CAR_Public/190301.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, March 1, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 44

                            Headlines

1859-HISTORIC HOTELS: Martinez to Recover Withheld Tips, OT Pay
247.AI INC: California Court Dismisses Ford Suit With Prejudice
ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ-BALI: Duarte Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
AMP: Burford Capital Bankrolling One of Class Actions
ARTISANAL LLC: Sued Over Unpaid Wages, Misappropriated Tip

ASCENA RETAIL: Additional Cash Distribution in Rougvie Suit Ordered
AT&T MOBILITY: Bid to Certify Class in Gorss Motels Suit Denied
BAY AREA TRAFFIC: Cervantes Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations
BAYER HEALTHCARE: Court Narrows Claims in Sun Protection Suit
BERESFORD CORP: Viala Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

BIRD RIDES: Machowski Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
BJ'S PAINT: Fails to Properly Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Henry Says
BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses M. Banegas' Deepwater Horizon Suit
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Inmate's Pro Se Class Certification Bid
CANADA: Sued Over Miscalculation of Veterans' Disability Pensions

CERTIFIED FOLDER: Court Requires Additional Briefing in Stone
CHARLOTTE SCHOOL: Barchiesi Appeals W.D.N.C. Ruling to 4th Cir.
CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Medgebow Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over Red-Light Camera Tickets
COOK COUNTY, IL: McFields' Bid to Certify Class Under Advisement

COUNTY JANITORIAL: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Castrej
D & A SERVICES: Certification of Class Sought in Stoviak Suit
D&D LIFT: Ross Suit Alleges Calif. Labor Code Violations
DC CONSTRUCTION: Imel Suit Seeks to Enforce Rights Under FLSA
DECIBELS OF OREGON: Court Narrows Claims in Wilson FLSA Suit

DECIBELS OF OREGON: Court Narrows FLSA Claims in Hemming
DIRECT FLOW: Court Orders Supplemental Brief on Reynolds Suit Deal
DUPLIN COUNTY, NC: Court Quashes Subpoena in FCRA Suit
EB SERVICES INC: De La Cruz Files Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
EGS FINANCIAL: Certification of Class Sought in Cheek Suit

FBCS INC: Hayes Disputes Time-barred Collection Letter
GATE GOURMET: Removes Garcia FLSA Class Suit to C.D. California
GEORGIA: Court Denies Inmate's Pro Se Class Certification Bid
GRACE AND LACE: Kiler Asserts Breach under Disabilities Act
H&M HENNES: Faces Haggar Class Suit Alleging ADA Violations

HEARTLAND AUTOMOTIVE: Johnson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
HOME HEALTH RESOURCES: Mathis Suit to Recover Overtime Pay
HYDRO ONE: Aird Attorney Discusses Class Action Dismissal
JONATHAN NEIL: Court Requires Supplemental Briefing in Brown
LM WIND: Parties Directed to Address Issues in Rosie Bobo Suit

LOS ROBLES: Settles Employees' Back Wages Class Action for $3MM
LUPER ENTERPRISES: Borozny Asserts Breach under ADA in Florida
MARKET PLUS: Retina Associates Sues over Unsolicited Fax Ads
MDL 2591: Burkes Can't Intervene in Syngenta Ag MIR 162 Corn Suit
MDL 2741: 2 Suits v. Monsanto Transferred to N.D. California

MDL 2775: 2 Smith & Nephew BHR Suits Transferred to Maryland
MDL 2782: MSP Recovery Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
MDL 2800: Smith v. Equifax Transferred to Georgia Northern Dist.
MDL 2804: 7 Actions Transferred to Northern District of Ohio
MDL 2875: Court Transfers 10 Actions to N.J., Expands MDL Scope

MDL 2876: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 6 Debt Collection Suits
MDL 2878: 4 Suits vs. Ranbaxy Inc. Transferred to Massachusetts
MDL 2879: 11 Suits v. Marriott Transferred to District of Maryland
MDL 2880: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 3 H&R Block Employee Suit
MEDI WINEBAR: Hernandez Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages

MERIVALE: Faces Class Action Case for Staff Underpayments
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
MIRACLE METHOD: Certification of Class Sought in Wolf Suit
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Feldman Sues Over Injuries Sustained
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Graham Sues for Negligence of Athletes' Health

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Harley Sues Over Disregard of Athlete's Health
NAVIOS MARITIME: Roberts Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duties
NESTLE USA: Judge Dismisses 2 Child Labor Class Actions
NEVADA GOLD: Assad Files Securities Class Action
NORTHSTAR REALTY: Court Denies Bid to Intervene in Boothe Suit

OCWEN LOAN: Stromberg Seeks Initial Settlement Approval
ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL: Not Compelled to Produce Docs in SEPTA Suit
OXNARD SCHOOL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Disabled Students Class
P24 LLC: Cajina Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
PAPA JOHN'S: Faces Class Action Over "No-Poach" Policy

PAPA JOHN'S: Faces Hubbard Wage and Hour Class Suit in Kentucky
PATRIOT LAND: Court Denies Dismissal in A. Conover's RESPA Suit
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: Court Narrows Claims in Talarico Suit
PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Drivers' Suit Transferred to S.D. Ind.
PUBLIC STORAGE: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Product

RAZORS EDGE: Berry Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
RSVP MEN LLC: Fiallo Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
SAVASENIORCARE ADMINISTRATIVE: Bid to Dismiss Dolison Suit Granted
SC STATE PLASTERING: Final Settlement Hearing Set in March
SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Morning Song Bird Food Settlement Has Prelim OK

SHOREWALK VACATION: Borozny Alleges Violation under ADA in Fla.
SNAP INC: Kaskela Law Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
SOFI DENTAL CARE: Hillow Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET: Underpays Merchandisers, Falcone Says
SYNERGY PHARMACEUTICALS: Concealed TRULANCE Issues, McMullen Says

TOWN SPORTS: 2nd Cir. Affirms Preliminary Injunction Denial
TRIPLE S PROPERTIES: Court Denies Arbitration Bid in Martinez
TWITTER INC: Sued by Murphy Over Misgendering/Deadnaming Policy
TYSON FOODS: Darden Opts Out of Class Action, Files Suit
UADA CORP: Borozny Asserts Breach under Disabilities Act

UBER TECH: Diva Limousine Files Appeal vs. N. Calif. Dist. Ct.
UNITED STATES: Westbrook Files Suit v. Justice Dept.
URBAN FOOD BAZAAR: Gupta Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
UTLA: LAUSD Teachers Union Dues Targeted in Class-Action Lawsuit
UXIN LIMITED: Faces Machniewicz IPO-related Class Action in N.Y.

VISIONSTREAM: Union Gets in Behind Proposed Class Action
WALGREEN CO: Court Narrows Claims in C. Moya's Suit

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $28MM Aearo-Related Costs at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $673MM for Respirator Suits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Still Faces 2,320 Claimants at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 43,100 Claims v. Goodyear Tire Pending at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal Still Ongoing over $13MM Verdict in Lopez

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabot Still Faces 35,000 Claimants at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $332MM Liability at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$79MM Reserves at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hobart Not Liable for Vulcan-Hart's Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Still Faces Suits at Dec. 29

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Thomas-Fish Hazardous Product Claim Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: WestRock Co. Had 775 PI Suits at Dec. 31


                            *********

1859-HISTORIC HOTELS: Martinez to Recover Withheld Tips, OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
Justin M. Martinez, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. 1859-Historic Hotels, Ltd. and Paul York,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00200 (D. Colo., January 23, 2019),
seeks to recover diverted employee tips, minimum wages and overtime
for all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek under the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Colorado Wage Claim Act, the Colorado
Minimum Wage Act and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order.

1859-Historic Hotels operates as "Cliff House," a historic hotel
located at 306 Canon Avenue, Manitou Springs, Colorado 80829,
providing luxury accommodations, event and dining services.
Martinez worked for Cliff House since October 2014 as a tipped
server. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gary M. Kramer, Esq.
      GARY KRAMER LAW, LLC
      1465 Kelly Johnson Blvd, Suite 210
      Colorado Springs, CO 80920
      Phone: (719) 694-2783
      Fax: (719) 452-3622
      Email: gary@garykramerlaw.com


247.AI INC: California Court Dismisses Ford Suit With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL FORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. [24]7.AI, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-02770-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson
Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, (i) denied the parties' stipulated
request to set a schedule for further briefing; and (ii) granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the present action, Ford, under
the first-to-file rule.

The putative class action was filed on May 10, 2018, asserting
claims arising out of a 2017 data breach that affected customers of
several large companies, including Best Buy, Delta Airlines, and
Sears, all of which had hired [24]7 to provide sales support to
their customers, including online chat services.  The Plaintiffs
claim that the data breach was caused by [24]7's inadequate
security and that [27]7 delayed providing notice of the breach.

Defendant [24]7 moves to dismiss the present action under the
first-to-file rule, pointing out that the first putative class
action arising out of the 2017 data breach was filed in the Central
District of California on April 6, 2018 -- Pica, et al. v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., et al. ("Pica"), Case No. 2:18-cv-02876-MWF-E
(C.D. Cal.).  Alternatively, it moves to transfer the present
action to the Central District of California under either the
first-to-file rule or under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), or to stay
the present action under the first-to-file rule pending disposition
of Pica.

After completion of briefing, the Court submitted [24]7's motion
without oral argument and vacated the hearing which had been set
for Jan. 31, 2019.  On Feb. 4, 2019, the Court tentatively has
determined that Pica is the first-filed action and that application
of the first-to-file rule is warranted.  The Court has discretion
to transfer, stay, or dismiss Ford under the first-to-file rule.
Ordinarily, the Court would be inclined to transfer Ford rather
than dismissing or staying it.  However, the Ninth Circuit made
clear in Bozic that a district court may transfer an action under
the first-to-file rule only to a district in which venue is proper.
Based on In re Bozic, it is not clear that venue is proper in the
Central District of California.

Noting that neither party had addressed Bozic in the briefing, the
Court directed the parties to file 2-page supplemental briefs by
Feb. 11, 2019, addressing: (1) the effect of Bozic on this Court's
authority to transfer Ford to the Central District of California;
and (2) if transfer is not an option, whether the Court should
dismiss or stay Ford.

Instead of complying with the Court's order, the parties filed a
Stipulation to Set Briefing Schedule, proposing to submit five-page
supplemental briefs addressing both the issues the Court directed
them to brief by Feb. 11, 2019 and the effect of the Pica court's
recent tentative ruling dismissing Pica with prejudice.  Under the
parties' proposed schedule, the Plaintiffs' supplemental brief
would be due on Feb. 15, 2019 and [24]7's supplemental brief would
be due on Feb. 22, 2019.

Judge Freeman denied the parties' stipulated request to set a
briefing schedule.  As stated in its Order Providing Tentative
Ruling, the Court has determined that the first-to-file rule
applies.  As a courtesy to the parties, the Court granted them an
opportunity to comment on the Bozic case, which neither side had
addressed, before the Court decided whether to dismiss, transfer,
or stay the action pursuant to the first-to-file rule.  The parties
elected not to avail themselves of that opportunity.  Accordingly,
she now issues its ruling on [24]7's motion.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman granted [24]7's motion to dismiss
the present action under the first-to-file rule.  She dismissed
with prejudice the action under the first-to-file rule.  The Clerk
will close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/99eca7 from Leagle.com.

Michael Ford, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Haakon Watson --
jwatson@justice4you.com -- Clayeo C. Arnold, A Professional Law
Corporation, Clayeo C. Arnold -- carnold@justice4you.com -- Clayeo
C. Arnold, A Professional Law Corporation, Jean Sutton Martin,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group, pro hac vice, John A.
Yanchunis, Morgan and Morgan, P.A., pro hac vice, Melissa S.
Weiner, pro hac vice & Ryan McGee, Morgan and Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice.

Rudolph Dubrovszky & Noe Gamboa, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua
Haakon Watson, Clayeo C. Arnold, A Professional Law Corporation,
Clayeo C. Arnold, Clayeo C. Arnold, A Professional Law Corporation,
Jean Sutton Martin, Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group, pro
hac vice, Melissa S. Weiner, pro hac vice & John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan and Morgan, P.A.

Madison Copeland, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel L. Warshaw,
Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Joseph C. Bourne, Pearson, Simon &
Warshaw, LLP, Jean Sutton Martin, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice, John A. Yanchunis, Morgan and
Morgan, P.A. & Melissa S. Weiner, pro hac vice.

[24]7.ai, Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Teresa Carey Chow -- tchow@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP,
Casie Dell Collignon -- ccollignon@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler
LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew D. Pearson -- mpearson@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP & Paul G. Karlsgodt --
pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler, LLP, pro hac vice.


ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ-BALI: Duarte Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------------
Arlen C. Duarte, and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. Alberto Dominguez-Bali, M.D. P.A, Alberto
Dominguez-Bali and Catherine Dominguez-Bali, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-20329, (S.D. Fla., January 24, 2019),
seeks to recover regular wages, overtime compensation, retaliatory
damages, liquidated damages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees
under the provisions of pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate Dominguez Medical Office, a professional medical
office, operating in two locations. Duarte worked at both locations
as a medical office front desk receptionist. She worked a minimum
of 10 hours daily and was unable to take bona fide lunch breaks.
She was eventually fired for her complaints about overtime and
unpaid wages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


AMP: Burford Capital Bankrolling One of Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------
Peter Ryan, writing for ABC, reports that the world's biggest
litigation funder has set up shop in Australia to get a slice of
the booming class action business, with some high profile ones
stemming from the banking Royal Commission.

The US-based Burford Capital is already bankrolling one of the
potential class actions against the troubled wealth manager AMP
which has had its reputation and market value smashed by Royal
Commission revelations including the "fee for no service" scandal.
[GN]


ARTISANAL LLC: Sued Over Unpaid Wages, Misappropriated Tip
----------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Galleher, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Artisanal, LLC and Bill Greene, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00055 (W.D. N.C., February 18, 2019) is a
collective action for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and class action for violation of the North Carolina Wage
and Hour Act ("NCWHA").

The Defendants did not permit Plaintiff and other Tipped Workers to
retain all the tips they earned. Specifically, Defendants required
Plaintiff to participate in a mandatory tip pooling arrangement and
share tips with employees and/or managers who are not entitled to
retain tips under the FLSA. The Defendants also regularly required
Plaintiff and other Tipped Workers to work hours in excess of forty
in a workweek, thus triggering the overtime requirements of the
FLSA.

The Defendants' failure to comply with the terms of the overtime
and minimum wage requirements of the FLSA regarding the payment of
overtime and taking of tip credit against minimum wages was a
willful violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Galleher was employed by Artisanal as a server, who is a resident
of Zionville, North Carolina.

Artisanal is a domestic business corporation registered and in good
standing in the State of North Carolina, owned by Bill Greene.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Philip J. Gibbons, Jr., Esq.
     Craig L. Leis, Esq.
     GIBBONS LEIS, PLLC
     14045 Ballantyne Corporate Place, Ste. 325
     Charlotte, NC 28277
     Phone: 704-612-0038
     Email: phil@gibbonsleis.com
            craig@gibbonsleis.com


ASCENA RETAIL: Additional Cash Distribution in Rougvie Suit Ordered
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAROL ROUGVIE, et al., v. ASCENA RETAIL GROUP, INC.,
et al, Civil Action No. 15-724 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Mark A. Kearney of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
directed the Claims Administrator to distribute identified amounts
to the Class Counsel, the counsel for the Comlish and Kallay
objectors, Justice Stores for the $8 Million reverter, and promptly
move for approval of the specific supplemental distribution to the
607,215 claimants.

The lawyers creatively settled this deceptive sales practices
action against Justice Stores on behalf of 18.4 million consumers
in exchange for stopping an allegedly deceptive marketing strategy,
up to $402 Million in vouchers to use at the retailer's stores for
those who wanted a voucher, and up to $50.8 Million immediately
deposited in a Settlement Fund allocated to pay up to $27.8 Million
in cash to consumers requesting cash, $8 Million for claims
administration, up to $14.1 Million in attorney's fees, and an
unlimited amount of the remaining funds reverting to Justice Stores
to cover voucher exposure.

After carefully considering several objections to the unlimited
reverter, the Court approved an arms'-length settlement capping
Justice Stores' reverter at $8 Million and awarded attorney's fees
to the Class Counsel based on hours worked.  Six objectors
appealed, and the Class Counsel then paid them $467,000
out-of-pocket (with a small contribution from Justice Stores) in
mid-2017 to dismiss the appeals.  After a year of monitoring the
consumers redeeming approximately $30 Million in vouchers and
cashing approximately $10 Million in checks, the Court must now
distribute the unanticipated millions of dollars left in the
Settlement Fund.  Everyone agrees to a supplemental distribution to
the Class Members who filed claims.  But the dilemma now is how to
distribute the unanticipated large balance in the Settlement Fund.

Judge Kearney holds that the lawyers diligently worked to provide a
substantial Class benefit to 18.4 million consumers, with over one
million persons taking advantage of the economic benefits.  It is
now time to distribute the balance in the Settlement Fund.  While
he must carefully examine the requests for money paid from the
Class Settlement Fund to professionals, he finds the Class Counsel,
and to a lesser extent, the counsel for the Comlish and Kallay
objectors, fulfilled their roles and improved the Class benefit.
He does not share the same view of the six objector-appellants'
counsel; not because they appealed the Court's Order but because
they filed appeals arguing for the best interests of the Class and
then sold out for hundreds of thousands of dollars in objector
greenmail. He is optimistic as to the effect of amended Federal
Rule 23 (e)(5) in discouraging this lawyering practice based on
fees alone.

The Judge is also concerned with the record-keeping and supervision
of this large Settlement Fund by the Claims Administrator.  The
Claims Administrators should be paid for their demonstrated
services.  But the days of submitting a bill in a class settlement
and expecting it will be automatically approved are hopefully over.
The Judge honors the representations made to induce his finding of
fairness of the settlement terms to the Class.  He does approve
attempts to change those terms, either because Justice Stores wants
more reverter money or the Claims Administrator did not properly
budget for its services.

In accompanying Orders, Judge Kearney approved supplemental cash
distributions to approximately 607,000 Class Members after costs
and paying fees based on today's Class benefit but must, consistent
with our fiduciary role, reject paying: the Claims Administrator's
unsupported or unbudgeted reimbursements; Justice Stores' request
for an increased reverter; over $1.2 Million in fees to an objector
group who, along with eleven others, objected to the unlimited
reverter; excessive costs to the Class Counsel; and, incentive fees
to objectors absent evidence of their specific efforts providing a
benefit to the Class.  Specifically, the Judge directed the Claims
Administrator to distribute identified amounts to the Class
Counsel, counsel for the Comlish and Kallay objectors, Justice
Stores for the $8 Million reverter, and promptly move for approval
of the specific supplemental distribution to the 607,215
claimants.

While deeply skeptical of handsomely paying off objector appeals to
move class action settlements to earlier distribution, the Judge
must also deny a request from one objector group to order five
objector-appellants disgorge the hundreds of thousands of dollars
Class Counsel paid them in 2017 to withdraw their 2016 appeals as
there is no present basis under our inherent power to find unjust
enrichment or otherwise apply the Dece. 1, 2018 amendment to
Federal Rule 23(e)(5) now requiring court approval of these payoffs
agreed to settle appeals.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/bHBZdr from Leagle.com.

MELINDA MEHIGAN, FONDA KUBIAK, MARGUERITE SINKLER GILDER, CAROLINE
MANSOUR, CAROL ROUGVIE, TIFFANY BOLTON & KARA BELL, Plaintiffs,
represented by KEVIN E. RAPHAEL -- ker@pietragallo.com --
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, WILLIAM
PIETRAGALLO, II -- wp@pietragallo.com -- ANTHONY J. COYNE --
acoyne@mggmlpa.com -- MANSOUR GAVIN LPA, pro hac vice, BRENDON P.
FRIESEN -- bfriesen@mggmlpa.com -- MANSOUR GAVIN LPA, pro hac vice,
EDWARD H. SKIPTON, III, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick &
Raspanti, LLP, EDWARD J. WESTLOW, pro hac vice, ERNEST P. MANSOUR,
MANSOUR GAVIN LPA, pro hac vice, KENNETH D. MCARTHUR, JR.,
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK, pro hac vice & ROBERT G. MANSOUR,
pro hac vice.

CAROL COWHEY, Plaintiff, represented by KEVIN E. RAPHAEL,
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, EDWARD H. SKIPTON,
III, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, EDWARD J.
WESTLOW, pro hac vice & KENNETH D. MCARTHUR, JR., PIETRAGALLO
GORDON ALFANO BOSICK, pro hac vice.

ASCENA RETAIL GROUP, INC., doing business as JUSTICE STORES,
Defendant, represented by EZRA DODD CHURCH --
ezra.church@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP,
CHRISTOPHER JOHN MANNION -- christopher.mannion@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP & GREGORY T. PARKS --
gregory.parks@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS.

TWEEN BRANDS, INC., doing business as JUSTICE STORES, Defendant,
represented by DAVID D. YEAGLEY -- dyeagley@ulmer.com -- ULMER &
BERNE - CLEVELAND, EZRA DODD CHURCH, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP,
MICHAEL N. UNGAR -- mungar@ulmer.com -- ULMER & BERNE, CHRISTOPHER
JOHN MANNION, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP & GREGORY T. PARKS,
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS.

STEVEN F. HELFAND, In Propria Persona, Respondent, pro se.

BARBARA COMLISH & KATHRYN ARTLIP, Respondents, represented by ADAM
E. SCHULMAN, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute.

KELSEY D FOLIGNO, Respondent, represented by GLENN A. MANOCHI --
gmanochi@lightmanlaw.com -- LIGHTMAN & MANOCHI.

PAMELA SWEENEY, Respondent, pro se.


AT&T MOBILITY: Bid to Certify Class in Gorss Motels Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Janet Bond Arterton denied the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification in the lawsuit styled GORSS MOTELS, INC. v.
AT&T MOBILITY LLC and AT&T MOBILITY NATIONAL ACCOUNTS LLC, Case No.
3:17-cv-00403-JBA (D. Conn.).

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the Defendants for
alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, for sending an
unsolicited fax advertisement.  The Plaintiff moves for class
certification pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class is defined as:

     All persons or entities who were successfully sent a
     facsimile on or about January 14, 2014, stating: "Visit your
     AT&T Partner online store at
     att.com/wireless/wyndhamfranchisees for your exclusive
     specials such as $50 new smartphone activation credit, $100
     instant rebate on all tablets while supplies last, 16% on
     qualifying monthly charges," and "Learn about AT&T's new
     Mobile Share Value Plan!," and "For a limited time, switch
     from T-Mobile and receive up to $450 when you trade in your
     current smartphone!."

In her ruling, Judge Arterton opined that the Plaintiff has not met
its burden to demonstrate that the requirements of Rule 23, citing
Raitport, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 234-235 (citing cases "den[ying] class
certification in cases involving allegedly defective opt-out
notices and arising under the TCPA" because of question of
individualized consent, and denying class certification for
Plaintiffs failure to show that "questions of law common to class
members predominate").[CC]


BAY AREA TRAFFIC: Cervantes Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Arturo Cervantes, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. Bay Area Traffic Solutions, Inc. and Does 1 through 50,
Case No. RG19001214 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty., January 3,
2019), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay minimum
wages and failed to pay wages and overtime.

The Plaintiff was employed as non-exempt, hourly traffic controller
and technician by the Defendant.

The Defendant Bay Area Traffic Solutions, Inc. ("BATS"), is a
traffic control company in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David Yeremian, Esq.
      Alvin B. Lindsay, Esq.
      DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATS, INC.
      535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705
      Glendale, CA 91203
      Tel: (818) 230-8380
      Fax: (818) 230-0308
      E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com
              alvin@yeremianlaw.com


BAYER HEALTHCARE: Court Narrows Claims in Sun Protection Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint in the case captioned KEVIN CURRAN,
Plaintiff, v. BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC, Defendant. No. 17 C 7930. (N.D.
Ill.).

Plaintiff Kevin Curran alleges that he purchased sunscreen labeled
with a sun protection factor (SPF) of 30 when, in fact, testing
revealed that the SPF was less than 15. He filed this suit, a
putative class action, against defendant Bayer Healthcare LLC,
asserting a number of state-law claims.

PREEMPTION

The Defendant argues that all of plaintiff's claims are preempted
by the FDCA because he does not allege that the testing that
allegedly showed that defendant's SPF labeling is inaccurate was
identical with that required by 21 C.F.R. Section 201.327(i).
Defendant is incorrect. Plaintiff has alleged that his test study
met all required testing procedures for SPF testing specified under
21 C.F.R. Section 201.327(i).

The Defendant argues that an inspection of the test results reveals
that they are deficient on their face because the testing
laboratory set the target SPF too low. Plaintiff responds that
defendant is misinterpreting the document, which shows that
defendant's sunscreen failed a test for SPF higher than 20, so the
lab lowered the target to determine the true SPF in a subsequent
round of testing. This is a factual dispute that the Court cannot
resolve on the pleadings. Defendant is free to reprise this
argument at trial or summary judgment, if the evidence supports it,
but the argument is out of place at the pleading stage. Plaintiff
has alleged that he followed the testing methodology required by
the FDA, and to require more would be to require him to prove his
claim in the complaint, which would exceed federal pleading
standards.  

PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies when: "enforcement of
a claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views. No fixed formula exists for applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present
and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application
in the particular litigation."

The Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss or stay this
case pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because,
according to defendant, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
should determine whether defendant's sunscreen labeling is
accurate. But there are two problems with defendant's position.
First, defendant has not identified any relevant proceedings to
which this Court should defer in resolving the issues presented by
this case. This press announcement describes in general terms the
FDA's commitment to making sure that the sunscreen] products
consumers use deliver their advertised benefits and promoting safe
and effective innovations for sun protection, but it does not
describe any specific regulatory proceedings that will impact the
resolution of this case. Under these circumstances, deference to
the FDA is unwarranted.

The Court will not dismiss or stay this case pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND BRISTOL-MEYERS SQUIBB

The Defendant argues that, based on Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S.Ct. 1773,
1781-82 (2017), this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
claims of any prospective class members who reside outside of the
state of Illinois, and it should therefore strike plaintiff's
nationwide class allegations.

Bristol-Myers Squibb held that due process does not permit courts
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over claims that are
unconnected to the forum state and brought by nonresident
plaintiffs against a nonresident defendant, even when the
nonresident plaintiffs join in a lawsuit initiated by plaintiffs
who suffered injury in the forum state.
  
The Defendant urges the Court to follow the decisions applying
Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions, arguing they represent the
growing weight of authority in this district but a leading treatise
states that most courts to address the issue nationwide have
concluded that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions. The
court explained that to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions would
be to hold that although absent class members are not parties for
purposes of diversity of citizenship, amount in controversy,
Article III standing, and venue, they are parties for purposes of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Court agrees with Al
Haj that that cannot be right. The Defendant's motion is denied as
to the nationwide class allegations.

BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT CLAIM

The Defendant argues that plaintiff's second claim for relief,
breach of implied contract through violation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fails to state a claim.
According to defendant, plaintiff has not alleged any facts
supporting the existence of an implied contract, nor is there any
stand-alone cause of action under Illinois law for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

In response, plaintiff argues that he has stated an express
warranty claim, which is a kind of breach of contract claim, and
that contract, like every other contract coming under the penumbra
of Illinois law, contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. But if that is plaintiff's theory, then the Court
fails to see how plaintiff's second claim for relief differs from
his first; plaintiff does not explain how defendant breached other
than by selling sunscreen labeled with the wrong SPF, which is
exactly how defendant allegedly breached the express warranty.
Under Illinois law, plaintiff cannot state a claim for breach of
the implied covenant that merely duplicates a claim for breach of
express contract terms. Plaintiff's second claim for relief is
dismissed as superfluous and duplicative of his first.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

The Defendant argues that plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim
should be dismissed because it is just a tagalong to the ICFA claim
and must rise or fall with it to the extent it rests on the same
alleged misconduct. Defendant states the law correctly, but the
case defendant cites provides no basis to dismiss the unjust
enrichment claim at this point because the ICFA claim has not
fallen defendant has not even moved to dismiss it, specifically.
Defendant's motion is denied as to the unjust enrichment claim.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part. The motion is granted as to plaintiff's second and third
claims for relief; it is otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7ybtzt2 from Leagle.com.

Kevin Curran, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carl V. Malmstrom --
malmstrom@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC,
Janine L. Pollack -- pollackj@thesultzerlawgroup.com -- The Sultzer
Law Group, PC, pro hac vice & Stephen DeNittis, DeNittis Osefchen
Prince, P.C.

Bayer Healthcare LLC, Defendant, represented by Eugene A. Schoon --
ESCHOON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Katherine L. Olson --
KATHERINE.OLSON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice,
Jacquelyn Erin Fradette -- JFRADETTE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin
LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan F. Cohn -- JFCOHN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice & Joshua J. Fougere -- JFOUGERE@SIDLEY.COM
-- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice.


BERESFORD CORP: Viala Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beresford
Corporation. The case is styled as Roger Viala, on behalf of
himself, others similarly situated and the general public,
Plaintiff v. Beresford Corporation, Andrew Lange and Does 1 to 10,
Defendant, Case No. CGC19573774 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco,
February 14, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as other non exempt
complaints.

Beresford Corporation operates as a hotel. The Company offers rooms
and suites, bathtubs and bidets, food and beverages, valet parking,
and in-room wireless internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Arlo Garcia Uriarte, Esq.
   Liberation Law Group, P.C.
   2760 Mission St
   San Francisco, CA 94110
   Tel: (415) 695-1000
   Fax: (415) 695-1006
   Email: arlo@liberationlawgroup.com


BIRD RIDES: Machowski Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
AMBER MACHOWSKI, WILLIAM BERRY, RUBEN BOBADILLA, ANTHONY SMITH,
YALDA SAFFIEH SHARIATI, each individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BIRD RIDES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; NEUTRON HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; CULVER
CITY, a public entity CITY OF LONG BEACH, a public entity; CITY OF
RIVERSIDE, a public entity; CITY OF ANAHEIM, a public entity; CITY
OF SANTA ANA, a public entity; CITY OF IRVINE, a public entity;
CITY OF GARDEN GROVE, a public entity; and DOES 1-10, Case No.
2:19-cv-01014 (C.D. Cal., February 11, 2019), alleges violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

Bird Rides, Inc., is a Delaware corporation, which rents electric
scooters to its customers through a mobile application.  Neutron
Holdings, Inc., is a Delaware corporation doing business as Lime-S,
which rents Lime Scooters to through the Lime App.

The lawsuit arises by reason of a deliberate and systematic
exploitation of the curb ramps, sidewalks, crosswalks, pedestrian
crossings and other walkways (hereafter "Pedestrian Rights of Way")
within the Cities of Culver City, Long Beach, Anaheim, Santa Ana,
Irvine, Garden Grove and Orange (collectively, the "Cities") by the
Electric Scooter Defendants for their own corporate profit to the
harm of some of the most vulnerable residents of the Cities -- the
disabled, according to the complaint.  The Plaintiffs contend that
the business model of the Electric Scooter Defendants is based on
the unauthorized and illegal, private use of public property (i.e.
Pedestrian Rights of Way) for their own business use.

Culver City, Long Beach City, Riverside City, Anaheim City, Santa
Ana City, Irvine City and Garden Grove City are public entities
within the meaning of the ADA, and have received federal financial
assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation, and state
financial assistance within the meaning of the Government Code.

