CAR_Public/190313.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, March 13, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 52

                            Headlines

A ROYAL FLUSH: Fails to Pay OT Under FLSA & NYLL, Canelha Claims
ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Holly-Taylor FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
ADTALEM GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Polly Suit With Prejudice
ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS: Chase Seeks to Certify Interest Holders Class
APOLLO BOX: Faces Rivera Class Action in C.D. Calif.

APPLE RECOVERY: Boebel Files FDCPA Suit in Wisconsin
ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Face Securities Class Action Over IPO
AT&T MOBILITY: Court Denies Certification in Junk Fax Suit
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD: Rolan & Brooks Seek to Certify Resident Class
BARNEYS NEW YORK: Schertzer Sues over Phantom Discounts

BEST BUY: Wins Bid to Send Dornaus Suit to Arbitration
BETHESDA SOFTWORKS: Meyer Suit Moved to N.D. California
BLENDTEC: Court Dismisses Blender False Advertising Class Action
BOGLIOLI RETAIL: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
BUCKS COUNTY, PA: Court Denies Cross Summary Judgment Bid in Taha

BUY BUY BABY: Faces Garey Suit Asserting ADA Breach
CABOT OIL & GAS: Messenger Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
CAPSTONE TURBINE: Settlement Reached in Kinney & Grooms Suit
CARMAX AUTO: Santos Seeks to Certify Class
CENTRAL TERMITE: Bynum Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages

CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Stays Vado False Advertising Suit
CJS SOLUTIONS: Partly Compelled to Produce Docs Requests in Borup
CLBL INC: Garey Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
COMMUNITY PROBATION: Court OKs Injunctive Relief in McNeil
CONNECTICUT: Union Sues Over Denied Pay for Meal Time Under FLSA

CREDIT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Gissendaner FDCPA Suit
CUYANA INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
EDGE PARTNERS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Beadle Says
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Court Narrows Documents Production in Bruno
EZCORP INC: Rooney Seeks to Certify Securities Class

FLORIDA BC: Two Sales Coordinators Classes Certified in Ward Suit
FOX RESTAURANT: Class of Salaried ASMs Certified in Watt Suit
FRAMES FOR AMERICA: Garey Files ADA Class Action
FREIGHT HANDLERS: Kraft Seeks to Certify Employee Class
FRONT BURNER: Alford et al. Seek to Certify Twin Peaks Staff Class

GC SERVICES: Harkins Asserts Breach of FDCPA in Nebraska
GEORGIA-PACIFIC WOOD: Harris Moves to Certify Class Under FLSA
GLASSES USA: Garey Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: Bond Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
GOLDEN MANUFACTURING: Bishop Files ADA Suit in New York

GRAYCO COMMUNICATIONS: Certification of Technicians Class Sought
GREENSKY INC: Lowinger Files Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
HAN DYNASTY: Court Dismisses H.L. Yeh's FLSA Suit
HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Moreau Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
HEALTHY HALO: Mclean Sues over Telemarketing Text Messages

HELM MANAGEMENT: Ramirez Sues over Wage & Hour Violations
HILLS PET NUTRITION: Paliseno Files Product Liability Suit
HOTEL VETIVER: Chavez Files Civil Rights Suit in New York
HURON LAW: Court Narrows FCRA Claims in Ross
ICP INC: Papadopoulos Dental Sues over Unsolicited Fax Ads

IMPLANT EDUCATORS: Papadopoulos Dental Sues over Spam Fax Ads
JET SPORT ENTERPRISES: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JONATHAN NEIL: $10K Class Settlement in T. Brown Suit Has Final OK
K12 INC: Class Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval
KAISER FOUNDATION: Aleman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

KC VIN, LLC: Removes TCPA Suit to Western District of Missouri
LANIER COLLECTION: Banks Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
LE TOTE INC: Vasquez-Cossio Files Suit in C.D. Calif.
LEDGEWOOD POWER: Bishop Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
LP INSURANCE: McCullough Seeks Unpaid Wages for Associates

MAIDEN HOLDINGS: April 12 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
MAXIMUS INC: Appeal in Virginia Class Action Underway
MDL 2323: NFL Wins Bid to Dismiss A.H.'s Concussion Injury Claims
MERCURY SYSTEMS: Massachusetts Class Suit Voluntarily Dismissed
MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Court Dismisses Forman Securities Fraud Suit

MICHIGAN: Court Partly Certifies Classes in Dearduff Prisoners Suit
MORGAN STANLEY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Frazier Class Suit
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Jefferson Files Suit for Personal Injury
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Johnson Sues Over Student-Athletes' Injuries
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Settles TCPA Class Action for $2.5MM

NETMORE AMERICA: Leszanczuk Files Consumer Fraud Class Suit
NEW LINK GENETICS: Court Dismisses Nguyen Securities Fraud Suit
NEW STATFORD RESTAURANT: Faces Traylor Suit in S.D. New York
NEW YORK, NY: MF Moves to Certify Class of Diabetic Students
NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Johnson Files FDCPA Class Action in Wisconsin

OCWEN LOAN: Wins Prelim. Approval of Delgado Suit Settlement
OPTICSPLANET INC: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
ORCHARD SUPPLY: Branco et al. Seek to Certify Class of Employees
PALISADES COLLECTION: Lopez Asserts FDCPA Breach in Class Suit
PERNIX SLEEP: Myers Files Adversary Proceeding in Del. Bank. Ct.

PHILIP MORRIS: Preliminary Motions in Adams Suit Remain Pending
PHILIP MORRIS: Unit Continues to Defend Blais Suit in Canada
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Steffek Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class
PRECC INC: Does Not Pay Technicians Overtime Wages, Berry Says
QUORA INC: Musgrave Sues over Information Data Breach

RALEY'S: California App. Flips Denial of Myers Class Certification
RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Coulter
REGENCY GP LP: Dieckman Files Petition for Insuance of Subpoena
REITER BUNSIC: Olivia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
SANTANNA NATURAL: Foreign Judgment Registration Filed in "Johansen"

SEALY INC: Court Narrows Claims in Sarmiento Wage & Hour Suit
SELIMA OPTIQUE: Garey Alleges Disabilities Act Breach
SMILEY DENTAL: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Employees
STUMPY'S SALES: Bishop Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
TGI FRIDAY'S: Mullen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act

UNITED STATES: Urban Financial Suit Removed to Oklahoma Dist. Ct.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Condry Seeks to Certify 3 Classes Under ERISA
UXIN LIMITED: Faces Chiu Suit over 50% Drop in Share Price
VALERO MARKETING: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Bautista Suit
VANDA PHARMA: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Securities Claims

WOLFGANG'S: Workers Sue Over Unpaid Wages, Discrimination
WORKOUT ANYTIME: Munday Seeks Payment of Past-Due Wages
WORLD WRESTLING: Asks Court to Dismiss Appeals in Wrestlers' Suits
YANKEE BOATING CENTER: Bishop Asserts Breach under ADA
YOGA CLUB: Vasquez-Cossio Files Class Action in Calif.

ZANELLA LTD: Garey Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
ZAPPOS RETAIL: Faces Traynor ADA Suit in S.D. New York

                            *********

A ROYAL FLUSH: Fails to Pay OT Under FLSA & NYLL, Canelha Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIANO CANELHA, JOAO LELIO FERREIRA, HUGO CANTE, LUIZ SILVANIO DOS
REIS, SEBASTIAO DEOLIVEIRA, and MAINE ROCHA SOUZA, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. A ROYAL FLUSH OF NEW
YORK II, INC., d/b/a A ROYAL FLUSH, A ROYAL FLUSH, INC., and
TIMOTHY BUTLER, and DEBRA RUSSO, as individuals, Case No.
1:19-cv-01587 (S.D.N.Y., February 20, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants did not pay the Plaintiffs time and a half for hours
worked over 40, a blatant violation of the overtime provisions
contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

A Royal Flush of New York II, Inc., doing business as A Royal
Flush, is a corporation organized under the laws of New York with a
principal executive office in Bronx, New York, and in Bridgeport,
Connecticut.  The Individual Defendants are owners, officers,
operators, agents or employees of the Company.

A Royal Flush provides the latest state of the art, industrial
grade portable toilets and customized solution systems that are
suited for remote field access.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          E-mail: avshalumovr@yahoo.com


ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Holly-Taylor FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The putative class action lawsuit entitled SHERYL HOLLY-TAYLOR, on
behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., Case No. 2018-CA-003744, was
removed on February 21, 2019, from the Circuit Court of the Sixth
Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County, Florida, to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-00454 to the
proceeding.

The action was commenced on November 27, 2018, in the Circuit
Court.  The Complaint asserts multiple claims under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Luis A. "Tony" Cabassa, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 365-3417
          E-mail: Lcabassa@wfclaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Catherine H. Molloy, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
          101 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1900
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 318-5700
          Facsimile: (813) 318-5900
          E-mail: molloyk@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark W. Peters, Esq.
          John E. B. Gerth, Esq.
          Kierstin Jodway, Esq.
          WALLER LANSDEN DORTCH & DAVIS, LLP
          51 I Union Street, Suite 2700
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-6380
          Facsimile: (615) 244-6804
          E-mail: Mark.Peters@wallerlaw.com
                  Jeb.Gerth@wallerlaw.com
                  Kierstin.Jodway@wallerlaw.com


ADTALEM GLOBAL: Court Dismisses Polly Suit With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RENEE HEATHER POLLY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ADTALEM
GLOBAL EDUCATION, INC. f/k/a DEVRY EDUCATION GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 16 CV 9754 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Manish S. Shah
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs are former students of DeVry University, a
for-profit university operated by the Defendants.  DeVry used an
expansive marketing campaign to recruit students, spending many
millions of dollars each year on television, print, radio, and
internet advertisements in addition to in-person pitches.  For
years, the employment rate of DeVry graduates was a core component
of the recruitment campaign.  Generally, DeVry boasted that 90% of
its graduates who were actively seeking employment obtained new
jobs in their chosen field of study within six months of
graduation.

The Plaintiffs, all former DeVry students, saw or heard 90%
representations before enrollment, and they all relied on the
representations when deciding to enroll.  They claim that those
representations were false and now sue the entities that operated
the school, alleging violations of various states' consumer
protection laws and unjust enrichment.  The Defendants move to
dismiss the amended complaint.  If they had known that the
representations were false, they would not have enrolled at DeVry
or they would have paid less for tuition.

The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action lawsuit against
DeVry in 2016.  DeVry moved to dismiss the complaint, and Judge
Shah granted the motion, dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. The dismissal was primarily due to the Plaintiffs'
failure to meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud.  The
Plaintiffs did not adequately plead what specific representations
each Plaintiff saw or when or where they saw them, nor did they
sufficiently plead the basis for their "on information and belief"
allegations that the 90% representations were false.  He also found
the Plaintiffs' allegations of damages to be too speculative.

The Plaintiffs amended their complaint.  DeVry now moves to dismiss
the amended complaint, arguing that the amendment did not cure the
deficiencies the Judge identified in the first complaint.  DeVry
also moves to strike the class allegations.

The Plaintiffs allege that DeVry's misrepresentation of its
graduates' employment rate violates the consumer protection
statutes of various states and constitutes unjust enrichment.
DeVry's primary arguments are that the Plaintiffs fail to
sufficiently allege damages caused by the 90% representations and
do not meet Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement for allegations
of fraud.  Though each state's consumer protection statutes and
accompanying case law may vary, these two arguments are common to
all the statutory claims (the Plaintiffs have not argued
otherwise)

Judge Shah does not agree with the Plaintiffs' position that the
2017 post-decrease tuition amount reflects the "true value" of
their educations.  That number would require further factual
development to address things like DeVry's points about economic
factors and the passage of time and probably expert testimony too.
Anyway, he says the Plaintiffs cannot rely on a price-inflation
theory to prove actual damages in consumer fraud claims.  Instead,
they must prove that the misrepresentations caused each individual
Plaintiff to pay more.  But at this stage, the tuition decrease
lends plausibility to the Plaintiffs' individual allegations that
they were damaged.  And though damages must be calculable, it is
too early to say that the Plaintiffs would not be able to calculate
the true value of the education they paid for.

Next, the Judge finds that even though the Plaintiffs have cleared
the damages hurdle, they have not adequately alleged fraud.  The
Plaintiffs' pleading burden is heightened for allegations of fraud,
which must be stated with particularity.  They must describe "the
who, what, when, where, and how" of the fraud, though precisely how
much information is required for each of those descriptions varies
depending on the facts of a case.  The Plaintiffs are required to
conduct their own careful pretrial investigations to inject
precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations
of fraud.

Allegations supporting unjust enrichment claims must comply with
Rule 9(b)'s requirements when they allege fraud.  The Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claims are premised on the same
misrepresentations as the statutory claims, so the particularity
deficiencies that defeated the statutory claims defeat the unjust
enrichment claim too.

The Plaintiffs request leave to amend, which should be freely
granted when required by justice.  However, the Judge retains broad
discretion to deny leave to amend where there has been a repeated
failure to cure deficiencies.  This is the Plaintiffs' second
failure to state a claim, and their amendment did not correct the
Rule 9(b) particularity deficiencies he identified in the original
complaint.  For that reason, the Plaintiffs' request for leave to
amend will be denied, and the dismissal will be with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Shah granted DeVry's motion to
dismiss, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  The motion to
strike class allegations is terminated as moot.  Enter judgment and
terminate civil case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/uebtmu from Leagle.com.

Debbie Petrizzo, Renee Heather Polly, Brandy Van Buren, Melissa
Lotzman, Jamison Purry & Cheryl Costello, Plaintiffs, represented
by Carl V. Malmstrom -- malmstrom@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Herz LLC & Thomas H. Burt -- burt@whafh.com -- Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz Llp, pro hac vice.

Dakar Villa, Rhonda Garrison, DeLeon McKee, Heather Anderson,
Stephanie Cumpton, Julie Ramroop, Elihu Guiste, Jorge Munoz,
Denisse Perez, Ashley Dellen, Jorge Rivas, Christopher Condie,
Cedric Holloway, Steven V Diaz, Robyn Petersen, Josh Ablian, Elijah
Morgan, Ethel Holloway, Kirstine Holiness, Nikita Benson, Kenya
Montgomery, Darius Bryant, Thomas Pearson, Steven Nickens, David
Viglielmo, Annette Pearson, Mariel Jennings, Eric Stone, Lynda
Crilley, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Jennifer Wallace, Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas H.
Burt, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz Llp, pro hac vice.

Jairo Jara, Alex Haberer & Suzane Apodaca, Plaintiffs, represented
by Gregory Michael Egleston, Gainey McKenna & Egleston, pro hac
vice & Thomas H. Burt, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz Llp,
pro hac vice.

Julio Vargas, Plaintiff, pro se.

DeVry Education Group, Inc., DeVry University, Inc. & DeVry/New
York Inc., Defendants, represented by Terance A. Gonsalves --
tgonsalves@steptoe.com -- Steptoe and Johnson LLP & Bryan Michael
Westhoff -- bwesthoff@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC.


ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS: Chase Seeks to Certify Interest Holders Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled JOANN CHASE, et al. v.
ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS, L.P, ANDEAVOR, f/k/a TESORO CORPORATION, TESORO
LOGISTICS, GP, LLC, TESORO COMPANIES, INC., and TESORO HIGH PLAINS
PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 5:18-cv-01050-DAE (W.D. Tex.), ask
the Court to certify this class:

     All individuals and estates that hold or have held
     beneficial surface interests in land held in trust by the
     United States located within the Fort Berthold Reservation,
     over which Defendants' Pipeline crosses, from January 1,
     1993 through present, and for which the owners of a majority
     interest did not consent in writing to renew the
     right-of-way for the Pipeline since it was acquired by
     Defendants, or who withdrew their consent before a new
     right-of-way was approved.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint JoAnn Chase, Inez
Burr, Eunice White Owl, and Margo Bean, as the class
representatives, and appoint Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton LLP
and Keith Harper, Esq., Lawrence Roberts, Esq., Jason Steed, Esq.,
Dustin T. Greene, Esq., and Stephen Anstey, Esq., as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Keith M. Harper, Esq.
          Lawrence S. Roberts, Esq.
          Stephen M. Anstey, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
          607 14th Street, NW, Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20005-2018
          Telephone: (202) 508-5844
          Facsimile: (202) 315-3241
          E-mail: kharper@kilpatricktownsend.com
                  lroberts@kilpatricktownsend.com
                  sanstey@kilpatricktownsend.com

               - and -

          Dustin T. Greene, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
          1001 W. Fourth Street
          Winston-Salem, NC 27101
          Telephone: (336) 607-7300
          Facsimile: (336) 607-7500
          E-mail: dgreene@kilpatricktownsend.com

               - and -

          Jason P. Steed, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
          2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 4400
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 922-7112
          Facsimile: (241) 583-5731
          E-mail: jsteed@kilpatricktownsend.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jeffrey A. Webb, Esq.
          Aimee Vidaurri, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
          300 Convent Street, Suite 2100
          San Antonio, TX 78205-3792
          Telephone: (210) 270-7109
          E-mail: jeff.webb@nortonrosefulbright.com
                  aimee.vidaurri@nortonrosefulbright.com

               - and -

          Robert D. Comer, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
          1225 Seventeenth Street, Suite 3050
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 801-2728
          E-mail: bob.comer@nortonrosefulbright.com


APOLLO BOX: Faces Rivera Class Action in C.D. Calif.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Apollo Box, Inc.  The
case is styled as Brianna Rivera, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Apollo Box, Inc., a
Delaware corporation and Does 1- 10, Inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01354 (C.D. Cal., February 22, 2019).

Apollo Box is an eCommerce platform for discovering, collecting and
sharing unique and creative products from all over the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Scott J Ferrell, Esq.
   Pacific Trial Attorneys APC
   4100 Newport Place Drive Suite 800
   Newport Beach, CA 92660
   Tel: (949) 706-6464
   Fax: (949) 706-6469
   Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


APPLE RECOVERY: Boebel Files FDCPA Suit in Wisconsin
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Apple Recovery LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Duane Boebel Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Apple
Recovery LLC, Dobberstein Law Firm LLC, BCG Equities LLC, Debt
Management Partners LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00149 (W.D.
Wis., Feb. 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Apple Recovery LLC is a Debt Collection Agency in Phoenix.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ben James Slatky, Esq.
     Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
     John D. Blythin, Esq.
     Mark Andrew Eldridge, Esq.
     Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
     3620 E. Layton Avenue
     Cudahy, WI 53110
     Phone:(414) 482-8000
     Fax: (414) 482-8001
     Email: bslatky@ademilaw.com
            jfruchter@wisc.edu
            jblythin@ademilaw.com
            meldridge@ademilaw.com


ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Face Securities Class Action Over IPO
--------------------------------------------------------
Stull, Stull & Brody ("SS&B") on Feb. 11 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Arlo Technologies, Inc. ("Arlo" or the "Company")
(NYSE:ARLO), pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's initial
public offering that commenced on August 3, 2018 and closed on
August 7, 2018 (the "IPO").

The investigation concerns whether Arlo's filings with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the IPO
contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted material
information, thereby injuring investors.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Arlo's securities
pursuant and/or traceable to the IPO may contact Stull, Stull &
Brody, by email to ARLO@ssbny.com, by telephone at 1-212-687-7230,
Ext. 147, or by fax to 1-212-490-2022.  

You may retain Stull, Stull & Brody, or other counsel of your
choice, to serve as your counsel in this action.

SS&B -- http://www.ssbny.com-- has litigated class actions for
violations of securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duty on
behalf of defrauded investors over the past 40 years and has
obtained court approval of substantial settlements on numerous
occasions.  SS&B has offices in New York and California. [GN]


AT&T MOBILITY: Court Denies Certification in Junk Fax Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court of the District of Connecticut
issued a Ruling denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned GORSS MOTELS, INC, Plaintiff, v. AT&T
MOBILITY LLC and AT&T MOBILITY NATIONAL ACCOUNTS LLC, Defendants.
Civil No. 3:17cv403 (JBA). (D. Conn.).

Gorss Motels, Inc., individually and as representative of a
proposed class, brings suit against AT&T Mobility and its affiliate
AT&T Mobility National Accounts for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005, for sending an unsolicited fax
advertisement.

Rule 23 Class Certification

The Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class:

     All persons or entities who were successfully sent a facsimile
on or about January 14, 2014, stating: Visit your AT&T Partner
online store at att.com/wireless/wyndhamfranchisees for your
exclusive specials such as $50 new smartphone activation credit,
$100 instant rebate on all tablets while supplies last, 16% on
qualifying monthly charges, and Learn about AT&T's new Mobile Share
Value Plan!, and For a limited time, switch from T-Mobile and
receive up to $450 when you trade in your current smartphone.

The requirements of both Rule 23(a) and (b) must be met for a class
to be certified. Under Rule 23(a), a class may be certified only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Rule 23 also incorporates an implied requirement of
ascertainability of the class. Plaintiff moves for certification
under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits the certification of a class
only where the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
and a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will address only Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement and will not reach the other
requirements for class certification.

Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement is far more demanding than
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement. Even assuming some questions
may be answered with generalized proof, class certification should
be denied if they] are not more substantial than the questions
requiring individualized proof. The predominance requirement tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.

The purpose of the predominance requirement is to ensure that the
class will be certified only when it would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness
or bringing about other undesirable results. The question therefore
is whether the five legal questions identified by Plaintiff as
common to all proposed class member predominate or are more
substantial than issues identified by the Defendants which would
require proof individualized to each class member.

Individual Consent to Receive the Fax

The Defendants argue that in this case, the question which will
predominate and will drive the litigation is a question of fact
which is not subject to class-wide determination: whether each
member of the class consented to receive the Fax. Defendants
contend that only those recipients who did not consent to receive
the Fax have a claim for relief, rendering the question of consent
a question which cannot be determined on a class-wide basis—the
driving question in this litigation and thereby rendering
Plaintiff's proposed class unsuitable for certification.

The Plaintiff argues that whether class members consented to
receive the Fax is legally irrelevant, because even consented-to
faxes must contain adequate opt-out language, which Plaintiff
alleges that the fax here did not.  

Therefore, the Plaintiff explains, common legal questions regarding
the Fax will predominate.

The Junk Fax Prevention Act

Sending an unsolicited advertisement to a fax machine is
prohibited, with limited exceptions. An unsolicited advertisement
is one which was transmitted to any person without that person's
prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.

Unsolicited advertisements may be sent where (1) the sender and
recipient have an established business relationship (2) the sender
obtained the recipient's fax number through the voluntary
communication of such number, within the context of such
established relationship or a directory, advertisement, or site on
the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to make
available its fax number for distribution, and (3) the
advertisement contains a notice which meets the statutory and
regulatory requirements for opt-out language.

47 USC Section 227(b)(2) also empowers the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to prescribe regulations to implement the
requirements" of the provisions regarding unsolicited
advertisements.

The Solicited Fax Rule and Bais Yaakov

The Plaintiffs' argument is based on 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(a)(4)(iv), regulations promulgated by the FCC under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005.

Those FCC regulations require that even a facsimile advertisement
that is sent to a recipient that has provided prior express
invitation or permission to the sender must include an opt-out
notice that complies with" the opt-out language requirements for
unsolicited faxes (Solicited Fax Rule).

The Defendants argue that the Solicited Fax Rule should not be
applied here because it was rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Bais
Yaakov of Spring Valley v. Federal Communications Comm., 852 F.3d
1078 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1043 (2018).

In that case, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Solicited Fax Rule,
finding that the Act does not require (or give the FCC authority to
require) opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements. Under
Bais Yaakov, solicited and unsolicited faxes are once again subject
to different requirements regarding the inclusion of opt-out
language. The applicability of Bais Yaakov to this case therefore
determines whether the Court would be asked to make individualized,
fact-based determinations regarding each proposed class member's
consent to receive the Fax.

The Plaintiffs argue that because it was decided in a different
circuit, Bais Yaakov is not binding over this Court. Defendants
respond that Bais Yaakov does control here because the D.C. Circuit
was acting as the reviewing court under the Hobbs Act, which grants
exclusive jurisdiction and renders that court's decision not
subject to collateral attack in a district court.

Courts which have directly considered the impact of Bais Yaakov
outside the D.C. Circuit have generally either found that it is
binding nationally or chosen to follow its reasoning and result.  

In light of the position of the Second Circuit regarding the
binding effect of consolidated appeals of FCC regulations, the text
of the statute, the reasoning of the Bais Yaakov decision, and the
position of other courts which have addressed this issue, the Court
will similarly join those that have concluded that they are bound
by the holding of Bais Yaakov. Thus, the Solicited Fax Rule does
not control here, and the Junk Fax Prevention Act therefore imposes
different opt-out language requirements on solicited and
unsolicited faxes. Before addressing legal questions common to the
proposed class, the Court will therefore have to determine whether
each of the several thousand potential class members consented to
receive the Fax.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Ruling
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y5q6377bfrom Leagle.com.

Gorss Motels Inc., a Connecticut corportation, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Y. Bellin --
AYTAN.BELLIN@BELLINLAW.COM -- Bellin & Associates LLC, Brian J.
Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice
& Ryan Michael Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson &
Wanca.

AT&T Mobility LLC, Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Hans J. Germann -- hgermann@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer
Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Kyle J. Steinmetz -
ksteinmetz@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
T. McCormack -- mmccormack@omjblaw.com -- O'Sullivan McCormack
Jensen & Bliss PC & Timothy P. Jensen -tjensen@omjblaw.com --
O'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss PC.

AT&T Mobility National Accounts LLC, Defendant, represented by Hans
J. Germann , Mayer Brown LLP.


ATLANTIC RICHFIELD: Rolan & Brooks Seek to Certify Resident Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LERITHEA ROLAN, and LAMOTTCA BROOKS, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. ATLANTIC
RICHFIELD COMPANY, E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, and THE
CHEMOURS COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00357-TLS-SLC
(N.D. Ind.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for class certification
of:

   "all persons who resided in the Class Area in July 2016 when
   the United States Environmental Protection Agency announced
   that high levels of lead and arsenic were found in the Class
   Area.

   The Class Area is located in East Chicago, Indiana and is
   defined generally as bordered: (1) on the north by the northern

   boundary of the Carrie Gosch Elementary School and a line
   extending eastward from that boundary to the eastern edge of a
   north/south utility right of way that runs parallel to McCook
   Avenue north of East 149th Place; (2) on the east by: (i) the
   eastern-most edge of a north/south utility right of way that
   runs parallel to McCook Avenue until East 149th Place, and (ii)

   McCook Avenue between East 149th Place and 151st Street; (3) on

   the south by East 151st Street; and (4) on the west by the
   Indiana Harbor Canal.

The Plaintiffs bring this matter as a class action on behalf of
themselves and other former residents of West Calumet Housing, each
of whom were forced to relocate from their homes for their own
health and safety as a result of contamination of the Class Area by
Atlantic Richfield Co. and E.I. du Pont de Nemours. The
contamination has thrown the lives of Plaintiffs, other Class
members, and their children into disarray. Initially, the EPA
warned residents to avoid outdoor activities to prevent exposure to
lead and arsenic in the soil that was hundreds of times greater
than safe residential levels. The Mayor of the City of East Chicago
advised residents to relocate from their homes. Now, in accordance
with the order by the East Chicago Housing Authority, due to the
dangerous levels of hazardous lead and arsenic, Plaintiffs and all
other Class members were forced to leave their homes in West
Calumet Housing, all of which have now been demolished.

The Plaintiffs seek, among other things, an order requiring the
Defendants to reimburse Plaintiffs and other Class members for
costs that they incurred in response to the contamination pursuant
to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a), and requiring DuPont to
pay compensatory and other damages for their injuries resulting
from DuPonts negligence.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          James D. Brusslan, Esq.
          Jason B. Hirsh, Esq.
          LEVENFELD PEARLSTEIN, LLC
          2 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1300
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 476-7570
          Facsimile: (312) 346-8434
          E-mail: jbrusslan@lplegal.com
                  jhirsh@lplegal.com

BARNEYS NEW YORK: Schertzer Sues over Phantom Discounts
-------------------------------------------------------
A case, KRISTEN SCHERTZER, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BARNEYS NEW YORK, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, and DOES 1- 50, inclusive, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00320-H-LL (S.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2019), targets
Barneys' unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practice of
advertising fictitious prices and corresponding phantom discounts
on merchandise sold in its retail outlet stores, Barneys
Warehouse.

The complaint explains this practice of false reference pricing
occurs when a retailer fabricates a fake regular, original, and/or
former reference price, and then offers an item for sale at a deep
"discounted" price. The result is a sham price disparity that
misleads consumers into believing they are receiving a good deal
and induces them into making a purchase. Retailers drastically
benefit from employing a false reference pricing scheme and
experience increased sales.

The complaint contends that a consumer is more likely to purchase a
jacket for $100.00 if it is 90% off of an "original" price of
$1,000.00; than a $100.00 jacket, advertised at its true price of
$100.00.

Barneys New York Inc. is an American chain of luxury department
stores founded and headquartered in New York City. The chain
operates 15 flagship, boutique, and warehouse stores in the United
States. In addition, it licenses twelve stores in Japan under a
franchise agreement.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Proposed Class Counsel.

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
          Alyshia K. Lord, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET
             KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1350 Columbia Street, Ste. 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619.762.1910
          Facsimile: 619.756.6991
          E-mail: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
                  alord@carlsonlynch.com

BEST BUY: Wins Bid to Send Dornaus Suit to Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned DEANNA DORNAUS, Plaintiff, v.
BEST BUY CO., INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-04085-PJH.
(N.D. Cal.).

Best Buy Co., Inc.'s and Best Buy Stores L.P.'s (Best Buy) motion
to compel arbitration and stay the action came on for hearing
before this court.

That operative complaint states five claims: (1) fraud and
fraudulent inducement (2) negligent misrepresentation or omission
(3) Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (4) California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and (5) unjust enrichment.  A Best Buy
salesperson at a California Best Buy store urged her to sign up for
Best Buy's so-called 0% interest promotion. She believed that, by
signing up for a Best Buy credit card, her purchase would not
accrue interest during an 18-month promotional period, but in
reality her purchase accrued retroactive interest.  

The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing
arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as
unconscionability.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), any party bound to an
arbitration agreement that falls within the scope of the FAA may
bring a motion in federal district court to compel arbitration and
stay the proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration. In
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the
district court's role is typically limited to determining whether
(i) an agreement exists between the parties to arbitrate (ii) the
claims at issue fall within the scope of the agreement and (iii)
the agreement is valid and enforceable.  

The court assess three issues when determining whether to compel
arbitration: whether (i) an agreement exists between the parties to
arbitrate; (ii) the claims at issue fall within the scope of the
agreement; and (iii) the agreement is valid and enforceable. The
parties agree that the first two issues support arbitration. The
parties dispute whether the Agreement is valid and enforceable.

The Plaintiff argues that the Agreement violates California
contract law as expressed in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th
945 (2017), by preventing any award of public injunctive relief,
while defendant argues that this court should decline to follow
McGill because the FAA preempts its holding.  

Whether the Agreement Precludes Public Injunctive Relief in
Violation of McGill

State contract defenses may invalidate arbitration clauses if those
defenses apply to contracts generally.   That includes contracts
that compel all claims to arbitration, yet allow only pursuit of
individual relief solely on behalf of oneself in that forum.
However, a contract compelling arbitration of a claim seeking a
remedy of public injunctive relief that allows the arbitrator to
award such relief is valid and enforceable under McGill.

The court first assesses whether the Agreement prohibits
adjudicating claims seeking public injunctive relief in any forum.
If it does, the offending provision is invalid and unenforceable
under California law.

The Agreement provides, in relevant part: "You or we may arbitrate
any claim, dispute or controversy between you and us arising out of
or related to your account, a previous related account or our
relationship called Claims.

"If arbitration is chosen by any party, neither you nor we will
have the right to litigate that Claim in court or have a jury trial
on that Claim.Except as stated below, all Claims are subject to
arbitration, no matter what legal theory they're based on or what
remedy (damages, or injunctive or declaratory relief) they seek."

