-1951
          E-mail: jriley@wbamct.com

               - and -

          Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
          Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
          GAINEY McKENNA & EGLESTON
          440 Park Avenue South
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 983-1300
          Facsimile: (212) 983-0380
          E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                  gegleston@gme-law.com

SM ENERGY: Chieftain Royalty Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit CHIEFTAIN ROYALTY COMPANY, the
Plaintiff, vs. SM ENERGY COMPANY, et al., the Defendant, Case No.
5:18-cv-01225-D (W.D. Okla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order on Feb. 8, 2019:

   1. granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, on
      behalf of:

      "All non-excluded persons or entities who are or were royalty

      owners in SM's 126 Coal County Gathering System wells 2 where

      SM ENERGY COMPANY is or was the operator. The Class Claims
      relate only to payment for gas and its constituents (residue

      gas, natural gas liquids, and drip gas) produced from the
      wells for production months October 2001 through May 2015.
      The Class does not include overriding royalty owners or other

      owners who derive their interest through the oil and gas
      lessee.";

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Nix Patterson, LLP and Barnes & Lewis, LLP as
      Class Counsel.

The Plaintiff contends that SM Energy improperly deducted costs
from royalty and otherwise underpaid royalty owed to it and the
putative Class in violation of express and implied covenants in the
Class' oil and gas leases, which govern royalty payments on SM's
126 Coal County Gathering System Wells.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Bradley E. Beckworth, Esq.
          Jeffrey Angelovich, Esq.
          Lisa Baldwin, Esq.
          Susan Whatley, Esq.
          NIX PATTERSON, LLP
          3600 North Capital of Texas Highway
          Suite 350, Building B
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 328-5333
          Facsimile: (512) 328-5335
          E-mail: bbeckworth@nixlaw.com
                  jangelovich@nixlaw.com
                  lbaldwin@nixlaw.com
                  swhatley@nixlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert N. Barnes, Esq.
          Patranell Lewis, Esq.
          Emily Nash Kitch, OBA No. 22244
          BARNES & LEWIS, LLP
          208 NW 60th Street
          Oklahoma City, OK 73118
          Telephone: (405) 843-0363
          Facsimile: (405) 832-1007
          E-mail: rbarnes@barneslewis.com
                  plewis@barneslewis.com
                  ekitch@barneslewis.com

SNACKS INNOVATIONS: Product Has No Real White Chocolate, Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
AURORA MORRISON, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SNACKS INNOVATIONS, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01238 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2019), seeks
redress for, and a stop to, the Defendant's unfair and deceptive
practice of advertising and marketing its "Drizzlicious" brand
products, including "Drizzlicious Cinnamon Swirl" and "Drizzlicious
Birthday Cake".

According to the complaint, the Prodcuts are advertised and sold to
mislead consumers into believing that they contain white chocolate,
when it in fact does not. One product, "Drizzlicious Cinnamon
Swirl", advertises itself as "cinnammon crisps drizzled with white
chocolate," making it clear to potential purchasers that it
contains white chocolate. The other product "Drizzlicious Birthday
Cake," advertises itself as mini rice cakes with white chocolaty
drizzle", implying the presence of white chocolate in the product
while failing to properly inform potential purchaers that the
prodcut does not cotain real white chocolate, but only imitation
flavoring, the lawsuit says.

Snack Innovations Inc. produces naturally delicious Better-For-You
gourmet snack foods.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

SNAP INC: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against Snap, Inc. ("Snap" or the "Company") (NYSE: SNAP) on
behalf of investors who purchased shares of the Company's common
stock between March 2, 2017 and August 10, 2017 (the "Class
Period").

Among other things, the class action complaint alleges that Snap
and certain other defendants made materially false and misleading
statements to investors during the Class Period about the Company's
business, operations, and user growth and engagement.

Investors who purchased Snap's common stock during the Class Period
and suffered a financial loss in excess of $100,000 as a result of
such purchases are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (D. Seamus
Kaskela, Esq.) toll-free at (888) 715-1740, or online at
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/snap-inc/,for additional information or
to learn how to participate in this action.

IMPORTANT DEADLINE:  Investors who purchased Snap's common stock
during the Class Period may, no later than January 31, 2019, seek
to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class
through Kaskela Law LLC, or other counsel, or may choose to do
nothing and remain an absent class member.

         D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
                    (888) 715-1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


SPANIERMAN GALLERY: Matzura Suit Asserts ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Spanierman Gallery, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Spanierman Gallery, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01249 (S.D. N.Y., February 8, 2019).

Spanierman Gallery, LLC is an art gallery in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


SRAH BAKERY: Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit KELLY POLANCO, ANA MENDEZ, and ADELINA
MELARA on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. SRAH BAKERY, INC. d/b/a STRAUSS BAKERY, G.E.S.
BAKERY, INC., TZVI GOLDSTEIN, and ELLIOT BERMAN, Case No.
18-cv-02530 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on
a date and time to be determined by the Court, before the Honorable
Brian M. Cogan, at the United States District Court, Eastern
District of New York, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11021,
for approval of the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Jeffrey E. Goldman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY E. GOLDMAN
          501 Fifth Avenue, Ste. 1900
          New York, NY 10017

SSC CARMICHAEL: Can Compel Arbitration in Farfan FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NAOMI FARFAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SSC CARMICHAEL
OPERATING COMPANY LP, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01472-HSG
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted the
Defendants' motions to compel arbitration of the individual claims
of Plaintiffs Terri Richter, Farfan, and Lollie Webster; (ii)
denied without prejudice their motions to dismiss all class action
claims; and (iii) denied as moot their motion to transfer to the
Eastern District of California.

Farfan, Webster, and Richter filed the putative class and
collective action suit against the Defendants on March 7, 2018.
According to the First Amended Complaint, California Plaintiffs
Webster and Farfan were employed by the Defendants as Certified
Nursing Assistants in Carmichael, California, and Plaintiff Richter
was employed by Defendants as a Licensed Practical Nurse in
Hickory, North Carolina.  

Plaintiffs Farfan and Webster, as representatives of a putative
California class and California sub-class, allege that the
Defendants violated California labor laws by failing to provide
adequate meal and rest breaks, and failing to pay overtime
compensation.  They also bring a claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act on behalf of a putative nationwide class for the same
alleged violations.

Each Named Plaintiff signed an Employee Dispute Resolution Program
Agreement ("EDR Agreement") when applying for employment with the
Defendants.  Additionally, each Named Plaintiff received an
Employee Dispute Resolution Booklet ("EDR Booklet"), explaining the
EDR Program processes.

On July 9, 2018, the Defendants filed the currently-pending motions
to compel arbitration, motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and motion to change venue.  On July 26, 2018, the
parties stipulated that the currently-pending motions to dismiss
and motion to change venue should not be considered until the Court
addresses the motions to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs contend that the EDR Agreement is unenforceable as
to Plaintiffs Farfan and Webster because the Agreement is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  The Plaintiffs
contend that the EDR Agreements signed by the California Plaintiffs
must be interpreted under the California Arbitration Act rather
than the FAA.  They contend that, because the California Plaintiffs
worked exclusively within Carmichael, California, the EDR Agreement
does not evidence a transaction involving interstate] commerce.

The Defendants contend that each Defendant is affiliated with a
national organization with its` headquarters and principal place of
business outside California, and which engages nurses and other
employees in many states to provide services in the stream of
interstate commerce.  More importantly, the Plaintiffs allege that
all the Defendants have been and continue to be, employers engaged
in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce.
The Plaintiffs' own allegations in the FAC are sufficient to
establish that the EDR Agreements signed by the California
Plaintiffs evidence a transaction affecting interstate commerce.
The FAA therefore governs interpretation of all the Plaintiffs' EDR
Agreements.

Judge Gilliam finds that because the Defendants presented the form
contract to the California Plaintiffs as a condition of employment
from a position of superior bargaining power, the procedural
unconscionability prong is satisfied.  He also finds that the
Plaintiffs provide no basis for their contention that the
Defendants would not be subject to enforcement of the same EDR
Agreements.  The Plaintiffs have therefore failed to demonstrate
the high degree of substantive unconscionability required to
invalidate the EDR Agreements.

Next, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations against each
Defendant are identical, and they allege that at all relevant times
each Defendant was the officer, director, employee, agent,
representative, alter ego, joint employer, co-employer, or
co-conspirator of each of the other Defendants.  The Plaintiffs'
allegations therefore establish an agency relationship sufficient
to allow the non-signatory Defendants to enforce the EDR
Agreements.

The Plaintiffs contend that the California Plaintiffs are party to
both the EDR Agreement and to the action, which involves third
parties not party to the EDR Agreement. As he discussed, Judge
Gilliam finds that all the Defendants are parties to the EDR
Agreements, and therefore are not third parties under section
1281.2.

The Judge also finds that the EDR Agreements and EDR Booklets are,
at best, ambiguous as to whether putative class action claims must
be arbitrated, or are permitted at all in any forum.  Under the
FAA, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of arbitration.
Therefore, he holds that the Plaintiffs' claims must be referred to
arbitration.

Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that the California Plaintiffs'
Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claim is not subject to
mandatory arbitration.  The Defendants do not dispute that the PAGA
claim is not subject to arbitration.  As a matter of state law, an
employment agreement that compels a waiver of the employee's
statutory right to bring representative claims under the PAGA is
contrary to public policy and unenforceable.  The Plaintiffs' PAGA
claims are therefore not subject to mandatory arbitration.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gilliam granted the Defendants'
motions to compel arbitration of the Plaintiffs' non-PAGA claims.
The Plaintiffs' PAGA claims are stayed pending arbitration.  The
Judge denied, without prejudice, the Defendants' motions to dismiss
and motion to transfer as moot.  