The City Defendants are local government entities with the
responsibility of providing the Plaintiffs access to its public
facilities, programs, services and activities.  The true names and
capacities of Doe Defendants are presently unknown to the
Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anoush Hakimi, Esq.
          Peter Shahriari, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF HAKIMI & SHAHRIARI
          7080 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 804
          Los Angeles, CA 90028
          Telephone: (323) 672-8281
          Facsimile: (213) 402-2170
          E-mail: anoush@handslawgroup.com
                  peter@handslawgroup.com

BJ'S PAINT: Fails to Properly Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Henry Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PATRICK HENRY, Individually, and on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated current and former employees v. BJ'S PAINT AND
WALLPAPER CO., a Tennessee For-profit Corporation, and BOBBY RAY
FENTRESS, individually, Case No. 3:19-cv-00123 (M.D. Tenn.,
February 13, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act in that they failed to properly pay the
Plaintiff for all hours he worked by not compensating him at the
rate of time and one-half his regular rate of pay for all the hours
worked over 40 hours in one workweek.

BJ's Paint and Wallpaper Co. is a Tennessee corporation authorized
to do business, and does business, in the state of Tennessee.
Bobby Ray Fentress is the owner of BJ's Paint and Wallpaper Co.

The Defendants paint residential and commercial buildings and
structures and provide other, similar services, such as
wallpapering.  The Defendants conduct business wherever their
client's building exists, including jobs in Middle Tennessee,
Louisiana, and North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com

               - and -

          Nina Parsley, Esq.
          PONCE LAW
          400 Professional Park Drive
          Goodlettsville, TN 37072
          Telephone: (615) 235-0078
          E-mail: nina@poncelaw.com


BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses M. Banegas' Deepwater Horizon Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons granting Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned MELVIN BANEGAS, v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC. AND BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO.
SECTION: "R" (1). Civil Action No. 17-7429. (E.D. La.).

This case arises from plaintiff Melvin Banegas's alleged exposure
to harmful chemicals after the DEEPWATER HORIZON oil spill. the
Plaintiff alleges that he was part of an organized effort to clean
the shoreline near Venice, Louisiana of toxic materials released as
a result of the oil spill.  During this work he was allegedly
exposed to oil, dispersants, and other harmful chemicals. According
to the plaintiff, he was diagnosed with chronic conjunctivitis,
chronic sinusitis, dermatitis, eczema, shortness of breath, and
dizziness.

Summary judgment is warranted when the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All reasonable inferences
are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but unsupported
allegations or affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory
facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or
defeat a motion for summary judgment. A dispute about a material
fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable
factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

The Plaintiff is a class member who did not opt out of the
Settlement Agreement, but he has stated a BELO claim against
defendants arising from his alleged exposure to toxic chemicals. To
succeed on this claim, he must prove, inter alia, (1) that he was
correctly diagnosed with his alleged physical condition after April
16, 2012 and (2) that his LMPC was legally caused by his exposure
to harmful substances released as a result of the oil spill.  

In a toxic torts case, a plaintiff must rely on expert testimony to
prove his medical diagnosis and causation.There is no indication
that plaintiff has retained an expert to provide testimony at trial
related to his medical diagnosis or causation. Nor is there an
indication that plaintiff will present expert testimony from a
non-retained treating physician.  

The only evidence before the Court that supports plaintiff's
medical diagnosis, or an inference of causation, is a two-page
Examination Report from Industrial Medicine Specialists (IMS),
dated March 1, 2013. But even if plaintiff were to belatedly
designate his examiner from IMS as a nonretained expert, any such
testimony would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

The owner of IMS, Dr. Paul Hubbell, testified that IMS was retained
after the BP oil spill by a law firm to provide medical
examinations of settlement class members. IMS conducted these
examinations to determine whether the members had injuries
sufficient to permit recovery of compensation benefits directly
from BP pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. Dr. Hubbell candidly
admitted that the clinicians conducting these examinations did not
follow the standards generally accepted in the medical community
for establishing medical diagnoses. Dr. Hubbell further admitted
that IMS conducted its examinations without information that is
critical to proving causation in this lawsuit, such as knowledge of
what chemicals plaintiff was exposed to, the toxicological effect
of those chemicals, or the degree of his exposure.

These admissions render any potential opinion from an IMS clinician
on these topics unreliable and inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid.
702. Because plaintiff cannot present competent evidence to prove
his medical diagnosis or causation at trial, defendants' motion for
summary judgment is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4acppe7 from
Leagle.com.

Melvin Banegas, Plaintiff, pro se.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Russell Keith Jarrett, Liskow & Lewis,
Charles B. Wilmore -- cbwilmore@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Devin
C. Reid -- dcreid@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Don Keller Haycraft
-- dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis & Patrick B. Reagin,
Liskow & Lewis.


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Inmate's Pro Se Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order dismissing the pro se complaint in the
case captioined KENNETH HILL, et al., Plaintiff, v. SCOTT KERNAN,
et al., Defendant. No. 2:18-cv-01108-TLN-CKD. (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs, state prisoners proceeding pro se, have filed this
civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

When determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, a court
must consider the likelihood of success on the merits as well as
the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in
light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. The burden of
demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff.
Plaintiff Hill has not demonstrated that he has a likelihood of
success on the merits, and appointment of counsel is therefore not
warranted. To the extent Plaintiff Hill asserts that counsel should
be appointed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g), as set
forth below, he has failed to demonstrate that the motion for class
certification should be granted, and so the need for appointment of
class counsel is a moot.

Plaintiff Hill's request for class certification is also be denied.
First, Hill is proceeding pro se and therefore cannot represent the
class. More importantly, even if the Court were to assign counsel,
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that class certification is
warranted.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, one or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class and(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff Hill is the only plaintiff who has
signed the motion for class certification. It is therefore unclear
whether any of the other plaintiffs agree that this case should
proceed as a class action. The lack of any other plaintiffs'
signature on the motion to certify the class, and the failure of
any plaintiffs other than Plaintiff Hill to object to the finding
that the plaintiffs are improperly joined, is sufficient grounds to
deny the motion for class certification. However, as addressed
below, Plaintiff Hill has also failed to demonstrate compliance
with Rule 23.

First, Plaintiff Hill has failed to show that the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Though Rule
23 does not impose a minimum number of class members, Plaintiff
Hill makes only broad assertions that the Housing Policy in
question, AFFECTS ALL General Population inmate/patients housed on
E.O.P. Treatment Facilities `STATEWIDE. However, even assuming this
fact to be true, Plaintiff Hill has not demonstrated that the
policy is unconstitutional on its face, and there is no indication
as to how many individuals have actually had their rights violated
as a result of the policy.  

Second, for the same reasons that the magistrate judge found
joinder of the plaintiffs was not proper, Plaintiff Hill has failed
to show that there are common questions of law or fact. The motion
to certify incorporates the complaint in an attempt to address this
factor. However, the complaint makes only broad, conclusory
allegations of general types of conduct that allegedly violate the
Plaintiffs' rights. As noted in the findings and recommendations,
based on the allegations in the complaint, each of Plaintiff's
claims will require individualized consideration and although the
findings and recommendations address this issue in the context of
deliberate indifference, the reasoning applies equally to Plaintiff
Hill's claims that Defendants have failed to protect the putative
class.

Third, Plaintiff Hill has not established that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class. Plaintiff Hill's conclusory assertion that
General Population inmate/patients housed on separate facilities
have expressed similar concerns relating to the substantial risk of
serious harm this Housing Policy exposes them to" is insufficient
to demonstrate the necessary typicality.  

Finally, Plaintiff Hill has failed to show that the named
plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. To determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately
represent a class, courts must resolve two questions: (1) do the
named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest
with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and
their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the
class? Plaintiffs are not represented by counsel and are therefore
not adequate representatives because they do not have authority to
represent anyone but themselves.  

Accordingly, Plaintiff Hill's motions for preliminary injunction
are denied.

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend as to the claims
regarding Plaintiff Hill, and all plaintiffs except Plaintiff Hill
are dismissed without prejudice to bringing their own, individual
actions. Putative Plaintiff T'varria Coleman, who attempted to join
in the first amended complaint, is also dismissed without prejudice
to bringing his own action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5hsxbw4 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Hill, Plaintiff, pro se.


CANADA: Sued Over Miscalculation of Veterans' Disability Pensions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits Canada reports that Koskie Minsky LLP launched a class
action lawsuit on Jan. 25 on behalf of all veterans who were in
receipt of disability pensions or disability awards between 2002
and 2010 from Veteran Affairs Canada.

The statement of claim alleges the attorney general, acting through
Veteran Affairs Canada, miscalculated the disability pensions and
disability awards of veterans during these years. As a result of
this error, veterans haven't received the full amount of benefits
they're entitled to, as well as interest on those benefits,
according to Koskie Minsky.

The claim alleges the attorney general breached its fiduciary
duties, contractual obligations and was negligent in the
administration of disability pensions and disability awards.

The lawsuit follows an accounting indexation error by Veterans
Affairs Canada, which was uncovered by the office of the veterans
ombudsmen in November 2018. The error, which could total around
$165 million for the period of 2003 and 2010, when it analyzed the
math behind the implementation of a change to the disability award.
When examining Veterans Affairs' worksheets, the office of the
ombudsman noticed that, for a number of years, the provincial basic
tax credit wasn't factored into the calculation of provincial
income tax as it was supposed to be, resulting in lower payments
for veterans.

"When the ombudsman brought this to our attention in 2018, we did a
detailed review and worked to secure up to $165 million for those
retroactive payments," said Jody Wilson-Raybould, minister of
Veterans Affairs, in a statement. "As this is before the courts, I
cannot comment any further, however we are committed to ensuring
those affected receive the compensation to which they are rightly
entitled." [GN]


CERTIFIED FOLDER: Court Requires Additional Briefing in Stone
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona issued
an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned Joseph P. Stone,
Plaintiff, v. Certified Folder Display Service Incorporated,
Defendant. No. CV-17-04205-PHX-JJT. (D. Ariz.).

Plaintiff Joseph P. Stone filed a Complaint on behalf of himself
and a similarly situated class of employees against Defendant
Certified Folder Display Service, Inc. On behalf of a class of
employees, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay overtime wages. In his
individual capacity, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated
A.R.S. Sections 23-350-23-355 (Arizona Wage Statute).

The parties' disagreement on whether all of the Plaintiff's claims
should proceed to arbitration hinges on a dispute about who can
resolve that question. While Defendant believes it is within the
Court's power to decide whether the Arbitration Agreement precludes
Plaintiff's class claims, Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator must
decide whether his class claims survive.

The Plaintiff argues that this Court cannot decide whether the
Arbitration Agreement allows class arbitration because that
agreement provides that any dispute arising from Plaintiff's
employment must be decided by an arbitrator including disputes
regarding interpretation of whether Plaintiff can bring a claim
arising from his employment on a class or collective action basis.

In deciding this, the Court will need to determine whether the
parties' Arbitration Agreement allows or disallows the collective
claims to proceed. But this issue is necessarily tied to the
question of what happens to Plaintiff's claims if they do not
proceed to arbitration. The parties largely neglected to discuss
this issue in their briefing. Defendant addressed it fleetingly in
its Motion, but in arguing that Plaintiff waived his class and
representation actions, Defendant failed to sufficiently explain
how Plaintiff did so by agreeing to the language of the Arbitration
Agreement and why that alleged waiver necessitates dismissal by the
Court.  

While a great deal of energy was spent trying to convince the Court
that the collective claims may or may not be arbitrated and
conflating that issue with the question of who must decide it,
neither party provided sufficient support for an argument about the
ultimate fate of the claims if they do not proceed to arbitration.
Without such briefing, the Court cannot determine the arbitrability
of the collective claims.

In addition to a lack of sufficient argument on the matter, binding
case law relevant to this issue came down at the same time as, or
immediately after, the parties submitted their briefs in 2018.
Understandably, parties could not timely contemplate the
implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). The Court believes that case bears
on the ultimate fate of Plaintiff's collective claims because it
discusses whether an employer's arbitration agreement may bar
collective claims altogether. If Defendant wishes the Court to find
that Plaintiff's collective claims may not proceed to arbitration,
it must explain what happens to those claims after the Court
precludes them from arbitration.

And if Plaintiff wishes the Court to find that his collective
claims, even if not arbitrable, must not be dismissed, he must
explain why case law allows them to proceed in some fashion. The
Court will not reach this decision without full briefing and
knowledge of the case law.

Accordingly, the parties shall each provide a supplemental brief on
this issue to the Court. The parties may cite to any other
pertinent case law that will assist the Court in deciding both the
question of arbitrability and the question of the ultimate fate of
Plaintiff's class action claims.

On the issue of sanctions, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request
is unwarranted. No evidence demonstrates that Defendant refused to
stipulate to arbitration in bad faith. Rather, Defendant refused a
stipulation because sending all of Plaintiff's claims to
arbitration is exactly the outcome Defendant hopes to avoid.
Agreeing to Plaintiff's stipulation would have required Defendant
to concede an important argument that it had not yet made to the
Court. The Court recognizes that this additional dispute has cost
(and continues to cost) both parties valuable time and resources
but finds that neither party could reasonably have avoided the
expense in pursuing the outcome they each seek.

The Court finds that it, and not an arbitrator, must determine
whether Plaintiff's class action claims may proceed to arbitration
under the parties' Arbitration Agreement. Additionally, the Court
finds that sanctions against Defendant are inappropriate. Having
decided as much, the Court now requires additional briefing on the
following issues: (1) Should Plaintiff's class action claims
proceed to arbitration along with his individual claims and (2) If
Plaintiff's class action claims are not arbitrable, must the Court
dismiss them?

The Court is therefore denying in part, without prejudice, the
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Plaintiff's class
action FLSA claims. The Court will maintain jurisdiction over this
case in order to decide, after further briefing, whether the
Plaintiff's class action claims may proceed to arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6rdsrfd from Leagle.com.

Joseph P Stone, on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Patricia Nicole Syverson --
psyverson@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint PC & Ty
Derek Frankel -- tfrankel@bffb.com -- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman &
Balint PC.

Certified Folder Display Service Incorporated, a California
corporation, Defendant, represented by Grant Daniel Waterkotte --
gwaterkotte@pettitkohn.com -- Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin
PC.


CHARLOTTE SCHOOL: Barchiesi Appeals W.D.N.C. Ruling to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Robert C. Barchiesi, et al., filed an appeal from a
Court ruling in their lawsuit titled ROBERT C. BARCHIESI, et al. v.
CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-00861-GCM,
in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina at Charlotte.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 4, 2019, Judge
Graham C. Mullen granted the parties' motion for final approval of
the class action settlement.

On Jan. 9, 2018, the District Court heard the motion for final
approval of the class action settlement of Settling Plaintiffs
Spencer Krebs, Morgan Switzer, Dave Wyatt, Krystal Horsley, Jacenta
Marie Price, Markisha Dobson, Raissa Levy, James Villanueva, Shanna
Rivera, and Andre McCoy, individually and in their representative
capacity on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Leah Ash,
individually, and Defendants Charlotte School of Law, LLC ("CSL"),
InfiLaw Corp., InfiLaw Holding, Chidi Ogene, Jay Conison, and Don
Lively.

The Class Members are defined as any person who enrolled in,
attended, or paid tuition or fees to CSL between Sept. 1, 2013 and
Aug. 15, 2017

The Settling Plaintiffs' Counsel are awarded 15% of the settlement
in attorneys' fees plus $35,773.82 in costs.  The Representative
Plaintiffs and Leah Ash are each awarded $500 as incentive awards.
The Claims Administrator will make such payments from the
Settlement Fund pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

The appellate case is captioned as Robert Barchiesi, et al. v.
Charlotte School of Law, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-1161, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ROBERT C. BARCHIESI, Individually and in a
Representative capacity on behalf of a class of all persons
similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          Angelique Adams, Esq.
          Kyle J. Nutt, Esq.
          Gary K. Shipman, Esq.
          SHIPMAN & WRIGHT, LLP
          575 Military Cutoff Road
          Wilmington, NC 28405
          Telephone: (910) 762-1990
          E-mail: aadams@shipmanlaw.com
                  knutt@shipmanlaw.com
                  gshipman@shipmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Karl J. Amelchenko, Esq.
          Steven Dennis Corriveau, Esq.
          Henry Forest Horne, Jr., Esq.
          John Alan Jones, Esq.
          MARTIN & JONES, PLLC
          410 Glenwood Avenue
          Raleigh, NC 27603-0000
          Telephone: (919) 821-0005
          E-mail: kja@m-j.com
                  sdc@m-j.com
                  hfh@m-j.com
                  jaj@m-j.com

Defendants-Appellees CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, LLC, INFILAW
CORPORATION, INFILAW CORPORATION, JAY CONISON and CHIDI OGENE are
represented by:

          Robert T. Cahill, Esq.
          COOLEY, LLP
          1 Freedom Square
          Reston Town Center
          11951 Freedom Drive
          Reston, VA 20190-5656
          Telephone: (703) 456-8000
          Facsimile: (703) 456-8100
          E-mail: rcahill@cooley.com

               - and -

          Rebecca Claire Fleishman, Esq.
          Johnny Morgan Loper, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
          555 Fayetteville Street
          Raleigh, NC 27601
          Telephone: (919) 755-2116
          E-mail: rebecca.fleishman@wbd-us.com
                  Johnny.Loper@wbd-us.com

               - and -

          Debbie Weston Harden, Esq.
          Sarah Motley Stone, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
          301 South College Street
          Charlotte, NC 28202-6037
          Telephone: (704) 331-4982
          E-mail: Debbie.Harden@wbd-us.com
                  Sarah.Stone@wbd-us.com

               - and -

          Michael Hays, Esq.
          David Edward Mills, Esq.
          COOLEY, LLP
          1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 842-7800
          E-mail: mhays@cooley.com
                  dmills@cooley.com

Defendants-Appellees STERLING PARTNERS and STERLING CAPITAL
PARTNERS IV, LLC, are represented by:

          Adam Doerr, Esq.
          Robert Evans Harrington, Esq.
          ROBINSON BRADSHAW & HINSON, PA
          101 North Tryon Street
          Charlotte, NC 28246
          Telephone: (704) 377-8114
          E-mail: adoerr@rbh.com
                  rharrington@rbh.com


CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Medgebow Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
-----------------------------------------------------
Joel Medgebow, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN RESTAURANTS INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-80090, (S.D. Fla., January 23, 2019),
seeks statutory damages and injunctive relief for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Checkers is a fast food chain restaurant that owns and operates two
brands, "Checkers" and "Rally's." To promote its services, it
engages in unsolicited text messaging using an auto-dialer.
Medgebow expressly and clearly revoked his consent to continue
receiving text messages on December 5, 2018 by sending an "opt-out"
message yet continued to receive such SMS ads. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
      Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
      EDWARDS POTTINGER, LLC
      425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 524-2820
      Facsimile: (954) 524-2822
      Email: Seth@epllc.com
             JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com

             - and -

      Michael J. Pascucci, Esq.
      EGGNATZ | PASCUCCI
      5400 S. University Drive, Ste. 417
      Davie, FL 33328
      Tel: (954) 889-3359
      Facsimile: (954) 889-5913
      E-mail: MPascucci@JusticeEarned.com


CHICAGO, IL: Faces Class Action Over Red-Light Camera Tickets
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Bilyk, writing for Cook County Record, reports that less
than a year since Chicago City Hall inked a settlement to end a
class action over defective red-light and speeding camera ticket
notices sent from 2010-2015, a new class action has landed in Cook
County court demanding the city be made to pay out for similar
notices delivered to others who got red light camera tickets in
earlier years.

On Jan. 25, attorneys with the firm of Cafferty Clobes Meriwether &
Sprengel LLP, of Chicago and Pennsylvania, filed a complaint in
Cook County Circuit Court on behalf of named plaintiff Fred Hampton
and a potential class of hundreds of thousands of additional
plaintiffs.

The lawsuit centers on allegations the city violated its own
ordinance in failing to send a second notice of violation to people
who were mailed tickets under Chicago's automated traffic
enforcement program. The notices were to be mailed to give those
receiving tickets sufficient chance to contest them before the city
began assessing additional fees and fines for the unpaid tickets.

Failure to issue the second notice should render any of those
tickets "null and void."

"The City . . . issued first notices of violation that
misrepresented to Plaintiff and Class members that they had only 14
days to contest a violation or would forfeit their right to do so,
contrary to" the city ordinance establishing the automated
enforcement program, the lawsuit said.

"The City's misconduct likely coerced thousands of Class members to
pay a fine they were not yet required to pay."

The claims on which Hampton's lawsuit are based substantially
mirror those in a  2015 class action filed by attorneys from the
firm of Myron M. Cherry & Associates, on behalf of named plaintiff
Delyn McKenzie-Lopez and others.

Ultimately, the city and the McKenzie-Lopez plaintiffs agreed to
settle that lawsuit in February 2018 for $38 million. The
settlement provided an average of $58 in refunds for class members.
The city paid $11 million to the Cherry & Associates lawyers under
the deal.

However, the settlement only included those who received automated
tickets from 2010-2015.

In the new lawsuit, Mr. Hampton's lawyers assert the five-year
limit on the claims should not be binding on their new class action
at all.

They noted the city on multiple occasions, both in Cook County
Circuit Court and on appeal, argued the class action claims should
be limited by law to the five-year span. Each time, Hampton's
lawyers said, those arguments were turned aside by the courts.

"Despite having secured certification of a class of all persons to
whom the City issued void determinations of liability following the
ATL (automated traffic law enforcement) program enactment in 2003
-- and the (Illinois First District Appellate Court) denying the
City's petition for leave to appeal that ruling on statute of
limitation grounds -- the McKenzie-Lopez plaintiffs perplexingly
agreed to settle the action on behalf of only those individuals
against whom the City entered an administrative judgment arising
from an alleged ATL or ASE violation between (2010-2015)," the
complaint said.

They asserted this should mean the settlement did nothing to end
the claims brought by Hampton and others who received red-light
camera and speed camera tickets in Chicago from 2003-2010.

The complaint does not estimate how many people might be included
in the class action. However, in the McKenzie-Lopez case,
plaintiffs estimated nearly 450,000 people received red-light
camera tickets from 2010-2015 alone. [GN]


COOK COUNTY, IL: McFields' Bid to Certify Class Under Advisement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 13, 2019, in the case
entitled Courtney McFields, et al. v. Sheriff of Cook County, et
al., Case No. 1:17-cv-07424 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held
before the Honorable John Robert Blakey.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Motion hearing was held on February 13, 2019;

   -- Plaintiff's motion [85] and [86] are stricken; and

   -- Plaintiff's motion to certify class [84] is taken under
      advisement; and

   -- the Court will issue a ruling and additional case
      management dates by separate order.[CC]


COUNTY JANITORIAL: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Castrej
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's Motion to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned MIREYA CASTREJON,
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CCS ORANGE COUNTY JANITORIAL, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant. No. G055759. (Cal. App.).

Castrejon, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
filed a class action complaint containing claims for (1) failure to
pay wages; (2) failure to provide meal periods (3) failure to
permit rest breaks (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
statements (5) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of
employment; (6) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses
and (7) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et
seq.  

CCS Orange County Janitorial, Inc. (CCS Orange County) filed a
motion to compel plaintiff Mireya Castrejon to submit her claims to
arbitration based on evidence Castrejon signed a binding
arbitration agreement at the commencement of her employment with
CCS Orange County. The trial court denied the motion.

CCS Orange County contends the court erred by concluding CCS Orange
County was not a party to the arbitration agreement and could not
enforce that agreement against Castrejon.

When a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by
prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement
exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it
is enforceable.

Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite
to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of
proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

CCS Orange County did not argue the applicability of any of these
exceptions in the trial court. While the record shows Pacific
Building Care, Inc. is the parent company of CCS Orange County, no
evidence was produced and no argument was made showing that the
relationship between those two separate corporate entities with
respect to Castrejon would support the application of an
exception.

CCS Orange County did not provide evidence or legal authority
showing the existence of any agency relationship and/or third party
beneficiary relationship between CCS Orange County and its parent
corporation much less showing how any such relationship fit into
one of the exceptions to the general rule. CCS Orange County
similarly failed to argue in the trial court that any exception
applied in this case.

At oral argument on appeal, CCS Orange County argued Castrejon is
equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration as a matter of law.
Equitable estoppel, however, is generally a question of fact. CCS
Orange County's counsel argued that the facts presented in
connection with the motion to compel arbitration were undisputed,
thereby making the issue of whether equitable estoppel applied a
question of law that this court may address in the first instance.
  
Even if the facts in our record regarding the motion to compel
arbitration are undisputed, because CCS Orange County did not argue
equitable estoppel below, Castrejon did not have the opportunity to
put forth additional evidence in opposition to the equitable
estoppel argument. The trial court, in turn, did not have the
opportunity to make findings on that issue based on a complete
factual record and ultimately rule on the applicability of
equitable estoppel in enforcing the arbitration agreement against
Castrejon in this case. Consequently, because of CCS Orange
County's failure to raise this issue below, we are not in a
position to determine the applicability of equitable estoppel in
the first instance as a matter of law.

Because the Court concludes the trial court properly denied the
motion to compel arbitration on the ground CCS Orange County was
not a party to the agreement and no exception to the general
applied, the Court do not reach Castrejon's other arguments
challenging the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.

The order is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' January 31, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9foqy2k from Leagle.com.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffrey S. Ranen --
ranen@lbbslaw.com -- William C. Sung -- wsung@lbbslaw.com -- and
Hillary M. Burrelle -- Hillary.Burrelle@lewisbrisbois.com -- for
Defendant and Appellant.

Aegis Law Firm, Kashif Haque, Samuel A. Wong, Jessica L. Campbell
and Ali S. Carlsen, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


D & A SERVICES: Certification of Class Sought in Stoviak Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Stoviak moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled JASON STOVIAK, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. D & A SERVICES LLC, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00240-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court
both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


D&D LIFT: Ross Suit Alleges Calif. Labor Code Violations
--------------------------------------------------------
Brian Ross, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v.
D&D Lift, LLC. and Does 1 through 50, Case No. UDE-2019-113 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., January 3, 2019), is brought against
the Defendants for violations of the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay minimum
wages and failed to pay wages and overtime.

The Plaintiff is a resident of California and San Joaquin County
and was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt employee within
the State of California based out of the Defendants' facility in
Tracy, California and within the County of San Joaquin.

The Defendant D&D Lift, LLC is a California limited liability
company, with its principal executive offices located in San
Joaquin County, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David Yeremian, Esq.
      Natalie Haritoonian, Esq.
      DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATS, INC.
      535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705
      Glendale, CA 91203
      Tel: (818) 230-8380
      Fax: (818) 230-0308
      E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com
              natalie@yeremianlaw.com


DC CONSTRUCTION: Imel Suit Seeks to Enforce Rights Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL IMEL on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated
v. DC CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC. and DUSTIN CALHOUN, Case No.
1:19-cv-00634-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind., February 12, 2019), is brought to
enforce the Plaintiff's rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Imel accuses the Defendants of willfully failing to pay members
of the Collective Class the correct overtime wages.  He adds that
he entered into a contract to get money to purchase a truck from
the Defendants.  He alleges that the Defendants breached the
contract by repossessing the truck despite the fact that the Loan
Agreement was not in breach.

DC is an incorporated business that operates an office in
Indianapolis, Indiana.  Mr. Calhoun is an officer, manager or owner
of DC.

DC is a civil construction company that provides services for
earthworks, drainage, pavements, etc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald E. Weldy, Esq.
          WELDY LAW
          8383 Craig Street, Suite 330
          Indianapolis, IN 46250
          Telephone: (317) 842-6600
          Facsimile: (317) 288-4013
          E-mail: weldy@weldylegal.com


DECIBELS OF OREGON: Court Narrows Claims in Wilson FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
Medford Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in
the case captioned DANIEL WILSON, Plaintiff, v. DECIBELS OF OREGON,
INC.; DENNIS SNYDER; LEO BROWN, Defendants. Civ. No.
1:17-cv-01558-MC. (D. Or.).

The Plaintiff sought to join an earlier-filed Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) collective action case, Matthew Wilson v. Decibels of
Oregon et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-00855-CL (Matthew Wilson case), as
an opt-in plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges that he and other similarly
situated installation technicians were subjected an unfair and
unlawful system of payment while employed by Defendants, which
deprived them of wages for time spent working and overtime pay to
which they were entitled.

As in the Matthew Wilson case, the Plaintiff is pursuing collective
action on behalf of similarly situated installation technicians.  

The Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to the
Plaintiff's FLSA collective action claim on the basis that it is
partially-time barred.

An action brought under the FLSA must be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues, unless the case involves a
willful violation, in which case the limitations period is extended
to three years.  

When the named plaintiff files his consent to join the collective
action at some time after the filing of the complaint, the action
is deemed to be commenced" on the date when the consent has been
filed.  

In the present case, the Plaintiff filed the original complaint on
October 2, 2017, but did not file a written consent until April 5,
2018.  The Defendants argue the action did not commence until the
Plaintiff filed the written consent and that, as a consequence, the
Plaintiff's claims are time-barred to the extent that they seek to
reach beyond April 5, 2015.

The Plaintiff contends that his claims are not time barred because
(1) he has brought an individual action under the FLSA, rather than
a collective action (2) a collective action is not instituted under
the FLSA until the plaintiff either seeks to conditionally certify
a class or an unnamed plaintiff files a consent to join in the
action and (3) the statute of limitations has been tolled from the
date on which Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to join in the
earlier Matthew Wilson case.

This is a dual capacity action

The Plaintiff asserts that he has not filed a collective action
case and, instead, seeks to vindicate his individual rights under
the FLSA. As an individual action, Plaintiff's claims would not be
subject to the written consent requirements of Section 256 and his
claim would be deemed to have commenced on the date of the original
complaint.  

In this case, the FAC explicitly identifies itself as a collective
action, notwithstanding Plaintiff's arguments in response to the
present motion.  The opening paragraph of the FAC alleges that
Plaintiff is used interchangeably with technicians as all
Installation Technicians were subjected to the same pattern,
practice, and policy of not counting all hours worked each date
toward the total hours worked each week. There are numerous
references to similarly situated employees and the FAC frequently,
albeit inconsistently, refers to plaintiffs in the plural.  

The FAC repeatedly expresses Plaintiff's intention to represent the
interests of other unnamed plaintiffs and to seek recovery on their
behalf. For example, in an unnumbered line of the FAC between, the
FAC alleges Plaintiffs seek to represent all employees
collectively. This unambiguous statement is in bold and all capital
letters. The phrase Plaintiff on his own behalf and the class he
seeks to represent, is also used repeatedly.  

Although the collective action allegations in this case clearly
predominate over the scattered references to an individual action,
the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has sufficiently put
Defendants on notice that he intends to pursue his individual
rights in addition to the collective action claim. The Court
concludes, therefore, that while Plaintiff's collective action
claims did not accrue until April 5, 2018, his individual claims
accrued on the date of his original complaint.

Commencement of a collective action

Plaintiff argues that he has not initiated a collective action
because he has not sought to certify a class, nor have any unnamed
plaintiffs sought to join in the putative collective action class.
As such, Plaintiff argues, he is not subject to the written consent
requirements of an FLSA collective action.