Claims brought as part of a class action, private attorney general
or other representative action can be arbitrated only on an
individual basis. The arbitrator has no authority to arbitrate any
claim on a class or representative basis and may award relief only
on an individual basis. If arbitration is chosen by any party,
neither you nor we may pursue a Claim as part of a class action or
other representative action.

The first two bulleted paragraphs quoted above provide that if
either party elects arbitration of a claim, even a claim seeking
public injunctive relief, it must be arbitrated and cannot be
litigated in court. The final bulleted paragraph quoted above
provides that, if a party elects arbitration, the arbitrator can
award relief only on an individual basis. That provision precludes
the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief, which is
relief intended to benefit those other than the individual bringing
the claim.  

As such, the Agreement allows a party to prevent adjudication of
public injunctive relief in any forum by electing arbitration,
which McGill does not permit.

Whether the FAA Preempts McGill

The Defendant argues that the court should decline to follow McGill
because it is preempted by the FAA. The FAA preempts state law to
the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

First, to fall within the ambit of Section 2's saving clause, the
McGill rule must be a generally-applicable contract defense rather
than a defense that applies only to arbitration. The California
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the prohibition of a
public injunctive relief award in any forum is a ground under
California law for revoking any contract.

Second, the court assesses whether the McGill rule conflicts with
the FAA's objectives, applying ordinary conflict preemption
principles to determine whether a state-law rule conflicts with a
federal statute containing a saving clause.

Claims seeking public injunctive relief do not necessarily require
the procedural complexities of class claims—there is no notice to
the public, no opportunity for others to join, and no concern for
others' due process rights. Instead, like PAGA claims, claims
seeking public injunctive relief are claims for which an enhanced
remedy may be available. Unlike the issue the Supreme Court faced
in Concepcion, there are no concerns here about forcing the
procedures of class actions onto arbitration.  

Whether the Public Injunctive Relief Bar is Severable

Given that the Agreement contains invalid terms under McGill, the
court turns to their effect on the enforceability of the Agreement.
The procedure to be followed here is dictated by the specific
procedures contracted to by the parties in the arbitration
agreement at issue here.

In a section titled Survival and Severability of Terms, the
Agreement provides in part:

"If any part of this arbitration provision is deemed invalid or
unenforceable, the other terms shall remain in force, except that
there can be no arbitration of a class or representative Claim.
This arbitration provision may not be amended, severed or waived,
except as provided in this Agreement or in a written agreement
between you and us."

Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, the agreement plainly does not
contain a poison pill provision invalidating the entire arbitration
provision. Rather, as quoted above, if any part of this arbitration
provision is deemed invalid or unenforceable, the other terms shall
remain in force.

Here, there are two terms that together create an unenforceable
result. The first is that the arbitrator can grant only individual
relief. The second is that any party can elect to arbitrate any
dispute, thereby eliminating the right to seek a remedy in court.
Relaxing either could bring the Agreement in line with McGill's
requirements.

Both parties have argued that, if the Agreement is unenforceable as
written under McGill, that at least "the claim for public
injunctive relief would remain with the Court to resolve. The court
agrees. While the remainder of plaintiff's action must be compelled
to arbitration under the terms of the Agreement including all
questions of liability the court shall retain jurisdiction over the
adjudication of plaintiff's request for public injunctive relief,
should defendant be found liable for the California statutory
claims, which are brought on behalf of the public and for which
public injunctive relief may be available.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff is compelled to arbitrate her claims
against Best Buy in accordance with this order.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yyvh3ddjfrom Leagle.com.

Deanna Dornaus, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel --
jdkaliel@gmail.com -- Kaliel PLLC, Daniel L. Warshaw --
dwarshaw@pswlaw.com -- Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Joseph C.
Bourne, Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, Melissa S. Weiner --
mweiner@pswlaw.com -- PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP, pro hac vice &
Sophia Goren Gold -- sgold@kalielpllc.com -- Kaliel PLLC.

Best Buy Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Marcos D. Sasso --
SASSOM@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- Ballard Spahr LLP & Jonathan M. Bye --
BYEJ@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- Ballard Spahr, LLP, pro hac vice.

Best Buy Stores L.P., Defendant, represented by Marcos D. Sasso --
SASSOM BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- Ballard Spahr LLP.


BETHESDA SOFTWORKS: Meyer Suit Moved to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
A case, Alex Meyer, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Bethesda Softworks, LLC
doing business as: Bethesda Game Studios a Delaware corporation,
the Defendant, Case No. RG19002237, was removed from the Alameda
County Court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (Oakland) on Feb. 14, 2019. The Northern District of
California Court Clerk assinged Case No. 4:19-cv-00820-DMR to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Donna M. Ryu.

Bethesda Softworks LLC is an American video game publisher based in
Rockville, Maryland. The company was founded by Christopher Weaver
in 1986 as a division of Media Technology Limited, and in 1999
became a subsidiary of ZeniMax Media.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Ari Nathan Cherniak, Esq.
          Julian Ari Hammond, Esq.
          Polina Brandler, Esq.
          HAMMONDLAW, PC
          1829 Reisterstown Road, Suite 410
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (443) 739-5758
          Facsimile: (310) 295-2385
          E-mail: acherniak@hammondlawpc.com
                  JHammond@hammondlawpc.com
                  pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Alan Jay Weil, Esq.
          Shauna E. Woods, Esq.
          KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1725
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-2700
          Facsimile: (310) 556-2705
          E-mail: aweil@kbkfirm.com
                 SWoods@kbkfirm.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Domenic Petrella, Esq.
          FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
          GARRETT AND DUNNER, LLP
          3300 Hillview Avenue
          Palo Alto, CA 94304
          Telephone: (650) 849-6732
          E-mail: nicholas.petrella@finnegan.com

BLENDTEC: Court Dismisses Blender False Advertising Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alan L. Friel, Esq. -- afriel@bakerlaw.com -- Linda Goldstein,
Esq., Amy R. Mudge, Esq. -- amudge@bakerlaw.com -- and Randal M.
Shaheen, Esq. -- rshaheen@bakerlaw.com -- of BakerHostetler, in an
article for Mondaq, report that when Alejandro Callegari filed a
class action against defendant Blendtec in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of Utah, he claimed to have been misled by
packaging claims on Blendtec's "Blendtec Classic 475 120v Blender,"
which he purchased online in July 2017. He alleged that he bought
it specifically for its considerable horsepower -- Blendtec sells
models that boast 3.0-3.8 HP, which is presumably higher than the
consumer blender industry standard.

But Mr. Callegari claimed that when he started blending with the
Blendtec Classic, he became convinced that it was not living up to
its advertised horsepower. He went ahead and enlisted electrical
and mechanical engineers to test Blendtec's claims. He alleged that
their testing "concluded that no Blender exceeded more than 25% of
the power output claimed by Blendtec, and that each power
representation used to market the Blenders was materially
overstated and false."

In April 2018, Mr. Callegari filed suit, accusing Blendtec of
violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA), breach
of express and implied warranty, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.

Bait and Glitch
The District Court examined Mr. Callegari's complaint and dismissed
his claims in their entirety. However, the dismissal was not due to
his use of legal arguments, but rather because the complaint failed
to cite appropriate Utah law.

The District Court held that Mr. Callegari's claims under the UCSPA
failed because while he alleged false advertising in his claim, he
cited Utah code, which prohibited bait and switch advertising.
"Plaintiff did not allege that he was diverted from the product
advertised by Blendtec to some other product," the District Court
wrote. "He only stated that he would not have purchased the
product, or would have paid less for it, had he known that the
blender was not as powerful as advertised."

Moreover, the District Court held, "Plaintiff has also failed to
plead or provide to the court any other applicable rule that
Blendtec may have violated."

The Takeaway
It might have ended there, but Mr. Callegari's suit was met with a
further indignity. "Even assuming that Plaintiff could satisfy the
UCSPA requirements for pleading a class action for damages," the
District Court wrote, "Plaintiff's UCSPA claims would nevertheless
fail for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b)."

Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake." In the District Court's opinion,
Mr. Callegari's complaint was undermined by his simple omissions of
fact, including failure to mention where the blender was purchased,
where he observed the false statements, and the specific
misrepresentations made about the model he purchased.

"The Complaint did not specifically set forth the 'who, what, when,
where and how' of Mr. Callegari's purchase, or of any specific
blender," the District Court concluded. "Rather, Plaintiff made
general statements regarding Defendant's advertising practices . .
. insufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of Rule
9."

This complaint and dismissal is a reminder of the importance of
properly constructing the arguments in a pleading for the court's
review. Although the plaintiff may have had a strong case for
damages, the insufficient citations to the proper law, incongruent
arguments, and failure to satisfy pleading standards were
ultimately the death knell to this particular complaint. [GN]


BOGLIOLI RETAIL: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Boglioli Retail Corp.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Boglioli Retail
Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01110 (E.D. N.Y., Feb. 25,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Boglioli Retail Corporation is a privately held company in New
York, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


BUCKS COUNTY, PA: Court Denies Cross Summary Judgment Bid in Taha
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion denying both Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned DARYOUSH TAHA, Plaintiff, v.
BUCKS COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA, BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, and
UNPUBLISH LLC, Defendants, UNPUBLISH LLC Cross Defendant, BENSALEM
TOWNSHIP Cross Claimant, v. BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
RECORDS/ RECORDS CUSTODIAN EMPLOYEES JANE AND/OR JOHN DOE #1-6,
BUCKS COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA, TERRANCE P. MOORE, FRANK NOONAN and
WILLIAM F. PLANTIER, Cross Defendants. Civil Action No. 12-6867.
(E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff, Daryoush Taha, filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself
and all persons whose criminal history record information was made
available on the ILT. He claimed that by publishing this
information, Defendants Bucks County Correctional Facility and
Bucks County violated Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record
Information Act (CHRIA), in particular contravening the portion of
the law that prohibits dissemination of "criminal history record
information except in defined circumstances.

Statute of Limitations

The Defendants assert that either a one- or two-year statute of
limitations applies to the CHRIA, and therefore Taha's claims must
be barred because the Amended Complaint was filed on February 26,
2013, more than two years after Defendants' ILT uploaded Taha's
criminal history record information onto the internet.

This argument is unavailing both because it is waived and because
the applicable statute of limitations is six years.

Defendants have Waived the Statute of Limitations Affirmative
Defense

While the Defendants did include a statute of limitations defense
in their answer, they eschewed multiple opportunities, motions to
dismiss, arguments for and against summary judgment and in response
to the Plaintiffs class certification briefing to raise the defense
with the Court. Instead, they waited more than six years to do so
after the Court had determined that they were liable for CHRIA
violations, after it had certified the class, and after class
members had been notified of the Court's decision on liability.   

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(c), which must be raised as early as practicable. Generally,
the failure to raise an affirmative defense in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment constitutes an abandonment of the
defense.

The Defendants did not present the issue within a pragmatically
sufficient time. There were many points during the years of this
litigation at which Defendants could have raised it in motion
practice, but they failed to do so.  

The failure is not without consequence. On March 28, 2016, the
Court entered an Opinion and Order on liability, finding that
Defendants' public dissemination of the criminal record history of
approximately 67,000 individuals violated the CHRIA. Accordingly,
it granted Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on
liability and subsequently certified a class. Thus, the only
remaining issue was whether Defendants had been willful in their
violation of the Act.

Therefore, Defendants waived the statute of limitations defense.

Plaintiffs Claims are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Even if the statute of limitations defense were not waived, the
statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiffs claims.

The six-year statute of limitations applies. The one-year statute
of limitations is clearly inapplicable, and as between the
remaining options of the two- and six-year statutes of limitations,
persuasive case law in Pennsylvania leads to the conclusion that
the six-year statute of limitation is the better fit with the
CHRIA. Because the Plaintiff brought his claim on December 7, 2012,
well within the six-year period, Plaintiffs claims are not barred.

One-Year Statute of Limitations Does Not Apply

The Pennsylvania one-year statute of limitations for libel, slander
or invasion of privacy actions does not govern here. Defendants
have been found liable under Section 9121 of the CHRIA, which
prohibits dissemination of certain criminal history record
information to an individual or non-criminal justice agency. This
is neither a cause of action for libel, nor for slander, nor for
invasion of privacy. Indeed, there is almost no overlap between the
elements of the cause of action that is arguably most similar,
invasion of privacy, and the elements Plaintiff established to
prove a violation of the CHRIA.  

The Defendants' argument to the contrary elides the difference
between a cause of action and a type of harm. Just because a
violation of a law implicates privacy interests does not transform
the violation into an invasion of privacy tort and subject it to a
one-year statute of limitations.
  
The Six-Year Statute of Limitations Applies

With the inapt one-year statute of limitations eliminated, two
options remain: the six-year statute of limitations for any civil
action which is neither subject to another limitation nor excluded
from the application of a period of limitation and the two-year
statute of limitations, for various specific torts and any other
action to recover damages for injury which is founded on negligent,
intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct.

The Plaintiff argues the same reasoning applies to the CHRIA
because application of a uniform six-year period is the only way to
avoid uncertainty and confusion.  Like the UTPCPL, the CHRIA both
lacks an explicit statute of limitations and encompasses an array
of practices that sound in various areas of law. The CHRIA
provides, for example, that criminal history record information
shall be disseminated to any individual or noncriminal justice
agency only upon request, that criminal history record information
shall be expunged under a variety of circumstances, that state
licensing agencies shall not consider certain criminal history
record information when determining eligibility for professional
licenses and certifications that private employers may, only
consider criminal history record information in certain
circumstances that criminal justice agencies shall ensure the
confidentiality and security of criminal history record information
through several specified procedures and more.

Thus, both the UTPCPL and the CHRIA are statutes under which
multifarious claims may be brought.

These heterogenous claims can be analogized to various Pennsylvania
common law causes of action or have no common law analog at all and
the Defendants' assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, not all
of which necessarily sound in tort. As with the UTPCPL, applying a
statute of limitations other than the 6-year catchall to the CHRIA
would cause plaintiffs uncertainty as to which limitations period
governed their claim until the court determined whether their claim
more closely resembled a tort action, a contract action, or an
action under some other statute. And plaintiffs would face
inconsistency to the extent that courts analogize the various
violations of the CHRIA to different common law causes of action.


This Court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold
that the six-year statute of limitations applies to violations of
the CHRIA and applies that time period here.

Punitive Damages Against Government Agencies

In the course of this lawsuit, both the Third Circuit and this
Court, twice have held that the CHRIA abrogates sovereign immunity
such that state agencies may be held liable for punitive damages
under the statute.  

In Franklin County, 174 A.3d at 608, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained that abrogation of sovereign immunity must be expressly
stated and that it had consistently held that where the General
Assembly intends to provide exceptions to immunity, such exceptions
must be specifically and explicitly expressed. This is the same
standard that has been in effect since the beginning of this
litigation, and the same standard that the Third Circuit applied in
affirming this Court's conclusion that sovereign immunity had been
abrogated. Indeed, the Third Circuit directly rejected the argument
that the CHRIA did not expressly abrogate sovereign immunity:
Defendants argue that the penalties provision does not expressly
allow punitive damages to be imposed on a government agency.

The Court disagrees.

Willful Violation

Section 9183 of the CHRIA provides for punitive damages where a
violation was willful. The Defendants contend that punitive damages
are unavailable because their conduct was not willful. The parties
spar over both the definition of willful in the context of the
CHRIA, and whether that definition encompasses the Defendants'
conduct.

Standard for Willfulness

No court has set a standard for what rises to the level of a
willful violation as used in Section 9183 of the CHRIA. In the
absence of controlling authority, the Plaintiff argues that it
should be defined as amounting essentially to reckless
indifference, whereas the Defendants argue it should be defined as
requiring that they actually knew their conduct was illegal.

The Plaintiff contends that willfulness in the context of the CHRIA
amounts to reckless indifference because that is the definition for
willfulness at common law and unless a statute states otherwise,
statutes are never presumed to make any innovation in the rules and
principles of the common law or prior existing law beyond what is
expressly declared in their provisions.  

The Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the presumption
that willful means reckless disregard is defeated by the CHRIA's
relationship to another statute: Pennsylvania's Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act).  

In support of this theory, the Defendants primarily point to
Kilgore v. City of Philadelphia, 717 A.2d 514 (Pa. 1998), a case in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that statutes dealing
with governmental and sovereign immunity are to be interpreted
consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.
According to the Defendants, therefore, Kilgore requires that
willfulness in the CHRIA be interpreted consistently with
willfulness in the Tort Claims Act, i.e., defined as a showing of
intention to do what is known to be wrong.

This Court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
conclude that the CHRIA and the Tort Claims Act are not in pari
materia, and therefore would define willful in the CHRIA as
requiring a showing of reckless disregard or indifference. The
problem with Defendants' argument is that Kilgore does not stand
for the broad proposition that any statute touching upon
governmental or sovereign immunity is in pari materia with all
other statutes that touch upon governmental or sovereign immunity.
Instead, Kilgore stands only for the proposition that the Tort
Claims Act is in pari materia with one specific statute: the
Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act.  

In sum, there is nothing to suggest that the Kilgore court had the
CHRIA in mind, nor anything to suggest that the doctrine of in pari
materia should nevertheless apply. For the reasons set forth supra,
the Court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would define
willful in the CHRIA to mean realized the risk and acted in
conscious disregard or indifference to it or reckless disregard and
applies that standard here.

Accordingly, both parties' motions for summary judgment will be
denied.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Opinion
is available at  http://tinyurl.com/y2c5crv8from Leagle.com.

DARYOUSH TAHA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by ALAN E. DENENBERG, ABRAMSON &
DENENBERG, JONATHAN SHUB -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT &
GRAF PC, JOSEPH C. KOHN -- jkohn@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT & GRAF
PC, KEVIN LAUKAITIS -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT &
GRAF PC & ROBERT J. LAROCCA  -- rlarocca@kohnswift.com -- KOHN
SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.

BUCKS COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA & BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Defendants, represented by FRANK A. CHERNAK -- fchernak@mmwr.com --
MONTGOMERY McCRACKEN WALKER & RHOADS LLP,BURT M. RUBLIN -- RUBLIN
BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP & ERIN
K. CLARKE -- eclarke@mmwr.com -- Montgomery McCracken Walker &
Rhoads LLP.


BUY BUY BABY: Faces Garey Suit Asserting ADA Breach
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Buy Buy Baby, Inc.
The case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Buy Buy Baby, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01665 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Buy Buy Baby, Inc. is an American chain of stores that sell
clothing, strollers and other items for use with infants and young
children. It operates 135 stores across the United States and
Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     Shalom Law, PLLC
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


CABOT OIL & GAS: Messenger Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Messenger, for himself and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation, a Texas
corporation, Carrie's Transport & rental, LLC, a west Virginia
Limited Liability Company, and Herbert H. Swiney, individually,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00308-MEM (M.D. Penn., February 22,
2019) is a complaint against the Defendants to recover overtime pay
as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for the Defendants
in excess of 40 hours within a workweek. Despite working hundreds
of overtime hours for the Defendants, Plaintiff was paid only a
day-rate, with no overtime premiums for his work.

The Defendants' failure and/or refusal ro properly compensate
Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, at the rates and amounts
required by the FLSA was willful and was in reckless disregard of
the law, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Cabot and Carrie's in Susquehanna County, and
Wyoming County, Pennsylvania.

Cabot is an oil and natural gas production and exploration company,
which operates throughout the United States, including in
Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Angeli Murthy, Esq.
     MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
     600 N. Pine Island Rd., Suite 400
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Phone: (954) 327-5369
     Fax: 954-327-3016
     Email: amurthy@forthepeople.com


CAPSTONE TURBINE: Settlement Reached in Kinney & Grooms Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Capstone Turbine Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 7, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2018, that a settlement
has been reached in the consolidated Kinney and Grooms class
action.

Two putative securities class action complaints were filed against
the Company and certain of its current and former officers in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
under the following captions: David Kinney, etc. v. Capstone
Turbine, et al., No. 2:15-CV-08914 on November 16, 2015 (the
"Kinney Complaint") and Kevin M. Grooms, etc. v. Capstone Turbine,
et al., No. 2:15-CV-09155 on November 25, 2015 (the "Grooms
Complaint").

The putative class in the Kinney Complaint was comprised of all
purchasers of the Company's securities between November 7, 2013 and
November 5, 2015. The Kinney Complaint alleges material
misrepresentations and omissions in public statements regarding BPC
and the likelihood that BPC would not be able to fulfill many legal
and financial obligations to the Company.  

The Kinney Complaint also alleges that the Company's financial
statements were not appropriately adjusted in light of this
situation and were not maintained in accordance with GAAP, and that
the Company lacked adequate internal controls over accounting. The
Kinney Complaint alleges that these public statements and
accounting irregularities constituted violations by all named
defendants of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5
thereunder, as well as violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act by the individual defendants.  

The Grooms Complaint makes allegations and claims that are
substantially identical to those in the Kinney Complaint, and both
complaints seek compensatory damages of an undisclosed amount.  

On January 16, 2016, several shareholders filed motions to
consolidate the Kinney and Grooms actions and for appointment as
lead plaintiff. On February 29, 2016, the Court granted the motions
to consolidate, and appointed a lead plaintiff. On May 6, 2016, a
Consolidated Amended Complaint with allegations and claims
substantially identical to those of the Kinney Complaint was filed
in the consolidated action.  

The putative class period in the Consolidated Amended Complaint is
June 12, 2014 to November 5, 2015.  Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint on June 17, 2016. On
March 10, 2017, the Court issued an order granting Defendants'
motion to dismiss in its entirety with leave to amend. Plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint on April 28, 2017. On February 9, 2018,
the Court issued an Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
On March 30, 2018, Defendants filed an answer to the Consolidated
Amended Complaint. On May 17, 2018, the Court issued a scheduling
order setting a trial date of March 17, 2020.  

On June 26, 2018, the Court entered an order vacating all deadlines
through the end of October 2018 and temporarily staying formal
discovery and other proceedings to allow the parties time to
conduct a mediation. The parties participated in mediation on
September 24, 2018, which did not result in a settlement. On
November 16, 2018, after further settlement discussions, the
parties advised the Court that they had reached an agreement in
principle to settle the action in its entirety.

The agreement in principle is subject to several conditions,
including the execution of a stipulation of settlement that is
satisfactory to all parties, and preliminary and final approval
from the court, among other things. The deadline to file the motion
for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement was March 7,
2019.

Capstone Turbine said, "If the settlement is finalized and approved
by the Court, the Company's insurance carrier will fund the
settlement amount. The Company has not recorded any liability as of
December 31, 2018 since any potential loss is not probable or
reasonably estimable given the current status of the proceedings."

Capstone Turbine Corporation develops, manufactures, markets, and
services microturbine technology solutions for use in stationary
distributed power generation applications worldwide. Capstone
Turbine Corporation was founded in 1988 and is headquartered in Van
Nuys, California.


CARMAX AUTO: Santos Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit ANTHONY GILBERT SANTOS, the Plaintiff,
v. CARMAX, INC., CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES CALIFORNIA, LLC, CARMAX
BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES WEST COAST, INC.,
the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 3:17-cv-02447-RS (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court for an order on April 18, 2019:

   1. certifying a plaintiff class defined as:

      "all persons who, in the State of California, purchased
      a vehicle from CarMax that was the subject of a safety
      recall but had not been repaired prior to the sale from
      February 12, 2006, to December 31, 2010";

   2. certifying Anthony Gilbert Santos as the representative
      of the Class; and

   3. appointing the law firms Kabateck LLP and the Law Offices
      of Edward Hess, Jr. as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g)
      of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Brian S. Kabateck, Esq.
          Christopher B. Noyes, Esq.
          Brian Hong, Esq.
          Joana Fang, Esq.
          KABATECK LLP
          633 West Fifth Street, Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 217-5000
          Facsimile: (213) 217-5010
          E-mail: bsk@kbklawyers.com
                  cn@kbklawyers.com
                  byh@kbklawyers.com
                  jf@kbklawyers.com

               - and -

          Edward W. Hess, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD W. HESS, JR.
          601 Parkcenter Drive, Suite 107-108
          Santa Ana, CA 92705
          Telephone: 714 508-1400

CENTRAL TERMITE: Bynum Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER BYNUM, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. CENTRAL TERMITE & PEST NWA, LLC, Case No.
4:19-cv-131-SWW (E.D. Ark., February 20, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's alleged failure to pay proper minimum wage and overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas
Minimum Wage Act.

Central Termite & Pest NWA, LLC, is a for-profit entity registered
to conduct business in the state of Arkansas.  The Company is
headquartered in Rogers, Arkansas.

Central Termite operates a pest control company based in Little
Rock, under the business name of Central Termite & Pest Control,
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          April Rheaume, Esq.
          Steve Rauls, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: april@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  steve@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Stays Vado False Advertising Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Stay in
the case captioned JESIKA VADO, Plaintiff, v. CHAMPION PETFOODS
USA, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-07118-JCS. (N.D.
Cal.).

Presently before the Court is Defendant Champion's Motion to Stay
Action or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss.

Vado alleges that Champion deceptively marketed its Acana and
Orijen brand pet foods (Pet Food Products) as Biologically
Appropriate and designed to nourish dogs and cats according to
their evolutionary adaptation to a diet rich and diverse in fresh
meat and protein when the products allegedly contained harmful
chemicals, toxins and artificial and/or synthetic ingredients.  

She alleges that she purchased the Pet Food Products at Pet Food
Express, which sells Champion's Acana and Orijen pet food. Vado
asserts claims for (1) negligent misrepresentation against all
Defendants (2) violations of California's Consumer Legal Remedies
Act against all Defendants (3) violations of California False
Advertising Law, Ca. Bus. & Prof. Code against all Defendants (4)
violations of the Unfair Competition Law, against all Defendants
(5) breach of express warranty, against Champion (6) breach of
implied warranty, against Champion and (7) quasi-contract, against
all Defendants.

The Removal

Champion removed Vado's action to federal court, asserting that
jurisdiction is proper under CAFA. First, Champion contends there
are at least 100 members in the putative class, pointing to Vado's
allegation that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.   

Second, Champion asserts that there is minimal diversity because
Vado and all of the members of the putative class are residents of
California, while Champion Petfoods USA is a Delaware corporation,
with its principal place of business located in Kentucky, and
Champion Petfoods LP is a Canadian limited partnership with its
principal place of business in Edmonton, Alberta.  

In the Motion to Stay or Dismiss, Champion argues that this action
should be stayed under the first-to-file doctrine because Reitman
was filed seven months before Vado filed the complaint in this
action and the cases involve identical class claims. Champion also
argues the claims asserted in this case should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure
to state a claim. Vado opposes the Motion to Stay or Dismiss,
arguing that the case should be remanded to state court under the
local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction.  

Pet Food Express, like Vado, argues that the case should be
remanded to state court under CAFA's local controversy exception
and asks the Court to decide this jurisdictional question before
addressing whether the case should be stayed or dismissed. In
contrast to Vado, however, Pet Food Express does not oppose entry
of a stay under the first-to-file doctrine. To the contrary, in its
Reply on the Motion to Remand, it states that there is little
question that this action should be stayed either by this Court or
by the Alameda County Superior Court as the Complaint in this
action is nearly an exact copy of the First Amended Complaint filed
in the first-filed Central District case.

Motion to Stay or Dismiss

Legal Standards Governing First-to-File Rule

The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay proceedings
if a similar case with substantially similar issues and parties was
previously filed in another district court.

Likewise, the issues in the earlier-filed case need only be
substantially similar to those in the subsequent case, a
requirement that is met when there is substantial overlap between
the two suits.  

When determining whether the parties are substantially similar in
the class action context, most courts compare the classes, not
their representatives, even when certification has not yet taken
place. Further, Champion is named as a defendant in both cases and,
as discussed above, the allegations in both cases are directed
almost entirely at Champion. The only difference with respect to
the parties in the two cases is the addition of Pet Food Express as
a defendant in this action. Under these circumstances, the Court
concludes that the goals of judicial economy, efficiency and comity
will be served by staying this case and that the parties and issues
raised in this case are substantially similar.

Accordingly, the Motion to Stay or Dismiss is granted as to the
request to stay the case under the first-to-file rule.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y5a34nvlfrom Leagle.com.

Jesika Vado, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey R. Krinsk --
jrk@classactionlaw.com -- Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP, Joshua Charles
Anaya, jca@classactionlaw.com --  Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP &Mark L.
Knutson  -- MLK@Knutson-Law.com -- Law Offices of Mark L. Knutson,
APC.

Champion Petfoods USA, Inc. & Champion Petfoods LP, Defendants,
represented by David Andrew Coulson -- coulsond@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig, Michael D. Lane -- lanemd@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig, LLP & Ricky Lynn Shackelford -- shackelfordr@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

Pet Food Express Ltd., Defendant, represented by John Douglas Moore
-- jmoore@recyclelaw.com -- Henn, Etzel & Moore.


CJS SOLUTIONS: Partly Compelled to Produce Docs Requests in Borup
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY C. BORUP, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE CJS SOLUTIONS GROUP,
LLC, d/b/a The HCI Group, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-1647 (PAM/DTS)
(D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota granted in part and denied in
part Borup's Motion to Compel Disclosures and Discovery Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).

Borup filed a "collective and class action" lawsuit under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Minnesota state law alleging that the
Defendant misclassified him and others as independent contractors,
resulting in loss of overtime pay.  In his Complaint, Borup alleges
that CJS employed him and others as consultants to assist medical
facilities as they transition to electronic recordkeeping systems.
These consultants are known as "ATEs" because they work "at the
elbows" of a facility's employees for a brief period as the
facility "goes live" with the electronic system.  Borup worked for
CJS for one such "go live" project at the Mayo Clinic in 2018.

He contends that, though CJS classified him and other consultants
as independent contractors, the reality of the arrangement properly
rendered them CJS employees.  He also contends that he and other
consultants regularly worked 12-hour days, 7 days a week during the
Mayo Clinic and other "go live" events.  But, because CJS
classified them as independent contractors, they were not paid
overtime under either the Fair Labor Standards Act or Minnesota
state law.  Borup seeks to have his lawsuit certified as a
collective action for the FLSA claim and as a Rule 23 class action
for the Minnesota statutory claim.

CJS previously faced lawsuits alleging it failed to pay appropriate
overtime wages due to misclassifying employees as independent
contractors.  It settled these lawsuits in 2018.  The settlement
was universally binding on claims under New York, North Carolina,
and Washington law.  It was only binding on FLSA claims if a class
member opted-in and deposited the settlement award check.

While the litigation was ongoing, CJS changed its practice and
began classifying almost all its ATE consultants as employees.
However, it continued to classify certain ATEs who were medical
doctors, medical residents, or medical students, as independent
contractors.  These consultants, "ATE MDs", received some
additional training and allegedly exercise greater discretion over
their work.  The Mayo Clinic event has been the only "go live"
project thus far under CJS' new classification regime.

Borup now seeks to compel discovery from CJS, arguing that many of
CJS's responses to his interrogatories and document requests were
deficient.  Borup served his first discovery requests in November
of 2018.  Many of the requests, including the single interrogatory,
are aimed at identifying and classifying individuals whom Borup
contends are similarly situated to him, but who have not released
their claims against CJS.  

CJS objected to the interrogatory and nearly every request for
production.  Some responses directed Borup to documents previously
produced as part of CJS' initial Rule 26 disclosures.  CJS' central
objections are that the discovery requests are irrelevant, overly
broad, or inappropriately attempt to relitigate the prior lawsuits
that led to settlement.  Beyond these objections, CJS' objections
are mere boilerplate.  CJS primarily questions the relevance of the
information Borup seeks, including those requests relating to the
scope and certifiability of the FLSA and Rule 23 classes, as well
as matters of privilege and breadth.

Because much of the information sought is at least relevant to the
certifiability of the collective action under the FLSA, as well as
the merits of the FLSA claim, Magistrate Judge Schultz finds that
Borup is entitled to much -- though not all -- of what he seeks.

