CAR_Public/190322.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, March 22, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 59

                            Headlines

51 ST. CAFE: Martinez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Pay
ACADIA PHARMA: Court Merges 3 Securities Fraud Suit
ACTION REMEDIATION: Kennedy Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
AETNA INC: Meidl ERISA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
ALTA MESA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action

AMERICAN SUGAR: Court Narrows Claims in J. Deccola's FLSA Suit
ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Levi & Korsinsky Files Securities Class Suit
ASTEC INDUSTRIES: April 2 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
AVON PRODUCTS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
AVON PRODUCTS: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action

AVON PRODUCTS: Johnson Fistel Files Securities Class Action Suit
BRINKER RESTAURANT: Barrows Hits Tip Pool, Seeks Minimum Wage
BRISTOW GROUP: Bragar Eagel Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
BRISTOW GROUP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
BRISTOW GROUP: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

CBL & ASSOCIATES: March 23 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
CBOE VELOCITY: April 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
CLIENT SERVICES: Biston Disputes Collection Letter
COOK COUNTY, IL: Judge Tosses Class Action Against Court Clerk
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Loses Bid to Dismiss S. Pearlstone's Suit

CREAM MANAGEMENT: Portell Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
DOORDASH: Drivers File Class Action Over Unpaid Tips
EMPIRE STATE: Magana Seeks Overtime Pay
ERMCO COMPONENTS: Hayes Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FL: Jail Victims Still Waiting for Settlement

EXXON MOBIL: Shell Loses Bid to Dismiss Lester's NORM Exposure Suit
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Patterson Class Action Ongoing
GENERAL ELECTRIC: April 2 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
HEALTHWAREHOUSE.COM: Garey Alleges Violation under ADA
HILL'S PET NUTRITION: Pet Owners Files Class Action Lawsuits

HILL'S PET: Johnson Files Class Action over Tainted Dog Food
HILL'S PET: Jubinville et al. Sue over Tainted Dog Food
HILL'S PET: Sun-Dampier Sues over Tainted Dog Food
HP: Some Office Printer Owners Eligible for Lawsuit Settlement
HYATT CORP: $725K Deal in Matthews FLSA Suit Has Final Approval

IL GABBIANO: Quituizaca et al. Seek Overtime Pay
INTERSTATE HOTELS: Court OKs $800K Richardson Class Settlement
KING COUNTY, WA: Dismissal of Jury Pay Suit Affirmed
KRAFT HEINZ: April 25 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
LANDRY'S RESTAURANT: Demurrer Ruling in Fierro Suit Partly Reversed

LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
LOGITECH INC: 9th Cir. Asks Judge Alsup to Explain Order
MARION COUNTY, IN: Prosecutor's Bid to Dismiss Washington Denied
MATTRESS FIRM: Court Compels Arbitration in Perez-Tejada Suit
MDL 1566: Ct. Retains Jurisdiction of Wisconsin Plaintiffs' Claims

MDL 2492: Alderman Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Alvarez Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Booker Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Bradwell Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Charles Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated

MDL 2492: Crawford Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Doss Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Dupree Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Fletcher Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Hanson Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated

MDL 2492: Havill Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Holloway Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Horton v. NCAA over Health & Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Jensen Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Keith v. NCAA over Health & Safety Issues Consolidated

MDL 2492: Kives Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Kunkle Suit v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: McGrier Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Ruo Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Thompson Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated

MDL 2492: Van Druten Suit v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated
MDL 2492: Whalen Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
MDL 2741: Alexy Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Coulter Suit v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Lombard Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MDL 2741: Rice Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Smith Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2879: Braun Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
MDL 2879: Costa Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
MDL 2879: Mortensen Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: March 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit
MOLSON COORS: April 16 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
MOLSON COORS: Bernstein Liebhard Files Class Action
MONSANTO COMPANY: Gunns Sue over Sale of Roundup Products

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ingle Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Kempfs Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Kunzs Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Mansfields Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Neills Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Olivers Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Pippin Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Pippis Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Riegers Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ross Sues over Sale of Roundup Products

MONSANTO COMPANY: Seiberts Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Swains Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Tomlinson Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Walter Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Watters Sue over Sale of Roundup Products

MONSANTO COMPANY: Wilkenings Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Williams Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
MONSANTO COMPANY: Yeager Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
NB NETWORK: Pena et al Seek Unpaid Wages & OT for Retail Clerks
NEIMAN MARCUS: Attia Labor Suit Settlement Has Final Approval

NEW YORK FOUNDLING: Shortchanges Nurses' Overtime Pay, David Says
NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: Cobra Plaintiff Missed Appeals Filing Deadline
NVIDIA CORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
ORGANIGRAM: McCarthy Tetrault Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
PEPE AUTO: Court Compels Arbitration in J. Gallagher's Suit

PLANET PIZZA: Court OKs Conditional Class Certification in Ridgeway
POWER SOLUTIONS: May 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
PROCTOR & GAMBLE: Israeli Court OKs Class-Action Suit
PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS BUREAU: Feinberg Disputes Collection Letter
PROSHARES SHORT VIX: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action

PUBLIC STORAGE: Obtains Favorable Ruling in Insurance Case
R WINGS: Bell Nunnally Secures Favorable Class Action Settlement
RECRO PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss IV Meloxicam-Related Suit Underway
REGENCY CENTERS: Kouri Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
REVOLUTION LIGHTING: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action

RUSSELL STOVER: Faison Sues Over Slack in Chocolate Packaging
SANOFI SA: Judge Denies Insulin Makers' Motion to Dismiss Suit
SNC-LAVALIN: Siskinds Files Securities Class Action
STARK COUNTY, OH: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Pay, Barker Says
STATE FARM: Court OKs Class Certification in S. Hicks' Suit

STOCKEN FAMILY: Sofia Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
TRINITY CAPITAL: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action Sui
TRUMMER'S INC: Failed to Pay Restaurant Workers' Minimum Wages
TRUSTMARK CORP: TNB Still Faces Class Suit over Stanford Collapse
TYME TECHNOLOGIES: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit

UNITED BANK CARD: Abante Rooter Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls
UNITED STATES: Berrieum Sues Attorney General in N.D. Florida
UNITED STATES: Court OKs $34K Costs in Osage Tribal Elections Suit
UNUM GROUP: Faces Consolidated Securities Class Suit in Tennessee
VALE SA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action

VAN BUREN COUNTY, MI: Lawsuit Takes Aim at Use of Foreclosure Law
VISA: November 7 Antitrust Settlement Approval Hearing Set
VIZIO: Discloses $17MM Settlement in Class Action Lawsuit
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Claims in Deras Suit
WASHINGTON: Denial of Gronquist's Bid for Contempt as Moot Flipped

WENDY'S: To Pay $50MM in Class-Action Data Breach Settlement
WINN MANAGED: Olsen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
WIRECARD AG: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
[*] America's Securities Class Action System Needs Urgent Reform
[*] Mintz Attorneys Discuss Litigation Implications of SBRA


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 119 Suits v Sempra Energy Units Pending at Feb. 21
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 343 Cases vs. AK Steel Still Pending at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AIG Defends Indemnity Claims Asserting Injuries
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Allstate Had $866MM Claim Reserves at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Inc. Still Defends Lawsuits at Dec. 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: CBS Corp. Had 31,570 Claims Pending at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Claims vs. Sealed Air's Units in Canada Pending
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Denies Zurn's Bid for Funding Order
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $12.6MM Asbestos Coverage at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Freeport-McMoRan Unit Still Faces Talc Suits

ASBESTOS UPDATE: GATX Corp., Units Still Face Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Imerys May Perfect Appeal Thru September 2019 Term
ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Still Defends Securities Suits over Talc
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Juni's Causation Issues Affirmed on Appeal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaman Corp. Still Defends Suits at Dec. 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Minerals Technologies Defends 34 Cases at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Still Defends 576 Lawsuits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Olin Corp., Units Still Face Suits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Onoratos Failed to Satisfy Highland at Home in FL
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Projects $70.3MM Liability at Dec.31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: SPX Had $587.5MM Asbestos Liability at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had 1,430 Fibro Cases at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Liability Upped to $46.7MM
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Teledyne Technologies Still Faces Exposure Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 755 Active Cases at Dec. 31



                            *********

51 ST. CAFE: Martinez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdias Garcia Ramirez, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 51 St. Cafe Corp., Teresa
Kafalogiannis and Jagtar Singh Benipal, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-01092 (S.D. N.Y., February 5, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum and overtime wages and redress for failure to provide
itemized wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a pizzeria, located at 51 W
51st St, New York, NY 10019 under the name "Teresa's Brick Oven
Pizza and Cafe" where Ramirez worked as a delivery worker. He
worked in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum
wage, spread-of-hours and overtime compensation for the hours that
they worked. Defendants also failed to maintain accurate
recordkeeping of the hours worked. His actual duties, in payroll
records, were as a delivery worker instead of as a non-tipped
employee, thus allowing Defendants to pay him above the tip-credit
rate, but below the minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


ACADIA PHARMA: Court Merges 3 Securities Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES STAUBLEIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-1647-AJB-BGS (S.D. Cal.),
Magsitrate Judge Anthony J. Battaglia of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California (i) granted Thomas Wood's
motion for Lead Plaintiff and appointment of the counsel, (ii)
denied all other competing motions, and (iii) granted the parties'
requests to consolidate.

The Plaintiff represents a class of those who acquired ACADIA
securities between April 29, 2016, and July 9, 2018, and who are
suing under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  They allege that
on April 29, 2016, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
approved ACADIA's lead drug, NUPLAZID.  On April 9, 2018, CNN
reported that physicians and other experts were worried that
NUPLAZID had been prematurely approved by the FDA due to the
mounting deaths.

The Plaintiffs allege ACADIA made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations and
prospects.  Specifically, they allege that ACADIA failed to
disclose: (1) that adverse events and safety concerns related to
NUPLAZID threatened the drug's initial and continuing FDA approval;
(2) that ACADIA engaged in business practices likely to attract
regulatory scrutiny; and (3) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' statements about ACADIA's business operations, and
prospects, were materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis.

Before the Court are competing motions to appoint the Lead
Plaintiff and the Lead Counsel in the case.  Plaintiffs Joseph
Paolantonio, Siry Investments, LP, and Wood all move to be
appointed the Lead Plaintiff.  Plaintiffs David Harper and Mitchell
Johnson, who originally moved, filed non-oppositions to the
competing motions.  The parties also request to consolidate.

There are three actions which the Plaintiffs request to
consolidate: Staublein v. Acadia Pharmaceuticals et al.,
18-cv-1647-AJB-BGS, Stone v. Acadia Pharmaceuticals et al.,
18-cv-1672-AJB-BGS, and Barglow v. Acadia Pharmaceuticals et al.,
18-cv-1812-AJB-BGS.  The three actions involve similar factual and
legal issues surrounding the same alleged misconduct by ACADIA,
between April 29, 2016, and July 9, 2018.   Accordingly, Magistrate
Judge Battaglia granted the parties' motions to consolidate.

Based on Wood's declaration, the Magistrate is satisfied that Wood
was aware he was seeking appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and that
Pomerantz would be his proposed Lead Counsel as he authorized the
filing of the motion.  Accordingly, he granted Wood's motion for
the Lead Plaintiff, and denied Paolantonio, Siry Investments,
Harper and Johnson's motions for Lead Plaintiff.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), Staublein v.
Acadia Pharmaceuticals et al., 18-cv-1647-AJB-BGS, Stone v. Acadia
Pharmaceuticals et al., 18-cv-1672-AJB-BGS, and Barglow v. Acadia
Pharmaceuticals et al., 18-cv-1812-AJB-BGS, and all related actions
are consolidated for all purposes.  The Order will apply to the
Consolidated Action and to each case that relates to the same
subject matter that is subsequently filed in the District or is
transferred to the District, and is consolidated with the
Consolidated Action.

A Master File is established for the proceeding.  The Master File
will be Case No. 3:18-cv-01647-AJB-BGS.  The Clerk will file all
pleadings in the Master File and note such filings on the Master
Docket.

An original of the Order will be filed by the Clerk in the Master
File.  The Clerk will mail a copy of the Order tothe  counsel of
record in the Consolidated Action.  

Every pleading in the Consolidated Action will have the following
caption: IN RE ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS No. 3:18-cv-01647-AJB-BGS
INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

When a case that arises out of the same subject matter as the
Consolidated Action is thereinafter filed in the Court or
transferred from another court, the Clerk of the Court shall: (a)
file a copy of the Order in the separate file for such action; and
(b) make the appropriate entry in the Master Docket for the
Consolidated Action.

Each new case that arises out of the subject matter of the
Consolidated Action will be consolidated with the Consolidated
Action.  The Order will apply thereto, unless a party objects to
consolidation, or to any provision of the Order, within 10 days
after the date upon which a copy of the Order is served on counsel
for such party by filing an application for relief, and the Court
deems it appropriate to grant such application.  Nothing in the
foregoing will be construed as a waiver of the Defendants' right to
object to consolidation of any subsequently filed or transferred
related action.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B), the Magistrate
appointed Wood to serve as the Lead Plaintiff in the Consolidated
Action.  Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v), Wood's
selection of Pomerantz LLP as the Lead Counsel for the class is
approved.  The Lead Counsel will have the authority to speak for
all the Plaintiffs and class members in all matters regarding the
litigation, including, but not limited to, pre-trial proceedings,
motion practice, trial, and settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qtldIM from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Barglow, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II
-- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti
-- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc., Stephen R. Davis & Todd S. Young,
Defendants, represented by Koji F. Fukumura -- kfukumura@cooley.com
-- Cooley Godward Kronish, Jeanne Detch, U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California, Nathaniel Robert Cooper --
ncooper@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Peter M. Adams --
padams@cooley.com -- Cooley Godward Kronish.


ACTION REMEDIATION: Kennedy Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Alastair Kennedy, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Action Remediation, Inc., Meadow Management &
Maintenance, Inc., Action Trucking Co., Inc. dba Action Hazmat
Trucking and Ralph Pantony, Case No. 2:19-cv-01237 (E.D. N.Y.,
March 1, 2019), is brought against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York State Labor Law.

The Plaintiff brings this action individually to recover unpaid
prevailing wages and supplemental benefits he was entitled to
receive in connection with labor he furnished to the Defendants on
publicly financed construction projects, including but not limited
to those for the Town of Brookhaven.

The Plaintiff is an individual who resides in the State of New
York, County of Suffolk. The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as
a non-exempt employee with the job title and duties of a
mechanic/operating engineer, from approximately 2009 through
approximately December 27, 2018.

The Defendant Action Remediation, Inc. is a domestic business
corporation, incorporated under the laws of the State of New York
and authorized to do business in the State of New York. The
Defendant operates its business from its headquarters located at
3010 Burns Ave., Wantagh, New York, 11793. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Desiree M. Gargano, Esq.
      Douglas E. Rowe, Esq.
      CERTILMAN BALIN ADLER & HYMAN, LLP
      90 Merrick Avenue, 9th Floor
      East Meadow, NY 11554
      Tel: (516) 296-7000
      E-mail: dgargano@certilmanbalin.com
              drowe@certilmanbalin.com


AETNA INC: Meidl ERISA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER MEIDL, on his own behalf and on behalf of
the certified class Plaintiff, v. AETNA INC., and AETNA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:15 CV 01319 (JCH)
(D. Conn.), Judge Janel C. Hall of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut granted the Plaintiff' unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of Settlement Agreement.

Meidl, individually and on behalf of the Class, and the Defendants
have determined to settle the matter on the terms and conditions
set forth in the Settlement Agreement dated Feb. 15, 2019 and all
exhibits thereto, the original of which is filed with the Clerk of
the Court.

The Plaintiff has filed an unopposed motion for an order that,
inter alia, (1) preliminarily approves the Settlement on the terms
set forth in the Settlement Agreement; (2) appoints the Settlement
Administrator; (3) directs the Settlement Administrator to notify
the members of the Class per the approved form of notice; (4)
establishes a deadline for members of the Class to opt out of or
object to the Settlement; and (5) schedules a hearing to determine
whether the Settlement should be finally approved as fair,
reasonable and adequate, and whether an order finally approving the
Settlement should be entered.

Judge Hall, having read and considered the motion, the memorandum
submitted in support of the motion and the exhibits thereto
(including the Plan of Allocation), the Settlement Agreement and
the exhibits thereto, finds that substantial and sufficient grounds
exist for entering the Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and
Approving Notice of Proposed Settlement and Fairness Hearing.  Upon
review and consideration of the foregoing materials, she has found
good cause for entering the Order.

The Judge preliminarily approved the proposed Settlement as
reflected in the Settlement Agreement and all exhibits thereto.
Accordingly, the notice of the proposed Settlement should be given
to the Class.  She approved the substance of the Notice of Proposed
Class Action Settlement and Fairness Hearing and the Opt-Out Form,
which are attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit B.  She
also approved the form and substance of the CAFA Notices, attached
to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit D.

Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc. is appointed as the
Settlement Administrator.  Within 20 business days of entry of the
Order, Aetna will provide the Settlement Administrator with the
Class List.  Within 60 days of the date of the Order, the
Settlement Administrator will provide the Notice to all individuals
listed on the Class List in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement.

Aetna and its counsel are authorized and directed to disclose the
Class List to the Settlement Administrator in accordance with the
foregoing paragraph and the terms of the Settlement.  Aetna and its
counsel are also authorized and directed to disclose agreed-upon
information about the Class members and their claims to the
Settlement Administrator, the Class Counsel, and Aetna's counsel
(including its litigation support vendor), as needed to facilitate
administration of the Settlement in accordance with the Order and
the Settlement's terms.

In order for a member of the Class to be excluded from the
Settlement, the member of the Class must request exclusion by
sending a complete, signed, and valid Opt-Out Form to the
Settlement Administrator at the address described in the Notice,
which must be postmarked no later than 40 days after the date on
which the Notice is mailed or otherwise provided.

To object to the Settlement, a Class member must send a complete,
signed, and valid objection to the Court at the address described
in the Notice, which must be received by the Court no later than 40
days after the date on which the Notice is mailed or otherwise
provided.

No later than 21 days before the opt-out and objection deadline,
the Plaintiff will file his motion for attorneys' fees,
reimbursement of costs and expenses, and award of an Incentive
Amount to the class representative.

By no later than 14 days after the deadline for submission of
Opt-Out Forms or objections, the Class Counsel will file the
Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the Settlement and any
other papers in support of final approval.  Copies of all papers
will be served upon all the Class members (or their counsel) who
file a valid and timely objection to the Settlement.

The Court will determine whether to grant final approval of the
Settlement at a Fairness Hearing to be held before the Court no
sooner than 125 days after the date the Order is entered.

The Settlement Administrator shall, at least seven days prior to
the Fairness Hearing, file with the Court proof of mailing of the
Notice to the Class.

Unless such requirement is excused by the Court, no person will be
heard in opposition to the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, or
the application for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses to Class Counsel unless such person, no later than 40 days
after the date on which the Notice is mailed or otherwise provided,
has filed with the Court an objection to the Settlement and a
notice of an intention to appear.

If, before the expiration of the deadline for submitting an Opt-Out
Form, a Class member initiates a separate action raising one or
more Released Claims, then: (i) within 10 days of receiving actual
notice of the action, Aetna will provide a copy of the Preliminary
Approval Order to counsel for the Plaintiff in such action; and
(ii) the Plaintiff in such action will within 10 days of receiving
this Preliminary Approval Order or the deadline for submitting a
valid Opt-Out Form, whichever is earlier, withdraw the complaint
without prejudice or submit a valid Opt-Out Form.

Judge Hall approved the following schedule for Settlement-related
activities:

      a. (TBD) 2019 - Order entered granting preliminary approval
[Day 1]

      b. (TBD) 2019 - Last day to provide Class notice [Day 60]

      c. (TBD) 2019 - The Plaintiff files request for attorneys'
fees and expenses and [Day 79] incentive award for class
representative

      d. (TBD) 2019 - Last day for Class members to opt out or
object to [Day 100] Settlement

      e. (TBD) 2019 Last day for the Plaintiff to file a motion for
final approval of [Day 114] the Settlement and to respond to
objections

      f. (TBD) 2019 - Fairness Hearing concerning final approval of
Settlement [Day 125 or after] and the Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys' fees and expenses and incentive award for class
representative

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Nh35FD from Leagle.com.

Christopher Meidl, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew N. Goldfarb --
agoldfarb@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, D.
Brian Hufford -- dbhufford@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Elizabeth K. Acee -- elizabeth.acee@leclairryan.com
--, LeClairRyan, Jason S. Cowart -- jcowart@zuckerman.com --
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Meiram Bendat --
mbendat@psych-appeal.com -- Psych-Appeal. Inc., pro hac vice,
Daniel Patrick Elliott -- daniel.elliott@leclairryan.com --
LeClairRyan & Jacob Pylman, LeClairRyan.

Aetna, Inc. & Aetna Life Insurance Company, Defendants, represented
by Geoffrey M. Sigler -- gsigler@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, pro hac vice, Heather L. Richardson --
hrichardson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, pro hac
vice, Paula Cruz Cedillo -- pcedillo@mccarter.com -- McCarter &
English, LLP & Thomas J. Finn -- tfinn@mccarter.com -- McCarter &
English, LLP.


ALTA MESA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Alta Mesa Resources, Inc. f/k/a Silver Run Acquisition Corporation
II (NASDAQ: AMR)
Class Period: purchasers of Class A common stock as of January 22,
2018, the record date to vote on the acquisition of Alta Mesa
Holdings, LP ("Alta Mesa") and Kingfisher Midstream LLC
("Kingfisher") by Silver Run II (the "Acquisition")
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 1, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/amr

The complaint alleges that in early 2018, Silver Run II issued a
materially false and misleading Definitive Merger Proxy Statement
on Schedule M14A (the "Proxy") that advised shareholders to vote
for the Acquisition in contravention of §§14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9. Consequently, Silver Run II
shareholders were not able to make an informed decision on whether
or not to redeem their shares and voted in favor of the Acquisition
on February 6, 2018. The redeemable Class A common shares were
valued at roughly $10 per share at the time of the Acquisition. The
complaint continues to allege that following the approval of the
Acquisition, the value of Silver Run II Class A common shares
severely dropped.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


AMERICAN SUGAR: Court Narrows Claims in J. Deccola's FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH DECCOLA, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN SUGAR
REFINING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-CV-00216 (N.D. Ohio),
Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Joseph
Deccola's Complaint.

Deccola initiated the action against American Sugar Refining
("ASR") on Jan. 26, 2018.  Deccola's Complaint alleged violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and violations of the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("Ohio Wage Act"), the Ohio Prompt
Pay Act ("OPPA").  Deccola's Complaint alleges that ASR failed to
pay him and other similarly situated employees in violation of the
FLSA.

Specifically, Deccola alleges that ASR failed to pay employees for
(1) time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment
that ASR requires employees to wear, (2) travel to and from the
locker room and time clock; and (3) working overtime.  He contends
that ASR's failure to pay employees overtime is due to two
policies: that ASR only compensates supervisor-authorized overtime
and that ASR has a practice of "rounding" time spent working past
the end of the shift; that is, ASR only compensates time worked 30
minutes past the end of shift.

On May 17, 2018, ASR filed the subject Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint.  ASR's Motion presented five grounds for
dismissal: (1) Deccola cannot establish the "similarly situated"
element of FLSA § 216(b) given a prior collective action to which
Deccola did not choose to opt in (Rosario et al. v. American Suger
Refining, Inc., No. 16-cv-02639 (N.D. Ohio)), (2) Deccola's FLSA
collective action claim runs afoul of the legislative intent of the
FLSA, (3) Deccola's related claims under Ohio law cannot survive
dismissal of his FLSA claims because they are based on the same
defects, (4) Deccola's Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class action claim fails
because he cannot meet the numerosity element as a matter of law,
and (5) Count V of Deccola's Complaint should be dismissed because
Ohio law does not recognize failure to keep records as a cause of
action.

Deccola filed his Memorandum in Opposition to ASR's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on June 29, 2018.  Deccola opposes
ASR's Motion because (1) the proposed collective class is similarly
situated to Deccola and the Rosario litigation is not binding on
the class, (2) the FLSA's "broad remedial purpose" justifies this
reading of the law, (3) Deccola may pursue Ohio state law claims
whether or not the FLSA claim survives, and (4) Deccola can satisfy
the numerosity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 Additionally,
Deccola notes that his Ohio law claims cannot be dismissed.

ASR filed a Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.  To further bolster its Motion to
Dismiss, ASR argues (1) Deccola's argument that the Rosario action
is not binding is incorrect, (2) Deccola misstates ASR's argument
regarding the FLSA's legislative intent, (3) Deccola fails to
provide support for his argument that his Ohio claims can survive
dismissal of his FLSA claims, and (4) Deccola fails to plead the
element of numerosity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as a matter of law.

Judge Boyko granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.  He finds that Deccola has satisfied the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and has stated a claim
upon which relief can be granted as to Counts I, II, III and IV of
the Complaint.  Accordingly, he denied ASR's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint in part, and granted it as to Count V of the
Plaintiff's Complaint.

Based on the Complaint, Deccola has raised plausible factual and
legal allegations that warrant relief: namely, that ASR does not
pay its employees for (1) donning and doffing time, (2) travel time
between the locker room and the time clock, and (3) overtime of
less than thirty minutes.  Deccola alleges that this uncompensated
time constitutes a violation of the FLSA and has sought relief
under the FLSA's collective action provision, as well as under the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class action provision in reference to state law
claims.  ASR attempts to dismiss the action in part because of a
settled matter that Deccola did not opt into and that because of
the former litigation, Deccola is unable to establish the
"similarly situated" requirement of FLSA Section 216(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/00PvJF from Leagle.com.

Joseph Deccola, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth P. Abbarno
-- kabbarno@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello Levitt & Casey & Mark M.
Abramowitz -- mabramowitz@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello Levitt & Casey.

American Sugar Refining, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lauren E.
Fenton-Valdivia -- lfvaldivia@bressler.com -- Bressler, Amery &
Ross & Michael T. Hensley -- mhensley@bressler.com -- Bressler,
Amery & Ross.


ARLO TECHNOLOGIES: Levi & Korsinsky Files Securities Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP disclosed that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of the following
publicly-traded companies. Shareholders interested in serving as
lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the
court and further details about the cases can be found at the links
provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

Arlo Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: ARLO)

Class Period: Investors who purchased shares pursuant and/or
traceable to the Company's Registration Statement and Prospectus
issued in connection with the August 3, 2018 Initial Public
Offering.

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: March 25, 2019

Join the action: https://tinyurl.com/yx94yt9t

The filed complaint alleges that the Registration Statement made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) there was a flaw and/or quality issue with
Arlo's newly designed battery for its Ultra camera systems; (ii)
this flaw and/or quality issue with the Ultra battery could result
in a shipping delay of Arlo's Ultra product; (iii) such a shipping
delay endangered Arlo's chances of launching the Ultra product in
time for the crucial holiday season; (iv) such a shipping delay
would allow Arlo's competitors to capitalize on the Ultra product's
missed launch, thereby increasing their own market share; (v)
Arlo's consumers had been experiencing battery drain issues and
other battery-related issues in connection with recent firmware
updates; (vi) because of the foregoing, Arlo's fourth quarter 2018
results and consumer base would be negatively impacted; and (vii)
as a result, Arlo's Registration Statement was materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

To learn more about the Arlo Technologies, Inc. class action
contact jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


ASTEC INDUSTRIES: April 2 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Astec Industries, Inc. (NASDAQ: ASTE)
Class Period: July 26, 2016 - October 22, 2018
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 2, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/aste

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose material adverse
information regarding Astec's business, operations and prospects,
including that its wood pellet plants suffered from significant and
costly problems that prevented them from running at their promised
production capacity, posing a threat to the Company's pellet plant
business, its overall financial performance, and its financial
outlook.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


AVON PRODUCTS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Avon Products, Inc. ("Avon"
or the "Company") (NYSE: AVP) and certain of its officers, on
behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired Avon
securities between August 2, 2016 and August 2, 2017, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors are encouraged to learn
more about this case by visiting the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/avp.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Avon was
engaged in an undisclosed scheme whereby it significantly loosened
its credit terms in order to recruit new representatives in Brazil,
its largest market; (2) its specific credit terms in Brazil; (3)
Avon failed to increase its allowance for doubtful accounts to
account for the changes to its credit terms in Brazil; and (4) as a
result of these concealments, Avon stock was trading at
artificially inflated prices throughout the class period.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you are an Avon
shareholder and wish to review a copy of the Complaint you can
visit the firm's site:  www.bgandg.com/avp. You may also contact
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. You
have until April 15, 2019 to request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Website: www.bgandg.com/avp
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


AVON PRODUCTS: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Avon Products, Inc. ("Avon" or the "Company")
(NYSE: AVP) in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of those who purchased or acquired
the securities of Avon between August 2, 2016 and August 2, 2017,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Avon was
engaged in an undisclosed scheme whereby it significantly loosened
its credit terms in order to recruit new representatives in Brazil,
its largest market; (2) its specific credit terms in Brazil; (3)
Avon failed to increase its allowance for doubtful accounts to
account for the changes to its credit terms in Brazil; and (4) as a
result of these concealments, Avon stock was trading at
artificially inflated prices throughout the class period.

On August 3, 2017, Avon issued a press release announcing its
second quarter 2017 financial results and held a conference call to
discuss the results. The Company reported a net loss of $0.12 per
share and a 3% decline in active representatives.  The Company also
reported that Brazil revenue was "down 2% in constant dollars,
primarily driven by a decrease in Active Representatives." On the
call, Avon's CFO acknowledged that, despite Avon's earlier
representations, the remedial actions in Brazil (i.e., stricter
credit terms applied to recruiting new representatives) were
negatively impacting active representatives and revenue in Brazil.
As a result of this news, the price of Avon stock dropped $0.36 per
share to close at $3.00 per share on August 3, 2017, a decline of
nearly 11%.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the April 15, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action please;

        Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
        Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
        Gainey McKenna & Egleston
        Telephone: (212) 983-1300
        Website: www.gme-law.com  
        E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


AVON PRODUCTS: Johnson Fistel Files Securities Class Action Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Fistel, LLP disclosed that a class action has been
commenced on behalf of purchasers of Avon Products, Inc. (NYSE:
AVP) ("Avon") common stock during the period between August 2, 2016
and August 2, 2017 (the "Class Period").

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than April 15, 2019. If you wish to discuss this action or
have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests, please contact Jim Baker at jimb@johnsonfistel.com at
619-814-4471. If emailing, please include a phone number.

The complaint charges Avon and certain of its current and former
officers with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Avon is a global manufacturer and marketer of beauty and related
products.  Avon's business is conducted primarily in one channel,
direct selling to Avon representatives.  Avon representatives then
resell Avon products to end-user customers.  As of December 31,
2016, Avon had approximately 6 million active representatives.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, in order to
inflate its reported revenue and representative growth metric, Avon
engaged in an undisclosed scheme whereby it significantly loosened
its credit terms in order to recruit new representatives in Brazil,
its largest market.  Avon did not disclose the changes to its
credit terms in Brazil.  Avon also failed to increase its allowance
for doubtful accounts to account for the changes to its credit
terms in Brazil.  As a result of the concealment of defendants'
scheme during the Class Period, the price of Avon stock was
artificially inflated to as high as $6.89 per share.

On November 3, 2016, Avon filed its Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2016 and disclosed that its operating
expenses and margins had been negatively impacted by higher bad
debt expense.  Over the next two days, the price of Avon stock
dropped $0.47 per share to close at $5.94 per share on November 4,
2016, a decline of more than 7%.  On February 16, 2017, the Company
issued a press release announcing its fourth quarter 2016 results
and held a conference call to discuss the results.  The Company
reported a net loss of $0.03 per share and a 2% decline in active
representatives. The Company also disclosed a $35 million bad debt
charge attributable to the previously undisclosed changes to credit
terms to recruit new representatives in Brazil.  As a result of
this news, the price of Avon stock dropped $1.09 per share to close
at $4.77 per share on February 17, 2017, a decline of nearly 19%.
On the following day, February 18, 2017, the price of Avon stock
dropped again, falling over 3% to close at $4.61 per share.  On May
4, 2017, Avon issued a press release announcing its first quarter
2017 results and held a conference call to discuss the results.
The Company reported a net loss of $0.10 per share and a 3% decline
in active representatives. On the call, Avon disclosed that despite
its earlier assurances that the Brazil bad debt problem had been
fully accounted for in 2016, the Company was recording another
significant charge for bad debt tied to Avon's decision to loosen
its credit terms to recruit new representatives in Brazil.  As a
result of this news, the price of Avon stock dropped $1.03 per
share to close at $3.62 per share on May 4, 2017, a decline of
22%.

Then, on August 3, 2017, Avon issued a press release announcing its
second quarter 2017 financial results and held a conference call to
discuss the results.  The Company reported a net loss of $0.12 per
share and a 3% decline in active representatives.  The Company also
reported that Brazil revenue was "down 2% in constant dollars,
primarily driven by a decrease in Active Representatives."  On the
call, Avon's CFO acknowledged that, despite Avon's earlier
representations, the remedial actions in Brazil (i.e., stricter
credit terms applied to recruiting new representatives) were
negatively impacting active representatives and revenue in Brazil.
As a result of this news, the price of Avon stock dropped $0.36 per
share to close at $3.00 per share on August 3, 2017, a decline of
nearly 11%.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
Avon common stock during the Class Period.

         Jim Baker, Esq.
         Johnson Fistel, LLP
         Telephone: 619-814-4471
         Email: jimb@johnsonfistel.com [GN]


BRINKER RESTAURANT: Barrows Hits Tip Pool, Seeks Minimum Wage
-------------------------------------------------------------
Savannah Barrows and Michael Mendez, for themselves and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Brinker Restaurant
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00144 (N.D. N.Y., February
5, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, "spread of hours"
compensation, uniform maintenance payments, unpaid tips and
gratuities, attorneys' fees, and costs pursuant to New York Labor
Laws and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

Brinker Restaurant Corporation operates as Chili's Grill and Bar in
Clay, New York.  Barrows worked for Brinker as a shift manager
while Mendez worked as a food runner. They were required to share
their tips, thus, rendering their pay below the mandatory rate.
Brinker failed to pay them weekly and denied them wage statements,
notes the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
      James Emmet Murphy, Esq.
      VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
      40 Broad Street, Seventh Floor
      New York, NY 10004
      Tel: (212) 943-9080
      Fax: (212) 943-9082

             - and -

      Frank S. Gattuso, Esq.
      O'HARA O'CONNELL & CIOTOLI
      7207 East Genesee Street
      Fayetteville, NY 13066
      Tel: (315) 451-3810
      Fax: (315) 451-5585
      Email: fsg@oharalaw.com


BRISTOW GROUP: Bragar Eagel Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Bristow Group Inc. (NYSE: BRS) securities
between February 8, 2018 and February 12, 2019 (the "Class
Period").  Investors have until April 15, 2019 to apply to the
Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the company's
business, operations, and prospects.  Specifically the complaint
alleges that defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
the company lacked adequate monitoring processes related to
non-financial covenants within its secured financing and lease
agreements; (2) that, as a result, the company could not reasonably
assure compliance with certain non-financial covenants; (3) that,
as a result, the company was reasonably likely to breach certain
agreements; (4) that, as a result, the company had understated its
short-term debt; (5) the required corrections would materially
impact financial statements; (6) that there was a material weakness
in the company's internal controls over financial reporting; and
(7) that, as a result of the foregoing, defendants' positive
statements about the company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Bristow securities during the Class Period or
continue to hold shares purchased before the Class Period, have
information, would like to learn more about these claims, or have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Brandon
Walker or Melissa Fortunato by email at investigations@bespc.com,
or telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact
form.  There is no cost or obligation to you.

         Brandon Walker, Esq.
         Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
         Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
         Telephone: (212) 355-4648
         Website: www.bespc.com
         Email: fortunato@bespc.com
                walker@bespc.com [GN]


BRISTOW GROUP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Bristow Group Inc. ("Bristow" or the "Company")
(NYSE: BRS) in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas on behalf of those who purchased or acquired the
securities of Bristow between February 8, 2018 through February 12,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages
caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Bristow lacked
adequate monitoring processes related to non-financial covenants
within its secured financing and lease agreements; (2) Bristow
could not reasonably assure compliance with certain non-financial
covenants; (3) Bristow was reasonably likely to breach certain
agreements; (4) Bristow had understated its short-term debt; (5)
the required corrections would materially impact financial
statements; (6) there was a material weakness in Bristow's internal
controls over financial reporting; and (7) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about Bristow's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.  When the true details entered
the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the April 15, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action please;

        Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
        Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
        Gainey McKenna & Egleston
        Telephone: (212) 983-1300
        Website: www.gme-law.com  
        E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


BRISTOW GROUP: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Bristow Group Inc. (NYSE:BRS) from February 8, 2018
through February 12, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Bristow investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Bristow class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1510.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Bristow lacked adequate monitoring processes related to
non-financial covenants within its secured financing and lease
agreements; (2) Bristow could not reasonably assure compliance with
certain non-financial covenants; (3) Bristow was reasonably likely
to breach certain agreements; (4) Bristow had understated its
short-term debt; (5) the required corrections would materially
impact financial statements; (6) there was a material weakness in
Bristow's internal controls over financial reporting; and (7) as a
result of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about
Bristow's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than April 15,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1510.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


CBL & ASSOCIATES: March 23 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
If You Were A Tenant At A Shopping Mall Managed By CBL Management
And Had The Amount You Paid For Electricity Determined By A
Valquest Systems Survey, You May Be A Class Member In A Class
Action Lawsuit.

Wave Lengths Hair Salons of Florida, Inc. v. CBL & Associates
Properties, Inc., CBL & Associates Management, Inc., CBL &
Associates Limited Partnership, and JG Gulf Coast Town Center LLC
(collectively, "CBL") is a class action lawsuit ("Lawsuit") filed
against CBL in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida ("Court"). The Lawsuit involves electricity
charges paid by tenants at shopping malls managed by CBL &
Associates Management that were determined by Valquest Systems'
("Valquest") surveys.

The Class alleges that CBL and Valquest conspired and marked-up the
amount it billed tenants per kilowatt hour (kWh), charging tenants
more per kWh than what CBL paid for that same electricity and
charging tenants for more kWhs than they actually used. The Class
alleges that this conduct violated the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), Florida's Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act ("Florida RICO"), and Florida's Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"). CBL denies these allegations
and asserts that it fully complied with all applicable laws.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS ARE AFFECTED;
ACCORDINGLY, YOU MAY:

DO NOTHING: Stay in the lawsuit. Await the outcome. Give up the
right to sue CBL separately for this claim. If you wish to remain
in the Lawsuit, you do not need to do anything. You may get money
or benefits from a trial or settlement. But you will give up any
right to sue CBL separately for the same legal claim at issue in
this Lawsuit.

ASK TO BE EXCLUDED: Get out of the Lawsuit. Get no benefits from
it. Keep the right to sue CBL separately for this claim. If you do
not wish to remain in the Lawsuit, you can ask to be excluded. If
any money or benefits are awarded, you will not share in them. But
you will keep any rights to sue CBL separately for the same legal
claim at issue in this Lawsuit.

Who's Included In The Class? The Court certified the Lawsuit as a
class action based on the Class' claim that CBL violated RICO,
Florida RICO, and FDUTPA.

The Nationwide RICO Class is defined as: All tenants at shopping
malls managed by CBL & Associates Management, Inc., whose
electricity charges were determined based on a Valquest survey
within the applicable limitations period.

The Florida Class is defined as: All tenants at shopping malls in
Florida managed by CBL & Associates Management, Inc., whose
electricity charges were determined based on a Valquest survey
within the applicable limitations period.

The applicable limitations period in this case for both the
Nationwide Class and the Florida Class is March 16, 2012, to
December 31, 2018.

Who Represents The Class? Class counsel are the law firms of
Buckner + Miles, 3350 Mary Street, Coconut Grove, Florida 33133,
(305) 964-8003, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, 1301 Second
Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA, 98101, (206) 268-9337, and Yormak
Employment & Disability Law, 9990 Coconut Road, Bonita Springs,
Florida 34135. These attorneys will represent you as part of the
Class unless you choose to hire your own attorney, which you may do
at your own expense. Class counsel represents the Class on a
contingency basis and will only receive attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of their expenses if there is a recovery for the
Class and the Court awards fees and costs, which may be paid from
the Class' recovery.

How to exclude yourself from the Class? If you DO NOT wish to
remain in the Class, then you must send a request to be excluded,
in writing, with the information required as set forth in the Long
Form Notice to A.B. Data no later than March 23, 2019.

