CAR_Public/190424.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, April 24, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 82

                            Headlines

AETNA LIFE: Reviewers' Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ALLY FINANCIAL: Taylor Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
ALTA MESA: Faces Class Action Over Non-Payment of Gas Royalties
AMERICAN CORADIUS: Muldowney Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. New York
AMERICAN EXPRESS: Sued by Bonoan Over Erroneous Collection Calls

AMERISOURCEBERGEN: Post Files Personal Injury Suit in West Virginia
AMGEN INC: Suppressed Generic Kidney Meds Manufacture, Says Suit
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD: Summary Judgment in Halle Suit Affirmed
ARCAN CAPITAL: Hamilton Remanded to State Court
ARKANSAS TOTAL: Class of Care Coordinators Conditionally Certified

ARS NATIONAL: Shaini Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
ATKINS & OGLE: Riddle Files FDCPA Suit in Virginia
BANK OF AMERICA: Alaska Employees' Fund Hits Bond Price-Fixing
BEST WESTERN: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
BLACKSTONE PROPERTY: Fischler Files Class Suit Over ADA Breach

CANTON, OH: Court Grants Bid for Indicative Ruling in Roth Suit
CAPITAL ONE: Credit Card Interest Suit Moved to E.D. Va.
CENSTAR ENERGY: Silbaugh Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
CHINA AGRITECH: Foley & Lardner Discusses Reach of SCOTUS Ruling
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS: Faces Class Action Over Union Dues

CONWAY, AR: Carla White Seeks OT Pay
CORNER BROOK: Court Lifts Stay of Class Action Proceedings
CRAVATH SWINE: Former Fresh Market Shareholders File Class Action
CREDITGUARD OF AMERICA: Claims in Amended T. Bank's Suit Narrowed
CRUNCH SAN DIEGO: Kelley Drye Discusses Class Action Settlement

DALLAS DEPOT: Trevino Seeks Overtime Pay
DEL-AIR HEATING: Fowler FLSA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
DOLLAR GENERAL: Fights Sanctions Over Class Action Interviews
EI DU PONT: Court Denies Bid to Stay Victoria Carey's Torts Suit
EL AD US HOLDING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in New York

ENVOY AIR: Hinkley and Rice Allege Age Discrimination
EQHEALTH SOLUTIONS: Russell Seeks to Certify Employee Class
ESTENSON LOGISTICS: Mendez Suit Removed to C.D. California
EVERQUOTE INC: Securities Class Action Pending in New York
FACEBOOK INC: Class in CSM's FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified

FACEBOOK INC: Derivative Privacy Suit Dismissed Under FRCP 23.1
FEDERAL SAVINGS: Court Denies Equitable Tolling Bid in McDermott
FLORIDA: Agrees to Foster Care Reforms in Miami-Dade, Monroe
FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses 3 Counts in Kasper ADA Suit
FORTY BAR & GRILLE: Faces Sanney Suit over Sex Discrimination

GALAXY INTERNATIONAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Mines FDCPA Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Corona Sues Over Defective Vehicle
GREEN CASH LLC: Carter Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls
GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES: Court Narrows Claims v. Edison in Moses Suit
GTX INC: Wheby Balks at Merger Deal with Oncternal Therapeutics

HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Gibbs RICO Suit
HEALTH-ADE: Settles Beverage Mislabeling Class Action for $4MM
HI-TECH METALS: Rojas Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
HUNTER WARFIELD: Vasquez Files FDCPA Suit in Pennsylvania
HYATT HOTELS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Tichy Antitrust Suit

I PLAY INC: Figueroa Files ADA Class Action in NY
IDAVM GROUP: Bid for Class Certification in Garcia Suit Nixed
IMPERIAL INDUSTRIAL: Fahel Sues Over False "Discounting" Scheme
INOV-8 LLC: Violates ADA, Figueroa Suit Asserts
INOVALON HOLDINGS: July 12 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set

JBS SA: July 18 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
JUST ENERGY: 2nd Bid to Decertify Class in Wilkins Suit Denied
KINDERCARE LEARNING: Sirousian Remanded to Superior Court
KING GEORGE J&J: Denied Workers Breaks, Overtime Pay, Tips, Refunds
L'OREAL: Sells Illegal, Misbranded Skin Care Products, Suit Says

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE: Russell Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
LOWE'S COMPANIES: Dugo Files Consumer Credit Suit in Calif.
MAHLE BEHR: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Petition for Certiorari
MCR INVESTORS: Lopez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2741: Doty vs Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL: Faces Class Action Over Buyback Fees
MICHIGAN: Ross, et al. Seek to Certify Class of Pre-Trial Detainees
MIDLAND CREDIT: Can't Compel Arbitration in Lance FDCPA Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Count I of Adkins Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Dwyer Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York

MIZUNO USA: Figueroa Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
NELS HEALTH: Little Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aids
NEWTON RUNNING: Figueroa Files ADA Suit in New York
OLIN CORP: Sued over Artificially Inflated Prices for Caustic Soda

OMNICARE INC: June 27 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
PAVILION GRAND:  Violates ADA, Young Suit Asserts
PORT OF EGYPT: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
QUEENSBURY HOTEL: Young Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Breach
RUSHMORE LOAN: Time to File Responsive Pleadings in Sharma Extended

SCHIFF, P.C.: Windsor Sues over Debt Collections Practices
SCOTT & ASSOCIATES: Williams Balks at Debt Collection Practices
SELENE FINANCE: New York Court Dismisses D. Werner's FDCPA Suit
SELIP & STYLIANOU: Walfish Files FDCPA Suit in New York
SEVENTY SEVEN: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss K. Myers' ERISA Suit

SKULLCANDY INC: Figueroa Sues over Website Accessibility
SOCIAL 8TH: $24K Settlement in Ramirez FLSA Suit Has Court Approval
SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Peltz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
SPREEMO INC: Kelley Drye Discusses Mauthe TCPA Suit Dismissal
SUN LOAN: Sued by De Los Santos Over Erroneous Collection Calls

TEMPERATURE EQUIPMENT: Chavez Hits Illegal Use of Biometrics Data
TOTAL AIRPORT: Cummings Hits Employees' Biometrics Data Sharing
TOWER VALET: Herrera-Zambrano Sues Over Unpaid Wages
TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION: Can Compel Arbitration in Garcia Labor Suit
TRANS UNION: Faces Skaist Suit Over Inaccurate Credit Report

TRANS UNION: Faces Solomon Suit over Erroneous Credit Report
TRINET GROUP: Dismissal of Amended Welgus Securities Suit Affirmed
TWENTY FIRST: Wiggins Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
U-LINE CORP: Settlement in Watts FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
U.S. XPRESS: May 10 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set

UNITED STATES: Common Ground Amends Suit Over CSR Payments
UNITED STUDENT: Summary Judgment in Henderson TCPA Suit Reversed
US CORRECTIONS: Dana White Seeks Overtime Pay
VENATOR MATERIALS: Gonzalez Files Securities Class Action in Texas
VERATIP CORP: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Sarikaputar Suit Denied

VIGO COUNTY, IN: Settles Inmates' Class Action Over Lockup
VIVINT SOLAR: Court Dismisses T. Bank's Amended TCPA Suit
WARNER CHILCOTT: Court Dismisses MSP Recovery's Racketeering Suit
WILMINGTON TRUST: $29.7MM Judgment for ESOP Affirmed
YELLOW PAGES: Court Okays Class Action Over Terms of Contracts


                            *********

AETNA LIFE: Reviewers' Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Linette Edmond Collins, Amy Valentine, Donna Lee, Jacqueline L.
Roseboro, Mildred Winston and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Aetna Life Insurance Company and Aetna Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01400, (N.D. Ill., February 26, 2019),
seeks all unpaid wages and overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees, costs and
expenses of this action, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
and such other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, New York
labor laws, North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

Defendant is a company that partners with health care providers and
health insurance plans to improve the quality and cost of medical
care where Plaintiffs performed utilization review and case
management. Plaintiffs claim to have worked over 40 hours in one or
more workweeks during that time period, all without overtime pay.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
      Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
      Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
      Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
      WERMAN SALAS P.C.
      77 West Washington, Suite 1402
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 419-1008
      Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
             zflowerree@flsalaw.com
             msalas@flsalaw.com
             sarendt@flsalaw.com

             - and -

      Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
      THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
      5438 Rutherglenn Drive
      Houston, TX 77096
      Tel: (512) 417-5716
      Email: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

             - and -

      Jack Siegel, Esq.
      SIEGEL LAW GROUP PLLC
      10440 N. Central Expy., Suite 1040
      Dallas, TX 75231
      Tel: (214) 790-4454
      Fax: (469) 339-0204
      Email: jack@siegellawgroup.biz
      Website: www.4overtimelawyer.com


ALLY FINANCIAL: Taylor Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ally Financial Inc.
The case is styled as Demarkus Taylor on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Ally Financial Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01561-AT (N.D. Ga., Apr. 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Ally Financial is a bank holding company organized in Delaware and
headquartered in Detroit, Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Adian Miller, Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, PLLC - Atl
     191 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 4200
     Atlanta, GA 30306
     Phone: (404) 496-7332
     Email: armiller@forthepeople.com

          - and -

     John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
     Jonathan Betten Cohen, Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A. -T.FL
     201 N. Franklin Street
     7th Floor
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Phone: (813) 223-5505
     Fax: (813) 222-2434
     Email: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
            jcohen@forthepeople.com



ALTA MESA: Faces Class Action Over Non-Payment of Gas Royalties
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rob Ruth, writing for Independent-Enterprise, reports that nine
local people who leased their mineral rights to Alta Mesa have
filed a class action suit against the gas and oil producer,
alleging "willful underpayment or non-payment of royalties on
natural gas and/or constituents of the gas stream produced from
wells in Idaho."

The lawsuit, which was filed March 1 in Third District Court in
Payette, further alleges that defendants "manipulated royalty
accounting methods by calculating royalty on a net price rather
than a gross price, by taking midstream deductions from royalty
that the oil and gas leases do not expressly authorize, by failing
to account for and pay royalties on all products produced, used, or
sold, and by engaging in transactions with affiliates which reduced
royalty paid . . . ."

Listed as plaintiffs are Thomas G. Roland, Marcia R. Roland,
Randall C. Kauffman, Thana M. Kauffman, Brett L. Moore, Kathleen A.
Moore, Richard Peterson, Gregory Semon and Terri Semon.

Defendants named include Alta Mesa Resources Inc., Alta Mesa
Services LP, Alta Mesa Holdings LP, AM Idaho LLC, High Mesa
Holdings LP, High Mesa Services LLC, and Northwest Gas Processing
LLC.

Plaintiffs are represented by Boise attorneys Vaughn Fisher and
Jeremiah Hudson, Reagan E. Bradford of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and
Rex A. Sharp of Prairie Village, Kansas.

One objective of the complaint is to settle the question of who
should bear the "midstream service expenses incurred to make
marketable products from the gas produced from the wells." The
complaint notes that "the majority of gas-producing jurisdictions"
require lessees (producers, such as Alta Mesa) "to bear all of the
costs of preparing gas for market. … The issue has not been
decided under Idaho law. This case provides that opportunity."

In all, the nine plaintiffs have six leases to Alta Mesa. According
to the complaint, five of the leases provide royalties of 3/16 of
gross proceeds from the gas sold, and one lease provides royalties
of 1/6. In all of the leases, the calculation is to be made based
on the "actual amount received" by the lessee.

"None of these leases expressly permit the deduction of any amounts
from the 'gross proceeds' or the 'actual amount received by the
Lessee' for products manufactured from the gas produced from
Plaintiffs' wells," the complaint states.

According to the complaint, the action is brought on behalf of the
class of all "persons who are or were royalty owners in Idaho wells
where Defendants [various Alta Mesa entities and others] are or
were the operator . . . from January 1, 2014 to the date Class
notice is given. . . . The Class claims relate to royalty payments
for gas and its constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas
liquids, or drip condensate)."

Nearly coinciding with the action's filing in the state court
system was the apparent conclusion to a legal back-and-forth which
had been playing out for longer than half a year in federal court
in Boise. There, U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill had ruled in
August that the Idaho Department of Lands' procedure for forcing
mineral rights from unconsenting owners into pools for extraction
violated due process. After Winmill reaffirmed the ruling on Feb.
1, the state faced a deadline early in March to formally appeal.

Shelley Brock, a board member of Citizens Allied for Integrity and
Accountability (CAIA), an Eagle-based group which had joined in the
suit challenging the forced pooling methods, noted on March 18 that
the state had opted not to contest Winmill's ruling.

"The state had until March fourth to appeal, and they did not
appeal," Brock said.

Idaho Department of Lands hasn't announced next steps to address
the due process shortcoming in light of the decision not to push on
against the court case.

"We assume this means there will have to be a whole new hearing
process held for the forced-pooled people," Brock said.

Unlike the CAIA-led suit against Idaho gas and oil regulators, the
class action complaint filed March 1 in Payette County was brought
by lessors who signed agreements to lease their mineral rights. The
complaint seeks to end Alta Mesa's alleged practice of deducting a
portion of the producer's midstream expenses from the lessors'
royalty checks. It also points to a requirement under the Idaho Oil
and Gas Conservation Act that interest of 12 percent be added to
royalty payments not paid within 60 days of their due date.

"The damages in this case will be significant," the complaint
states.

The newspaper has reached out to Alta Mesa for comment on the class
action. [GN]


AMERICAN CORADIUS: Muldowney Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Coradius
International, LLC. The case is styled as Matthew Muldowney
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. American Coradius International, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 5:19-cv-00422-TJM-TWD (N.D. N.Y., April 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

American Coradius International LLC is a full service financial
service agency representing banks and finance companies on a
national level.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


AMERICAN EXPRESS: Sued by Bonoan Over Erroneous Collection Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
Viann Bonoan and Ronald Musto, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. American Express Company,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01782 (S.D. N.Y., February 26, 2019),
seeks statutory damages, permanent injunction over Defendants' and
their agents' violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this action, statutory
prejudgment interest, and such other relief.