Accordingly, he granted in part and denied in part Borup's Motion
to Compel Disclosures and Discovery.  The Defendant will answer the
Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1.  

CJS will produce all documents requested in the Plaintiff's
Document Requests Nos. 1-18 and 21-28, subject to the following
specific modifications:

     a. Document Request No. 5: For all workers identified in
Interrogatory No. 1, the Defendant will produce all documents
identifying which workers traveled to any out-of-town locations
related to go live events, and when they did so.

     b. Document Request No. 9: The Defendant will produce the
documents requested to the extent they relate to any of the
parties' claims or defenses are not otherwise privileged.

     c. Document Requests Nos. 14-15: The Defendant will treat
these requests as they were served as interrogatories.

The Defendant need not produce documents requested by the
Plaintiff's Document Requests Nos.19 to 20 and 29 to 30.  

The Judge finds that Document Request 19 seeks the number of hours
CJS billed clients for work by the identified individuals.  To the
extent Borup seeks the information to get conditional
certification, that information is sufficiently covered by Borup's
other discovery requests.

In addition, the Judge largely agrees regarding Document Requests
20, 29 and 30.  These requests seek communications between the
counsel during the settlement, as well as documents produced, and
discovery disclosed, to the Plaintiffs as part of the prior
lawsuits.  He finds that the requests are irrelevant and overbroad
because they sweep into discovery documents relating primarily to
individuals who have already settled and waived their claims.  To
the extent that some of the documents would be relevant to showing
a common policy, other requests provide Borup with that
information.  Of course, CJS may produce the documents it produced
in these prior cases if doing so lessens the burden of complying
with the discovery in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gRUHeJ from Leagle.com.

Timothy C. Borup, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kelly A. Lelo --
klelo@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP, T. Joseph Snodgrass --
jsnodgrass@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP & Thomas A. Jacobson,
Swenson Lervick Syverson Anderson Trosvig Jacobson, PA.

The CJS Solutions Group, LLC, doing business as The HCI Group,
Defendant, represented by Claire B. Deason -- cdeason@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.A., Corey Christensen --
cchristensen@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C. & Jacqueline E.
Kalk -- jkalk@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC.


CLBL INC: Garey Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CLBL, Inc. The case
is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CLBL, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01669 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

CLBL, Inc. retails music compact discs and VHS and DVD movies
through the Internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     Shalom Law, PLLC
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


COMMUNITY PROBATION: Court OKs Injunctive Relief in McNeil
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Columbia Division, issued a Memorandum granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned
KAREN MCNEIL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES,
LLC, et al., Defendants. No. 1:18-cv-00033. (M.D. Tenn.).

Plaintiff Indya Hilfort, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, alleges Defendants Giles County and Sheriff Kyle Helton
(County Defendants) violate the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining
indigent individuals who are unable to pay the secured bail amount
pre-pre-printed on violation-of-probation arrest warrants.

The Motion requests a classwide preliminary injunction on Count 15
enjoining: "Defendant Giles County, the Sheriff, and their
officers, agents, employees, servants, attorneys, and all persons
in active concert or participation with them from enforcing against
any person on misdemeanor probation in Giles County any secured
financial condition of release on a violation of probation warrant
determined without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to
pay, consideration of alternatives, or a finding by an appropriate
judicial officer that pre-revocation detention is necessary to meet
a compelling government interest."

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is to
consider: (1) the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits
(2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the
injunction (3) whether granting the injunction will cause
substantial harm to others and (4) the impact of the injunction on
the public interest.

The Plaintiffs argue they have shown a likelihood of success on the
merits on their claim that detaining indigent misdemeanor probation
arrestees based on a secured bail amount imposed in the absence of
the arrestee, and without an inquiry into the ability to pay,
consideration of alternatives, and a finding that detention is
necessary violates the equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The issue presented here, involving indigent defendants and the
imposition of secured bail for pretrial release, has not been
considered by the Supreme Court, but has been the subject of
numerous lower court decisions. In Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1978), the plaintiffs challenged, among other things, the
pretrial detention of indigent defendants in Florida solely because
they were unable to post bail as a condition of release. While the
case was pending, the Supreme Court of Florida promulgated a new
rule listing six forms of release, one of which contemplated the
execution of a bail bond with sureties or the deposit of cash in
lieu thereof. The plaintiffs argued the new rule was deficient in
the case of indigents because it did not require a presumption
against money bail and a presumption for the other enumerated forms
of release.  

In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged, based on Williams, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970) and Tate, Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971), that
imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious
discrimination and not constitutionally permissible. Applying that
principle to pretrial bail, the court explained, requires a
balancing of the state's compelling interest in assuring the
presence at trial of persons charged with crime and the
understanding that the accused individuals remain clothed with a
presumption of innocence and with their constitutional rights
intact. Those considerations led the court to conclude that equal
protection and due process prohibit the setting of bail in excess
of what is necessary to reasonably assure defendant's presence at
trial.

The Plaintiffs in this case claim the secured bail system in Giles
County violates the equal protection and due process rights of
indigent misdemeanor probation arrestees. Turning to the equal
protection claim, the Court is persuaded heightened scrutiny is the
appropriate standard to apply because Plaintiffs have demonstrated
an inability to afford bail and an absence of meaningful
consideration of other possible alternatives to secured bail. The
evidence presented by the parties demonstrates the secured bail
amounts written on the arrest warrants for misdemeanor probationers
are determined prior to arrest, and without an opportunity for the
arrestee to be heard or present evidence regarding ability to pay
or alternative conditions of release. In addition, the judges
writing in the secured bail amounts do not make factual findings
concerning the person's ability to pay, the necessity of detention,
or the adequacy of alternative conditions of release.  

Individuals who are able to pay the secured bail amount written on
the warrant are informed of a date to appear in court for an
arraignment, and are released from custody by the Sheriff's
deputies. Those who cannot afford to pay the bail amount are kept
in jail while they wait for a court date to be set by the General
Sessions or Circuit Courts.

For example, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs shows that
Mr. Clinnon Alexander was detained for 22 days before his first
in-court appearance because he could not afford to pay either a
$500 cash bond (requiring him to pay the full $500) or a $10,000
secured bond (meaning he could have paid a 10% nonrefundable
premium to a commercial bonding agent) required for his release.
Mr. James Matthew Allen was detained for over 21 days before his
first in-court appearance because he could not afford to pay either
a $210 cash bond or a $5,000 secured bond required for his release.


Even the initial post-arrest hearings do not provide an opportunity
for indigent arrestees to obtain bail reductions5 or to seek
alternative conditions of release, nor are there any factual
findings made about the necessity of detention. Thus, to survive an
equal protection challenge, the distinction created by the current
bail system in Giles County between indigent misdemeanor probation
arrestees and other arrestees must be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling governmental interest.  

The defense largely relies on procedural arguments in opposing the
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, and has not made
any significant arguments that the bail system described in the
stipulated facts serves any compelling governmental interest. Even
if the Court assumes the Defendants have a legitimate interest in
ensuring arrestees appear at their revocation hearings and in
protecting the community from dangerous criminals, however, the
Defendants have presented no proof to suggest the current bail
system furthers those interests. For example, the Defendants have
presented no statistical evidence of the court-appearance rates or
new criminal activity rates of those released after arrest.

The Defendants have not shown that arrestees who are able to pay
the secured bail amount are more likely to appear for their
revocation hearing and less likely to commit crime. As pointed out
by the court in Schultz, a dangerous arrestee who can post bond
immediately returns to the community to which she is a threat,
suffering only the inconvenience of detention of no more than two
hours.

Given the complete absence of evidence supporting the bail system
in Giles County for indigent misdemeanor probation arrestees, the
Court concludes that, even if it applied the rational basis
standard, Defendants have failed to show the current bail system
rationally furthers a legitimate governmental interest.  

As to the Plaintiffs' due process claim, the Court is persuaded by
the authority described above that the system of setting secured
bail as described in the stipulated facts is constitutionally
deficient in failing to provide notice and an opportunity for the
arrestee to be heard, and for failing to provide oral or written
findings regarding the arrestee's ability to pay, alternative
conditions of release, and the need for pre-revocation detention.


The Defendants argue that, even if the Court concludes the secured
bail system at issue here is constitutionally infirm, they are not
the parties who should be enjoined. The Defendant Helton contends
that, as Sheriff, he is required to execute the arrest warrants
issued by Giles County judges, and cannot second-guess the validity
of those warrants. The Defendants argue that to demonstrate
municipal liability, the Plaintiffs must show the local
government's policy or custom was the moving force behind the
alleged constitutional violation. According to the Defendants, the
moving force underlying the constitutional claims at issue here is
the issuance of arrest warrants with secured bail amounts, which is
solely within the purview of the judges.

The custom or policy the Plaintiffs challenge in Count 15, however,
is the practice of the Sheriff in detaining misdemeanor probation
arrestees who cannot satisfy the secured bail amount written on the
arrest warrant. As the official in charge of the operation of the
county jail, the Sheriff effectuates the detention of these
indigent misdemeanor probation arrestees.

Despite the Defendants' arguments to the contrary, the relief
requested by the Plaintiffs does not require the Sheriff or his
deputies to refrain from serving arrest warrants, nor does it
require they second-guess the validity of arrest warrants. The
injunctive relief requested focuses on the Sheriff's role as jailer
in detaining misdemeanor probation arrestees after arrest based
solely on the individual's inability to pay the secured bail amount
written on the arrest warrant. Complying with such injunctive
relief does not require the Sheriff, or his employees, to engage in
any kind of legal analysis to understand that detaining an arrestee
based on such an arrest warrant with a secured bail amount cannot
be the basis for constitutional detention under the system
described in the stipulated facts. The Fifth Circuit in O'Donnell
approved similar injunctive relief regarding the sheriff in that
case.  

To the extent the Defendants challenge the issuance of injunctive
relief before the Court rules on the Plaintiffs' pending motion for
class certification, that challenge is without merit. The Court may
grant preliminary injunctive relief protecting class members under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), based upon its general equity powers.  

For these reasons, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have
established a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the
constitutional claims raised in Count 15. As for the other Rule 65
considerations, the Court is persuaded Plaintiff Hilfort and other
similarly-situated indigent misdemeanor probation arrestees will
suffer irreparable harm, namely, the unconstitutional deprivation
of their liberty, absent the injunction. Detention of these
arrestees, who are otherwise deemed eligible for release, solely
due to the inability to pay the secured bail amount on the arrest
warrant can result in loss of work, separation from family, undue
pressure to plead guilty, and other negative consequences as
outlined in Dr. Jones' Report. This threatened harm outweighs any
harm to Defendants or to the public interest.

The Defendants have presented no evidence demonstrating the
injunctive relief requested will result in increased danger to the
community given that these indigent arrestees are otherwise deemed
eligible for release. Nor have the Defendants demonstrated the
release of these indigent arrestees will likely result in their
failure to appear for court hearings. Finally, the Defendants have
not demonstrated the costs of alternatives to detention for these
arrestees are greater than the costs of incarceration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/y426rfcvfrom
Leagle.com.

Karen McNeil, Lesley Johnson, Tanya Mitchell, Indya Hilfort & Sonya
Beard, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Chirag Badlani -- cbadlani@hsplegal.com
-- Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd., David W. Garrison --
dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Elizabeth Anne Rossi, Civil Rights Corps, Eric
Halperin, Civil Rights Corps, Jonas Wang, Civil Rights Corps, Kate
E. Schwartz -- kschwartz@hsplegal.com --  Hughes, Socol, Piers,
Resnick & Dym, Ltd., Kyle F. Mothershead, The Law Office of Kyle
Mothershead, Matthew J. Piers -- mpiers@hsplegal.com -- Hughes,
Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd. & Scott P. Tift  --
stift@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC.

Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation Services,
L.L.C., Community Probation Services & Patricia McNair, Defendants,
represented by Andre S. Greppin, Moore, Rader, Fitzpatrick and
York, P.C. & Daniel H. Rader, IV, Moore, Rader, Clift &
Fitzpatrick, P.C.


CONNECTICUT: Union Sues Over Denied Pay for Meal Time Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut State Police Union, on behalf of the Union, and its
Individuals, and all persons similarly situated v. State of
Connecticut, et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00037 (D. Conn., January 9,
2019), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs bring this action to recover unpaid compensation as
it relates to meal time and other relief under provisions of the
FLSA. The Defendants, through their denial of compensation for meal
time has denied compensation for members of the Union.

The Plaintiff, Connecticut State Police Union, is a labor union and
collective bargaining unit within the Defendants, State of
Connecticut which represents Connecticut State Troopers. The
Plaintiffs are members or retired members of the Connecticut State
Police Union which is an employee representative of State
Troopers.

The Defendant, State of Connecticut has been established under the
Connecticut State Constitution. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Jeffrey L. Ment, Esq.
      THE MENT LAW GROUP, LLC
      225 Asylum Street
      Hartford, CT 06103-3101
      Tel: (860) 969-3200
      Fax: (860) 969-3210
      E-mail: jment@mentlaw.com


CREDIT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Gissendaner FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW GISSENDANER, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT CORP SOLUTIONS,
INC., d/b/a Tasman Credit, Defendant, Case No. 6:18-CV-06313 EAW
(W.D. N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of New York (i) granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss, and (ii) denied the Defendant's and the
Plaintiff's respective motions for sanctions and costs.

On Jan. 30, 2018, the Defendant mailed a letter to the Plaintiff
seeking to collect an alleged debt relating to a credit card issued
by Synchrony Bank.  The Letter informed the Plaintiff that the
Defendant had purchased the debt from Synchrony Bank on Dec. 20,
2017.  By the time Defendant acquired the debt, the Plaintiff had
already defaulted on his account balance

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, on April 23, 2018, alleging
that the Defendant sought to collect a debt from him and others in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The
Plaintiff claims that because his credit card account had accrued
interest at a rate exceeding that permitted by New York's usury
statutes while his balance was pending with the original creditor,
the Defendant unlawfully attempted to take or receive interest in
violation of New York law by seeking to collect the principal due
after the account had been charged off.

On June 12, 2018, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim, which also
includes a request for court-ordered sanctions and costs.  The
Plaintiff opposes the Defendant's motion and requests the Court
award him attorneys' fees as a counter-sanction for the Defendant's
own request for sanctions.

Judge Wolford finds that because the Defendant's attempt to collect
the principal balance on the Plaintiff's credit card account, by
definition, did not charge, take, or receive "interest on the
loan," it also did not violate or otherwise implicate New York's
usury laws.  Construing the FDCPA as a barrier to the collection of
principal composed of lawful interest charges would be wholly
unreasonable and completely unrelated to the purposes for which the
statute was enacted.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff has failed to assert that
the Defendant ever charged him an usurious interest rate.  The fact
that Synchrony Bank may have charged the Plaintiff an interest rate
in excess of New York's usury laws does not invalidate the debt
sought by the Defendant -- Synchrony Bank is located in Utah and
thus, New York's usury laws do not apply to it.  While New York's
usury laws do apply to the Defendant, its attempt to collect the
principal due on the Plaintiff's credit card account does not
implicate New York's usury statutes and does not violate the FDCPA.
Therefore, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Complaint is granted.

Without reaching its merits, the Judge declines to consider the
Defendant's request for Rule 11 sanctions, because it failed to
comply with Rule 11's procedural requirements in moving for
sanctions against the Plaintiff.  Although the Plaintiff's
Complaint is based upon an unfounded legal theory, the Judget does
not find "clear evidence" that the Plaintiff or his counsel acted
in bad faith in commencing the action.  The Plaintiff's
misunderstanding of the law may have resulted in the assertion of a
meritless cause of action, but this alone is not grounds for the
imposition of sanctions.

Finally, because the Plaintiff's request for an award of attorneys'
fees and costs is not warranted, the Judge also denies the
Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions.  Although she did not reach
the merits of the Defendant's Rule 11 motion, the reasons the
Defendant advanced for the imposition of sanctions under that Rule
are similar to those asserted in support of its related Section
1927 and inherent powers arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolford granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss, dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint, and denied
the Defendant's and the Plaintiffs respective requests for
sanctions.  The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/YreWQq from Leagle.com.

Andrew Gissendanner, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Jerome
Douglas -- alex@lawroc.com -- Douglas Firm, P.C.

Credit Corp Solutions, Inc., doing business as Tasman Credit,
Defendant, represented by Hilary F. Korman -- hkorman@blankrome.com
-- Blank Rome LLP & Scott Evan Wortman -- swortman@blankrome.com --
Blank Rome LLP.


CUYANA INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cuyana, Inc. The case
is styled as Thomas J. Olsen individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cuyana, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01109 (E.D. N.Y., Feb. 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Cuyana, Inc. manufactures and retails clothing, bodysuits, bags,
small leather goods, and accessories. It operates an online
platform and also owns showrooms, which retail its products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


EDGE PARTNERS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Beadle Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY BEADLE, on his own behalf, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals v. EDGE PARTNERS, LLC, d/b/a/FLAMINGO RESORT a
Florida corporation and JACK DOUGHERTY, individually, Case No.
8:19-cv-00443-SCB-AEP (M.D. Fla., February 20, 2019), alleges that
the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to
pay the Plaintiff minimum wages and overtime wages based on his
regular hourly rate for those hours worked in excess of 40 within a
work week.

Edge Partners, LLC, doing business as Flamingo Resort, is a Florida
corporation, which operates and conducts business in Pinellas
County, Florida.  Jack Dougherty, is the Owner and Manager of Edge
Partners.

Flamingo Resort is a resort, bar and restaurant located in St.
Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida.  Flamingo Resort provides
lodging, food and beverages to the general public.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Fraley, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 North Franklin Street, Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 393-5457
          Facsimile: (813) 393-5481
          E-mail: mfraley@forthepeople.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Court Narrows Documents Production in Bruno
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production in the case captioned
DANIEL BRUNO, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, et
al., Defendants. No. 2:17-cv-327-WBS-EFB. (E.D. Cal.).

This case was before the court on plaintiff's motion to compel
defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC (Equifax) to produce
documents responsive to plaintiff's First Requests for Production
of Documents that were withheld on the basis of privilege.

The Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) against defendants Equifax; Geneva Financial
Services, Inc. (Geneva Inc.) and its officers Mark Hassan and John
McGinley; Geneva Motors, Inc. d/b/a Geneva Financial Services
(Geneva Motors) and its president and CEO, Kamies Elhouty; REBS
Supply Inc. d/b/a REBS Marketing, Inc. (REBS) and its CEO, Andy
Mitchell; and Robert McGinley. The crux of plaintiff's complaint is
that Equifax improperly furnished his and proposed class members'
credit information to the other defendants, who did not have a
permissible purpose for obtaining such information.

The Plaintiff has moved to compel the production of those
documents, arguing that Equifax has wrongfully withheld four
categories of documents that are not covered by the attorney-client
privilege: (1) employee-to-employee communications (2)
communications sent to Equifax client services mailboxes (3)
Equifax employee statements that were not transmitted to an
individual and (4) communications between Equifax employees and
third-parties.

Relevant Legal Standards

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
between attorneys and clients, which are made for the purpose of
giving legal advice. The party asserting the attorney-client
privilege has the burden of establishing the relationship and the
privileged nature of the communication and if necessary, to
segregate the privileged information from the non-privileged
information. The attorney-client privilege exists: (1) Where legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.

The Supreme Court addressed the application of the attorney client
privilege in the context of a corporate client. The Supreme Court
held that the privilege applies to communications by any corporate
employee regardless of position when the communications concern
matters within the scope of the employee's corporate duties and the
employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable
the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.

Employee-to Employee Communications

The Plaintiff argues that Equifax has improperly withheld or
redacted several employee-to-employee communications that are not
covered by the attorney-client privilege. He contends that these
communications, which were made between non-attorney Equifax
employees, do not relate to legal advice because there is no
indication that they were made on behalf, or at the behest of, an
attorney.  

Equifax counters that plaintiff's argument is premised on the
flawed assumption that one can determine whether the withheld
communication contains protected statements based on the
surrounding communications.  

This category of documents consists of 68 documents. Documents 1
through 57 of Volume A7 consist of various emails, as well as two
email attachments, sent between various Equifax employees, some of
which are members of Equifax's in-house counsel. Upon thorough
review of each of these emails, it is evident that many, but not
all, of these email communications are privileged.

Document 1 is an email relating to a request for legal advice from
attorney Doug Sperry, in-house counsel for Equifax. Accordingly,
the email is privileged. Document 2 and 3 contain a series of
communications from the same email chain. These emails primarily
consist of privileged communications made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. However, the earliest email in both
documents is from Jack Bourlas, a Datamyx employee, concerning
business dealings between Equifax and Datamyx. While the other
communications in these documents are privileged, the email from
Jack Bourlas is not and must be produced.

Documents 4-8, 9-10 and 20-24, and 11-17, are three separate email
chains, all containing internal communications made for the purpose
of securing legal advice and, therefore, are privileged. Documents
18-19 and 25-29 contain a series of related emails, the vast
majority constituting attorney-client communications. However,
Equifax has not shown that the most recently sent email in document
18 and the two most recently sent emails in document 27 contain
communications made for the purpose of facilitating legal advice.
Instead, these emails, which are between two non-attorney
employees, pertain to a purely business matter.

Accordingly, these three emails must be produced, but the remaining
emails may be redacted.
As for documents 30-37, Equifax produced these documents but with
redactions. Documents 30-36 are related emails, and the redacted
portions contain privilege communications made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. The same is true of the one redaction made
to documents 37.

The court also finds that the emails in documents 38 and 39, which
were withheld in their entirety, are protected by the privilege.

Equifax, however, has failed to meet its burden of showing that the
email communications in documents 40 and 41 are privileged.
Document 40 contains a series of emails related to an internal
review of a separate entity with which Equifax does business. None
of the emails were drafted by in-house counsel. Although an Equifax
attorney was among the eight employees copied, or cc-ed, on the
earlier emails, nothing suggests that these attorneys received the
emails to facilitate the rendering of legal advice. The emails do
not request legal advice from either of the attorney recipients,
nor is there any indication that either attorney responded to the
emails. Counsel's mere inclusion among the recipients of the
initial emails is not sufficient to afford protection under
attorney-client privilege. More significantly, the email chain's
seven most recently sent emails are between four non-attorney
employees and are each designated for those recipients' eyes only.
That designation demonstrates that these communications were not
made for the purpose of obtaining or sharing previously rendered
legal advice. As for document 41, it consists of the same series of
emails, but with the two most recently sent emails excluded.

Accordingly, Equifax has failed to show that documents 40 and 41
are protected by the attorney-client privilege.

As for documents 42 and 58-61, Equifax's in camera submission
indicates that it has withdrawn its assertion of the privilege for
these documents. Accordingly, these documents must be produced, if
Equifax has not already done so.

Documents 43-57 consist of a series of emails, each related to a
legal opinion provided by in-house counsel Doug Sperry concerning a
proposed mailer. Documents 43-48 and 52 were withheld, while
documents 49-51 and 53-57 were produced with redactions. The
withheld documents, and the redacted portions of the produced
documents, reflect privileged communications, including Mr.
Sperry's advice and employee discussions related to that advice.
While these communications would usually be protected from
disclosure, the record reflects that Equifax failed to maintain the
confidentiality of Mr. Sperry's legal advice. Documents 6 and 7 of
Volume D8 reflect that Mr. Sperry's legal advice regarding the
proposed mailer was voluntarily disclosed to a third-party, thereby
waiving the privilege for all communications related to that
advice.

Accordingly, all communications in documents 43-57 are no longer
protected by the attorney-client privileged and must be produced.

The remaining seven documents in this category, documents 62-68,
are identified by Equifax's privilege log as email attachments. The
documents, which were produced but with more than 30 redactions,
consist of hundreds of pages of spreadsheets. Equifax explains that
the redacted portions memorialize either prior communications with
Equifax employees and Equifax in-house attorneys regarding
compliance with federal or state laws, the intent to engage in such
attorney-client communications, or both.

Equifax's vague and conclusory explanation fails to provide any
assistance in determining whether each of the redactions was
proper. It does not provide any context for any particular
redaction, nor does it explain how the redacted information relates
to legal advice concerning compliance with state and federal laws.
This is problematic since it is not obvious from reviewing the
documents that all redacted information relates to the seeking or
rendering of legal advice.

Having thoroughly reviewed documents 62-68, the court finds that
Equifax has failed to make a clear showing that the redacted
communications appearing at the pages with the following bates
numbers were made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
advice.

Because it is not evident that the redactions on the pages with the
bates numbers cited above contain legal, as opposed to business,
advice from in-house counsel, Equifax has failed to satisfy its
burden of demonstrating that the communications are privileged.

Communications Sent to Equifax Group Mailboxes

The Plaintiff also challenges Equifax's assertion of the privilege
over emails Equifax employee Doria Langenkamp sent to two client
services group mailboxes. He argues that there is no indication
that the emails were sent for the purpose of exchanging legal
advice or that Ms. Langenkamp sent the communications within the
scope of her corporate duties.

The nine documents in this category are from two separate email
chains, as well as email attachments from one of the chains.
Document 112 is a series of emails that were produced, but with two
redactions. Both redactions contain the same legal opinion from
Shiriki Cavitt, in-house counsel for Equifax, regarding a contract.
Similarly, the communications in the other email chain, which are
contained in documents 2-6, are between non-legal employees and
attorney Shiriki Cavitt relating to contracts. Thus, the
communications were made for the purpose of facilitating legal
advice.

Equifax, however, has failed to demonstrate that three email
attachments related to the second email chain documents 2A, 2B, and
2C contain privileged information. The three attachments appear to
be general forms utilized by Equifax employees and do not relate to
legal advice. Although these documents were sent in relation to
privileged emails, Equifax is required to show that the information
in each email attachment is protected.   

As Equifax has failed to make such a showing, these email
attachments must be produced.
As for the emails that are privileged, plaintiff further argues
that Equifax has waived the privilege because all Equifax employee
in the Client Services Department had access to the emails. With
its in camera submission, Equifax included the declaration of
Jessica Spurlock, a member of Equifax's in-house legal staff. Ms.
Spurlock states that, with the exception of the IT department, only
five members of the Client Services Department had access to the
Client Services Account Setup mailbox, while only four member of
the department had access to the Client Services Contract
Management mailbox.  

The court accepts these representations and finds no basis for
concluding that Equifax widely disseminated these emails and
thereby waived their privileged status.

Communications Without a Recipient

Equifax's May privilege log identifies several withheld documents
that did not have a recipient. Plaintiff argues that because the
documents were not sent to another individual, Equifax cannot
establish that information in these documents was conveyed for the
purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice.  

Equifax's in camera submission reflects that it has withdrawn its
claim of privilege for several of the withheld documents, with
Equifax now claiming that only nine documents within this category
contain protected information.14 Documents 1, 2, 3, 3A, 4 and 4A
are all related.

Documents 1 and 2 are identical. They contain a draft email
prepared by Equifax employee Oliver Markham Healey, as well as an
email Mr. Healey sent to Jason Esteves, in-house counsel for
Equifax.15 Documents 3 and 4, which are identical, also contain the
same email Mr. Healey sent Mr. Esteves, but without the draft email
found in documents 1 and 2. The email Mr. Healey sent to in-house
counsel was sent for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and was
related to the same information contained in his draft email.
Accordingly, Mr. Healey's email to counsel, as well as his draft
email, are covered by the privilege.  

Each of these documents, however, also include an email from
defendant John McGinley. Since Mr. McGinley is not an Equifax
employee, his communications are not covered by the privilege. In
the same vein, documents 3A and 4A are both copies of a letter
addressed to Mr. McGinley, which he subsequently shared with
Equifax. Consequently, these documents also fall outside the
privilege.

The remaining documents in this category, documents 5, 6 and 7 were
produced to plaintiff with redactions. These documents, which are
substantially similar in form to documents 62-68 in Volume A are
comprised of approximately 2,400 pages of spreadsheets containing
over 200 redactions. A thorough review of these documents reflects
that many of the redacted statements pertain to the giving or
receiving of legal advice.  

To address each redaction separately in this order is simply not
practical and would waste scarce judicial resources. The court,
however, has performed the onerous task of carefully reviewing each
redaction, and finds that Equifax has failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that redactions at the pages identified by the
following bates numbers contain privileged information:
EIS-BRUNO-453970, 453987 (both redactions), 453990 (both
redactions), 454080 (rows 51, 53, and 54), 454091 (rows 32, 34, and
35), 454108, 454488 (rows 237-249 and 252-263), 454492, 454493,
454501 (row 402), 454508, 454527, 455631, 455649, 455655, 455664
(rows 74-75), 455762, 456169, 456170, 456180 (row 402), 456189,
456190, 456494 (both redactions), 456506 (both redactions), 457034
(row 402), and 457189.

Accordingly, these pages must be produced without these
redactions.

Communications Between Equifax Employees and Cauley Sutton, John
McGinley, Robert McGinley, and David Baily

The final category consists of seven documents containing
communications between Equifax employees and third-parties Cauley
Sutton, John McGinley, Robert McGinley, and David Baily. Equifax
contends that the communications with these individuals are
privileged under the common interest doctrine.  .

Document 1-5 are emails from the same email chain that were
produced with redactions. Documents 1 is an email from Equifax
employee Lance Rubeck to Datamyx employee Cauley Sutton. That email
included prior email exchanges between Equifax employees, which are
found in documents 2-5. Equifax produced these emails but redacted
the entire communication between Mr. Rubeck and Mr. Sutton, as well
as earlier statements made by another Equifax employee to Mr.
Rubeck. Equifax claims that the redacted communications are covered
by the common interest doctrine because Equifax and Datamyx share a
common legal interest.   

Equifax explains that both it and Datamyx, who was responsible for
providing Equifax data to Geneva Financial, had a shared interest
in complying with the FCRA in providing data to Geneva Financial.
In his declaration, Mr. Rubeck further explains that the withheld
documents contain the ongoing legal analysis being conducted by Mr.
Sperry (Equifax's in-house counsel) to assess the state and/or
federal lawcompliance   implications of the activity attributed to
Geneva. Mr. Rubeck further states that both Equifax and its
processing agent Datamyx needed to know the status and results of
attorney Sperry's legal analysis concerning Geneva's activities,
and whether they were acceptable from a state and/or federal law
compliance perspective.

While there can be no doubt that both Equifax and Datamyx had an
interest in complying with the FCRA an interest shared by virtually
all companies that deal in the exchange of credit information that
shared interest is insufficient to afford protection to these
parties' communications under the common interest doctrine.
  
Additionally, Equifax has not shown that the redacted statements
were made to facilitate communication between the two companies'
legal departments. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the common
interest privilege is designed to allow attorneys for different
clients to communicate with each other. There is nothing before the
court suggesting Equifax's in-house counsel directed the company's
employees to relate the redacted communications to Dataymx's
counsel. Nor is there any indication Datamyx ever shared the
information with its attorney.  

Indeed, Equifax has not even shown that Datamyx had legal
representation at the time the communications were disclosed. That
alone forecloses protection under the common interest doctrine.  

Likewise, Equifax has failed to show that the common interest
doctrine applies to the two remaining documents in this category.
Documents 6 and 7 include emails containing in-house attorney Doug
Sperry's legal advice related to his review of a proposed mailer.
Both documents reflect that Mr. Healey forwarded the legal advice
provided by Mr. Sperry to David Bailey, an employee of third-party
Decisionlinks. Equifax explains that Decisionlink was functioning
as Equifax's processing agent for Geneva, which was making firm
offers of credit to consumers.

Accordingly, Equifax contends that both companies, Equifax and its
processing agent Decisionlinks, needed to know the status and
results of attorney Sperry's legal analysis concerning Geneva's
activities, and whether they were acceptable from a FCRA
perspective.