The parties will file a joint report regarding the status of the
arbitration proceeding 90 days from the date of the Order, and
every 90 days thereafter until that proceeding is concluded.  The
parties also are directed to jointly notify the Court within 48
hours of the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding.  The clerk
is directed to administratively close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NfY783 from Leagle.com.

Naomi Farfan, individually and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Lollie Webster, individually and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated
& Terri Richter, individually and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan
J. McCormack , McCormack & Erlich, LLP, George Ryan Nemiroff --
gnemiroff@wynnelawfirm.com -- Wynne Law Firm & Edward Joseph Wynne
-- Wynne@wynnelawfirm.com -- Wynne Law Firm.

SSC Carmichael Operating Company LP, SSC Carmichael Operating GP
LLC, SSC Carmichael Management Company LP, SSC Hickory 13th
Operating Company LLC, SSC Hickory East Operating Company LLC,
Savaseniorcare Administrative Services, LLC, Savaseniorcare, LLC &
Savaseniorcare Consulting, LLC., Defendants, represented by
Jonathan Walcom Black -- jonathan.black@ogletree.com -- Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Michael J. Nader --
michael.nader@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C..


STONE POINT: Gottlieb Sues Over Delisting of AmTrust's Stocks
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARK GOTTLIEB on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. BARRY D. ZYSKIND, GEORGE KARFUNKEL, LEAH
KARFUNKEL, ABRAHAM GULKOWITZ, SUSAN C. FISCH, DONALD T. DECARLO,
RAUL RIVERA, ADAM KARKOWSKY, MARK SEROCK, JOHN F. SHETTLE JR.,
CHRIS STROUP, TRIDENT VII PROFESSIONALS FUND, L.P., TRIDENT VII,
L.P., TRIDENT VII DE PARALLEL FUND, L.P., TRIDENT VII PARALLEL
FUND, L.P., TRIDENT PINE ACQUISITION LP, TRIDENT PINE GP, LLC,
EVERGREEN PARENT, LP, EVERGREEN PARENT GP, LLC, K-Z EVERGREEN, LLC,
and STONE POINT CAPITAL LLC, Case No. 2019-0091- (Del. Ch.,
February 7, 2019), arises from the delisting of AmTrust's publicly
traded preferred stock.

On January 18, 2019, AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. ("AmTrust" or
the "Company") announced that its board had initiated a voluntary
delisting and deregistration of its publicly traded preferred
stock, denominated as Series A, B, C, D, E, and F (the "Preferred
Stock").

This Delisting is being done to crush the value of the preferred
shares to enable to Karfunkel-Zyskind family and their private
equity sponsors at Stone Point Capital LLC ("Stone Point") to
eliminate the remaining public investors in AmTrust at a greatly
depressed price, Mr. Gottlieb alleges.  He adds that the Delisting
follows on the heels of the closing of a going-private deal
through, which the controlling family and Stone Point acquired all
outstanding common shares that the Karfunkels and Zyskinds did not
already control (the "MBO"), in a process in which the Company and
its controllers repeatedly assured preferred stockholders and
regulators that the Preferred Stock would remain listed and
registered after closing.

Stone Point Capital LLC is a Delaware limited liability company and
private equity firm headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut.  Stone
Point manages Trident VII Professionals Fund, L.P., Trident VII,
L.P., Trident VII DE Parallel Fund, L.P. and Trident VII Parallel
Fund, L.P. (collectively, the "Trident Funds").  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

The Trident Funds hold their interests in AmTrust through their
limited partnership interests in Defendant Trident Pine Acquisition
LP ("Trident Pine").  The general partner of Trident Pine is
Trident Pine GP, LLC ("Trident Pine GP"), which is controlled by
the Trident Funds.

Evergreen Parent, L.P., is the direct owner of AmTrust's common
stock.  The limited partners of Evergreen Parent are Trident Pine
Acquisition LP (whose limited partners are the Trident Funds) and
K-Z Evergreen, LLC, which is owned by Zyskind, G. Karfunkel and L.
Karfunkel.

AmTrust is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive
offices located in New York City.  AmTrust underwrites and
provides, among other things, property and casualty insurance
products, including workers' compensation, commercial automobile,
general liability and extended service and warranty coverage, in
the United States and internationally, to niche customer groups.
AmTrust was founded in 1998 by G. Karfunkel and his late brother M.
Karfunkel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Barry, Esq.
          Kyle J. McGee, Esq.
          Joseph L. Christensen, Esq.
          GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
          123 Justison Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 622-7000
          E-mail: mbarry@gelaw.com
                  kmcgee@gelaw.com
                  jchristensen@gelaw.com

               - and -

          Laurence D. Paskowitz, Esq.
          PASKOWITZ LAW FIRM P.C.
          208 East 51st Street, Suite 380
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 685-0969
          E-mail: classattorney@aol.com

               - and -

          Roy L. Jacobs, Esq.
          ROY JACOBS & ASSOCIATES
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2440
          New York, NY 10170
          Telephone: (212) 867-1156
          E-mail: rjacobs@jacobsclasslaw.com


SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY: Class Certification Denial in Young Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN YOUNG AND NICHOLAS BROWN, Appellants, v. SULLIVAN
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, INC., Appellee, Case No. 2018-CA-000364-ME (Ky.
App.), Judge Jeff S. Taylor of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
affirmed the Feb. 23, 2018 order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
denying certification of a class action against Sullivan.

On April 27, 2016, Young and Brown, for themselves and for a class
of other individuals similarly situated, filed a complaint in the
Jefferson Circuit Court against Sullivan.  Young and Brown sought
class certification under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 23
on behalf of all individuals who were students in the culinary arts
program at Sullivan since 2004.

It was alleged that Sullivan engaged in "unfair, false, misleading,
and deceptive" representations mainly concerning career success in
relation to its culinary arts program that induced Young, Brown,
and others similarly situated to enroll in such program.  Due to
Sullivan's wrongful acts, it was claimed that Young, Brown, and
others similarly situated incurred significant damages, mainly
student debt.

By order entered Feb. 23, 2018, the circuit court denied the motion
to certify the class and concluded that neither the commonality or
typicality requirements of CR 23.01 were satisfied.

The appeal follows.  At issue in the appeal are the commonality and
typicality requirements.  Young and Brown contend that the circuit
court erred by determining that the commonality and typicality
requirements necessary for class certification under CR 23.01 were
not satisfied.  They maintain that the common core of the case is
whether Sullivan misleads prospective students regarding the
prospects of career success for its graduates.  In particular,
Young and Brown assert that Sullivan's marketing campaign and
advertisements induced students to pay tuition for a culinary arts
degree by misrepresenting the actual career success of graduates.
Additionally, they believe that the circuit court improperly judged
the merits of the claims in determining not to certify the class
action.

Judge Taylor believes that the circuit court's reasoning is sound
and cannot conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred.  In fact,
the circuit court's reasoning was well within the parameters of CR
23's requirements for certification of a class.  And, he rejects
Young and Brown's contention that the circuit court improperly
judged the merits.  Rather, the circuit court properly undertook a
rigorous analysis that necessarily required an examination of the
facts beyond the pleadings.  Accordingly, he's of the opinion that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Young and
Brown's motion to certify a class action.  He views any remaining
contentions of error as moot.

For these reasons, Judge Taylor affirmed the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Sxo97s from Leagle.com.

T. Scott Abell, Joshua T. Rose -- jrose@craighenrylaw.com --
Louisville, Kentucky, Briefs for Appellants.

Joshua T. Rose, Louisville, Kentucky, Oral Argument for
Appellants.

Grover C. Potts, Jr. -- gpotts@wyattfirm.com -- Michelle D. Wyrick
-- michellewyrick@wyattfirm.com -- Sean G. Williamson, Louisville,
Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.

Michelle D. Wyrick, Louisville, Kentucky, Oral Argument for
Appellee.


SUNDARAM TAGORE: Matzura Asserts Claim under ADA in New York
------------------------------------------------------------
Sundaram Tagore, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Sundaram Tagore, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01209 (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Sundaram Tagore, Inc. is an Art gallery in Hong Kong.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


TITLEMAX OF NEW MEXICO: Arbitration Ruling in Romero Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSE ROMERO, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TITLEMAX OF NEW MEXICO,
INC., Defendant-Appellant, and TMX FINANCE, LLC; TRACY YOUNG,
Defendants, Case No. 18-2077 (10th Cir.), Judge Mary Beck Briscoe
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's partial denial of TitleMax's motion to compel
arbitration.

Romero filed a class action complaint in New Mexico state court
against the Defendants-Appellants, alleging that TitleMax's title
loan business violates New Mexico consumer protection statutes and
common law consumer protection principles.  TitleMax provides title
loans.

On July 19, 2016, Romero took out the first of three title loans
from TitleMax.  His 2004 Jaguar X-Type served as collateral. The
first loan was for $1,005 at an annual interest rate of 156.4484%.
On Aug. 6, 2016, Romero took out a second title loan where the same
car served as collateral.  This time the loan was for $2,074.26 at
an annual interest rate of 144.0365%.  Approximately nine months
later, on May 15, 2017, Romero took out a third title loan on the
same car.  This time the loan was for $1,940.44 at an annual
interest rate of 144.4116%.  

Each loan agreement had the same material terms, headings, clauses,
and title, and varied only in the dates that they were signed, the
identifying loan numbers, the amount of the loan, and the interest
rate charged.  The second loan was used in part to pay off the
first, and the third loan was used to pay off the second loan.
Each loan agreement also contained an identical Waiver of Jury
Trial and Arbitration Provision provided in a question-and-answer
table.