American Express Company is a credit card company with its
headquarters in New York. Defendants or its agents place telephone
calls to Plaintiffs using autodialers and/or left prerecorded
telephone messages intended for another recipient. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brittany Sloane Weiner, Esq.
      IMBESI LAW P.C.
      450 7th Avenue
      New York, NY 10123
      Tel: (646) 380-9555
      Fax: (212) 658-9177
      Email: brittany@lawicm.com

             - and -

      Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
      GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
      106 East Sixth Street, Suite 913
      Austin, TX 78701
      Telephone: (512) 322-3912
      Fax: (561) 961-5684
      Email: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
      GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
      5550 Glades Rd, Ste. 500
      Boca Raton, FL 33431
      Tel: (561) 826-5477
      Fax: (561) 961-5684
      Email: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
      KOZONIS LAW, LTD
      4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
      Chicago, IL 60630
      Phone: (773) 545-9607
      Fax: (773) 496-8617
      Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


AMERISOURCEBERGEN: Post Files Personal Injury Suit in West Virginia
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Amerisourcebergen
Corporation. The case is styled as Frances G. Post individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Amerisourcebergen Corporation, a Delaware corporation, US
Bioservices Corporation a Delaware Corporation, I.g.G. Of America,
Inc. a Maryland Corporation, IHS Acquisition XXX, Inc. a Delaware
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00073-TSK (N.D. W. Va.,
Apr. 8, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury.

AmerisourceBergen Corporation is an American drug wholesale company
that was formed by the merger of Bergen Brunswig and AmeriSource in
2001.

US Bioservices Corporation provides pharmacy, specialty pharmacy,
and infusion nursing services in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Cheryl A. Fisher, Esq.
     William M. Tiano, Esq.
     Tiano O'Dell, PLLC
     Post Office Box 11830
     Charleston, WV 25339
     Phone: (304) 720-6700
     Email: wtiano@tolawfirm.com

          - and -

     Tony L. O'Dell, Esq.
     Berthold, Tiano & O'Dell
     PO Box 3508
     Charleston, WV 25335
     Phone: (304) 345-5700
     Fax: (304) 345-5703
     Email: tlodell@ntelos.net


AMGEN INC: Suppressed Generic Kidney Meds Manufacture, Says Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cesar Castillo, Inc., individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Amgen Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, INC., Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd., Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc., Actavis Pharma,
Inc. and Actavis PLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00396, (D. Del.,
February 26, 2019), seeks to recover treble damages, costs of suit
and reasonable attorneys' fees resulting from the allocation of the
market for cinacalcet hydrochloride tablets in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act as well as
various state consumer protection laws.

Defendants produce, market and sell cinacalcet hydrochloride, a
calcium-sensing receptor agonist indicated for secondary
hyperparathyroidism (HPT) in adult patients with chronic kidney
disease on dialysis. It is also indicated for the treatment of
hypercalcemia in adult patients with parathyroid carcinoma and
severe hypercalcemia in adult patients with primary HPT who are
unable to undergo parathyroidectomy.

Defendants allegedly tried to suppress the manufacture of generic
version of cinacalcet hydrochloride upon expiry of its patent by
filing patent infringement lawsuits in federal district courts
against each and every generic drug manufacturer vying for FDA
approval to bring their generic versions of cinacalcet
hydrochloride to market.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert J. Kriner, Jr., Esq.
      Scott M. Tucker, Esq.
      Tiffany J. Cramer, Esq.
      Vera G. Belger, Esq.
      CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
      2711 Centerville Road Suite 201
      Wilmington, DE 19808
      Tel: (302) 656-2500
      Fax: (302) 656-9053
      Email: rjk@chimicles.com
             smt@chimicles.com
             tjc@chimicles.com
             vgb@chimicles.com

             - and -

      Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
      CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
      One Haverford Centre
      361 W. Lancaster Avenue
      Haverford, PA 19041
      Telephone: (610) 642-8500
      Facsimile: (610) 649-3633
      Email: bfj@chimicles.com

             - and -

      Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
      Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
      Hugh Sandler, Esq.
      NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
      1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
      New York, NY 10036-8718
      Tel: (917) 438-9189
      Email: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
             bcohen@nussbaumpc.com
             hsandler@nussbaumpc.com

             - and -

      Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
      Bradley J. Vettraino, Esq.
      HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
      55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
      Cambridge, MA 02142
      Tel: (617) 482-3700
      Fax: (617) 482-3003
      Email: tom@hbsslaw.com
             bradleyv@hbsslaw.com

             - and -

      Sharon K. Robertson, Esq.
      Donna M. Evans, Esq.
      COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
      88 Pine Street, 14th Floor
      New York, NY 10005
      Tel: (212) 838 7797
      Fax: (212) 838 7745
      Email: srobertson@cohenmilstein.com
             devans@cohenmilstein.com

             - and -

      John Radice, Esq.
      Daniel Rubenstein, Esq.
      Kenneth Pickle, Esq.
      RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
      475 Wall Street
      Princeton, NJ 08540
      Telephone: (646) 245-8502
      Facsimile: (609) 385-0745
      Email: jradice@radicelawfirm.com
             drubenstein@radicelawfirm.com
             kpickle@radicelawfirm.com

             - and -

      Shawn Raymond, Esq.
      SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
      1000 Louisiana, Suite 5100
      Houston, TX 77002
      Tel: (713) 653-7817
      Email: sraymond@susmangodfrey.com

             - and -

      Kalpana Srinivasan, Esq.
      SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
      1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Tel: (310) 789-3106
      Email: ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com

             - and -

      Michael M. Buchman, Esq.
      Michelle C. Clerkin, Esq.
      MOTLEY RICE LLC
      600 Third Avenue, Suite 2101
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 577-0040
      Facsimile: (212) 577-0050
      Email: mbuchman@motleyrice.com
             mclerkin@motleyrice.com


ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD: Summary Judgment in Halle Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HALLE DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al., v. ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY, Case No. 1298 (Md. Spec. App.), Judge Andrea M.
Leahy-Fucheck of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County order
denying the Appellants' (i) petition to enforce the final judgment,
and (ii) motion for summary judgment.

The Appellants, Halle Development, Inc., et al. ("Owners") are the
representative Plaintiffs in a class action for certain property
owners in Anne Arundel County.  The origin of the class action
dispute dates back to February 2001, when the Owners filed an
action in assumpsit seeking to recover development impact fees
collected by the Appellee, the County.

For almost two decades, the case has occasioned interlocutory
orders and intervening appeals to the Court and the Court of
Appeals.  Following a remand by the Court of Appeals in 2009, the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County decided in favor of the
Owners and later entered a final judgment on Aug. 18, 2016,
requiring the County to pay refunds in the amount of $1,342,360
plus 5% simple interest per annum, and to pay attorney's fees, by
Nov. 7, 2016.  The Owners did not appeal the August 2016 Order.

The County subsequently paid the ordered refund amount, including
interest, by the court-ordered deadline.  The Owners subsequently
filed -- more than nine months later -- a petition to enforce the
final judgment, along with a motion for summary judgment.  On Aug.
9, 2017, the circuit court denied both motions.  

The Owners appealed, again, and present one question for review:
Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
against the Class, when the County's records demonstrate the County
received compound interest on impact fees deposited in special
funds, yet only paid to the Class simple interest.

Judge Leahy-Fucheck discerned no error in the trial court's denial
of summary judgment.  She finds that the August 2016 Order
constituted a final judgment and the Owners subsequently failed to
pursue a post-judgment motion under Maryland Rule 2-535.  Even if
she were to treat the Owners' motion for summary judgment as a
post-judgment motion as they suggest, the Owners failed to
demonstrate fraud, mistake or irregularity, as required by Rule
2-535(b).  

And, even if a proper motion had been timely filed in the case, the
Owners' appeal would be barred by the law of the case doctrine
because the Court's 2008 opinion, Anne Arundel Cty v. Halle Dev.,
Inc., (filed Feb. 7, 2008), on reconsideration, squarely rejected
their investment income argument, and, the Owners failed to raise
this issue on appeal in both 2013 and 2017.  As the Court
explicated in Halle Dev. Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty., (filed Nov. 22,
2017), the issue of the interest to which the Owners were entitled
was barred by the law of the case.  Unfortunately, this is not the
first time the Court has decided that the Owners' arguments are
barred by the law of the case.

For these reasons, Judge Leahy-Fucheck declined to address the
merits of the Owners' appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/av41aN from Leagle.com.


ARCAN CAPITAL: Hamilton Remanded to State Court
-----------------------------------------------
Judge Loretta C. Biggs of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina remanded the case, TANESHA HAMILTON,
Plaintiff, v. ARCAN CAPITAL, LLC, and CMJD WINSTON-SALEM
APARTMENTS, LLC d/b/a/ SEDGEFIELD APARTMENTS, Defendants, Case No.
1:18CV356 (M.D. N.C.), to the General Court of Justice of North
Carolina, Forsyth County Superior Court Division.

The Plaintiff initiated the putative class action alleging unlawful
debt collection practices against Arcan Capital and CMJD
Winston-Salem in Forsyth County Superior Court on March 26, 2018.
The Plaintiff leased an apartment from Sedgefield Apartments, which
was operated by Arcan Capital.  In September 2017, the Plaintiff
was late in making a rent payment and was charged an additional 5%
of her monthly rent, pursuant to the terms of her lease.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the Defendants initiated a Complaint in Summary
Ejectment in Small Claims Court in Forsyth County.  On Sept. 28,
2017, the Defendants charged the Plaintiff $191 for
"Eviction/Filing Fees."  On Oct. 11, 2017, the Defendants obtained
a Judgment in their Action for Summary Ejectment, in which the
costs of the action were taxed to the Defendants.  The same pattern
repeated for the month of October, with the Plaintiff being charged
both a 5% late fee and $191 for "Eviction Filing Fees."

The Plaintiff filed the action individually and on behalf of a
class, asserting three claims of violations of state law: one
violation of the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act,
one violation of the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, and one
violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("NCUDTPA").

The Plaintiff's putative class consists of all tenants of the
Defendants' Apartments in North Carolina who (a) at any point
within the four-year period preceding the filing of the Plaintiff's
Complaint and during its pendency (b) resided in one of the
apartments owned or managed by the Defendants in North Carolina (c)
were charged Court Costs and Attorneys' Fees prior to a North
Carolina court taxing such Court Costs and Attorneys' Fees to the
particular individual (d) or actually paid such Court Costs and
Attorneys' Fees to the Defendants.

The Defendants removed the case to the Court pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), and diversity jurisdiction on May 1,
2018.  The Plaintiff now moves to remand this case back to state
court, arguing that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the
matter.  The Plaintiff also requests that she be awarded attorney's
fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

Judge Biggs finds that the Defendants do not state whether they
have access to the relevant data: the number of times they charged
"Court Costs and Attorneys' Fees" prior to a court taxing such
costs on tenants.  If that data does exist, however, it would be in
the Defendants' control.  The Defendants have failed to provide the
Court with sufficient factual matter to determine the amount in
controversy, such that the Court may only "speculate" as to whether
the class action belongs in federal court.  Therefore, because the
Defendants have failed to carry their burden, the Judge is unable
to conclude that it has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
CAFA.

The Defendants' argument that a request for punitive damages is
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold in the case, the
Judge finds that without more, is at best speculative and therefore
fails meet their burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  Thus,
because federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.

Accordingly, because the Defendants have failed to demonstrate that
this Court has jurisdiction under either CAFA or diversity
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1332(a), the Plaintiff's motion
to remand will be granted.

As to the Plaintiff's request in their Motion to Remand that
attorney's fees be awarded, the Judge finds that although the
Defendants' arguments were unsuccessful, he does not find that they
were objectively unreasonable.  There is no indication in the
record that the Defendants removed the case for an improper
purpose.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees
and costs will be denied.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Biggs granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand.  He remanded the case to the General Court of
Justice of North Carolina, Forsyth County Superior Court Division.
The parties will bear their own costs related to removal and
remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/eE5ehi from Leagle.com.

TANESHA HAMILTON, Plaintiff, represented by SCOTT C. HARRIS --
scott@wbmllp.com -- LEWIS & ROBERTS, PLLC, KARL S. GWALTNEY,
MAGINNIS LAW, PLLC & PATRICK M. WALLACE -- pat@wbmllp.com --
WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP.

ARCAN CAPITAL, LLC & CMJD WINSTON-SALEM APARTMENTS, LLC, d/b/a
SEDGEFIELD APARTMENTS, Defendants, represented by REID CALWELL
ADAMSJr. -- cal.adams@wbd-us.com -- WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
& JONATHAN REID REICH -- jonathan.reich@wbd-us.com -- WOMBLE BOND
DICKINSON (US) LLP.

CMJD WINSTON-SALEM APARTMENTS, LLC, d/b/a SEDGEFIELD APARTMENTS &
ARCAN CAPITAL, LLC, Counter Claimants, represented by REID CALWELL
ADAMS, Jr., WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP & JONATHAN REID REICH,
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP.

TANESHA HAMILTON, Counter Defendant, represented by SCOTT C.
HARRIS, LEWIS & ROBERTS, PLLC, KARL S. GWALTNEY, MAGINNIS LAW, PLLC
& PATRICK M. WALLACE, WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP.