In support of this position, Plaintiff relies on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Allen v. Atl. Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131
(5th Cir. 1984). In Allen, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion
that an action involving multiple named plaintiffs was a collective
action, despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought to represent
themselves and other similarly situated employees. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the action never evolved into a collective
or class action since no unnamed plaintiff ever came forward and
filed a written consent to suit, asking to be made a party
plaintiff.

Consistent with the plain language of Section 256, a collective
action under the FLSA commences when the there is both a complaint
and a written consent, without regard to whether any unnamed
plaintiff has opted into the suit, or whether the named plaintiff
has affirmatively sought to certify the putative class. Applied to
the facts of this case, Plaintiff's collective action commenced
when he filed his written consent on April 5, 2018.

Tolling

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations has been tolled
from the date of his consent to join the Matthew Wilson case
through the entry of final judgment in that case. Plaintiff offers
no case law or other support for this position. To the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to toll the statute of limitations by invoking the
savings provision of ORS 12.220,  that argument is unavailing. As
Judge Brown recently noted, federal courts borrow state statutes of
limitation and savings provisions in the absence of a federal
statute of limitations.  

When the federal statute provides an appropriate statute of
limitations, however, federal courts do not apply state savings
statutes.  Congress explicitly put a limit upon the time for
enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter.
The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive. In the
present case, § 256 imposes a clear limitations period and the
application of ORS 12.220 is therefore inappropriate. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that this action was not tolled by the filing
of Plaintiff's written consent in the earlier Matthew Wilson
action.

Plaintiff does not appear to seek an equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations and so the Court does not address that
issue, other than to note that nothing prevented Plaintiff from
filing his written consent at the same time as the original
complaint in this action.  

Accordingly, the Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted in part and denied in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yayn2fzs from Leagle.com.

Daniel Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by Quinn E. Kuranz, The
Office of Q.E. Kuranz Attorney at Law, LLC.

Decibels of Oregon, Inc., Dennis Snyder & Leo Brown, Defendants,
represented by John Baird Dudrey -- john.dudrey@stoel.com -- Stoel
Rives LLP, Karen L. O'Connor -- karen.oconnor@stoel.com -- Stoel
Rives LLP & Caroline J. Livett -- caroline.livett@stoel.com --
Stoel Rives LLP.


DECIBELS OF OREGON: Court Narrows FLSA Claims in Hemming
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
Medford Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in
the case captioned RYAN HEMMING, Plaintiff, v. DECIBELS OF OREGON,
INC.; DENNIS SNYDER; LEO BROWN, Defendants. Civ. No.
1:17-cv-01624-MC. (D. Or.).

The Plaintiff sought to join an earlier-filed Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) collective action case, Matthew Wilson v. Decibels of
Oregon et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-00855-CL (Matthew Wilson case), as
an opt-in plaintiff.  The Plaintiff alleges that he and other
similarly situated installation technicians were subjected an
unfair and unlawful system of payment while employed by the
Defendants, which deprived them of wages for time spent working and
overtime pay to which they were entitled. As in the Matthew Wilson
case, the Plaintiff is pursuing collective action on behalf of
similarly situated installation technicians.  

The Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to the
Plaintiff's FLSA collective action claim on the basis that it is
partially-time barred.

An action brought under the FLSA must be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues, unless the case involves a
willful violation, in which case the limitations period is extended
to three years.
  
When the named plaintiff files his consent to join the collective
action at some time after the filing of the complaint, the action
is deemed to be commenced" on the date when the consent has been
filed.  

In the present case, the Plaintiff filed the original complaint on
October 2, 2017, but did not file a written consent until April 5,
2018.  The Defendants argue the action did not commence until the
Plaintiff filed the written consent and that, as a consequence, the
Plaintiff's claims are time-barred to the extent that they seek to
reach beyond April 5, 2015.

The Plaintiff contends that his claims are not time barred because
(1) he has brought an individual action under the FLSA, rather than
a collective action (2) a collective action is not instituted under
the FLSA until the plaintiff either seeks to conditionally certify
a class or an unnamed plaintiff files a consent to join in the
action and (3) the statute of limitations has been tolled from the
date on which Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to join in the
earlier Matthew Wilson case.

This is a dual capacity action

The Plaintiff asserts that he has not filed a collective action
case and, instead, seeks to vindicate his individual rights under
the FLSA. As an individual action, Plaintiff's claims would not be
subject to the written consent requirements of Section 256 and his
claim would be deemed to have commenced on the date of the original
complaint.  

In this case, the FAC explicitly identifies itself as a collective
action, notwithstanding the Plaintiff's arguments in response to
the present motion.  The opening paragraph of the FAC alleges that
Plaintiff is used interchangeably with technicians as all
Installation Technicians were subjected to the same pattern,
practice, and policy of not counting all hours worked each date
toward the total hours worked each week. There are numerous
references to similarly situated employees and the FAC frequently,
albeit inconsistently, refers to plaintiffs in the plural.  

The FAC repeatedly expresses Plaintiff's intention to represent the
interests of other unnamed plaintiffs and to seek recovery on their
behalf. For example, in an unnumbered line of the FAC between, the
FAC alleges Plaintiffs seek to represent all employees
collectively. This unambiguous statement is in bold and all capital
letters. The phrase Plaintiff on his own behalf and the class he
seeks to represent, is also used repeatedly.  

Although the collective action allegations in this case clearly
predominate over the scattered references to an individual action,
the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has sufficiently put
Defendants on notice that he intends to pursue his individual
rights in addition to the collective action claim. The Court
concludes, therefore, that while Plaintiff's collective action
claims did not accrue until April 5, 2018, his individual claims
accrued on the date of his original complaint.

Commencement of a collective action

The Plaintiff argues that he has not initiated a collective action
because he has not sought to certify a class, nor have any unnamed
plaintiffs sought to join in the putative collective action class.
As such, Plaintiff argues, he is not subject to the written consent
requirements of an FLSA collective action.

In support of this position, Plaintiff relies on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Allen v. Atl. Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131
(5th Cir. 1984). In Allen, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion
that an action involving multiple named plaintiffs was a collective
action, despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought to represent
themselves and other similarly situated employees. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the action never evolved into a collective
or class action since no unnamed plaintiff ever came forward and
filed a written consent to suit, asking to be made a party
plaintiff.

Consistent with the plain language of Section 256, a collective
action under the FLSA commences when the there is both a complaint
and a written consent, without regard to whether any unnamed
plaintiff has opted into the suit, or whether the named plaintiff
has affirmatively sought to certify the putative class. Applied to
the facts of this case, Plaintiff's collective action commenced
when he filed his written consent on April 5, 2018.

Tolling

The Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations has been
tolled from the date of his consent to join the Matthew Wilson case
through the entry of final judgment in that case. The Plaintiff
offers no case law or other support for this position. To the
extent that the Plaintiff seeks to toll the statute of limitations
by invoking the savings provision of ORS 12.220,  that argument is
unavailing. As Judge Brown recently noted, federal courts borrow
state statutes of limitation and savings provisions in the absence
of a federal statute of limitations.  

When the federal statute provides an appropriate statute of
limitations, however, federal courts do not apply state savings
statutes.  Congress explicitly put a limit upon the time for
enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter.
The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive. In the
present case, § 256 imposes a clear limitations period and the
application of ORS 12.220 is therefore inappropriate. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that this action was not tolled by the filing
of Plaintiff's written consent in the earlier Matthew Wilson
action.

The Plaintiff does not appear to seek an equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations and so the Court does not address that
issue, other than to note that nothing prevented Plaintiff from
filing his written consent at the same time as the original
complaint in this action.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yayn2fzs from
Leagle.com.

Daniel Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by Quinn E. Kuranz, The
Office of Q.E. Kuranz Attorney at Law, LLC.

Decibels of Oregon, Inc., Dennis Snyder & Leo Brown, Defendants,
represented by John Baird Dudrey -- john.dudrey@stoel.com -- Stoel
Rives LLP, Karen L. O'Connor -- karen.oconnor@stoel.com -- Stoel
Rives LLP & Caroline J. Livett -- caroline.livett@stoel.com --
Stoel Rives LLP.


DIRECT FLOW: Court Orders Supplemental Brief on Reynolds Suit Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J. JASON REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. DIRECT FLOW MEDICAL,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00204-KAW (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California ordered the Plaintiff to
provide a supplemental brief regarding his motion for preliminary
approval of settlement.

The Plaintiff asserts that in November 2016, Defendant Direct Flow
Medical shut down its operations and terminated almost its entire
work force.  He alleges that in doing so, the Defendant failed to
provide its former employees with 60 days' notice of the
termination in violation of the WARN Act, failed to reimburse
terminated employees for previously incurred work-related expenses,
failed to compensate terminated employees for paid time off ("PTO")
accrued but not used at the time of their termination, and failed
to compensate terminated employees for promised but deferred pay
raises.  The Plaintiff also brings a California Private Attorneys
General Act ("PAGA") claim.

The proposed settlement is for $911,500, in addition to costs for
settlement administration.  Once the attorney's fees ($227,875),
costs (currently estimated at $21,681.15), incentive award
($12,500), and PAGA penalty ($10,254) are excluded, the net
settlement fund is estimated to be $639,189.85.

The Plaintiff estimates the maximum liability in the class to be
$7,255,500 (excluding civil penalties under PAGA).  Thus, the
$911,500 settlement amount is 12.6% of the full verdict value, and
the $639,189.85 net settlement amount is 8.8% of the full verdict
value.  

Magistrate Westmore required additional information as to the
proposed discount, particularly the risk regarding the liability of
the individual Defendants.  While the Plaintiff asserts that the
liability of the individual Defendants is not certain under
California Labor Code Section 558.1 and alter ego liability, he
provides no authority to allow the Court to determine the extent of
those risks.  Thus, the Plaintiff must fully explain the risks of
demonstrating liability as to the individual Defendants, citing to
specific case law and facts, and why these risks warrant the
proposed discount.

As to the calculation of settlement share, the Magistrate required
further explanation on why the 20/80 ratio for Portions 1 and 2 was
chosen.  A class member's share of the settlement is calculated as
two "Portions."  First, the settlement administrator calculates
each class member's "Annualized Compensation Ratio" by dividing the
individual class member's annual compensation by the total annual
compensation of all class members.  The settlement administrator
will then multiply the class member's "Annualized Compensation
Ratio" by a figure representing 20% of the net settlement amount to
obtain "Portion 1" of the class member's settlement payment.

Second, the settlement administrator adds: (1) the dollar value of
the individual class member's PTO that the class member accrued but
had not used as of Nov. 30, 2016, (2) the amount of unreimbursed
work expenses the class member incurred as of Nov. 30, 2016, and
(3) the amount of compensation the class member would have received
as of Nov. 30, 2016 from approved but deferred pay expenses that
the class member had not received.  The settlement administrator
then divides this figure by the sum of these three figures for all
the class members to obtain the individual class member's "Unpaid
Compensation & Expenses Ratio."  The class member's "Unpaid
Compensation & Expenses Ratio" is then multiplied by a figure
representing 80% of the net settlement amount to obtain "Portion 2"
of the class member's settlement payment.  If the class member has
no unpaid PTO, unreimbursed expenses, or a deferred raise, the
class member's Portion 2 will be zero.

The Magistrate required information on the value of the PAGA claim.
She required that the Plaintiff addresses whether he submitted a
copy of the settlement to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency ("LWDA"), and whether he has received any comments from the
LWDA.  If the LWDA has provided any comments, the comments should
be attached as an exhibit to the supplemental brief.

Next, the Settlement Agreement provides that if the total amount of
the cashed settlement checks exceeds 90% of the net settle fund but
is less than 100%, the remainder will be put in a cy pres fund.
Per the Procedural Guidance, the Magistrate holds that the parties
should identify their chosen cy pres recipients and explain how
those recipients are related to the subject matter of the lawsuit
and the class members.

The Settlement Agreement proposes an incentive payment of $12,500
to Plaintiff Reynolds.  The Magistrate required additional briefing
on whether the work performed by the Plaintiff warrants the
requested incentive awards, including the amount of time and work
he has put into the case.  

She also ordered that the Plaintiff will clarify whether the class
members who only receive notice by mail will also receive an
estimate of the settlement payment the class member will receive.
The parties should address whether CAFA notice is required and if
so, when it will be given.

The Class Notice does not appear to identify the PAGA award, which
will come out of the $911,500 settlement amount.  The Magistrate
required the Plaintiff to indicate whether he intends to correct
this.

The Class Notice states that checks will be mailed 10 days after
final approval.  The Settlement Agreement, however, provides that
checks will be mailed within 30 days of the final approval.  She
required the Plaintiff to explain the discrepancy.

Finally, the Class Notice states that class members who do not file
a written objection must ask for permission to speak at the final
approval hearing.  It is not clear why permission is required.  The
Plaintiff will explain why permission is required, and identify
other cases that have required that permission be granted.
Additionally, there appear to be a number of typos in this section
that should be corrected.

The supplemental brief will be filed no later than Feb. 20, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 5, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bUUhYg from Leagle.com.

J. Jason Reynolds, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Steven M. Tindall --
smt@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP, Caroline Camille
Corbitt -- scc@classlawgroup.com -- GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP & John H.
Douglas -- jdouglas@douglaslegal.com -- Douglas Law Offices.

Direct Flow Medical, Inc., Dan Lemaitre, John David Boyle, Gordon
Bishop, Paul LaViolette & Yuval Binur, Defendants, represented by
Allan J. Gomes -- agomes@andgolaw.com -- Anderies & Gomes LLP.


DUPLIN COUNTY, NC: Court Quashes Subpoena in FCRA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Southern Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Quash Subpoena in the case captioned RYAN LANG, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DUPLIN
COUNTY, Defendant. No. 7:18-CV-77-BO. (W.D.N.C.).

In this putative class action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant, an owner of
residential rental properties, failed to give the Plaintiffs proper
FCRA disclosures that it took adverse action against them based on
credit reports.

After discovery closed, the Defendant issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum
to one of the Plaintiffs' prior landlords, TLC Properties,
demanding production of the Plaintiffs' tenant files. The
Plaintiffs seek to quash the subpoena as out of time, citing
Dziadek v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:11-CV-04134-RAL, 2016
WL 1643825 (D.S.D. Apr. 22, 2016).

The Defendant argues that the subpoena is proper because the
documents go only to impeaching the Plaintiffs' testimony about
whether they owe anything to their prior landlord, citing Joseph P.
Carroll Ltd. v. Baker, No. 09 CIV. 3174 SHS, 2012 WL 1232957
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012), and Malmberg v. United States, No.
506-CV-1042 FJS/GHL, 2010 WL 1186573 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010).

In the alternative, the Defendant claims it has good cause under
Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for relief from
the scheduling order's discovery deadline because, after discovery
closed, Plaintiffs submitted summary judgment affidavits that
conflict with their deposition testimony.

The Defendant is incorrect that the subpoena is proper just because
it claims the documents go only to impeachment. When the party
issuing the belated subpoena could have obtained the requested
documents during discovery, courts will quash the subpoena as
untimely notwithstanding the party's contention that the documents
are for impeachment.

The Defendants also have not shown good cause for relief from the
discovery deadline. The primary measure of good cause is the
movant's diligence in attempting to meet the order's requirements.


The Plaintiffs testified during their depositions that they either
believed they did not owe anything to TLC or did not know whether
they did.   

In the Plaintiffs' summary judgment affidavits, they testified that
their credit reports listed false debts to TLC, which they would
have corrected if the Defendant had given them the proper FCRA
disclosures. The Defendant claims this is an inconsistency in
testimony that did not arise until after discovery closed, so it
did not have a reason to seek the tenant files until then.

The Court disagrees.

The Plaintiffs' deposition testimony about whether they owed debts
to TLC was equivocal at best, and it certainly should not have led
the Defendant to believe that the Plaintiffs were conceding that
they owed debts to TLC. Moreover, the Defendant fails to explain
how it will use the tenant files for impeachment.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4rmsj7m from Leagle.com.

Ryan A Lang, Plaintiff, represented by Charlotte Smith, The Law
Offices of Gilda A. Hernandez, PLLC, Emma J. Smiley, The Law Office
of Gilda A. Hernandez, PLLC & Gilda A. Hernandez, The Law Offices
of Gilda A. Hernandez, PLLC.

Duplin County, Defendant, represented by Norwood P. Blanchard, III
-- norwood@cmclawfirm.com -- Crossley McIntosh Collier Hanley &
Edes, PLLC & Wendy Lynne Sivori, Duplin County Legal Department.


EB SERVICES INC: De La Cruz Files Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------
Juan De La Cruz, and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff(s), v. EB Services, Inc. and Eduardo Bedoya,
individually, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-80097, (S.D. Fla., January
24, 2019), seeks to recover regular wages, overtime compensation,
retaliatory damages, liquidated damages, costs and reasonable
attorney's fees under the provisions of, and pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

EB Services is a construction company specializing in complete
remodeling of residential properties and general construction work
where De La Cruz worked as a driver and construction laborer. He
worked a minimum of 10 hours daily and was unable to take bona fide
lunch breaks. He was fired for his complaints about overtime and
unpaid wages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


EGS FINANCIAL: Certification of Class Sought in Cheek Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Donna Cheek moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit styled DONNA CHEEK, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. EGS FINANCIAL CARE INC.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00239-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the
Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff avers.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


FBCS INC: Hayes Disputes Time-barred Collection Letter
------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Hayes, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. Financial Business and Consumer
Solutions, Inc. (d/b/a FBCS, Inc.), Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00062
(W.D. Ky., January 23, 2019), seeks actual and statutory damages
for violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Credit Act.

On or about January 23, 2018, FBCS, sent a letter to Hayes via mail
where it sought to collect an alleged debt in the amount of
$1,425.49 allegedly owed to Verizon Wireless. Said debt was time
barred at the time the letter was mailed yet Defendant made a
settlement offer splitting the settlement into 3 payments and
offered a "50% discount" on the outstanding balance," an
arrangement that was not authorized by agreement. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zachary L. Taylor, Esq.
     Nina B. Couch, Esq.
     TAYLOR COUCH PLLC
     2815 Taylorsville Road, Suite 101
     Louisville, KY 40205
     Tel: (502) 625-5000
     Email: ztaylor@taylorcouchlaw.com
            ncouch@taylorcouchlaw.com


GATE GOURMET: Removes Garcia FLSA Class Suit to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHIRLEY GARCIA, an individual, on her own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. GATE GOURMET, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV02518, was
removed on February 12, 2019, from the Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-01075 to the
proceeding.

On January 9, 2019, Plaintiff Shirley Garcia filed a civil action
in the Superior Court.  She alleges 11 causes of action on behalf
of herself and other allegedly similarly situated employees,
including (1) failure to pay all wages owed; (2) failure to pay
overtime compensation (Welfare Commission Orders and California
Labor Code); (3) missed meal and rest breaks; (4) failure to pay
compensation at the time of termination; (5) failure to provide
proper wage statement; and (6) failure to pay all wages and
overtime compensation, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.
          Kiley Lynn Grombacher, Esq.
          Taylor L. Emerson, Esq.
          BRADLEY/GROMBACHER, LLP
          2815 Townsgate Road, Suite 130
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone: (805) 270-7100
          Facsimile: (805) 270-7589
          E-mail: mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com
                  kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com
                  temerson@bradleygrombacher.com

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian II, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Boulevard
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609-0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609-0892
          E-mail: sahagii@aol.com

Defendant GATE GOURMET, INC., is represented by:

          Diana Tabacopoulos, Esq.
          David D. Jacobson, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
          Telephone: (310) 277-7200
          Facsimile: (310) 201-5219
          E-mail: dtabacopoulos@seyfarth.com
                  djacobson@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Michael W. Kopp, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2350
          Sacramento, CA 95814-4428
          Telephone: (916) 448-0159
          Facsimile: (916) 558-4839
          E-mail: mkopp@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Rod M. Fliegel, Esq.
          Alison S. Hightower, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-1940
          Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
          E-mail: rfliegel@littler.com
                  ahightower@littler.com


GEORGIA: Court Denies Inmate's Pro Se Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, Statesboro Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned STEPHEN RAY
HOKE, Plaintiff, v. MR. LYTE, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No.
6:16-cv-45. (S.D. Ga.).

The Plaintiff filed his initial 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Complaint on
April 21, 2016, naming five Defendants: Nathan Deal; Homer Bryson;
Valient Lyte; Stanley Williams; and Tiffany Henry.

The Plaintiff claimed the named Defendants violated his rights
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), by preventing his religious mail from coming into the
prison.  

The Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, asserts there are more
than 200 Christian inmates at Georgia State Prison; thus, they all
have the same claims as he has asserted against the Defendants. The
Plaintiff contends these claims should not be hard to prove based
on the facts he sets forth in his Amended Complaint, and the
Defendants brag about sending religious mail back without notice.

It is plain error to permit an imprisoned litigant who is
unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class
action. Simply put, incarcerated pro se litigants may not bring a
class action on behalf of other prisoners. Even if the Plaintiff
met the Rule 23 requirements necessary for class certification, he
cannot litigate the interests of other prisoner-litigants.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Benjamin W. Cheesbro recommends the
Court deny the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5e3nccs from Leagle.com.

Stephen Ray Hoke, Plaintiff, pro se.

Mr. Lyle, Chaplain, Ex Warden Stanley Williams, Inidividual and
Official Capacity & Officer Tiffany Henry, Inidividual and Official
Capacity, Defendants, represented by Amy L. Macrina, Georgia
Department of Law & David S. Grossman, Georgia Department of Law.

Chaplain Valient Lyte, Individual and Official Capacity, Defendant,
represented by Amy L. Macrina, Georgia Department of Law.


GRACE AND LACE: Kiler Asserts Breach under Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
Grace and Lace, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled Marion
Kiler, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Grace and Lace, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00928 (E.D. N.Y., February 15, 2019).

Grace and Lace, LLC designs and manufactures boot socks and other
accessories for women and girls. It also offers leg warmers, boot
cuffs, scarves, arm warmers, and apparel. The company was founded
in 2011 and is based in Cedar Park, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11217
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


H&M HENNES: Faces Haggar Class Suit Alleging ADA Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
ELIA HAGGAR; KYO HAK CHU; VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. H&M
HENNES & MAURITZ GBC AB, LLC; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:19-cv-01070-AB-KS (C.D. Cal., February 13, 2019), alleges
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB manufactures and distributes apparel.
The Company offers clothing for men, women, and kids, as well as
other accessories and home products.  The Company markets its
products to customers worldwide.  The true names and capacities of
the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Bobby Saadian, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com


HEARTLAND AUTOMOTIVE: Johnson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chresha Johnson, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Heartland Automotive Services, Inc. and
Team Car Care, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00122 (W.D. Tex.,
February 18, 2019) is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants have failed and refused to pay their hourly employees at
time-and-one-half their regular rates of pay for all hours worked
in excess of forty hours within a workweek by purposefully and
intentionally eliminating the hours worked by these employees
during their lunch periods, even though their employees
consistently worked through their lunch periods, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Chresha Johnson was employed by Defendants from November
2017 to the present as a lube specialist, who resides in Austin,
Texas.

Defendants are a foreign corporation and a foreign limited
liability company that are currently authorized to do business in
Texas, and that is doing business in Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
     MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
     The Commissioners House at Heritage Square
     2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
     Austin, TX 78746
     Phone: (512) 782-0567
     Fax: (512) 782-0605
     Email: doug@morelandlaw.com


HOME HEALTH RESOURCES: Mathis Suit to Recover Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Mathis, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated employees Plaintiff, v. Home Health Resources, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00256 (S.D. Tex., January 23, 2019),
seeks to recover overtime wages owed, liquidated damages,
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees, costs, expert fees,
mediator fees, and out-of-pocket expenses under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Home Health Resources is in the business of providing home
healthcare services where Mathis worked as a nurse, going to
patient's homes and assisted living facilities to provide medical
assistance. She worked from August 2016 to February 2018. Plaintiff
worked between 60–80 hours a week almost every week without
receiving time-and-a-half for each hour that exceeded 40 per week.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dennis A. Clifford, Esq.
     THE CLIFFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     712 Main Street, Suite 900
     Houston, TX 77002
     Tel: (713) 999-1833
     Fax: (866) 232-0999
     Email: dennis@cliffordemploymentlaw.com


HYDRO ONE: Aird Attorney Discusses Class Action Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------
David Stevens, Esq. -- dstevens@airdberlis.com -- of Aird & Berlis
LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that on December 31, 2018,
the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal of a November 2017
Decision denying certification of a class action against Hydro One
Networks Inc. (Hydro One). The proposed class action relates to
alleged overcharges resulting from the rollout of a new customer
information system (CIS) starting in 2013. The Divisional Court
confirmed that this is not an appropriate case for a class action,
in part because the determination of each class member's claim
would require individual trials, and in part because an alternate
remedy is available from the Ontario Energy Board (OEB).

As detailed in an earlier post, because of "a malfunctioning and a
negligently implemented and administered CIS," Hydro One
undercharged or overcharged some of its 1.3 million customers. Some
customers did not receive bills for extended periods of time and
some customers received incorrect bills, including bills with large
overcharge amounts. The proposed class action seeks damages of $100
million related to alleged overcharges. Hydro One asserts that it
responded to and resolved all billing issues, and that ultimately
no customer was overcharged.

The motion judge in the November 2017 Decision declined to certify
the class action, finding that there were insufficient common
issues and noting that a class action is not preferable in this
case to individual lawsuits by class members. The motion judge
found that even if the representative plaintiff was successful in
establishing its overall claims (the common issues), there would be
a host of remaining issues (largely around damages) to be
established in individual damages trials. The motion judge also
found that there are alternative administrative procedures that
could be pursued through the OEB, such as the OEB's complaint
process. The motion judge noted that the OEB is guided by the
objective of protecting the interests of customers with respect to
prices, and that the OEB could be expected to respond in
appropriate cases in accordance with its statutory mandate.

The Ontario Divisional Court did not disturb any of the findings of
the motion judge. On the question of whether the proposed class
action raises common issues, the Divisional Court Decision endorsed
the findings of the motion judge, stating that:

A finding that some bills were wrong and the CIS was poorly
designed and implemented does not advance the resolution of the
claims for the class. It will still be necessary to determine for
each individual, what loss, if any, was suffered, whether the loss
was caused by the CIS or something else (computer malfunction or
human error, for example), and what recompense has already been
received. In other words there is no saving compared to individual
trials. Alternatively expressed, no issue is off the table at
individual trials because it has been resolved already at the
common trial.

As a final comment, the Divisional Court judges declined to disturb
the motion judge's finding that a class action is not the
preferable procedure. The judges agreed that the motion judge had
properly weighed relevant factors in finding that "the goals of the
[Class Proceedings Act] are met by the OEB, which is the
legislature's chosen and preferred vehicle to regulate the
respondents' behaviour." [GN]


JONATHAN NEIL: Court Requires Supplemental Briefing in Brown
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order requiring Supplemental Brief on Motion
for Approval of Class Action Settlement in the captioned TERI
BROWN, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NEIL AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 1:17-cv-00675-SAB. (E.D. Cal.).

A joint motion for final approval of the class settlement in this
action was filed along with a motion for attorney fees. In
reviewing the motion for final approval, the Court shall require
supplemental briefing regarding the following.

In his declaration, Mr. Marcus states that the firm has received no
objections to the settlement or opt outs. However, the class notice
was mailed, after the date to which Mr. Marcus states there are no
objections. Mr. Marcus shall file a declaration addressing whether
any members objected or opted out of the settlement prior to the
deadline to do so.

The joint motion for final approval states that each class member
will receive $36.36. There is no information describing how this
amount was arrived at. The Court notes that there are 279 class
members and the award appears to have been determined by using only
the 275 class members that actually received notice, although why
the parties determined not to designate the award for the missing
class members to the cy pres beneficiary is not addressed.

The Plaintiff designates Greater Bakersfield Legal Assistance, Inc.
as the cy pres beneficiary. A cy pres award must qualify as the
next best distribution to giving the funds directly to the class
members.  

Here, the Plaintiff did not include any information about Greater
Bakersfield Legal Assistance, Inc. Without information on Greater
Bakersfield Legal Assistance, Inc., the Court cannot find that that
it is an appropriate cy pres beneficiary. The Plaintiff is directed
to submit further briefing addressing why Greater Bakersfield Legal
Assistance, Inc. is a proper cy pres beneficiary.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyq42a8e from Leagle.com.

Teri Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac vice,
Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman,
LLC, pro hac vice & Tammy L. Hussin -- Tammy@HussinLaw.com --
Hussin Law.

Jonathan Neil and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Michael Egan -- cegan@porterscott.com -- Porter Scott,
APC, Derek Joseph Haynes -- dhaynes@porterscott.com -- Porter
Scott, PC & Lynette Mary Komar, Porter Scott.


LM WIND: Parties Directed to Address Issues in Rosie Bobo Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Western Division, issued an Order requesting issues to be
address in the case captioned ROSIE BOBO; and AMBER GRAYSON, Each
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. LM WIND POWER BLADES ND, INC., Defendant. No.
4:18-cv-230-DPM. (E.D. Ark.).

The Court notes the joint motion for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement.  

Here are the issues the Court requests that the parties address,
inter alia:

     Scrivener's errors? In Swection 7(b), the and/or before
romanette (iii) seems to introduce ambiguity into the point system.


     In Section 16, after romanette (iii), is the Court missing?
Perhaps it should be added in (ii) as well the Court construes the
settlement.  

     In the release provisions, for example Section 18, the last
phrase uses the word derivate. This is an old and odd word, which
the Court had to look up in the dictionary. Is there clear phrasing
that is more likely to be understood by the workers in this case?

      On the notice, a period is omitted at the end of the bold
sentences in the third box.

Substantive issues.

     Sections 12(c) and (d) on curing late and deficient claims
seem a bit tight, given the preclusive effects on the Rule 23 class
members. Plus, because LM Wind Power will get any undistributed
settlement funds, the company would have an incentive to be
unforgiving when deciding whether a claim gets paid or not.

     Similar concerns on Section 13(b): an untimely or defective
opt out equals no money and release.

     The release in Section 19, is broader than the release in the
notice form.

     The proposed agreement and claim form, Section 13(a) and No.
18-1 at 25, make it harder to opt out than to make a claim. This
situation enhances some of the Court's other concerns.

     In the claim notice, the first shaded box would be more
accurate if reversed: Your options and legal rights.

     In the notice, the first box refers to the class action
settlement and release described above, but the release is not
described above. Same problem with the third box. The release isn't
described until several pages in.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2q6jp8b from Leagle.com.

Rosie Bobo, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Amber Grayson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel D. Ford,
Sanford Law Firm, Joshua Sanford, Sanford Law Firm & Joshua Lee
West, Sanford Law Firm.

LM Wind Power Blades ND Inc, Defendant, represented by Leni D.
Battaglia -- leni.battaglia@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP, pro hac vice & Eva C. Madison -- emadison@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


LOS ROBLES: Settles Employees' Back Wages Class Action for $3MM
---------------------------------------------------------------
Becca Whitnall, writing for Thousand Oaks Acorn, reports that
without admitting any wrongdoing, Los Robles Regional Medical
Center has agreed to pay nearly $3 million to settle a class-action
lawsuit alleging it owes some employees and former employees back
wages.

The settlement is the result of a suit filed in June 2014 by former
Los Robles nurse Jeanette Munden, who alleged that the hospital
prevented employees from taking lunch breaks and broke other labor
laws and that it failed to pay employees what they were owed.