Romero did not opt out of the first or second loan agreements.
However, on May 22, 2017, Romero's counsel sent compliant written
notice to TitleMax stating that Romero was exercising his opt-out
right under the Arbitration Clause for the third loan agreement.

Shortly thereafter, on June 20, 2017, Romero filed a class action
complaint in New Mexico state court against TitleMax on behalf of
all citizens of New Mexico who took out a title loan with TitleMax
on or after March 11, 2013.  TitleMax timely removed the case to
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction or, in the alternative,
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.

In the operative class action complaint Romero alleges TitleMax's
lending practices are unconscionable trade practices under New
Mexico law.  He seeks, among other relief, a rescission of each
loan agreement between TitleMax and each putative class member,
restitution for the putative class, treble damages pursuant to
statute, a permanent injunction against TitleMax's current loan
products, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

TitleMax then filed a motion with the district court to, among
other things, compel all of Romero's claims to arbitration, enforce
the arbitration clause as to all proposed class members who did not
opt out of the Arbitration Clause, and stay all court proceedings.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part
for reasons explained in a teleconference between the district
court and the parties.  The district court held that Romero did not
opt out of the Arbitration Clauses in the first and second loan
agreements, that Romero properly exercised his right to opt out of
the third loan agreement's Arbitration Clause, and that the three
loan agreements were each individual loan agreements.  As a result,
the district court held that Romero could litigate claims arising
from the third loan agreement but had to proceed to arbitration on
claims related to the first and second loan agreements.  The
district court further declined to compel arbitration for absent
class members since no class had been certified and hence the
absent class members were not before the court.

TitleMax asserts that the district court erred when it ruled on the
issue of arbitrability as regards the third loan agreement when the
threshold question of arbitrability should have been determined by
an arbitrator.  TitleMax also appears to argue that Romero did not
properly opt out of arbitration under the third loan agreement.

Judge Briscoe explains that the district court determined that all
three loan agreements were separate, individual agreements because
each contained different identifying loan numbers, assessed
different interest rates, and lent different amounts of money.
Another fact supports the district court's conclusion that each
loan agreement is an individual contract: Each loan agreement
contains its own, albeit identical, arbitration clause.  Hence,
consistent with New Mexico case law, she finds that the Arbitration
Clause in the third loan agreement must mean something.  Despite
this, and in the absence of any supporting authority, TitleMax asks
the Court to render an entire clause in the third loan agreement
meaningless.  She declines to do so and instead gives full effect
to the parties' decision to include an opt-out provision in the
third loan agreement's Arbitration Clause.

TitleMax also raises several alternative theories in support of its
motion to compel arbitration.  The Judge finds that these arguments
are either premature or procedurally improper.  Further, the
majority of TitleMax's briefing addresses class action
considerations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) such as
numerosity, commonality, and typicality, but nothing in the record
demonstrates that either party has moved for class certification or
sought discovery related to class certification.  The district
court is in a better position to address these concerns when
presented with a proper Rule 23 motion for class certification or a
"pre-emptive" motion to deny class certification.  Accordingly, she
declines to address these premature or procedurally improper
arguments.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Briscoe affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order and Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/8BLczr from Leagle.com.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEM: Azizbayev Files Class Suit Over FDCPA Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld System,
Inc.  The case is styled as Ravil Azizbayev, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Transworld
System, Inc and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 22:19-cv-05399
(D. N.J., February 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Transworld Systems Inc. provides accounts receivable, debt
recovery, and past due accounts services for businesses, medical
companies, dental companies, education facilities, Fortune 500
companies, and small businesses in the United States and
internationally. It offers accelerator, profit recovery, messenger,
dental collection, demand/direct deposit account recovery plus,
outsourcing, medical collection, education collection, and
commercial/business-to-business collections services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   STEIN SAKS, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601-2726
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Koskie Minsky Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Padraigin Murphy, Esq. -- pmurphy@kmlaw.ca -- of Koskie Minsky LLP,
in an article for Lexology, reports that in the Ontario Court of
Appeal's first decision of the year, Heller v Uber, 2019 ONCA 1,
the court held that an arbitration clause in the terms that
individual drivers are required to "accept" to become drivers for
Uber breached the prohibition on contracting out of the Employment
Standards Act (ESA), and was otherwise unconscionable at common
law.

The appeal arose in the context of a proposed class action. The
plaintiff Uber driver sought a declaration that Uber drivers are
employees of Uber and therefore governed by the ESA. The claim also
sought damages in relation to alleged breaches of the ESA,
including with respect to minimum wage, overtime, and vacation
pay.

In the decision under appeal, the Superior Court granted a stay of
the proceedings due to the arbitration clause. The clause
stipulated that the agreement "shall be exclusively governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of The Netherlands", and
required that any "dispute, conflict, or controversy" arising out
of or relating to the agreement must be submitted for mediation
proceedings in the Netherlands. Justice Perell held that there was
a prima facie case that an arbitrator in the Netherlands had
jurisdiction over the dispute. Further, he held that the
"competence-competence" principle applied, so the arbitrator had
the power to rule with respect to his or her jurisdiction. Justice
Perell also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the arbitration
clause was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal overturned the stay. Justice Nordheimer first
considered whether the arbitration clause amounted to contracting
out of the ESA. Section 5 of the ESA provides that no employee or
employer may contract out of or waive an employment standard,
unless by a provision or contract that provides a greater right in
relation to that employment standard. An employee may contract to
earn more than minimum wage, for example, but not less.

Justice Nordheimer held that the arbitration clause amounted to a
contracting out of an employees' right to make a complaint to the
Ministry of Labour regarding an alleged breach of the ESA, and to
have that complaint investigated by the Ministry. He held that the
arbitration process provided for by the arbitration clause did not
provide a greater right, and that the clause was therefore a
violation of section 5 of the ESA.

With respect to unconscionability, the evidence was that the
administrative costs for a driver to participate in arbitration
were at least US$14,500. This amount did not include legal fees, or
accommodation in the Netherlands. The appellant driver earned
approximately $20-30,000 per year, before taxes and expenses.
Justice Nordheimer also observed that the clause was not a standard
arbitration clause. It also amounted to a forum selection provision
and a choice of laws provision.

Justice Nordheimer held that the impugned terms met the four-part
test for unconscionability set out in Titus v. William F. Cooke
Enterprises Inc.: (1) a grossly unfair and improvident transaction;
(2) a party's lack of independent legal advice or other suitable
advice; (3) an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by
the victim's ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the
language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or
similar disability; and (4) the other party's knowingly taking
advantage of this vulnerability.[1] The court did not determine
whether a two-part test for unconscionability should apply as
either version of the test was made out on the record.

Justice Nordheimer concluded by observing that, for the purposes of
his analysis, there is no reasonable distinction to be made between
the appellant driver and a consumer. He quotes the Supreme Court in
Douez v. Facebook, Inc., which held that "foreign selection clauses
often operate to defeat consumer claims,"[2] and observes that the
same can be said of this clause, "it operates to defeat the very
claims it purports to resolve."[3] Thus, he concludes that if Uber
is correct and their drivers are not employees, the relationship
may nevertheless attract protection due to the inequality of
bargaining power between the parties. [GN]


UNION PACIFIC: Must Answer Interrogatory Questions in Harris Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, QUINTON HARRIS, GEOFFREY MILLER, NORMAN MOUNT, SCOTT
ZINN, THOMAS TAYLOR, and JOHN BAKER, Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 8:16CV381 (D. Neb.), Judge
Joseph F. Bataillon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska (i) sustained the Plaintiffs' objection to the magistrate
judge's order granting the Defendant's motion for a protective
order; (ii) overruled and reversed the Order of the magistrate
judge; (iii) ordered the Defendants to comply with the discovery
and answer interrogatory questions #24 and 25 within 30 days of the
date of the Memorandum and Order; (iv) denied the Defendant's
motion for a protective order; (v) denied the Defendants' motion to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Kevin Trangle; (vi) denied the motion
to exclude Dr. John Holland's testimony; (vii) denied at this time
the motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Paul Dillard; (viii)
denied as set forth Memorandum and Order the motion to exclude Dr.
Michael Collins; and (ix) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude
or strike the expert report of Dr. Ali Saad.

The case is a putative class action suit and involves claims of
employment disability discrimination under the American with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act.

Union Pacific has a company-wide Fitness-for-Duty ("FFD") program.
In 2014, Union Pacific made changes to this program.  Employees in
certain positions under the new policy are required to disclose
specific health conditions, and the newly implemented policy
automatically excluded employees who disclosed these conditions
from employment.  These employees then had to have a fitness for
duty evaluation, and according to the Plaintiffs, Union Pacific
routinely ignores the medical opinions of outside doctors.  The
records are sent to Dr. Holland in Olympia, Washington.  Dr.
Holland does not do a physical evaluation, but he and his designees
make all decisions regarding who is fit for duty.

The Plaintiffs are all previous employees of Union Pacific.  Many
had worked for years, were qualified and performing their jobs with
no problems.  They were pulled from their jobs under their new
program, evaluated, and then excluded from their positions at Union
Pacific, even though they had no trouble fulfilling the essential
functions of their jobs.

Defendant Union Pacific moved for a protective order shielding it
from the Plaintiffs' interrogatories Nos. 23 and 243 and from all
future inquires regard Union Pacific's color vision testing.  The
Plaintiffs contested the motion, arguing the color vision testing
information they requested is relevant to their disability claims
in the case.  The magistrate judge determined that the color vision
testing information is not relevant and granted Union Pacific's
motion for a protective order.