ARKANSAS TOTAL: Class of Care Coordinators Conditionally Certified
------------------------------------------------------------------
TAQUILLA HATCH, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the PLAINTIFF, vs. ARKANSAS TOTAL CARE, INC., CENTENE
CORPORATION and CENTENE MANAGEMET COMPANY, LLC, the DEFENDANTS,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00580-JM (E.D. Ark.), the Hon Judge James M. Moody
Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting conditional certification under FLSA for purposes
      of notice and discovery;

      "all Care Coordinators for Arkansas Total Care, Inc. and
      Centene Corporation at any time since August 27, 2015";

   2. approving the form of notice;

   3. directing the Defendant to provide to counsel for the
      plaintiff the names and addresses of all persons who were
      employed by them as Care Coordinators during the specific
      time within 14 days from the entry of the Order. Defendant
      shall provide the information in electronic format only if it

      is currently maintained in electronic format. The Court
      hereby authorizes a 90-day opt-in period from the date the
      notice is mailed.;

   4. authorizing lawyers for the Plaintiff to issue the notice and

      consent forms by mail, and authorizing to send a reminder
      postcard thirty days after the initial notice is mailed; and


   5. denying Plaintiff's request to provide notice via electronic

      mailing or text message.

The Court said, "Plaintiff claims that she and all putative class
members performed the same or similar job duties which inevitably
required more than 40 hours of work per week. The Plaintiff claims
that the duties performed by her and all of the members of the
putative class included providing various services, to include
traveling to meet clients, assisting clients with day-to-day tasks,
scheduling and accompanying clients to their appointments and
related tasks. Much of the work took place at the Defendants'
clients' locations, although some work was performed at Defendants'
office location. Plaintiff claims that they were required to write
extensive client notes each evening prior to the beginning of the
next work day. The Plaintiff contends that all care coordinators,
including Plaintiff and opt-in Plaintiffs, regularly worked more
than 40 hours per week due to the mandatory client note-taking. The
Plaintiff claims that all Care Coordinators were paid by the hour
by the Defendants but were not paid any wages for hours spent
writing the mandatory client notes each evening. After carefully
considering these factors, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
provided enough information to establish that she is similarly
situated to the putative class members at this stage of the
litigation. Accordingly, the Court finds that conditional
certification is proper under the FLSA for purposes of notice and
discovery, and accordingly, certifies the class requested by the
Plaintiff."[CC]

ARS NATIONAL: Shaini Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARS NATIONAL SERVICES
INC. The case is styled as EROOLL SHAINI, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARS NATIONAL
SERVICES INC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-09296
(D. N.J., April 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

ARS National Services, Inc. offers accounts receivable management
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


ATKINS & OGLE: Riddle Files FDCPA Suit in Virginia
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Atkins & Ogle Law
Offices, LC. The case is styled as Bobbi J. Riddle on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Atkins & Ogle
Law Offices, LC, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00249 (S.D. Va., Apr.
4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Atkins & Ogle Law Offices, LC is a law firm in Buffalo, West
Virginia focusing on various areas of law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew P. Stapleton, Esq.
     STAPLETON LAW OFFICE
     400 Fifth Avenue
     Huntington, WV 25701
     Phone: (304) 529-1130
     Fax: (304) 529-0103
     Email: stapletonlawoffices@gmail.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Alaska Employees' Fund Hits Bond Price-Fixing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Bank Of America, N.A., Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., BNP
Paribas Securities Corp., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Deutsche
Bank Securities Inc., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., HSBC Bank PLC,
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Nomura
Securities International, Inc., TD Securities (USA) LLC, and Wells
Fargo Securities, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01796, (S.D.
N.Y., February 26, 2019), asserts violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act.

Defendants are dealers of debt issued by the Federal National
Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
unsecured bond issuances.

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund is a pension fund established to
provide retirement benefits for the employees of Alaska's
electrical construction community and currently manages over $2
billion in assets. It had transacted directly with the Defendants
for these instruments and claim that it was overcharged or
underpaid in these transactions as a direct result of an alleged
conspiracy to fix the prices of the bonds.

Defendants allegedly charge inflated, supracompetitive prices for
newly issued bonds that they sold to investors after acquiring them
from the Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel L. Brockett, Esq.
     Steig D. Olson, Esq.
     Thomas J. Lepri, Esq.
     Christopher M. Seck, Esq.
     Thomas Popejoy, Esq.
     QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
     51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
     New York, NY 10010
     Telephone: (212) 849-7000
     Fax: (212) 849-7100
     Email: danbrockett@quinnemanuel.com
            steigolson@quinnemanuel.com
            thomaslepri@quinnemanuel.com
            christopherseck@quinnemanuel.com

            - and -

      Patrick J. Coughlin, Esq.
      David W. Mitchell, Esq.
      Brian O. O'Mara, Esq.
      Steve Jodlowski, Esq.
      Ashley M. Kelly, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      655 W. Broadway, Suite 1900
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (619) 231-1058
      Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
      Email: patc@rgrdlaw.com
             sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com
             davidm@rgrdlaw.com
             bomara@rgrdlaw.com
             akelly@rgrdlaw.com

            - and -

      Anthony P. Alden, Esq.
      Jeremy D. Andersen, Esq.
      QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
      865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90017
      Telephone: (213) 443-3000
      Fax: (213) 443-3100
      Email: anthonyalden@quinnemanuel.com
             jeremyandersen@quinnemanuel.com


BEST WESTERN: DiCarlo Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------
DAVID DICARLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL INC., Case No. 153398/2019
(N.Y. Sup., New York Cty., April 2, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant is denying blind individuals, including the Plaintiff,
throughout the United States equal access to the goods and services
it provides to its non-disabled customers through
http://www.bestwestern.com/.

The Web site provides access to the array of goods and services
offered to the public by the Defendant, including special pricing
offers and other benefits related to these goods and services.

Best Western International Inc. is an American for-profit
corporation organized under the laws of New York State with a
process of service address in Phoenix, Arizona.  The Company owns
and operates Best Western Premier, which is a place of public
accommodation located throughout the United States and in New York
State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          Taimur Alamgir, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com
                  anne@leelitigation.com


BLACKSTONE PROPERTY: Fischler Files Class Suit Over ADA Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blackstone Property
Partners L.P. The case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Blackstone Property Partners L.P. doing business as: Parker Towers,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02979 (S.D. N.Y., April 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Blackstone Property Partners specializes in core-plus real estate,
office, industrial, retail, multifamily, residential, commercial
property, and apartment properties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


CANTON, OH: Court Grants Bid for Indicative Ruling in Roth Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL T. ROTH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
CANTON, OHIO, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:17CV0234 (N.D. Ohio),
Judge Benita Y. Pearson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division (i) denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; (ii) granted the
Defendants' Motion for an Indicative Ruling; (iii) denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply to Defendants'
Motion for an Indicative Ruling and Motion for Relief From
Judgment; and (iv) granted the Defendants' Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Supplement.

The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction and permanently enjoined Defendants City of
Canton and Shirley Moore from enforcing Canton Ordinance 505.14,
its animal-limit Ordinance.  It held that Plaintiff Michael T. Roth
and his mother, Plaintiff Julie Roth, had standing to seek
injunctive relief on their claim that the Ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague not because either had suffered a past
injury (hence no claim for damages), but because there was a
substantial risk that, in the future, they could be prosecuted
under the Ordinance.

On Nov. 20, 2018, the Defendants made a timely Motion for an
Indicative Ruling and Motion for Relief From Judgment.  The
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply to
Defendants' Motion for an Indicative Ruling and Motion for Relief
From Judgment.  Rather than wait until the motion was ruled upon by
the Court, the Plaintiffs attached their Sur-Reply to the motion.

Judge Pearson explains that Local Rule 7.1 permits the filing of a
motion and memorandum in support, a memorandum in opposition, and a
reply memorandum.  The primary purpose for allowing the moving
party to file a reply memorandum is so it can respond to any new
issues raised in the memorandum in opposition — i.e., allowing
the movant to be the first and last to be heard.  Allowing the
Plaintiffs to file a sur-reply, based on the record now
established, would frustrate the purpose of allowing the movant to
be the first and last to be heard on the Defendants' Motion for an
Indicative Ruling and Motion for Relief From Judgment.

The Plaintiffs' Supplement was filed on Feb. 25, 2019.  They argue
that it is necessary because they have new information from the
Defendants that] shows that there is a credible threat of
enforcement and prosecution against Julie Roth.  However, there is
nothing "new" about the information on which they base the filing
of their Supplement.  The Defendants' discovery that Plaintiff
Julie Roth likely had more than nine dogs or cats was, as
Plaintiffs acknowledge, repeated2 in the Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply.  So,
if the Plaintiffs were going to respond, they had a chance to do so
in their Reply.  But, they did not. Therefore, the Judge holds that
despite that Plaintiffs' claim that they are responding to "new"
information in their Supplement, they are doing nothing of the
kind.

The Defendants ask the Court to indicate whether it would vacate
its Memorandum of Opinion and Order because Plaintiffs Michael T.
Roth and Julie Roth lacked standing due to their relocation out of
Canton months before the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction.  In the alternative, they
request that the Court indicates that the motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)(3) or (5) raises a
substantial issue if remanded from the Court of Appeals.  Whether
the Roths lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief once they
moved out of Canton is the ultimate issue presented by the
Defendants' Motion for an Indicative Ruling and Motion for Relief
From Judgment.

The Judge holds that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to
vacate its Memorandum of Opinion and Order), except to the extent
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 permits.   With Plaintiff Michael T. Roth
not living in the city of Canton, there can be no dispute that
Julie Roth lacked standing to challenge Canton Ordinance 505.14 as
it applies to others -- even if her claims were not moot in the
first place.  Plaintiffs Michael T. Roth and Julie Roth's lack of
residency in Canton rendered their claim moot.

On March 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class
Certification. The proposed Classes are defined as follows:

     a. Class I: All persons who live in the City of Canton who own
dogs or cats, or a combination;

     b. Class II: All persons who feed stray dogs or cats in the
City of Canton;

     c. Class III: All persons who live in the City of Canton with
stray cats on that property.

The Plaintiffs' Supplement to Brief in Support of Motion for Class
Certification is deemed filed as of June 5, 2018.  On June 14,
2018, the Defendants filed their memorandum in opposition.  On July
5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of
their Motion for Class Certification.

Given the within ruling on the Defendants' Motion for an Indicative
Ruling and Motion for Relief From Judgment, the Judge denied
without prejudice to refiling the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, if the Court of Appeals does not remand for the
Court to grant the Defendants' Motion for Relief From Judgment.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Pearson denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and may be resubmitted
if the Court of Appeals does not remand for the Court to grant the
Defendants' Motion for Relief From Judgment.

She granted the Defendants' Motion for an Indicative Ruling.  She
indicated and certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 that upon remand
from the Sixth Circuit it would: grant the Defendants' Motion for
Relief From Judgment and issue an order vacating the Court's Sept.
28, 2018 Memorandum of Opinion and Order.  The Defendants will
promptly notify the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(a) of the
Court's within indicative ruling.

The Judge denied the PPlaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply to Defendants' Motion for an Indicative Ruling and Motion
for Relief From Judgment.  She granted the Defendants' Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs' Supplement.  The Plaintiffs' Supplement to Their
Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Vacate is stricken from the
file pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Memorandum of
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/Ujly5p from
Leagle.com.

Michael T. Roth, Julie Roth, Joy wagner & Toni A. Leach,
Plaintiffs, represented by Richard B. Rosenthal & Michela J. Huth.

City of Canton, Ohio, City of Canton Police Department, Shirley
Moore, In her official and individual capacity & John Does, Police
Officers and Supervisors, in their official and individual
capacities, Defendants, represented by Kristen Bates Aylward,
Department of Law & Kevin R. L'Hommedieu, Department of Law.


CAPITAL ONE: Credit Card Interest Suit Moved to E.D. Va.
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN DRESS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-40064 (D. Mass.), Judge Timothy
S. Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted the Defendant's motion to transfer the case
to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a).

The case is a putative class action suit brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1331(d)(2) and (6) by Mrs. Dress against Capital
One.  The suit is brought on behalf of Capital One consumers in the
United States ("National Class") for a claim of breach of contract
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and in
Massachusetts ("Massachusetts Subclass") on a third claim alleging
unfair or deceptive acts or practices violating M.G.L.A. chapter
93A Sections 2 and 9.  The Plaintiff claims the Defendant breached
their credit card contract by charging interest to her and members
of the class on amounts that were paid in full before the due date,
an alleged express violation of their terms.

In 2009, Mrs. Dress, a citizen of Massachusetts who works and lives
in the Commonwealth, opened a credit card account with Capital One,
which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia in the Eastern District
of Virginia.  The credit card came with an annual fee and no
rewards program.  Sometime around 2017 and at Mrs. Dress' request,
Capital One provided her with an upgraded Quicksilver Platinum
MasterCard credit card with no annual fee and a rewards program.
The upgraded credit card's agreement specifically prohibited the
assessment of residual interest charges by promising an
interest-free grace period on purchases paid off before the due
date.  

Mrs. Dress, however, noticed that she was charged interest on all
new purchases even though she had paid off her entire statement
balance before the due date.  She claims this charge violates the
credit card agreement.  She alleges that without notifying
customers, Capital One eliminates the grace period for all new
purchases if a consumer does not pay off her entire statement
balance in a given month.

The Plaintiff files the action on behalf of herself and the
National Class alleging Capital One affirmatively misrepresented
and omitted in its contracts that if a consumer fails to pay off
his or her entire balance by the statement due date, Capital One
will revoke the interest-free grace period on all future purchases
and collect residual interest.  She claims breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on behalf of
herself and the national class.

On behalf of herself and the Massachusetts Subclass, the Plaintiff
alleges a violation of M.G.L.A. c. 93A Sections 2 and 9.  Mrs.
Dress brought the action in the Court.  The credit card agreement
signed by Mrs. Dress contains a Virginia choice of law provision,
stating that all claims asserted on behalf of a putative nationwide
class will be governed by Virginia law.