In court filings, she claimed she was regularly denied meal and
rest breaks in violation of state law. She also said she did not
receive proper compensation when she resigned in 2015.

Ms. Munden did not respond to attempts to contact her for comment.

According to the settlement, $1.9 million of the $2.95 million will
be split among the 3,000 class members, with lead plaintiff Ms.
Munden receiving $15,000 of that.

Of the remainder, $973,000 will go to legal fees and $10,000 will
be paid to the state for labor code violations.

"We're happy the case is resolved," said Ms. Munden's attorney,
Marcus Bradley of Bradley/Grombacher LLP of Westlake Village,
adding that he was extremely limited in what he was allowed to say
regarding the suit.

"It was a fair settlement based on the facts and data we
presented," he said.

In a statement sent to the Acorn, Los Robles said: "Unfortunately,
these kinds of employment lawsuits are all too common at this time.
There are hundreds filed in our state every year and that does not
mean that they have merit. We deny all allegations in the lawsuit;
we made the decision to enter into a no-fault settlement in order
to resolve it and keep our focus on what we do best: caring for our
patients."

The current settlement, approved Jan. 16 by Ventura County Superior
Court Judge Kevin DeNoce, is neither the first nor the largest Los
Robles has been a party to.

In 2005, the hospital settled a case filed two years earlier for
$4.75 million. In that case, four respiratory therapists accused
Los Robles of miscalculating overtime and not compensating hourly
workers for missed breaks, according to a Los Angeles Times report
from that period.

According to the California Department of Industrial Relations,
employers generally must provide a nonpaid meal break of not less
than 30 minutes to employees working a five-hour or longer work
period. In addition, employers generally must provide hourly
workers with a rest break of 10 minutes for each four hours
worked.

Of those eligible to participate in the Munden case, 74 opted out
of the action and one class member filed an objection to the
settlement. [GN]


LUPER ENTERPRISES: Borozny Asserts Breach under ADA in Florida
--------------------------------------------------------------
Luper Enterprises Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
Austin Borozny, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Luper Enterprises Inc., a Florida
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00397 (M.D. Fla., February
14, 2019).

Luper Enterprises Inc. is engaged in the real estate business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   The Advocacy Group, LLC
   200 SE 6th St Ste 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3424
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: jkerr@advocacypa.com


MARKET PLUS: Retina Associates Sues over Unsolicited Fax Ads
------------------------------------------------------------
RETINA ASSOCIATES MEDICAL GROUP, INC., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, MARKET PLUS LLC
and NANCY JUNE LANCASTER, the Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00288
(C.D. Cal., Feb. 13, 2019), alleges that the Defendants, directly
or through other persons acting on their behalf, conspired to,
agreed to, contributed to, assisted with, or otherwise caused the
wrongful acts and omissions, including the dissemination of junk
faxes.  Through fax messages sent in December 2018 and January
2019, the Defendants sought to hire the Plaintiff to take its web
survey in exchange for $55.

Attorney for the Plaintiff:

          Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
          EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
          425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954 524-2820
          Facsimile: 954 524-2822
          E-mail: seth@epllc.com

MDL 2591: Burkes Can't Intervene in Syngenta Ag MIR 162 Corn Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas denied John and Joanna Burkes' motion to
intervene in the case, IN RE: SYNGENTA AG MIR162 CORN LITIGATION.
This document relates to: KENNETH P. KELLOGG, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. WATTS GUERRA, LLP, et al., Defendants, MDL 14-md-2591-JWL, Case
No. 18-2408-JWL (D. Kan.).

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs who are all farmers,
bring fraud-based claims against lawyers and law firms that
represented them in their claims against Syngenta in the underlying
MDL.  The gravamen of their complaint is that the lawyers committed
fraud and malpractice in soliciting and representing them.  

Two individuals who are not farmers and who have not been
represented by the Defendant law firms, the Burkes, have filed a
motion to intervene in the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and
(b).  All parties oppose their intervention.

The Burkes state they seek intervention to protect their interest
in their homestead which is under the order of foreclosure, as a
direct result of legal conspiracy.  They go on to discuss an
alleged conspiracy perpetrated by lawyers who are not parties in
the action, and related to property not involved in this action.
They also express admiration for farmers and seek intervention to
help the corn farmers.

Judge O'Hara finds that missing from the Burkes' motion is any
suggestion that they have an interest related to the legal
representation by the specific defendants in the case of the
specific farmer plaintiffs in the case, in other words, to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action.  They
simply have no legal or factual connection to the case.  They are
not current or former clients of any defendant, nor are they corn
growers (much less members of a class of Plaintiffs in the MDL).
The Burkes interest in their homestead is not an interest that
could be adversely affected by the litigation. Accordingly, the
Judge finds the Burkes have failed to establish the right to
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).

The Burkes state that negligent legal misrepresentation is a theme
common in both their cases and the action.  Although this may be
generally true, the Judge declines to allow permissive intervention
on this attenuated basis.  He is confident the Plaintiffs' counsel
can adequately address the issue, and permitting overlapping
briefing and argument by movants would be inefficient and
contradictory to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1's mandate that the federal rules
be interpreted to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of the action.  Accordingly, he declines the Burkes'
request to intervene under Rule 24(b).

For these reasons, Judge O'Hara denied the Burkes' motion to
intervene.  The Burkes are informed that, within 14 days after they
are served with a copy of the Order, they may, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72 and D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4(a), file written objections to
the Order by filing a motion for the district court judge to review
it.  They must file any objections within the 14-day period if they
want to have appellate review of the Order.  If they do not timely
file objections, no court will allow appellate review.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WRlTLQ from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, represented by Don M. Downing -- ddowning@grgpc.com
-- Gray, Ritter & Graham, PC, pro hac vice, Patrick J. Stueve --
stueve@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Richard L.
Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm, Scott A. Powell -- scott@hwnn.com --
Hare Wynn Newell & Newton, pro hac vice & William B. Chaney --
wchaney@grayreed.com -- Gray Reed & McGraw, LLP, pro hac vice.

All Defendants, represented by Michael D. Jones --
michael.jones@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice &
Thomas P. Schult -- tschult@berkowitzoliver.com -- Berkowitz Oliver
Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP.

Ellen K. Reisman, Special Master, represented by Ellen K. Reisman
-- tschult@berkowitzoliver.com -- Reisman Karron Greene LLP.

Stracener Farming Company, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W. Mason
-- clark@clarkmason.com -- Clark Mason Attorneys, pro hac vice,
James J. Thompson, Jr. --  JT@JimThompsonLaw.com -- pro hac vice,
Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John Paul Byrd
-- wwinfo@paulbyrdlawfirm.com -- Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, pro hac
vice, Martin J. Phipps -- mphipps@phippscavazos.com -- Phipps
Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts -- mcwatts@wattsguerra.com --
Watts Guerra, LLP & Nolan E. Awbrey, Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac
vice.

David Stracener, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W. Mason, Clark
Mason Attorneys, pro hac vice, James J. Thompson, Jr., pro hac
vice, Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John Paul
Byrd, Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, pro hac vice, Martin J. Phipps,
Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP &
Nolan E. Awbrey, Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac vice.

Larry Petit, Plaintiff, represented by Clark W. Mason, Clark Mason
Attorneys, pro hac vice, James J. Thompson, Jr., pro hac vice,
Jerry Obe Kelly, Kelly Law Firm, PA, pro hac vice, John Paul Byrd,
Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, pro hac vice, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps
Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP & Nolan E.
Awbrey, Riley Jackson, PC, pro hac vice.

Trans Coastal Supply Company Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jayne
Conroy -- JConroy@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy, Martin
J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts
Guerra, LLP, Patrick J. Stueve, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Paul J.
Hanly -- phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- Jr., Simmons Hanly Conroy, Sarah
Burns, Simmons Hanly Conroy & William B. Chaney --
wchaney@grayreed.com -- Gray Reed & McGraw, LLP.

Luke Claas, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt --
wchaney@grayreed.com -- Grant & Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice,
Edmund S. Aronowitz, Grant & Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, J. Brett
Milbourn -- BMILBOURN@WBSVLAW.COM -- Walters Bender Strohbehn &
Vaughan, PC, James J. Pizzirusso, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice,
Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts
Guerra, LLP, Paul D. Lundberg -- paul@lundberglawfirm.com --
Lundberg Law Firm, PLC, pro hac vice & Thomas V. Bender --
TBENDER@WBSVLAW.COM -- Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC.

Meinke Farms, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt, Grant &
Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, Edmund S. Aronowitz, Grant &
Eisenhofer, PA, pro hac vice, J. Brett Milbourn, Walters Bender
Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC, James J. Pizzirusso, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac
vice, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts,
Watts Guerra, LLP, Paul D. Lundberg, Lundberg Law Firm, PLC, pro
hac vice & Thomas V. Bender, Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan,
PC.

Cargill International SA, Defendant, represented by Clifford M.
Greene -- cgreene@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP, Erin
Sindberg Porter -- esindbergporter@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel
PLLP, Janine W. Kimble, Greene Espel PLLP, John W. Ursu --
jursu@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP, Martin J. Phipps,
Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts, Watts Guerra, LLP & X.
Kevin Zhao -- kzhao@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP.

Syngenta Biotechnology, Inc., Third Party Plaintiff, represented by
D. Scott Aberson -- scott.aberson@maslon.com -- Maslon Edelman
Borman & Brand, LLP, David S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County, pro
hac vice, Edwin J.U. -- edwin.u@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis,
Michael D. Jones -- michael.jones@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis,
Patrick F. Philbin -- patrick.philbin@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis & Thomas P. Schult -- tschult@berkowitzoliver.com --
Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP.

Syngenta Corporation, Third Party Plaintiff, represented by David
S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County, pro hac vice.

Syngenta Seeds, Inc., Third Party Plaintiff, represented by David
S. Chipman, CASA of Shawnee County, pro hac vice.

Cargill International SA, Defendant, represented by Clifford M.
Greene, Greene Espel PLLP, Erin Sindberg Porter, Greene Espel PLLP,
Janine W. Kimble, Greene Espel PLLP, John W. Ursu, Greene Espel
PLLP, Martin J. Phipps, Phipps Anderson Deacon LLP, Mikal C. Watts,
Watts Guerra, LLP & X. Kevin Zhao, Greene Espel PLLP.


MDL 2741: 2 Suits v. Monsanto Transferred to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No.
2741, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring two
action from the Eastern District of Missouri to the Northern
District of California and, with the consent of that court,
assigned the actions to the Honorable Vince Chhabria for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The two actions are styled, OUZEANES, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY,
C.A. No. 4:18-01806; and HOOKS, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A.
No. 4:18-01897.

Plaintiffs in the two actions move under Panel Rule7.1 to vacate
the Panel's order that conditionally transferred these actions to
the Northern District of California for inclusion in MDL No. 2741.
Defendant Monsanto Company opposes the motions to vacate.

In support of their motions, plaintiffs argue that federal subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking and that plaintiffs' pending remand
motions should be decided by the transferor courts.  As the Panel
has often held, such jurisdictional issues generally do not present
an impediment to transfer.  Plaintiffs can present their
jurisdictional arguments to the transferee judge.

Therefore, after considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance
finds that the two actions involve common questions of fact with
the actions transferred to MDL No. 2741, and that transfer under 28
U.S.C. Sec.  1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation.  In the Panel's order centralizing this litigation, the
Judge held that the Northern District of California was an
appropriate Section 1407 forum for actions sharing factual
questions arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup
herbicide, particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that their
respective actions share multiple factual issues with the cases
already in the MDL.  Like plaintiffs in the MDL, plaintiffs in
these two actions allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 7, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2BSQI2v


MDL 2775: 2 Smith & Nephew BHR Suits Transferred to Maryland
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SMITH & NEPHEW BIRMINGHAM HIP RESURFACING (BHR)
HIP IMPLANT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2775, Judge
Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has entered an order transferring two actions to the
District of Maryland and, with the consent of that court, assigned
the actions to the Honorable Catherine C. Blake for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The two actions are:

   - BROWN, ET AL. v. SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., C.A. No. 1:18-23908
(Southern District of Florida); and
   - KEMP v. SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 1:18-00593
(Eastern District of Texas).

Plaintiffs in the Brown and Kemp actions move under Panel Rule 7.1
to vacate the Panel's orders that conditionally transferred their
respective actions to the District of Maryland for inclusion in MDL
No. 2775.  Defendants Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Beaumont
Bone and Joint Institute, P.A., and Ronald Talbert, M.D., support
plaintiff's motion to vacate in the Kemp action.  Defendant Smith &
Nephew, Inc., opposes both motions.

In opposition to transfer, plaintiffs in Brown, pending in the
Southern District of Florida, argue that transfer is inappropriate
because Brown does not involve sufficient questions of fact in
common with the actions pending in the MDL.  To the contrary,
plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within the scope of the MDL.  They
allege that Mrs.  Brown underwent a hip resurfacing using the
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR) system, which was removed and
replaced with Smith &Nephew's Short Modular Femoral (SMF) system.
Plaintiffs assert product liability claims pertaining to both the
BHR and SMF system.  The Panel previously held that MDL No. 2775
"include[s]...  actions asserting a claim as to a BHR component,"
and "[t]he only actions excluded from the MDL as falling outside
the scope of the litigation [do]not involve any allegations
relating to BHR components." The Panel is not persuaded that
plaintiffs' claims pertaining to the SMF system necessitate
excluding Brown from the MDL.  Transfer under Section 1407 does not
require a complete identity or even majority of common factual and
legal issues.

With respect to Kemp, pending in the Eastern District of Texas,
plaintiff and the three defendants that support the motion to
vacate argue that Kemp should not be transferred until the
transferor court had decided plaintiff's pending motion to remand
the action to state court.  The pendency of jurisdictional
objections are not, as a general matter, a sufficient reason to
delay or deny transfer.  The Panel is not persuaded by plaintiff's
argument that his jurisdictional objections should be treated
differently because remand purportedly is compelled under
controlling case law.   The Panel regularly orders transfer of
actions over similar objections, consistent with the
well-established principle that the Panel lacks the authority under
Section 1407 to decide questions going to the jurisdiction or
merits of a case.

Plaintiff asserts several additional arguments against transfer.
First, plaintiff contends that transfer is not appropriate because
he asserts claims against healthcare providers and sales
representatives, and therefore discovery in Kemp will be unique.
The presence of additional facts, theories, and parties, however,
is not significant when the actions arise from a common factual
core.  Kemp will require the same discovery of the BHR system and
Smith & Nephew's conduct as the actions in the MDL; that
plaintiff's claims may require additional discovery does not bar
transfer.

Plaintiff also suggests that informal cooperation and coordination
among the parties is preferable to transfer.  Plaintiff's
willingness to coordinate discovery efforts is to be commended.  In
this instance, though, such cooperation and coordination will be
better effectuated within the confines of the MDL.

Finally, plaintiff argues that Kemp has reached an advanced
procedural posture that weighs against transfer to the MDL.  In
fact, pretrial proceedings in Kemp remain at an early stage.
Written discovery of the Texas defendants had only just begun when
Kemp was removed to the Eastern District of Texas.  No depositions
have yet been taken, nor any dispositive motions filed.  Transfer
to the MDL at this juncture will facilitate coordination of common
discovery and pretrial practice with the actions in the MDL.

Accordingly, after considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance
finds that the two actions involve common questions of fact with
the actions transferred to MDL No. 2775, and that transfer under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation.  In the Panel's order centralizing this litigation, the
Panel held that the District of Maryland was an appropriate Section
1407 forum for actions sharing factual questions concerning the
design, manufacture, marketing or performance of Smith & Nephew's
BHR system.  The actions in this MDL focus on complications arising
from the use of a cobalt-chromium alloy in the manufacture of the
BHR components.  Plaintiffs in both Brown and Kemp similarly allege
that they suffered complications arising from the metal-on-metal
nature of the BHR components used in their respective hip
resurfacing or hip replacement procedures.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 7, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2H1u5wb


MDL 2782: MSP Recovery Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ETHICON PHYSIOMESH FLEXIBLE COMPOSITE HERNIA
MESH PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2782, Judge Sarah S.
Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has
entered an order transferring the case styled MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS,
SERIES LLC, ET AL. v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ET AL., C.A. No.
1:18-24580, from the Southern District of Florida to the Northern
District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court, assigned
the action to the Honorable Richard W. Story for inclusion in the
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Defendants Ethicon, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson move under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1407(c) for transfer of the MSP Recovery action to the
Northern District of Georgia for inclusion in MDL No. 2782.
Plaintiffs do not respond to the motion and, therefore, are deemed
to acquiesce in the relief sought.

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance finds that
MSP Recovery involves common questions of fact with the actions
transferred to MDL No. 2782, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  No party
disputes that, like many of the already-centralized actions, MSP
Recovery involves factual questions arising out of allegations that
defects in defendants' Physiomesh hernia mesh can lead to
complications when implanted in patients.

Plaintiffs in MSP Recovery seek a pure bill of discovery against
defendants, in support of a planned future action to recoup the
costs that may have been incurred by Medicare payors as a result of
patients' implantation with defendants' Physiomesh product.  The
discovery they seek includes identifying information on patients
who have been implanted with Physiomesh.  The requested discovery
thus likely overlaps with the common discovery in MDL No. 2782.  It
appears that defendants will oppose production of this information,
and transfer may prevent inconsistent rulings on this discovery
issue, according to Judge Vance.  If the transferee judge
determines that MSP Recovery is best excluded from centralized
proceedings, procedures are available to accomplish this with a
minimum of delay.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 6, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2BQa6x2


MDL 2800: Smith v. Equifax Transferred to Georgia Northern Dist.
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: EQUIFAX, INC., CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2800, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order
transferring the action styled SMITH v. EQUIFAX INC., C.A. No.
2:18-01147 from the Northern District of Alabama to the Northern
District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court, assigned
it to the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash for inclusion in the
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiff in the action (Smith), proceeding pro se, moves under
Panel Rule 7.1 to vacate the Panel's order conditionally
transferring his action to MDL No. 2800.  Defendant Equifax, Inc.,
opposes the motion to vacate.

After considering all arguments, Judge Kaplan finds this action
involves common questions of fact with the actions previously
transferred to MDL No. 2800, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  The
actions in MDL No. 2800 arise from a 2017 cybersecurity incident
involving Equifax in which it is alleged that the personally
identifiable information of more than 145 million consumers was
compromised.  While the initial transfer order in MDL No. 2800
included only putative nationwide and statewide consumer class
actions, actions brought by individual consumers, including pro se
plaintiffs, have been included in centralized proceedings through
Section 1407 transfer or direct filing in the transferee court.
Smith involves allegations, similar to those in the MDL No. 2800
actions, that Equifax failed to adequately safeguard plaintiff's
personally identifiable information, which was compromised during
the Equifax data breach; failed to provide the public with timely
notice of the breach; and that certain Equifax executives
improperly sold Equifax stock before publicly announcing the
breach.

Plaintiff does not dispute that his action arises out of the 2017
Equifax data breach and shares questions of fact and law with the
MDL No. 2800 actions.  Against transfer, he argues that (1)
transfer outside his home district would be inconvenient, (2) he
has not consented to transfer under Section 1404(a), and (3) he has
been granted permission to sue by the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ).

The Judge has held that, while it might inconvenience some parties,
transfer of a particular action often is necessary to further the
expeditious resolution of the litigation taken as a whole.  The
transferee judge is in the best position to structure proceedings
so as to minimize inconvenience to any individual party.  Moreover,
the Section 1407 transfer does not require plaintiff's consent.
That the DOJ informed plaintiff he could file a lawsuit when it
denied his Federal Tort Claims Act claim is not relevant to the
Panel's determination under Section 1407.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 12, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2TlhJWA


MDL 2804: 7 Actions Transferred to Northern District of Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION, MDL
No. 2804, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring seven
actions to the Northern District of Ohio and, with the consent of
that court, assigned the actions to the Honorable Dan A. Polster
for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.

Plaintiffs in seven actions and Southern District of Ohio defendant
Mylan Bertek Pharmaceuticals, Inc., move under Panel Rule 7.1 to
vacate the orders conditionally transferring the actions to MDL No.
2804.  Various responding manufacturer and distributor defendants
oppose the motions.

After considering the argument of counsel, Judge Vance finds these
actions involve common questions of fact with the actions
previously transferred to MDL No. 2804, and that transfer under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1407 will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation.  Moreover, transfer is warranted for the reasons set
out in her order directing centralization.  In that order, she held
that the Northern District of Ohio was an appropriate Section 1407
forum for actions sharing factual questions regarding the allegedly
improper marketing and distribution of various prescription opiate
medications into cities, states and towns across the country.

Despite some variances among the actions before the Panel, all
contain a factual core common to the MDL actions: the manufacturing
and distributor defendants' alleged knowledge of and conduct
regarding the diversion of these prescription opiates, as well as
the manufacturers' allegedly improper marketing of such drugs.  The
actions therefore fall within the MDL's ambit.

The parties opposing transfer in five actions argue principally
that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their cases.  But
opposition to transfer challenging the propriety of federal
jurisdiction is insufficient to warrant vacating conditional
transfer orders covering otherwise factually-related cases.
Several parties argue that including their actions in this large
MDL will cause them inconvenience.  Given the undisputed factual
overlap with the MDL proceedings, transfer is justified in order to
facilitate the efficient conduct of the litigation as a whole.

Plaintiffs in two actions, infants born opioid-dependent, argue
that their unique damages -- which include the alleged need for a
medical monitoring trust that funds prolonged, multidisciplinary
care -- and their need for prompt resolution of their cases
differentiate their cases from those brought by the cities,
counties and states that comprise the bulk of MDL No. 2804.  While
the Judge agrees that plaintiffs will have different damages and
potential remedies, the differences among these claims are
outweighed by the substantial factual allegations shared with the
MDL actions.  Several similar cases are pending in the MDL, and
substantial efficiencies can be obtained by allowing all related
actions to proceed in the transferee forum.  She further denies
these plaintiffs' motions for the reasons stated in her prior
transfer decisions involving infants with neonatal abstinence
syndrome (NAS).

A full-text copy of the Court's February 7, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2EuHP0W


MDL 2875: Court Transfers 10 Actions to N.J., Expands MDL Scope
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: VALSARTAN N-NITROSODIMETHYLAMINE (NDMA)
CONTAMINATION PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2875, Judge
Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has entered an order transferring 10 actions to the
District of New Jersey and, with the consent of that court,
assigned to the Honorable Robert B. Kugler for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Judge Vance as also ordered that MDL No. 2875 is renamed In re:
Valsartan Products Liability Litigation.

This litigation arises out of an investigation by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration into impurities found in generic drug products
containing valsartan, a medication indicated for the treatment of
high blood pressure and other conditions.  During the course of the
FDA investigation, a number of voluntary recalls of generic
valsartan medications were issued.  Purchasers of recalled lots of
generic valsartan subsequently filed actions alleging economic
losses.  The initial wave of consumer class actions was followed by
actions alleging personal injuries from the ingestion of affected
valsartan medications, as well as other related litigation.

Plaintiff in one action moves under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to
centralize 10 actions in the District of New Jersey.  Each of these
actions seeks economic damages and related injunctive relief on
behalf of proposed classes of purchasers of generic valsartan.  The
initial motion for centralization also listed an action alleging
individual personal injury (Gentry), but the action subsequently
was voluntarily dismissed.  Since the filing of the motion, the
Panel has been notified of 30 related actions.  Of these, 17 are
individual personal injury actions, and the remainder are putative
class actions on behalf of consumers and third-party payors.

Responding plaintiffs in seven actions on the motion and nine
potential tag-along actions support centralization of all actions,
including the personal injury actions, and request the District of
New Jersey as their first or second choice of forum.  Their other
suggested districts are the Northern District of California, the
Northern District of Florida, the District of Massachusetts, the
District of Minnesota, and the Western District of Texas.
Plaintiffs in two actions on the motion (Stimma and Duffy) support
centralization only of the consumer class actions and seek the
District of New Jersey.  Plaintiff in one potential tag-along
action on behalf of third-party payors (MSP Recovery) seeks
inclusion of its action and requests the Southern District of
Florida or the District of New Jersey.

The principal common defendants in this litigation -- Zhejiang
Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (ZHP) and its U.S. affiliates
Prinston Pharmaceutical Inc., Solco Healthcare U.S., LLC, and
Huahai U.S., Inc. (together, the ZHP defendants) -- along with
pharmacy defendants Walgreen Co. and Throggs Neck Pharmacy support
centralization of the 10 actions on the motion in the District of
New Jersey.  They ask the Panel to limit the scope of the MDL
solely to consumer class actions, though they acknowledged shared
factual issues among the personal injury and consumer actions at
oral argument.  The Mylan defendants -- sued in six potential
tag-along actions -- oppose inclusion 23 of any actions against
Mylan or actions involving personal injuries and, alternatively,
request the District of New Jersey or the Northern District of West
Virginia.  The other respondingdefendants4do not oppose
centralization of solely the consumer class actions in the District
of New Jersey, but Teva and certain other defendants suggest that
an MDL may not be warranted on the ground that alternatives to
centralization exist, particularly transfer under Section 1404(a).
In the event an MDL is established, they strongly oppose inclusion
of any personal injury actions.  Additionally, Teva opposes
inclusion of the MSP Recovery third-party payor action.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, Judge Vance
finds that these actions involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this
litigation.  All actions involve common factual questions arising
out of allegations that plaintiffs purchased or used generic
formulations of valsartan medications containing the nitrosamine
impurities NDMA and/or NDEA; that these impurities present a risk
of cancer and liver damage; and that defendants knew, or should
have known, of the impurities as early as 2012.  All actions stem
from the same FDA investigation and voluntary recall announced in
July 2018, and the voluntary recalls are ongoing.  Although the
investigation, and the earliest-filed actions, focused on ZHP as
the source of the alleged impurities, the FDA investigation and the
actions before the Panel now encompass alleged industry-wide issues
concerning the production of the valsartan active pharmaceutical
ingredient (API) which will be common to all actions.  The common
questions of fact include: (1) whether the generic valsartan sold
by defendants contained NDMA or NDEA; (2) the cause of the alleged
impurities, including alleged defects in the manufacturing and
sampling process; (3) when defendants knew or should have known of
the impurities; (4) how long the NDMA- and NDEA-containing
valsartan medications were in circulation; and (5) whether the
amounts of NDMA and NDEA in the medications presented a risk of
cancer or other injuries.  All of the valsartan actions will raise
these issues, regardless of whether the alleged supplier of the
valsartan API was ZHP, Mylan, Hetero Labs Limited, or some other
entity.  Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification and Daubert motions; and conserve the resources
of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

Although all pending actions on the motion before the Panel are
putative consumer class actions seeking economic damages, Judge
Vance received extensive briefing and oral argument on whether the
MDL should include personal injury actions.  Based on this record,
she believes that the centralized proceedings should include the
related personal injury actions alleging that plaintiffs developed
cancer as a result of using valsartan containing NDMA or NDEA
impurities.  The core factual issues in the personal injury actions
will be the same as in the consumer class actions -- in particular,
the cause of the alleged impurities; the nature and extent of the
health risks posed by the NDMA and NDEA levels at issue;
defendants' knowledge of the alleged impurities; and the impact of
any findings made by the FDA.  Additionally, there is significant
overlap in defendants in the consumer class actions and personal
injury actions.  Thus, discovery undoubtedly will overlap among
these actions.  The Panel often has recognized the efficiencies of
centralizing economic loss class actions with personal injury
actions, explaining that "liability discovery in all the cases will
certainly overlap," and that, in her experience, the individual
discovery required in personal injury actions is "regularly and
successfully coordinated" within MDLs involving both kinds of
actions. For these reasons, she intends to include personal injury
potential tag-along actions in this MDL through the conditional
transfer order process.

Judge Vance also intends to include the MSP Recovery third-party
payor class action through the conditional transfer order process.
The MSP Recovery action makes substantially the same factual
allegations as the consumer class actions - essentially, that
defendants sold valsartan medications that they knew or had reason
to know contained NDMA or NDEA.  The handful of case-specific
issues raised by Tevain opposition to transfer -- plaintiff's
standing to sue and the assertion of an allegedly unique legal
claim -- do not warrant exclusion of the action considering the
common factual core.

The Judge finds that Section 1404 transfer is not a practicable
alternative to centralization, given the number of actions,
districts, and counsel for plaintiffs and defendants.  There are
presently a total of 40 related actions pending in 22 districts,
which involve over a dozen distinct slates of plaintiffs' counsel
and some 20 defendants, most of whom do not share counsel.  These
circumstances portend significant inefficiencies and obstacles to
Section 1404 transfer of the related actions to a single district.
The number of involved districts and counsel also would make
efforts to informally coordinate discovery and pretrial motions
impracticable.

The District of New Jersey is an appropriate transferee district
because five actions on the motion and seven potential tag-along
actions are pending there.  Many of the defendants have their U.S.
headquarters in New Jersey, including ZHP's U.S. affiliates, which
are named in nearly all actions, as well as Hetero USA Inc., Camber
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Torrent Pharma, Inc.  Thus, common
documents and witnesses likely will be located in this district.
Nearly all responding parties support, or do not oppose, the
District of New Jersey as their first or second choice.  Judge
Robert B.  Kugler is an experienced transferee judge with the
willingness and ability to manage this litigation.  Judge Vance is
confident that he will steer this litigation on a prudent course.

Judge Vance further ordered that, in light of this opinion, MDL No.
2875 is renamed In re: Valsartan Products Liability Litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 14, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2IBZ3NS


MDL 2876: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 6 Debt Collection Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC, FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) LITIGATION, MDL No. 2876, Judge
Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has denied Defendant Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC's
motion for centralization of pretrial proceedings of six actions,
each pending in a separate district, namely:

   - Eastern District of California - FRALEY v. ENHANCED RECOVERY
COMPANY, LLC, C.A. No. 2:18-02606
   - Southern District of Florida - ISRAELSON v. ENHANCED RECOVERY
COMPANY, C.A. No. 9:18-80688
   - Southern District of Indiana - RHODES v. ENHANCED RECOVERY
COMPANY, LLC, C.A. No. 1:17-04297
   - Eastern District of New York - HULL v. ENHANCED RECOVERY
COMPANY, LLC, C.A. No. 2:18-05787
   - Middle District of North Carolina - THIBODEAUX v. ENHANCED
RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:18-00470; and
   - Middle District of Tennessee - HARPER v. ENHANCED RECOVERY
COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 3:18-00525

Defendant Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, moves under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1407 to centralize pretrial proceedings in this litigation in
the Eastern District of New York.  This litigation currently
consists of six actions, each pending in a separate district.  In
addition, the parties have notified the Panel of one related
action, which was filed in the Eastern District of New York.
Plaintiffs in each of these actions allege that they received a
debt collection letter from Enhanced Recovery that identified
Kohl's Department Store, Inc., as the creditor to which the debt
was owed, rather than Capital One, N.A.  Plaintiffs allege that
this misidentification violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692, et seq.  Plaintiffs in two
actions oppose centralization, while plaintiffs in the other four
actions on the motion support centralization.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held,
Judge Vance concludes that centralization will not serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses or further the just and
efficient conduct of this litigation.  These actions share some
factual questions arising from plaintiffs' allegations that
Enhanced Recovery sent each of them a debt collection letter that
failed to identify Capital One, N.A., as the creditor to which the
alleged debt was owed.  These common factual questions, though, are
not sufficiently complex or numerous to warrant the creation of an
MDL.  There is no dispute regarding the contents of these letters,
only whether the Enhanced Recovery is liable under the FDCPA for
those contents.  The actions on the motion also involve
non-overlapping putative state classes of consumers.  Thus, there
is no substantial risk of conflicting pretrial rulings,
particularly with respect to class certification.