The Plaintiffs point out that they bring the action on behalf of a
class of individuals. The ADA Class includes individuals who were
removed from service over their objection, and/or suffered another
adverse employment action, during their employment with Union
Pacific for reasons related to a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation at any
time from 300 days before the earliest date that a named Plaintiff
filed an administrative charge of discrimination to the resolution
of the action.

Judge Bataillon finds that the Defendant is not entitled to a
protective order.  They're at the discovery phase of the lawsuit.
Following discovery, if the evidence points otherwise, Union
Pacific is free to file another motion.  But at this point, Union
Pacific must answer Interrogatories numbered 23 and 24 and disclose
the requested information.  Union Pacific cannot show good cause;
it has not shown hardship; and its argument that this is without
relevance is incorrect.  The allegations made by the Plaintiffs
clearly encompass vision testing as it is included in the FFD
program.  The representation in the case is for all who suffered
adverse employment actions related to Union Pacific's FFD program.
The criteria have been applied to the vision testing and utilized
by Dr. Holland on behalf of Union Pacific.  Further, for all these
reasons, Dr. Neitz's rebuttal report is relevant and will not be
excluded.

Union Pacific moves to exclude portions of expert opinions of the
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Trangle.  It contends that the proffered
testimony of Dr. Tangle goes beyond the specifics of the 12 people
he reviewed in his expert report.  Further, Union Pacific argues
Dr. Trangle is not qualified to offer a statistics-based
conclusion, and in any event, the 12 individuals cannot provide a
representative sample for the rest of the putative class that
plaintiffs want to certify.  

The Judge finds that no basis for excluding this expert's
testimony, based on his review of the employee's and the relevant
documents maintained by Union Pacific.  He finds that it does not
appear that Dr. Trangle is offering a statistical opinion.
Accordingly, the he finds that Dr. Trangle is a qualified expert,
he is testifying in his area of expertise, and his testimony is
relevant.

The Plaintiffs move to strike the expert report of Dr. John
Holland, contending that the expert report is only two-pages with
2,900 pages of exhibits and is deficient and contains no complete
statement of his opinions as required under the rules.  The Judge
finds that Mr. Holland's expert opinions are not expressed as
clearly as possible, nor are they necessarily easily identifiable.
However, given the amount of discovery that has occurred, he will
permit Mr. Holland to testify.  However, if Mr. Holland attempts to
testify on matters not contained in his expert report, the
Plaintiffs are free to so object at trial, and the Judge will take
up the matter at that time.

Union Pacific contends that expert witness Mr. Dillard is not
qualified to give an opinion on railroad industry standards
reasonable care.  The Judge will permit the Plaintiffs to lay
foundation showing that Union Pacific adopted these standards in
part.  If they're able to do so, then the testimony, at least in
part, of Mr. Dillard becomes relevant.  If they cannot establish
that these standards were used by Union Pacific, then the testimony
will not be relevant and will lack foundation.  Therefore, at this
point, the Judge is willing to allow plaintiffs to proceed with the
testimony at trial, and het will make a final ruling as the
evidence is received.  With that said, Mr. Dillard will not be
permitted to testify outside of his area of expertise.

Union Pacific moves to exclude the expert report of Michael Collins
on the basis that Mr. Collins has no opinion specific to Union
Pacific, and his testimony regarding railroad employers is not
based on the facts in this case, any published data, a recognized
methodology, or an objective analysis.  The Judge finds Mr. Collins
is allowed to testify as to RRB occupational disability annuity
process as set forth in his report.  Further, he finds that RRB can
testify as to any defenses of mitigation or damages or estoppel.
On the issue of whether Mr. Collins can testify regarding whether
the revised policies were passed to create these to discharge
expensive employees from their payrolls, the Judget will not make a
decision at this time.  If sufficient foundational evidence of such
is presented as to Union Pacific, he will consider allowing Mr.
Collins to testify as to his specialized knowledge that relates to
such terminations.  However, he is not going to permit Mr. Collins
to testify regarding his general knowledge, absent some connection
to Union Pacific's practices in this regard.

The Plaintiffs move the Court for an order striking the expert
report and testimony of Dr. Saad as untimely and improper.  Dr.
Saad is a rebuttal expert to Dr. Trangle.  The Judge agrees that
Dr. Sadd does not meet the criteria of Rule 702.  He will exclude
paragraphs 23 through 75, including exhibits 1 through 22, of Dr.
Saad's report as inadmissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702.  He
finds Dr. Saad is not qualified to rebut the expert opinions of Dr.
Trangle, and further, the testimony in this regard will not be
helpful at trial and is speculative.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bataillon (i) sustained the
Plaintiffs' objection to the magistrate judge's order granting the
Defendant's motion for a protective order; (ii) overruled and
reversed the Order of the magistrate judge; (iii) ordered the
Defendants to comply with the discovery and answer interrogatory
questions #24 and 25 within 30 days of the date of the Memorandum
and Order; (iv) denied the Defendant's motion for a protective
order; (v) denied the Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony
of Dr. Kevin Trangle; (vi) denied the motion to exclude Dr. John
Holland's testimony; (vii) denied at this time the motion to
exclude the testimony of Mr. Paul Dillard; (viii) denied as set
forth Memorandum and Order the motion to exclude Dr. Michael
Collins; and (ix) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude or
strike the expert report of Dr. Saad.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/NMkKG5 from Leagle.com.

Quinton Harris, Geoffrey Miller, Norman Mount, Scott Zinn, Thomas
Taylor & John Baker, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony S. Petru --
petru@hmnlaw.com -- HILDEBRAND, MCLEOD LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Charles A. Delbridge -- cdelbridge@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, Corey L. Stull -- cstull@atwoodlawyers.com --
ATWOOD, HOLSTEN LAW FIRM, David E. Schlesinger --
schlesinger@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
James H. Kaster -- kaster@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Laura Baures -- lbaures@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, Lindsey E. Krause, NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Neil D. Pederson -- npederson@nka.com -- NICHOLS,
KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nicholas D. Thompson --
nthompson@moodyrrlaw.com -- MOODY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice & Robert
L. Schug -- schug@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant, represented by Allison
D. Balus -- abalus@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM,
Christopher R. Hedican -- chedican@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW
FIRM, David P. Kennison -- dkennison@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, Leigh C. Joyce -- lcampbell@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM & Scott P. Moore -- spmoore@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

UNITED STATES: Accused of Using Immigrant Children as Bait
----------------------------------------------------------
Angelina Chapin, writing for Huffington Post, reports that Donald
Trump's administration is using detained immigrant children as
"bait" to arrest their sponsors and deliberately keeping kids in
shelters for long periods, according to a class action lawsuit
filed on Jan. 18 by immigration advocacy groups.

The lawsuit, which was filed on behalf of more than 10,000 children
detained in Office of Refugee Resettlement shelters, is a list of
horror stories compiled by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the
Legal Aid Justice Center and a D.C.-based law firm.

Among the examples provided are an 11-year-old child who has
languished in a shelter for more than five months and a 17-year-old
whose father was deported to Guatemala after submitting his
fingerprints to the ORR as part of the sponsorship process.

Using children in efforts to arrest their sponsors and keeping
minors unnecessarily detained is "an abomination," said Mary Bauer,
the deputy legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center's
Immigrant Justice Project. "It is cruel, it is shocking, and it is
every bit as horrific as the other kinds of family separation we
have seen. This is not a problem that has been solved."

She said a recently leaked government memo confirms that the Trump
administration implemented policies such as zero tolerance and
sharing a sponsor's information with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement to deter families of unauthorized immigrants from
coming to the U.S.

Kayla Vazquez, who has been trying for four months to sponsor a
17-year-old family member, said the administration continues to put
up hurdles to their reunification. "It feels like the government
doesn't care and they don't understand how hard it is for the
family," she said during a media call on Jan. 22. "I feel like they
are playing a game and just keeping him there to have the family
suffer."  

A representative from the Department of Health and Human Services
wrote in an email to HuffPost, "As a matter of policy, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services does not comment on matters
related to pending litigation. We are currently reviewing the court
filing and have no information to add at this time."

In November the number of detained children reached a record high
of 14,000, and kids are spending an average of two months in
shelters -- largely due to Trump's zero tolerance policy and a
government crackdown on sponsors.

In an effort to lower the number of detained children, the
government nixed a policy in December that required everyone in a
sponsor's household to be fingerprinted. In January the Trump
administration shut down Tornillo, a tent camp in Texas that held
more than 2,700 teens.

But immigration experts said there is still a crisis: Shelters are
overflowing with children, and their sponsors are being arrested.

"I think the narrative we've seen in the media writ large is that
things are better and kids got out and they are fine," said Ms.
Bauer. "And that's wrong."

The lawsuit attacks a memorandum of agreement (MOA) that
immigration officials signed in April, directing the ORR to share
information gathered on sponsors -- including fingerprints,
addresses and "biographic information" -- with ICE. While the
government has claimed that the agreement helps keep children
safer, Bauer pointed out that the leaked memo states that a purpose
of the MOA was to refer sponsors "for criminal prosecution" and
that the agreement would have a "tremendous deterrent effect."
Since July, at least 170 potential sponsors have been arrested by
ICE, and immigration experts said the agreement dissuades sponsors
without legal status from coming forward, for fear of being
deported.

The lawsuit tells the story a man from Guatemala who applied to
sponsor his 17-year-old son, submitted fingerprints to the ORR in
September and was deported three days later. After four months in
detention, which involved being transferred to a high-security
facility, the boy attempted to kill himself, according to court
documents.

Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg, the legal director of the Legal Aid
Justice Center's immigrant advocacy program said on the media call
that the MOA has turned the ORR into an "enforcement agency" rather
than one that is supposed to protect kids.

"Every child we represent . . . has someone who wants them to come
and live with them, and they are not allowed to do that," said Ms.
Bauer. "It's really heartbreaking."

In a separate but related issue, the lawsuit tells of sponsors who
are waiting for months to get a child released from detention.
Meanwhile, detained kids are becoming depressed and anxious and are
behaving erratically, according to the court filing.

On the media call, Ms. Vazquez said that over the course of trying
to sponsor her husband's 17-year-old cousin, who fled Honduras
because his father was abusive, case managers asked her to submit
documents, such as his birth certificate and passport, multiple
times.

After submitting her fingerprints in December and allowing a case
manager to inspect her house, she was told her husband's cousin
would be released by Christmas. She said she is now worried they
won't be reunited before he turns 18 in four months, at which point
he will be transferred to ICE custody.

"It's frustrating not to know what is going on," said Ms. Vazquez,
choking back tears. "His mother reaches out to me, asking, 'What is
going on?' . . . and most of the time, I don't have anything to say
to her because we don't know ourselves."

Mr. Sandoval-Moshenberg said that the sponsorship process is opaque
and that case managers have wide discretion to approve or deny
applicants on the basis of subjective criteria.

The first hearing in the case is set for Feb. 15, and Mr.
Sandoval-Moshenberg said that he wants the government to establish
transparent policies and standards for the reunification process
and to end the MOA between ICE and the ORR so potential sponsors
don't fear arrest.

Ms. Bauer said children should be speedily reunited with relatives,
yet the Trump administration has falsely painted sponsors as
criminals. "That's not the real story here," she said. "Not a
single one of the kids that we talked to was being detained because
there were concerns of abuse or trafficking." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Bid to Dismiss Refugee Disability Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REFUGEE DISABILITY BENEFITS OREGON and JOHN DOE I, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v.
ALEX AZAR, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of
Health and Human Services; NANCY BERRYHILL, in her official
capacity as Acting Commissioner of the United States Social
Security Administration; and KEN TOTA, in his official capacity as
Deputy Director of the United States Office of Refugee
Resettlement; Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00279-HZ (D. Or.), Judge
Marco A. Hernandez of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon, Portland Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action on behalf of a class
of Iraqi and Afghan immigrants who are eligible to apply to receive
supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits on account of their
service to the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Beginning in
2008, Iraqi and Afghan nationals with "special immigrant
visa-holder" ("SIV") status were eligible to receive SSI for up to
eight months.  In October 2009, the Congress extended that period
to provide SIV status-holders up to seven years of SSI
eligibility.

It is undisputed that the Defendants erroneously continued to apply
the shorter period of eligibility to SSI applications filed by at
least some SIV status-holders after Congress extended the period of
eligibility.  After the Plaintiffs filed the action in February
2017, the Defendants acknowledged the errors and began to undertake
efforts to identify the applications of SIV status-holders that had
been improperly processed on the basis that the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") erroneously applied the shorter period of
eligibility.

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in which they contend the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' putative class action on the basis that their claims
are moot and because they failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies.

The Court heard oral argument on Nov. 27, 2018.

With respect to any putative class-members who were either not
permitted to file applications or who were dissuaded from filing an
application because the SSA personnel erroneously advised them that
any application would be futile, Judge Hernandez concludes that
their efforts to file an application are sufficient to satisfy the
presentment requirement because in both instances the SIV
status-holder's inability or failure to file an application was
attributable to the SSA's errors.  Accordingly, on this record, he
concludes at this early stage of the proceedings that the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that the John Doe
Plaintiff and the putative class-members presented their claims to
the SSA.

As to exhaustion, the Judge finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' claims,
which concern only the appropriate period of eligibility to apply
to their claims, are collateral to a substantive claim of
entitlement to SSI benefits; (ii) the Plaintiffs have established
irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants' errors because the
John Doe Plaintiff and the putative class-members have had their
applications for SSI benefits erroneously limited, denied, or
delayed; and (iii) dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims for failure to
exhaust would not serve the purposes of the exhaustion
requirement.

Finally, the Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on
the basis that they are moot.  The Judge concludes that the
Plaintiffs' claims are not moot.  He says the Plaintiffs are
correct that the Defendants have failed to establish that their
claims are moot.  The Defendants acknowledge they have not yet
corrected all errors in the processing of the claims of all
putative class-members and, in fact, contend they cannot correct
some such errors.  In any event, notwithstanding the Defendants'
contention that it cannot correct all erroneously processed
applications, the Judge finds that they have failed to demonstrate
the searches they undertook have resulted in the identification of
all erroneously processed applications filed by SIV
status-holders.

For these reasons, Judge Hernendez denied the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/99kzEe from Leagle.com.

Refugee Disability Benefits Oregon & John Doe I, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by James S. Coon -- jcoon@tcnf.legal -- Thomas, Coon, Newton &
Frost.

United States Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tom Price, in
his official capacity as United States Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Commissioner Social Security Administration, Nancy
Berryhill, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the
United States Social Security Administration & United States Office
of Refugee Resettlement, Ken Tota in his official capacity as
Deputy Director of the United States Office of Refugee
Resettlement, Defendants, represented by Daniel Bensing, U.S.
Department of Justice.


UNITED STATES: Calif. Court Certifies Children's Class in J.L. Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.L., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEE FRANCIS CISSNA, et
al., Defendants, Case No.18-cv-04914-NC (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Nathaniel M. Cousins of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

The Plaintiffs are a group of young immigrants who allege that the
Defendants -- the United States Department of Homeland Security,
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"),
and individual officers in charge of those departments -- have
adopted a new, unlawful requirement for obtaining Special Immigrant
Juvenile status ("SIJ").

The SIJ status is a "special immigrant" classification granted to
non-citizen juveniles who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned
by their parents.  The SIJ statute was significantly overhauled in
2008 under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
("TVPRA").  The SIJ status confers various benefits, including
protection from removal and a pathway to permanent residency and
citizenship.  The United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service first promulgated implementing regulations for the SIJ
statute in 1993.  Despite passage of the TVPRA in 2008, the
implementing regulations have not been updated.

The Named Plaintiffs are four 20- to 22-year old immigrants who
obtained a guardianship order in California state court after their
18th birthdays.  Three of the named Plaintiffs were denied or
issued a notice of the government's intent to deny SIJ status on
the grounds that the California probate court lacked jurisdiction
to issue the requisite guardianship order. One named Plaintiff's
SIJ application is still pending.

J.L. is an unmarried 20-year-old from New Zealand who was neglected
and abandoned by her parents when she was four months old.  She now
lives in California with her aunts, who were declared her guardians
by the Los Angeles County Probate Court in January 2017.  J.L.
applied for SIJ status on March 15, 2017, but USCIS denied her
application on April 17, 2018.  USCIS asserted that the Los Angeles
County Probate Court was not a "juvenile court" with jurisdiction
to issue the prerequisite guardianship order.

M.G.S. is a 20-year-old from Guatemala who was abused by his father
and neglected by his mother as a child.  When he was 17, M.G.S.
fled to the United States where he now lives with his older sister
in California.  M.G.S.'s sister was declared his guardian by the
Alameda County Probate Court in August 2017.  M.G.S. applied for
SIJ status on Sept. 5, 2017, and that application is still pending.
M.G.S. is currently in removal proceedings.

M.D.G.B. is an unmarried 22-year-old from Mexico who was abandoned
by her father at birth.  She was abused and neglected by her mother
until the age of 7, when she moved to the United States to live
with her grandmother in California.  M.D.G.B.'s grandmother was
declared her guardian by the San Diego County Probate Court in
February 2017.  M.D.G.B. applied for SIJ status on Feb. 7, 2017,
and was issued a Notice of Intent to Deny ("NOID") on April 24,
2018.  USCIS asserted that the San Diego County Probate Court was
not a "juvenile court" with jurisdiction to issue the requisite
guardianship order.

J.B.A. is an unmarried 22-year-old from Mexico who was abused by
her father and neglected by her mother.  She moved to the United
States with her family when she was 7 years old.  J.B.A. met her
computer science teacher, who has since become like a mother to
her.  J.B.A.'s teacher was declared her guardian by the Alameda
County Probate Court in January 2017.  J.B.A. applied for SIJ
status on Feb. 6, 2017, and was issued a NOID on July 20, 2018.
USCIS asserted that the Alameda County Probate Court was not a
"juvenile court" with jurisdiction to issue the prerequisite
guardianship order.

On Oct. 24, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction on a class-wide basis and ordered the
Plaintiffs to move for class certification.  They filed an amended
complaint on Nov. 20, 2019, and now move to certify a class of
children who have received or will receive guardianship orders
pursuant to California Probate Code Section 1510.1(a) and who have
received or will receive denials of their SIJS petitions on the
grounds that the state court that issued the SIJ Findings lacked
jurisdiction because the court did not have the authority to
reunify the children with their parents.

Judge Cousins granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and certified the class of children who have received
or will receive guardianship orders pursuant to California Probate
Code Section 1510.1(a) and who have received or will receive
denials of their SIJ status petitions on the grounds that the state
court that issued the SIJ Findings lacked jurisdiction because the
court did not have the authority to reunify the children with their
parents.

The Judge appointed (i) J.L., M.G.S., M.D.G.B., and J.B.A. as the
class representatives; and (i) Phelps & Phillips, LLP; Public
Counsel; and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San
Francisco Bay Area as the class counsel.