The action is nearly identical to the action the Plaintiff's
husband, David Dress, brought in the Eastern District of Virginia
before the instant case was filed.  Mr. Dress filed a putative
class action lawsuit against Capital One in the Eastern District of
Virginia, claiming breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith.  Eleven days after filing it and after a
judge was assigned to the case, Mr. Dress dismissed his complaint.
Two months later and represented by the same counsel, Mrs. Dress
filed her suit against Capital One alleging the same claims in a
complaint nearly verbatim to that of her husband.

On May 25, 2018, the Defendant filed the motion to transfer,
claiming the private and public factors, including allegations of
forum-shopping, make the Eastern District of Virginia the more
convenient and proper venue.  The Defendant argues that the Eastern
District of Virginia is more convenient because that is where the
essential documents to the case are located and where the policies
and practices at issue were developed and implemented.  The
Plaintiffs oppose the motion to transfer.

Judge Hillman finds that Mrs. Dress is connected to her choice of
forum because she lives and works in Massachusetts.  Suspicion of
forum shopping arose because Mrs. Dress' husband, Mr. Dress, filed
a putative class-action lawsuit against Capital One in the Eastern
District of Virginia claiming breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith, in which Mrs. Dress was mentioned
in averment as a Capital One cardholder.  Mr. Dress dismissed his
complaint on March 26, 2018, 11 days after filing it and before
there was any substantial action by the Eastern District of
Virginia.

The Judge also finds that on May 2, 2018, Mrs. Dress filed her suit
against Capital One alleging the same claims in a complaint nearly
verbatim to her husband's.  Additionally, both Mr. and Mrs. Dress
are represented by the same counsel.  Where there is such suspicion
of forum shopping, the Plaintiff's choice of forum does not have
the same weight.

The Judge holds he can consider the factual circumstances basing
the allegations of forum-shopping in determining the weight to give
the Plaintiff's choice of forum without ruling that she did in fact
forum shop. After considering the facts, this factor goes in favor
of the Defendant.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Hillman finds that based on the
convenience of the parties and material witnesses, and in the
interest of justice, the matter will be transferred to the Eastern
District of Virginia.  Accordingly, he granted the Defendant's
Motion to Transfer.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum of
Decision and Order is available at https://is.gd/JBPqe6 from
Leagle.com.

Susan Dress, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel --
jkaliel@kalielpllc.com -- Kaliel PLLC, pro hac vice, Nicholas A.
Migliaccio -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod,
LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick J. Sheehan -- psheehan@whatleykallas.com
-- Whatley Kallas, LLP, Sophia Goren Gold -- sgold@kalielpllc.com
-- Kaliel PLLC, pro hac vice & Jason S. Rathod --
jrathod@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod, LLP, pro hac vice.

Capital One Bank (U.S.A.), N.A., Defendant, represented by Andrew
Soukup -- asoukup@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice
& Michael M. Maya -- mmaya@cov.com -- Covington & Burling.


CENSTAR ENERGY: Silbaugh Suit Moved to M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Tia Silbaugh, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CENSTAR ENERGY CORP.
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00161 was moved from the Northern
District of Ohio to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on April 4, 2019, and assigned Case No.
6:19-cv-00653.

Plaintiff Silbaugh is the named class representative in the
putative class. In her action, Plaintiff alleges that CenStar
Energy has violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act based on
an unsolicited ringless voicemail Plaintiff and the putative class
received, says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Evan B. Berger, Esq.
     Becker & Poliakoff, P.A.
     1 East Broward Blvd., Suite 1800
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Telephone: (954) 987-7550
     Facsimile: (954) 985-4176
     Email: eberger@bplegal.com


CHINA AGRITECH: Foley & Lardner Discusses Reach of SCOTUS Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kendall E. Waters, Esq. -- kwaters@foley.com -- and Jennifer M.
Keas, Esq. -- jkeas@foley.com -- of Foley & Lardner LLP, in an
article for National Law Review, reports that circuit courts of
appeal are solidifying the reach of the Supreme Court's June 2018
decision in China Agritech v. Resh and curtailing the availability
of equitable tolling in class contexts. The Supreme Court's
decision in China Agritech, which we previously previewed and
attended oral arguments for, held that the tolling principles
announced in its earlier American Pipe decision do not allow absent
class members to file follow-on class action lawsuits where the
statute of limitations has otherwise expired on their claims.
Recent decisions across several circuit courts of appeal have
confirmed our prediction regarding the reexamination of class cases
relying upon American Pipe and reigned in plaintiffs' reliance on
tolling in class contexts.

In February, the First Circuit extended the reach of China Agritech
to prevent successive class actions even where the original suit
did not reach a decision on class certification. In In re Celexa &
Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Practices Litigation, the First Circuit found
that Plaintiff Painters was able to sue in its individual capacity,
but that "Painters [could ]not parlay that dispensation into the
much-delayed filing of a class action." The case involved a
proposed class of third-party payers accusing Defendant Forest of
misleading consumers regarding the efficacy of two of its drugs --
Celexa and Lexapro -- for pediatric use.  A prior proposed class
action, which likewise alleged putative class claims under RICO and
various state consumer protection statutes against Forest, was
filed in 2009.[5] On a motion for class certification, that case
was instead dismissed in June 2010.

The First Circuit gave effect to the spirit of China Agritech by
prohibiting Painters from proceeding as a class irrespective of
whether the prior suit reached a substantive ruling on class
certification. Although "the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
[China Agritech] to answer the narrow question of whether a
putative class member may commence a class action beyond the
limitations period upon the district court's denial of a request
for class certification filed within the statute of limitations []
the Court proceeded to provide a broader answer: Its precedents do
not 'so much as hint that American Pipe tolling extends to
otherwise time-barred class claims.'"

Further, the First Circuit offered pointed language regarding
plaintiff's impermissible attempt to delay the running of the
statute of limitations in an effort to save its class claims.
Forest argued that Painters was on notice of its potential claims
against Forest once the United States unsealed its complaint
against Forest regarding similar claims, which unsealing gave rise
to the filing of two distinct private class action complaints
within the following two weeks. The Court did not sympathize with
Painters' position that the lawsuits did not provide sufficient
notice of the claims, admonishing that there is "no case law
holding that a statutory limitations period does not start to run
until the potential defendant first delivers a gift-wrapped
admission of its alleged wrongdoing[, because if] that [were] the
rule, very few limitations periods would ever commence, much less
conclude." The First Circuit's no-nonsense approach echoes the
sentiments of China Agritech and further reins in the use of
equitable doctrines to sidestep traditional limitations periods.

The Seventh Circuit has also demonstrated its willingness to
curtail abuse of tolling doctrines by applying China Agritech to
prevent an untimely amended complaint from proceeding as a class
action. In Supreme Auto Transportation, LLC, the Court affirmed
dismissal of an antitrust suit initiated by a proposed class of
indirect purchasers alleging a price-fixing conspiracy, finding the
suit was filed outside the permissible limitations period. Although
the initial complaint was timely filed, the amended complaint was
not because it did not relate back to the original complaint -- and
therefore could not be salvaged by tolling. The Seventh Circuit
scrutinized the amended complaint and determined that it did not
relate back because it was levied by predominantly new plaintiffs
and contained wholly distinct claims. The Court went on to clarify
that plaintiffs could not avail themselves of American Pipe tolling
because the named plaintiffs in the amended complaint were not
members of the class defined in the initial complaint, and their
claims were not encompassed in the original suit. "If there were
any doubt about this (and we have none), the Supreme Court's recent
decision in China Agritech, Inc. -- to the effect that upon denial
of certification, a putative class member may not commence a new
class action beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of
limitations -- also supports our reasoning."[10] The Seventh
Circuit's astute application of tolling principles prevented the
use of equitable doctrines to expand the reach of a complaint far
beyond the original parties and subject matter.

Relatedly, the Second Circuit recently affirmed Rule 11 sanctions
against a plaintiff who filed a successive class action that was
clearly time-barred. In this noteworthy win for class action
defense counsel -- McCabe v. Lifetime Entertainment Services --
plaintiffs originally filed a putative TCPA class action suit in
August 2013 regarding alleged conduct in August 2009. In 2015, the
district court denied class certification due to the lack of
ascertainability, which decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit
in 2017.[13] One of the named plaintiffs filed individual and class
claims only after the denial of class certification was affirmed by
the Second Circuit, but this delay was unjustified "because class
members can no longer reasonably rely on the named plaintiffs to
represent their interests once the district court denies
certification." In affirming Rule 11 sanctions, the Court
highlighted that "American Pipe tolling is an exception to the
statute of limitations and invites abuse."[15] Because none of
plaintiff's successive claims were timely filed, the Court did not
need to rely on China Agritech in the first instance to dismiss the
untimely class claims. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that even
if plaintiff had timely filed, he would only have been able to
bring his individual claims, and not his asserted class claims,
because class certification had previously been denied. The
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for untimely filed claims in this
context could pave the way for similar treatment of improvident and
successive class claims barred by China Agritech.

Courts continue to limit the scope of unwarranted equitable tolling
in class action contexts. While China Agritech has aided in the
dismissal of meritless successive class actions, courts of appeal
are elevating the import of that ruling. Where class actions are
dismissed, class action defendants should have renewed confidence
that related class litigation will not continue to proliferate.
Further, where a plaintiff's claims are untimely and plaintiff
cannot avail its claims of tolling doctrines, defense counsel
should have more tools available when moving to dismiss or
negotiating settlements. [GN]


COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS: Faces Class Action Over Union Dues
----------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Susan Berry, writing for Breitbart, reports that a Columbus,
Ohio, city employee filed a federal class action lawsuit against
the Communication Workers of America (CWA) Local 4502 for
continuing to collect union dues from her paycheck despite her
objections.

Connie Pennington says CWA violated her constitutional rights by
continuing to seize dues from her paycheck, even though she broke
with the union and revoked her dues deduction authorization after
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

According to the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,
which represents Pennington, CWA claims workers cannot relinquish
membership in the union until its contract with the city ends in
2020. The union then claims an "escape period" policy that states,
even after the expiration of the local's contract, workers have
only a designated 30-day period in which to inform the union of
their desire to revoke their membership.

CWA refused to accept Pennington's revocation of membership and
then continued to deduct dues from her paycheck after Foundation
attorney William Messenger, who argued the Janus case at the
Supreme Court, sent a letter to union officials stating their
policy was preventing her from exercising her First Amendment
rights.

The lawsuit seeks to overturn the union's policy and allow its
1,400 government workers to end their membership immediately.

Additionally, Pennington is seeking a refund of dues that were
deducted from her paycheck after she had resigned her union
membership, and those seized from all other workers who resigned as
well.

In the Janus decision, handed down last June, the Supreme Court
ruled that public sector unions could no longer compel non-members
to pay dues because it violated their constitutional rights. In
addition, the high court held that deducting union dues or fees
without a public employee's affirmative consent is a violation of
his or her First Amendment rights.

"Ms. Pennington joins many other public sector workers across the
country in standing up to Big Labor's coercion," said Mark Mix,
president of the National Right to Work Foundation, in a statement,
adding:

National Right to Work Foundation has established a special website
that addresses workers' rights: MyJanusRights.org.

The case is Pennington v. Communications Workers of America, Local
4502, and the City of Columbus, No. 19-937, in U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern Division. [GN]


CONWAY, AR: Carla White Seeks OT Pay
------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against the city of Conway
for violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act. The case is
captioned CARLA WHITE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated vs. CITY OF CONWAY, Case No. 4:19-cv-00243-SWW
(E.D. Ark., April 10, 2019). Throughout her employment with the
city of Conway, Plaintiff Carla White received an hourly wage with
overtime compensation that was in the form of one hour of 'comp
time' for every hour that she worked in excess of 40 in a week.
White did not receive overtime compensation at a rate of one and
one-half times her regular rate of pay.

The city of Conway in Arkansas earns the name of "City of Colleges"
because it's the home three institutions of higher learning,
namely, University of Central Arkansas, Hendrix College, and the
Central Baptist College. The city employs civil servants who work
to maintain public safety and public health. It also provides
sanitation services such as waste collection. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Lydia H. Hamlet, Esq.
     Steve Rauls, Esq.
     Josh Sandford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Telephone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     E-mail: lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com
             steve@sanfordlawfirm.com
             josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


CORNER BROOK: Court Lifts Stay of Class Action Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
Gary Kean, writing for The Western, reports that the effort to
launch a class-action lawsuit against Corner Brook Pulp and Paper
regarding alleged seepage from the Deer Lake Canal is heading back
to the courtroom.

In December 2017, Justice David Hurley of the Supreme Court of
Newfoundland and Labrador put a virtual halt to the matter when he
issued a stay of proceedings in the legal action being pursued by
Deer Lake residents claiming their properties were damaged by water
seeping from the canal.

The canal is controlled by Corner Brook Pulp and Paper and feeds
water to the Deer Lake Power hydroelectric power generating station
that provides electricity to the mill in Corner Brook.

In his ruling, Hurley agreed with the paper company's arguments
that legislation dating back to 1915 indicated that each of the
plaintiffs needed to first go through an arbitration process
individually with the company before their issues could be brought
to court.

The plaintiffs have since appealed that decision and, in a decision
released by the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Hurley's decision has been overturned.

The appeal court's decision determined that the legislation
actually provides for the option of either arbitration or court
proceedings.

The decision affirmed that the courts can be a more effective
option when there are numerous parties interested in litigation, as
opposed to dealing with each case on its own. Despite amendments
since the original legislation the court ruled none of those
changes removed the right to argue disputes in court.

Maddy Carter of Wagner's Law Firm in Halifax, one of the lawyers
representing the plaintiffs, said the appeal decision is the right
one and the next step will be to have the class action certified by
the courts. She said the parties should get a court date soon to
work out the scheduling of going about the certification process.