Furthermore, only seven actions are at issue here (including the
related action), at least four of which involve common plaintiffs'
counsel.  Where only a minimal number of actions are involved, the
proponent of centralization bears a heavier burden to demonstrate
that centralization is appropriate.  To the extent there is any
possibility of duplicative discovery or inconsistent pretrial
rulings, voluntary cooperation and coordination among the parties
and the involved courts seems a feasible alternative to
centralization.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 7, 2019 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2IBUgvS


MDL 2878: 4 Suits vs. Ranbaxy Inc. Transferred to Massachusetts
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: RANBAXY GENERIC DRUG APPLICATION ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, MDL No. 2878, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an order transferring
four actions to the District of Massachusetts and, with the consent
of that court, assigned to the Honorable Nathaniel M. Gorton for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The four actions are:

District of Massachusetts
   - MEIJER, INC., ET AL. v. RANBAXY INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
1:15-11828
   - MEIJER, INC., ET AL. v. RANBAXY INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
1:18-12129

Eastern District of New York
   - CESAR CASTILLO, INC. v. RANBAXY INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
1:18-06126

Eastern District of Pennsylvania
   - UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS HEALTH AND WELFARE FUNDOF
NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA v. RANBAXY, INC., ET AL., C.A. No.
2:18-04807

Plaintiff in an action pending in the Eastern District of New York
(Cesar Castillo) moves under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 to centralize
pretrial proceedings in this litigation in the Eastern District of
New York or, alternatively, the District of Massachusetts. This
litigation consists of four actions pending in three districts. The
actions involve allegations that defendants engaged in
anticompetitive conduct in submitting applications for Abbreviated
New Drug Applications to improperly secure the "first-to-file"
status concerning the generic drugs Diovan, Valcyte and Nexium.

Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania action supports
centralization in the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs
Meijer Distribution, Inc., and Meijer, Inc., in two District of
Massachusetts actions support centralization in that district.
Defendants Ranbaxy Inc., and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
(collectively Ranbaxy), oppose centralization. If the Panel decides
to centralize the cases, defendants suggest the Eastern District of
New York as the transferee forum.

On the basis of the papers filed and hearing held, Judge Vance
finds that these actions involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the District of Massachusetts will serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and
efficient conduct of this litigation. Plaintiffs all allege that
Ranbaxy adopted a practice of ignoring FDA regulations and
protocols to obtain first-to-file status for its generic drug
applications. The first-to-file 180-day exclusivity period blocked
other generic drugs from entering the market for several months,
allowing Ranbaxy to reap large profits. When the FDA made inquiries
into its procedures, plaintiffs allege that Ranbaxy enlisted an
outside law firm, Buc & Beardsley LLP, and an ostensibly
independent consultant, Parexel Consulting LLC, to perpetuate the
fraud and falsely represent to the FDA that Ranbaxy complied with
FDA regulations. These false reports allegedly allowed Ranbaxy to
gain tentative approval of its generic drug applications and
maintain its exclusive status for several drugs, including Valcyte,
Nexium, and Diovan. Centralization is warranted to prevent
inconsistent rulings (including with respect to class
certification) and overlapping pretrial obligations, reduce costs,
and create efficiencies for the parties, courts, and witnesses.

Defendants oppose centralization. They argue that the initial
District of Massachusetts action (Meijer I), which was filed in
2015, is too far advanced to benefit from centralization and that
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania action's indirect purchaser
claims are inappropriate to include alongside the three direct
purchaser cases.

Judge Vance is not persuaded by these arguments. All cases now
before her present complex questions of fact and will involve
complex economic analysis, discovery of foreign defendants and
issues of regulatory compliance. While some discovery has been
taken in Meijer I, and defendants' motion to dismiss has been ruled
upon, the action was stayed for most of the year and a half that
passed between the filing of the petition for leave to proceed with
an interlocutory appeal and the First Circuit's decision denying it
in December 2018. Indeed, defendants conceded during oral argument
that no depositions have been taken in Meijer I. Because a
significant amount of potentially redundant pretrial motion
practice remains in all cases -- i.e., class certification, Daubert
and summary judgment rulings -- centralization offers an
opportunity to streamline this litigation. As to defendants' second
argument, the Panel often centralizes the claims of direct and
indirect purchasers in a single MDL, so long as they arise from a
common factual core, as the claims in these actions clearly do.

The Judge selects the District of Massachusetts as the first-filed
and most advanced Meijer I action is pending in this district. By
selecting Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton to preside over this
litigation, she is choosing a jurist well-versed in the nuances of
complex and multidistrict litigation to steer this matter on a
prudent course.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 11, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2EuLKuM


MDL 2879: 11 Suits v. Marriott Transferred to District of Maryland
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., CUSTOMER DATA
SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION, MDL No. 2879, Judge Sarah S. Vance of
the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has entered an
order transferring 11 lawsuits to the District of Maryland, and,
with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable Paul W.
Grimm for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiffs in two actions move separately under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407
to centralize this litigation in the District of Maryland.  One
movant alternatively suggests centralization in the District of
Massachusetts.  Plaintiffs' motions include 11 actions pending in
five districts.  The Panel also has been notified of 70
potentially-related actions filed in eleven districts.

The responding parties generally support centralization, though
there is some opposition to including the McGrath securities action
in centralized proceedings.  Responding plaintiffs in nineteen
actions support centralization in the District of Maryland, as do
defendants Marriott International, Inc.; Marriott Hotel Services,
Inc.; and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC(Starwood and,
together, Marriott).  Other suggested transferee districts are the
Central District of California, the Northern District of
California, the District of Connecticut, the Southern District of
Florida, the Eastern District of New York, and the Northern
District of Illinois.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, Judge Vance
finds that centralization under Section1407 of all actions in the
District of Maryland will serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this
litigation.  Ten of these actions -- which are putative nationwide
and/or statewide consumer class actions -- share factual issues
concerning a recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest
reservation database from 2014 to 2018.  The factual overlap among
these actions is substantial, as they all arise from the same data
breach, and they all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place
reasonable data protections.  Many also allege that Marriott did
not timely notify the public of the data breach.  Centralization
will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings on class certification and other issues, and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

The McGrath action is brought on behalf of a putative nationwide
class of Marriott stockholders.  It alleges that defendants'
filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
misled investors about the security of Marriott's data systems,
resulting in a drop in the price of Marriott securities upon
announcement of the data breach.  Plaintiffs in at least three
consumer class actions support or do not oppose inclusion of
McGrath in centralized proceedings.  The McGrath plaintiff and
defendants (as well as plaintiffs in two consumer class actions)
argue that McGrath should not be included because it involves some
unique defendants, unique claims, and some unique factual issues
regarding the preparation of Marriott's SEC filings and the effect
of the announcement of the data breach on Marriott's stock price.
But there will be overlapping factual issues and discovery relating
to, inter alia, what Marriott knew about the security of Starwood's
guest reservation database during and after its acquisition of
Starwood in 2016.  Indeed, these factual issues likely will be
central to both the securities action and the consumer class
actions.  The Panel has held that Section 1407 "does not require a
complete identity of common factual issues or parties as a
prerequisite to transfer, and the presence of...  differing legal
theories is not significant where, as here, the actions still a
rise from a common factual core." The Panel finds sufficient
factual overlap among the actions to warrant including McGrath in
centralized proceedings and that its inclusion will not impose a
significant burden on the transferee judge.  If the transferee
judge finds at any point in pretrial proceedings that the inclusion
of McGrath will not serve the convenience of the parties and
witnesses or promote the just and efficient conduct of this
litigation, Section 1407 remand of the action to its transferor
court can be accomplished with a minimum of delay.

Judge Vance selects the District of Maryland as Marriott is
headquartered in that district, and relevant documents and
witnesses thus likely will be found there.  Defendants and the vast
majority of responding plaintiffs support selection of this
district, and far more actions are pending there than in any other
district.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 6, 2019 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2SodvsH


MDL 2880: Court Denies Bid to Centralize 3 H&R Block Employee Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: H&R BLOCK EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, MDL
No. 2880, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation denied the Plaintiff's motion for
centralization of pretrial proceedings in three actions.

The three actions are:

Northern District of Illinois
   - MAURELLA v. H&R BLOCK, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 1:18-07435; and
   - GRIFFITH v. H&R BLOCK, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 1:18-07520

Western District of Missouri
   - RAMSEY v. H&R BLOCK, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 4:18-00933

Plaintiff in an action pending in the Northern District of Illinois
(Maurella) moves to centralize pretrial proceedings in this
litigation in the Northern District of Illinois. The litigation
consists of three actions, two in the Northern District of
Illinois, and one in the Western District of Missouri. The Panel
has been notified of three additional federal actions involving
related issues. Those actions also are pending in the Northern
District of Illinois (two) and the Western District of Missouri
(one).

All responding plaintiffs support centralization, but they differ
as to whether it should be in the Northern District of Illinois or
the Western District of Missouri. Common defendants H&R Block,
Inc., and H&R Block Tax Services LLC (collectively H&R Block)
oppose centralization. If the Panel orders centralization over its
objections, H&R Block favors the Western District of Missouri.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, Judge Vance
concludes that centralization is not necessary for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses or to further the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual issues
arising from allegations that (1) H&R Block and unnamed
co-conspirators engaged in a conspiracy with respect to the
recruiting of employees and potential employees, including agreeing
not to solicit or recruit, without prior approval, each other's
personnel; (2) defendants orchestrated and enforced the agreements
among themselves and their franchisees through, inter alia, the use
of a "No Poach Clause" in the standard H&R Block franchise
agreement; and (3) the agreements impeded or restricted the
movement of employees between H&R Block and its franchisees,
prohibited and prevented competition between and among H&R Block
and its franchisees for employees, unreasonably limited
franchisees' ability to solicit individuals who work for H&R Block
or other franchisees, and decreased employment options available to
current employees. Nevertheless, these issues -- in particular, the
existence of the "No Poach Clause" -- appear to be largely
undisputed, and unlikely to require significant discovery. Notably,
H&R Block, the party most likely to face duplicative discovery
requests in the absence of an MDL, opposes centralization.

The limited number of involved districts also weighs against
centralization. The three constituent actions and three tag-alongs
are pending in only the Northern District of Illinois and the
Western District of Missouri. The two constituent Illinois actions
already have been consolidated, and H&R Block represents that it
intends to move in that action to compel arbitration, or, in the
alternative, for Section 1404 transfer. If the three Illinois
actions are sent to arbitration or transferred, the multidistrict
character of this litigation will be eliminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 7, 2019 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2Xh1MzL


MEDI WINEBAR: Hernandez Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARCIAL AMARO HERNANDEZ, On Behalf of Himself And All Others
Similarly Situated v. MEDI WINEBAR, LLC, 9TH AVE BLUE LLC d/b/a
BLUE SEAFOOD BAR & EATERY, DORIAN GASHI and ANDREA GIACOMONI, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01295 (S.D.N.Y., February 11, 2019), seeks to recover
from the Defendants full payment of all alleged unpaid minimum wage
and overtime compensation and liquidated damages under the
applicable provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Medi Winebar is a domestic business corporation with its principal
place of business located in New York City.  9th Ave Blue LLC,
doing business as Blue Seafood Bar & Eatery, is a domestic business
corporation with its principal place of business located in New
York City.  The Individual Defendants are owners, officers or
managers of the Defendant Corporations.

The Defendants own and operate a wine bar and seafood restaurant,
the Medi Winebar and Blue Seafood Bar & Eatery.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis M. Leon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 583-7400
          E-mail: LLeon@Cafaroesq.com


MERIVALE: Faces Class Action Case for Staff Underpayments
---------------------------------------------------------
Staffing Industry Analysts reports that The Australian Financial
Review reports that Merivale, an Australia-based hospitality
company, is facing a potential class action over claims that it was
underpaying workers in breach of workplace laws for years.

Australian Law firm Adero has confirmed it is investigating legal
action against Merivale after alleging the company misclassified
workers and failed to pay them the legal hourly rate even under its
long-expired WorkChoices enterprise agreement. Lawyers are
currently seeking redress of AUD 15 to 25 million (USD 10.6 to 17.7
million) to recover underpayments, along with financial damages
claims for up to AUD 728,000 (USD 516,600).

According to Yahoo, the Fair Work Commission terminated the
Merivale's long-expired 2007 Employee Collective Agreement that
meant it was not required to pay almost 3,000 staff overtime or
full penalty rates for nearly a decade. The employee agreement (EA)
expired on Dec. 21 2012. Adero's potential lawsuit is understood to
raise complex and largely untested legal issues over rates owed in
expired agreements made before the Fair Work Act.[GN]


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Rosen Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Micron Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: MU) from June 22,
2018 through November 19, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Micron investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Micron class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1491.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Chinese State Administration for Market Regulation
notified Micron it was investigating dynamic random-access memory
("DRAM") chip providers in China for potential collusion and other
anti-competitive conduct; (2) Chinese investigators had found
"massive evidence" of Micron's anti-competitive behavior; (3)
Micron had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy with Samsung
Electronics and SK Hynix; and (3) as a result, Micron's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than March 25,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1491.html

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


MIRACLE METHOD: Certification of Class Sought in Wolf Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Maria Wolf moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned MARIA WOLF, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. MIRACLE METHOD, INC. and
BURAC & ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00242-JPS (E.D. Wisc.),
and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendants)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Feldman Sues Over Injuries Sustained
---------------------------------------------------------
Chet Feldman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00729-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind., February 18,
2019) seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of
Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Ohio University ("OU") student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other OU football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former OU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Chet Feldman is a natural person and citizen of the State
of Ohio.

NCAA is an unincorporated association with its principal place of
business located at 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46206.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Graham Sues for Negligence of Athletes' Health
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Anderson Graham, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00725-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind., February 18,
2019) seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of
the Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of West Alabama University ("WAU") student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other WAU football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former WAU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Anderson Graham is a natural person and citizen of the
State of Alabama.

NCAA is an unincorporated association with its principal place of
business located at 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46206.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Harley Sues Over Disregard of Athlete's Health
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Demetrics Harley, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00730-RLY-DLP (S.D. Ind.,
February 18, 2019) seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained a
result of the Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and
safety of generations of Fayetteville State University ("FSU")
student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other FSU football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former FSU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football. As such,
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Demetrics Harley is a natural person and citizen of the
State of South Carolina.

NCAA is an unincorporated association with its principal place of
business located at 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46206.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NAVIOS MARITIME: Roberts Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-----------------------------------------------------------
Norman Roberts, on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Navios Maritime Holdings, Inc., Angeliki N.
Frangou, Spyridon Magoulas, George Malanga, John Stratakis and
Shunji Sasada, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00655 (S.D. N.Y., January
23, 2019), seeks damages to compensate all holders of Navios
American Depository Shares  who were improperly coerced into
tendering their shares, and an order invalidating the consent
solicitation, and such other and further relief for breach of
fiduciary duties.

Roberts claims that his fellow American Depository Share (ADS)
holders were forced into giving up their right to receive accrued
but unpaid dividends by tying the tender offer to exchange each
series of ADS for a prorated allocation of a small cash payment and
an unsecured debt instrument. Norman Roberts has been a holder of
Series G ADS since November 26, 2014 and a holder of Series H ADS
since December 10, 2014.

Navios is a maritime shipping and logistics company that focuses on
the transport of dry bulk commodities, including iron ore, coal and
grain.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeroen van Kwawegen, Esq.
     Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
     Christoper J. Orrico, Esq.
     Tamara Gavrilova, Esq.
     BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
     1251 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10020
     Tel: (212) 554-1400


NESTLE USA: Judge Dismisses 2 Child Labor Class Actions
-------------------------------------------------------
Tina Bellon, writing for Reuters, reports that a federal judge in
Boston on Jan. 30 dismissed two proposed class action lawsuits by
consumers alleging Nestle USA Inc and The Hershey Co had failed to
disclose child labor practices on their chocolate products' labels,
saying their claims were not actionable under Massachusetts law.

U.S. District Judge Allison Burroughs said that, while it was
"beyond dispute" that the use of child and slave labor was
widespread at cocoa plants in the Ivory Coast, the Massachusetts
consumers filing the lawsuits failed to show the companies deceived
them. [GN]


NEVADA GOLD: Assad Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------
George Assad, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc., William J. Sherlock, Frank
Catania, William G. Jayroe, Rudolph K. Kluiber, Shawn W. Kravets,
and Francis M. Ricci, Case No. 2:19-cv-00026 (D. Nev., January 3,
2019), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on
September 18, 2018, pursuant to which Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc.
will be acquired by Maverick Casinos LLC and Maverick Casinos
Merger Sub Inc.

On December 3, 2018, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff owns Nevada Gold common stock.

The Defendant Nevada Gold is a developer, owner, and operator of
nine gaming operations in Washington and a local casino in
Henderson, Nevada.

The Individual Defendants are members of the board of directors of
Nevada Gold. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael J. Gayan, Esq.
      KEMP, JONES & COULTHARD LLP
      Wells Fargo Tower, 17th Floor
      3800 Howard Hughes Parkway
      Las Vegas, NV 89169
      Tel: (702) 385-6000


NORTHSTAR REALTY: Court Denies Bid to Intervene in Boothe Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACK BOOTHE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTHSTAR REALTY FINANCE CORP.,
INC., et al., Defendants, Civil No. JKB-16-3742 (D. Md.), Judge
James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland denied the Michael Bumgardner, William Pennington, John
Wood, and Marjorie Wood ("Intervenors")'s motion to intervene and
for relief from the final order and judgment.

The case involved the merger between Colony Capital, Inc.,
NorthStar Asset Management Group, Inc., and NorthStar Realty
Financial Corp.  A number of public shareholders -- including the
Plaintiff, a shareholder in NorthStar Realty Finance Corp. ("NRF")
-- challenged the merger.  In November 2017, the Plaintiff and the
Defendants agreed to a settlement, terminating the case.

Now, four former NRF shareholders move to intervene in the closed
case, seeking relief from the judgment so that they can proceed on
their own claims against the Defendants.

In June 2016, Defendants entered into a planned merger agreement.
The Defendants notified their shareholders of the proposed merger
and requested their votes.  Over the course of the next few months,
several shareholders sued the Defendants for violating Section
14(a) and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
Securities Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9.

The Plaintiff filed his complaint on Nov. 18, 2016.  The Plaintiff
alleged that the joint proxy statement, circulated to the
shareholders, contained materially incomplete and misleading
information concerning: (1) the financial projections for the
Defendants, which were relied upon by the board in assessing the
fairness of the Merger Consideration and by the Company's financial
advisor; and (ii) certain information regarding the valuation
analyses the financial advisor] performed in support of its
fairness opinion.  He sought class certification and an injunction
against the merger.  News of the Plaintiff's complaint became
public immediately.

The Plaintiff and the Defendants agreed to the proposed settlement
in June 2017.  The proposed settlement moved the Court to certify a
non-opt out class of all NRF shareholders, preliminarily approve
the terms of the settlement, approve the means of notifying the
class of the settlement, and schedule a fairness hearing.  The
Court granted preliminary approval.  The parties hired a legal
administrative services company to mail notice of the proposed
class action settlement to all the class members who could be
identified.

The Court held a fairness hearing.  It determined that the
settlement was fair and reasonable and, accordingly, approved it on
Nov. 30, 2017.  The settlement dismissed all claims against
Defendants, and the Plaintiff agreed to a broad release such that
all Class Members -- that is, all NRF shareholders -- were deemed
to have forever released completely claims of any kind that related
to the merger. Dvores appealed.

The Intervenors seek to intervene in the case.  In July 2018, they
filed complaints in California courts, alleging that the Defendants
violated different provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.  At
the end of July, Intervenors filed an amicus brief in Dvores'
appeal, but Dvores settled in September.  On November 13, the
Intervenors moved to intervene, asserting that, as former NRF
shareholders, they were members of the non-opt out class certified
by the Court and, as such, their claims were released by the
Plaintiff's settlement agreement.  To this Court, the Intervenors
argue that the judgment must be vacated or amended because the
Plaintiff (1) failed to investigate claims that were subsequently
released; (2) misrepresented to the Court the nature of the claims
being released; (3) made misstatements in the Registration
Statement; and (4) did not comply with the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").

Judge Bredar finds that the Intervenors fail to make the "strong
showing" necessary to overcome the presumption that their
post-judgment motion is untimely.  In a class action the critical
issue with respect to timeliness is whether the proposed intervenor
moved to intervene as soon as it became clear that the interests of
the unnamed class members would no longer be protected by the named
class representatives.  The Intervenors did not move when it became
clear that the Plaintiffs were not pursuing Intervenor's claims
and, in fact, were releasing those exact claims.  The Intervenors
do not meet the threshold requirement of filing a timely motion for
intervention of right.

The Judge concludes that Intervenors fail to show that the
Plaintiff was inadequate in his compliance with the PSLRA, his
investigation of potential claims, and his representations to the
Court.  Therefore, although the he denies intervention of right as
untimely, the Judge does not deny it on that ground alone.  Turning
to the substantive elements, he concludes that Intervenors fail to
establish inadequate representation too.

Because the Judge denies intervention, he must deny relief from the
judgment as well.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bredar denied the Intervenors'
motion to intervene and for relief from the final order and
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/w7xnzJ from Leagle.com.

Jack Boothe, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yelena Trepetin --
trepetin@browerpiven.com -- Brower Piven A Professional Corporation
& James Milligan Wilson, Jr., Faruqi and Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice.

Northstar Realty Finance Corp., David T. Hamamoto, Judith A.
Hannaway, Wesley D. Minami, Louis J. Paglia, Gregory Rush & Charles
W. Schoenherr, Defendants, represented by Elizabeth Catherine
Rinehart -- lcrinehart@venable.com -- Venable LLP & Andrew Gendron
-- agendron@Venable.com -- Venable LLP.

Howard B. Hoffman, Interested Party, pro se.

Michael Bumgardner, William Pennington, John Wood & Marjorie Wood,
Intervenors, represented by Patrick C. Smith -- psmith@dehay.com --
Dehay and Elliston LLP.


OCWEN LOAN: Stromberg Seeks Initial Settlement Approval
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit BONNIE LYNNE STROMBERG, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. OCWEN
LOAN SERVICING, LLC, MORGAN STANLEY PRIVATE BANK, N.A., RBS
CITIZENS, N.A., and DOE the Defendants 1-55, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:15-cv-04719-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court on March 28, 2019, for an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of Stipulation and Settlement
      Agreement pursuant to which the parties proposed to settle
      this action on a class wide basis;

   2. finding that final approval of the proposed Settlement under

      Rule 23(e)(2) and certification of the class for purposes of

      judgment on the proposed Settlement is likely;

   3. directing Notice to the Settlement Class in the form and
      manner set forth in the Settlement Agreement or in such other

      form and manner determined by the Court to be appropriate
      pursuant to Fed. 13 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and (e)(1); and

   4. scheduling a fairness hearing consistent with the time frame

      and process set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

The case is a class action brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of
herself and all similarly situated persons against the Defendants.
The Plaintiff alleges that each of these companies were
beneficiaries or assignees of loans secured by deeds of trust on
real property located in California and serviced by Ocwen, and that
they violated California Civil Code Section 2941(b) by failing to
timely execute and deliver to the trustee those documents necessary
to cause a reconveyance of the deed of trust to be recorded. By her
complaint, the Plaintiff seeks statutory damages on behalf of
herself and class members in the amount of $500 per loan, as
provided for by the statute.

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Todd M. Schneider, Esq.
          Mark T. Johnson, Esq.
          Kyle G. Bates, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: 415-421-7100
          Facsimile: 415-421-7105
          E-mail: tschneider@schneiderwallace.com
                  mjohnson@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Todd S. Collins, Esq.
          Eric Lechtzin, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: 215-875-3000
          Facsimile: 215-875-4604
          E-mail: tcollins@bm.net
                  elechtzin@bm.net

               - and -

          Seth R. Lesser, Esq.
          Kurt B. Olsen, Esq.
          KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP
          Two International Drive, Suite 350
          Rye Brook, NY 10573
          Telephone: (914) 934-9200
          Facsimile: (914) 934-9220

               - and -

          Charles Delbaum, Esq.
          NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
          Winthrop Square, 4th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: 617 542-8010
          Facsimile: 617 542-8033
          E-mail: cdelbaum@nclc.org

ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL: Not Compelled to Produce Docs in SEPTA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff, v. ORRSTOWN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:12-cv-00993 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Yvette Kane of
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
denied Plaintiff SEPTA's Motion to Compel Production of Documents
withheld by the Orrstown Defendants, as well as by the third
parties.

The case is a purported class action alleging securities violations
in connection with Orrstown's early 2010 public offering of
approximately 1.4 million shares of Orrstown common stock, which
raised almost $40 million.  Following a series of revelations
regarding Orrstown's financial condition, Orrstown reported
significant losses for the fourth quarter of 2011, and on March 15,
2012, filed its 2011 Annual Report, which disclosed that it had a
"material weakness" in its internal controls and had "failed to
implement a structured process with appropriate controls to ensure
that updated loan ratings were incorporated timely into the
calculation of the Allowance for Loan Losses."  Orrstown further
admitted that, as of March 2012, it had failed to fully remediate
its material weakness in its internal control over financial
reporting relating to loan ratings and its impact on the allowance
for loan losses.   On March 23, 2012, Orrstown and its Board of
Directors revealed that they had entered into an agreement with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and a consent order with the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Banking, requiring
them, inter alia, to revise their underwriting and credit
administration policies and strengthen their credit risk management
practices.

On May 12, 2012, SEPTA, on behalf of two classes, filed the
purported class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(3) against the Orrstown Defendants and several
additional individual Defendants, as well as Orrstown's auditor and
underwriters involved in the subject stock offering.  On March 4,
2013, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that the
Defendants issued materially untrue and/or misleading statements
and omissions in violation of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Exchange Act of 1934.

The amended complaint asserted claims on behalf of two classes: (1)
the "Securities Act Class," which consists of persons and/or
entities who purchased Orrstown common stock pursuant to, or
traceable to, Orrstown's Feb. 8, 2010 registration statement and
March 23, 2010 prospectus supplement issued in connection with
Orrstown's secondary stock offering in March 2010 and were damaged
thereby; and (2) the "Exchange Act Class," which consists of all
persons or entities who purchased Orrstown common stock on the open
market between March 15, 2010 and April 5, 2012 and were damaged
thereby.  SEPTA acquired Orrstown stock pursuant to the offering
documents for the March 2010 offering and also purchased Orrstown
common stock on the open market during the class period.

After extensive briefing, the Court dismissed SEPTA's Securities
and Exchange Act claims against all the Defendants for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  With permission of
the Court, SEPTA filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") against
the same Defendants, which focused exclusively on alleged
materially false and/or misleading statements made by the
Defendants in the offering documents and through the class period
pertaining to the effectiveness of the Orrstown Defendants'
internal controls over underwriting of loans, risk management,
financial reporting and compliance with banking regulations.

All the Defendants filed motions to dismiss.  On Dec. 7, 2016, the
Court granted the auditor and underwriters' motions to dismiss, and
granted in part and denied in part the Orrstown Defendants' and
additional Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss.

In connection with its decision, the Court took judicial notice of
the SEC Order and its findings, which the Court determined support
the SAC's allegations of misstatement or omission beginning in the
second quarter of 2010 through the end of 2011.  Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the allegations of the SAC, coupled with the
SEC Order, support an inference that Orrstown failed to maintain an
adequate system of internal accounting controls through the
relevant time period -- second quarter 2010 through 2011 -- and
that such failure resulted in inaccuracies in financial reporting
during that time, including (1) incorrect loan risk ratings; (2)
incorrect disclosures of impaired loans; (3) incorrect calculations
and disclosures of loan losses; (4) incorrect application of newly
issued accounting pronouncements; and (5) the lack of action to
remedy accounting problems after being alerted to them.

On Jan. 18, 2017, the Orrstown Defendants served upon SEPTA Initial
Disclosures listing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("FRB") and the Pennsylvania Department of Banking ("PADOB")
regulatory reviews as evidence it would use to support its defenses
to SEPTA's claims.  On Feb. 2, 2017, SEPTA served document requests
on the Orrstown Defendants pertaining to the Regulators'
Enforcement Actions against the Orrstown Defendants.

Shortly thereafter, the Orrstown Defendants communicated to SEPTA
their stated intent to withhold documents from production because
they potentially contain confidential supervisory information
("CSI"), which is protected from disclosure without the express
written consent of the FRB.  On Feb. 14, 2017, SEPTA sent a formal
waiver request to the FRB pursuant to 12 C.F.R. Section 261.22,
seeking access to the withheld documents.

That Request for Production, dated Feb. 2, 2017, specifically seeks
the following categories of information, covering the period from
January 1, 2009, to the date of the Request for Production:

     1. All documents that you produced to the SEC in connection
with the investigation and proceedings that culminated in the SEC
Order.

     2. All documents produced by any person to you or the SEC in
connection with the investigation and proceedings that culminated
in the SEC Order.

     3. All transcripts or recordings of any depositions or
interviews of witnesses taken during the investigation and
proceedings that culminated in the SEC Order, including all
documents identified, used or marked as exhibits during those
depositions or interviews.

     4. All documents that the SEC delivered to you during the
investigation and proceedings that culminated in the SEC Order.

     5. All documents that were sent to the SEC or delivered by you
to the SEC subsequent to the issuance of the SEC Order with respect
to the SEC Order.

     6. All communications and documents that relate to or reflect
any communications that you had internally or with any other person
concerning the SEC investigation and proceedings that culminated in
the SEC Order.

     7. The joint reports of examination and all documents
concerning the joint reports of examination.

     8. All documents that you produced to the Federal Reserve in
connection with the Joint Examination.

     9. All documents produced by any person to you or the Federal
Reserve in connection with the Joint Examination.

     10. All documents that the Federal Reserve delivered to you in
connection with the Joint Examination.

     11. All documents concerning the Written Agreement.

     12. All documents that were sent to the Federal Reserve or
delivered by you to the Federal Reserve subsequent to the issuance
of the Written Agreement with respect to the Written Agreement.

     13. The Stipulation of Consent and Entry of Order, and any
Documents concerning the Stipulation of Consent and Entry of
Order.

     14. All documents that you produced to the Department of
Banking in connection with the Joint Examination.

     15. All documents produced by any person to you or the
Department of Banking in connection with the Joint Examination.

     16. All documents that the Department of Banking delivered to
you in connection with the Joint Examination.
     
     17. All documents concerning the Consent Order.

     18. All documents that were sent to the Department of Banking
or delivered by you to the Department of Banking subsequent to the
issuance of the Consent Order with respect to the Consent Order.

     19. All transcripts or recordings of any depositions or
interviews of witnesses taken in connection with the Joint
Examination which culminated in the Enforcement Action, including
all Documents identified, used or marked as exhibits during those
depositions or interviews.

     20. All communications and documents that relate to or reflect
any communications that you had internally or with any other person
concerning the: (a) Joint Reports of Examination; (b) Stipulation
of Consent and Entry of Order; (c) Joint Examination; (d)
Enforcement Actions; (e) Written Agreement; and (f) Consent Order.