How to obtain further information: If you need additional
information about the Lawsuit, you should visit the website
www.CBLElectricityLawsuit.com. If you cannot find the information
you need there, write to Class counsel at
CBLclassaction@bucknermiles.com or call one of the numbers above.
Please do not contact the Court with questions regarding the
Lawsuit. [GN]


CBOE VELOCITY: April 5 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
--------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq., or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Velocity
Class Period: June 30, 2017 - February 5, 2018
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 5, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/ziv

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the
inverse ETNs was not appropriate for managing daily trading risks;
(2) Credit Suisse had designed the ZIV to fail under certain market
conditions; (3) Credit Suisse had offered and sold more inverse
ETNs than the market could bear which would enable Credit Suisse to
cause the collapse of the inverse ETNs when the opportunity
presented itself; and (4) Credit Suisse could actively manipulate
inverse ETNs by precipitating an acute liquidity event in
volatility markets including markets for VIX futures.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


CLIENT SERVICES: Biston Disputes Collection Letter
--------------------------------------------------
Zalman Biston, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Client Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-00710 (S.D. N.Y., February 5, 2019), seeks damages, and
declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act.

Defendant is a collection agency with its principal office located
in St. Charles, Missouri. It mailed a collection letter to Biston
seeking to collect on an unpaid account originally owed to
Synchrony Bank that failed to accurately state the amount of the
debt.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel C. Cohen, Esq.
      COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
      300 Cadman Plaza W, 12th floor
      Brooklyn, NY 11201
      Phone: (929) 575-4175
      Fax: (929) 575-4195
      Email: dan@cml.legal


COOK COUNTY, IL: Judge Tosses Class Action Against Court Clerk
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin reports that a federal judge threw out a
proposed class-action lawsuit accusing Dorothy A. Brown of
violating drivers' privacy in her role as Cook County court
clerk.In a written opinion on Feb. 22, U.S. District Judge John J.
Tharp Jr. held Mary Nisi does not have a case under the federal
Driver's Privacy Protection Act. [GN]


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Loses Bid to Dismiss S. Pearlstone's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned SCOTT
PEARLSTONE, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 4:18CV630 RLW. (E.D. Mo.).

The Plaintiff enrolled in a 12-month executive membership with
Costco at a location in St. Louis and paid $110.00 for the
executive membership. The Plaintiff asserts he became dissatisfied
with his experience and his executive membership, and he
subsequently cancelled his membership. Upon the Plaintiff's
cancelation, Costco refunded him $86.13, which was $23.87 less than
what he paid to purchase his executive membership. The Plaintiff
filed this putative Class Action Complaint in which he asserts the
following three claims against Costco: breach of contract (Count
I), unjust enrichment (Count II) and violation of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) (Count 111).

Breach of contract claim

Costco first argues the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
breach of contract because he has not pleaded facts establishing a
condition precedent. The Risk-Free 100% Satisfaction Guarantee as
provided in the Member Privileges & Conditions says Costco will
cancel and refund a customer's membership fee in full at any time
if the customer is dissatisfied. While the parties agree this
contract provision requires Plaintiff plead he was dissatisfied,
they disagree on whether he has sufficiently pleaded so in his
putative Class Action Complaint.

Under Missouri law, when performance of a promise is conditioned on
the satisfaction of the promisor, the promisor must exercise that
judgment in good faith, which means that he cannot act arbitrarily
or capriciously and there must be a bona fide reason for his
dissatisfaction. Costco contends Plaintiff's complaint fails to
satisfy this standard by simply stating Plaintiff became
dissatisfied with his experience and his executive membership, and
he subsequently cancelled his membership.

The complaint clearly asserts the Plaintiff canceled his executive
membership after becoming dissatisfied with his experience. Costco
does not cite to any authority for its conclusion that a plaintiff
claiming breach of contract must plead his objective
dissatisfaction with particularity to survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rather, the case law it cites concern
motions for summary judgment.  

At this stage of the litigation, the Plaintiff has stated a
plausible claim. Any questions surrounding the veracity of his
dissatisfaction can be investigated through discovery and argued at
the summary judgment stage.

Unjust enrichment claim

Costco next argues the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
unjust enrichment. Under Missouri law, the elements for a claim of
unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant
by the plaintiff (2) appreciation of the fact of such benefit by
the defendant and (3) acceptance and retention of that benefit
under circumstances in which retention without payment would be
inequitable. Because the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is
based on the same subject matter as his breach of contract claim,
Costco avers the Plaintiff cannot proceed on both theories.

The Plaintiff argues a party may assert alternative claims for
breach of an express contract and equitable relief.  

Here, the complaint explicitly states that the Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim is pled in the alternative to his breach of
contract count, and his unjust enrichment count does not
incorporate the allegations under the other count. Consequently,
this Court will allow the Plaintiff's alternative pleadings for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

MMPA claim

Lastly, Costco argues the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
relief under the MMPA.

The MMPA is a broad statute that prohibits the act, use or
employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the
concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in
connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in
trade or commerce.

Costco asserts it did not establish a deception or unfair practice
by refunding Plaintiff the amount he paid to purchase his executive
membership less the amount he had accrued in rewards because the
terms of their contract provided for it.

The Plaintiff cites to a regulation promulgated by the Missouri
Attorney General that provides litt is an unfair practice for any
person in connection with the sale of merchandise to unilaterally
breach unambiguous provisions of consumer contracts.

The MMPA grants the Missouri Attorney General authority to
promulgate rules and the Supreme Court of Missouri has made clear
that properly promulgated rules have the force and effect of law.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges Defendant unilaterally breached
the terms of its Member Privileges & Conditions and the agreements'
Risk-Free 100% Satisfaction Guarantee when it failed to refund the
full value of fees paid for cancelled executive memberships.

At this stage in the litigation, the Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged an unfair consumer practice. Additionally, the Plaintiff's
MMPA claim is not based on a single breach of contract claim or
single instance of an unfair consumer practice. He is seeking class
certification for his MMPA claim on behalf of 141 persons who,
during the applicable limitations period, purchased an executive
membership from Defendant in Missouri; cancelled the executive
membership; and were not refunded the full value of the executive
membership fee they originally paid.

Based on this, the Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts to
state a claim under the MMPA to survive a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Complaint is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yy3ettmv
from Leagle.com.

Scott Pearlstone, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Lanny H. Darr, DARR FIRM &
Paul T. Geske, MCGUIRE LAW, PC.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant, represented by Booker T.
Shaw -- bshaw@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP & Kristen
E. Sanocki -- ksanocki@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP.


CREAM MANAGEMENT: Portell Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
ANTONIO PORTELL and other similarly-situated individuals, the
Plaintiff, v. CREAM MANAGEMENT & CONSULTING SERVICES, INC. and
EDGARDO LAFAURIE, individually, the Defendants, Case
1:19-cv-20687-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Feb. 22, 2019), seeks to recover
money damages for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all other current and
former employees similarly situated to the Plaintiff worked in
excess of 40 hours during one or more weeks on or after January
2017, without being compensated overtime wages pursuant to the
FLSA.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

DOORDASH: Drivers File Class Action Over Unpaid Tips
----------------------------------------------------
Charmaine Little, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that two
DoorDash drivers have filed a class action lawsuit over allegations
the on-demand food delivery service did not pay them 100 percent of
tips as advertised.

The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division on Feb. 8.

Georgia residents Jamie Webb and Aaron Hodge filed the lawsuit
against DoorDash over allegations of breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, wantonness, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and
damages. They allege DoorDash, which delivers groceries from
Walmart and food from franchise and local restaurants,
inappropriately took tips, causing them not to be paid the full
amount they were owed despite DoorDash's advertisement that its
workers, or "Dashers," would receive 100 percent of the customer
tip.

"DoorDash changed [its] tipping policy by using a customer's tip to
pay the Dasher's base rate," according to the lawsuit. "This
contradicts DoorDash's explicit representations, including
statements on its website and to plaintiffs and class members that
‘if the base pay (plus) tip is less than the guaranteed minimum
offered, Dashers will receive the guaranteed minimum amount."

The suit states that the agreement was if the base pay and tip is
larger than the guaranteed amount, Dashers will get the base pay
and the tip. The plaintiffs allege DoorDash deceived both customers
and drivers as tips were supposed to go to the driver in addition
to the driver's base pay. They allege because DoorDash used the
tips to pay the base rate, they were financially harmed.

The plaintiffs requested the court certify the class action and
issue a final judgment against DoorDash, as well as an injunction
that would order DoorDash to "inform each class member of the true
nature of the compensation system employed by defendant and
requiring that tips that were rightfully earned by provided to the
plaintiffs and class members," according to the lawsuit.

They also asked the court to disgorge the tips and asked for an
injunction that would oblige DoorDash to fully disclose the alleged
compensation scheme. The plaintiffs also asked for punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, court costs and a trial by jury.

The plaintiffs are represented by Heninger Garrison Davis in
Atlanta and Birmingham, Alabama. [GN]


EMPIRE STATE: Magana Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------
ROGELIO MAGANA individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. EMPIRE STATE ELECTRICAL,
CORP. and LAWRENCE RAFALOVICH, individually, the Defendants, Case
No. 151779/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Feb. 19, 2019), seeks to recover wages
and benefits which Plaintiffs were statutorily entitled to receive
pursuant to the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants maintained a policy and
practice of paying Plaintiff and members of the putative class a
flat hourly rate for each hour worked.  The Defendants failed to
pay Plaintiff and members of the putative class overtime
compensation. Like Plaintiff, when members of the putative class
worked over 40 hours in a week, they also did not receive overtime
compensation. Instead, they were paid their regular hourly rate,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the putative class:

          Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
          Jack L. Newhouse, Esq.
          Joel L. Goldenberg, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080

ERMCO COMPONENTS: Hayes Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Malcolm Hayes, individually and on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. ERMCO Components, Inc., Case No.
1:19-cv-01046 (W.D. Tenn., March 1, 2019), is brought against the
Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff seek to recover the "off-the-clock", "rounded-off"
and "edited-out/shaved" unpaid straight time and overtime
compensation from the Defendant.

The Plaintiff has been employed by and worked for Defendant as an
hourly-paid, non-exempt employee at the Defendant's work facilities
in Dyersburg, Tennessee within the three year period preceding the
filing of this action.

The Defendant ERMCO Components Inc. is a Delaware Corporation and
has its principal offices at 2225 Industrial Road, Dyersburg, Dyer
County, Tennessee 38024-2344. The Defendant owns and operates work
facilities in Greenville, Tennessee; Little Rock, Arkansas;
Raleigh, North Carolina as well as in Dyersburg, Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
      J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
      Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
      JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
      262 German Oak Drive
      Memphis, TN 38018
      Tel: (901) 754-8001
      Fax: (901) 754-8524
      E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
              rbryant@jsyc.com
              rturner@jsyc.com


ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FL: Jail Victims Still Waiting for Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chorus Nylander, writing for ABC 3 WEARTV.com, reports that it's
been nearly five years since the deadly explosion of the old
Escambia County Jail.

A gas leak during severe weather in April 2014 caused the
explosion. It killed two inmates, left a corrections officer
paralyzed, and left more than 180 others injured.

David Smoot was one of those injured inmates. He was serving time
for several driving violations.

"It was just a big boom and everybody panicked," Smoot said.

Smoot said he was trampled by several other inmates trying to
escape during the chaos. He said he suffered head and back pain as
well as post-traumatic stress.

To this day he says he is barely able to work like the way he used
to, but he's trying despite the injuries.

"Just trying to make a living," Smoot said.

A small body shop, just next to the wreckage of the old jail, is
now his road to recovery. He hopes to be able to recover
financially but said he's frustrated to have still not seen a dime
from a class-action lawsuit.

Smoot is part of a lawsuit, with 140 other inmates injured during
the incident, seeking compensation. Smoot said each time they are
close to settling things get pushed back. He said he blames
Escambia County commissioners and would like them to do something
to speed things up.

"We just keep getting strung along and ragged along," Smoot said.

WEAR spoke to Commissioner Doug Underhill. He said he sympathizes
with Smoot's situation, but the pending litigation is unfortunately
a long a tedious process.

"The reason they take a long time is because each one of those
victims has a right to due process, they have a right for an
attorney to negotiate in their best interest and try and negotiate
the best deal they can," Underhill explained.

For that reason, Underhill said he would not support any measure to
try and make things move faster. He said commissioners do get
regular updates on the situation.

Smoot is represented by the Stevenson-Klotz Law Firm in Pensacola.
Attorney Chris Klotz, Esq. told Channel 3 News there is planned
distribution in the case in March, but due to some "objectors"
things could be pushed back.

The old jail is currently being demolished as a more than $120
million project to build a new jail is also underway.[GN]


EXXON MOBIL: Shell Loses Bid to Dismiss Lester's NORM Exposure Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying a motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Shell Oil Company, Shell Offshore
Inc., and SWEPI LP, to dismiss the case captioned WARREN LESTER, ET
AL., v. EXXON MOBIL CORP., ET AL., SECTION "L" (2). Civil Action
No. 14-1824. (E.D. La.).

The Plaintiffs in this action were allegedly exposed to naturally
occurring radioactive material (NORM) associated with the cleaning
of used oilfield pipe at pipe yards in Harvey, Louisiana, including
the Grefer Tract, nearby tracts of land, and tracts of land in
other locations in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
Lester has a lengthy procedural history. In 2002, over 600
Plaintiffs filed a single petition, entitled the Lester petition,
seeking damages in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
State of Louisiana. Since 2002, the state court proceedings have
disposed of the claims of various Plaintiffs through trial flights,
settlements, or other dismissals, such that just over 500
Plaintiffs remain.  

Shell moved for summary judgment, arguing the Plaintiffs had no
expert testimony connecting Shell's conduct to the Plaintiffs'
exposure to NORM dust in doses sufficient to cause an injury and
thus contend Plaintiffs cannot establish an essential element of
their claim.

Shell contends it is entitled to summary judgment on the causation
element, arguing Plaintiffs have no evidence showing that they were
exposed to a dangerous level of radiation from NORM in pipe
belonging to any particular Shell defendant. Because Louisiana law
has never permitted market-share liability to supplant proof of
causation, Plaintiffs cannot simply lump all of the Tuboscope
customers together and assert that they all substantially caused
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Thus, Shell contends, without medical
evidence upon which to base a liability finding against any Shell
Defendant, the jury will be asked to speculate in the total absence
of evidence showing Shell-specific radiation exposure.

In support of this argument, Shell points to the fact that
Plaintiffs' experts did not render an opinion specifically
attributing a particular dose of NORM dust exposure to any
Tuboscope yard customer.  

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue they need not prove a specific
dosage attributable to Shell because Shell is solidarity liable
with any alleged third-party tortfeasors and therefore bears fifty
to one hundred percent of the responsibility for Plaintiffs'
injuries depending on the individual Plaintiffs' date of
significant exposure. In support of their argument that the
pre-amendment version of Civil Code Article 2324 applies to this
case, Plaintiffs point to Aucoin v. State Department of
Transportation and Development, 97-1967 (La. 4/24/98), 712 So.2d
62(overturned on other grounds by statute) and Cole v. Celotex
Corp, 599 So.2d 1058 (La. 1992).
According to Plaintiffs, under the pre-amendment version of Civil
Code Article 2324, a cause of action in a long-latency occupational
disease case accrues when pre-act exposures are significant and
such exposures later result in the manifestation of damages.

Thus, the Plaintiffs contend, because each of the Tuboscope flight
Plaintiffs had significant exposure during one or both of the time
periods when Civil Code article 2324 permitted some degree of
solidary liability, Shell is solidarily liable with all the other
third-parties. Because Plaintiffs have offered testimony
establishing that Shell's pipe was the primary source of
Plaintiffs' NORM exposure, Plaintiffs submit there are substantial
questions of material fact as to whether Shell's conduct was a
significant contributing cause of Plaintiffs' injuries as would
preclude summary judgment.  

If Shell may be held solidarily liable, then Plaintiffs must show
Shell had something to do with Plaintiffs' injuries to defeat
summary judgment. Thus, determining whether Shell has borne its
initial summary judgment burden requires the Court to first
consider whether Shell may be held solidarily liable for
Plaintiffs' injuries.

Relevant to the instant case, Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 was
amended in 1987, with an effective date of September 1, 1987. Prior
to the 1987 revision of article 2324, a victim was able to seek
full recovery from any one of the joint tortfeasors who were left
to seek their respective contribution and indemnity from each
other. The 1987 amendment still provided for solidary liability
among joint tortfeasors but capped the amount at fifty percent of
the plaintiff's recoverable damages. Being a substantive change in
the law, the 1987 amendments applied prospectively only.  

Shell's argument that Plaintiffs are not able to prove an essential
element of their claims is predicated on the idea that Plaintiffs
are required to provide expert testimony stating the precise amount
of NORM to which Plaintiffs were exposed that is attributable to
Shell. Notably, Shell does not argue Plaintiffs have no evidence of
their exposure attributable to Shell, rather, at oral argument,
Shell emphasized that its motion pertained specifically to
Plaintiffs' lack of expert testimony.

The Court finds Plaintiffs are not required to provide expert
testimony attributing a specific amount of Plaintiffs' alleged NORM
exposure to Shell to show Shell's conduct bears a proximate
relation to Plaintiffs' harm and is substantial in nature. As a
result, the Court concludes Shell has failed to carry its burden on
summary judgment. Even if Shell had borne its burden, thereby
shifting the burden to Plaintiffs to show Shell's pipe was a
significant cause of their injuries, Plaintiffs offer ample record
evidence that Shell's actions or inactions were a significant cause
of their injuries.

To demonstrate causation attributable to Shell, Plaintiffs first
point to the deposition testimony of Lester Jackson, Shell's
materials manager from 1974 to 2000. Jackson worked at Shell's
terminal in Venice, Louisiana for all but three years, from 1974 to
1995. As a part of his job duties, Jackson oversaw the movement of
production pipe to and from Shell's production platforms in the
Gulf of Mexico. During his deposition, Jackson was unable to
identify how many Shell wells were in the Gulf, as they were so
numerous.  

Next, Plaintiffs point to the testimony of Greg Southworth, another
of Shell's corporate representatives, who explained Shell's testing
of pipe revealed that about half of its production contained a
radioactivity level of above 2,000 picocuries per gram (pCi/g). As
Plaintiffs' and Shell's experts explain, at 2,000 pCi/g, NORM is
considered so hazardous that it is subject to hazardous waste
transportation regulations. Moreover, Plaintiffs' experts and
Shell's health physics expert, John Frazier, agree that there is an
overall NORM radioactivity concentration in scale.

In addition to expert testimony from both Plaintiffs' and Shell's
experts, Plaintiffs point to ten affidavits from the living
Tuboscope Plaintiffs and from co-workers on behalf of the deceased
Plaintiffs. These affidavits reveal that: (1) all Plaintiffs worked
with Shell pipe, (2) all were exposed to scale dust released from
the used pipes, (3) the primary customer at the Tuboscope yard was
Shell, and (4) Shell's used pipe was the single greatest source of
Plaintiffs' NORM exposure.

Based on the evidence offered by Plaintiffs, the Court concludes
there are significant issues of material fact on the question of
whether Shell's actions or inactions were a significant
contributing cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. As a result, the Court
will deny Shell's motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
Shell Oil Company, Shell Offshore Inc., and SWEPI LP, is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019 Order
and Reasons is available at http://tinyurl.com/y3aejnzafrom
Leagle.com.

Warren Lester, Alfreda Marshall, David Quinn, Demetria Sterling,
Dawn Humphries, Joseph LeBlanc, Sr., Jeffrey Guidry, Eugenio
Mallol, Antionette Clark, Wade Bethley, Charles Paine, III, Rebekah
Paine, Renee Deris, Kevin Pollard, Harold Singleton, Arthur
Russell, Jr., Darlene Roche, Leo Pollard, Ronald Williams, John
Williams, Sr., John Gros, III, Jack Roy, Clarence Ross, Earl
Williams, Jr, Merlin Williams, Sr, John Hendrix, Jr., Leonardus
Meerman, Alan Humphries, Bruce Ingram, An Nguyen, Vi Nguyen, Thoa
Vo, Judy Mark, Milton Thompson, Laura Arcement, Robert Arcement,
Don Hymel, Clarence Washington, Adam LeBoeuf, Laura LeBoeuf, John
Cade, Eric Harrison, Calvin Plaisance, Jr., Mary Favorite, James
Autin, Sr., David Hervey, Gregrey Liberta, Jeffrey Liberta, Lyle
Ragas, Cedric Watts, Norman Abreo, John Booth, Jr., Louis Brown,
Jr, Richard Fritz, Rosetta Williams, Timothy Crowley, Mediamolle
Leo, Othe Nash, Raymond Schaeffer, Pierre Orlandez, Sr., Janice
Toups, Aquanette Granger, Marylee Calvey, John Oleszkowicz, John
Lester, Hermina McCall, Ronald ODonley, Dallas Antoine, Wanda
Lester, Warren Lester, Jr., Montreal Matthews, Ronald Watts, Alvin
Campbell, Sr., Linda Wickem, Ventress Degree, Antonia Scott, Joseph
Scott, Cheryl Nicholas, Janice Lew, Kevin Nicholas, Francis Mends
Johnson, Rose Johnson, Charles Green, Sr., Joseph Ruffin, Ernest
Sauls, Dolin Calvey, Richard Shrieves, Raymond Hoffmann, Glenda
OChery, Robert Ashley, Warren Hock, Roland Fonseca, Kevin
Babineaux, J Lindsey, Wallace Lanasa, Jr., Nola Toups, Kent
Arcement, Michael Babineaux, George Martinez, Billy King, Ernest
Peters, Alexander Raymond, Roger Laviolette, Lloyd Baise, Laura
Borders, Kenny Coutee, Oscar Lomax, Calvin Nicholas, Melkile
Favorite, Ivy Nash, Louis Banks, Edward Williams, Lawrence Jackson,
Leonard Stevenson, James Usin, Alma Loston, Alfrida Loston, Clark
Murphy, Dennis Hock, Jr., Vanessa Mitchell, Lawrence Batiste,
Clarence George, Roselee Gaston, Rayfield Gaston, Jr., Oscar
Jasmine, Sterling Harris, Jeffery Lang, Randy Coleman, Joseph
Johnson, Tilman Guidry, Ernest Aguilard, Elvira Aguilard, John
Celistan, Jr., Raymond Patin, Barbara Wilson, Margaret Patin,
Hakeem Wakeelah, Roland Fleming, Rayfield Gaston, III, Charles
Napoleon, Jr., Tannard Darrensburg, Paris Dardar, Joseph Battle,
Ernest Mayho, Lionel Gaston, Noble Morton, Jr., Mae Rivet, George
Singleton, Barbara Hamilton, Richard Matthews, Jr., Page Girtley,
Willis Jackson, Darrel Clarks, Thomas Robinson, Morris Patin,
(Hameen), Minnie Patterson, Ethel Henry, Antoinette Magee, Louis
Orear, Jr., Lionel Helton, Jimmy Lanette, Lois Walker, Timothy
Richard, Denise Lew, Arthur Mitchell, Marva Ceasar, David Brown,
Sr., George Bowie, Bobby Bolden, Kerry Dixon, Earl Sevin, Morris
Bias, Jr., Denise Jones, Jackie Hebert, David Washington, Jerry
Chaisson, Wanda LeBlanc, Carlton LeBlanc, Theodore Stamps, III,
Wilfred Adams, Arthur Keys, Barry Humphries, William Walker, Sr.,
Elwood Dixon, Mae Spears, Henry Roussell, Victor McCaskill, Gaynell
Smith, Garfield Gaston, Carolyn Levier, Ahrionne Levier, Aldo
Hernandez, Shirley Watts-Robinson, Reginald Price, Magee Winston,
Warren Pierce, Maxine Stevenson, Artis Buckley, Deidre Allen,
Wilbert Allen, III, Lum Davis, Jr., L.J. Harper, Jr., Eula Scott,
Murphy Gautreaux, Arlen Whelan, Charles LeBoeuf, Cecilia Cummings,
Steven Brignac, Charles Carter, Sr., Wilton Gary, Sr., Darlene
Jenkins, Andrew Burnett, Andrew Nason, Jerry Daniels, Jarmaine
Seltzer, Willie Hills, Albert Lloyd, Julien Arcement, Jr., James
Dufrene, Jr., Raymond Guidry, Grace Guidry, Russell Todaro, Brandy
DiMaggio, Pam Todaro, Ella Todaro, Camille Todaro, Melanie Langeau,
Kathleen Lavalla, Todd Lavalla, Samuel Lavalla, George Thomas, Jr.,
Sylvester Johnson, William Brown, Dr., Horace Crappel, Gloria
Crappel, Brant Griffin, Kevin Sider, James Jackson, Bryan Bournes,
George Tracy, Jimmie McGee, Carla Simmons, Frank Morris, Raymond
Schaefer, James Perry, Willis Clofer, Kirbie Hawkins, Darrell
Wilson, Johnny Riley, Charles Cross, Hector Martinez, Mark Russell,
Avis Russell, Edward Russell, Raymond Hill, Roy Jacks, Edward
Dabney, Lercy Dabney, Jr., Percy Burns, Henry Stokes, David Hill,
James Lee, Laddies Jones, Jr., Merian Cross, Lonzo Taylor, Kenneth
Honora, Samella Addison, Janet Addison, Jimmy Merchant, Michelle
Nicholas, Stanley Harris, Sr, Wayne Hill, Steve Ricard, Robert
Stokes, Leo Coleman, Freddie Carter, Sr., Henry Thompson, Delores
Johnson, Orlandez Pierre, Fred Wilson, Jr, Marion Burks, Richard
Schwary, Kenneth Gaines, Joseph Paul, Jr., Earl Williams, III,
Jeffery Duckett, Reginald Hadley, Lorraine Davis, Carnel Allen,
Charles Hadley, Lawrence Dorsey, Sherman Gaston, Wynesta Gaston,
David Snedecor, Monroe Turner, David Lackey, Jr, Barbara Lackey,
Donald Johnson, Terral Johnson, Mason Saulsberry, Jr, Joseph
Baudion, Joseph Hadley, Louis Fulton, Jr, Christopher Ford, Larry
Bourg, Albert Lewis, Jr., Genevea Marshall, Joseph Thomas, III,
Paul Plaunche, Tyrone Boyd, Roy Rome, Jr, Roland Bougere, Robert
Williams, Rose Brown, Clifford Pierre, Winston Whitten, Charles
Davis, Jr, James Roussell, Louis Coleman, Jessie Clark, Milton
Carter, Jr, J D. Frazier, Gerald Hunter, Porter Edwards, Tong Tran,
Eddie Fitzgerald, Allan Lepine, Ruth Lepine, Hayes Lepine, Kevin
Meredith, Joe Frazier, Donald Hill, Hilton Clark, Fred Adams, Isiah
Parker, Thomas Breaux, Jr, Maxine Harris, John Harris, III, Damion
Harris, Rosie Page, Ruby Paige, Randy Thortorn, Terry Joseph,
Trelldrieke Addison, Dirk Addison, Joann Stevenson, Lawrence Davis,
Teresa Davis, Leroyal Hester, Sr, Rod Robin, Carlo Blanda, Russell
Champ, Randolph Harris, Edna Semien, Salvador Lebella, Glenn
Cuccia, Eddie Fonseca, Herman Fonseca, Sr, Jeanette Houston, Thomas
Saylor, Betty Thomas, Edward Jackson, III, Kenneth Walker, Kenneth
Lew, Jr., Reynard Mitchell, Rodell Houston, Jr., Rodell Houston,
Sr., Selina Tipton, William Clarke, Alex Henry, Kim Walker, King
Robinson, Alvin Richardson, Jr., Wiley Dorsey, Jr., Larry Bourg,
Jr., Dan Crowley, Sr., Ruby Bowie, Leslie Mead, William Brown,
Francis Turner, Yvette Burks, Eugene Young, Robert Goudy, Clarence
Harris, Jr., Freddie Harris, Renee Harris, Tina Kreig, Alvin
Comeaux, Frank Miller, Shareta Miller, Edward Lee, Lloyd Vercher,
Flowers Wilson, Russell Jack, Sr., Claude Dupre, Jr., Lee
Pellegrin, Sr., Ronald Allen, Clyde McGill, Joseph Baker, Hanson
Theriot, Willie Boldens, Harold Harris, Wayne Townsend, Robert
Jacquot, Preston McGee, Jr., Theodore Gatlin, Earl Johnson, Richard
Grear, Gillbert Hoffpauir, Derryl Himel, Sr., Billy Lebouef, Jr.,
Russell Jasmine, Philip Breaux, James Day, Earl Gautreaux, David
Williams, Leon Hill, Alvin Beaubouef, Sr., Irving Benoit, Aubrey
Smalls, Rufus Jean-Batiste, Walter Lemieux, Jr., Augusta Genorta,
Leonard Grace, Henry Mang, Hal Jenkins, Tamika Brown, Nerry Landry,
Ion Verret, Gilda Knighton, Roger Coursey, Rene Domangue, Mytaya
Semien, John Dupont, Terry Lovern, Andrew Wright, Sr., Ervin
Porche, Sr., Roosevelt Scott, John Barrios, Leeroy Babin, Jr.,
William Hebert, Hayward Bourque, H. Jackson, Harold Quellette,
Willis Touchet, Wardell Brignac, James Lewis, Terry Young, Jimmie
Gray, Sidney Howard, Margaret Teague, Angela Lawrence, Shala
Allen-Miller, Anita Miller, Kim Smith, Edna Raymond, obo Frank
Raymond, Jr., deceased, Earl Boullion, Jr., Earnest Wilson, Sr.,
Eva Wilson, John Julien, Sr., Rodney Wilson, Freddie Credear,
Carmen Teague, Keith Duhon, Larry Duhon, Peter Duhon, Byron
Mansion, Sr., Lionel Ayo, James Smith, also known as, Mary Doris,
Yacheka Brown, Marquette Smith, Mickey Chaney, Clarence Gamble,
William Cook, Joyce Cook, Isaac Smith, Reginald Raymond, obo Frank
Raymond, Jr., deceased, Preston Jack, Sr., Gregory Wilson, Sr,
Eugene Thompson, Jr., Sidney Manison, III, Wilson Bowie, Jr.,
Charlotte Istre, Bert Istre, Laddie Batiste, Don Harris, Herbert
Teague, Julia Caldwell, Lionel Singleton, Raoul Toups, Marlon
Edwards, Donald Steel, Clinton Mikel, Louis Noel, Barry Mayon,
Michael Wilson, David Perry, James Braud, Robin Rodrigue, Karen
Rodrigue, Rodney Morehead, Patricia Judy, Curtis Dixon, Houston
Slate, Joseph Berry, Jeffrey Harmond, Andrew De Lotte, Melvin
Brown, Darryl Elliott, Simon Elliser, Earl Hamilton, Detroit Roy,
Evelyn Lirette, Stuart Lirette, Randy Luke, Joseph Batiste, Deborah
Desereaux, Judy Perrin, Harris Lanette, Darryl Lirette, Isabella
Tinson, Danny Blanchard, Glenn Coulon, Michelle Chauvin, Travis
Lirette, Daisy Sylve, Darren McDonald, Thomas Willette, Jr., Cecil
Breaux, Cory Paige, Valeria Paige, Vivian Paige, Joseph Page,
Carlos Paige, Melanie McMullen, Betty Reed, Lloyd Folse, JoAnn
Folse, Alvin Miller, Joseph Palmer, Sean Raymond, Lester Drennan,
Gaylen Spencer, Joycelyn Jasmine, Jack Page, Ira Simoneaux, Jr.,
Richard Benoit, Giles Lanasa, Melanie Scioneaux, Onise Lirette,
Janel Edwards, Albert Williams, Victor Bonilla, Wilbert Miller,
Sidney Maise, Angela Pollard, Earleen Miller, Macey R. Aucoin,
Sterling J. Aucoin, III, Armand F. Bellanger, Sr., Jessica Billiot,
Walter T. Bonnie, Jr., Leroy J. Bottley, Berkline Boudreaux, Sr.,
Bruce Campbell, Danielle R. Champine, Byron Davis, Sherman Farr,
Sr., Sherman R. Farr, Jr., John E. Fleming, Dennis A. Foret,
Michael E. Grygo, Alan Williams, Sr., Clarence Hall, Jr., Robert
Johnson, Christopher J. Johnson, Isaiah J. Kellup, Jr., Lawrence B.
Knight, Herman LeBlanc, Jr., Stella C. Lirette, Deyond Lloyd, Mose
Lloyd, Tony L. Louviere, Robert McCall, Stephen C. Niehaus, Garland
R. Oldham, Gary I. Price, Michael J. Thomas, Rosalie Williams,
Stephen Yancey, Willie Mae Antoine, spouse of decedent, Oliver
Antoine, Sr., Kawana Valet, for decedent, Leroy Valet, Kerry Valet,
for decedent, Leroy Valet, Kenneth Valet, for decedent, Leroy
Valet, Karen Alexie Rodrigue, Felix Alexie, Jr., Kevin Alexie,
Michelle Alexie, Morris Bowie, Harold Bowie, Cora M. Chess, Brenda
Washington, Diane Lawrence, Roy Chess, Mary Bradley Doris, Parnell
M. Doris, Kevin A. Doris, Gerard Doris, Charell Doris Ellis, Daryl
R. Doris, Charlene B. Boquet, Nedra B. Detiveaux, Doris Young, as
tutrix of her minor child, Terrell Young, Jennifer Hurst, Alice
Junior, Randy Junior, Lionel Junior, II, Landa Boyd, Kristin
Johnson, Lezia M. Parsley, Charles C. Parsley, Natalie P. Brown,
Angela R. Parsley, Diana Verret, James Verret, II, Angele Verret
Ridge, Sheri Dunlavy, Jerry Lynn Dunlavy, Casey Dunlavy, Adrienne
J. Ingram, Jovanna Thompson, Darryle Johnson, Wanda Raymond, obo
Frank Raymond, Jr., deceased, Marie Stevenson, obo Frank Raymond,
Jr., deceased, Aje Edwards, obo Frank Raymond, Jr., deceased,
Ja'don Charles, obo Frank Raymond, Jr., deceased, Frank Raymond,
III, obo Frank Raymond, Jr., deceased, Shirley Bottley, Jovane
Benoit & Juajuan Benoit, Plaintiffs, represented by Timothy John
Falcon, Falcon Law Firm, Jarrett S. Falcon, Falcon Law Firm,
Jeremiah A. Sprague, Falcon Law Firm, Juan C. Obregon --
Juan.Obregon@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C., Kevin David
Micale, Smith Stag, LLC, Michael G. Stag, Stag Liuzza, LLC & Stuart
Housel Smith, Smith Stag, LLC.

Exxon Mobil Corporation, Defendant, represented by Glen Marion
Pilie, Adams & Reese, LLP, David M. Stein, Pugh, Accardo, Haas,
Radecker & Carey, Donald Cole Massey, Couhig Partners, LLC, E.
Paige Sensenbrenner, Adams & Reese, LLP, Martin Alan Stern, Adams &
Reese, LLP, Roland M. Vandenweghe, Jr., Adams & Reese, LLP, Ronald
J. Sholes, Adams & Reese, LLP & Valeria M. Sercovich, Adams &
Reese, LLP.

Joseph Grefer, Camille Grefer, Rosemarie Grefer Haase & Henry
Grefer, Defendants, represented by Gladstone N. Jones, III --
gjones@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC,
Eberhard D. Garrison -- egarrison@jonesswanson.com -- Jones,
Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC, Jacqueline Alexandra Stump &
Kevin Earl Huddell -- khuddell@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson,
Huddell & Garrison, LLC.


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Patterson Class Action Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------
Fidelity National Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February
19, 2019, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the
company continues to defend itself against a class action lawsuit
captioned, Patterson, et al. v. Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company, et al.

In a class action captioned Patterson, et al. v. Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company, et al., Case No. GD 03-021176, originally
filed on October 27, 2003 and pending in the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, plaintiffs allege the named
Company underwriters violated Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") by failing to provide
premium discounts in accordance with filed rates in refinancing
transactions.

Contrary to rulings in similar federal court cases that considered
the rate rule and agreed with the Company's position, the court
held that the rate rule should be interpreted such that an
institutional mortgage in the public record is a "proxy" for prior
title insurance entitling a consumer to a discount rate when
refinancing when there is a mortgage of record within the number of
years required by the rate rule.

The rate rule requires sufficient evidence of a prior policy, and
because not all institutional mortgages were insured, the Company's
position is that a recorded first mortgage alone does not
constitute sufficient evidence of an earlier policy entitling
consumers to a discounted rate. The court certified the class
refusing to follow prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court and appellate
court decisions holding that the UTPCPL requires proof of reliance,
an individual issue which precludes certification.

After notice to the class, plaintiffs moved for partial summary
judgment on liability, and defendants moved for summary judgment.
On June 27, 2018, the court entered an order granting plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on liability, and denying the
Company's motion finding that the Company failed to advise its
agents on how to interpret the rate rule so that it would be
uniformly applied, thereby having engaged in "deceptive conduct."
The Company plans to seek interlocutory review of the summary
judgment order.

The court approved the parties' stipulation in which they agreed
that before interlocutory review is appropriate, the court will
first determine which party should bear the burden of ascertaining
the class and calculating damages, and determine whether the
damages should be trebled.

Briefing on these issues is complete and oral argument was held on
January 15, 2019. A decision is pending with the court.

Fidelity National said, "There has been no determination as to the
size of the class. It is unknown whether plaintiffs will seek
statutory or actual damages, whether the judge will exercise
discretion to award treble damages or award prejudgment interest,
or what plaintiffs' counsel will seek as reasonable attorneys'
fees. Accordingly, damages are not reasonably estimable at this
time. We will continue to vigorously defend this matter, and we do
not believe the result will have a material adverse effect on our
financial condition."

Fidelity National Financial, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
provides various insurance products in the United States. The
company operates in Title, and Corporate and Other segments.
Fidelity National Financial, Inc. was founded in 1847 and is
headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: April 2 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

General Electric Company (NYSE: GE)
Class Period: October 12, 2018 - October 29, 2018,
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 2, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/ge

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose material adverse
facts relating to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's
(the "SEC") expanded investigation into the Company's accounting
practices, including investigating GE's $23 billion goodwill
impairment charge (the "Power Charge"). GE disclosed the Power
Charge on October 1, 2018, and the SEC investigation began shortly
after.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


HEALTHWAREHOUSE.COM: Garey Alleges Violation under ADA
------------------------------------------------------
Healthwarehouse.com, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kevin Garey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Healthwarehouse.com, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02074 (S.D. N.Y., March 6, 2019).

Healthwarehouse.com, Inc. is a Medical supply store in Florence,
Kentucky.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
   Shalom Law, PLLC.
   124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
   Kew Gardens, NY 11374
   Tel: (516) 807-1748
   Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


HILL'S PET NUTRITION: Pet Owners Files Class Action Lawsuits
------------------------------------------------------------
Maureen McKinney, writing for Veterinary News.dvm360, reports that
at least two law firms have filed class action suits on behalf of
individuals who claim they lost their pets as a result of the
Hill's recall.

San Francisco law firm Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP disclosed
yesterday that it has filed a class action lawsuit against Hill's
Pet Nutrition for selling dog food containing excessive and
dangerous amounts of vitamin D.

It's unclear how many dogs have died as a result of eating the
recalled Hill's products, but a quick glance through social media
indicates that hundreds of owners believe their pets have been
affected.

Filed on February 12 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, the lawsuit seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief to prevent Hill's from selling pet food with
potentially toxic levels of vitamin D.

To say that affected owners are devastated and angry is an
understatement. dvm360 spoke with several grief-stricken owners who
believe their dogs have died as a result of eating the recalled
foods.

The victims' stories

The stories pet owners are sharing are eerily similar.

When Los Angeles pet owner Kimberly Mull's 13-year-old pug-bichon
frise mix Precious was diagnosed with diabetes in November, her
veterinarian prescribed Hill's Prescription Diet w/d. Mull started
noticing signs of serious illness in January, a week before the
recall announcement. In a Facebook post she said of Precious: "Her
little body couldn't handle the kidney dysfunction and she took a
rapid turn for the worse and died."

Mull describes Hill's response as "very cold, very stock" when she
contacted the company. "They were less than compassionate or caring
that they killed my fur baby, my daughter's best friend," she told
dvm360.