The plaintiffs allege defects in the design, development and
operation of the canal. He says the decision clarifies that an
administrative decision-maker does not automatically receive
exclusive jurisdiction when legislation refers to arbitration.

Kruger Inc., the Montreal-based parent company of Corner Brook Pulp
and Paper, would not comment on the decision when contacted on
March 20. [GN]


CRAVATH SWINE: Former Fresh Market Shareholders File Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Heelan Stanzione, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that
Cravath, Swaine & Moore is being sued by a former public
shareholder of a grocery chain in a class action that alleges the
firm breached its fiduciary duty by providing tainted advice that
directed the grocer toward a buyer, private equity group Apollo
Global Management.

New York-based Cravath crafted a "false and misleading" U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filing relating to the 2016
$1.36 billion leveraged buyout of The Fresh Market by Apollo, the
complaint alleges.

The plaintiff claims in a complaint filed in the Delaware Court of
Chancery that Cravath drafted the Schedule 14D-9 "to procure
stockholder approval and cover up prior wrongdoing," and in doing
so, pocketed $5.5 million in fees.

A Schedule 14D-9 is an SEC filing that discloses the details of an
offer to purchase shares.

The complaint alleges that The Fresh Market's founder and chairman,
Ray Berry, made a deal with Apollo that would allow the company to
buy out the public stockholders "on the cheap" and never entertain
other buyout offers.

"The Company's board of directors avoided threatened stockholder
activism by acquiescing to and covering up a sham sale process,"
the complaint alleges.

Its "high-powered advisors," including Cravath, "each stood to
benefit financially from making a deal happen, and they each aided
and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty to do so," it said.

"Cravath's task was to lend a patina of integrity to a sham
auction," the complaint said.

Cravath did not immediately respond to request for comment on the
complaint.

The suit also names JP Morgan, which served as investment banker to
The Fresh Market on the deal.

This is the second iteration of the case. The Delaware Supreme
Court in 2018 reversed a dismissal of the case that had been based
on stockholder approval of the challenged transaction.

It found that the record supported the plaintiff's allegation that
the auction of The Fresh Market was a sham. [GN]


CREDITGUARD OF AMERICA: Claims in Amended T. Bank's Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD C. BANK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDITGUARD OF AMERICA, FREEDOM
DEBT RELIEF, LLC, FREEDOM FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC, and FREEDOM
FINANCIAL FUNDING, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1311 (PKC) (RLM)
(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Pamela K. Chen of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York (i) granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its
entirety, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6); and (ii) denied their motion to strike the Plaintiff's
federal TCPA class allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f) and Rule
23(d)(1)(D).

Plaintiff Bank filed the instant pro se action against the
Defendants, alleging tha they made unsolicited automated commercial
telemarketing and advertising calls, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), and New York General Business Law
("NYGBL"), and failed to provide disclosures required by state law.
On June 11, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.

On Jan. 10, 2018, the Plaintiff, a New York resident, received a
telephone call on his residential telephone line; the Caller
Identification information included the telephone number
248-710-0050.  A voice recording was played on the caller's end.
Upon hearing "Press '1' now to speak with a live operator," the
Plaintiff pressed "1," and was transferred to a live operator, who
asked him several questions about his finances and also asked for
his credit card number.  After Plaintiff answered these questions,
the operator placed him on hold, and a person came on the line,
identifying himself as "Ken Wright, a credit advisor with
CreditGuard of America."  

The Plaintiff (falsely) told both the operator and Wright that his
name was "Thomas LaRasche," and that he held credit-card debt of
approximately $14,000.  The call between Plaintiff and Wright was
disconnected.  Moments later, he received a call from Wright, who
addressed him as "Thomas."  The Caller ID that appeared for the
Wright Call was 800-838-7132 and "CreditcardAmer," which belonged
to CGA.  During the call, Wright told the Plaintiff that CGA was a
nonprofit credit counseling and debt-management company.

The Plaintiff subsequently dialed another number, 800-853-0065,
which belonged to CGA, and spoke with a representative named "Sue."
He made yet another call to the number 659-571-0961, in which the
Plaintiff spoke to Greg Townsend, an employee of Freedom Financial
and Freedom Debt Relief.  The Plaintiff subsequently held a
conference call with Peter and someone named "CC" of CGA, as well
as Daniel Kelly of Freedom Debt Relief.  On the conference call,
Kelly confirmed that CGA was an "affiliate" or "partner" of Freedom
Debt Relief and Freedom Financial Network.

The Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in the action on March
1, 2018, and an amended complaint on June 11, 2018.  The Court
granted the Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint on June 26, 2018.  The Defendants' motion was
fully briefed on Aug. 17, 2018.  The Court heard oral argument on
the Defendants' motion on Dec. 11, 2018.

The Defendants, filing jointly on behalf of CGA and the Freedom
Defendants, seek to: (1) dismiss the Plaintiff's TCPA claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); (2) dismiss the Plaintiff's claims under
NYGBL Section 399-p pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6);
and (3) strike class allegations as to both claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(f), and Rule 23(d)(1).

Judge Chen (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety, pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); and (ii)
denied their motion to strike the Plaintiff's federal TCPA class
allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f) and Rule 23(d)(1)(D).  She
dismissed (i) the Plaintiff's TCPA claim as to Defendant CGA; and
(ii) the Plaintiff's Section 399-p claims and putative Section
399-p class claims as to all the Defendants.  The Judge terminated
Defendant CGA as a party in the action.  The Judge struck all the
class allegations relating to the Plaintiff's putative Section
399-p class claims from the amended complaint.  By April 12, 2019,
the Plaintiff will file a second amended complaint excising the
class allegations relating to the putative Section 399-p class
claims.  

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's TCPA
claims against the Freedom Defendants, as well as their motion to
strike the Plaintiff's putative federal TCPA class claims.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's individual and putative class claims
under the TCPA against the Freedom Defendants will proceed.

Among other things, the Judge finds that the Freedom Defendants may
not cloak their commercial telemarketing activity simply by adding
a noncommercial element, e.g., CGA's services, to their calls.
Because the initial telemarketing call is alleged to have had the
commercial purpose of promoting the Freedom Defendants' own
services, the Judge holds that they are not covered by the
nonprofit exemption to liability under the TCPA.  Even if the Judge
were to find that the Plaintiff has failed to allege direct
liability against the Freedom Defendants, she would still find that
he has stated a claim against each Defendant based on a theory of
vicarious liability.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://is.gd/6iJjaA from Leagle.com.

Todd C. Bank, Plaintiff, pro se.

Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, Freedom Financial Network, LLC & Freedom
Financial Network Funding, LLC, Defendants, represented by Neil
Asnen -- nasnen@kleinmoynihan.com -- Klein Moynihan Turco LLP.


CRUNCH SAN DIEGO: Kelley Drye Discusses Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew E. Minkiewicz, Esq. -- aminkiewicz@kelleydrye.com -- John
D.S. Gilmour, Esq. -- jgilmour@kelleydrye.com -- Philip D. Robben,
Esq. -- probben@kelleydrye.com -- David A. Hartquist, Esq., John M.
Herrmann II, Esq., Lee S. Brenner, Esq., James F. Jacobus, Esq.,
John L. Hagan, Esq., and Talat Ansari, Esq. of Kelley Drye & Warren
LLP, in an article for Lexology, report that the defendant in a
TCPA class action has settled the case after filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Crunch San Diego, LLC
v. Marks, No. 18-995. The defendant-petitioner, Crunch San Diego,
had used a web-based system to send promotional text messages to a
list of stored telephone numbers at a time selected by the gym. It
is undisputed that the system did not use a random or sequential
number generator. The District Court for the Southern District of
California granted summary judgment in favor of Crunch. The 9th
Circuit reversed, ruling that an ATDS includes devices with the
capacity to automatically dial stored telephone numbers, whether or
not a random or sequential number generator was used.

Crunch had argued that the Court should grant the petition because
(1) the TCPA's plain text requires that an ATDS use a random or
sequential number generator, (2) Congress's purpose in enacting the
TCPA was to restrict telemarketing that used an ATDS, and (3) the
9th Circuit knowingly created a circuit split with the Third
Circuit, which held that an ATDS requires the use of a random or
sequential number generator.

Crunch filed its petition on January 28, 2019. On February 15,
Plaintiff-respondent Marks was granted an extension of time to file
a response to April 1. On February 20, the Southern District of
California granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss because the
case settled (No. 14-cv-348-BAS-BLM). Accordingly, the parties
filed an agreement to dismiss the case with the Supreme Court on
February 21. Consequently, the 9th Circuit's decision and
definition of an ATDS remains. [GN]


DALLAS DEPOT: Trevino Seeks Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------
An employment-related class action complaint has been filed against
Dallas Depot, Inc. for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The case is captioned Jonathan Trevino, individually
and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Dallas
Depot, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00875-K (N.D. Tex., April
10, 2019). Plaintiff Jonathan Trevino asserts that he and similarly
situated employees have regularly worked in excess of 40 hours a
week but were paid only straight time. He also claims that Dallas
Depot did not pay them time-and-one-half their regular rate of pay
for the hours that they worked over 40 hours a week. Accordingly,
Trevino seeks to recover all unpaid wages and overtime
compensation.

Dallas Depot is a discount grocery store located at 3107 S.
Cockrell Hill Rd, Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Chris R. Miltenberger
     THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
     1360 N. White Chapel, Suite 200
     Southlake, TX 76092-4322
     Telephone: (817) 416-5060
     Facsimile: (817) 416-5062
     E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com


DEL-AIR HEATING: Fowler FLSA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------------------
The purported class action lawsuit titled EDWARD FOWLER, on his own
behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated v. DEL-AIR
HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION, INC., a Florida profit
corporation, Case No. 2018-CA-007993, was removed on April 2, 2019,
from the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for
Duval County, Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-00372 to the
proceeding.

The Complaint seeks relief for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as amended.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carlos Leach, Esq.
          THE LEACH FIRM, P.A.
          1950 Lee Road, Suite 213
          Winter Park, FL 32789
          Telephone: (321) 445-9410
          E-mail: cleach@theleachfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amanda A. Simpson, Esq.
          Amy G. Fudenberg, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 246-8440
          Facsimile: (407) 246-8441
          E-mail: amanda.simpson@jacksonlewis.com
                  amy.fudenberg@jacksonlewis.com


DOLLAR GENERAL: Fights Sanctions Over Class Action Interviews
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that a judge broke with longstanding legal precedent
in finding that Dollar General violated attorney conduct rules and
must pay sanctions after its counsel interviewed potential members
of proposed collective and class.

The Court granted Defendants Dollar General Corp. and Dolgencorp
LLC's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Regarding
Plaintiff Christopher Weller's Motion to Strike and for Sanctions.

Weller's Motion to Strike and for Sanctions is granted in part and
denied in part.

Weller may notice the depositions of William Dengler, Kristy
Fusselman, Raymond Garcia, Marcia Hare, Parker Harris, Rodger
Kreiser, Shawn Kreiser, Linday Mast, Jim Mehler, Erik Mingucha,
Erin Murry, Kristina Nelson, Steven Rivera-Vega, Patrick Shaud,
Gabriel Telford, and Israel Delgado, and other putative class
members interviewed by Dolgencorp's counsel. Depositions shall be
held within 60 days by telephone or at a location designated by
Weller's counsel, relative to the contents of their declarations
and related facts.

Dolgencorp shall pay all legal fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff
in the depositions.

Weller shall file a Reply in Support of his Motion for Class
Certification and Conditional Collective Action Certification 30
days after this additional discovery has concluded.

The case is CHRISTOPHER WELLER, on behalf himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORP., DOLGENCORP,
LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-2292 (E.D. Pa.).

A full-text copy of the Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2k6yjr6 from Leagle.com

CHRISTOPHER WELLER, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by MARC A. GOLDICH , AXLER
GOLDICH, LLC, NOAH I. AXLER , AXLER GOLDICH LLC & SAMUEL A. DION ,
DION & GOLDBERGER.

DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION & DOLGENCORP, LLC, Defendants,
represented by JOEL S. ALLEN , McGuireWoods LLP, CHEN G. NI ,
MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, JOSEPH L. GORDON , Pietragallo Gordon Alfano
Bosick & Raspanti, LLP & MELISSA M. HENSLEY , MCGUIRE WOODS LLP.
[GN]


EI DU PONT: Court Denies Bid to Stay Victoria Carey's Torts Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTORIA CAREY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. E.I. DU PONT DE
NEMOURS AND CO., et al., Defendants, Case No. 7:17-CV-201-D (E.D.
N.C.), Judge James C. Denver, III of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina, Southern Division, (i)
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss; (ii) denied their motion to stay; and (iii) granted their
motion to strike.

On March 2, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
consolidated class-action complaint, and filed a memorandum in
support.  On April 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs responded in
opposition.  On April 27, 2018, the Defendants replied.

The Judge (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss; (ii) denied their motion to stay; and (iii)
granted their motion to strike.  In due course, he will issue an
order expounding on his conclusions.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/tobPaK from Leagle.com.

Victoria Carey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jamie L. Bowers --
jbowers@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Jay J. Chaudhuri -- jchaudhuri@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Theodore J. Leopold -- --
tleopold@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC,
Andrew O. Whiteman, Whiteman Law Firm, Douglas J. McNamara --
dmcnamara@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Gary K. Shipman info@shipmanandwright.com -- Shipman & Associates,
LLP, Jordan W. Connors -- jconnors@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman
Godfrey LLP, Stephen Douglas Bunch -- dbunch@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Stephen E. Morrissey --
smorrissey@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP & Steven M.
Seigel -- sseigel@gmail.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP.