Again, Equifax has merely shown that both entities had a shared
interest in complying with the law. As discussed above, such a
showing is insufficient for application of the common interest
doctrine. Equifax also again fails to show that the redacted
statements were made at the behest of the entities' counsel or for
the purposes of allowing communication between their attorneys.
Accordingly, Equifax must produce documents 1-7 without
redactions.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted in part
and denied in part, as provided in the order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y6rynt74from Leagle.com.

Daniel Bruno, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Louis Kohl, Law Offices
Of James Louis Kohl, Joseph Messer -- jmesser@messerstrickler.com
-- Messer Strickler, Ltd., pro hac vice & Kevin S. Borozan --
kborozan@messerstrickler.com -- Messer Strickler, LTD, pro hac
vice.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Edward
A. Bedard -- ebedard@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Matthew H.
Dawson -- mdawson@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Allison L. Hill
White -- awhite@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice,
Andrew H. Walcoff -- awalcoff@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, pro
hac vice, Meryl W. Roper -- mroper@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding
LLP, pro hac vice & Zachary A. McEntyre -
zmcentyre@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, pro hac vice.


EZCORP INC: Rooney Seeks to Certify Securities Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JOHN ROONEY, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. EZCORP, INC.
and MARK E. KUCHENRITHER, the Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-00608-SS
(W.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Sam Sparks entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification;

   2. certifying a class consisting of

      "all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise
      acquired EZCORP, Inc. Class A common stock between January
      28, 2014 and October 20, 2015, inclusive, and were damaged
      thereby. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers

      and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members

      of their immediate families and their legal representatives,

      heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which
      Defendants have or had a controlling interest."

   3. appointing Lead Plaintiff John Rooney as Class
      Representative;

   4. appointing the law firms of Block & Leviton LLP and Glancy
      Prongay & Murray LLP as Class Counsel and The Kendall Law
      Group, PLLC as Liaison Counsel for the Class.

The Court said, "Plaintiff argues that there is no other ongoing
litigation concerning this controversy; that the individual class
members have little interest in controlling the prosecution because
the cost of bringing individual suits to seek recovery would in
most cases outweigh the recovery obtained; that this forum is as
desirable a forum as any given the geographic dispersal of
investors and EZCORP's headquarters in Austin, Texas; and that this
putative class action presents no likely management difficulties.
The Defendants have not put forward any argument in response, and
the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has established that class
certification is superior to other available methods of
adjudication."

The case is a securities fraud class action brought on behalf of
all persons who purchased Class A common stock of payday loans and
pawn EZCORPa company which provides "instant cash" services like
loans between January 28, 2014 and October 20, 2015. The Plaintiff
alleges that during the Class Period, EZCORP CEO Mark Kuchenrither'
made material misrepresentations to shareholders regarding the
impact of a subsidiary's loan portfolio upon EZCORP's reported
financials and thereby violated 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5.[CC]

FLORIDA BC: Two Sales Coordinators Classes Certified in Ward Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Carlos E. Mendoza adopts and confirms, and makes a part of
this Order the Report and Recommendation submitted by U.S.
Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Kelly in the lawsuit entitled RONALD
WARD v. FLORIDA BC HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No. 6:18-cv-00459-CEM-GJK
(M.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Conditional Class Certification
is granted in part and denied in part.  The case is conditionally
certified as a class action for these classes:

   a. All Employees of Synergy who were: (1) employed by Synergy
      as Sales Coordinators during the preceding three years at
      any store other than the Orlando or Daytona Beach stores;
      (2) were classified as exempt from the FLSA; and (3) worked
      more than forty hours in a work week without being paid
      proper overtime compensation; and

   b. All Employees of Synergy who: (1) are or were employed by
      Synergy as Sales Coordinators since November 2016; (2)
      worked more than forty hours in a work week; and (3) did
      not receive proper overtime because: (a) Synergy failed to
      include all weekly remuneration in Sales Coordinator's
      regular rate of pay when calculating the overtime rate and
      (b) failed to include all hours worked when calculating
      overtime.

The Plaintiff's Counsel is appointed as class counsel.  The
Proposed Notices are approved.  The Misclassification Class Notice
shall be amended to reflect that the class is limited to Sales
Coordinators "at any store other than the Orlando or Daytona Beach
stores," upon the date of this Order.

Judge Mendoza directed the Defendant to provide the Plaintiff with
a list containing the names, job titles, dates of employment, last
known addresses, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses for each
individual in each class by March 10, 2019.

Within 10 days of receiving the above list, the Plaintiff shall
send the approved Notice and Consent Form containing the revision
above with a self-addressed return envelope to each putative class
member via first class mail.

On or before seven days from date of sending Notice deadlines, the
Plaintiff shall notify the Court of the date the Notices were sent.
The Motion is denied in all other respects.[CC]



FOX RESTAURANT: Class of Salaried ASMs Certified in Watt Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sue E. Myerscough grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification and Court-Authorized Notice to Potential
Class Members in the lawsuit styled BRITTANY MICHELLE WATT, JAMES
E. KIRKPATRICK, JR., and PAUL ROWLAND, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. FOX RESTAURANT VENTURE, LLC,
FOX NC ACQUISITION, LLC, and FOX SC ACQUISITION, LLC, Case No.
2:17-cv-02104-SEM-EIL (C.D. Ill.).

The statute of limitations is tolled from May 9, 2017, to December
14, 2017 (seven months and five days) on the Plaintiffs' claim with
respect to all of the Defendants' current and former employees, who
are eligible to opt-in to this litigation.

The Court conditionally certifies a collective pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act defined as:

     All individuals who are currently or were formerly employed
     as salaried assistant store managers at any Jimmy John's(R)
     Sandwich Shop owned by Fox Restaurant Ventures, LLC, Fox NC
     Acquisitions, LLC and/or Fox SC Acquisitions, LLC in the
     States of Indiana, North Carolina and/or South Carolina from
     August 7, 2015 through the present.

     This date is three years, seven months, and five days prior
     to the date of the mailing of the Notice to account for the
     equitable tolling.

Judge Myerscough approves the Plaintiffs' proposed Notice, as
amended, and Plaintiffs' proposed Consent to Become a Party form.
Within 10 days from the date of this Opinion, the Defendants are
ordered to produce to the Plaintiffs in a usable electronic format
the names, last known mailing address, and last known personal
e-mail addresses of all Putative Collective Members to be notified.
The Defendants shall only provide last known telephone numbers of
those individuals whose notices are returned or otherwise
undelivered or for any individuals for whom Defendants do not have
a mailing address.  The Plaintiffs may only use those telephone
numbers for the purpose of locating the current addresses of those
individuals.  The parties shall confer regarding the method and
time in which the Defendants will furnish the telephone number
information.

Within 20 days from the date of this Opinion, the Plaintiffs'
Counsel or the Third Party Administrator shall mail a copy of the
Court-approved Notice and Consent Form to Putative Collective
Members.  Additionally, the Defendants shall place a Notice in all
current assistant store managers' pay envelopes.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs shall establish a website with the Notice and Consent
Form.

The Putative Collective Members shall have 90 days to mail in their
signed Consent forms for filing with the Court.[CC]



FRAMES FOR AMERICA: Garey Files ADA Class Action
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Frames for America,
Inc. The case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Frames for America, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01668 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Frames For America, Inc. offers eyeglasses, sunglasses,
prescription sunglasses, frames, contact lenses, goggles, and
reading and computer glasses online. It offers eyewear for men,
women, boys, and girls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     Shalom Law, PLLC
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


FREIGHT HANDLERS: Kraft Seeks to Certify Employee Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JAMES KRAFT, on behalf of himself and
those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FREIGHT HANDLERS, INC.
a Foreign For Profit Corporation, and FHI, LLC, a Foreign For
Profit Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No.
6:18-cv-01469-CEM-GJK (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order on Feb. 19, 2019:

   1. granting conditional certification and approving timely
      notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) of the Fair Labor

      Standards, to a lass of:

      all "Freight Handlers" (a/k/a "Lumpers" and/or "Unloaders"
      and other employees performing similar duties, however
      variously titled) employed by Defendants, Freight Handlers
      Inc. and FHI, LLC (collectively "FHI" or "Defendants"),
      within the last three (3) years (the "FLSA Collective").

   2. requiring FHI to identify all members of the FLSA Collective

      by providing a list of their names, last known addresses,
      dates of employment, cell phone number, and e-mail addresses

      in electronic and importable format, e.g. a Microsoft Excel
      spreadsheet, within 14 days of an entry of an order;

   3. permitting the Plaintiff's counsel to send Court-approved
      notice of this action to the members of the FLSA Collective
      via U.S. Mail, e-mail, and text message;

   4. permitting the Plaintiff's counsel to send a reminder notice

      via e-mail and text message to the members of the FLSA
      Collective at the half-way point in the notice period;

   5. approving a 90-day opt-in period from the date the Court-
      approved notice is sent during which the members of the FLSA

      Collective may join this case by returning their written
      consents; and

   6. allowing members of the FLSA Collective to electronically
      sign and return the Consent to Become an Opt-In Plaintiff.

The Defendants provide third-party warehouse services and a full
range of logistic services for companies in the warehouse,
distribution, and manufacturing industries. The Defendants
guarantee to reduce a client's risk, increase throughput and
maintain predictable costs.  The Defendants' Freight Handlers
were/are subjected to the same illegal pay practices at issue --
off-the-clock hours suffered/permitted to be worked -- that
resulted in sub-minimum wages and unpaid overtime pay, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated:

          Paul M. Botros, Esq.
          Matthew Gunter, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          600 N Pine Island Rd., Ste. 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 327-5352
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3017
          E-mail: pbotros@forthepeople.com
                  MGunter@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Camar R. Jones, Esq.
          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          1515 South Federal Hwy., Suite 404
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561)447-8888
          Facsimile: (561)447-8831
          E-mail: cjones@shavitzlaw.com
                  gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com

FRONT BURNER: Alford et al. Seek to Certify Twin Peaks Staff Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEIGH ALFORD; STEPHANIE MENDEZ-MARTINEZ; and BRITTANY OZMENT, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees,
the Plaintiffs, vs. CNG RESTAURANTS, LLC, and FRONT BURNER
RESTAURANTS, LP, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-1225 (M.D.
Tenn.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a nationwide collective action
      consisting of:

      all Twin Peaks Girls (hostesses, servers, and bartenders)
who
      worked at any Twin Peaks Restaurant in the United States at
      any time since November 1, 2015 (the Putative Class);

   2. ordering Defendants CNG Restaurants, LLC, Twin Restaurant
      Franchise LLC, and Twin Restaurant Holding, LP 1 to produce
      contact information -- including name, last-known address,
      last-known phone number, last-known personal and work e-mail

      addresses, dates of employment, positions held, and work
      location -- for all members of the Putative Class; and

   3. authorizing issuance of the proposed Court-authorized notice

      and proposed consent to join form attached to the Memorandum

      to all members of the Putative Class via U.S. mail, e-mail, a

      website, posting at Twin Peaks Restaurants, and enclosing it

      with the regularly scheduled paychecks for the members of the

      Putative Class.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Charles P. Yezbak, III, Esq.
          YEZBAK LAW OFFICES PLLC
          2002 Richard Jones Road, Suite B-200
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: 615-250-2000
          E-mail: yezbak@yezbaklaw.com

               - and -

          Douglas B. Janney III, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DOUGLAS B. JANNEY III
          2002 Richard Jones Road, Suite B-200
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: (615) 742-5900
          E-mail: doug@janneylaw.com

Attorneys for CNG Restaurants, LLC:

          Martha L. Boyd, Esq.
          Zachary B. Busey, Esq.
          BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,
            CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC
          211 Commerce St., Ste. 800
          Nashville, TN 37201
          E-mail: mboyd@bakerdonelson.com
                  zbusey@bakerdonelson.com

Attorneys for Front Burner Restaurants, LP:

          Meredith Cavallaro, Esq.
          Courtney Fain, Esq.
          PADUANO & WEINTRAUB LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas, 9th Floor
          New York, New York 10020
          E-mail: mcavallaro@pwlawyers.com
          cf@pwlawyers.com

               - and -

          Douglas H. Duerr, Esq.
          Sean Libby, Esq.
          ELARBEE, THOMPSON, SAPP & WILSON, LLP
          229 Peachtree Street, NE
          800 International Tower
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          E-mail: duerr@elarbeethompson.com
          libby@elarbeethompson.com

               - and -

          R. Eddie Wayland, Esq.
          Benjamin P. Lemly, Esq.
          KING & BALLOW
          315 Union Street, Ste. 1100
          Nashville, TN 37201
          E-mail: rew@kingballow.com
                  blemly@kingballow.com

GC SERVICES: Harkins Asserts Breach of FDCPA in Nebraska
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership.  The case is styled as Marvin Harkins, individually
and on behalf of herself individually and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GC Services Limited Partnership and John
Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03015 (D. Neb., February
22, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

GC Services Limited Partnership provides accounts receivable and
customer care solutions to public and private sector organizations.
It offers first party receivable programs, including cure programs,
early stage collections, and pre charge-off collections; third
party receivables management programs, such as post charge-off
collections and skip tracing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   STEIN, SAKS LAW FIRM
   285 Passaic Street
   Hacksensack, NJ 07601-2726
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@rclawgroup.com



GEORGIA-PACIFIC WOOD: Harris Moves to Certify Class Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled KENNETH HARRIS, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC
WOOD PRODUCTS, LLC, and GEORGIA-PACIFIC, LLC, Case No.
6:19-cv-06001-RTD (W.D. Ark.), asks the Court to conditionally
certify this class under the Fair Labor Standards Act:

     All hourly employees who worked more than thirty-nine (39)
     hours in any week since January 2, 2016.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of all former and current
hourly-paid employees employed by the Defendants to recover
overtime wages and other damages pursuant to the FLSA and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Mr. Harris also asks the Court to approve his proposed notices and
forms, and notice procedures.  He further asks the Court to order
the Defendants to produce the contact information of each putative
class member and to allow for an opt-in period of 90 days, to begin
seven days after the day that the Defendants produce the contact
information.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Burks, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


GLASSES USA: Garey Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Glasses USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Kevin Garey on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Glasses USA, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01667 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Glasses USA, LLC operates as an online retailer of eyeglasses and
sunglasses for men and women. It offers aviator, classic wayframe,
round, oval, and rectangular glasses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     Shalom Law, PLLC
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11374
     Phone: (516) 807-1748
     Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: Bond Seeks to Recover Overtime Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
ELDON BOND, on his own behalf and on behalf of those similarly
situated v. GLOBAL CONNECTIONS OF KANSAS, INC. a Foreign Profit
Corporation a/k/a GLOBAL CONNECTIONS, INC., Case No.
6:19-cv-00338-RBD-KRS (M.D. Fla., February 20, 2019), seeks to
recover alleged unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Global Connections is a Foreign Profit Corporation headquartered in
Overland Park, Kansas.  The Defendant's Web site is available at
http://www.exploregci.com/

The Defendant is in the business of operating a travel club
membership program company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kimberly De Arcangelis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 14th Floor
          P.O. Box 4979
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3383
          E-mail: kimd@forthepeople.com


GOLDEN MANUFACTURING: Bishop Files ADA Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Golden Manufacturing,
Inc. d/b/a Golden Boat Lifts. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop
and On Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v.
Golden Manufacturing, Inc. d/b/a Golden Boat Lifts, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01751 (S.D. N.Y., Feb. 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Golden Manufacturing, Inc. manufactures boat lift systems. Golden
Manufacturing, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and is based in North
Fort Myers, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


GRAYCO COMMUNICATIONS: Certification of Technicians Class Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit TONY JOSEPH GEORGE AND RAYNELL
WICKWARE, on behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. GRAYCO COMMUNICATIONS, L.P, Case No.
2:18-cv-08953-LMA-JVM (E.D. La.), the Plaintiffs will move the
Court for an order conditionally certifying a collective pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   "all former and current employees or "1099" Independent
   Contractors of Grayco Communications, L.P, and Protek
   Communications, Inc., who worked within the three years
   prior to the filing of this Complaint who performed work
   as Cable Technicians."[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Chelsea B. Cusimano, Esq.
          Douglas R. Kraus, Esq.
          Susannah C. McKinney, Esq.
          BRENER & KRAUS, LLC
          3640 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70115
          Telephone: (504) 302-7802
          Facsimile: (504) 302-4759
          E-mail: dkraus@brenerlawfirm.com
                  cbcusimano@brenerlawfirm.com
                  smckinney@brenerlawfirm.com

GREENSKY INC: Lowinger Files Securities Suit Over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Lowinger, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Greensky, Inc., David Zalik, Robert
Partlow, Joel Babbit, Gerald Benjamin, John Flynn, Gregg Freishtat,
Nigel Morris, Robert Sheft, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Morgan
Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Suntrust Robinson
Humphrey, Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC,
Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Guggenheim Securities, LLC,
Sandler O'Neill Partners, L.P., Fifth Third Securities, Inc. and
Does 1-25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 650303/2019, filed in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York on
January 16, 2019, seeks statutory, compensatory and rescissory
damages resulting from violations of Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act.

GreenSky is a financial technology company based in Atlanta,
Georgia, and runs an online platform that allows creditors to
process loan applications at the point of sale. GreenSky allegedly
failed to disclose to its investors, including Lowinger, that it
experienced a significant decline in its revenues after going into
the healthcare business. On January 15, 2019, GreenSky stock closed
at $10.88/per share from an IPO price of $23.00 in May 25, 2018.

Lowinger purchased GreenSky stock during the IPO and incurred
damages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Aaron L. Brody, Esq.
      Michael J. Klein, Esq.
      STULL, STULL & BRODY
      6 East 45th Street
      New York, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 687-7230
      Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
      Email: abrody@ssbny.com
             mklein@ssbny.com


HAN DYNASTY: Court Dismisses H.L. Yeh's FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned HSIEH LIANG YEH, on his own behalf and
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HAN DYNASTY,
INC. d/b/a/ HAN Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY UPER WEST SIDE CORP d/b/a Han
Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY NYU CORP d/b/a Han Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY OF
UNIVERSITY CITY, INC. d/b/a Han Dynasty; 3711 MID-ATLANTIC LLC
d/b/a Han Dynasty; 3711 MID-ATLANTIC TV/O LLC d/b/a Han Dynasty;
NEW HAN DYNASTY INC. d/b/a Han Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY OF PHILADELPHIA
INC d/b/a Han Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY OF MANA YUNK INC d/b/a Han
Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY OF CHERRY HILL, LLC d/b/a Han Dynasty; HAN
DYNASTY OF BROOKLYN, LLC d/b/a Han Dynasty; HAN DYNASTY MANAGEMENT
INC. d/b/a Han Dynasty; HD GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC; TAO-PIN CHIANG;
LUNG-LUNG SHEN CHIANG; HAN MING CHIANG a/k/a Han Chiang, a/k/a Ming
Han Chiang; HELEN M KWAN; JUNE KWAN; MEIDA LIU; and MARK ALLAN;
Defendants. No. 18 Civ. 6018 (PAE). (S.D.N.Y.).

All other defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Hsieh Liang Yeh, a former chef at a Han Dynasty
restaurant in Exton, Pennsylvania and at a Han Dynasty restaurant
on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, brings wage claims against
numerous companies bearing the Han Dynasty name and affiliated
individuals and entities located in New Jersey, New York, or
Pennsylvania. Yeh brings these claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA); New York Labor Law (NYLL) and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 (PAMWA).

Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

Applicable Legal Standards

The Moving Defendants argue, under Rule 12(b)(1), that Yeh lacks
standing to sue them. A court properly dismisses a claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when it lacks
the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it, such as
when the plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to bring the
action.

The irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing requires that
the plaintiff have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The Moving Defendants argue that Yeh's AC fails to plead sufficient
facts to establish that they were his employers. On this basis,
they argue, the AC fails to plead facts supporting his Article III
standing to bring claims against them.

On this question, the Court holds with Yeh. The AC clearly alleges
that Yeh has suffered an injury, non-payment of statutorily
required wages, traceable to conduct of his employers and
redressable by an award in his favor. That gives him standing to
sue entities or persons alleged to have been his employers for
relief under the FLSA.  

The question whether the Moving Defendants were along with the
Non-Moving Defendants employers of Yeh during some or all of the
period covered by the AC is of a different nature. That question
goes to the merits. It concerns not a jurisdictional question, but
the existence of a fact that Congress has specified as a
prerequisite for the application of a federal statute.

Here, the AC alleges that all defendants were among Yeh's employers
and, as such, were responsible for the failure to pay him overtime
wages. Whether the facts pled adequately support that the Moving
Defendants were among Yeh's employers is properly addressed under
Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court, therefore, denies the Moving Defendants' 12(b)(1) motion
in its entirety and proceeds to their motion under 12(b)(6).

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Applicable Legal Standards

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. A complaint must be dismissed where, as a
matter of law, the allegations in a complaint, however true, could
not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.

Legal Standard for Being an Employer

The FLSA defines employer as any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.  

The Second Circuit has identified several sets of factors relevant
to the economic reality inquiry. In its narrowest form, this
analysis evaluates whether an alleged employer exercised formal
control, and at its broadest it evaluates functional control.
Accordingly, the exercise of formal control over employees is
sufficient, but not necessary, to adequately allege an employer
relationship.

Formal Control

When evaluating formal control, courts consider: whether the
alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees
(2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions
of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment and
(4) maintained employment records.    

Functional Control

When evaluating functional control, courts may evaluate myriad
factors, depending on the circumstances. In Brock v. Superior Care,
Inc., 840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit inquired
whether the workers depend upon someone else's business or are in
business themselves.

And in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71-72 (2d Cir.
2003), it identified the following, non-exclusive, factors: (1)
whether the alleged employers' premises and equipment were used for
the plaintiffs' work (2) whether the subcontractors had a business
that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer
to another (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete
line job that was integral to [the alleged employers' process of
production (4) whether responsibility under the contracts could
pass from one subcontractor to another without material changes (5)
the degree to which the alleged employers or their agents
supervised plaintiffs' work and (6) whether plaintiffs worked
exclusively or predominantly for the alleged employers.

Single-Integrated-Enterprise Liability

Finally, in the context of affiliated entities within a corporate
family, courts in this District have sometimes applied another
test: the single-integrated-enterprise test. When applied, the test
is usually used to determine whether employees at different arms of
a corporate family shared a common employer.

The AC alleges that the individual Moving Defendants had control
over Yeh under the economic reality analysis. It does not so allege
as to the corporate Moving Defendants, whom Yeh effectively
concedes lacked any direct relationship with him. Instead, Yeh's
theory as to these defendants is that they, with HDP and HDUWS,
comprised a single integrated enterprise, and as such that they are
jointly responsible for Yeh's alleged wage shortfalls.

Individual Moving Defendants

The Defendants argue that the AC's allegations against individual
Moving Defendants do little more than merely recite the elements of
the formal control test. And, they note, to the limited extent the
AC contains factual allegations specific to individual defendants,
these do not concretely establish that defendant's control over
Yeh's employment.
  
This critique is valid. A complaint's bare recitation of the legal
standard, unsupported by concrete factual allegations, is
inadequate to plead that a given individual was an employer of a
plaintiff. And, as to specific individual Moving Defendants, the
AC's factual allegations are sparse and ineffective. In particular,
the allegation that some, such as Han Ming Chiang, held ownership
positions does not by itself make them Yeh's employer.  

The Court therefore dismisses the claims against the individual
Moving Defendants.

Corporate Moving Defendants

Yeh alleges that the corporate Moving Defendants comprised a single
integrated enterprise on the basis that they share ownership,
management, and employees. Yeh further alleges that the Han Dynasty
Enterprise has a centralized website which provides a common
platform for menu information, reservations, online ordering and
contact. Various Han Dynasty locations, Yeh alleges, distribute
advertising cards that list the locations of each Han Dynasty
restaurant.  

The Defendants argue that whatever effect these allegations of an
integrated enterprise might have in a case involving multiple
plaintiffs the AC does not plead facts justifying holding Han
Dynasty restaurants with no connection to Yeh accountable for wage
infractions at the two restaurants at which Yeh worked: in Exton,
Pennsylvania, and on the Upper West Side.

The AC, they argue, does not plead any facts tending to demonstrate
that any of these entities which managed Han Dynasty restaurants in
places such as Brooklyn, New York; Cherry Hill, New Jersey; and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania are accountable for his employment or
pay or had any control formal or functional over him.  

This critique is valid, too. Courts applying the single integrated
enterprise tests to restaurants consider whether separate venues
have, inter alia, common decor, name, menu, and marketing; the use
of the same employees at multiple locations; the transfer of items
between restaurants; use of the same central payroll office, common
storage space and leases; and the distribution of common employee
guidelines and procedures across different businesses.

But in the end, the decisive factor as to whether a named defendant
is responsible for FLSA violations as to a particular plaintiff
turns on control, whether formal or functional. Courts will dismiss
a complaint against defendants within a broader alleged enterprise
that lack a nexus suggesting control of the plaintiff at hand: for
example, where the plaintiff fails to allege that he worked at the
other locations in the enterprise that he transferred items between
those stores, or that he communicated with anyone at those stores.

Such is the case here. Yeh's complaint is devoid of facts
suggesting any connection between him and these other entities or
the discrete Han Dynasty restaurants they managed. It supplies no
basis for bringing them into this lawsuit which, at present,
contains allegations of violations of law solely as to him.

The Court, accordingly, grants the motion to dismiss the claims
against the corporate Moving Defendants.

The Court denies the Moving Defendants' 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
but grants their 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y5e25zmvfrom
Leagle.com.

Hsieh Liang Yeh, on his own behalf and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron B. Schweitzer,
Troy Law, PLLC & John Troy, Troy Law, PLLC.

Han Dynasty, Inc, doing business as Han Dynasty, Han Dynasty Upper
West Side Corp, doing business as Han Dynasty, 3711 Mid-Atlantic
Two LLC, doing business as Han Dynasty & Lung-Lung Shen Chiang,
Defendants, represented by Kevin K. Yam -- kyam@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C. & William H. Ng -- wng@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C..


HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Moreau Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lynwood Moreau, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Harris County, Texas, Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-00646 (S.D. Tex., February 22, 2019) is a collective action
seeking to recover unpaid overtime compensation from the Defendant
and for other violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA").

Harris County violated the FLSA by employing Moreau and other
similarly situated nonexempt employees "for a workweek longer than
forty hours but refusing to compensate them for their employment in
excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which they are or were employed," says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Moreau is a longtime employee of Harris County; he
currently works as a deputy sheriff in the Harris County Sheriff's
Department and has attained the rank of lieutenant.

Harris County is a political subdivision of the State of
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Melissa Moore, Esq.
     Curt Hesse, Esq.
     MOORE & ASSOCIATES
     Lyric Centre
     440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
     Houston, TX 77002
     Phone: (713) 222-6775
     Facsimile: (713) 222-6739

          - and -

     Robert J. 'Bob' Thomas, Esq.
     5100 Westheimer Road, Suite 105
     Houston, TX 77056
     Phone: (713) 659-0005
     Facsimile: (713) 750-0070


HEALTHY HALO: Mclean Sues over Telemarketing Text Messages
----------------------------------------------------------
MARY MCLEAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HEALTHY HALO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.,
a California Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
9:19-cv-80223-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Feb. 14, 2019), seeks injunctive
relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in
the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of
the daily life of thousands of individuals, under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, on or about November 6, 2018, the
Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to the
Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in 1212. The
Defendant's text messages were transmitted to the Plaintiff's
cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this
action.

The Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing because they
encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or
services, i.e., selling the Plaintiff insurance services. The
information contained in the text message advertises Defendant's
various specials and plans, which Defendant sends to promote its
business.

The Defendant is an insurance agency. To promote its services, the
Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of
consumers in the process.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1 st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd No. 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

HELM MANAGEMENT: Ramirez Sues over Wage & Hour Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
ARIANA RAMIREZ, an individual, on behalf of herself and other
current and former employees, the Plaintiff, vs. THE HELM
MANAGEMENT CO. d/b/a TAMARACK BEACH RESORT; and DOES 1 through 50,
the Defendants, Case No.: 37-2019-09008434-CU-0E-NC (Cal. Super.
Ct., Feb. 14, 2019), asserts violations of the California Labor
Code and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order against the
Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was hired sometime in
2014 and worked for Defendants as a housekeeper during which time
she was paid hourly, on a bi-weekly basis, and was considered
nonexempt. California law provides that an employee may file an
action against an employer for penalties in connection with
violations of the Labor Code and Wage Order provided the aggrieved
employee file an action on behalf of herself and/or similarly
situated current and former employees.

The Defendants failed to state the total hours worked on the wage
statements in violation of Labor Code; failed to include the total
hours worked by the employee during each pay period; failed to
accurately state the proper net wages on the wage statements; and
failed to include the appropriate net wages earned because they
failed to include the proper amount of vacation wages vested and
paid, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Alex Asil Mashiri, Esq.
          MASHIRI LAW FIRM
          11251 Rancho Carmel Drive No. 500694
          San Diego, CA 92150
          Telephone: (858) 348-4938
          Facsimile: (858) 348-4939
          E-mail: alexmashiri@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Tamim Jami, Esq.
          Email: tamim@jamilaw.com
          THE JAMI LAW FIRM P.C.
          3525 Del Mar Heights Rd No. 941
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 284-0248
          Facsimile: (858) 284-0977

HILLS PET NUTRITION: Paliseno Files Product Liability Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hills Pet Nutrition,
Inc.  The case is styled as Amanda Paliseno and Diane Walton, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Hills Pet Nutrition, Inc. Kansas Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-02101-JAR-KGG (D. Kan., February 22, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Tort Product
Liability filed pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc. produces and markets pet food. The
company offers cat and dog food/care products. It offers its
products to pet owners, veterinary professionals, and other key pet
professionals. The company sells products through veterinary
clinics and hospitals, pet specialty stores, feed stores, and pet
grooming facilities in the United States and internationally, as
well as authorized online pet stores. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc.
was formerly known as Hill Packing Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Isaac L. Diel, Esq.
   Sharp McQueen PA - OP
   6900 College Blvd., Suite #285
   Overland Park, KS 66211
   Tel: (913) 661-9931
   Fax: (913) 661-9935
   Email: idiel@sharpmcqueen.com


HOTEL VETIVER: Chavez Files Civil Rights Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Long Island City
Partners LLC. The case is styled as Kenneth T. Chavez on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Long Island
City Partners LLC doing business as: Hotel Vetiver, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-01069-SJ-ST (E.D. N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

Hotel Vetiver is a hotel in Long Island which offers comfortable
rooms and attentive service. It is located at 29-11 39th Avenue,
Queens, NY 11101.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mitchell Segal, Esq.
     Law Offices of Mitchell Segal P.C.
     1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 208
     Great Neck, NY 11021
     Phone: (516) 415-0100
     Fax: (516) 706-6631
     Email: msegal@segallegal.com


HURON LAW: Court Narrows FCRA Claims in Ross
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Huntington Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting in part and denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned VICKI ROSS, Plaintiff, v. HURON LAW GROUP WEST
VIRGINIA, PLLC, HURON LAW GROUP, PLLC, GRT FINANCIAL, INC., ZERO
DEBT, LLC, DOE CORPORATION I, and DOE CORPORATION II, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:18-0036. (S.D.W.V.).

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint filed by Defendants Huron Law Group West Virginia, PLLC;
Huron Law Group, PLLC; GRT Financial, Inc.; and Zero Debt, LLC
(Named Defendants).  

The Amended Complaint raises three claims under the FCRA, including
that (Count 1) Doe I and Doe II furnished Plaintiff's consumer
report to Named Defendants for an impermissible purpose and that
(Count 2) Doe II and (Count 3) Named Defendants accessed and used
Plaintiff's consumer report without properly certifying a
permissible purpose, under false pretenses, and without a
permissible purpose.  

In the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Named Defendants
state dismissal is merited on three grounds. Named Defendants argue
(1) a lack of personal jurisdiction (2) a failure to sufficiently
allege any claim under the FCRA and (3) a failure to allege any
action by Named Defendants to sufficiently state a claim against
them in Count One of the Amended Complaint.  

