CAR_Public/190227.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, February 27, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 42

                            Headlines

561 STRAIGHT: Mejia Seeks Overtime Pay for Stock Workers
AAA APARTMENT: Simmons Seeks Regular and Overtime Wages
AEROHIVE NETWORKS: Court Dismisses McGovney Suit Without Prejudice
ALIBABA GROUP: May 17 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
AMD: Class Action Over Bulldozer Eight-Core FX Processors OK'd

AMERICAN INTERCONTINENTAL: Williams Sues over Telemarketing Calls
ANGIE'S LIST: Court Refuses to Alter Judgment in Strauss
APOLLO CAPITAL: Faces Pocrass Class Suit in Cal. Super Ct.
ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK: Caldwell Seeks to Void Claims Release
ATLANTIC CREDIT: Dotson Sues over Debt Collection Practices

BANK OF AMERICA: Court OKs $22MM Settlement Final Approval
BANK OF AMERICA: Sanders Sues over Use of Automated Calls
BANK OF HAWAII: Court Denies 2nd Summary Judgment Bid in EFTA Suit
BANK OF NEW YORK: June 17 ADR FX Settlement Hearing Set
BIG FISH: Thimmegowda Sues over Illegal Online Casino Games

CAPITAL ONE: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brown Suit
CARL'S JR: Faces Class Action Over Antitrust Law Violation
CASHCALL INC: Court Dismisses De La Torre Suit Without Prejudice
CENTURY 21: Valdes Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
CHARTER COMMS: Partly Compelled to Reply to Sansone Interrogatories

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: March 1 Due to Respond to Warenski Suit
CIR LAW: Ambrosino Alleges Breach of FDCPA
COLUMBIA HOUSING: Faces Class Action Over Living Conditions
CONTINENTAL GENERAL: Fastrich Stayed Pending Ohio Case Deal OK
CORNELL UNIVERSITY: Retirement Plan Investors Get Class Status

COURTYARD BY MARRIOTT: Garcia Suit Asserts Wage and Hour Violations
CTB INVESTORS: Doohan Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
CYAN INC: June 5 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
DARP INC: Court Grants Certifies Class in Drug Program Suit
EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Dawson Says Website Not Blind-accessible

EQUIFAX INC: Must Face Class Action Over 2017 Security Breach
ESTERO ISLAND: Pilibosian Seeks Minimum Wage & OT for Bartenders
EYEBUYDIRECT: Dawson Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
FCA US: Bid to Compel Production of Docs Filed in Grigorian Suit
FINISAR CORP: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over II-IV Merger

GIBSON COUNTY, IN: Stilwell Files Suit Over Prison Conditions
GLENN M ROSS: Baker Seeks Final Approval of Class Settlement
GOOGLE INC: Appeals Decision in Rivera BIPA Suit to 7th Circuit
GORDO TAQUERIA: Settles Wage-and-Labor Class Action for $690K
GRAND ISLE SHIPYARD: Sandlin Moves for FLSA Class Certification

HILL'S PET: Rusells Sue over Alleged Defective Canned Dog Food
HILLSIDE LUMBER: Damian Stepien Seeks Overtime Pay
HILLSTONE HEALTHCARE: Smith's Bid to Certify FLSA Class Granted
HORIZONTAL WELL: Glover Seeks Certification of Applicants Class
IMAGING INC: Court Grants Dismissal Bid in Securities Suit

INVESTORS BANCORP: Removed Discrimination Case to D. New Jersey
JP MORGAN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss T. Golden's Suit
KELLOGG SALES: Watson Alleges Mislabeling of Graham Crackers
LAZ PARKING: Barone's Bid to Certify Asst. Managers Class Granted
LOGITECH INC: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit

LOGITECH: Judge Refuses to Stay False Advertising Class Action
MAIDEN HOLDINGS: 2013 Earnings Report Misleading, Wigglesworth Says
MDL 2879: Kim Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Court Narrows Claims in Defective Sunroofs Suit
MERIVALE: Faces Class Action for Allegedly Underpaying Staff

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: March 25 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Arbitration in TCPA Suit
MONSANTO COMPANY: Burchfield Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MULTI-STATE LOTTERY: Lottery Scam Suit Gets Class-Action Status
MUNCHERY: Faces Class Action Over WARN Act Violation

NASSAU COUNTY, NY: 99 Lakeville Road Corp. Files Class Action
NATIONAL CREDIT: Cortes Feb. 7 Hearing & Pretrial Deadlines Vacated
NATIONAL GRID: Faces 2 Class Actions Over Aquidneck Gas Outage
NEW YORK PILATES: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
NEW YORK: Website not Accessible to Blind, Kiler Says

NFL: Suit Over Improper Call Remains in District Court
NUSRET NEW YORK: Former Waiter Files Class Action Over Unpaid OT
NYACK MOTOR: Violates Americans with Disabilities Act, Hart Says
OPEN ARMS: Petty and Burns Seek Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
ORGANIGRAM INC: Class Action Over Contaminated Cannabis OK'd

OUR PEACEFUL: Lyssa Miller Seeks Overtime Wage Compensation
PAM TRANSPORT: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Browne Suit to 8th Cir
PHENIX, AL: Appeals Court Unlikely to Rule in Favor of Drivers
PITTSBURGH MEDICAL: Dittman et al. Sue over Data Breach
PIVOTAL PAYMENTS: Settles Class Action Over Robocalls

PNC FINANCIAL: Underpays Call Center Staff, Minor & Yarbrough Say
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Howe Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Smith Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
PRETIUM RESOURCES: April 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
QUALITY CARE: Messer & Gray Seek Minimum Wage Compensation

RACKSPACE HOSTING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Pension Fund Suit
RADIUS GLOBAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
RANBAXY INC: Louisiana Health Asserts RICO Class Action in Mass.
RAYMOND JAMES: Asks Court to Review Class Action Certification
RBH INC: Home Purchasers' Action Transferred to N.D. Ala.

REGAL MARINE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Bishop Says
RES-CARE CALIFORNIA: Faces Wilson Labor Suit in Sacramento
RUBY TUESDAY: Chandler & Marchand Allege Labor Violations
SELECT HOME: Panvini Sues over Unwanted Telephone Calls
SKYWEST AIRLINES: Becker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

SLM CORPORATION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Homaidan Suit
SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Floyd Alleges Violation Under FDCPA
SPACESHIP CO: Faces Chavez Labor Suit in Kern County
ST. LOUIS, MO: Faces Class Action Over Cash-Bail System
STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Court Grants 3rd Bid to Dismiss Cole FDCA Suit

SUKHMANI INC: Vladimir Svirodiv Sues over Tip Skimming
SYNTER RESOURCE: Violates FDCPA, Yungreis Suit Asserts
TELEDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS: Faces Trejo Suit in Sacramento
THOMPSON SECURITY: Underpays Patrol Officers, Krembs Suit Alleges
TRANE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Defective HVAC Systems Suit

TYME TECHNOLOGIES: March 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
U.S. SPECIALTY: Court Partially Grants Summary Judgment in Jonas
UNION PACIFIC: Court Certifies Class in Harris Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Enjoins MAVNI Continuous Monitoring Program
UNITED STATES: Hadley Alleges Breach of Civil Rights Act

UNITED STATES: Judge Rejects Challenge Over Unpaid Shutdown Work
UNITED TEACHERS: Faces Class Action Over Forced Union Dues
US GOVERNMENT: P.L., et al. File Class Action in S.D. New York
VALE SA: March 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
WAL-MART STORES: Mays's Bid to Certify Class Under Submission

WESTERN UNION: Underpays Compliance Officers, Minasyan Claims
WISE GULL: Guerra Files Class Action in S.D. Florida
WORLD CLASS MAINTENANCE: Schmidt Seeks Overtime Pay
WORLD OF JEANS: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
YAHOO!: Must Face Class Action Over 2013 Megahack

ZIKS HOME: Brown Moves to Certify Class of Home Health Aides
ZIONS BANCORP: Abetted $5MM Ponzi Scam, Class Action Claims
[*] Defense Expenses for Consumer Class Actions Can Take a Toll

                            *********

561 STRAIGHT: Mejia Seeks Overtime Pay for Stock Workers
--------------------------------------------------------
ELEAZAR MEJIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. 561 STRAIGHT DELI GROCERY, INC., 561
STRAIGHT PATH DELI GROCERY CORP., and JOHN DOE 1 a/k/a SAMMY and
JOHN DOE 2 aka DAVID, as individuals, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-01292 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to recover damages
including compensatory damages and liquidated damages in an amount
exceeding $100,000.00 for alleged egregious violations of state and
federal wage and hour laws arising out of Plaintiff's employment at
the Defendants, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and New
York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed by the
Defendant from May 2015 until July 2017. The Plaintiff's primary
duties were as a stock worker, performing miscellaneous duties. The
Plaintiff was paid by the Defendant $530 per week. The Plaintiff
worked 84 hours or more per week during his employment but the
Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff time and a half for hours
worked over 40 hours, a blatant violation of the overtime
provisions in the FLSA and NYLL.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591

AAA APARTMENT: Simmons Seeks Regular and Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
MARK SIMMONS, on behalf of himself and all others simialrly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. AAA APARTMENT STAFFING, LTD., the
Defendants, Case 4:19-cv-00032-WTM-CLR (S.D. Ga., Feb. 11, 2019),
alleges that the Defendants have committed violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate employees at the
minimum wage rate and w overtime rate for hours worked in excess of
40 hours in a given workweek.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Tyler B. Kasper, Esq.
          THE KASPER FIRM, LLC
          152 New Street, Suite 109B
          Macon, GA 31201
          Telephone: 404 944 3128
          E-mail: tyler@kasperfirm.com

AEROHIVE NETWORKS: Court Dismisses McGovney Suit Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB McGOVNEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AEROHIVE
NETWORKS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-00435-LHK (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice.

Lead Plaintiff Andrew Moreau, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, alleges that the Defendants
violated federal securities laws.  The Plaintiff purchased Aerohive
common shares and was allegedly damaged by misrepresentations and
omissions made by the Defendants.  He seeks to represent a putative
class of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Aerohive common shares between Nov. 1, 2017 and
Jan. 16, 2018, both dates inclusive.

Defendant Aerohive is a California corporation that is
headquartered in Milpitas, California.  Aerohive's common stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "HIVE."
Flynn has served as Aerohive's CEO since July 2007, as its
President since November 2007, and as its Chairman since July 2013.
Ritchie has served as Aerohive's CFO and Senior VP since September
2015, and as Aerohive's COO since February 2017.

The Plaintiffs allege that between Nov. 1, 2017 and Jan. 16, 2018,
the Defendants made a number of false or misleading statements or
omissions.  They broadly categorize the false and misleading
statements and omissions into three categories: (1) statements and
omissions related to sales personnel issues; (2) statements and
omissions related to sales execution; and (3) statements and
omissions related to projected revenues.  These false or misleading
statements were allegedly made in Aerohive's quarterly report for
3Q17 on Form 10-Q  with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and Aerohive's earnings call with investors for
3Q17.

The Plaintiffs allege that the statements or omissions were
misleading for one of three reasons.  First, they contend that
statements or omissions regarding Aerohive's sales personnel were
misleading because Aerohive had replaced knowledgeable, experienced
sales personnel and implemented cost-cutting measures that left the
sales organization understaffed and ill-equipped to service
existing customers and develop new opportunities.

Second, they contend that the statements and omissions related to
sales execution were misleading because the Defendants represented
that the Aerohive Connect and Aerohive Select program offerings may
reduce revenue or the rate of revenue growth and that it may be
difficult to compensate for a shortfall in revenue when, according
to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants already knew and/or recklessly
disregarded that the transition to Aerohive Connect and Aerohive
Select was experiencing significant setbacks that would impact
revenues in the fourth quarter.

Third, the Plaintiffs contend that the statements and omissions
related to the projected revenues were misleading because the
Defendant Ritchie projected fourth quarter revenues in 2017 in the
range of $40 million to $42 million but did not disclose adverse
facts pertaining to Aerohive's business, operational and financial
results.

The Plaintiffs allege two causes of action: (1) violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all the
Defendants, and (2) violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against the Individual Defendants.

On Jan. 19, 2018, a group of Aerohive shareholders filed suit
against Aerohive in the instant case captioned McGovney et al. v.
Aerohive Networks, Inc., et al., N.D. Cal. Case No.
5:18-CV-00435-LHK.  A different group of Aerohive shareholders
filed suit on Jan. 25, 2018, in a case captioned Beyerbach et al.
v. Aerohive Networks, Inc., et al., N.D. Cal. Case No.
5:18-CV-00544-HSG.  A third suit was filed on Jan. 30, 2018, in a
case captioned Panjabi et al. v. Aerohive Networks, Inc., et al.,
N.D. Cal. Case No. 18-CV-00656-LHK.  On Feb. 15, 2018, the Court
granted an administrative motion to relate the three cases.  On
Aug. 9, 2018, the Court consolidated the three cases.  It also
appointed Plaintiff Andrew Moreau as the Lead Plaintiff in the
instant suit.  In the same order, the Court also appointed the Lead
Plaintiff's counsel. Id.

On Sept. 28, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint.  On Oct. 26, 2018, the Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint.
On Dec. 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an opposition.

In connection with their motion to dismiss, the Defendants request
judicial notice of five documents, which include (1) a transcript
of Aerohive's earnings call for 4Q16, held on Feb. 14, 2017
("Exhibit 1"); (2) a transcript of Aerohive's earnings call for
2Q17, held on Aug. 2, 2017 ("Exhibit 2"); (3) a copy of Aerohive's
quarterly report for 3Q17 on Form 10-Q, filed on Nov. 1, 2017
("Exhibit 3"); (4) a transcript of Aerohive's earnings call for
3Q17, held on Nov. 1, 2017 ("Exhibit 4"); and (5) a transcript of
Aerohive's earnings call for 4Q17, held on Feb. 8, 2018 ("Exhibit
5").  Judge Koh granted the Defendants' request for judicial
notice.

Next, the Judge finds that, as currently alleged, the CWs lack
personal knowledge and reliability because the complaint lacks
important details about the CWs employment information, including
"his or her job description and responsibilities," as per Zucco and
Daou.  She also finds that none of the alleged misrepresentations
or omissions are actionable.

Statement 1 is a statement in the 3Q17 Form 10-Q regarding
Aerohive's expectation that it would "continue to invest" in the
organization and that Aerohive is investing to increase its sales
capacity as well as its channel program.  Statement 2 is a
statement in the 3Q17 Form 10-Q regarding Aerohive's significantly
slower pace of order volume attributable to slower pace of funding
approvals under the federal E-Rate Program.

The Judge also finds that, with respect to statements 1 and 2, the
Plaintiffs fail to plead falsity as required by the PSLRA.
Therefore, she will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to
these statements.  Because granting the Plaintiffs an additional
opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue
delay, or unduly prejudice the Defendants, and because the
Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith, she will grant leave to
amend.

Statement 3 is a statement in the 3Q17 Form 10-Q regarding the
Aerohive Connect and Aerohive Select program offerings and the fact
that the program may reduce Aerohive's revenue, or the rate of
Aerohive's revenue growth, as purchasers take advantage of the
lower entry pricing for Aerohive's products.  Statement 4 is a
statement in the 3Q17 Form 10-Q that noted that the introduction of
Aerohive's HiveManager NG resulted in elongated sales cycles.

With respect to statements 3 and 4, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs fail to plead falsity as required by the PSLRA.
Therefore, she will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to
these statements.  She finds that granting the Plaintiffs an
additional opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile,
cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice the Defendants, and that the
Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith.  Therefore, she will grant
leave to amend.

Statement 5 is a statement in the 3Q17 Earnings Call made by
Defendant Flynn regarding the fact that Aerohive continues to
strengthen their go-to-market.  The Judge finds that finds the
Plaintiffs fail to plead falsity as required by the PSLRA.
Therefore, she will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss this
statement.  Because granting the Plaintiffs an additional
opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue
delay, or unduly prejudice the Defendants, and because the
Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith, she will grant leave to
amend.

Statement 6 is a statement in the 3Q17 Earnings Call made by
Defendant Ritchie that made references to "sales efficiency" and
"sales productivity."  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs'
allegations regarding the Defendants' purported sales execution
failures lack particularity to support the assertion that the
Defendants' statements were misleading.   Accordingly, she will
grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss statement 6.  She will
grant leave to amend because she finds that the Plaintiffs have not
acted in bad faith and that granting them an additional opportunity
to amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or
unduly prejudice the Defendants.

Finally, Statement 7 is a statement in the 3Q17 Earnings Call made
by Defendant Ritchie on Nov. 1, 2017 that they're currently
expecting Q4 revenue in the range of $40 million to $42 million.
The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged
that statement 7 was false or misleading.  She willl grant leave to
amend because she finds that the Plaintiffs have not acted in bad
faith and that granting them an additional opportunity to amend the
complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly
prejudice the Defendants.

Any amended complaint will cure the scienter deficiencies that the
Judge has identified as well as any deficiencies properly
identified by the Defendants in their motion.  

Because the  Plaintiffs have failed to plead a primary securities
law violation, the Plaintiffs have also failed to plead a violation
of Section 20(a).  Accordingly, the Judge will grant the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim under Sections
20(a).   Because granting the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity
to amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or
unduly prejudice the Defendants, and the Plaintiffs have not acted
in bad faith, she will grant leave to amend.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety without prejudice.
Should the Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they
must do so within 30 days of the Order.  Failure to do so, or
failure to cure the deficiencies addressed in the Order, will
result in dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.  The
Plaintiffs may not add new claims or parties without leave of the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/LJAJir from Leagle.com.

Jacob McGovney, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

LEAD PLAINTIFF Andre Moreau, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer
Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman
-- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Michele S. Carino --
mcarino@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Omar Jafri --
ojafri@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

William Beyerbach, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II
-- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer
Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice.

Karan Panjabi, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas --
rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Aerohive Networks, Inc., David K. Flynn & John Ritchie, Defendants,
represented by John Charles Roberts, Jr. -- jroberts@wsgr.com --
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, pro hac vice, Keith E. Eggleton --
KEggleton@wsgr.com - Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A
Professional Corporation, Rodney Grant Strickland, Jr. --
RStrickland@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A
Professional Corporation & Ryan Scott Wolf -- rwolf@wsgr.com --
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati.

Wayne Flores, Movant, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen, The
Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Kujtim Begaj, Movant, represented by Adam Christopher McCall --
amccall@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP.


ALIBABA GROUP: May 17 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP and Cotchett, Pitre & Mccarthy, LLP regarding the Alibaba
Securities Litigation Settlement:

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
CHICAGO LABORERS PENSION FUND, et al.,

Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED, et al.,
Defendants.

(Consolidated)

CLASS ACTION

Case No. CIV535692

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

Assigned for All Purposes to Dept. 16
Date Action Filed: 10/05/15

THIS NOTICE WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT. IT IS NOT A LAWYER
SOLICITATION. PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS
ENTIRETY.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a hearing will be held on May 17,
2019, at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Richard H. DuBois at the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, Department 16,
Courtroom 7A, 400 County Center, Redwood City, CA 94063, to
determine whether: (1) the proposed settlement (the Settlement) of
the above-captioned action as set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement (Stipulation)2 for $75,000,000 in cash should be
approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2) the
Judgment as provided under the Stipulation should be entered; (3)
to award Plaintiffs Counsel attorneys fees and expenses out of the
Settlement Fund (as defined in the Notice of Proposed Settlement of
Class Action (Notice), which is discussed below) and, if so, in
what amount; (4) to pay Plaintiffs for representing the Class out
of the Settlement Fund and, if so, in what amount; and (5) the Plan
of Allocation should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable
and adequate.

This Action is a consolidated securities class action brought on
behalf of those Persons who purchased or acquired Alibaba ADS
pursuant or traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus
for Alibabas IPO, against Alibaba and certain of its officers,
directors and underwriters of Alibabas IPO (collectively,
Defendants) for, among other things, allegedly misstating and
omitting material facts from the Registration Statement and
Prospectus filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the IPO. Plaintiffs allege that these
purportedly false and misleading statements inflated the price of
the Companys stock, resulting in damage to Class Members when the
truth was revealed. Defendants deny all of Plaintiffs allegations.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED ALIBABA ADS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
THROUGH AND INCLUDING OCTOBER 5, 2015, YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED
BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS ACTION.

To share in the distribution of the Settlement Fund, you must
establish your rights by submitting a Proof of Claim and Release
form (Proof of Claim) by mail (postmarked no later than May 2,
2019) or electronically (no later than May 2, 2019). Your failure
to submit your Proof of Claim by May 2, 2019, will subject your
claim to rejection and preclude your receiving any of the recovery
in connection with the Settlement of this Action. If you are a
member of the Class and do not request exclusion therefrom, you
will be bound by the Settlement and any judgment and release
entered in the Action, including, but not limited to, the Judgment,
whether or not you submit a Proof of Claim.

If you have not received a copy of the Notice, which more
completely describes the Settlement and your rights thereunder
(including your right to object to the Settlement), and a Proof of
Claim, you may obtain these documents, as well as a copy of the
Stipulation (which, among other things, contains definitions for
the defined terms used in this Summary Notice) and other settlement
documents, online at www.AlibabaSecuritiesLitigation.com, or by
writing to:

         Alibaba Securities Litigation Settlement
         c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC
         P.O. Box 505023
         Louisville, KY 40233-5023

Inquiries should NOT be directed to Defendants, the Court, or the
Clerk of the Court. Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice
or for a Proof of Claim, may be made to Plaintiffs Counsel:

         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         Ellen Gusikoff
         Stewart 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: 800/449-4900

         COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
         Mark C. Molumphy
         840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
         Burlingame, CA 94010
         Telephone: 650/697-6000

IF YOU DESIRE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS, YOU MUST SUBMIT A
REQUEST FOR EXCLUSION SUCH THAT IT IS POSTMARKED BY APRIL 2, 2019,
IN THE MANNER AND FORM EXPLAINED IN THE NOTICE. ALL MEMBERS OF THE
CLASS WHO HAVE NOT REQUESTED EXCLUSION FROM THE CLASS WILL BE BOUND
BY THE SETTLEMENT EVEN IF THEY DO NOT SUBMIT A TIMELY PROOF OF
CLAIM.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE
SETTLEMENT, THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION, THE REQUEST BY PLAINTIFFS
COUNSEL FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES, AND/OR THE
PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR TIME AND EXPENSES. ANY OBJECTIONS
MUST BE FILED WITH THE COURT AND SENT TO PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL BY
APRIL 2, 2019, IN THE MANNER AND FORM EXPLAINED IN THE NOTICE.

BY ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. DuBOIS

DATED: January, 11, 2019

1 For purposes of this Settlement only, the Class includes all
persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Alibaba ADS
on or before October 5, 2015. 2 The Stipulation can be viewed
and/or obtained at www.Alibabasecuritieslitigation.com.


AMD: Class Action Over Bulldozer Eight-Core FX Processors OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dave James, writing for PCGames, reports that AMD may be flying
high with its Ryzen processors, soon moving into the 3rd Gen Ryzen
phase, but no matter how good its current Zen-based CPUs are the
shadows cast by the old Bulldozer days still loom over the company
. . . and could potentially cost the red team a whole lot of cash
too.

A district judge in California has granted a motion for a class
action lawsuit, with the legal case set to properly kick off later
this year.

The class action lawsuit, originally started back in November of
2015, was filed regarding claims of AMD 'misrepresenting' the
number of cores in its 'eight-core' FX processors of the Bulldozer
and Piledriver generations. The idea is that customers didn't
understand AMD's definition of CPU cores in its Bulldozer
architecture, and thought they were getting a processor with eight
independent cores, not the shared Bulldozer architecture which
bottlenecked performance.

The timeline of the case is going to be decided on February 5,
which might take some of the wind out of AMD's sails as it launches
its new Radeon VII graphics card just a couple of days later. The
options on the table are going to be whether AMD settles with the
plaintiffs, potentially costing a lot of cash, or goes to jury
trial, which could cost it significantly more if AMD loses.

The latest developments in the case -- reported by The Register --
have seen Judge Haywood Gilliam rejecting AMD's claim that there is
no common understanding of the term 'core' so it could not be
misrepresented. As the defendant in the case it also states that "a
significant majority interpret 'core' in ways that are fully
consistent with AMD's chips."

The judge however disagreed, calling AMD's challenges to the class
action "not persuasive."

The old Bulldozer design was built on the gamble that parallelism
was going to become a more desirable feature than single threaded
performance, and so AMD built nominally dual-core 'modules' which
featured most of the silicon you would expect in an independent
core, but with some shared resources in there too.

Each module has a pair of x86 cores in them, but they have to share
the branch prediction engine, fetch and decode, floating-point
unit, cache controller, instruction cache, and L2 cache.

It's not as lightweight as the HyperThreading or Simultaneous Multi
Threading that you'll see in Intel's Core chips or AMD's later
Ryzen processors, but it's also not as powerful as having fully
independent cores that won't bottleneck when both cores in a module
are fighting it out for dominion over the shared resources.

AMD FX 9590 CPU

But when one of the plaintiffs in the case saw the Bulldozer parts
advertised on AMD.com they were referenced as "the first native
8-core desktop processor" and so immediately purchased a pair of
FX-9590 CPUs for $300. The second plaintiff makes the same case
about an FX-8350 he purchased based on the "industry's only native
8-core desktop processor for unmatched multitasking and pure core
performance with 'Bulldozer' architecture" messaging.

They are seeking damages in line with the difference in cost
between a four-core and an eight-core processor, with hundreds of
thousands of people potentially affected by the class action case.
These people are being defined as:

"All individuals who purchased one or more of the following AMD
computer chips either (1) while residing in California or (2) after
visiting the AMD.com website: FX-8120, FX-8150, FX-8320, FX8350,
FX-8370, FX-9370, and FX-9590."

AMD has told The Register that "the class certification motion does
not address the underlying merits of the plaintiffs' claims, and we
intend to defend ourselves vigorously."

While it may seem pretty obvious to a lot of us how AMD's Bulldozer
architecture was made up, and understood its inherent problems,
what the tech-savvy user knows and believes can be very different
to the level of understanding the law expects from a general
consumer.

So while AMD has moved on to bigger and better things with its
processors, it may find still itself dragged back to the grim old
days to pay out millions of dollars to people who feel they got
burned by Bulldozer. [GN]


AMERICAN INTERCONTINENTAL: Williams Sues over Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ALYSSA WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN INTERCONTINENTAL
UNIVERSITY, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00865 (N.D. Ill.,
Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to stop the Defendant's practice of making
unsolicited telemarketing calls to the telephones of consumers
nationwide.

Accoridng to the complaint, American Intercontinental University,
Inc. is a for-profit online school based in Illinois. In an effort
to solicit potential customers/students, the Defendant recruited,
or employed call centers which began making telephone calls, en
masse, to consumers across the country. The Defendant and or its
agents purchase leads from multiple lead generators that obtain
consumer contact and demographic information from a number of
sources. The Defendant conducted wide scale telemarketing campaigns
and repeatedly made unsolicited calls to consumers' telephones --
whose numbers appear on the National Do Not Call Registry --
without consent, all in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

By making the telephone calls at issue in this complaint, the
Defendant caused Plaintiff and the members of a putative Class of
consumers actual harm, including the aggravation, nuisance, and
invasion of privacy that necessarily accompanies the receipt of
unsolicited and harassing telephone calls, as well as the monies
paid to their carriers for the receipt of such telephone calls, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington St., Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com

               - and -

          W. Craft Hughes, Esq.
          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554-2377
          E-mail: craft@hughesellzey.com
                  jarrett@hughesellzey.com

ANGIE'S LIST: Court Refuses to Alter Judgment in Strauss
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or to
Alter Judgment in the case captioned STEVE STRAUSS d/b/a CLASSIC
TREE CARE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANGIE'S LIST, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 2:17-CV-02560-HLT-TJJ. (D. Kan.).

Plaintiff Strauss alleged that the Defendant engages in false
advertising, primarily through its website, which it markets to
consumers as a forum for the viewing and posting of first-hand,
consumer-generated reviews of service providers. According to
Plaintiff Strauss, the Defendant represents to consumers that a
search of Defendant's website will return a list of potential
service providers, in ranked order, based on the first-hand
experience of other consumers. In reality, however, the order in
which Defendant displays service providers within search results is
substantially affected by whether a service provider pays Defendant
to advertise on Defendant's website.

The Court entered the Dismissal Order, dismissing the vast majority
of Plaintiff Strauss's Lanham Act and KCPA claims as time-barred
under either a laches (Lanham Act) or statute of limitations (KCPA)
theory. The remaining Lanham Act and KCPA claims were dismissed for
failure to plausibly plead at least one essential element of each
claim. The Court also denied Plaintiff Strauss's motion to amend as
futile because the proposed amended complaint contained the same
allegations with respect to Plaintiff Strauss's claims against
Defendant and, thus, it did not remedy the original complaint's
shortcomings.1 Plaintiff Strauss now asks the Court to reconsider
the dismissal of his Lanham Act claims. He does not seek
reconsideration of the dismissal of his KCPA Claims.

Plaintiff Strauss assures the Court he does not intend to simply
repeat or rehash his previous arguments. Rather, he contends the
Court made five critical errors in dismissing Plaintiff Strauss's
claims, each based on the Court's misapprehension of some of the
key facts, Plaintiff Strauss's position, and/or the controlling
law.

Laches in Rule 12(b)(6) Context

Plaintiff Strauss first contends that the Court erred in dismissing
his Lanham Act claims as time barred under the doctrine of laches
because such an equitable affirmative defense requires factual
determinations which cannot be made in connection with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In short, Plaintiff Strauss argues the
bare allegations in the original complaint provided insufficient
information from which the Court could determine whether the
required elements of the affirmative defense of laches were met.

The Court rejects this argument for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff Strauss waived this argument by not raising it in
prior briefing. Plaintiff Strauss's response to Defendant's
affirmative defense of laches was two pages, inclusive of the
point-header. He offered two unsupported arguments both of which
addressed only the issue of which state's statute of limitations
the Court should use as a guide when conducting the laches
analysis. Plaintiff Strauss did not contend as he does now that
Defendant could not raise an affirmative defense such as laches on
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or that the original complaint
provided the Court insufficient information from which to analyze
the laches defense.

Second, contrary to Plaintiff Strauss's suggestion, there is no per
se rule that affirmative defenses are inappropriate for
consideration on a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit
has recognized that, to be sure, on occasion it is proper to
dismiss a claim on the pleadings based on an affirmative defense.
Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir.
2018). This situation arises when the complaint itself admits all
the elements of the affirmative defense by alleging the factual
basis for those elements. If the defense appears plainly on the
face of the complaint itself, the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim may be disposed of under Rule 12(b). The same
standard applies to the affirmative defense of laches. If the
elements of laches appear on the face of the complaint, the
defendant may move for and the court may grant dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).

When considering Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
including Defendant's affirmative defense of laches, the Court
limited its analysis and findings to the facts contained in the
original complaint. The Court did not consider any facts or
documents outside the four corners of the original complaint.5 The
Court considered the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff
Strauss, and drew all inferences in his favor. Those facts were
numerous, detailed, and clear. There was nothing for the Court to
misapprehend. Unfortunately for Plaintiff Strauss, he simply pled
himself out of court.

No clear error was committed and no manifest injustice has
occurred.

Doctrine of Unclean Hands

As his second point of error, Plaintiff Strauss contends the Court
erred in failing to recognize that laches, as an equitable defense,
is subject to the equitable principle of unclean hands and that,
numerous courts have recognized that in a Lanham Act case, the
defense of laches is not available to a defendant who has violated
the Act intentionally, willfully, or deliberately.

The Court also rejects this argument for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff Strauss has waived this argument by not raising it
in prior briefing. In his response to Defendant's motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff Strauss did not contend that the defense of
laches was unavailable to Defendant based on the equitable
principle of unclean hands. A motion to reconsider is not the
appropriate vehicle for Plaintiff to raise this argument, which
could have been raised in his response to Defendant's motion to
dismiss. On this basis alone, the Court finds that Plaintiff
Strauss has waived the argument that the doctrine of unclean hands
prohibited Defendant from relying on the defense of laches.
  
Second, Plaintiff Strauss improperly conflates the threshold
requirements for pleading a knowing and intentional
misrepresentation to assert a Lanham Act false advertising claim
with the higher standard for establishing unclean hands. When a
plaintiff brings a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act the
plaintiff must show that a defendant did more than make the
challenged claims knowing they were false to defeat a laches
defense on the basis of unclean hands. To conclude otherwise would
be effectively to preclude the application of laches whenever a
dispute of fact regarding the merits of a Lanham Act claim existed
because conceivably all suits involving Lanham Act claims could
involve accusations of fraudulent or deceptive conduct. To rely on
the doctrine of unclean hands to escape laches, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant acted with a fraudulent intent in
making the challenged claims.

The Court did not commit clear error and no manifest injustice has
occurred.

Continuing Violations Theory

Plaintiff Strauss's third and fourth points of error involve the
Court's decision not to apply the continuing violations theory in
this case. He contends the Court incorrectly concluded that: (1) he
waived any argument supporting application of the continuing
violations theory; and (2) application of the continuing violations
theory is disfavored in the context of laches and Lanham Act false
advertising claims. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff Strauss contends that he did not waive any argument
supporting application of the continuing violations theory for
three reasons.

First, Plaintiff Strauss contends laches is an affirmative defense
and Plaintiff Strauss was not required to anticipate that defense
and preemptively include in his complaint any allegations that
Defendant's violations were continuing. Second, he argues his
complaint nonetheless does include allegations that Defendant's
violations were continuing. And, third, Plaintiff Strauss contends
that a statement in the final paragraph of his memorandum in
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss indicated Plaintiff
Strauss intended to argue that Defendant's violations were
continuing in nature.

These arguments are unavailing.

Plaintiff Strauss did allege facts indicating Defendant's conduct
was continuing in nature. But in his response to Defendant's motion
to dismiss, Plaintiff did not raise or discuss the legal theory of
continuing violations. Plaintiff Strauss apparently adopts the
position that, because his complaint included allegations that may
have supported a legal theory or argument, the argument was
sufficiently raised to avoid waiver. But it is not the Court's role
or responsibility to serve as Plaintiff Strauss's attorney and
search the record to construct arguments. Plaintiff certainly could
have asserted the theory in his response to Defendant's motion to
dismiss, but failed to do so and, thus, waived the argument.

Even if Plaintiff Strauss had properly raised the continuing
violations theory, the Court was correct in concluding that its
application is disfavored in the context of laches and Lanham Act
false advertising claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on three cases considering the continuing violations theory
in the context of a laches defense to Lanham Act false advertising
claims. Plaintiff Strauss does not address these cases. Instead, he
relies on two Tenth Circuit cases and a District of Kansas case
that are not on point.

In short, Plaintiff Strauss waived any argument that the continuing
violations theory should apply to Defendant's affirmative defense
of laches by failing to raise the argument in prior briefing. And
even if the Court considers the arguments now raised and
authorities now cited by Plaintiff Strauss, they do not change the
Court's previous conclusion that the continuing violations doctrine
does not apply. The Court did not commit clear error and no
manifest injustice has occurred.

Third Prong of Proctor & Gamble Test

As his fifth and final point of error, Plaintiff Strauss contends
the Court erred in concluding that Plaintiff Strauss failed to
include in his complaint allegations sufficient to satisfy the
third prong of the test for Lanham Act false advertising claims
articulated by the Tenth Circuit in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,
222 F.3d 1262, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 2000). Prong three requires that
plaintiff to establish that the defendant's representations were
made for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy the
defendant's goods or services.

Plaintiff Strauss contends that the complaint contains several
express allegations that consumers made their decision to pay to
become a member of Defendant's website based on Defendant's false
and misleading representations. But Plaintiff Strauss's citation to
these allegations is unavailing because these allegations relate
only to Plaintiff Strauss' Lanham Act claims which the Court
determined were barred by laches. The Court concluded that
Plaintiff Strauss's only Lanham Act claims that were not barred by
laches were based on Defendant's alleged representations set forth
in a single paragraph paragraph 52 of the original complaint.  

Because Plaintiff Strauss's timely Lanham Act claims were confined
to those based on the 2016 Website Statements, prong three of the
Proctor & Gamble test could only be satisfied if Plaintiff Strauss
alleged that the 2016 Website Statements were made for the purpose
of influencing consumers to buy the Defendant's goods or services.6
The Court correctly concluded that the 2016 Website Statements,
even when considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff
Strauss, cannot be construed as having been made for purposes of
influencing consumers to buy Defendant's goods or services, i.e., a
consumer membership to Defendant's website or Defendant's
advertising services.  

The Court did not commit clear error and no manifest injustice has
occurred.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or to Alter Judgment
is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y83fhrfc
from Leagle.com.

Steve Strauss, doing business as Classic Tree Care, Plaintiff,
represented by Robert J. Bjerg -- bb@ksmolaw.com -- Colantuono
Bjerg Guinn, LLC.

Angie's List, Inc., Defendant, represented by Franco A. Corrado --
franco.corrado@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. -- gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac
vice, J. Kevin Fee -- kevin.fee@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn W. Hursh --
lhursh@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Matthew R.
Brunkhorst -- mbrunkhorst@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong
Teasdale, LLP, Natalie M. Georges --
matalie.georges@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
pro hac vice & Paul M. Croker -- pcroker@armstrongteasdale.com --
Armstrong Teasdale LLP.


APOLLO CAPITAL: Faces Pocrass Class Suit in Cal. Super Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Apollo Capital
Management. The case is styled as Katherine Pocrass, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Apollo
Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management LP, Carriage House
Capital Advisors LLC, Does 1-50, Inclusive, Marblegate Special
Opportunities Master Funds LP, Nomura Securities International,
Oppenheimer Funds Inc., Searchlight Capital Partners LP and
Tricadia Capital management, LLC, Defendants, Case No. CGC19573713
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., February 11, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as other non exempt
complaints.

Apollo Global Management, LLC is an American public equity firm,
founded in 1990 by former Drexel Burnham Lambert banker Leon Black.
The firm specializes in leveraged buyout transactions and purchases
of distressed securities involving corporate restructuring, special
situations, and industry consolidations.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK: Caldwell Seeks to Void Claims Release
--------------------------------------------------------------
Emmett W. Caldwell, on behalf of himself and all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New
York, Defendant, Case No. 151683/2019 (Sup. Ct., New York Cty.,
February 14, 2019) seeks to void the Release he and other victims
signed relinquishing their claims for childhood sexual abuse
against the Archdiocese of New York, pursuant to the "Independent
Reconciliation and Compensation Program."

In 2016, the Archdiocese of New York developed and implemented a
fraudulent scheme designed to induce victims of child sexual abuse
to release claims against the Archdiocese of New York at a fraction
of their value, recounts the complaint.

While lobbyists and officials of the Archdiocese of New York were
intimately familiar with developing legislative initiatives in the
State of New York that would allow childhood victims of clergy
sexual abuse to file lawsuits on expired claims and recover the
full value of their damages against the ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK,
the victims did not have this knowledge, the complaint notes.

The Archdiocese of New York seized on this imbalance in power and
information to create a program it referred to as the "Independent
Reconciliation and Compensation Program" for the purpose of
misleading and fraudulently inducing victims to settle their claims
at a fraction of their worth, to the substantial financial benefit
of the Archdiocese of New York, asserts the complaint.

Emmett W. Caldwell is an adult male, age 62, resident of Puerto
Rico. During his childhood, he lived with his family in New York
City. He was sexually abused by Father Kevin Kelly of St. Thomas
the Apostle in Manhattan.

The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York is a New York non-profit
organization with its principal place of business and office
located in New York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Herman, Esq.
     Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.
     Daniel G. Ellis, Esq.
     HERMAN LAW
     41 Madison Avenue
     New York, NY 10010
     Phone: (212) 390-0100
     Email: jhcyman@hermanlaw.com
            smermelstein@hermanlaw.com
            dellis@hermanlaw.com

          - and -

     5200 Town Center Circle, Suite 540
     Boca Raton, FL 33486
     Phone: (305) 931-2200
     Fax: (305) 931-0877

ATLANTIC CREDIT: Dotson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
LUIS DOTSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ATLANTIC CREDIT & FINANCE, INC.; MIDLAND
FUNDING LLC; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Case No. 2:19-cv-01143-JLL-JAD
(D.N.J., Jan. 25, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt. The case is assigned to
Chief Judge Jose L. Linares and referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph
A. Dickson.

Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. purchases and manages unsecured and
consumer-distressed assets. Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. was
founded in 1996 and is headquartered in Roanoke, Virginia with
branch offices in Roanoke and Richmond, Virginia; and Phoenix,
Arizona. As of August 6, 2014, Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
     KIM LAW FIRM LLC
     411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Telephone: (201) 273-7117
     Facsimile: (201) 273-7117
     E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Court OKs $22MM Settlement Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
N. Pantelyat, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., Defendants.
No. 16-cv-8964 (AJN). (S.D.N.Y.).

This putative class alleges that Bank of America breached its
contractual obligations to
consumers by charging overdraft fees on non-recurring debit card
transactions made with Uber Technologies, Inc.

The Settlement Is Procedurally Fair

A proposed settlement is presumed procedurally fair, reasonable,
and adequate if it culminates from arm's-length negotiations
between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery.

This case warrants the presumption. Settlement discussions occurred
over the course of several months and after three in-person
mediations under the supervision of experienced JAMS mediators,
including the retired Hon. Daniel Weinstein. As discussed briefly
above, Class Counsel are capable members of the consumer class
action bar. Finally, discovery was meaningful. Accounting for both
pre-filing investigation and discovery, Class Counsel capably
interviewed accountholders, examined bank statements and account
documents, obtained an accounting of the affected accounts,
consulted with experts, and interviewed Bank of American employees.


The Settlement Is Substantively Fair

A proposed settlement is substantively fair if a totality of the
nine factors outlined in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. weigh in
favor of that conclusion.  

The Grinnell Factors Render the Settlement Substantively Fair

Having addressed these threshold concerns, the Court turns to the
substantive fairness of the Settlement Agreement's remaining
provisions. In assessing substantive fairness, the Court considers
the nine factors detailed by the Second Circuit in Grinnell, 495
F.2d at 448: (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement (3) the
stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed (4)
the risks of establishing liability (5) the risks of establishing
damages (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the
trial (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater
judgment (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery (9) the range of reasonableness
of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the
attendant risks of litigation.

The Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration of the Litigation

The expense and duration of the litigation weigh in favor of
approving this settlement. A fully briefed motion to dismiss was
previously filed in this case and Defendants retain several
defenses, including arguments that the fees were authorized under
the contract, arguments that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by
notification requirements, and arguments contesting the
appropriateness of merits class certification. Although the
strength of these defenses varies, the expense and delay of fully
litigating each of them through trial and any appellate briefing
would likely offset the gains of a higher settlement amount.
Accordingly, this factor favors approval of the settlement.

The Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

Here, the reaction of the class to the settlement also weighs in
favor of approval. Sixty-one3class members opted out of the
Settlement, representing a tiny fraction of the Settlement Class.
Those persons are identified in Exhibit A attached to the
accompanying Final Approval Order and Judgment. And no objections
to the settlement remain. While one class member initially
purported to object to the settlement, Class Counsel represent that
they contacted him, learned that his objection was based on his
belief that he would owe Bank of America money as a result of the
settlement, and corrected this misunderstanding.  

The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

While the parties need not have engaged in extensive discovery for
a settlement to garner approval, a sufficient factual investigation
must have been conducted to afford the Court the opportunity to
make an intelligent appraisal of the settlement. Furthermore, the
pretrial negotiations and discovery must be sufficiently
adversarial that they are not designed to justify a settlement, but
an aggressive effort to ferret out facts helpful to the prosecution
of the suit.

Although this case settled swiftly, Class Counsel represent that
they conducted substantial discovery, including document and data
productions and interviews of Bank of America employees. There is
nothing in the record to suggest an underdeveloped investigation.
Accordingly, this factor does not weigh against approval.