Marie Burris & Michael Kiser, Plaintiffs, represented by Gary K.
Shipman, Shipman & Associates, LLP, Jay J. Chaudhur, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Steven M. Seigel, Susman Godfrey LLP &
Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC.

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, a business entity form
unknown, The Chemours Company, a Delaware corporation & The
Chemours Company FC, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants, represented by Jonathan D. Sasser --
jon.sasser@elliswinters.com -- Ellis & Winters, LLP, John K. Sherk
-- jsherk@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kenneth J. Reilly
-- kreilly@shb.com -- Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Mark D. Anstoetter
-- manstoetter@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP & Stephen D.
Feldman -- stephen.feldman@elliswinters.com -- Ellis & Winters,
LLP.

Brent Nix, Interested Party, represented by Steven M. Seigel,
Susman Godfrey LLP & Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll, PLLC.

Cape Fear Public Utility Authority, Interested Party, represented
by Joseph A. Ponzi -- jponzi@brookspierce.com -- Brooks Pierce
McLendon Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P..


EL AD US HOLDING: Olsen Files ADA Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against El Ad US Holding,
Inc. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. El Ad
US Holding, Inc. doing business as: 108 Leonard, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02981 (S.D. N.Y., SApr. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

El Ad US Holding, Inc. is engaged in the acquisition, development,
and conversion of residential and commercial properties in markets
throughout North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


ENVOY AIR: Hinkley and Rice Allege Age Discrimination
-----------------------------------------------------
An employment class action has been filed against Envoy Air, Inc.,
alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act;
the Texas Labor Code; and for breach of contract and promissory
estoppel. The case is captioned JOHN HINKLEY, and STEVE RICE,
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, vs. ENVOY AIR, INC, Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00340
(N.D. Tex., Feb. 21, 2019). Plaintiff John Hinkley and Steve Rice
assert that Defendant Envoy Air, Inc. has actively ranked their new
employees by age, oldest to youngest. To add insult to injury,
after Plaintiffs were constructively terminated, Defendant sought
to recover the signing bonuses that were paid to Plaintiffs as an
inducement for Plaintiffs to work for Defendant. Accordingly,
Hinkley and Rice seek redress for the Defendant's unlawful age
discrimination, breach of contract, and unequitable conduct.

Envoy Air, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Airlines
Group operating more than 150 aircraft on nearly 1,000 daily
flights to more than 150 destinations. The company’s more than
16,000 employees provide regional flight service to American
Airlines under the American Eagle brand and livery and ground
handling services for many American flights. The company's
principal place of business is 4301 Regent Blvd, Irving Texas,
75063l. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Kirk Claunch, Esq.
     301 W. Central Avenue
     Fort Worth, TX 76164
     Telephone: (817) 335-4003
     Facsimile: (817) 335-7112


EQHEALTH SOLUTIONS: Russell Seeks to Certify Employee Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit MELISSA RUSSELL, AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. EQHEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00005-SDD-EWD (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiffs move the Court for conditional certification of and
notice to the following group of:

   "Defendant's current and former non-supervisory employees paid
   on a salary basis; who worked more than 40 hours in at least one

   workweek over the past three years; and whose job duties
   included Care Management Work or similar job duties. The class
   definition includes, without limitation, such job titles as
   "Care Coordinator," Pediatric Care Coordinator, "Utilization
   Review Nurse," "Utilization Review Coordinator," "Utilization
   Reviewer," "Clinical Reviewer," "First Level Reviewer," and
   other non-supervisory positions within Defendant's "Care
   Coordination" or "Utilization Management" job families
   containing the terms "coordinator," "utilization" or "reviewer"

   in the job title whose job duties include Care Management Work.

   The definition specifically excludes Defendant's employees, if
   any, whose job duties involved providing direct medical care to
   members or traditional nursing care to patients in a clinical
   setting."

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          TRAVIS M. HEDGPETH
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          5438 Rutherglenn Drive
          Houston, TX 77096
          Telephone: (512) 417-5716
          E-mail: travis@hedgpethlaw.com
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  zflowerree@flsalaw.com

               - and -

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          www.4overtimelawyer.com
          2820 McKinnon, Suite 5009
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: 214.790.4454
          E-mail: jack@siegellawgroup.biz

               - and -

          Michael A. Mahone, Jr.
          Louisiana Bar No. 32567
          T HE M AHONE F IRM LLC
          5190 Canal Blvd., Suite 102
          New Orleans, LA 70124
          Telephone: (504) 564-7342
          Facsimile: (504) 617-6474
          E-mail: mike@mahonefirm.com

               - and -

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  zflowerree@flsalaw.com

ESTENSON LOGISTICS: Mendez Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Mario Mendez, an individual, on his own
behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
ESTENSON LOGISTICS, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV07422 was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
Angeles to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California on April 5, 2019, and assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-02625.

The Complaint alleges eight causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay
Wages and/or Overtime; (2) Meal Break Violations; (3) Rest Break
Violations; (4) Wage Statement Violation; (5) Unauthorized
Deductions/Failure to Indemnify Employees For Business Expenses;
(6) Failure to Pay Wages at Time of Termination; (7) Forfeiture of
Vacation Pay; and (8) Unfair Competition: Violation of California
Business And Professions Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Robert R. Roginson, Esq.
     Kathleen J. Choi, Esq.
     OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
     400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213.239.9800
     Facsimile: 213.239.9045
     Email: robert.roginson@ogletree.com
            kathleen.choi@ogletree.com


EVERQUOTE INC: Securities Class Action Pending in New York
----------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP alerts investors in EverQuote Inc.
(NASDAQ: EVER) to the securities class action pending in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York.  If you purchased or
otherwise acquired EverQuote common stock pursuant or traceable to
the registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with
EverQuote's June 2018 initial public offering ("IPO") contact
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.  For more information about the
case click https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/EVER

or contact Reed Kathrein, who is leading the firm's investigation,
by calling 510-725-3000 or emailing EVER@hbsslaw.com.

According to the complaint, Defendants misled investors by
repeatedly referring to EverQuote's increases in both revenue and
quote request volume even though the Company strategized to reduce
its quote request volume in order to inflate other financial
metrics (including margin and revenue per quote) ahead of the IPO.

After a series of partial disclosures following the IPO, EverQuote
shares have traded as much as 69% below the $18.00 IPO offering
price.

"We're focused on investors' losses and the extent to which
Defendants' IPO-related statements may have misled investors," said
Hagens Berman partner Reed Kathrein.

Whistleblowers:  Persons with non-public information regarding
EverQuote should consider their options to help in the
investigation or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.
Under the new program, whistleblowers who provide original
information may receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any
successful recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call
Reed Kathrein at 510-725-3000 or email EVER@hbsslaw.com.

                     About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a national
investor-rights law firm headquartered in Seattle, Washington with
78 attorneys in 9 offices across the country.  The Firm represents
investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex
litigation.  [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Class in CSM's FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSIE BIGGER, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 17 C 7753 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Harry D. Leinenweber of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, (i) denied the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
and (ii) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion
for Conditional Certification of an Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") collective action.

The case concerns the Client Solutions Manager ("CSM") position at
Facebook, and whether that role constitutes an "overtime-exempt"
position under the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL").
Facebook is a social media company that generates revenue primarily
from selling advertisements that are displayed on its various
electronic platforms.  Its sales structure is organized around
industries (known at Facebook as "verticals") and sales teams
(known as "pods").

Facebook utilizes a compensation system in which employees are
hired at certain designations that indicate their role and
compensation level.  The case concerns the "Individual Contributor"
("IC") (i.e., non-managerial) designation.  An IC-1 is an
Individual Contributor level 1, an IC-2 is an Individual
Contributor level 2, and so on.

The case concerns a particular position at Facebook -- the CSM --
whose origin lies in two prior roles that Facebook has since
eliminated.  Prior to 2014, a sales "pod" included, among other
positions, an Account Manager and a Media Solutions Manager
("MeSo").  The Parties disagree over how exactly to characterize
the MeSo role, and the extent to which MeSos were overtime exempt.


Facebook contends that MeSos had a sales role as well as "more
analytical" duties that included planning, implementing, and
optimizing the performance of advertising campaigns.  In contrast,
the Plaintiff claims that MeSos performed operational duties,
including data entry, troubleshooting bugs in ads, and following up
with clients on unpaid invoices.  The Plaintiff claims that
Facebook classified all MeSos as overtime exempt; Facebook contends
that only MeSos at certain IC levels were exempt.

Facebook hired Plaintiff Bigger in April 2013 to work in its
Chicago office as an Account Manager in the Financial Services
"vertical" (industry team).  Bigger received an IC-4 designation,
which rendered her exempt from overtime compensation.

In late 2013, the Account Manager and MeSo positions were merged
into a new role called CSM.  Bigger was one of many who assumed
that position.  She retained her IC-4 designation when she became a
CSM.  The Plaintiff claims she worked an average of 60 hours per
week as a CSM.  Due to her IC-4 designation, Facebook classified
her as exempt and did not pay her overtime.

The Plaintiff filed suit against Facebook on Oct. 27, 2017, on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated CSMs.  She claims
that Facebook wrongly classified her, and all other IC-3 and IC-4
CSMs, as overtime exempt.  She brings two counts: (1) a putative 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) collective action for violating the FLSA's
overtime provisions, and (2) a putative Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 class action for violating the IMWL's overtime
provisions.  

The Plaintiff defines her putative FLSA collective as all
individuals who were employed by Facebook as Client Solutions
Managers at level IC-3 or IC-4 at any location in the United States
during the period from three years prior to the entry of the
conditional certification order, and as extended by stipulation of
the parties, to the present.

Bigger now moves for conditional certification of her proposed FLSA
collective.  Facebook moves for summary judgment, contending that
it cannot be held liable under the FLSA and IMWL as a matter of
law.

Judge Leinenweber denies Facebook's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Bigger's FLSA claims.  He finds that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether Bigger did marketing work.  Neither the
FLSA regulations nor the parties define "marketing."  Also, whether
Bigger was making sales or merely promoting them is in dispute.
Because Facebook argues that Bigger's "consulting" work was
intertwined with promoting sales, its claim is premised on disputed
material facts, and fails.

The Judge also finds that Facebook fails to establish that the
Plaintiff is overtime exempt under the highly compensated employee
test.  Facebook does not contend that Bigger's work satisfies any
of the Section 541.202(b) factors.  Those factors include the
employee's personnel responsibilities; advertising or promotion
work; freedom from direct supervision; authority to set budgets;
duty to anticipate competitive products or services and distinguish
them from competitor's products or services; and duty to
troubleshoot or problem-solve on behalf of management.  Some of
these factors may cut in Bigger's favor, and some against.
Regardless, Facebook failed to measure Bigger's work against those
factors.  Thus, there remains a genuine dispute of material facts
as to Bigger's discretion.

As an alternative to the highly paid employee test, the Defendant
seeks to establish that Bigger is exempt from the FLSA's overtime
requirements because she was employed in a "bona fide
administrative capacity."  The Judge finds that the Defendant
failed to establish that Bigger regularly performed either of those
two duties as a matter of law.  Thus, he denies Facebook's Motion
for Summary Judgment on Bigger's FLSA claims.

Turning to IMWL claim, the Judge finds that the Defendant did not
address the relevant IMWL standards in its motion, but instead
assumed that the short test is identical to the bona fide
administrative capacity exception in the current regulations.  Even
if the Judge assumes these two tests are coextensive, Facebook
failed to establish as a matter of law that the Plaintiff was a
bona fide administrative employee under the FLSA.  Therefore,
Facebook's Motion for Summary Judgment on the IMWL claim fails.

Examining the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification of
the FLSA collective, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has made a
"modest factual showing" that she and similarly situated employees
were victims of a common policy that violated the FLSA.  Proceeding
to the Plaintiff's Proposed Notice to the FLSA putative collective
members, he finds that, subject to modifications, the Plaintiff's
Proposed Notice meets the requirements of "timeliness, accuracy and
information."
However, the Judge denies the Plaintiff's request for a reminder
notice 20 days before the end of the opt-in period to any opt-in
Plaintiffs who have not returned their opt-in consent forms
.  He says a reminder is unnecessary given the adequacy of both
U.S. mail and email notice and may be misinterpreted as judicial
encouragement to join the lawsuit.  He also denies the denies the
Plaintiff's request to post the Proposed Notice in all Facebook
offices where members of the FLSA Collective are likely to view it.
Workplace postings can be overly intrusive, especially when a
workplace posting is meant to supplement a mailed notice.

For the reasons stated, Judge Leinenweber denied the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.  He granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification of an FLSA
collective action.

The Judge conditionally certified a collective action by the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated members of the collective defined
as all individuals who were employed by Facebook as Client
Solutions Managers at level IC-3 or IC-4 at any location in the
United States during the period from three years prior to the entry
of the Order, and as extended by stipulation of the parties, to the
present.

He ordered Facebook to produce to the Plaintiff in a usable
electronic format the names, last-known mailing address, email
address, telephone number, dates of employment, social security
numbers, and dates of birth of all FLSA Collective members to be
notified.  Facebook will tender this information to the Plaintiff
by April 2, 2019.  He ordered notice to the FLSA Collective in the
form of her Proposed Notice.  The opt-in period will be 60 days
from the Notice mailing.  The Judge authorized the Plaintiff to
send the Proposed Notice, at her expense, by first-class U.S. Mail
and email to all members of the FLSA Collective to inform them of
their right to opt-in to the lawsuit.

The Judge denied the Plaintiff's request for a reminder notice 20
days before the conclusion of the opt-in period, and request to
post the Proposed Notice in Facebook's offices.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/JEbXZL from Leagle.com.