Personal Jurisdiction

In Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., the defendant accepted personal
jurisdiction for in-state claims in a class action suit, but
contested that finding nationwide specific personal jurisdiction
for non-resident members of the purported class violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted under
the Supreme Court's ruling in Bristol-Myers. 2018 WL 3580775, at
*3.

The court held, alongside most of the courts that have encountered
this issue, that Bristol-Myers Squibb's holding and logic do not
extend to the federal class action context. The court reasoned that
unlike class actions, each plaintiff in a mass tort action is a
real party in interest to the complaint. The court elaborated that
in class actions there is only one suit: the suit between Plaintiff
and Defendant and the Bristol-Myers decision framed the specific
jurisdiction analysis at the level of the suit. Unlike the mass
action in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the only suit before the Court does
arise out of or relate to Defendant's contacts with the forum.

Similarly, Named Defendants attempt to apply the exact same
argument. The Court finds the rationale of the court in Morgan
persuasive, and rejects the application of Bristol-Myers to federal
class action claims for substantively similar reasons. Because
Named Defendants do not dispute specific personal jurisdiction over
Ms. Ross' claims, the Court finds there is no lack of personal
jurisdiction of purported non-resident class members, and the
defendant may not attempt to parse the Court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction at this finer level of granularity.

The Court denies Named Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

Failure to State a Claim - Consumer Reports Under the FCRA

Named Defendants' second argument claims that Plaintiff failed to
sufficiently allege any facts to show that Named Defendants
obtained a consumer report as defined under the FCRA.  

Under the FCRA, there is a definition for what constitutes a
consumer report. That definition includes a communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit standing which is used or expected to be used in whole or in
part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for (a) credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Here, Named Defendants claim the Plaintiff alleged mere legal
conclusions by simply stating the Named Defendants obtained
consumer reports without offering any supporting facts to show the
purpose of the documents furnished fit the definition of a consumer
report under the FCRA.
  
Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations. The Court
reads the Plaintiff's claims under the FCRA as sufficiently
pleading the report in question was a consumer report under the
FCRA. As such, the Court denies Named Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the
FCRA for that basis.

Failure to State a Claim - Count One as Alleged Against Named
Defendants

The Plaintiff failed to allege any supporting facts that tend to
show Named Defendants furnished consumer reports in violation of
the FCRA. In Count One of the Complaint, the Plaintiff does claim
that Named Defendants ever furnished a consumer report. In response
to this observation, Plaintiff directs attention to an earlier
portion of the Amended Complaint, specifically paragraphs 34 and
36-39.  

However, even though the Plaintiff alleges Named Defendants
furnished these reports for preparation and mailing of marketing
letters, the Plaintiff fails to state any fact alleging Named
Defendants' purpose was to establish the consumer's eligibility for
an impermissible purpose. In fact, the Plaintiff alleges the Named
Defendants directed the third party to prepare and send these
mailers at their behest.  

Where the Court could reasonably read the Amended Complaint to
allege that Named Defendants acquired the alleged consumer reports
for the purpose of determining eligibility for the debt
consolidation services they provide, the Court cannot read that
same allegation into the Amended Complaint. Here, Plaintiff alleged
the nonparty marketing firm was acting as an agent of the Named
Plaintiffs and making no independent assessment of its own.3 As
such, the Court grants this part of Named Defendants' motion, and
dismisses Count One as it pertains to them.

The Court grants in part the Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint, dismisses Count One as it pertains to Huron Law Group
West Virginia, PLLC; Huron Law Group, PLLC; GRT Financial, Inc. and
Zero Debt, LLC, and denies in part for the remainder.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y26gqq9cfrom Leagle.com.

Vicki Ross, Plaintiff, represented by Ian B. Lyngklip, LYNGKLIP &
ASSOCIATES CONSUMER LAW CENTER, pro hac vice, John W. Barrett --
jbarrett@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER & Priya Bali ,
LYNGKLIP & ASSOCIATES CONSUMER LAW CENTER, pro hac vice.

Huron Law Group West Virginia, PLLC, Huron Law Group, PLLC, GRT
Financial, Inc. & Zero Debt, LLC, Defendants, represented by John
C. Lynch -- john.lynch@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS.


ICP INC: Papadopoulos Dental Sues over Unsolicited Fax Ads
----------------------------------------------------------
M. Papadopoulos Dental Corporation, a California corporation,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. ICP, Inc. d/b/a Dental City, a Delaware corporation,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01133 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2019),
seeks to stop Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited fax
advertisements and to obtain redress for all persons injured by its
conduct under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The alleged classes consist of more than 100 persons each, there is
minimal diversity, and the claims of the class members when
aggregated together exceed $5 million. The case challenges
Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements.

According to the complaint, Dental City faxes promote the services
and goods of Defendant, namely dental equipment and products. The
Defendant allegedly sent, and continues to send, unsolicited
advertisements via facsimile transmission.

Unsolicited faxes cause concrete and particularized legal harm and
damages to their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of
its fax machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes
the recipient's time that would have been spent on something else.
A junk fax also invades the recipient's privacy. Unsolicited faxes
prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent their
use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the
recipients' fax machines, and require additional labor to attempt
to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited message, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLP
          9404 Genesee Ave, Suite 340
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (303) 222-0281
          Facsimile: (858) 800-4277
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com

IMPLANT EDUCATORS: Papadopoulos Dental Sues over Spam Fax Ads
-------------------------------------------------------------
M. Papadopoulos Dental Corporation, a California corporation,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Implant Educators, Inc., a Florida corporation, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01136 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2019), seeks
to stop Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited fax
advertisements and to obtain redress for all persons injured by its
conduct under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The alleged classes consist of over 100 persons each, there is
minimal diversity, and the claims of the class members when
aggregated together exceed $5 million. The case challenges
Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements.

According to the complaint, Dental City faxes promote the services
and goods of Defendant, namely dental equipment and products. The
Defendant allegedly sent, and continues to send, unsolicited
advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the
JFPA.

Unsolicited faxes cause concrete and particularized legal harm and
damages to their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of
its fax machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes
the recipient's time that would have been spent on something else.
A junk fax also invades the recipient's privacy. Unsolicited faxes
prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent their
use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the
recipients' fax machines, and require additional labor to attempt
to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited message, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLP
          9404 Genesee Ave, Suite 340
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (303) 222-0281
          Facsimile: (858) 800-4277
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com

JET SPORT ENTERPRISES: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jet Sport
Enterprises, Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop and On Behalf
of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Jet Sport
Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01758 (S.D. N.Y.,
Feb. 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Jet Sport Enterprises Inc. in Dix Hills, NY, carries Polaris
Motorcycles, ATVs, UTVs, Scooters, and Watercraft.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


JONATHAN NEIL: $10K Class Settlement in T. Brown Suit Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties Joint Motion for Final
Approval of the Class Action Settlement in the case captioned TERI
BROWN, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NEIL AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 1:17-cv-00675-SAB. (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Teri Brown filed this action on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated against Defendant Jonathan Neil and
Associates, Inc. alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (FDCPA) by sending a collection letter that failed to
accurately identify the creditor in violation of the FDCPA.

Terms of Settlement Agreement

The Defendant has agreed to pay $10,000.00 in statutory damages to
the Settlement Class which is comprised of approximately 281
individuals. The class members that do not opt out will receive a
pro rata share of the settlement fund.  

The parties have agreed to settle the claims of a class defined
as:

     All consumers with an address located in Kern County,
California who were sent an initial collection letter and/or
notices from Defendant, during the period of May 16, 2016 to
present, attempting to collect a consumer debt owed which stated
Re: Mercury Casualty Insurance.

The court considers a number of factors in making the fairness
determination including: the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the
risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status throughout
the trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of
discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the
experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.

The strength of the Plaintiffs' case

An important consideration in judging the reasonableness of a
settlement is the strength of the plaintiffs' case on the merits
balanced against the amount offered in the settlement. The court's
role is not to reach any ultimate conclusion on the facts or law
which underlies the merits of the dispute as the very uncertainty
of the outcome and the avoidance of expensive and wasteful
litigation is what induces consensual settlements. In reality, the
reasonable range of settlement is arrived at by considering the
likelihood of a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant, the
potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to
a present value.  

This action is based on the Plaintiff's claim that the letters sent
to the class members violate the FDCPA and the RFDCPA by failing to
accurately identify the creditor. The Plaintiff argues that, while
this case is not complex, the likelihood of success at trial is
uncertain. The Plaintiff contends that the claims and defenses
involve complex issues and the Defendant has raised several
defenses to the Plaintiff's individual claims that it avers would
ultimately have defeated the claims of the class.

The settlement in this action provides the class members with
substantial relief now; and given the uncertainty of ultimate
success at trial, the proposed settlement provides the parties with
a fair resolution of the issues presented which weighs in favor of
settlement.

The risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation

In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate,
its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive
litigation with uncertain results. Absent settlement this action,
the parties would continue to engage in discovery, motions for
summary judgment, and trial which would have likely required
experts to be hired. These costs could exceed the maximum recovery
in the action.

Further, if this action were to proceed to trial, the class would
be subjected to the risk of receiving less recovery or being denied
any recovery in this action. Resolving the action at this time
saves the parties the expense of conducting further litigation and
confers substantial benefit to the class without being subjected to
the risks inherent with proceeding to trial of the matter.

The risks inherent in continuing to litigate this action, the
additional expenses that would be incurred were this action to
proceed, and the complexity of this action weigh in favor of
settlement.

The amount offered in settlement

The Defendants have offered to settle this action for $10,000.00,
with administration costs, attorney fees, and the class incentive
award to be paid separately. The FDCPA limits damages to the lesser
of $500,000.00 or 1% of the debt collector's net worth. The
settlement amount agreed upon is likely to be in excess of one
percent of the Defendant's net worth; and therefore, the class is
receiving more than they would be entitled to if this action were
to proceed to trial.

The fact that the class is receiving more than they would be
entitled to if this action proceeded to trial weighs heavily in
favor of approving the settlement. Here, each class member will be
receiving an award of $35.84 under the settlement agreement. This
award to each class member is within the range of comparable
actions.  

The Court finds that the amount offered in settlement of this
action weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

The stage of the proceedings

A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings
indicates that the parties have carefully investigated the claims
before resolving the action. The settlement in this action occurred
approximately eight months after discovery commenced in this
action. In considering the fairness of the settlement, the court's
focus is on whether the parties carefully investigated the claims
before reaching a resolution.

In this action, the parties went beyond informal discovery and
participated in formal discovery, including written discovery and
depositions. Plaintiff argues that they exchanged sufficient
information to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of their claims
and defenses. Here, the discovery allowed Plaintiff to determine
the size of the class and Defendant's net worth which provided
significant information to determine that settlement of this action
would be in the best interest of the class.

The fact that the parties believe they engaged in sufficient
discovery to weigh the merits of the action weighs in favor of
approving the class action settlement.

The experience and views of counsel

The Court is to accord great weight to the recommendation of
counsel because they are aware of the facts of the litigation and
in a better position than the court to produce a settlement that
fairly reflects the parties' expected outcome in the litigation.
Class counsel is experienced in class action litigation and has
opined that the settlement agreement in this action is fair,
reasonable and adequate to the members of the class.  

This weighs in favor of approving the class action settlement.

The reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement

It is established that the absence of a large number of objections
to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption
that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable
to the class members. The class here consist of 279 class members.
No class members have filed objections or opted out of the class.
The absence of any objections is compelling evidence that the
settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. The absence of class
members opting out of the class and the absence of objections by
class members weighs in favor of settlement.

Risk of collusion

The Ninth Circuit has provided examples of signs that a settlement
is the product of collusion between the parties, such as (1) when
counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement,
or when the class receives no monetary distribution but class
counsel are amply rewarded (2) when the parties negotiate a clear
sailing' arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys' fees
separate and apart from class funds  and (3) when the parties
arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be
added to the class fund.

Here, none of the signs of collusion are present. The class in this
action is receiving more than they would receive had they proceeded
to trial and class counsel is seeking an award that will not come
from the settlement fund. Additionally, the unclaimed funds in this
action do not revert to the defendants, but shall be distributed to
a cy pres beneficiary. This supports the finding that there was no
collusion between the parties in reaching the agreement.

The factors weigh in favor of approving the class and collective
action settlement

After considering the foregoing factors, the Court finds that the
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable pursuant to Rule
23(e). Further, the Court finds no evidence that the settlement is
the result of any collusion between the parties.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of class
action settlement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y5fdywlafrom Leagle.com.

Teri Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac vice,
Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman,
LLC, pro hac vice & Tammy L. Hussin -- Tammy@HussinLaw.com --
Hussin Law.

Jonathan Neil and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Michael Egan, Porter Scott, APC, Derek Joseph Haynes,
Porter Scott, PC & Lynette Mary Komar, Porter Scott.


K12 INC: Class Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Judicial Division, issued an Order granting
Class Settlement Preliminary Approval in the case captioned In re
K12 INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. No. 4:16-cv-04069-PJH. (N.D.
Cal.).

The Lead Plaintiff has made an application, pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order preliminarily
approving the Settlement in accordance with the Stipulation,
certifying the Settlement Class for purposes of the Settlement
only, and allowing notice to Settlement Class Members as more fully
described herein.

The Court finds and concludes that, pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for the purposes of the
Settlement only, Lead Plaintiff Babulal Tarapara is an adequate
class representative and certifies him as Class Representative for
the Settlement Class. The Court also appoints Lead Counsel as Class
Counsel for the Settlement Class, pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement as being fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the Settlement Class, subject to
further consideration at the Settlement Hearing.

The Court may adjourn the Settlement Hearing without further notice
to the Settlement Class, and may approve the proposed Settlement
with such modifications as the Parties may agree to, if
appropriate, without further notice to the Settlement Class.

Any Settlement Class Member who does not request exclusion from the
Settlement Class may file a written objection to the proposed
Settlement, the proposed Plan of Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's
motion for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses and appear and show cause, if he, she, or it
has any cause, why the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses should not be approved;
provided, however, that no Settlement Class Member shall be heard
or entitled to contest the approval of the terms and conditions of
the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of Allocation, and/or
the motion for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses unless that Person has filed a written objection with the
Court such that it is received no later than twenty-one (21)
calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

The contents of the Settlement Fund held by The Huntington National
Bank (which the Court approves as the Escrow Agent), shall be
deemed and considered to be in custodia legis of the Court, and
shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, until such
time as they shall be distributed pursuant to the Stipulation
and/or further order(s) of the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yxqrwnnufrom
Leagle.com.

Babulal Tarapara, Plaintiff, represented by Casey Edwards Sadler --
csadler@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Kevin Francis
Ruf -- kevinruf@gmail.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Leanne
Heine Solish -- LSOLISH@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- GLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Joseph Daniel Cohen -- JCOHEN@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Melissa C. Wright -- mwright@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Stan Karas -- SKARAS@GLANCYLAW.COm
-- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Kara M. Wolke --
KWOLKE@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Robert
Vincent Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP.

K12 Inc., Nathaniel A. Davis, James J. Rhyu & Timothy L. Murray,
Defendants, represented by Kevin H. Metz -- kevin.metz@lw.com --
Latham & Watkins, Peter Allen Wald -- peter.wald@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP & Stephen Paul Barry -- stephen.barry@lw.com -- Latham
and Watkins LLP.


KAISER FOUNDATION: Aleman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Jose Aleman, Freddie Altamirano, Daniel Argaw, Dennis Awotedu,
Bobby Childers, David Dols, Dwayne Douglas, Derrick Dunn, Roger
Fields, Marciano Gonzales, Roger Henderson, Roberto Kaje, Lawrence
Krzyzaniak, Jr., Dale Lohman, Lyndon McKay, Elwood Nelson, Manuel
Reynosa, Eligio Rivera, Rakesh Sahadevan, Ernest Satterfield, John
Schneck, Jose Silva, James Skidmore, Darren Smith, Joseph Turay,
and Dennis Wint, Individually, and on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-00591-PX (D. Md., February 26, 2019) is a collective action
for unpaid wages, damages and other relief as provided by the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law
("MWHL"), and the Maryland Wage Payment  and Collection Law
("MWPCL").

Plaintiffs frequently worked more than 40 hours in a statutory
workweek. However, for these workweeks that included a shift
differential, the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs proper
overtime compensation at a rate that included the appropriate shift
differentials in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA,
mandated by the provisions of the MWHL, and in violation of the
MWPCL.

The Defendant thus violated the provisions of the FLSA, the MWHL
and the MWPCL by failing and refusing to pay plaintiffs the
overtime compensation required for all hours paid in excess of 40
hours in each work week, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs, including those similarly situated, are current or
former employees of defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the
Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., employed in the positions of engineer or
maintenance technician.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. is a
non-profit organization that provides health care in a number of
states, including Maryland, Virginia and the District of
Columbia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Robert E. Paul, Esq.
     Zwerdling, Paul, Kahn & Wolly, PC
     1025 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 712
     Washington, DC 20036-5420
     Phone: (202) 857-5000
     Fax: (202) 223-8417
     Email: rpaul@zwerdling.com


KC VIN, LLC: Removes TCPA Suit to Western District of Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------------
KC Vin, LLC removes case, MCKENZI TAYLOR, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. KC VIN,
LLC d/b/a PIZZA BAR, the Defendant, Case No. 1816-CV19883 (July 30,
2018) from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri to the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The
Western District of Missouri assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-00110-DGK to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that Pizza Bar is liable to the Plaintiff
addnd each putative class member for statutory and regulatory
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.[BN]

Attorneys for KC Vin, LLC d/b/a Pizza Bar:

          Jacqueline M. Sexton, Esq.
          W. James Foland, Esq.
          Zach T. Bowles, Esq.
          FOLAND, WICKENS, ROPER,
             HOFER & CRAWFORD, P.C.
          1200 Main Street, Suite 2200
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 472-7474
          Facsimile: (816) 472-6262
          E-mail: jfoland@fwpclaw.com
                  jsexton@fwpclaw.com

               - and -

          Lauri A. Mazzuchetti, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
          One Jefferson Road
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 503-5900
          E-mail: lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          William Charles Kenney, Esq.
          BILL KENNEY LAW FIRM LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 1800
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          E-mail: bkenney@billkenneylaw.com

LANIER COLLECTION: Banks Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Christopher Eric Banks, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00009 (S.D. Ga., January 9, 2019), seeks to
recover damages for Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Lanier files hundreds of lawsuits each
year against consumers in the Magistrate Courts of the State of
Georgia to collect consumer obligations alleged to be owed to
Lanier by virtue of alleged post charge-off assignments from the
original creditors. However, Lanier does not have a true assignment
of all rights, title, and interest from such original creditors.
Instead, Lanier collects debts in Magistrate Court for the benefit
of such original creditors, notes the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in the Southern
District of Georgia.

The Defendant Lanier is a debt collector organized under the laws
of the State of Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      James M. Feagle, Esq.
      SKAAR & FEAGLE, LLP
      2374 Main Street, Suite B
      Tucker, GA 30084
      Tel: (404) 373-1970
      Fax: (404) 601-1855
      E-mail: jfeagle@skaarandfeagle.com


LE TOTE INC: Vasquez-Cossio Files Suit in C.D. Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Le Tote, Inc.  The
case is styled as Inez Vasquez-Cossio, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Le Tote, Inc., a
Delaware corporation and Does 1 - 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 5:19-cv-00347 (C.D. Cal., February 22, 2019).

Le Tote, Inc. operates online platform to provide apparels and
accessories on rent to women in the United States. It offers
dresses, tops, cardigans, jackets, sweaters, skirts, pants, tunics,
bracelets, earrings, necklaces, rings, scarves, and handbags. The
company was founded in 2012 and is based in San Francisco,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Scott J Ferrell, Esq.
   Pacific Trial Attorneys APC
   4100 Newport Place Drive Suite 800
   Newport Beach, CA 92660
   Tel: (949) 706-6464
   Fax: (949) 706-6469
   Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com




LEDGEWOOD POWER: Bishop Sues Over Blind-inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------------
Cedric Bishop and on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. LEDGEWOOD POWER SPORTS, INC. Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01755 (S.D. N.Y., February 25, 2019) is a civil
rights action for Defendant's failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer.

Defendant is and was, at all relevant times herein, incorporated
pursuant to the Business Corporation laws of the state of New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NYork 10003
     Phone: 212.228.9795
     Fax: 212.982.6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com
            danalgottlieb@aol.com


LP INSURANCE: McCullough Seeks Unpaid Wages for Associates
----------------------------------------------------------
CHARMAINE MCCULLOUGH, 18104 West Road Cleveland, Ohio 44121; and
SAMANTHA YOUNG, 3326 W. 126th Street, Cleveland, OH 44111, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. LP INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC D/B/A LOAN PROTECTOR
INSURANCE SERVICES c/o Statutory Agent Corporation Service Company
50 West Broad Street, Suite 1330 Columbus, OH 43215; and WILLIS
TOWERS WATSON MIDWEST INC. F/K/A WILLIS OF OHIO INC. d/b/a) LOAN
PROTECTOR INSURANCE SERVICES c/o Statutory Agent Corporation
Service Company 50 West Broad Street, Suite 1330 Columbus, OH
43215, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00345 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 14,
2019), alleges that Defendants engaged in practices and policies of
not paying its non-exempt employees, including Plaintiffs and other
similarly-situated employees, for all hours worked, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, in 2018, LP Insurance Services, LLC
purchased Loan Protector Insurance Services. The Plaintiff
McCullough was employed by Defendant LP Insurance Services LLC
d/b/a Loan Protector Insurance Services between July 9, 2018 and
February 2019. The Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated
employees were employed as Call Center Associates. The Plaintiffs
and other similarly-situated employees were required by Defendants
to perform unpaid work before clocking in each day, including but
not limited to starting and logging into Defendants' computer
systems, numerous software applications, and phone system.
Defendants arbitrarily failed to count this work performed by
Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees as "hours
worked." Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees
performed this unpaid work every workday, and it constituted a part
of their fixed and regular working time. This unpaid work performed
by Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees was
practically ascertainable to Defendants, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants provide insurance services and operate a call center
in Solon, Ohio.[BN]

Attornesy for the Plaintiffs:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          TelePhone: 216-696-5000
          Facsimile: 216-696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com

MAIDEN HOLDINGS: April 12 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. on Feb. 11 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on behalf of all persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired Maiden Holdings, Ltd. (NASDAQ:
MHLD) securities between March 4, 2014 and November 9, 2018 (the
"Class Period").  Investors have until April 12, 2019 to apply to
the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period defendants
misrepresented the quality and nature of Maiden's underwriting and
risk management policies and practices and the risks of its
reinsurance portfolio.  Specifically, the complaint alleges that
defendants misleadingly claimed that they were subjecting AmTrust's
insurance portfolio to robust analysis and cross-checks to ensure
that the company had appropriately priced the risk of reinsuring
AmTrust's insurance portfolio.  According to the complaint, the
company failed to employ sufficient underwriting and risk
management protocols and had largely abdicated its responsibility
to ensure that its AmTrust Reinsurance segment priced policies
commensurate with the risk assumed by the Company.

If you purchased Maiden securities during the Class Period or
continue to hold shares purchased before the Class Period, have
information, would like to learn more about these claims, or have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Brandon
Walker or Melissa Fortunato by email at investigations@bespc.com,
or telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact
form.  There is no cost or obligation to you.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. -- http://www.bespc.com-- is a New
York-based law firm concentrating in commercial and securities
litigation.  For additional information concerning the Maiden
lawsuit, please go to https://bespc.com/mhld/ [GN]


MAXIMUS INC: Appeal in Virginia Class Action Underway
-----------------------------------------------------
Maximus, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2018, that the appeal in a
Virginia class action is still pending.

In August 2017, the Company and certain officers were named as
defendants in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff
alleged the defendants made a variety of materially false and
misleading statements, or failed to disclose material information,
concerning the status of the Company's Health Assessment Advisory
Service project for the U.K. Department for Work and Pensions from
the period of October 20, 2014, through February 3, 2016.

In August 2018, the defendants' motion to dismiss the case was
granted, and the case was dismissed. In October 2018, the
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court for
the Fourth Circuit. That appeal is pending.

Maximus said, "At this time, it is not possible to reasonably
predict whether this matter will be permitted to proceed as a class
or to reasonably estimate the value of the claims asserted, and we
are unable to estimate the potential loss or range of loss."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Maximus, Inc. provides business process services (BPS) to
government health and human services programs worldwide. The
company was founded in 1975 and is headquartered in Reston,
Virginia.


MDL 2323: NFL Wins Bid to Dismiss A.H.'s Concussion Injury Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
PLAYERS' CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO
A.H., et al. v. National Football League, et al., Scroggins, et al.
v. National Football League. No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323,
No. 18-464., 16-2058 (E.D. Pa.).

Defendants the National Football League, the National Football
League Foundation, and the NFL Properties (LLC) (NFL Parties) move
to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff A.H.
A.H. brings a claim against the NFL Parties for loss of consortium
related to injuries her father, Aaron Hernandez (Hernandez),
sustained while playing professional football for the NFL.

The Court entered an order granting preliminary approval of the
Settlement between the NFL Parties and a proposed Settlement Class.
The proposed Class consisted of three groups of people:

     All living NFL Football Players who, prior to the date of the
Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order July 7, 2014,
retired, formally or informally, from playing professional football
with the NFL or any Member Club or were formerly on any roster of
any such Member Club or league and who no longer are under contract
to a Member Club and are not seeking active employment as players
with any Member Club, whether signed to a roster or signed to any
practice squad, developmental squad, or taxi squad of a Member Club
(Retired NFL Football Players);

     Authorized representatives of deceased or legally
incapacitated or incompetent Retired NFL Football Players
(Representative Claimants) and Spouses parents, children who are
dependents, or any other persons who properly under applicable
state law assert the right to sue independently or derivatively by
reason of their relationship with a Retired NFL Football Player
(Derivative Claimants).

The NFL Parties argue that A.H.'s claims should be dismissed
because she is a Settlement Class Member who failed to timely opt
out, and thus her claims are precluded by the Settlement under the
doctrine of res judicata. A.H. argues (1) that the Court cannot
decide claim preclusion before addressing her pending motion to
remand; (2) that claim preclusion cannot be determined on this
motion to dismiss because determining whether A.H.'s claim is
precluded requires factual determinations; and (3) that A.H. is not
a Settlement Class Member because her father was not a Retired
Football Player under the terms of the Settlement.

A.H. is a Derivative Claimant and a Class Member

A final judgment in a properly conducted class action can preclude
the claims of all class members who do not timely opt out of the
class action, even if those class members were not named parties to
the original action.  Therefore, because the NFL Concussion Class
Action was properly conducted, all Class Members are bound by the
Settlement Agreement and subject to its preclusive effect.

The Settlement Agreement defines the Settlement Class as "all
Retired NFL Football Players, Representative Claimants and
Derivative Claimants who do not timely and properly exercise the
right to be excluded from the Settlement Class The Settlement
Agreement defines Derivative Claimants as spouses, parents,
children who are dependents, or any other persons who properly
under applicable state law assert the right to sue independently or
derivatively by reason of their relationship with a Retired NFL
Football Player or deceased Retired NFL Football Player."

A.H. asserts a claim against the NFL Parties by reason of her
relationship with Hernandez, her father, because she brings a claim
for loss of parental consortium. A.H. did not opt out of the
Settlement. Therefore, if Hernandez was a Retired Football Player
under the terms of the Settlement, A.H. is a Settlement Class
Member.

Hernandez is a Retired NFL Football Player Within the Meaning of
the Settlement

The Settlement Agreement defines Retired NFL Football Players as:
"all living NFL Football players who, prior to the date of the
Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order [July 7, 2014],
[1] retired, formally or informally, from playing professional
football with the NFL or any Member Club  or [2] were formerly on
any roster, including preseason, regular season, or postseason, of
any such Member Club or league and who no longer are under contract
to a Member Club and are not seeking active employment as players
with any Member Club, whether signed to a roster or signed to any
practice squad, developmental squad, or taxi squad of a Member
Club."

The crux of the issue is whether Hernandez was seeking active
employment as an NFL football player as of July 7, 2014. He was
not. On this date, Hernandez had been imprisoned without bail for
nearly a year, was awaiting trial for murder and related gun
charges, and was facing a possible sentence of life without parole.
The trial did not begin until January 2015. These facts are
squarely inconsistent with seeking active employment with an NFL
team.

To be seeking something requires an individual to engage in active
steps toward the object he seeks. To merely wish for or intend
something is distinct from actually seeking it: a seeker must go in
search of or try to bring about the thing he seeks.  

As an initial matter, A.H. has not pled that Hernandez was seeking
active employment as of July 7, 2014. Nor has A.H. pled that
Hernandez was taking any active steps amounting to seeking
employment as an NFL player, such as signing with an agent, making
it known to teams that he was available to be signed, engaging in
active negotiations with teams, and/or trying out for teams.  

Because A.H. did not plead that Hernandez was taking active steps
towards employment as an NFL football player as of July 7, 2014,
and because it would have been impossible for Hernandez to do so
while indefinitely incarcerated, Hernandez is a Retired Football
Player within the meaning of the Settlement. This makes A.H., who
brings her loss of consortium claim against the NFL Parties by
virtue of her relationship with Hernandez, a Derivative Claimant.

A.H.'s Action Against the NFL Parties and the Settlement are the
Same Cause of Action

Because the NFL Parties were parties to the Settlement, A.H. is a
Class Member bound by the Settlement, and the Settlement was a
final judgment on the merits, the only remaining issue is whether
A.H.'s action and the Settlement are the same cause of action.

The Settlement release plainly encompasses A.H.'s claims. It
released all claims that could have been asserted in the Class
Action Complaint or any other Related lawsuit and explicitly
released claims arising out of or related to head injuries, claims
arising out of or related to CTE, and claims for loss of
consortium. A.H.'s complaint alleges these precise claims: that
Hernandez experienced repeated traumatic head impacts during his
professional football career, that these head injuries contributed
to Hernandez's development of CTE, and that the NFL Parties'
conspiracy, negligence, and fraud resulted in Hernandez suffering
damages that prevented him from rendering love, affection, society,
and companionship to his daughter. The cause of action A.H. asserts
loss of consortium is one of the causes of action released by the
Settlement. In addition, the factual predicate to A.H.'s claims is
identical to the factual predicate underlying the settlement
agreement: whether the NFL Parties knew of the risks created by
concussive and sub-concussive head injuries, failed to take
reasonable action to protect players from those risks, and
fraudulently concealed those risks from players.

Allowing A.H.'s suit to proceed would be allowing the relitigation
of settled question at the core of the NFL Settlement. Because
A.H.'s claim is squarely within the scope of the Settlement's
release, it is the same cause of the action as the Settlement, and
her claim is precluded.

Accordingly, the NFL Parties' Motion to Dismiss A.H.'s Complaint
will be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/yyf2563yfrom
Leagle.com.

CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR, Adminstrator, represented by ORRAN L. BROWN ,
BROWNGREER PLC.

ARIZONA CARDINALS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC, Movant, represented by
ALEXANDRA M. WALSH, PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP,
BETH A. WILKINSON, PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, BRAD
S. KARP, PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, BRUCE
BIRENBOIM, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP & CASEY O.
HOUSLEY -- c.housley@swrsllp.com -- SANDERS AND WARREN LLP.


MERCURY SYSTEMS: Massachusetts Class Suit Voluntarily Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury Systems, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2018, that the securities class
action complaint before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts has been voluntarily dismissed. The case was
terminated by the Court and is no longer pending.

On July 10, 2018, a securities class action complaint was filed
against the company, Mark Aslett, and Gerald M. Haines II in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The
complaint asserted Section 10(b) and 20(a) securities fraud claims
on behalf of a purported class of purchasers and sellers of the
company's stock from October 24, 2017 to April 24, 2018.