The Plaintiffs must meet and confer with the Defendants to propose
a method and form of notice to the class members under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(A).  The Plaintiffs must file the
proposed class notice by Feb. 15, 2019.

The Judge also ordered the Plaintiffs to show cause why M.V.B.
should not be terminated as a named Plaintiff in the case and
whether the caption should be updated accordingly.  They must
respond by Feb. 8, 2019, and the Defendants may respond by Feb. 15,
2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ZFexXR from Leagle.com.

J.L., M.V.B., M.D.G.B. & J.B.A., Plaintiffs, represented by Sirena
Peleka Castillo -- scastillo@Manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps, Phillips
LLP, Adrianne Elizabeth Marshack -- amarshack@Manatt.com -- Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Allison Claire Nelson, Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, LLP, Judith Maura London -- jlondon@publiccounsel.org --
Public Counsel, Kathleen Elizabeth Ingra Wise, Manatt, Phelps,
Phillips, LLP, Keith Lee Wurster -- kwurster@lccr.com -- Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisc, Mary Tanagho Ross
-- mross@publiccounsel.org -- Public Counsel, Matthew Brent Golper,
Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, LLP, Matthew P. Kanny --
mkanny@Manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Michael
Gregory Nordon, Manatt Phelps Phillips, LLP & Sara Lynn Van
Hofwegen -- svanhofwegen@publiccounsel.org -- Public Counsel.

M.G.S., Plaintiff, represented by Sirena Peleka Castillo, Manatt
Phelps, Phillips LLP & Matthew Brent Golper, Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, LLP.

Director Lee Francis Cissna, Director, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Defendant, represented by Ari Nazarov,
USDOJ/Civil Off. Immigration Litigation, Michael Thomas Pyle,
United States Attorney's Office, Nicole Joann Thomas-Dorris, U.S.
Dep't of Justice Civil Division, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Katelyn
Masetta-Alvarez, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration
Litigation, Kenneth John Ian, US Dept of Justice Civil Divsion &
Lauren Fascett, US Dept. of Justice Civil Division, Office of
Immigration Litigation.

Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary, United States Department
of Homeland Security, Director Robert Cowan, Director, National
Benefits Center of United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services & United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Defendants, represented by Ari Nazarov, USDOJ/Civil Off.
Immigration Litigation, Michael Thomas Pyle, United States
Attorney's Office, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez,
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation,
Kenneth John Ian, US Dept of Justice Civil Divsion & Nicole Joann
Thomas-Dorris, U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Division.

United States Department of Homeland Security, Defendant,
represented by Michael Thomas Pyle, United States Attorney's
Office, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S. Department of Justice Office of
Immigration Litigation, Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez, U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Kenneth John Ian, US Dept
of Justice Civil Divsion & Nicole Joann Thomas-Dorris, U.S. Dep't
of Justice Civil Division.

Immigration, Children's Rights and Family Law Scholars, Amicus,
represented by Nicholas Frederic Daum -- ndaum@kbkfirm.com --
Kendall Brill & Klieger LLP & Ari Nazarov, USDOJ/Civil Off.
Immigration Litigation.

Non-Profit SIJS Service Providers, Amicus, represented by Linda
Susan Dakin-Grimm -- ldakin-grimm@milbank.com -- Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy LLP.


UNITED YACHT: Bishop Asserts Breach Under Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------
United Yacht Sales, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. United Yacht Sales, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01258 (S.D. N.Y., February 8, 2019).

United Yacht Sales, LLC is a boat dealer in Stuart, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



VAN DE WEGNE: Faces Class Suit in NY for ADA Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Van de Wegne, Ltd. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled Steven
Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Van de Wegne, Ltd., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01176
(S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Van Den Weghe is known as high-end natural stone company in the
entire world, with a sharp eye for luxury design.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


VAN DORENWAXTER: Matzura Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Van DorenWaxter LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Steven Matzura, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Van DorenWaxter LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01201 (S.D. N.Y., February 7, 2019).

Van DorenWaxter LLC was founded in 2013. Van Doren Waxter
represents the evolution in the partnership between John Van Doren
and Dorsey Waxter who worked together for 15 years at Greenberg Van
Doren. The gallery specializes in post war American Abstraction,
including a number of artists from California: Richard Diebenkorn,
Sam Francis, and John McLaughlin.  Additionally, the gallery
handles secondary market work specializing in: John Chamberlain,
Helen Frankenthaler, Hans Hofmann, Ellsworth Kelly, Franz Kline,
Roy Lichtenstein, Georgia O'Keeffe, Frank Stella, and Wayne
Thiebaud, among others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


VENATOR MATERIALS: Fails to Disclose Plant Fire Damage, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MACOMB COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and 0n
Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. VENATOR
MATERIALS PLC, SIMON TURNER, KURT D. OGDEN, STEPHEN IBBOTSON, RUSS
R. STOLLE, HUNTSMAN (HOLDINGS) NETHERLANDS B.V., HUNTSMAN
INTERNATIONAL LLC, HUNTSMAN CORPORATION, CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS
INC, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, GOLDMAN
SACHS & C0. LLC and LLC, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES, the Defendants,
Case No. DC-19-02030 (Tex. Dist Ct., Dallas Cty., Feb. 8, 2019), is
a securities class action on behalf of all persons or entities who
purchased Venator ordinary shares in or traceable to the Company's
August 4, 2017 initial public offering and/or in its December 1,
2017 secondary offering (the "SPO).

The Defendant was previously organized as the pigments and
additives division within defendant Huntsman, a multinational
chemical producer and manufacturer. On October 28, 2016, Huntsman
filed, through its subsidiary, a Form 10 registration statement
with the SEC for the spin-off its Pigments & Additives and Textile
Effects divisions. On January 17, 2017, Huntsman announced that it
would retain its Textile Effects Division and only spin off its
Pigments & Additives Division into a new entity named Venator
Materials Corporation.

Following its separation from Huntsman, Venator retained two
primary business segments: (i) Titanium Dioxide, which consists of
the Company's TiO2 business; and (ii) Performance Additives, which
consists of its functional additives, color pigments, timber
treatment and water treatment businesses. The Titanium Dioxide
business represented the majority of the Company's revenues. For
the 12 months ended March 31, 2017, Venator achieved adjusted
EBITDA of $112 million in its Titanium Dioxide segment and $72
million in its Performance Additives segment.

Titanium Dioxide is derived from titanium bearing ores and is a
white inert pigment that provides whiteness, opacity and brightness
in manufactured items such as coatings, plastics, paper, printing
inks, fibers, food and personal care products. Venator claims to be
one of the six major producers of TiO2 , which collectively account
for approximately 60% of global TiO2 production capacity. Venator
alone claimed to have a nameplate production capacity of
approximately 782,000 metric tons per year, accounting for
approximately 11% of global TiO2 production capacity and placing
Venator among the top three TiO2 producers in the world. Venator
manufactures TiO2 using both sulfate and chloride manufacturing
processes, which the Company claims provides it with a competitive
advantage by allowing for flexibility in the selection of raw
materials.

On January 30, 2017, a fire ravaged a Venator facility located in
Pori, Finland. The facility was one of the Company's most important
plants for manufacturing Titanium Dioxide. The Pori facility had a
nameplate capacity of 130,000 metric tons, which represented
approximately 17% of the Company's total TiO 2 nameplate capacity
and approximately 2% of total global demand for the chemical.
Unbeknownst to investors, the damage that resulted from the
disaster was so extensive that the facility was essentially beyond
repair, and any attempt to restore full functionality to the
facility would cost in excess of $1 billion, well above the $500
million insurance policy limits applicable to the disaster. In
addition, the Company had permanently lost 15% of its total
nameplate capacity as a result of the fire.

On May 5, 2017, Venator filed a registration statement for the IPO
on Form S-1, which, after several amendments, was declared
effective on August 2, 2017. On August 4, 2017, Venator filed a
prospectus for the IPO on Form 424B4, which incorporated and formed
part of the IPO Registration Statement. By means of the IPO
Registration Statement, Venator offered and sold more than 26
million ordinary shares at $20 per share for over $522 million in
gross proceeds. The proceeds from the IPO went to Huntsman and not
to Venator. The IPO Registration Statement was negligently prepared
and, as a result, contained untrue statements of material fact,
omitted material facts necessary to make the statements contained
therein not misleading, and failed to make adequate disclosures
required under the rules and regulations governing the preparation
of such documents.

Specifically, the IPO Registration Statement failed to disclose the
true extent of the fire damage to Venator's Pori facility, the cost
to rehabilitate the facility, and the impact to Venator's business
and operations as a result of the damage to the facility. The SPO
Registration Statement was negligently prepared and, as a result,
contained untrue statements of material fact, omitted material
facts necessary to make the statements contained therein not
misleading, and failed to make adequate disclosures required under
the rules and regulations governing the preparation of such
documents, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Joe Kendall, Esq.
          Jamie J. Gilmore, Esq.
          KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3811 Turtle Creek B1Vd., Suite 1450
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: 214 744 3000
          Facsimile: 214 744 3015
          E-mail: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com
                    jgilmore@kendalllawgroup.com

               - and -

          BRIAN E. COCHRAN, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          200 South Wacker Drive, 3 1 st Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: 312 674 4674
          Facsimile: 312 674 4676
          E-mail: bcochran@rgrdlaw.com

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Integrity Head Open to Class Action Rules
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alanna Petroff, writing for Yahoo Finance UK, reports that here's
something counterintuitive: a leading Volkswagen executive said she
welcomes Europe's proposal for new class action legal rules.