On March 1, 2017, the FRB responded to a Feb. 2, 2017 letter and
follow-up Feb. 13, 2017 email from the Orrstown Defendants
requesting permission to produce to SEPTA all documents Orrstown
previously produced to the SEC.   In that letter, the FRB requested
that the Orrstown Defendants produce to the FRB a log reflecting
the information designated as CSI by Orrstown and produced to the
SEC in connection with its investigation.

In its Feb. 9, 2018 status report filed with the Court, SEPTA
reported that after receiving the CSI log in December 2017, it
discovered that a number of the documents on the log contained only
"partial" CSI and that others were publicly disseminated documents.
Accordingly, the Orrstown Defendants subsequently produced to
SEPTA redacted versions of partial-CSI documents and removed
additional documents from the log.

n March 2018, the counsel for the parties and the Regulators
participated in a conference call to discuss the Regulators' review
of documents the Orrstown Defendants had designated as containing
full or partial CSI.  As a result of the discussion that occurred,
the Regulators requested re-production of the potential CSI
documents in two groups -- the first containing the full CSI
documents, and the second containing the redacted, partial-CSI
documents.  Accordingly, on March 27, 2018, the Orrstown Defendants
produced the 3,398 full CSI documents, comprising 17,419 pages, to
the Regulators. On April 3, 2018, the Orrstown Defendants produced
the partial-CSI, redacted documents, which consisted of 649
documents comprising 48,984 pages, to the Regulators.

Thereafter, the parties filed a Joint Status Report with the Court
on May 2, 2018, reporting that the parties had participated in an
April 2018 conference call with the Regulators to discuss the
status of the Regulators' review of the CSI documents. (Doc. No.
153 at 3-4.)

In the meantime, on June 18, 2018, Katherine H. Wheatley, Associate
General Counsel to the FRB, sent a detailed letter to SEPTA's
counse, formally responding to SEPTA's Feb. 14, 2017 Request
seeking the FRB's waiver of any applicable bank examination
privilege and approval of the Orrstown Defendants' production of
CSI to SEPTA.  In the Wheatley letter, the FRB stated its position
that SEPTA's Feb. 14, 2017 Request does not comply with the
requirements of the Board's regulations regarding requests for
access to confidential supervisory information, and therefore, the
FRB is unable to process SEPTA's request in its current form.

Following its receipt of the Wheatley letter, SEPTA filed the
instant Motion to Compel Production of Documents, with supporting
brief and exhibits on Aug. 9, 2018.  The Orrstown Defendants filed
a brief in response to the Motion to Compel on Aug. 23, 2018.
Thereafter, the FRB filed an unopposed Motion to Intervene in the
action for the limited purpose of opposing SEPTA's Motion to
Compel.  Ultimately, the Court issued an Order approving a
Stipulation filed by the parties permitting the intervention of the
FRB and setting a briefing schedule on SEPTA's Motion to Compel.  

Upon careful consideration of the briefs of the parties, the
supporting documents filed in connection with those briefs,
including the Wheatley letter, and the relevant authorities, Judge
Kane is unpersuaded by SEPTA's argument that the Court should treat
the FRB's refusal to process SEPTA's waiver Requests in their
current form, as articulated by the Wheatley letter, as tantamount
to a denial of those Requests and an assertion of the bank
examination privilege over the entire universe of potentially
CSI-designated documents sought by SEPTA from the Orrstown
Defendants and third parties.  Rather, she finds that, by its
refusal to respond to the Wheatley letter and engage with the FRB
in an effort to provide the necessary information for the FRB to
complete its review of the relevant documents, SEPTA has failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies.  Accordingly, its Motion to
Compel will be denied on that basis.

The Judge notes that discovery in the case has been pending for
over two years, and is now at a standstill awaiting the resolution
of the issue.  She expects that the good faith efforts of SEPTA to
engage with the FRB as outlined in the Wheatley letter will be met
with the FRB's timely and good faith review of the relevant
documents and prompt final action -- whether it be assertion or
waiver of the bank examination privilege -- on SEPTA's Requests.

For all of the reasons discussed, Judge Kane denied SEPTA's Motion
to Compel.  An Order consistent with the Memorandum follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/OJjNHv from Leagle.com.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Tiffany J. Cramer -- tiffanycramer@chimicles.com -- Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Timothy N. Mathews --
TimothyMathews@chimicles.com -- Chimicles Schwartz Kriner &
Donaldson-Smith LLP, Benjamin F. Johns -- benjohns@chimicles.com --
Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Kimberly M.
Donaldson Smith -- kimdonaldson@chimicles.com -- Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & Nicholas E. Chimicles --
nick@chimicles.com -- CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP.

Orrstown Financial Services, Inc., Orrstown Bank, Thomas R. Quinn,
Jr., Bradley S. Everly & JEFFREY W. EMBLY, Defendants, represented
by David J. Creagan, White and Williams, LLP, David E. Edwards,
White and Williams LLP & Justin K. Fortescue, White and Williams
LLP.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Amicus,
represented by George Michael Thiel, U.S. Attorney's Office.


OXNARD SCHOOL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Disabled Students Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit J.R., the Plaintiff, v. Oxnard School
District, et al., the Defendants, Case No. LA CV17-04304 JAK
(FFMx), the Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt entered an order on Feb.
15, 2019:

   1. denying, without prejudice, a motion to certify a class
      consisting of:

      "all students in Oxnard School District who have or may
      have disabilities and who have been or will be subject
      to the District's policies and procedures regarding
      identification and evaluation of students for purposes
      of providing services or accommodations under the
      Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Section
      504 of the Rehabilitation Act and/or the Americans with
      Disabilities Act"; and

   2. granting a motion to dismiss without prejudice.

The Court said, "any amended complaint shall be filed no later than
March 8, 2019. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that PLN's
members would have standing to sue in their own right. . . .  PLN
members I.B. and W.H. do not have such standing. The Plaintiffs
identify two additional PLN members, M.Y. and H.V., who were
affected by the District's Child Find policies but do not have
standing to sue. Plaintiffs have not identified any other members
of PLN whom they contend would have standing. PLN is a small
organization whose members are approximately 15-20 families. The
Plaintiffs selected four of those families to provide declarations
in support of the Motion for Class Certification. None of those
families would have standing to sue in their own right. In light of
the small membership of PLN, and the reasonable inference that
Plaintiffs did not deliberately identify only those member families
without standing in support of their associational standing
argument, it has not been shown that any individual member of PLN
would have standing to sue in his own right. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that PLN has direct or
associational standing. For the foregoing reasons, the proposed
class representatives do not have Article III standing to bring the
class claims under the current class definition. Any amended
complaint shall address the deficiencies in Article III standing
identified in this Order. The Plaintiffs may consider narrowing the
class claims and the class definition to correspond to the claims
of the proposed class representatives, creating sub-classes, and/or
adding new proposed class representatives with standing to bring
the broader set of claims."[CC]

P24 LLC: Cajina Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
--------------------------------------------
Alexander Cajina, and all others similarly situated v. P24, LLC dba
PIOLA, Case No. 1:19-cv-20033 (S.D. Fla., January 3, 2019), is
brought against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages, liquidated
damages, interests, costs and attorney's fees for the Defendant's
violation of the overtime provisions and for retaliation. The
Plaintiff also seeks unpaid wages under Florida law.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida and
worked for the Defendant as a kitchen employee or pizza maker. The
Plaintiff was employed from February 13, 2017 through December 4,
2018.

The Defendant PIOLA is a Florida limited liability company which
regularly conducted business within the Southern District of
Florida as an Italian restaurant with various locations in South
Florida, including the location where Plaintiff worked in Brickell.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Isaac Mamane, Esq.
      MAMANE LAW LLC
      10800 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 350A
      Miami, FL 33161
      Tel: (305) 773-6661
      E-mail: mamane@gmail.com


PAPA JOHN'S: Faces Class Action Over "No-Poach" Policy
------------------------------------------------------
Brian Flood, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that three separate
lawsuits challenging "no-poach" language in Papa John's franchise
agreements will be combined into a single putative class action,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky ruled
Jan. 28.

Under the company's standard franchise agreement, franchisees
agreed not to solicit or induce employees of Papa John's, its
affiliates, or its other franchises to leave their positions. Three
employees brought antitrust suits, saying this provision
artificially depressed their wages and limited their job
opportunities. [GN]


PAPA JOHN'S: Faces Hubbard Wage and Hour Class Suit in Kentucky
---------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA HUBBARD, AARON NELSON and JOSHUA BOYLAND, for themselves and
all others similarly situated v. PAPA JOHN'S INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Case No. 5:19-cv-00022-TBR (W.D. Ky., February 12, 2019), seeks to
redress PJI's alleged systematic policy and practice of paying its
delivery drivers net hourly wages that are well below the minimum
wage mandated by Kentucky's wage and hour law, the Colorado Minimum
Wage of Workers Act and the Missouri Minimum Wage Law.

PJI is a Delaware corporation that maintains its primary place of
business within this District and operates numerous Papa John's
stores within this District.

PJI owns and operates at least 708 Papa John's stores in various
states, including numerous stores in Kentucky, Colorado and
Missouri.  That total includes both stores wholly owned and
operated by PJI and other stores operated by PJI as "joint
ventures."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Suetholz, Esq.
          J. Gerard Stranch IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (877) 369-0267
          Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
          E-mail: davids@bsjfirm.com
                  gerards@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Andrew C. White, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com
                  gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  awhite@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Mark Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, LLP
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997-9150
          Facsimile: (314) 997-9170
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Paul III, Esq.
          PAUL, LLP
          601 Walnut Street, Suite 300
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 984-8100
          E-mail: Rick@PaulLLP.com

               - and -

          David J. Cohen, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          604 Spruce Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 873-4836
          E-mail: dcohen@stephanzouras.com


PATRIOT LAND: Court Denies Dismissal in A. Conover's RESPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, issued an Opinion denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned ANNA CONOVER, PARRISH AND JACQUELINE
SHERIDAN, BRYAN AND JACQUELINE VAN VELSON, Plaintiffs, v. PATRIOT
LAND TRANSFER, LLC, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants. Civil No.
17-4625(RMB/JS). (D.N.J.).

Plaintiffs Anna Conover, Parrish and Jacqueline Sheridan, and Bryan
and Jacqueline Van Velson brought this putative class action
against Defendants Patriot Land Transfer, LLC (Patriot) and Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), alleging violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
  
Wells Fargo moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint on three
grounds, arguing that (1) the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
statute of limitations, (2) the Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (3) that the Plaintiffs'
claims are too individualized to warrant class treatment.  

Statute of Limitations

First, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' RESPA claims are
barred by RESPA's one-year statute of limitations, which requires
that actions brought pursuant to Section 2607 be asserted within
one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation. Since
the alleged RESPA violations occurred in 2014, the closing date of
Plaintiffs' mortgage loans, the one-year statute of limitations
would have expired in 2015.  Because Plaintiffs did not file this
action until June 23, 2017, Wells Fargo contends that Plaintiffs'
claims are time-barred.

The Plaintiffs do not dispute RESPA's one-year statute of
limitations, however, the Plaintiffs claim an entitlement to
equitable tolling. Under Third Circuit precedent, equitable tolling
permits a plaintiff to sue after the statutory time period for
filing a complaint has expired under three circumstances, (1) the
defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the
plaintiff's cause of action (2) the plaintiff in some extraordinary
way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights or (3) the
plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the
wrong forum.

In this case, the Plaintiffs argue for equitable tolling on the
basis of fraudulent concealment, alleging that the Defendants'
active misleading prevented Plaintiffs from having notice of facts
giving rise to their RESPA claims.

The fraudulent concealment doctrine permits plaintiffs to toll the
statute of limitations in circumstances when the accrual date of a
claim has passed but the plaintiff's cause of action has been
obscured by the defendant's conduct. However, Plaintiff has the
burden of proving fraudulent concealment, which requires a
three-part showing: (1) that the defendant actively misled the
plaintiff (2) which prevented the plaintiff from recognizing the
validity of her claim within the limitations period and (3) where
the plaintiff's ignorance is not attributable to her lack of
reasonable due diligence in attempting to uncover the relevant
facts.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to
equitable tolling because an alleged failure to disclose
information is simply not enough for fraudulent concealment. The
Defendant argues that under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiff
must point to some additional affirmative fraudulent act that
perpetuates concealment; inaction or silence by the lender is not
sufficient to show fraudulent concealment to toll equitably the
limitations period. The Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs'
allegations concerning the HUD-1 form and the Good Faith Estimate
cannot possibly amount to fraudulent concealment, because there is
no proper place on a HUD-1 statement for disclosure of the fact, if
true, that Patriot was providing Wells Fargo with marketing lists.

Contrary to the Defendant's characterization of the Plaintiffs'
claims, the Plaintiffs do not allege mere non-disclosure of the
kickback agreement. Rather, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants chose to omit the kickbacks and the facts of the
Defendants' coordinated business relationship under the Patriot
Kickback Agreement from the Plaintiffs' loan documents and that the
purpose of these omissions was to conceal the kickbacks and
Defendants' coordinated business relationship under the Patriot
Kickback Agreement Such an allegation of affirmative concealment
goes beyond mere non-disclosure and is, therefore, sufficient to
state a claim for equitable tolling.

Failure to State a Claim

The Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' theory of liability is
implausible and fails to state a claim under RESPA, which prohibits
the acceptance of any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to
any agreement or understanding that business incident to or a part
of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related
mortgage loan shall be referred to any person.

The Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' allegation falls under
RESPA's safe harbor provision, precluding a cause of action for
fees charged for services that were actually rendered.

Therefore, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs' claim fails because it
involves fees that were charged to Plaintiffs in exchange for
services actually performed. Defendant further argues that
Plaintiffs fail to draw a connection between the extra fees for
title and closing services, and the alleged kickback payments from
Patriot to Wells Fargo.  

The Defendant's argument is misplaced. The Plaintiffs' cause of
action is premised upon the existence of a kickback arrangement
between the Defendants. To that end, the Plaintiffs alleged that
such an arrangement existed in the Amended Complaint. The
Plaintiffs' allegation, that they were charged more for closing and
settlement services than they would have been without a kickback
arrangement, is relevant only to the extent it impacts damages.
Although Defendant's argument raises a potentially relevant point
regarding Plaintiffs' ability, or lack thereof, to recover damages,
Defendant has already conceded Plaintiffs' standing in this case.


Class Action Claims

The Defendant moves to dismiss the class action allegations,
arguing that the Plaintiffs' equitable tolling claim necessitates
individualized inquiries, which are inappropriate for class
treatment.

As an initial matter, this motion is premature at this stage of the
proceedings. The arguments raised by Defendant would be more
appropriately addressed in response to a motion for class
certification. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the class
allegations will also be denied.

Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint will be
denied without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybqvzuve from Leagle.com.

ANNA CONOVER, PARRISH SHERIDAN, JACQUELINE SHERIDAN, BRYAN VAN
VELSON & JACQUELINE VAN VELSON, Plaintiffs, represented by BRUCE
DANIEL GREENBERG -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA
GREENBERG, LLC.

PATRIOT LAND TRANSFER, LLC, Defendant, represented by BENJAMIN W.
SPANG -- bspang@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON LLP & JERRY R.
DESIDERATO -- JDeSiderato@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON LLP.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant, represented by JENNIFER JANEIRA
NAGLE -- jennifer.nagle@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP.


PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: Court Narrows Claims in Talarico Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLENE TALARICO, individually and on behalf of a
class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-909
(JPO) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part Port Authority's motion to dismiss certain of Talarico's
claims and to strike all of her class allegations.

Talarico has filed the putative class action against her employer,
the Port Authority, alleging that the Port Authority has engaged in
a practice of filming its employees' private medical examinations
without their knowledge or consent.  Talarico claims that the
alleged practice violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution, as well as the analogous guarantees of the
New York State Constitution, and she seeks individual and
class-wide relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York
law.

Talarico numbers among the Port Authority's roughly 8,000
employees.  On Aug. 4, 2016, after receiving a hand injury in an
altercation with a coworker, Talarico visited one of the Medical
Services Offices that the Port Authority provides for the exclusive
use of its workers.  There, she received an examination from a Port
Authority physician in a private examination room.

Following this incident, Talarico initiated legal proceedings in a
New Jersey municipal court against the coworker who had injured
her.  During the course of discovery, the Port Authority allowed
Talarico to view several video recordings, one of which showed
Talarico's Aug. 4, 2016 medical examination in its entirety.
Talarico had not previously been aware of the recording, and she
had never consented to having her examination recorded.

On Feb. 1, 2018, Talarico initiated the instant lawsuit against the
Port Authority on behalf of herself and a proposed class of all
other employees who had been and would be subjected to "covert
video surveillance" during a medical examination at any of the Port
Authority's Medical Services Offices.  Her four-count complaint
claims that the Port Authority's alleged practice of covertly
filming its employees' medical examinations without their consent
violates the guarantees against unreasonable searches enshrined in
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Count One) and
Article I, Section 12, of the New York State Constitution (Count
Three), and that the practice also violates the privacy guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Count Two)
and Article I, § 6, of the New York State Constitution (Count
Four).

Talarico pursues her federal claims by way of Section 1983, a
remedial federal civil-rights statute, and she pursues her
state-law claims directly under the New York State Constitution.
In addition to class-wide relief, Talarico seeks compensatory and
punitive damages on her own behalf.

On March 27, 2018, the Port Authority moved to dismiss or strike
several of Talarico's claims.  Specifically, it argues that
Talarico's Section 1983 claims, as well as her claim for punitive
damages, must be dismissed in their entirety for failure to state a
viable legal claim.  To the extent that Talarico has stated a claim
under federal law, the Port Authority further argues that her
state-law claims must be dismissed in light of the available
federal remedy.  Finally, it moves to dismiss or strike all of
Talarico's class claims.

Judge Oetken finds that (i) Talarico has therefore adequately
alleged an official policy or custom; (ii) to the extent that the
type of covert surveillance alleged violates the Fourth Amendment,
he easily concludes that Talarico has plausibly alleged that she
was not alone in suffering such a violation; (iii) Talarico is
entitled to discovery on her Fourteenth Amendment claims; (iv)
because Section 1983 offers an adequate remedy to redress any
injury inflicted by the specific conduct alleged, then, the New
York State Constitution does not itself provide a cause of action;
and (v) punitive damages are not available against the Port
Authority.

Having concluded that Talarico is entitled to proceed solely on her
Section 1983 claims, the Judge now considers the Port Authority's
motion to strike Talarico's class allegations insofar as it relates
to these claims.  He finds that the complaint does plausibly allege
that putative class members other than Talarico have a right to
relief under Section 1983.  Therefore, to the extent that the Port
Authority argues that Talarico's class allegations should be struck
for failure to articulate more than the sort of "conclusory" claims
that are properly addressed at the pleadings stage, that argument
fails.  He therefore will deny the Port Authority's motion to
strike Talarico's class claims, albeit without prejudice to any
arguments the Port Authority may wish to renew at the class
certification stage.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Oetken granted in part and denied
in part the Port Authority's partial motion to dismiss.
Specifically, he granted the motion with respect to all statelaw
claims (Counts Three and Four) and all claims for punitive damages.
In all other respects, he denied the motion.  s to the remaining
claims (Counts One and Two), the Port Authority's motion to strike
the class allegations is denied, and the Port Authority's motion
for an extension of time to respond is granted.

The Port Authority will file its answer to the remaining claims
within 14 days after the date of the Opinion and Order.  The Clerk
of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 15.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ui0M6E from Leagle.com.

Charlene Talarico, individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by William George
Schimmel -- wschimmel@weissmanmintz.com -- Weissman & Mintz LLC.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Defendant,
represented by David Robert Kromm, Law Office of James M. Begley &
Lauren T. Grodentzik, The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey.


PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Drivers' Suit Transferred to S.D. Ind.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue in the case captioned YUWSUF
ABDUL-GHAFOOR, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC.
and RONALD D. ROMAIN, Defendants. Case No. 17-CV-1105-SMY-GCS.
(S.D. Ill.).

Now pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
Improper Venue or to Transfer Venue to the Southern District of
Indiana.

The 1,464 Plaintiffs are current or former employees of
Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI) who worked as over-the-road
drivers. PTI is in the business of providing interstate and
intrastate ground transportation for railroad crews in 30 states
plus the District of Columbia.

The Plaintiffs filed this collective action pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that they are owed minimum
wage and overtime pay for various work-related activities.  

The venue statute provides, in relevant part: "(b) Venue in
general. A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district
in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of
the State in which the district is located (2) a judicial district
in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated or(3) if there is no district
in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to
the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action."

For purposes of the statute, a natural person is a resident of the
state where he is domiciled. The parties agree that Romain is
domiciled in Evansville, Indiana which is located in the Southern
District of Indiana. Thus, the Plaintiff argues that Romain is
subject to this Court's personal jurisdiction just like PTI. The
Defendants do not address this point nor do they offer any argument
that the inclusion of Romain as a party-defendant may be merely
duplicative of Defendant PTI as, presumably, the Plaintiffs will be
entitled to only one recovery.

The movant has the burden of establishing, by reference to
particular circumstances, that the transferee forum is clearly more
convenient and the Court must give some weight in favor of the
forum in which the plaintiff chose to file the Complaint. Putting
aside the question of whether Romain is an employer for personal
jurisdiction purposes, the Court finds that transfer to the
Southern District of Indiana is appropriate under Section 1404(a).

The deference typically afforded a plaintiff's forum choice is
diminished where the cause of action does not arise in the forum or
the plaintiffs do not live in the forum. Deference is further
diminished where a collective or class action is pursued because
any plaintiff can claim that any other jurisdiction is more
convenient. Here, Plaintiffs could have filed suit in any number of
judicial districts; the fact that they filed in this District is
given limited deference.

More significantly, weighing the convenience factors in this case
yields a neutral result. The witnesses are either dispersed
throughout the United States (i.e. Plaintiffs and branch employees
or generally located in Evansville, Indiana (corporate employees).
Plaintiffs maintain the location of witnesses is irrelevant because
they will only seek to conduct written discovery of electronic
materials. While such a presumption may not be a foregone
conclusion, it is not immediately apparent that extensive
depositions will be required. And, as Plaintiffs point out, the
physical location of electronic records has limited weight as they
can be easily transmitted.

Other factors, such as the location of material events and ease of
access to proof are equally neutral given the diverse geography of
the plaintiffs and locations were the policy in question was
enforced.

That said, the Court finds that the interests of justice warrant
transfer. As the parties point out in their briefing, the Southern
District of Indiana has extensive knowledge of the bases of this
litigation. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiffs' theory of recovery
may well be one that was litigated generally in Crawford. Moreover,
the Evansville community has a greater interest in the resolution
of this matter than the citizens of Southern Illinois. The decision
of how to compensate drivers was driven by a policy developed by
executives in Evansville, Indiana, and that community has vested
interest in ensuring that corporations within its boundaries are
complying with federal law. For these reasons, this matter should
be transferred to the Southern District of Indiana.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5uolx6b
from Leagle.com.

YUWSUF ABDUL-GHAFOOR, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Terry D. Smith, LAW
OFFICES OF TERRY D. SMITH & Joseph H. Cassell --
JHCASSELL@ERONLAW.NET -- ERON LAW OFFICE, PA.

PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION INC, an Indiana corporation licensed to
conduct business in Illinois & RONALD D. ROMAIN, Individually, as
Statutory Employer and President of Professional Transportation,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Christopher C. Murray --
christopher.murray@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C., Michelle R. Maslowski --
michelle.maslowskie@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C. & Patrick F. Hulla -- patrick.hulla@ogletree.com --
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C..


PUBLIC STORAGE: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Product
---------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Harris, writing for SpareFoot, reports that did
self-storage giant Public Storage mislead tenants into buying their
in-house insurance product?

That's the central question at the heart of a class action trial
that started in California on Jan. 28. The suit seeks $100 million
in restitution for the plaintiffs who claim that employees of the
storage REIT told customers that they must buy an insurance plan
from the company itself in order to rent a unit. As a result the
company is accused of violating California's unfair competition
law.

Public Storage says in legal filings that the company requires
tenants to have insurance, but doesn't force customers to buy a
plan from them. Tenants are free to obtain insurance from any
qualified carrier, according to Public Storage attorneys. The
company also says that employees do not give insurance advice, or
check for proof of insurance.

Going off-script
According to reporting by Law360, Public Storage lawyers sought to
decertify the class on Jan. 29, arguing that plaintiff testimony
points to a few isolated cases where employees went "off-script".
As such those examples are not enough to prove misconduct on a
class wide-basis.

The class is made up of tenants who rented a Public Storage unit in
California between February 3, 2012 and February 8, 2016. The case
was filed in Superior Court of California for the County of Los
Angeles.

Former CFO testifies
Law360 also reports that retired chief financial officer Edward
Reyes testified on Jan. 29 that in-house insurance revenue only
accounts for less than 5 percent of the company's business.

District manager Clare Ingram also testified, according to Law360:

Clare Ingram, a district manager at the company, is in charge of
about 18 to 20 people at 10 different Public Storage locations and
said she oversees the training of property managers and sales
employees. She testified that employees must follow specific
scripts and procedures when helping customers rent storage units.

When explaining the insurance part of the lease agreement, Ingram
said employees are instructed to tell customers that insurance is
required and that one option is the in-house insurance program. She
also said that if a customer elects to not buy the in-house
coverage the company does not ask for proof of insurance.

Plaintiffs in the case testified on Jan. 28 that employees told
them otherwise, and that they were intentionally led to believe
buying the company's insurance was required.

The trial was expected to continue through Jan. 30.

This isn't the first time Public Storage has faced legal action
over its insurance programs. In 2015, the company settled a class
action suit in Florida. The plaintiffs in that case claimed that
Public Storage misrepresented how it was using premiums collected
by people who bought its insurance. [GN]


RAZORS EDGE: Berry Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------
Jennifer Berry, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Razors Edge Pizza, Inc., Case No. 4:19-cv-00006 (E.D.
Ark., January 3, 2019), is brought against the Defendant for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of the Defendant's failure
to pay the Plaintiff lawful overtime compensation for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Saline County. The
Plaintiff worked as an hourly-paid employee for the Defendant.

The Defendant Razors Edge Pizza, Inc., owns and operates several
pizza delivery establishments in Little Rock under the name
Domino's Pizza. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Christopher Burks, Esq.
      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      One Financial Center
      650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Tel: (501) 221-0088
      Fax: (888) 787-2040
      E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
              josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


RSVP MEN LLC: Fiallo Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Fiallo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. RSVP Men LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-20303 (S.D. Fla., January 23, 2019), seeks statutory damages
and injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

RSVP Men operates as "RSVP Skin Care for Men," a company that sells
a skin care line specifically for men. To promote its services, it
engages in unsolicited telemarketing using an auto-dialer and/or
pre-recorded answering machine. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

             - and -

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


SAVASENIORCARE ADMINISTRATIVE: Bid to Dismiss Dolison Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TANYA DOLISON, Individually and as a Representative of
the Class, Plaintiff, v. SAVASENIORCARE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 15-3135 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Jan E.
DuBois of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (i) granted Sava's Motion to Dismiss, and denied the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

In the putative class action, Dolison asserts, on behalf of herself
and similarly situated individuals, that Sava violated the
stand-alone disclosure requirement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA").  The putative class members are any individuals whose
consumer report was procured by Sava for employment purposes in the
period beginning two years prior to the filing of the Complaint and
continuing through the date the class list is prepared for class
certification.

The Plaintiff worked as a Dietary Assistant at the Broomall
Rehabilitation and Nursing Center in Broomall, Pennsylvania, from
approximately November 1998 through April 2014.  The Broomall
Center is a nursing facility that provides care and rehabilitation
services to its residents.  In 2014, Defendant Sava, acquired
control of the Broomall Center through Broomall Operating Co. LP.
As a part of the change in operations, all the employees at the
Broomall Center were required to participate in a "re-application"
process.  During this re-application process all employees were
given, and asked to complete, documents contained in an Employee
Documents Book ("EDB").  Although Sava conducted training sessions
as part of the change in Broomall Center operations, it did not
provide instruction regarding the re-application process or the
completion of paperwork contained in the EDB.

The central allegation in the case is that Defendant Sava failed to
provide a consumer report disclosure that complied with the
dictates of the FCRA.  The Plaintiff asserts that her consumer
report was procured through a disclosure contained in a booklet,
the EDB, as opposed to in a document consisting solely of the
disclosure and that the disclosure inappropriately contained a
liability waiver, releasing the Defendant of any and all
liability.

On Jan. 16, 2014, in response to Defendant Sava's instructions,
Kroll Background America requested that the Pennsylvania State
Police run a criminal record check on the Plaintiff.  On Jan. 23,
2014, the Pennsylvania State Police provided Kroll with a document
which stated that the Plaintiff had been convicted in 1999 for
violating "Pennsylvania criminal offense code CS13A30," which
prohibits the possession and/or manufacture of controlled
substances with intent to deliver.  This document also included the
Plaintiff's arrest date and detailed his criminal history.  On
April 16, 2014, Sava notified the Plaintiff that her 1999
conviction was a disqualifying offense and that as a result her
employment at the Broomall Center was terminated.

The Plaintiff filed the action on June 5, 2015, on behalf of
herself and other putative class members.  The Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint on Aug. 19, 2015, and a Second Amended Complaint
on June 29, 2016.  Her Second Amended Complaint asserts two claims
for relief: first, that the Defendant had procured consumer reports
without making proper disclosures in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section
1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), and second, that the Defendant took adverse
action without providing a proper description of FCRA rights in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii).

On July 5, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Two
of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiff filed a
response which stated that she does not oppose the Defendant's
Motion.  On July 20, 2017, the Court dismissed the second claim for
relief in the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Thus, only one claim for relief is at issue in the present case:
the Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant procured consumer reports
without first making proper disclosures in violation of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).  The crux of this argument is that the
Plaintiff's consumer report was procured without a disclosure made
in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, also known as
the FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement, and that the
disclosure contained an inappropriate liability waiver.

There are currently two motions pending before the Court: (1) the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification; and the (2) Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Claim for Lack of Standing under
Rule 12(b)(1).

In her Motion for Class Certification, the Plaintiff argues that
she and the putative class satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.  In its Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), Sava argues that the Plaintiff does not have standing
because (1) the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Sava's alleged
violation of FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement caused her
tangible harm or concrete injury, and (2) a bare procedural
violation of FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement cannot
confer Article III standing.  

As an initial matter, Judge DuBois finds that significant evidence
mitigates against the conclusion that the Plaintiff was unaware
that she consented to a background check.  However, assuming
arguendo that the Plaintiff was "unaware," she has not successfully
tied this lack of awareness to the Defendant's alleged FCRA
violations.  The Plaintiff failed to carry her burden to show (i)
that she was unaware that she had consented to a background check
or that any lack of awareness, and (ii) that either of her alleged
harms constitute injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the
Defendant's alleged FCRA violations.   The Judge concludes that a
violation of the FCRA's stand-alone disclosure requirement
constitutes a bare procedural violation that is insufficient to
create standing.


As to the Plaintiff's motion for class certification , the Judge
finds that where the Plaintiff does not satisfy the standing
requirements of Article III for the claims asserted on behalf of
the class, he cannot address the class certification issues under
Rule 23 and must dismiss the class claims.  He also finds that that
amendment would be futile with respect to the named Plaintiff's
individual claims.  The Plaintiff has developed a factual record
over nearly four years of litigation.  She has had multiple
opportunities to refine her argument, including the filing of her
Amended Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, Motion for Class
Certification, and Response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Consequently, the named Plaintiff's individual claims under 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) are dismissed with prejudice.