Susie Bigger, on behalf of herself, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan F.
Stephan -- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan, Zouras, LLP,
James B. Zouras -- jzouras@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, LLP
& Teresa M. Becvar -- tbecvar@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras,
Llp.

Facebook, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anneliese Wermuth --
awermuth@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, Jason E. Barsanti --
jbarsanti@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, Jenny R. Goltz --
jgoltz@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor & Joseph P. Campbell, Cozen
O'Conner.


FACEBOOK INC: Derivative Privacy Suit Dismissed Under FRCP 23.1
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE FACEBOOK, INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE PRIVACY
LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case No.
18-cv-01792-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (i)
granted in part Facebook's motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens; (ii) granted Facebook's motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1; (iii) denied as moot the Individual
Defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b); (iv) denied as moot Facebook's motion to stay; and (v)
denied the State Plaintiff Christopher Leagre's motion to
intervene.

Plaintiffs Jeremiah F. Hallisey, Ronald Martin, Natalie Ocegueda,
James Karon, and the Gloria Stricklin Trust bring the shareholder
derivative action against nominal Defendant Facebook and Individual
Defendants Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl Sandberg, Marc Andreesen, Peter
Thiel, Reed Hastings, Erskine B. Bowles, Dr. Susan D.
Desmond-Hellmann, and Jan Koum.  The State Plaintiff, a plaintiff
in a separate derivative litigation in Delaware state court, also
filed a motion to intervene in the action.

The Plaintiffs filed a consolidated shareholder derivative
complaint on July 2, 2018 against the Defendants, for claims
related to Facebook's data privacy protection policies and
practices in the wake of the revelation that Cambridge Analytica
was misappropriating millions of Facebook users' information for
use in political campaigns.

Cambridge Analytica is a political consulting firm that
impermissibly gathered and analyzed data from millions of Facebook
users in order to influence U.S. elections.  This was first
reported in 2015, and the Defendants were aware then that Cambridge
Analytica was engaging in the unauthorized use of Facebook's user
data.  After this discovery, Facebook stated that it had obtained
written certifications from the third parties responsible
"declaring that all such data they had obtained was accounted for
and destroyed."  However, in March 2018, it was reported that
Cambridge Analytica may not actually have deleted the data and was
still misappropriating information to "target political advertising
and manipulate voters."  Facebook hired a forensic auditor to
uncover whether that information indeed had been destroyed.

In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, multiple lawsuits
against Facebook and its Board were filed in courts around the
U.S., including the derivative action brought by the Plaintiffs on
March 22, 2018.  The Plaintiffs bring the derivative action
alleging the following eight causes of action: (1) violation of
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9, against the
Individual Defendants; (2) violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, against the Defendants; (3)
misappropriation of information and breach of fiduciary duty for
insider sales, against Individual Defendants Zuckerberg, Sandberg,
and Koum; (4) violation of California Corporations Code Section
25402, against Individual Defendants Zuckerberg, Sandberg, and
Koum; (5) violation of California Corporations Code Section 25403,
against the Defendants; (6) breach of fiduciary duty, against the
Defendants; (7) contribution and indemnification, against the
Defendants; and (8) aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty,
against the Defendants.

Pending before the Court are (i) Facebook's motion to dismiss under
FRCP 23.1; (i) the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss under
FRCP 12(b); (iii) Facebook's motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens; (iv) Facebook's motion to stay; and (v) State
Plaintiff's motion to intervene.

Judge Gilliam granted in part the Facebook's motion to dismiss
based on forum non conveniens as to the Plaintiffs' derivative
state law claims.  Those claims are dismissed without leave to
amend but without prejudice to their reassertion in the Delaware
Court of Chancery.  He finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have not shown
that the Delaware Court of Chancery would be unable to provide an
adequate remedy for their shareholder derivative claims; (ii) the
Plaintiffs have not shown that the adoption of the forum selection
clause was a result of overwhelming bargaining power, fraud, or
overreaching; and (iii) he does not find Facwebook's assertions
compelling enough to make the case an "exceptional" and "unusual"
case so as to justify overriding the forum selection clause.

Next, the Judge granted Facebook's motion to dismiss under FRCP
23.1 with leave to amend as to the federal claims only.  He finds
that the Plaintiffs have not pled demand futility with sufficient
particularity and therefore, demand was not excused.  The
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Individual Defendants'
relationships with Zuckerberg make them so "beholden" to him that
they could not be independent in considering a demand.

The Judge denied as moot without prejudice the Individual
Defendants' motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b).  Because the
Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds as to the derivative state claims and dismissed on demand
futility grounds as to the derivative federal claims, the Judge
does not consider the Individual Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)
arguments.

Facebook moves to stay the litigation pending the resolution of (1)
the securities class action cases against Facebook, pending in this
district before the Honorable Edward J. Davila; (2) the consumer
class action cases against Facebook, pending in the district before
the Honorable Vince Chhabria; and (3) the FTC investigation of
Facebook, all arising from the same allegations as brought.
Because Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, the Judge denied the
motion as moot without prejudice.

On Oct. 11, 2018, the State Plaintiff filed a motion to intervene
to file a limited opposition to Facebook's motion to dismiss under
FRCP 23.1.  He claims that he would be unduly prejudiced if the
motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice and requests that if
the Court does so, it should dismiss without prejudice as to him.
On Nov. 9, 2018, the City of Birmingham Relief and Retirement
System, Construction and General Building Laborers' Local Union No.
79 General Fund, and Lidia Levy filed to join the State Plaintiff's
motion to intervene, stating that they are pursuing a consolidated
books and records inspection of Facebook in Delaware and would also
be potentially prejudiced if the Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

The Judge denied the motion to intervene.  He declines to exercise
the Court's broad discretion to grant permissive intervention in
the action.  The State Plaintiff's main argument is that he
believes he has a better strategy for pursuing the derivative
litigation, but that is not a sufficient reason to allow him and
the other proposed intervenors to join now and potentially delay
the litigation.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Gilliam (i) granted in part
Facebook's motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, and
dismissed the Plaintiffs' derivative state claims without leave to
amend and without prejudice to reassertion of these claims in the
Delaware Court of Chancery; (ii) granted Facebook's motion to
dismiss under FRCP 23.1, and dismissed the Plaintiffs' remaining
derivative federal claims with leave to amend; (iii) denied as moot
the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b); (iv)
denied as moot Facebook's motion to stay; and (v) denied the State
Plaintiff's motion to intervene.

The Plaintiffs may amend their complaint if they are able to plead
particularized allegations, on a director-by-director basis, that
demonstrate that demand was futile as to the federal claims.  The
Court will consider only factual, rather than conclusory,
allegations when assessing the viability of any amended complaint.
The Plaintiffs will file any amended complaint within 28 days of
the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/AYSZMi from Leagle.com.

Jeremiah F. Hallisey, derivatively on behalf of Facebook, Inc., a
Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Cotton
Molumphy -- mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy,
LLP, Brian Danitz -- bdanitz@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy LLP, Gina Stassi -- gstassi@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre
& McCarthy LLP & Joseph W. Cotchett -- jcotchett@cpmlegal.com --
Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

James Karon, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Brian Danitz,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Derek G. Howard, Derek G. Howard
Law Firm, Inc., Daniel Joseph Mulligan, Jenkins, Mulligan &
Gabriel, LLP, Gina Stassi, Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Larry
Wayne Gabriel, Jenkins Mulligan & Gabriel, Mark Cotton Molumphy,
Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Joseph W. Cotchett, Cotchett Pitre
& McCarthy, LLP.

Natalie Ocegueda, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Brian Danitz,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Bottini &
Bottini, Inc., Gina Stassi, Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Mark
Cotton Molumphy, Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Joseph W.
Cotchett, Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Facebook, Inc., (Nominal Defendant) a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by David Evan Ross -- dross@ramllp.com --
Kelogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel PLLC, Nicholas D. Mozal,
Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP, Orin Snyder -- osnyder@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, pro hac vice, Richard Garrett Rice ,
Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP, pro hac vice, Brian Michael Lutz,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Joshua Seth Lipshutz, Gibson, Dunn and
Crutcher LLP, Kristin A. Linsley, Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
& Paul J. Collins -- pcollins@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn,
Crutcher LLP.

Christopher K. Cox, Consol Defendant, represented by David Evan
Ross, Kelogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel PLLC, Nicholas D.
Mozal, Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP & Richard Garrett Rice, Ross
Aronstam & Moritz LLP, pro hac vice.

Karen Sbriglio, Movant, represented by Jennifer S. Coleman --
jcoleman@hopkinscarley.com -- Hopkins & Carley A Law Corporation &
Catherine Pratsinakis, Dilworth Paxson LLP, pro hac vice.

Christopher Leagre, City of Birmingham Relief and Retirement
System, Construction and General Building Laborers' Local Union No.
79 General Fund & Lidia Levy, Intervenors, represented by Stephen
J. Oddo -- soddo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP.


FEDERAL SAVINGS: Court Denies Equitable Tolling Bid in McDermott
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL McDERMOTT, and DOUGLAS FINNEGAN, Individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, JOHN T. CALK, AND STEVE CALK, Defendants,
Case No. 14-CV-6657 (JMA) (GRB) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Joan M. Azrack
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
denied the Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations for claims under Fair Labor Standards Act.

On Sept. 28, 2019, Magistrate Judge Gary R. Brown issued a Report
and Recommendation ("R&R") denying the Plaintiffs' motion seeking
equitable tolling.  The R&R rejected the Plaintiffs' request that
sought equitable tolling for all 609 putative Plaintiffs.  After
Judge Brown issued the R&R, the Plaintiffs filed a timely
objection.  The Defendants have not filed any response to the
objection.

The Plaintiffs contend that the R&R should have addressed, on the
merits, the equitable tolling arguments of the Named Plaintiff
Douglas Finnegan and Opt-in Plaintiffs who previously filed consent
to join forms with the Court who are not part of the limited
collective of MSA loan officers.  They argue that the Court's April
18, 2018 Order effectively dismissed the non-MSA loan officers'
claims without prejudice and that the statute of limitations should
be tolled so that they may be afforded the opportunity to bring
their claims individually in a more appropriate jurisdiction.

Judge Azrack finds that Magistrate Judge Brown correctly concluded
in the R&R that the question of equitable tolling as to these
individuals is not properly before the Court.  To date, neither
Finnegan nor the other Opt-in Plaintiffs who were not covered by
the Douglas Elliman MSA, have been dismissed from the action.
Relatedly, the Defendants have not moved for decertification and no
motions have been filed to sever or transfer the claims of Finnegan
or the other Opt-in Plaintiffs not covered by the Douglas Elliman
MSA.  If, at some future date, the Court had an occasion to dismiss
the claims of those parties without prejudice, it would entertain
an application to toll the statute of limitations for a short
period in order to allow those parties to file separate actions.

The Plaintiffs also object to the R&R's refusal to equitably toll
the statute of limitations for the fourteen 2018 Opt-Ins.  The R&R
did not resolve the split of authority over whether, in the context
of motion seeking equitable tolling for FLSA opt-ins based on the
litigation delay that results from a pending motion for conditional
certification, the focus should be on the diligence of the opt-ins
or of the named plaintiffs and their counsel.  Instead, the
Magistrate Judge found that, based on the "uncommon facts of the
case," equitable tolling was not warranted.  The Judge agrees with
the Magistarte Judge that, based, on the record before him and the
unique circumstances of the case, equitable tolling was not
warranted.  Accordingly, the Judge denies the Plaintiffs' request
for equitable tolling as to the 2018 Opt-Ins.

The Plaintiffs raise two additional points in their objections.
First, they object to the R&R to the extent that the R&R precludes
the 2018 Opt-Ins from filing applications for equitable tolling on
an individual basis.  Second, they and the 2018 Opt-Ins request the
opportunity to submit additional evidence concerning the diligence
of the 2018 Opt-Ins and Plaintiffs' counsel.  The Judge finds that
neither of these arguments are a reason not to adopt the R&R.

As to the first point, the Judge finds that the R&R says nothing
about whether the 2018 Opt-in Plaintiffs are precluded, at some
future date, from filing applications for equitable tolling on an
individual basis.  As to the second, related, point, the Judge
exercises his discretion and declines to consider any additional
evidence from the Plaintiffs as part of their objections.  The
instant Order, however, does not preclude the Plaintiffs from
seeking to raise equitable tolling arguments and introduce
additional evidence on that issue at some later point.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Azrack overruled the
Plaintiffs' objections, adopted the R&R, and denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for equitable tolling.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/QZvidk from Leagle.com.

Michael McDermott, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Justin M. Reilly --
nhglaw@nhglaw.com -- Neil H. Greenberg & Associates, P.C., Erik
Harald Langeland, Erik H. Langeland, P.C., James B. Zouras, Stephan
Zouras, LLP, Keith E. Williams, Neil H Greenberg & Associates, P.C,
Ryan F. Stephan, Stephan Zouras LLP, Teresa Becvar, Stephan Zouras,
LLP & Neil H. Greenberg -- ngreenberg@nhglaw.com -- Neil H.
Greenberg & Associates, P.C.

The Federal Savings Bank, John T. Calk & Steve Calk, Defendants,
represented by William H. Pillsbury -- wpillsbury@whplawoffices.com
-- Offit Kurman, April M. Rancier -- arancier@offitkurman.com --
Offit Kurman, Ari Karen -- akaren@offitkurman.com -- Offit Kurman,
P.A. & Katharine T. Batista -- kbatista@offitkurman.com -- Offit
Kurman, pro hac vice.

Citizens Financial Group, Objector, represented by John Patrick
Barry -- jbarry@proskauer.com -- Proskauer LLP.


FLORIDA: Agrees to Foster Care Reforms in Miami-Dade, Monroe
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher O'Donnell, writing for Tampa Bay Times, reports that
the agency that runs foster care in Florida has agreed to no longer
place children overnight in hotels or unlicensed offices, to stop
squeezing more children into foster homes than they are licensed
for and to keep children aged 6 and younger out of group foster
homes staffed by shift workers.