A Pennsylvania pet owner, who wishes to remain anonymous because
she is in discussions with the Chicago law firm Cafferty Clobes
Meriwether & Sprengel to become the fourth plaintiff in its suit
filed against the company, experienced the loss of her dog in much
the same way as Mull, but her experience with Hill's was more
compassionate. "The gentleman was very nice on the phone," she told
dvm360. "He kept apologizing for the incident and offered his
condolences." But that didn't make up for her loss.

Her dog began eating one of the Prescription Diet w/d recalled
products in early December after being diagnosed with sudden-onset
diabetes on November 30 and died about four weeks later. Just
before his death, the dog's blood urea nitrogen level exceeded 300
mg/dl and his pancreatic lipase was 4462 U/L (normal range,
200–1800), the pet owner says.

Christina Marie Sawyer also lost her 13-year-old dog Taco a week
before the recall announcement.

"Taco's battle started at Thanksgiving when she was diagnosed with
acute pancreatitis," Sawyer told dvm360. "We put her on Science
Diet Youthful Vitality Chicken & Vegetable Stew, which she loved."

Taco stopped eating and started losing weight rapidly after about a
week on the diet. He died on January 24. "For a company as large as
Hill's not to recognize a potential threat is unfathomable," she
says. "Hill's really dropped the ball on this one and it cost me my
family member and friend."

What pet owners should know

Although Hill's insists that the recall extends only to varieties
of canned dog foods, many pet owners are calling for the company to
look more carefully at its dry foods after they claim their pets
exhibited signs of vitamin D toxicity while on dry Hill's diets.

Many other pet food products have been recalled in recent months
for excessive vitamin D levels. Those companies and products are
listed here.

Affected pet owners can reach out to Hill's via social media or
phone at 800-445-5777.[GN]


HILL'S PET: Johnson Files Class Action over Tainted Dog Food
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hill's Pet Nutrition,
Inc. The case is styled as David Johnson, Angelina Raines and Kayla
Vanwinsen, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-02121-KHV-KGG (D. Kan., March 6, 2019).

The lawsuit alleges that the Defendant's dog food products contain
dangerously elevated levels of vitamin D, which can be fatal to
dogs.

Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc, marketed simply as "Hills", is an
American pet food company that produces dog and cat foods. The
company is a subsidiary of Colgate-Palmolive.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Brendan McNeal, Esq.
   Edgar Law Firm LLC
   1032 Pennsylvania Ave.
   Kansas City
   Kansas City, MO 64105
   Tel: (816) 932-5228
   Email: bmm@edgarlawfirm.com

      - and -

   John F. Edgar, Esq.
   Edgar Law Firm, LLC - KC
   1032 Pennsylvania Avenue
   Kansas City, MO 64105
   Tel: (816) 531-0033
   Fax: (816) 531-3322
   Email: jfe@edgarlawfirm.com


HILL'S PET: Jubinville et al. Sue over Tainted Dog Food
-------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER JUBINVILLE, JENNA SPRENGEL, KELLI COPPI, and LAURA
FREEMAN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, vs. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., and HILL'S PET
NUTRITION SALES INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00074
(D.R.I., Feb. 15, 2019), asks the Court to compel Hill's Pet
Nutrition ensure that all potentially affected Dog Food products
are identified on Hill's website and removed from shelves and that
the public is adequately notified that they should not purchase and
should immediately stop using the tainted food, and their dogs
should be taken to a veterinarian for testing and whatever
treatment is necessary.

Hill's manufactures, markets, warrants, and sells Hill's
Prescription Diet ("Prescription Diet") and Hill's Science Diet
("Science Diet") dog foods. These products are specially formulated
for the specific health needs of certain dogs. In marketing
materials and packaging for the Specialty Dog Food, Hill's says it
is providing "nutrition that can transform the lives of pets and
comfort the pet parents and vets who care for them," and claims
that "differences you can see, feel & trust" all "start with
science."

Contrary to its representations, however, Hill's has manufactured,
sold, and warranted Specialty Dog Food containing toxic and often
fatal levels of vitamin D. Excessive vitamin D poses substantial
and unreasonable risks to dogs. As Hill's itself recognized in
recalling a subset of its Specialty Dog Food, "elevated levels of
vitamin D" can cause symptoms such as "vomiting, loss of appetite,
increased thirst, increased urination, excessive drooling, and
weight loss," and can lead to "serious health issues in dogs
including renal dysfunction."

The lethal nature of Hill's Specialty Dog Foods has been compounded
by Hill's excessive and unwarranted delay in warning consumers and
regulatory agencies of the dangers posed by those products and has
caused untold numbers of pet owners significant emotional distress
and financial loss, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Fidelma L. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          55 Cedar Street, Suite 100
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: 401-457-7700
          Facsimile: 401-457-7708
          E-mail: ffitzpatrick@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Kenneth A. Wexler, Esq.
          Bethany R. Turke, Esq.
          Umar Sattar, Esq.
          WEXLER WALLACE LLP
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 346-2222
          Facsimile: (312) 346-0022
          E-mail: kaw@wexlerwallace.com
                  brt@wexlerwallace.com
                  us@wexlerwallace.com

HILL'S PET: Sun-Dampier Sues over Tainted Dog Food
--------------------------------------------------
JUN VIRGINIA SUN-DAMPIER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No.
3:19-cv-00819 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2019), is a class action on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all persons in California who purchased
Hill's Prescription Diet and Hill's Science Diet brand dog food
with dangerously elevated levels of vitamin D.  The Defendant has
publicly admitted that "select canned food products" under these
brand names contained elevated levels of vitamin D, and that "the
affected canned dog foods were distributed through retail pet
stores and veterinary clinics nationwide."

Ingesting excessive amounts of vitamin D can be dangerous and even
lethal for dogs. The Defendant recognized this fact and have
recalled its select Products, stating that "elevated levels of
vitamin D" can cause symptoms such as "vomiting, loss of appetite,
increased thirst, increased urination, excessive drooling, and
weight loss," and can lead to "serious health issues in dogs
including renal dysfunction and failure and death."[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Stanley D. Saltzman, Esq.
          Adam M. Tamburelli, Esq.
          MARLIN & SALTZMAN, LLP
          29800 Agoura Road, Suite 210
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 991-8080
          Facsimile: (818) 991-8081
          E-mail: ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com
                  atamburelli@marlinsaltzman.com

HP: Some Office Printer Owners Eligible for Lawsuit Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brad Bennett, writing for MobileSyrup, reports that HP Canada has
settled a class-action lawsuit that alleged the company caused its
printers to not work with specific non-HP branded ink. HP used a
program called 'Dynamic Security' that kept its printers from
working with some ink cartridges. HP still maintains that it did
nothing wrong, but is paying out $700,000 CAD to those part of the
suit. "Class Members are included in the proposed Settlement if
they are a Canadian resident and owned a Class Printer between
March 1st, 2015 and December 31st, 2017," reads the press release
from HP.

The printers included in the lawsuit are as follows.

* HP OfficeJet Pro 6230
* HP OfficeJet 6812, 6815, 6820
* HP OfficeJet Pro 6830, 6835, 8610, 8615, 8616, 8620, 8625, 8630
* HP OfficeJet Pro X551dw, X451dn, X451dw, X576dw, X476dn, X476dw

To receive compensation, users must have experienced a printer
interruption while using non-HP ink between March 1st, 2015 and
December 31st, 2017. Compensation can include things like a new
printer, ink or other expenses occurred when the printer refused to
work. That said, those who are part of the lawsuit must provide
proof to support their claim.

People part of the lawsuit can also submit a claim for an out of
pocket expense without documentation if they lost time or money due
to the printer. If the sum of all the applications doesn't reach
$700,000 CAD then each claim receives $50. If there are more than
$700,000 in claims, the payout is adjusted accordingly, reads the
press release.

Users are only allowed to submit one claim per civic address unless
they can provide multiple printer serial numbers. You can submit
your claim online here. HP is accepting applications until June
28th, 2019. Users can also submit a claim via email, or snail mail
at Nelson P.O. Box 20187-322 Rideau Street, Ottawa ON K1N 5Y5.[GN]


HYATT CORP: $725K Deal in Matthews FLSA Suit Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLA MATTHEWS, FAITH HOLLOWAY, THERESA GIBSON, DINA
BARTOLINI, RITA TAKETA, And all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. HYATT CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-413-RJC-DCK (W.D. N.C.), Judge Robert
J. Conrad, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, granted (i) the Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class/Collective Action
Settlement, Named Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Settlement
Administration Expenses, and Entry of Final Approval Order; and
(ii) the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class
Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses.

THe Parties reached a settlement of the captioned matter that was
preliminarily approved by the Court on Dec. 21, 2018.  The Court
conducted a final fairness hearing on Feb. 26, 2019.

Judge Conrad has examined and finds good grounds to approve the
Parties' settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate pursuant to
the standards for approval of a class settlement under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(e).

He has reviewed and now approved the material terms of the
Settlement Agreement, which are summarized as follows:

     a. The Defendant will allocate $725,000 (the Maximum
Settlement Amount) to pay: (a) Class Member claims; (b) Settlement
administration costs; (c) Class Counsel's fees and litigation
costs; and (d) Incentive awards to the class representatives.

     b. The Class Counsel will receive attorneys' fees in the
amount of $241,666.66 and costs not to exceed $40,000.

     c. The Named Plaintiffs will receive Incentive Awards in the
total amounts of $9,000, to be allocated among them per the
Settlement Agreement.

     d. Simpluris, Inc. will receive administration costs in the
total amount of $20,000.

     e. After deducting from the Maximum Settlement Amount for
administration costs, the Class Counsel's fees and litigation
costs, and Incentive Awards, the Defendant will use the net amount
to pay each Potential Class Member who does not submit a timely
Opt-Out Form to be excluded from the Settlement as follows:

          (a) To all Opt-In Plaintiffs, and to all Class Members
who reside in Colorado, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and
Ohio, an amount equal to $9.54 per workweek.

          (b) To Class Members who did not previously file consent
forms to opt in to the FLSA claim and do not reside in Colorado,
Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio, an amount equal to
$2.30 per workweek.

               (c) If necessary, all settlement payments to the
Opt-In Plaintiffs and the Class Members will be paid on a pro rata
basis from the Settlement Fund Balance.

     f. Each Potential Class Member who does not submit a timely
Opt-Out Form and receives and cashes the payment from the
Settlement will be deemed to release and discharge the Defendant
for all claims, liabilities, and causes of action of every
description whatsoever by the Potential Class Member related to any
claim for unpaid wages, overtime wages, minimum wages and/or
liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and litigation costs
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and any state or common law
that accrued from Jan. 11, 2015 through Aug. 10, 2018 which
includes the time he/she was employed by Defendant as a Remote
Associate, including without limitation, claims for wages, premium
pay, overtime pay, penalties, liquidated damages, punitive damages,
interest, attorneys' fees, and litigation costs.

Any payments from the Settlement made to the Class Members that are
unclaimed or uncashed will be provided to The Employee Rights
Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy.

The Judge granted final approval of the Parties' Settlement
Agreement pursuant to Rule 23(c) and (e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Section 216(b) of the FLSA as agreed to by the
Parties.

Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(3), he certified the following Rule 23 class
for settlement purposes only: All current and former hourly Remote
Associates who worked for the Defendant from Jan. 11, 2015 to Aug.
10, 2018.

Pursuant to the collective action procedures of Section 216(b) of
the FLSA, the Judge final approval as to all FLSA aspects of the
settlement.  He confirmed the appointment of the Named Plaintiffs
as the Representatives of the Rule 23 class.

The Judge approved payment of enhancement awards to the Named
Plaintiff, Carla Matthews, in the amount of $5,000, and Named
Plaintiffs Faith Holloway, Theresa Gibson, Dina Bartolini and Rita
Taketa in the amount of $1,000 each.

He approved payment of attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in the
amount of $241,666.66 and litigation expenses not to exceed
$40,000.  In the event the Class Counsel's litigation expenses do
not exceed this amount, any leftover monies will be re-distributed
to the Class on a pro rata basis.  He approved payment to
Simpluris, Inc. in the amount of $20,000.  

The Judge He further confirmed pursuant to Rule 23(g) the
appointment of the Plaintiffs' Counsel, Kreis, Enderle, Hudgins &
Borsos, P.C. and Sommers Schwartz, P.C., as the Class Counsel.

The Parties' Settlement is approved in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KFmU89 from Leagle.com.

Carla Matthews, all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff,
represented by Charles Robert Ash, IV -- crash@sommerspc.com --
Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice, Jesse L. Young --
young@Kreisenderle.com -- Kreis enderle Hudgins & Borsos PC, pro
hac vice & edward B. Davis -- ward.davis@belldavispitt.com -- Bell,
Davis & Pitt PA.

Hyatt Corporation, an Illinois corporation, Defendant, represented
by Frederick T. Smith -- fsmith@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
Kara L. Goodwin -- kgoodwin@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, pro
hac vice & Noah Alan Finkel -- nfinkel@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth
Shaw LLP, pro hac vice.


IL GABBIANO: Quituizaca et al. Seek Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------
PEDRO FERNANDO QUITUIZACA, ANGEL SERAFIN QUITUIZACA, DAVID ELIAS
QUITUIZACA, and FELIX PAUL PARICHABALA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. IL GABBIANO
LLC, A AND E ONE LLC, JOSE MARIN, and DOMENICO SALVATORE, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06591 (D.N.J., Feb. 22, 2019), seeks
equitable and legal relief for Defendants' violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and
the New Jersey Wage Payment Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs regularly worked in
excess of 40 hours per week during their employment with the
Defendants. The Defendants knowingly failed to pay Plaintiffs
overtime wages of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate
of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per week. Instead,
Defendants compensated Plaintiffs a fixed salary each week, and
failed to provide Plaintiffs with overtime wages for hours worked
in excess of 40 per week.

Il Gabbiano LLC and A and E are domestic limited liability
companies. On or around August 9, 2006, A and E commenced
operations. A and E operated an Italian restaurant named Il
Gabbiano at 10 South Avenue West, Cranford, New Jersey 07016. While
employed by Il Gabbiano LLC, Plaintiffs retained the same title,
responsibilities, and hours of work as they maintained while
working for A and E. Il Gabbiano LLC merely continued the
operations of A and E as to the Restaurant, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs:

          Nicole Grunfeld, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          Facsimile: (212) 428-6811
          E-mail: ndgrunfeld@katzmelinger.com

INTERSTATE HOTELS: Court OKs $800K Richardson Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of a Proposed Settlement Agreement in the case captioned
DINA RAE RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INTERSTATE HOTELS & RESORTS,
INC., a Delaware corporation; INTERSTATE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
No. C 16-06772 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

This wage and hour class action was brought by plaintiff Dina Rae
Richardson against defendants Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc. and
Interstate Management Company, LLC, asserting claims for relief
that the defendants did not authorize and permit employee meal and
rest periods, did not pay minimum and overtime wages, did not
provide accurate itemized wage statements, and did not pay all
wages due upon separation.  

FINAL APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT

Under FRCP 23(e), court approval is required for any settlement
agreement that will bind absent class members. When a proposed
settlement agreement is presented, the district court must perform
two tasks: (1) direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class
members who would be bound by the proposal and (2) approve the
settlement only after a hearing and on finding that the terms of
the agreement are fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Adequacy of Notice

The notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
It must also describe the terms of the settlement in sufficient
detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to
come forward and be heard. The undersigned judge previously
approved the form, content, and planned distribution of the class
notice. As described above, the settlement administrator fulfilled
the notice plan. This order accordingly finds that notice to class
members was adequate.

Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of Proposed Settlement.

A district court may approve a proposed class settlement only upon
finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, taking into
account (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3)
the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial
(4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings (6) the experience and
view of counsel (7) the presence of a governmental participant and
(8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.


First, the plaintiff admits that she faced a number of risks in all
three classes. Primarily, given the lack of records for rest breaks
and off-the-clock work, establishing damages would be difficult.
Although the plaintiff maintains that both liability and the
amounts of premium wages due for missed rest periods could be
determined using representative sampling, any proposed methodology
would be vulnerable in ways that could limit recovery. Any recovery
would thus likely require the analysis of granular data points,
resulting in an expensive, time-consuming, and arduous process.  

Second, the settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate. As
stated, the settlement amount of $800,000 offers substantial
benefits when balanced with the strength of the plaintiff's case.
The settlement represents 71.93% of the amount of unpaid wages
exclusive of interest and penalties ($1,112,194.11). Including
interest and penalties, the maximum potential recovery for the
certified claims is $4,158,169.83 but, as class counsel stated at
oral argument, these penalties depend on a showing of willfulness,
exceedingly difficult to prove here.  

Third, the plan of allocation of settlement proceeds is also fair
and reasonable. To start, the net settlement will be distributed so
that after expenses, attorney's fees, class award and the
employer's tax are paid out of the $800,000 settlement fund, 41.5%
of the remaining funds will be allocated to two classes (the Room
Attendant Class Members) and 58.5% will be allocated to the third
class (the Non-Room Attendant Class Members).  

In short, having considered the applicable factors, this order
finds the proposed class settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate so as to warrant final approval. Accordingly, final
approval of the proposed class settlement and plan of allocation is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y26mwm76from Leagle.com.

Dina Rae Richardson, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew John Matern
MMatern@maternlawgroup.com, Matern Law Group, PC,Deanna S. Leifer,
Matern Law Group, PC, Kayvon Sabourian, Matern Law Group, PC &
Launa Nicole Everman Adolph, Matern Law Group, PC.

Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc., a Delaware corporation &
Interstate Management Company, LLC, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, represented by Rebecca Licht Jensen --
rebecca.jensen@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Hien
Nguyen -- hnguyen@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Jason S. Mills -- jason.mills@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Robin Marie Lagorio --robin.lagorio@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP.


KING COUNTY, WA: Dismissal of Jury Pay Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two, issued an Opinion
affirming the Superior Court's judgment granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned RYAN ROCHA,
NICOLE BEDNARCZYK, and CATHERINE SELIN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. KING COUNTY, a
municipal corporation, Respondent. No. 51823-6-II. (Wash. App.).

Nicole Bednarczyk and Catherine Selin appeal the superior court's
order granting King County's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing their disparate impact claim based on economic status
and a claim for minimum wage related to jury service in King
County.

The Appellants filed a complaint against King County, alleging that
King County's jury pay disparately excluded jurors from service
based on economic status and that jurors were entitled to be paid
minimum wage for their service. The Appellants also sought a
declaratory judgment ruling that (1) King County's current jury
compensation was causing jurors to be disparately excluded based on
economic status and (2) King County was violating wage and hour
laws by failing to pay jurors minimum wage.

DISPARATE IMPACT

The Appellants argue that the superior court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of King County on the disparate impact
claim because RCW 2.36.080(3) allows for a disparate impact claim
based on economic status. The Court holds that the superior court
properly granted summary judgment on the Appellants' disparate
impact claim.

Disparate Impact Claim Based on Economic Status

There are two types of disparate impact claims: disparate impact
under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter
49.60 RCW, and disparate impact under constitutional equal
protection principles. The Appellants may not bring a disparate
impact claim under the WLAD because the WLAD does not include
economic status as a protected class for the purposes of WLAD
claims, and the Appellants did not bring an equal protection
claim.

Economic status is not recognized as a protected class under the
WLAD. RCW 49.60.030(1). WLAD only protects the right to be free
from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin,
sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual
orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical
disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a
person with a disability. Protection from discrimination based on
economic status is not enumerated in the WLAD.

Therefore, as a matter of law, Appellants cannot bring a disparate
impact claim based on economic status under the WLAD.

Disparate impact claims may be brought under the equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Washington
Constitution. The Appellants did not plead a disparate impact claim
under the equal protection clause in the superior court nor do they
argue a constitutional disparate impact claim on appeal.

Instead, the Appellants merely cite to a voting case addressing a
constitutional equal protection claim. Therefore, we decline to
address whether the Appellants established a constitutional
disparate impact claim.  

The Appellants have failed to show they can bring a disparate
impact claim based on economic status under the WLAD or as an equal
protection claim.

Implied Disparate Impact Cause of Action under RCW 2.36.080(3)

The Appellants argue that the amount jurors are paid under the jury
pay statute (RCW 2.36.150)3creates a disparate impact based on
economic status and violates the no juror exclusion statute (RCW
2.36.080(3)). But Appellants did not bring a disparate impact claim
under the juror pay statute. Instead, Appellants' disparate impact
claim seems to be rooted in the no juror exclusion statute.

The underlying premise of the Appellants' argument is that the
amount jurors are paid causes jurors of lower economic status to
not be able to serve, and, therefore, the amount jurors are paid
has a disparate impact on people of lower economic status. This
premise is not disputed. But this premise does not give rise to an
implied disparate impact claim under RCW 2.36.080(3).

RCW 2.36.080(3) provides, "A citizen shall not be excluded from
jury service in this state on account of economic status." However,
RCW 2.36.080 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of
this provision. Therefore, the Appellants must show that RCW
2.36.080(3) creates an implied cause of action under the test set
out by the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 784
P.2d 1258 (1990).

With regard to the first part of the inquiry, the plain language of
the statute protects people from being excluded from jury service
based on economic status. Therefore, the plaintiffs would be within
the class for whose benefit RCW 2.36.080(3) was enacted.
Accordingly, the first part of the Bennett inquiry is satisfied.

As to the second part of the inquiry, the legislative intent
expressed in RCW 2.36.080(1) and RCW 2.36.080(2) shows that
implying a remedy based on juror pay is not consistent with
legislative intent.  

Read together, the legislature's intent is to ensure that state
residents have the opportunity to be considered for jury service,
that state residents have an obligation to serve as a juror when
summoned, and that any burden is minimized by limiting the amount
of time that must be spent in jury service. The legislature did not
intend to guarantee jurors be able to serve by providing adequate
financial compensation. Therefore, it would be inconsistent with
the legislative intent to imply a remedy based on jurors' financial
compensation for alleged violations of RCW 2.36.080(3). The second
part of the Bennett inquiry is not satisfied.

As to the third part of the inquiry under Bennett, the underlying
purpose of the legislation relied on by Appellants is to ensure
that state residents have the opportunity to be considered for jury
service and the obligation to serve when summoned for jury service.
The implied cause of action and remedy sought here increase in
juror pay is not consistent with the underlying purpose of RCW
2.36.080(3). It is undisputed that the Appellants were included in
the master jury pool and continue to be eligible to be summoned for
jury service. Therefore, the third part of the Bennett inquiry is
not satisfied.

Because an implied cause of action and remedy of increased juror
pay is not consistent with the legislative intent or the underlying
purpose of the statute, the Appellants have failed to demonstrate
that RCW 2.36.080(3) creates an implied disparate impact cause of
action based on jury pay. Moreover, RCW 2.36.080(3) prohibits
conduct that excludes persons from the opportunity to be considered
for jury service based on economic status. Therefore, even if RCW
2.36.080(3) allows for an implied cause of action, which we hold it
does not, the Appellants must establish some conduct by King County
that excluded them from the opportunity to be considered for jury
service based on their economic status.

Here, the Appellants assert that King County's jury pay caused them
to ask for an economic hardship excusal, which the court granted.
But economic hardship excusals are not exclusions for the purpose
of the protections provided by RCW 2.36.080(3). As discussed above,
RCW 2.36.080(1) clarifies that the legislature intended to protect
the opportunity for people to be considered for jury service and to
impose the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned. It is
undisputed that the Appellants were, and continue to be, included
in the master jury list, and, therefore, the Appellants continue to
have the opportunity to be considered for jury service.4Because
economic hardship excusals do not prevent potential jurors from
being summonsed for jury duty or from being included in the master
jury list, they are not exclusions for the purposes of RCW
2.36.080(3).5

Therefore, King County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and the superior court properly granted King County's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the Appellants' disparate impact
claim.

MINIMUM WAGE

The Appellants also argue that the superior court erred by granting
summary judgment on their claim that King County violated the
Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW. The Court
disagrees.

The MWA requires employers to pay certain minimum amounts of
compensation to their employees. An employee' includes any
individual employed by an employer. And employ' includes to permit
to work. Taken together, these statutes establish that, under the
MWA, an employee includes any individual permitted to work by an
employer.

Here, the Appellants focus on the degree of control the King County
exercises over jurors during jury service, as well as other
specific aspects of jury service. However, the Appellants fail to
address the fundamental nature of jury service.

Jury service is service performed as a civic duty. As such, jurors
are not entitled to compensation for their service.  

Because jurors are not employees under the MWA, King County was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the superior
court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Appellants' MWA
claim.

STANDING UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

King County argues that the Appellants do not have standing to seek
declaratory judgment. We agree.

To establish standing under the declaratory judgment act, chapter.
7.24 RCW, the plaintiff must meet a two part test. First, the
plaintiff's interest must be within the zone of interest protected
by the statute in question. Second, the plaintiff must show an
injury in fact resulting from the challenged action.  

The Appellants are seeking a declaratory judgment under both RCW
2.36.080(3) and the MWA. The Appellants lack standing to seek
declaratory judgment under both statutes.

Here, it is undisputed that the Appellants are on the master jury
service list and may be summoned for jury duty. If they are
selected to serve, they will be paid the statutory jury service
fee. However, if they seek to be excused from jury duty due to
economic hardship, they will have been excused from jury service
due to their request, not because of King County's actions. Thus,
Appellants cannot show injury in fact resulting from King County's
actions.
And, as explained above, jury service is not employment and jurors
are not employees for the purposes of the MWA. Therefore, the
Appellants' interests are not within the zone of interests
protected by the MWA.

The Court holds that the Appellants lack standing to seek a
declaratory judgment.

Therefore, the Court affirms the superior court's order dismissing
Appellants' claims.

A full-text copy of the Wash. App.'s February 21, 2019 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y6sppsslfrom Leagle.com.

Toby James Marshall, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, Jeffrey
Lowell Needle, Attorney at Law, Counsel for Appellant(s).

Karen Astrid Pool Norby, King Co. Prosecuting Attorney Office,
Janine Elizabeth Joly, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Heidi
Joanne Jacobsen-Watts, King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office,
Counsel for Respondent(s).

Anita Khandelwal, King County Department of Public Defense, Lorinda
Meier Youngcourt, Attorney at Law, Amicus Curiae on behalf of King
County Dept. of Public Defense.

Jamal N. Whitehead, Schroeter Goldmark Bender, Nancy Lynn Talner,
Attorney at Law, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Aclu.


KRAFT HEINZ: April 25 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until April 25, 2019 to file lead plaintiff applications
in a securities class action lawsuit against The Kraft Heinz
Company (NasdaqGS: KHC), if they purchased the Company's securities
between May 4, 2017 and February 21, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  This action is pending in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

What You May Do

If you purchased securities of Kraft and would like to discuss your
legal rights and how this case might affect you and your right to
recover for your economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost
to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at
1-877-515-1850 or via email (lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-khc/ to learn more. If
you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you
must petition the Court by April 25, 2019.

About the Lawsuit

Kraft and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On February 21, 2019, Kraft disclosed that it had "recorded
non-cash impairment charges of $15.4 billion to lower the carrying
amount of goodwill in certain reporting units."  Further, the
Company revealed that it had received a subpoena from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2018 relating to its
procurement policies, procedures and internal controls.

On this news, the price of Kraft's shares plummeted.

The case is Hedick v. Kraft Heinz Company et al, 19-cv-01339.

                  About Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

KSF, whose partners include the former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is a law firm focused on securities,
antitrust and consumer class actions, along with merger &
acquisition and breach of fiduciary litigation against publicly
traded companies on behalf of shareholders. The firm has offices in
New York, California and Louisiana.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com. [GN]


LANDRY'S RESTAURANT: Demurrer Ruling in Fierro Suit Partly Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORGE FIERRO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
LANDRY'S RESTAURANT INC., Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
D071904 (Cal. App.), Judge Joan Irion of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fourth District, Division Two, reversed that
portion of the trial court's order sustaining Landry's Restaurants'
demurrer without leave to amend as to Fierro's class claims; and on
remand, the court is instructed to enter an order overruling that
portion of Landry's Restaurants' demurrer directed to the class
claims.

Fierro filed the underlying action against Defendant Landry's
Restaurants, seeking remedies for what Fierro alleges to be
Landry's Restaurants' violations of specified California labor laws
and wage orders.  Fierro asserts claims on behalf of himself and on
behalf of a class of individuals that he alleges is similarly
situated.  Landry's Restaurants demurred to the complaint on the
basis that each of the causes of action is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.

As to Fierro's individual claims, the trial court overruled the
demurrer, concluding that the statute of limitations defense did
not appear affirmatively on the face of the complaint.  As to the
class claims, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend on the basis that a prior class action with identical
class claims against Landry's Restaurants had been dismissed for
failure to bring the case to trial in five years as required by
Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360.  Under the
"death knell" doctrine, Fierro appeals from that portion of the
order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to the class
claims.

Previously, the Court filed an opinion reversing the order on the
basis that the applicable statutes of limitations on the class
claims had been tolled.  However, the California Supreme Court
granted review and transferred the matter to the Court with
directions to vacate the opinion and to reconsider the cause in
light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in China
Agritech, Inc. v. Resh (2018) -- an opinion issued following the
filing of our opinion but before issuance of the remittitur.  After
vacating its decision, the Court requested and received
supplemental briefing from the parties as to the potential
application of China Agritech to the issues presented in the
instant appeal.

China Agritech, holds that, upon denial of class certification, a
putative class member may not commence a new class action asserting
the same claim, if the statute of limitations on the claim has run.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the efficiency and economy of
litigation which support tolling the statutes of limitations for
individual claims during the pendency of the initial class action
do not support tolling the statutes of limitations for the class
claims.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
sustaining without leave to amend the class claims in Fierro's
complaint.  Judge Irion finds that there is no controlling
California state authority with regard to whether American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah tolling applies to successive class (as
contrasted with individual) claims.  Despite certain differences in
state and federal class action procedures, the Judge concludes that
applying the rule of law established China Agritech in California
will ensure the requisite fairness in the resolution of class
action suits in California as required by our high court in Jolly
v. Eli Lilly & Co.

She explains, in the event a plaintiff class is not certified, the
pendency of the putative class' claim does not toll the applicable
statute of limitations to the same class claim alleged in a later
action.  Thus, upon denial of class certification in an action, a
putative class member may not commence the same class claim in a
new action beyond the time allowed by the limitation period
applicable to the class claim. As in federal court, in California,
American Pipe does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class
action past expiration of the statute of limitations.

She holds that the application of this rule to the putative class
that Fierro alleges in his complaint likely will result in some of
the absent class members' claims being time-barred.  Based on this
likelihood, Landry's Restaurants contends that it is entitled to an
affirmance of the trial court's order sustaining its demurrer as to
the class claims.  However, the Judge cannot determine from the
face of the complaint and judicially noticed matters -- which is
what the Court is limited to considering in the instant appeal from
an order sustaining a demurrer -- that any one of the putative
class's claims is untimely.

Accordingly, even though she holds that American Pipe tolling does
not apply to Fierro's class claims, this holding does not provide a
basis on which to affirm the trial court's ruling that sustained
without leave to amend Landry's Restaurants' demurrer to the class
claims in Fierro's complaint.  In due course, on a more developed
record, the Court can decide issues related to class certification
and/or statutes of limitations with the guidance that American Pipe
tolling does not apply to the class claims.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Irion reversed that portion of the
trial court's order sustaining Landry's Restaurants' demurrer
without leave to amend as to Fierro's class claims, and on remand
the court is instructed to enter an order overruling that portion
of Landry's Restaurants' demurrer directed to the class claims.
The parties will bear their respective costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TbzVTU from Leagle.com.

Righetti Glugoski, Matthew Righetti and John J. Glugoski for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Mary E. Lynch, Mary E. Lynch --
mary@marylynchlaw.com; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Ryan D.
McCortney -- rmccortney@sheppardmullin.com -- and Jason M. Guyser
-- jguyser@sheppardmullin.com -- for Defendants and Respondents.


LEXICON PHARMACEUTICALS: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by visiting the
links below or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss, you can
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability
to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

Lexicon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: LXRX)
Class Period: March 11, 2016 - January 17, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 1, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/lxrx.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the data
from Lexicon's Phase 3 clinical trials assessing the safety and
efficacy of Sotagliflozin in treating type 1 diabetes were not as
positive as Lexicon represented; (2) the health risks posed by
Sotagliflozin were severe enough to threaten its FDA approval
prospects; and (3) as a result, Lexicon's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


LOGITECH INC: 9th Cir. Asks Judge Alsup to Explain Order
--------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that a federal
appeals court has ordered  Judge William Alsup to explain why he
refused to allow lawyers to engage in settlements talks in a class
action against Logitech Inc.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Logitech's
emergency motion for a stay of the case pending its petition for a
writ of mandamus challenging two of Alsup's orders. Those orders,
on June 13 and Aug. 23, barred lawyers on both sides from
settlement talks prior to certification of a nationwide class of
Logitech consumers, who alleged false advertising over the sale of
computer speakers.

Alsup, of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, known for his unique standing orders, has long had a
requirement that lawyers get class actions certified prior to
settlement discussions. In a Jan. 18 order in the Logitech case, he
acknowledged that this could be the first time someone had
challenged that standing order. "No one has ever complained about
it—until now," he wrote.

"What the Ninth Circuit is saying right now is, 'Hey, judge, we're
giving you a chance to explain yourself better or to do something
differently," said Howard Erichson of Fordham University School of
Law, whose publications Alsup cited in the Logitech case. "We
actually see some merit in this in the mandamus petition."

Mayer Brown partner Donald Falk in Palo Alto, California, who
represents Logitech, and plaintiffs attorney Rafey Balabanian, Esq.
-- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- of Edelson PC in San Francisco
declined to comment.

Edelson filed the case less than a year ago, alleging Logitech
mislead consumers into believing that its Z200 stereo sound system
came with speakers that had had four functional drivers, not two.
Alsup's initial standing order on June 13 emphasized, among other
things, that lawyers should not discuss settlement of the case
prior to class certification—although he carved out some
exceptions in which doing so would be "acceptable to conserve
resources."

Claiming to fit within that exception, lawyers asked Alsup to halt
the litigation for settlement negotiations. He denied that and, in
an Aug. 23 case management order, set deadlines for class
certification to move forward.

Most judges do not impose such a requirement, but many are
reviewing class action settlements with increasing scrutiny,
particularly in the Northern District of California, which
disclosed new guidelines on Nov. 1. U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh
cited the new rules on Jan. 28 when she rejected an $85 million
data breach settlement with Yahoo, as did U.S. District Judge
Charles Breyer in his Feb. 11 preliminary approval of an $800
million emissions agreement over Fiat Chrysler's EcoDiesel
vehicles.

But, unlike the new guidelines, which focus on the details of an
actual agreement, Alsup's standing order addresses the timing of
settlement discussions. His order in the Logitech case cited a
concern that lawyers would low-ball the claims of absent class
members in settlement discussions due to perceived risks that a
judge would reject certification.

Alsup also is concerned about sacrificing the class for a quick
settlement, Erichson said.

"The danger is the plaintiffs' lawyer will want to cut the deal,
the defendant will cut the deal, and some judges are too quick to
approve it, even if it screws over the class members," he said.
"Judge Alsup is more aware of that than most judges and more
willing to say so explicitly, saying if you want to negotiate a
class settlement, then, get your class action certified."

On Oct. 8, Logitech first petitioned the Ninth Circuit to intervene
so that both sides could settle the case. Its petition cited
excerpts of an Aug. 23 hearing in which Alsup outlined his
concerns: "It's called collusive settlements," he said. "Well, a
lot of judges would rubber-stamp that because they'd love to get
rid of the case. Well, I don't do that. My job is to protect the
absent class members."

Logitech called Alsup's orders "legally untenable."

"Both parties to this false-advertising class action agree that it
should be settled, and settled now," wrote Falk and Dale Giali,
another partner at Mayer Brown, in Los Angeles, in the original
petition. "Continuing the litigation will only serve to waste the
money, time, and resources of all concerned—including the
district court."

The petition cited constitutional violations, such as the First
Amendment's free speech clause, in prohibiting settlement
discussions. Logitech also argued that Alsup had plenty of
opportunities under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which govern class actions, to address his concerns
about a potential settlement.

Logitech emphasized that its petition could have repercussions
beyond its own case.

"The district court appears to issue standing orders very similar
to the order at issue here in every putative class action that is
assigned to it," the Mayer Brown lawyers wrote. "Absent
intervention by this court, therefore, the district court may
impede many other parties in many other class actions from engaging
in reasonable, pre-certification settlement efforts."

A panel of the Ninth Circuit refused on Dec. 24 to grant the
petition but allowed Logitech to refile its petition after raising
its concerns to Alsup. Logitech did so in a motion for
reconsideration, but Alsup denied the motion on Jan. 18. The judge
insisted that his standing order allowed for class action
settlements prior to certification in certain circumstances and was
not a broad First Amendment ban on settlement discussions. He also
refused to stay the case, ordering plaintiffs' lawyers to file
their motion for class certification by Feb. 21.

In its second petition, filed on Jan. 25, Logitech renewed its
arguments, adding that new amendments to Rule 23 that became
effective on Dec. 1 envisioned that there would be settlements of
class actions prior to certification.

"This petition for a writ of mandamus raises issues that may
warrant an answer," wrote a different motions panel of the Ninth
Circuit in this week's order. The Ninth Circuit ordered Alsup to
respond within 14 days. [GN]


MARION COUNTY, IN: Prosecutor's Bid to Dismiss Washington Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEROY WASHINGTON, on his own behalf and on behalf of a
Class of those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARION
COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 17-2933 (7th
Cir.), Judge Daniel Anthony Manion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit (i) denied the Prosecutor's motion to dismiss;
and (ii) remanded for further proceedings.

Washington was driving a vehicle he owned when an Indianapolis
police officer pulled him over on Sept. 21, 2016.  He was arrested
and charged with three felonies: dealing in marijuana, resisting
law enforcement, and obstruction of justice.  The officer had
Washington's vehicle towed and held for forfeiture pursuant to
Indiana Code 34-24-1-1(a)(1) and 2(a)(1).

On Nov. 1, 2016, Washington demanded return of his vehicle per I.C.
34-24-1-3.  He filed a federal class-action complaint the next day,
claiming the seizures of his vehicle and the class's vehicles under
I.C. 34-24-1-2(a)(1) violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause.  In a clarifying brief requested by the district court,
Washington said he challenged I.C. 34-24-1-2(a)(1) as applied.  But
the court construed the challenge as a facial challenge to I.C.
34-24-1-1(a)(1), read in conjunction with other provisions of that
chapter.

In early February 2017, the Marion County Prosecutor's Office and
the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department released the
vehicle to Washington.  On Feb. 3, 2017, the Defendants moved to
dismiss the case as moot given the vehicle's return.  Later that
month, Washington moved for summary judgment.

On Aug. 18, 2017, the district court certified a class and granted
Washington summary judgment.  The court declared I.C.
34-24-1-1(a)(1) (as read in conjunction with other provisions of
the same chapter) unconstitutional for violating the due process
clauses.  The court permanently enjoined the Defendants from
enforcing it.  In particular, the court concluded the statutory
provisions allowing for seizure and retention of vehicles without
an opportunity for an individual to challenge pre-forfeiture
deprivation are unconstitutional.  The Prosecutor appealed.  After
the judgment, and while the appeal pended, Indiana amended its
vehicle forfeiture statute.

The Prosecutor continues to argue on appeal that the old version of
the statute did not violate the due process clause.  The Prosecutor
also argues the new version changed and increased the available
process, thereby ameliorating any "potential" due process
deficiencies identified by the district court.  These changes, the
argument goes, satisfy the district court's due process concerns by
allowing a person interested in a vehicle to challenge
pre-forfei-ture deprivation. The Prosecutor moved us to dismiss
this case as moot given the statutory amendments.

But Washington argues the amendments are superficial, the same or
similar problems exist, and the statute as amended remains
unconstitutional.  In short, he argues the amendments do not cure
the due process deficiency, do not provide any meaningful impact,
and do not moot his claim.

Judge Manion finds that the district court did not have a chance to
address the amendments.  Given that the record and arguments
regarding the amendments are under-developed, he will remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.  On remand, the
district court should address the parties' contentions regarding
the amendments: (i) Whether the amendments ameliorate the
constitutional problems the district court identified; and (ii) the
district court should resolve these contentions to the extent
necessary and proper.  If appropriate, the district court should
also revisit the class to determine whether it should be
decertified or redefined in light of the amendments.