The complaint alleged that the company's public disclosures in SEC
filings and on earnings calls were false and/or misleading. On
September 27, 2018, The City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire Pension
Fund was designated as the lead plaintiff and Levi & Korsinsky was
designated as lead counsel in the matter.  

The Court granted plaintiff leave to amend and restate the
complaint, which was due on December 10, 2018. On December 10,
2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without
prejudice and the case was terminated by the Court and is no longer
pending.

Mercury Systems, Inc. provides sensor and safety critical mission
processing subsystems for various critical defense and intelligence
programs in the United States. Its products and solutions are
deployed in approximately 300 programs with 25 defense contractors.
Mercury Systems, Inc. was founded in 1981 and is headquartered in
Andover, Massachusetts.


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Court Dismisses Forman Securities Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Barbara Forman, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Meridian Bioscience, Inc., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-774 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Susan J.
Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Meridian is a life sciences company which, among other things,
develops, manufactures, sells, and distributes clinical diagnostic
test kits.  It is a publicly-held company and its securities are
registered with the SEC and traded on NASDAQ.  Defendant John A.
Kraeutler is the former CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Meridian.  Defendant Melissa A. Lueke has served as Meridian's
Vice President, CFO, and Secretary since 2001, and she was
appointed Executive Vice President in 2009.

The Plaintiff alleges generally that Meridian made misstatements
about blood lead level testing systems manufactured by Magellan
Biosciences, Inc., a company which Meridian acquired in March 2016.
She alleges that Meridian misstated the efficacy of the blood lead
level testing systems and concealed known regulatory problems.

On Nov. 15, 2017, Forman filed a Class Action Complaint asserting
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of a
class defined as all persons or entities, other than Defendants and
their affiliates, who purchased or otherwise acquired Meridian
securities from March 25, 2016 through July 13, 2017, both dates
inclusive.  Three months later, the Court appointed Forman as the
Lead Plaintiff and Levi & Korsinsky, LLP as the lead counsel.

On April 16, 2018, Forman filed an Amended Complaint against
Defendants Meridian, John Kraeutler, and Melissa Lueke on behalf of
herself and all other persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired securities of Meridian between March 24, 2016
and Oct. 23, 2017.

She asserted two claims for relief: (i) Count I - Violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against all
the Defendants; and (ii) Count II - Violations of Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act against all the Defendants.

The matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the securities fraud case.  The Defendants move to dismiss on the
grounds that the Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").

As to misrepresentation, Judge Dlott finds, that (i) Meridian did
not mislead when it stated that Magellan was a leading manufacturer
or provider of such systems; (ii) the Plaintiff has not alleged
that after the acquisition Meridian vouched for, adopted, or
re-stated Magellan's warranties to it; (iii) none of Meridian's
statements about its expectations for Magellan in the November 2016
press release are actionable misrepresentations under the PSLRA;
and (iv) the Plaintiff fails to plead facts suggesting that
Meridian knew prior to November 2017 about the internal control
deficiencies.

With respect to scienter, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
theory of liability is not as compelling as Meridian's non-culpable
explanation.  As such, she concludes that Meridian's specific
statement in November 2016 that all of its products were FDA
cleared does not rise to the level of a knowing and deliberate
intent to manipulate, deceive, or defraud, and recklessness.
Because the Plaintiff has not met the scienter requirement, the
Judge need not consider the remaining element of a securities fraud
claim.  She will dismiss the Exchange Act claims against the
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/EWiyRW from Leagle.com.

Barbara Forman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chris T. Nolan --
cnolan@perantinides.com -- Perantinides & Nolan Co., L.P.A., James
Rubin Cummins -- jcummins@cumminslaw.us -- CUMMINS LAW LLC &
Shannon L. Hopkins -- shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Meridian Bioscience, Inc., John A. Kraeutler & Melissa A. Leuke,
Defendants, represented by James Eugene Burke -- jburke@kmklaw.com
-- Keating Muething & Klekamp, Daniel J. Kramer --
dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, pro
hac vice, Gregory F. Laufer -- glaufer@paulweiss.com -- Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice & Katherine
Kelly Fell -- kfell@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP, pro hac vice.


MICHIGAN: Court Partly Certifies Classes in Dearduff Prisoners Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Laurie J. Michelson of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division granted in part and
denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the case,
JOEY DEARDUFF, NICHOLAS BAILEY, TIMOTHY BROWNELL, MELVIN BOWNES,
TIMOTHY FLESSNER, JAMES GUNNELS, LEON MEANS, JOHN PORTER, KENNETH
REEVES, ANTHONY RICHARDSON, BRYAN SLONE, and TINA STOLL, on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
HEIDI WASHINGTON, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, and
JONG CHOI, Dental Regional Director, in their official capacities,
Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-11691 (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs claim that the MDOC's requirement that a prisoner be
incarcerated for two years before receiving "routine" dental care
is unconstitutional.  The MDOC divides dental services into three
categories: emergency, urgent, and routine.  In 2013, the MDOC
instituted a policy of providing prisoners routine dental services
only after two years of uninterrupted sentenced incarceration
within the MDOC institutions.  The motivation for this policy is
not entirely clear.  But the record hints at two possible reasons:
half of all new MDOC prisoners are released in two years and the
two-year rule reduced the wait list for dental care from 8,000 to
2,000 inmates.

Several of the Plaintiffs claim that the two-year rule has harmed
or will harm them.  On behalf of themselves and other prisoners in
the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, the
Plaintiffs claim that the MDOC is deliberately indifferent to their
serious dental problems in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify these four classes of MDOC
prisoners:

     a. Class I: The Plaintiffs seek to represent all prisoners who
are subject to the two-year rule.  Proposed Class I is more
precisely defined as all prisoners who have less than 24 months of
uninterrupted incarceration within an MDOC correctional facility
starting from the prisoner's first day at the reception center.
This group of prisoners constitutes about half of MDOC's
population, about 19,000 inmates.  Each potential member of this
proposed class claims that the MDOC's requirement that he or she be
incarcerated for two years before becoming eligible for routine
dental care exposes him or her to a substantial risk of serious
harm of which Defendants are aware.

     b. Class II: The MDOC's practice of inadequate diagnosis of
periodontal disease as the result of failing to use appropriate
x-rays and document periodontal probing routinely; and not
prescribing and performing appropriate periodontal treatment (such
as root planning and scaling), even when periodontal disease is
diagnosed, subjects the prisoners to a preventable risk of
progression of periodontal disease, with associated loss of teeth
and unnecessary pain.

          i. Class IIA: The Plaintiffs believe that because the
MDOC does not use probing and intra-oral x-rays to assess
periodontal disease, prisoners in the MDOC's custody are at risk of
having undiagnosed periodontal disease and at risk of having the
severity of their periodontal disease underestimated.  They
likewise believe that because the MDOC does not use intra-oral
x-rays, prisoners are at risk of having undiagnosed or
underdiagnosed caries. Although all prisoners are at some non-zero
risk of periodontal disease and caries (and, perhaps, periapical
disease), not all prisoners are adversely affected by the alleged
deficiencies in the MDOC's diagnostic tools.

          ii. Class IIB: The Plaintiffs also apparently maintain
that the MDOC has a policy or practice of not providing appropriate
treatment for periodontal disease.

     c. Class III: The MDOC's practice of routinely not providing
partial and complete dentures to prisoners no longer subject to the
two-year quarantine period.  These prisoners, who request dentures
to address chewing difficulty, replace worn or otherwise
unserviceable dentures, or to replace dentures lost due to
extenuating circumstances, are subjected to gratuitous pain as well
as major issues concerning chewing and nutrition.

     d. Class IV: The fourth proposed class involves those
Plaintiffs and class members who have been confined for more than
two-years and request dental care due to dental/tooth pain,
inability to sleep, bleeding gums, or seek routine dental care but
are placed on long wait lists before they can receive such care.

          i. Class IVA: Class IVA consists of all prisoners on the
Routine Dental Appointment List.

          ii. Class IVB: Class IVB consists of all prisoners that
the MDOC has identified as waiting for urgent dental services.

Judge Michelson finds that some of the proposed classes include
every prisoner in the MDOC's custody.  But in a group that size--
about 37,000 individuals -- the dental-health diversity is
presumably great.  It is likely that some have had few dental
issues and are at low risk of any serious ones in the foreseeable
future.  For these prisoners, the alleged deficiencies in the
MDOC's dental care probably do not subject them to a substantial
risk of serious harm.  On the other hand, in a group of 37,000,
some undoubtedly have frequent, serious dental needs.  For these
prisoners, the alleged deficiencies in the MDOC's dental care
probably do subject them to a substantial risk of serious harm.  It
is thus difficult to address the Eighth Amendment claims of all
37,000 prisoners in "one stroke."  Yet that is a requirement for
class certification.  On the other hand, there are smaller, less
dentally-diverse groups of prisoners whose claims can, at least in
significant part, be efficiently litigated at once.

For these reasons, Judge Michelson granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  Attached as
an appendix to the opinion is a summary chart of the Judge's
rulings.

Given that a class of 19,000 prisoners likely encompasses prisoners
whose risk of sustaining serious dental harm is very low and
prisoners whose risk of sustaining serious dental harm is very
high, the Judge did not certify that Class I.  The attempt to
certify the would have to establish that the dental-health
diversity of all 19,000 prisoners is not so great, i.e., that all
19,000 prisoners are at a similar risk of a similar degree of
harm.

What was said about Class I also applies to Class IVA: "All
prisoners on the Routine Dental Appointment List."   Absent
evidence that virtually all prisoners on the RDAL are at a similar
risk of harm, the Judge is not convinced that these 3,000
prisoners' claims have a key issue that can be productively
litigated at once.

The Judge certified the following class as Class IIB: All prisoners
incarcerated in an MDOC correctional facility with healthy gums,
gingivitis, early periodontitis, and stable moderate periodontitis
insofar as these prisoners claim that the MDOC's failure to provide
them with periodontal treatment exposes them to a substantial risk
of serious harm.

And for reasons similar to those provided for Class IIB, the Judge
finds that the class could craft a single injunction that gives
relief to all in Class IIA.  As an example, the Court could order
that the MDOC conduct probing and take intra-oral x-rays at intake
and then every two years thereafter.  Proposed Class IIA meets Rule
23 and Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirements.

As to Class IVB, the Judge finds that the class warrants
certification.  She finds that the class satisfies Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement, Timothy Brownell is an adequate class
representative and that his claims are typical of those in Class
IVB, and the proposed Class IVB fits within the category of classes
set out in Rule 23(b)(2).

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/iO5XTG from Leagle.com.

Joey Dearduff, Anthony Richardson, Bryant Slone & Tina Stoll,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel E. Manville --
Daniel.manville@law.msu.edu -- Civil Rights Clinic & Tracie R.
Gittleman.

Kenneth James Reeves, Carl Roman, Nicholas John Bailey, Timothy
Brownell, Melvin Bownes, Timothy Flessner, James Gunnels, Leon
Means & John Porter, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel E. Manville,
Civil Rights Clinic.

Heidi Washington, Defendant, represented by Sara Elizabeth
Trudgeon, Michigan Attorney General's Office CLEE Division, A.
Peter Govorchin, Michigan Department of Attorney General Complex
Litigation Division & Lisa M. Geminick, State of Michigan
Department of Attorney General.

MD Jong Choi, Defendant, represented by Sara Elizabeth Trudgeon,
Michigan Attorney General's Office CLEE Division & A. Peter
Govorchin, Michigan Department of Attorney General Complex
Litigation Division.


MORGAN STANLEY: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Frazier Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Yared Abraham, O. Adepoju-Grace, Andrew Clark, Kwesi
Coleman, Kathy Frazier, Jeanna Pryor and Aisha Rada filed an appeal
from a Court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Frazier, et al. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, et al., Case No. 16-cv-804, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 20, 2019, the
Plaintiffs, who lost their attempt to be certified as a class in a
case alleging racial discrimination, are seeking to renew their
case by filing an amended complaint with new evidence.

Kathy Frazier and the six other plaintiffs have asked Judge Richard
Sullivan to reconsider their case, which argues among other claims
that Morgan Stanley discriminated in its account distribution and
teaming policies.

They want to present new evidence and allegations from advisors in
14 states to address the judge's ruling that their complaint
offered "insufficient and anecdotal instances of discrimination,"
according to a court document filed the day after Christmas by
their lawyer, Linda Friedman of Stowell & Friedman in Chicago.

The appellate case is captioned as Frazier, et al. v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., LLC, et al., Case No. 19-462, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Kathy Frazier, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, O. Adepoju-Grace, Aisha Rada, Andrew
Clark, Jeanna Pryor, Yared Abraham and Kwesi Coleman are
represented by:

          Linda Debra Friedman, Esq.
          STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD.
          321 South Plymouth Court
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 431-0888
          E-mail: lfriedman@sfltd.com

Defendants-Respondents Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC are represented by:

          Blair Joseph Robinson, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          101 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10178
          Telephone: (212) 309-6000
          E-mail: blair.robinson@morganlewis.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Jefferson Files Suit for Personal Injury
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Inez David Jefferson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Southern
Methodist University, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00779-JRS-TAB
(S.D. Ind., February 22, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Personal
Injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
   RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Fax: (713) 554-9098
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Johnson Sues Over Student-Athletes' Injuries
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00810-JPH-DML (S.D. Ind., February 25,
2019) seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of
the Defendant's reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of University of West Georgia ("UWG")
student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those Plaintiff experienced, Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect Plaintiff and other UWG football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them, asserts the complaint.

As a direct result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff and
countless former UWG football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football, the complaint
relates.

Plaintiff Kevin Johnson is a natural person and citizen of the
State of South Carolina.

NCAA is an unincorporated association with its principal place of
business located at 700 West Washington Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46206.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeff Raizner, Esq.
     RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
     2402 Dunlavy Street
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: 713.554.9099
     Fax: 713.554.9098
     Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

          - and -

     Jay Edelson, Esq.
     Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
     Chicago, IL 60654
     Phone: 312.589.6370
     Fax: 312.589.6378
     Email: jedelson@edelson.com
            brichman@edelson.com

          - and -

     Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
     EDELSON PC
     123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
     San Francisco, CA 94107
     Phone: 415.212.9300
     Fax: 415.373.9435
     Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Settles TCPA Class Action for $2.5MM
-------------------------------------------------------
Greg Land, writing for Daily Report, reports that Navient, the
student loan servicing company formerly known as Sallie Mae, paid
$2.5 million to settle claims that it violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by using automated dialers to seek
information about borrowers from third parties who were not
responsible for the loans.

Nearly half of the settlement finalized in Virginia's Eastern
District Court will go to the plaintiff's attorneys and the firm
administrating the class and settlement. The verified class of
17,780 class members will each receive about $75, according to
Henry Turner of Decatur's Turner Law Offices, who originated the
litigation.

Navient is the largest student loan servicer in the country with
more than 12 million borrowers, Mr. Turner said.

None of the class members were themselves borrowers, but Navient
and its third-party collection contractors nonetheless targeted
them as it attempted to collect on loans, Mr. Turner said.

"Navient is of course a loan servicer, but it also functions as
collector when there's a default," Mr. Turner said.

"Student loan servicers are protected more than normal debt
collector under TCPA because of protections Congress passed when
they wrote it," said Mr. Turner. "But there are still restrictions
under TCPA."

Mr. Turner's client was Denise Baker, a Tennessee woman whose
brother used her as a reference for obtaining a student loan and
who was repeatedly the subject of auto-dialed calls to her
cellphone seeking information.

Despite several requests for Navient and its agents to stop calling
about her brother, the calls kept coming, Turner said.

"She never authorized or gave express permission for them to call
her, which is required under the TCPA," Mr. Turner said.

Navient is headquartered in Virginia, and Mr. Turner enlisted the
aid of Bill Downing and his Suffolk firm, Consumer Legal Solutions,
to file a putative class action in November 2017.

The complaint asserted that Navient "has a corporate policy of
using an Autodialer or a prerecorded or artificial voice message to
call persons listed as references, relatives, neighbors,
acquaintances or otherwise" on loan applications or through
skip-trace searches as a means of tracking down borrowers, it said.


Navient had been the subject of thousands of complaints to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and more than 1,300 complaints
to the Better Business Bureau related to "billing/collection
issues," the complaint said.

The company filed a motion to dismiss but, while it pending, the
parties met for a daylong mediation and announced a preliminary
settlement in June.

In the agreement, Navient said it "denies the material allegations
of plaintiff's Class Complaint and vigorously disputes that it
violated the TCPA when contacting Plaintiff and the proposed class
members. Therefore, in the litigation, [Navient] denies that
Plaintiff and the putative class members are entitled to any relief
whatsoever."

"Nevertheless," it said, "after extensive discovery, the full
briefing of Navient's motion for summary judgment and a mediation
before a former United States magistrate judge, the parties have
agreed to resolve this matter for an all-cash, non-reversionary
settlement fund in the amount of $2.5 million."

Navient was represented by Margaret Inomata --
minomata@vedderprice.com -- of Vedder Price's Washington, D.C.,
office and Lisa Simonetta and Christopher Ramos --
cramos@vedderprice.com -- of the firm's Los Angeles branch. Turner
said Simonetta led the company's negotiations.

A Navient spokesman declined to comment.

Mr. Turner said Navient's team "put up a real fight" before
agreeing to the settlement, which was given final approval by Judge
Leonie Brinkema of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia.

According to figures, Mr. Turner provided, the lawyers will receive
$857,713 in fees and expenses; the settlement administrator, Rust
Consulting, will receive $362,639; and Baker will receive a $15,000
service as class representative.

Each class member will receive a pro rata share of $74.24 from the
remaining $1.3 million. [GN]


NETMORE AMERICA: Leszanczuk Files Consumer Fraud Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sylvia Leszanczuk, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Netmore America,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2019CH02447 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill.,
February 25, 2019) is a class action asserting claims against
Netmore for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violations
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("Consumer Fraud Act").

This case challenges Netmore's practice of assessing and collecting
inspection fees while providing related services to mortgages in
default. Netmore's imposition of default-related inspection fees
violates the regulations promulgated pursuant to the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), and the
contractual language of its assigned mortgage agreements or the
mortgage agreements Netmore services for other lenders, asserts the
complaint.

Netmore failed to comply with HUD regulations and the agreements it
services by conducting and assessing fees for unauthorized and
unnecessary property inspections of homes which, although in
default, are owner-occupied, says the complaint.

Leszanczuk is a resident of Illinois.

Netmore America, Inc., is a privately-held Delaware corporation and
a mortgage lender, with its principal place of business in
Clackamas, OR.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Patrick Solberg, Esq.
     Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
     Jeffrey Berman, Esq.
     ANDERSON + WANCA
     Cook County Firm # 57010
     3701 W. Algonquin Rd. Ste 500
     Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
     Phone: (847) 368-1500
     Facsimile: (855) 827-2329

          - and -

     Arthur C. Czaja, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF ARTHUR C. CZAJA AND ASSOCIATES
     Cook County Attorney #47671
     7521 N. Milwaukee Avenue
     Niles, IL 60714
     Phone: (847) 647-2106
     Facsimile: (847) 647-2057
     Email: arthur@czajalawoffices.com


NEW LINK GENETICS: Court Dismisses Nguyen Securities Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL NGUYEN and KELLY NGUYEN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEW LINK
GENETICS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16cv3545 (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge William H. Pauley, III of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted Defendants NewLink
Genetics, Charles Link, and Nicholas Vahanian' motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Class Action Complaint.

In the wake of the Court's prior Opinion & Order, Nguyen v. New
Link Genetics Corp., 297 F.Supp.3d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), NewLink
cabined its motion to dismiss to falsity and loss causation, the
two elements that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege in the
First Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs claim NewLink made a series of misrepresentations
regarding the development of its flagship pancreatic cancer drug,
algenpantucel-L, also known as HyperAcute Pancreas.  Through the
Phase 2 and Phase 3 clinical trials, NewLink and its officers
allegedly misrepresented the drug's efficacy and misled the market
into believing that the company would obtain Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval to market the drug.  However, the
drug failed to achieve the requisite markers in its clinical trial,
foreclosing its chances for FDA approval.

With respect to falsity, the Complaint alleges three new
misstatements or omissions.  Two relate to the alleged
underreporting of the historic survival rate of pancreatic cancer
patients during Phase 3 testing, while the third relates to Phase 2
testing's efficacy.  The Plaintiffs' new allegations attempt to
show that NewLink undersold the survival rate of the control group
so that its Phase 3 results would look better than they were, and
that NewLink inflated its Phase 2 results by excluding sicker
patients. According to the Complaint, this painted a rosier picture
for investors, who were misled into thinking the drug would obtain
FDA approval.

As for loss causation, the Plaintiffs now allege that three partial
or corrective disclosures revealed the truth behind NewLink's
alleged misrepresentations, in addition to the final disclosure
that Phase 3 had failed . All were purportedly followed by dips in
NewLink's stock price, which they claim were caused by the
disclosures.  NewLink counters that these disclosures were simply
bad news that triggered dips in its stock price.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint in the securities
fraud action.  They argue that the Complaint does not adequately
plead materially false statements or omissions of fact; and that
the Complaint falls short of alleging loss causation.

Judg Pauley finds that the Plaintiffs failed to allege that the
15-20-month statement was false in the First Amended Complaint, and
all they have done to amplify their allegations is cite more
contrary studies.  But that fails to aver that the speaker did not
hold the belief he professed, the supporting facts he supplied were
untrue, or he misled investors.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs fail
to adequately allege that Dr. Vahanian's Sept. 27, 2013 statement
was false.

Next, the Judge finds that the Complaint that NewLink's reference
to "all patients in the trial" was misleading because the arm of
the study the Plaintiffs contend is a better comparator reported a
survival rate of approximately 20 months.  But this argument fails
because Dr. Vahanian explicitly stated on that same earnings call
that the NewLink study contemplated a control arm in the
low-20-month range.  In addition, any qualms with NewLink's
interpretation of historical data are insufficient to state a fraud
claim.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs do not adequately allege falsity
with respect to Dr. Vahanian's statement on the March 11, 2014
Earnings Call.

The Plaintiffs argue that Phase 2's reported 24.1-month survival
rate did not represent any increase over reported survival rates in
historical studies, meaning that NewLink misled consumers regarding
Phase 2's success.  This argument, the Judge finds, overlaps with
the Plaintiffs' other arguments regarding historical survival rates
and yields the same result.

AS to loss causation, the Plaintiffs enumerate three categories of
corrective disclosures.  Because loss causation is the "causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss,"
the Plaintiffs are limited to alleging a corrective disclosure of
the only actionable misstatement -- that patients were successfully
enrolled in Phase III.

Judge Pauley finds that because the Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged falsity with respect to statements regarding
historical survival rates, there can be no loss causation based on
those alleged misstatements.  And because these statements do not
relate to Phase 3 enrollment, these alleged corrective disclosures
fail.

Next, the Judge agrees with NewLink's argument that the GCP
violations in the alleged corrective disclosure do not relate to
Phase III patient enrollment.  He finds that the Plaintiffs alleged
that the fraudulent statement was that Phase 3 had achieved full
and adequate patient enrollment, and this alleged corrective
disclosure did nothing to reveal the truth behind the alleged
fraud.

On May 9, 2016, NewLink issued its final disclosure that Phase 3
had failed.  The Plaintiffs note that the results of Phase 3
revealed that the control group's survival rate was about 50%
higher than what was conveyed by the Defendants.  They also allege
that the final disclosure showed that the research and development
on which the Phase 3 trial was based was not conducted properly.
The Judge finds that these allegations merely parrot those already
found to be insufficient in the First Amended Complaint.
Ultimately, they are insufficient to allege loss causation because
they merely show that the market reacted to adverse news.  Nothing
in this disclosure relates to the only actionable misrepresentation
regarding Phase 3 enrollment.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs fail to
plead loss causation.

Finally, because the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims fail, the Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) and Section 20A claims
fail as well.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Pauley granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Complaint.  The Clerk of Court is directed to
terminate all pending motions and to mark the case closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/pliZo8 from Leagle.com.

Michael Nguyen, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Kelly Nguyen, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Lead Plaintiffs, represented by Kim Elaine
Miller -- kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC.

NewLink Genetics Corporation, Charles J. Link, Jr. & Nicholas N.
Vahanian, Defendants, represented by Patrick Gibbs --
pgibbs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, David Hillel Kupfer --
dkupfer@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Sarah Malke Lightdale --
slightdale@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


NEW STATFORD RESTAURANT: Faces Traylor Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class suit has been filed against New Statford Restaurant.  RYAN
TRAYLOR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEW STATFORD RESTAURANT, INC. doing business
as: TEN DEGREES, doing business as: BACI E VENDETTA; and MORDECHAI
H. HASSON, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00949-JMF (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
31, 2019). The case is assigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman and
referred to Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman.

New Statford Restaurant, Inc. is engaged in restaurant business in
New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Karl J. Stoecker, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF KARL J. STOECKER
          275 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 818-0080
          Facsimile: (212) 818-9055
          E-mail: kjs@kjslawfirm.com


NEW YORK, NY: MF Moves to Certify Class of Diabetic Students
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned M.F., a minor, by and
through his parent and natural guardian YELENA FERRER; M.R., a
minor, by and through her parent and natural guardian JOCELYNE
ROJAS; I.F., a minor, by and through her parent and natural
guardian JENNIFER FOX, on behalf of themselves and a class of those
similarly situated; and THE AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, a
nonprofit organization v. THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION; THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL
HYGIENE; THE OFFICE OF SCHOOL HEALTH; THE CITY OF NEW YORK; BILL DE
BLASIO, in his official capacity as Mayor of New York City; RICHARD
A. CARRANZA, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York
City Department of Education; OXIRIS BARBOT, in her official
capacity as Acting Commissioner of the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene; and ROGER PLATT, in his official
capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the Office of School Health,
Case No. 18-CV-6109 (NG) (SJB) (E.D.N.Y.), move the Court for an
order certifying this class:

     all students who are now or will be entitled to receive
     diabetes-related care and attend New York City public
     schools.

On January 23, 2019, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants jointly
filed a stipulation moving the Court to certify the class.  On
January 25, 2019, Hon. Judge Sanket J. Bulsara denied that motion
without prejudice to renew on the basis that a more detailed motion
should be submitted to the Court in support of the motion.[CC]

Plaintiffs M.F., M.R., I.F., and the American Diabetes Association
are represented by:

          Torie Atkinson, Esq.
          Seth Packrone, Esq.
          Michelle Caiola, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          655 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 644-8644
          E-mail: tatkinson@dralegal.org
                  spackrone@dralegal.org
                  mcaiola@dralegal.org

Plaintiff American Diabetes Association is represented by:

          Sarah Fech-Baughman, Esq.
          AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION
          2451 Crystal Drive, Suite 900
          Arlington, VA 22202
          Telephone: (703) 253-4823
          E-mail: sfech@diabetes.org

               - and -

          Alan L. Yatvin, Esq.
          POPPER & YATVIN
          230 Broad Street, St. 503
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 546-5700
          Facsimile: (215) 546-5701
          E-mail: Popper.yatvin@verizon.net


NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Johnson Files FDCPA Class Action in Wisconsin
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the case captioned Kevin Johnson, Plaintiff, v.
Northstar Location Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00292-WCG (E.D. Wis., February 22, 2019) brings this action
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated for the
illegal practices of the Defendant when attempting to collect an
alleged debt in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").

In attempting to collect debts, Northstar uses the mails,
telephone, the internet, and other instruments of interstate
commerce. Northstar mailed or caused to be mailed a letter dated
February 23, 2018 to Johnson. The Letter alleged Johnson had
incurred and defaulted on a financial obligation. The Letter listed
the "Balance" and "total amount due" as $455.64. The Letter also
stated in relevant part: "Because of interest, late charges and
other charges that may vary day to day, the amount due on the day
you pay may be greater."

On information and belief, there are no "late charges and other
charges that may vary from day to day" regarding the Debt, asserts
the complaint. Neither Northstar nor the creditor of the Debt may
legally or contractually impose late charges on the Debt. The
Letter deprived Johnson of truthful, non-misleading, information in
connection with Northstar's attempt to collect a debt, adds the
complaint.

Johnson is a natural person and was a citizen of, and resided in,
the City of Green Bay, Brown County, Wisconsin.

Northstar is a for-profit Limited Liability Company formed under
the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Francis R. Greene, Esq.
     Philip D. Stern, Esq.
     Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
     STERN•THOMASSON LLP
     3010 South Appleton Road
     Menasha, WI 54952
     Phone (973) 379-7500
     Email: Philip@SternThomasson.com
            Andrew@SternThomasson.com
            Francis@SternThomasson.com


OCWEN LOAN: Wins Prelim. Approval of Delgado Suit Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Nicholas G. Garaufis grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the
lawsuit titled MARGARITA DELGADO, et al., Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING,
LLC, et al., Case No. 1:13 Civ. 04427 (NGG) (ST) (E.D.N.Y.).

The Court conditionally certifies, for settlement purposes only, a
Settlement Class defined as:

     All current and former mortgage Ocwen, GMAC, and Homeward
     Residential customers who (a) were enrolled in one or more
     Cross Country Home Services ("CCHS") warranty or home
     service plans between August 6, 2009 and December 31, 2013
     ("Plans") after cashing or depositing one of CCHS's check
     solicitations; (b) made one or more payments for a Plan; (c)
     never made a claim under a Plan, and (d) never received a
     full refund of all premiums paid for a Plan.

This Settlement Class includes some former GMAC and Homeward
Residential customers whose loans were never serviced by Ocwen.
Excluded from the Settlement Class are: Defendants, any entities in
which they have a controlling interest, any of their parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees and
members of such person's immediate family and the presiding
judge(s) in this case and their immediate family.

The Court finds Plaintiffs Margarita Delgado, William Sheppard,
Geraldine Mahood, Kevin Chowning, Lya Chovming, Paul Emmert,
Carolyn Toth, Brian Rafacz, Jennifer Hendricks, Cynthia Beniwal,
Kimberly Kayes, Justin Wisnewski, Laurie Cheamitru, Dale Zimmer,
Michael Benhamu, Meghan Fox, Dan Wilkinson, Kent Collier, Theresa
McCuUough, Ben Elliott, Jason Abt, Nathan May, Cami Peloza, and
Terry Oliver are adequate and appoints them as Representatives of
the Settlement Class.  The Plaintiffs' counsel are appointed as
Class Counsel.

Judge Garaufis approves the form and content of the proposed Short
Form Settlement Notice, Long Form Notice, and Claim Form, and
approves the Parties' proposal (i) to disseminate the Short Form
Settlement Notice by both first-class U.S. Mail and email, followed
by a Reminder Notice, and (ii) to disseminate the Long Form Notice
and Claim Form on a Web site established by the Claims
Administrator, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.  The Court
approves the Settlement Agreement's schedule for dissemination of
the Class Notice, requesting exclusion from the Settlement Class or
objecting to the settlement, submitting papers in connection with
Final Approval, and the Final Approval Hearing.  The Court approves
the appointment of Heffler Claims Group as the Claims
Administrator, with the responsibilities set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

A Final Approval Hearing is scheduled to be held on July 26, 2019,
at 11:00 a.m., to consider the fairness, reasonableness and
adequacy of the Settlement Agreement, the entry of a Final Order
and Judgment in the case, proposed service awards to the
Plaintiffs, an application for attorneys' fees, costs and
reimbursement of expenses made by Class Counsel.[CC]


OPTICSPLANET INC: Website not Accessible to Blind, Dawson Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
LESHAWN DAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. OPTICSPLANET, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01430-PAE (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2019), alleges that
Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
website at www.opticsplanet.com to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people, a violation of the Plaintiff's rights
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a visually-impaired
and legally blind person who requires screen-reading software to
read website content using his computer. The Plaintiff uses the
terms "blind" or "visually-impaired" to refer to all people with
visual impairments who meet the legal definition of blindness in
that they have a visual acuity with correction of less than or
equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who meet this definition have
limited vision. Others have no vision.  Based on a 2010 U.S. Census
Bureau report, approximately 8.1 million people in the United
States are visually impaired, including 2.0 million who are blind,
and according to the American Foundation for the Blind's 2015
report, approximately 400,000 visually impaired persons live in the
State of New York.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, the lawsuit says.