The members of the putative class, however, may have experienced a
concrete harm as a result of the Defendant's alleged failure to
comply with the stand-alone disclosure requirement or the
extraneous sentence related to waiving liability.  Thus, amendment
of the Second Amended Complaint would not be futile with respect to
the claims of the putative class, and those claims are dismissed
without prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge DuBois granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Claim for Lack of Standing, and
the remaining claims under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) -- the
"First Claim for Relief" -- in the Second Amended Complaint are
dismissed.  Dolison's individual claims are dismissed with
prejudice, as amendment of the Second Amended Complaint would be
futile with respect to her individual claims.  The claims of the
putative class are dismissed without prejudice.  The Plaintiff's
motion for class certification is denied. An appropriate Order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 12, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/sX4sEH from Leagle.com.

TANYA DOLISON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CLASS,
Plaintiff, represented by JASON T. BROWN -- jtb@jtblawgroup.com --
BROWN, LLC, JONATHAN SHUB -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT &
GRAF PC, NICHOLAS R. CONLON -- nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com --
BROWN, LLC & KEVIN LAUKAITIS -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com -- KOHN
SWIFT & GRAF PC.

SAVASENIORCARE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, represented
by CHESLEY S. MCLEOD -- chesley.mcleod@agg.com -- ARNALL GOLDEN
GREGORY LLP, EDWARD P. CADAGIN, ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP, HENRY M.
PERLOWSKI -- henry.perlowski@agg.com -- ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP,
JOSIAH RODNEY WOLCOTT -- jwolcott@connollygallager.com -- CONNOLLY
BOVE LODGE & HUTZ LLP, MEGAN P. MITCHELL -- megan.mitchell@agg.com
-- ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY, LLP & RYAN P. NEWELL --
rnewell@connollygallagher.com -- CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP.


SC STATE PLASTERING: Final Settlement Hearing Set in March
----------------------------------------------------------
Angela Brown, writing for WCIV, reports that over 4,000 people who
joined a class action lawsuit for poor contractor work in their
Lowcountry homes say the settlement they were awarded is not enough
to cover repairs.

The Wickerhoff family, of Bluffton, says they are breathing in bad
air because of a mold problem due to faulty construction in their
Beaufort County home.

They joined a class action lawsuit alleging shoddy stucco work in
Sun City homes.

South Carolina State Plastering (SCSP) did the stucco work. The
company was named first in the lawsuit, along with developer Del
Webb, builder Pulte Homes, and Kephart Architects.

Last October a multi-million dollar agreement was reached, but the
Wickerhoffs say their share of the settlement was not enough.

"When we bought this house, we probably paid the most money on the
street," says Caroline Wickerhoff

The plaintiffs allege that SCSP did not properly install the stucco
when their homes were built. The Wickerhoffs say that lead to mold
and other structural damage.

"The major problems is around the window, where the water got
through. I would hate to see what it looks like behind there," says
Joseph Wickerhoff.

In 2018, all parties reached an agreement worth over $43 million
that would be split up between thousands of homeowners.

The Wickerhoffs believe their slice of the settlement could be up
to $6,000, well short of the $45,000 estimate they got for repairs
to their home.

Joseph Wickerhoff says, "This money would cover one panel over
here, maybe. Whatever they give us isn't going to do diddly
squat."

So what are their legal options?

Local attorney Stephan Futeral says, "once they settle, if the
funds come in even pennies on the dollar, or doesn't come anywhere
near compensating you, you have no further recourse. You cannot go
and file a separate lawsuit saying I did not get enough."

Mr. Futeral is not involved in this particular lawsuit, but says it
should be a lesson to anyone thinking of joining a class action
suit.

"Pain and suffering, lots of that, you want to proceed
individually," Mr. Futeral says. "Some customer-related things,
like you were overcharged on a debit card, you should consider (a
class action suit)," says Mr. Futeral.

The Wickerhoffs still plan on living out their golden years in Sun
City. In the meantime, "this is an air purifier that is supposed to
kill mold spores," says Joseph Wickerhoff.

The couple is also talking to us hoping Pulte Homes the builder
will listen.

"What are we going to do, just leave?" Caroline Wickerhoff asked
rhetorically. "We have a mortgage ... so we can't just walk away.
We'd lose everything."

According to the class action lawsuit, SCSP is no longer in
business and it's only assets are insurance policies.

Del Webb is a part of the Pulte Group. He declined to comment when
asked if Pulte will offer any assistance to families beyond the
settlement, and if they are still building homes with the SCSP
stucco.

A Beaufort County judge will hold a final hearing on the settlement
in March. If approved, it could be months before anyone receives
any money. [GN]


SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Morning Song Bird Food Settlement Has Prelim OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement in the case
captioned In re MORNING SONG BIRD FOOD LITIGATION. This Document
Relates To: ALL ACTIONS. United States District Court for the
Southern District of California. Lead Case No.
3:12-cv-01592-JAH-AGS.

The parties to the Action filed a joint motion for substitution of
revised notices for preliminary approval of the Settlement.

The parties' joint motion for substitution of revised notices is
granted.

The Court preliminarily concludes, based on its prior order
granting certification of a litigation class and the information
submitted to date, that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 have been satisfied. Specifically, the Court finds
that: (a) the Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (b) there are questions of law and fact
common to the Settlement Class, and such questions predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members (c) the claims of
Plaintiffs as representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims
of the Settlement Class (d) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have
fairly and adequately protected and represented the interests of
the Settlement Class and (e) a settlement class is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
claims and disputes at issue in this Action. Defendants retain all
rights to challenge whether the Action may proceed as a class
action, except for settlement purposes only.

The Court appoints Plaintiffs Laura Cyphert, Milt Cyphert, Ellen
Larson, and David Kirby as the Settlement Class representatives and
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Dowd & Dowd P.C., and The
Driscoll Firm, P.C. as Class Counsel.

The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement set forth in the
Agreement as fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests
of the Settlement Class.

KCC LLC is appointed as the Settlement Administrator, to implement
and administer the Notice Plan and the Settlement, including the
claims process and Refunds as described in the Agreement, subject
to the oversight of the Parties and this Court.

The Court directs the Settlement Administrator to review the
Retailer Records and information provided by Class Counsel and
Defendants' Counsel to identify recipients of the
Retailer-Identified Refund Notice and the Long-Form Notice per the
terms of the Parties' Agreement. The Settlement Administrator shall
keep and maintain Settlement Class Member contact information as
confidential and shall use such information only for purposes of
the Settlement.

The Court directs the Settlement Administrator to commence
dissemination of the Retailer-Identified Refund Notices and
Long-Form Notices, as set forth in the Agreement, within thirty
(30) days after entry of this Order and to commence publication of
the Publication Notice, as set forth in the Agreement, within
thirty (30) days after entry of this Order or as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter. In addition, the Court directs the
Settlement Administrator: (a) to establish a settlement website and
post to it the Long-Form Notice and Claim Form as well as other
important documents and deadlines in consultation with Class
Counsel and Defendants' Counsel (b) to establish a post-office box
for the receipt of any Settlement-related correspondence (c) to
establish a toll-free telephone number that will provide automated
Settlement-related information to Settlement Class Members (d) to
respond to inquiries or requests from Settlement Class Members in
consultation with Class Counsel and Defendants' Counsel and (e) to
respond to inquiries or requests from Class Counsel, Defendants'
Counsel, and the Court. The Settlement Administrator and the
Parties shall promptly send copies of any requests for exclusion,
objections, and related correspondence to each other.

Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to request a Proof of
Purchase Refund and/or a Claim Form Refund shall submit a Claim
Form with all supporting documentation (including Proof of Purchase
and Claim Form Affidavit, respectively) to the Settlement
Administrator by regular, first-class mail or via the settlement
website by July 1, 2019.

Any and all Retailer-Identified Refunds, Proof of Purchase Refunds,
Claim Form Refunds, Supplemental Claim Form Refunds, and Second
Supplemental Claim Form Refunds shall be issued to Settlement Class
Members in accordance with the procedures set forth in the
Agreement.

No Person shall be entitled to object to the Settlement, to the
final judgment to be entered in this Action, to any award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses to Class Counsel, or to any Service
Award to Plaintiffs, or otherwise to be heard, except by serving
and filing a written notice of intention to appear and written
objections in the form and manner, and by the date, required by the
Notice and the terms of this Order. Any Settlement Class Member who
fails to object in the manner and by the date required shall be
deemed to have waived and forfeited any and all rights he or she
may have to object to the Settlement and/or to appear and be heard
on his or her objection at the Fairness Hearing (including any
right to appeal), shall be forever barred from raising such
objections in this Action or any other action or proceeding, and
shall be bound by all the terms of the Agreement and by all
proceedings, orders and judgments, including, but not limited to,
the release of the Plaintiffs' Released Claims.

Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to exclude himself or
herself from the Settlement must personally sign and submit a
written request to opt out stating I wish to exclude myself from
the Settlement Class in In re Morning Song Bird Food Litigation (or
substantially similar clear and unambiguous language) to the
Settlement Administrator on or before May 13, 2019.The written
request must also include: the Settlement Class Member's printed
name, address, and telephone number; a statement that the
individual requesting exclusion is a Settlement Class Member and
the Morning Song Bird Food purchased with approximate dates,
retailers, product type, and purchase.

No one shall be permitted to exercise any exclusion rights on
behalf of any other person, whether as an agent or representative
of another or otherwise, except upon proof of a legal power of
attorney, conservatorship, trusteeship, or other legal
authorization and no one may exclude other persons within the
Settlement Class as a group, class, or in the aggregate.

The Court shall retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over
all Parties, the Action, and the Agreement to resolve any dispute
that may arise regarding the Agreement, the Settlement, or in
relation to the Action, including any dispute regarding validity,
performance, interpretation, administration, enforcement,
enforceability, or termination of the Agreement and the Settlement.
The Court retains ongoing and exclusive jurisdiction and
independent case management authority regarding the general
administration of the Settlement and the Settlement Administrator.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ckoqw8 from Leagle.com.

Laura Cyphert, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Milt Cyphert, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian E. Cochran --
bcochran@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins, Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Douglas
P. Dowd -- doug@dowdlaw.net -- Dowd & Dowd, P.C., pro hac vice,
Jason A. Forge  -- forge@rgrdlaw. Com -, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Jennifer N. Caringal -- jcaringal@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, John J. Driscoll, IV, The Driscoll
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Kevin Lane, Dowd & Dowd, P.C., pro hac
vice

The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company & The Scotts Company LLC,
Defendants, represented by Allison E. Haedt, Jones Day, Casteel
Elizabeth Borsay, Jones Day, pro hac vice, Edward P. Swan, Jr.,
Jones Day, Irene Fiorentinos, Jones Day, pro hac vice, James Todd
Kennard, Jones Day, pro hac vice, Jeffrey J. Jones, Jones Day, pro
hac vice & Marjorie P. Duffy, Jones Day, pro hac vice.


SHOREWALK VACATION: Borozny Alleges Violation under ADA in Fla.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shorewalk Vacation Villas, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Austin Borozny, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Shorewalk Vacation Villas, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-00405 (M.D. Fla., February 14, 2019).

Shorewalk Vacation Villas, LLC is a 3-star hotel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   The Advocacy Group, LLC
   200 SE 6th St Ste 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3424
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: jkerr@advocacypa.com



SNAP INC: Kaskela Law Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against Snap, Inc. ("Snap" or the "Company") (NYSE: SNAP) on
behalf of investors who purchased shares of the Company's stock
between March 2, 2017 and August 10, 2017 (the "Class Period").

IMPORTANT DEADLINE:  Investors who purchased Snap's stock during
the Class Period may, no later than January 31, 2019, seek to be
designated as a lead plaintiff representative in the action.

Snap investors who suffered a financial loss in excess of $100,000
as a result of their Class Period stock purchases are encouraged to
contact Kaskela Law LLC (D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) prior to January
31, 2019 at (484) 258-1585 or (888) 715-1740, or online at
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/snap-inc/,for additional information
about this action and/or to learn how to participate in the
action.

On or around March 2, 2017, Snap commenced its initial public
offering ("IPO") of common stock, selling over 200 million shares
of stock to investors at $17.00 per share.  Following the IPO,
shares of Snap's stock increased in value to over $29.00 per share.
However, beginning in May 2017, the Company slowly disclosed to
investors, among other things, disappointing financial and
operational metrics, including disappointing user growth at the
Company's Snapchat messaging platform.  Following these
disclosures, shares of the Company's stock significantly declined
in value, causing financial harm to the Company's investors.

The class action complaint alleges that Snap made materially false
and misleading statements to investors during the Class Period
concerning: (i) the impact of competition from Instagram, a
Facebook subsidiary, on Snap's core business, including Snap's
Daily Active Users ("DAU"); (ii) the existence and substance of a
lawsuit challenging the metrics by which investors and advertisers
valued Snap's platform, and internal control deficiencies at Snap;
and (iii) Snap's misrepresentations concerning its now admitted use
of "growth hacking," a technique use to artificially inflate DAU
numbers.  The complaint further alleges that, as a result of the
foregoing, investors purchased Snap's shares at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period and suffered financial
damages as a result of defendants' actions.

Snap investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC prior to
January 31, 2019 for additional information about this action
and/or to discuss their legal rights and options.  Kaskela Law LLC
exclusively prosecutes shareholder actions in state and federal
courts throughout the country.  For additional information about
Kaskela Law LLC please visit www.kaskelalaw.com.

         D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
                    (888) 715-1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


SOFI DENTAL CARE: Hillow Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Hillow, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sofi Dental Care & Cosmetics, Defendant,
Case No. 19-cv-20318 (S.D. Fla., January 23, 2019), seeks statutory
damages and injunctive relief for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Defendant is a cosmetic dentistry practice. To promote its
services, it engages in unsolicited telemarketing using an
auto-dialer and/or pre-recorded answering machine. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
      EDELSBERG LAW, PA
      19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 975-3320
      Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

             - and -

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: 305-479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET: Underpays Merchandisers, Falcone Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
DONNA FALCONE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY LLC;
DERK-JAN TERHORST; STACY WIGGINS; and MARK MCGOWN, Defendants, Case
No. 19-0117 (Mass. Super., Norfolk Cty., Jan. 29, 2019) seeks to
recover from the Defendant unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Falcone was employed by the Defendants as
merchandiser.

The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company LLC is a food retailer in New
England. The company is based in Quincy, Massachusetts. The Stop &
Shop Supermarket Company LLC is a subsidiary of Koninklijke Ahold
Delhaize N.V. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brook S. Lane, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607-3260
          E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas R. Beauvais, Esq.
          PO Box 120693
          Boston, MA 02112
          Telephone: Thomas@beauvaislegal.com


SYNERGY PHARMACEUTICALS: Concealed TRULANCE Issues, McMullen Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GARY MCMULLEN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. TROY HAMILTON, GARY S. JACOB, and GARY G. GEMIGNANI,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00825 (E.D.N.Y., February 11, 2019), is a
securities class action arising from the Defendants' alleged
dissemination of materially false and misleading statements and
omissions and concealment of material adverse facts regarding
Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc.'s lead product -- TRULANCE.

On September 7, 2017, the Company began to deceive the market by
elaborating on the potential for its lead product -- TRULANCE --
and the positive indicators in its launch to the marketplace.
TRULANCE is a drug for the once-daily treatment of chronic
idiopathic constipation ("CIC").  The Defendants either
misleadingly affirmed that the Company was expected to meet or
exceed the covenants' requirements, or failed to disclose to the
market the reality: TRULANCE had underachieved and the Company was
burdened with covenants that it could not satisfy, Mr. McMullen
alleges.

The Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Synergy is incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware
with its headquarters located in New York City.  Synergy is a
biopharmaceutical company focused on the development and
commercialization of therapies to treat Gastro-Intestinal disorders
and diseases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew M. Guiney, Esq.
          Patrick Donovan, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 686-0114
          E-mail: guiney@whafh.com
                  donovan@whafh.com


TOWN SPORTS: 2nd Cir. Affirms Preliminary Injunction Denial
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued an Order
affirming the District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for for Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned CARLY PISARRI,
AUBILY REMUS JASMIN, JOSHUA BILMES, SAMANTHA FAHY, BARI LASKY,
ELIZABETH PLESSER, PETR PRIELOZNY, VADIM TERNOVSKI, and HELENA VON
ROSENBERG, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
dba New York Sports Clubs, dba Boston Sports Clubs, dba Washington
Sports Clubs, dba Philadelphia Sports Clubs, TOWN SPORTS
INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC., dba New York Sports Clubs, dba Boston
Sports Clubs, dba Washington Sports Clubs, dba Philadelphia Sports
Clubs, Defendants-Appellees. No. 18-1164-cv. (2nd Cir.).

The Plaintiffs appeals the from the District Court's denial of
their Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Defendants-Appellees Town Sports International, LLC, and Town
Sports International Holdings, Inc. (TSI), own and operate gym
locations throughout the Eastern seaboard. Plaintiffs-Appellants,
including Carly Pisarri (Pisarri) and Aubily Remus Jasmin (Jasmin),
were members of TSI's gyms.

Pisarri and Jasmin first sued TSI in New York state court,
alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of various
state consumer fraud protection statutes in connection with their
gym memberships. TSI responded by revoking both memberships.
Plaintiffs-Appellants then filed a class action complaint in
federal court alleging, inter alia, retaliation and prima facie
tort. They moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting TSI's
alleged acts of retaliation and their motion was denied. This
appeal ensued.  

A district court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests
on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2)
its decision  though not necessarily the product of a legal error
or a clearly erroneous factual finding cannot be located within the
range of permissible decisions. Even when a district court has made
an error of law or fact, however, an appellate court remains free
to affirm an appealed decision on any ground which finds support in
the record.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must show (1)
irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction and (2) either
(a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the
movant's favor.

Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that TSI's retaliation constitutes
irreparable harm because people are being deterred from
participating in this action given Defendants' retaliatory conduct
and witnesses and potential witnesses will be unwilling to
cooperate and voluntarily provide helpful information absent a
preliminary injunction. In support of this argument, they cite
Second Circuit caselaw holding that an employer's retaliation
against an employee for the exercise of statutory rights can
constitute irreparable harm. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that these
cases show that TSI's retaliation against them for asserting
statutory rights under the consumer protection statutes must in and
of itself constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support a
preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs-Appellants are incorrect. An employer's retaliation
against an employee bears little analogy to a business's
retaliation against a consumer. Employees facing the prospect of
discharge, demotion, or salary reduction often face significant
hurdles to finding a new job, while consumers facing the prospect
of lost access to a particular good or service can generally find
an adequate replacement elsewhere in the marketplace.

Second, Holt, Holt v. Continental Grp., Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d
Cir. 1983), makes clear that even an employer'sretaliatory conduct
does not necessitate a finding of irreparable injury.  

Therefore, even assuming Holt applies in the consumer protection
context, the district court was still free to conclude that on the
record here, Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to demonstrate
irreparable harm arising from TSI's admitted acts of retaliation.
TSI points out that Pisarri and Jasmin were able to recruit seven
additional named plaintiffs for their federal court complaint even
after TSI had cancelled Pisarri's and Jasmin's memberships. This
fact undermines Plaintiffs-Appellants' claim that TSI's retaliatory
conduct irreparably harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants' assertion of
their statutory rights in this case. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that the district court's conclusion that
Plaintiffs-Appellants have not shown irreparable harm is outside
the range of permissible decisions.

The Court have considered all of Plaintiffs-Appellants' remaining
arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the Court
affirms the judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5hsxbw4 from Leagle.com.

DAVID E. GOTTLIEB (Taylor J. Crabill, Esq., on the brief), Wigdor
LLP, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

JACOB C. COHN, Esq. -- jcohn@grsm.com -- (Peter G. Siachos, Esq. --
psiachos@grsm.com -- on the brief), Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
LLP, for Defendants-Appellees.


TRIPLE S PROPERTIES: Court Denies Arbitration Bid in Martinez
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Southern Division, issued an Opinion denying Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned ELIZABETH
MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRIPLE S PROPERTIES, Defendant.
Case No. 6:17-03195-CV-RK. (W.D. Mo.).

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Rushmore Service
Center, LLC's, Miles K. Beacom's, Dale Dobberpuhl's, and Thomas D.
Sanford's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

Josephine F. Tailor and Alison George bring this purported class
action against Rushmore Service Center, LLC and its managers Miles
K. Beacom, Dale Dobberpuhl, and Thomas D. Sanford for alleged
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
Plaintiffs allegedly incurred personal debts that became past due
and in default.

The Defendants move to compel arbitration and stay the current
proceedings. They assert that the Plaintiffs incurred the debts
described in the Amended Complaint pursuant to credit card
agreements that include an arbitration clause.  

In support of that contention, the Defendants submit a declaration
from Julie K. Gilson (Gilson Declaration), an employee of PREMIER
Bankcard, LLC, the servicing entity for First Premier Bank FPB,
which issued the credit cards.  Gilson attached exemplar Credit
Card Contract and Account Opening Disclosures containing the terms
and conditions governing Plaintiffs accounts. Those contracts
included arbitration clauses encompassing all disputes arising out
of or connected to this contract and applicable to employees,
affiliates, beneficiaries, agents, and assigns of FPB.  

The Plaintiffs respond that because arbitrability is not apparent
based on the face of the Complaint, the Motion should be denied
pending an opportunity for discovery. In reply, the Defendants make
clear that the Motion was brought under the Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) standard, yet argue the Plaintiffs' arguments fall flat as
they are insufficient to challenge the admissible evidence set
forth in the Gilson Declaration.

Here, the Defendants insist the Motion was brought under the Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard. Therefore, granting the Motion would
only be appropriate if the Amended Complaint established with
clarity that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. It does not. No
arbitration clause appears in the Amended Complaint, nor any
documented incorporated by reference therein.  

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
the Proceedings is denied without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 4, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3n6zcel from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Martinez, Elizabeth Bolden & Jesus Rios, Jr., Plaintiffs,
represented by Craig R. Heidemann, Douglas, Haun & Heidemann,
Nathan Duncan, Douglas, Haun & Heidemann & Nickolas W. Allen,
Douglas, Haun & Heidemann.

Triple S Properties, Defendant, represented by Brett W. Roubal,
Baird Lightner Millsap, PC, Rachel A. Riso, Baird Lightner Millsap,
PC & Patrick R. Baird, Baird Lightner Millsap, PC.


TWITTER INC: Sued by Murphy Over Misgendering/Deadnaming Policy
---------------------------------------------------------------
MEGHAN MURPHY, an individual, on behalf of herself, those similarly
situated, and the general public v. TWITTER, INC., a California
corporation; TWITTER INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, an Irish registered
company, Case No. CGC-19-573712 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty.,
February 11, 2019), alleges breach of contract, promissory estoppel
and violation of the Unfair Competition Law.

Ms. Murphy, of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, is a feminist
writer and journalist.  On November 15, 2018, Twitter locked her
account and on November 23, 2018, Twitter banned her permanently.

Ms. Murphy contends that Twitter's new "misgendering or deadnaming"
policy is viewpoint discriminatory on its face because it forbids
expression of the viewpoints that (1) whether an individual is a
man or a woman is determined by their sex at birth, and (2) an
individual's gender is not simply a matter of personal preference.
She adds that Twitter's "misgendering or deadnaming" policy singles
out users, who express these widely-held viewpoints and
perspectives for suspensions, permanent bans, and other enforcement
actions.

Twitter, Inc., is a corporation duly organized under the laws of
the state of Delaware with its principal place of business in San
Francisco, California.  Twitter International Company is an Irish
registered company that is a subsidiary of Twitter, Inc.  Twitter
International serves as a base for Twitter's EMEA (Europe, the
Middle East and Africa) operations.

Twitter is the world's largest microblogging site, with an average
of 330 million active users per month from all over the globe.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harmeet K. Dhillon, Esq.
          Michael R. Fleming, Esq.
          DHILLON LAW GROUP, INC.
          177 Post Street, Suite 700
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 433-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 520-6593
          E-mail: harmeet@dhillonlaw.com
                  mfleming@dhillonlaw.com

               - and -

          D. Adam Candeub, Esq.
          MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
          442 Law College Building
          East Lansing, MI 48864
          Telephone: (517) 432-6906
          E-mail: candeub@law.msu.edu

               - and -

          Noah B. Peters, Esq.
          NOAH PETERS LAW
          1875 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Floor 10
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 688-3246
          E-mail: noah@noahpeterslaw.com


TYSON FOODS: Darden Opts Out of Class Action, Files Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Joel Crews and Bob Sims, writing for Meat Poultry, report that
Darden Restaurants Inc., parent company of foodservice chains such
as Olive Garden, Cheddar's Scratch Kitchen and Longhorn Steakhouse,
has filed an antitrust suit in the US District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging multiple poultry companies
engaged in price fixing, according to court records. The latest
complaint was filed on Jan. 25, 2019, against 34 different
defendants including Tyson Foods Inc., Fieldale Farms, Sanderson
Farms Inc., Koch Pilgrim's Pride Corp. and others. Darden's case
alleges "illegal conspiracy which increased the prices of chicken
sold in the United States," according to court records.

Darden is opting out of the original class-action lawsuit,
originally filed in September 2016 (Maplevale Farms Inc. v. Koch
Foods Inc. et al, case number 1:16-cv-08637), which alleged that
major companies used coordinated supply restrictions to manipulate
prices for broiler chickens. By filing on its own behalf, Darden
said, "The company is doing what it believes is tin the best
interest of the business and its shareholders."

The lawsuit also claims the companies shared price and product
information provided by AgriStats Inc. -- which also was named in
the lawsuit -- to fix the Georgia Dock broiler price index,
according to court documents.

According to a spokesman from Tyson, "Follow-on complaints like
these are common in antitrust litigation. Such complaints do not
change our position that the claims are unfounded. We will continue
to vigorously defend our company."

This past June, another faction opted out of the class-action suit
when group of meat distributors and grocery companies filed a
federal antitrust lawsuit of its own (Action Meat Distributors,
Inc. et al v. Norman W. Fries, Inc., d/b/a Claxton Poultry Farms,
Inc. et al, case number 1:18-cv-03471) in the same district court,
alleging a "cartel" of US chicken producers illegally raised the
price of broiler chickens from at least Jan. 1, 2008, through Dec.
31, 2016.

This past November, attorneys for Fieldale Farms and plaintiffs
filed a motion to approve a settlement from the company to release
it from the lawsuit. [GN]


UADA CORP: Borozny Asserts Breach under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------
UADA Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Austin
Borozny, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UADA Corporation, a Florida corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00404 (M.D. Fla., February 14, 2019).

Uada Corporation filed as a Domestic for Profit Corporation in the
State of Florida on Friday, September 11, 1998 and is approximately
twenty-one years old, as recorded in documents filed with Florida
Department of State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   The Advocacy Group, LLC
   200 SE 6th St Ste 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3424
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: jkerr@advocacypa.com



UBER TECH: Diva Limousine Files Appeal vs. N. Calif. Dist. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Diva Limousine, Ltd., filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in its lawsuit styled DIVA LIMOUSINE, LTD. v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-05546-EMC, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 29, 2019,
Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen granted Uber's motion to disqualify
Diva's counsel Warren Postman, Esq., and his firm, Keller Lenkner,
LLC.

Diva, a licensed provider of livery services in California, brings
the putative class action on behalf of providers of pre-arranged
ground transportation services against Uber Technologies and
related business entities.  Diva alleges that Uber secures cost
savings by misclassifying its drivers as independent contractors
instead of employees and in doing so takes market share from
competitors like Diva that operate their businesses in compliance
with the law. Diva asserts two causes of action: a claim under the
California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), and a claim under the
California Unfair Practices Act ("UPA").

Diva filed its class action complaint on Sept. 10, 2018.  It then
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on a "single issue":
whether Uber drivers are properly classified as independent
contractors or employees under the California Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
5th 903 (2018).

On Oct. 24, 2018, Uber filed the instant motion to disqualify
Diva's counsel Warren Postman and his firm, Keller Lenkner LLC
("KL").  It contends that Mr. Postman, during his previous tenure
at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Litigation Center, had worked with
Uber on litigation implicating the driver classification question
under a common interest agreement, pursuant to which he became
privy to Uber's privileged and confidential information.

The appellate case is captioned as Diva Limousine, Ltd. v.
USDC-CASF, Case No. 19-70357, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

The Respondent is the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, San Francisco.

Plaintiff-Petitioner DIVA LIMOUSINE, LTD., Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Nicole Berg, Esq.
          Thomas Kayes, Esq.
          Ashley Keller, Esq.
          Travis D. Lenkner, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 4270
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 948-8477
          E-mail: ncb@kellerlenkner.com
                  tk@kellerlenkner.com
                  ack@kellerlenkner.com
                  tdl@kellerlenkner.com

               - and -

          Warren David Postman, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          1300 I St. NW, Suite 400E
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 749-8334
          E-mail: wdp@kellerlenkner.com

Defendants-Real Parties in Interest UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
RAISER-CA LLC, RAISER, LLC, UBER USA, LLC, and UATC, LLC, are
represented by:

          Kent Michael Roger, Esq.
          Sujal Shah, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Market Street
          Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-1000
          E-mail: kent.roger@morganlewis.com
                  sujal.shah@morganlewis.com


UNITED STATES: Westbrook Files Suit v. Justice Dept.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against thr U.S. Department
of Justice. The case is styled as Elena Westbrook, Yanko Lukov and
LevonKetsoyan, individually and on behalf of all similarl ysituated
individuals, Plaintiffs v. U.S. Department of Justice, William
Barr, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the
United States, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Thomas D Homan in his official
capacity as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Director of ICE, David A. Marin in his official capacity as the
Director of the Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, Thomas P Giles in
his official capacity as the Deputy Field Office Director of
Detention and Removal Operation for Disctrict 23, Robert M Culley
in his official capacity as the Director of the Salt Lake City
Field Office of ICE, Doe 1 in his official capacity as the Deputy
Field Office Director of Detention and Removal for the Las Vegas
Sub-Office of ICE and the Warden of Immigration Detainees in the
Henderson Detention Facility, Does 2-5 and U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01198-VAP-AGR (C.D.
Cal., February 15, 2019).

The docket of the lawsuit states the case type as Habeas Corpus -
Alien Detainee.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Nicolette Glazer, Esq.
   Law Offices of Larry R Glazer
   1875 Century Park East No 700
   Century City, CA 90067
   Tel: (310) 407-5353
   Fax: (310) 407-5354
   Email: nicolette@glazerandglazer.com

The Respondents are represented by:

   Nicolette Glazer, Esq.
   Law Offices of Larry R Glazer
   1875 Century Park East No 700
   Century City, CA 90067
   Tel: (310) 407-5353
   Fax: (310) 407-5354
   Email: nicolette@glazerandglazer.com


URBAN FOOD BAZAAR: Gupta Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
Priti Gupta and Srinivas Bandamede, individually and on behalf of
FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, v. Urban Food
Bazaar LLC, Urban Logistics, LLC, Jesal Parekh and Maximus D'Souza,
individually Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00993 (D. N.J., January 23,
2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wage, unpaid overtime,
unpaid wages, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, New Jersey Wage and Hour
Law and the New Jersey Wage Collection Law.