The Risks of Establishing Liability and Damages and Maintaining a
Class Action Through Trial

As noted in Part IV.B.3.a, Bank of America retained viable defenses
in this case and was well-counseled. Impediments standing between
the class and recovery include the previously filed motion to
dismiss; a possible motion for summary judgment; a class
certification briefing process; and appeal of class certification.
Although the parties have not identified significant risks to
establishing damages, the risks to establishing liability and
securing class recovery are sufficiently great for both of these
factors to favor settlement approval.

The Ability of the Defendant to Withstand a Greater Judgment

While Defendants could likely withstand greater judgment, its
capacity does not, standing alone, suggest that the settlement is
unfair. Given total potential damages in the range of what
Defendants agreed to in this case, this factor favors approval of
the settlement.

The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement Fund in Light of the
Best Possible Recovery and in Light of all of the Attendant Risks
of Litigation

It is well-settled that a cash settlement amounting to only a
fraction of the potential recovery will not per se render the
settlement inadequate or unfair. In any case there is a range of
reasonableness with respect to a settlement, a range which
recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular case
and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in taking
any litigation to completion and the judge will not be reversed if
the appellate court concludes that the settlement lies within that
range.

The settlement amount of $22 million constitutes, in the parties'
estimation, 80% of all revenues charged by Bank of America as a
result of Uber Overdraft fees. In comparison, if Plaintiffs' class
were certified, Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, and the Court
accepted Plaintiffs' damages theories, Plaintiffs contend that the
class would recover $27.1 million plus an additional $2.45 million
if prejudgment interest were assessed.   Plaintiffs emphasize that
courts regularly approve much lower recovery rates. Nonetheless,
the recovery rate in this settlement significantly outpaces what is
typical; it is much closer to full recovery. Weighed against the
risks of litigation, the Court finds such a fund reasonable in this
case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of the Class
Action Settlement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycv846oc from
Leagle.com.

N. Pantelyat, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Ahdoot --
rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, pro hac vice,
Christopher Paul Ridout -- christopher.ridout@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed LLP, Daniel K. Bryson -- dan@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield
Bryson & Mason LLP, Theodore W. Maya -- tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com --
Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, pro hac vice & Tina Wolfson --
twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Michael Edwards & Isabelle Scherer, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher Paul Ridout, Zimmerman Reed LLP, Daniel K. Bryson,
Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, Robert Ahdoot, Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC,
pro hac vice & Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.

Bank of America, N.A. & Bank Of America Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Alyssa Anne Sussman -- asussman@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP, David L. Permut -- dpermut@goodwinprocter.com
-- Goodwin Procter, LLP & Patrice Hendriksen --
phendriksen@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP.


BANK OF AMERICA: Sanders Sues over Use of Automated Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
The case, YVONDA SANDERS, individually and on behalf others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., the
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00069 (W.D.N.C.), alleges that Bank of
America, N.A. contacted individuals believed to be its debtors
through the use of automated calls in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and the Federal Communications Commission
rules.

According to the complaint, the Defendant made calls to the
Plaintiff and Class Members using an "automatic telephone dialing
system" without the Plaintiff's and Class Members' prior express
consent within the meaning of the TCPA. The Plaintiff therefore
brings this action for injunctive relief and statutory damages to
hold the Defendant accountable for its illegal activities in
utilizing automatically dialed calls to solicit payment from
individuals it presumably (but wrongfully) believed to be debtors.


Beginning in or around October of 2018, the Plaintiff began
receiving numerous autodialed calls on her cellular telephone
((XXX) XXX-6290) from the Defendant. When the Plaintiff did not
pick up the phone, the Defendant left a voicemail informing the
Plaintiff that she should call the Defendant back. There were at
least three numbers that appeared in the Plaintiff's caller ID for
these calls: 214-960-3575, 800-310-5587, and 888-689-4464. For
example, when these numbers are called, an automatic recording will
answer, "This call may be recorded. Welcome to Bank of America." In
receiving unwanted and unsolicited calls on her cellular telephone,
the Plaintiff suffered concrete harm in the form of lost time spent
fielding the unwanted calls and attempting to get the Defendantf to
stop the calls, loss of use of her cellular telephone as the calls
came in, and the invasion of privacy and intrusion upon her
seclusion, the lawsuit says.

Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational investment
bank and financial services company based in Charlotte, North
Carolina with central hubs in New York City, London, Hong Kong,
Minneapolis, and Toronto. Bank of America was formed through
NationsBank's acquisition of BankAmerica in 1998.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Wesley S. White, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WESLEY S. WHITE
          2300 E. 7th Street, Suite 101
          Charlotte, NC 28204
          Telephone: (702) 824-1695
          E-mail: wes@weswhitelaw.com

               - and -

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
          4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
          Chicago, IL 60630
          Telephone: 312 283 3814
          Facsimile: 773 496 8617
          E-mail: gklinger@kozonislaw.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Ste. 500
          Boca Raton, Florida 33431
          Telephone: 561 826 5477
          Facsimile: 561 961 5684
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com

BANK OF HAWAII: Court Denies 2nd Summary Judgment Bid in EFTA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
an Order denying Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment in
the case captioned RODNEY SMITH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF HAWAII, Defendant.
CIV. No. 16-00513 JAO-RLP (D. Haw.).

BOH moves for summary judgment on five causes of action or, in the
alternative, partial summary judgment as to actual damages on the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA) claim.

Plaintiff Rodney Smith challenges the adequacy of disclosures
regarding the method used by Defendant Bank of Hawaii (BOH) to
impose overdraft fees. Smith contends that BOH charged him
overdraft fees in a manner inconsistent with what was described in
agreements he signed, by using an available-balance method rather
than a ledger-balance method to assess the sufficiency of customer
account funds to cover a transaction.

BOH seeks summary judgment on Smith's UDAP, breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, money had and received, and EFTA claims and, in
the alternative, partial summary judgment as to actual damages on
the EFTA claim. Having drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of
Smith, the Court finds that the contract between BOH and Smith was
ambiguous, and that there are genuine issues of material fact
regarding the claims.

Breach of Contract

BOH moves for summary judgment on Smith's breach of contract claim,
arguing that: (1) the January 2015 CIT Notice alleviated the
ambiguity Chief Judge Seabright found in the contract documents
concerning which balance method was used to determine overdraft
fees and (2) if the Court still finds ambiguity, extrinsic evidence
clarifies the ambiguity.

Ambiguity in the Contract Documents

The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question
of law. Courts should seek to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the parties as manifested by the contract in its
entirety. Contract terms are interpreted according to their plain,
ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech. A contract is
ambiguous when its terms are reasonably susceptible to more than
one meaning. If the language of the contract is ambiguous, the
ambiguity raises the question of the parties' intent, which is a
question of fact that will often render summary judgment
inappropriate.

Extrinsic Evidence

BOH next argues that the Court should consider extrinsic evidence
to resolve the ambiguity in the contract, and that a course of
dealing between Smith and BOH created an expectation that overdraft
fees would be assessed using the available-balance method.  .

Generally, an ambiguous contract raises a question of intent, which
is a question of fact precluding summary judgment. However,
extrinsic evidence may be considered to resolve a contractual
ambiguity on a summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the Court will
review extrinsic evidence, including the course of dealing and
performance5 between Smith and BOH, to see if it resolves the
contractual ambiguity.

BOH argues that Smith's conversations with BOH employees reveal
Smith's knowledge of BOH overdraft practices. Maryellen Ing,
Manager of Training and Support Center for BOH, declared that BOH
trained its employees to explain BOH's overdraft program including
what available balance means when someone opened a new account.
Smith testified that on one occasion a BOH employee mentioned holds
to him when he called the bank to discuss his overdraft fees.
However, Smith also testified that BOH employees did not explain
available balance or holds to him and so construing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Smith , BOH's practice does not resolve
the contractual ambiguity.

BOH also points to overdraft notices it mailed to Smith. However,
nothing in these notices made clear that an available-balance
method was utilized by BOH. Similarly, BOH also electronically sent
Smith monthly account statements, some of which show that the daily
balance, which was the ledger balance, was positive on certain days
when overdraft fees were imposed. However, to understand that,
Smith would need to review several pages of account activity on the
statement to identify what day he overdrafted, and then review the
final page of the statement, which lists the daily balances, in
order to determine that his daily balance was positive on the day
he overdrafted. While Smith testified that he reviewed his monthly
account statements when he received a mailed notice about an
overdraft fee, Smith testified that he never understood the
difference between available balance and ledger balance. Thus, it
does not appear that Smith conducted a detailed investigation into
his account statement in which he figured out BOH's balance method
for overdraft fees.

In light of the ambiguity of the Agreements and the January 2015
CIT Notice, and the fact that the extrinsic evidence does not
resolve the contractual ambiguity here, the motion for summary
judgment on the breach of contract claim is DENIED.

Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices

BOH moves for summary judgment on Smith's UDAP claim. Under HRS
Section 480-2, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are unlawful.

A plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of HRS Section 480-13 to
state a cause of action and recover money damages under HRS Section
480-2. To satisfy HRS Section 480-13, the consumer must establish
three elements: (1) a violation of HRS chapter 480 (2) injury to
the plaintiff's business or property resulting from such violation;
and (3) proof of the amount of damages.

Violation of HRS Chapter 480

BOH argues that Smith did not establish the first required element
to satisfy HRS Section 480-13, a violation of HRS chapter 480
because the contract between Smith and BOH was neither deceptive
nor unfair.  

BOH first argues that it did not engage in deception because any
ambiguity concerning the balance method was resolved when Smith
received disclosures from BOH that clarified BOH's balance method.
As discussed above, the Court does not find that such disclosures
clarified the balance method.

BOH next argues that, even if the contract documents were
ambiguous, ambiguity alone is not a deceptive practice. BOH asserts
that Smith must also show that BOH's actions were likely to
mislead, and that Smith has failed to make that showing.  

It is certainly possible that a trier of fact could resolve this
ambiguity against BOH and find that the Agreements contained a
deceptive representation. That is, a jury could find that the
Agreements' terms use ledger balance when determining overdraft
fees, and because BOH actually used available balance, this would
constitute a material representation likely to mislead consumers
under Section 480-2. Separately, the jury could find that the
Agreements simply omit the applicable balance calculation method,
which is sufficient to constitute a deceptive act or practice and
possibly trigger UDAP liability.  

Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Smith, there is
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether BOH's practices
were a violation of HRS chapter 480.

Injury Resulting from a Violation of HRS Chapter 480

BOH also argues that Smith has not established the second element
required under HRS Section 480-13, an injury to the plaintiff's
business or property resulting from a HRS chapter 480 violation.
ECF No. 116-1 at 37-38.

To satisfy HRS Ssection 480-13, the injury to the plaintiff's
business or property must be an injury in fact that is the result
of or fairly traceable to the defendant's wrongful conduct.  

In asserting that Smith did not suffer an injury in fact to his
property that is fairly traceable to BOH's alleged wrongful
conduct, BOH makes the same arguments that it made concerning
Smith's breach of contract claim: that, by September 9, 2015, Smith
understood that BOH used the available-balance method and
overdrafted anyway. BOH also offers an additional argument that
Smith's frequent overdrawing of his accounts, even when both the
available balance and ledger balance were negative, demonstrates
that Smith was fully aware of how BOH assessed overdrafts.

Perhaps if Smith never challenged his overdraft fees this would be
a closer call, but Smith testified that he called the bank on
several occasions because he thought the overdraft fees were
wrongly imposed.. For this reason and for the reasons stated above
in Part IV.A.2., the question of whether Smith knew by September 9,
2015 how BOH assessed overdrafts is most appropriately left to the
trier of fact.

Thus, the motion for summary judgment of the UDAP claim is DENIED.

EFTA

BOH moves for summary judgment on Smith's EFTA claim, arguing that:
(1) while Regulation E requires BOH to describe its overdraft
service, the regulation does not require BOH to disclose its
balance method; and (2) Smith did not suffer any actual damages
resulting from an EFTA violation.  

EFTA was enacted as part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA), along with other consumer-protection statutes like the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA). EFTA provides a basic framework
establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of
participants in electronic fund and remittance transfer systems,
and its primary objective is the provision of individual consumer
rights.

EFTA (Regulation E) Violation

BOH's argument that it met all EFTA requirements, and determined
that Smith made a plausible claim that BOH failed to describe its
overdraft service in a clear and readily understandable manner. As
the instant Motion does not offer any new arguments, and the moving
party bears the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of
material fact, this challenge fails.  

Actual Damages Resulting from Violation

BOH also argues that Smith's actual damages did not result from an
EFTA violation. BOH asks the Court to use the detrimental reliance
standard, citing cases interpreting EFTA's notice provisions. The
Court agrees that detrimental reliance is required to prove actual
damages for an EFTA claim. While the Ninth Circuit has not directly
addressed this issue, a number of other courts have.  

BOH argues that Smith did not detrimentally rely on the language in
the Opt-In Agreement when he incurred overdraft fees. Specifically,
BOH argues that the enough money language in the Opt-In Agreement
had no impact on Plaintiff's understanding of BOH's overdraft
program nor did it affect his conduct. However, Smith testified
that he remembered reading the relevant Opt-In Agreement language,
and at the time, he understood it to mean, if I don't have enough
money in my account, they cover it. Smith testified that he
understood enough money to mean I have enough money in the account.
I shouldn't be overdraft. Smith also testified that the Opt-In
Agreement did not say anything about holds and what may be not
available. Smith testified that he often used his own mental
calculations using the ledger-balance method to determine his
spending, and was surprised when that spending resulted in
overdraft fees.  

Based on Smith's testimony and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of Smith, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether: (1) Smith relied on the Opt-In Agreement language to mean
that BOH used a ledger-balance method and (2) that this reliance
was to his detriment because he then incurred overdraft fees based
on that understanding.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment of the EFTA claim is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y8qcfqfr from Leagle.com.

Rodney Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Emily J. Kirk, McCune Wright
Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Margery S. Bronster, Bronster Fujichaku
Robbins, Melinda M. Weaver, Bronster Fujichaku Robbins, Richard D.
McCune, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Robert M. Hatch,
Bronster Fujichaku Robbins & Taras Kick, The Kick Law Firm, APC,
pro hac vice.

Bank of Hawaii, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Demko --
andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac
vice, Kristin L. Holland, Dentons US LLP, Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Dentons US LLP, Paul Alston, Dentons US LLP & Stuart M. Richter --
stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac
vice.


BANK OF NEW YORK: June 17 ADR FX Settlement Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP and Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP regarding
The Bank of New York Mellon ADR FX Litigation.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Court Order, the
Court has directed notice of the $72.5 million settlement proposed
in In re: The Bank of New York Mellon ADR FX Litigation, No.
16-CV-00212-JPO-JLC (S.D.N.Y.) to the Settlement Class.  If
approved, the settlement will resolve all claims in the litigation.
This notice provides basic information. It is important that you
review the detailed notice ("Notice") found at the website below.

What is this lawsuit about:
Lead Plaintiffs allege that, during the relevant time period, BNYM
systematically deducted impermissible fees for conducting foreign
exchange from dividends and/or cash distributions issued by foreign
companies, and owed to ADR holders. BNYM has denied, and continues
to deny, any wrongdoing or liability whatsoever.

Who is a Settlement Class Member:
All entities and individuals who at any time from January 1, 1997
through January 17, 2019 held (directly or indirectly, registered
or beneficially), or otherwise claim any entitlement to any payment
(whether a dividend, rights offering, interest on capital, sale of
shares, or other distribution) in connection with, any ADR for
which BNYM acted as the depositary sponsored by an issuer that is
identified in the Appendix to the Notice.  Certain entities and
individuals are excluded from the definition of the Settlement
Class as set forth in the Notice.

What are the benefits:
If the Court approves the settlement, the proceeds, after deduction
of Court-approved notice and administration costs, attorneys' fees
and expenses, and any applicable taxes, will be distributed
pursuant to the Plan of Allocation set forth in the Notice, or
other plan approved by the Court.

What are my rights:
If you receive/have received a Post-Card Notice in the mail, you
are a Registered Holder (i.e., you hold (or held) your eligible
ADRs directly and your relevant information was provided by BNYM's
transfer agent), and you do not have to take any action to be
eligible for a settlement payment.  If you do not receive/have not
received a Post-Card Notice in the mail, you are a Non-Registered
Holder and you must submit a Claim Form, postmarked (if mailed), or
online, by August 15, 2019, to be eligible for a settlement
payment.  Non-Registered Holder Settlement Class Members who do
nothing will not receive a payment, but will be bound by all Court
decisions.

If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not want to remain in
the Settlement Class, you may exclude yourself by request, received
by May 13, 2019, in accordance with the Notice. If you exclude
yourself, you will not be bound by any Court decisions in this
litigation and you will not receive a payment, but you will retain
any right you may have to pursue your own litigation at your own
expense concerning the settled claims.  Objections to the
settlement, Plan of Allocation, or request for attorneys' fees and
expenses must be received by May 13, 2019, in accordance with the
Notice.

A hearing will be held on June 17, 2019 at 3:00 p.m., before the
Honorable J. Paul Oetken, at the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse,
40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007, to determine if the
settlement, Plan of Allocation, and/or request for fees and
expenses should be approved. Supporting papers will be posted on
the website once filed.

For more information visit www.bnymadrfxsettlement.com, email
info@bnymadrfxsettlement.com or call 866-447-6210.


BIG FISH: Thimmegowda Sues over Illegal Online Casino Games
-----------------------------------------------------------
MANASA THIMMEGOWDA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BIG FISH GAMES, INC., a
Washington corporation; ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES INC., a Nevada
corporation; ARISTOCRAT LEISURE LIMITED, an Australian corporation;
and CHURCHILL DOWNS INCORPORATED, a Kentucky corporation, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00199 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 11, 2019),
seeks to enjoin and obtain redress for the Defendants' operation of
illegal online casino games.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are the current owners
and operators of "Big Fish Casino" as well as other similar
internet casino games that compete in the so-called "social casino"
market. Through "Big Fish Casino" and other similar internet
casinos, Defendants offer a multitude of electronic slot machine
and other internet casino games to consumers. Consumers play Big
Fish Casino and Defendants' other casino games on Apple iOS
devices, Android Devices, and Facebook.

The Defendants provide a bundle of free "chips" to first-time
visitors of their online casinos that can be used to wager on their
games. After consumers inevitably lose their initial allotment of
chips, Defendants attempt to sell them additional chips. Without
additional chips, consumers cannot play Defendants' gambling games.
Freshly topped off with additional chips, consumers wager to win
more chips. The chips won by consumers playing Defendants' games of
chance are identical to the chips that it sells. Thus, by wagering
chips that consumers purchase, consumers have the chance to win
additional chips that they would otherwise have to purchase, the
lawsuit says.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Janissa A. Strabuk, Esq.
          Cecily C. Shiel, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          E-mail: jstrabuk@tousley.com
                  cshiel@tousley.com
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: 206 682 5600
          Facsimile: 206 682 2992

               - and -

          Rafey Balabanian, Esq.
          Todd Logan, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: 415 212 9300
          Facsimile: 415 373 9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  tlogan@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com

CAPITAL ONE: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELLA S. BROWN, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-1816 (4th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
dismissing Brown's putative class action suit against Capital One,
for alleged violations of Maryland's Credit Grantor's Closed End
Credit Provisions.  

The Court has reviewed the record included on appeal, as well as
the parties' briefs, and it finds no reversible error.
Accordingly, it denied Capital One's motion to file a surreply
brief, and affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court.
It dispensed with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before it and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 6, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/1eC3kb from Leagle.com.

Cory L. Zajdel -- clz@zlawmaryland.com -- Z LAW, LLC, Timonium,
Maryland, for Appellant.

Jon S. Hubbard -- jon.hubbard@troutman.com -- Richmond, Virginia,
S. Mohsin Reza -- mohsin.reza@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.


CARL'S JR: Faces Class Action Over Antitrust Law Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
former manager for the Carl's Jr. franchise By the Rio claims in a
federal class action that the companies conspire to suppress wages
by nonsolicitation and no-hire provisions in franchise agreements,
in violation of antitrust law.

A copy of the Complaint in Rice v. By the Rio LLC, et al., Case No.
19-cv-00129 (D. Colo.), is available at:

         https://is.gd/msNbOn


CASHCALL INC: Court Dismisses De La Torre Suit Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDUARDO DE LA TORRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CASHCALL,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 08-cv-03174-TSH (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Thomas S. Hixon of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' California's Unfair Competition
Law unconscionability claim, and therefore dismissed the case
without prejudice to re-filing in state court.

CashCall is a California corporation that provides high interest
unsecured personal loans to qualifying consumers.  The operative
Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC") asserts claims on behalf of a
putative class of borrowers with loans from CashCall of $2,500 or
more with 96% and 135% interest rates.  

The FAC alleges one federal claim and five state law claims: (1)
violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act; (2) violation of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (3) violation of the Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act; (4) unlawful business practices in
violation of the UCL; (5) a derivative unlawful business practices
claim based on the above violations; and (6) fraudulent and unfair
business practices.

The unsecured consumer loans at issue in the case are governed by
the California Finance Lenders Law ("FLL").  The FLL prescribes
maximum interest rates for loans below $2,500, but this interest
rate limitation does not apply to any loan of a bona fide principal
amount of $2,500 or more.  It also incorporates by reference the
general Civil Code provision about contract unconscionability.  The
FLL does not create a private right of action, but a private cause
of action lies under the UCL for any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice.  The UCL borrows violations of other laws
and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition
law makes independently actionable.

On Nov. 15, 2011, Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James2 certified a
"National Class" consisting of individuals who borrowed money from
CashCall, Inc., between June 30, 2004 and February 2007, who signed
CashCall's promissory note containing an electronic funds
authorization indicating that cancellations of such authorization
must be received at least seven days prior to the applicable
payment due date.  She also certified a "California Class" of
individuals who, while residing in California, borrowed from $2,500
to $2,600 at an interest rate of 90% or higher from CashCall, Inc.,
for personal, family, or household use at any time from June 30,
2004 to the present.  Judge James limited the California Class
certification to the claim that making loans at "unconscionable
interest rates" gave rise to a cause of action under the UCL.

Since granting class certification, the UCL unconscionability claim
is now all that remains pending, as the federal and other state law
claims were dismissed or settled.

After CashCall moved for summary judgment on the unconscionability
claim, Judge James originally denied the summary judgment motion.
But after reconsideration, she granted the summary judgment motion.
On Dec. 22, 2014, she directed the entry of judgment in favor of
CashCall on the UCL claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).  The Plaintiffs timely appealed on Dec. 30, 2014.

On Aug. 13, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision finding
that the interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or more can
render the loans unconscionable because an interest rate on a loan
is the price of that loan, and it is clear that the price term,
like any other term in a contract, may be unconscionable.

Based on the California Supreme Court's decision, on Oct. 3, 2018,
the Ninth Circuit vacated judgment as to the unconscionability
claim and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion.  After remand, the Court set the matter
for a case management conference and directed the parties to file
an updated joint case management statement.

On Dec. 20, 2018, the Court held a case management conference, at
which time it raised the issue of whether it should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction given the California Supreme
Court's decision.  It directed CashCall to file a motion to dismiss
addressing the issue by Jan. 31, 2019.  Alternatively, if both
parties agreed that the Court should retain supplemental
jurisdiction, the Court directed them to file a joint motion
requesting Court retain pendant jurisdiction.

The parties filed their joint memorandum on Jan. 30, 2019,
requesting that the Court exercise its discretion to retain
jurisdiction over the claim.  The parties note the case is now a
10-year old case with a long history in the federal courts, and
that judicial economy and convenience clearly favor the retention
of jurisdiction.  They argue that dismissing the unconscionability
claim would create confusion and uncertainty and would only prolong
this already extremely protracted case and its ultimate resolution.
Finally, the parties maintain that the novel issue of state law
identified by the Ninth Circuit as to the applicability of the
unconscionability doctrine to the loans at issue in this case was
resolved by the California Supreme Court on certification from the
Ninth Circuit.

Judge Hixon finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral
argument and vacated the March 7, 2019 hearing.  After considering
the statutory and common law factors, he finds the balance of
factors favors declining supplemental jurisdiction.

In looking at factors of convenience, fairness, and comity, he
finds the factors of convenience and fairness cut in neither
direction.  The parties do not argue that state court would be an
inconvenient forum and, as to fairness, a state forum will provide
just as fair a proceeding as a federal one.  Finally, principles of
comity will be well-served by allowing the state courts to resolve
claims solely of state law.  Accordingly, he finds dismissal
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(3).

In addition, given that the Plaintiffs' remaining claim under the
UCL raises a novel issue of state law, the Judge finds the general
principles underlying the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
dictate that the wisest course of action is to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in the case.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Hixon declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the case without
prejudice to re-filing in state court.  The Clerk of Court will
close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NsqE7l from Leagle.com.

Eduardo De La Torre, Plaintiff, represented by Brad W. Seiling --
bseiling@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Damon Mathew
Connolly, Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly, James C. Sturdevant,
The Sturdevant Law Firm, Whitney Stark, Terrell Marwill Daudt &
Willie, PLLC, Arthur David Levy, Jessica Lee Riggin --
jriggin@rhdtlaw.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP, Melinda Fay Pilling --
melinda.pilling@doj.ca.gov -- Rukin Hyland Doria and Tindall &
Steven M. Tindall -- smt@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP.

Lori saysourivong, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur David Levy,
James C. Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm, Melinda Fay Pilling,
Rukin Hyland Doria and Tindall, Steven M. Tindall, Gibbs Law Group
LLP & Whitney Stark -- whitneystark@tmdwlaw.com. -- Terrell Marwill
Daudt & Willie, PLLC.

Cashcall, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brad W. Seiling, Manatt
Phelps & Phillips LLP, Claudia Callaway, Manatt Phelps & Phillips,
LLP, pro hac vice, Lydia Michelle Mendoza -- lmendoza@manatt.com --
Manatt Phelps and Phillips LLP & Noel Scott Cohen --
ncohen@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli LLP.

Cashcall, Inc., Counter-claimant, represented by Brad W. Seiling,
Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Claudia Callaway, Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP, Lydia Michelle Mendoza, Manatt Phelps and Phillips
LLP & Noel Scott Cohen, Polsinelli LLP.

Eduardo De La Torre, Counter-defendant, represented by Damon Mathew
Connolly, Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly, James C. Sturdevant,
The Sturdevant Law Firm, Whitney Stark, Terrell Marwill Daudt &
Willie, PLLC & Arthur David Levy.

Lori saysourivong, Lori Saysourivong, Counter-defendant,
represented by Arthur David Levy, Law Office of Arthur D. Levy &
James C. Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm.


CENTURY 21: Valdes Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
--------------------------------------------------------
JORGE VALDES, individually on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE, LLC, a New
Jersey limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05411 (D.N.J., Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to stop Century 21
from directing its realtors to violate the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by making unsolicited, autodialed calls to consumers
without their consent, including calls to consumers registered on
the national Do Not Call list, and to obtain injunctive and
monetary relief for all persons injured by Century 21's conduct.

According to the complaint, Century 21 is a national real estate
franchise with over 8,000 franchised locations. Although Century
21's realtors are affiliated with different franchised locations,
Century 21 realtors market realty services on behalf of and at the
direction and control of Century 21. Century 21 controls its
realtors' marketing by means of its pervasive training programs
which directs realtors to (1) buy leads associated with real estate
listings that have expired or otherwise been removed from multiple
listing services, and (2) cold call those leads using an autodialer
without consent. Century 21 instills this marketing plan through,
among other things, the Century 21 Workbook, Century 21 University,
a preferred vendor program, Century 21 Coaches, and annual seminar
retreats.

In the Plaintiff's case, Century 21's direction of realtors'
marketing resulted in him receiving unsolicited, autodialed calls
from different realtors associated with different franchised
locations over an eight-month period (from May 2018 through January
2019) culminating in this complaint.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative Classes

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          1072 Madison Ave, Suite 1
          Lakewood, NJ 08701
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

CHARTER COMMS: Partly Compelled to Reply to Sansone Interrogatories
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Jennifer M. Sansone, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charter
Communications, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-01880-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion to compel
(i) Defendants Charter Communications, Inc. and Charter
Communications, LLC to produce responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1,
3, 5, and 7 (Set One); and (ii) Defendant TWC Administration, LLC
("TWC") to produce responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3, and 5
(Set One).  

The Plaintiff was a TWC employee from around May 19, 2010 to May
18, 2016, and an employee of Charter from around May 18, 2016 to
the present.  Plaintiff Baldemar Orduno, Jr., was a TWC employee
from around April 14, 2011 to May 18, 2016, and an employee of
Charter from around May 18, 2016 to the present.  round May 18,
2016, Charter Inc. acquired Time Warner and all of its
subsidiaries, including TWC.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against Charter
Inc., Charter LLC, and TWC alleging that on the date of Charter
Inc.'s acquisition of Time Warner, their employment, and the
putative class members' employment, with TWC was terminated.  They
allege that after their termination with TWC, the Plaintiffs' and
other Vacation Pay class members' accrued and unused vacation wages
were transferred to Charter LLC, as opposed to paid out, in
violation of California law.  They further allege that after TWC
and Charter transferred their vacation wages, Charter LLC
unilaterally reduced the value of the wages, also in violation of
California law.  

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that Charter LLC refused to pay them
and other Commissions subclass members bonuses or commissions wages
under the applicable bonus or commission plans.  Specifically, they
allege that Charter LLC unilaterally and retroactively reduced the
commissions to be paid, and credit to be applied to sales for use
in determining sales-related bonuses, for Complex Coax products.

The instant discovery dispute concerns whether the Defendants must
produce, prior to class certification, the names and contact
information for members of the Vacation Pay class and the Base Pay
and Commissions subclasses.  The parties also dispute whether the
Defendants must produce the names and contact information for the
putative class members the Defendants allege are subject to an
arbitration provision for the claims at issue.

The parties telephonically met and conferred regarding the instant
discovery dispute, and several other discovery disputes, on Sept.
18, 2018 and Sept. 21, 2018.  Unable to resolve all of their
disputes, the parties filed a joint motion on Sept. 21, 2018 to
extend their meet and confer deadline by 20 days.  The Court
granted the parties' joint motion on Sept. 25, 2018, extending the
meet and confer deadline to Oct. 26, 2018.

On Oct. 17, 2018, the parties left a joint voicemail with the Court
requesting the Court's assistance in resolving three different
discovery disputes, including the instant dispute.  The Court then
set a telephonic, counsel-only Discovery Conference with the
parties for Oct. 23, 2018.  

After the Discovery Conference, the Plaintiffs proposed a 30%
sampling of the Vacation Pay class members' contact information to
the Defendants.  The Defendants rejected this proposal and
countered with an offer to not argue in opposition to a motion for
class certification that determining whether and which putative
class members provided written consent to have their vacation time
transferred between Charter LLC and TWC is an individualized issue
rendering class treatment inappropriate.

In response to the Defendants' counteroffer, the Plaintiffs
proposed either a 30% sampling of the Vacation Pay class members'
contact information or an agreement that the Defendants would not
use declarations from class members in opposition to class
certification and that they would not be making arguments in
opposition to class certification to which the class may have
information helpful to rebut their arguments.  The Defendants
rejected the Plaintiffs' second proposal and indicated that they
would not agree to limit their ability to submit declarations in
opposition to class certification and would not agree to a
sampling.

Unable to agree upon what amount of sampling would be appropriate,
or even whether sampling is the appropriate resolution, the parties
left a joint voicemail with the Court on Oct. 26, 2018, requesting
a briefing schedule.  

On Nov. 12, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel.
The Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants Charter Inc.
and Charter LLC to produce responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3,
and 5; and Defendant TWC to produce responses to Interrogatories
Nos. 1 and 3.  These interrogatories collectively request the
Defendants to identify and produce contact information for all of
the Vacation Pay class members and all of the Base Salary and
Commissions subclass members, as defined.

In her motion, the Plaintiff reduces her request to a 25% random
sampling of the contact information of the Vacation Pay class
members (8,150 total members), but continues to request contact
information for all of the Base Salary subclass members (130 class
members) and the Commissions subclass members (undetermined number
of class members).  She mainly argues that class contact
information is relevant because access to members of the putative
class will allow the Plaintiffs to rebut the Defendants'
anticipated arguments that individual issues exist, or that the
identified classes are not ascertainable.

Among other things, Judge Burkhardt finds that the Plaintiff has
met her burden to show that the class contact information is
relevant at this stage in the litigation.  The Plaintiff is
entitled to putative class members' contact information so that the
Plaintiffs may have the opportunity to substantiate their class
allegations, or rebut the Defendants' opposition to class
certification, through the class member declarations.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3,
and 5 propounded on Defendants Charter Inc. and Charter LLC and
Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 3 propounded on Defendant TWC is granted
in part and denied in part.  On Feb. 13, 2019, the Defendants will
randomly produce the names and last known contact information for:
(1) 10% of the estimated 8,150 Vacation Pay class members (815
members); (2) all of the estimated 130 Base Salary subclass
members; and (3) 150 of the Commissions subclass members, if the
number of Commissions subclass members is equal to or exceeds 150.
If the number of Commissions subclass members is not equal to or
does not exceed 150, the Defendants will produce contact
information for all of the Commissions subclass members.

Additionally, the production will be accompanied by a signed
declaration stating how the random sample was selected.  If the
sample proves inadequate because of the inability to locate
substantial numbers of former employees, the reluctance of
significant numbers of current employees to speak to the
Plaintiff's counsel, or any other reason, the Plaintiff may apply
for additional relief after meeting and conferring with the
Defendants' counsel.

The Judge also granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel as to Interrogatory No. 7 propounded on the
Defendants Charter Inc. and Charter LLC and Interrogatory No. 5
propounded on Defendant TWC.  On Feb. 13, 2019, the Defendants will
randomly produce the names and last known contact information for
20% of the estimated 2,184 class members (437 class members) the
Defendants allege are subject to the arbitration agreement in the
document produced by the Defendants as CHARTER000297-298.

Additionally, the production will be accompanied by a signed
declaration stating how the random sample was selected.  If the
sample proves inadequate because of the inability to locate
substantial numbers of former employees, the reluctance of
significant numbers of current employees to speak to the
Plaintiff's counsel, or any other reason, the Plaintiff may apply
for additional relief after meeting and conferring with the
Defendants' counsel.

Finally, the Judge finds that no party is entitled to the costs
incurred from making or opposing the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

Based on the foregoing, Judge BUrkhardt granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.  Each party will bear
their own fees and expenses incurred from bringing the motion.
Additionally, to assure that the information provided to the
Plaintiff is protected against abuse, the Judge finds that a
limited protective order -- to be complied with by the parties
regarding the information to be disclosed -- is appropriate.
Accordingly, she further ordered that before the class is
certified, the contact information of potential class members will
be viewed solely by the Plaintiffs' counsel, their investigators,
and experts, and not by the individual Plaintiffs.  The information
will be used solely in the litigation and not for any other purpose
without an order from the Court.  The Plaintiffs' counsel must
inform each contacted individual that he or she has the right not
to talk to the counsel and, upon a declination, the counsel will
immediately terminate the conversation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/PDmBDA from Leagle.com.

Jennifer M. Sansone, Individually and on Behalf of Other Members of
the Public Similarly Situated & Baldemar Orduno., Jr., Individually
and on Behalf of Other Members of the Public Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Justin Alan Morello --
justin@morellolawpc.com -- Morello Law, P.C., London D. Meservy --
london@meservylawpc.com -- Meservy Law, P.C. & Matthew S. Dente --
matt@dentelaw.com -- Dente Richard LLP.

Charter Communications, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joseph
Scott Carr -- scarr@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP,
Joseph W. Ozmer, II -- jozmer@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman & Ozmer
LLP, Kristapor Vartanian -- kvartanian@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman
& Ozmer LLP, Michael Kabat -- mkabat@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman &
Ozmer LLP, pro hac vice, Nathan D. Chapman -- nchapman@kcozlaw.com
-- Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP & Paul G. Sherman --
psherman@kcozlaw.com -- Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, pro hac vice.

TWC Administration LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph W. Ozmer,
II, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, Kristapor Vartanian, Kabat Chapman &
Ozmer LLP, Paul G. Sherman, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, pro hac vice
& Joseph Scott Carr, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP.

Charter Communications, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph W.
Ozmer, II, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, Kristapor Vartanian, Kabat
Chapman & Ozmer LLP, Michael Kabat, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, pro
hac vice, Paul G. Sherman, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP, pro hac vice
& Joseph Scott Carr, Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: March 1 Due to Respond to Warenski Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALAN WARENSKI, individually and on behalf of all and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS
d/b/a SPECTRUM, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00101-RFB-NJK (D.
Nev.), Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada has issued an order extending Charter's
deadline to respond to the complaint up to and including March 1,
2019.

On Jan. 17, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the Complaint, thereby
commencing the action.  He served the Summons and Complaint on Jan.
18, 2019.  As such, the current deadline for Charter to answer or
otherwise plead in response to the Complaint is Feb. 8, 2019.

The parties stipulated that Charter will have up to and including
March 1, 2019, to answer or otherwise plead in response to the
Complaint.  By entering into the Stipulation, Charter does not
waive any rights or defenses, including defenses related to
jurisdiction and arbitrability of claims (to the extent
applicable).

It is the first request for extension of time by Charter, and is
made due to the size and nature of the proposed class action, and
anticipates the filing of applications in accordance with LR IA
11-2 by the counsel for both parties.  Accordingly, the parties'
stipulation is made in good faith and not for purposes of delay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/GUg021 from Leagle.com.

Alan Warenski, Plaintiff, represented by George Haines --
ghaines@hainesandkrieger.com -- Haines and Krieger, LLC, Matthew I.
Knepper, Knepper & Clark, LLC, Miles N. Clark, Knepper & Clark LLC,
Shawn Wayne Miller -- smiller@hainesandkrieger.com -- Haines &
Krieger, LLC & David H. Krieger -- dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com --
Haines & Krieger, LLC.

Charter Communications, doing business as Spectrum, Defendant,
represented by Patrick J. Reilly -- preilly@bhfs.com -- Brownstein
Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP.


CIR LAW: Ambrosino Alleges Breach of FDCPA
------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CIR, Law Offices
International.  The case is styled as Christophe Ambrosino,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. CIR, Law Offices International and DOES 1 through 10,
inclsuive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01058 (C.D. Cal., February
12, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

CIR Law Offices, LLP provides legal advisory and bad debt
collection services. It offers skip tracing and pre and post
litigation collection services. It recovers debts for preferred
accounts including credit card debt, private label debt, assigned
debt, automobile replevins and/or deficiencies, promissory notes,
signature and other loans for credit unions and banks, petitions to
confirm credit card arbitration awards, breach of contract, student
loans, telecommunications, and bad checks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Amir J Goldstein, Esq.
   Amir J Goldstein Law Offices
   8032 West Third Street Suite 201
   Los Angeles, CA 90048
   Tel: (323) 937-0400
   Fax: (866) 288-9194
   Email: ajg@consumercounselgroup.com



COLUMBIA HOUSING: Faces Class Action Over Living Conditions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Angela Rogers, writing for WOLO, reports that more than 400 people
displaced from their home and now the Columbia Housing Authority is
facing a class-action lawsuit. It means that residents who say they
have been dealing with issues at Allen Benedict Court for months,
some even say years, might be able to receive compensation.

Attorneys Ron Cox and Dave Maxfield say the class action lawsuit is
seeking compensation for those who were paying rent for a safe
living environment, and simply didn't get that.

"You know, you may have a tendency to think, well, this was low
income housing, you get what you pay for. But these rules are
safety rules, whether it's a luxury condominium or student
housing," Mr. Maxfield said.

The class-action lawsuit will have to go before a judge first to
determine if the lawsuit can benefit all of the residents of Allen
Benedict Court Apartments who were forced out of their homes and
put into hotels more than a week ago.

"Every landlord has a basic obligation in a residential lease
situation to provide a safe, habitable place for the renters to
live. That's the basic, fundamental thing that they failed to do.
We don't know all the reasons why it didn't happen, but we intend
to try to find out," Mr. Cox said.

Messrs. Cox and Maxfield believe they are just at the beginning.
Some residents have told them they have lived with infestations of
roaches, bedbugs, mold and sewage issues. They say those are all
violations that can be found in the S.C. Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act: citing inhabitable conditions due to health and safety
concerns.

"If what we've heard is true, their rights have been violated for a
very long time, but people aren't always aware of that," Cox said.

Bob Coble, who is representing the Housing authority says he
expects there might be more lawsuits to follow.

"I have not seen that, and once we get this lawsuit, or any other
lawsuit, you know we will certainly deal with it… and you know
it's a very serious matter. I imagine there will be a number of
lawsuits," Coble said.

The Columbia Housing Authority has 30 days to respond to the
class-action lawsuit. [GN]


CONTINENTAL GENERAL: Fastrich Stayed Pending Ohio Case Deal OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN FASTRICH and UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiffs, v. CONTINENTAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 8:16CV487 (D. Neb.), Magistrate Judge Michael D. Nelson of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the
Joint Notice of Conditional Settlement and Motion to Stay
Proceedings.

The parties have reached a conditional settlement of the action and
the parallel action pending in the Southern District of Ohio, Case
No. 17CV615-SJD, contingent upon court approval.  Therefore, they
jointly request that the Court stays all proceedings in the action
pending approval of the final settlement.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Nelson granted the parties' request.
All proceedings in the case are stayed pending final approval of
the class action settlement in the Ohio action.  Within seven days
of obtaining final approval of the class action in the Ohio action,
the parties will file a joint stipulation of dismissal (or other
dispositive stipulation) which will fully dispose of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KUnBhL from Leagle.com.

John Fastrich & Universal Investment Services, Inc., Plaintiffs,
represented by Alan L. Rosca -- arosca@prwlegal.com -- PEIFFER,
ROSCA LAW FIRM, Brian O. Marty, SHINDLER, ANDERSON LAW FIRM, J.
Barton Goplerud, SHINDLER, ANDERSON LAW FIRM, Stephen D. Marso,
WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW FIRM-WEST DES MOINES & Thomas S. Reavely,
WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW FIRM.

Continental General Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Edward D. Hotz -- ehotz@pheblaw.com -- PANSING, HOGAN LAW FIRM,
Gregory J. Star -- gstar@cozen.com -- DRINKER, BIDDLE LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice & Steven H. Brogan -- steven.brogan@dbr.com -- DRINKER,
BIDDLE LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.


CORNELL UNIVERSITY: Retirement Plan Investors Get Class Status
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that more than
28,000 investors in Cornell University's retirement plan received
class status in their lawsuit targeting the plan's fees and
investment options.

A federal judge Jan. 22 rejected Cornell's argument that the
investors who filed suit lacked standing to challenge plan
investments they didn't personally hold. [GN]


COURTYARD BY MARRIOTT: Garcia Suit Asserts Wage and Hour Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Carmelita Garcia and Maria Garcia, individuals, on behalf of
themselves and other current and former employees, Plaintiffs, v.
Courtyard by Marriott; Dolphin California Management, LLC;
Clearview Hotel Capital, LLC; and Does 1 through 50, Defendants,
Case No. 37-2019-00008681—CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego
Cty., February 14, 2019) is a representative action against
Defendants for wage and hour violations of the California Labor
Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order,
pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), incorporated
in Labor Code.

Plaintiffs work for Defendants during which time they were paid
hourly, on a bi-weekly basis, and were considered nonexempt. On
information and belief, these current and former employees were
subject to wage and hour violations by Defendants, by Defendants'
failure to provide accurate wage statements, earned wages, rest
periods, sick days, and vacation pay upon separation of employment,
among other things.

Plaintiffs are each an "aggrieved employee" because they were
employed by Defendants and had one of more of the alleged
violations committed against them, notes the complaint.

Defendants do business in the County of San Diego, State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Alex Asil Mashiri, Esq.
     MASHIRI LAW FIRM
     A Professional Corporation
     11251 Rancho Carmel Drive #500694
     San Diego, CA 92150
     Phone: (858) 348-4938
     Fax: (858) 348-4939
     Email: alexmashiri@yahoo.com

          - and -

     Tamim Jami, Esq.
     THE JAMI LAW FIRM P.C.
     3525 Del Mar Heights Rd #941
     San Diego, CA 92130
     Phone: (858) 284-0248
     Fax: (858) 284-0977
     Email: tamim@jamilaw.com


CTB INVESTORS: Doohan Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
---------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Andy Doohan, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CTB Investors d/b/a PBR
Big Sky Cowboy Bar, Defendant, Case No. 1816-CV19880, was removed
from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on
February 14, 2019, and assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-00111-FJG.