OpticsPlanet, Inc. is a privately held online retailer of shooting,
hunting, military, law enforcement, eyewear and laboratory
equipment. The company is headquartered in Northbrook, Illinois,
and operates a number of specialized online destinations, as well
as its flagship store OpticsPlanet.com.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com

ORCHARD SUPPLY: Branco et al. Seek to Certify Class of Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit LAWRENCE C. BRANCO, KATHY ELLIOTT,
individually on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated and as representatives and proxies for the State
of California, the Plaintiffs, vs. ORCHARD SUPPLY COMPANY, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00531-EJD (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs
will move the Court for an order on May 16, 2019:

   1. authorizing a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
section
      216(b) and authorizing mailing of the proposed notice to:

      "all current and former employees of Orchard Supply Company,
      LLC in the United States of America with the title
“Assistant
      Store Manager" who worked at any time from January 24, 2015
      through the present; and

   3. requiring Defendant to produce a computer readable data file

      containing the names, last known residence address, last
      known telephone numbers, last known cell phone numbers, last

      known email addresses and social security numbers of all such

      potential opt-in plaintiffs so that notice may be
      implemented.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has violated sections 206 and
207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 201, et
seq., by failing to pay ASMs overtime compensation for overtime
hours worked.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Edward J. Wynne, Esq.
          George R. Nemiroff, Esq.
          WYNNE LAW FIRM
          80 E. Sir Francis Drake Blvd., Suite 3G
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 461-6400
          Facsimile: (415) 461-3900
          E-mail: ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com
                  gnemiroff@wynnelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Alan L. Quiles, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          1515 South Federal Highway, Ste. 404
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  aquiles@shavitzlaw.com

PALISADES COLLECTION: Lopez Asserts FDCPA Breach in Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Palisades Collection,
LLC.  The case is styled as Darshane Lopez, on behalf of herself
individually and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Palisades Collection, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01659 (S.D.
N.Y., February 22, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Palisades Collection, L.L.C is a debt collection agency. The
company was founded in 2001 and is based in Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey. Palisades Collection, L.L.C operates as a subsidiary of
Asta Funding, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Novlette Rosemarie Kidd, Esq.
   Fagenson & Puglisi
   450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704
   New York, NY 10123
   Tel: (212) 268-2128
   Fax: (212) 268-2127
   Email: nkidd@fagensonpuglisi.com


PERNIX SLEEP: Myers Files Adversary Proceeding in Del. Bank. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action adversary proceeding complaint has been filed
against Pernix Sleep, Inc.  The case is styled as Chad Myers and
Jeffrey Hartzler, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Pernix Sleep, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-50107-CSS, in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on February 21,
2019.

A pretrial conference has been set for April 15, 2019, at 2:00
p.m., at US Bankruptcy Court, 824 Market St., 5th Fl., Courtroom
#6, Wilmington, Delaware.

Pernix Sleep, Inc., a specialty pharmaceutical company, engages in
developing and commercializing prescription therapeutics to treat
medical conditions. The company focuses on in-licensing,
developing, and marketing proprietary products and late-stage
product candidates for the treatment of diseases and disorders in
the central nervous system therapeutic area.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James E. Huggett, Esq.
   Margolis Edelstein
   300 Delaware Ave., Suite 800
   Wilmington, DE 19801 U.S.A
   Tel: (302) 888-1112
   Fax: (302) 888-1119
   Email: jhuggett@margolisedelstein.com


PHILIP MORRIS: Preliminary Motions in Adams Suit Remain Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 7,
2019, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that preliminary
motions in the case, Adams v. Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers'
Council, et al., are still pending.

In a class action pending in Canada, Adams v. Canadian Tobacco
Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Queen's Bench, Saskatchewan,
Canada, filed July 10, 2009, the company, its subsidiaries, and its
indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and other members of the industry
are defendants.

The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges her own addiction to
tobacco products and COPD resulting from the use of tobacco
products. She is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on
behalf of a proposed class comprised of all smokers who have smoked
a minimum of 25,000 cigarettes and have allegedly suffered, or
suffer, from COPD, emphysema, heart disease, or cancer, as well as
restitution of profits. Preliminary motions are pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. It markets and sells its products in the European
Union, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast
Asia, East Asia, Australia, Latin America, and Canada. The company
was incorporated in 1987 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Unit Continues to Defend Blais Suit in Canada
------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 7,
2019, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the
company's subsidiary continues to defend a class action suit in
Canada entitled, Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and
Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges
Inc. and JTI Macdonald Corp.

In the case, Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and
Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges
Inc. and JTI Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior Court, Canada, filed
in November 1998, the company's subsidiary and other Canadian
manufacturers (Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and JTI-MacDonald
Corp.) are defendants.

The plaintiffs, an anti-smoking organization and an individual
smoker, sought compensatory and punitive damages for each member of
the class who allegedly suffers from certain smoking-related
diseases. The class was certified in 2005. Trial began in March
2012 and concluded in December 2014. The trial court issued its
judgment on May 27, 2015.

The trial court found that the company's subsidiary and two other
Canadian manufacturers liable and found that the class members'
compensatory damages totaled approximately CAD 15.5 billion,
including pre-judgment interest (approximately $11.8 billion). The
trial court awarded compensatory damages on a joint and several
liability basis, allocating 20 percent to the company's subsidiary
(approximately CAD 3.1 billion, including pre-judgment interest
(approximately $2.37 billion)).

In addition, the trial court awarded CAD 90,000 (approximately
$69,000) in punitive damages, allocating CAD 30,000 (approximately
$23,000) to the company's subsidiary and found that defendants
violated the Civil Code of Quebec, the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms, and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act by
failing to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking.

The trial court also found that defendants conspired to prevent
consumers from learning the dangers of smoking. The trial court
further held that these civil faults were a cause of the class
members’ diseases. The trial court rejected other grounds of
fault advanced by the class, holding that: (i) the evidence was
insufficient to show that defendants marketed to youth, (ii)
defendants' advertising did not convey false information about the
characteristics of cigarettes, and (iii) defendants did not commit
a fault by using the descriptors light or mild for cigarettes with
a lower tar delivery. The trial court estimated the disease class
at 99,957 members.

The trial court ordered defendants to pay CAD 1 billion
(approximately $763 million) of the compensatory damage award into
a trust within 60 days, CAD 200 million (approximately $153
million) of which is the subsidiary’s portion and ordered
briefing on a proposed claims process for the distribution of
damages to individual class members and for payment of attorneys'
fees and legal costs.

In June 2015, the company's subsidiary commenced the appellate
process by filing its inscription of appeal of the trial court's
judgment with the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The company's
subsidiary also filed a motion to cancel the trial court's order
for payment into a trust within 60 days notwithstanding appeal. In
July 2015, the Court of Appeal granted the motion to cancel and
overturned the trial court's ruling that the company's subsidiary
make an initial payment within 60 days.

In August 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion with the Court of Appeal
seeking an order that defendants place irrevocable letters of
credit totaling CAD 5 billion (approximately $3.8 billion) into
trust, to secure the judgments in both the Letourneau and Blais
cases.

Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their motion for security against
JTI-MacDonald Corp. and proceeded only against the company's
subsidiary and Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. In October 2015, the
Court of Appeal granted the motion and ordered the company's
subsidiary to furnish security totaling CAD 226 million
(approximately $172.5 million) to cover both the Letourneau and
Blais cases. Such security may take the form of cash into a court
trust or letters of credit, in six equal consecutive quarterly
installments of approximately CAD 37.6 million (approximately $28.7
million) beginning in December 2015 through March 2017.

The Court of Appeal ordered Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. to furnish
security totaling CAD 758 million (approximately $578 million) in
seven equal consecutive quarterly installments of approximately CAD
108 million (approximately $82.4 million) beginning in December
2015 through June 2017.

In March 2017, the company's subsidiary made its sixth and final
quarterly installment of security for approximately CAD 37.6
million (approximately $28.7 million) into a court trust. This
payment is included in other assets on the consolidated balance
sheets and in cash used in operating activities in the consolidated
statements of cash flows.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the security is payable upon a
final judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's
judgment or upon further order of the Court of Appeal. The Court of
Appeal heard oral arguments on the merits appeal in November 2016.


The company's subsidiary and PMI believe that the findings of
liability and damages were incorrect and should ultimately be set
aside on any one of many grounds, including the following: (i)
holding that defendants violated Quebec law by failing to warn
class members of the risks of smoking even after the court found
that class members knew, or should have known, of the risks, (ii)
finding that plaintiffs were not required to prove that defendants'
alleged misconduct caused injury to each class member in direct
contravention of binding precedent, (iii) creating a factual
presumption, without any evidence from class members or otherwise,
that defendants' alleged misconduct caused all smoking by all class
members, (iv) relying on epidemiological evidence that did not meet
recognized scientific standards, and (v) awarding punitive damages
to punish defendants without proper consideration as to whether
punitive damages were necessary to deter future misconduct.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. It markets and sells its products in the European
Union, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast
Asia, East Asia, Australia, Latin America, and Canada. The company
was incorporated in 1987 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Steffek Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled SARAH STEFFEK, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. PHILLIPS & COHEN
ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Delaware Corporation; and, JOHN AND JANE DOES
NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25, Case No. 1:18-cv-00239-WCG (E.D. Wisc.),
seeks to certify a class defined as:

     All persons to whom Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd. mailed
     a written communication in the form of Exhibit A to the
     Complaint, using an address in the State of Wisconsin,
     during the period of February 14, 2017 through March 7, 2018
     which either: (a) included a "Balance"; (b) made an offer to
     accept an amount less than the Balance along with a
     statement that, "If you are unable to pay in full or settle
     at the reduced rate, we would still like to work with you to
     resolve this matter, as other repayment options may be
     available;" or (c) made an offer to accept an amount less
     than the Balance and included the following warning:

        "Whenever $600.00 or more in principle of a debt is
         forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than
         the balance owing, the creditor may be required to
         report the amount of the debt forgiven to the Internal
         Revenue Service on a 1099C form, a copy of which would
         be mailed to you by the creditor. If you are uncertain
         of the legal or tax consequences, we encourage you to
         consult your legal or tax advisor."

In her complaint, Ms. Steffek accuses the Defendants of violating
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Ms. Steffek also asks the Court to appoint her to represent the
putative class members, and to appoint her attorneys as counsel for
the class.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis R. Greene, Esq.
          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          3010 South Appleton Road
          Menasha, WI 54952
          Telephone (973) 379-7500
          E-mail: Francis@SternThomasson.com
                  Philip@SternThomasson.com
                  Andrew@SternThomasson.com


PRECC INC: Does Not Pay Technicians Overtime Wages, Berry Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
FRANK BERRY, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. PreCC, INC. f/k/a PREMIER CC, INC., and ANTHONY URSO,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00440-B (N.D. Tex., February 20, 2019), alleges
that the Plaintiff and other cable technicians routinely worked in
excess of 40 hours per week, and was not paid overtime compensation
in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.

PreCC, Inc., formerly known as Premier CC, Inc., is an Illinois
corporation that actively conducted business in the state of Texas.
Anthony Urso, of Elmhurst, Illinois, is the Chief Operating
Officer and owner of the Company.

Premier is in the business of installing and servicing
telecommunications and cable systems.  According to its Web site,
Premier considers itself "a national leader in the
telecommunications customer service fulfillment industry."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Barry S. Hersh, Esq.
          HERSH LAW FIRM, PC
          3626 N. Hall St., Suite 800
          Dallas, TX 75219-5133
          Telephone: (214) 303-1022
          Facsimile: (214) 550-8170
          E-mail: barry@hersh-law.com


QUORA INC: Musgrave Sues over Information Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
RICK MUSGRAVE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. QUORA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00566-NC (N.D. Cal., Jan. 31, 2019) is a class action
against Defendant for its failure to secure and safeguard the
Plaintiff's personal identifying information.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to adequately
protect the Personal Information of its users, and that information
is now in the hands malicious third parties. The Plaintiff and the
class now face a heightened, imminent risk of fraud, identity
theft, and financial harm.

Quora, Inc. operates an online portal that enables users to post
questions and get answers, share knowledge, and browse information
about people and topics. The company was founded in 2009 and is
based in Mountain View, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher , Esq.
          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          Thomas A. Reyda, Esq.
          Blair E. Reed, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-Mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
                  jsmith@bursor.com
                  treyda@bursor.com
                  breed@bursor.com


RALEY'S: California App. Flips Denial of Myers Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROGER MYERS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
RALEY'S, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. C075125 (Cal. App.),
Judge Vance W. Raye of the Court of Appeals of California for the
Third District, Yolo, reversed the judgment of the trial court
denying class certification, and remanded the case to the trial
court to articulate a statement of reasons for approving or denying
class certification.

Plaintiffs Myers, Dave Billings, Greg Neyhart, and Jim Mestas were
nonexempt maintenance technicians for Raley's grocery stores.
Maintenance technicians, including food equipment technicians,
refrigeration technicians, and service and construction
electricians, travel from store to store in company-owned vehicles
to repair ovens, refrigeration units, electrical components, and
other equipment.

The Plaintiffs allege they are required to drive company vehicles
carrying their own tools as well as specialized tools and they are
not allowed to run personal errands without special permission or
carry passengers who are not Raley's employees except in an
emergency.  Despite Raley's control over their driving time, they
are not compensated for the time they spend driving to their first
store or driving home from the last store they service each day.
They assert Raley's uniform practice violates California law.

The technicians allege Raley's maintains uniform policies and/or
practices denying them travel time while they are under Raley's
control, compensation for working during meal time, and
reimbursement for personal tools they are required to purchase and
replace.   These uniform policies and practices, according to the
technicians, present common issues of fact and law and their
legality are particularly well suited to a class action.  
  
The Plaintiffs sought certification of the class defined as all
current and former hourly employees who held the position of Food
Service Technician, Refrigeration Technician and/or Electrician
Technician (and/or similar position) at Raley's in the State of
California within four years of the filing of the original
complaint to the present.

Without the benefit of Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.,
and Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, and without elucidating its
reasons, the trial court denied Raley's maintenance technicians'
motion for class certification of their wage and hour claims.  In
denying class certification, the trial court made the conclusory
finding the Plaintiffs failed to establish that a well-defined
community of interest exists and that the common issues of fact and
law predominate.

Judge Raye finds that the technicians allege that Raley's retained
the right to control them whenever they were driving company
vehicles, which included the drive time to the first store in the
morning and home from the last store they serviced in the
afternoon.  As in Ayala, the question is not whether different
managers exercised control in a myriad of ways with different
categories of technicians, but whether, as the technicians allege,
Raley's had the right to control.  From the trial court's cursory
finding, the Judge cannot determine whether it understood the
distinction and therefore whether it relied on improper criteria or
inaccurate assumptions.  The trial court need not resolve that
question on the merits, but it must properly articulate the
question so as to determine whether the right to control is a
common question amenable to class treatment.

He also finds that to turn to the record to concoct some basis for
the trial court's denial of certification is to abolish the
relevant standard of review, ignore the trial court's reasoning,
and apply ordinary appellate review contrary to the legion of cases
that prohibit appellate revisionism.  This he cannot do.  The
Supreme Court has clearly stated the they review the trial court's
actual reasons for granting or denying certification; if they are
erroneous, they must reverse, whether or not other reasons not
relied upon might have supported the ruling.  The court in Dailey
violated this basic precept.  The Judge rejects Raley's reliance on
a case at odds with the fundamental scope of our task as defined by
the Supreme Court

Judge Raye concludes that his review of the trial court's denial of
class certification is governed by a unique standard of review
requiring him to examine the trial court's reasons, not the
propriety of the outcome.  Because the trial court's cursory
finding renders his task impossible and because cases decided after
the court's ruling expose the dangers of employing the wrong legal
criteria, asking the wrong questions, or inflating the significance
of the opposing parties' evidence, he must remand the case to the
trial court for reconsideration in light of Ayala and Jones and for
a statement of reasons to ensure the court has not employed
improper criteria or relied on erroneous legal assumptions.

Accordingly, he reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court to articulate a statement of reasons for approving or
denying class certification.  The Plaintiffs will recover costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 13, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/YqDYXT from Leagle.com.


RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Coulter
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned JOSHUA COULTER, individually
and behalf of all others similarly situated v. RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, et al. Civil Action No. 17-3970. (E.D. Pa.).

Coulter and RMS have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
limited to the issue of RMS's liability to Coulter, i.e., whether
the debt collection letter violated the FDCPA.

Plaintiff Joshua Coulter brings this putative class action against
Defendant Io, Inc. t/d/b/a Receivables Management Systems (RMS)
(misidentified in the Complaint as Receivables Management Systems),
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). Coulter's claims stem from a debt collection letter he
received from RMS. Coulter alleges the collection letter violated
two provisions of the FDCPa because it misleadingly suggested he
could dispute the debt RMS was seeking to collect by calling RMS
when, in fact, a dispute must be in writing to be effective under
the FDCPA.

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
she is a consumer (2) the defendant is a debt collector (3) the
defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a
debt as the Act defines it and (4) the defendant has violated a
provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.

Coulter principally alleges the Collection Letter violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1692g, which requires a debt collector seeking to
collect a debt to provide the consumer with certain information
regarding the debt and the consumer's rights. Specifically, Section
1692g requires a debt collector to provide a consumer with a
written notice, either in its initial communication with the
consumer about the alleged debt or within five days after its
initial communication, containing: (1) the amount of the debt; (2)
the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement
that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a
statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification
of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy
of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by
the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's
written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector
will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current creditor.

In determining whether a validation notice is contradicted or
overshadowed, the court must interpret the collection letter from
the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor. The least
sophisticated debtor standard is lower than simply examining
whether particular language would deceive or mislead a reasonable
debtor, as the purpose of the standard is to ensure that the FDCPA
protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.

Although the least sophisticated debtor standard is less demanding
than one that inquires whether a particular communication would
mislead or deceive a reasonable debtor. Under this standard, a
validation notice will be found to be overshadowed or contradicted
by other language in the collection letter if the least
sophisticated debtor, upon reading the letter in its entirety,
would be uncertain as to her rights, such as when the letter can be
reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of
which is inaccurate.

Coulter does not dispute that the Collection Letter in this case
included the statutorily required validation notice in the final
paragraph of the Letter, under the heading Federal Law requires us
to inform you that. Rather, Coulter argues the Collection Letter
violated Section 1692g because the validation notice was
overshadowed and contradicted by other language in the Letter.
Specifically, Coulter points to the Letter's third and fourth
paragraphs, which advise the consumer: "If you feel that this
balance may be due from your insurance carrier, please contact your
carrier prior to contacting the representative at the extension
listed below. Our Collection Representatives are available to work
with you between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Mail your
payment or call today."

In evaluating the parties' positions, the Court's analysis begins
with Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, LLC, 709
F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2013), which Coulter argues is controlling here.
Like this case, Caprio involved a debt collection letter seeking to
collect a medical debt. The body of the letter included the
statement, if we can answer any questions, or if you feel you do
not owe this amount, please call us toll free at 800-984-9115 or
write us at the above address and directed the debtor to SEE
REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. The statutorily required
validation notice was printed on the reverse side of the collection
letter.

Interpreting the collection letter from the perspective of the
least sophisticated debtor, the court held the instruction that the
consumer should call or write if you feel you do not owe this
amount overshadowed and contradicted the collection letter's
validation notice because the least sophisticated debtor could
reasonably understand this statement to instruct the debtor to call
or write in order to dispute the debt itself, when, in fact, a
telephone call is not a legally effective alternative for disputing
the debt.

Although acknowledging the letter did not expressly state that a
telephone call would be sufficient to dispute the debt and that the
please call language could be read as nothing more than a mere
invitation to communicate, the court stressed that the question
before it was not whether the debtor or the debt collector offered
a more appropriate reading' of the debt collection letter, but how
the letter would be understood by the least sophisticated debtor.
The court went on to hold that the least sophisticated debtor could
reasonably understand the phrase if you feel you do not owe this
amount to encompass a dispute regarding the debt and its validity,
and could thus understand the letter to instruct that such disputes
could be raised by telephone.  

The court therefore concluded the collection letter was deceptive
because it can be reasonably read to have two or more different
meanings, one of which is inaccurate, i.e., that the debto could
dispute the debt by making a telephone call.

Although the issue is a close one, this Court agrees with Coulter
that, under Caprio, the Collection Letter in this case violated
Section 1692g because the least sophisticated debtor could
reasonably understand the Letter to instruct the consumer to raise
insurance-related disputes regarding the debt by calling RMS. While
RMS's alternative interpretation of the Letter as merely
encouraging the consumer to call RMS to make payment on the debt
may be plausible, Caprio made clear that the Court's task in
reviewing the Collection Letter is not to decide whether the debtor
or the debt collector offers a more appropriate reading' of the
Letter, but to interpret the document from the perspective of the
`least sophisticated debtor. As noted, the third paragraph of the
Letter advises the consumer, if you feel that this balance may be
due from your insurance carrier, please contact your carrier prior
to contacting the representative at the extension listed below.

Viewed from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor, the
phrase if you feel that this balance may be due from your insurance
carrier" can reasonably be understood to reference a dispute
regarding the debt. This phrase is the equivalent of the phrase if
you feel you do not owe this amount, which the Caprio court held
could reasonably be interpreted to encompass a dispute a consumer
who feels that a debt is owed by his insurance company would
necessarily also feel that he personally does not owe the debt.
Indeed, at his deposition, RMS's corporate representative conceded
that if a consumer were to advise RMS that the consumer did not
believe he owed some or all of the balance alleged to be due
because insurance should have covered it, RMS would normally
consider the debt to be disputed.  

As noted, Coulter also alleges the Collection Letter in this case
violated Section 1692e(10), which prohibits a debt collector from
using any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a
consumer. Having found that the Collection Letter violated Section
1692g by misleadingly suggesting the consumer could raise an
insurance-related dispute regarding the debt by telephone, the
Court also finds the Letter violated Section 1692e(10).
Accordingly, summary judgment will also be granted in favor of
Coulter as to liability on his Section 1692e(10) claim.

Accordingly, Coulter's motion for summary judgment will be granted
and RMS's motion for summary judgment will be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/y5hn54fsfrom
Leagle.com.

JOSHUA COULTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ARI H. MARCUS --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC.

RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, Defendant, represented by THOMAS G.
COLLINS -- thomas.collins@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY
PC & JACOB M. THEIS, BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC.


REGENCY GP LP: Dieckman Files Petition for Insuance of Subpoena
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the case captioned Adrian Dieckman, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Regency GP LP and
Regency GP EEC, pending in the Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware under Case No. 11130-CB has filed a petition for issuance
of a subpoena.

Mr. Dieckman, as Petitioner, seeks the production of documents from
one or more witnesses located in Dallas County, Texas, including
LRS Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Lajitas Gold Resort and Spa, 8111
Westchester Drive, Suite 600, Dallas, Texas 76225. Mr. Dieckman has
obtained a Commission for the issuance of subpoena to LRS Operating
Company from the Court in which the Delaware Lawsuit is pending.  

Mr. Dieckman requests, pursuant to Texas rule of Civil Procedure
201.2, that the honorable Court assign a miscellaneous cause number
to the foregoing action to allow Petitioner to issue subpoena duces
tecum on LRS Operating Company, LLC, and any other individuals or
entities located in Dallas County, Texas from Which Petition may
seek discovery.

The Petitioner is represented by:

     James M. McCown, Esq.
     NESBITT, VASSAR & MCCOWN, L.L.P.
     15851 Dallas Parkway, Suite 800
     Addison, TX 75001
     Phone: (972) 371-2411
     Telecopier: (972) 371-2410
     Email: jmccown@nvmlaw.com


REITER BUNSIC: Olivia Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
German Olivia, on behalf of himself and other employees similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Reiter Bunsic Contractors, Inc., a Florida
corporation; Louis F. Bunsic; Daniel Reiter; and, William J.
Reiter, Defendants, Case No. 9:19-cv-80254-RLR (E.D. Wis., February
22, 2019) is an action seeking to recover monetary damages in the
form of unpaid overtime and minimum wages, and to redress the
deprivation of rights secured to Plaintiff, and others similarly
situated, by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Florida
Minimum Wage Amendment ("FMWA").

The Defendants knowingly and willfully and maliciously operated
their business with a policy of not paying the statutory minimum
wages and overtime to the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
construction workers, says the complaint.

Plaintiff German Olivia was employed by the Defendants as a
construction worker.

Defendant RBC was and continues to be an "enterprise engaged in
commerce" within the meaning of the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter Bober, Esq.
     Samara Robbins Bober, Esq.
     BOBER & BOBER, P.A.
     2699 Stirling Road, Suite A-304
     Hollywood, FL 33312
     Phone: (954) 922-2298
     Fax: (954) 922-5455
     Email: peter@boberlaw.com
            samara@boberlaw.com


SANTANNA NATURAL: Foreign Judgment Registration Filed in "Johansen"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A registration of foreign judgment from the Court of Northern
District Illinois was filed in the case captioned  JOHANSEN v.
SANTANNA NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, Case No. 2:19-mc-00019-UJ, in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
February 13, 2019.

Santanna Natural Gas Corporation, doing business as Santanna Energy
Services, supplies natural gas and electricity to commercial,
industrial, institutional, and residential customers in Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. The company was founded in 1988 and is
based in Bolingbrook, Illinois.[BN]

Santanna Natural Gas Corporation doing business as: Santanna Energy
Services is represented by:

   Sarah L. Wieselgren, Esq.
   Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP
   Three Logan Square
   1717 Arch St., Suite 610
   Philadelphia, PA 19103
   Tel: (215) 717-4028
   Fax: (973) 377-1911
   Email: swieselgren@grsm.com


SEALY INC: Court Narrows Claims in Sarmiento Wage & Hour Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part the
case captioned JESUS SARMIENTO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEALY, INC.,
et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-01990-JST. (N.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is Defendants Sealy, Inc. and Sealy Mattress
Manufacturing Company, LLC's motion for judgment on the pleadings
on several of Plaintiffs' claims.

The Plaintiffs Jesus Sarmiento and Juan Chavez are former employees
of Sealy's mattress manufacturing facility in Richmond, California.
Sarmiento worked concurrently as a loader, taper or sewer during
his employment. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), Sarmiento was entitled to a different hourly rate for each
job. The Plaintiffs allege that Sealy did not pay Sarmiento and
other putative class members the higher hourly rates when
required.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)

After the pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial
a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. A judgment on the
pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in
the non-moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

LMRA Section 301 Preemption

LMRA section 301 provides federal jurisdiction over suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization. Section 301 encapsulates a congressional mandate to
the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be
used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.

The demarcation between preempted claims and those that survive
Section 301's reach is not a line that lends itself to analytical
precision. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-prong inquiry to
analyze whether section 301 preemption applies. Burnside v. Kiewit
Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2007). A court must
first determine whether the asserted cause of action involves a
right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a
CBA. If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the
claim is preempted and the court's analysis ends there. However, if
the court determines the right underlying the state claims exists
independently of the CBA the court then proceeds to the second
prong, which examines whether the right is substantially dependent
on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.

In determining if the first prong is met whether a right is
independent of a CBA a court must evaluate whether the legal
character of a claim is independent of rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. Section 301 preempts the claim if it is
founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining
agreements.  

In determining whether the second prong is met whether the claim is
substantially dependent on a CBA the Court must evaluate whether
the claim can be resolved by looking to versus interpreting the
CBA. If the latter, the claim is pre-empted, if the former, it is
not.

Garmon Preemption

While the NLRA contains no express preemption provision, two
categories of state action are implicitly preempted: (1) laws that
regulate conduct that is either protected or prohibited by the NLRA
(Garmon preemption) and (2) laws that regulate in an area Congress
intended to leave unregulated or controlled by the free play of
economic forces.  

Garmon preemption is intended to preclude state interference with
the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) interpretation and
active enforcement of the integrated scheme of regulation
established by the NLRA. Under Garmon preemption, a State may not
regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably
protects or prohibits.

Sealy argues that the Plaintiffs' second, third, seventh, and
eighth claims are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.
Alternatively, Sealy contends, the Plaintiffs' seventh and eighth
claims are preempted by Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.  

LMRA

Second and Third Claims (Wage Claims)

The Plaintiffs' second claim alleges that Sealy violated California
Labor Code section 223, which requires that, where any statute or
contract requires an employer to maintain the designated wage
scale, it shall be unlawful to secretly pay a lower wage while
purporting to pay the wage designated by statute or by contract.

Similarly, the Plaintiffs' third claim alleges a violation of
California Labor Code section 222, which provides that it shall be
unlawful, in case of any wage agreement arrived at through
collective bargaining, either wilfully or unlawfully or with intent
to defraud an employee, a competitor, or any other person, to
withhold from said employee any part of the wage agreed upon.

Sealy asserts that the Plaintiffs' claims are expressly based on
breaches of the CBA and therefore are preempted under the first
Burnside prong. Although there is some merit to this argument, the
Court ultimately finds it unpersuasive. True, the protections
conferred section 222 specifically require a wage agreement arrived
at through collective bargaining and section 223 applies here only
because the CBA is a contract that requires an employer to maintain
the designated wage scale. The court concluded that this right was
independent of the CBA at step one and would not require
interpretation of the CBA at step two, even though the plaintiff's
banked vacation days exist[ed] only by virtue of her having earned
them in accordance with a workplace policy incorporated in the
CBA.

Nor is it sufficient for prong one that section 222 applies only to
workers covered by a CBA. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a
law could cover only unionized workers but remain unpre-empted if
no collective-bargaining agreement interpretation was needed to
resolve claims brought thereunder.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims are not preempted
under the first prong.
The Court therefore turns to the second prong of the Burnside test.
Here, the parties have not provided the Court with enough
information to ascertain whether there is an active dispute over
'the meaning of contract terms.' The Plaintiffs' complaint states
only that Sealy did not pay the appropriate hourly rate for various
job assignments. Sealy theorizes that resolving these claims will
require a complex evaluation of the CBA's procedures for
determining the appropriate hourly rate but that is not necessarily
so. If, for instance, Sealy simply refused to pay any of the higher
hourly rates, the Court would need to look to the CBA only to
determine the difference between what was paid and what was owed.
Moreover, at the hearing on this motion, the Court asked Sealy to
identify the precise provisions of the CBA that the Court would
need to construe and explain why such construction was necessary.
Sealy was unable to do so.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that neither the Plaintiffs'
second and third claims, nor their derivative PAGA claims, are
preempted.

Seventh and Eighth Claims (Wrongful Termination Claims)

The Plaintiffs' seventh claim alleges that Sealy terminated them in
violation of Labor Code section 923, which establishes a public
policy that employees shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion in, among other things, concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. The Plaintiffs allege that their actions at the town
hall meeting constituted concerted activities and that Sealy
terminated them in retaliation for those actions. The Plaintiffs'
eighth claim asserts a common-law tort claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, based upon the same
theory of retaliation for concerted activities.   

Section 301 Claims

The CBA contains a mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs generally cannot succeed in a suit under
Section 301 to vindicate personal contract-based rights unless the
contractual grievance-arbitration procedure is invoked on their
behalf or on behalf of a group of employees of which they are part.
An employee may nonetheless pursue an unexhausted claim in federal
court only by showing also that the union violated its duty of fair
representation by failing to pursue the grievance to arbitration,
or pursuing it arbitrarily. Courts have referred to this procedure
as a hybrid section 301/fair representation claim.

Because the Court assumes for the sake of argument that the
Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by section 301, it likewise
assumes that the Plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of the
grievance and arbitration procedure.