At present, the Judge expressed no opinion regarding the
constitutionality of the old or new versions of the statute,
regarding mootness, or regarding the class.  Also, his argument
summaries do not limit the arguments the parties may raise on
remand.  He left latitude to the district court to conduct further
proceedings it deems necessary and proper given the amendments and
the parties' positions.  Any review the Court is subsequently
called upon to make will benefit from these proceedings and the
reasoning of the district court.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Manion denied the Prosecutor's motion
to dismiss.  He remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/xQ9FLt from Leagle.com.

Kyle Hunter, for Defendant-Appellant.

Patricia Caress McMath, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jeffrey Richard Cardella -- JeffCardella@CardellaLawOffice.com --
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Richard Elliott, for Defendant-Appellant.


MATTRESS FIRM: Court Compels Arbitration in Perez-Tejada Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Individual Arbitration in the case captioned MACK PEREZ-TEJADA,
ROGER RICKS II, ROY MCELROY, ASHRAF MESHRIKY, EZENWA ONUKWUE,
ROBERT LAMANTIA, BRYCE WILLIAMSON and MARK A. TURNER; on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
MATTRESS FIRM, INC., KENNETH MURPHY and JIM BLACK, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 17-12448-DJC. (D. Mass.).

The Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated against Defendants asserting claims
for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), Massachusetts wage law and New York Labor Law.

An email from Human Resources was sent to all Mattress Firm
employees. This email contained a copy of the Mutual Arbitration
Agreement (Agreement) and requested that the employees first watch
a video on MFRMtv explaining the significance of the Agreement and
thereafter either execute electronically via DocuSign or complete
the opt-out process.  

Employees had the choice of opting-out of the Agreement by
requesting an Opt Out form via the email address listed in the body
of the email. Employees were required to return this form no later
than April 23, 2016. Id. The March 23 email also indicated that
clicking the Decline to Sign option within DocuSign was not a valid
option for the fulfillment of the Agreement.  

Plaintiff Ricks received the Agreement in March 2016 and viewed the
Agreement on April 7, 2016.   Plaintiffs McElroy, Onukwue and
LaMantia received and signed the Agreement as part of Mattress
Firm's new hire process between April 2016 and August 2017.
Plaintiffs Perez-Tejada, Meshriky and Williamson each became
employees of Mattress Firm following its February 2016 acquisition
of Sleepy's, however, they were not integrated into Mattress Firm's
payroll and benefits system until several months later.  

The Defendants argue that, pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiffs
agreed to submit all employment matters, including the claims
asserted here, to binding arbitration and to waive their right "to
bring claims as class, collective, or representative actions." The
Defendants have also requested a stay of the court proceedings
until arbitration is complete.  

For the reasons given below, the Court holds that (1) there is a
valid arbitration agreement, (2) Defendants are entitled to invoke
the Agreement, (3) Plaintiffs are bound by the Agreement and, (4)
the asserted claims fall within the scope of the Agreement.

Legal Standards Governing Arbitration

The FAA compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written
arbitration agreements. The purpose of the Act is to put
arbitration provisions on the same footing as other contracts.
Accordingly, under section 2 of the FAA, a written provision in any
contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.

The Agreement is Valid
It is well established in Massachusetts that the essential elements
of a contract are an offer, acceptance, and an exchange of
consideration or meeting of the minds.

Offer and Acceptance of the Agreement and the Parties' Meeting of
the Minds

The Defendants sent an email about arbitration to all Mattress Firm
employees on March 23, 2016. In the email, Defendants indicated an
arbitration form was attached requiring action from all employees.
The email also instructed the employees to watch a video on
Mattress Firm's internal television, explaining the impact of the
Agreement on the employees.The employees were given an option to
either execute the Agreement or opt out by executing an opt-out
form.  

With respect to Plaintiff Ricks, although he did not execute the
Agreement, he failed to opt out of the Agreement in the timeframe
provided. As previously discussed, an email containing the
Agreement was sent to Ricks on March 23, 2016. The undisputed facts
reflect that on April 7, 2016, Ricks viewed the email, received a
hard copy of the Agreement and, that evening, received the same
email again. Id. These emails gave Ricks notice that he would be
bound by the Agreement if he failed to exercise his option to opt
out by April 23, 2016.

The Court concludes that none of the alleged inconsistencies in the
formation of contracts render the Agreement invalid. Plaintiffs'
signatures on the Agreement and, in Ricks' case, failure to opt out
indicate their intention to enter into an agreement to arbitrate
matters relating to wages and compensation.
  
Adequate Consideration

The Court is also unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' allegations of a lack
of adequate consideration for the Agreement. The Court notes that
it is well settled that the mutual promises of the parties in an
agreement for arbitration are sufficient consideration each for the
other. That is, the mutual promise to arbitrate is a bargained-for
exchange affording both a legal detriment and a corresponding
benefit to the parties. The record demonstrates that the Defendants
have met their burden to show adequate consideration for the
Agreement.

Defendants Are Entitled to Invoke the Arbitration Agreement

Per the terms of the Agreement, arbitration is required between the
employees, including the Plaintiffs here, and Mattress Firm, Inc.
The Agreement goes on to define claims against Mattress Firm, Inc.
to include claims against all parent and subsidiary and related
companies as well as their respective officers, directors,
managers, supervisors, employees, current and former and any trade
names or alleged joint employers. Accordingly, the claims against
Defendants Murphy and Black, officers of Mattress Firm, are,
therefore, covered under the Agreement. The claims against
Defendants Murphy and Black are therefore subject to arbitration to
the same extent as the claims against Defendant Mattress Firm.

The Agreement was Not Unconscionable

The Plaintiffs contend that even if the Agreement was valid, it
would be unenforceable on unconscionability grounds. Pursuant to
Massachusetts law, unconscionability must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, with particular attention to whether the
challenged provision could result in oppression and unfair surprise
to the disadvantaged party.

Here, the Plaintiffs have not proven substantive or procedural
unconscionability. As to procedural unconscionability, as discussed
above, Plaintiffs received several procedural protections,
including multiple notices of the Agreement. As to substantive
unconscionability, Plaintiffs argue that the Agreement's
unconscionability stems from Defendant's reservations of its rights
to unilaterally modify the terms of the Agreement. The modification
clause states that the Agreement may be modified or terminated by
the Company after thirty days written notice to Plaintiffs and that
any modifications or terminations shall be prospective only and
shall not apply to any claims or disputes that are pending in
arbitration or that have initiated by either party.

This modification clause is not objectively oppressive. Although
the Defendants reserve the rights to modify, the modification
clause requires that Defendants must provide Plaintiffs with thirty
days written notice, at which point, Plaintiffs presumably would
have a choice of continuing their at-will employment. This coupled
with the fact that any modification would be prospective and
excludes pending claims or disputes undermines Plaintiffs'
contention as to the unconscionability of the clause. In sum,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving unconscionability
either procedural or substantive that would invalidate the
Agreement.

The Collective Action Waiver is Enforceable

In addition to their arguments challenging the arbitration
provision of the Agreement, Defendants urge the Court to uphold the
Agreement's prohibition on collective actions. In support of the
enforceability of same, Defendants cite to the recent Supreme Court
holding in Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1612
(2018). In Epic Systems, plaintiff employees urged the Court to
find that the requirement of individualized arbitration rendered
the arbitration agreements illegal under the National Labor
Relations Act. Epic Sys. The Supreme Court declined to adopt
plaintiffs' position because doing so would have interfered with a
fundamental attribute of arbitration. Prohibiting class action
waivers would have the effect on arbitration of taking much time
and effort and introducing new risks and costs for both sides and
arbitration would wind up looking like the litigation it was meant
to displace.

The Supreme Court concluded that Congress has instructed that
arbitration agreements like those before us must be enforced as
written. In analyzing similar collective action waiver provisions
here, the Court is bound by Supreme Court precedent and finds no
reason to set aside the plain language of the valid and enforceable
Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court allows the Defendants' motion to compel
individual arbitration.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y3vgf3l8
from Leagle.com.

Mack Perez-Tejada, Roy McElroy, Ashraf Meshriky, Ezenwa Onukwue &
Roger Ricks, II, Plaintiffs, represented by Raymond P. Ausrotas,
Arrowood LLP, James D. Livingstone, The Employee Rights Group, LLC,
John P. Regan, Jr., The Employee Rights Group, LLC & Sarah E.A.
Sousa, Arrowood LLP.

Robert LaMantia, Bryce Williamson & Mark A. Turner, Plaintiffs,
represented by James D. Livingstone, The Employee Rights Group,
LLC, John P. Regan, Jr., The Employee Rights Group, LLC & Sarah
E.A. Sousa, Arrowood LLP.

Mattress Firm Inc., Kenneth E Murphy & Jim Black, Defendants,
represented by Heather L. Sherrod --
heather.sherrod@nortonrosefullbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULLBRIGHT
US LLP, pro hac vice, Shauna Johnson Clark --
shauna.clark@nortonrosefullbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULLBRIGHT US
LLP, pro hac vice & Diane M. Saunders, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
& Stewart, P.C.


MDL 1566: Ct. Retains Jurisdiction of Wisconsin Plaintiffs' Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Parties' Joint Motion for Court to Separate
Claims against Settling Defendants and retain Jurisdiction Over
Those Claims for the Purpose of Approving Settlements in the case
captioned IN RE WESTERN STATES WHOLESALE NATURAL GAS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Arandell Corp., et al. v.
Xcel Energy Inc., et al. NewPage Wisconsin System Inc., et al. v.
CMS Energy Resource Management Company, et al. Nos. MDL 1566,
CV-S-03-1431-RCJ-PAL, Case No. 2:07-CV-01019-RCJ-PAL.,
2:09-CV-00915-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev.).

The proposed class settlements would resolve all remaining claims
by the Wisconsin Plaintiffs against the Settled Defendants, and
thus would result, if approved, in the final and complete dismissal
of the Wisconsin Plaintiffs' claims against the Settled
Defendants.

The Parties accordingly contemplated and agreed as part of their
settlements that this Court should retain the Wisconsin Plaintiffs'
claims against the Settled Defendants and Reliant for purposes of
settlement approval and consummating the settlements, thereby
obviating any need to remand the Wisconsin Plaintiffs' claims
against the Settled Defendants and Reliant to the transferor court
for trial and avoiding unnecessary delay.

The Parties believe that this Court's retention of jurisdiction
over the Wisconsin Plaintiffs' claims against the Settled
Defendants and Reliant will be the most effective means to complete
consummation of those settlements quickly and to provide tens of
millions of dollars in additional recovery to Wisconsin class
members in the most expeditious manner possible.

The Wisconsin Plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary
approval of the class action settlements in the Wisconsin Actions
with El Paso and CenterPoint.

The Wisconsin Plaintiffs, Settled Defendants, and Reliant jointly
and respectfully stipulate that this Court should retain
jurisdiction over the Wisconsin Plaintiffs' claims in the Wisconsin
Actions against the Settled Defendants and Reliant for the purpose
of overseeing the class settlement approval process, and thus
request that the Court consent to retain jurisdiction over these
settlements for the purposes of (a) overseeing the class settlement
approval process with El Paso and CenterPoint and the dismissal of
claims against Reliant, and (b) if the settlements satisfy the
requirements for final approval, entering final judgments fully
resolving and dismissing the Wisconsin Plaintiffs' claims in the
Wisconsin Actions against the Settled Defendants and Reliant.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 18, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y5tm53p8from Leagle.com.

Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation,
Plaintiff, represented by Jay Kevin Wieser -- bweber@lockelord.com
-- Jackson Walker L.L.P., Anna K. Milunas --
amilunas@mckoolsmith.com -- McKool Smith Hennigan PC, Bradley C.
Weber -- bweber@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP, Brent Cohen --
bcohen@lrrc.com -- Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Brett D.
Bissett -- bbissett@mckoolsmithhennigan.com -- McKool Smith
Hennigan, P.C., Craig A. Fitzgerald, Gable Gotwals, D. Neal
Tomlinson, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Diane R. Hazel -- dhazel@lrrc.com
-- Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Eric I. Unrein, Cavanaugh,
Biggs & Lemon, P.A., Gary D. McCallister, Gary D. McCallister &
Associates, LLC.

Aquila, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles A. Moore, Dewey &
LeBoeuf LLP, Khai LeQuang -- klequang@orrick.com -- Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, pro hac vice, Martin M. Loring,
Blackwell, Sanders, Peper, Martin, William Molinski --
wmolinski@orrick.com- Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, Bradley
C. Weber -- bweber@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP & Orrin L.
Harrison, III -- oharrison@foley.com -- Gruber Hurst Johansen Hail
Shank.

Cantera Natural Gas, Inc. & Cantera Resources, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Bradley C. Weber, Locke Lord LLP, Orrin L. Harrison,
III, Gruber Hurst Johansen Hail Shank, Sean Commons --
scommons@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP & T. Robert Scarborough --
TSCARBOROUGH@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


MDL 2492: Alderman Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Christopher Alderman, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and Mississippi College, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00367 (Filed Jan. 27, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on Feb. 22, 2019. The Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 1:19-cv-01072 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
Mississippi College student-athletes.

The Alderman case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Alvarez Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Michael Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00354 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 22, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 1:19-cv-01047 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

The Alvarez case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com


MDL 2492: Booker Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Simeon Booker, III, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and Cornell University, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00338 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on Feb 21, 2019. The Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 1:19-cv-01018  to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Cornell University
student-athletes.

The Booker case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Bradwell Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Edward Bradwell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00375 (Filed Jan. 27,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 22, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 1:19-cv-01178 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

The Bradwell case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Charles Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
A case, William Charles, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and CARTHAGE COLLEGE, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00348 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on
Feb 21, 2019. The Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01036 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Carthage College
student-athletes.

The Charles case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Crawford Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, David Crawford, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and Wagner College, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00373 (Filed Jan. 27, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on
Feb. 22, 2019. The Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01176 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
Wagner College student-athletes.

The Crawford case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Doss Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------
A case, Christopher Doss, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00368 (Filed Jan. 27,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 22, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01172 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

The Doss case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re: NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION INJURY
LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013. These
actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of former
student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they suffered
concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Dupree Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Leandre Dupree, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00298 (Filed Jan. 25,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 19, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-00977 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Dupree case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Fletcher Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, William Fletcher, Jr., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00349 (Filed
Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01038 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Carthage College
student-athletes.

The Fletcher case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Hanson Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Timothy Hanson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and California Lutheran University, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00344 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on Feb 21, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01030 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of California Lutheran
University student-athletes.

The Hanson case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge  John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Havill Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Ryan Havill, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00337 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
(Chicago) on Feb 21, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:16-cv-08727 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Rose-Hulman
Institute of Technology student-athletes.

The Havill case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Holloway Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Terrill Holloway, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00341 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb 21, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01024 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Holloway case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Horton v. NCAA over Health & Safety Issues Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Timirr Horton, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00343 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No.1:19-cv-01028 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Horton case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Jensen Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, William Jensen, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00350 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb 21, 2019. The
Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01040 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Jensen case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Keith v. NCAA over Health & Safety Issues Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, William Keith, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00351 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01042 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Keith case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Kives Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Stephen Kives, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and Northeastern University, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00339 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on
Feb 21, 2019. The Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01019 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Northeastern
University student-athletes.

The Kives case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, PC
          120 N. LaSalle Street, 31st Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312 899 9090
          E-mail: SMM@cliffordlaw.com


MDL 2492: Kunkle Suit v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Mark Kunkle, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00412 (Filed Jan. 27,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 26, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01052 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained as result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Student-Athletes.

The Kunkle case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: McGrier Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Warren McGrier, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No.1:19-cv-00347 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01034 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The McGrier case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Ruo Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------
A case, Thomas Ruo, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and Bryant University, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00342 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on
Feb 21, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01026 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of Bryant University
student-athletes.

The Ruo case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re: NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION INJURY
LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013. These
actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of former
student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they suffered
concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Thompson Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Stephen Thompson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION and William Marsh Rice University, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00340 (Filed Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on Feb 21, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01022 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of William Marsh Rice
University student-athletes.

The Thompson case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Van Druten Suit v. NCAA over Health Issues Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A case, Richard Van Druten, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00336 (Filed
Jan. 26, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01016 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Van Druten case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2492: Whalen Suit v. NCAA over Safety Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
A case, TIMOTHY WHALEN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00345 (Filed Jan. 26,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Feb. 21, 2019. The
Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01032 to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained a result of Defendant's
reckless disregard for the health and safety of student-athletes.

The Whalen case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. Plaintiffs in all actions
seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554 9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554 9098
          E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com

MDL 2741: Alexy Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DWIGHT ALEXY, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00149 (Filed Jan. 31,
2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 22, 2019. The
Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00956-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Alexy case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave., Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207-2950
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MDL 2741: Coulter Suit v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled CHAD COULTER, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 44:19-cv-161 (Filed Feb.
1, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 22, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00961-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Coulter case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI & JULIAN LAW
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

MDL 2741: Lombard Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled JIMMY LOMBARD, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00139 (Filed Jan.
30, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 22, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00954-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Lombard case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Rice Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled GORDON RICE, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-158 (Filed Feb.
1, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 22, 2019.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-00958-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Rice case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI & JULIAN LAW
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

MDL 2741: Smith Suit v Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DENNIS W. SMITH, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No.  4:19-cv-00138 (Filed
Jan. 30, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Feb. 22,
2019. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-00953-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Smith case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2879: Braun Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit titled Marvin Braun and Penn Chabrow,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., and Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-25136
(Filed Dec. 6, 2018), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on Feb. 22, 2019. The
District of Maryland Court Clerk assigned Case No.
8:19-cv-00517-PWG to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges violation of customers' privacy rights.

The Braun case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re:
Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019. These
actions -- which are putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer
class actions -- share factual issues concerning a
recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest reservation
database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb. 6, 2019 Order, the MDL
Panel found that the factual overlap among these actions is
substantial, as they all arise from the same data breach, and they
all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place reasonable data
protections. Many also allege that Marriott did not timely notify
the public of the data breach. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of
the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead case is
8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]


MDL 2879: Costa Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit titled Kathryn Costa, Natalene Gauna, Greg
Leeb, Karen Stivaletta, Kerri Shapiro, and Lori Trent, the
Plaintiffs, vs. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., and Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00145
(Filed Jan. 31, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Connecticut, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on Feb. 22, 2019. The District of
Maryland Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-00515-PWG to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges violation of customers' privacy rights.

The Costa case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re:
Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019. These
actions -- which are putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer
class actions -- share factual issues concerning a
recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest reservation
database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb. 6, 2019 Order, the MDL
Panel found that the factual overlap among these actions is
substantial, as they all arise from the same data breach, and they
all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place reasonable data
protections. Many also allege that Marriott did not timely notify
the public of the data breach. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of
the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead case is
8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]

MDL 2879: Mortensen Suit vs Marriott over Data Breach Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit titled Andrew J. Mortensen, the Plaintiff,
vs. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., and Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide LLC, the Defendants, Case No.  1:18-cv-11740 (Filed Dec.
14, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland (Greenbelt) on Feb. 22, 2019. The District of
Maryland Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-00527-PWG to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiffs allege violation of customers' privacy rights.

The Mortensen case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re:
Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019. These
actions -- which are putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer
class actions -- share factual issues concerning a
recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's Starwood guest reservation
database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb. 6, 2019 Order, the MDL
Panel found that the factual overlap among these actions is
substantial, as they all arise from the same data breach, and they
all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place reasonable data
protections. Many also allege that Marriott did not timely notify
the public of the data breach. Centralization will eliminate
duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on
class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of
the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead case is
8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: March 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP disclosed that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of the following
publicly-traded companies. Shareholders interested in serving as
lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the
court and further details about the cases can be found at the links
provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

Micron Technology Inc. (NASDAQGS: MU)
Class Period: September 26, 2017 - November 19, 2018
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: March 25, 2019

Join the action: https://tinyurl.com/y4jylg9b

About the lawsuit: Micron Technology Inc. allegedly made materially
false and/or misleading statements during the class period and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) the Company engaged in
anti-competitive behavior, including artificially restricting
supply growth of DRAM; (2) these anti-competitive efforts were
reasonably likely to lead to regulatory scrutiny; (3) the Company's
anti-competitive efforts artificially boosted its operating
metrics; (4) as a result, the Company's financial performance,
including revenue, was overstated; and (5) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

To learn more about the Micron Technology Inc. class action contact
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Micron Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: MU) from September
26, 2017 through November 19, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").
The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Micron investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Micron class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1491.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Chinese State Administration for Market Regulation
notified Micron it was investigating dynamic random-access memory
("DRAM") chip providers in China for potential collusion and other
anti-competitive conduct; (2) Chinese investigators had found
"massive evidence" of Micron's anti-competitive behavior; (3)
Micron had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy with Samsung
Electronics and SK Hynix; and (4) as a result, Micron's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than March 25,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1491.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


MOLSON COORS: April 16 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
--------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, disclosed that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of the following
publicly-traded companies. Shareholders interested in serving as
lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the
court and further details about the cases can be found at the links
provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

Molson Coors Brewing Company (NYSE: TAP)
Class Period: February 14, 2017 - February 11, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 16, 2019

Join the action: https://tinyurl.com/yxw5vhfd

About the lawsuit: Molson Coors Brewing Company allegedly made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Molson Coors failed to properly reconcile the
outside basis deferred income tax liability for Molson Coors'
investment in its MillerCoors, LLC partnership; (2) consequently,
Molson Coors misreported net income in its consolidated financial
statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2016 and
December 31, 2017, resulting in an overall downward revision to net
income; (3) Molson Coors lacked adequate internal controls over
financial reporting; and (4) as a result, defendants' statements
about Molson Coors' business, operations and prospects were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times.

To learn more about the Molson Coors Brewing Company class action
contact jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request the court
appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


MOLSON COORS: Bernstein Liebhard Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Chief Investment Officer reports that New York law firm Bernstein
Liebhard has filed a class action lawsuit against Molson Coors
Brewing, accusing the company of making false and misleading
statements that resulted in misreporting net income.

The firm, which is seeking a lead plaintiff, said the suit is on
behalf of those who purchased or acquired the securities between
Feb. 14, 2017, and Feb. 12, 2019.  The suit also names as
defendants Molson Coors Chief Executive Officer and President Mark
Hunter and Chief Financial Officer Tracey Joubert.

According to the lawsuit, Molson Coors failed to disclose that it
did not properly reconcile the outside basis deferred income tax
liability for the company's investment in its MillerCoors, LLC
partnership. As a result, it misreported net income in its
consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ending Dec.
31, 2016, and Dec. 31, 2017, resulting in an overall downward
revision to net income.

The suit also accuses Molson Coors of lacking adequate internal
controls over financial reporting, which it said led to statements
about its business, operations, and prospects that "were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times."

In a Feb. 12 SEC filing, Molson Coors said that the audit committee
of the its board of directors, after consulting with its
accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers, "concluded that the company's
previously issued consolidated financial statements as of and for
the years ended December 31, 2017, and December 31, 2016, should be
restated and no longer be relied upon."

The company also said that it "concluded that the previously issued
2017 and 2016 consolidated financial statements were misstated."

As a result, the company restated its financial statements for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2016, to increase its deferred tax liabilities
and deferred tax expense by $399.1 million, with a corresponding
decrease in net income and earnings per share. It also restated its
financial results for fiscal year 2017 that resulted in an
aggregate $247.7 million increase to the company's deferred tax
liabilities and corresponding decrease in retained earnings and
total equity.

In the filing, Molson Coors also said that it "has determined that
a material weakness existed in the company's internal control over
financial reporting," adding that it "did not design appropriate
controls to identify and reconcile deferred income taxes associated
with the accounting for acquired partnership interests."

The suit says that as a result of this disclosure, shares of Molson
Coors fell $6.17 per share or approximately 9.5% to close at $59.19
per share on February 12, 2019, damaging investors.

"Unbeknownst to investors, the defendants repeatedly and materially
misstated Molson's financial condition in filings with the SEC,"
says the suit, "while falsely representing that Molson's financial
statements complied with GAAP and that its internal controls were
effective. As a result, class members were materially misled."

The suit alleges that because of their positions with the company
and access to material non-public information available to them,
Hunter and Joubert knew that the adverse facts "had not been
disclosed to and were being concealed from the public and that the
positive representations being made were false and misleading."

Additionally, the suit says the company and the two executives
"knew that the public documents and statements issued or
disseminated in the name of the company were materially false and
misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued
or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and
substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or
dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations
of the federal securities laws." [GN]


MONSANTO COMPANY: Gunns Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
---------------------------------------------------------
TOMMY J. GUNN and SHARI L. GUNN, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00267-HEA (E.D. Mo., Feb.
21, 2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of
various Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Monsanto
Company, in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act,
the New York General Business Law, the California's Unfair
Competition Law, the False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal
Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ingle Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
EDDIE INGLE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50,
the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00311 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 26, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI JULIAN LAW
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Kempfs Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
----------------------------------------------------------
GARY C. KEMPF and MARY C. KEMPF, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00271 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 21,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Monsanto Company, in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, as further
outlined herein, Defendants omit material, contrary information
that might clarify that statement, namely, that bacteria present in
humans and animals produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by
Roundup. Because of the false statement and material omissions,
Defendants have been able to sell more Roundup Products and to
charge more for Roundup than they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Kunzs Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
---------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD W. KUNZ and MARY J. KUNZ, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00272 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 21,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Monsanto Company, in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Mansfields Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
PHILLIP MANSFIELD AND SCHARLENE MANSFIELD, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. :
4:19-cv-00332 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 26, 2019), seeks to recover damages
suffered by Plaintiffs, as a direct and proximate result of the
Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Neills Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
RONALD L. NEILL and CONNIE NEILL, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00322
(E.D. Mo., Feb. 26, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by
Plaintiffs, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Olivers Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
RITA L. OLIVER and KEVIN OLIVER, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00321
(E.D. Mo., Feb. 26, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by
Plaintiffs, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Pippin Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
WALTER PIPPIN, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES
1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00325 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 26,
2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Pippis Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
----------------------------------------------------------
SUSAN C. PIPPI and AUGUSTINE PIPPI JR., on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00285 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto
Company and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Riegers Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
ALVIN F. RIEGER and CAROL M. RIEGER, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00287-JAR (E.D. Mo., Feb.
22, 2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of
various Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant
Monsanto Company and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products,
Inc., in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the
New York General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition
Law, the False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ross Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
---------------------------------------------------------
PAUL H. ROSS and JUDITH ROSS, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00289 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019),
alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup
Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company
and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation
of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Seiberts Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
------------------------------------------------------------
WILSON K. SEIBERT and DIANE SEIBERT, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00290 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto
Company and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Swains Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
----------------------------------------------------------
GARY D. SWAIN and SHANNON SWAIN, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00294 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019),
alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup
Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company
and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation
of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, as further
outlined herein, Defendants omit material, contrary information
that might clarify that statement, namely, that bacteria present in
humans and animals produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by
Roundup. Because of the false statement and material omissions,
Defendants have been able to sell more Roundup Products and to
charge more for Roundup than they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Tomlinson Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
--------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM BOYD TOMLINSON, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-14067-XXXX (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019),
alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup
Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company
and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation
of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The Plaintiff
and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup Products suffered
economic damages in a similar manner because they purchased more
Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup Products than they
would have had they not been deceived, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          T. David Hoyle, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE, LLC
          28 Bridgeside Boulevard
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: 843 216-9000
          Facsimile: 843 216-9440
          E-mail: dhoyle@motleyrice.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Walter Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
KEITH E. WALTER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:19-cv-00296-HEA (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019), alleges unlawful
promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup Products,
manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company and
distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation of
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Watters Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
RANDALL E. WATTERS and LISA WATTERS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00297 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto
Company and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Wilkenings Sue over Sale of Roundup Products
--------------------------------------------------------------
RONALD D. WILKENING and MELVA J. WILKENING, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00298 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22,
2019), alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various
Roundup Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto
Company and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York
General Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the
False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Williams Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
-------------------------------------------------------------
VIRGINIA R. WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00299 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019),
alleges unlawful promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup
Products, manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company
and distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation
of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Yeager Sues over Sale of Roundup Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND J. YEAGER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:19-cv-00286-AGF (E.D. Mo., Feb. 22, 2019), alleges unlawful
promotion, marketing, and sale of various Roundup Products,
manufactured and marketed by Defendant Monsanto Company and
distributed by Scotts Miracle-Gro Products, Inc., in violation of
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the New York General
Business Law, the California's Unfair Competition Law, the False
Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants label, advertise, and
promote their retail Roundup (TM) products, including but not
limited to their Roundup (TM) "Garden Weeds" Weed & Grass Killer
products ("Roundup" or "Roundup Products"), with the false
statement that Roundup's active ingredient, glyphosate, targets an
enzyme that is not found "in people or pets." This statement is
false, misleading, and deceptive, because the enzyme that
glyphosate targets is found in people and pets. Glyphosate targets
the EPSP synthase enzyme, which is utilized by beneficial bacteria
present, including in the gut biome, in humans and other mammals,
such as household pets. This enzyme, in beneficial bacteria, is
critical to the health and wellbeing of humans and other mammals,
including their immune system, digestion, allergies, metabolism,
and brain function.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, and
Roundup Original 2k herbicide.

The Defendants' false statements and omissions regarding glyphosate
and the enzyme it targets are material. There is widespread
controversy and concern around glyphosate and its effects on humans
and animals. For example, EPSP synthase is directly linked to our
general health, and the interference with the gut flora (including
EPSP synthase) can have serious effects on humans and pets.

Instead of being open and honest with consumers, Defendants have
chosen to use a false statement to market their Roundup (TM)
products. In addition to making the false statement, Defendants
omit material, contrary information that might clarify that
statement, namely, that bacteria present in humans and animals
produce and utilize the enzyme targeted by Roundup. Because of the
false statement and material omissions, Defendants have been able
to sell more Roundup Products and to charge more for Roundup than
they otherwise would have been.

The Defendants were unjustly enriched through utilizing the false
statement and omitting material contrary information. The
Plaintiffs and other Class Members who purchased the Roundup
Products suffered economic damages in a similar manner because they
purchased more Roundup Products and/or paid more for Roundup
Products than they would have had they not been deceived, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Eq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

NB NETWORK: Pena et al Seek Unpaid Wages & OT for Retail Clerks
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit against NB Network Solutions, Inc., and
related entities seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation,
illegal deductions from wages, unpaid commissions, unpaid minimum
wage, unpaid spread of hours compensation, and for other relief
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were jointly employed by
the Defendants as retail clerks at Defendants' Boost Mobile retail
stores at various location in New York.

The Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated employees' earned commissions but failed to pay them the
full amount of commissions to which they were entitled for this
work under the law. The Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs and
other similarly situated employees' work hours but failed to pay
them the full amount of spread of hours compensation. The
Defendants were aware that they were illegally deducting money from
Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees' wages but did so
anyway, the lawsuit says.

The case is captioned as TAISHA PENA, KEVIN DE LA CRUZ, and JIZMARC
PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. NB NETWORK SOLUTIONS INC., NB NET
SOLUTION INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 3 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 4 INC, NB
NET SOLUTIONS 5 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 6 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 8
INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 9 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 10 INC, NB NET
SOLUTIONS 11 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 12 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 13 INC,
NB NET SOLUTIONS 15 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 16 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS
18 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 19 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 20 INC, NB NET
SOLUTIONS 21 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 24 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 25 INC,
NB NET SOLUTIONS 28 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 29 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS
33 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 36 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 37 INC, NB NET
SOLUTIONS 38 INC, NB NET SOLUTIONS 40 INC, BAYZEED CHOWDHURY, ANELL
CHOWDHURY, NAIFUR CHOWDHURY, and JOHN DOES No. 1-30, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01681 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 22, 2019).

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Neil H. Greenberg, Esq.
          Keith E. Williams, Esq.
          NEIL H. GREENBERG & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          4242 Merrick Road
          Massapequa, NY 11758
          Telephone: 516 228 5100
          E-mail: keith@nhglaw.com

NEIMAN MARCUS: Attia Labor Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HOLLY ATTIA, ROSHANAK BASTI, NILOOFAR ESHAGHBEIGL,
MICHELLE GIRARD, ELISE KELLEY, KIM MARCONI, XUAN HIEN NGUYEN,
ISABEL ROMERO, DAVID TOLBERT, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP,
INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 8:16-CV-00504 DOC (FFM) (C.D. Cal.), Judge
David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Granting
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Entering Judgment.

On July 23, 2018, the Parties to the action entered into a Joint
Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, and on July 24, 2018 they
applied to the Court for preliminary approval of the Agreement and
the terms thereof.  On Sept. 6, 2018, the Court granted preliminary
approval of the Agreement, certified pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for settlement purposes only the
Class and Expense Reimbursement Subclass, approved the form of the
Notice of Class Action Settlement, and authorized the mailing of
Class Notices to the Class Members and Expense Reimbursement
Subclass Members.  As also required by Rule 23, all the
Class/Subclass Members were given an opportunity to object to the
settlement and/or opt out of it.

On Jan. 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Order Granting
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Entering Judgment.
The Court held a hearing on that motion on Feb. 25, 2019.

Upon consideration of the Agreement, the Parties' briefs,
declarations, and oral arguments in support thereof, and the
proceedings in the action to date, Judge Carter finds that the
Agreement was reached after arm's-length negotiations between the
Parties; and was concluded only after the counsel for the Parties
had conducted adequate discovery and investigation.  He finally
approved the Settlement of the action as fair, reasonable,
adequate, and consistent and in compliance with all applicable
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any other
applicable law, and in the best interests of the Parties and the
Class Members.

For the purpose of settlement, the Judge finally certified the
following "Class" in which the Class Members are defined as all
persons currently or formerly employed by The Neiman Marcus Group,
LLC at the Defendant's full-line department stores in California as
employees who were compensated in full or in part on a commission
or piece rate basis, at any time during the period from May 1, 2014
through the date of preliminary approval.

For the purpose of settlement, hre finally certified the following
"Subclass" in which the Expense Reimbursement Subclass Members are
defined as all persons currently or formerly employed by NMG at
Defendant's full-line department stores in California as employees
who were compensated in full or in part on a commission or piece
rate basis, at any time during the period from Dec. 31, 2011
through the date of preliminary approval.

The Class and Subclass are certified for settlement purposes and
the certification should not be construed as an admission by
Defendant with respect to any of the allegations made against it by
or behalf of the Class/Subclass.

In the Final Approval Order, the Judge found the Settlement is
fair, reasonable and adequate within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(e), and all other applicable law.  

NMG will deposit the Gross Settlement Amount into a Qualified
Settlement Account, from which the Settlement Administrator will
issue Individual Settlement Payments to participating Class Members
according to the terms and timeline stated in the Agreement.

The Class Counsel, James Hawkins APLC, is awarded $1,466,666.67 in
attorneys' fees and $80,519.85 in costs.  Payment will be made
pursuant to the timeline stated in paragraph 60 of the Agreement.

Plaintiffs Attia, Eshaghbeigi, Girard, Kelley, Romero, and Nguyen
are awarded $7,000 each and Plaintiff Basti is awarded $5,000 as
class representative enhancement payments.  Payment will be made
pursuant to the timeline stated in paragraph 60 the Agreement.

Judge Carter approved the Parties' allocation set forth in the
Agreement as the PAGA Penalty Payment.  Specifically, $640,000 will
be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount as the PAGA Penalty
Payment, of which $480,000 (75%) will be paid to the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency and $160,000 (25%) will be allocated
to the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the participating
Class Members.

The Settlement Administrator, CPT Group, Inc., will receive payment
of $30,000 for services rendered and to be rendered in connection
with the completion of its administrative duties pursuant to the
Agreement.  Payment will be made pursuant to the timeline stated in
paragraph 60 of the Agreement.

The Judge entered final judgment in the case approving the
Agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate, and dismissed the case
with prejudice, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and
the Final Approval Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/l5pIpD from Leagle.com.

Holly Attia, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Roshanak Basti, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Niloofar Eshaghbeigl, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Michelle Girard,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Elise
Kelley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Isabel Romero, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Xuan Hien Nguyen, on behalf of themselves
individually and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Christina M. Lucio -- clucio@farnaeslaw.com --
Farnaes and Lucio APC, James R. Hawkins --
james@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins APLC & Malte L.L.
Farnaes -- malte@farnaeslaw.com -- Farnaes and Lucio APC.

Kim Marconi, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & David Tolbert, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert Alan Hennig,
Hennig Ruiz and Singh PC, Christina M. Lucio, Farnaes and Lucio
APC, Dat Hoang Phan, Hennig Ruiz and Singh & Malte L.L. Farnaes,
Farnaes and Lucio APC.

The Neiman Marcus Group LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Koree Blyleven, Jones Day, Aaron Lee
Agenbroad -- alagenbroad@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Cindi Lynn
Ritchey -- critchey@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


NEW YORK FOUNDLING: Shortchanges Nurses' Overtime Pay, David Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel David individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. New York Foundling Charitable
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01087, (S.D. N.Y., February
5, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages, overtime compensation and
unlawful deductions owed, and redress for Defendant's failure to
provide wage statement and notices under New York labor laws and
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Foundling owns and operates residential facilities for individuals
with developmental disabilities in Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx and
Manhattan. David worked as a nurse for Foundling. She claims to
have rendered 4-5 hours coordinating medicines, appointments and
responding to emergencies, all in excess of 40 hours per work week
without being paid overtime. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      LaDonna M. Lusher, Esq.
      Alanna R. Sakovits, Esq.
      VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
      40 Broad Street, Seventh Floor
      New York, NY 10004
      Tel: (212) 943-9080
      Fax: (212) 943-9082

             - and -

      Maurice Pianko, Esq.
      PIANKO LAW GROUP, PLLC
      30 Broad Street, 14th Floor
      New York, NY 10004
      Tel: (646) 801-9675
      Fax: (646) 381-3612


NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: Cobra Plaintiff Missed Appeals Filing Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NUTRACEUTICAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TROY
LAMBERT, Case No. 17-1094 (U.S.), Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the
Supreme Court of the United States (i) reversed the Court of
Appeals' order reversing the district court's decertification
order; and (ii) remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with her Opinion.

In March 2013, respondent Lambert sued petitioner Nutraceutical in
federal court, alleging that its marketing of a dietary supplement
ran afoul of California consumer-protection law.  The District
Court for the Central District of California initially permitted
Lambert to litigate on behalf of a class of similarly situated
consumers.  On Feb. 20, 2015, however, the District Court revisited
that decision and ordered the class decertified.  From that point,
Lambert had 14 days to ask the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for permission to appeal the order.

Instead of filing a petition for permission to appeal, Lambert
informed the District Court at a status conference on March 2, 2015
(10 days after the decertification order) that he would want to
file a motion for reconsideration in the near future.  The court
told Lambert to file any such motion "no later than" March 12,
2015.  Neither Lambert nor the District Court mentioned the
possibility of an appeal.

Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration, in compliance with
the District Court's schedule, on March 12, 2015 (20 days after the
decertification order).  The District Court denied the motion on
June 24, 2015.  Fourteen days later, on July 8, 2015, Lambert
petitioned the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal the
decertification order.  Nutraceutical's response argued that
Lambert's petition was untimely because more than four months had
elapsed since the District Court's Feb. 20, 2015 order decertifying
the class, far more than the 14 days that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) allows.

Notwithstanding the petition's apparent untimeliness, the Court of
Appeals deemed Lambert's petition timely because, in its view, the
Rule 23(f) deadline should be "tolled" under the circumstances.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Rule 23(f)'s time limit is
non-jurisdictional, and that equitable remedies softening the
deadline are therefore generally available.  Tolling was warranted,
the court concluded, because Lambert informed the District Court
orally of his intention to seek reconsideration within Rule 23(f)'s
14-day window, complied with the District Court's March 12
deadline, and otherwise acted diligently.  On the merits, the Court
of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in
decertifying the class.  It reversed the decertification order.

In accepting Lambert's petition, the Court of Appeals recognized
that other circuits would likely not toll the Rule 23(f) deadline
in Lambert's case.

Judge Sotomayor explains that to take an immediate appeal from a
federal district court's order granting or denying class
certification, a party must first seek permission from the relevant
court of appeals within 14 days after the order is entered.  The
case poses the question whether a court of appeals may forgive on
equitable tolling grounds a failure to adhere to that deadline when
the opposing party objects that the appeal was untimely.