On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff Andy Doohan filed his Class Action
Petition for Damages. Plaintiff alleges that Big Sky is liable to
Plaintiff and each putative class member for statutory and
regulatory violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     William Charles Kenney, Esq.
     Bill Kenney Law Firm LLC
     1100 Main Street, Suite 1800
     Kansas City, MO 64105
     Email: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

     W. James Foland, Esq.
     Jacqueline M. Sexton, Esq.
     Zach T. Bowles, Esq.
     Foland, Wickens, Roper, Hofer & Crawford, P.C.
     1200 Main Street, Suite 2200
     Kansas City, MO 64105
     Phone: (816) 472-7474
     Facsimile: (816) 472-6262
     Email: jfoland@fwpclaw.com
            jsexton@fwpclaw.com

          - and -

     Lauri A. Mazzuchetti, Esq.
     KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
     One Jefferson Road
     Parsippany, NJ 07054
     Phone: (973) 503-5900
     Email: lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com


CYAN INC: June 5 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Cyan Securities Litigation:

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
FUND, et al., Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

CYAN, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

Lead Case No. CGC-14-538355
(Consolidated with No. CGC-14-539008)

CLASS ACTION
Assigned to: Department 304
SUMMARY NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
OF CLASS ACTION

TO:
  
ALL PERSONS THAT PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED CYAN, INC. ("CYAN"
OR THE "COMPANY") COMMON STOCK FROM MAY 9, 2013 TO NOVEMBER 4,
2013, EXCEPT FOR PURCHASES OR ACQUISITIONS OF NON-REGISTERED SHARES
IN A PRIVATE TRANSACTION ("CLASS" OR "CLASS MEMBERS")

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a hearing will be held on June 5,
2019, at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable A.C. Massullo at the
Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco (the
"Court"), located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, CA
94102, to determine whether: (1) the proposed settlement (the
"Settlement") of the above-captioned action as set forth in the
Amended Stipulation of Settlement ("Stipulation")1 for $15,000,000
in cash should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and
adequate; (2) the Plan of Allocation should be approved by the
Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (3) to award Class Counsel
attorneys' fees and expenses out of the Settlement Fund (as defined
in the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action ("Notice"),
which is discussed below); and (4) to pay Class Representatives'
service awards for the time and expenses they incurred in
representing the Class out of the Settlement Fund.

This Action is a securities class action brought on behalf of those
Persons who purchased or acquired the common stock of Cyan pursuant
or traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus for
Cyan's May 9, 2013 initial public offering ("IPO") and against
Cyan, certain of its key executives, directors, and the
underwriters of Cyan's IPO (collectively, "Defendants") for, among
other things, allegedly misstating and omitting material facts from
the Registration Statement filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with the IPO. Class
Representatives allege that Defendants failed to adequately warn
investors that Cyan revenue depended on two limited-life projects,
a broadband stimulus project and a fiber-to-the-tower installation
project, and that both projects were in the process of winding
down. Class Representatives allege that these purportedly false and
misleading statements inflated the price of the Company's stock,
resulting in damage to Class Members when the truth was revealed.
Defendants deny all of Class Representatives' allegations.
Defendants expressly have denied and continue to deny all charges
of wrongdoing or liability against them arising out of any of the
conduct, statements, acts, or omissions alleged, or that could have
been alleged, in the Action, and also have denied and continue to
deny the allegations that Plaintiffs or Class Members have suffered
damage, or were otherwise harmed by the conduct alleged in the
Action. The Court has not ruled on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims
or Defendants' defenses.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED CYAN COMMON STOCK BETWEEN MAY 9, 2013
THROUGH AND INCLUDING NOVEMBER 4, 2013, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS ACTION.

To share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must
establish your rights by submitting a Proof of Claim and Release
form ("Proof of Claim") by mail (postmarked no later than May 24,
2019) or electronically (no later than May 24, 2019) at
www.CyanSecuritiesLitigation.com. Your failure to submit your Proof
of Claim by May 24, 2019, will subject your claim to possible
rejection and may preclude you from receiving any of the recovery
in connection with the Settlement of this Action. If you are a
member of the Class and did not request exclusion therefrom in
connection with the Notice of Pendency of Class Action provided in
2015, you will be bound by the Settlement and any judgment and
release entered in the Action, including, but not limited to, the
Final Judgment, whether or not you submit a Proof of Claim. Class
Counsel represents you and other Members of the Class. If you want
to be represented by your own lawyer, you may hire one at your
expense.

If you have not received a copy of the Notice, which includes the
precise Class definition and exceptions to Class membership and
more completely describes the Settlement and your rights thereunder
(including your right to object to the Settlement), and a Proof of
Claim, you may obtain these documents, as well as a copy of the
Stipulation (which, among other things, contains definitions for
the defined terms used in this Summary Notice), the other briefs
and declarations submitted to the Court in support of preliminary
approval of the Settlement, the Court's Order Preliminarily
Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice, and the operative
complaint filed in the Action, online at
www.CyanSecuritiesLitigation.com, or by writing to:

         Cyan Securities Litigation
         c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC
         P.O. Box 404098
         Louisville, KY 40233-4098

In addition, the papers in support of final approval of the
Settlement will be posted to the website after they are filed on
March 25, 2019.

Inquiries should NOT be directed to Defendants, the Court, or the
Clerk of the Court.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice or for a Proof of
Claim, may be made to a representative of Class Counsel:

         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         Ellen Gusikoff Stewart
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: 800/449-4900

ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS WHO DID NOT REQUEST EXCLUSION FROM THE
CLASS IN 2015 WILL BE BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT EVEN IF THEY DO NOT
SUBMIT A TIMELY PROOF OF CLAIM.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE
SETTLEMENT, THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION, THE REQUEST BY CLASS COUNSEL
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES, AND/OR THE PAYMENT TO
CLASS REPRESENTATIVES FOR THEIR TIME AND EXPENSES. ANY OBJECTIONS
MUST BE SENT TO CLASS COUNSEL SUCH THAT IT IS POSTMARKED NO LATER
THAN APRIL 25, 2019, IN THE MANNER AND FORM EXPLAINED IN THE
NOTICE.

Questions? Call toll-free 1-866-276-1239 or visit
www.CyanSecuritiesLitigation.com.

1 The Stipulation, and other relevant documents related to the
Settlement can be viewed and/or obtained at
www.CyanSecuritiesLitigation.com.


DARP INC: Court Grants Certifies Class in Drug Program Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned MARK FOCHTMAN; CORBY SHUMATE; MICHAEL SPEARS; ANDREW
DANIEL; FABIAN AGUILAR; and SLOAN SIMMS Individually, and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. DARP, INC.;
HENDREN PLASTICS, INC.; and JOHN DOES 1-29, Defendants. Case No.
5:18-CV-5047. (W.D. Ark.).

The Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint alleging violations of
law arising from their participation in a residential drug
rehabilitation program run by DARP, which stands for Drug and
Alcohol Recovery Program. The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class
of similarly-situated individuals who were ordered to attend DARP
by drug courts in Arkansas and Oklahoma. State drug courts
routinely allow certain individuals charged with drug crimes to
participate in diversion programs, where they are given the option
of completing drug and alcohol rehabilitation in lieu of
imprisonment.

Defendants DARP and Hendren dispute whether: the purported class is
sufficiently numerous to be appropriate for class certification;
there are questions of law and fact common to the class; the
putative class representatives have claims that are typical of
those of the rest of the class; the class representatives will
adequately protect the interests of the class; class issues
predominate over individual issues; and a class action is a
superior method of resolving this dispute, as compared to
individual lawsuits. Below, the Court will consider these
arguments.

Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)) and Ascertainability

The Defendants do not dispute that the precise number of class
members is either known or may be discovered fairly easily.
Plaintiffs maintain there are approximately 180 former DARP
residents who meet the class definition, and Defendants do not
dispute that number. Instead, DARP argues that it is unclear at
this time whether any of the 180 putative class members will
ultimately want to remain as members of the class or will instead
opt out. DARP claims this absence of clarity means Plaintiffs have
not proven that members of the proposed class are sufficiently
numerous to warrant certification.

DARP's argument above tends to demonstrate that it does not
understand what the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 actually
entails. In order to make a finding that a class will be so
numerous that joinder will be impractical, the Court does not need
to consult its crystal ball and predict how many class members will
opt out and how many will remain. The numerosity requirement asks,
simply, how many individuals meet the class definition. Here, the
number is 180, and the class members' identities are easily
ascertainable.

The numerosity and ascertainability requirements are easily
satisfied.

Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2))

The Defendants' arguments on the issue of commonality go only to
the merits of the case. First, the Defendants note that all class
members signed the same Disclaimer of Employment Relationship" form
which, to Defendants, definitively proves that the class members
were not employees under the AMWA and have no valid claims for
damages. Defendants, once again, improperly urge the Court to
decide the merits of the case and make a finding that Plaintiffs
and the putative class are not employees. This the Court cannot do
at the class certification stage.
  
The Defendants' argument that some workers received a stipend upon
successful completion of the DARP program, while others did not,
does not mean the case is unsuitable for class certification.
Provided that the calculation of damages will not bog down the
litigation and render the class action model unworkable and
inefficient, there is no reason to refuse to certify a class simply
because some class members may require certain, special deductions
in their damage calculations. Here, the stipend DARP paid to
successful residents who completed the program was either $500 (for
six months of successful compliance) or $1000 (for twelve months).
It should be a simple matter of arithmetic to subtract those
stipends from the damage totals of the individual workers who
received them.

The Court finds that commonality inquiry weighs in favor of class
certification.

Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3))

The typicality inquiry asks whether the named Plaintiffs' claims
are typical of those of the rest of the class. Defendants rehash
their arguments with respect to commonality and maintain that the
named Plaintiffs' claims cannot possibly be typical of the rest of
the class because each class member must have had his own,
individual expectations about whether he was an employee and
entitled to receive minimum wages and overtime compensation. Again,
the Court rejects Defendants' arguments for the reasons previously
stated. Since Plaintiffs were all DARP residents who worked at
Hendren Plastics under substantially the same conditions as the
rest of the putative class, the Plaintiffs' claims are typical of
those of the class.

Adequacy of Class Representatives (Rule 23(a)(4))

DARP argues that the named Plaintiffs will not adequately represent
the interests of the class, simply because their interests are
allegedly not aligned with the majority of former DARP residents.
DARP contends that most, if not all, of its former residents
benefited from the program and will have no interest in being part
of this class action lawsuit. Again, DARP seems to think that if
some class members opt out in the future, that fact is somehow
relevant to the class-certification analysis. It is not.
Plaintiffs' interests and legal claims align with those of all the
individuals who could potentially be members of the class. It
follows logically that if any class member later chooses to opt
out, Plaintiffs will still be adequate representatives of all those
class members who decide to remain in the lawsuit.

As for Hendren Plastics, it suggests that Plaintiffs will not make
adequate class representatives because they are convicted felons
with drug dependency issues. Most, if not all, class members are
also convicted felons with drug dependency issues, by virtue of the
nature of the claims at issue in this case. To suggest, without
more, that a felon could never serve as a class representative
strikes the Court as rather a specious argument.  

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs will adequately represent the
claims and interests of the class.

Requirements of Rule 23(b)

Predominance

With respect to predominance, the relevant inquiry is whether class
issues will tend to predominate over individual issues. Plaintiffs
contend that the salient question here is whether the residents of
DARP were employees of DARP and/or Hendren Plastics. That is a
question that depends on the economic reality of the workers'
situations. It is undisputed that all putative class members worked
in the same location and under the same conditions, were paid the
same hourly rates, and were given substantially the same in-kind
benefits in exchange for their work.

The Defendants contend that the Court should not find that class
issues predominate over individual ones because it is unknown at
this time whether any class members will ultimately qualify as
employees under the AMWA, due to their differing expectations,
intentions, and motivations in choosing DARP for inpatient
substance abuse treatment. The Court rejects Defendants'
merits-based arguments for the reasons previously explained. Class
issues will tend to predominate over individual ones in this
matter.

Superiority

The Plaintiffs here advise that there are approximately 180
individuals who meet the class definition and share common claims
for damages and common questions of law and fact. Defendants really
do not disagree. It will be far more efficient to dispose of all
class members' claims in one forum rather than entertain piecemeal
litigation. Furthermore, the Court does not believe that the
management of this class action will be overly complex or
burdensome and will certainly not be more burdensome than
litigating 180 separate lawsuits on the same question of liability.
The superiority requirement is therefore satisfied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4xp4xma from Leagle.com.

Mark Fochtman, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Corby Shumate, individually, and on behalf of all others,
Michael Spears, individually and on behalf of all others, Andrew
Daniel, individually and on behalf of all others, Fabian Aguilar,
individually and on behalf of all others & Sloan Simms,
individually and on behalf of all others, Plaintiffs, represented
by Jerry D. Garner, Holleman and Associates P.A., John Holleman,
Holleman & Associate P.A. & Timothy A. Steadman, Holleman &
Associates, P.A.

DARP, Inc., Defendant, represented by William B. Putman, Putman Law
Office.

Hendren Plastics, Inc., Defendant, represented by Laurence M.
McCredy, Reece Moore Pendergraft LLP, Timothy Chad Hutchinson,
Reece Moore Pendergraft LLP & James Robert Renner, RMP, LLP.


EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Dawson Says Website Not Blind-accessible
-----------------------------------------------------------
Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Edgewell Personal Care Company, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01432-DAB (S.D. N.Y., February 14, 2019) is a
civil rights action against Defendant for its failure to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its goods and services offered thereby, is a
violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen reading software to read website content using his
computer and is a resident of Brooklyn, New York.

Defendant is and was at all relevant times a Missouri Corporation
doing business in the United States, including New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
     COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (929) 575-4175
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: Joseph@cml.legal

          - and -

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003-2461
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Email: nyjg@aol.com
            danalgottlieb@aol.com


EQUIFAX INC: Must Face Class Action Over 2017 Security Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ethan Wolff-Mann, writing for Yahoo Finance, reports that a federal
judge on Jan. 28 shot down Equifax's attempt in an Atlanta district
court to dismiss a proposed class-action lawsuit, a move that would
have stopped the case from moving forward.

The case follows Equifax's 2017 security breach in which almost 150
million people had their sensitive personal information
compromised, including Social Security numbers, credit card
information, addresses, birth dates, and more. It was one of the
largest data breaches of this kind in history.

Following the data incident, many people have sued, some of them in
small claims, and some have had success. (At least one person told
Yahoo Finance they had received and cashed a check.)

But this case is a proposed consolidated class action with many who
allege damages from "present, immediate, imminent, and continuing
increased risk of harm" because of the data breach. The lawsuit
aims to represent similar people in the U.S., which could be up to
approximately 150 million people.

Equifax tried to have a judge strike down the lawsuit on the
grounds that the plaintiffs haven't "sufficiently alleged injury
and proximate causation." The evidence of injury is a tricky thing
when it comes to something as abstract as the exposure of a Social
Security number, because it's hard to quantify the damage unless
there was an identity theft with an obvious cost. Equifax has honed
this strategy in its small-claims court defenses.

Furthermore, with many data breaches in the past, it can be hard to
connect damages to specific companies, which could potentially
point that the data is out there already.

Consumers on the other hand, contend that Equifax had a duty of
care to guard the data well, a matter that the court agreed with.

"The Court finds that [a precedent] supports the conclusion that
the Defendants owed a legal duty to take reasonable measures to
prevent a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm due to a data breach
incident," Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr wrote.

Amy Keller, a lawyer for the plaintiffs at DiCello Levitt & Casey,
LLC, expressed satisfaction with the opinion and noted that holding
otherwise "would create perverse incentives for businesses who
profit off of the use of consumers' personal data to turn a blind
eye and ignore known security risks."

Still, the judge did dismiss some elements of the complaint,
including a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

This opinion is the this first substantive ruling the court has
made regarding the merits of the case, which will now proceed
forward to a discovery process. No damages have been put forth by
the plaintiffs yet.

Equifax did not respond to a request for comment. [GN]


ESTERO ISLAND: Pilibosian Seeks Minimum Wage & OT for Bartenders
----------------------------------------------------------------
DENISE PILIBOSIAN for herself and on behalf of those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ESTERO ISLAND RESTAURANTS LLC, a
Florida limited liability company, d/b/a NERVOUS NELLIES, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00089 (M.D. Fla., Feb. 12, 2019),
alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by
failing to pay the Plaintiff and other similarly-situated
servers/bartenders (tipped employees) the proper minimum wage and
overtime compensation for all hours worked.

The action is intended to include each and every hourly-paid tipped
employee who worked for Defendant at any time within the past three
years. On or about June 2015, Defendant hired the Plaintiff to work
as a non-exempt server for Defendant's company, a restaurant, at
its location in Fort Myers, Florida. the Plaintiff's job duties
included, but were not limited to, serving food and drinks to
customers. the Plaintiff was employed by Defendant in this position
until January, 2017.

During the Plaintiff's' employment, she and other tipped employees
including other servers and bartenders, were subjected to several
unlawful pay practices which resulted in a failure to pay minimum
wage and overtime, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff:

          Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N. Franklin Street, No. 700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: 813-223-5505
          Facsimile: 813-257-0572
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com

EYEBUYDIRECT: Dawson Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
---------------------------------------------------------
Leshawn Dawson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Eyebuydirect, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01429-PAE (S.D. N.Y., February 14, 2019) is a civil rights
action against Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually
impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its goods and services offered thereby, is a
violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen reading software to read website content using his
computer and is a resident of Brooklyn, New York.

Defendant is and was at all relevant times a Missouri Corporation
doing business in the United States, including New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
     COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (929) 575-4175
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: Joseph@cml.legal

          - and -

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003-2461
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Email: nyjg@aol.com
            danalgottlieb@aol.com


FCA US: Bid to Compel Production of Docs Filed in Grigorian Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to compel production of documents has been filed in the
case captioned Mariam Grigorian, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FCA US, LLC, a Michigan
limited liability company, Defendant, Mudd, Inc. doing business as:
Mudd Advertising, Third Party Defendant, Case No.
2:19-mc-00003-JES-MRM (M.D. Fla., February 12, 2019).

FCA US LLC, together with its subsidiaries, designs, engineers,
manufactures, distributes, and sells vehicles primarily in the
United States. The company offers passenger cars; utility vehicles,
including sport utility and crossover vehicles; minivans; trucks;
and commercial vans under the Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram brand
names.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Manuel Santiago Hiraldo, Esq.
   Hiraldo PA
   401 E Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
   Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 400-4713
   Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

      - and -

   Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law, PA
   19495 Biscayne Blvd.
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 975-3320
   Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


FINISAR CORP: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over II-IV Merger
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
directors are selling Finisar Corp. too cheaply through an unfair
process to the optoelectronics firm II-IV Inc., for $15.60 a share
plus 0.2218 shares of the new company for each Finisar share, a
$3.2 billion merger, shareholders say in a federal class action.

A copy of the Complaint in Davis v. Finisar Corporation, et al.,
Case No. 19-cv-00271 (N.D. Cal.), is available at;

         https://is.gd/qPcKGX


GIBSON COUNTY, IN: Stilwell Files Suit Over Prison Conditions
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the Sheriff of Gibson
County, Indiana. The case is styled as Zeberiah Stilwell,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Sheriff of Gibson County, Indiana in his official
capacity and Gibson County, Indiana, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00030-RLY-MPB (S.D. Ind., February 13, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Prisoner
Petitions - Prison Condition filed pursuant to the Civil Rights
Act.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Stevie Pactor, Esq.
   ACLU OF INDIANA
   1031 E. Washington St.
   Indianapolis, IN 46202
   Tel: (317) 759-6420
   Fax: (317) 635-4105
   Email: spactor@aclu-in.org


GLENN M ROSS: Baker Seeks Final Approval of Class Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled CASSANDRA BAKER, CORRINE
MORRIS, and all others similarly situated v. GLENN M. ROSS, P.C.
and GLENN M. ROSS, Case No. 2:17-cv-04274-HB (E.D. Pa.), move for
Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement reached in this
matter.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Charles M. Delbaum, Esq.
          NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
          7 Winthrop Square, 4th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 542-8010
          E-mail: cdelbaum@nclc.org

               - and -

          Nicholas E. Chimicles, Esq.
          Alison Gabe Gushue, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          361 West Lancaster Ave.
          One Haverford Centre
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: Nick@chimicles.com
          AlisonGushue@chimicles.com

               - and -

          Mary M. McKenzie, Esq.
          Daniel Urevick-Ackelsberg, Esq.
          George Donnelly, Esq.
          PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER
          1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2nd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 627-7100
          E-mail: mmckenzie@pubintlaw.org
                  dackelsberg@pubintlaw.org
                  gdonnelly@pubintlaw.org


GOOGLE INC: Appeals Decision in Rivera BIPA Suit to 7th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Google, LLC, filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Lindabeth Rivera, et al. v. Google, LLC, Case No.
1:16-cv-02714, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division.

The appellate case is captioned as Lindabeth Rivera, et al. v.
Google, LLC, Case No. 19-1242, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.  That appellate case is titled Lindabeth Rivera,
et al. v. Google, LLC, Case No. 19-1182, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 14, 2019,
Plaintiffs Lindabeth Rivera and Joseph Weiss filed an appeal from a
court ruling issued in their lawsuit.

The lawsuit seeks damages and other alleged legal and equitable
remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Google in
collecting, storing and using the Plaintiff's and other similarly
situated individuals' biometric identifiers and biometric
information without informed written consent, in direct violation
of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees LINDABETH RIVERA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, and JOSEPH WEISS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          E-mail: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com

Defendant-Appellant GOOGLE, LLC, is represented by:

          Debra Rae Bernard, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          131 S. Dearborn Street
          Chicago, IL 60603-5559
          Telephone: (312) 324-8559
          E-mail: dbernard@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Susan Fahringer, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 Third Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101-3099
          Telephone: (206) 359-8000
          E-mail: SFahringer@perkinscoie.com


GORDO TAQUERIA: Settles Wage-and-Labor Class Action for $690K
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jenny Weng, writing for The Daily Californian, reports that Gordo
Taqueria, a restaurant chain operating five locations in San
Francisco, Berkeley and Albany, has agreed to pay a total of
$690,000 to settle a class-action lawsuit alleging that the
restaurant's owners failed to abide by wage and labor laws, as
first reported by Berkeleyside.

The settlement received preliminary approval in December and is
scheduled to receive final approval April 2. According to Harry
DeCourcy, the restaurant's attorney, Gordo Taqueria categorically
denies all the allegations in the complaint.

"Gordo Taqueria ("Gordo") has served the Bay Area since the 1970s,
and has always strived to serve great food and to be a great place
to work," Mr. DeCourcy said in an email. "When the class action
complaint was filed at the end of 2016, Gordo and its counsel
proactively engaged plaintiff's counsel in negotiations and early
alternative dispute resolution, and the parties worked to negotiate
a deal that is believed to be fair to all parties."

The lawsuit includes 240 current and former employees and was
brought by former dishwasher and prep cook Jose Martinez, who
worked at the restaurant's College Avenue location in Berkeley from
2013 to 2015.

Mr. Martinez alleged in the complaint, filed in December 2016, that
the restaurant failed to pay him and other workers legally required
overtime, provide employees with legally required rest or meal
breaks when working more than 10 hours a day and distribute tips in
a timely manner. Instead, tips were distributed at the end of the
calendar year or periodically a few times throughout the year.

Carole Vigne, an attorney representing Mr. Martinez and the other
plaintiffs in the case, said cash tips should legally be
distributed at the end of every day, while credit card tips should
be paid out every pay period, which can vary from restaurant to
restaurant.

"We believe that cash tips should be distributed at the end of
every day as soon as practical, perhaps the next morning," Ms.
Vigne said. "We think credit card tips are typically pulled out
because it's a little bit harder to distribute. . . . We think
that's probably why the legislature allows for a little bit more
room."

According to Ms. Vigne, the settlement is likely to receive final
approval, and her law firm is currently in the process of notifying
all the plaintiffs. The settlement should provide an average payout
of $2,000 to each member of the suit, which is almost equivalent to
an extra month of pay.

Ms. Vigne also said that because of the suit, Gordo Taqueria is now
in better compliance with wage and labor laws, which she said is
something she and the plaintiffs are satisfied with.

"It was something that was important to our client, and it was
important to us as an organization advocating for worker and wage
rights," Ms. Vigne said. "We do think that the case has led to
positive changes at the restaurant. . . . We hope that it makes a
difference in the lives of the workers." [GN]


GRAND ISLE SHIPYARD: Sandlin Moves for FLSA Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned WESLEY SANDLIN, Individually
and on behalf of other employees similarly situated v. GRAND ISLE
SHIPYARD, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-07607-LMA-KWR (E.D. La.), files
with the Court a motion for conditional certification.

Wesley Sandlin, on behalf of similarly-situated persons that the
Defendant employed, asks that the Court grant the motion to issue
notice under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trang Q. Tran, Esq.
          TRAN LAW FIRM
          2537 S. Gessner Road, Suite 104
          Houston, TX 77063
          Telephone: (713) 223-8855
          Facsimile: (713) 623-6399
          E-mail: Ttran@tranlawllp.com

               - and -

          Scott Webre, Esq.
          WEBRE AND ASSOCIATES
          2901 Johnston Street, Suite 307
          Lafayette, LA 70503
          Telephone: (337) 237-5051
          Facsimile: (337) 237-5061
          E-mail: scott@webreandassociates.com


HILL'S PET: Rusells Sue over Alleged Defective Canned Dog Food
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the case, MICHAEL RUSSELL and JODI RUSSELL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. Hill's PET NUTRITION, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00395-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla., Feb. 11, 2019), blames Hill's Pet
Nutrition, Inc. for the death of Plaintiffs' pet dog caused by
ingestion of tainted and defective canned dog food.

The case is a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
Defendant's canned dog food products that caused injury, illness,
and/or death to  the Plaintiffs' and the Class members' household
pet dogs.

The Plaintiff and the Class have sustained actual damages as a
result of the Defendants' deceptive acts and unfair practices,
which violate Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The canned dog food products at issue include:

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) c/d (TM) Multicare Canine
    Chicken & Vegetable Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) i/d (TM) Canine Chicken &
    Vegetable Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) i/d (TM) Canine Chicken &
    Vegetable Stew 5.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) z/d (TM) Canine 5.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) g/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) i/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) j/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) k/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) w/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) z/d (TM) Canine 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) Metabolic + Mobility
    Canine Vegetable & Tuna Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) w/d (TM) Canine Vegetable
    & Chicken Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) i/d (TM) Low Fat Canine
    Rice, Vegetable & Chicken Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Prescription Diet (TM) Derm Defense (TM) Canine
    Chicken & Vegetable Stew 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Small & Toy Breed
    Chicken & Barley EntrEe Dog Food 5.8oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Puppy Chicken & Barley
    Entree 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult Chicken & Barley
    Entree Dog Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult Turkey & Barley Dog
    Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult Chicken & Beef EntrEe
    Dog Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult Light with Liver Dog
    Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Chicken & Barley
    Entree Dog Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Beef & Barley
    Entree Dog Food 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Turkey & Barley
    Entree 13oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Healthy Cuisine
    Braised Beef, Carrots & Peas Stew dog food 12.5oz

-- Hill's (TM) Science Diet (TM) Adult 7+ Youthful Vitality
    Chicken & Vegetable Stew dog food 12.5oz[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class:

          Matthew D. Schultz, Esq.
          William F. Cash, III, Esq.
          LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS,
            MITCHELL, RAFFERTY & PROCTOR, P.A.
          316 South Baylen Street, Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32503
          Telephone: (850) 435-7140
          Facsimile: (850) 436-6140
          E-mail: mschultz@levinlaw.com
                  bcash@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          George V. Granade, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com
                  ggranade@reesellp.com

HILLSIDE LUMBER: Damian Stepien Seeks Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------
Damian Stepien, on behalf of himself and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. Hillside Lumber, Inc., and
Ewa Kulaga, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00861 (N.D. Ill., Feb.
11, 2019), seeks to recover overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated current and former employees regularly worked over 40
hours per week but were not fully paid their overtime hours at one
and one-half times their regular rate of pay. The Plaintiff and
asserted members of the Collective are similarly situated because,
inter alia, they all were not paid the required overtime rate of
one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all work in
excess of 40 hours per week and had such rights undermined and
neglected by Defendant's unlawful practices and policies, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          David J. Fish, Esq.
          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM P.C.
          200 E 5 th Ave Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: (630) 355-7590
          Facsimile: (630) 778-0400

HILLSTONE HEALTHCARE: Smith's Bid to Certify FLSA Class Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James L. Graham grants the Plaintiff's second motion to
conditionally certify a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in the lawsuit entitled Doniele Smith, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated v. Hillstone Healthcare Inc.
and Cornerstone Innovations, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-01075-JLG-EPD
(S.D. Ohio).

The Court conditionally certifies a class under the Fair Labor
Standards Act consisting of:

     All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of
     defendants who: (1) performed duties as a State Tested
     Nursing Assistant (STNA) for defendants (2) at one of
     defendant Hillstone's facilities in Ohio and (3) who, in
     performing duties as a STNA, received bonus payments for
     working extra shifts or hours beyond what the employee was
     scheduled to work (sometimes called a shift bonus or
     supplementary shift bonus) (4) during any workweek that the
     employee worked over 40 hours (5) beginning three years
     prior to the filing date of the First Amended Complaint and
     continuing through the date of the final disposition of this
     case.

The Defendants are ordered to provide to the Plaintiff's counsel
within 14 days of the date of this Order a list in electronic and
importable format of all persons potentially fitting within the
proposed class.  The list shall include an employee's full name,
location(s) of employment, position(s) of employment, last-known
mailing address, last-known telephone number(s), last-known e-mail
address(es), and dates of employment at Hillstone.

The Defendants have stated no objections to the Plaintiff's
proposed opt-in notice, consent form, method of delivery or 90-day
opt-in period.  The parties are ordered to meet and confer
regarding the revisions, which need to be made to the proposed
notice's class definition and references to "nondiscretionary
bonus" payments.  They shall jointly submit a revised opt-in notice
for the Court's approval within 14 days of this Order.[CC]


HORIZONTAL WELL: Glover Seeks Certification of Applicants Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff-Intervenor in the lawsuit styled EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and WILBERT GLOVER,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenor v. HORIZONTAL WELL DRILLERS, LLC, Case No.
5:17-cv-00879-R (W.D. Okla.), asks the Court to certify this
class:

     All applicants who applied for employment with HWD during
     the period January 1, 2012 through June 30, 2014, using
     HWD's online or paper-based employment application.

Wilbert Glover also asks the Court to enter an order naming him as
class representative case and to appoint Jonathan E. Shook, Esq.,
of SHOOK & JOHNSON, PLLC, as class counsel.

Mr. Glover filed a charge of discrimination against Defendant
Horizontal Well Drillers, LLC ("HWD") with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in March 2013.  He
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADA") and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 ("GINA").[CC]

The Plaintiff-Intervenor is represented by:

          Jonathan E. Shook, Esq.
          SHOOK & JOHNSON, P.L.L.C.
          7420 S. Yale Ave.
          Tulsa, OK 74136
          Telephone: (918) 293-1122
          Facsimile: (918) 293-1133
          E-mail: jshook@shookjohnson.com

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick J. Holman, Esq.
          Emily A. Keatley, Esq.
          Lauren W Johnston, Esq.
          U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
          215 Dean A. McGee Ave., Suite 524
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 231-5829
          Facsimile: (405) 231-4125
          E-mail: patrick.holman@eeoc.gov
                  emily.keatley@eeoc.gov
                  lauren.johnston@eeoc.gov

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jo Anne Deaton, Esq.
          John H. Tucker, Esq.
          Denelda L. Richardson, Esq.
          Michael P. Robertson, Esq.
          RHODES HIERONYMUS
          Two West Second Street, 10th Floor
          Tulsa, OK 74103
          Telephone: (918) 582-1173
          E-mail: jdeatoncourts@rhodesokla.com
                  jtuckercourts@rhodesokla.com
                  drichardsoncourts@rhodesokla.com
                  mrobertson@rhodesokla.com


IMAGING INC: Court Grants Dismissal Bid in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned In Re: ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION. Civil Action No. 17-5992. (D.N.J.).

The Plaintiffs bring securities fraud claims that are predicated
upon alleged misrepresentations contained in Electronics For
Imaging Inc. (EFI)’s annual and quarterly financial reports.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants intentionally or
recklessly misrepresented the adequacy of EFI's internal controls
in the Company's annual and quarterly financial reports. The
Plaintiffs allege that statements in EFI's 2016 Form 10-K and First
Quarter 2017 Form 10-Q falsely assured investors that the Company's
internal controls and procedures were functional and effective.  

Count One - 10(b) Violations

SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful "(a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security."

To state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff
must allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission  (2)
scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase of a sale or security (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission (5) economic loss, and (6) loss
causation.

Accordingly, the Court will address each alleged basis for scienter
and all reasonable opposing inferences of non-fraudulent intent.
The Court will then consider the Complaint as a whole in
determining whether Plaintiffs have pled facts to support a strong
inference of scienter.

Evidence of Conscious Misbehavior or Recklessness and GAAP
Violations

The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead any
direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a strong
inference of scienter. Instead, the Defendants argue that the only
plausible inference from the allegations in the Amended Complaint
is a non-culpable one.

The Defendants maintain that they believed EFI's internal controls
to be effective when they filed their financial reports. They
further submit that when they discovered evidence of material
weakness, they moved quickly to investigate, inform investors, and
implement remedial measures.

Accordingly, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' case amounts
to nothing more than classic alleged fraud by hindsight.

The Plaintiffs' theory of liability rests largely on the allegation
that the Defendants falsely represented that they were engaged in a
comprehensive effort to review, evaluate, and improve the Company's
controls' while stating in the same SEC filings that they have
concluded that the controls were effective. The Plaintiffs argue
that the disclosures contained in the Amendments are in direct
contradiction with Defendants' previous unambiguous statements that
EFI's management reviewed, evaluated, and improved the internal
controls.  

Here, the Plaintiffs allege that the sheer magnitude of the
Defendants' fraud supports a strong inference of scienter. The
Plaintiffs point to no evidence by affidavit or otherwise that a
particular deficiency was so obvious that the Defendants must have
known. Instead, the Plaintiffs only cite to the consequences of the
internal control deficiencies, not to signs that should have
alerted the Defendants to their presence. For example, the
Plaintiffs highlight that the Defendants experienced the worst
conversion rate of any quarter in recent memory, due at least in
part to the Company's assessment of its controls. They also note
the Company's nearly 50% drop in stock price following disclosure
of the fraud and the massive reallocation of staff resources needed
to address the deficiencies. But these facts are insufficient to
show that the internal control weaknesses were "so obvious that
[Defendants] must have been aware" of them when they performed
their review. Moreover, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts setting
forth the magnitude of the actual errors, and they consequently
fail to support their allegation that the internal control
deficiencies were so pervasive that the officers could not have
missed them during a review.

The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint also lacks any allegations of red
flags that would have alerted the Defendants to the internal
control issues.

In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the core operations
doctrine, Defendants' SOX Certifications, Deloitte's investigation,
and individual Defendants' motive all support a strong inference of
scienter. The Court will address each in turn.

The Core Operations Doctrine

The core operations doctrine provides that a plaintiff may be able
to allege a strong inference of scienter by alleging that a
defendant made misstatements concerning the `core matters' of
central importance to a company. However, the doctrine does not
support a finding of scienter absent some additional allegation of
specific information conveyed to management and related to the
fraud. For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs have failed to
allege facts upon which the Court can conclude, for the purposes of
this Motion to Dismiss, that Defendants knew their statements were
false.

SOX Certifications

Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, principal executive and financial
officers of public companies must make a number of certifications
about their financials. Specifically, officers must certify the
general truthfulness of the company's quarterly and annual reports
and the establishment and adequacy of the company's internal
controls. However, an allegation that a defendant signed a SOX
certification attesting to the accuracy of an SEC filing that
turned out to be materially false does not add to the scienter
puzzle in the absence of any allegation that the defendant knew he
was signing a false SEC filing or recklessly disregarded
inaccuracies contained in an SEC filing. Again, for the reasons
expressed above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support
the conclusion that Defendants knew the information in the SOX
Certifications was false.

Deloitte's Investigation

The Plaintiffs allege that Deloitte's opinion expressed in the
original 2016 10-K supports a strong inference of scienter.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants furnished false or
misleading information to Deloitte in connection with the
certification of the Company's internal controls because otherwise
Deloitte would have discovered the insufficiencies during its
audit. But Plaintiffs allege no particularized facts in support of
this conclusory allegation.

Without particularized allegations to support Plaintiffs' argument
that Defendants intentionally withheld information from Deloitte,
the Court rejects Plaintiffs' contention that the unqualified
opinion supports an inference of scienter. This allegation is far
too speculative. Without more, the Court finds more compelling the
opposing non-culpable inferences that Defendants either: (1)
disclosed all relevant information to Deloitte and that Deloitte
did not detect the internal control deficiencies or (2)
unintentionally withheld information about the internal control
deficiencies because Defendants were not yet aware of the material
weaknesses.

Individual Defendants' Motive

The Plaintiffs acknowledge that motive is not dispositive in the
scienter calculus. They argue that, together with all of the other
indicia of scienter explained above, the Individual Defendants'
desire to increase their compensation, including through
artificially inflating the value of the company's stock, is
indicative of scienter. However, motives that are generally
possessed by most corporate directors and officers do not suffice.
Plaintiffs must instead assert a concrete and personal benefit to
the individual defendants resulting from the instant fraud
allegations. The motive Plaintiffs proffer inflating stock prices
for personal financial gain amounts to nothing more than general
motives to aid the company. Accordingly, the Court rejects
Plaintiffs' argument that the Individual Defendants' motive
supports a strong inference of scienter.

Collective Scienter

Under the doctrine of collective scienter, a plaintiff can plead an
inference of scienter against a corporate defendant without raising
the same inferences required to attribute scienter to an individual
defendant. The Third Circuit has neither accepted nor rejected this
doctrine.

Assuming the doctrine's applicability in this district, Plaintiffs'
argument still fails.

To allege collective scienter, the pleaded facts must create a
strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the
corporation acted with the requisite scienter. Defendants repeat
the same arguments discussed above in urging the Court to apply the
doctrine of collective scienter. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants represented that they had engaged in a
comprehensive effort to review, evaluate, and improve the Company's
controls while making numerous contemporaneous misrepresentations
regarding the internal control review. These allegations fail to
support the application of collective scienter for the same reasons
discussed above. The more compelling inference is that the
contemporaneous misrepresentations" resulted from mere corporate
mismanagement or negligence.

Failure to Plead a Strong Inference of Scienter

The Plaintiffs set forth two potential theories of liability: (1)
that Defendants lied about the performance or the depth of their
internal control review; or (2) that Defendants performed the
review and, based on the magnitude of the material weaknesses, must
have been aware of the internal control deficiencies. As pled here,
both theories are too speculative to support a strong inference of
scienter. Plaintiffs fail to allege any particularized facts to
support the conclusions that they lied about the review, that the
pervasiveness of the internal control deficiencies was so great
that Defendants could not have missed them, or that Plaintiffs were
apprised of and ignored red flags that would have alerted them to
the issues.

The additional arguments Plaintiffs advance in support of scienter
GAAP violations, the Core Operations Doctrine, SOX Certifications,
Deloitte's unqualified opinion, and collective scienter all require
Plaintiffs to allege additional facts to demonstrate Defendants'
knowledge of the fraud. Plaintiffs have failed to do so. Plaintiffs
also argue that Defendants' motives support a strong inference of
scienter, but they fail to plead anything beyond general motives to
aid the company. In sum, none of Plaintiffs' arguments are
individually or collectively sufficient to support a strong
inference of scienter.

Count Two - Control Person Claim Against the Individual Defendants
under Section 20(a)

Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates a
cause of action against individuals who exercise control over a
controlled person, including a corporation, that has committed a
violation of Section 10(b). 15 U.S.C. Section 78t(a). Accordingly,
liability under Section 20(a) is derivative of an underlying
violation of Section 10(b) by the controlled person. Because
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for violation of Section
10(b) against Defendants, Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim against
the Individual Defendants necessarily fails. Count Two is
dismissed.

The Motion to Dismiss, is granted and the Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7vphwls from Leagle.com.

Anthony Pipitone, Lead Plaintiff, represented by KEITH ROBERT
LORENZE -- klorenze@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM PA &
LAURENCE M. ROSEN -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com --  THE ROSEN LAW FIRM,
PA.

Donald B. Cork, Lead Plaintiff, represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & KEITH
ROBERT LORENZE , THE ROSEN LAW FIRM PA.

Electronics For Imaging, Inc., Guy Gecht & Marc Olin, Defendants,
represented by RYAN M. CHABOT -- ryan.chabot@wilmerhale.com --
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP & STEVEN WILLIAM SHULDMAN
-- STEVEN.SHULDMAN@WILMERHALE.COM -- WILMERHALE LLP.


INVESTORS BANCORP: Removed Discrimination Case to D. New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------
Investors Bancorp. Inc. removed a case, ANITRA PARIS, the
Plaintiff, vs. INVESTORS BANKCORP, INC. d/b/a INVESTORS BANK and
JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, Docket No. ESX-OOOI 06-19 (filed Jan. 4,
2019) from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, to the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on Feb. 11,
2019. The District of New Jersey Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-05340 to the proceeding.

The complaint filed by plaintiff alleges claims for violation of
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. She seeks an award for
compensatory damages, as well as interest, punitive damages, cost
of suit, attorneys' fees, and enhanced attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiff asks the Court to order the Defendants to cease and
desist all conduct inconsistent with the claims made going forward,
both as to the specific plaintiff and as to all other individuals
similarly situated.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Alan I. Model, Esq.
          Lindsay Sorin, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          One Newark Center, 8th Floor
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: 973 848 4700

JP MORGAN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss T. Golden's Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District New
York issued a Memorandum Decision denying Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned In re: TASHANNA B. GOLDEN, fka
TASHANNA B PEARSON, Chapter 7, Debtor. TASHANNA B. GOLDEN,
Plaintiff, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE TRUST,
FIRSTMARK SERVICES, GOLDEN TREE ASSET MANAGEMENT LP, GS2 2016-A
(GS2), NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-3, NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-4, PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION
ASSISTANCE AGENCY D/B/A/ AMERICAN EDUCATION SERVICES, Defendants.
Case No. 16-40809-ess, Adv. Pro. No. 17-01005-ess. (E.D.N.Y.).

Tashanna Golden, fka Tashanna B. Pearson, filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, together with her
bankruptcy schedules and statements. Ms. Golden filed a motion to
reopen her bankruptcy case to obtain a determination of the
dischargeability of certain of her student loans the Court entered
an order reopening the case.

Ms. Golden commenced this adversary proceeding by filing a
complaint against JP Morgan Chase Bank, Firstmark Services,
GoldenTree Asset, and National Collegiate Trust. She seeks a
determination that certain debts that she incurred as a student are
not nondischargeable student loan debts under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(B), and an award of damages, including attorneys'
fees and costs, for the Defendants' willful violations of the
bankruptcy discharge injunction.

On October 17, 2017, Ms. Golden filed an Amended Complaint to add
class action allegations and additional defendants.  And on
November 2, 2017, Ms. Golden voluntarily dismissed defendant
GoldenTree Asset Management from this action.

PHEAA's Arguments in Support of Dismissal

PHEAA relies on Bankruptcy Code Sections 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) and
523(a)(8)(B), among other grounds, in support of its arguments for
dismissal. It argues that Ms. Golden's Tuition Answer Loans are
exempted from discharge under Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) as funds
received as an educational benefit and Section 523(a)(8)(B) as
qualified education loans, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

PHEAA argues that Ms. Golden utterly fails to plead any claims
against PHEA. It urges that the Amended Complaint is deficient for
two principal reasons. First, PHEAA argues that applying the
pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Ms. Golden
fails to allege any plausible facts to support any claims against
PHEAA with respect to whether the loan allegedly serviced by PHEAA
has been discharged. Second, PHEAA argues that the loan for which
it is allegedly responsible for as a servicer is a nondischargeable
loan, because it is either a qualified education loan or education
benefit that is exempted from discharge under Section 523(a)(8).