These rules were designed in response to Volkswagen's Dieselgate
scandal, with the aim of helping individuals mobilise against big
corporations.

Hiltrud Werner, head of integrity and legal affairs at Volkswagen
Group (VOW3.DE), told Yahoo Finance UK that she thought the new EU
legal rules could be a good thing for individuals and her firm.

"I think this will give the company and consumers a much smoother .
. . process," she said in a special one-to-one video interview at
the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland.

Ms. Werner, who has been in her role for the past two years, has
been working to help the company recover from the damaging
Dieselgate scandal in 2015, when it was caught cheating on diesel
emissions tests.

Allowing Volkswagen to deal with one large legal action instead of
tens of thousands of small claims would be a "a good sign for both
sides," she said.

Last year, the European Commission proposed rules that would allow
EU citizens to band together and seek compensation from companies.
The proposal was designed to fix a patchwork system of national
rules that makes it difficult, or impossible, for consumer groups
to launch legal action when companies break the law.

The European Commission said last year that Volkswagen's diesel
scandal demonstrated that consumer laws had to be be strengthened
to ensure companies faced consequences.

"In a globalised world where the big companies have a huge
advantage over individual consumers we need to level the odds,"
said Věra Jourová, the European commissioner for iustice, when
the newly proposed rules were launched in April.

But unlike the US system, EU consumers wouldn't be able to seek
compensation for things like emotional distress.

"No punitive damages should be awarded," the European Commission
said. "Consumers will be compensated for the actual harm
suffered."

Ms. Werner said on Jan. 23 it was time for Europe to act.

"The European Union has very often said that they want to be one of
the leading legal systems in the world. And quite frankly, they
have done a very good job on data protection," she said. "Similar
movement in other areas of the law, [such as] consumer class
actions, would be a good development."

The proposed class action rules are now being considered by the
European Parliament and the European Council. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Settlement in Nakamura Suit Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIN NAKAMURA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION d/b/a WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 17-4029-DDC-GEB (D. Kan.), Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the
U.S. granted Nakamura's Unopposed Motion for Certification of
Settlement Class and Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement.

The parties have agreed, subject to the Court's approval, to settle
the case under the terms set forth in the Sept. 25, 2018,
Settlement Agreement.  The Plaintiff has moved for an order
granting preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Crabtree has reviewed the parties' Settlement Agreement and
attached exhibits, the record in the case, the counsel's briefs and
arguments, and supporting exhibits.  He preliminarily finds, for
purposes of settlement only, that the action meets all the
prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  

He preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement, subject to
further consideration at the final Fairness Hearing.  He directed
the parties to perform and satisfy the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement, for which entry of the Order is a condition.


The Court will hold the Fairness Hearing on May 15, 2019, at 9:00
a.m.

For settlement purposes only, the Judge preliminarily certified the
action as a class action under Rule 23 on behalf of the Settlement
Class, defined as all servicemembers who, before the servicemember
entered military service, paid a deposit or installment on a motor
vehicle loan originated, acquired, and/or serviced by Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns
(Wells Fargo), and whose motor vehicle subject to the loan was
repossessed by Wells Fargo while the servicemember was in active
military service without a court order authorizing the repossession
between Jan. 1, 2006, and Dec. 31, 2017, and have not already
released their claims.

The Judge approved the form and content of the notice of the
proposed Settlement Agreement.  He confirmed and appointed Epiq
Administration as the Settlement Administrator.

No later than Feb. 28, 2019, the Settlement Administrator must: (1)
publish the full versions of the Settlement Agreement and the
Preliminary Approval Order on a public website; and (2) mail and/or
email the notice, substantially in the form attached as Exhibit B
to the Settlement Agreement, to all the Settlement Class members
whose addresses can be identified with reasonable effort.

The Judge approved the form and content of the Distribution Plan.
All reasonable expenses incurred in identifying and notifying
members of the Settlement Class, as well as administering and
distributing the settlement funds, must be paid in the fashion set
forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Under Rule 23, the Judge designated the named Plaintiff in the
action as the class representative.  He also preliminarily
appointed Rex A. Sharp, Ryan C. Hudson, and Scott B. Goodger of Rex
A. Sharp, P.A., Bryce B. Bell and Mark W. Schmitz of Bell Law Firm,
LLC, and A. Scott Waddell of Waddell Law Firm, LLC, as the Class
Counsel.

The counsel must file their motion and supporting memorandum
seeking an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards no
later than April 1, 2019.

Any member of the Settlement Class who desires to request exclusion
from the Settlement Class must do so by filing their exclusion
request, as set forth in the notice, no later than April 30, 2019,
at 5:00 p.m. (CDT).  All written objections and supporting papers
must be filed timely as set forth in the notice no later than April
30, 2019, at 5:00 p.m. (CDT).

All proceedings unrelated to settlement in the action are stayed
pending final approval of the proposed settlement.  The Class
Counsel must file their motion for final approval of settlement and
all supporting documentation and papers no later than April 1,
2019.

By the Opt-Out/Objection Deadline, Settlement Administrator must
file with the court a declaration confirming that the plan for
disseminating the notice has been accomplished in accordance with
the Settlement Agreement.  The Class Counsel must file their
responses to any objections to the Settlement Agreement, or to the
class representative incentive award, no later than five days
before the final Fairness Hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/DOPFxx from Leagle.com.

Jin Nakamura, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley Scott Waddell ,
Waddell Law Firm LLC, Bryce B. Bell -- Bryce@belllawkc.com -- Bell
Law, LLC, Mark W. Schmitz -- ms@belllawkc.com -- Bell Law, LLC, Rex
A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C.
Hudson -- rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sarah
Bradshaw , Rex A. Sharp, PA & Scott B. Goodger --
sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA, doing business as Wells Fargo Dealer
Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron R. Marienthal, pro
hac vice, Alicia A. Baiardo -- abaiardo@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods, LLP, pro hac vice, Anna M. Berman, Kutak Rock LLP,
Carolee A. Hoover -- choover@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP,
pro hac vice, David C. Powell, McGuireWoods, LLP, pro hac vice &
Michael E. Brown, Kutak Rock LLP.


WOODHAVEN DISCOUNT: Underpays Liquor Salesmen, Kumar Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
RAMAN KUMAR, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WOODHAVEN DISCOUNT WINE & LIQUOR INC.
(D/B/A WOODHAVEN DISCOUNT WINE & LIQUOR), GNG WINE & LIQUOR INC.
(D/B/A GNG WINE & LIQUOR), HOOK DISCOUNT WINE AND LIQUOR INC.
(D/B/A HOOK DISCOUNT WINE AND LIQUOR), SOUTH FACE WINE & LIQUOR
INC. (D/B/A SOUTH FACE WINE & LIQUOR), TS WINES & LIQUORS INC.
(D/B/A TS WINES & LIQUOR), and GURINDER SINGH, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00805 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2019), seeks unpaid minimum
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards and the New
York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed as a
Salesman at the liquor stores. He worked in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation
for the hours that he worked. Rather, Defendants failed to maintain
accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to pay
Plaintiff Kumar appropriately for any hours worked, either at the
straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium.
Furthermore, Defendants repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff Kumar
wages on a timely manner. The Defendants maintained a policy and
practice of requiring the Plaintiff and other employees to work in
excess of 40 hours per week without providing the minimum wage and
overtime compensation required by federal and state law and
regulations, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled several liquor
stores, including the five where Plaintiff Kumar worked located at
9214 Jamaica Ave, Woodhaven, NY 11421 (Woodhaven Discount Wine &
Liquor location).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

YALE UNIVESRITY: Employees Seek Class Action Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Yale
University workers who sued the school over their retirement plan
want a federal judge to certify their case as a class action
covering more than 14,000 people.

The workers say Yale's retirement plan carried excessive fees and
offered poorly performing investment options. Their Jan. 15 motion
comes nine months after a federal judge in Connecticut largely
denied the school's attempt to have the case dismissed.

At least 20 prominent colleges have been sued over their retirement
plans since 2016. Cases against New York University, Emory, Duke,
Vanderbilt, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Columbia
University have been certified as class actions.

Rulings in these cases have been mixed. Only the NYU case has gone
to trial, which resulted in a 2017 victory for the school. Five
federal appeals courts have been asked to weigh in, but none has
issued a ruling on the merits of these cases.

The case against Yale is pending before Judge Alvin W. Thompson of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.

Schlichter Bogard & Denton LLP and Cohen & Wolf PC represent the
Yale employees. Mayer Brown LLP represents Yale.

The case is Vellali v. Yale Univ., D. Conn., No. 3:16-cv-01345-AWT,
motion for class certification 1/15/19. [GN]


YELP INC: Sapan Class Certification Bid Nixed
---------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Sapan, the Plaintiff, v. Yelp, Inc.,
the Defendant, Case 3:17-cv-03240-JD (N.D. Cal., Feb. 7, 2019), the
Hon. Judge James Donato entered an order terminating, without
prejudice, a motion for class certification.