The Judge finds that because Rule 23(f) is not amenable to
equitable tolling, the Court of Appeals erred in accepting
Lambert's petition on those grounds.  Lambert's argument relies on
a mistaken premise.  A timely motion for reconsideration filed
within a window to appeal does not toll anything; it "renders an
otherwise final decision of a district court not final" for
purposes of appeal.  In other words, it affects the antecedent
issue of when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the availability
of tolling.

Lambert devotes much of his merits brief to arguing the distinct
question whether his Rule 23(f) petition was timely even without
resort to tolling.  The Judge finds that the Court of Appeals did
not rule on this alternative ground, which is beyond the scope of
the question presented.  If the Court of Appeals concludes that
these arguments have been preserved, it can address them in the
first instance on remand.

Judge Sotomayor concludes that the relevant Rules of Civil and
Appellate Procedure clearly foreclose the flexible tolling approach
on which the Court of Appeals relied to deem Lambert's petition
timely.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fgScDu from Leagle.com.

John Charles Hueston -- jhueston@hueston.com -- Hueston Hennigan
LLP, Attorney for Petitioner, Nutraceutical Corporation.

Ronald Albert Marron -- admin@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices
of Ronald A. Marron, Attorney for Respondent, Troy Lambert.

Jonathan Alan Herstoff -- jherstoff@haugpartners.com -- Haug
Partners LLP, Attorney for Respondent, Troy Lambert.


NVIDIA CORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against NVIDIA Corporation ("NVIDIA" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: NVDA) in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on behalf of those who purchased or acquired
the securities of NVIDIA between August 10, 2017 and November 15,
2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages
caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges that NVIDIA and certain of its senior
executives made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business and its ability to react to
fluctuations in demand for GPUs.  Specifically, Defendants falsely
assured investors of their ability to see into their inventory
channel and react to the volatility of cryptocurrency markets.
Furthermore, after cryptocurrency miners' demand for GPUs fell,
NVIDIA continued to push GPU stock into the channel, causing a
foreseeable oversupply of inventory. NVIDIA also reassured
investors about its ability to manage inventory and adapt to the
volatility of the cryptocurrency market.  These statements
concealed the magnitude of the inventory problem and the impact
declining cryptocurrency -- based demand would have on the
Company's growth.

The truth was partially revealed on August 16, 2018, as NVIDIA
lowered its revenue guidance for the third quarter of 2018 and
reported that it no longer expected a meaningful contribution from
cryptocurrency miners.  The Company also reported a 30% increase in
existing GPU inventory compared to the prior quarter. In response,
NVIDIA's common stock price declined by $12.62, or 4.9%, to close
at $244.82 on August 17, 2018.

On November 15, 2018, it was further revealed that when NVIDIA cut
its revenue guidance for the fiscal fourth quarter from 17% growth
to 7% decline. The Company attributed the results to increased
inventory of GPUs that had built up before the decline in
cryptocurrency-related demand. On this news, NVIDIA's stock price
fell by $57.69, or 28.5% over the next two trading days to close at
$144.70 on November 19, 2018, eliminating more than $35 billion in
shareholder value.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the February 19, 2019
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please

        Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
        Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
        Gainey McKenna & Egleston
        Telephone: (212) 983-1300
        Website: www.gme-law.com  
        E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


ORGANIGRAM: McCarthy Tetrault Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Leah Ostler, Esq. -- lostler@mccarthy.ca -- Brandon Kain, Esq. --
bkain@mccarthy.ca -- and Frank McLaughlin, Esq. --
fmclaugh@mccarthy.ca -- of McCarthy Tetrault, in an article for
Lexology, report that as cannabis legalization moves north of the
border, companies in Canada will inevitably face legal issues
similar to those faced by their peers in the United States, where
the decriminalization of cannabis in several jurisdictions has been
accompanied by a new set of product liability class actions.

A class action against a medical cannabis producer with
headquarters in Moncton, New Brunswick was recently certified in
Downton v Organigram, 2019 NSSC 4 – the first of its kind in
Canada. The action was commenced after Organigram, in conjunction
with Health Canada, issued voluntary recalls of a number of its
products after some of the products were found to contain traces of
pesticides that are not authorized for use on cannabis plants under
the Pest Control Products Act, S.C. 2002, c. 28. Organigram found
out about the trace pesticides when one of its wholesale recipients
advised that one of its cannabis lots had been tested by a
third-party laboratory. The plaintiff claimed that she suffered
adverse health consequences as a result of consuming the recalled
cannabis and claimed various remedies including general and
punitive damages.

While the outcome of the action (and whether or not certification
was appropriate, if the decision is appealed) has yet to be
determined, the cautionary tale is clear: licensed producers must
be aware of, and adhere to, the applicable pesticide regulations
and should consider vigilant testing of crops to ensure all safety
standards are met and are consistent with brand marketing. Class
actions of this nature are by no means limited to medical cannabis
producers, and may very well affect the recreational industry as
well. [GN]


PEPE AUTO: Court Compels Arbitration in J. Gallagher's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
JOSEPH GALLAGHER, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. PEPE AUTO GROUP; MERCEDES BENZ OF NEW
ROCHELLE; JOSEPH PEPE, individually; GENE PEPE, individually;
ROBERT PEPE, individually; and SALVATORE PEPE, individually,
Defendants. No. 18 CV 3433 (VB). (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff brings collective action claims against defendants
Pepe Auto Group, Mercedes Benz of New Rochelle (MBNR), Joseph Pepe,
Gene Pepe, Robert Pepe, and Salvatore Pepe for age discrimination
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), and the
New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).

The Plaintiff also brings individual state law claims for (i)
breach of contract (ii) wrongful discharge (iii) breach of
fiduciary duty (iv) intentional interference with contractual
relationship (v) intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage, (vi) injurious falsehood, and (vii) libel per se.

In the context of motions to compel arbitration brought under the
Federal Arbitration Act, the court applies a standard similar to
that applicable for a motion for summary judgment. A party to an
arbitration agreement seeking to avoid arbitration generally bears
the burden of showing the agreement to be inapplicable or invalid.

The Defendants argue the Court should compel arbitration because
the parties signed a valid arbitration agreement encompassing
plaintiff's claims. The Plaintiff disputes only that the claims
fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

The Court finds that the plaintiff's ADEA, OWBPA, NYSHRL, breach of
contract, wrongful discharge, and breach of fiduciary duty claims
fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, but plaintiff's
intentional interference with contractual relationship, intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, injurious
falsehood, and libel per se claims (post-termination claims) do
not.

In deciding whether to compel arbitration, a court must determine
(i) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (ii) if so, the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate; (iii) whether Congress intended any
federal statutory claims asserted to be nonarbitrable and (iv) if
some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable,
whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.


Here, the arbitration agreement, which provides, Any dispute under
this Agreement shall be resolved by binding arbitration, is broad.
Therefore, there is a presumption of arbitrability regarding
plaintiff's claims that arise under the Employment Agreement. Those
claims include plaintiff's discrimination claims under the ADEA,
OWBPA, and NYSHRL, as well as plaintiff's claims for breach of
contract, wrongful discharge, and breach of fiduciary duty
(arbitrable claims).

But the plaintiff's post-termination claims do not fall under the
arbitration clause. They require examination of different evidence
and do not require interpretation of or reference to the Employment
Agreement. The Court also notes defendants do not seem to contest
the non-arbitrability of plaintiff's post-termination claims.  

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to
rebut the presumption of arbitrability as to the arbitrable claims.
Rather, the plaintiff argues (i) the Employment Agreement does not
contain provisions relating to termination of employment without
cause or employment discrimination claims, and (ii) the Court
should not compel arbitration of plaintiff's ADEA, OWBPA, and
NYSHRL claims because he did not agree to arbitrate his class
action claims.

The Court further finds the Plaintiff's arguments are meritless.
Regarding the plaintiff's first argument, broad arbitration
provisions encompass employment discrimination claims, unless a
plaintiff rebuts the presumption of arbitrability. Thus, the
Employment Agreement need not contain specific provisions relating
to termination of employment to cover the plaintiff's claims.

Accordingly, the Court compels arbitration of the plaintiff's ADEA,
OWBPA, NYSHRL, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and breach
of fiduciary duty claims.

The motion to compel arbitration is granted as to the plaintiff's
ADEA, OWBPA, NYSHRL, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and
breach of fiduciary duty claims, and denied as to the plaintiff's
intentional interference with contractual relationship, intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, injurious
falsehood, and libel per se claims.

This action is also stayed pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y6hrp2yjfrom
Leagle.com.

Joseph Gallagher, individually and on behalf of other similar
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Seth L. Dobbs, Aboyoun, Heller
& Dobbs, LLC.

Pepe Auto Group, Mercedes Benz of New Rochelle, Joseph Pepe,
Individually, Gene Pepe, Individually, Robert Pepe, Individually &
Salvatore Pepe, Individually, Defendants, represented by Jonathan
Marc Kozak -- Jonathan.Kozak@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.
& John Thomas Cigno -- John.Cigno@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C..


PLANET PIZZA: Court OKs Conditional Class Certification in Ridgeway
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Columbia Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional as to their FLSA claims
in accordance with 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) in the case captioned
GEOFFREY RIDGEWAY and A. P., a minor, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PLANET PIZZA 2016, INC.,
RAVINDER S. THIARA, and JOHN ROGAN, Defendants. Civil Action No.
3:17-cv-03064-MGL. (D.S.C.).

Plaintiffs Geoffrey Ridgeway and A. P., a minor, bring this lawsuit
against Defendants Planet Pizza 2016, Inc., and its owners and
operators, Ravinder S. Thiara, and John Rogan.  The Plaintiffs
filed their complaint on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated current and former employees of the Defendants complaining
of violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the South
Carolina Payment of Wages Act (SCPWA). They seek payment of what
they claim to be unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid minimum wages
and unpaid wages.

The Plaintiffs maintain all of the Defendants' current and former
employees are similarly situated to them; their proposed notice is
fair and adequate; the Plaintiffs should be allowed to mail their
notice to all current and former employees of the Defendants; those
who receive the notice should be given ninety days to opt into the
lawsuit, and the Plaintiffs' proposed limited discovery is
essential to ensure timely notice.

The Defendants counter the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden of establishing they are similarly situated to the putative
collective action group and that they are entitled to conduct
limited pre-certification discovery to test the Plaintiffs'
assertion. The Defendants also claim the Plaintiffs' proposed
notice is defective and the Plaintiff's proposed ninety-day opt-in
period is too long and should be reduced.

At the first stage, the court makes a preliminary determination
whether to conditionally certify the action based upon the limited
record before the court. Consistent with the underlying purpose of
the FLSA's collective action procedure, this initial inquiry
proceeds under a fairly lenient standard and requires only minimal
evidence. In fact, the standard for conditional certification
requires nothing more than substantial allegations that the
putative collective action members were together the victims of a
single decision, policy, or plan
The court proceeds to stage two if the defendant files a motion for
decertification, usually after discovery is virtually complete.
Accordingly, throughout the second stage, courts apply a heightened
fact specific standard to the 'similarly situated' analysis.

Whether Plaintiffs and Current and Former Employees are
Similarly-Situated

Turning now to the parties' contentions, the Plaintiffs state all
of the Defendants current and former employees are similarly
situated to them. The Defendants, however, maintain the Plaintiffs
have failed to show the employees are similarly situated and they
are entitled to conduct limited pre-certification discovery to test
the Plaintiffs' similarly-situated assertion.

Ridgeway states the following: the first week [he] worked
approximately 120 hours. When he asked about being paid for that
time, Mr. Thiara pulled $250 in cash out of his wallet. He
protested the shortfall but was told that was all he could pay me
at the time and that he would take care of me the next week. He
made the next week promise repeatedly over time. In June, July, and
early August, Ridgeway claims he regularly worked over 100 hours a
week. He maintains between June and August, he was paid cash three
times and received two checks but that none of those payments came
close to paying the rate promised or hours worked.

With these allegations, the Plaintiffs have easily satisfied the
lenient burden they must meet at the first stage of the
certification process to show all of the Defendants' current and
former employees are similarly situated to them. Nevertheless, the
Defendants argue the Plaintiffs have neglected to present any
evidence, besides Ridgeway's affidavit, of any other putative
collective action members or a common policy or plan. At this early
juncture, however, the substantial allegations contained in
Ridgeway's affidavit provide a sufficient basis for the Court to
conditionally certify the Plaintiffs' FLSA action. It seems the
Defendants would have the Court to employ a heightened fact
specific standard to its analysis. But that is for the second-step,
the decertification stage. It is inappropriate during the first
step, the certification stage.

Whether the Proposed Notice is Fair and Adequate and Plaintiffs
should be permitted to mail the notice to all current and former
employees of the Defendants, who would have ninety days to opt in.

According to the Plaintiffs, their proposed notice is fair and
adequate; and they should be allowed to mail the notice to all
current and former employees of the Defendants, who would be given
ninety days to opt in. The Defendants, however, argue the
Plaintiffs' proposed notice is defective. The Defendants also argue
the Plaintiff's proposed ninety-day opt-in period is too long and
should be reduced.

The FLSA opt-in requirement seeks to balance employees' interest in
pooling resources to bring collective actions and employers'
interest in reducing baseless lawsuits. To strike this balance,
district courts must be able to supervise contacts between the
parties and their respective counsel to ensure that potential
plaintiffs are not misled about the consequences of joining a
collective action in an ongoing employment dispute.

Although the Court will grant the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification, it will require: (1) the Plaintiffs make
the modification mentioned above and (2) the parties file with the
Court a proposed notice that they consent to as proper. Once the
parties have filed the proposed notice and the Court has approved
it, the Defendants will be allowed to mail the notices to all the
Defendants' current and former employees.  

The Defendants maintain the ninety-day time period for potential
collective action members is too long and should be shortened.
Although notice periods may vary numerous courts around the country
have authorized ninety day opt-in periods for collective actions.
The Court declines to depart from the collective wisdom of these
other courts that have approved a ninety-day opt-in time period.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yxlo54lmfrom Leagle.com.

Geoffrey Ridgeway, On Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly
Situated & A. P., a minor, On Behalf of Themselves and Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Blaney A. Coskrey,
III, Coskrey Law Office & William Clark Tucker, Tucker Law Firm.

Planet Pizza 2016, Inc., Ravinder S. Thiara & John Rogan,
Defendants, represented by Marion M. Moses, Marion M Moses Law
Offices & Ryan Kyle Hicks, Cromer Babb Porter and Hicks.


POWER SOLUTIONS: May 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SUMIT GUPTA, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

     v.

POWER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., GARY S. WINEMASTER, DANIEL

P. GOREY, and MICHAEL P. LEWIS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:16-cv-08253
Consolidated with
Case No.: 1:16-cv-08253

Honorable Virginia M. Kendall

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION
EXPENSES

TO:  All persons and entities who, during the period between
February 27, 2014 and February 2, 2017, inclusive, purchased or
otherwise acquired Power Solutions International, Inc. ("PSI")
common stock and were damaged thereby (the "Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY; YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain persons and
entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by definition
as set forth in the full Internet Notice of (I) Pendency of Class
Action and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing;
and (III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses (the "Internet Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiff and named Plaintiff in
the Action have reached a proposed settlement of the Action for
$8,500,000 in cash (the "Settlement"), which, if approved, will
resolve all claims in the Action.  Defendants deny all allegations
of wrongdoing, damages, and liability.

A hearing will be held on May 13, 2019 at 09:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Virginia M. Kendall at the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, United States Courthouse,
Courtroom 2319, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60604, to
determine (i) whether the proposed Settlement should be approved as
fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be
dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and whether the
Releases specified and described in the Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement dated January 22, 2019 (and in the Internet Notice)
should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation
should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  The detailed Internet
Notice and Proof of Claim and Release Form ("Claim Form") can be
downloaded from the website maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.PowerSolutionsSecuritiesLitigation.com.  You may also obtain
copies of the Internet Notice and Claim Form by contacting the
Claims Administrator at Power Solutions Securities Litigation, c/o
Claims Administrator, P.O. Box 3747, Portland, OR 97208-3747,
1-888-457-6703.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked no later than June 13, 2019.
If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not submit a proper
Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in the distribution
of the net proceeds of the Settlement but you will nevertheless be
bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than April 22, 2019, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Internet Notice.
If you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you
will not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court
in the Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds
of the Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than April 22, 2019, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the detailed Internet Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, PSI, or its
counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about this notice,
the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to participate in the
Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel or the Claims
Administrator.

Requests for the detailed Internet Notice and Claim Form should be
made to:

         In re Power Solutions Securities Litigation    
         c/o Claims Administrator
         P.O. Box 3747
         Portland, OR 97208-3747
         888-457-6703
         www.PowerSolutionsSecuritiesLitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the detailed Internet Notice and
Claim Form, should be made to Lead Counsel:

         GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
         Jason Krajcer, Esq.
         1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
        (888) 773-9224
         settlements@glancylaw.com

By Order of the Court
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
[GN]


PROCTOR & GAMBLE: Israeli Court OKs Class-Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Dror Halavy, writing for Hamodia, reports that attorneys have filed
a NIS 30 million class-action lawsuit against the Israeli
representatives of Proctor and Gamble, makers of Oral B mouthwash.
According to the lawsuit, the Israeli company conspired to get
Israelis to use more of the product, specifically Oral B White Luxe
and Pro Expert mouthwashes, than necessary, thus cheating consumers
by making them buy the product more often. The lawsuit was approved
for class-action status by the Tel Aviv District Court.

According to the lawsuit, the Hebrew-language instructions on the
packages of Oral B, drawn up and placed on the imported bottles by
P&G Israel, instruct consumers to use the mouthwash twice a day,
gargling for 30 seconds at a time – while the original
English-language instructions specify using Oral B once a day, for
60 seconds. By following the Hebrew-language instructions,
consumers would be using the product twice as fast as the
manufacturer specified -- thus cheating consumers who don't read
English by instructing them to use the product twice as fast as
necessary.

The representative of the class-action suit, an Israeli named Yossi
Beitner, told the court that he discovered the "fraud" when he
peeled off the Hebrew-language instructions, which were pasted over
the English-language instructions. As a regular user of the
product, Beitner estimated that he was out some NIS1,400.

In response, representatives of P&G Israel said that according to
studies they were prepared to present in court, the product was
more effective when used in the manner recommended in the
Hebrew-language instructions. The court said that this was not
sufficient; the fact that the company did not alert consumers to
both possibilities was enough to qualify the case for adjudication,
and as the problem likely affected many consumers, for class-action
status as well.

P&G Israel said that it would present its case in court, "following
proper legal procedure."[GN]


PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS BUREAU: Feinberg Disputes Collection Letter
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Feinberg, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Professional Claims Bureau, Inc.
and ARStrat, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00719 (E.D. N.Y.,
February 5, 2019), seeks damages, and declaratory and injunctive
relief pursuant to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

ARStrat is a collection agency with its principal office located in
Harris County, Texas. It was assigned to collect a debt incurred by
Feinberg primarily for medical services when he fell behind on his
payments via collection letter that stated that his account was
previously placed with Ingram & Associates despite Feinberg's
contention that this was the first notice he received. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
      BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
      100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
      Garden City, NY 11530
      Tel: (516) 203-7600
      Fax: (516) 706-5055
      Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


PROSHARES SHORT VIX: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (NYSE: SVXY)
Class Period: shares purchased (1) pursuant to the May 15, 2017
Registration Statement and/or (2) between May 15, 2017 - February
5, 2018
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 1, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/svxy

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that adverse
information regarding the risks of investing in the Fund.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the Registration Statement
failed to disclose that the Fund was threatened with catastrophic
losses as a result of the Fund's flawed design and the
low-volatility environment and acute liquidity risks that existed
during the Class Period. The complaint continues to allege that
throughout the Class Period defendants made substantially similar
false and misleading statements as those contained in the
Registration Statement in numerous financial reports and draft
prospectuses and registration statements filed with the SEC.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


PUBLIC STORAGE: Obtains Favorable Ruling in Insurance Case
----------------------------------------------------------
John Egan, writing for SpareFoot, reports that a California judge
has tentatively sided with Public Storage in a $100 million
class-action lawsuit that alleged the self-storage REIT tricked
California tenants into believing they had to buy company-sold
insurance when they rented storage units.

In a Feb. 21 order, Judge Carolyn Kuhl of Los Angeles County
Superior Court wrote that the plaintiffs had failed to supply
evidence of Public Storage committing "systemic violations" of
California's insurance code.

In addition to alleging that Public Storage led tenants to believe
that they had to buy rental insurance through the company, the suit
claims Public Storage failed to tell tenants they had options aside
from company-sold insurance to meet the requirement that they carry
insurance of some kind to cover their belongings.

Judge Kuhl wrote that she found no "uniform misleading statements"
were made to plaintiffs in the case that would lead a "reasonable
person" to think they had to buy the company's insurance when they
rented a unit from Glendale, CA-based Public Storage. The judge
said she found Public Storage employees to be credible in their
testimony about corporate training and oversight programs related
to renting out storage units and selling rental insurance.

If the judge's tentative order winds up becoming permanent, it
would bring to an end a court fight that has dragged on for three
years.

The class-action lawsuit, filed in February 2016, went to trial in
late January 2019. The suit involves the purchase of Public Storage
rental insurance by various plaintiffs from 2012 through 2016.

Judge Kuhl gave Public Storage until March 11 to file what's known
as a "proposed statement of decision" in the case. Plaintiffs face
an April 11 deadline to make objections to Public Storage's filing.
Judge Kuhl set a hearing for June 12 to consider Public Storage's
filing and the plaintiffs' objections. If all goes Public Storage's
way, the judge then would switch her temporary order to a permanent
order, closing the case in favor of the self-storage operator.

Representatives of Public Storage and attorneys for the plaintiffs
couldn't be reached for comment.

Public Storage faced a similar legal challenge in Florida. In 2015,
the company settled a class-action suit in Florida that alleged the
REIT misrepresented how it was using premiums collected by tenants
who bought its insurance. [GN]


R WINGS: Bell Nunnally Secures Favorable Class Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
On January 29, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and Bell Nunnally client R Wings R Wild LLC (RWRW) disclosed
the settlement of a class action dispute that alleged claims of sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 U.S. Civil
Rights Act. The Commission brought the suit (Civil Action No.
4:17-cv-624-BRW) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Western Division.

The central claim brought against RWRW, the owner/operator of the
Buffalo Wild Wings franchise locations, stemmed from a male
bartender who alleged that in 2014 he applied for and was denied
employment due to his gender. The class size, at one point as high
as 10 claimants, numbered only three at the matter's conclusion.
The suit sought monetary relief in the form of back pay,
compensatory and punitive damages, compensation for lost benefits
and an injunction.

RWRW agreed to a nominal monetary settlement, a fraction of the
total amount initially sought by the Commission, and it agreed to
conduct sex discrimination training at its locations to demonstrate
its continuing commitment to providing equal employment
opportunities for all.

"While our client has denied the Commissions' allegations since day
one, we are pleased that we were able to work amicably with the
EEOC to settle this matter at a monetary value that more
appropriately reflected the scope of the alleged offense than what
the Commission initially sought. R Wings R Wild always strives to
provide a harmonious and legally compliant workplace, and this
agreement will only strengthen our client's commitment to providing
same," said Bell Nunnally Partner Alana K. Ackels, part of the
firm's team representing RWRW, along with Partner Jay M. Wallace
and Senior Associate Brent D. Hockaday.

R Wings R Wild CEO, Jeromy Howard, stated, "We are pleased to put
this matter behind us. Our restaurant group is committed to
providing equal employment opportunities for all employees and
applicants, while providing patrons with an excellent dining
experience."

         Traci Stuart/Michael Bond          
         Blattel Communications                
         Telephone: 415-413-4522
                    415-413-4524          
         Email: traci@blattel.com
                michael@blattel.com
         
         Brittany Lewis, Esq.
         Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP
         Telephone: 214-880-6661
         Email: BLewis@bellnunnally.com [GN]


RECRO PHARMA: Bid to Dismiss IV Meloxicam-Related Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Recro Pharma, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 19, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the company is seeking
dismissal of a class action lawsuit pending before the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania involving
the company's NDA for IV meloxicam.

On May 31, 2018, a securities class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and certain of its officers and directors in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Case No. 2:18-cv-02279-MMB) that purported to state a claim for
alleged violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder, based on statements made
by the Company concerning the NDA for IV meloxicam.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages, interest, attorneys' fees
and other costs. On December 10, 2018, lead plaintiff filed an
amended complaint that asserted the same claims and sought the same
relief but included new allegations and named additional officers
and directors as defendants.

On February 8, 2019, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint in its entirety.

The Company believes that the lawsuit is without merit and intends
to vigorously defend against it.

Recro Pharma said, "The lawsuit is in the early stages and, at this
time, no assessment can be made as to its likely outcome or whether
the outcome will be material to the Company."

Recro Pharma, Inc., a specialty pharmaceutical company, develops
and commercializes products for hospital and related acute care
settings. The company operates in two segments, Acute Care, and
Contract Development and Manufacturing. The company was formerly
known as Recro Pharma I, Inc. and changed its name to Recro Pharma,
Inc. in August 2008. Recro Pharma, Inc. was founded in 2007 and is
based in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


REGENCY CENTERS: Kouri Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------
Regency Centers Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Janne Kouri and Michael G. Murphy, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Regency Centers
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00658-JLK (D. Colo., March
6, 2019).

Regency Centers Corporation is a real estate investment trust based
in Jacksonville, Florida and is one of the largest operators of
grocery-anchored shopping centers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Benjamin James Sweet, Esq.
   Sweet Law Firm PC
   186 Mohawk Drive
   Pittsburgh, PA 15228
   Tel: (412) 742-0631
   Email: ben@sweetlawpc.com


REVOLUTION LIGHTING: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
on Feb. 25 announced the filing of a class action lawsuit against
Revolution Lighting Technologies, Inc. (Revolution Lighting or the
Company) (NASDAQ: RVLT) for violations of §§10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between March 14, 2014
and November 14, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before April 1, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall, or Sherin Mahdavian,
of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los
Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of
charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at
www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Revolution Lighting improperly recognized
revenue for various transactions, resulting in the Company's
financial statements being misstated. Revolution failed to maintain
adequate controls on its financial reporting. Based on these facts,
the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Revolution Lighting, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation. [GN]


RUSSELL STOVER: Faison Sues Over Slack in Chocolate Packaging
-------------------------------------------------------------
Walter Faison, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Russell Stover Chocolates LLC and
Ghirardelli Chocolate Company, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00721
(E.D. N.Y., February 5, 2019), seeks restitution and disgorgement
of inequitably obtained profits, preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief, monetary and punitive damages and interest,
costs and expenses, including reasonable fees for attorneys and
experts, and such other and further relief resulting from unjust
enrichment and violations of New York general business laws.

Russell Stover Chocolates LLC and Ghirardelli Chocolate Company
manufacture, package, market, distribute and sell chocolate
products to consumers. Faison alleges that their products'
packaging contains void space not visible to consumers, making the
impression of being fully-filled. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
      LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      1 Penn Plaza, Suite 2527
      New York, NY 10119
      Tel: (212) 792-0046
      Email: joshua@levinepstein.com

             - and -

      Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
      SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      891 Northern Blvd., Suite 201
      Great Neck, NY 11021
      Tel: (516) 303-0552
      Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


SANOFI SA: Judge Denies Insulin Makers' Motion to Dismiss Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge's opinion has greenlighted a national class-action
lawsuit filed against Sanofi, Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly for their
systematic overpricing of insulin and concealment of a
behind-the-scenes arrangement orchestrated to hike insulin prices,
according to attorneys at Hagens Berman.

Hon. Brian R. Martinotti, U.S. District Judge for the District of
New Jersey, granted in part and denied in part the drug companies'
motion to dismiss the case. The opinion allows state law claims
from plaintiffs -- people living with diabetes who Eli Lilly,
Sanofi and Novo Nordisk have forced to pay skyrocketing insulin
prices -- and gave attorneys representing them ability to address
concerns regarding individual state representation. To the extent
the court requires a patient from each state, attorneys say they
can and will add clients to satisfy the court's concerns.

Regarding the plaintiffs' state claims, Judge Martinotti's opinion
read, "This Court finds Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
fraudulent, unfair, or unconscionable conduct." The court also held
that the plaintiffs "adequately pled an ascertainable loss."

The lawsuit states that in recent years, Sanofi, Novo Nordisk and
Eli Lilly have raised the sticker or "benchmark" prices on their
drugs by more than 150 percent. Some plaintiffs now pay almost $900
dollars per month just to obtain the drugs they need, according to
the firm.

Hagens Berman filed the first-of-its-kind lawsuit in 2017,
detailing several accounts from patients resorting to extreme
measures to survive rising insulin prices, including starving
themselves to control their blood sugars, under-dosing their
insulin, and taking expired insulin. The complaint also detailed
how class members having intentionally allowed themselves to slip
into diabetic ketoacidosis -- a potentially fatal blood syndrome
caused by lack of insulin in the body -- so that they can obtain
insulin samples from hospital emergency rooms.

Steve Berman, managing partner and co-founder of Hagens Berman, was
named co-lead counsel in the case by Judge Martinotti.

"In general we are pleased with the decision because we can now
bring consumer protection claims in most states," Berman said.
"This ruling also clears the way for us to begin obtaining
discovery from the manufacturers and PBMs so we can shine the light
on exactly what has driven insulin prices sky high."

"This ruling blows the insulin racket wide open," he added.

The complaint states that this once affordable drug is now out of
reach for many patients due to a behind-the-scenes quid pro quo
arrangement between drug makers and pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs): "increased benchmark prices are the result of a scheme and
enterprise among each defendant and several bulk drug distributors.
In this scheme, the defendant drug companies set two different
prices for their insulin treatments: a publicly-reported, benchmark
price and a lower, real price that they offer to certain bulk drug
distributors."

Attorneys are currently looking for those who purchased Lantus,
Levemir, Novolog, Humalog Apidra, and/or Toujeo from the following
states: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia or Wyoming.

Did you purchase Humalog in Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee or Vermont?

Did you purchase Novolog or Levemir in Colorado, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nevada, or Washington?

Did you purchase Lantus, Apidra or Toujeo in Louisiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Tennessee or Washington?

         Ashley Klann
         Telephone: 206-268-9363
         Website: www.hbsslaw.com
         Email: ashleyk@hbsslaw.com [GN]


SNC-LAVALIN: Siskinds Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Siskinds LLP and Siskinds, Desmeules Avocats s.e.n.c.r.l. on Feb.
25 announced the filing of a proposed securities class action in
the Québec Superior Court against SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. ("SNC"),
SNC's President and Chief Executive Officer Neil Bruce, and SNC's
Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer Sylvain Girard
(the "Action").  The Action was filed on February 6, 2019.

The Action alleges that persons who acquired SNC shares between
February 22, 2018 and January 27, 2019 (inclusive) ("Class Period")
suffered damage as a result of alleged misrepresentations made in
SNC's disclosure documents and oral statements during the Class
Period.  The Action alleges that the misrepresentations were
corrected by a press release issued by SNC on January 28, 2019.  In
that press release, SNC disclosed a number of issues and problems
affecting its Mining & Metallurgy and Oil & Gas segments that would
have a material adverse effect on SNC's performance in 2018 and
beyond.  Following that disclosure, the price of SNC's shares
declined by $13.49 or approximately 28% during trading on the TSX
on January 28, 2019 from its closing price on the previous trading
day.

Subject to certain exclusions, the proposed class in the Action
comprises all persons and entities, wherever they may reside or be
domiciled, who acquired SNC shares in the secondary market during
the Class Period and held some or all of such shares as of the
commencement of trading on the TSX on January 28, 2019 ("Class
Members").

The Plaintiff is seeking compensation for the losses suffered by
the Class Members. The Plaintiff alleges that SNC, Mr. Bruce and
Mr. Girard are liable for those losses.

Class Member Contacts:

If you are a Class Member, we encourage you to complete the
information form on the website of Siskinds LLP at
https://www.siskinds.com/snc-lavalin-group-inc-ii-2019/ by clicking
on the "Receive Updates on this Case" link.

For inquiries, please complete the "Ask a Question" form at
https://www.siskinds.com/snc-lavalin-group-inc-ii-2019/ or email
snc@siskinds.com.  For telephone inquiries, please call
1-800-461-6166 x 2206.

Media Contacts:

          Michael Robb
          Siskinds LLP
          michael.robb@siskinds.com
          519-660-7872

The Siskinds LLP class actions team has offices in London and
Toronto, and an affiliate office in Québec City. The team,
comprised of 25 lawyers admitted to practice in Ontario, Québec,
New York State and the District of Columbia, acts exclusively for
plaintiffs. Over the years, Siskinds' class action team has
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for class members in
Canada and elsewhere. If you are looking for Canada's top-ranked
law firm* to represent your class action lawsuit, contact us
today.

Siskinds LLP -- http://www.siskinds.com/-- is ranked in the top
band of the Chambers Canada 2019 guide. The guide is compiled by
global legal review organization, Chambers and Partners. Siskinds
LLP is the highest ranked Canadian law firm and the 16th ranked
North American law firm in the most recent edition of the
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Securities Class Action
Services Top 50 Report. The report lists the top 50 plaintiff-side
law firms ranked by the total dollar value of the final class
action settlements occurring in 2017 in which the law firm served
as lead or co-counsel. [GN]


STARK COUNTY, OH: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Pay, Barker Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christy Barker and Deanna Clapper, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Stark County, Ohio,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00276, (S.D. Ohio, February 5, 2019),
seek unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

Clapper worked as an hourly Corrections Officer at the Stark
County, Ohio jail while Barker worked as a Trustee Coordinator.
Both claim that they were not paid any amount for the pre-shift
and/or post-shift work, and such time was not counted as hours
worked for purposes of computing overtime. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
      Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
      Massillon, OH 44646
      Telephone: (330) 470-4428
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
             sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

             - and -

      Robi J. Baishnab, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      34 N. High St., Ste. 502
      Columbus, OH 43215
      Telephone: (614) 824-5770
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com


STATE FARM: Court OKs Class Certification in S. Hicks' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland, issued a Memorandum Opinion
and Order granting Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned SUSAN HICKS and DON WILLIAMS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-CV-00053-HRW. (E.D. Ky.).

The Plaintiffs filed this civil action to challenge State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company's (State Farm) method of calculation of the
actual cash value (ACV) of structural losses under its insurance
policies issued in Kentucky. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege State
Farm improperly depreciated labor costs when calculating ACV
payments, which resulted in breach of their respective insurance
policies (Count I). Plaintiffs further alleged claims for unjust
enrichment (Count II), statutory bad faith in violation of KRS
304.12-235 (Count III), and violation ofKRS 367.170, the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act (Count IV). State Farm sought dismissal of
Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The Plaintiffs request certification of the following class of
individuals seeking monetary damages from State Farm:

     All persons and entities that received actual cash value
payments, directly or indirectly, from State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company (State Farm) for loss or damage to a dwelling or other
structure located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, such payments
arising from events that occurred from February 28, 2004 through
July 25, 2015, where the cost of labor was depreciated.

Excluded from the class are (1) all persons and entities that
received payment from State Farm in the full amount of insurance
shown on the declarations page (2) State Farm and its affiliates,
officers, and directors (3) members of the judiciary and their
staff to whom this action is assigned and (4) Plaintiffs' counsel.

To be certified under Rule 23, a putative class must satisfy, by a
preponderance of the evidence, each of the four requirements of
Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

Here, the Plaintiffs seek certification of the Class under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires that questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

In order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), a class must be so numerous
thatjoinder of all members is impracticable.

Numerosity is satisfied here. For example, State Farm's own
documentation of its Kentucky refund program identifies 1,854
Kentucky policyholders with claims during just four months of the
more than two-year class period who received labor depreciation
refund payments. All of these policyholders are members of
Plaintiffs' proposed class.

Commonality

To establish commonality, the plaintiffs' claims must depend on a
common contention of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke.

Here, the Plaintiffs have identified a common question, whether it
is improper for State Farm to depreciate labor costs in calculating
the ACY of structural damage claims in Kentucky that will yield a
common answer for the entire class and that, if true, will make
State Farm liable to the entire class.

For this reason, the Court modifies the class definition as
follows:

     All persons and entities that were insured under the same type
of homeowners policy form issued to Plaintiffs and who received
actual cash value payments, directly or indirectly, from State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) for loss or damage to a
dwelling or other structure located in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, such payments arising from events that occurred from
February 28, 2013 through July 25, 2015, where the cost of labor
was depreciated.

Excluded from the Class are: (1) all persons and entities that
received payment from State Farm in the full amount of insurance
shown on the declarations page (2) State Farm and its affiliates,
officers, and directors (3) members of the judiciary and their
staff to whom this action is assigned and (4) Plaintiffs' counsel.

With this modification, commonality is satisfied.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires plaintiffs to show that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class.

To satisfy typicality, the class representatives' interests must be
aligned with those of the putative class and the pursuit of their
claims must also advance the interest of the class.
Plaintiffs' claims and the class's claims all arise from State
Farm's course of conduct of using Xactimate to depreciate labor
costs when calculating ACV. Like all other members of the class,
Plaintiffs had labor costs depreciated and deducted from ACV
payments they received for structural damage claims. Additionally,
Plaintiffs' claims are based on the same legal theories as the
class's claims. Plaintiffs contend that they and every other class
member are entitled to damages which are comprised of umecovered
labor depreciation and prejudgment interest. Because Plaintiffs
allege both a single practice or course of conduct on the part of
Defendant that gives rise to the claims of each class member and a
single theory of liability, typicality is satisfied.  

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing that the representative parties
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.  

Here, regarding the first criterion, Ms. Hicks' and Mr. Williams'
interests are fully aligned with those of the class, as they are
both part of the class and their claims arise out of the same
common course of conduct and are based upon the same legal theories
as class members' claims. As to the second criterion, Plaintiffs
have demonstrated, through their diligent prosecution of the
litigation to date, that they will continue to vigorously prosecute
the claims of the class as a whole.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Predominance

To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish
that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the
class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to
only individualized proof.

Where, as here, the Plaintiffs challenge an insurer's standard
process, this is a predominate issue central to each of the
Plaintiffs' claims and subject to generalized proof.

The Plaintiffs' expert proposes to measure damages in a manner that
both is consistent with the liability case and measures only those
damages attributable to that theory' of liability.

The Plaintiffs allege that State Farm's improper depreciation of
labor costs resulted in a breach of its insurance policies, and
that State Farm should not have withheld labor depreciation when it
made ACV payments to class members. Plaintiffs also allege that the
class members are owed prejudgment interest representing the
time-value of money for the labor amounts improperly withheld.  

Predominance is established here.

Superiority is established

As the Sixth Circuit has explained, the policy at the very core of
the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring
a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. Young, 693 F.3d at
545. Where, as here, it is not economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.

As in Young, here damages are relatively small for each of the
potential class members. Indeed, the spreadsheet produced by State
Farm showing the supplemental labor depreciation payments made as
part of its Kentucky labor depreciation refund program demonstrates
that the bulk of its policyholders were paid less than $1,000.00,
with a significant portion paid less than the filing fee for
initiating an action in state court.  

Accordingly, a class action is the superior method for adjudicating
the class's claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y4furqk7from Leagle.com.

Susan Hicks, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bartley K. Hagerman, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, Erik David Peterson, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, Jessica Morgan Smith,
Richardson & Smith,M. Austin Mehr, Mehr Fairbanks & Peterson Trial
Lawyers, PLLC, Paula Richardson, Richardson Barber & Williamson PSC
& Philip G. Fairbanks, Mehr Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers,
PLLC.

Don Williams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bartley K. Hagerman, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, Erik David Peterson, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, M. Austin Mehr, Mehr
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC & Philip G. Fairbanks,
Mehr Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
Heidi Dalenberg -- hdalenberg@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes &
Cancila LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob L. Kahn -- jkahn@rshc-law.com --
Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph A. Cancila,
Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP,
pro hac vice, David T. Klapheke, Boehl, Stopher & Graves, Ryan P.
Poscablo -- rposcablo@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila
LLP, pro hac vice & Tal C. Chaiken  -- rposcablo@rshc-law.com --
Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice.


STOCKEN FAMILY: Sofia Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
Stocken Family I LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Daniel Sofia, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Stocken Family I LLC and Handy Pantry
Stores, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01297 (E.D. N.Y., March
6, 2019).