Defendants are into grocery packaging and delivery service in
Jersey City and Short Hills, New Jersey where Gupta worked as
customer service representative while Bandamede as warehouse staff.
Plaintiffs claim to be denied overtime pay for hours rendered in
excess of 40 hours per week, wage statements and both were
terminated for complaining and have yet to receive their last
paycheck. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert D. Salaman, Esq.
      AKIN LAW GROUP PLLC
      45 Broadway, Suite 1420
      New York, NY 10006
      Tel: (212) 825-1400
      Email: rob@akinlaws.com


UTLA: LAUSD Teachers Union Dues Targeted in Class-Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Miriam Hernandez, writing for KABC-TV, reports that just as the
United Teachers Los Angeles union celebrates a victory at the
bargaining table, the massive organization is slapped with a
potentially debilitating federal class action lawsuit.

It's about union dues. Teacher Irene Seager said for what she gets
from UTLA, she doesn't want to pay them.

The suit, filed by the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, claims no teacher should have to pay and that now
individuals have more rights to decline.

"It means that all public sector employees now have a right to
choose whether they want to have a union," attorney Bill Messenger,
Esq. said.

He argued the underlying case before the U.S. Supreme Court. The
plaintiffs won in Janus vs AFSCME on First Amendment grounds.

"There are certainly those who would call it union busting. There
are others who would say it is a question of civil rights," said
Thomas Lenz, labor lawyer and USC law lecturer.

According the UTLA website, the fees for full members in 2017 was
$988.

The lawsuit targets the UTLA dues payment authorization form. The
signer agrees that "everyone represented by our union should pay
their fair share."

There is a 30-day window for a teacher to opt out.

The lawsuit asserts that members should be able get out any day.
More importantly, that there should be specific language that tells
the member that there are personal freedom of speech implications.

"By signing this document and agreeing to dues deduction they are
agreeing to waive that First Amendment right," Messenger said.

Unions have already been pushing for legal protection in the state
legislature, arguing that unions pay a vital role for public
employees.

In California, there is recently passed legislation to protect the
collective bargaining process.

"Sacramento does see value in union representation and they see a
different vision of the workplace," Lenz said.

UTLA has not had a chance to review the suit, which was in the
process of being served on Jan. 23.[GN]


UXIN LIMITED: Faces Machniewicz IPO-related Class Action in N.Y.
----------------------------------------------------------------
PATRICK MACHNIEWICZ, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. UXIN LIMITED, KUN DAI, ZHEN ZENG, RONG LU,
JULIAN CHENG, DOU SHEN, HAINAN TAN, MORGAN STANLEY & CO.
INTERNATIONAL PLC, GOLDMAN SACHS (ASIA) L.L.C., J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC, CHINA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL CORPORATION HONG KONG
SECURITIES LIMITED, and CHINA RENAISSANCE SECURITIES (HONG KONG)
LIMITED, Case No. 1:19-cv-00822 (E.D.N.Y., February 11, 2019),
arises from Uxin's initial public offering held on June 27, 2018,
seeking to recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants'
violations of the Securities Act of 1933.

The Plaintiff alleges that the IPO Registration Statement was
materially false and misleading and omitted to state that: (1) Uxin
was likely to stop providing complementary services such as
inspections to its customers; (2) instead, Uxin would connect
consumers to dealers who would provide such complementary services;
(3) as a result, Uxin's 2B business would be materially impacted;
and (4) consequently, Defendants' statements in the Registration
Statement regarding Uxin's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially false and/or misleading.

Uxin Limited is incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands
with its principal executive offices located in Beijing, China.
Uxin is a used car e-commerce platform in China.  The Company has
two segments: Uxin Auction (or 2B business) sells used cars to
dealers, and Uxin Used Car (or 2C business) sells used cars to
consumers.  The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of
the Company.

Defendants Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, China
International, and China Renaissance served as underwriters for the
Company's IPO.  Pursuant to the Securities Act, the Underwriter
Defendants are liable for the false and misleading statements in
the Registration Statement, the Plaintiff contends.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com


VISIONSTREAM: Union Gets in Behind Proposed Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Tom Pullar-Strecker, writing for Stuff.co.nz, reports that the E tu
union says it will get in behind a proposed "class action" lawsuit
against Chorus' main contractor Visionstream and contracting
companies working for Visionstream, national organiser Joe
Gallagher says.

Gallagher believed about 3500 workers who have been involved in
building Chorus' UFB network could have a claim for unpaid
entitlements.

ASX-listed law firm Shine Lawyers -- which brought a $1 billion
bank-fee claim against Australian banks in 2014 -- revealed on Jan.
22 that it now had what it described as the "horrendous conditions"
of workers building New Zealand's ultrafast broadband (UFB) network
in its sights.

Shine Lawyers' Auckland associate Tim Gunn, Esq. said it hoped to
win back pay, holiday pay and sick pay for an army of
sub-contractors who he argued had been offered work as
subcontractors building UFB on "sham contracts", when they were
instead entitled to be treated as staff.

Australian-owned Visionstream -- as well as Chorus which is not
expected to be directly targeted by the lawsuit -- have declined to
comment about the potential legal action.

Gallagher said E tū planned to support Shine by encouraging
subbies to come forward to support a class action.

The union hoped to arrange a closed meeting between subbies, the
union and Shine Lawyers in Auckland at the end of February or early
in March, he said.

"I think [Shine] have got a good argument. The message I am putting
out to all my contractors is the union fully supports taking a
class action and we are trying to get contractors to come forward.

"The union wants to create an environment where they can do that
without fear," he said.[GN]


WALGREEN CO: Court Narrows Claims in C. Moya's Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned CAROLYN MOYA, Plaintiff, v. WALGREEN CO., Defendant.
Case No. 18-CV-1785-JPS. (E.D. Wis.).

She sues the Defendant for charging allegedly improper fees to
herself and the putative class members in providing them copies of
their healthcare records.

Wisconsin Statutes Section 146.83 (Section 146.83) limits the fees
that a healthcare provider may charge a patient when it provides
the patient with his or her healthcare records. The Plaintiff was
injured in a vehicle crash in April 2011. She retained her current
attorneys, the Welcenbach Law Offices S.C., to represent her in a
personal injury claim. With the Plaintiff's authorization,
Welcenbach sought her healthcare records from a number of
providers, including the Defendant. Welcenbach paid the $55 charge
without protest and without taking advantage of the offer in the
final sentence of the quoted passage. The Plaintiff now claims that
the $55 fee violates Section 146.83 because it exceeds the maximum
amount the statute permits Defendant to charge for the records it
provided.  

The Plaintiff presents two causes of action. First, she alleges
that the Defendant charged her and the putative class members more
for providing their healthcare records than is permitted by Section
146.83. Because of this, the Plaintiff asserts that Defendant owes
her actual damages, as well as exemplary damages of up to $25,000
per violation of the statute (the maximum amount depends on whether
the violation was willful or negligent). Second, the Plaintiff
claims that the Defendant was unjustly enriched when it knowingly
charged her more than it legally could and has retained the
overpayment.   

4.1 Section 146.83

Section 146.83(3f)(b) establishes a fee scheme that healthcare
providers must comply with in meeting a request for patient
records. Plaintiff claims that the $55 fee is greater than what the
statute permits for the five pages of records that Defendant
provided, thus demonstrating Defendant's violation of the statute
and her entitlement to damages. Defendant counters that the invoice
expressly allowed Plaintiff to pay a different amount if that
amount was provided for by state statute. It appears, then, that
the invoice is a form document used by Defendant throughout its
national operations, and the form is specifically designed to
account for variations in state laws, including Wisconsin's Section
146.83.

The Defendant notes two reasons why the Plaintiff, and more
importantly Welcenbach, knew full well that they could pay a sum
less than $55. First, the Plaintiff had the records in hand when
she paid the fee. Thus, she could have utilized the scheme
described by Section 146.83(3f)(b) to calculate the proper amount
owed, and then send that fee to Defendant along with a copy of the
statute. Second, Plaintiff and Welcenbach were aware of the legal
basis for their current complaint at the time of payment back in
2013. Seven days before Welcenbach paid the fee, Plaintiff filed
her lawsuit against Healthport accusing it of the same misconduct
as Defendant.

Despite being armed with both a factual and legal basis to pay a
lesser fee and avoid the instant controversy, Plaintiff
nevertheless paid the full $55 fee without protest and waited over
five years to file a lawsuit about it. Defendant contends that
Plaintiff's conduct operates as a waiver of her right of action
under Section 146.83. Wisconsin recognizes the doctrine of waiver
as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.

The waiver doctrine applies squarely to Plaintiff's conduct in this
case. She knew that the $55 fee in the invoice was objectionable,
and that she was provided an express avenue to avoid paying it, but
chose to pay it anyway. This demonstrates her actual intent to
waive the right to challenge the propriety of the fee. Indeed, the
cynical observer may conclude that Plaintiff paid the fee in order
to manufacture this lawsuit. Perhaps she paid the fee in the hope
that the Aurora case would end favorably for her, thus providing a
basis to sue Defendant half a decade later. Had Plaintiff refused
to pay the fee, or paid under protest, or paid a lesser amount as
allowed by Section 146.83, waiver would not apply. The matter would
have then been in Defendant's hands; it could insist on the $55
fee, thereby violating Section 146.83, or it could accept a lesser
payment and avoid a lawsuit. Because Plaintiff instead chose to pay
and wait in the weeds for an opportune moment to pounce on
Defendant, Plaintiff has demonstrated her intent to waive her right
to sue for a violation of Section 146.83.

Healthport moved for summary judgment on the ground that Welcenbach
was not a person authorized as contemplated by the statute, and so
its fees were proper. The circuit court denied the motion, but it
was reversed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court then granted Plaintiff's petition for review. For
reasons not important to this case, the court determined that
Plaintiff was correct, and that Welcenbach should not be required
to pay the extra $28 in certification and retrieval fees.  

That court felt that it could not apply the voluntary payment or
waiver doctrines as Healthport suggested, because to do so would
undermine the legislature's purpose in permitting attorneys like
Welcenbach to obtain low-cost healthcare records on behalf of their
clients. But that concern is much lessened here. Welcenbach was
expressly given an opportunity to pay what he felt was permitted
under Section 146.83, namely, much less than $55 but did not take
advantage of it. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain about
that choice. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has waived her
Section 146.83 claim, and that the claim must therefore be
dismissed.

4.2 Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege
three things: (1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the
benefit and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the
defendant under circumstances making it inequitable to do so. In
its opening brief, Defendant offers two arguments supporting
dismissal of the claim. First, Defendant contends that the
complaint did not allege all of the required elements of such a
claim. Namely, Plaintiff fails to allege inequity because
Welcenbach chose to pay the fee when, as stated in the invoice, it
could have paid a lesser amount.  

Second, the Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff's voluntary
payment of the fee, with full knowledge that it exceeded the
maximum charges allowed under Section 146.83, bars a claim for
unjust enrichment.  

The Plaintiff's opposition brief makes no attempt to defend the
unjust enrichment claim against either of these arguments. Indeed,
she fails to even mention the claim. The Court must, therefore,
treat the Defendant's arguments as conceded and grant its request
to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.  

In light of this, the Defendant's motion to dismiss must be
granted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 31, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycgtwmpp from Leagle.com.

Carolyn Moya, Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Welcenbach,
Welcenbach Law Offices SC,  John Craig Jones, Jones & Hill LLC &
Scott C. Borison, Legg Law Firm LLP.

Walgreen Co, Defendant, represented by Cynthia G. Burnside --
cynthia.burnside@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight LLP, Latoya Brisbane
-- Latoya.Brisbane@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight LLP, Susan E.
Lovern -- slovern@vonbriesen.com -- von Briesen & Roper SC & Kelly
J. Noyes -- knoyes@vonbriesen.com -- von Briesen & Roper SC.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $28MM Aearo-Related Costs at Dec. 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company, through its Aearo Technologies subsidiary, had accruals
of US$28 million as of December 31, 2018, for product liabilities
and defense costs related to current and future Aearo-related
asbestos and silica-related claims, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "On April 1, 2008, a subsidiary of the Company
purchased the stock of Aearo Holding Corp., the parent of Aearo
Technologies ("Aearo").  Aearo manufactured and sold various
products, including personal protection equipment, such as eye,
ear, head, face, fall and certain respiratory protection products.

"As of December 31, 2018, Aearo and/or other companies that
previously owned and operated Aearo's respirator business (American
Optical Corporation, Warner-Lambert LLC, AO Corp.  and Cabot
Corporation ("Cabot")) are named defendants, with multiple
co-defendants, including the Company, in numerous lawsuits in
various courts in which plaintiffs allege use of mask and
respirator products and seek damages from Aearo and other
defendants for alleged personal injury from workplace exposures to
asbestos, silica-related, coal mine dust, or other occupational
dusts found in products manufactured by other defendants or
generally in the workplace.

"As of December 31, 2018, the Company, through its Aearo
subsidiary, had accruals of US$28 million for product liabilities
and defense costs related to current and future Aearo-related
asbestos and silica-related claims.  This accrual represents the
Company's best estimate of Aearo's probable loss and reflects an
estimation period for future claims that may be filed against Aearo
approaching the year 2050.  Responsibility for legal costs, as well
as for settlements and judgments, is currently shared in an
informal arrangement among Aearo, Cabot, American Optical
Corporation and a subsidiary of Warner Lambert and their respective
insurers (the "Payor Group").  Liability is allocated among the
parties based on the number of years each company sold respiratory
products under the "AO Safety" brand and/or owned the AO Safety
Division of American Optical Corporation and the alleged years of
exposure of the individual plaintiff.  Aearo's share of the
contingent liability is further limited by an agreement entered
into between Aearo and Cabot on July 11, 1995.  This agreement
provides that, so long as Aearo pays to Cabot a quarterly fee of
US$100,000, Cabot will retain responsibility and liability for, and
indemnify Aearo against, any product liability claims involving
exposure to asbestos, silica, or silica products for respirators
sold prior to July 11, 1995.  Because of the difficulty in
determining how long a particular respirator remains in the stream
of commerce after being sold, Aearo and Cabot have applied the
agreement to claims arising out of the alleged use of respirators
involving exposure to asbestos, silica or silica products prior to
January 1, 1997.  With these arrangements in place, Aearo's
potential liability is limited to exposures alleged to have arisen
from the use of respirators involving exposure to asbestos, silica,
or silica products on or after January 1, 1997.  To date, Aearo has
elected to pay the quarterly fee.  Aearo could potentially be
exposed to additional claims for some part of the pre-July 11, 1995
period covered by its agreement with Cabot if Aearo elects to
discontinue its participation in this arrangement, or if Cabot is
no longer able to meet its obligations in these matters."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2H2sw15


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Accrues $673MM for Respirator Suits at Dec. 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company had an accrual of US$673 million as of December 31,
2018, for liabilities associated with respirator mask and asbestos
cases (excluding those related to Aearo Technologies), according to
the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

3M Co. states, "The Company regularly conducts a comprehensive
legal review of its respirator mask/asbestos liabilities.  The
Company reviews recent and historical claims data, including
without limitation, (i) the number of pending claims filed against
the Company, (ii) the nature and mix of those claims (i.e., the
proportion of claims asserting usage of the Company's mask or
respirator products and alleging exposure to each of asbestos,
silica, coal or other occupational dusts, and claims pleading use
of asbestos-containing products allegedly manufactured by the
Company), (iii) the costs to defend and resolve pending claims, and
(iv) trends in filing rates and in costs to defend and resolve
claims, (collectively, the "Claims Data").  As part of its
comprehensive legal review, the Company regularly provides the
Claims Data to a third party with expertise in determining the
impact of Claims Data on future filing trends and costs.  The third
party assists the Company in estimating the costs to defend and
resolve pending and future claims.  The Company uses these
estimates to develop its best estimate of probable liability.

"Developments may occur that could affect the Company's estimate of
its liabilities.  These developments include, but are not limited
to, significant changes in (i) the key assumptions underlying the
Company's accrual, including, the number of future claims, the
nature and mix of those claims, the average cost of defending and
resolving claims, and in maintaining trial readiness (ii) trial and
appellate outcomes, (iii) the law and procedure applicable to these
claims, and (iv) the financial viability of other co-defendants and
insurers.

"As a result of the Company's review of its respirator
mask/asbestos liabilities and as a result of the cost of resolving
claims of persons who claim more serious injuries, including
mesothelioma, other malignancies, and black lung disease, the
Company increased its accruals in 2018 for respirator mask/asbestos
liabilities by US$141 million.  In 2018, the Company made payments
for legal fees and settlements of US$76 million related to the
respirator mask/asbestos litigation.

"As of December 31, 2018, the Company had an accrual for respirator
mask/asbestos liabilities (excluding Aearo accruals) of US$673
million, up US$65 million from the accrual at December 31, 2017.
This accrual represents the Company's best estimate of probable
loss and reflects an estimation period for future claims that may
be filed against the Company approaching the year 2050.  The
Company cannot estimate the amount or upper end of the range of
amounts by which the liability may exceed the accrual the Company
has established because of the (i) inherent difficulty in
projecting the number of claims that have not yet been asserted or
the time period in which future claims may be asserted, (ii) the
complaints nearly always assert claims against multiple defendants
where the damages alleged are typically not attributed to
individual defendants so that a defendant's share of liability may
turn on the law of joint and several liability, which can vary by
state, (iii) the multiple factors that the Company considers in
estimating its liabilities, and (iv) the several possible
developments that may occur that could affect the Company's
estimate of liabilities.

"As of December 31, 2018, the Company's receivable for insurance
recoveries related to the respirator mask/asbestos litigation was
US$4 million.  The Company continues to seek coverage under the
policies of certain insolvent and other insurers.  Once those
claims for coverage are resolved, the Company will have collected
substantially all of its remaining insurance coverage for
respirator mask/asbestos claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2H2sw15


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Still Faces 2,320 Claimants at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company is still a defendant in numerous lawsuits in various
courts that purport to represent approximately 2,320 individual
claimants as of December 31, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "The vast majority of the lawsuits and claims
resolved by and currently pending against the Company allege use of
some of the Company's mask and respirator products and seek damages
from the Company and other defendants for alleged personal injury
from workplace exposures to asbestos, silica, coal mine dust or
other occupational dusts found in products manufactured by other
defendants or generally in the workplace.  A minority of the
lawsuits and claims resolved by and currently pending against the
Company generally allege personal injury from occupational exposure
to asbestos from products previously manufactured by the Company,
which are often unspecified, as well as products manufactured by
other defendants, or occasionally at Company premises.

"The Company's current volume of new and pending matters is
substantially lower than it experienced at the peak of filings in
2003.  The Company expects that filing of claims by unimpaired
claimants in the future will continue to be at much lower levels
than in the past.  Accordingly, the number of claims alleging more
serious injuries, including mesothelioma, other malignancies, and
black lung disease, will represent a greater percentage of total
claims than in the past.  Over the past twenty years, the Company
has prevailed in fourteen of the fifteen cases tried to a jury
(including the lawsuits in 2018).  In 2018, 3M received a jury
verdict  in its favor in two lawsuits - one in California state
court in February and the other in Massachusetts state court in
December - both involving allegations that 3M respirators were
defective and failed to protect the plaintiffs against asbestos
fibers.  In April 2018, a jury in state court in Kentucky found
3M's 8710 respirators failed to protect two coal miners from coal
mine dust and awarded compensatory damages of approximately US$2
million and punitive damages totaling US$63 million.  In August
2018, the trial court entered judgment and the Company has
appealed.  The Company believes liability in this case is not
probable and estimable.  In June 2018, the Company also settled a
number of coal mine dust lawsuits for an amount that was not
material to the Company.

"The Company has demonstrated in these past trial proceedings that
its respiratory protection products are effective as claimed when
used in the intended manner and in the intended circumstances.
Consequently, the Company believes that claimants are unable to
establish that their medical conditions, even if significant, are
attributable to the Company's respiratory protection products.
Nonetheless the Company's litigation experience indicates that
claims of persons alleging more serious injuries, including
mesothelioma, other malignancies, and black lung disease, are
costlier to resolve than the claims of unimpaired persons, and it
therefore believes the average cost of resolving pending and future
claims on a per-claim basis will continue to be higher than it
experienced in prior periods when the vast majority of claims were
asserted by medically unimpaired claimants."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2H2sw15


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 43,100 Claims v. Goodyear Tire Pending at Dec. 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has 43,100 pending
asbestos-related claims at the end of year 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in numerous lawsuits
alleging various asbestos-related personal injuries purported to
result from alleged exposure to asbestos in certain products
previously manufactured by us or present in certain of our
facilities.  Typically, these lawsuits have been brought against
multiple defendants in state and federal courts.  To date, we have
disposed of approximately 147,200 claims by defending, obtaining a
dismissal, or entering into a settlement.  The sum of our accrued
asbestos-related liability and gross payments to date, including
legal costs, by us and our insurers totaled approximately US$541
million and US$529 million through December 31, 2018 and 2017,
respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2GYBlJn


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal Still Ongoing over $13MM Verdict in Lopez
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
December 29, 2018, that briefing has been completed regarding an
appeal from a US$13 million verdict in an asbestos-related case
against the Company's subsidiary.

The Company states, "The Hillshire Brands Company was named as a
defendant in an asbestos exposure case filed by Mark Lopez in May
2014 in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California.  Mr.
Lopez was diagnosed with mesothelioma in January 2014 and is now
deceased.  Mr. Lopez's family members asserted negligence, premises
liability and strict liability claims related to Mr. Lopez's
alleged asbestos exposure from 1954-1986 from the Union Sugar plant
in Betteravia, California.  The plant, which was sold in 1986, was
owned by entities that were predecessors-in-interest to The
Hillshire Brands Company.  In August 2017, the jury returned a
verdict of approximately US$13 million in favor of the plaintiffs,
and a judgment was entered.  We have appealed the judgment and all
briefing has been completed."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2SZca0y


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabot Still Faces 35,000 Claimants at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
There were approximately 35,000 claimants as of December 31, 2018
in pending cases asserting claims against Cabot Corporation's
American Optical Corporation in connection with respiratory
products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Cabot has exposure in connection with a safety
respiratory products business that a subsidiary acquired from
American Optical Corporation ("AO") in an April 1990 asset purchase
transaction.  The subsidiary manufactured respirators under the AO
brand and disposed of that business in July 1995.  In connection
with its acquisition of the business, the subsidiary agreed, in
certain circumstances, to assume a portion of AO's liabilities,
including costs of legal fees together with amounts paid in
settlements and judgments, allocable to AO respiratory products
used prior to the 1990 purchase by the Cabot subsidiary.  In
exchange for the subsidiary's assumption of certain of AO's
respirator liabilities, AO agreed to provide to the subsidiary the
benefits of: (i) AO's insurance coverage for the period prior to
the 1990 acquisition and (ii) a former owner's indemnity of AO
holding it harmless from any liability allocable to AO respiratory
products used prior to May 1982.  As more fully described in the
2018 10-K, the respirator liabilities generally involve claims for
personal injury, including asbestosis, silicosis and coal worker's
pneumoconiosis, allegedly resulting from the use of respirators
that are alleged to have been negligently designed and/or labeled.
Neither Cabot, nor its past or present subsidiaries, at any time
manufactured asbestos or asbestos-containing products.  At no time
did this respiratory product line represent a significant portion
of the respirator market.

"As of both December 31, 2018 and September 30, 2018, there were
approximately 35,000 claimants in pending cases asserting claims
against AO in connection with respiratory products.  Cabot has a
reserve to cover its expected share of liability for existing and
future respirator liability claims.  At December 31, 2018 and
September 30, 2018, the reserve was US$24 million and US$25
million, respectively.  The Company made payments related to its
respirator liability of US$1 million and less than US$1 million in
the first three months of fiscal 2019 and fiscal 2018,
respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2TesZ6S


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $332MM Liability at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Emerson Electric Co. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended December 31, 2018, that it has US$332 million as liability
related to asbestos litigation at December 31, 2018.

The Company also recorded US$123 million for asbestos-related
insurance receivables, which was included in other assets, at Dec.
31, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2U1v82N


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had US$79MM Reserves at Dec. 31
------------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Corporation's subsidiary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
had reserved US$79 million at December 31, 2018 for
asbestos-related bodily injury claims, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Generation maintains estimated liabilities for
claims associated with asbestos-related personal injury actions in
certain facilities that are currently owned by Generation or were
previously owned by ComEd and PECO.  The estimated liabilities are
recorded on an undiscounted basis and exclude the estimated legal
costs associated with handling these matters, which could be
material.

"At December 31, 2018 and 2017, Generation had recorded estimated
liabilities of approximately US$79 million and US$78 million,
respectively, in total for asbestos-related bodily injury claims.
As of December 31, 2018, approximately US$24 million of this amount
related to 238 open claims presented to Generation, while the
remaining US$55 million is for estimated future asbestos-related
bodily injury claims anticipated to arise through 2050, based on
actuarial assumptions and analyses, which are updated on an annual
basis.  On a quarterly basis, Generation monitors actual experience
against the number of forecasted claims to be received and expected
claim payments and evaluates whether adjustments to the estimated
liabilities are necessary."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2Iwg5Nv


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hobart Not Liable for Vulcan-Hart's Liabilities
----------------------------------------------------------------
The First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York unanimously reversed the Court's Order, entered on or
about May 7, 2018, which denied defendant ITW Food Equipment Group,
LLC's motion for summary judgment dismissing as against it so much
of the complaint as is predicated on a de facto merger.

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable, as a successor to the
Vulcan-Hart Corporation, for the consequences of her Decedent's
exposure to asbestos between 1969 and 1988 arising from his work on
ovens, grills and broilers manufactured by Vulcan-Hart.
Vulcan-Hart's assets were purchased in 1986 by Hobart Corporation
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement, and defendant acquired
Hobart Corporation's product lines and other assets in 2002.

The Court finds Defendant has established prima facie that there
was no de facto merger between Hobart and Vulcan-Hart that would
make Hobart responsible for Vulcan-Hart's preexisting liabilities,
because there was no continuity of ownership between the two
corporations. The asset purchase agreement stated that Hobart
purchased Vulcan-Hart's assets for cash.

In opposition, Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to
continuity of ownership. There is no evidence in the record that
any other transaction took place in which Vulcan-Hart's
shareholders obtained an interest in Hobart. Thus, Plaintiff failed
to show that discovery on continuity of ownership would be anything
other than a fishing expedition.

The appealed case is Eleni Dritsas, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Amchem Products, Inc., etc., et al.,
Defendants, ITW Food Equipment Group, LLC, etc.,
Defendant-Appellant, 8430, 190276/15, (N.Y. App. Div. 1st).

A copy of the Decision and Order, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y68y3k5m from Leagle.com.

Lynch Daskal Emery LLP, New York ( Lawrence G. Lee of counsel), and
Gary J. Saalman of the bar of the State of Ohio and the State of
Texas, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant.

Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York ( Pierre A. Ratzki of counsel),
for respondents.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Still Faces Suits at Dec. 29
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company still defends itself against
lawsuits related to asbestos-containing products, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended December 29, 2018.

Scotts Miracle-Gro states, "The Company has been named as a
defendant in a number of cases alleging injuries that the lawsuits
claim resulted from exposure to asbestos-containing products,
apparently based on the Company's historic use of vermiculite in
certain of its products.  In many of these cases, the complaints
are not specific about the plaintiffs' contacts with the Company or
its products.  The cases vary, but complaints in these cases
generally seek unspecified monetary damages (actual, compensatory,
consequential and punitive) from multiple defendants.

"The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit
and is vigorously defending against them.  No accruals have been
recorded in the Company's consolidated financial statements as the
likelihood of a loss is not probable at this time; and the Company
does not believe a reasonably possible loss would be material to,
nor the ultimate resolution of these cases will have a material
adverse effect on, the Company's financial condition, results of
operations or cash flows.

"There can be no assurance that future developments related to
pending claims or claims filed in the future, whether as a result
of adverse outcomes or as a result of significant defense costs,
will not have a material effect on the Company's financial
condition, results of operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2Ve0dR7


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Thomas-Fish Hazardous Product Claim Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. District Judge Maryellen Noreika has issued an Order adopting
Magistrate Judge Fallon's Feb. 1, 2019 Report and Recommendation
and granting the Defendants' unopposed Motion to Dismiss filed in
the case entitled Helen Thomas-Fish, Individually and as Executrix
of the Estate of Robert C. Fish, Plaintiff, v. Avborne Accessory
Group, InC., et al., Defendants, C.A. No. 18-1195 (MN) (SRF), (D.
Del.).

Plaintiff's claim of marketing an ultra-hazardous product and the
associated demand for an award of punitive damages (Count II) are
dismissed with prejudice.

Judge Noreika granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint
within fifteen days of the date of the Order (dated Feb. 19, 2019)
to correct the deficiencies outlined in the Report and
Recommendation, particularly on following claims:

      (a) Plaintiff's claims for strict liability, negligence, and
breach of express and implied warranties and the associated demand
for an award of punitive damages (Count I) are dismissed without
prejudice.

      (b) Plaintiff's claim for failure to warn and the associated
demand for an award of punitive damages (Count III) are dismissed
without prejudice.

      (c) Plaintiff's claim for civil conspiracy and the associated
demand for an award of punitive damages (Count IV) are dismissed
without prejudice.

      (d) Plaintiff's claims for loss of consortium and the
associated demand for an award of punitive damages (Count V) are
dismissed without prejudice.

A copy of the Order, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4rcwkdl
from Leagle.com.

Helen Thomas-Fish, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of
Robert C. Fish, Plaintiff, represented by David W. deBruin --
lsoler@gawthrop.com -- Gawthrop Greenwood, PC.

Avborne Accessory Group, Inc., Dover Corporation, Dover Engineered
Systems, Inc., formerly known as Dover Diversified, Inc., Sargent
Aerospace & Defense, LLC, formerly known as Dover Sargent Aerospace
& Defense, LLC, Sargent Industries, Inc. & Roller Bearing Company
of America, Inc., formerly known as RBC Holdings Corp., Defendants,
represented by Catherine A. Mohan -- cmohan@mccarter.com --
McCarter & English, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel J. Brown --
djbrown@mccarter.com -- McCarter & English, LLP, Janine L. Faben --
jfaben@mccarter.com -- McCarter & English, LLP & Peggy L. Ableman
-- pableman@mccarter.com -- McCarter & English, LLP.

RBC Bearings Incorporated, formerly known as Roller Bearing Holding
Company Inc. & RBC Sargent Airtomic, Defendants, represented by
Daniel J. Brown -- djbrown@mccarter.com -- McCarter & English,
LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: WestRock Co. Had 775 PI Suits at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------
WestRock Company still defends itself against approximately 775
personal injury lawsuits related to asbestos matters as of December
31, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "We have been named a defendant in
asbestos-related personal injury litigation.  To date, the costs
resulting from the litigation, including settlement costs, have not
been significant.  As of December 31, 2018, there were
approximately 775 such lawsuits.  We believe that we have
substantial insurance coverage, subject to applicable deductibles
and policy limits, with respect to asbestos claims.

"We have valid defenses to these asbestos-related personal injury
claims and intend to continue to defend them vigorously.  Should
the volume of litigation grow substantially, it is possible that we
could incur significant costs resolving these cases.  We do not
expect the resolution of pending asbestos litigation and
proceedings to have a material adverse effect on our consolidated
financial condition or liquidity.  In any given period or periods,
however, it is possible such proceedings or matters could have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial
condition or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2XlRo9R



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