PHEAA also argues that the Amended Complaint does not allege
adequately plausible facts against PHEAA to sustain a claim for
relief, and that instead, Ms. Golden makes group allegations
against all defendants, without specific reference to PHEAA. It
argues that because she names multiple defendants in her pleading,
Ms. Golden is required to indicate clearly the defendants against
whom relief is sought and the basis upon which the relief is sought
against the particular defendants. And PHEAA asserts that in the
Amended Complaint, Ms. Golden does not make any specific
allegations against PHEAA as a lender in the context of her request
for a declaratory judgment.

Firstmark's Arguments in Support of Dismissal

Firstmark relies generally on the terms of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 and Bankruptcy Code Section 523, among other grounds,
in support of its request to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Firstmark argues that the Amended Complaint does not provide
Firstmark with the basic information needed to investigate or
respond to Ms. Golden's claims, as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a). It argues that Ms. Golden makes certain
conclusory allegations, but does not allege that Firstmark
originated or serviced any of the loans at issue in this action.
Firstmark also asserts that Ms. Golden fails to adequately identify
the underlying loans and that it cannot ascertain which of the many
student loans listed in Schedule F of Ms. Golden's bankruptcy
petition constitutes the so-called Citibank Loan, which,
apparently, is the only loan in this action that implicates
Firstmark. And Firstmark states that while Ms. Golden's Schedule F
lists two student loans owed to Fm/Slfv Tru and lists Firstmark's
address in connection with both, but she leaves Firstmark to guess
which one, if either, is the mysterious Citibank Loan.

Firstmark also argues that Ms. Golden's characterization of her
student loans as direct-to-consumer loans is not accurate, and
points out that her loan documents include language specifying that
Ms. Golden's loan proceeds would be disbursed directly to her
school. Firstmark also argues that while Ms. Golden states that one
of the loans at issue is the Citibank Loan, according to its
records, Citibank never originated a loan to Ms. Golden in the
amount of $9,348. However, Firstmark's records only reflect one
loan from 2007. That loan is identified in Firstmark's system by
the number 1218101. Firstmark must now assume that loan number
1218101 is the Citibank Loan.

The Trusts' Arguments in Support of Dismissal

The Trusts rely on Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i), and the
pleading standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a),
12(b)(6), and 9(b), among other grounds, in support of their
arguments that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

The Trusts argue that the Amended Complaint does not meet the
pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). They
state that Ms. Golden does not adequately identify the loans at
issue, and does not adequately connect those loans to the Trusts.
They argue that after individually defining the Trust Defendants in
the Amended Complaint's opening paragraph, Ms. Golden never makes
another allegation that references the Trust Defendants or connects
any loan at issue to a specific trust. The Trusts argue that Ms.
Golden proceeds as if there are connections between the Loans and
the Trust Defendants, but she never sets forth any plausible
allegations that actually tie any of the Loans to any of the Trust
Defendants. For these reasons, the Trusts argue that Ms. Golden
does not allege plausible allegations of a claim against the
Trusts.  

The Trusts also argue that Ms. Golden fails plausibly to allege
that the loans at issue here were covered by the Discharge Order,
that the Trusts collected on the loans, or that a violation of the
Discharge Order actually occurred. They claim that Ms. Golden makes
conclusory assertions that do not even address, much less explain
away, the numerous deficiencies in the Amended Complaint. And they
state that while they stipulated to be substituted in as a party in
this adversary proceeding, the fact that the Trust Defendants may,
as Ms. Golden argues, have stipulated that they held loans made to
Ms. Golden does not mean that they held the Loans at issue in the
lawsuit it is simply impossible to tell which loans on the Schedule
F are the Loans at issue here.

Ms. Golden's Opposition

Ms. Golden opposes the dismissal of her Amended Complaint, and on
January 8, 2018, she filed a combined memorandum of law in
opposition to each Motion to Dismiss, addressing the arguments made
both to dismiss the Amended Complaint and to compel arbitration of
her claims.

Ms. Golden responds that the Defendants have not shown that she
does not state plausible claims for relief. She argues that
although Defendants have done their utmost to obfuscate the
contents of the Amended Complaint, Defendants know what two loans
are at issue in this proceeding and what they are alleged to have
done. She states that the first loan at issue is the NCT Loan,
which was originated by Bank One, N.A. on September 26, 2006, in
the amount of $7,103 and thereafter was transferred to either
Defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3 or 2006-4
or both.

She notes that those entities were subsequently substituted as
defendants in this action by in place of National Collegiate Trust,
by stipulation of the parties that was so-ordered by the Court. Ms.
Golden argues that PHEAA services the NCT Loan. And Ms. Golden
states that the second loan at issue is the Citibank Loan, which
was originated by Citibank in 2007, in the amount of $9,348, and is
now owned by Defendant Goal Structured Solutions Trust 2016-A, sued
as GS2 2016-A Trust.

Ms. Golden also responds that the Amended Complaint clearly alleges
what conduct the Defendants committed. Ms. Golden asserts that the
Amended Complaint clearly alleges that the loans at issue were in
excess of the cost of attendance at the University of Pennsylvania,
and therefore are not nondischargeable loans under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(B). She points to allegations in the Amended
Complaint that Defendants, lenders and servicers of the two subject
loans have nonetheless continued to collect on the loans and have
demanded payment from her, as they have from other class members.
And she notes that the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants
were aware that these loans were not exempted by Section 523(a)(8)
and were therefore discharged, but they continued to collect on
them after discharge.

The Applicable Legal Standards

The Pleading Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

The Supreme Court set forth a two-step approach for courts to
follow when deciding a motion to dismiss. First, a court should
identify pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Second, when there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. A claim is plausible when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

The Pleading Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to seek
dismissal of a claim at the pleading stage if it does not state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. In Twombly, the Supreme
Court held that for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570.  

The Pleading Requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as incorporated by Bankruptcy
Rule 7009(b), adopts a special pleading standard with respect to
allegations of fraud.

To allege a claim for fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind
may be alleged generally. A fraud claim must additionally express
and spell out with reasonable clarity the specific factual
misconduct relied on not encased in a thicket of words or
legalistic concepts  and should express the basis for the assertion
of such charges.

The Categories of Nondischargeable Debt Under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8) outlines several categories of
student debt that may be excluded from discharge. It states that a
debtor is not discharged from any debt that constitutes:

(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution
or(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship or stipend or(B) any other educational loan
that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is
an individual.

The Elements of a Discharge Injunction Violation Claim

Bankruptcy Code Section 524 describes the effect of a discharge. It
states that a bankruptcy discharge operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the
employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any
such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not
discharge of such debt is waived.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Ms. Golden's First Claim for
Relief Should Be Dismissed

In order to address the question of whether Ms. Golden's First
Claim for Relief states a plausible claim, the Court first
considers the question whether the allegations of the Amended
Complaint set forth a plausible basis to conclude that the
threshold requirements for a declaratory judgment are met. Next,
the Court considers whether the Defendants have shown that
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excludes Ms. Golden's
Tuition Answer Loans from discharge as a matter of law. Then, the
Court considers whether the Defendants have shown that Bankruptcy
Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(i) applies to exclude one of those loans,
the NCT Loan, from discharge as a matter of law. And finally, the
Court considers whether, under the standards set forth in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(6), and 9(b), the Amended
Complaint states each of the elements of a plausible claim for
relief.

Whether the Threshold Requirements for a Declaratory Judgment Are
Met

According to the Second Circuit, a declaratory judgment action
presents an actual controversy if the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.

Here, it is plain from the Amended Complaint that Ms. Golden has
alleged a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of relief. At the outset, the dispute is substantial. The
Amended Complaint states that the Defendants knowingly undertook
collection efforts on debts that she alleges come within the
Discharge Order entered in her bankruptcy case. Ms. Golden alleges
that she has been damaged, in a tangible way, by those efforts. And
she alleges that the Defendants' collection efforts violated this
Court's Discharge Order, warranting a finding of civil contempt.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint show that the parties have
adverse legal interests, in light of these claims. It is in Ms.
Golden's interests that her Tuition Answer Loans be discharged
under the applicable bankruptcy law, and it is in the Defendants'
interests that this Court reach the opposite conclusion. It is also
in Ms. Golden's interests that her allegations of contempt be
sustained, and just as much, in the Defendants' interests that they
be rejected.

The Court concludes that the threshold requirements for a
declaratory judgment claim are met.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(A)(ii) Applies To Exclude the Loans at Issue from
Discharge as a Matter of Law

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts from discharge any
obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend. But Section 523(a)(8) does not define
student loans. Nor does it define educational benefit. Rather, it
describes certain categories of debt that are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy unless the debtor establishes that excepting the debt
from discharge would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his
or her family, and those descriptions are particular and detailed.

In this light, the text of Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) merits
attention. It describes funds received as an educational benefit.
This would be an unconventional way to discuss a loan. And the
neighboring terms to benefit are scholarship or stipend. These,
plainly, do not describe a loan. The prior and following
subsections refer to loan made, educational loan and qualified
education loan. That is, the term loan was part of the drafting
process of Section 523(a)(8), and it seems reasonable to assume
that if Congress intended this subsection to include loans, it
would have said so.

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), both by its terms and
read in context, does not sweep in all education-related debt, or
all loans that support a student's efforts to gain the benefits of
an education. If this Section had the breadth for which the
Defendants advocate, it is hard to see where it would end
conceivably, it could encompass credit card debt that was incurred
to purchase textbooks, personal loans that were used to pay for
tuition and school fees, and any other debt that, in one way or
another, facilitated a student's efforts to gain the benefits of an
education. And plainly, this is not what Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)
encompasses, or what the Bankruptcy Code permits, or what Congress
intended.

Here, a review of the Amended Complaint shows that Ms. Golden
alleges that she borrowed an additional $7,103 on September 28,
2006 in private loans from National Collegiate Trust and that this
loan was originated in excess of the published cost of attendance'
and was not a qualified education loan under section 523(a)(8)(B).
She also alleges that the NCT Loan was not `made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit' or made under a program funded
in whole or in part by a non-profit.

In addition, more is required to satisfy the requirements of
Section 523(a)(8) than a statement in a loan document that either
or both of certain exceptions from discharge may apply. If that
language alone were sufficient, then it is hard to see what role
would be left for Congress or the courts in drafting, interpreting,
and applying these sections of the Bankruptcy Code. At the most,
the Trusts have identified a disputed issue of fact that is not
ripe for resolution at this stage of these proceedings.

The Court concludes that the Defendants have not established that
these claims are implausible on these grounds.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that the Amended Complaint Does
Not State a Plausible Claim that the Loans at Issue Are Outside the
Scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(B)
The Defendants urge that the Amended Complaint falls short of the
pleading standards required by the Federal Rules because, in
substance, it does not establish a plausible basis to conclude that
Ms. Golden's Tuition Answer Loans are outside the scope of the
nondischargeability provisions of Section 523(a)(8)(B). They also
argue, in substance, that the Amended Complaint falls short of
these standards because it does not give each Defendant notice as
to what loans are at issue, what each of their individual roles was
in connection with the loan, or what activities they each
individually undertook to violate the discharge injunction. PHEAA
states that the Amended Complaint names multiple defendants, but
does not indicate clearly the defendants against whom relief is
sought and the basis upon which the relief is sought against the
particular defendants.

And Firstmark asserts that it is left to guess which loan is at
issue. To similar effect, the Trusts note that it is simply
impossible to tell which loans on the Schedule F are the Loans at
issue her.

Ms. Golden responds that the Amended Complaint sets forth a
plausible claim that the loans at issue do not come within the
nondischargeability provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(B). The Amended Complaint states that qualified education
loans are defined by Internal Revenue Code Section 221(d)(1) as
debts incurred by eligible students, at eligible institutions, for
eligible expenses. In turn, a qualified higher education expense'
is one that issued to pay for the cost of attendance at a qualified
educational institution. She argues that the Amended Complaint sets
forth allegations sufficient to show that her Tuition Answer Loans
were for amounts that clearly exceeded the stated cost of
attendance at the University of Pennsylvania, and for those
reasons, her loans are not qualified education loans. And she
points to allegations in the Amended Complaint that show that these
loans lack the traditional characteristics of educational loans
because they were made under Defendants' direct-to-consumer lending
programs and were not conducted through the financial aid offices
of eligible schools. Ms. Golden's loans were not limited as to the
amount of money that could be lent above and beyond the published
cost of attendance and were assigned an adjustable interest rate at
the time of origination, the same as any commercial loan.

Here, a review of the Amended Complaint shows that Ms. Golden
alleges that she attended the University of Pennsylvania during the
2006-07 and 2007-08 academic years. She also alleges that in each
of those years, she received scholarship funds and borrowed
significant sums in loans from the federal government. And she
alleges that she borrowed additional sums in the form of private
Tuition Answer Loans, the NCT Loan and the Citibank Loan, which are
the loans at issue here.

A review of the Amended Complaint also shows that Ms. Golden
alleges that during the 2006-07 academic year, in light of her
federal student loans, scholarships, and grants, the NCT Loan was
originated in excess of the published cost of attendance and for
that reason, was not a qualified education loan under section
523(a)(8)(B). And she claims that the NCT Loan was not made,
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit' or made under a
'program funded in whole or party by' a non-profit and thus was not
non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(8)(A)(i).

And Ms. Golden alleges that during the 2007-08 academic year, at
the time the Citibank Loan was originated, she already had exceeded
the Cost of Attendance in loans and scholarship/grants. As a
result, she alleges, the Citibank Loan was originated in excess of
the published cost of attendance' and [was] not [a] qualified
education loan[] as that term is defined in section 523(a)(8)(B).

For these reasons, based on the allegations of the Amended
Complaint, accepting all of the factual allegations as true, and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Ms. Golden's favor, the Court
finds that the Defendants have not shown that Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(B) applies to exclude the loans at issue from the
scope of the Discharge Order as a matter of law.

The Motions to Dismiss the First Claim for Relief are denied.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Ms. Golden's Second Claim
for Relief Should Be Dismissed

Ms. Golden's second claim for relief seeks an award of damages and
attorneys' fees and costs for the Defendants' willful violations of
the discharge injunction pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 524
and 105.  

Bankruptcy Code Section 524(a)(2) states that a discharge in a case
under this title operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act,
to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability
of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.

The Defendants argue that Ms. Golden's claim that they violated the
Discharge Order should be dismissed for several reasons, including
for the same reason that her first claim for relief should be
dismissed  namely, that her Tuition Answer Loans were not
discharged in her bankruptcy case. The Defendants also argue that
Ms. Golden can recover damages for discharge injunction violations
only through a claim for contempt of court, not the claim that she
has brought here.

And the Defendants argue that for a contempt claim to lie, the
order at issue must be clear and unambiguous, and here, the
Discharge Order is not. For these reasons, the Defendants argue
that Ms. Golden's allegations cannot support a claim for what
amount to contempt sanctions against the Defendants.

Ms. Golden responds that the argument that there is no private
right of action to address a discharge violation through an
adversary proceeding is a red herring. Additionally, she states
that the Defendants argue that the Court's Discharge Order is too
vague to support a contempt finding, but if the Defendants are
correct in this assertion, then there could never be a contempt of
a discharge order because every discharge order is vague.

Ms. Golden also responds that bankruptcy courts have the power to
enforce discharge injunctions through adversary proceedings such as
this. She argues that there is no question that bankruptcy courts
have the power to enforce discharge injunctions regardless of any
specified private right of action and there is no question that
this is a proper action to address the alleged discharge injunction
violations. And she states that the argument that the Court's
Discharge Order is too vague to support a contempt finding is
simply incorrect and would, in substance, strip the Court's power
to enforce its own discharge orders. She also responds that the
Defendants knew that her Tuition Answer Loans would be discharged,
as indicated by, among other things, their statements to
investors.

Here, the record shows that Ms. Golden alleges that she received a
discharge. In particular, the Amended Complaint states that on
February 29, 2016, Ms. Golden filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and
properly listed on Schedule F certain 'student loans' owed. The
Amended Complaint also states that on or about August 3, 2016, this
Court issued a discharge order in Golden's bankruptcy proceeding
and that the Debts were discharged pursuant to the Discharge Order
entered by this Court on August 3, 2016 because they were unsecured
consumer loans and not non-dischargeable student loans under
section 523(a)(8). And as the Court has already concluded, Ms.
Golden has described facts that establish a plausible basis to
conclude that her Tuition Answer Loans are not excluded from
discharge by operation of Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8).

In sum, and as with Ms. Golden's first claim for relief, the
question posed by these motions is whether Ms. Golden has stated a
plausible claim that the Defendants violated the Discharge Order
entered in her case. And here again, at this stage in these
proceedings, the Court concludes that the Defendants have not
established that this claim is implausible. For these reasons, the
Motions to Dismiss the Second Claim for Relief are denied.

The Court finds that the Defendants have not shown that the
Plaintiff, Tashanna Golden, has not stated plausible claims for
relief. The Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are denied.

A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's January 31, 2018
Memorandum Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydyyt5rl
from Leagle.com.

Tashanna B Golden, Plaintiff, represented by Jason W. Burge --
jburge@fishmanhaygood.com -- Fishman Haygood, LLP, George F.
Carpinello, Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP, 30 South Pearl Street,
11th Floor, Albany, NY 12207, Kathryn J. Johnson --
kjohnson@fishmanhaygood.com -- Fishman Haygood, LLP, Adam Shaw,
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, 30 South Pearl Street, 11th Floor,
Albany, NY 12207, Austin C. Smith -- austin@acsmithlawgroup.com --
Smith Law Group, Lynn E. Swanson -- lswanson@jonesswanson.com --
Jones, Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC & Robert C. Tietjen, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, 30 South Pearl Street, 11th Floor, Albany, NY
12207.

National Collegiate Trust, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey J.
Peters -- gpeters@weltman.com -- Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co LPA.

Firstmark Services, Defendant, represented by Charles F. Kaplan --
ckaplan@perrylawfirm.com -- Perry Guthery Haase & Gessford PC &
Barbara L. Seniawski, The Seniawski Law Firm PLLC, 1460 Broadway Fl
4, New York, NY, 10036-7328


KELLOGG SALES: Watson Alleges Mislabeling of Graham Crackers
------------------------------------------------------------
Wanda Watson individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Kellogg Sales Company, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01356 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant's representation of its Keebler brand of graham crackers
is misleading, false, deceptive and unfair because it creates an
erroneous impression that graham flour is the predominant or
exclusive flour component, as opposed to white flour. This is
because the predominant flour in the Products is refined, white
flour -- enriched flour --  indicated on the ingredient list below
for the honey variety though the proportion of graham flour to
non-graham flour is consistent across the varieties.

Consumers increasingly seek food with more whole grains, because of
its health benefits and association with lower risk of several
diseases and conditions, which are not attributes connected with
white flour. Graham flour is type of whole wheat flour and is a
coarse-ground, "unbolted" flour, made from the whole grain --
endosperm, germ, and bran. Enriched flour -- known as white flour
or flour -- is made from refined grains that only containing the
endosperm. It is reasonable for consumers to expect the Products to
contain more graham (whole wheat) flour than non-graham flour
because the products are named "graham(s) crackers." Through
"graham(s)" preceding and modifying "crackers," it tells a
reasonable consumer what kind of cracker they are getting.

Consumers expect foods to have common or usual names which contain
simple and direct terms to indicate its basic nature and
characterizing properties or ingredients. When the proportion or
amount of a component has a material bearing on price or consumer
acceptance, it is deceptive and misleading for the representations
to create the erroneous impression that a valued component is
present in an amount greater than is actually the case. The
Defendant obtained benefits and monies because the Products were
not as represented and expected, to the detriment and
impoverishment of the Plaintiff and class members, who seek
restitution and disgorgement of inequitably obtained profits, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          Spencer Sheehan
          505 Northern Blvd., Ste. 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1 Penn Plaza, Suite 2527
          New York, NY 10119

LAZ PARKING: Barone's Bid to Certify Asst. Managers Class Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert A. Richardson grants the motion for
conditional class certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act
filed by Plaintiff Anthony Barone and Opt-In Plaintiff Benjamin
Lhota in the lawsuit titled ANTHONY BARONE, on behalf of, Himself
and all others Similarly situated v. LAZ PARKING LTD, LLC, Case No.
3:17-cv-01545-VLB (D. Conn.).

The Plaintiff brings the lawsuit on behalf of all persons employed
by the Defendant as Assistant Managers since Sept. 13, 2014.  The
Plaintiff seeks alleged unpaid overtime wages on behalf of current
and former employees working at LAZ Parking in similar but
differently titled, salary paid assistant manager positions.

Judge Richardson also grants the Plaintiffs' motion for notice,
subject to the modifications set forth in the Order.

The Defendant shall disclose to the Plaintiff the names and contact
information for potential FLSA opt-in plaintiffs within 21 days.
The notice period -- that is, the period during which individuals
may "opt in" the FLSA collective action -- shall begin on March 4,
2019, and conclude on May 6, 2019.[CC]


LOGITECH INC: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned ED SHAPIRO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LOGITECH, INC., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 17-00673 (FLW) (TJB). (D.N.J.).

Pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion to strike and/or
dismiss the Plaintiff's nationwide class allegations under
California law because his California consumer fraud claims are not
viable, as New Jersey law applies.  

Plaintiff Ed Shapiro brought this putative nationwide, except
California consumers class action, alleging, inter alia, consumer
fraud, breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment arising from the
purchase of a self-installed and operated digital home video
surveillance system known as the Alert System, manufactured and
sold by Defendant Logitech, Inc.

The Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, courts accept all factual allegations as true, construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. Under this standard, the
factual allegations set forth in a complaint must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.

Choice of Law

The Defendant also moves to dismiss on choice of law grounds. As a
federal court sitting in diversity, the Court applies the
choice-of-law rules of New Jersey to determine the controlling law.
New Jersey has adopted the most significant relationship test set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  The first
step is to determine whether an actual conflict exists. That is
done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable laws
to determine whether there is a distinction' between them. If there
is not an actual conflict, the inquiry is over. If, however, an
actual conflict is found to exist, the inquiry proceeds to the
second step, in which the court must determine which jurisdiction
has the `most significant relationship' to the claim.

Actual Conflict Between NJCFA and Califorinia's Consumer Protection
Laws

With regard to the first prong of the analysis, rather than
examining the substance of the potentially applicable laws,
Plaintiff argues that the record is still too incomplete to
consider the threshold inquiry of whether an actual conflict of
laws exists. However, Plaintiff has not shown how factual
development of the record would impact the choice of law analysis
vis-a-vis a conflict between New Jersey and California laws.
Rather, in looking at the substance of the NJCFA and the CLRA and
UCL, courts in this District have recognized that the NJCFA
materially conflicts with the consumer protection statutes of
California, the CLRA and UCL.

Indeed, the NJCFA requires the Plaintiffs to prove three elements:
1) unlawful conduct by defendant 2) an ascertainable loss by
plaintiff and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct
and the ascertainable loss. In place of the traditional reliance
element of fraud and misrepresentation, the act requires that
plaintiffs demonstrate that they have sustained an ascertainable
loss. By contrast, both the UCL and CLRA require a showing of
actual reliance to satisfy the standing requirement of section
17204 of the UCL and actual reliance must be established for an
award of damages under the CLRA, Therefore, as the substance of the
laws conflict, the Court proceeds to the second step of the
analysis.  

Most Significant Relationship Test

Under the second step of the analysis, this Court must determine
which state has the most significant relationship to the claim at
issue by weighing the factors set forth in the Restatement section
that corresponds to Plaintiff's cause of action.  Because Plaintiff
asserts claims sounding in fraud or misrepresentation, the Court
applies the conflict of laws analysis of Section 148. Here, as
Plaintiff alleges the misrepresentations were not made and received
in the same state, the proper choice of law analysis involves
Section 148(2) of the Restatement, which uses six factors to
determine the state with the most significant relationship to the
case:

   (a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the defendant's representations;

   (b) the place where the plaintiff received the representations;

   (c) the place where the defendant made the representations;

   (d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties;

   (e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the
transaction between the parties was situated at the time; and

   (f) the place where the plaintiff is to render performance under
a contract which he has been induced to enter by the false
representations of the defendant.

There is no dispute that at least three of the six factors favor
application of New Jersey law. As to factors (a) and (b) the place
where Plaintiff acted in reliance upon Defendant's representations,
and the place where Plaintiff received the representations the SAC
is clear that Plaintiff resides in New Jersey, purchased the Alert
System in New Jersey, suffered damages in New Jersey, and, while
there, prior to purchase, he viewed Logitech's marketing materials
for Logitech Alert Systems and relied on Logitech's deceptive
marketing.  

Factor (d), the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties also weighs in
favor of New Jersey, as in cases of pecuniary loss the domicil,
residence and place of business of the plaintiff are more important
than are similar contacts on the part of the defendant' because
financial loss will usually be of greatest concern to the state
with which the person suffering the loss has the closest
relationship. Factor (e) is inconclusive and (f), which only is
relevant in contract actions, is inapplicable to Plaintiff's
claims.

Thus, the only remaining factor that points in favor of application
of California law is factor (c), the place where defendant made the
representations. But, although it is undisputed that Logitech is a
California company or that the allegedly misleading statements
emanated from its marketing department in California, the case law
is clear that this single contact factor (c) does not warrant
applying California law. Maniscalco, 709 F.3d at 209. In
Maniscalco, the named plaintiff, a South Carolina resident, brought
a putative class action against defendant Brother International
Corp. for failing to disclose certain design defects with respect
to some of the company's printers. The plaintiff claimed that
defendant's wrongful conduct violated the NJCFA.

The Third Circuit affirmed my finding on summary judgment that the
factors weighed in favor of applying the law of plaintiff's home
state, i.e.,South Carolina, and not New Jersey, the state where the
defendant was headquartered, because South Carolina had the most
significant relationship with the litigation.  

Therefore, New Jersey, not California, has the most significant
relationship to Plaintiff's claims, and accordingly, all nationwide
claims under California law are dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendant's partial motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9hulm4q from Leagle.com.

EDWARD SHAPIRO, individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by WILLIAM J. PINILIS --
wpinilis@consumerfraudlawyer.com -- PINILIS HALPERN.

LOGITECH, INC., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL J. O'MALLEY --
michael.o'malley@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman
& Dicker LLP & SUNA LEE -- suna.lee@wilsonelser.com -- WILSON,
ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP.


LOGITECH: Judge Refuses to Stay False Advertising Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that how can federal
judges best protect the interests of class members who may not even
know their rights are at stake? And can they look out for absent
class members without compromising defendants' rights and federal
policies encouraging settlements?

An important policy debate about those questions heated up, when
U.S. District Judge William Alsup of San Francisco refused to stay
a consumer class action accusing the computer peripherals company
Logitech of falsely advertising the number of drivers in certain of
its speakers. Logitech and the plaintiffs' lawyers who filed the
class action want to settle. But Judge Judge Alsup, as you may
recall, has a standing order barring prospective class counsel from
entering settlement negotiations with defendants until he has
certified a class. Absent extraordinary circumstance, the judge
won't appoint class counsel or entertain settlement proposals until
he has determined the class is warranted.

Want more On the Case? Listen to the On the Case podcast.

Logitech contends Judge Alsup has erected litigation roadblocks
that not only violate the First Amendment by imposing a prior
restraint on speech but also contravene the federal court system's
rules encouraging settlement. Its lawyers at Mayer Brown filed a
mandamus petition at the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that
challenges Judge Alsup's rule on both constitutional and policy
grounds. Logitech asked the judge to delay discovery until the 9th
Circuit rules on its mandamus petition. Judge Alsup, in a terse
order issued on Jan. 26, refused.

If this sounds vaguely familiar, that's because Logitech previously
filed a similar mandamus petition last fall, as I reported at the
time. In December, a 9th Circuit panel denied mandamus because
Logitech hadn't raised its constitutional concerns with Judge Alsup
before heading to the appeals court. The panel, however, left open
the door to a renewed challenge after Judge Alsup weighed in.

The ensuing debate in January between Logitech and Judge Alsup,
which culminated in Logitech's new mandamus petition, fleshes out
both the judge's rationale and Logitech's arguments against it.
Given the frequency of class action settlements before class
certification rulings -- and the widespread judicial acquiescence
to such settlements -- it's worth taking a look at why Logitech
believes defendants must be allowed to pursue precertification
negotiations and why Judge Alsup disagrees.

Ms. Frankel previously described Logitech's First Amendment
position: It contends that Judge Alsup's rule is an overly broad
prior restraint on speech that cannot withstand the strict scrutiny
test, which requires such restraints to be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. Logitech also said Judge
Alsup's policy interferes with its right to petition the court for
approval of a proposed settlement. The company's Jan. 8 motion for
reconsideration added policy arguments to its constitutional
concerns.

It pointed to the newly amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which, according to Logitech, expressly recognizes
that parties in class actions may settle cases before classes are
certified. The revised rule governing class actions, Logitech said,
ensures that judges overseeing the cases have two chances to
scrutinize proposed precertification settlements, before granting
preliminary and final approval. Judge Alsup's order effectively
barring such settlements, according to Logitech, conflicts with
Rule 23.

Similarly, according to Logitech's motion, Judge Alsup is out of
sync with his district's procedural guidelines. The Northern
District of California, which updated its class action settlement
guidelines in November and December, specifically anticipates that
class actions settle before class certification proceedings and
offers guidelines for how judges should evaluate such settlements
when they're proposed. Logitech contends Judge Alsup's prohibition
on settlement talks is at odds with districtwide guidance.

The judge answered all of Logitech's contentions in a succinct Jan.
18 opinion denying the motion for reconsideration. First, Alsup
explained why he adopted his rule directing class action plaintiffs
and defendants not to talk about settlement until the class is
certified. Certification, he said, determines which class claims
are valid and imposes a duty on class counsel to pursue them.
Delaying settlement talks, according to Judge Alsup, "avoids the
awkward situation in which counsel waste time on a proposed
settlement of issues that should not be litigated or settled on a
classwide basis. And, it avoids the creation of an artificial
ceiling for the value of a case before we determine which issues
deserve class treatment. It also avoids overbroad releases by
absent class members of claims that should not be released."
Without the leverage of a class certification decision, the judge
said, absent class members may not recover as much as they're
entitled to.

All fair points. But what about the rights of defendants? The judge
said his rule doesn't stop class action defendants from talking to
plaintiffs' lawyers about settling individual claims but simply
delays discussion of settling claims of people who aren't
represented until class counsel is appointed. "To the extent a
limited restriction exists, the interests are overwhelmingly
outweighed by the interest of the court in effectuating orderly
case management and the interests of the absent class members whose
rights are also at risk," the judge said.

Judge Alsup acknowledged that Rule 23 amendments anticipate
precertification settlements, but said that the federal rule calls
for plaintiffs' lawyers to seek appointment as interim class
counsel to negotiate such deals. The judge said his own order also
allows plaintiffs' lawyers to ask to be named interim class
counsel. In fact, the plaintiffs' firm that filed the Logitech
class action, Edelson, made that motion. Alsup said he exercised
his discretion -- as Rule 23 permits -- to deny the motion.
"Whether or not to appoint interim counsel is an issue of
discretion for the district court," the judge wrote. "Logitech
merely disagrees with the exercise of discretion by the district
judge in this case."

Judge Alsup's opinion didn't directly address Logitech's argument
about his district's guidelines but said the 9th Circuit has
emphasized that trial judges must engage in "rigorous analysis" of
class action settlements. To support the point, he cited a 2018
decision, ABS Entertainment v. CBS, in which the appeals court
invalidated a local rule in the Central District of California that
required prospective class action plaintiffs to move for class
certification within 90 days of filing a suit. Class actions
shouldn't be rushed, the judge suggested. "A settlement should be
negotiated only after adequate and reasonable investigation and
discovery by class counsel," Alsup wrote.

Logitech's new mandamus petition, filed on Jan. 25, argues that
Judge Alsup's order produces a "perverse result." The entire court
system, from the Northern District to the U.S. Supreme Court, is
supposed to encourage parties to settle. Judge Alsup's order
barring precertification settlement talks "replaces this speedy and
efficient solution to disputes with additional litigation --
litigation that serves little purpose, given that the parties agree
about the need for class adjudication and the proper scope of class
relief."

For a counterpoint to Logitech's petition, Ms. Frankel talked to
Fordham law professor Howard Erichson, who got star billing in
Judge Alsup's opinion denying Logitech's motion for
reconsideration. Mr. Erichson said Logitech's constitutional
arguments are a diversion. The 9th Circuit, he said, should look at
what Judge Alsup's order accomplishes: It protects prospective
class members from losing their claims before they're even parties
in a case. Logitech argues that "both sides" want to settle and
have roughly agreed on terms but Mr. Erichson said that's a
misframing: Logitech and named plaintiffs may want to settle, but
no one yet has the right to speak for everyone else in the
prospective class.

"These settlements have become so commonplace," Mr. Erichson said.
"We've become blind to what is so outrageous."

The law prof admitted that the Rules Committee that worked for
years on the just-enacted amendments to Rule 23 did not share his
qualms about precertification settlements. I asked whether the
litigation over Judge Alsup's rule might inspire other judges to
adopt similar restrictions on precertification settlements. Is
anyone out there pushing for such prohibitions?

"Besides me?" Mr. Erichson said. "I don't know." [GN]


MAIDEN HOLDINGS: 2013 Earnings Report Misleading, Wigglesworth Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL WIGGLESWORTH, Individually and on Behalf of All Others )
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MAIDEN HOLDINGS, LTD.,
ARTURO M. RASCHBAUM, KAREN L. SCHMITT and JOHN M. MARSHALECK, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05296 (D.N.J., Feb. 11, 2019), is a
securities class action on behalf of all purchasers of Maiden
common stock between March 4, 2014 and November 9, 2018, against
Maiden and certain of the Company's former executive officers.

The lawsuit asserts that the Defendants misrepresented the quality
and nature of Maiden's underwriting and risk management policies
and practices and the risks of its reinsurance portfolio. In
particular, the Defendants misleadingly claimed that they were
subjecting AmTrust's insurance portfolio to robust analysis and
cross-checks to ensure that the Company had appropriately priced
the risk of reinsuring AmTrust's insurance portfolio. In truth, the
Company had failed to employ sufficient underwriting and risk
management protocols and had largely abdicated its responsibility
to ensure that its AmTrust Reinsurance segment priced policies
commensurate with the risk assumed by the Company. These failures
subjected the Company, and investors, to catastrophic losses. As
those losses were realized, the price of Maiden stock declined
precipitously.

The Class Period began on March 4, 2014. On that date, Maiden filed
an annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC for the fiscal fourth
quarter and year ended December 31, 2013. The 2013 10-K contained
materially false and misleading statements of fact and failed to
disclose facts required to be disclosed therein under the rules and
regulations regarding its preparation. For the fourth fiscal
quarter, Maiden reported operating earnings of $23.3 million and
net premiums written of $445.9 million. For 2013, Maiden reported
operating earnings of $87.5 million and net premiums written of
$2.1 billion. During 2013, the Company recorded an estimated net
favorable development on prior year loss reserves of $1.4 million.

The 2013 10-K represented that Maiden employed sophisticated and
dependable risk management processes based on detailed data from
its reinsurance customers in order to appropriately price policies,
set loss and loss adjustment expense ("LAE") reserves and avoid
unexpected adverse developments, which would allow the Company to
provide predictable operating results and shareholder returns. For
example, the 2013 10-K stated that Maiden "specializes in
reinsurance solutions that optimize financing and risk management
by providing coverage within the more predictable and actuarially
credible lower layers of coverage and/or reinsuring risks that are
believed to be lower hazard, more predictable and generally not
susceptible to catastrophe claims."

Similarly, the 2013 10-K stated that Maiden's "Business Strategy"
was its "Dedication to Predictable and Stable Results," which was
purportedly achieved by: "(1) focusing on traditional, lower
volatility lines of business that are more predictable and thus,
produce more stable long-term operating results and require less
capital to achieve those results; and (2) placing emphasis on
working layer and pro rata reinsurance participations where data is
more abundant and results are more predictable." The 2013 10-K also
stated that Maiden's subsidiaries maintained an "efficient
operating platform that target [sic] lines of business and types of
contracts that are more predictable than the market as a whole,
allowing stability of earnings over time," the lawsuit says.

Maiden is a Bermuda-based holding company that provides specialty
reinsurance through its subsidiaries. During the Class Period,
shares of Maiden common stock traded on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market ("NASDAQ") under the ticker symbol "MHLD."[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Donald A. Ecklund, Esq.
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
          Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: 973/994-1700
          Facsimile: 973/994-1744
          E-mail: jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
                   decklund@carellabyrne.com

               - and -

          Samuel H. Rudman, esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: 631 367-7100
          Facsimile: 631 367-1173

               - and -

          Brian E. Cochran, esq.
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619/231-1058
          Facsimile: 619/231-7423

               - and -

          Michael I. Fistel, Jr.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: 470/632-6000
          Fascimile: 770/200-3101

MDL 2879: Kim Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit titled Helen Kim, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, LLC,
the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-10034, was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on
Feb. 12, 2019. The District of Maryland Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 8:19-cv-00358-PWG to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges violation of customers' privacy rights.

The Kim case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re:
Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019. These
actions -- which are putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer
class actions -- share factual issues concerning a
recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest reservation
database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb. 6, 2019 Order, the MDL
Panel found that the factual overlap among these actions is
substantial, as they all arise from the same data breach, and they
all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place reasonable data
protections. Many also allege that Marriott did not timely notify
the public of the data breach. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of
the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead case is
8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]

Attorneys for Marriott Interational, Inc.:

          Daniel R Warren, Esq.
          Gilbert S Keteltas, Esq.
          Lisa M Ghannoum, Esq.
          BAKER AND HOSTETLER LLP
          Key Tower 127 Public Square Ste. 2000
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 861-7145
          Facsimile: (216) 696-0740
          E-mail: dwarren@bakerlaw.com
                  gketeltas@bakerlaw.com
                  lghannoum@bakerlaw.com

MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Court Narrows Claims in Defective Sunroofs Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned GIORGIO ENEA,
Plaintiff, v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No.
18-cv-02792-HSG. (N.D. Cal.)

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA).

Plaintiff Giorgio Enea brings this putative class action against
MBUSA, Daimler AG, and other unnamed defendants alleging that
certain MBUSA vehicles are equipped with defective sunroofs.

The Plaintiff alleges that the MBUSA sunroofs are prone to
spontaneously explode, shatter, or crack. The Plaintiff alleges
that the sunroof in his own Mercedes Benz vehicle shattered while
he was driving, and that he was prevented from working for several
days as a result. The Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants
would not repair the shattered sunroof unless the Plaintiff signed
a release of liability, which Plaintiff refused to do.  

Defect

MBUSA contends that each of Plaintiff's claims fails because
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a design or manufacturing
defect in the MBUSA vehicles. MBUSA cites to a number of district
court cases for the proposition that dismissal is appropriate where
Plaintiff does not include factual allegations that identify what
aspect of the subject component design and manufacture made it
defective.

Here, Plaintiff identifies a single component (the sunroof), and
alleges that that component will spontaneously explode. Given that
the sunroof is a single component of the MBUSA vehicles, and the
alleged defect involves a complete failure of that component,
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged facts sufficient to support a
defect claim.

Breach of Express Warranty

Plaintiff contends that Defendants' vehicles are backed by a New
Vehicle Limited Warranty (Limited Warranty) that covers defects in
material or workmanship for 48-months or 50,000 miles, whichever
comes first. Plaintiff also alleges that the MBUSA vehicles are
covered by various other express warranties, because Defendants
represented and advertised that their automobiles, including
sunroofs, were luxury, top-of-the line cars, built to the highest
standard, and were safe for their intended use.

Coverage

Defendant notes that the Limited Warranty referenced in the
complaint states that glass breakage or scratches are not covered
unless positive physical proof of a manufacturing defect can be
established. Defendant contends that because Plaintiff did not
present such proof when he brought his vehicle in for repairs, the
repairs were not covered by the Limited Warranty.  

The Limited Warranty does not require that positive physical proof
of a manufacturing defect be presented at the time of repair.
Rather, it covers glass breakage for which such proof can be
established. The allegations presented in the complaint do not
foreclose establishment of physical proof of a manufacturing
defect, and so the Court cannot dismiss these claims based on the
terms of the Limited Warranty.  

Design Defect

MBUSA contends that the Limited Warranty covers only defects in
material or workmanship and not design defects. Under California
law, a defect in the manufacture of a product exists if the product
deviates from the manufacturer's intended result. A design defect,
by contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the
injury-producing product with the manufacturer's plans or with
other units of the same product line, since by definition the plans
and all such units will reflect the same design.

Plaintiffs' allegations are not limited to design defects. The
complaint states that the MBUSA vehicle sunroofs are defective in
their design and manufacture, as well as for their lack of
warnings. The spontaneous shattering of the MBUSA sunroofs alleged
by Plaintiff may be attributable to material or workmanship
defects. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support
a plausible claim that the transmissions differ from the product
the manufacturer intended to sell in ways that could be
attributable to a materials or workmanship defect.

Therefore, even assuming the Limited Warranty only covers materials
and workmanship defects, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the
existence of such a defect at this stage.

Other Warranties

In addition to the Limited Warranty, Plaintiff also points in its
breach of express warranty claim to other express warranties,
including various representations and advertisements.  

In order to plead a cause of action for breach of express warranty,
one must allege the exact terms of the warranty, plaintiff's
reasonable reliance thereon, and a breach of that warranty which
proximately causes plaintiff injury. Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged a plausible claim for breach of express warranty based on
MBUSA's Limited Warranty. However, to the extent Plaintiff's breach
of express warranty claim is based on advertisements and
representations outside the Limited Warranty, Plaintiff has not
sufficiently alleged the specific terms of those warranties
applicable to the MBUSA vehicle sunroofs. The Court therefore
grants with leave to amend the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims as to all express
warranties other than the Limited Warranty.

The Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach
of express warranty claim with respect to the Limited Warranty.

Breach of Implied Warranty

Limitations Period

MBUSA contends that, because Plaintiff's sunroof failed more than a
year after he initially leased his vehicle, Plaintiff is beyond the
limitations period for a California implied warranty claim.  

Plaintiff contends that the provision limiting the duration of an
implied warranty to less than one year following sale applies only
in the event that there is no express warranty or an express
warranty without a duration. The Court rejects Plaintiff's
interpretation that the phrase in no event means in the event that
there is no express warranty or there is an express warranty
without a duration. Under the plain meaning of the statute, an
implied warranty is limited to one year following the sale of a
good.  

Plaintiff thus states a plausible claim that a defect existed at
the time of sale, and within the implied warranty claim period.

Fitness for Ordinary Purpose

MBUSA contends that Plaintiff's implied warranty claim fails for
the additional reason that Plaintiff's car, even with the alleged
defect, was fit for the ordinary purpose of providing
transportation. MBUSA notes that Plaintiff drove his car for years
before the sunroof shattered, and that even after the alleged
incident, Plaintiff was able to maintain control of the
automobile.

In response, Plaintiff cites to the California Court of Appeal case
Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, which rejected the notion that
merely because a vehicle provides transportation from point A to
point B, it necessarily does not violate the implied warranty of
merchantability. 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 27 (2007).

The Court need not dissect the holding of Isip here because
Plaintiff alleges a defect that renders the MBUSA vehicles unfit
for driving. Plaintiff alleges that the sunroofs in the MBUSA
vehicles are prone to explode while the cars are in motion, causing
shards of glass to fall on drivers while operating the vehicle. The
alleged defect poses a risk for any driver on the road, and is more
than sufficient to survive at the pleading stage.

CLRA Claim

9(b) Pleading Standard

For allegations grounded in fraud, Plaintiff's complaint must
satisfy the traditional plausibility standard of Rules 8(a) and
12(b)(6), as well as the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b). To properly plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b), a
pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the
misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about
the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false. With
regard to alleged misrepresentations, in order to avoid dismissal
for inadequacy under Rule 9(b), the complaint would need to state
the time, place, and specific content of the false representations
as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.