Stocken Family I LLC is a Lawyer in Mastic, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James E. Bahamonde, Esq.
   James E. Bahamonde, P.C.
   2501 Jody Court
   North Bellmore, NY 11710
   Tel: (646) 290-8258
   Fax: (646) 435-4376
   Email: James@civilrightsNY.com



TRINITY CAPITAL: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action Sui
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. disclosed that it has filed a class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico on behalf of holders of Trinity Capital Corporation
("Trinity Capital") (OTC: TRIN) common stock in connection with the
proposed acquisition of Trinity Capital by Enterprise Financial
Services, Inc. ("Enterprise") disclosed on November 1, 2018 (the
"Complaint").  The Complaint, which alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Trinity Capital, its Board
of Directors (the "Board"), and Enterprise, is captioned Parshall
v. Trinity Capital Corporation, Case No. 1:19-cv-00066 (D.N.M.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long,
P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On November 1, 2018, Trinity Capital entered into an agreement and
plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Enterprise.  Pursuant
to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of Enterprise
will receive $1.84 in cash and 0.1972 shares of Enterprise common
stock for each share of Trinity Capital they own (the "Proposed
Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a registration
statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Complaint alleges
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to, among other things, Trinity Capital's and Enterprise's
financial projections and the analyses performed by Trinity
Capital's financial advisor.  The Complaint seeks injunctive and
equitable relief and damages on behalf of holders of Trinity
Capital common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than April 16, 2019.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

       Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
       Gina M. Serra, Esq.
       Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
       Telephone: (888) 969-4242
                  (302) 295-5310
       Fax: (302) 654-7530
       Email: gms@rl-legal.com
              sdr@rl-legal.com [GN]


TRUMMER'S INC: Failed to Pay Restaurant Workers' Minimum Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jillian Pettit, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated; the Plaintiffs, v. Trummer's, Inc., an Arizona
corporation; Kimberly Troub, an Arizona resident; and Marty Troub,
an Arizona resident, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01227-DWL (D.
Ariz., Feb. 22, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to compensate
Plaintiff and all similarly-situated current and former hostesses,
bussers, and or servers their minimum wages Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff and the Collective Members are current and former
restaurant workers employed by the Defendants. On or around June
15, 2017, the Plaintiff began employment with the Defendants as a
hostess, busser, and/or server. The Defendants deducted a meal
deduction from Plaintiff's pay check. Normally, the Plaintiff would
not eat at the Defendants' restaurant. Even if Plaintiff did not
eat at the Defendants' restaurant, they would still deduct a meal
deduction from Plaintiff's pay check. The meal deduction would
result in Plaintiff's wages to fall below minimum, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jason Barrat, Esq.
          Michael Zoldan, Esq.
          ZOLDAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          14500 N. Northsight Blvd., Suite 133
          Scottsdale, AZ 85260
          Tel: 480 442 3410
          E-mail: mzoldan@zoldangroup.com
                  jbarrat@zoldangroup.com

TRUSTMARK CORP: TNB Still Faces Class Suit over Stanford Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Trustmark Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 19, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that Trustmark National
Bank (TNB) continues to defend itself from a class action lawsuit
related to the collapse of the Stanford Financial Group.

Trustmark's wholly-owned subsidiary, TNB, has been named as a
defendant in three lawsuits related to the collapse of the Stanford
Financial Group. The first is a purported class action complaint
that was filed on August 23, 2009 in the District Court of Harris
County, Texas, by Peggy Roif Rotstain, Guthrie Abbott, Catherine
Burnell, Steven Queyrouze, Jaime Alexis Arroyo Bornstein and Juan
C. Olano (collectively, Class Plaintiffs), on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, naming TNB and four other
financial institutions unaffiliated with Trustmark as defendants.

The complaint seeks to recover (i) alleged fraudulent transfers
from each of the defendants in the amount of fees and other monies
received by each defendant from entities controlled by R. Allen
Stanford (collectively, the Stanford Financial Group) and (ii)
damages allegedly attributable to alleged conspiracies by one or
more of the defendants with the Stanford Financial Group to commit
fraud and/or aid and abet fraud on the asserted grounds that
defendants knew or should have known the Stanford Financial Group
was conducting an illegal and fraudulent scheme. Plaintiffs have
demanded a jury trial. Plaintiffs did not quantify damages.  

In November 2009, the lawsuit was removed to federal court by
certain defendants and then transferred by the United States Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to federal court in the Northern
District of Texas (Dallas) where multiple Stanford related matters
are being consolidated for pre-trial proceedings. In May 2010, all
defendants (including TNB) filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit. In
August 2010, the court authorized and approved the formation of an
Official Stanford Investors Committee (OSIC) to represent the
interests of Stanford investors and, under certain circumstances,
to file legal actions for the benefit of Stanford investors.  

In December 2011, the OSIC filed a motion to intervene in this
action. In September 2012, the district court referred the case to
a magistrate judge for hearing and determination of certain
pretrial issues. In December 2012, the court granted the OSIC's
motion to intervene, and the OSIC filed an Intervenor Complaint
against one of the other defendant financial institutions. In
February 2013, the OSIC filed a second Intervenor Complaint that
asserts claims against TNB and the remaining defendant financial
institutions.  

The OSIC seeks to recover: (i) alleged fraudulent transfers in the
amount of the fees each of the defendants allegedly received from
Stanford Financial Group, the profits each of the defendants
allegedly made from Stanford Financial Group deposits, and other
monies each of the defendants allegedly received from Stanford
Financial Group; (ii) damages attributable to alleged conspiracies
by each of the defendants with the Stanford Financial Group to
commit fraud and/or aid and abet fraud and conversion on the
asserted grounds that the defendants knew or should have known the
Stanford Financial Group was conducting an illegal and fraudulent
scheme; and (iii) punitive damages. The OSIC did not quantify
damages.  

In July 2013, all defendants (including TNB) filed motions to
dismiss the OSIC’s claims. In March 2015, the court entered an
order authorizing the parties to conduct discovery regarding class
certification, staying all other discovery and setting a deadline
for the parties to complete briefing on class certification issues.
In April 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the
defendants' motions to dismiss the Class Plaintiffs' claims and the
OSIC's claims.

The court dismissed all of the Class Plaintiffs' fraudulent
transfer claims and dismissed certain of the OSIC's claims. The
court denied the motions by TNB and the other financial institution
defendants to dismiss the OSIC's constructive fraudulent transfer
claims.  

On June 23, 2015, the court allowed the Class Plaintiffs to file a
Second Amended Class Action Complaint (SAC), which asserted new
claims against TNB and certain of the other defendants for (i)
aiding, abetting and participating in a fraudulent scheme, (ii)
aiding, abetting and participating in violations of the Texas
Securities Act, (iii) aiding, abetting and participating in
breaches of fiduciary duty, (iv) aiding, abetting and participating
in conversion and (v) conspiracy.  

On July 14, 2015, the defendants (including TNB) filed motions to
dismiss the SAC and to reconsider the court's prior denial to
dismiss the OSIC’s constructive fraudulent transfer claims
against TNB and the other financial institutions that are
defendants in the action. On July 27, 2016, the court denied the
motion by TNB and the other financial institution defendants to
dismiss the SAC and also denied the motion by TNB and the other
financial institution defendants to reconsider the court’s prior
denial to dismiss the OSIC's constructive fraudulent transfer
claims.  

On August 24, 2016, TNB filed its answer to the SAC. On October 20,
2017, the OSIC filed a motion seeking an order lifting the
discovery stay and establishing a trial schedule. On November 7,
2017, the court denied the OSIC's motion seeking class
certification and designation of class representatives and counsel,
finding that common issues of fact did not predominate.  The court
granted the OSIC's motion to lift the discovery stay that it had
previously ordered.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Trustmark Corporation operates as the bank holding company for
Trustmark National Bank that provides banking and other financial
solutions to individuals and corporate institutions in the United
States. Trustmark Corporation was founded in 1889 and is
headquartered in Jackson, Mississippi.


TYME TECHNOLOGIES: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
disclosed the filing of a class action lawsuit against Tyme
Technologies, Inc. ("Tyme" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: TYME) for
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between June 22, 2018
and November 19, 2018, inclusive (the ''Class Period''), are
encouraged to contact the firm before March 25, 2019.         

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall, or Sherin Mahdavian,
of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los
Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of
charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at
www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Tyme failed to design its Phase II Study
of its drug candidate SM-88 in a way that could present reliable
results on its efficacy for pancreatic cancer. Specifically, the
Company failed to include a control group, instead relying on
historical control data. Not including a control group in the Phase
II trial rendered the study's results unreliable. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Tyme, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         1880 Century Park East, Suite 404
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone:  
           Office: 310-301-3335
           Cell:   424-303-1964
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Email: brian@schallfirm.com
           sherin@schallfirm.com [GN]


UNITED BANK CARD: Abante Rooter Hits Illegal Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
Abante Rooter and Plumbing Inc., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. United Bank Card, Inc. and
Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00636 (N.D.
Cal., February 5, 2019), seeks injunctive relief, statutory
damages, treble damages and all other relief for violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

United Bank Card operates as Harbortouch, a merchant processing
company that contracts with businesses to provide credit card and
debit card processing services, including point of sale card
readers and related equipment.

Abante Rooter and Plumbing is a rooting and plumbing business in
Emeryville, California. Abante claims to have received calls from
the Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system offering
its services. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rebecca Davis, Esq.
      Richard T. Drury, Esq.
      LOZEAU DRURY LLP
      410 12th Street, Suite 250
      Oakland, CA 94607
      Telephone: (510) 836-4200
      Facsimile: (510) 836-4205
      Email: richard@lozeaudrury.com
             rebecca@lozeaudrury.com

           - and -

     Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
     WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
     3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
     Denver, Colorado 80210
     Telephone: (720) 213-0675
     Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
     Email: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com


UNITED STATES: Berrieum Sues Attorney General in N.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the Attorney General
of United States. The case is captioned as CHRISTINA BERRIEUM, the
Plaintiff, vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00103-MW-CAS (N.D. Fla., Feb. 22, 2019).  The suit
alleges job discrimination. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Mark E Walker.

The United States Attorney General (A.G.) is the chief lawyer of
the federal government of the United States. The current Attorney
General is William Barr.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Tiffany Rousseau Cruz, Esq.
          FRIEDMAN & ABRAHAMSEN
          403 E Park Avenue
          Tallahassee, FL 32301
          Telephone: (850) 681-3540
          E-mail: tiffany@fa-lawyers.com

UNITED STATES: Court OKs $34K Costs in Osage Tribal Elections Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying
in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs in the
case captioned WILLIAM FLETCHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. Case No. 02-CV-427-GKF-JFJ.
(N.D. Okla.).

Their original Complaint contained four claims: (1) that the
government's regulations violated their First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to vote in Osage tribal elections and to
participate in the Osage Tribe's government (2) that the government
breached its trust responsibilities by (a) eliminating plaintiffs'
right to participate or vote in Osage tribal elections and (b)
allowing headrights to be alienated to persons not of Osage blood
(3) that the government's failure to manage the Tribe's assets,
coupled with the government's inability to keep Osage headrights
from passing into the hands of those who are not of Osage blood,
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and (4) that federal
regulations restricting plaintiffs' right to participate in tribal
government constituted illegal agency action pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act.

The Plaintiffs sought the following relief: (a) an order holding
that the federal regulation pertaining to Osage tribal elections
violated their constitutional rights (b) an order holding that the
government breached its trust responsibilities by restricting the
plaintiffs' right to participate in tribal elections and by
allowing Osage headrights to be alienated to those not of Osage
blood (c) an order holding that, by allowing the alienation of
headright interests to those not of Osage blood, the government
effected an unconstitutional taking of a protected property
interest and (d) an order directing the government to pay attorney
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).

In their initial motion for attorney fees and costs under EAJA, the
plaintiffs requested $1,835,665.19 in attorney fees and $57,817.43
in costs and other expenses.

In response, the government argued that the plaintiffs had failed
to satisfy certain threshold eligibility requirements. The
government argued that threshold legal questions existed as to the
plaintiffs' net worth eligibility under EAJA. It also argued that
the plaintiffs had not met their burden of demonstrating that they
have incurred fees and other expenses for which reimbursement is
proper under EAJA; that no EAJA award is proper because the
government's position was substantially justified; and that any
award must be limited because plaintiffs only partially prevailed.


THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS

EAJA provides that a prevailing party shall recover reasonable
attorney fees and expenses incurred in any civil action against the
United States, unless the position of the United States was
substantially justified or special circumstances make an award
unjust:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other
than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial
review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in
any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

THE REQUEST FOR EAJA FEES AND EXPENSES

The Plaintiffs' request for EAJA fees and expenses presents two
primary issues: (a) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover
fees and expenses under EAJA; and, if so, (b) whether the request
is reasonable.
  
Plaintiffs' Entitlement to Recovery

In order for the plaintiffs to recover reasonable fees and expenses
under EAJA, the court must find that (i) the named plaintiffs meet
EAJA's net worth eligibility requirement (ii) the plaintiffs are
the prevailing parties (iii) the plaintiffs have incurred fees and
expenses (iv) the government's position was not substantially
justified and (v) no special circumstances make recovery unjust.

Plaintiffs meet EAJA's net worth eligibility requirement

An individual seeking an EAJA award must establish that his or her
net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action
was filed. Net worth is calculated by subtracting total liabilities
from total assets. In a class action such as this, the named
plaintiffs must each satisfy the net worth requirement.  

To establish their net worth, plaintiffs have submitted the
declarations of Tara Damron, the executor of the estate of named
plaintiff Charles Arthur Pratt, Jr., and the declaration of
plaintiff William S. Fletcher. Damron declares that Pratt's net
worth did not exceed $2 million on or after May 31, 2002; that
Pratt's assets in 2002 included his $170,000 house and three
vehicles; and that his W-2 income for 2002 was $14,533.36.  

Fletcher declares that he had some real estate holdings, a BIA
account, and a bank account in May, 2002, but he does not know the
exact balances of the accounts or the exact values of the other
assets; that he is confident that the total value of all his assets
as of May 2002, was less than $2 million and that most of the
information needed to determine the values of his assets in May,
2002, can be provided by the BIA and he is in the process of
retrieving, compiling, and analyzing the detailed information and
will supplement his declaration to set forth the details and to
attach copies of relevant account statements and other documents.
No such supplement has been submitted.

The government argues that plaintiffs either fail to meet the $2
million net worth requirement, or, at least, have failed to carry
their burden to show that they meet this requirement. The
government focuses exclusively on Fletcher, arguing his declaration
is insufficient because he states only that he is confident that
the total value of all of his assets as of May, 2002, was less than
$2 million and because he never supplemented his declaration as
promised.

As to Lopp's declaration, the government argues his assumption that
cash and cash equivalents for each  Plaintiff was $250,000 is
unsubstantiated. The government challenged Lopp's methodology
through the declaration of Colleen Stegner, a Program Analyst for
the Department of the Interior's Office of Historical Trust
Accounting. Stegner calculated the values of Fletcher's headright
and real estate interests as $278,833.00 and $1,037,739.50,
respectively for a total of $1,316,572.50 on May 31, 2002, and as
exceeding $2 million on and after April 4, 2006.  However, the
court struck Stegner's declaration pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 702
and denied the government's motion to substitute a new declaration.


The government has not pointed to facts indicating that a serious
question exists as to Fletcher's eligibility on May 31, 2002.
Indeed, it acknowledges that Fletcher's net worth was less than $2
million at that time.  Even if Fletcher's cash and cash equivalents
were two and a half times the amount Lopp assumes, Fletcher's net
worth on May 31, 2002 would still be less than $2 million.

Plaintiffs are prevailing parties

A prevailing part is one who has been awarded some relief by the
court.  

Here, though the accounting claim was only one of several claims
for relief, and though it was not the most significant issue
presented, the plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties
insofar as they succeeded on an issue which achieved some of the
benefit they sought in bringing suit.

Plaintiffs have not incurred attorney fees under EAJA

EAJA requires that fees and expenses be incurred by the party
seeking an award. As a matter of statutory interpretation,
litigants incur fees under the EAJA when they have an express or
implied legal obligation to pay over such an award to their legal
representatives.  

In their response, the government contends plaintiffs have not
established that they incurred fees and costs under EAJA. The
government has submitted copies of engagement letters signed by
Fletcher and Pratt on or about December 11, 2009.  

In reply, plaintiffs cite caselaw for the proposition that
contingency fee agreements do not prevent an award of fees. While
this is true as a general matter, the cases on which plaintiffs
rely do not support an award of fees under EAJA unless fees were
incurred by the party. In Turner, the Sixth Circuit held plaintiffs
incurred fees under contingency fee agreements, but only after
concluding that the agreements contained an express or implied
legal obligation to pay over such an award to their legal
representatives. 680 F.3d at 724-25  

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that they have incurred fees.
Rather, the engagement letters provide that the lawyers will not be
paid for their time and their work as lawyers unless one of the
three listed conditions have occurred and none of them have.
Because plaintiffs have not shown they incurred fees under EAJA,
they are not entitled to an attorney fee award.

The government's position was substantially justified

The government bears the burden of proving its position was
substantially justified. EAJA provides that whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record including the record with
respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which
the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for
which fees and other expenses are sought. The test for substantial
justification is one of reasonableness in law and fact. The
government's position can be substantially justified even though it
is not correct.  

The fact that EAJA denominates the position of the United States in
the singular buttresses the conclusion that only one threshold
determination for the entire civil action is to be made. While the
parties' postures on individual matters may be more or less
justified, the EAJA like other fee-shifting statutes favors
treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized
line-items.

Although the Supreme Court's directive in Jean, Jean, 496 U.S. at
159, may at first appear sufficiently broad to resolve the issue
presented here, Jean involved the narrow issue of whether EAJA
required a second finding that the government's position in a
separate stage of litigation, the fee litigation itself, was
substantially justified. Here, in contrast, plaintiffs advanced
multiple claims, and federal courts are split on how the analysis
should be conducted in such cases.  

For example, the Fourth Circuit relies on Jean as directing a
broadly focused analysis that would reject the view that any
unreasonable position taken by the government during the course of
litigation automatically opens the door to an EAJA fee award.
Rather, when determining whether the government's position in a
case is substantially justified, the Court look beyond the issue on
which the petitioner prevailed to determine, from the totality of
circumstances, whether the government acted reasonably in causing
the litigation or in taking a stance during the litigation.

The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, while the EAJA redresses
governmental abuse, it was never intended to chill the government's
right to litigate or to subject the public fisc to added risk of
loss when the government chooses to litigate reasonably
substantiated positions, whether or not the position later turns
out to be wrong.  Some courts have evaluated whether the
government's position as a whole was substantially justified based
on the more prominent claims. In comparison, the Third Circuit
requires district courts to evaluate every significant argument
made by an agency to determine if the argument is substantially
justified, in order to determine whether, as a whole, the
government's position was substantially justified.  

The majority of courts have recognized that the type of
claim-by-claim substantial justification determination advocated by
plaintiffs is difficult to reconcile with the EAJA's text. As the
Supreme Court stated in Jean, the term position of the United
States in Section 2412(d)(2)(D) of the EAJA is  denominated in the
singular and buttresses the conclusion that only one threshold
determination for the entire civil action is to be made. Permitting
claim-by-claim substantial justification determinations also risks
running afoul of the Supreme Court's admonition that a request for
attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation.
However, the fact that the government prevailed on most issues is
not determinative.  

The court concludes that the position of the United States in this
case as a whole was substantially justified, and its position on
the more prominent claims is not outweighed by its position on the
accounting claim.

The claims plaintiffs made over the course of this long-running
lawsuit fall within three general categories—1) tribal voting
rights; 2) breach of trust responsibilities, including allowing
headrights to be alienated to persons not of Osage blood; and 3) an
accounting. The court will address the positions taken by the
United States as to each of these claims.

In 2004, Judge Ellison dismissed plaintiffs' tribal voting rights
claim for failure to join a necessary and indispensable party. The
United States had argued that the Osage Tribal Council was a
necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined because
of sovereign immunity. The judge agreed, concluding that athough
both the factual allegations and the relief requested appear to
have been carefully crafted to exclude the Tribal Council, it is
clear that granting the remedy requested by plaintiffs would
require a significant change in voting procedures and result in a
significant change in the government and membership of the tribe.

The position of the United States on plaintiffs' claim of wrongful
distributions of quarterly royalty income to persons who are not
Osage Indians was also reasonable. After plaintiffs filed their
First Amended Complaint, the government moved to dismiss for
failure to join other indispensable parties, including the Osage
Nation and non-Osage owners of headrights; for lack of jurisdiction
for failure to comply with the final agency action prerequisites to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act and for
failure to challenge an actionable final agency action within the
applicable statute of limitations.  

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint joined approximately 1,700
non-Osage headright owners, but similarly failed to specify the
agency actions being challenged. As a result, the court directed
plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Complaint. Upon the filing of
the Third Amended Complaint, many non-Osage headright owner
defendants filed motions to dismiss. The court granted those
motions, concluding that plaintiffs were incorrect as a matter of
law in their contention that a non-Indian cannot hold legal or
equitable title.

The United States moved to dismiss the allegations in the Third
Amended Complaint that it had wrongfully distributed royalty
payments to non-Osage headright owners, and the court granted that
motion. The court finds that the position of the United States in
defense of plaintiffs' wrongful distribution claim was reasonable
in fact and law.

In sum, the government's positions on the voting rights claim, the
wrongful distribution claim, and the scope of the accounting were
substantially justified, but its position on plaintiffs'
entitlement to an accounting was not substantially justified.

In assessing whether the government's position was substantially
justified, the court must treat the case as an inclusive whole and
base its decision on the totality of the circumstances. In that
regard, the court finds that the most heavily litigated claim in
this case was the claim of wrongful distributions to persons who
were not Osage Indians. When plaintiffs first sought an accounting
in their First Amended Complaint filed in 2006, the request for an
accounting was subordinate to and in furtherance of the claim that
the government had wrongfully distributed royalty payments to
persons who were not Osage Indians. The same is true in both the
Second and Third Amended Complaints. And although the accounting
claim survived the 2012 dismissal of the wrongful distributions
claim, it became unmoored from its original scope and purpose of
identifying royalty payments to persons who were not Osage Indians.


This court finds and concludes that the government's position as a
whole was substantially justified based on the more prominent
claims.

Denial or Reduction Based Upon Special Circumstances

The court may deny or reduce an EAJA award if special circumstances
make an award unjust.

Reasonableness of Plaintiffs' Requested Fees

Having determined that plaintiffs have not incurred fees, and
because the government's position in this case as a whole was
substantially justified, the court need not address the
reasonableness of the requested fees.  

Plaintiffs' Request Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2412(b)

Plaintiffs also request fees and expenses under 28 U.S.C. Section
2412(b), which provides that the United States shall be liable for
such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any
statute which specifically provides for such an award. But a fee
award under Section 2412(b) is punitive, it requires more than a
showing of a weak or legally inadequate case and is only
appropriate in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of
justice. Because plaintiffs have not made such a showing, their
Section 2412(b) request is denied.

THE REQUEST FOR COSTS

The court previously ordered that the award of costs would be
limited to those costs identified in plaintiffs' Bill of Costs.
Plaintiffs requested a total of $34,839.61, consisting of (a)
$331.00 in fees of the Clerk; (b) $5,701.62 in fees for service of
summons and subpoenas; (c) $574.65 in fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in
the case; and (d) $28,232.34 in fees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case.

Fees of the Clerk

Plaintiffs requested $331.00 for fees of the Clerk in their Bill of
Costs. They now request $605.00, representing their initial filing
fee of $150.00 and $455.00 for an appellate filing fee paid in
2012. The government objects to the $455.00 not included in the
Bill of Costs, and notes that the $181.00 over the initial filing
fee of $150.00 lacks explanation. In reply, plaintiffs state they
had mistakenly included the filing fee for the first appeal already
awarded to Plaintiffs by the Tenth Circuit instead of the filing
fee from the 2012 appeal and corrected that in their Brief in
Support of Bill of Costs. But the appellate filing fee for the
first appeal was $255.00, not $181.00, and the Circuit subtracted
that fee from its award of costs, "as that fee is recoverable only
in district court.

Plaintiffs' request is limited by the amount requested in their
Bill of Costs. The court therefore finds that $331.00 in fees of
the Clerk, representing $150.00 for the initial filing fee and
$181.00 toward appellate filing fees, should be taxed to the
government.

Fees for Service of Summons and Subpoenas

Plaintiffs requested $5,701.62 in fees for service of summons and
subpoenas of the Clerk in their Bill of Costs. They now request
$18,209.36: (1) $5,701.62 for secretary of state fees, automated
mailing services, and service by publication and (2) $12,507.74 for
internal postage expenses. The first component is compensable; the
second is not. Postage expenses are not compensable under Section
1920. The court therefore finds that $5,701.62 in fees for service
of summons and subpoenas should be taxed to the government.

Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case

Plaintiffs request $574.65 for printed transcripts of court
hearings necessarily obtained for their use in filing briefs the
case. Upon review of the request and receipts submitted, the court
finds that $574.65 should be taxed to the government.

Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case, and fees and disbursements for printing
In support of its request to tax costs, plaintiffs submitted
invoices from an outside print shop for printing costs in the total
amount of $12,106.16 and an affidavit from the legal administrator
at Sneed Lang, PC, showing an additional $16,186.60 in in-house
copying costs.

Plaintiffs necessarily incurred substantial printing costs in order
to effectuate service of the Second Amended Complaint upon 1,740
non-Indian headright owners during the second half of 2009. The
1,740 defendants were added after the government prevailed on its
motion that non-Indian headright owners were required and
indispensable parties under FED. R. CIV. P. 19.

The court finds that these printing/copying costs were reasonably
incurred in order to provide the 1,740 additional defendants with
copies of the pleadings.  

In sum, the court taxes a total of $34,839.61 in EAJA costs,
consisting of $331.00 in filing fees, $5,701.62 in fees for service
of summons and subpoenas, $574.65 in transcript costs, and
$28,232.34 in copying costs.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is granted in part
and denied in part. The court denies plaintiffs' motion for
attorney fees and grants plaintiffs' motion for costs in the amount
of $34,839.61.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 21, 2019 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y4wju94vfrom Leagle.com.

William S Fletcher, Individually, and as member of the Osage
Development Council, Individually, and on behalf of themselves and
all others similary situated (added 6/12/09) & Charles A Pratt,
Individually, and as member of the Osage Development Council,
Plaintiffs, represented by Amanda Sue Proctor, Shiel Law Group PLC,
Dallas Lynn Dale Strimple, Aamodt Law Firm, J. David Jorgenson --
djorgenson@wjwattorneys.com -- Waller Jorgenson Warzynski PLLC,
Jason Bjorn Aamodt, Aamodt Law Firm, Evan Mcguire McLemore,
Levinson, Smith & Huffman, P.C., George Steven Stidham, Stidham
Law, PC, Lee Ira Levinson, Levinson, Smith & Huffman, P.C. &
Krystina Elizabeth Phillips, Indian and Environmental Law Group,
PLLC.

United States of America, Department of Interior & Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Separately and It's Assistant Secretary of the Interior -
Indian Affairs, Defendants, represented by Cathryn Dawn McClanahan,
United States Attorney's Office, Jeffrey Andrew Gallant, United
States Attorney's Office, John H. Martin, US Department of Justice,
Joseph Hosu Kim, US Department of Justice, Loretta Finiece Radford,
United States Attorney's Office & Barbara M.R. Marvin, US
Department of Justice.


UNUM GROUP: Faces Consolidated Securities Class Suit in Tennessee
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Unum Group said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 19, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the company remains a
defendant in a consolidated securities class action in Tennessee,
entitled In re Unum Group Securities Litigation

Three alleged securities class action lawsuits have been filed
against Unum Group and individual defendants as follows:

     * On June 13, 2018, an alleged securities class action lawsuit
entitled Cynthia Pittman v. Unum Group, Richard McKenney, John
McGarry, and Daniel Waxenberg was filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The plaintiff
seeks to represent purchasers of Unum Group publicly traded
securities between January 31, 2018 and May 2, 2018.

     * The plaintiff alleges the Company caused its shares to trade
at artificially high levels by failing to disclose information
about the rate of long-term care policy terminations and long-term
care claim incidence resulting in misleading statements about
capital management plans and long-term care reserves. The complaint
asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and seeks
compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

     * On July 13, 2018, an alleged securities class action lawsuit
entitled Scott Cunningham v. Unum Group, Richard McKenney, John
McGarry, and Daniel Waxenberg was filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The
allegations, class period, and damages claimed mirror those in the
Pittman matter.

     * On July 25, 2018, an alleged securities class action lawsuit
entitled City of Taylor Police and Fire Retirement System v. Unum
Group, Richard McKenney, John McGarry, Steve Zabel, and Daniel
Waxenberg was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee. The plaintiff seeks to represent
purchasers of Unum Group publicly traded securities between October
27, 2016 and May 1, 2018. The allegations and damages claimed
mirror those in the Pittman matter. The Company strongly denies
these allegations and will vigorously defend the litigation.

The Company strongly denies these allegations and will vigorously
defend the litigation.

On November 9, 2018, the court consolidated the Pittman,
Cunningham, and City of Taylor Police and Fire Retirement System
cases into one matter entitled In re Unum Group Securities
Litigation, appointed a lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff's
counsel, and directed the plaintiff to file a consolidated amended
complaint.

On January 15, 2019, the plaintiff filed a consolidated amended
complaint asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

Unum Group, together with its subsidiaries, provides financial
protection benefit solutions in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and internationally. It operates through Unum US, Unum
International, Colonial Life, and Closed Block segments. The
company was founded in 1848 and is based in Chattanooga,
Tennessee.


VALE SA: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by contacting
Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael
Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If
you suffered a loss, you can request that the Court appoint you as
lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Vale S.A. (NYSE: VALE)
Class Period: April 13, 2018 - January 28, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: March 29, 2019
For more info: www.bgandg.com/vale

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Vale had
failed to adequately assess the risk and damage potential of a dam
breach at its Feijão iron ore mine; (2) Vale's programs to
mitigate health and safety incidents were inadequate; (3)
consequently, several people were killed and hundreds more were
reported as missing after Vale's dam at its Feijão iron ore mine
was breached; and (4) as a result, defendants' statements about its
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email:  peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


VAN BUREN COUNTY, MI: Lawsuit Takes Aim at Use of Foreclosure Law
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rod Smith, writing for Herald Palladium,reports that the Van Buren
County Board has hired a Lansing-based law firm to defend itself
against a lawsuit challenging its enforcement of the state property
tax foreclosure law.

Commissioners hired the firm of Dykema Gossett to defend the county
in against a suit filed on behalf of Larry and Mary Jo Carlson of
Sawyer. The suit is now pending in the Berrien County court
system.

"This particular firm is well-versed in this issue," County
Administrator John Faul told commissioners.

Berrien County had foreclosed on the Carlson property because
$5,063 was owed in back taxes, fees and penalties. It then in turn
auctioned off the property in 2017 for $85,000. However, the suit
contends the fair market value of the property was $182,800,

Attorney Phillip Ellison, Esq., of Hemlock, Mich., alleges this is
illegal in three ways: by violating the takings clause of the U.S.
Constitution, plus violating the Eighth Amendment, which forbids
excessive fines, as well as violating the state law regarding
unjust enrichment.

Ellison argues that the Carlsons are owed $79,937 -- the difference
between the auctioned value and the taxes owed.

Though filed in Berrien County, the Carlson lawsuit is a
class-action suit that also names Van Buren, Cass, St. Joseph and
Kalamazoo counties, since they use the same process, the General
Property Tax Act, Public Act 123, according to Ellison. Ellison
said at this point they don't know how much money would be refunded
from those counties, should the lawsuit prevail.

"Statewide, we're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars,"
Ellison said. His plans are to file against 80 of the 83 counties
in the state. So far the suits cover all of the Lower Peninsula
except for Oakland, Wayne and Macomb counties. Ellison said the
state is also a defendant since some counties have the state
enforce PA 123.

A map and further explanation of the issue is available at
Ellison's website: www.michigantf.com. The website explaining the
issue from Ellison's point of view offers the following
explanation, under the heading: "What is this class action all
about?"

"Each year, county and state treasurers throughout Michigan seize
and sell thousands of properties from property owners who owe a
small amount of past due tax. Many of these parcels are worth
thousands or tens of thousands of dollars. Instead of returning the
excess sale proceeds or the "surplus equity" in excess of the tax
debt, treasurers simply keep the extra funds for the county's
general budget. It has become governance for profit to fill budget
shortcomings of county governments."

Van Buren County Treasurer Trisha Nesbitt wrote in a letter to the
county commission that, "The implications of this lawsuit could
have a profound impact on the collection of delinquent tax, our
ability to hold taxpayers accountable, and our county budget should
damages be awarded."

Nesbitt, who was not present on Feb 12 meeting, is new on the job
after taking over Jan. 16 from now-retired Treasurer Karen Makay.
Nesbitt said she is still reviewing the suit and at this point
doesn't know how much money is at stake.

Nesbitt said she is "passionate" about keeping people in their
homes and meets with five-to-seven people daily to work out payment
plans. "We refer folks to programs that may be of assistance,"
Nesbitt said, ticking off a number of such programs.

Although she doesn't have the monetary totals, Nesbitt said the
county auctioned off 64 properties last year.

Van Buren County Commission Chair Richard Godfrey said that the
lawsuit would, in effect, make the county act as a realtor on that
property after the owners have forfeited their rights.

The first hearing locally on the case is scheduled for 3 p.m. April
29, in Berrien County.

Ellison said a similar lawsuit, which he's not involved in, is
pending at the Michigan Supreme Court concerning Oakland and Wayne
counties. Should the plaintiff prevail it may affect the local
suit, he said.[GN]


VISA: November 7 Antitrust Settlement Approval Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------------
This notice is authorized by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York to inform merchants about an agreement
to settle a class action lawsuit that may affect them.

The lawsuit claims that Visa and Mastercard, separately, and
together with certain banks, violated antitrust laws and caused
merchants to pay excessive fees for accepting Visa and Mastercard
credit and debit cards. The defendants say they have done nothing
wrong and the Court has not decided who is right, but the parties
have agreed to a settlement. The Court has now given preliminary
approval to this settlement.

Under the settlement, Visa, Mastercard, and the bank defendants
have agreed to provide approximately $6.24 billion in class
settlement funds. Those funds are subject to a deduction to account
for certain merchants that exclude themselves, but in no event will
the deduction be greater than $700 million. The net class
settlement fund, after deducting court-awarded attorneys' fees and
costs, will be used to pay valid claims of merchants that accepted
Visa or Mastercard credit or debit cards at any time between
January 1, 2004 and January 25, 2019.

If the Court grants approval of the settlement, and if that
approval is affirmed on any appeals, every merchant that does not
exclude itself from the class by the deadline described below and
files a valid claim will get money from the class settlement fund.
The value of each claim will be based on the actual or estimated
interchange fees attributable to the merchant's Mastercard and Visa
payment card transactions from January 1, 2004 to January 25,
2019.

Merchants who are included in this lawsuit have the legal rights
and options explained below.

Exclude themselves from the Settlement Class. Merchants who exclude
themselves will not get any money from this settlement but can
individually sue the Defendants on their own at their own expense,
if they want to. Merchants who wish to exclude themselves must make
a written request, place it in an envelope, and mail it with
postage prepaid and postmarked no later than July 23, 2019, or send
it by overnight delivery shown as sent by July 23, 2019, to Class
Administrator, Payment Card Interchange Fee Settlement, P.O. Box
2530, Portland, OR 97208-2530.
Object to the settlement. The deadline to object is July 23, 2019.
To learn how to object, visit www.PaymentCardSettlement.com or call
1-800-625-6440. Note: Merchants who exclude themselves from the
Settlement Class cannot object to the settlement.
Eventually file a claim to ask for payment. To receive payment,
merchants will be required to fill out a claim form. Claims cannot
yet be filed. If the Court grants final approval, and if that
approval is affirmed on any appeals, the Court will approve a claim
form and set a claim deadline. Claim forms will then be mailed to
all identified merchants. When the time comes to file claims,
merchants can submit them via mail or email, or may file online at
www.PaymentCardSettlement.com.

For more information about these rights and options, visit:
www.PaymentCardSettlement.com.

Members of the Settlement Class who do not exclude themselves by
the deadline will be bound by the terms of this settlement,
including the release of claims against the released parties
provided in the settlement agreement, whether or not the members
file a claim for payment.

On November 7, 2019, there will be a Court hearing to decide
whether to approve the proposed settlement. The hearing also will
address the requests for attorneys' fees and expenses, and awards
for the Class Plaintiffs for their representation of merchants in
MDL 1720, which culminated in the settlement agreement. The hearing
will take place at:

         United States District Court for the
         Eastern District of New York
         225 Cadman Plaza
         Brooklyn, NY 11201

Members of the Settlement Class do not have to go to the Court
hearing or hire an attorney, but can if they want to, at their own
cost. The Court has appointed the law firms of Robins Kaplan LLP,
Berger Montague PC, and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as Rule
23(b)(3) Class Counsel to represent the Rule 23(b)(3) Settlement
Class. [GN]


VIZIO: Discloses $17MM Settlement in Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Greathouse, writing for KOAA.com Colorado Springs and
Pueblo News, reports that television manufacturer Vizio has
discloseda $17 million settlement in a class action lawsuit
stemming from privacy issues involving its products.

According to the lawsuit, some people who bought Vizio smart TVs
claim the company violated privacy and consumer protection laws by
collecting information, called "Viewing Data," about what was seen
on the devices from Feb. 1, 2014  to Feb. 6, 2017.

Vizio denies those allegations, but will pay $17 million into a
settlement fund related to the lawsuit. It will also delete all
Viewing Data collected during the class period.

Funds from the settlement are available to people who bought one of
the Smart TVs for home or personal use, and had it connected to the
Internet during the above time period.

The company also now provides a notice of Viewing Data collection,
and asks for consent before collecting the information.

Vizio has set up a website with more information on the settlement.
Customers who are part of the class can also file a claim at the
website.

Class members have until April 29 to file a claim. Vizio estimates
affected customers will collect between $13 and $31 per
television.

Only one purchaser per Smart TV can submit a claim, but those who
bought more than one qualifying television can file a claim for
each TV.

Those who are not sure if they are included in the class can call
877-252-4685.[GN]


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Claims in Deras Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSAURA DERAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP
OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05452-JST (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss
certain claims in the second amended complaint ("SAC").

The putative class action asserts various claims against Defendant
VW based on allegations that VW fails to warn consumers about the
dangers of "sunroofs which spontaneously shatter."  The Court
denied VW's motion to dismiss the implied warranty claims from the
first amended complaint ("FAC") but dismissed the unjust enrichment
claim with prejudice.  The Court dismissed, with leave to amend,
the unfair competition law ("UCL"), California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and fraud by omission claims after
concluding that the FAC did not adequately allege that VW had
knowledge of the alleged defect at the time of sale or lease.

Plaintiff Deras filed a timely SAC, which adds Alexander Santiago
and Maria Elena Santiago as potential named Plaintiffs.  The SAC
also adds allegations relevant to VW's knowledge of the alleged
defect.  VW contends that the Plaintiffs' allegations of knowledge
remain deficient and moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' UCL, CLRA,
and fraud by omission claims with prejudice.

Judge Tigar does not find persuasive the SAC's conclusory
allegation that 57 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") complaints represents in fact an unusually high number of
complaints sufficient to alert VW of the defect.  Even if the Judge
assumes as true the SAC's next allegation that consumers are more
likely to complain to "their dealership or VW corporate" than to
the NHTSA, and that VW therefore had received more complaints than
the NHTSA, it would be speculative to conclude that VW must
therefore have received "an unusually high number of complaints"
relative to the "potentially hundreds of thousands or more" Class
Vehicles.  Standing alone, the allegations of consumer complaints
are therefore insufficient to allege knowledge.  Nonetheless, the
Judge concludes that the allegations in the SAC, when taken as a
whole and viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, are
sufficient.  The SAC's allegations are sufficient to raise a
plausible inference of knowledge.

In conjunction with its reply brief, VW requests judicial notice of
three documents related to its prior recalls of VW and Audi
vehicles not at issue in the case.  The Plaintiffs have not had an
opportunity to respond to these documents.  But even if the Court
were to consider them, they would not require a different result.
As to VW's recall of 2013-15 Beetles, the Court previously
explained that VW characterizes the cause of the recall as a
one-time manufacturing defect, but construing the allegations in a
light most favorable to Deras, it is reasonable to infer that
sunroofs with similar designs might experience the same defect.
The same reasoning applies to VW's characterization of the Audi
recalls as due to a production process issue at the sunroof glass
supplier.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Tigar denide VW's motion to
dismiss certain claims in the Plaintiffs' second amended
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RLrJB0 from Leagle.com.