Sealy contends, without citation to any material properly before
the Court, that the Plaintiffs have filed grievances related to
their terminations. According to Sealy, Chavez's grievance was
settled on December 27, 2017, while Sarmiento's grievance was
denied on June 8, 2017. Neither the Plaintiffs' complaint nor their
opposition addresses these allegations.

Regardless, the Plaintiffs must plead a breach of the duty of fair
representation against the union in order to bring a hybrid section
301/fair representation claim here. The Plaintiffs were required to
plead this claim within a six-month statute of limitations. Whether
the Plaintiffs would have brought a claim against the union for
failing to pursue an initial grievance and arbitration, or for
acting arbitrarily in pursuit of those remedies, the Plaintiffs
have not pleaded this claim within the requisite time.

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs cannot pursue their
wrongful termination claims under section 301.

NLRA

Sealy also argues that the Plaintiffs' seventh and eighth claims
are preempted by the NLRA. Sealy reasons that the Plaintiffs'
allegations that they were terminated in retaliation for their
concerted activities to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment are based on acts prohibited or arguably prohibited by
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.

The Court agrees.

California Labor Code section 923, on which the Plaintiffs' claims
are based, provides that employees shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. These
protections are mirrored in the NLRA. Section 7 of the NLRA gives
employees the right to, among other things, engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. Section 8, in turn, make it an
unfair labor practice for employers to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7. Section 8 further prohibits an employer's ability to by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

Where the NLRA's provisions are almost identical to the state
statute at issue, there is a clear case for Garmon preemption.
Moreover, the preemptive effect of Garmon cannot be avoided by
reference to California public policy violations, such as
violations of Labor Code Section 923. Here, Plaintiffs' alleged
violations of an employee's right to engage in concerted activities
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.

On its face, it is difficult to reconcile this reasoning with
Garmon preemption, which is aimed by its own terms at claims
pleaded under state law. Under Plaintiffs' reading, Paige is
inconsistent with numerous cases finding Garmon preemption of
asserted state-law claims unaccompanied by allegations of NLRA
violations.  

Despite these critiques, the Court is obligated to follow binding
precedent unless clearly irreconcilable with subsequent higher
authority. The issue before the court was thus whether there was a
basis for federal court jurisdiction. Because Garmon preemption is
not an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, it is
not a basis for removal from state to federal court jurisdiction
and its invocation does not create a federal question for federal
court jurisdiction.

Contradicting the allegations in their complaint and the basis for
their claims Plaintiffs' opposition states that they do not assert
any concerted union activities. To the extent that Plaintiffs
dispute the legal label attached to the activities alleged in their
complaint, the Court is not required to accept these assertions. To
the extent that Plaintiffs allege that, as a factual matter, no
such activities occurred, the Court does not consider these new
allegations as support for the merits of Plaintiffs' argument.

Rather, facts raised for the first time in plaintiff's opposition
papers should be considered by the court in determining whether to
grant leave to amend or to dismiss the complaint with or without
prejudice. But a plaintiff can only cure the complaint's
deficiencies with additional allegations that are consistent with
the challenged pleading and that do not contradict the allegations
in the original complaint. Nor have Plaintiffs explained how they
could possibly pursue their section 923 claims without those
allegations of concerted activities.

The Court therefore concludes that Garmon preemption deprives the
Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' seventh and eighth claims.

The Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

The Court holds that the Plaintiffs' second and third claims,
including any derivative PAGA claims, are not preempted by section
301 of the LMRA. The Court also holds that the Plaintiffs' seventh
and eighth claims are preempted under Garmon and cannot proceed in
the alternative as section 301 claims. The seventh and eighth
claims are accordingly dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 14, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y67hldhgfrom Leagle.com.

Jesus Sarmiento & Juan Chavez, Plaintiffs, represented by Scott S.
Nakama -- snakama@burtonemploymentlaw.com -- Burton Employment Law
& Jocelyn Burton -- jburton@burtonemploymentlaw.com -- Burton
Employment Law.

Sealy, Inc. & Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Company, LLC.,
Defendants, represented by Angela Joy Rafoth -- arafoth@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Courtney Marguerite Osborn --
cosborn@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Julie A. Stockton
-- jstockton@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


SELIMA OPTIQUE: Garey Alleges Disabilities Act Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
Selima Optique and Accessories, Inc. is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SelimaOptique and Accessories,
Inc, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01666 (S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2019).

SelimaOptique and Accessories, Inc., is a luxury eyewear brand
founded by Selima Salaun.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


SMILEY DENTAL: Court Conditionally Certifies Class of Employees
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JANIE RODRIGUEZ ON BEHALF OF HERSELF
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. SMILEY DENTAL
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC; SD-BRAUN, P.C.; SD-POTRANCO, P.C.;
SD-DEZAVALA, P.C.; SD-ROOSEVELT, P.C.; sd-933SCHERTZ, P.C.;
SD-431FREDERICK, P.C.; LYNH PHAM; AND THANG "KIDO" PHAM, the
Defendants, Case No 5:18-cv-01047-DAE (W.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge
David Alan Ezra entered an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a collective action under the Fair
      Labor Standards Act and authorizing Plaintiff's counsel,
      Melissa Morales Fletcher and Allison S. Harty of The Morales

      Firm, P.C., to issue opt-in notices and consent forms to a
      class consisting of:

      "all current and former hourly employees employed by
      Defendants in the State of Texas from [three years prior to
      the date the notice is issued] to the present who worked at
      more than one of Defendants' variuos locations in any
      workweek and whose hours worked at more than at each of those

      locations were not aggregated for purposes of calculating
      overtime pay due. The Class consists of only those persons
      whose aggregated hours, at Defendants' various locations, in

      a workweek equals more than 40 hours in that workweek.";

   2. directing the Defendants to produce to the Plaintiff's
      counsel in a usable electronic format no later than 10 days
      from the entry of the Court's order: the names, last-known
      residential addresses, last-known personal e-mail addresses,

      and dates of employment of all hourly employees who meet the

      parameters of the Class; and

   3. authorizing that the notice and consent to join may
      immediately be issued to the class members in accordance with

      the procedure.[CC]

STUMPY'S SALES: Bishop Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
Stumpy's Sales And Service, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Stumpy's Sales And Service, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01645 (S.D. N.Y., February 21, 2019).

Stumpy's Sales And Service, Inc. is a Motorcycle dealer in New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


TGI FRIDAY'S: Mullen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------
TGI Friday's Franchisor, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
Bartley M. Mullen, Jr., individually, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TGI Friday's Franchisor,
LLC and TGIF, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00197-MRH (W.D.
Pa., February 22, 2019).

TGI Fridays Franchisor LLC owns and operates franchise restaurant
of the TGIF brand. The company was incorporated in 2017 and is
based in Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
   Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP
   1133 Penn Avenue
   5th Floor
   Pittsburgh, PA 15222
   Tel: (412) 322-9243
   Email: bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com



UNITED STATES: Urban Financial Suit Removed to Oklahoma Dist. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Urban Financial REO, LLC v. Atwood et al., Case
No. CJ-2017-00061, was removed from
the Circuit Court of Nowata County, Oklahoma, to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on January 25, 2019,
and assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-00039-TCK-JFJ.

Plaintiff Urban Financial REO, LLC is represented by:

   Blake C Parrott, Esq.
   Baer & Timberlake (OKC)
   PO BOX 18486
   OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73154-0486
   Tel: (405) 842-7722
   Fax: (405) 429-5216
   Email: bparrott@baer-timberlake.com

      - and -

   Bret Daniel Davis, Esq.
   Lamum Mock Cunnyngham & Davis PC
   5613 N CLASSEN BLVD
   OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73118
   Tel: (405) 840-5900
   Fax: (405) 842-6132
   Email: bdavis@lamunmock.com

      - and -

   Chynna Scruggs, Esq.
   Baer & Timberlake, P.C.
   PO BOX 18486
   OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73154-0486
   Tel: (405) 842-7722
   Fax: (405) 848-9349

      - and -

   Donald J Timberlake, Esq.
   Baer & Timberlake (OKC)
   PO BOX 18486
   OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73154-0486
   Tel: (405) 842-7722
   Fax: (405) 848-9349

      - and -

   Gary D Baer, Esq.
   Baer & Timberlake (OKC)
   PO BOX 18486
   OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73154-0486
   Tel: (405) 842-7722
   Fax: (405) 848-9349

      - and -

   Kim Jenkins, Esq.
   Baer & Timberlake, P.C.
   PO Box 18486
   Oklahoma City, OK 73154-0486
   Tel: (405) 842-7722
   Fax: (405) 848-9349

Defendant Betty Atwood individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated persons is represented by:

   Bradford D Barron, Esq.
   Barron Law Firm PLLC
   PO BOX 369
   CLAREMORE, OK 74018
   Tel: (918) 341-8402
   Fax: (918) 515-4691
   Email: bbarron@barronlawfirmok.com

      - and -

   Zachary T Barron, Esq.
   Barron Law Firm PLLC
   PO BOX 369
   CLAREMORE, OK 74018
   Tel: (918) 341-8402
   Fax: (918) 515-4691
   Email: zbarron@barronlawfirmok.com

Defendant USA is represented by:

   Cathryn Dawn McClanahan, Esq.
   110 W 7TH ST STE 300
   TULSA, OK 74119-1013
   Tel: (918) 382-2700
   Fax: (918) 560-7939
   Email: cathy.mcclanahan@usdoj.gov

Third Party Defendant Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. is
represented by:

   Graham Webster Gerhardt, Esq.
   Bradley Arant Blount Cummings LLP (Birmingham)
   1819 5TH AVE N
   BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203
   Tel: (205) 521-8000
   Fax: (205) 488-6393
   Email: ggerhardt@bradley.com


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Condry Seeks to Certify 3 Classes Under ERISA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned RACHEL CONDRY, JANCE HOY,
CHRISTINE ENDICOTT, LAURA BISHOP, FELICITY BARBER, and RACHEL
CARROLL on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. UnitedHealth Group Inc.; UnitedHealthcare, Inc.;
UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company; UnitedHealthcare Services,
Inc.; and UMR, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-00183-VC (N.D. Cal.), move
the Court for an order certifying these classes:

   A. The "Claims Review Class" defined as:

      All participants and beneficiaries, in one or more of the
      ERISA employee health benefit plans administered by
      Defendants in the United States, which provide benefits for
      healthcare services and for which claims administration
      duties are delegated to one or more of the Defendants, who
      received from August 1, 2012 to present, an explanation of
      benefits for Comprehensive Lactation Services, that
      included one or more of the denial reasons:

      (1) Remark code KM: "This is not a reimbursable service.
          There may be a more appropriate CPT or HCPCS code that
          describes this service and/or the use of the modifier
          or modifier combination is inappropriate."

      (2) Remark code I5: "This service code is not separately
          reimbursable in this setting."

      (3) Remark code 13: "Your plan does not cover this
          nonmedical service or personal item."

      (4) Remark code B5: "Benefits for this service are denied.
          We sent a letter to the member asking for additional
          information.  We have not received a Response.";

   B. The "Lactation Services Class" defined as:

      All participants and beneficiaries in one or more of the
      ERISA, nongrandfathered, non-federal employee health
      benefit plans sold, underwritten or administered by
      Defendants in the United States in their capacity as
      insurer or administrator, who received from August 1, 2012
      to present Comprehensive Lactation Services, for which
      Defendants did not provide coverage and/or imposed
      cost-sharing; and

   C. The "ACA Class" defined as:

      All participants and beneficiaries in one or more of the
      non-grandfathered, non-federal employee health plans, sold,
      underwritten or administered by Defendants in the United
      States in their capacity as insurer or administrator, who
      received from August 1, 2012 to present Comprehensive
      Lactation Services, for which Defendants did not provide
      coverage and/or imposed cost-sharing.

For the Lactation Services Class and the ACA Class, a
non-grandfathered plan means: (i) any health insurance policy
created or purchased after March 23, 2010, and (ii) any health
insurance policy created or purchased on or before March 23, 2010,
that subsequently lost its grandfathered status.

For each of the Classes, Comprehensive Lactation Services means
comprehensive lactation support, counseling and education services
provided during the antenatal, perinatal, and the postpartum
period.

Excluded from the Classes are the Defendants, their subsidiaries or
affiliate companies, their legal representatives, assigns,
successors and employees.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint:

   -- for the Claims Review Class, Plaintiffs Barber, Bishop,
      Condry, Endicott, and Hoy as Class Representatives;

   -- for the Lactation Services Class, Plaintiffs Bishop, Hoy
      and Endicott as Class Representatives;

   -- for the ACA Class, Plaintiff Carroll as Class
      Representative; and

   -- their counsel, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith
      LLP and Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller and Shah, LLP as
      Co-Lead Class Counsel, and Axler Goldich LLC as Class
      Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on April 25, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.,
to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kristen Law Sagafi, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          483 Ninth Street, Suite 200
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 254-6808
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: ksagafi@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Nicholas E. Chimicles, Esq.
          Kimberly Donaldson-Smith, Esq.
          Stephanie E. Saunders, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          361 W. Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          Facsimile: (610) 649-3633
          E-mail: NEC@Chimicles.com
                  KMD@Chimicles.com
                  SES@Chimicles.com

               - and -

          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER AND SHAH, LLP
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                  lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Marc A. Goldich, Esq.
          Noah Axler, Esq.
          AXLER GOLDICH LLC
          1520 Locust Street, Suite 301
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (267) 534-7400
          Facsimile: (267) 534-7407
          E-mail: mgoldich@axgolaw.com
                  naxler@axgolaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan W. Cuneo, Esq.
          Pamela B. Gilbert, Esq.
          Monica E. Miller, Esq.
          Katherine Van Dyck, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: jonc@cuneolaw.com
                  pamelag@cuneolaw.com
                  mmiller@cuneolaw.com
                  kvandyck@cuneolaw.com


UXIN LIMITED: Faces Chiu Suit over 50% Drop in Share Price
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, DANIEL CHIU, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UXIN LIMITED; KUN DAI; ZHEN ZENG;
RONG LU; JULIAN CHENG; DOU SHEN; HAINAN TAN; MORGAN STANLEY & CO.
INTERNATIONAL PLC; GOLDMAN SACHS (ASIA) L.L.C.; J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC; CHINA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL CORPORATION HONG KONG
SECURITIES LIMITED; and CHINA RENAISSANCE SECURITIES (HONG KONG)
LIMITED, Defendants, Case No. 650633/2019 (N.Y. Sup., New York
Cty., Jan. 31, 2019) is a securities class action brought on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities, other than
Defendants and their affiliates, who purchased or otherwise
acquired publicly traded securities of Uxin pursuant and traceable
to the Company's initial public offering held on or around June 27,
2018, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants'
violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

According to the complaint, on June 28, 2018, the Company filed
with the SEC the prospectus for its upcoming IPO, which forms part
of the Registration Statement. The Company sold in its IPO
25,000,000 American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") at a price of $9 per
share. Each ADS represents three shares of Class A common stock.
The Company received proceeds of approximately $205.1 million from
the IPO, net of underwriting discounts and commissions. The
proceeds from the IPO were purportedly to be used to improve the
Company's transaction service capabilities, research and
development, and general corporate purposes.

On November 20, 2018, Uxin reported that the transaction volume of
its 2B business had declined 8.5% year-over-year and the gross
merchandise value ("GMV") had declined 14.8% year-over-year due to
the Company's decision to stop providing services such as
inspections for its customers.

As a result, Uxin's share price had fallen $4.50 per share in total
from its $9 IPO price, or 50%, to close at $4.50 on November 20,
2018.

The Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, the Registration Statement was materially
false and misleading and omitted to state that: (1) Uxin was likely
to stop providing complementary services such as inspections to its
customers; (2) instead, Uxin would connect consumers to dealers who
would provide such complementary services; (3) as a result, Uxin's
2B business would be materially impacted; and (4) consequently,
Defendants' statements in the Registration Statement regarding
Uxin's business, operations, and prospects, were materially false
and misleading.

Uxin Limited, through its subsidiaries, operates an used car
e-commerce platform in China. Uxin Limited was founded in 2011 and
is based in Beijing, China. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com


VALERO MARKETING: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Bautista Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Faith Bautista filed an appeal from a Court ruling in her
lawsuit titled Faith Bautista v. Valero Marketing and Supply
Company, Case No. 3:15-cv-05557-RS, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ms. Bautista
brings suit against Valero, alleging that Valero-branded gas
stations engage in deceptive advertising with respect to the price
per gallon charged for gasoline purchased with a debit card.  She
alleges that Valero's deceptive and misleading signage violates the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California False Advertising Law, and
California Unfair Competition Law.

The appellate case is captioned as Faith Bautista v. Valero
Marketing and Supply Company, Case No. 19-80018, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner FAITH BAUTISTA, Individually and Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Susan Katina Alexander, Esq.
          Andrew Love, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          One Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: salexander@rgrdlaw.com
                  alove@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Stuart Andrew Davidson, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          120 E. Palmetto Park Road
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          Facsimile: (561) 750-3364
          E-mail: sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Rafael Bernardino, Jr., Esq.
          HOBSON, BERNARDINO & DAVIS, LLP
          333 S. Hope Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 235-9190
          E-mail: rbernardino@hbdlegal.com

Defendant-Respondent VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY is
represented by:

          David S. Harris, Esq.
          Gerald Edward Hawxhurst, Esq.
          HAWXHURST HARRIS LLP
          11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 620
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 893-5150
          E-mail: david@hawxhurstllp.com
                  jerry@hawxhurstllp.com


VANDA PHARMA: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Securities Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Feb. 11
disclosed that it is investigating potential securities claims on
behalf of shareholders of Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NASDAQ:VNDA)
resulting from allegations that Vanda may have issued materially
misleading business information to the investing public.

On February 11, 2019, Aurelius Value published an article which
discussed a 150-page whistleblower lawsuit alleging that, "Vanda
has engaged in a series of fraudulent schemes, some personally
orchestrated by [its CEO], to defraud government payors." The
whistleblower lawsuit alleges "illegal off-label promotion of both
of Vanda's drugs, Vanda's participation in a fraud involving
doctors writing hundreds of ‘fake prescriptions' and pocketing
cash using Vanda-issued copay cards, falsified documents in
internal systems, and resignations of senior executives who refused
to participate in illegal activity." On this news, shares of Vanda
securities fell during intra-day trading on February 11, 2019.

Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action lawsuit to recover
losses suffered by Vanda investors. If you purchased shares of
Vanda please visit the firm's website at
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1504.html to join the class
action. You may also contact Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen
Law Firm toll free at 866-767-3653 or via email at
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013.


WOLFGANG'S: Workers Sue Over Unpaid Wages, Discrimination
---------------------------------------------------------
Nefail Ljubanovic and Jairo Dodic, on behalf of himself and the
Class, Plaintiffs, v. Wolfgang's Steakhouse Inc., Wolf Eastside
LLC, d/b/a Wolfgang's Steakhouse, ZMF Restaurants LLC, d/b/a
Wolfgang's Steakhouse At Park Avenue, Wolf Gotham LLC, d/b/a
Wolfgang's Steakhouse - Gotham Hotel, Wolf on Broadway LLC, d/b/a
Wolfgang's Steakhouse, Wolf at Tribeca Inc., d/b/a Wolfgang's
Steakhouse Tribeca, Peter Zweiner, Wolfgang Zweiner, Zizo Doe (last
name unknown), Aramo Doe (last name unknown), John Does 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 151956/2019 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., New York Cty.,
February 22, 2019) alleges, pursuant to the New York Labor Law
("NYLL") that they, and others similarly situated, are entitled to
recover from Defendants: unpaid minimum wages due to an invalid tip
credit deduction, unpaid spread of hours premiums, statutory
penalties, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

One of the Plaintiffs further alleges, pursuant to New York State
Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), and New York City Human Rights Law
("NYCHRL"), that he was deprived of his statutory rights as a
result of Defendants' discriminatory employment practices, and
seeks to recover economic damages, compensatory damages and
punitive damages.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with
a policy of not providing proper wage notices to Plaintiffs, in
violation of the NYLL, asserts the complaint.

Serbian managers would curse at Plaintiff, and make extremely
derogatory comments about his ethnicity, national origin and
religion. After enduring months of severe verbal abuse, around
March 2016 Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendants' corporate office
to complain about the daily abuse he was suffering. Plaintiff
pleaded with the Defendants to do something about the situation.

Despite Plaintiff's plea for help, nothing was done by management
and no one from management ever spoke to Plaintiff about the
letter. In fact, after writing the letter, the situation worsened
and the level of abuse increased, the complaint relates.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants to work as a waiter and a
head waiter.

Wolfgang's Steakhouse Inc. is a domestic corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     William Brown, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 465-1188
     Fax:(212) 465-1181


WORKOUT ANYTIME: Munday Seeks Payment of Past-Due Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL MUNDAY; individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. WORKOUT ANYTIME ILLINOIS, INC., an
Illinois corporation; ERIC NAGLE; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01056 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14, 2019),
seeks payment of past-due wages and an equivalent amount in
liquidated damages for putative class members who opt-in against
Defendants for willfully violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have actual and
constructive knowledge that Plaintiff and others were performing
work for which they were not paid the minimum wage, and at times
performing work for which they were not paid any wage. The
Plaintiff and others were working more than 8 hours in a single
day, but were not paid one and a half times their regular rate of
pay for this overtime work, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs:

          Michael L. Fradin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL L. FRADIN
          8401 Crawford Ave. Ste. 104
          Skokie, IL 60076
          Telephone: 847 986-5889
          Facsimile: 847 673-1228
          E-mail: mike@fradinlaw.com

WORLD WRESTLING: Asks Court to Dismiss Appeals in Wrestlers' Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February
7, 2019, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the
Company has moved to dismiss all of the appeals in connection with
several class suits, except for the appeal of the dismissal of the
Laurinaitis case, for being filed untimely.

On October 23, 2014, a lawsuit was filed in the U. S. District
Court for the District of Oregon, entitled William Albert Haynes
III, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, v. World
Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.  This complaint was amended on
January 30, 2015 and alleged that the Company ignored, downplayed,
and/or failed to disclose the risks associated with traumatic brain
injuries suffered by WWE's performers and seeks class action
status. On March 31, 2015, the Company filed a motion to dismiss
the first amended class action complaint in its entirety or, if not
dismissed, to transfer the lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut. Without addressing the merits of the
Company's motion to dismiss, the Court transferred the case to
Connecticut on June 25, 2015.  The plaintiffs filed an objection to
such transfer, which was denied on July 27, 2015.

On January 16, 2015, a second lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, entitled
Evan Singleton and Vito LoGrasso, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.,
alleging many of the same allegations as Haynes.

On February 27, 2015, the Company moved to transfer venue to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut due to
forum-selection clauses in the contracts between WWE and the
plaintiffs and that motion was granted on March 23, 2015.  

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 22, 2015 and,
following a scheduling conference in which the court ordered the
plaintiffs to cure various pleading deficiencies, the plaintiffs
filed a second amended complaint on June 15, 2015.  On June 29,
2015, WWE moved to dismiss the second amended complaint in its
entirety.

On April 9, 2015, a third lawsuit was filed in the U. S. District
Court for the Central District of California, entitled Russ
McCullough, a/k/a "Big Russ McCullough," Ryan Sakoda, and Matthew
R. Wiese a/k/a "Luther Reigns," individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.,
asserting similar allegations to Haynes.

The Company again moved to transfer the lawsuit to Connecticut due
to forum-selection clauses in the contracts between WWE and the
plaintiffs, which the California court granted on July 10, 2015.
On September 21, 2015, the plaintiffs amended this complaint, and,
on November 16, 2015, the Company moved to dismiss the amended
complaint.  

Each of these suits seeks unspecified actual, compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive relief, including ordering medical
monitoring. The Haynes and McCullough cases purport to be class
actions.

On February 18, 2015, a lawsuit was filed in Tennessee state court
and subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, entitled Cassandra Frazier, individually and
as next of kin to her deceased husband, Nelson Lee Frazier, Jr.,
and as personal representative of the Estate of Nelson Lee Frazier,
Jr. Deceased, v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

A similar suit was filed in the U. S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas entitled Michelle James, as mother and
next friend of Matthew Osborne, minor child, and Teagan Osborne, a
minor child v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

These lawsuits contain many of the same allegations as the other
lawsuits alleging traumatic brain injuries and further allege that
the injuries contributed to these former talents' deaths. WWE moved
to transfer the Frazier and Osborne lawsuits to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut based on forum-selection
clauses in the decedents' contracts with WWE, which motions were
granted by the respective courts. On November 23, 2015, amended
complaints were filed in Frazier and Osborne, which the Company
moved to dismiss on December 16, 2015 and December 21, 2015,
respectively.

On November 10, 2016, the Court granted the Company's motions to
dismiss the Frazier and Osborne lawsuits in their entirety. On June
29, 2015, the Company filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.
S. District Court for the District of Connecticut entitled World
Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Robert Windham, Thomas Billington,
James Ware, Oreal Perras and various John and Jane Does seeking a
declaration against these former performers that their threatened
claims related to alleged traumatic brain injuries and/or other
tort claims are time-barred. On September 21, 2015, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss this complaint, which the Company
opposed.

The Court previously ordered a stay of discovery in all cases
pending decisions on the motions to dismiss. On January 15, 2016,
the Court partially lifted the stay and permitted discovery only on
three issues in the case involving Singleton and LoGrasso. Such
discovery was completed by June 1, 2016. On March 21, 2016, the
Court issued a memorandum of decision granting in part and denying
in part the Company's motions to dismiss the Haynes,
Singleton/LoGrasso, and McCullough lawsuits.

The Court granted the Company's motions to dismiss the Haynes and
McCullough lawsuits in their entirety and granted the Company's
motion to dismiss all claims in the Singleton/LoGrasso lawsuit
except for the claim of fraud by omission. On March 22, 2016, the
Court issued an order dismissing the Windham lawsuit based on the
Court's memorandum of decision on the motions to dismiss.

On April 4, 2016, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration
with respect to the Court's decision not to dismiss the fraud by
omission claim in the Singleton/LoGrasso lawsuit and, on April 5,
2016, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration with respect
to the Court dismissal of the Windham lawsuit. On July 21, 2016,
the Court denied the Company's motion in the Singleton/LoGrasso
lawsuit and granted in part the Company's motion in the Windham
lawsuit.

On April 20, 2016, the plaintiffs filed notices of appeal of the
Haynes and McCullough lawsuits. On April 27, 2016, the Company
moved to dismiss the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction,
which motions were granted, and the appeals were dismissed with
leave to appeal upon the resolution of all of the consolidated
cases.

The Company filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole
remaining claim in the Singleton/LoGrasso lawsuit, which was
granted on March 28, 2018. The Company also filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings against the Windham defendants.

Lastly, on July 18, 2016, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut, entitled Joseph M.
Laurinaitis, et al. vs. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. and
Vincent K. McMahon, individually and as the trustee of certain
trusts. This lawsuit contains many of the same allegations as the
other lawsuits alleging traumatic brain injuries and further
alleges, among other things, that the plaintiffs were misclassified
as independent contractors rather than employees denying them,
among other things, rights and benefits under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), federal tax law,
and various state Worker's Compensation laws.

This lawsuit also alleges that the booking contracts and other
agreements between the plaintiffs and the Company are
unconscionable and should be declared void, entitling the
plaintiffs to certain damages relating to the Company's use of
their intellectual property. The lawsuit alleges claims for
violation of RICO, unjust enrichment, and an accounting against Mr.
McMahon.

The Company and Mr. McMahon moved to dismiss this complaint on
October 19, 2016. On November 9, 2016, the Laurinaitis plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint. On December 23, 2016, the Company and
Mr. McMahon moved to dismiss the amended complaint. On September
29, 2017, the Court issued an order on the motion to dismiss
pending in the Laurinaitis case and on the motion for judgment on
the pleadings pending in the Windham case.

The Court reserved judgment on the pending motions and ordered that
within thirty-five (35) days of the date of the order the
Laurinaitis plaintiffs and the Windham defendants file amended
pleadings that comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court further ordered that each of the Laurinaitis plaintiffs
and the Windham defendants submit to the Court for in camera review
affidavits signed and sworn under penalty of perjury setting forth
facts within each plaintiff's or declaratory judgment-defendant’s
personal knowledge that form the factual basis of their claim or
defense.

On November 3, 2017, the Laurinaitis plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint. The Company and Mr. McMahon believe that the
second amended complaint failed to comply with the Court's
September 29, 2017 order and otherwise remained legally defective
for all of the reasons set forth in their motion to dismiss the
amended complaint.

Also on November 3, 2017, the Windham defendants filed a second
answer. The Company does not know if the Laurinaitis Plaintiffs and
Windham Defendants submitted the affidavits required under the
Court's September 29, 2017 order. On November 17, 2017, the Company
and Mr. McMahon filed a response that, among other things, urged
the Court to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings against
the Windham defendants and dismiss the Laurinaitis plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice and award sanctions against the
Laurinaitis plaintiffs' counsel because the amended pleadings fail
to comply with the Court's September 29, 2017 order and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

On September 17, 2018, the Court granted the motion to dismiss
filed by the Company and Mr. McMahon in the Laurinaitis case in its
entirety, awarded sanctions against the Laurinaitis plaintiffs'
counsel, and granted the Company's motion for judgment on the
pleadings against the Windham defendants. The plaintiffs have
attempted to appeal these decisions.

On November 16, 2018, the Company moved to dismiss all of the
appeals, except for the appeal of the dismissal of the Laurinaitis
case, for being filed untimely.

WWE said, "The Company believes all claims and threatened claims
against the Company in these various lawsuits were prompted by the
same plaintiffs' lawyer and that all are without merit. The Company
intends to continue to defend itself against the attempt to appeal
these decisions vigorously."

World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., an integrated media and
entertainment company, engages in the sports entertainment business
in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Asia
Pacific, and Latin America. It operates in three segments: Media,
Live Events, and Consumer Products. The company was founded in 1980
and is headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.


YANKEE BOATING CENTER: Bishop Asserts Breach under ADA
------------------------------------------------------
Yankee Boating Center, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Cedric Bishop and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Yankee Boating Center, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01642 (S.D. N.Y., February 21, 2019).

Yankee Boating Center is a family-owned and operated marine retail
and service business that has been serving New York's Capital
District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


YOGA CLUB: Vasquez-Cossio Files Class Action in Calif.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Yoga Club, LLC.  The
case is styled as Inez Vasquez-Cossio, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Yoga Club, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company and Does 1 - 10 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-00348 (C.D. Cal., February 22, 2019).

YogaClub is an online retailer selling athletic wear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Scott J Ferrell, Esq.
   Pacific Trial Attorneys APC
   4100 Newport Place Drive Suite 800
   Newport Beach, CA 92660
   Tel: (949) 706-6464
   Fax: (949) 706-6469
   Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


ZANELLA LTD: Garey Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
Zanella, LTD. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled Kevin
Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. William J. Zanella, LTD., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01662 (S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2019).

Zanella Ltd. manufactures and sells apparel for men and women. It
specializes in sartorial trousers. The company sells its products
through specialty stores and department stores in the United
States, Canada, Mexico, and Europe. Zanella Ltd. was incorporated
in 1978 and is based in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


ZAPPOS RETAIL: Faces Traynor ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zappos Retail, Inc.
The case is captioned as YASEEN TRAYNOR, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZAPPOS RETAIL, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00947-JGK (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 2019).
The lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The case is assigned to Judge John G. Koeltl.

Zappos.com, Inc. operates as an online shoe retailer. The company
offers shoes for women, men, girls, and boys, as well as other
specialty shoes. It also provides bags and handbags; eyewear;
accessories; and watches; clothing for women, men, girls, and boys.
Zappos.com, Inc. was formerly known as ShoeSite.com and changed its
name to Zappos.com, Inc. in June 1999. The company was founded in
1999 and is based in Las Vegas, Nevada. As of November 1, 2009,
Zappos.com, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Harris Kohn, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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