Knowledge

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants had
knowledge of the defects. Other than the conclusory statement that
Defendants at all relevant times were aware of the defects,
Plaintiff's allegations of knowledge comprise: (1) allegations
regarding other car manufacturers. None of these sufficiently
alleges knowledge.

Recalls of different sunroofs not at issue in this case are
insufficient to allege Defendants' knowledge of a defect. Plaintiff
has failed to allege that Plaintiff had knowledge of any defect at
the time of sale and/or the time of any alleged misrepresentations,
and has therefore failed to state a plausible CLRA claim.

Misrepresentation

The complaint alleges that:

Defendants represented and advertised that their automobiles,
including sunroofs, were luxury, top-of-the line cars, built to the
highest standard, and were safe for their intended use. Among other
things, Defendant advertises and represents that the safety first
features of Mercedes-Benz set a standard that all automobiles
eventually follow, and that its vehicles utilize Intelligent Drive
which is, essentially, the entire suite of groundbreaking driving
safety features you'll find across our entire vehicle line.

These allegations fail to identify the who, what, when, where, and
how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or
misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it
is false, and are therefore insufficient to state a claim for
misrepresentation.
  
Omissions

Plaintiff contends in the alternative that the complaint states a
valid fraud claim based on Defendants' active concealment of
material information about the sunroof from Plaintiff.   
An omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted fact is (1)
contrary to a material representation actually made by the
defendant or (2) is a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.
In the latter case, failure to disclose can constitute actionable
fraud: (1) when the defendant is the plaintiff's fiduciary (2) when
the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known
or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff (3) when the defendant
actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff and (4) when
the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading
because some other material fact has not been disclosed.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants actively concealed material
facts about the sunroofs. Absent a fiduciary relationship,
allegations of active concealment must amount to more than mere
nondisclosure. A claim of active concealment requires allegations
of affirmative acts on the part of the defendants in hiding,
concealing or covering up the alleged defect.  

Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to support a claim of
active concealment. Plaintiff alleges simply that Defendants made
false representations regarding the overall quality of the MBUSA
vehicles and were aware of the defects at all relevant times. These
allegations alone do not state a plausible claim that Defendants
took affirmative action to conceal the alleged defects.

The Court grants with leave to amend the Defendant's motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's CLRA claim.

UCL Claim

Plaintiff alleges UCL claims under both the unfair competition
prong and the unlawful prong of the UCL.  

Unlawful Prong

The unlawful prong of the UCL borrows violations of other laws and
treats them as unlawful practices and makes them independently
actionable.

Plaintiff borrows breach of express and implied warranty claims,
along with violations of the CLRA to support his claim under the
unlawful prong. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged a breach of implied warranty claim, the Court
also finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of the
unlawful prong of the UCL.

Unfair Prong

A business practice is unfair within the meaning of the UCL if it
violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which
outweighs its benefits.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants engaged in unfair conduct under
the UCL by charging a premium for the sunroof feature, when the
sunroof was defective. Plaintiff's claim under the unfair prong
overlaps entirely with Plaintiff's CLRA claim, and due to the same
deficiencies discussed above, namely, that Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege that Defendants had knowledge of the defects,
affirmatively misrepresented the sunroofs or actively omitted
material facts, Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a UCL violation
under the unfair prong.

Defendant MBUSA's motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ydyslq from Leagle.com.

Giorgio Enea, an individual; on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua H. Haffner --
jhh@haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC & Graham Gordon Lambert --
GL@Haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Aengus Hartley
Carr -- aengus.carr@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs LLP,
Alfredo William Amoedo -- alfredo.amoedo@squirepb.com -- Squire
Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Eric J. Knapp -- eric.knapp@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Troy Masami Yoshino --
troy.yoshino@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP.


MERIVALE: Faces Class Action for Allegedly Underpaying Staff
------------------------------------------------------------
Che-Marie Trigg, writing for Broadsheet, reports that Justin
Hemmes's hospitality group Merivale is facing a potential class
action from workers who are alleging underpayment. It comes after
the company's enterprise agreement (EA) was terminated by the Fair
Work Commission. It ordered Merivale to transition from its expired
EA to industry-standard awards by March 5.

Law firm Adero has told the Australian Financial Review it is
accepting registrations from current and former Merivale employees
who wish to claim back wages they believe have been underpaid.

The firm alleges the company has been underpaying employees since
2013, which is when its Workchoices-era EA expired. Rather than
drawing up a new contract after it expired, it maintained the EA,
which meant staff continued to be employed under those conditions.
The lawful 2007 agreement meant Merivale wasn't required to pay
overtime or full penalty rates to staff.

Merivale, which runs more than 70 venues in Sydney, told Broadsheet
it denies the allegations of a lawsuit and underpayment and is
confident staff has been paid in full. The company says it was
audited by the Fair Work Ombudsman in 2018, which found it was in
full compliance with its legal obligations. "Merivale also
continually undertakes internal audits and is confident that there
is no systemic underpayment," a spokesperson said.

Adero principal lawyer Rory Markham told Australian Hotelier, an
online news service for Australia's beer, wine, spirits and
hospitality industries, "That means in basic terms [Merivale] found
a way to pay staff a certain amount of money that was below the
current minimum rates of pay, as we see it."

He says that while the agreement that existed prior to 2009 was
lawful then, if made in the current day it would be significantly
below minimum rates and would be prohibited. "We're dealing with
what they would call a 'zombie agreement'.

"Our cause of action is really saying that when the [industrial
relations] system came into existence post 2009, there was an
obligation to ensure people were paid minimum rates of pay and that
Merivale has failed to keep those rates of pay up to minimum
standards," Mr. Markham says.

While only 50 employees have so far registered, Markham anticipates
between 3500 and 5000 people will come forward. He argues Merivale,
which is worth more than $1 billion, gained an advantage over its
competitors due to the underpayments.

The Merivale spokesperson said, "The type of claim ventilated in
media reports is not about systemic underpayments, but rather is
based on a creative, novel and strained interpretation of the
industrial instrument, which is contrary to the Fair Work
Ombudsman's interpretation."

It urges any current or ex employees to contact Merivale directly
with questions or concerns, saying "the only winners out of any
proposed class action, as always, will be lawyers and litigation
funds.

"A proposed class action is speculative and could involve current
and former employees in a long, drawn out and expensive legal
action which could take years."

The Merivale spokesperson also says the queries can be dealt with
confidentially and within a guaranteed 14 days.

Mr. Markham believes this allegation of underpayment is not a
one-off case. "There are a large number of operators that have
similar practices to Merivale," he told Australian Hotelier. "We'll
be expecting announcements in the next three-month cycle of other
operators." [GN]


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: March 25 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C. on Jan. 28 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased
Micron Technology, Inc. ("Micron" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: MU)
between June 22, 2018 and November 19, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

Micron shareholders may, no later than March 25, 2019, move the
Court for appointment as a lead plaintiff of the Class.  If you
purchased shares of Micron and would like to learn more about these
claims or if you wish to discuss these matters and have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights, contact
Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at (844) 291-9299.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, Defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) the Chinese State Administration for Market
Regulation notified Micron it was investigating dynamic
random-access memory ("DRAM") chip providers in China for potential
collusion and other anti-competitive conduct; (2) Chinese
investigators had found "massive evidence" of Micron's
anti-competitive behavior; (3) Micron had engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy with Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix; and (4) as a
result, Micron's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On November 19, 2018, the Financial Times reported that Chinese
investigators found "massive evidence" of anti-competitive behavior
by Micron and two other companies. On this news, Micron's share
price fell $2.61 per share, or 6.6%, to close at $36.83 per share
on November 19, 2018.

If you are a member of the class, you may, no later than March 25,
2019, request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff of the
class.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.  In
order to be appointed lead plaintiff, the Court must determine that
the class member's claim is typical of the claims of other class
members, and that the class member will adequately represent the
class.  Under certain circumstances, one or more class members may
together serve as "lead plaintiff."  Your ability to share in any
recovery is not, however, affected by the decision whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.  You may retain RM LAW, P.C. or other
counsel of your choice, to serve as your counsel in this action.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com or click here.   For more information
about class action cases in general or to learn more about RM LAW,
P.C. please visit our website by clicking here.

RM LAW, P.C. -- http://www.rmclasslaw.com-- is a national
shareholder litigation firm.  RM LAW, P.C. is devoted to protecting
the interests of individual and institutional investors in
shareholder actions in state and federal courts nationwide. [GN]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Arbitration in TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned IN RE: MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC. TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION. Case No.
11md2286-MMA (MDD), Member Cases No. 16cv2157-MMA (MDD),
16cv2768-MMA (MDD). (S.D. Cal.)

The Defendants move to compel Bentley and Baker to arbitrate their
individual claims.

Lead Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the putative class,
allege that Defendants violated the TCPA by contacting them on
their cellular telephones using an Automatic Telephone Dialing
System and by using an artificial or prerecorded voice without
obtaining the Plaintiffs' prior express consent.  

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to
the arbitration agreements within the Citibank credit card
agreements. The Plaintiffs oppose arbitration.  

Here, the credit card agreements contain governing law provisions
stating that federal law and the law of South Dakota govern the
terms and enforcement of these Agreements because the credit on the
accounts extend from South Dakota. Accordingly, this Court finds
that South Dakota has a substantial relationship to this dispute
and application of South Dakota law would not be contrary to any
fundamental policy of California. As such, where applicable, this
dispute is governed by South Dakota law.

Agreements to Arbitrate Exist

The Plaintiffs dispute that there are valid agreements to arbitrate
on three grounds: (1) the Defendants have not provided sufficient
evidence of valid agreements to arbitrate between the Plaintiffs
and Citibank (2) the plain language of the arbitration agreements
prohibit assignment to Midland and (3) the Defendants have not
provided sufficient evidence of Citibank's assignment of the right
to enforce the arbitration agreements to Midland.

Evidentiary Value of Credit Card Agreements

First, the Plaintiffs question whether the credit card agreements
provided by the Defendants are valid because the Defendants have
not produced the original agreements sent to them. They note that
the fact sheets accompanying the credit card agreements provided by
the Defendants list 2018 as the date they were issued. As the
Defendants acknowledge, Bentley opened a Shell MasterCard credit
card account with Citibank in 2006, and Baker opened a Sears
MasterCard credit card account with Citibank in 1996.  

Here, Mr. Peck, a custodian of records for Citibank, attests to the
validity of the credit card agreements as copies of the card
agreements that Citibank mailed to Plaintiffs in connection with
their accounts. Plaintiffs have not come forward with any evidence
to rebut that the terms produced by Defendants are the same as
those entered between Plaintiffs and Citibank. In fact, Plaintiffs'
opposition brief concedes that the terms of the credit card
agreements provided by Defendants are the terms at issue in this
motion.  

In summation, Citibank's custodian of records authenticated the
credit card agreements and declares they were sent to Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs concede that the terms of the arbitration agreements
within those credit card agreements apply to this motion, and
Plaintiffs provide no evidence that different arbitration
agreements govern the parties' relationships. Based on the
foregoing, the Court accepts that the arbitration agreements in the
exemplars proffered by Defendants are the agreements that govern
the parties' relationships.  

Parties to the Agreement

The Plaintiffs concede that they entered into valid agreements to
arbitrate with Citibank by using their credit card accounts. The
Court is likewise persuaded that valid agreements to arbitrate
exist between Plaintiffs and Citibank because the Defendants
provided account statements for both Plaintiffs, evincing their use
of their credit card accounts. The Plaintiffs also do not challenge
the validity of the arbitration agreements generally, nor do the
Plaintiffs allege any of the generally applicable contract defenses
in order to avoid the arbitration agreements. As the existence of
the arbitration agreements are not in dispute by either party, the
Court finds valid agreements to arbitrate exist between the
Plaintiffs and Citibank.

The Court's Authority to Determine the Parties Covered by the
Agreements

Under the FAA, parties to a contract may agree that an arbitrator
rather than a court will resolve disputes arising out of the
contract. When parties empower the arbitrator to decide certain
threshold issues in a delegation clause, the courts are divested of
the authority to decide those issues. Where the parties have
clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, a
court's role is narrowed from deciding whether there is an
applicable arbitration agreement to only deciding whether there is
a valid delegation clause.

Here, the arbitration agreements grant the arbitrator the authority
to decide the application, enforceability, or interpretation of
this Agreement and this arbitration provision. However, the
threshold issue of whether the delegation clause is even applicable
to a certain party must be decided by the Court. In other words, a
delegation clause granting authority to an arbitrator to decide
issues of application, enforceability, or interpretation are only
applicable to the parties of the agreement. Accordingly, the Court
must first decide which parties are bound by the delegation clauses
before the arbitrator can determine the applicability,
enforceability, and interpretation of the arbitration agreements.


The Agreements' Reference to Third Parties

The Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of the credit card and
arbitration agreements prohibit assignment of the right to compel
arbitration.  They contend that the arbitration provisions only
allow two parties to compel arbitration: "you" and "we."  The
"credit card agreements define "we, us, and our" as Citibank, N.A.,
the issuer of your account, and defines "you, your, and yours" as
the person who applied to open the account" and any other person
responsible for complying with this Agreement.

Under South Dakota law, the goal of contract interpretation is to
determine the parties' intent. Courts must examine contracts as a
whole and give words their plain and ordinary meaning. Courts must
also interpret contracts to give a reasonable and effective meaning
to all terms and not in a way that renders a portion of the
contract meaningless.  

The Court finds the Plaintiffs' argument regarding the Survival and
Severability of Terms clauses is similarly without merit because it
relies on the Plaintiff's limited view of the arbitration
agreements. The Survival and Severability of Terms clauses provide
that the "arbitration agreements survive the sale or assignment of
the accounts and that no portion of these arbitration provisions
may be amended, severed or waived absent a written agreement
between you and us." The Plaintiffs rely on their narrow view that
only Citibank and the Plaintiffs can compel arbitration to argue
that the Defendants may not compel arbitration because the
arbitration agreements were not amended by a written agreement
between Citibank and the Plaintiffs. Because this Court has already
found that the arbitration agreements contemplate that assignees
may compel arbitration, the Plaintiffs' argument fails.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the plain
language of the arbitration agreements allow assignees to compel
arbitration.

Evidence of Assignment

The Plaintiffs next argue that the Defendants have not provided
evidence establishing that Midland acquired all rights under the
credit card agreements. They assert that the bills of sale and
assignment provided by the Defendants to evince Citibank assigned
the right to arbitrate to Midland do not permit the Court to
determine what rights Citibank sold to Midland. In support, they
highlight language from the bills of sale and assignment explaining
that they are subject to the terms and conditions of the Purchase
and Sale Agreements. They argue that absent the purchase and sale
agreements, the Court cannot determine whether the right to
arbitrate was assigned to Midland.  

In reply to the Plaintiffs' opposition, the Defendants attach the
declaration of Sarah Banda, an assistant secretary at Midland, who
attests to the validity of two attached purchase and sale
agreements pertaining to the sale of Plaintiffs' Citibank accounts
to Midland. The purchase and sale agreements state that Midland
agreed to purchase from Citibank all right, title and interest of
Citibank in and to the accounts. This is repeated throughout the
agreements. Additionally, section 6.12 of the agreements state that
Midland shall not initiate an arbitration proceeding in a
collection action against a Cardholder based on a provision in an
Account Document authorizing arbitration without prior written
approval of Citibank and Midland shall provide Citibank with prior
written notice in the event Midland otherwise initiates an
arbitration action in a dispute with a Cardholder based on a
provision in an Account Document authorizing arbitration.

The Court finds the documents proffered by Defendants are
sufficient to prove that Citibank assigned all rights, including
the right to compel arbitration, to Midland.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have standing to
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreements,
regardless of their being nonsignatories to the credit card
agreements. As such, the first prong of the Court's inquiry is
satisfied as the Court concludes there are valid agreements to
arbitrate between the parties by virtue of the credit card
agreements between Plaintiffs and Citibank.  

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims on an individual basis and
requires Plaintiffs Bentley and Baker to submit to the arbitrator
whether their dispute is arbitrable.

The Court grants the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration of
the Plaintiffs' claims on an individual basis and stays their
individual member actions (16cv2157-MMA (MDD) and 16cv2768-MMA
(MDD)).  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycjrs28y from Leagle.com.

Christopher Robinson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas J. Campion,
Law Offices of Douglas J. Campion, Abbas Kazerounian --
ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law Group, APC & Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.

Nicholas Martin, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burke --
aburke@burkelawllc.com -- Burke Law Offices, LLC, pro hac vice.  

Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron L.
Vorce, Dykema Gossett, Aimee Guidry Szygenda --
aszygenda@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford, Amanda E. Wilson,
Amy M. Gallegos -- agallegos@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Amy
R. Jonker, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, 300 Ottawa Avenue, NorthWest Suite,
700Grand Rapids, MI 49503, Andrew Michael Schwartz --
amschwartz@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &
Goggin, P.C., Anthony J. Palermo -- Anthony.Palermo@hklaw.com --
Holland & Knight, LLP, Benjamin Michael Katz, Burr and Forman,
Brandon Stein -- bstein@hinshawlaw.com  -- Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP


MONSANTO COMPANY: Burchfield Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN BURCHFIELD, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN
DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00205-CAS (E.D. Mo.,
Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiffs, as
a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiffs' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI JULIAN LAW
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

MULTI-STATE LOTTERY: Lottery Scam Suit Gets Class-Action Status
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Clayworth, writing for Des Moines Register, reports that a
judge has granted class-action status in a lawsuit that claims
people who purchased at least 7.2 million lottery tickets in 19
states were scammed by a former national lottery IT director who
worked in Iowa.

Eddie Tipton, the former IT director for the Multi-State Lottery
Association in Urbandale, added a secret code to "random"
number-generating computer software in 2005 that allowed him to
narrow the drawing's winning odds from as great as 5 million to 1
down to 200 to 1.

Mr. Tipton's scam -- the largest in U.S. history -- went undetected
for years, and the code was replicated in lottery computer software
across the nation. He hijacked at least five winning drawings
totaling more than $24 million in prizes in Colorado, Wisconsin,
Iowa, Kansas and Oklahoma, court records show.

The scheme began to unravel following multiple failed attempts in
2011 to collect a $16.5 million ticket Tipton had purchased at a
Des Moines convenience store. He was sentenced in 2017 to up to 25
years in prison in connection with the lottery scams.

Burlington resident Dale Culler is among at least three people who
have filed lawsuits naming the Multi-State Lottery Association in
connection with the rigged games.

In January, Polk County District Court Judge Michael Huppert
granted Mr. Culler's effort to seek damages on behalf of
potentially hundreds of thousands of players.

Court documents show Mr. Culler spent $63 to purchase tickets in
two games he believes were affected by Mr. Tipton's scam. He has
alleged that at least 20 drawings between 2005 and 2013 were
affected.

The lottery association -- commonly referenced as MUSL -- argued
that a class-action lawsuit is not manageable because its members
cannot be sufficiently ascertained due to the lack of records of
people who purchased losing tickets.

Mr. Culler argued that people who believed they've been cheated
could use affidavits to identify themselves as members of the
class-action lawsuit, which Judge Huppert ruled as acceptable.

"The court finds that potential problems of manageability do not
outweigh the fact that a class-action suit is the best, and perhaps
the only, method of resolving this dispute," Judge Huppert wrote in
his opinion.

MUSL is an umbrella organization that is owned and operated by 36
member lotteries including the Iowa Lottery. Its executives
previously have said they no longer use computer programs that
Tipton designed.

Bret Toyne, the association's director; and Jerry Crawford, a Des
Moines attorney who is representing Mr. Culler; declined to
comment, citing ongoing litigation.

Details showing how players may join Mr. Culler's lawsuit have not
been filed with the court. A trial is set for March 11.

Mr. Culler says games in the following states are affected: Iowa,
Colorado, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Dakota,
West Virginia, Oklahoma, Delaware, Maine, Vermont, Tennessee and
Washington, D.C. [GN]


MUNCHERY: Faces Class Action Over WARN Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------
Caleb Pershan, writing for San Francisco Eater, reports that one of
an estimated 250 Munchery employees laid off when the San Francisco
startup shut down abruptly has filed a class action lawsuit against
his former employer. In a legal complaint filed in US District
Court, lawyers on behalf of ex-Munchery courier Joshua James Eaton
Philips argue that the company violated the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, known as the WARN act, which states
that companies of more than 100 employees must give them 60-day
notices before mass layoffs.

"Losing one's job is a hardship in any circumstance, but losing it
without any sort of notice is even more traumatic," says Gail Lin
Chung -- gl@outtengolden.com -- an attorney at the Law firm Outten
& Golden, which filed the complaint. "There's no time to plan for
alternate income. The WARN Act was specifically designed to
alleviate that sort of hardship."

Most of Munchery's workers were based at its South San Francisco
commercial kitchen space. When Munchery closed, many heard the news
through word of mouth or from the media. The lawsuit seeks 60 days
of unpaid wages for the employees, plus commissions, bonuses,
holiday pay accrued, and more.

Under federal law, the WARN act makes exceptions for companies that
prove unforeseen business circumstances led to more immediate
layoffs — but California law does not. Still, state law does make
an exception for companies that prove they were actively seeking
financing at the time of the layoffs, and demonstrate that giving
employees notice would have jeopardized that potential investment.

Munchery once raised $150 million and expanded nationally on the
promise of inexpensive, quality meal delivery. But it closed on
January 21 without settling up with employees or vendors like Three
Babes Bakeshop, a small San Francisco pie bakery that says Munchery
stiffed them $20,000. And in the state of Delaware, where Munchery
was incorporated, it has yet to pay $143,429.63 in overdue taxes.

The company hasn't filed for bankruptcy, but if it does, vendors
like Three Babes are likely to face a long wait for a small
percentage of what they're owed -- and cases like an employee class
action suit will be put on hold, too. [GN]


NASSAU COUNTY, NY: 99 Lakeville Road Corp. Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beaumont Jefferson.
The case is styled as 99 Lakeville Road Corp., and all other
petitioners similarly situated identified in the annexed exhibit
"a" affecting the parcels listed therein by section, block, lot
description, Plaintiff v. Beaumont Jefferson, in his official
capacity as the treasurer of Nassau County, and the County of
Nassau, Defendant, Case No. 145/2019 filed in the New York Supreme
Court, Nassau County, on February 13, 2019.

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as other.

Nassau County is a county in the U.S. state of New York. At the
2010 census, the county's population was 1,400,000 estimated to
have increased to 1,400,514 in 2017. The county seat is Mineola and
the largest town is the Town of Hempstead.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Herman, Katz, Cangemi & Clyne, LLP
   360 Lexington Ave Suite 1502
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (631) 501-5011

The Defendant is represented by:

   Nassau County Attorney
   1 West Street Executive Bldng
   Mineola, New York 11501
   Tel: (516) 571-3056


NATIONAL CREDIT: Cortes Feb. 7 Hearing & Pretrial Deadlines Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIKE CORTES, on Behalf of Himself and all Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CREDIT ADJUSTERS,
L.L.C., Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-00823-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District California vacated the Feb. 7, 2019 hearing and
all remaining pretrial deadlines.

On Aug. 2, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification, entered default judgment as to liability, and held
the issue of damages in abeyance.  On Aug. 3, 2018, it approved the
Plaintiff's notice plan, directed the Plaintiff to provide notice
to the class, and held judgment as to liability in abeyance for the
duration of the notice period.

On Aug. 10, 2018, the Plaintiff caused notice to be disseminated
pursuant to the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 order.  On Sept. 4, 2018, the
Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Default, for Leave to File an
Answer and Affirmative Defenses and to Vacate Aug. 2, 2017
Memorandum and Order, and its motion has now been fully briefed.

on Nov. 20, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Damages and
Costs, and the Plaintiff's motion has now been fully briefed.

On Jan. 10, 2019, the Court, on its own motion, scheduled the
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default to be heard on Feb. 7,
2019, at 11:00 a.m.  On Jan. 18, 2019, the Parties participated in
a mediation with Martin Quinn, Esq., at JAMS in San Francisco, CA.
On Feb. 5, 2019, the Parties executed a binding Term Sheet setting
out an agreement to settle all claims in the action on a class
basis.

The Parties agree to work in a good faith basis to execute a full
class action settlement agreement, to be submitted to the Court for
preliminary and final approval.  There is no longer a reason to
have a hearing on Feb. 7, 2019, as the Parties have agreed to
settle all of their claims.

Therefore, they stipulated and agreed, and Judge England granted,
that the Feb. 7, 2019 hearing and all remaining pretrial deadlines
will be vacated as moot.  In accordance with the provisions of
Local Rule 160, dispositional documents are to be filed no later
than Feb. 28, 2019.  Failure to file dispositional papers on the
date may be grounds for sanctions.  The Court may, on good cause
shown, extend the time for the filing dispositional papers upon a
written request from the Parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CR4frx from Leagle.com.

Mike Cortes, Plaintiff, represented by Yeremey Olegovich Krivoshey
-- ykrivoshey@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

National Credit Adjusters, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Debbie
P. Kirkpatrick -- dkirkpatrick@sessions.legal -- Sesions Fishman
Nathan & Israel, LLP & James Kevin Schultz --
jschultz@sessions.legal -- Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel, LLP.


NATIONAL GRID: Faces 2 Class Actions Over Aquidneck Gas Outage
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Doiron and Kim Kalunian, writing for WPRI, report that a
local attorney has filed two class-action lawsuits on behalf of
eight residents and three businesses affected by the Aquidneck
Island natural gas outage.

Lawyer Brian Cunha, Esq. -- brian@briancunha.com -- of Brian Cunha
& Associates filed the lawsuits on Jan. 28 in Newport Superior
Court against National Grid and Enbridge,a Canada-based natural gas
supplier.

"They've all lost income, they've all lost money. Heating bills,
electrical . . . all of that has to be compensated," Cunha said of
the residents and businesses impacted by the week-long outage.

National Grid said a dramatic drop in pressure from its
transmission system, Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., forced them to
suspend service to thousands of customers in Newport and parts of
Middletown. The gas outage affected more than 10,000 people at its
peak and left residents without natural gas for a week.

In the lawsuit, the residents are seeking compensatory damages and
inconvenience damages in connection with negligence, breach of
expressed and implied warranties and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

"People in Newport need to be compensated, this wasn't their
fault," Mr. Cunha said. "This was a negligence issue."

Mr. Cunha is also representing three businesses that were impacted
by the natural gas outage. The businesses are seeking compensatory
damages for lost income, property damage and other damages related
to the loss of gas service.

The lawsuits claim the residents and businesses ". . . suffered a
loss of their home and business, as a result of which the
Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses, incurred great mental anguish
and suffering and suffered an impairment in their enjoyment of
life, which damages are continuing in nature."

One of the residents who has signed onto the lawsuit is Patrick
Kennedy, who said his business on Thames Street was among those
without gas.

"We thought the initial response was slow, trying to get
information was impossible," he said. "My personal experience with
the call centers was a disaster."

Mr. Kennedy said his tenants had to temporarily relocate and he was
forced to shutter the bar he runs for several days. He said he's
still calculating how much money he lost.

"A couple thousand, maybe more, fortunately we didn't lose the
pipes but we were out of luck here for a week," he said.

Mr. Cunha said the next step is a hearing in court and if the judge
allows the lawsuit to move forward, anyone who is eligible to sign
onto the suit will receive a letter instructing them on how to do
so.

National Grid spokesperson Ted Kresse released a statement on
behalf of the utility company, stating they do not comment on
ongoing legal cases.

"Our main focus remains on the restoration of those customers
impacted by the gas supply interruption on Aquidneck Island and
helping them move forward," Mr. Kresse said.

National Grid has promised to reimburse residents for any expenses
incurred as a result of the outage. Both the utility company and
the state have offereed temporary assistance to small businesses as
well.

"I did see Gina Raimondo saying they're going to put some money
up," Mr. Cunha said. "But it wont be enough, so you really have to
go this route."

Eyewitness News also reached out to Enbridge for comment but did
not immediately hear back. [GN]


NEW YORK PILATES: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
LESHAWN DAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK PILATES NYC, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01343-VEC (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2019),
alleges that the Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain,
and operate its website at www.newyorkpilates.com to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people, a violation of the Plaintiff's
rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. The Plaintiff uses the
terms "blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with
visual impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in
that they have a visual acuity with correction of less than or
equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who meet this definition have
limited vision. Others have no vision.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12 th Fl.
          Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, N.Y. 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

NEW YORK: Website not Accessible to Blind, Kiler Says
-----------------------------------------------------
MARION KILER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NEW YORK & COMPANY STORES, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00851 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2019),
alleges that the Defendant is denying blind individuals throughout
the United States equal access to the goods and services the
Defendant provides to its non-disabled customers through its
website, www.nyandcompany.com. The Website provides to the public a
wide array of the goods, services, and other opportunities offered
by the Defendant. Yet, the Website contains access barriers that
make it difficult, if not impossible, for blind customers to use
the Website.  The Defendant thus excludes the blind from the full
and equal participation in the growing Internet economy that is a
fundamental part of the common marketplace and daily living.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Class:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: 212 465-1188
          Facsimile: 212 465-1181

NFL: Suit Over Improper Call Remains in District Court
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand in the case captioned TOMMY BADEAUX, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
ROGER GOODELL, ET AL., Defendants. Civil Docket No. 19-566. (E.D.
La.).

This case arises out of the events in the final two minutes of the
National Football Conference championship game between the New
Orleans Saints and the Los Angeles Rams, held in New Orleans,
Louisiana. The Plaintiffs allege that Los Angeles Rams cornerback,
Nickell Ribey-Coleman, made improper helmet-to-helmet contact with
New Orleans Saints wide receiver, Tommylee Lewis, and improperly
interfered with his ability to catch a pass. Plaintiffs allege, and
it is undisputed, the officials at the game did not call either a
pass-interference or a helmet-to-helmet contact penalty.

The Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, invoking this Court's
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which
provides federal subject matter jurisdiction over a class action in
which plaintiff class members number at least 100, at least one
plaintiff class member is diverse in citizenship from any
defendant, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000.

Over One Hundred Plaintiffs

For this court to exercise diversity subject matter jurisdiction
under CAFA, the plaintiff class members must number at least one
hundred. Plaintiffs bring suit in an individual capacity and on
behalf of New Orleans Saints Season Ticket Holders, New Orleans
Saints National Fan Base a/k/a The Who Dat Nation and any party
with interest that has been affected by the outcome. Although this
Court does not have evidence of the number of New Orleans Saints
season ticketholders, Plaintiffs do not contest that there are at
least one hundred Saints season ticketholders. It is reasonable for
the Court to infer that the number of class members exceeds one
hundred. As a result, the Court finds the plaintiff class members
number at least one hundred persons.
Minimal Diversity

CAFA requires minimal diversity in that it requires any member of
the class of plaintiffs to be diverse from any defendant.
Plaintiffs Tommy Badeaux and Candis Lambert are domiciled in
Louisiana. Defendants state in their Amended Notice of Removal that
Defendant Roger Goodell is domiciled in the state of New York.38
Plaintiffs argue Defendants did not properly allege the citizenship
of Defendant Goodell in their original Notice of Removal and, as a
result, the Court may not consider the allegations in the amended
Notice of Removal to determine the citizenship of Defendant
Goodell. Diversity jurisdiction rests on the facts that exist at
the time of removal, not on the sufficiency of the jurisdictional
allegations contained in the notice of removal.

The Court may consider the jurisdictional allegations in the
amended Notice of Removal to determine whether diversity
jurisdiction existed at the time of removal. Defendants are
permitted to freely amend the notice of removal prior to the
expiration of the thirty-day period for removal. Plaintiffs filed
the state court petition on January 22, 2019 and served Defendants
on that same day. Defendants filed their amended Notice of Removal
on January 28, 2019, well within that thirty-day period. Even after
the expiration of the thirty-day period for removal, a defendant
may amend the notice of removal to cure technical defects in
jurisdictional allegations. Because the citizenship of Plaintiffs
is diverse from that of Defendant Goodell, the Court finds minimal
diversity of citizenship exists.

Amount in Controversy

For this court to exercise diversity subject matter jurisdiction
under CAFA, the aggregate amount in controversy must exceed
$5,000,000.
  
The Defendants assert the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
The Court is permitted to make common-sense inferences about the
amount in controversy. Although Defendants have not alleged the
number of New Orleans Saints season ticketholders, it is reasonable
for the court to infer there are at least 60,000 season
ticketholders. The claims of these 60,000 season ticketholders,
claiming only $100 in damages each, would exceed the $5,000,000
threshold. As a result, the Court finds the amount in controversy
is satisfied.

Even if the Court could consider the Tommy Badeaux affidavit, it
would not affect the amount in controversy as the purported class
has not been certified. A pre-class certification stipulation by a
class representative that the amount in controversy does not exceed
$5,000,000 will not divest a federal court of CAFA jurisdiction
because the affidavit is not binding on the absent class members
but only on the affiant himself. Tommy Badeaux's post-removal
affidavit does not reduce the amount in controversy.

Because the Plaintiffs bring a class action, in which the class
exceeds one hundred, minimal diversity exists, and the amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000, this Court has diversity subject
matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to CAFA. The Motion to
Remand filed by Plaintiffs is denied.

Plaintiffs' Right to a Writ of Mandamus

The Plaintiffs' second prayer in the state court petition is that a
writ of mandamus be ordered by this Court. It is clear the
Plaintiffs seek a writ directed to Defendant Goodell. It is unclear
what action Plaintiffs seek to compel him to do. The rule to show
cause issued by the state court, presumably drafted by Plaintiffs,
ordered Defendants to show cause why that court should not issue a
writ of mandamus compelling Roger Goodell, commissioner of National
Football League, to implement Rule 17, Section 2, Article 1 and 3,
wherein the commissioners powers under this section 2 include the
reversal of the game's result or the rescheduling of a game either
from the beginning or from the point of which the extraordinary act
occurred.

It is well established that the writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy which is to be used only sparingly. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has explained, the writ of mandamus is the
most arbitrary of all the forms of judicial authority which is
exercised. It shuts out the right of trial by jury. It substitutes
for the ordinary and cautious mode of judicial proceeding an
extremely harsh and summary one. The Louisiana Code characterizes
it as an extraordinary remedy; and it is subjected to close
limitations.

A writ of mandamus may not be directed to Defendant Goodell.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 3861 and 3864 authorize
the writ of mandamus be directed only to a corporation or officer
thereof or a limited liability company or a member or manager
thereof.Commissioner Goodell is not a corporation or an officer of
a corporation. Commissioner Goodell is not a limited liability
company or a member or manager of a limited liability company.

The Plaintiffs argue the NFL, an unincorporated association, should
be treated as a corporation and the bylaws of the NFL confer upon
the Commissioner the same powers as an officer of a corporation.
The Code specified that writs of mandamus could be directed to
corporations (1) To compel them to make elections and perform the
other duties required by their charter: and (2) To compel them to
receive or restore to their functions such of their members as they
shall have refused to receive, although legally chosen, or whom
they shall have removed without sufficient cause.

Early Louisiana courts granted writs of mandamus to compel
corporations to comply with their duties under their corporate
charters or under Louisiana law. They did not grant writs of
mandamus in cases in which the plaintiffs could not establish a
legal right to the remedy.

The Plaintiffs do not have the right to seek a writ of mandamus.
The Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the mandamus remedy
strictly and declined to issue the writ to reinstate the student
because she was not a member or manager of the non-profit
corporation.

None of the actions Plaintiffs might seek to compel Commissioner
Goodell to do are the kinds of actions a writ of mandamus may
address. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3864 authorizes
a writ of mandamus be directed to compel performance of a
ministerial duty; such as the holding of an election or the
performance of other duties required by bylaws, articles of
organization, or operating agreement or as prescribed by law; or to
compel the recognition of the rights of the shareholders or
members.

It is clear that the writ of mandamus may be used only to compel
the performance of some unequivocal duty imposed by law. Mandamus
is to be used only when there is a clear and specific legal right
to be enforced or a duty which ought to be performed; it never
issues in doubtful cases. The writ of mandamus may not be used to
enforce a disputed right. The writ of mandamus is not appropriate
to exercise visitorial powers over .associations or their
proceedings, except to prevent the violation of some law of the
state or to protect or enforce some right already acquired.

Accordingly, the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiffs is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9cc66kx from Leagle.com.

Tommy Badeaux, Individually and o/b/o New Orleans Saints Season
Ticket Holders, New Orleans Saints National Fan Base a/k/a The Who
Dat Nation, any party with interest that has been affected by the
outcome & Candis Lambert, Individually and o/b/o New Orleans Saints
Season Ticket Holders, New Orleans Saints National Fan Base a/k/a
The Who Dat Nation, any party with interest that has been affected
by the outcome, Plaintiffs, represented by Frank Jacob D'Amico,
Jr., Frank J. D'Amico, Jr., APLC, David Scott Scalia, The Dugan Law
Firm APLC, James R. Dugan, II, Dugan Law Firm PLC, James McClendon
Williams Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum &
Hayes, LLC & Roderick Alvendia, Alvendia, Kelly, & Demarest, LLC.

National Football League, NFL Properties, LLC,
Successor-in-interest to NFL Properties, Inc. & Roger Goodell, as
Commissioner of the National Football League, Defendants,
represented by Gladstone N. Jones, III, Jones, Swanson, Huddell &
Garrison, LLC, Harvey Sylvanous Bartlett, III, Jones, Swanson,
Huddell & Garrison, LLC, Lynn E. Swanson, Jones, Swanson, Huddell &
Garrison, LLC & Peter Newton Freiberg, Jones, Swanson, Huddell &
Garrison, LLC.


NUSRET NEW YORK: Former Waiter Files Class Action Over Unpaid OT
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that Turkish restaurateur Nusret
Gokce, who earned the nickname Salt Bae after footage of his
peculiar steak preparations went viral, was hit with a federal
overtime class action on Jan. 15 from a former waiter.

A copy of the Complaint n Fteja v. Nusret New York LLC, Case No.
19-cv-00429 (S.D.N.Y.), is available at:

         https://is.gd/1omlsV


NYACK MOTOR: Violates Americans with Disabilities Act, Hart Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
OWEN HARTY, Individually, the Plaintiff, v. NYACK MOTOR HOTEL INC.,
A New York Corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-01322-VB
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2019), seeks injunctive relief, and attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to the Americans
with
Disabilities Act.  The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has
discriminated against the Plaintiff by denying him access to full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and/or accommodations of its business known as The Nyack
Motor Lodge, 110 N. Route 303 West Nyack, NY 10994, in the County
of Rockland, in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 12181 et seq. and 28
CFR 36.302(e). Furthermore, the Defendant continues to discriminate
against the the Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated by
failing to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford all
offered goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities; and by failing to
take such efforts that may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services,
segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals
because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.

The Plaintiff is a Florida resident, lives in Broward County, is
sui juris, and qualifies as an individual with disabilities as
defined by the ADA. The Plaintiff is unable to engage in the major
life activity of walking. Instead, the Plaintiff is bound to
ambulate in a wheelchair. The Plaintiff is an advocate of the
rights of similarly situated disabled persons and is a "tester" for
the purpose of asserting his civil rights and monitoring, ensuring,
and determining whether places of public accommodation and their
websites are in compliance with the ADA.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Peter Sverd, Esq.
          225 Broadway, Suite 613
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (646) 751-8743
          E-mail: psverd@sverdlawfirm.com

OPEN ARMS: Petty and Burns Seek Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
ELLAREECE PETTY AND SHAMICHAEL BURNS Individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. OPEN ARMS HEALTHCARE
AGENCY, INC., and WILLIE GATEWOOD, Individually, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-02104 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to
recover unpaid wages, minimum wages, and overtime wages for
Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants violated the FLSA in
that they failed to pay Plaintiffs for all hours worked by not
compensating them at the rate of time and one-half their regular
rate of pay for all the hours worked over 40 hours in one
workweek.

Ms. Petty worked as a human resource assistant for Open Arms from
January 2011 to January 2018. Ms. Burns currently works as nursing
aide for Open Arms and has worked for Open Arms since January 2016
to April 2018. The Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees
would routinely work hours in excess of 40 hours per week but were
not compensated for any overtime hours worked by Plaintiffs, the
lawsuit says.

The Defendants own and operate a home-healthcare agency in Shelby
County, Tennessee. Defendant Gatewood had knowledge of the
uncompensated hours worked by Plaintiffs and Class Members but
failed to provide proper redress or lawful pay for this excessive
"off the clock" work., as required by the FLSA.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated current and former employees:

          William A. Wooten, Esq.
          WOOTEN LAW OFFICE
          120 Court Square East
          Covington, TN 38019
          Telephone: (901) 475-1050
          Facsimile: (901) 475-0032
          E-mail: wawooten@gmail.com

ORGANIGRAM INC: Class Action Over Contaminated Cannabis OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Kuhl, writing for Pot Network, reports that Organigram Inc.
may face trial after the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia certified a
class action lawsuit against them. The company is accused of
supplying contaminated medical cannabis to patients who then fell
ill.

A judge recently certified the suit for trial after first setting a
48-hour hearing for the case back in June.

The suit pertains to the cannabis products Organigram voluntarily
recalled in Jan 2017 after certain lots tested positive for
unauthorized pesticides. Organigram offered reimbursement and
coupons for patients negatively affected by the contaminated
cannabis, but the plaintiffs in this particular case claim that the
pesticides caused long-term deterioration in health.

In their press release, Organigram stated that they would
"vigorously" defend themselves against the charges. The release
then goes on to reference a statement made by Health Canada in Mar
2017 following the initial recalls.

[Everyone wants to be first-to-market with a cannabis-infused
beverage. Keith Dolo and Sproutly may be winning the race.]

Last spring, the department claimed that the pesticide found on the
cannabis samples "is 500 times below the acceptable level" and that
"the risk of serious adverse health consequences resulting from the
inhalation of...the recalled cannabis products was determined by
Health Canada to be low."

With that in mind, investors should note that Organigram still has
an opportunity for appeal. The recent certification made by the
judge offers no bearings on the merits of the case, only approves
the lawsuit to move on to the next step in the Canadian penal
procedure.

Net revenues up 287 percent
Meanwhile, Organigram posted net revenues of $12.4 million for the
first quarter of fiscal year 2019, putting them up 287 percent
sequentially quarter-over-quarter. According to a statement it
consists of gross revenue of $14.4 million minus excise taxes and
returns of $2.0 million.

Net revenue was however limited by post-harvest costs such as
extraction, packaging, excising and labeling, which Organigram
claims it is aggressively looking to "augment and gain greater
efficiencies on."

"The first quarter of 2019 is just the start of what we expect to
be a year of tremendous growth," said Greg Engel, the Company's
Chief Executive Officer in a statement. "We've always believed the
Moncton campus would be a competitive advantage for us being able
to produce high-quality indoor-grown product at a low cash cost of
cultivation.  Our first quarter results confirmed that as we
reported an adjusted gross margin of 71 [percent]."

"While we continue to work hard to take advantage of our enviable
inventory build to drive increased sales we are already well
underway preparing for the derivative and edibles launch during the
fall of 2019," he continued.

Pesticides, pot, and pending lawsuits in cannabis
Organigram is not the only cannabis company to face class action
lawsuits in recent months. Mettrum, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Canopy Growth Corporation (TSX:WEED) (NYSE:CGC), faced their own
lawsuits last year after all of their cannabis products received
the same Type III recall in Canada.

Both Organigram and Mettrum's cannabis tested positive for a
pesticide known as myclobutanil, but both company's samples
contained such small amounts that they would be unlikely to cause
adverse health effects.

The issue that arises with cases like this is that they are pinned
on some of the biggest Licensed Producers in Canada. While the
companies may not suffer financially from the charges, their
reputations are at risk.

The pending case against Organigram claims that the patient who
fell ill after using the contaminated products "has lost confidence
in licensed producers" and is "unable to obtain any medical relief"
through them or their products.