Rosaura Deras, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Morris Rose
-- adam@starrlaw.com -- The Law Office of Robert L. Starr, APC,
Matthew Anthony Giovannucci -- matthew@starrlaw.com -- The Law
Office Robert L. Starr, APC, Robert L. Starr -- robert@starrlaw.com
-- The Law Office of Robert L. Starr, APC & Stephen Massong Harris
-- stephen@smh-legal.com -- The Law Offices of Stephen M. Harris,
APC.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Craig
Lee Winterman -- cwinterman@hrllp-law.com -- Herzfeld & Rubin LLP,
Gary Steven Yates -- gyates@hrllp-law.com -- Herzfeld & Rubin LLP,
Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com -- Herzfeld &
Rufin, P.C., pro hac vice & Michael B. Gallub --
MGallub@herzfeld-rubin.com -- Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., pro hac
vice.


WASHINGTON: Denial of Gronquist's Bid for Contempt as Moot Flipped
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEREK GRONQUIST, Appellant, RICHARD KING and RICHARD
JACKSON, individually and representing a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON and KING COUNTY PROSECUTOR DANIEL
SATTERBURG, Respondents. CHASE RIVELAND and JANET BARBOUR, in their
official capacities; the INDETERMINATE SENTENCING REVIEW BOARD; and
KEN EIKENBERRY, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the
State of Washington, Defendants, Case No. 49392-6-II (Wash. App.),
Judge Rich Melnick of the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division
II, (i) reversed the trial court's order denying Gronquist's motion
for contempt as moot; and (ii) remanded for the court to rule on
the contempt motion.

Gronquist was convicted in 1988 of two felony sex offenses.  He
entered the Sexual Offender Treatment Program ("SOTP").  

In 1991, some convicted sex offenders who had participated in the
SOTP brought a class action lawsuit against DOC to enjoin the
release of their SOTP files.  The SOTP files included extensive
information about the individual's psychological evaluations,
treatment progress, answers to tests, DOC evaluation results, staff
notes on therapy sessions, relapse prevention plans, and other
documents.  The case resulted in a permanent injunction (King
injunction) prohibiting DOC from releasing any documents from any
class member's SOTP file.

After being convicted of two sex offenses in 1988, Gronquist
entered the SOTP program.  Although not a named party in King,
Gronquist fell within the class of persons protected by the King
injunction.

In July 2015, Gronquist intervened in the 1991 case that resulted
in the King injunction.  He alleged that DOC violated the King
injunction by sharing his SOTP file with King County Prosecutor
("KCP").  Gronquist filed a motion for an order to show cause why
DOC and KCP should not be held in contempt.  Gronquist alleged that
DOC had forwarded KCP his entire SOTP file in February 2013 when
KCP planned to initiate civil commitment proceedings against
Gronquist.

KCP moved to vacate or modify the King injunction as to Gronquist
because of law changes since the Supreme Court had upheld the
injunction in 1995.  DOC joined this motion.

On Jan. 14, 2016, the trial court entered a written order vacating
the injunction as to Gronquist.  The court noted that the law had
changed significantly since the injunction was entered and that
changes to SVP statutes unequivocally require disclosure to the
prosecuting attorney of all records, including complete SOTP files,
in connection with Sexually Violent Predator proceedings.  The
court concluded that the vacation of the injunction as to
Gronquist, would not directly affect the current contempt action.
It clarified that its decision was prospective only, and did not
resolve allegations of contempt in the past.

After the injunction had been vacated and the Court declined
review, DOC provided KCP with Gronquist's complete SOTP file.

DOC and KCP argued that Gronquist's motion for contempt was moot
because DOC was no longer prohibited from releasing the SOTP file.
They claimed that, because the purpose of civil contempt was to
coerce parties to obey court orders, no remaining remedy existed
because KCP now lawfully possessed the SOTP file.  They argued that
any remedy would be punitive, which would require criminal contempt
charges and new proceedings initiated by a prosecutor.  The trial
court agreed and denied Gronquist's motion for contempt as moot.

Gronquist appeals.  Gronquist contends that the trial court erred
by denying his contempt motion on the basis of mootness.  He
contends that his contempt motion was not moot because the trial
court could have required DOC and KCP to compensate him "for his
injuries, costs, and attorney fees.

Judge Melnick agrees.  He opines that the issue of mootness is
about whether the court is able to provide effective relief.  DOC's
and KCP's arguments that Gronquist has not shown any losses do not
go to mootness but to whether he can show damages.  A court has
authority to order DOC and KCP to compensate Gronquist for any
losses he suffered as a result of their alleged contempt.  The
trial court denied Gronquist's motion for contempt as moot without
reaching the issue of whether contempt actually occurred or whether
Gronquist suffered any losses as a result.  If Gronquist can prove
DOC and KCP are in contempt, then he can recover losses that he
proves resulted from the disclosure of his SOTP file. The court can
award him compensatory relief.  Therefore, Gronquist's motion for
contempt is not moot.

The Judge reversed the trial court's order denying Gronquist's
motion for contempt as moot, and remanded for the court to rule on
the contempt motion.

A majority of the panel having determined that the Opinion will not
be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed
for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so
ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2019 Unpublished Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/3N1HE8 from Leagle.com.

Derek Gronquist (Appearing Pro Se), 943857 Monroe Corr Complex, Po
Box 888 A-507-2, Twin Rivers Unit, Monroe, WA, 98272, Counsel for
Appellant.

Douglas Wayne Carr, Attorney at Law, 1125 Washington St Se, Po Box
40116, Olympia, WA, 98504-0116. David J. Hackett, King County
Administration Building, 500 4th Ave Ste 900, Seattle, WA,
98104-2316, Counsel for Respondent(s).


WENDY'S: To Pay $50MM in Class-Action Data Breach Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Henry, writing for Government Technology, reports that
Wendy's will pay $50 million to settle a class-action lawsuit from
a data breach that hit more than 1,000 of its restaurants in 2015
and 2016.

On Feb. 13, the Ohio-based burger chain disclosed the pending
agreement with financial institutions that alleged Wendy's did not
protect customer credit card information. Wendy's said it will pay
$27.5 million of the settlement, with the rest covered by
insurance.

"With this settlement, we have now reached agreements in principle
to resolve all of the outstanding legal matters related to these
criminal cyberattacks," Todd Penegor, Wendy's president and CEO,
said in a news release.

Wendy's said 1,025 stores, all owned by franchisees, had malware
that could have stolen customer data, such as credit or debit card
numbers, names, expiration dates, and more. Of the restaurants, 20
were in central Ohio.

"We look forward to putting this behind us so that we can continue
to focus on growing the Wendy's brand," Penegor said.[GN]


WINN MANAGED: Olsen Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
------------------------------------------------------
Winn Managed Properties, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Winn Managed Properties, LLC doing
business as: Diego Beekman, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01316
(E.D. N.Y., March 6, 2019).

Winn Managed Properties, LLC is a licensed real estate service
provider in Boston, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


WIRECARD AG: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Wirecard AG (OTC: WCAGY, WRCDF) from April 7, 2016
through February 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Wirecard investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Wirecard class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1499.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) for the period
spanning from 2015 to 2018, a senior Wirecard executive in
Singapore had been accused of forging and backdating contracts,
including falsifying accounts and money laundering; (2) an external
law firm commissioned to investigate Wirecard's Singapore office
had reportedly found evidence of "serious offences of forgery
and/or of falsification of accounts"; (3) Wirecard had downplayed
weaknesses in its internal controls over financial reporting and
failed to disclose the true extent of those weaknesses; and (4) as
a result, defendants' statements about Wirecard's business,
operations and prospects were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than April 9,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1499.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


[*] America's Securities Class Action System Needs Urgent Reform
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sue Reisinger, writing for Corporate Counsel, reports that
America's securities class action system sits in "a broken state"
and urgently needs to be fixed, according to new research from the
U.S. Chamber's Institute for Legal Reform.

The Institute held a press briefing on Feb. 26 and released two
research reports to substantiate its claims that plaintiffs and
their lawyers are abusing the legal system.

Mayer Brown partner Andrew Pincus, who spoke at the briefing and
prepared one of the research reports, told Corporate Counsel that
general counsel should consider such litigation a serious threat.

"The data show that public companies today have the highest
possibility of being sued of any time in history," Mr. Pincus said.
"That's basically means every single year, one in every 12 public
companies is being sued in a securities class action."

And they are not small cases, he said. "They are the aircraft
carriers of litigation, with huge costs and huge liabilities. For
any general counsel, that's a concern," Mr. Pincus explained.

Harold Kim, chief operating officer of the Institute, said a key
message from the briefing was that security class actions are "back
with a vengeance. Filings are up. Hourly fees claimed by
plaintiffs' bar and which haven't been vetted carefully by the
courts, are significantly up."

Kim said general counsel and the entire business community need to
know that this exploding litigation is a problem. "Today really was
for us a declaration that enough is enough and something needs to
be done," he added.

One research report, titled Risk and Reward: The Securities Fraud
Class Action Lottery, was prepared by three law professors: Stephen
Choi of New York University School of Law, Jessica Erickson of the
University of Richmond School of Law, and Adam Pritchard of the
University of Michigan Law School.

Their report says, "The high dismissal rate in such cases—roughly
half—along with the high incidence of "nuisance
settlements"—cases settled for less than defense costs—suggest
that the plaintiffs' bar brings cases that are either meritless or
not cost justified. These data leave open the possibility that
these cases are being filed purely for extortion value."

The second report prepared by Mr. Pincus, called Containing the
Contagion, offers proposals to fix what he calls a broken system.

"Federal courts have been hit by an avalanche of cases alleging
misstatements in connection with a public company's merger or
acquisition—virtually every deal valued at over $100 million is
hit by a lawsuit," the report states.

A second wave of security class actions has arisen from adverse
events in a company's underlying business, such as a data breach or
environmental disaster. These suits claim a company defrauded
investors "by failing to warn that the adverse event might occur,
even though these events are -- by definition -- unexpected," the
report explains.

It says the data confirm that these new waves of lawsuits are
characterized by unjustified, abusive claims. "Federal securities
cases are being dismissed at a greater rate, and those cases not
dismissed are settled, most for an amount less than or equal to the
cost of defending the lawsuit," it says.

The Pincus report goes on to say federal courts have not yet
identified "effective tools for deterring the filing of unjustified
claims leading to ‘settlements' that reward the plaintiffs'
lawyers with fees but provide only meaningless disclosures to
investors, who of course pay the bills for the plaintiffs' lawyers
and the defense lawyers and for wasted management time."

The document recommends several changes, including:

   -- The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission should study the
state of private securities class action litigation and issue a
paper acknowledging the problem of abusive lawsuits.
   -- The SEC also should file amicus briefs in these cases,
informing federal courts of the serious nature of the problem and
urging them to prevent cases from being used to extort unjustified
attorneys' fees.
   -- Congress should enact legislation to limit how many times a
person can serve as a plaintiff in these cases, amend the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to help stop abusive
lawsuits, and adopt a cap on damages. [GN]


[*] Mintz Attorneys Discuss Litigation Implications of SBRA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joshua Briones, Esq. -- JBriones@mintz.com -- and Matthew Novian,
Esq. -- MJNovian@mintz.com -- of Mintz Communications, in an
article for The National Law Review, report that a. Current State
of the Automated Telephone Dialing System and a Congressional
Resolution, the Stopping Bad Robocalls Act By this time next year,
the TCPA landscape may look very different. A uniform Automated
Telephone Dialing System ("ATDS") definition, binding FCC guidance,
a Congressional amendment to the TCPA; these are all possibilities,
and at least one is likely to stick. With all these permutations in
play, litigants should consider seeking a stay pending definitive
guidance.

Most recently, on February 4, 2019, the Stopping Bad Robocalls Act
("SBRA" HR 946) was reintroduced in the House of Representatives.
Among its proposals, the SBRA would amend the TCPA by replacing the
phrase to "use an Automatic Telephone Dialing System" with "to make
robocalls." This Congressional proposal comes amid forthcoming FCC
guidance on the ATDS definition and the Supreme Court's decision in
PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc., which may
determine whether the FCC's forthcoming legal interpretations of
the TCPA are binding on District Courts. 138 S. Ct. 478 (2019).
Moreover, the defendant in Marks v. Crunch San Diego filed its writ
of certiorari on January 29, 2019 seeking review of the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the ATDS definition. Of these options,
however, an Act of Congress would be determinative.

B. Litigation Implications if the SBRA Is Implemented
If enacted, the SBRA will supersede any ATDS interpretation offered
by the FCC or Supreme Court. In its proposed form, the SBRA will
strike the phrase "use an Automatic Telephone Dialing System"
inserting "make robocalls," defined as:

A) using equipment that makes a series of calls to stored telephone
numbers, including numbers stored on a list, or to telephone
numbers produced using a random or sequential number generator,
except for a call made using only equipment that the caller
demonstrates requires substantial additional human intervention to
dial or place a call after a human initiates the series of calls;
or B) using an artificial or prerecorded voice. See SBRA of 2019,
H.R. 946.

At first glance, the "robocall" definition bears a striking
resemblance to the current "ATDS" definition including references
to "stored telephone numbers," and use of a "random or sequential
number generator." Id. On closer examination, however, the SBRA
definition aligns with Marks in regards to number generation, but
challenges Marks's dismissal of the human intervention test. Marks
v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018). This
codification of the human intervention test can be a powerful tool
for litigants going forward.

The SBRA's amendment would create a cause of action under the TCPA
whether or not a dialer has the capacity to produce numbers using a
random or sequential number generator. Courts have wrestled with
whether technology needs to generate telephone numbers to qualify
as an ATDS.[1] The SBRA, however, would likely clarify the point
and open the door to technology that either generates numbers or
dials them from a list.

However, the SBRA formalizes a defense based on substantial human
intervention, a judicial rule Markspotentially negated. Marks, 904
F.3d at 1053 (reading an ATDS to include equipment with capacity to
dial numbers automatically "even if the system must be turned on or
triggered by a person."); Herrick v. GoDaddy.com LLC, 312 F. Supp.
3d 792 (finding a provider did not use an ATDS where it had to "log
into system, create a message, schedule a time to send it, and
enter a code to authorize its ultimate transmission."). Without
more, however, courts will have to continue deciding what
"substantial additional" human intervention actually means.

C. Additional Proposal within the SBRA Seeking to Amend the TCPA
In addition to the ATDS amendment, the SBRA also proposes to curb
the rise of robocalls by:

   -- Amending the TCPA to ensure that the FCC has the authority
and the tools to take strong, quick action when it tracks down
robocallers;

   -- Allowing consumers to revoke consent they had previously
given to receive calls at any time and in any reasonable manner;

   -- Codifying a reassigned number database to put robocallers on
notice when a telephone number they may have previously been
authorized to call has been given to a new customer who has not
authorized their call;

   -- Limiting the number of robocalls exempted from the TCPA under
the FCC's rules;

   -- Requiring calls to have verified caller identification
information associated with a call before the call can be put
through; and

   -- Extending the statute of limitations from one year to four
years for callers violating robocall prohibitions.

See, Pallone Reintroduces Bill to Stop Robocalls, Press Release,
February 4, 2019
https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-reintroduces-bill-to-stop-robocalls

D. Litigation Recommendation
Because it appears ever more likely that the ATDS definition is set
to change, or be removed altogether, litigants should consider
seeking a stay pending 1) FCC guidance on the ATDS definition; 2)
the Supreme Court's decision in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton &
Harris Chiropractic Inc.; 3) the Supreme Court's decision to grant
certiorari in Marks v. Crunch San Diego; or 4) Congress's decision
to pass or reject the SBRA.

[1] See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1043 ("the statutory definition of ATDS
includes a device that stores telephone numbers to be called,
whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or
sequential number generator."); Cf. Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894
F.3d 116 (3d. Cir.) (Finding Plaintiff failed to establish use of
ATDS absent any evidence that the system had capacity to generate
random or sequential telephone numbers and dial those numbers, as
opposed to sending messages only to numbers individually and
manually inputted into its system by a user.). [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 119 Suits v Sempra Energy Units Pending at Feb. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy's units have 119 asbestos-related personal injury
lawsuits pending as of February 21, 2019, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 26, 2019, for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2018.

The Company states, "Certain EFH subsidiaries that we acquired as
part of the Merger are defendants in personal injury lawsuits
brought in state courts throughout the U.S. As of February 21,
2019, 119 such lawsuits are pending, and 1,685 such lawsuits have
been filed but not served.  These cases allege illness or death as
a result of exposure to asbestos in power plants designed and/or
built by companies whose assets were purchased by predecessor
entities to the EFH subsidiaries, and generally assert claims for
product defects, negligence, strict liability and wrongful death.
They seek compensatory and punitive damages.  Additionally, in
connection with the EFH bankruptcy proceeding, approximately 28,000
proofs of claim were filed on behalf of persons who allege exposure
to asbestos under similar circumstances and assert the right to
file such lawsuits in the future.  We anticipate additional
lawsuits will be filed.  None of these claims or lawsuits were
discharged in the EFH bankruptcy proceeding."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2JmxY1G


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 343 Cases vs. AK Steel Still Pending at Dec. 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
AK Steel Holding Corporation had 343 asbestos-related cases pending
at December 31, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Since 1990 we have been named as a defendant
in numerous lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos.  The great majority of these lawsuits have
been filed on behalf of people who claim to have been exposed to
asbestos while visiting the premises of one of our current or
former facilities.  The majority of asbestos cases pending in which
we are a defendant do not include a specific dollar claim for
damages.  In the cases that do include specific dollar claims for
damages, the complaint typically includes a monetary claim for
compensatory damages and a separate monetary claim in an equal
amount for punitive damages, and does not attempt to allocate the
total monetary claim among the various defendants.

"Since the onset of asbestos claims against us in 1990, five
asbestos claims against us have proceeded to trial in four separate
cases.  All five concluded with a verdict in our favor.  We
continue to vigorously defend the asbestos claims.  Based upon
present knowledge, and the factors, we believe it is unlikely that
the resolution in the aggregate of the asbestos claims against us
will have a materially adverse effect on our consolidated results
of operations, cash flows or financial condition.  However,
predictions about the outcome of pending litigation, particularly
claims alleging asbestos exposure, are subject to substantial
uncertainties.  These uncertainties include (1) the significantly
variable rate at which new claims may be filed, (2) the effect of
bankruptcies of other companies currently or historically defending
asbestos claims, (3) the litigation process from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from case to case, (4) the type and severity of
the disease each claimant alleged to suffer, and (5) the potential
for enactment of legislation affecting asbestos litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2IVvmYk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AIG Defends Indemnity Claims Asserting Injuries
----------------------------------------------------------------
American International Group, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that it continues to receive
indemnity claims asserting injuries from asbestos.

The Company states, "We continue to receive claims asserting
injuries and damages from toxic waste, hazardous substances, and
other environmental pollutants and alleged claims to cover the
cleanup costs of hazardous waste dump sites, referred to
collectively as environmental claims, and indemnity claims
asserting injuries from asbestos.  The vast majority of these
asbestos and environmental losses emanate from policies written in
1984 and prior years.  Commencing in 1985, standard policies
contained absolute exclusions for pollution-related damage and
asbestos.  The current environmental policies that we specifically
price and underwrite for environmental risks on a claims-made basis
have been excluded from the analysis.

"The majority of our exposures for asbestos and environmental
losses are related to excess casualty coverages, not primary
coverages.  The litigation costs are treated in the same manner as
indemnity amounts, with litigation expenses included within the
limits of the liability we incur.  Individual significant loss
reserves, where future litigation costs are reasonably
determinable, are established on a case-by-case basis.

"The estimation of liability for loss reserves and loss adjustment
expenses relating to asbestos and environmental pollution losses on
insurance policies written many years ago is typically subject to
greater uncertainty than other types of losses.  This is due to
inconsistent court decisions, as well as judicial interpretations
and legislative actions that in some cases have tended to broaden
coverage beyond the original intent of such policies or have
expanded theories of liability.  In addition, reinsurance
recoverable balances relating to asbestos and environmental loss
reserves are subject to greater uncertainty due to the underlying
age of the claim, underlying legal issues surrounding the nature of
the coverage, and determination of proper policy period.  For these
reasons, these balances tend to be subject to increased levels of
disputes and legal collection activity when actually billed.  The
insurance industry as a whole is engaged in extensive litigation
over these coverage and liability issues and is thus confronted
with a continuing uncertainty in its efforts to quantify these
exposures.

"In 2018, we recognized no change on the retained portion of
asbestos claims.  The development on the portion of the asbestos
business ceded to NICO was unfavorable by US$96 million on a gross
basis, but had no net impact.  For environmental, we recognized
US$150 million in unfavorable prior year development as a result of
adverse claim emergence and top-down actuarial analyses performed
during the year.

"In 2017, we recognized favorable net prior year development of
US$37 million on the retained portion of asbestos claims.  This was
primarily due to additional reinsurance recoveries identified for
this portfolio.  The development on the portion of the asbestos
business ceded to NICO was unfavorable by US$50 million on a gross
basis, but had no net impact.  For environmental, we recognized
US$22 million in unfavorable prior year development in
consideration of activity related to several large clean-up sites
and related accounts as well as a result of top-down actuarial
analyses performed during the year.  As part of this analysis, we
increased our estimates of unallocated loss adjustment expense
reserves for such claims, which were partially offset by a decrease
in indemnity reserves.

"In 2016, we increased gross undiscounted asbestos incurred losses
by US$106 million and decreased net undiscounted asbestos incurred
losses by US$20 million.  The gross undiscounted change reflects an
increase in estimates related to our accounts retroceded to NICO.
The favorable development of the net incurred losses was largely a
result of higher estimated external reinsurance recoveries on our
retained asbestos exposures.  For environmental, we increased
incurred losses by US$211 million primarily due to unfavorable
development on several large clean-up sites and related accounts as
well as a result of top down actuarial analyses performed during
the year."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2H8VAVA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Allstate Had $866MM Claim Reserves at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Allstate Corporation had US$866 million reserves for asbestos
claims net of reinsurance recoverables of US$400 million as of
December 31, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Allstate's reserves for asbestos claims were
US$866 million and US$884 million, net of reinsurance recoverables
of US$400 million and US$412 million, as of December 31, 2018 and
2017, respectively.  Reserves for environmental claims were US$170
million and US$166 million, net of reinsurance recoverables of
US$39 million and US$33 million, as of December 31, 2018 and 2017,
respectively.

"The Company establishes reserves for claims and claims expense on
reported and unreported claims of insured losses.  The Company's
reserving process takes into account known facts and
interpretations of circumstances and factors including the
Company's experience with similar cases, actual claims paid,
historical trends involving claim payment patterns and pending
levels of unpaid claims, loss management programs, product mix and
contractual terms, changes in law and regulation, judicial
decisions, and economic conditions.  In the normal course of
business, the Company may also supplement its claims processes by
utilizing third party adjusters, appraisers, engineers, inspectors,
and other professionals and information sources to assess and
settle catastrophe and non-catastrophe related claims.  The effects
of inflation are implicitly considered in the reserving process."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2TnZSPe


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Inc. Still Defends Lawsuits at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
AMETEK, Inc. remains a defendant in a number of asbestos-related
lawsuits, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2018.

AMETEK, Inc. states, "The Company (including its subsidiaries) has
been named as a defendant in a number of asbestos-related lawsuits.
Certain of these lawsuits relate to a business which was acquired
by the Company and do not involve products which were manufactured
or sold by the Company.  In connection with these lawsuits, the
seller of such business has agreed to indemnify the Company against
these claims (the "Indemnified Claims").

"The Indemnified Claims have been tendered to, and are being
defended by, such seller.  The seller has met its obligations, in
all respects, and the Company does not have any reason to believe
such party would fail to fulfill its obligations in the future.

"To date, no judgments have been rendered against the Company as a
result of any asbestos-related lawsuit.  The Company believes that
it has good and valid defenses to each of these claims and intends
to defend them vigorously."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2XWemES


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CBS Corp. Had 31,570 Claims Pending at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
CBS Corporation had approximately 31,570 asbestos-related claims
pending as of December 31, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

CBS Corporation states, "The Company is a defendant in lawsuits
claiming various personal injuries related to asbestos and other
materials, which allegedly occurred as a result of exposure caused
by various products manufactured by Westinghouse, a predecessor,
generally prior to the early 1970s.  Westinghouse was neither a
producer nor a manufacturer of asbestos.  The Company is typically
named as one of a large number of defendants in both state and
federal cases.  In the majority of asbestos lawsuits, the
plaintiffs have not identified which of the Company's products is
the basis of a claim.  Claims against the Company in which a
product has been identified most commonly relate to allegations of
exposure to asbestos-containing insulating material used in
conjunction with turbines.

"Claims are frequently filed and/or settled in groups, which may
make the amount and timing of settlements, and the number of
pending claims, subject to significant fluctuation from period to
period.  The Company does not report as pending those claims on
inactive, stayed, deferred or similar dockets that some
jurisdictions have established for claimants who allege minimal or
no impairment.  As of December 31, 2018, the Company had pending
approximately 31,570 asbestos claims, as compared with
approximately 31,660 as of December 31, 2017 and 33,610 as of
December 31, 2016.  During 2018, the Company received approximately
3,290 new claims and closed or moved to an inactive docket
approximately 3,380 claims.  The Company reports claims as closed
when it becomes aware that a dismissal order has been entered by a
court or when the Company has reached agreement with the claimants
on the material terms of a settlement.  Settlement costs depend on
the seriousness of the injuries that form the basis of the claims,
the quality of evidence supporting the claims and other factors.
The Company's total costs for the years 2018 and 2017 for
settlement and defense of asbestos claims after insurance
recoveries and net of tax were approximately US$45 million and
US$57 million, respectively.  The Company's costs for settlement
and defense of asbestos claims may vary year to year and insurance
proceeds are not always recovered in the same period as the insured
portion of the expenses.

"Filings include claims for individuals suffering from
mesothelioma, a rare cancer, the risk of which is allegedly
increased by exposure to asbestos; lung cancer, a cancer which may
be caused by various factors, one of which is alleged to be
asbestos exposure; other cancers, and conditions that are
substantially less serious, including claims brought on behalf of
individuals who are asymptomatic as to an allegedly
asbestos-related disease.  The predominant number of pending claims
against the Company are non-cancer claims.  The Company believes
that its reserves and insurance are adequate to cover its asbestos
liabilities.  This belief is based upon many factors and
assumptions, including the number of outstanding claims, estimated
average cost per claim, the breakdown of claims by disease type,
historic claim filings, costs per claim of resolution and the
filing of new claims.  While the number of asbestos claims filed
against the Company has remained generally flat in recent years, it
is difficult to predict future asbestos liabilities, as events and
circumstances may occur, including, among others, the number and
types of claims and average cost to resolve such claims, which
could affect the Company's estimate of its asbestos liabilities."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2H2ky8Y


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Claims vs. Sealed Air's Units in Canada Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sealed Air Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2018, that it could be required to pay substantial
damages for asbestos claims involving its Canadian subsidiaries,
although the possibility is remote.

The Company states, "In November 2004, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary Sealed Air (Canada) Co./Cie learned that it had been
named a defendant in the case of Thundersky v. The Attorney General
of Canada, et al. (File No. CI4-1-39818), pending in the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench.  Grace and W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. were also
named as defendants.  The plaintiff brought the claim as a putative
class proceeding and sought recovery for alleged injuries suffered
by any Canadian resident, other than in the course of employment,
as a result of Grace's marketing, selling, processing,
manufacturing, distributing and/or delivering asbestos or
asbestos-containing products in Canada prior to the Cryovac
Transaction.  A plaintiff filed another proceeding in January 2005
in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench naming the Company and
specified subsidiaries as defendants.  The latter proceeding, Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Manitoba v. The
Attorney General of Canada, et al. (File No. CI5-1-41069), sought
the recovery of the cost of insured health services allegedly
provided by the Government of Manitoba to the members of the class
of plaintiffs in the Thundersky proceeding.  In October 2005, we
learned that six additional putative class proceedings had been
brought in various provincial and federal courts in Canada seeking
recovery from the Company and its subsidiaries Cryovac, Inc. and
Sealed Air (Canada) Co./Cie, as well as other defendants including
W.R. Grace & Co. and W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn., for alleged injuries
suffered by any Canadian resident, other than in the course of
employment (except with respect to one of these six claims), as a
result of Grace's marketing, selling, manufacturing, processing,
distributing and/or delivering asbestos or asbestos-containing
products in Canada prior to the Cryovac transaction.  Grace and
W.R.  Grace & Co.-Conn. agreed to defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the Company and its affiliates in respect of any liability
and expense, including legal fees and costs, in these actions.

"In April 2001, Grace Canada, Inc. had obtained an order of the
Superior Court of Justice, Commercial List, Toronto (the "Canadian
Court"), recognizing the Chapter 11 actions in the United States of
America involving Grace Canada, Inc.'s U.S. parent corporation and
other affiliates of Grace Canada, Inc., and enjoining all new
actions and staying all current proceedings against Grace Canada,
Inc. related to asbestos under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act.  That order was renewed repeatedly.  In November 2005, upon
motion by Grace Canada, Inc., the Canadian Court ordered an
extension of the injunction and stay to actions involving asbestos
against the Company and its Canadian affiliate and the Attorney
General of Canada, which had the effect of staying all of the
Canadian actions.  The parties finalized a global settlement of
these Canadian actions (except for claims against the Canadian
government).  That settlement, which has subsequently been amended
(the "Canadian Settlement"), will be entirely funded by Grace.  The
Canadian Court issued an Order on December 13, 2009 approving the
Canadian Settlement.  We do not have any positive obligations under
the Canadian Settlement, but we are a beneficiary of the release of
claims.  The release in favor of the Grace parties (including us)
became operative upon the effective date of a plan of
reorganization in Grace's United States Chapter 11bankruptcy
proceeding.  As filed, the Plan contemplates that the claims
released under the Canadian Settlement will be subject to
injunctions under Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The
Confirmation Orders with respect to the Plan were entered by the
Bankruptcy Court on January 31, 2011 and February 15, 2011 and the
District Court on January 30, 2012 and on June 11, 2012.  The
Canadian Court issued an Order on April 8, 2011 recognizing and
giving full effect to the Bankruptcy Court's Confirmation Order in
all provinces and territories of Canada in accordance with the
Bankruptcy Court Confirmation Order's terms.

"The Plan became effective on February 3, 2014.  In accordance with
the December 13, 2009 order of the Canadian court, on the Effective
Date the actions became permanently stayed until they were amended
to remove the Grace parties as named defendants.  The actions in
the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench were dismissed by the Manitoba
court as against the Grace parties on February 19, 2014.  The
remaining actions were either dismissed or discontinued with
prejudice by the Canadian courts as against the Grace parties in
May and June 2015, but for two actions in the Province of Quebec,
which were discontinued by order of the Quebec court in February
2016.  Although we believe the possibility to be remote, if the
Canadian courts refuse to enforce the final plan of reorganization
in the Canadian courts, and if in addition Grace is unwilling or
unable to defend and indemnify the Company and its subsidiaries in
these cases, then we could be required to pay substantial damages,
which we cannot estimate at this time and which could have a
material adverse effect on our consolidated financial condition and
results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2UqRBa2


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Denies Zurn's Bid for Funding Order
----------------------------------------------------------
In her Memorandum Opinion in the case entitled Zurn Industries,
LLC, as Successor in Interest to Zurn Industries, Inc., Plaintiff,
v. Allstate Insurance Company, individually and as successor in
interest to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company
(formerly Northbrook Insurance Company), et al., Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-299-SPB, (W.D. Pa.), Judge Susan Paradise Baxter of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has
denied Zurn's Motion for an Expedited Interim Funding Order against
Defendants First State Insurance Company and New England Insurance
Company.

The action arises out of an insurance coverage dispute between
Plaintiff Zurn Industries, LLC, as Successor in Interest to Zurn
Industries, Inc. and certain insurance carriers that provided
secondary or excess insurance coverage to Zurn for asbestos-related
personal injury claims.

Zurn is a company that has historically been engaged in the
construction business and the manufacturing, sale and distribution
of boilers. Over the years, Zurn has insured against these risks
through a number of layered insurance policies.  For purposes of
Zurn's current motion, however, the Court is concerned with several
layers of insurance that Zurn maintained during the mid-1980s.

During the period April 1, 1983 through April 1, 1986, Zurn had a
primary commercial general liability insurance policy with
Travelers Casualty and Surety Company -- a combined single limit of
$2 million per occurrence and in the aggregate for asbestos-related
bodily injury claims.

Directly above the Travelers primary insurance policy were two
first-layer umbrella policies issued to Zurn by Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company. The first of these was a $10 million policy that
covered the period April 1, 1983 through April 1, 1985. The second
was a $20 million policy covering the period April 1, 1985 to April
1, 1986. Aetna's rights and obligations under these first-layer
umbrella insurance policies were later assumed by Travelers.

Above the Aetna 1983-85 Policy were two second-layer liability
insurance policies that Zurn purchased from subsidiaries of the
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., which are the subject of
Zurn's motion. The first is a $15 million policy that Zurn
purchased from Royal Indemnity to cover the period April 1, 1983
through April 1, 1984. First State Insurance, a subsidiary of the
Hartford Financial Service Group, Inc., is the successor in
interest to all rights and liabilities that Royal Indemnity had
under the Royal Policy.

The second policy at issue is a $15 million policy that Zurn
purchased from New England Insurance Company, which provided second
layer umbrella liability coverage for the period April 1, 1984
through April 1, 1985. Like First State, New England Insurance is a
subsidiary of the Hartford Financial Service Group, Inc.

At other times relevant to the lawsuit, Zurn purchased a number of
other policies that provided primary, umbrella, or excess coverage.
Among these was a $2 million commercial general liability policy
that Zurn purchased from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company to cover
the period April 1, 1978 to April 1, 1979. Directly above the
Liberty Policy was an umbrella policy that Zurn purchased from
Northbrook Insurance Company to cover the same period, i.e., April
1, 1978 through April 1, 1979. Allstate Insurance Company is
currently the sole survivor and successor in interest to all rights
and responsibilities formerly held by Northbrook Insurance Company
pursuant to the Northbrook Policy, which has limits of $9 million
per each occurrence and in the aggregate.


In 2003, Zurn, Liberty Mutual, and Travelers entered into a
cost-sharing agreement pursuant to which Liberty Mutual and
Travelers shared in the cost of defense and indemnity related to
Zurn's asbestos bodily injury lawsuits. Zurn contends Liberty
Mutual fully exhausted its limits of liability in or around 2009
and, since that time, Travelers has largely funded Zurn's asbestos
defense program by itself with its remaining policy limits.

In or about 2015, Travelers represented to Zurn that it had
exhausted the limits of the Aetna 1983-85 Policy (which underlay
the Royal and New England Policies) and as well as the limits of
another Aetna policy that covered the earlier period April 1, 1980
to April 1, 1983. Travelers further represented that the only Aetna
Policy with any remaining limits was the Aetna 1985-86 Policy.
Travelers has been funding Zurn's asbestos litigation defense under
that policy until the present time.

Based on Travelers' representation that exhaustion of the remaining
limits of the Aetna 1985-86 Policy is imminent, Zurn sought
additional defense and indemnity funding from Allstate (through the
Northbrook Policy) and Hartford (through the Royal and New England
Policies). To that end, Zurn proposed that Allstate and Hartford
enter into a cost-sharing agreement. On October 3, 2018, Zurn sent
correspondence to Allstate and Hartford formally tendering its
defense and indemnity relative to the underlying asbestos
litigation. Thereafter, Zurn invited all carriers to Chicago for a
meeting to discuss a possible interim funding agreement. However,
Hartford and Allstate have not reached any agreement to date on the
issue of cost-sharing.

In its motion, Zurn asserts that: (a) it has properly designated
Allstate and Hartford as the policies under which it will seek
additional defense and indemnity funding in the asbestos litigation
and, (b) as a result, it is incumbent upon Allstate and Hartford to
share the defense and indemnity costs, subject to their right -- at
some later point in time -- "to redistribute the burden among
themselves."

Zurn contends that, because it has provided Hartford evidence of
Travelers' exhaustion of the Aetna 1983-1985 Policy in the form of
loss runs, it has thereby made a prima facie showing that the
Hartford excess insurance policies were triggered.

Having designated the Northbrook and Hartford policies as the ones
from which it seeks indemnity, Zurn claims that both insurers have
a complete obligation to defend and indemnify Zurn in the
underlying asbestos claims and lawsuits. Zurn thus seeks an order
that directs Hartford to immediately assume 50% of those costs
until Allstate and Hartford reach a permanent cost-sharing
agreement.

Hartford contends that it is both premature and procedurally
inappropriate to grant the relief that Zurn is requesting. Hartford
further contends that significant questions remain about the
accuracy of Travelers' representation of exhaustion of the
underlying Aetna policy, and these questions should be resolved
following discovery and motions practice.

Zurn contends that it has satisfied its prima facie burden of
demonstrating that the underlying asbestos claims fall within the
grant of coverage afforded by the Hartford policies. The Court
finds, however, that the instant case presents two extenuating
circumstances. First, the underlying litigation involves not one,
but allegedly "thousands" of claims against Zurn, making it
impracticable for the Court to conduct a literal "four corners"
analysis. Second, because the case involves a dispute about excess
insurance coverage, it is not enough for Zurn to show that the
subject policies cover the types of injuries alleged in the
underlying asbestos litigation.

In addition, as both sides acknowledge, the Court determines that
Zurn must establish that the Hartford Policies were triggered by
the exhaustion of the Aenta 1983-85 Policy, which provided the
first layer of umbrella coverage directly beneath the Hartford
Policies.

Zurn, of course, contends that it has satisfied its prima facie
burden by establishing -- through Travelers' loss runs -- that the
Aetna 1983-85 Policy was exhausted. But the Court finds exhaustion
inherently a factual issue, for the record before the Court is both
limited and underdeveloped. Although Zurn alludes to a settlement
agreement involving the underlying Aetna policy, the particulars of
that agreement have not been provided. Moreover, Hartford's
submissions in opposition to the pending motion suggest to the
Court that factual disputes (or at least uncertainties) exist
concerning the accuracy of Travelers' loss run calculations and
representation of exhaustion.

Given that the pleading phase of this litigation has not yet closed
(e.g., Travelers has not yet answered the complaint or cross-claims
against it), it is premature for the Court to make any declaration
concerning exhaustion. The Court explains that the fact that Zurn's
ultimate evidentiary burden is light -- requiring only prima facie
evidence of coverage -- does not necessarily mean that the Court
can or should determine whether that burden has been met in the
opening stages of litigation, before discovery has occurred.

As matters currently stand, Zurn's defense is being undertaken by
Allstate pursuant to the terms of a $9 million umbrella policy.
Although Zurn states that this policy will eventually be exhausted,
the Court finds that the contingency is not characterized as
imminent.

Zurn also hypothesizes that some of the lawsuits at issue may
involve bodily injuries whose onset date post-dates the period of
coverage involved in the Allstate policy. However, there is no
evidence before the Court to confirm this hypothetical possibility,
much less is there evidence that Zurn will be irreparably harmed if
Hartford does not immediately assume its defense.

At most, Zurn alleges in its Complain that "allocating substantial
monies toward the defense and indemnity of the asbestos claims and
lawsuits will impede Zurn from taking advantage of other business
opportunities and could cause serious damage to Zurn's stability
and profitability." Moreover, by Zurn's own admission, the "vast
majority of these lawsuits contain allegations in which the
plaintiff claims exposure to asbestos that either pre-dates the
Northbrook Policy, coincides with the Northbrook Policy or is
unknown. In any case, these allegations trigger [Allstate's]
obligations under the Northbrook Policy."

Nevertheless, even if irreparable injury has not been sufficiently
demonstrated on the present record, the matter of Zurn's defense in
thousands of lawsuits is a serious matter that deserves prompt
attention. The factual issue in contention -- whether Travelers has
exhausted its obligations under the Aetna 1983-85 Policy, thereby
triggering Hartford's defense and indemnity obligations -- is a
narrow one.

Therefore, the Court is amenable to allow a period of expedited
discovery to commence immediately. To that end, the Court directs
Hartford to confer with counsel for Zurn and submit a proposal for
expedited discovery on the issue of exhaustion. To the extent the
parties believe it would be helpful, the Court would entertain the
use of a master to assist in the discovery process. At the
completion of the discovery process, Zurn may renew its motion for
relief in the form of an expedited motion for summary judgment.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion, is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y43dvwq4from Leagle.com.