According to the civil minutes, the motion for class certification
is terminated and the Plaintiff may file an amended motion for
class certification by April 8, 2019. The amended motion should
address the Court's concerns, as stated on the record. The case is
stayed, and all remaining pre-trial and trial deadlines are vacated
pending further order.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jeffrey B. Cereghino, Esq.
          THE ROCK LAW FIRM
          101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          http://www.therocklawfirm.com
          Telephone: 415 433-4949
          Facsimile: 415 433-7311

               - and -

          Justin Michael Prato, Esq.
          PRATO & REICHMAN
          8555 Aero Dr Ste 303
          San Diego, CA 92123
          Telephone: (619) 886-0252
          Facsimile: (619) 241-8309
          E-mail: jmprato@gmail.com
                  ChrisR@Prato-Reichman.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Nicole V. Ozeran, Esq.
          Joshua Briones, Esq.
          Mintz Levin
          2029 Century Park E, Ste 3100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3044
          Telephone: (310) 586-3200
          Facsimile: (310) 586-3202
          E-mail: jbriones@mintz.com

[*] Calif. Accounts for More Than 50% of Class Actions in U.S.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Manzo, writing for Fox & Hounds, reports that if you own or
operate a business in California you most likely already know we
have one of the highest workers compensations rates in the nation,
highest tax rates, health insurance rates, and recently named
number one for the most litigious state. At a certain point you
would think our legislators would be embarrassed by such numbers.

An article published in Law 360 pointed out that California
accounts for 12% of the total US population and more than 50% of
all class actions in the US. There are more than 3,200 new federal
cases filed a year in California with even more class actions filed
in State Court. I would say California shattered the Class Action
Lawsuit ranking and has another number one in the nation trophy to
mount on their wall.

With the court system already being too jammed up, this opens the
door for more cases to be settled in mediation. The Private
Attorney General Act (PAGA) appears they have about 98% mediation
rate as most never go to court due to the expense. PAGA is known as
the sue your boss law and has been gaining more and more momentum
year after year as the trial attorneys are realizing huge payouts
for themselves while business owners, their employees, and the
state are helpless in mediation and also become victims to this
cruel law. PAGA was written into law in 2004 to protect employees
for the underground economy so bad employers would not take
advantage of them. The state at the time had a deficit and felt it
was a good idea to allow trial attorneys to enforce labor law
violators. 'Ovem lupo commitere' , Latin for ('To set a wolf to
guard sheep.')

More than 35,000 PAGA Lawsuits have been filed since 2004 and the
cases are shocking to comprehend based on the so called labor
violations. If you have a flexible schedule and decide to eat your
lunch 1 second past 5 hours, that is a violation. If you give an
employee a gift card or bonus for a job well done, that is a
violation if not calculated properly, off by a penny or two, it
could coat you millions.

What is really taking place is trial attorneys are seeking out
terminated employees and offering them money they are owed from
their previous employer. This ex-employee can represent all of
their fellow employees in a class action lawsuit. With the PAGA
provision it makes it easy to send a notice to the employer,
investigate, while looking for any violation, and then file suit
against the employer.

Here is an example of how skewed this law is. If the employer
shorted the employee $ 28.61 on alleged labor law violations  civil
penalties and personal damages would be $69,508.61.  That is 2,430
times the alleged actual damages and I bet you would get a better
rate form a loan shark. If the employer has 30 employees the
exposure is over $ 2,000,000 and actual damages would be only
$858.30 to the aggrieved employees. So the trial attorney goes to
mediation with the threat of more than $ 2,000,000 and tells the
employer you need to settle this as legal expenses to fight could
be another million. The trial attorneys know based on their deal
with the state they will get 100% of their fees paid, as it comes
right off the top of the settlement, usually a third of the total.
The balance is then negotiated and what is supposed to happen
rarely does, meaning the state takes 75% of the balance and the
employees get the remaining 25%. When the balance is settled
everything becomes a shroud of secrecy and all of the employers do
not want to talk about this as they are afraid they will get hit
again.

The state is so overwhelmed with PAGA cases they can't keep track,
and the disgruntled employee who gets a check for $ 15.00 is told
by the attorney who is being paid to protect them that you were
only owed $ 28.61, so you did alright. The employer thinks after
they settled for $750,000 that it was way better than 2 million.
The trial attorney gets $250,000 and tells all of their colleagues
how much they are helping the employees who have been taken
advantage of.

That is the reality of PAGA and if anyone tells you different they
are probably a trial attorney. California is being a leader in too
many categories and Class action Lawsuits is nothing to be proud
of. Furthermore we are the only state with such a law as PAGA and
it is only allowing trial attorneys to steal from not only
businesses, they are stealing form non-profits as well. Plaintiff
Magazine has an article on settling class action lawsuits and how
to divvy up the money on PAGA to the LWDA, "Most attorneys are
allocating only a small amount to PAGA claims in their
settlements". Recently one attorney stated in an article," PAGA is
not for the employees."

Our legislators need to focus on business and the negative effects
of passing too many complex laws. Alan Dershowitz is quoted, "The
defendant wants to hide the truth because he's generally guilty.
The defense attorneys job is to make sure the jury does not arrive
at that that truth." The PAGA Trial Lawyers know they are guilty of
taking advantage of a broken law and it is their job to keep you
way from that truth. [GN]


[*] Freshfields Attorney Discusses Employment Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Stroud, Esq. -- caroline.stroud@freshfields.com -- of
Freshfields, in an article for Personnel Today, reports that the
courts have seen a significant rise in the number of employment
claims brought by large groups of individuals. The most common
employee 'class actions' relate to equal pay and worker status. Ms.
Stroud from looks at the types of class action claims on the
increase and how employers should respond.

Class action claims
How can an employer defend an equal pay claim?

Asda equal pay claims: what are the implications for similar
employers?

Equal pay claims
This type of claim has traditionally been seen as a public sector
issue. Public sector pay structures are generally more transparent
than those in the private sector, allowing employees more access to
pay data and therefore more opportunity to launch an equal pay
claim. This, combined with a strong public sector union presence to
fund the action, has meant that the public sector has been fertile
ground for these types of claims.

But this is now changing. The Asda equal pay claim which is
currently moving through the courts demonstrates how equal pay
claims are moving into the private sector.

And, as anyone who has been involved in defending an equal pay
claim knows, they are complex and costly. A successful claimant can
claim for arrears of pay for up to six years. And if a claim is
brought by a large number of employees, compensation can run into
millions. Defending an equal pay claim can quickly become a
business critical issue.

There is an expectation that, with the introduction of gender pay
gap reporting, the number of equal pay claims in the private sector
will increase. It is certainly true that the first gender pay gap
reports attracted a great deal of publicity.

Businesses reporting high pay gaps tend to be those in which women
are overrepresented within the lowest pay quartile, or in which
women make up only a small proportion of senior staff. It is likely
that industries such as financial services, STEM and retail are
especially vulnerable to challenge.

Employees are also becoming more aware of their rights. Equal pay
litigation almost always make the headlines and private sector
employees are waking up to the fact that this type of claim is not
the sole preserve of public sector workers.

Private sector employers would be well advised to assess whether
they are at risk of a collective equal pay claim and decide what to
do if such a claim is threatened.

The best way to achieve this may be through an equal pay review
conducted by lawyers – the contents of such a review, together
with related legal advice, will be confidential. The business will
then be able to assess the risk and how to manage it without the
pressure of doing so while subject to litigation (and its
timetable).

Worker status claims
This type of employee 'class action' has been seen in the courts
more often in the past couple of years largely because of the
emergence of the gig economy, with high profile cases such as those
involving Uber and Deliveroo hitting the headlines.

As we all know, the gig economy is revolutionising the world of
work, but it brings with it fresh challenges to how employment law
operates.

Quite a number of collective employment claims are being brought
against businesses using the gig business model, which relies on
large pools of 'self-employed' individuals, working via web-based
platforms or 'apps'.

There are around 4.7 million self-employed people in the UK, and
many enjoy the flexibility and control this status brings. Others,
however, seek to challenge it, claiming that in reality they are
workers or employees entitled to increased levels of protection,
including the national minimum wage and holiday pay.

How employment law operates in this new environment is being tested
in the courts. In each case, the impact of the judgment will be
felt across the defendant's business -- and in some cases may even
threaten the existence of the business itself.

The employment status of individuals working in the gig economy is
being considered in a number of different cases. What happens in
one case, however, does not predetermine the outcome in another --
in each case the focus will be on how the business and working
relationships are structured.

The increased presence of trade unions in this space also makes
collective claims more likely. Unions have been galvanising
individual gig workers into collective groups, arguing that they
can collectively bargain on their behalf to improve key terms such
as pay.

Businesses operating in the gig economy will wish to pre-empt
litigation by conducting an audit of their working practices and
business model upon which the lawyers can then base their advice.
The results of such an audit will allow the business to assess what
innovative solutions might be available to head off collective
employment claims and prevent them from undermining their operating
model.

Law firm business models
It is no secret that collective claims are expensive to bring and
historically they have generally only got off the ground with trade
union support. However, while trade unions are still funding these
types of claims, many are now also brought on a "no win, no fee"
basis.

The leading law firms acting for claimants in collective claims
rely on running large-scale multi-party litigation. A no win, no
fee model means that it is essential to a claimant law firm's
success for it to recruit hundreds or even thousands of claimants
together in one action -- the higher the number of claimants the
higher its reward will be if the claim is successful.

In a unionised business, the union may not actually be keen on
seeking out a collective employment claim if it could cost the
business millions of pounds and destroy the relationship between
the employer and the union. In this situation, a claimant firm may
step in and approach employees directly.

The fear of such a firm stepping in in this way may cause a union
to change tactic and bring a collective claim where it would
otherwise not have done so. The increasing use of this business
model by claimant law firms therefore increases the likelihood of
collective employment claims being brought.

Businesses would be well advised to undertake an audit to assess
the risk of these types of claims. These audits can take some time
and the worst time to undertake them is when there is an imminent
threat of litigation. Advance planning for this type of risk is
key. The phrase 'forewarned is forearmed' has never felt more apt.
[GN]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

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