The spotlight is on cannabis right now, and anyone with a smudge in
their ledger could be at risk. While it is still too early to tell
whether the pending lawsuit against Organigram will do more damage
than naught, it may be just enough for investors to keep their
distance until these pot stocks can redeem their tainted
reputations. [GN]


OUR PEACEFUL: Lyssa Miller Seeks Overtime Wage Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------
LYSSA MILLER, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C.
216(b), the Plaintiff(s), v. OUR PEACEFUL LIVING, INC., a Florida
non-profit corporation, CHRISTIAN JANNELLI, individually, and RONDA
JANNELLI, individually, the Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-00371-VMC-SPF (M.D. Fla., Feb. 12, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants have unlawfully deprived the Plaintiff, and all other
employees similarly situated, of federal wage compensation during
the course of their employment, pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff often worked 50 hours per
week, for which she did not receive proper overtime wages. The
Plaintiff is entitled to recover statutorily proscribed federal
overtime wages at a rate time-and-one-half per hour, for all hours
worked in excess of 40 per week. However, the Defendants
intentionally and/or willfully violated the FLSA or were reckless
and/or indifferent as to their compliance with federal overtime
law. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to liquidated (double)
damages, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is a non-profit corporation that specializes in
assisting adults with disabilities and has been operating in the
State of Florida since 2017.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Jordan Richards, Esq.
          USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS –
          JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
          805 East Broward Blvd. Suite 301
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 871-0050
          E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  melissa@jordanrichadrspllc.com
                  jake@jordanrichardspllc.com

PAM TRANSPORT: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Browne Suit to 8th Cir
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant P.A.M. Transport, Inc., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled David Browne, et al. v. P.A.M.
Transport, Inc., Case No. 5:16-cv-05366-TLB, in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 18, 2019, Judge
Timothy L. Brooks (i) denied PAM's Motion to Decertify Conditional
Collective FLSA Action, and (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs, who worked as truck drivers for PAM, have brought a
variety of claims against PAM under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), several Arkansas statutes including the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act ("AMWA"), and the Arkansas common law of contracts and
unjust enrichment.  They brought their claims as a putative
collective action under the FLSA, and as a putative class action
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See id.  With PAM's consent, the Court
conditionally certified the collective action on May 8, 2017.
Roughly 3,000 individuals have since opted in as collective-action
Plaintiffs.

The appellate case is captioned as David Browne, et al. v. P.A.M.
Transport, Inc., Case No. 19-8003, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents David Browne, on behalf of himself and all
those similarly situated; Antonio Caldwell, on behalf of himself
and all those similarly situated; and Lucretia Hall, on behalf of
herself and all those similarly situated, are represented by:

          Joshua S. Boyette, Esq.
          Travis B. Martindale-Jarvis, Esq.
          Richard S. Swartz, Esq.
          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Highway N, Ste. 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685-7417
          E-mail: jboyette@swartz-legal.com
                  tmartindale@swartz-legal.com
                  rswartz@swartz-legal.com
                  jswidler@swartz-legal.com

Defendant-Petitioner P.A.M. Transport, Inc., is represented by:

          Morris Reid Estes, Jr., Esq.
          Martin D. Holmes, Esq.
          Peter F. Klett, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          424 Church, Suite 1401
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-6538
          E-mail: restes@dickinsonwright.com
                  mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com
                  pklett@dickinsonwright.com

               - and -

          K. Scott Hamilton, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 4000
          Detroit, MI 48226
          Telephone: (313) 223-3500
          E-mail: khamilton@dickinsonwright.com

               - and -

          Robert L. Jones, III, Esq.
          Kerri E. Kobbeman, Esq.
          Amber T. Prince, Esq.
          CONNER & WINTERS
          4375 N. Vantage Drive, Suite 405
          Fayetteville, AR 72703
          Telephone: (479) 582-5711
          E-mail: bjones@cwlaw.com
                  kkobbeman@cwlaw.com
                  aprince@cwlaw.com


PHENIX, AL: Appeals Court Unlikely to Rule in Favor of Drivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kayla Goggin, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that an
11th Circuit panel appeared highly unsympathetic on Jan. 15 to
Alabama drivers who argue a city ordinance unlawfully imposes fines
on motorists caught by automated red-light cameras without giving
them the right to confront their accuser.

In February 2017, Thomas Worthy, James Adams and insurer
Willcox-Lumpkin Co. Inc. filed a class action in Alabama federal
court alleging Phenix City and Redflex Traffic Systems Inc.
conspired to illegally profit from fines that are assessed after
drivers are caught running red lights by Redflex's cameras.

Messrs. Adams and Worthy were each fined $100 after allegedly
running red lights at intersections where Redflex's automated
cameras were installed.

The two men alleged that a determination of their guilt was made
based solely on the images captured by the red-light cameras.

Since no police officer appears or testifies at administrative
hearings where red-light violations are adjudicated, the plaintiffs
claim they are denied the opportunity to confront their accusers
and are therefore denied the right to due process.

Mr. Worthy is the only plaintiff who requested and received an
administrative hearing. He was found liable for the violation and
did not appeal to a circuit court.

Although the plaintiffs claimed that the traffic violations are
criminal in nature, the city alleged that the ordinance provides a
civil rather than criminal penalty.

U.S. District Judge Jack Zouhary sided with Phenix City and Redflex
in an October 2017 decision, finding that the plaintiffs lack
standing to assert claims of a lack of due process because they
"cannot trace any injury to a process which they failed to
utilize."

"If plaintiffs received a citation in error and were forced to pay
a fine because the process provided by the city was not adequate to
correct that error, they could bring a claim alleging a violation
of due process. They cannot, however, assert a constitutional claim
alleging nothing more than that the city's process is inadequate,"
the judge wrote.

Judge Zouhary found that the plaintiffs are not faced with "an
imminent threat of liability" due to the ordinance.

On Jan. 15, attorneys representing the plaintiffs asked a
three-judge 11th Circuit panel to overturn the district court's
dismissal, but it appeared unlikely the federal appeals court will
rule in their favor.

U.S. Circuit Judge Gerald Tjoflat called the allegations against
the city "a shotgun complaint that is terrible" and accused the
plaintiffs of trying to "bypass the judicial system of Alabama."

"Why in the world would we even entertain this? It's beyond me,"
Judge Tjoflat said.

"This is a garden variety ordinance… You've deprived the Alabama
courts of ruling on your constitutional arguments. You could've
gone to the circuit court in Alabama and said [the ordinance] is
unconstitutional," Judge Tjoflat said during attorney George Walker
III's arguments on behalf of the plaintiffs.

"We have the right to pick our forum," Walker responded.

"We're going to write an opinion that says . . . They deliberately
refuse to go to the Alabama circuit court to raise these questions.
They have thumbed their nose at the doctrine of federalism. How do
you think that would look in print? You brought [the case] here
because you think you'll lose in state court," Judge Tjoflat said.

Attorney Thomas Wells Jr., representing Phenix City and Redflex,
kept his comments brief and was interrupted by Tjoflat, who was
clearly frustrated the case came before the panel.

"As to standing, we think the district court was correct,"  Mr.
Wells said. "There is no standing for the procedural due process
claims."

Judge Tfoflat was joined on the panel by U.S. Circuit Judge Kevin
Newsom and Senior U.S. District Judge John Antoon II, sitting by
designation. The judges did not indicate when they will rule.


PITTSBURGH MEDICAL: Dittman et al. Sue over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA A. DITTMAN, GARY R. DOUGLAS, and ALICE PASTIRIK,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. UPMC cl/b/a THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL
CENTER, and UPMC MCKEESPORT, the Defendants, Case No. GD-14-003285
(Penn. Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty., Feb. 11, 2019) alleges that
UPMC violated administrative guidelines and failed to meet current
data security industry standards by failing to ensure adequate
security over its workers' personal and financial information.  As
a result of UPMC's' failure to protect this confidential data, the
personal and financial information of its workers was used to file
fraudulent tax returns.

According to the complaint, UPMC had a duty to protect the private,
highly sensitive, confidential personal and financial information
and the tax documents of Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed
Classes. UPMC failed to safeguard and prevent vulnerabilities from
being taken advantage of in its computer system. When UPMC first
confirmed the identity thefts in February 2014, it stated that only
22 workers were affected by the Data Breach. By March 5, 2014, UPMC
reported that 322 of its employees' personal and financial
information had been stolen. By April 17, 2014, UPMC admitted as
many as 27,000 workers' personal and financial information has been
compromised, and that at least 788 employees have been the victims
of tax fraud.

As a condition of their employment, the Plaintiffs and the members
of the proposed Classes, current and former employees of UPMC, were
required to provide UPMC with highly sensitive, private, and
confidential personal and financial information, including their
legal names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and dates of
birth. The personal and financial information of Plaintiffs and the
members of the proposed Classes, as well as their W-2 tax forms,
while under the control of UPMC, was accessed without the
authorization of Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed
Classes, the lawsuit says.

UPMC is an integrated global health enterprise, and one of the
leading nonprofit health systems in the United States. UPMC is
comprised of 22 hospitals, 400 doctors' offices and outpatient
sites, various long-term care facilities, and a major health
insurance services division. UPMC serves the health needs of
approximately 4 million people each year. UPMC is headquartered at
600 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. UPMC is the parent
corporation of approximately 35 subsidiaries, including UPMC
McKeesport and various other subsidiary hospital entities.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Michael L. Kraemer, Esq.
          David M. Manes
          Elizabeth Polloek-Avery
          KRAEMER, MANES & ASSO ELATES LLC
          US Steel Tower
          600 Grant Street, Suite 660
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 626-5626
          Facsimile: (412) 637-0232
          E-mail: rn@lawkm. com
                  david@lawkrn.com
                  elizabeth@lawkm. com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
          Sunshine R. Fellows, Esq.
          Benjamin I. Sweet, Esq.
          Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LTD
          PNC Park
          115 Federal Street, Suite 210
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                  ekilpela@carlsonlynch. com
                  bsweet@carlsonlynch.com
                  sfellows@carlsonlynch.com
                  jetzel@carlson1ynch.com


PIVOTAL PAYMENTS: Settles Class Action Over Robocalls
-----------------------------------------------------
Bob Sullivan, writing for BobSullivan.net, reports that free money
is good. Getting free money as retribution from a misbehaving
company -- like a robocaller -- is even better, says David
Bookbinder.  He was bragging to friends the other day about a $77
check he received because he'd registered as a "victim" in a class
action lawsuit . . . months ago.

"This one I had to Google the case name to remind me what it is
for," Mr. Bookbinder told me. The check was the result of a
settlement in a robocalling case filed against a Texas-based firm
named Pivotal Payments. The firm was accused of robocalling small
businesses under the name Capital Processing Network, pitching
payment processing tools, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.   Pivotal agreed to settle the case without
admitting any wrongdoing.  Lawyers estimated that class members who
received unwanted solicitation calls would receive between $20-$60
from the settlement; Bookbinder did a little better than that when
the payments were disbursed earlier in January.

"I take solace in picturing the defendants writing this check out,"
he said, when bragging about the $77 payment.

The Massachusetts small business owner says he registers as a
victim -- that is, as a member of a class -- in every class action
lawsuit he hears about. Through the years, he figures he's
collected thousands of dollars, and rattled off a long list of
cases to me. Optical drive cases.  Retailers. Websites.

"One paid $600 or $700," he said.

(It's too late for the Pivitol case, however.  Registration for
class members ended last year.)

Mr. Bookbinder says he finds out about ongoing class action cases
in various ways.  Some he hears about in the news; some, from
Slickdeals.com.

"Sometimes I get notified of them," he said. "I always tell people
to fill these out. Apply for whatever ones you can qualify for. The
money is going to be paid, and the more people who apply, the more
gets paid to them instead of the attorneys."

Unclaimed class action settlement funds are disbursed as directed
by the settlement terms: Sometimes they revert to the defendant,
sometimes they are paid to the class members who register, and
sometimes the money goes to charity.  The more people who register,
the more the firm accused to wrongdoing is forced to do right by
its "victims."

While lawyers do often earn millions in fees from class action
cases, consumers rarely get rich from the payouts. Most are humble
-- $10 or $20, or even just a coupon.  Still, registration is
usually simple, and worth the trouble, Mr. Bookbinder says. As long
as you're patient.

"One thing to remember is, it can take a long time until a
settlement is reached and you finally get paid. Often years. Most
of these I forget about," he says.  Until he cashes the checks.

If you are thinking about copying Bookbinders' technique, there's
one important caveat: Offers of free money are often scams.  So are
websites asking for a lot of personal information. Be extremely
careful when deciding to register with a site claiming it can make
you a member of a class and eligible for a potential settlement
payout.

"Use the same rules you apply for phishing," Mr. Bookbinder says.
Look for signs that the URL seems bogus -- bad spelling, an unusual
web address, no reachable phone numbers.

Also: Find an unaffiliated source to confirm the lawsuit is
legitimate.  Find a news story about it, or visit the court's
website to look for related court filings.  The site announcing the
class action settlement should also include links to all relevant
documents.

"I have a pretty good BS detector," Mr. Bookbinder said. And a nose
for consumer justice. [GN]


PNC FINANCIAL: Underpays Call Center Staff, Minor & Yarbrough Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CASEY MINOR and ALEXIS YARBROUGH, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs, vs. THE PNC
FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00114 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 12, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
wages and overtime wages arising from the Defendant's willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's retail banking segment
"provides deposit, lending, brokerage, insurance services,
investment management and cash management products and services to
consumer and small business customers within our primary geographic
markets." In order to service its consumer and small business
customers, the Defendant employs hourly, nonexempt call center
employees -- Customer Service & Support Representatives or CSRs --
to take inbound calls to provide customer service support to those
who contact the PNC Customer Care Center. The Defendant employs
these CSRs, including Plaintiffs, in multiple call center
facilities located throughout the United States, including
Kalamazoo, Michigan and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") recognizes that call center
jobs, like those held by Defendant's CSRs, are homogenous; in July
2008, it issued Fact Sheet No. 64 to alert call center employees to
some of the abuses that are prevalent in the industry. One of those
abuses, which is occurring in this case, is the employer's refusal
to pay for work "from the beginning of the first principal activity
of the workday to the end of the last principal activity of the
workday."

More specifically, DOL Fact Sheet #64 condemns an employer's
non-payment of an employee's necessary pre-shift activities: "An
example of the first principal activity of the day for
agents/specialists/representatives working in call centers includes
starting the computer to download work instructions, computer
applications and work-related emails." Id. Additionally, the FLSA
requires that "[a] daily or weekly record of all hours worked,
including time spent in pre-shift and post-shift job-related
activities, must be kept."

The Defendant requires its CSRs to work a full-time schedule, plus
overtime. However, Defendant does not compensate CSRs for all work
performed; instead, Defendant requires its CSRs to perform
compensable work tasks before and after their scheduled shifts and
during their unpaid meal periods, but trains and instructs its CSRs
not to record this time on their electronic timesheets. This policy
results in CSRs not being paid for all time worked, including
overtime, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is one of the largest diversified financial services
companies in the United States, having businesses engaged in retail
banking, including residential mortgage, corporate and
institutional banking and asset management, providing many of our
products and services nationally.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Collective/Class
Members:

          Matthew L. Turner, Esq.
          Rod M. Johnston, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355-0300
          E-mail: mturner@sommerspc.com
                  rjohnston@sommerspc.com

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Howe Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC. The case is styled as Lekishea Howe also known as:
Lekishea Craft Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC and
Unidentified Parties, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01237-MLCF-KWR
(E.D. La., February 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, also known as Anchor
Receivables Management, manages past-due accounts. It serves
customers through account representatives. The company was
incorporated in 1996 and is based in Norfolk, Virginia. Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC operates as a subsidiary of PRA Group,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Samuel J. Ford, Esq.
   Scott, Vicknair, Hair & Checki, LLC
   909 Poydras St., Suite 1100
   New Orleans, LA 70112
   Tel: (504) 684-5200
   Email: ford@vhclaw.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Smith Sues Over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates LLC.  The case is styled as Leakeasha Smith also known
as: Lakeasha Brown, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC
and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00025-CDL (M.D.
Ga., February 13, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, also known as Anchor
Receivables Management, manages past-due accounts. It serves
customers through account representatives. The company was
incorporated in 1996 and is based in Norfolk, Virginia. Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC operates as a subsidiary of PRA Group,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   285 Passaic St
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Fax: (201) 282-6501

      - and -

   Misty Oaks Paxton, Esq.
   3515 Charleston Ct
   Decatur, GA 30034
   Tel: (404) 725-5697
   Email: attyoaks@yahoo.com




PRETIUM RESOURCES: April 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pretium Resources Inc. Securities Class Action Notice of
Certification
Read this notice carefully as it may affect your legal rights

This Notice is directed to: All persons and entities, other than
Excluded Persons1, who purchased Pretium Resources, Inc.'s
("Pretium") common shares listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange
("TSX"), and all Canadian-resident persons and entities who
purchased Pretium's common shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, during the period from July 23, 2013, to and including
October 21, 2013, and who held some or all of those securities at
the close of trading on October 8, 2013; or October 21, 2013 (the
"Class" and "Class Member(s)")

1Excluded Person means Pretium Resources Inc. and Robert A.
Quartermain, and Pretium's past and present subsidiaries,
affiliates, officers, directors, and any member of Quartermain's
family.

This lawsuit alleges that Pretium and Quartermain released
documents containing misrepresentations about the Company's
business and operations at its Brucejack Mine. The lawsuit further
alleges that when the Company issued statements correcting these
misrepresentations on October 9, and 22, 2013, the price of
Pretium's stock declined to reflect the true state of events,
thereby harming Class Members.

On January 23, 2019, the Honourable Justice Belobaba of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice certified the action: Wong v. Pretium
Resources, Court File No.: CV-13-00491800-CP (the "Class Action")
as a class proceeding against Pretium and Quartermain on consent,
and appointed David Wong as the representative plaintiff. The
substance of the litigation (i.e. that the Defendants made
misrepresentations in their public disclosure documents in 2013)
has not been adjudicated by the Court. The Defendants deny the
allegations.

YOUR TWO OPTIONS:

1. Do Nothing and Remain in the Class Action:
Class Members are automatically included in the action once
certified if they do not opt-out. You do not need to do anything at
this time to stay in the Class Action. If a settlement or any
recovery or benefits are achieved for the Class and approved by the
Court, you will be notified about how to ask for the portion to
which you are entitled. You will be legally bound by all orders and
judgments of the Court, and you will not be able to sue the
Defendants on your own regarding the legal claims made in this
case. You will NOT be required to pay any costs in the event that
this Class Action is unsuccessful.

2. Opt-Out of the Class Action:
All Class Members will be bound by all orders and judgments of the
Court and any settlement reached unless they opt-out of the action.
If you wish to pursue your own action or do not want to be bound by
the outcome of the Class Action, YOU MUST OPT-OUT OF THE CLASS
ACTION.

If you want to opt-out of the Class Action, you must fill out an
Opt-Out Form (available at www.morgantico.com) and send it BEFORE
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2019 AT 5:00 PM E.S.T., by email to
paul@trilogyclassactions.ca or by regular mail or courier to Paul
Battaglia at:

         Trilogy Class Action Services
         c/o Pretium Class Action Settlement
         177 Queen Street,P.O. Box 1000,
         Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON L0S 1J0

A copy of the long-form notice providing greater detail about the
certification and your right to opt-out of the action is available
at http://www.morgantico.com.

Class members who seek the advice or guidance of their personal
lawyers do so at their own expense.

The publication of this notice was authorized by the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice. Questions about this notice should NOT
be directed to the Court.

Contacts:

         Hadi Davarinia
         Lawyer
         MORGANTI & CO., P.C.
         21 St. Clair Avenue East, Suite 1102
         Toronto, ON Canada M4T 1L9
         Office: (647) 344-1900 ext. 5
         hdavarinia@morgantilegal.com
         www.morgantico.com


QUALITY CARE: Messer & Gray Seek Minimum Wage Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------
SHARON MESSER and JULIE GRAY, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs v. QUALITY CARE FOR KIDS,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00010-GFVT (E.D. Ky. Feb. 12,
2019), seeks to redress violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

According to the complaint, Quality Care's violations of the FLSA
have deprived Messer and Gray, as well as all others similarly
situated, of wages to which they are entitled by law. Messer, Gray,
and the collective worked during work weeks without receiving
minimum wages as required by 29 U.S.C. section 206(a).

Quality Care provides vision and hearing testing for children
throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky, performing its testing
services in elementary, middle, and high schools. Quality Care
submits claims for payment to Medicaid and private insurance
carriers, and earns in excess of $500,000.00 on an annual
basis.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Matthew T. Lockaby, Esq.
          LOCKABY PLLC
          1795 Alysheba Way, Suite 4207
          Lexington, KY 40509
          Telephone: 859.263.7884
          Facsimile: 844.270.3044
          E-mail: mlockaby@lockabylaw.com

RACKSPACE HOSTING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Pension Fund Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF WARWICK MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND et
al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RACKSPACE HOSTING, INC., WILLIAM TAYLOR RHODES, and
KARL PICHLER, Defendants, No. 17 Civ. 3501 (JFK) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
John F. Keenan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
complaint.

Lead Plaintiff KBC, a Belgium-based institutional investment
company, brings the class action individually and on behalf of
itself and all others who purchased or otherwise acquired common
stock in Defendant Rackspace between Nov. 11, 2014 and Aug.t 10,
2015 inclusive.

Rackspace is a managed cloud computing company which offers
Internet-based computing, data storage, and related services to its
customers.  During the Class Period, Rackspace was traded on the
New York Stock Exchange.  Defendant Rhodes was, at all relevant
times, Rackspace's CEO, President, and a member of its Board of
Directors.  Defendant Pichler is, and was at all relevant times,
Rackspace's CFO, Senior VP, and Treasurer.

During the Class Period, telecommunications company Vodafone was "a
significant customer" within Rackspace's international segment and
one of its three biggest customers overall.  In 2007, Vodafone
partnered with Safaricom, its partly-owned subsidiary, to launch a
mobile phone application in Kenya called "M-Pesa."  On Aug. 9,
2010, Rackspace announced that Vodafone had renewed its contract
with Rackspace to host M-Pesa data for five years, ending on April
1, 2015.

Soon after its debut, M-Pesa expanded into other African countries
and experienced significant user growth.   Soon thereafter,
however, M-Pesa experienced "routine" service delays,
interruptions, and outages, which prevented its customers from
using the service.  To minimize these disruptions and lower costs,
starting in 2013, Safaricom began to migrate the M-Pesa
infrastructure from Rackspace's servers to local hosts in Africa.
As Rackspace lacks Africa-based data centers, this choice
effectively meant the Vodafone Contract would not, and could not,
be renewed.

The Class Period begins on Nov. 11, 2014 -- four-and-a-half months
before the Vodafone Contract expired.  By then, the Plaintiffs
contend, the Defendants knew that the Vodafone Contract would not,
and could not, be renewed.  They allege that the Defendants
intentionally concealed the Vodafone Churn Event and its imminent
effects from investors, issuing misleading reassurance and guidance
regarding Rackspace's growth, customer retention, and churn rates.
The Plaintiffs further allege that some of these statements were
materially false and misleading because they reaffirmed or were
Rackspace's Feb. 17, 2015 full-year 2015 guidance, which allegedly
did not account for the Vodafone Churn Event.

On Aug. 10, 2015, the Class Period's final day, Rackspace issued a
press release announcing its second-quarter results and lowering
its full-year 2015 revenue guidance to a range of 12% to 14%
revenue growth from 14% to 18%.  Th Plaintiffs allege that the
effects of the Vodafone Churn Event forced these changes.  As a
result, Rackspace's share prices dropped 7.85% the next day.

On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff City of Warwick Municipal Employees
Pension Fund filed the original complaint in the consolidated class
action.  On Sept. 19, 2017, the Court appointed KBC as the Lead
Plaintiff.

On Nov. 3, 2017, KBC filed the amended complaint, alleging (1) a
single cause of action for violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder against all the
Defendants; and (2) a single cause of action for violation of
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against Defendants Rhodes and
Pichler.

On Dec. 18, 2017, the Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims because (1) the Defendants'
statements and omissions are (a) not actionable for various reasons
and, even if they were, (b) do not rise to the level of fraud; (2)
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts establishing a strong
inference of scienter; and (3) the Plaintiffs have failed to allege
loss causation in the August 2015 price drop.

Judge Keenan finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that the Defendants made the statements with the
actual knowledge that they were false or misleading; (ii) two of
the statements cited by the Plaintiffs are inactionable puffery;
(iii) the Plaintiffs have made no allegations that the Vodafone
Churn Event would necessarily preclude the possibility that
Rackspace's international operations could grow or that Defendants
held that belief at the time they made these statements; (iv) the
Plaintiffs have again failed to meet Rule 9(b) or the PSLRA's
specificity standards and these statements are inactionable; (v)
the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege an Item 303
violation; (vi) the Plaintiffs have failed to make allegations
sufficient to plead Basic materiality; and (vii) the Plaintiffs
have failed to plead a violation of securities law.

Should the Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint, they must
demonstrate (1) how they will cure the deficiencies in its claims
by filing a proposed amended complaint and (2) that justice
requires granting leave to amend.  Such demonstration will be filed
within 30 days of the date of the Opinion.

For the reasons stated, Judge Keenan granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.  The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to terminate the motion docketed at ECF No.
37.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/41tGVq from Leagle.com.

KBC Asset Management NV, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan
Gardner -- jgardner@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Alfred
Louis Fatale, III -- afatale@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP,
James M. Hughes -- jhughes@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, Ross
Michael Kamhi -- rkamhi@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP,
William H. Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC &
William Stephen Norton, Motley Rice LLC.

City of Warwick Municipal Employees Pension Fund, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented
by Francis Paul McConville -- fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton &
Sucharow LLP & Christopher J. Keller -- ckeller@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow, LLP.

Rackspace Hosting, Inc., William Taylor Rhodes & Karl Pichler,
Defendants, represented by Stephen Mark Dollar, Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP & Peter Andrew Stokes, Fulbright & Jaworski LLP.


RADIUS GLOBAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned RACHEL HOLMES, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
RADIUS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00208-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

RANBAXY INC: Louisiana Health Asserts RICO Class Action in Mass.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ranbaxy, Inc. The
case is styled as Louisiana Health Services and Indemnity Company
doing business as: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana and HMO
Louisiana, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Ranbaxy, Inc., Ranbaxy Laboratories, LTD,
Ranbaxy, USA, Inc. and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-10274-NMG (D. Mass., February 13,
2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as filed pursuant to
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Ranbaxy Inc. manufacturers and distributes prescription, branded,
and over-the-counter drugs in the United States and Canada. The
company was incorporated in 1994 and is headquartered in Princeton,
New Jersey. Ranbaxy Inc. is a subsidiary of Ranbaxy (Holdings) U.K.
Limited.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica H. Kish, Esq.
   The Dugan Law Firm
   One Canal Place
   365 Canal Street, Suite 1000
   New Orleans, LA 70130
   Tel: (617) 291-3296
   Email: jessica@dugan-lawfirm.com


RAYMOND JAMES: Asks Court to Review Class Action Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
Miriam Rozen, writing for Financial Advisor IQ, reports that
Raymond James earlier in January asked an appeals court to review a
Florida federal judge's order certifying a class of plaintiffs of
nearly 50,000 existing and former clients. The class-action lawsuit
is based on allegations that Raymond James required those clients
to pay fees on ostensibly commission-free "Passport Investment
Accounts."

In its notice seeking the higher court's review, Raymond James
argues that the trial judge failed to conduct rigorous analysis
before certifying the plaintiffs' class. The company also argues
that each of the proposed class members' claims should be litigated
individually because each of their circumstances is likely to
differ.

Central to the plaintiffs' claims are Raymond James' processing
fees for these so-called passport accounts. The plaintiffs argue
those fees simply masked commissions given to the broker dealer on
transactions.

On its website, Raymond James describes these passport accounts as
self-directed accounts that tailor a diversified portfolio
according to the clients' investing goals, risk tolerance, time
frame and budget. "You pay no traditional commissions -- just an
asset-based fee and low transaction charges," according to the
information on the website, which also says the minimum investment
is $25,000.

In its appeal notice, Raymond James argues: "It is impossible to
ascertain which clients actually paid processing fees without
conducting a transaction-by-transaction review of a million-plus
trades, as well as what amounts those clients paid . . . That alone
should have defeated class certification." Samuel Braver at Tampa,
Fla.-based law firm Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, represents Raymond
James in the litigation and wrote the appeal notice.

Neither Mr. Braver nor a Raymond James spokesperson returned
requests for comment for this story.

Late last year, the Florida federal trial court granted the
certification after the class-action lawsuit's named plaintiff,
Jyll Brink, made breach-of-contract and negligence claims. In
Brink's complaint filed on Sept. 18, 2018, Ms. Brink alleged: "The
Processing Fee charged by Raymond James contained up to a 1,000%
mark-up for profit in some instances (and a significant mark-up in
all instances), and as such, was transaction-based remuneration to
Raymond James -- an unauthorized commission in an account that is
supposed to be commission free."

According to Ms. Brink's complaint, a transaction spreadsheet
produced by Raymond James shows related data for more than a
million trades in passport accounts for 58,610 holders of the
account.

Clients had to pay the entire processing fee 94% of the time, while
financial advisors only paid them 4% of the time, for around 2,800
passport account holders, according to her complaint. The court did
not include in the class the holders of the nearly 3,000 accounts
where advisors either paid all or some of the processing fees.

In its response to that complaint, Raymond James argued that Ms.
Brink had voluntarily paid the processing fee and her claims for
breach of contract and negligence should therefore fail.

In past years, broker-dealers and their clients have litigated the
question of what constitutes a commission.

"This issue of whether or not a fee is in reality a commission has
been the subject of past Finra enforcement actions, thus the issues
being litigated in this case are not new or novel," Bradley
Bennett, the former head of Finra enforcement, who practices law in
Washington, D.C., told FA-IQ previously.

Eric Sodhi, a partner in the Miami law firm of Sodhi Spoont, who
represents Ms. Brink, did not return a request for comment for this
story. But Mr. Sodhi previously told FA-IQ the fees charged were
not limited to amounts to defray costs associated with executing
and clearing trades. [GN]


RBH INC: Home Purchasers' Action Transferred to N.D. Ala.
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana issued a Ruling granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer
Venue in the case captioned BMTP, LLC, v. RBH, INC., CMH HOMES,
INC., CMH MANUFACTURING, INC., CMH SERVICES, INC., AND NTA, INC.
Civil Action No. 18-352-SDD-RLB. (M.D. La.).

The Plaintiff purchased twenty new RBH manufactured homes, and they
were delivered to the Plaintiff's park in Louisiana. After a piece
of sliding fell off one of the homes, allegedly revealing hidden
defects, the Plaintiff investigated the homes and discovered
numerous hidden defects common to all the homes. The Plaintiff
filed this action on behalf of itself and as a representative of a
putative class of purchasers and owners of RBH homes, alleging the
homes were defective due to inadequate design, materials, systems
and manufacturing techniques.

RBH moves to transfer this case to the Northern District of
Alabama, arguing that potential witnesses include former RBH
employees and former and current Southern Energy employees who
worked at the plant during the relevant time period. Plaintiff
opposes RBH's motion, arguing that: it has set forth a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction over RBH by this Court,
jurisdictional discovery should be allowed, and RBH has not carried
its burden of demonstrating that transfer is warranted in this
case.

Section 1404(a) of Title 28 allows the Court in its discretion to
transfer venue to another district or division, for the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, where the
action might have been brought. When the movant demonstrates that
the transferee venue is clearly more convenient' than the venue
chosen by the plaintiff, it has shown good cause and the district
court should grant the transfer.

The private interest factors that a court must consider are: (1)
the relative ease of access to sources of proof (2) the
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4)
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.

Arguments of Parties

Plaintiff argues that that the private and public interest factors
weigh against transfer. Plaintiff first addressed the private
interest factors. As to the relative ease of access to sources of
proof, Plaintiff acknowledges that the manufacturing plant is in
Hackleburg, Alabama, but notes that the physical damages, defects,
and resulting damages to Plaintiff are in Walker, Louisiana.
Plaintiff admits that other homes within the putative class are
located all over the southeast United States. Plaintiff claims that
documents relevant to design, construction, manufacturing,
inspection, and the certification process are just as available in
Louisiana as they are in Alabama through discovery.

Plaintiff contends this factor weighs against transfer or is
neutral. Plaintiff contends the compulsory process factor weighs
against transfer because Plaintiff's witnesses are subject to the
compulsory process in the Middle District of Louisiana, not the
Northern District of Alabama, and RBH's witnesses are subject to
its control, compulsory process or not. The cost for witnesses is
neutral as the travel from Louisiana to Alabama would be the same
in either direction. As to the practical problems that make trial
easy, expeditious and inexpensive, Plaintiff focused its argument
on disagreeing with RBH's contention that transfer of this case
would obviate the need to decide the jurisdictional questions
facing the Court and would, thus, favor judicial economy.

RBH notes that Plaintiff does not dispute that venue is proper, and
personal jurisdiction over RBH is found, in the Northern District
of Alabama. Further, RBH argues that a plaintiff's choice of forum
is entitled to minimal deference when, as here, the plaintiff seeks
to represent a nationwide class. RBH maintains that, in light of
the class allegations, the private interest factors clearly weigh
in favor of transfer. First, the former employees of RBH and former
and current employees of Southern Energy are located in the
Northern District of Alabama. RBH contends these non-party
witnesses are not under the control of a party and are outside the
territorial powers of this Court.

Suit Could Have Been Filed in Northern District of Alabama

Pursuant to the Section 1404(a) framework, the Court must first
determine whether this lawsuit could have been brought in the
Northern District of Alabama. Thus, the general venue statute, 28
U.S.C. Section 1391, applies, which establishes venue in: (1) a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants
are residents of the State in which the district is located (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or (3) if there is no
district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in
this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such
action. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that this suit could
have been filed in the Northern District of Alabama; thus, the
Court finds that this action could have been brought in the
Northern District of Alabama where venue would be proper.

Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

Generally, a plaintiff's choice of forum is given great weight.40
However, plaintiff's choice of forum, while a factor to be
considered, is neither conclusive nor determinative.The district
court for the Western District of Louisiana recognized that, w]here
there are potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of plaintiffs
from many different states, deference to the plaintiffs' chosen
forum is considerably weakened. Plaintiff has acknowledged that
putative class members may be found all over the southeast United
States. Accordingly, Plaintiff's choice of forum is afforded little
weight in this analysis.

Private and Public Interest Factors

After consideration of the facts in the record and the applicable
law, the Court finds that transfer of this case to the Northern
District of Alabama furthers the convenience of the parties and is
in the interests of justice. The facts of this case demonstrate
that all of RBH's witnesses are located in the state of Alabama.
All witnesses to the design, construction, and manufacture of the
allegedly defective homes are located in Alabama as is the plant
where all of these homes were constructed and the relating
documents and evidence. While it is clear that harm has been felt
in Louisiana as a result of Defendants' alleged conduct, all
conduct of which Plaintiff complains occurred in the Northern
District of Alabama.  

Turning to the public interest factors, the Court likewise finds
that these factors warrant transfer. Plaintiff dismisses the issue
of docket congestion as speculative; however, the administrative
difficulties flowing from docket congestion in the Middle District
based on recent events have significantly impacted this District.44
Considering this Court's heavily congested docket coupled with the
fact that no operative facts relating to Defendants' alleged
conduct occurred in this district, the Court finds that this factor
weighs heavily in favor of transfer.

The alternative request for relief in RBH's Motion to Transfer
Venue is granted and this case will be transferred to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Ruling is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8yc8tsb from Leagle.com.

BMTP, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth H. Hooks, III --
kenny@dodsonhooks.com -- DODSON & HOOKS LLC, Eric Alan Kracht ,
Kracht & Frazier LLP, Henry Price Mounger -- Price@dodsonhooks.com
-- Dodson, Hooks & Frederick, APLC, Jacob B. Huddleston, Kracht &
Frazier, L.L.P. & Scott E. Frazier, Kracht & Frazier, L.L.P.

RBH, Inc, Defendant, represented by Evan J. Bergeron --
ebergeron@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan, LLP & Gregory S.
Ritchey, Ritchey Law Firm, pro hac vice.

CMH Homes, Inc., CMH Manufacturing, Inc. & CMH Services, Inc,
Defendants, represented by Lamont P. Domingue, Voorhies & Labbe,
APLC, James C. Lester -- jlester@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard,
Cooper & Gale, P.C., pro hac vice, Lee E. Bains, Jr. --
lbains@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., pro hac
vice, Thomas W. Thagard -- tthagard@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard,
Cooper & Gale, P.C., pro hac vice & W. Scott Simpson, Simpson,
McMahan, Glick & Burford, PLLC, pro hac vice.


REGAL MARINE: Website not Accessible to Blind, Bishop Says
----------------------------------------------------------
CEDRIC BISHOP AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the the Plaintiffs, v. REGAL MARINE INDUSTRIES, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01323-VSB (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12, 2019),
alleges that Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its website at WWW.REGALBOATS.COM to be fully accessible to
and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people,  a violation of the Plaintiff's rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. The Plaintiff uses the
terms "blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with
visual impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in
that they have a visual acuity with correction of less than or
equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who meet this definition have
limited vision. Others have no vision.  Based on a 2010 U.S. Census
Bureau report, approximately 8.1 million people in the United
States are visually impaired, including 2.0 million who are blind,
and according to the American Foundation for the Blind's 2015
report, approximately 400,000 visually impaired persons live in the
State of New York.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212 228 9795
          Facsimile: 212.982.6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

RES-CARE CALIFORNIA: Faces Wilson Labor Suit in Sacramento
----------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Res-Care California Inc. The case is captioned as DEZIREE WILSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. RES-CARE CALIFORNIA INC.; and DOES 1-50, Defendants,
Case No. 34-2019-00249225-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty.,
Jan. 25, 2019).

Res Care California Inc was founded in 1999. The company's line of
business includes providing inpatient nursing and rehabilitative
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP, LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333


RUBY TUESDAY: Chandler & Marchand Allege Labor Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
SARAH CHANDLER; and CHRISTOPHER MARCHAND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RUBY TUESDAY,
INC., Defendant, Case No. ________ (Conn. Super., Hartford Cty.,
Jan. 14, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendant unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as server.

Ruby Tuesday, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the
ownership, development, operation, and franchise of casual dining
restaurants under the Ruby Tuesday name in the United States and
internationally. As of September 5, 2017, the company owned and
operated 541 Ruby Tuesday restaurants and 58 franchised Ruby
Tuesday restaurants in 41 states, Guam and internationally. Ruby
Tuesday, Inc. was founded in 1920 and is based in Maryville,
Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard E. Hayber, Esq.
          THE HAYBER LAW FIRM
          750 Main Street, Suite 904
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 522-8888
          Facsimile: (860) 218-9555
          E-mail: rhayber@hayberlawfitm.com


SELECT HOME: Panvini Sues over Unwanted Telephone Calls
-------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Panvini, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. Select Home Warranty LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00907-SPL (D. Ariz., Feb. 12, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, in October 2015, the Plaintiff entered
into a policy holder agreement with Defendant. The Plaintiff's
policy had a two-year contract term, expiring in October 2017. In
August 2016, the Plaintiff entered into a new policy holder
agreement with Defendant, expiring on October 20, 2018. The
Plaintiff did not further renew his agreement with Defendant, nor
did he enter into any other agreement with Defendant. As a result,
Plaintiff's relationship with Defendant ended on October 20, 2018.
Since that time, the Plaintiff has not had any business
relationship with Defendant. In approximately August 2018,
Defendant began placing telephone calls to Plaintiff's cellular
telephone number -- (914)-XXX-3368 -- for the purpose of soliciting
new business from Plaintiff.  Defendant's representative attempted
to convince the Plaintiff to renew his coverage with Defendant or
otherwise enter into a new policy with Defendant. The Plaintiff
informed Defendant that he was not in position to renew his policy
and instructed Defendant to take his number off its autodialer and
not call him again.  Despite Plaintiff's instruction, Defendant
continued to place calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number.


The Defendant is a limited liability company based in Mahwah, New
Jersey. The company offers home service contracts.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the proposed class:

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684 (Fax)
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com


SKYWEST AIRLINES: Becker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Skywest Airlines,
Inc. The case is styled as Lauren Becker and Tremaine Wilson,
individually and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, and as aggrieved employee pursuant to the
private attorneys general act (PAGA), Plaintiffs v. Skywest
Airlines, Inc. and Does 1 to 100, Defendant, Case No. CGC19573737
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., February 13, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as other non exempt
complaints.

SkyWest Airlines is a North American regional airline headquartered
in St. George, Utah. SkyWest is classified as one of the major
airlines of the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Matthew Roland Baine, Esq.
   The Bainer Law Firm
   1901 Harrison St Ste 1100
   Oakland, CA 94612-3648
   Tel: (510) 922-1802
   Fax: (510) 844-7701
   Email: mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com


SLM CORPORATION: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Homaidan Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned In re: HILAL KHALIL HOMAIDAN, aka
HELAL K HOMAIDAN, Chapter 7, Debtor. HILAL KHALIL HOMAIDAN,
Plaintiff, v. SLM CORPORATION, SALLIE MAE, INC., NAVIENT SOLUTIONS,
LLC, and NAVIENT CREDIT FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendants. Case No.
08-48275-ess, Adv. Pro. No. 17-01085-ess (E.D.N.Y.).

Hilal Khalil Homaidan, aka Helal K. Homaidan, filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 08-48275.
Mr. Homaidan filed his schedules and statements and filed certain
amended schedules. In his Schedule F, Creditors Holding Unsecured
Nonpriority Claims, he listed Tuition Answer loans owed to Sallie
Mae in the amounts of $7,983.19 and $8,190.11. The Chapter 7
Trustee filed a no-asset report stating that the estate has no
non-exempt property to distribute. Mr. Homaidan moved to reopen his
bankruptcy case to obtain a determination of the dischargeability
of certain of his student loans

This Adversary Proceeding

Mr. Homaidan commenced this adversary proceeding as a putative
class action, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
by filing a complaint against SLM Corporation, Sallie Mae, Inc.,
Navient Solutions, LLC (Navient Solutions), and Navient Credit
Finance Corporation (Navient Credit). Mr. Homaidan seeks a
determination that certain debts that he incurred as a student are
not nondischargeable student loan debts under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(B), and an award of damages, including attorneys'
fees and costs, for the Defendants' willful violations of the
bankruptcy discharge order entered in his case.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Mr. Homaidan's First Claim
for Relief Should Be Dismissed

Mr. Homaidan's first claim for relief seeks a declaratory judgment,
pursuant to Judiciary Code Section 2201 and Bankruptcy Rule
7001(9), that certain of his debts were discharged by operation of
law on April 9, 2009, because they were not student loans excluded
from discharge by any subsection of Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8). And in this Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants argue that
he does not state a plausible claim for relief because, based on
the allegations of the Complaint, the debts at issue here Mr.
Homaidan's Tuition Answer Loans  are an obligation to repay funds
used for an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend" within
the scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

The Parties' Arguments

The Defendants ask this Court to dismiss Homaidan's Complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. They argue that the Court
should dismiss the Complaint because it is plain from the
allegations that the Tuition Answer Loans constitute obligations to
repay funds received as educational benefits, and are therefore
excepted from discharge under [Section] 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Defendants state that Mr. Homaidan received
funds to allow him to attend Emerson College, and that his loans
were conditioned upon his attendance at Emerson College. In the
promissory note, Mr. Homaidan certified that the loans were
qualified education loans and he guaranteed that he would repay any
funds not attributable to educational expenses. And they argue that
Mr. Homaidan agreed in the same promissory note that he would pay
$8,800 of the $11,800 that he requested directly to Emerson College
for tuition, fees, room, and board, and the remaining $3,000 would
be used for `educational expenses not paid directly' to the
school.