Zurn Industries, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley L. Wilkinson
-- alw@muslaw.com -- Meyer, Unkovic & Scott LLP, Benjamin J.
Galloway -- bjg@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey & Parsky, LLC, pro hac
vice, Beth Ann Slagle -- bas@muslaw.com -- Meyer, Unkovic & Scott,
Cicely Miltich -- cicely.miltich@dentons.com -- pro hac vice,
Jonathan R. Sichtermann -- jrs@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey &
Parsky, LLC, pro hac vice & Mark E. Parsky --
mep@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey & Parsky, LLC, pro hac vice.

Allstate Insurance Company, individually and as successor in
interest to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company,
Defendant, represented by Robert R. Anderson, III --
randerson@hsplegal.com -- Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.,
pro hac vice, Christopher A. Johnson -- cjohnson@hsplegal.com --
Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd., pro hac vice, Daniel A.
Waitzman -- dwaitzman@hsplegal.com -- Hughes Socol Piers Resnick &
Dym, Ltd., pro hac vice & Timothy R. Smith -- tsmith@pionlaw.com --
Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, P.C.

Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, individually and as
successor in interest to the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,
Defendant, represented by Keith Moskowitz --
keith.moskowitz@dentons.com -- pro hac vice, Mark A. Martini --
mmartini@rlmlawfirm.com -- Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP & Cicely
Miltich -- cicely.miltich@dentons.com -- pro hac vice.

First State Insurance Company, a subsidiary of The Hartford
Financial Services Group, Inc. & New England Insurance Company, a
subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Charles E. Leasure, III --
cleasure@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, James Ruggeri --
jruggeri@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice &
Michele Backus Konigsberg -- mbackus@goodwin.com -- Shipman &
Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice.

New England Insurance Company, a subsidiary of The Hartford
Financial Services Group, Inc. & First State Insurance Company, a
subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,
ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented by Charles E. Leasure, III --
cleasure@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, James Ruggeri --
jruggeri@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice &
Michele Backus Konigsberg -- mbackus@goodwin.com -- Shipman &
Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice.

New England Insurance Company, a subsidiary of The Hartford
Financial Services Group, Inc. & First State Insurance Company, a
subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., Cross
Claimants, represented by Charles E. Leasure, III --
cleasure@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, James Ruggeri --
jruggeri@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice &
Michele Backus Konigsberg -- mbackus@goodwin.com -- Shipman &
Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice.

Allstate Insurance Company, individually and as successor in
interest to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company, Cross
Defendant, represented by Christopher A. Johnson --
cjohnson@hsplegal.com -- Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.,
pro hac vice, Daniel A. Waitzman -- dwaitzman@hsplegal.com --
Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd., pro hac vice, Robert R.
Anderson, III -- randerson@hsplegal.com -- Hughes Socol Piers
Resnick & Dym, Ltd., pro hac vice & Timothy R. Smith --
tsmith@pionlaw.com -- Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, P.C.

Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, individually and as
successor in interest to the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,
Cross Defendant, represented by Keith Moskowitz --
keith.moskowitz@dentons.com -- pro hac vice, Mark A. Martini --
mmartini@rlmlawfirm.com -- Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP & Cicely
Miltich  -- cicely.miltich@dentons.com.

New England Insurance Company, a subsidiary of The Hartford
Financial Services Group, Inc. & First State Insurance Company, a
subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., Counter
Claimants, represented by Charles E. Leasure, III --
cleasure@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, James Ruggeri --
jruggeri@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice &
Michele Backus Konigsberg -- mbackus@goodwin.com -- Shipman &
Goodwin LLP, pro hac vice.

Zurn Industries, LLC, Counter Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Galloway -- bjg@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey & Parsky, LLC, pro hac
vice, Beth Ann Slagle -- bas@muslaw.com -- Meyer, Unkovic & Scott,
Cicely Miltich -- cicely.miltich@dentons.com -- pro hac vice,
Jonathan R. Sichtermann -- jrs@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey &
Parsky, LLC & Mark E. Parsky -- mep@mcveyparsky-law.com -- McVey &
Parsky, LLC.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enpro Had $12.6MM Asbestos Coverage at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Enpro Industries, Inc. had approximately US$12.6 million of
insurance coverage to cover asbestos claims payments and certain
expense payments at December 31, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "The historical business operations of our
subsidiaries, Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC ("GST LLC") and The
Anchor Packing Company ("Anchor"), resulted in a substantial volume
of asbestos litigation in which plaintiffs alleged personal injury
or death as a result of exposure to asbestos fibers.  Those
subsidiaries manufactured and/or sold industrial sealing products,
predominately gaskets and packing, that contained encapsulated
asbestos fibers.  Anchor was an inactive and insolvent indirect
subsidiary of EnPro's then-direct subsidiary, Coltec Industries Inc
("Coltec").  Our subsidiaries' exposure to asbestos litigation and
their relationships with insurance carriers had been managed
through another subsidiary, Garrison Litigation Management Group,
Ltd.  ("Garrison").  GST LLC, Anchor and Garrison are collectively
referred to as "GST."

"On June 5, 2010 (the "GST Petition Date"), GST filed voluntary
petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (the "GST Chapter 11 Case") in the Bankruptcy
Court.  GST LLC is one of the businesses in our broader Garlock
group and it and its subsidiaries operate five manufacturing
facilities, including operations in Palmyra, New York and Houston,
Texas.  The filings on the GST Petition Date did not include EnPro
Industries, Inc. or any other EnPro Industries, Inc.  operating
subsidiary.

"The filings were the initial step in a claims resolution process
for an efficient and permanent resolution of pending and future
asbestos claims through court approval of a plan of reorganization
to establish a facility to resolve and pay all GST asbestos claims.
On March 17, 2016, we announced that we had reached a
comprehensive consensual settlement (the "Consensual Settlement")
to resolve current and future asbestos claims which contemplated
the joint plan of reorganization (the "Joint Plan") which was filed
with the Bankruptcy Court.  The Joint Plan and Consensual
Settlement contemplated that, as an appropriate and necessary step
to facilitate the implementation of the Consensual Settlement and
not to delay or hinder creditors or the resolution of claims,
Coltec would, subject to the receipt of necessary consents, undergo
a restructuring (the "Coltec Restructuring") in which all of its
significant operating assets and subsidiaries, which included each
of our major business units, would be distributed to a new direct
EnPro subsidiary, EnPro Holdings, Inc. ("EnPro Holdings").  EnPro
Holdings would also assume all of Coltec's non-asbestos
liabilities.  The Coltec Restructuring was completed on December
31, 2016, and included the merger of Coltec with and into OldCo,
LLC ("OldCo"), which was a direct subsidiary of EnPro Holdings.
OldCo, as the restructured entity, retained responsibility for all
asbestos claims and rights to certain insurance assets of Coltec,
as well as the business operated by our EnPro Learning System, LLC
subsidiary ("EnPro Learning System"), which provides occupational
safety training and consulting services to third parties.  EnPro
Learning System was also merged into OldCo.

"As contemplated by the Joint Plan, on January 30, 2017 (the "OldCo
Petition Date"), OldCo, as the successor by merger to Coltec, filed
the OldCo Chapter 11 Case.  On February 3, 2017, the Bankruptcy
Court issued an order for the joint administration of the OldCo
Chapter 11 Case with the GST Chapter 11 Case.

"During the pendency of the GST Chapter 11 Case and the OldCo
Chapter 11 Case, certain actions proposed to be taken by GST or
OldCo not in the ordinary course of business were subject to
approval by the Bankruptcy Court.  As a result, during the pendency
of the GST Chapter 11 Case and the OldCo Chapter 11 Case, we did
not have exclusive control over these companies.  Accordingly, as
required by GAAP, GST was deconsolidated beginning on the GST
Petition Date and OldCo was deconsolidated beginning on the OldCo
Petition Date.

"At December 31, 2018, approximately US$12.6 million of available
products hazard limits or insurance receivables existed under
primary and excess general liability insurance policies other than
the Pre-Garlock Coverage Block (the "Garlock Coverage Block") from
solvent carriers with investment grade ratings, which we believe is
available to cover GST asbestos claims payments and certain expense
payments, including contributions to the Trust.  We consider such
amount of available insurance coverage under the Garlock Coverage
Block to be of high quality because the insurance policies are
written or guaranteed by U.S.-based carriers whose credit rating by
S&P is investment grade (BBB-) or better, and whose AM Best rating
is excellent (A-) or better.  The remaining US$12.6 million of
solvent insurance coverage is available to pending and estimated
future claims.  There are specific agreements in place with
carriers regarding the remaining available coverage.  Based on
those agreements and the terms of the policies in place and prior
decisions concerning coverage, we believe that all of the US$12.6
million of insurance proceeds will ultimately be collected,
although there can be no assurance that the insurance companies
will make the payments as and when due."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2UIjCtJ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Freeport-McMoRan Unit Still Faces Talc Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FCX) disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2018, that its indirect wholly owned subsidiary
remains a target in cases related to asbestos contamination
matters.

The Company states, "Since approximately 1990, various FCX
affiliates have been named as defendants in a large number of
lawsuits alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos or talc
allegedly contained in industrial products such as electrical wire
and cable, raw materials such as paint and joint compounds,
talc-based lubricants used in rubber manufacturing or from asbestos
contained in buildings and facilities located at properties owned
or operated by affiliates of FCX.  Many of these suits involve a
large number of codefendants.  Based on litigation results to date
and facts currently known, FCX believes there is a reasonable
possibility that losses may have been incurred related to these
matters; however, FCX also believes that the amounts of any such
losses, individually or in the aggregate, are not material to its
consolidated financial statements.  There can be no assurance that
future developments will not alter this conclusion.

"There has been a recent significant increase in the number of
cases alleging the presence of asbestos contamination in talc-based
personal care products and in cases alleging exposure to talc
products that are not alleged to be contaminated with asbestos.  In
these cases, plaintiffs allege serious health risks and often fatal
diseases, including mesothelioma and ovarian cancer, allegedly
caused by long-term use of talc-based cosmetic and personal care
products.  Nationwide trial results in these cases have ranged from
outright dismissals to large jury awards of both compensatory and
punitive damages.  The primary targets have been the producers of
those products, but defendants in many of these cases also include
talc miners.  Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (CAMC), an indirect
wholly owned subsidiary of FCX, is one of those targets.  One of
CAMC's wholly owned subsidiaries, Cyprus Mines Corporation, was
involved in talc mining until 1992 when it exited that business.
CAMC has contractual indemnification rights, subject to limited
reservations, against the ultimate successor to the business, which
has acknowledged those indemnification obligations, and has taken
responsibility for all cases tendered to it to date.  However, on
February 13, 2019, the indemnitor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, and CAMC is in the very early stages of evaluating the
potential implications of that filing.  To date, no judgments have
been rendered against CAMC, and FCX believes that CAMC has strong
defenses.  Accordingly, FCX currently believes the losses, if any,
related to these cases, individually or in the aggregate, are not
material to its consolidated financial statements.  There can be no
assurance that future developments will not alter this
conclusion."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2ESbW1t


ASBESTOS UPDATE: GATX Corp., Units Still Face Claims at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
GATX Corporation and its subsidiaries continue to face
asbestos-related cases, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Several of our subsidiaries have also been
named as defendants or co-defendants in cases alleging injury
caused by exposure to asbestos.  The plaintiffs seek an unspecified
amount of damages based on common law, statutory, or premises
liability or, in the case of claims against ASC, the Jones Act,
which provides limited remedies to certain maritime employees.  In
addition, demand has been made against GATX for asbestos-related
claims under limited indemnities given in connection with the sale
of certain of our former subsidiaries.

"In 2018, other income (expense) was unfavorable by US$1.2 million,
driven by expenses recorded in 2018 related to an accrual for
asbestos-related litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2ufuqEc


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Imerys May Perfect Appeal Thru September 2019 Term
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled In Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation Joan
Arazosa, as Executor for the Estate of Richard Arazosa,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. 3M Co., et al., Defendants, Imerys S.A.,
Defendant-Appellant, Motion No. M-6760, Index No. 190069/16, (N.Y.
App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, First Department, has granted Defendant-appellant Imerys
S.A.'s motion to the extent of enlarging the time to perfect the
appeal to the September 2019 Term.

Defendant-appellant has moved for an enlargement of time to perfect
the appeal taken from an order of the Supreme Court, New York
County, entered on or about March 27, 2018.

A copy of the Order, is available at http://tinyurl.com/y257lpyk
from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Still Defends Securities Suits over Talc
-------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson continues to face securities lawsuits related to
alleged asbestos contamination in body powders containing talc,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In February 2018, a securities class action
lawsuit was filed against Johnson & Johnson and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that Johnson & Johnson violated the federal
securities laws by failing to adequately disclose the alleged
asbestos contamination in body powders containing talc, primarily
JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder, and that purchasers of Johnson &
Johnson's shares suffered losses as a result.  Plaintiffs are
seeking damages.

"In October 2018, a shareholder derivative lawsuit was filed
against Johnson & Johnson as the nominal defendant and its current
directors as defendants in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, alleging a breach of fiduciary duties
related to the alleged asbestos contamination in body powders
containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder, and that
Johnson & Johnson has suffered damages as a result of those alleged
breaches.  Plaintiff is seeking damages and an order for the
Company to reform its internal policies and procedures."

"In January 2019, two ERISA class action lawsuits were filed by
participants in the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan against Johnson
& Johnson, its Pension and Benefits Committee, and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by offering Johnson & Johnson stock as a Johnson & Johnson
Savings Plan investment option when it was imprudent to do so
because of failures to disclose alleged asbestos contamination in
body powders containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.
Plaintiffs are seeking damages and injunctive relief.

"Each of these matters will be adjudicated in conjunction with the
multi-district litigation.  In addition, the Company has received
preliminary inquiries and subpoenas to produce documents regarding
these matters from Senator Murray, a member of the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the Department of Justice
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Company is
cooperating with these government inquiries and will be producing
documents in response."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2HiXinh


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Juni's Causation Issues Affirmed on Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the decision reached by
the Appellate Division on the issues of general or specific
causation, upon finding that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to establish that Ford Motor Company's conduct was a
proximate cause of the decedent's injuries pursuant to the
standards set forth in Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. (7 N.Y.3d 434
[2006]) and Cornell v 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC (22 N.Y.3d 762
[2014]) -- there was simply a gap in proof as to the toxicity of
the products at issue.

Arthur H. Juni, Jr. and his wife sued, among others, defendant Ford
Motor Company, claiming Ford's failure to warn him of the dangers
of exposure to its asbestos-containing products was a substantial
cause of his illness. Mr. Juni passed away before trial and his
wife substituted as administrator for his estate.

Although the jury returned a verdict in Mr. Juni's favor, finding
Ford 49% liable, the Supreme Court granted that part of Ford's
motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), on the
ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
verdict.

The jury heard testimony by way of Mr. Juni's deposition, that he
spent his entire career working for Orange and Rockland utilities,
where he worked for over 25 years as auto mechanic servicing Ford
Motor Company vehicles. On a daily basis, he was exposed to
asbestos-laden dust from new and used brakes, clutches, and
manifold and engine gaskets. That dust emanated from parts worked
on by himself and other mechanics in the surrounding work area.

There is no dispute that raw chrysotile asbestos greater than 5
microns in length is toxic and exposure to it carries increased
risk for mesothelioma, or that Mr. Juni died of mesothelioma, and
the proof is more than sufficient to establish that his exposure to
asbestos caused his disease and death.

Nevertheless, Ford disputed causation and presented expert
testimony contesting the toxicity of the product contents to which
Mr. Juni was exposed during his years as a mechanic, and whether
mechanics, like Mr. Juni, had an increased risk of developing
mesothelioma based on the type of work performed and their work
environment. Ford adduced evidence that the process of
manufacturing friction products under extreme temperatures alters
the chemical composition of the asbestos, and the subsequent use of
those products also subjects them to very high temperatures causing
the conversion of the asbestos into a biologically inert substance
called Forsterite.

The jury also heard expert testimony that during the time of Mr.
Juni's exposure, Ford's vehicle parts contained chrysotile
asbestos, which had been linked to mesothelioma. Another expert
opined that the presence of visible dust is a scientifically
recognized way of identifying the presence of air-borne asbestos in
amounts generally recognized within the scientific community as
toxic to humans, and that it is the cumulative exposure to asbestos
that increases the risk of mesothelioma. The jury was presented
with various internal Ford documents revealing that Ford recognized
that friction products in Ford vehicles "overexposed" mechanics to
carcinogenic asbestos fibers and that Ford took steps to protect
its own employees from exposure to dust from these products.

Plaintiffs did not produce an expert to rebut the argument that the
physical properties of the asbestos in Ford's friction products had
been so radically altered as to render conventional asbestos
toxicology irrelevant. Instead, one of plaintiffs' causation
experts testified extensively that chrysotile asbestos in its raw
state caused mesothelioma. Plaintiffs' other causation expert, when
asked specifically about the high temperature transformation of
asbestos to Forsterite, testified that "no one knows" whether the
friction product dust to which Mr. Juni was exposed when replacing
the used products was toxic. Thus, the Supreme Court, in setting
aside the jury verdict, relied on this same problem as to both of
plaintiffs' experts -- the necessary link in the proof of proximate
cause was missing.

The appealed case is In the Matter of New York City Asbestos
Litigation. Mary Juni, & C., Appellant, and A.O. Smith Water
Products Co., Et al., Defendants, Ford Motor Company, Respondent,
No. 123, N.Y. App. Div.

A copy of the Memorandum, is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y3kvzo2ffrom Leagle.com.

Alani Golanski , for appellant.

J. Tracy Walker, IV -- twalker@mcguirewoods.com -- for respondent.

Philip J. Landrigan, et al.; Coalition for Litigation Justice,
Inc., et al.; Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc.; John Henderson
Duffus, et al., amici curiae.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaman Corp. Still Defends Suits at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kaman Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2018, that based on information currently available,
it does not believe that the resolution of any currently pending
asbestos-related matters will have a material adverse effect on its
business, financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows.

The Company states, "Like many other industrial companies, the
Company and/or one of its subsidiaries may be named as a defendant
in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of exposure to
asbestos integrated into certain products sold or distributed by
the Company and/or the named subsidiary.  A substantial majority of
these asbestos-related claims have been covered by insurance or
other forms of indemnity or have been dismissed without payment.
The rest have been resolved for amounts that are not material to
the Company, either individually or in the aggregate."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2UIkj6j


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Minerals Technologies Defends 34 Cases at Dec. 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
Minerals Technologies Inc. has 34 pending asbestos cases, according
to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

Minerals Technologies states, "Certain of the Company's
subsidiaries are among numerous defendants in a number of cases
seeking damages for exposure to silica or to asbestos containing
materials.  The Company currently has three pending silica cases
and thirty four pending asbestos cases.  To date, 1,493 silica
cases and 57 asbestos cases have been dismissed, not including any
lawsuits against AMCOL International Corporation ("AMCOL") or
American Colloid Company dismissed prior to our acquisition of
AMCOL in 2014.  Fourteen new asbestos cases were filed in 2018 and
four additional cases were filed subsequent to the end of 2018.
Four asbestos cases were dismissed during 2018 and no silica cases
were dismissed during 2018.  Most of these claims do not provide
adequate information to assess their merits, the likelihood that
the Company will be found liable, or the magnitude of such
liability, if any.  Additional claims of this nature may be made
against the Company or its subsidiaries.  At this time management
anticipates that the amount of the Company's liability, if any, and
the cost of defending such claims, will not have a material effect
on its financial position or results of operations.

"The Company has settled only one silica lawsuit, for a nominal
amount, and no asbestos lawsuits to date (not including any that
may have been settled by AMCOL prior to completion of the
acquisition).  We are unable to state an amount or range of amounts
claimed in any of the lawsuits because state court pleading
practices do not require identifying the amount of the claimed
damage.  The aggregate cost to the Company for the legal defense of
these cases since inception continues to be insignificant.  The
majority of the costs of defense for these cases, excluding cases
against AMCOL or American Colloid, are reimbursed by Pfizer Inc.
pursuant to the terms of certain agreements entered into in
connection with the Company's initial public offering in 1992.  The
Company is entitled to indemnification, pursuant to agreement, for
sales prior to the initial public offering.  Of the 34 pending
asbestos cases, 25 of the non-AMCOL cases are subject to
indemnification, in whole or in part, because the plaintiffs claim
liability based on sales of products that occurred either entirely
before the initial public offering, or both before and after the
initial public offering.  In five of the six remaining non-AMCOL
cases, the plaintiffs have not alleged dates of exposure, and in
the sixth remaining non-AMCOL case, exposure is alleged to have
been after the Company's initial public offering in 1992.  The
remaining three cases involve AMCOL only, so no Pfizer indemnity is
available.  Our experience has been that the Company is not liable
to plaintiffs in any of these lawsuits and the Company does not
expect to pay any settlements or jury verdicts in these lawsuits."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2VHPdvv


ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Still Defends 576 Lawsuits at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MRC Global Inc. continues to defend itself in 576 asbestos-related
lawsuits involving approximately 1,166 claims, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "We are one of many defendants in lawsuits that
plaintiffs have brought seeking damages for personal injuries that
exposure to asbestos allegedly caused.  Plaintiffs and their family
members have brought these lawsuits against a large volume of
defendant entities as a result of the various defendants'
manufacture, distribution, supply or other involvement with
asbestos, asbestos-containing products or equipment or activities
that allegedly caused plaintiffs to be exposed to asbestos.  These
plaintiffs typically assert exposure to asbestos as a consequence
of third-party manufactured products that the Company's subsidiary,
MRC Global (US) Inc., purportedly distributed.

As of December 31, 2018, we are a named defendant in approximately
576 lawsuits involving approximately 1,166 claims.  No asbestos
lawsuit has resulted in a judgment against us to date, with the
majority being settled, dismissed or otherwise resolved.
Applicable third-party insurance has substantially covered these
claims, and insurance should continue to cover a substantial
majority of existing and anticipated future claims.  Accordingly,
we have recorded a liability for our estimate of the most likely
settlement of asserted claims and a related receivable from
insurers for our estimated recovery, to the extent we believe that
the amounts of recovery are probable."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2HkS4qk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Olin Corp., Units Still Face Suits at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation and its subsidiaries continue to defend themselves
in legal proceedings on alleged asbestos exposures, according to
the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "We, and our subsidiaries, are defendants in
various other legal actions (including proceedings based on alleged
exposures to asbestos) incidental to our past and current business
activities.  At December 31, 2018 and 2017, our consolidated
balance sheets included liabilities for these legal actions of
US$15.6 million and US$24.8 million, respectively.  These
liabilities do not include costs associated with legal
representation and do not include US$8.0 million of insurance
recoveries included in receivables, net within the accompanying
consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 2017.

"Based on our analysis, and considering the inherent uncertainties
associated with litigation, we do not believe that it is reasonably
possible that these legal actions will materially and adversely
affect our financial position, cash flows or results of
operations.

"In connection with the October 5, 2015 acquisition of DowDuPont's
U.S. Chlor Alkali and Vinyl, Global Chlorinated Organics and Global
Epoxy businesses, the prior owner of the businesses retained
liabilities related to litigation to the extent arising prior to
October 5, 2015."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2Y7xkZ3


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Onoratos Failed to Satisfy Highland at Home in FL
------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon the appeal of Highland Stucco and Lime Products, Inc., the
District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third District has
reversed the order denying Highland's motion to dismiss in the case
entitled Highland Stucco and Lime Products, Inc., Appellant, v.
Silverio Onorato and Faye Onorato, Appellees, Case No. 3D18-792,
(Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App.) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court determines that plaintiffs, Silverio Onorato and Faye
Onorato failed to satisfy the "minimum contacts" federal
constitutional due process requirement.

The plaintiffs filed a products liability action against Highland
and several other defendants alleging that Onorato developed
mesothelioma from his exposure from 1972 to 1976 to
asbestos-containing products that were manufactured, distributed,
and/or sold by the defendants in the state of Florida.

In the first amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Onorato
developed mesothelioma as a result of being exposed in Florida to
products containing asbestos manufactured by Highland. Because the
complaint alleges that Highland committed a tortious act in
Florida, thus the burden is shifted to Highland to contest the
allegations by affidavit or other proof, or to claim that the
federal minimum contacts requirement was not satisfied.

Highland filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In support of its motion, Highland submitted the
sworn affidavit of Frederick M. Atkinson. Mr. Atkinson explained
that Highland, which dissolved in 2009, was acquired in the
mid-1960s by his father, who is now deceased. Mr. Atkinson began
working at Highland in 1966, moving up through the ranks of the
company until he became the vice-president in 1972, and the
president approximately twenty years later.

In his affidavit, Atkinson averred that Highland (1) never
transacted any business in Florida; (2) never negotiated, entered
into, or performed a contract in Florida; (3) never owned, used, or
possessed real property in Florida; (4) never contracted to insure
any person, property, or risk in Florida; (5) never maintained a
place of business in Florida; (6) never registered to do business
in Florida; (7) never had a registered agent in Florida; (8) never
obtained bank accounts, offices, post office boxes, telephone
numbers, or any other business facilities in Florida; and (9) never
advertised in any Florida publication, radio station, or television
station. Atkinson's affidavit also states that Highland did not
directly solicit business within Florida; had no connection with
Florida arising from any action or conduct; never purposely
directed conduct toward Florida; and never manufactured,
distributed, sold, supplied or installed any asbestos-containing
products in Florida.

The affidavit further states that "the overwhelming majority of
Highland's business was conducted in California. During the time
period when Highland used asbestos, its products were primarily
sold to building supply dealers within a 60 mile radius of its Van
Nuys, California plant."

Because Highland adequately contested the allegations, the burden
then shifted back to the plaintiffs to refute the evidence
submitted by Highland. The plaintiffs conducted no jurisdictional
discovery and the only evidence they submitted to rebut Atkinson's
affidavit was: (1) excerpts from Onorato's deposition wherein he
testified that Highland's products were commercially available for
purchase in Florida during the time of his exposure; (2) an
unauthenticated advertisement from a 1959 trade journal for
Highland Hi-Sorb acoustical plaster distributed by Highland Stucco
and Lime Products of Florida, Inc. ("Highland of Florida"); (3) an
unauthenticated article in the same 1959 trade journal that
references a plant in Fort Lauderdale operated by Highland of
Florida; and (4) an excerpt from Atkinson's deposition which was
taken in connection with a 2000 California lawsuit.

In the 2000 California case, Atkinson specifically testified that
all of Highland's sales were made to building material dealers who
would usually pick the products up at the plant. However, on
occasion, Highland would deliver the products to the dealers, but
this did not occur often because the company had only one truck and
primarily sold to dealers within a sixty-mile radius of its plant
in Van Nuys, California. The Court agrees with Highland that
nothing in Atkinson's testimony serves to refute the affidavit that
Atkinson filed in the case.

The Court recognizes Highland, the named defendant in the action,
was a California corporation that dissolved in 2009. Highland of
Florida, at best, was a Florida corporation that dissolved in 1964,
approximately eight years before Onorato's alleged exposure to
stucco products containing asbestos, and Onorato has failed to show
any connection or relationship between the two corporations. The
Court also finds nothing in the record suggests that the two
corporations shared a corporate identity.

The Court concludes that even if specific jurisdiction under
Florida's long-arm jurisdiction was established, the plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of overcoming Highland's sworn
affidavit and submitting evidence demonstrating that Highland's
contacts with Florida are sufficient under the constitutional due
process prong of the jurisdictional analysis. The Court finds that
plaintiffs still failed to establish that Highland, not Highland of
Florida, had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida. Accordingly,
the Court reverses the trial court's order denying Highland's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

GrayRobinson, P.A., and Jack R. Reiter --
jack.reiter@gray-robinson.com -- for appellant.

Rebecca S. Vinocur , Simmons Hanly Conroy and William Kohlburn --
bkohlburn@simmonsfirm.com -- (Salt Lake City, UT), for appellees.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rogers Corp. Projects $70.3MM Liability at Dec.31
------------------------------------------------------------------
Rogers Corporation estimates US$70.3 million liability as of
December 31, 2018, for all current and future asbestos-related
claims projected through 2058, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

As of December 31, 2018, the estimated insurance recovery for all
current and future claims projected through 2058 was US$63.8
million.

The Company states, "We recognize a liability for asbestos-related
contingencies that are probable of occurrence and reasonably
estimable.  In connection with the recognition of liabilities for
asbestos-related matters, we record asbestos-related insurance
receivables that are deemed probable.

"The liability projection period covers all current and future
claims through 2058, which represents the expected end of our
asbestos liability exposure with no further ongoing claims expected
beyond that date.  This conclusion was based on our history and
experience with the claims data, the diminished volatility and
consistency of observable claims data, the period of time that has
elapsed since we stopped manufacturing products that contained
encapsulated asbestos and an expected downward trend in claims due
to the average age of our claimants, which is approaching the
average life expectancy.

"To date, the defense and settlement costs of our asbestos-related
product liability litigation have been substantially covered by
insurance.  We have identified continuous coverage for primary,
excess and umbrella insurance from the 1950s through the mid-1980s,
except for a period in the early 1960s, with respect to which we
have entered into an agreement for primary, but not excess or
umbrella, coverage.  In addition, we have entered into a cost
sharing agreement with most of our primary, excess and umbrella
insurance carriers to facilitate the ongoing administration and
payment of claims by the carriers.  The cost sharing agreement may
be terminated by any party, but will continue until a party elects
to terminate it.  As of the filing date for this report, the
agreement has not been terminated, and no carrier had informed us
it intended to terminate the agreement.  During 2018, we received
notices that primary coverage for a period of eight years and
excess coverage for a period of three years had been exhausted.  In
2018, we incurred indemnity and defense costs of US$1.2 million for
the year ended December 31, 2018, primarily related to the periods.
We expect to exhaust individual primary, excess and umbrella
coverages over time, and there is no assurance that such exhaustion
will not accelerate due to additional claims, damages and
settlements or that coverage will be available as expected.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related liability and the
related insurance receivables are based on facts known at the time
and a number of assumptions.  However, projecting future events,
such as the number of new claims to be filed each year, the average
cost of disposing of such claims, the length of time it takes to
dispose of such claims, coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies, as well as the
numerous uncertainties surrounding asbestos litigation in the
United States, could cause the actual liability and insurance
recoveries for us to be higher or lower than those projected or
recorded.

"Changes recorded in the estimated liability and estimated
insurance recovery based on the projections of asbestos litigation
and corresponding insurance coverage, result in the recognition of
expense or income.  For the years ended December 31, 2018, 2017 and
2016, we recognized expense of US$0.7 million, US$3.4 million and
US$0.3 million, respectively.  The increase in expense recognized
in 2017 compared to 2016 was primarily attributable to the change
in the forecast period from 10 years to 40 years."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2XWHP1r


ASBESTOS UPDATE: SPX Had $587.5MM Asbestos Liability at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
SPX Corporation recorded US$587.5 million for asbestos product
liability matters at December 31, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Numerous claims, complaints and proceedings
arising in the ordinary course of business have been asserted or
are pending against us or certain of our subsidiaries
(collectively, "claims").  These claims relate to litigation
matters (e.g., class actions, derivative lawsuits and contracts,
intellectual property and competitive claims), environmental
matters, product liability matters (predominately associated with
alleged exposure to asbestos-containing materials), and other risk
management matters (e.g., general liability, automobile, and
workers' compensation claims).  Additionally, we may become subject
to other claims of which we are currently unaware, which may be
significant, or the claims of which we are aware may result in our
incurring significantly greater loss than we anticipate.  While we
(and our subsidiaries) maintain property, cargo, auto, product,
general liability, environmental, and directors' and officers'
liability insurance and have acquired rights under similar policies
in connection with acquisitions that we believe cover a significant
portion of these claims, this insurance may be insufficient or
unavailable (e.g., in the case of insurer insolvency) to protect us
against potential loss exposures.  Also, while we believe we are
entitled to indemnification from third parties for some of these
claims, these rights may be insufficient or unavailable to protect
us against potential loss exposures.

"Our recorded liabilities related to these matters totaled US$631.7
million (including US$587.5 million for asbestos product liability
matters) and US$685.7 million (including US$641.2 million for
asbestos product liability matters) at December 31, 2018 and 2017,
respectively.  The liabilities we record for these claims are based
on a number of assumptions, including historical claims and payment
experience and, with respect to asbestos claims, actuarial
estimates of the future period during which additional claims are
reasonably foreseeable.  While we base our assumptions on facts
currently known to us, they entail inherently subjective judgments
and uncertainties.  As a result, our current assumptions for
estimating these liabilities may not prove accurate, and we may be
required to adjust these liabilities in the future, which could
result in charges to earnings.  These variances relative to current
expectations could have a material impact on our financial position
and results of operations.

"We have recorded insurance recovery assets associated with the
asbestos product liability matters, with such amounts totaling
US$541.9 million and US$590.9 million at December 31, 2018 and
2017, respectively.  These assets represent amounts that we believe
we are or will be entitled to recover under agreements we have with
insurance companies.  The assets we record for these insurance
recoveries are based on a number of assumptions, including the
continued solvency of the insurers, and are subject to a variety of
uncertainties.  Our current assumptions for estimating these assets
may not prove accurate, and we may be required to adjust these
assets in the future, which could result in additional charges to
earnings.  These variances relative to current expectations could
have a material impact on our financial position and results of
operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2XHcCPw


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Had 1,430 Fibro Cases at Dec. 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately 1,430 asbestos-related cases were outstanding at
December 31, 2018, for which Standard Motor Products, Inc. may be
responsible for any related liabilities in connection to its former
brake business, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "In 1986, we acquired a brake business, which
we subsequently sold in March 1998 and which is accounted for as a
discontinued operation in the accompanying statement of operations.
When we originally acquired this brake business, we assumed future
liabilities relating to any alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products manufactured by the seller of the acquired brake business.
In accordance with the related purchase agreement, we agreed to
assume the liabilities for all new claims filed on or after
September 2001.  Our ultimate exposure will depend upon the number
of claims filed against us on or after September 2001, and the
amounts paid for settlements, awards of asbestos-related damages,
and defense of such claims.  At December 31, 2018, approximately
1,430 cases were outstanding for which we may be responsible for
any related liabilities.  Since inception in September 2001 through
December 31, 2018, the amounts paid for settled claims are
approximately US$25.6 million.  We do not have insurance coverage
for the indemnity and defense costs associated with the claims we
face."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2VWnuaB


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Standard Motor Liability Upped to $46.7MM
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard Motor Products, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2018, that it increased its asbestos
liability to US$46.7 million and recorded an additional incremental
pre-tax provision of $10.1 million in earnings (loss) from
discontinued operations, in light of a California case wherein a
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in November
2018.

The Company states, "In evaluating our potential asbestos-related
liability, we have considered various factors including, among
other things, an actuarial study of the asbestos related
liabilities performed by an independent actuarial firm, our
settlement amounts and whether there are any co-defendants, the
jurisdiction in which lawsuits are filed, and the status and
results of such claims.  As is our accounting policy, we consider
the advice of actuarial consultants with experience in assessing
asbestos-related liabilities to estimate our potential claim
liability.  In addition, based on the information contained in the
actuarial study and all other available information considered by
us, we have concluded that no amount within the range of settlement
payments was more likely than any other and, therefore, in
assessing our asbestos liability we compare the low end of the
range to our recorded liability to determine if an adjustment is
required.  The methodology used to project asbestos-related
liabilities and costs in our actuarial study considered: (1)
historical data available from publicly available studies; (2) an
analysis of our recent claims history to estimate likely filing
rates into the future; (3) an analysis of our currently pending
claims; and (4) an analysis of our settlements to date in order to
develop average settlement values.

"In accordance with our policy of performing an annual actuarial
evaluation in the third quarter of each year, and whenever events
or changes in circumstances indicate that additional provisions may
be necessary, an actuarial study were performed as of August 31,
2018.  The results of the August 31, 2018 study included an
estimate of our undiscounted liability for settlement payments and
awards of asbestos-related damages, excluding legal costs and any
potential recovery from insurance carriers, ranging from US$37.1
million to US$56.9 million for the period through 2061.  Based upon
the results of the August 31, 2018 actuarial study, in September
2018 we increased our asbestos liability to US$37.1 million, the
low end of the range, and recorded an incremental pre-tax provision
of US$3.5 million in earnings (loss) from discontinued operations.

"In November 2018, we were involved in an asbestos liability case
in California, in which a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for the gross amount of US$8.6 million in compensatory
damages.  Of this amount, we were held responsible for
approximately US$7.4 million, and we plan to pursue all rights of
appeal.  As a result of this asbestos case, our actuarial firm
revised the results of the August 31, 2018 study.  The results of
the revised actuarial study increased the low end of the estimated
range of our undiscounted liability for settlement payments and
awards of asbestos-related damages, excluding legal costs and any
potential recovery from insurance carriers, from US$37.1 million to
US$46.7 million, and increased the high end of the range from
US$56.9 million to US$83.9 million for the period through 2061.
Based upon the results of the revised actuarial study, in December
2018, and in accordance with our practice, we increased our
asbestos liability to US$46.7 million, the low end of the range,
and recorded an additional incremental pre-tax provision of US$10.1
million in earnings (loss) from discontinued operations.  Future
legal costs, which are expensed as incurred and reported in
earnings (loss) from discontinued operations, are estimated,
according to the revised study, to range from US$45 million to
US$83.1 million.

"We plan to perform an annual actuarial evaluation during the third
quarter of each year for the foreseeable future and whenever events
or changes in circumstances indicate that additional provisions may
be necessary.  Given the uncertainties associated with projecting
such matters into the future and other factors outside our control,
we can give no assurance that additional provisions will not be
required.  We will continue to monitor events and changes in
circumstances surrounding these potential liabilities in
determining whether to perform additional actuarial evaluations and
whether additional provisions may be necessary.  At the present
time, however, we do not believe that any additional provisions
would be reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on our
liquidity or consolidated financial position."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2VWnuaB


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Teledyne Technologies Still Faces Exposure Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Teledyne Technologies Incorporated continues to defend itself
against multi-defendant lawsuits related to asbestos exposure,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We have been joined, among a number of
defendants (often over 100), in lawsuits alleging injury or death
as a result of exposure to asbestos.  In addition, because of the
prominent "Teledyne" name, we may continue to be mistakenly joined
in lawsuits involving a company or business that was not assumed by
us as part of our 1999 spin-off.  To date, we have not incurred
material liabilities in connection with these lawsuits.  However,
our historic insurance coverage, including that of its
predecessors, may not fully cover such claims and the defense of
such matters.  Coverage typically depends on the year of purported
exposure and other factors.  Nonetheless, we intend to vigorously
defend our position against these claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2TQm5oM


ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 755 Active Cases at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation has approximately 755 active
asbestos-related cases involving approximately 2,320 plaintiffs as
of December 31, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2018.

The Company states, "As of December 31, 2018, U.S. Steel was a
defendant in approximately 755 active cases involving approximately
2,320 plaintiffs.  The vast majority of these cases involve
multiple defendants.  About 1,540, or approximately 66 percent, of
these plaintiff claims are currently pending in jurisdictions which
permit filings with massive numbers of plaintiffs.  As of December
31, 2017, U.S. Steel was a defendant in approximately 820 cases
involving approximately 3,315 plaintiffs.  Based upon U.S. Steel's
experience in such cases, it believes that the actual number of
plaintiffs who ultimately assert claims against U.S. Steel will
likely be a small fraction of the total number of plaintiffs.

"Historically, asbestos-related claims against U.S. Steel fall into
three groups: (1) claims made by persons who allegedly were exposed
to asbestos on the premises of U.S. Steel facilities; (2) claims
made by persons allegedly exposed to products manufactured by U.S.
Steel; and (3) claims made under certain federal and maritime laws
by employees of former operations of U.S. Steel.

"The amount U.S. Steel accrues for pending asbestos claims is not
material to U.S. Steel's financial condition.  However, U.S. Steel
is unable to estimate the ultimate outcome of asbestos-related
claims due to a number of uncertainties, including: (1) the rates
at which new claims are filed, (2) the number of and effect of
bankruptcies of other companies traditionally defending asbestos
claims, (3) uncertainties associated with the variations in the
litigation process from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, (4)
uncertainties regarding the facts, circumstances and disease
process with each claim, and (5) any new legislation enacted to
address asbestos-related claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2TjYRI9



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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