The Defendants state that Homaidan doesn't allege anywhere in his
Complaint that he used the proceeds of his Tuition Answer Loans for
anything other than educational expenses. They urge that the
Tuition Answer Loans enabled him to attend and graduate from
Emerson College and supported his personal decision to improve his
life through higher education and therefore, these loans conferred
educational benefits' on him. For these reasons, the Defendants
argue, Mr. Homaidan's Tuition Answer Loans are excepted from
discharge under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

The Defendants argue that faced with dischargeability claims
similar to Homaidan's, most courts nationwide have found that
private educational loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The
Defendants claim that the majority of courts across the country
have concluded that a private student loan qualifies as an
`obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit'
under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). And the Defendants
argue that because Mr. Homaidan stated that the proceeds of his
Tuition Answer Loans would be used for educational expenses, he is
precluded from alleging here that they are not funds used for an
educational benefit, and therefore, not excluded from discharge.  

Whether the Threshold Requirements for a Declaratory Judgment Are
Met

First, the Court considers whether, in light of the allegations of
the Complaint and the arguments advanced by the Defendants, the
threshold requirements for a declaratory judgment claim are met.
Judiciary Code Section 2201 states that in any case of actual
controversy, a court may, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration and such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

According to the Second Circuit, a declaratory judgment action
presents an actual controversy if the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.

Here, it is plain from the Complaint that Mr. Homaidan has alleged
a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of relief. At the outset, the dispute is substantial. The
Complaint states that the Defendants knowingly undertook collection
efforts on debts that he alleges come within the Discharge Order
entered in his bankruptcy case. Mr. Homaidan alleges that he has
been damaged, in a tangible way, by those efforts. And he alleges
that the Defendants' collection efforts violated this Court's
Discharge Order, warranting a finding of civil contempt.

The Court concludes that the threshold requirements for a
declaratory judgment claim are met.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(A)(ii) Applies To Exclude the Loans At Issue from
Discharge as a Matter of Law.

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) excepts from discharge any
obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend. But Section 523(a)(8) does not define
student loans. Nor does it define educational benefit. Rather, it
describes certain categories of debt that are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy unless the debtor establishes that excepting the debt
from discharge would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his
or her family, and those descriptions are particular and detailed.

In this light, the text of Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) merits
attention. It describes funds received as an educational benefit.
This would be an unconventional way to discuss a loan. And the
neighboring terms to benefit are scholarship or stipend. These,
plainly, do not describe a loan.

The prior and following subsections refer to loan made, educational
loan and qualified education loan. That is, the term loan was part
of the drafting process of Section 523(a)(8), and it seems
reasonable to assume that if Congress intended this subsection to
include loans, it would have said so.

Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), both by its terms and
read in context, does not sweep in all education-related debt, or
all loans that support a student's efforts to gain the benefits of
an education. If this Section had the breadth for which the
Defendants advocate, it is hard to see where it would end
conceivably, it could encompass credit card debt that was incurred
to purchase textbooks, personal loans that were used to pay for
tuition and school fees, and any other debt that, in one way or
another, facilitated a student's efforts to gain the benefits of an
education. And plainly, this is not what Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)
encompasses, or what the Bankruptcy Code permits, or what Congress
intended.

In addition, this Court also agrees with those other courts,
including courts within and outside this District, that have
concluded that an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit must mean something other than a loan. As one
bankruptcy court observed, this conclusion is necessary because
another subsection, Section 523(a)(8)(B), excludes from discharge
qualified education loans.

Here, the record shows that Mr. Homaidan alleges that the Tuition
Answer Loans were direct-to-consumer loans, and not conditional
grants. That is, his allegations show that the debt at issue is not
an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend. The record also shows that Mr. Homaidan
seeks a declaratory judgment that the Tuition Answer Loans were
discharged in his bankruptcy case, upon the entry of the discharge
order, and by implication, that they were not excluded from
discharge by Section 523, including Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

While it is far from clear whether Mr. Homaidan can prove his
allegations, that question is not before the Court on this Motion
to Dismiss. Rather, the question posed by this motion is whether
Mr. Homaidan's claim for a declaratory judgment that his Tuition
Answer Loans were discharged in his bankruptcy case is rendered
implausible by the nondischargeability terms of Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). And here, at this stage in these
proceedings, the Court concludes that the Defendants have not
established that this claim is implausible. For these reasons, the
Motion to Dismiss the First Claim for Relief is denied.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that Mr. Homaidan's Second Claim
for Relief Should Be Dismissed

Mr. Homaidan's second claim for relief seeks an award of damages
and attorneys' fees and costs for the Defendants' willful
violations of the discharge injunction pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
Sections 524 and 105.  

Bankruptcy Code Section 524(a)(2) states that a discharge in a case
under this title operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act,
to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability
of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived. As
one court recently observed, bankruptcy without the discharge is
like a car without an engine; a useful tool rendered ineffective.
In order to state a claim that a creditor violated Bankruptcy Code
Section 524(a)(2), a plaintiff must allege that the debtor received
a discharge, the defendant received a notice of the discharge, and
the defendant intended the acts that violated the discharge.

The Defendants argue that Mr. Homaidan's claim that they violated
the Discharge Order should be dismissed for the same reason that
his first claim for relief should be dismissed namely, that his
Tuition Answer Loans were not discharged in his bankruptcy case.
The Defendants also argue that Mr. Homaidan can recover damages for
discharge injunction violations only through a claim for contempt
of court, not the claim that he has brought here. And the
Defendants argue that for a contempt claim to lie, the order at
issue must be clear and unambiguous, and here, the Discharge Order
is not. The Defendants argue that Mr. Homaidan's allegations cannot
support a claim for what amount to contempt sanctions against the
Defendants.

Mr. Homaidan responds that the argument that there is no private
right of action to address a discharge violation through an
adversary proceeding is a red herring. Additionally, he states that
the Defendants argue that the Court's Discharge Order is too vague
to support a contempt finding, but if the Defendants are correct in
this assertion, then there could never be a contempt of a discharge
order because every discharge order is vague.

Here, the record shows that Mr. Homaidan alleges that he received a
discharge. In particular, the Complaint states that on December 4,
2008, Mr. Homaidan filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and properly
scheduled the Tuition Answer Loans on Schedule F of his petition.
The Complaint also states that on April 9, 2009, this Court ordered
discharge of all Plaintiff's properly scheduled pre-petition debt.
And as the Court has already concluded, Mr. Homaidan has described
facts that establish a plausible basis to conclude that his Tuition
Answer Loans are not an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend that would be excluded
from discharge by Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

The record also shows that Mr. Homaidan alleges that the Defendants
received notice of the discharge in his case. Specifically, he
alleges that the Defendants were duly notified of the discharge of
all of Homaidan's pre-petition debts. And the Complaint states that
on December 6, 2008 Defendant sent correspondence to Homaidan
stating that they received notice of the bankruptcy filing and
requested a copy of the the first meeting of creditors.

In sum, and as with Mr. Homaidan's first claim for relief, the
question posed by this motion is whether Mr. Homaidan's claims that
the Defendants violated the discharge injunction are rendered
implausible by the nondischargeability terms of Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). And here again, at this stage in these
proceedings, the Court concludes that the Defendants have not
established that this claim is implausible. For these reasons, the
Motion to Dismiss the Second Claim for Relief is denied.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that the Court Should Strike
Portions of the Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(f)

The Defendants argue that Mr. Homaidan makes allegations that the
they engaged in a massive effort to defraud student debtors and
that these allegations, among others, should be stricken because
they are inappropriate for a short and plain statement of the
claims. These paragraphs, the Defendants argue, also amount to
allegations of nonspecific fraud.

Mr. Homaidan responds that the Court should not strike any portion
of the Complaint. He argues that the background to Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(8) and the actions of the Defendants are relevant to
this action. Mr. Homaidan also states that he believes that through
discovery he will prove his allegations. And he claims that the
Court should not strike any allegations in a motion to dismiss
before discovery has taken place. He will demonstrate a knowing
violation of the discharge injunctions and the allegations reflect
that intent.

The Court must consider whether any material in support of the
statements would be admissible. Here, the Court observes that
evidence of the Defendants' knowledge of the dischargeability of
Mr. Homaidan's loans could potentially be admissible in the
determination of his claims for willful violations of the Discharge
Order. And here again, at this stage in these proceedings, the
Court concludes that the Defendants have not established grounds to
strike paragraphs 2 and 13 to 55 of the Complaint for containing
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. For these
reasons, the motion to strike portions of Mr. Homaidan's Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is denied.

Whether the Defendants Have Shown that the Court Should Strike
Portions of the Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)

In the alternative, the Defendants also ask this Court to strike
several paragraphs of Mr. Homaidan's complaint on grounds that
these paragraphs contain allegations of nonspecific fraud and fail
to meet the particularity requirement for averments of fraud as set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), made applicable here
by Bankruptcy Rule 7009.  

To allege with particularity a claim for fraud, the Second Circuit
has held that the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that
the plaintiff contends were fraudulent (2) identify the speaker (3)
state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why
the statements were fraudulent.

Here, a review of the Complaint shows that Mr. Homaidan asserts
claims for a declaratory judgment for violations of the Discharge
Order, and for related relief. And here too, at this stage in these
proceedings, the Court concludes that the Defendants have not shown
that Mr. Homaidan states claims that invoke Rule 9(b)'s heightened
pleading standard for fraud, or that Rule 9(b) requires the
dismissal of these claims, or that Rule 9(b) provides a basis to
strike any of the allegations in the Complaint. For these reasons,
the motion to strike portions of Mr. Homaidan's Complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is denied.

A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's January 31, 2018
Memorandum Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/yap8vey8
from Leagle.com.

Hilal Khalil Homaidan, Plaintiff, represented by Jason W. Burge --
jburge@fishmanhaygood.com -- Fishman Haygood LLP, George F.
Carpinello, Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP, Kathryn J. Johnson --
kjohnson@fishmanhaygood.com -- Fishman Haygood, LLP, Adam Shaw,
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Austin C. Smith --
austin@acsmithlawgroup.com -- Smith Law Group, Lynn E. Swanson --
lswanson@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell & Garrison,
LLC & Robert C. Tietjen, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP.

Sallie Mae, Inc., Defendant, represented by Thomas M. Farrell --
tfarrell@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP.

Navient Solutions, LLC & Navient Credit Finance Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Thomas M. Farrell, McGuire Woods LLP &
Shawn Randall Fox  -- sfox@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP.


SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Floyd Alleges Violation Under FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southwest Credit
System, L.P. The case is styled as Terry Floyd, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Southwest
Credit System, L.P. and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-05352 (D. N.J., February 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Southwest Credit Systems, L.P. was founded in 2003. The Company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   STEIN SAKS, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601-2726
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


SPACESHIP CO: Faces Chavez Labor Suit in Kern County
----------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
The Spaceship Co., LLC. The case is captioned as EDUARDO CHAVEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. THE SPACESHIP CO., LLC, Defendant, Case No.
BCV-19-100231 (Cal. Super., Kern Cty., Jan. 25, 2019). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Thomas S. Clark.

The Spaceship Company (TSC) manufactures and integrates aerospace
composite. The Company develops a fleet of commercial spaceships
and carrier aircraft for regular and commercial space travel. TSC
provides its services in the United States.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Otkupman, Esq.
          OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, A LAW CORPORATION
          28632 Roadside Dr., Suite 203
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 293-5623
          Facsimile: (888) 850-1310
          E-mail: Roman@Ol.FLA.com


ST. LOUIS, MO: Faces Class Action Over Cash-Bail System
-------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Fenske, writing for River Front Times, reports that charging
that the city of St. Louis holds people in jail "simply because
they are too poor to pay for their freedom," a host of civil rights
organizations have filed a class-action suit demanding an end to
its cash-bail system.

The lawsuit targets the city, its circuit court judges, Sheriff
Vernon Betts, and Commissioner of Corrections Dale Glass. It asks a
federal judge to declare its current practices unconstitutional --
and to order the immediate release of four litigants currently
being held in the city's Workhouse.

The suit argues that the city officials deny detainees equal
protection under the law, as well as their right to due process.

"The Supreme Court has directed judges that pretrial detention
should be a 'carefully limited exception' in our legal system," the
suit notes. "Nevertheless, individuals arrested and charged in St.
Louis City are subject to an unconstitutional system where they are
denied any process to argue for their liberty.

"In fact, the first hearing on release conditions only occurs when
an individual obtains counsel. Because appointment of a public
defender typically takes four to five weeks, those too poor to pay
the monetary release conditions or to hire a private attorney are
subjected to extended pretrial incarceration before they have any
opportunity to contest their release conditions. Conversely,
wealthier individuals are released from custody almost immediately
because they can pay the monetary conditions of release."

And the cost is real. The time spent confined to the notoriously
hellish Workhouse -- an average of 291 days waiting for trial, the
suit notes -- has real consequences: "[P]retrial detainees
routinely suffer losses in employment, child custody, and housing,
and experience greater risks of physical and emotional illness,
barriers to counsel, and -- critically -- statistically worse trial
and sentencing outcomes than released individuals who were charged
with the same offense."

The suit has four named plaintiffs, each a man awaiting trial. Each
of the four is currently being held in the Workhouse, and has been
there for at least twelve days without an opportunity for release
other than paying up.

One man, 25-year-old Richard Robards, is "desperate to be released
soon to care for his pregnant partner." Another, 52-year-old David
Buster Dixon, is the primary caregiver for a paralyzed uncle. Stuck
in jail now for eighteen days since he can't afford a $30,000 cash
bond, he "fears he will not make it out alive," the suit says.

The suit was filed by ArchCity Defenders and Georgetown Law's
Institute for Constitutional Advocacy, along with two national
organization: the Advancement Project National Office and the Civil
Rights Corps.

Last fall, ArchCity Defenders filed a class-action suit against the
city over the Workhouse, seeking a declaration that its
"unspeakably hellish and inhumane" conditions are unconstitutional,
and asking a federal judge to shut it down or fine the city until
makes major fixes.

That suit is still pending. [GN]


STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Court Grants 3rd Bid to Dismiss Cole FDCA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEX J. COLE, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, V. STEPHEN EINSTEIN & ASSOCIATES,
P.C. and SECOND ROUND, L.P. d/b/a/ Third Round, L.P., Defendants,
Case No. 6:18-cv-06230 EAW (W.D. N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (i)
granted the Defendants' third motion to dismiss; and (ii) denied
the Defendants' and the Plaintiff's respective motions for
sanctions and costs.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, on March 20, 2018, alleging
that the Defendants sought to collect a debt from the Plaintiff and
others in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  The Plaintiff claims that the collection letter he
received from Einstein failed to articulate that the "charges or
fees" identified therein related only to those incurred after his
debt had been charged off.  According to Plaintiff, Einstein's
letter was misleading because it could be interpreted as reflecting
all charges or fees incurred since the account's inception.  He
also claims that because his credit account had accrued interest at
a rate exceeding that permitted by New York's usury statutes while
the balance was pending with the original creditor, the Defendants
unlawfully attempted to take or receive interest in violation of
New York law by seeking to collect the principal due after the
account was charged off.

The Plaintiff has identified two putative classes, one for each
cause of action asserted in his Amended Complaint.  He alleges that
members of the first putative class were harmed because, by falsely
stating that the amount of accrued charges or fees was $0, Einstein
made a false and misleading representation in violation of 15
U.S.C. Section 1692e.  The Plaintiff also states that because
interest at the rate of 26.99% APR had accrued on the credit card,
Einstein attempted to collect interest at a rate which exceeds New
York's maximum rate under its criminal usury state.  As a result,
he claims that members of the second putative class were harmed by
Einstein's misrepresentation of the "character, legal status, or
amount of the debt" as well as its ability to collect interest
above the rate set by New York's criminal usury statute, and by
Einstein's threat "to collect interest which could not legally be
collected" and its collection of interest in lain amount which was
not permitted by New York law," all in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1692e, (2)(A), (5), and 1692f(1).  He further alleges that
Second Round is vicariously liable for Einstein's conduct because
Einstein is Second Round's agent.

The Plaintiff seeks statutory and actual damages on behalf of
himself and the members of the putative classes as well as
recoupment of reasonable attorney's fees.

On March 20, 2018, the Plaintiff commenced this putative class
action against the Defendants, alleging that the Letter constituted
"a false and misleading representation in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692e.  On May 4, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.  Their notice of motion did not
indicate whether they intended to submit reply papers in further
support of their motion.  Fourteen days later, the Defendants filed
an "amended motion to dismiss."  The amended motion to dismiss
consisted solely of an amended notice of motion that stated the
Defendants' intent to file reply papers in support of the first
motion to

On May 22, 2018, the Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, which
remains the operative pleading in the matter.  Three days later,
the Plaintiff filed his response to the Defendants' first motion to
dismiss, arguing that the motion had been rendered moot as a result
of his filing of the Amended Complaint.

On June 5, 2018, the Defendants filed a third motion to dismiss,
which also included a request for court-ordered sanctions and
costs.  The Plaintiff opposes the Defendants' third motion to
dismiss.

On July 11, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiff's request to file
a sur-reply in further opposition to the Defendants' third motion
to dismiss, which was filed the next day.  On Nov. 2, 2018,
Defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority, drawing the
Court's attention to a recent Second Circuit decision.

Also before the Court are the Defendants' request for sanctions,
and the Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions.

Judge Wolford finds that since the FDCPA does not extend to every
bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretation of a collection notice, the
Plaintiff's first cause of action is dismissed.  

He also finds that the Plaintiff has failed to assert that at any
time the Defendants have actually charged him an usurious interest
rate.  The fact that Synchrony Bank may have charged the Plaintiff
an interest rate in excess of New York's usury laws does not
invalidate the debt sought by Defendants—Synchrony Bank is
located in Utah and thus, New York's usury laws do not apply.
While New York's usury laws apply to Defendants, their attempt to
collect the principal due on the Plaintiff's credit card account
does not implicate New York's usury statutes and does not violate
the FDCPA.  Therefore, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's second cause of action is granted.

Without reaching its merits, the Judge declines to consider the
Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions, because the Defendants
failed to comply with Rule 11's procedural requirements in moving
for sanctions against the Plaintiff.

Although the Plaintiff's second cause of action appears to be based
upon an unfounded legal theory, the Judge does not find "clear
evidence" that the Plaintiff or his counsel acted in bad faith in
asserting this claim.  The Plaintiff's misunderstanding of the law
may have resulted in the assertion of a meritless cause of action,
but this alone is not grounds for the imposition of sanctions.
Accordingly, he declines to impose any award of sanctions on the
Defendants' behalf.

Finally, because the Plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's
fees is not warranted, the Judge denies the Plaintiff's
cross-motion for sanctions.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolford dismissed as moot the
Defendants' first and amended motions to dismis; (ii) granted the
Defendants' third motion to dismiss; and (iii) denied the
Defendants' and the Plaintiff's respective requests for sanctions.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/FNm8B7 from Leagle.com.

Alex J. Cole, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Jerome Douglas --
alex@lawroc.com -- Douglas Firm, P.C.

Stephen Einstein & Associates, P.C. & Second Round, L.P., d/b/a
Third Round, L.P., Defendants, represented by Hilary F. Korman --
hkorman@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, Scott Evan Wortman --
swortman@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP & Andrea Marie Roberts --
aroberts@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP.


SUKHMANI INC: Vladimir Svirodiv Sues over Tip Skimming
------------------------------------------------------
VLADIMIR SVIRIDOV, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective, the
Plaintiffs and the Class, the Plaintiff, vs SUKHMANI INC. d/b/a
TAMARIND, and AVTAR SINGH WALIA, the Defendants, Case No.
151462/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 11, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum wage and overtime due to invalid tip credit, illegal
retention of gratuities, statutory penalties, and liquidated
damages under the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor Standards
Act

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all non-exempt tipped
employees (including servers, bussers, food runners, among others)
employed by the Defendants at their restaurant on or after the date
that is six years before the filing of the complaint. With regard
to the Plaintiff and the Class, the Defendants failed to pay them
the proper minimum wage and overtime because the Defendants were
not entitled to claim any tip credit because they failed to meet
statutory requirements under the New York Labor Law.  The Plaintiff
and the Class suffered from the Defendants' failure to pay minimum
wage and their proper overtime due to the Defendants' invalid tip
credit allowance because the Defendants (i) failed to properly
provide tip credit notice at hiring and annually thereafter, (ii)
implemented an invalid tip pool, (iii) illegally retained
gratuities and (iv) claimed tip credit for all hours worked despite
having caused tipped employees to engage in non-tipped duties for
hours exceeding 20% of the total hours worked each workweek, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016

SYNTER RESOURCE: Violates FDCPA, Yungreis Suit Asserts
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Synter Resource Group
LLC. The case is styled as Philip Yungreis, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Synter
Resource Group LLC and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-05262-FLW-TJB (D.N.J., February 11, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Synter Resource Group, LLC provides accounts receivable management,
first party collections, early intervention, third party
collections, transaction processing, and attorney network services.
It also offers inbound/outbound dispute resolution,
inbound/outbound customer care and customer billing inquiry, master
account updating, and welcome call/new customer orientation
services. The company was founded in 2002 and is based in
Charleston, South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   STEIN SAKS, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601-2726
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



TELEDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS: Faces Trejo Suit in Sacramento
---------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
TeleDirect Communications Inc. The case is captioned as NATALIE
TREJO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. TELEDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS INC.; HOWROYD WRIGHT
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY INC.; and DOES 1-100, Defendant, Case No.
34-2019-00249262-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., Jan. 25,
2019).

TeleDirect Communications, Inc. provides outsourced business
services specializing in inbound and outbound call center services.
The company provides call center services to help clients manage
customer contacts and market their business. The services include
reservation services, lead response management, answering services,
appointment scheduling, product exchanges and support, and
technical support services. It operates call center platform for
unified cloud communication. The company serves the healthcare,
insurance, education, telecommunications, retail, construction,
information technology, media, and financial services industries.
TeleDirect Communications, Inc. was founded in 1961 and is based in
Sacramento, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amir Nayebdadash, Esq.
          PROTECTION LAW GROUP LLP
          136 Main Street, Suite A
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (844) 294-3095
          Facsimile: (866) 264-7880


THOMPSON SECURITY: Underpays Patrol Officers, Krembs Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LYNN F. KREMBS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THOMPSON SECURITY, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-2-02577-8-SEA (Wash. Super., King Cty., Jan. 25, 2019) seeks to
recover from the Defendant unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

The Plaintiff Krembs was employed by the Defendant as patrol
officer.

Thompson Security, LLC provides various security services
throughout Western Washington for residential, corporate,
government and other clients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James B. Pizl, Esq.
          ENTENTE LAW PLLC
          315 Thirty-Ninth Ave. SW Suite 14
          Puyallup, WA 98373-3690
          Telephone: (253) 446-7668


TRANE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Defective HVAC Systems Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned LOUISE LIVINGSTON, MELISSA
RAINEY, DAVID SMITH, RAYMOND SABBATINE, PETER GOLDIS, and BILL
COLBERT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TRANE INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 17-6480 (ES)
(MAH).

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action to recover damages
arising from the Defendant's allegedly defective HVAC systems,
including air conditioners and heat pumps. The Court will set out
facts as they appear in the Complaint. According to the Complaint,
the Defendant's systems contain defective thermal expansion valves.
The defect arises from a chemical rust inhibitor, Ryconox, used in
manufacturing by one of Trane's suppliers.

Count I: Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

The Plaintiffs bring a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(MMWA), on behalf of themselves, the nationwide Class, and the
State Sub-Classes. The MMWA provides a private right of action in
federal court for consumers who are damaged by the failure of a
supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any
obligation under a written or implied warranty.' MMWA claims based
on breaches of express and implied warranties under state law
depend upon those state law claims.

The Plaintiffs' MMWA claim is based on the Defendant's alleged
breaches of express and implied warranties under state law. The
Plaintiffs have complied with the notice requirement of the MMWA
and have adequately stated claims for many of those alleged
breaches of express and implied warranties. The Plaintiffs' MMWA
claim, therefore, may proceed to that extent.  

The Court denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I to the
extent detailed below.  

Count II: Negligent Misrepresentation

The Plaintiffs bring negligent misrepresentation claims on behalf
of themselves and their respective State Sub-Classes. They allege
that the Defendant had and continues to have a duty to disclose the
actual quality of the systems and the defect alleged herein but
that the Defendant negligently and/or recklessly misrepresented,
omitted and concealed from the Plaintiffs and their respective
State Sub-Classes material facts relating to the quality of the
systems.

The Defendant contends that Count II should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Rule 9(b).  

The Court concurs.

Here, in Count II, the Plaintiffs alternatively allege reckless
misrepresentation and accuse the Defendant of concealments and
having concealed from the Plaintiffs. And they repeat and reallege
the allegations contained in the Complaint. Those allegations
include, for instance, that the Defendant knowingly sold defective
systems and foisted significant repair costs onto consumers.

These allegations do not amount to nothing more than negligence
they sound in fraud and Count II does not delineate the allegations
that support the negligence cause of action as distinct from the
alleged fraud. The Court, therefore, rules that Rule 9(b) applies
to Count II.

Here, Plaintiffs never allege when Defendant negligently and/or
recklessly misrepresented and concealed facts relating to the
quality of the systems or when it had a duty to disclose the defect
alleged. The timing is crucial to Count II which affirmatively
alleges that Defendant concealed because Plaintiffs also allege
that Defendant only discovered the defect by the early summer of
2014. The Complaint does not, for instance, allege with
particularity that Defendant had knowledge of the defect at the
time Plaintiffs Colbert, Goldis, Rainey, and Sabbatine purchased
their systems before or during summer 2014.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count II as to Plaintiffs Colbert,
Goldis, Rainey, and Sabbatine without prejudice.  

Separately, Plaintiffs concede that the Economic Loss Doctrine
precludes Plaintiff Smith's and Plaintiff Livingston's negligent
misrepresentation claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count II
as to Plaintiffs Smith and Livingston with prejudice.

Count III: Unjust Enrichment

The Plaintiffs bring unjust enrichment claims on behalf of
themselves and their respective State Sub-Classes, alleging that
Defendant should be required to pay restitution. Generally, unjust
enrichment is an equitable remedy. Under the law of North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massachusetts, that equitable remedy is
not available to plaintiffs who have an adequate remedy at law.  

Here, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs do not have an
equitable remedy at law and, in fact, has arguably suggested the
opposite. Nor does the Complaint appear to to assert claims in the
alternative for unjust enrichment. Apparently to the contrary, each
Count, including Count III, repeats and realleges the allegations
contained above.

Similarly, under Wisconsin law, the doctrine of unjust enrichment
does not apply where the parties have entered into a contract.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the parties have entered into a
contract for instance, Plaintiffs cast their breach of express
warranty claim under Count V as Contract. Therefore, Plaintiffs
Colbert, Goldis, Livingston, Rainey and Smith have not stated a
claim for which relief can be granted.  

Under Kentucky law, in contrast, the Court rules that Plaintiff
Sabbatine has stated a claim. To recover on a claim of unjust
enrichment a plaintiff is required to prove following three
elements: (1) benefit conferred upon a defendant at a plaintiff's
expense (2) a resulting appreciation of benefit by the defendant
and (3) inequitable retention of [that] benefit without payment for
its value.   First, Plaintiffs allege that they conferred a direct
benefit in the form of profits to Defendant yet ended up with
defective systems. Second, Defendant retained these benefits
despite knowing the [systems] contained a material defect. Third,
Defendant's continued retention of the benefit would be unjust and
inequitable because Defendant knew the systems purchased by
Plaintiffs and Class members contained a material defect. Drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of, and construing the Complaint
in the light most favorable to, Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' allegations
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief, under Kentucky
law.  

The Court denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III as to
Plaintiff Sabbatine. And the Court grants the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count III as to Plaintiffs Colbert, Goldis, Livingston,
Rainey and Smith without prejudice.

Count IV: Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Plaintiffs Colbert, Livingston, Rainey, Sabbatine, and Smith bring
claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability on
behalf of themselves and their respective State Sub-Classes. The
Court rules that Plaintiffs Colbert, Rainey, and Smith have stated
a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under
their respective states' laws and DENIES Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count IV accordingly.

Separately, Plaintiffs concede that their implied warranty claims
under Count IV as to Plaintiffs Sabbatine and Livingston may be
dismissed for lack of privity. The Court grants the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Count IV as to Plaintiffs Sabbatine and
Livingston with prejudice.

Count V: Breach of Express Warranty (Contract)

The Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of express warranty on
behalf of themselves and their respective State Sub-Classes. The
Court rules that Plaintiffs Colbert, Livingston, Rainey, Sabbatine,
and Smith have stated claims for breach of express warranty under
their respective states' laws and denies the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count V.

Count VI: Fraudulent Concealment

The Plaintiffs bring fraudulent concealment claims on behalf of
themselves and their respective State Sub-Classes. A plaintiff
asserting a claim for fraudulent concealment must satisfy the
heightened pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b). Like Count II, Count VI must be dismissed under Rule 9(b) for
at least two reasons. First, Plaintiffs never allege when,
Defendant intentionally suppressed and concealed the defect or had
a duty to disclose that its systems were defective. The when is
crucial to Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claim because
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant only "discovered the defect by the
early summer of 2014. The complaint does not allege with
particularity that Defendant had knowledge of the defect at the
time Plaintiffs Colbert, Goldis, Rainey, and Sabbatine purchased
their systems before or during summer 2014. Therefore, the
Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts showing that Defendant
was aware of the alleged defects prior to the sales at issue in
this litigation.

Second, in order to satisfy Rule 9(b), a complaint must provide the
what of the events at issue. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant
intentionally suppressed and concealed the defect and Defendant
knew or recklessly disregarded that its representations were false,
yet do not specify what defect or which representations they are
referring to in those allegations. The Complaint thus fails to
identify what misrepresentations were made and how those alleged
misrepresentations were material.

The Court grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count VI as to
Plaintiffs Colbert, Goldis, Rainey, and Sabbatine without
prejudice.  

Separately, the Plaintiffs concede that the Economic Loss Doctrine
precludes the claims of Plaintiffs Smith and Livingston. The Court
grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count VI as to Plaintiffs
Livingston and Smith with prejudice.

Count VII: Violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act

Plaintiff Rainey brings a claim for violation of the North Carolina
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, on behalf of herself and
the North Carolina State Sub-Class. In Count VI, Plaintiffs brought
a fraud claim outright; they also brought this section 75-1.1 claim
apparently predicated on precisely the same alleged
misrepresentations. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Section 75-1.1 claim is
explicitly based on Defendant's having concealed and failed to
disclose an alleged defect, which Plaintiffs call deceptive and
unconscionable. And a paragraph supporting Count VII repeats and
realleges the allegations contained above in the Complaint, which
include, for instance, allegations of fraudulent concealment.  As a
result, "Rule 9(b) applies to Plaintiffs' section 75-1.1 claim,
which is based on Plaintiff Rainey's detrimental reliance on
Defendants' alleged misrepresentations.

The Court must dismiss Count VII under Rule 9(b) for substantially
the same reasons discussed above with respect to Counts II and VI
for instance, that Plaintiffs do not specify when Defendants
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts with respect to each individual
Plaintiff. The Court dismisses Count VII without prejudice.

Count VIII: Violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law

Plaintiff Smith brings a claim for violation of the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), on
behalf of himself and the Pennsylvania State Sub-Class. A UTPCPL
claim based on deceptive conduct differs from a claim based on
fraudulent conduct. Here, Plaintiffs allege that that Defendant
advertised with the intent not to sell as advertised; actively
concealed and intentionally concealed alleged defects; and
purposefully withheld material facts from Plaintiff Smith. And as
with every Count, Plaintiffs also repeat and reallege the
allegations contained above, which include the fraudulent
concealment allegations. Thus Count VIII's theory sounds in fraud
and the Court rules that Rule 9(b) applies to Count VIII.  

The Court must dismiss Count VIII for substantially the same
reasons discussed above with respect to Counts II, VI, and VII for
instance, that Plaintiffs failed to identify when certain allegedly
false representations were made and do not sufficiently allege
facts showing that Defendant was aware of the alleged defects prior
to the sales at issue in this litigation.

Count IX: Violations of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices
Act

Plaintiff Livingston brings a claim for violations of the Wisconsin
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (WDPTA), on behalf of herself and the
Wisconsin State Sub-Class. Count IX alleges that Defendant knew
about the defect; supplied false information; and made untrue,
deceptive, and misleading assertions. Count IX also repeats and
realleges the allegations contained above, which include the
fraudulent concealment allegations. Thus this Wis. Stat. Section
100.18 claim is subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule
9(b). For substantially the same reasons discussed above with
respect to Counts II, VI, VII, and VIII, Plaintiffs' allegations
fall short of complying with Rule 9(b).  For instance, Plaintiffs
failed to specify when Defendant had a duty to disclose to
Livingston and members of the Wisconsin Class the defect in its
systems and do not sufficiently allege facts showing that the
Defendant was aware of the alleged defects prior to the sales at
issue in this litigation.

The Court dismisses Count IX without prejudice.

Count X: Violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

Plaintiff Colbert brings a claim for violations of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. (ICFA), on
behalf of himself and the Illinois State Sub-Class. Count X alleges
that Defendant intended that Colbert and the Illinois Class members
would rely on its deceptive acts; Defendant made deceptive
misrepresentations, concealments, and omissions; and Defendant's
conduct constituted consumer fraud. Count X also repeats and
realleges the allegations contained above, which include the
fraudulent concealment allegations. Like Counts II, VI, VII, VIII,
and IX, the Court must analyze ICFA claims of deception under the
heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), particularly because Count X relies upon the same baseline
allegations as Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claims.  

Counts II, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, the Plaintiffs' allegations in
Count X fall short of complying with Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the
Court dismisses Count X without prejudice.

Count XI: Violations of Massachusetts's Regulation of Business
Practices for Consumer Protection

Plaintiff Goldis brings a claim for violations of Massachusetts's
Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection, Mass.
Gen. Laws, Ch. 93A, et seq., on behalf of himself and the
Massachusetts State Sub-Class.

Count XI alleges that Defendant engaged in countless deceptive acts
and a deceptive scheme to mislead consumers; and that such
violations of [law] were willful and knowing. Count XI also repeats
and realleges the allegations contained above, which include the
fraudulent concealment allegations. As Counts II, VI, VII, VIII,
IX, and X, Count XI is subject to the heightened pleading
requirement. So for substantially the same reasons discussed above,
Plaintiffs' allegations fall short of complying with Rule 9(b).

The Court dismisses Count XI without prejudice.

Count XII: Violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act

Plaintiff Sabbatine brought a claim for violations of the Kentucky
Consumer Protection, on behalf of himself and the Kentucky State
Sub-Class.  But the Plaintiffs concede that Mr. Sabbatine's claim
as currently pled is barred by that statute's two-year limitation.
The Court grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Count XII
without prejudice.

Count XIII: Breach of Express Warranty (North Carolina)

Plaintiff Rainey, a resident of North Carolina, brings a claim for
breach of express warranty under N.C.G.S. Section 25-2-313, on
behalf of herself and the North Carolina State Sub-Class. The facts
pertinent to this claim are described directly below in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Rainey purchased a new system from a third-party company,
which also installed the system. In making her decision to
purchase, Plaintiff Rainey researched the system and reviewed
product information provided by the distributor and on Trane's
website, which did not state that Trane's systems contained a
chemical contaminant that would cause them to cease functioning
soon after installation. Defendant then failed to replace
contaminated oil and clogged TXVs and, instead, instructed service
personnel to inject MJ-X, which causes damage and further devalued
the system and did not remedy the underlying defect. Because the
system was beginning to fail, Plaintiff Rainey paid the third-party
company that sold her the system $300 to inject the system with
MJ-X pursuant to Trane's recommendation.

Here, similarly, Plaintiffs' allegations plausibly establish the
three relevant elements. First, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant
dispute the existence of an express warranty as to a fact or
promise relating to the goods. The Express Warranty, Plaintiffs
allege, warrants the systems against manufacturing defects and
warrants that Defendant would provide adequate repairs required as
a result of manufacturing defects by replacing parts. Second,
Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Rainey, in making her decision to
purchase a system, researched the system and reviewed product
information and reviewed and relied upon the statements contained
in Defendant's marketing and warranty materials. And third,
Plaintiff Rainey alleges that her system began to fail because of a
manufacturing defect, sticking TXV; Defendant denied that there was
a manufacturing defect, did not replace the TXV and instructed
service personnel to inject the defective systems with MJ-X, which
damages and devalues; and she suffered damages as a result.

The Court denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count XIII.

Count XIV: Breach of Implied Warranty (North Carolina)

Plaintiff Rainey brings a claim for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability under N.C.G.S. Section 25-2-314, on behalf of
herself and the North Carolina State Sub-Class.  

A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind.  Goods to be merchantable must be at least such
as to pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description and fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used.

Here, first, Plaintiff Rainey's system is a good. Defendant is a
merchant with respect to goods of the kind purchased by Rainey
Plaintiff and the Express Warranty specifically contemplates that
her system is subject to the implied warranty of merchantability
but that it is limited in duration.

Second, Plaintiff Rainey has plausibly alleged that her system was
defective at the time of sale, because the defect arises from a
chemical rust inhibitor" installed before the system was sold.
Importantly, a good can be defective at the time of sale even if it
functions for several years after the sale.  

Third and fourth, the defect allegedly present at the time of sale
caused Plaintiff Rainey's system to begin to fail, leading her to
incur several hundreds of dollars in damages. Thus Plaintiff Rainey
did allege how the product was not fit for its ordinary use
contrary to Defendant's assertion. Therefore, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of, and construing the Complaint in
the light most favorable to, Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' allegations
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief, under North
Carolina law.  

Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Count XIV.

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycclbwpg from Leagle.com.

LOUISE LIVINGSTON, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, MELISSA RAINEY, On behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, DAVID SMITH, On behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, RAYMOND SABBATINE, On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, PETER GOLDIS, On
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated & BILL
COLBERT, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by TIMOTHY N. MATHEWS, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & JAMES C. SHAH -- jshah@sfmslaw.com
-- SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP.

TRANE U.S. INC., Defendant, represented by SHANA EVE RUSSO --
srusso@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.


TYME TECHNOLOGIES: March 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Jan. 28 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Tyme Technologies, Inc. ("Tyme" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: TYME) and certain of its officers. The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, and docketed under 19-cv-00843, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Tyme securities between March 14, 2018 and
January 18, 2019, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"),
seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company
and certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Tyme securities between
March 14, 2018, and January 18, 2019, both dates inclusive, you
have until March 29, 2019, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead
Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and number of shares purchased.

Tyme is a clinical-stage biotechnology company that develops novel
cancer therapeutics. The Company was founded in 2011 and is
headquartered in New York, New York. Tyme is currently developing
SM-88, a combination therapy based on dysfunctional metyrosine
derivatives for metastatic pancreatic cancer and
biomarker-recurrent prostate cancer.

On March 14, 2018, Tyme announced that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") had accepted its Investigational New Drug
("IND") application to initiate the Company's Phase II clinical
trial for SM-88 in pancreatic cancer (the "Phase II Study").

On March 27, 2018, Tyme commenced a Phase II Study of SM-88,
officially titled "A Phase II Multi-Center Study of SM-88 in
Subjects With Pancreatic Cancer Whose Disease Has Progressed or
Recurred After/on First Line Chemotherapy" (the "Phase II Study").

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Tyme had not adequately
designed the Phase II Study to present reliable results on the
efficacy of SM-88 on pancreatic cancer; (ii) Tyme had failed to
include an appropriate control group in its open-label Phase II
clinical trial for SM-88; (iii) the omission of an appropriate
control group distorted the reliability of data showing the
efficacy of SM-88 in the Phase II Study; and (iv) as a result,
Tyme's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On January 18, 2019, Tyme reported results from the Phase II Study.
Although Tyme characterized the results as positive, stating that
SM-88 "improves survival," the trial did not include a control
group, and Tyme's announcement merely compared survival data to
historical controls. Market commentators were quick to highlight
this glaring deficiency in the Phase II Study.

On this news, Tyme's stock price fell $1.32 per share, or 35.39%,
to close at $2.41 per share on January 18, 2019.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Florida, and Los Angeles, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members. [GN]


U.S. SPECIALTY: Court Partially Grants Summary Judgment in Jonas
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of Delaware issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned IDT CORPORATION and HOWARD
JONAS, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, and XL SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. C.A. No. N18C-03-032 PRW CCLD.
(Del.).

Plaintiffs IDT Corporation and Howard Jonas seek declaratory relief
and damages for breach of contract against Defendant Insurers U.S.
Specialty Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company
of Pittsburgh, PA, and XL Specialty Insurance Company, allegedly
arising from those insurers' obligations to cover costs IDT and
Jonas incurred in a Delaware Court of Chancery case In re Straight
Path Communications Inc. Consolidated Stockholder Litigation,No.
2017-0486-SG (Del. Ch.) (Straight Path Action).

THE STRAIGHT PATH ACTION

Straight Path was spun-off from IDT (Spin-Off). One of Jonas's
sons, Davidi Jonas, served as Straight Path's CEO and President at
the time of the Spin-Off. Under the Spin-Off's terms, Straight Path
common stocks were distributed pro rata to IDT stockholders,
including Jonas, who maintained voting control of Straight Path
through a dual-class structure. In fact, the Spin-Off resulted in
Jonas retaining complete voting control over both IDT and Straight
Path.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court cannot grant any party's motion for summary judgment
under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 56 unless no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a
material fact in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire
thoroughly into the facts to clarify the application of the law to
the circumstances.

APPLICABLE RULES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION FOR INSURANCE POLICIES

Insurance policies are contracts. It is a well-established
principle that under Delaware law, the interpretation of
contractual language, including that of insurance policies, is a
question of law. The objective is to give effect to the parties'
mutual intent at the time of contracting. In construing the
language of a contract, the Court should interpret the language in
the same manner as it would be understood by an objective,
reasonable third party. Absent ambiguity, all contract terms
including those in insurance policies should be accorded their
plain, ordinary meaning. A contract term is not ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree on its meaning. Rather, ambiguity
exists when the disputed term is fairly or reasonably susceptible
to more than one meaning.

THE TERMS OF THE U.S. SPECIALTY POLICY

Insuring Agreement (B) of the U.S. Specialty's policy states as
follows:

     "(B) The Insurer will pay to or on behalf of the Company Loss
arising from: (1) Claims90 first made during the Policy Period or
the Discovery Period (if applicable) against the Insured Persons
for Wrongful Acts, if the Company has paid such Loss to or on
behalf of the Insured Persons as indemnification or advancement
and/or(2) Securities Claims first made during the Policy Period or
the Discovery Period (if applicable) against the Company for
Wrongful Acts."

Put more succinctly, U.S. Specialty is liable for the Losses
incurred by IDT for (1) Claims against an Insured Person for
Wrongful Acts and (2) Securities Claims against the Company for
Wrongful Acts. A look at each of the foregoing defined terms in the
U.S. Specialty policy is necessary to determine whether U.S.
Specialty's duty to pay defense costs has been triggered by the
Straight Path Action.

U.S. SPECIALTY HAS THE DUTY TO DEFEND JONAS IN THE STRAIGHT PATH
ACTION BECAUSE HIS ACTIONS CONSTITUTE WRONGFUL ACTS.

The first question is whether Jonas is an Insured Person who has
engaged in Wrongful Acts through the conduct alleged in the
Straight Path Action. The U.S. Specialty policy defines an Insured
Person, in relevant part, as any past, present or future director
or officer of the Company. The Company is IDT. Under those
definitions, Jonas is an Insured Person under the U.S. Specialty
policy. He was the Chairman of IDT's board of directors during the
events that spawned the Straight Path Action.

As an Insured Person under the U.S. Specialty policy, Jonas must be
covered if the actions alleged in the Straight Path Action
constitute Wrongful Acts. The U.S. Specialty policy defines
Wrongful Act to include any:

     "(1) actual or alleged act, error, misstatement, misleading
statement, neglect, omission or breach of duty: (a) by an Insured
Person in his capacity as such, including while acting as a
Controlling Person, or (b) with respect only to Securities Claims,
by the Company or (2) matter claimed against an Insured Person
solely by reason of his or her service in such capacity."

Central to the current dispute is the first defined type of
Wrongful Act. The Court finds the terms of the U.S. Specialty
policy unambiguous. Its plain language is not susceptible to more
than one meaning. So, to construe the meaning of Wrongful Act, the
Court gives the policy's words their plain, ordinary meaning.

Jonas Acted in His Insured Capacity that Gave Rise to the Straight
Path Action

To be a Wrongful Act under the U.S. Specialty policy, the conduct
must be taken by an Insured Person in his capacity as such. Because
Jonas' Insured Person status is based on his position as IDT's
Chairman, his insured capacity must necessarily derive from acts
taken in his capacity as IDT's Chairman. On this the parties agree.
The parties dispute, however, whether the conduct must be taken in,
and solely in, Jonas's capacity as IDT's Chairman, and not in his
capacity as Straight Path's controlling stockholder.

In determining whether the duty to defend and advance defense costs
is triggered, the Court must examine whether the underlying
complaint alleges facts that fall within the scope of coverage.
Although the Court looks to the allegations of the underlying
complaint, the Court is not limited to the plaintiff's unilateral
characterization of the nature of its claims. Rather, the Court
reviews the complaint as a whole and considers all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the alleged facts. The key is
whether the allegations of the complaint, when read as a whole,
assert a risk within the coverage of the policy.

Read as a whole, the Straight Path Action, paints a picture of
Jonas singlehandedly furthering his own and IDT's interests at the
expense of Straight Path and its stockholders. In examining the
nature of the claims and alleged acts, the Court finds that the
Underlying Complaint has sufficiently asserted a risk within the
coverage of the U.S. Specialty policy. That is, Jonas took the
alleged wrongful actions he did for the benefit of IDT and himself
in his capacity as the Chairman of IDT. The fact that Jonas may at
the same time also be a controlling stockholder of Straight Path
and breaching his concomitant fiduciary duties there does not mean
that his actions weren't taken in his capacity as an IDT officer.
Had U.S. Specialty intended the coverage to be so limited, it
should have, and could have, drafted the policy accordingly.

U.S. SPECIALTY HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND IDT BECAUSE THE STRAIGHT PATH
ACTION IS NOT A SECURITIES CLAIM

Under the U.S. Specialty policy, Securities Claim means a Claim
which:

     "(1) is brought by or on behalf of one or more securities
holders of the Company in their capacity as such, or (2) arises
from the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any
securities issued by the Company, whether such purchase, sale or
offer involves a transaction with the Company or occurs in the open
market."

IDT argues that the Straight Path Action is a Securities Claim
under both definitions.122 U.S. Specialty contends that the
Straight Path Action satisfies neither.

The Straight Path Action is Not a Securities Claim Because It Was
Brought by Straight Path's Securities Holders, not IDT.

To fall under the first part of the definition of a Securities
Claim, a claim must be brought by securities holders of the
Company. The U.S. Specialty policy defines Company to include the
Named Corporation, here IDT, and any Subsidiary thereof.  

Because the Straight Path Action is brought by securities holders
of Straight Path, the Straight Path Action can only be a Securities
Claim under the first provision if Straight Path is a Subsidiary of
IDT during the relevant time period.

IDT doesn't deny that it ceased to hold more than 50% of the voting
rights of Straight Path after the 2013 Spin-Off. Nevertheless, it
argues, Straight Path continues to qualify as IDT's Subsidiary
under the policy because Straight Path's role as a Subsidiary
pre-Spin-Off is central to the Straight Path Action. Put another
way, IDT proposes that a former subsidiary of IDT is within the
meaning of Subsidiary under the U.S. Specialty policy so long as
the former subsidiary's role is purportedly pivotal to the
Underlying Complaint. This Court can't buy into IDT's attempted
rewrite of the policy's terms.

In construing the term Subsidiary, the Court finds that the policy
language is clear and unambiguous and must, therefore, afford those
terms their plain and ordinary meaning. The policy language
provides that an entity qualifies as a Subsidiary under the policy
if IDT owns more than 50% of its voting rights. That entity ceases
to be a Subsidiary when IDT no longer owns more than 50% of its
voting rights.

The Court rejects IDT's proposed rewriting of its terms and finds
that as of the effective date of the 2013 Spin-Off, Straight Path
ceased to be a Subsidiary of IDT. The Wrongful Acts alleged in the
Straight Path Action took place in 2017 four years after Straight
Path ceased to be a subsidiary of IDT when IDT is alleged to have
aided and abetted Straight Path's release of its Indemnification
Claim. Therefore, Straight Path does not fall within the definition
of Company.

The Straight Path Action does not constitute a Securities Claim
under the first part of the definition because the Straight Path
Action was not brought by IDT's securities holders.

The Straight Path Action is Not a Securities Claim Because a
Spin-Off is Not a Sale of Securities

IDT's posits that the Spin-Off is a sale of securities. Yet federal
and various state courts have consistently held that a spin-off is
not a purchase or sale of securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act of 1933 because it does not affect a fundamental
change in the stockholders' holdings. Moreover, the word spin-off
is merely a short-hand term used in corporate transactional
parlance for a certain type of dividend. That is, one in which a
parent corporation distributes all of the shares of one of its
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations to its existing stockholders.
Under 8 Del. C. Section 173, dividends may be paid in cash, in
property, or in shares of the corporation's capital stock.
Accordingly, in Delaware statutory terms, a spin-off is a dividend
paid in the property of the parent corporation, not a sale of its
securities.

Accordingly, IDT's argument that the Spin-Off here was a sale of
securities fails. The Court finds that the Straight Path Action
does not implicate a Securities Claim under any natural reading of
the definition. And so, U.S. Specialty is not obligated to provide
for IDT's defense in the Straight Path Action.

IDT and Jonas's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against U.S.
Specialty is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's January 31, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycmymkf5 from Leagle.com.

Brian M. Rostocki, Esquire -- brostocki@reedsmith.com -- Benjamin
P. Chapple, Esquire -- bchapple@reedsmith.com --  Reed Smith LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, Robin L. Cohen, Esquire --
rcohen@mckoolsmith.com -- (pro hac vice), Keith McKenna, Esquire --
kmckenna@mckoolsmith.com --  (pro hac vice) (argued), McKool Smith,
P.C., New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

John C. Phillips, Jr., Esquire -- jcp@pgmhlaw.com -- David A.
Bilson, Esquire -- dab@pgmhlaw.com -- Phillips, Goldman, McLaughlin
& Hall, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Alexander R. Karam, Esquire --
alex.karam@clydeco.us -- (pro hac vice) (argued), Addison Draper,
Esquire -- addison.draper@clydeco.us -- (pro hac vice), Clyde & Co
US LLP, Washington, DC, Attorneys for Defendant U.S. Specialty
Insurance Company.


UNION PACIFIC: Court Certifies Class in Harris Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, QUINTON HARRIS, GEOFFREY MILLER, NORMAN MOUNT, SCOTT
ZINN, THOMAS TAYLOR, and JOHN BAKER, Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 8:16CV381 (D. Neb.), Judge
Hoseph F. Bataillon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Union Pacific has a company-wide Fitness-for-Duty ("FFD") program.
In 2014, it made changes to this program.  Employees in certain
positions under the new policy are required to disclose specific
health conditions, and the newly implemented policy automatically
excludes employees who disclosed these conditions from employment.
These employees then had to have a fitness for duty evaluation, and
according to the Plaintiffs, Union Pacific routinely ignores the
medical opinions of outside doctors.  The records are sent to Dr.
John Holland in Olympia, Washington, and his support staff.  Dr.
Holland and his staff do not do a physical evaluation, but he and
his designees make all decisions regarding who is fit for duty.

The Plaintiffs are all previous employees of Union Pacific.  Many
had worked for years and were allegedly qualified and performing
their jobs with no problems.  They were pulled from their jobs
under Union Pacific's new program, evaluated, and then excluded
from their positions at Union Pacific, even though, they argue,
they had no trouble fulfilling the essential functions of their
jobs. Plaintiffs challenge Union Pacific's policy of removing
employees from their jobs based on an arbitrary and
scientifically-unsound 1% Rule regarding the risk of sudden
incapacitation.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs assert three class
claims under the ADA on behalf of themselves and putative class
members: (1) disparate treatment - alleging that through its
Fitness-for-Duty program, Union Pacific engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination by implementing qualification standards
and other criteria that screen out individuals with disabilities;
(2) disparate impact - alleging that the Fitness-for-Duty program
had an adverse impact on individuals with disabilities by, for
example, screening them out or tending to screen them out of work;
and (3) unlawful medical inquiry - alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.
Section 12112(d)(4)(A), which provides that an employer will not
require a medical examination and will not make inquiries of an
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability,
unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.

The Plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of the proposed class of all
individuals who were removed from service over their objection,
and/or suffered another adverse employment action, during their
employment with Union Pacific for reasons related to a
Fitness-for-Duty evaluation at any time from 300 days before the
earliest date that a named Plaintiff filed an administrative charge
of discrimination to the resolution of the action.

The Plaintiffs move to certify the class to include all individuals
who have been or will be subject to a fitness-for-duty examination
as a result of a reportable health event at any time from Sept. 18,
2014 until the final resolution of the action.

Judge Bataillon finds that the case involves a single, uniform
reportable events policy.  He agrees with the Plaintiffs that the
Eighth Circuit has not joined the Third Circuit in requiring a
stronger administrative feasibility requirement.  Rather, the
Eighth Circuit simply requires that a class must be adequately
defined and clearly ascertainable. A class may be ascertainable
when its members may be identified by reference to objective
criteria.

He also agrees that where a pattern-or-practice of discrimination
is going to be tried, followed by a trial on injuries and members
of the class who wish to make claims, a Teamsters analysis is an
appropriate one.  In that regard, the Court in Teamsters stated
that the plaintiff is not required to offer evidence that each
person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the
employer's discriminatory policy. Instead, the focus will be on a
pattern of discriminatory decision making.  Further, the documents
incorporating the policy in question in the case show that sudden
incapacitation work restrictions are both standard and uniform.
Dr. Holland agreed that these work restrictions do not vary by
position and that the standard work restrictions are in fact
standard.

Finally, the Court made mention in its previous order regarding
class action status, that the case might be appropriate for
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).  These are
referred to as "hybrid" class actions.  The Court, after thoroughly
reviewing the alleged facts and law finds the hybrid trial plan
will best meet the needs of this case.  The parties will litigate
liability and injunctive relief in Phase One of the trial.  Then,
in Phase Two, the parties will litigate damages and other remaining
issues through individual hearings, or group hearings as
appropriate, or by stipulations of the parties.  This model is
consistent with litigating class discrimination cases as set forth
under Teamsters.  The Judge will certify liability and injunctive
relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and will certify the back pay and
compensatory damages under Rule 23(b)(3).  He will adopt the
proposed trial plan as outlined by the Plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bataillon granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.  He certified liability and
injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and back pay and compensatory
damages under Rule 23(b)(3).

The Judge certified the class to consist of all individuals who
have been or will be subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a
result of a reportable health event at any time from Sept.r 18,
2014 until the final resolution of the action.

He approved notice to the class by U.S. mail, in the form proposed
by the Plaintiffs.  He appointed the Plaintiffs as the class
representatives and the Plaintiffs' counsel Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/ASMFlM from Leagle.com.

Quinton Harris, Geoffrey Miller, Norman Mount, Scott Zinn, Thomas
Taylor & John Baker, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony S. Petru --
petru@hmnlaw.com -- HILDEBRAND, MCLEOD LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Charles A. Delbridge -- cdelbridge@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, Corey L. Stull -- cstull@atwoodlawyers.com --
ATWOOD, HOLSTEN LAW FIRM, David E. Schlesinger --
schlesinger@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
James H. Kaster -- kaster@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Laura Baures -- lbaures@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, Lindsey E. Krause, NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Neil D. Pederson -- npederson@nka.com -- NICHOLS,
KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nicholas D. Thompson --
nthompson@moodyrrlaw.com -- MOODY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice & Robert
L. Schug -- schug@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant, represented by Allison
D. Balus -- abalus@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM,
Christopher R. Hedican -- chedican@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW
FIRM, David P. Kennison -- dkennison@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, Leigh C. Joyce -- lcampbell@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM & Scott P. Moore -- spmoore@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.


UNITED STATES: Court Enjoins MAVNI Continuous Monitoring Program
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Request
for Permanent Injunction in the case captioned KIRTI TIWARI; SEUNG
YOON YANG; AMANDEEP SINGH; DUNCAN MAKAU; VALDETA MEHANJA; RAJ
CHETTRI; THONG NGUYEN; XI CUI; RAJAT KAUSHIK; BLERTA MEHANJA;
MENGMENG CAI; SANDEEP SINGH; FLEURY NGANTCHOP KEIGNI DI SATCHOU;
KAUSHAL WADHWANI; ANGELITA ACEBES; KUSUMA NIO; and QI XIONG,
Plaintiffs, v. JAMES MATTIS, Secretary, United States Department of
Defense, in his official capacity, Defendant. No. C17-242 TSZ.
(W.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the NIAC requirements
unconstitutionally discriminate against them on the basis of
national origin, and they seek injunctive and equitable relief.

The Plaintiffs are seventeen (17) United States citizens who are or
were, at the time trial commenced, serving in the United States
Army. They each enlisted through the Military Accessions Vital to
the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which was implemented in
fiscal year (FY) 2009 to address difficulties the Department of
Defense (DoD) had experienced in recruiting individuals with either
proficiency in critical foreign languages5 or specialized
healthcare training.

The Defendant counters that the DoD's unequal treatment of citizens
who were recruited through the MAVNI program survives
constitutional challenge because either (i) it is premised on the
manner through which the individuals enlisted in the Army rather
than on those citizens' national origin; or (ii) if an inherently
suspect classification is implicated, the DoD's actions are
necessary and precisely tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest, namely national security.

The Court concludes that strict scrutiny must be applied to the
challenged DoD policies.

Government action that distinguishes among citizens on the basis of
national origin is inherently suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny. To satisfy strict scrutiny (i) the use of a suspect
classification must bear a close relationship to the promotion of a
compelling governmental interest (ii) the use of such
classification must be necessary to achieve such interest, and
(iii) the means or procedures used must be precisely tailored to
serve such interest.

Contemporaneous Discrimination Against Foreign Nationals

All military personnel must undergo background investigations but
the October 2017 policy treated lawful permanent residents and
citizens differently, allowing the latter, but not the former, to
ship to basic training before completion of the required
investigations. The DoD's stated purpose for the disparate
treatment of lawful permanent residents was to facilitate process
efficiency and the appropriate sharing of information for security
risk based suitability and security decisions for the accession of
foreign nationals. Given the DoD's explicit reference to
nationality in a similar policy simultaneously announced,
defendant's contention that the DoD was concerned solely about the
targeting of the MAVNI program lacks credibility. The Court
concludes plaintiffs have shown all that they need to prove,
specifically that national origin was a motivating factor in the
DoD's disparate treatment of MAVNI recruits.  

Discrimination Against Less Than All Members of the Class

The Defendant also argues that the NIAC requirements applied only
to MAVNI personnel are facially neutral because they do not extend
to aliens who are lawful permanent residents or to naturalized
citizens who did not enlist through the MAVNI program, and they
therefore distinguish on the basis of military accession as opposed
to national origin. In essence, defendant asserts that, because the
discrimination is not complete, it is not subject to strict
scrutiny, but defendant cites no authority to support this
proposition, which runs contrary to equal protection jurisprudence.


In Huynh, the plaintiffs challenged a DoD regulation that denied
security clearance to naturalized citizens who were born or resided
for a significant period in one of 29 or 30 countries, unless they
had been United States citizens for five years or United States
residents for ten years.   In granting a preliminary injunction
enjoining enforcement of the regulation, the Huynh Court concluded
that strict scrutiny was proper, even though the regulation applied
to only a subset of naturalized citizens, namely those from the
enumerated countries who had not yet satisfied the chronological
requirements. Huynh undermines defendant's contention that rational
basis review is appropriate in this matter, not only because it
contradicts defendant's assertion that discrimination against a
subset of a protected class should receive less scrutiny than
discrimination against all members of the class, but also because
it belies defendant's suggestion that the MAVNI policies at issue
are somehow outliers in the DoD's approach to restricting
eligibility for security clearances.

The Court finds that, contrary to the defendant's denials, the DoD
focused on MAVNI status as a proxy for national origin.

Proof of Discriminatory Animus Not Required

In a different approach aimed at receiving the benefit of rational
basis review, defendant asserts that, absent proof of
discriminatory animus or motive, the NIAC components of continuous
monitoring and security clearance protocols merely have a
disproportionate impact on a protected group and cannot rise to the
level of an equal protection violation. The Defendant's analysis is
flawed because it assumes, without demonstrating, that the
continuous monitoring and more rigorous security clearance
requirements are facially neutral, and it therefore relies on
inapposite authorities.

When the government classifies persons on the basis of race,
national origin, or similar immutable characteristic, a plaintiff
challenging such action in a lawsuit need not make an extrinsic
showing of discriminatory animus .to trigger strict scrutiny.
Moreover, strict scrutiny applies even when the reason for the
differential treatment is benign, for example, preferences in
academic admissions, government contracting, election
redistricting, as well as when the protected attribute is just one
of several factors in a government decision. Finally, a suspect
classification need not be stated explicitly to warrant strict
scrutiny.  

The Evidence Establishes Any Required Animus

In Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977)), faced with a challenge to the Village's denial of
a rezoning request, the Supreme Court observed that, when a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in a decision,
the legislative or administrative body is no longer entitled to
judicial deference. Determining whether an improper animus played a
role in the official action demands a sensitive inquiry into the
available direct and circumstantial evidence, which may include
whether one race (or protected group) is more heavily impacted than
another. This factor alone might be determinative (as in the case
of the MAVNI-centric policies at issue), but if not, courts may
look to other evidence. Among other considerations of possible
relevance are (i) the historical background of the decision at
issue, (ii) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged action (iii) departures from normal procedures (iv)
substantive departures, particularly when the factors usually
considered important would strongly favor a decision contrary to
the one reached and (v) legislative or administrative history,
especially statements made contemporaneously with the allegedly
unconstitutional decision, meeting minutes, or reports.  

Applying Strict Scrutiny

Compelling Interest

The Plaintiffs do not quarrel with the concept that national
security is a compelling governmental interest, but they have cast
doubt on the value of certain evidence on which defendant has
relied in alleging a threat to national security. In a declaration
filed in connection with motion practice, the DoD's Chief of
Personnel Security, Roger Smith, indicated that a number of
individuals accessed into the military through the MAVNI program
based on receiving fraudulent visas to attend universities that did
not exist. The only example Mr. Smith could provide at trial
concerned the University of Northern New Jersey, which was a fake
school created by the Department of Homeland Security as part of a
sting operation aimed at trapping brokers who were unlawfully
referring foreign students to academic institutions for a fee.

The Court is unimpressed with any assertion that MAVNI recruits who
were deceived by an agency of the United States into believing that
they were enrolled in, or engaged in either curricular or optional
practical training through, a legitimate school constituted a
threat to national security.

Mr. Smith's declaration also referenced a MAVNI enlistee who said
he would voluntarily help China in a crisis situation. During
trial, Mr. Smith agreed that this individual was the subject of a
DoD PowerPoint slide, which indicated that this person declined to
become a naturalized United States citizen (and thus, is not
similarly situated to plaintiffs), admitted to being a communist
and loving socialism, identified himself as Josef Stalin, wore old
foreign military (Nazi) apparel, and was removed from campus
housing and suspended from a university after a search revealed
several non-functioning firearms and a bayonet. While this person
(and others like him) might pose a risk to community safety,
defendant has not shown how he or similar individuals would escape
detection through the MAVNI, or even the more lax non-MAVNI,
enlistment protocols, and thus, defendant's reliance on this
example as evidence that MAVNI soldiers constitute a national
security threat is unpersuasive.

Neither Necessary Nor Precisely Tailored

The Plaintiffs contend that the continuous monitoring program and
the enhanced security clearance protocols for MAVNI personnel are
both overbroad and underinclusive, and thus, do not bear a
sufficiently narrow relationship to national security. The Court
agrees. The Court notes that plaintiffs, who all accessed after
February 2012, already underwent investigations that were beyond
what anyone else seeking the highest levels of security clearance
must endure, and they did so just to enlist and obtain a favorable
Military Service Suitability Determination.

The Defendant has offered no statistical basis or other evidence to
support a theory that a subsequent biennial NIAC (as part of a
continuous monitoring system or a security clearance application)
would reveal national security concerns somehow left unexposed by
the SSBI/Tier 5, NIAC, and CIFSR performed upon recruitment.
Moreover, defendant has provided no explanation for engaging in
flagrant profiling, i.e., equating MAVNI status with national
security risk, rather than justifying on a case-by-case basis the
heightened monitoring or screening that the DoD wishes to conduct.
Indeed, as conceded by defendant's witnesses, no citizen who
accessed into the Army through the MAVNI program has ever been
charged or convicted of any criminal offense or been denaturalized,
and defendant has offered no evidence that espionage or similar
activity is so rampant among MAVNI personnel who have attained
citizenship that a departure from the usual standard of
particularized suspicion is necessary.  

Accordingly, the Court enters the following permanent injunction:
the Defendant and the United States Department of Defense are
enjoined from requiring, in the absence of individualized
suspicion, a biennial series of National Intelligence Agency Checks
for continuous monitoring or security clearance eligibility
purposes with respect to any citizen affiliated with the DoD who
accessed into the United States Army through the Military
Accessions Vital to the National Interest program.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb8culkr from Leagle.com.

Kirti Tiwari, Seung Yoon Yang, Amandeep Singh, Duncan Makau,
Valdeta Mehanja, Raj Chettri, Blerta Mehanja, Rajat Kaushik, Thong
Nguyen, Sandeep Singh, Xi Cui, Mengmeng Cai, Kusuma Nio, Qi Xiong,
Angelita Acebes, Fleury Ngantchop Keigni Di Satchou & Kaushal
Wadhwani, Plaintiffs, represented by Neil T. O'Donnell, CASCADIA
CROSS BORDERLAW GROUP LLC, pro hac vice & Joseph R. Shaeffer --
jeo@mhb.com -- MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS.

Patrick Shanahan, Acting Secretary, United States Department of
Defense, in his official capacity, Defendant, represented by Joseph
C. Dugan , US DEPT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DEVISION, FEDERAL PROGRAMS
BRANCH, Michael Fraser Knapp, US DEPT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DEVISION,
FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH & Nathan M. Swinton, US DEPT OF JUSTICE
CIVIL DIVISION, FEDERAL PROGRAMS BRANCH.


UNITED STATES: Hadley Alleges Breach of Civil Rights Act
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United States of
America. The case is styled as Leonard Hadley, on his own behalf
and on behalf of all other African Americans similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. United States of America, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00197-JPG-GCS (S.D. Ill., February 13, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as Other Civil
Rights.

The U.S. is a country of 50 states covering a vast swath of North
America, with Alaska in the northwest and Hawaii extending the
nation's presence into the Pacific Ocean. Major Atlantic Coast
cities are New York, a global finance and culture center, and
capital Washington, DC. Midwestern metropolis Chicago is known for
influential architecture and on the west coast, Los Angeles'
Hollywood is famed for filmmaking.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



UNITED STATES: Judge Rejects Challenge Over Unpaid Shutdown Work
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Ryan, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
denying federal employees a pass on working unpaid during the
government shutdown, a federal judge ruled on Jan. 15 that bending
to their demands would be "profoundly irresponsible" and throw the
nation into "disarray."

"At best it would create chaos and confusion," U.S. District Judge
Richard Leon said from the bench. "At worst, it could be
catastrophic."

Judge Leon acknowledged the difficult position in which the
shutdown has placed federal workers, who started missing paychecks,
but said he could not grant the relief they were after. He said
blocking the government from forcing employees to come in without
pay could cause major disruptions to crucial government
operations.

"It's hard not to empathize with the plaintiffs' positions," said
Judge Leon, an appointee of President George W. Bush. "They're not
the ones at fault here."

Judge Leon issued his verdict after more than an hour of arguments
on Jan. 15 from three different groups of employees and unions who
brought suits in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia after the shutdown began on Dec. 22.

Each group of employees asserted slightly different claims and
asked Leon for somewhat different relief, but all at least
requested a temporary restraining order that, among other things,
would stop the government from forcing certain employees to work
without pay.

Currently, some employees, referred to as "excepted employees," are
required to report to work even though the funding bills for the
agencies that employ them are caught up in the ongoing fight over
whether Congress will provide President Donald Trump with $5
billion in new funding for his long-promised wall along the
southern border.

Congress has passed a bill to award those employees backpay after
the shutdown ends, and Trump has promised to sign the legislation.

But the attorneys who argued on Jan. 15 on behalf of the federal
employees said that promise is of little use now, as the shutdown
has made it difficult for some people to make ends meet, especially
those who have child care obligations or high medical bills.

Paras Shah, an attorney with the National Treasury Employees Union,
said by forcing employees to come to work without pay, the Trump
administration is essentially obligating Congress to make payments
it has not authorized.

"That is not how our constitutional structure anticipated this
working," Mr. Shah said on Jan. 15.

Mr. Shah also said the Office of Management and Budget has injected
"elastic language" into a federal law that allows some essential
employees to keep working during a shutdown, allowing agencies to
force more than just the bare minimum staff to come in and work
without pay.

But Judge Leon struggled throughout the hearing to determine what
he could do about the workers' plight.

"So here's the problem, Congress appropriates funds, not the
judiciary," Judge Leon said. "What are we going to pay them with?"

Molly Elkin, who represents the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association and a group of air traffic controllers, suggested the
money could come out of the Treasury Department's judgment fund.

Ms. Elkin, with the firm Woodley & McGillivary, pleaded with Leon
to "drop your legal hammer" on the government, saying morale in the
high-stress job of air-traffic control is plummeting as employees
worry about how they will pay for basic expenses if the shutdown
continues much longer.

"They're not going to be able to pay for gas to get to the towers,"
Ms. Elkin said.

The stream of lawsuits over the shutdown began with employees who
did not receive overtime pay for work they performed on the day the
shutdown began. But the trickle sped up as employees started
missing paychecks and as the president and congressional leadership
dug in for a protracted fight over funding the government.

The shutdown, already the longest in U.S. history, appears no
closer to a resolution, as Trump insists on receiving money for his
wall as part of any deal to reopen the government. House Democrats
have insisted he will get no such money and have passed several
funding bills to that end. Senate Republican leadership has said
the chamber will not take up any bills Trump will not sign, locking
Congress up for the foreseeable future.

While Judge Leon rejected the motions for a temporary restraining
order, he quickened the pace for briefing on the employees'
requested injunction in the case, setting a hearing for Jan. 31.


UNITED TEACHERS: Faces Class Action Over Forced Union Dues
----------------------------------------------------------
With free legal aid from National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation staff attorneys, a Los Angeles public school teacher is
challenging the United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) union officials'
illegal "window period" scheme to forcibly seize union membership
dues from her paycheck without her consent and in violation of her
constitutional rights.

Plaintiff Irene Seager, a public school teacher at Porter Ranch
Community School, filed the class action complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California against the
UTLA, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the Attorney
General of California.

Ms. Seager became a UTLA union member and signed a dues deduction
authorization form in April 2018, when to keep her job she was
required to choose between paying full union dues as a member or
forced union fees as a nonmember. However, following the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court Janus v. AFSCME ruling in June 2018 which made
such payments for teachers and other public employees voluntary,
she attempted to exercise her First Amendment rights by resigning
her union membership and stopping dues payments.

In Janus, argued and won by Foundation staff attorneys, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to require government
workers to pay any union dues and fees as a condition of
employment. Additionally, the Court clarified that no union dues or
fees can be taken from workers without their affirmative consent
and knowing waiver of their First Amendment right not to
financially support a labor union.

However, UTLA union officials never informed Ms. Seager of her
First Amendment rights when she originally signed her dues
deduction authorization, making it impossible for her to have
knowingly waived those rights as required by Janus. Even after Ms.
Seager resigned her union membership and made it clear in a letter
sent to the union weeks after Janus that she does not consent to
dues deductions, union officials continue seizing membership dues
from her hard-earned wages. Union officials claim that Ms. Seager
can only cut off dues deductions during a union-created 30-day
"window period" each year.

Ms. Seager's class action lawsuit asks the court to strike down
this unlawful "window period" scheme and order union officials to
stop deducting unauthorized dues. Additionally, the lawsuit
challenges a California state law which allows the union to enforce
the restrictive "window period" policy.

Her complaint also seeks a refund of membership dues that were
wrongfully taken from her and hundreds, if not thousands, of other
teachers subjected to UTLA's unconstitutional policy.

"Ms. Seager's case shows that union bosses are willing to trample
on the First Amendment rights of the teachers they claim to
'represent' to keep their forced-dues power," said Mark Mix,
president of the National Right to Work Foundation. "Despite what
union bosses say, workers' constitutional rights cannot be limited
to just 30 days out of the year. The Foundation remains vigilant to
offer free legal aid to any teacher or other public sector worker
who seeks to exercise their rights protected by the Supreme Court's
Janus decision."

National Right to Work Foundation staff attorneys are also
providing free legal aid to a math professor with the nearby
Ventura County Community School District, who is challenging a
similar "window period" scheme enacted by the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) to block him and his colleagues from exercising
their Janus rights.

The Foundation also recently released a special legal notice
informing Los Angeles teachers of their rights during the
UTLA-ordered teacher strike. [GN]


US GOVERNMENT: P.L., et al. File Class Action in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. The case is styled as P.L., A.Q., K.T.,
R.F.J., A.R.B., B.M.B., J.C., Brooklyn Defender Services, Legal Aid
Society and Bronx Defenders, Plaintiffs v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United
States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Deputy Director Ronald Vitiello, Deputy Director and Acting
Director of ICE, in official capacity, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen,
Secretary of Homeland Security, in official capacity, Matthew G.
Whitaker, Acting United States Attorney General, in official
capacity, Director Matthew T. Albence, Executive Associate Director
of ICE Enforcement Removal Operations, in official capacity,
Director Thomas R. Decker, Director of New York Field Office of
ICE, in official capacity, Deputy Director William P. Joyce, Deputy
Director of New York Field Office of ICE, in official capacity,
Director James McHenry, Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review, in official capacity and Daniel J. Daugherty,
Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, in official capacity,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01336-ALC (S.D. N.Y., February 12,
2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as Other Immigration
Actions.

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a law enforcement
agency of the federal government of the United States tasked to
enforce the immigration laws of the United States and to
investigate criminal and terrorist activity of foreign nationals
residing in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Brooke Menschel, Esq.
   Brooklyn Defender Services
   177 Livingston Street, 7th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (718) 254-0700
   Fax: (718) 254-0897
   Email: bmenschel@bds.org



VALE SA: March 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, on Jan. 28 disclosed that a securities class action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of those who purchased or acquired the
securities of Vale S.A. ("Vale" or the "Company") (NYSE: VALE)
between April 13, 2018 and January 28, 2019, both dates inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover Vale
shareholders' investment losses.

If you purchased Vale securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit Vale Shareholder Class
Action Lawsuit or contact Daniel Sadeh toll free at (877) 779-1414
or dsadeh@bernlieb.com.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Vale had failed to adequately assess the risk and damage
potential of a dam breach at its Feijao iron ore mine; (2) Vale's
programs to mitigate health and safety incidents were inadequate;
(3) consequently, several people were killed and hundreds more were
reported as missing after Vale's dam at its Feijao iron ore mine
was breached; and (4) as a result, Defendants' statements about its
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.
When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

On January 25, 2019, Reuters reported that Vale's tailings dam had
burst at its Feijao iron ore mine. A "torrent of sludge tore
through the mine's offices, including a cafeteria during
lunchtime." Several people were killed. Rescuers were searching for
hundreds of others who were missing.

On this news, shares of Vale fell $1.20 per share or over 8% from
its previous closing price to close at $13.66 per share on January
25, 2019.

Then, on January 26, 2019, BBC News reported that hundreds of
people affected by the dam's breach remained missing, in part
because the dam's alarm system failed at the time of the accident.
A report by a Folha de S. Paulo newspaper stated "the risk of
collapse of the dam had been mentioned in a 'tense meeting' that
approved its license in December [.]"

On January 28, 2019, Reuters reported "Brazil's top prosecutor said
on Jan. 29 she would pursue criminal prosecutions after the
collapse of a tailings dam operated by mining giant Vale SA killed
at least 58 people and left hundreds missing, and that executives
may be punished."

On this news, shares of Vale fell sharply during intraday trading
on January 28, 2019.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than March 29, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Vale securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/vale-sa-vale-lawsuit-class-action-fraud-stock-108/
or contact Daniel Sadeh toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
dsadeh@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP -- http://www.bernlieb.com--
has recovered over $3.5 billion for its clients. In addition to
representing individual investors, the Firm has been retained by
some of the largest public and private pension funds in the country
to monitor their assets and pursue litigation on their behalf. As a
result of its success litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class
actions, the Firm has been named to The National Law Journal's
"Plaintiffs' Hot List" thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500
for ten consecutive years. [GN]


WAL-MART STORES: Mays's Bid to Certify Class Under Submission
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Andre Birotte, Jr., takes under submission the
Plaintiff's motion for certification of a wage statement class in
the lawsuit styled Lerna Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Case No.
2:18-cv-02318-AB-KK (C.D. Cal.).

The Court, having carefully considered the papers and the evidence
submitted by the parties, and having heard the oral argument of
counsel, takes the motion under submission.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Alan Harris, Esq.
          Priya Mohan, Esq.
          David Zelenski, Esq.
          HARRIS & RUBLE
          655 N Central Ave., Floor 17
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (323) 962-3777
          Facsimile: (323) 962-3004
          E-mail: aharris@harrisandruble.com.
                  pmohan@harrisandruble.com
                  dzelenski@harrisandruble.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Mitchell A. Wrosch, Esq.
          Paloma P. Peracchio, Esq.
          BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
          1851 East First Street, Suite 1550
          Santa Ana, CA 92705-4067
          Telephone: (949) 863-3363
          Facsimile: (949) 863-3350
          E-mail: mwrosch@bwslaw.com
                  pperacchio@bwslaw.com


WESTERN UNION: Underpays Compliance Officers, Minasyan Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
TAMARA MINASYAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WESTERN UNION FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV02545
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., Jan. 25, 2019) is an action against
the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum
wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiff Minasyan was employed by the Defendants as compliance
officer.

Western Union Financial Services, Inc. provides consumer money
transfer services. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. was
formerly known as WUFS Inc. and changed its name to Western Union
Financial Services, Inc. in December, 1999. The company was
incorporated in 1999 and is based in Englewood, Colorado. Western
Union Financial Services, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of The
Western Union Company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Duane Westrup, Esq.
          Alexander Farkas, Esq.
          WESTRUP & ASSOCIATES, A.P.C.
          444 West Ocean Boulevard, Suite 1614
          Long Beach, CA 90802-4524
          Telephone: (562) 432-2551
          Facsimile: (562) 435-4856
          E-mail: jveloff@westrupassociates.com
                  afarkas@westrupassociates.com


WISE GULL: Guerra Files Class Action in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wise Gull, Inc. The
case is styled as Tony Guerra, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Wise Gull, Inc. doing
business as: Blenders Eyewear, a California Corporation, Defendant,
Case No. 0:19-cv-60381 (S.D. Fla., February 12, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as Other Statutory
Actions.

Blenders Eyewear is a privately held company in San Diego, CA and
is a Single Location business.

Categorized under sunglasses and sun goggles manufacturers,
Blenders Eyewear was established in 2012 and incorporated in
CA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
   14 NE 1st Ave STE 1205
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (404) 797-9696
   Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com


WORLD CLASS MAINTENANCE: Schmidt Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------------
DAVID SCHMIDT, individually, and as the class representative of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WORLD CLASS
MAINTENANCE, INC. and JOSEPH TERMINI individually, the Defendants,
Case No. 8:19-cv-00355 (M.D. Fla., Feb. 11, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay overtime compensation in violations of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants unlawfully misclassified
Plaintiff Schmidt as an exempt employee to avoid compensating him
for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiff in accordance with the FLSA. Specifically,
Plaintiff was not paid time and a half of his regular rate of pay
for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The Plaintiff
was not paid the salary basis minimum that meets the definition of
exempt under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a maintenance worker
from approximately August 2017 until January 24, 2019. The
Plaintiff's duties as a maintenance worker included roofing,
flooring, pressure washing, concrete work, patio screening, small
engine repair, and all other activities so directed by the
Defendants, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Peter A. Sartes, Esq.
          Peter L. Tragos, Esq.
          TRAGOS, SARTES & TRAGOS, PLLC
          601 Cleveland Street, Suite 800
          Clearwater, FL 33755
          Telephone: (727) 441-9030
          Facsimile: (727) 441-9254
          E-mail: peter@greeklaw.com
                  linda@greeklaw.com

WORLD OF JEANS: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
------------------------------------------------------------
LESHAWN DAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. WORLD OF JEANS & TOPS d/b/a TILLY'S,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01351-JMF (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 12,
2019), alleges that the Defendant failed to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website, www.tillys.com, to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people, a violation of the Plaintiff's
rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. the Plaintiff uses the
terms "blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with
visual impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in
that they have a visual acuity with correction of less than or
equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who meet this definition have
limited vision. Others have no vision.  Based on a 2010 U.S. Census
Bureau report, approximately 8.1 million people in the United
States are visually impaired, including 2.0 million who are blind,
and according to the American Foundation for the Blind's 2015
report, approximately 400,000 visually impaired persons live in the
State of New York.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.

World of Jeans & Tops, Inc. operates a chain of specialty retail
stores that offers casual clothing, footwear, and accessories for
mem, women, and kids.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, New York 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

YAHOO!: Must Face Class Action Over 2013 Megahack
-------------------------------------------------
Gareth Corfield, writing for The Register, reports that a US court
has nixed Yahoo!'s attempt to settle a class-action lawsuit over
the 2013 megahack, saying it's fatally flawed.

Judge Lucy Koh of the California Northern District in San Jose
ruled [PDF] that a settlement proposed in October of 2018 was not
acceptable, particularly in regards to the share of attorney fees
and the opaque nature of the proposed payout for victims.

Judge Koh pointed out that the settlement appears to earmark a
whopping $35m in payments for attorney fees that include a number
of law firms and attorneys who weren't even authorized to work on
the case.

"By the Court's count, Plaintiffs' lodestar [fee calculation]
covers 143 attorneys from 32 firms," Judge Koh noted.

"This Court only authorized five law firms to work on the instant
MDL case. On February 1, 2018, the Court ordered "[o]ther that the
Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, no other law firms shall work on
this MDL without prior approval of the Court."

Additionally, the deal calls for the fees to be held separate from
the fund, meaning any unclaimed cash would be handed back to Yahoo!
instead of the customers. This, again, reeks of a deal that has the
interests of Yahoo! and the lawyers in mind, rather than the actual
plaintiffs.

To really rub it in, the settlement would have prevented others
from being able to continue the suit based on separate but related
claims about prior data breaches, even if Yahoo! paid off the
individuals named in the lawsuit.

Among the holes the judge shot in the proposed deal was a lack of
accounting for exactly how much money would go into the settlement
and how the various costs were adding up. She notes that no total
figure was presented for the settlement, and that the deal doesn't
explain how the costs for credit monitoring service, administration
of the settlement payouts, or service of notices would be
calculated. Without that information, Judge Koh says, it is
impossible to decide if the customers are getting a fair deal.

Judge Koh summarised an expert report into Yahoo!'s security
practices, commissioned by the claimants, as saying:

The report shows repeated failures to follow industry-standard
security practices, extensive knowledge of ongoing security
breaches beginning in 2008 with failure to adequately respond,
failure to provide adequate staffing and training, and failure to
comply with industry standard regulations.

The expert, Mary Frantz, also reportedly found "several incidents
prior to 2013" that "involved several million accounts". [GN]


ZIKS HOME: Brown Moves to Certify Class of Home Health Aides
------------------------------------------------------------
Kara Brown, a plaintiff in the lawsuit styled KARA BROWN, et al.,
for herself and all others similarly v. ZIKS HOME HEALTHCARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-00350-WHR (S.D. Ohio),
moves, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, for entry of an
order:

    (i) conditionally certifying the proposed FLSA class; and

   (ii) implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
        Plaintiffs' FLSA claim can be promptly sent to all
        potential opt-in plaintiffs.

In her complaint, Ms. Brown alleges that Defendants Ziks Home
Healthcare Solutions, LLC, Ziks Home Healthcare, LLC, and Nnodum
Iheme failed to pay her and a class of similarly-situated Home
Health Aides overtime wages for years.

The group of similarly-situated Home Health Aides includes all
current and former employees of the Defendants, who have worked as
direct support professionals, support associates, caregivers, home
health aides, or other employees, who provided companionship
services, domestic services, home care, and/or other in-home
services, and who worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning
October 26, 2015, through the present, and were not paid time and a
half their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over
40.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bradley L. Gibson, Esq.
          Brian G. Greivenkamp, Esq.
          GIBSON LAW, LLC
          9200 Montgomery, Road, Suite 11A
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Telephone: (513) 834-8254
          Facsimile: (513) 834-8253
          E-mail: brad@gibsonemploymentlaw.com
                  brian@gibsonemploymentlaw.com


ZIONS BANCORP: Abetted $5MM Ponzi Scam, Class Action Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that in
a federal class action, nearly 100 named plaintiffs claim Zions
Bancorporation aided and abetted a $5 million Ponzi scam.

A copy of the Complaint in Springer, et al. v. Zions
Bancorporation, Case No. 19-cv-00035 (D. Utah), is available at:

         https://is.gd/VVGHhD


[*] Defense Expenses for Consumer Class Actions Can Take a Toll
---------------------------------------------------------------
Steven P. Inman, II, Esq., of Barnes & Thornburg LLP, in an article
for Lexology, reports that defense expenses for consumer class
actions can take a devastating toll on a company. While the
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 that went into
effect in December 2018 may decrease the cost of giving notice of
class certifications and settlements, they are unlikely to
significantly reduce the high cost of defending these lawsuits.

Unfortunately, insurers are also increasingly including broad
exclusions in their policies for claims arising from consumer
protection laws (e.g., the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Fair
Debt Collection Practice Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and
consumer privacy laws).

However, a company that finds itself with such an exclusion should
not simply resign itself to having to pay the full cost of its
defense. An insurer's duty to defend may apply to spare the company
the high cost of defending a consumer class action, even when the
policy includes a consumer protection law exclusion. Moreover,
earlier policies may obligate other insurers to participate in the
insured's defense.

Potential for Coverage

An insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.
In many jurisdictions, an insurer has a duty to defend its insured
not only when coverage exists, but also when a mere potential for
coverage exists. For instance, in Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV
Transportation, the court stated: "An insurer must defend its
insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity under
the policy."

Within a cause of action for a consumer protection law violation, a
single fact may be pled that raises a potential for coverage and
triggers the insurer's duty to defend the entire lawsuit. In Buss
v. Superior Court, the court found that, "in a 'mixed' action, the
insurer has a duty to defend the action in its entirety."

As stated in Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Fed. Ins.
Co., "[C]ourts have repeatedly found that remote facts buried
within causes of action that may potentially give rise to coverage
are sufficient to invoke the defense duty."

The pleadings may be amended based on the facts pled to assert a
covered claim. While at the conclusion of the lawsuit the insurer
may seek reimbursement for defense expenses related to claims that
are not covered, the insurer bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating which expenses benefitted solely the insured's
defense against the uncovered claims. This is a difficult and often
insurmountable burden for insurers to meet. Thus, insureds should
not assume based on the labels of the causes of action.

Earlier Occurrence Policies

Earlier occurrence-based policies (such as most commercial general
liability policies) may also require an insurer to provide the
company with a defense. If the alleged class period spans multiple
policy years, and the potential for coverage exists under the
policies issued during those years, the insurers that issued those
policies will likely also be obligated to share in the
responsibility for company's defense. These earlier policies may
not contain the same exclusions that are included in current policy
and can provide additional resources for an insured's defense.

When sued in a consumer class action, companies can take steps to
mitigate the impact of defense expenses by immediately giving
notice under all potentially applicable current and prior insurance
policies and by having coverage counsel review those policies to
determine whether the facts pled trigger one or more insurers'
duties to provide a defense or to pay the insured's defense
expenses. [GN]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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