But that commitment only applies in Miami-Dade and Monroe counties,
where the Florida Department of Children and Families was sued by
Children's Rights, a child advocacy group. The department agreed to
the conditions as part of a settlement to a federal class action
lawsuit that alleged the state was failing to provide adequate
accommodation and care for foster children in the two counties,
which are classified as DCF's Southern Region.

So what about the rest of Florida?

State officials said the agreement doesn't mean different levels of
care across the state. The standards in the agreement line up with
federal and state targets that apply across Florida, they said. And
children are only placed in offices in exceptional circumstances.

"The settlement agreement is specific to the Southern Region.
However, DCF's work in meeting state and federal standards, and
improving the system of care, is statewide," said spokeswoman
DaMonica Smith.

But the agreement will mean a difference in how foster care is
monitored and the potential penalties DCF could face, at least in
South Florida.

The settlement designates national child welfare expert Kevin Ryan
as an independent auditor to oversee how well DCF is performing. If
the department under-performs, advocates can now call on a federal
judge to demand corrective action.

"The agreement is enforceable by the federal court," said Ira
Lustbader, litigation director at Children's Rights. "It would be
up to the court to determine any remedies."

Other child welfare groups across Florida are taking note.

"This is a significant step in the right direction because
officially the state of Florida and DCF have agreed there are
longstanding problems in the child welfare system and they've
agreed on a mandate to fix those problems," said Roy Miller,
president of the Tallahassee non-profit The Children's Campaign.

But Miller said DCF must come up with a statewide fix for problems
that include a shortage of foster beds and children being bounced
from home to home.

His comments were echoed by Robin Rosenberg, deputy director of
Florida's Children First, a group that advocates for children's
rights across Florida.

"No one should have to sue DCF to get them to do their job," she
said. "The problems with inadequate placement are pervasive across
the state of Florida."

A Tampa Bay Times analysis of foster placement records between 2000
and 2017 revealed that about 1,500 children stayed in 12 different
homes over a single year. More than 7,500 children were moved an
average of once a month over a six-month period and almost 2,000
children had six placements in just one month.

Psychologists warn that frequent moves can result in children
developing trust issues and becoming unable to form healthy
relationships.

DCF's commitment on not placing children in offices or hotels will
be of particular interest in Hillsborough County, which has used
offices and other unlicensed accommodations as it has struggled to
find room for foster children. The county leads the state in the
number of children in care, despite its No. 4 ranking in
population.

Eckerd Connects, the agency that runs foster care across Tampa Bay,
was warned last year it could lose its contract for Hillsborough
after a state-mandated review expressed special concern for
children who have been moved from home to home and who often lack
access to laundry, hygiene products and nutritious or home-cooked
food. There were 35 of these children at the time of the
evaluation.

The Southern Region federal lawsuit was filed in early 2018 after
advocates learned that children under the age of 6 had been housed
in emergency shelters and group homes and received care from shift
workers. Studies suggest that children fare better in home
settings.

In addition to more stable placements, the settlement requires that
DCF ensure that at least 90 percent of children receive needed
mental and behavioral counseling. It is required to meet all of the
standards by 2021.

Florida is already working through statewide improvements in foster
care that were mandated in 2017 by the Children's Bureau, part of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Its review of 80 foster care cases that year found that more than
half the time child welfare agencies removed children from homes
without first providing appropriate services such as parenting
classes.

The bureau approved a corrective plan and DCF has completed all but
two points identified on it, said spokeswoman Jessica Sims. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses 3 Counts in Kasper ADA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDWARD KASPER, on behalf of himself and similarly
situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-2895 (N.D. Ohio), Judge James S. Gwin of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (i) granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss three of the six counts in the
complaint; and (ii) granted in part and denied in  part its motion
to strike the class allegations for all claims.

Kasper brings a disability discrimination class action against
Ford, claiming that Ford's job application process discriminates
against prospective applicants whose disabilities prevent them from
navigating and using Ford's website.  With his complaint, the
Plaintiff alleges that he has a cognitive disability and the
cognitive disability makes it difficult for him to navigate
websites and complete information-intensive tasks online, like
online job applications.  The Ford typically only accepts job
applications through the Ford website application portal, unless it
grants a disabled applicant's request for an accommodation.  The
Plaintiff alleges that he has tried to apply for Ford positions but
has been unable to do so because of Ford's online application
process and Ford's failure to respond to the Plaintiff's
accommodation requests.

Before the suit, the Plaintiff filed disability discrimination
charges against Ford relating to Ford's online application process
in 2014 and 2017.  Because the 2014 charge is time-barred, the
Court only recites the complaint's allegations relating to the 2017
events.

Ford's website has a hotline phone number that disabled persons may
call to request an accommodation with Ford's application process.
Next to the hotline number on the website, a message states that
callers should leave their contact information and details about
the job opening that interests them.  Upon calling the hotline, a
recorded message states that Ford will return the individual's
call.

The Plaintiff alleges that Ford's website design makes the hotline
number difficult to find and that he was unable to locate it by
himself.  He claims that he was only able to call the hotline
number to request help with the application process after receiving
another's assistance.

The Plaintiff also claims that Ford never returns his calls because
Ford requires hotline callers to include information in the
voicemail that his disability prevented him from obtaining.  Next
to the hotline number on Ford's website, Ford tells callers to
leave information about the job opening that interests them to
receive a return call—online information that the Plaintiff could
not access.

The Plaintiff now sues Ford on behalf of himself and other
prospective applicants with disabilities who attempted to access
Ford's online application portal and were unable to apply for a
Ford position.  He, inter alia, makes federal and state
disparate-impact and failure-to-accommodate class claims alleging
that Ford's discriminatory conduct resulted in Ford's failure to
hire him and similarly situated disabled individuals.

The Defendant moves to dismiss Counts 3, 5, and 6 of the six counts
in Kasper's complaint.  Ford also moves to strike the class
allegations for all counts.

The Plaintiff does not oppose certain parts of the motions.
Accordingly, Judge Gwin grants Ford's uncontested request to
dismiss the Title III Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claim
(Count 5) and the stand-alone injunctive and declaratory relief
request (Count 6).  In addition, he grants Ford's uncontested
request to limit the Ohio class definition to persons reachable by
Ohio law.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's ADA claim alleging
that Ford's website has a disparate impact on certain disabled
prospective applicants (Count 3).  Because the Plaintiff has not
exhausted his administrative remedies for the ADA disparate impact
claim, the Judge grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss this
claim.  He finds that the Plaintiff represents that he successfully
called the Ford hotline to ask for a reasonable accommodation.
This implies that the Plaintiff was able to access the hotline
number.  Without more, the EEOC would have no reason to investigate
Ford's website.

As to the Defendant Ford's motion to strike the class allegations
for all claims, the Judge finds that Defendant Ford fails to show
that the Plaintiff's class allegations suffer from an irreparable
defect that clearly makes class certification inappropriate.  He
also does not share Ford's view that the class action vehicle is
inappropriate simply because the Plaintiff's class claims may
require individualized determinations as to whether class members
are legally "disabled."  Finally, despite Ford's representations to
the contrary, the Plaintiff need not include detailed factual
allegations about other class members in the complaint.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Gwin granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss Counts 3, 5, and 6, as well the Defendant's
motion to strike the nationwide scope of the potential Ohio class.
He otherwise denied the Defendant's motion to strike the class
allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/YYXZnR from Leagle.com.

Edward Kasper, and other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Lewis A. Zipkin -- zfwlpa@aol.com -- Zipkin Whiting
& Shawn A. Romer -- sromer@romerlawfirm.com.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Blaine H. Evanson --
bevanson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher - Irvine, David
A. Posner -- dposner@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, Eugene
Scalia -- escalia@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, pro
hac vice, Naima L. Farrell, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher & Ronald G.
Linville -- rlinville@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler.


FORTY BAR & GRILLE: Faces Sanney Suit over Sex Discrimination
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Forty Bar & Grille
and Robert Merashoff for alleged violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
The case is captioned CARRIE SANNEY, Plaintiff, v. FORTY BAR &
GRILLE and ROBERT MERASHOFF, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00407-CB
(W.D. Pa., April 10, 2019). Plaintiff Carrie Sanney, who was
employed as a cook by Forty Bar & Grille, seeks equitable relief as
well as monetary and punitive damages, to redress Defendant's
unlawful discrimination. Sanney accuses Defendant Robert Merashoff
of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that constitute
sexual harassment. Such conduct has interfered Sanney's work
performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.

Forty Bar & Grille is located at 3390 W. Chestnut St. Washington,
PA. It is owned by Robert Merashoff and his mother, Cynde
Merashoff. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kayla Drum, Esq.
     KRAEMER, MANES & ASSOCIATES, LLC
     U.S. Steel Tower
     600 Grant Street, Suite 660
     Pittsburgh, PA 15219
     Telephone: (411) 626.5594
     Facsimile: (412) 345.5151
     E-mail: kd@lawkm.com


GALAXY INTERNATIONAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Mines FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY MINES, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GALAXY INTERNATIONAL PURCHASING,
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, and GLOBAL CREDIT &
COLLECTION CORP. a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-04746-RLY-DLP (S.D. Ind.), Judge Richard L. Young of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel and
Stay Case.

On Dec. 27, 2007, Plaintiff Mines, individually and on behalf of
other similarly situated, filed a Class Action Complaint against
the Defendants, alleging that they failed to identify the current
creditor of his debt and the putative class members' debts in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

On April 5, 2018, the Defendants filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Case.  The Court referred the matter to the
Magistrate Judge, who issued her Report and Recommendation.  The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grants the Defendants'
motion.

Neither party objects.  Judge Young has reviewed the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation and finds no clear error.
Accordingly, he adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, and granted the Defendants' motion.  The case is
stayed pending completion of the arbitration pursuant to the terms
of the Arbitration Provision at issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/SgnnSX from Leagle.com.

ANTHONY MINES, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Angie K. Robertson, PHILIPPS
AND PHILIPPS, LTD., David J. Philipps, PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD.,
John Thomas Steinkamp, SAWIN, SHEA & STEINKAMP, LLC & Mary E.
Philipps, PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD.

GALAXY INTERNATIONAL PURCHASING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company & GLOBAL CREDIT & COLLECTION CORP., a Deleware corporation,
Defendants, represented by Boyd W. Gentry --
bgentry@boydgentrylaw.com -- LAW OFFICE OF BOYD W. GENTRY, LLC.


GENERAL MOTORS: Corona Sues Over Defective Vehicle
--------------------------------------------------
RUBEN A. CORONA and MARIA R. CORONA, Plaintiffs, v. General Motors
LLC, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
CGC-19-575027 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., April 4, 2019)
brought this claim pursuant and seeks remedies available pursuant
to Magnuson-Moss under California law, including California Civil
Code Section 1794 nd/or California Commercial Code Sections
2711-2715, and/or other remedies that the Court may deem proper.

On or about January 23, 2010, Plaintiffs purchased a 2010 Chevrolet
Traverse, vehicle identification number 1GNLRHED5AS156593, from MK
Smith Chevrolet which was manufactured and or distributed by
Defendant. In connection with the purchase, Plaintiffs received an
express written warranty, which covers power steering system and/or
related components.

The Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or
performance of the Vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a
failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time.
The warranty provided, in relevant part, that in the event a defect
developed with the Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiffs
could deliver the Vehicle for repair services to Defendant's
representative and the Vehicle would be repaired.

During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed
defects and Plaintiffs suffered damages. Plaintiffs purchased the
Vehicle as manufactured with GM's steering system. GM knew about
the Steering Defect, and its safety risks since 2010, if not
before. Nevertheless, GM concealed and failed to disclose the
defective nature of the Vehicle and its Lambda crossover platform
to Plaintiffs at the time of sale and thereafter. Had Plaintiffs
known that the Vehicle suffered from the Steering Defect, they
would not have purchased the Vehicle, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are residents of San Bernardino County, California.

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC is a corporation organized and in existence
under the laws of the State of Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Tionna Dolin, Esq.
     Daniel Tai, Esq.
     Strategic Legal Practices, APC
     1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 929-4900
     Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
     Email: tdolin@slpattorney.com
            dtai@slpattorney.com


GREEN CASH LLC: Carter Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jesse Carter, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Green Cash, LLC and WB Services, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-00378 (M.D. Fla., February 26, 2019),
seeks damages and other legal and equitable remedies resulting from
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Defendants are in the online payday loan industry and elicits loan
applications, which it then provides to third-party lenders for a
commission or finder's fee. WB is either a wholly-owned subsidiary
or a brand of Green Cash. To solicit online payday loan
applications, it engages in telemarketing and text messages sent
from an automated telephone dialing system. [BN]

Carter is represented by:

      Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
      Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
      NORMAND PLLC
      3165 McCrory Place, Suite 175
      Orlando, FL 32803
      Telephone: (407) 603-6031
      Email: service@ednormand.com
             ed@ednormand.com
             jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com


GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES: Court Narrows Claims v. Edison in Moses Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAVEN MOSES, STARAISHA MORRIS, DWAYNE DALE, ISMAIYL
JONES, individually and on behalf of themselves and all current and
former employees, and AYANNA BEACHAM and ANDRE MURRAY, Plaintiffs,
v. GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES, LLC, MICHAEL SMITH, individually, WINSTON
SMITH, individually, ADNDREW MUNIZ, individually, AARON MUNIZ,
individually, DANE YEE, individually, MARIO LOPEZ, individually,
GRIFFIN SECURITY SERVICES, CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
INC., and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL
1430, GRANT ASSOCIATES, NIQUE IRVING, SEXTON ALSON, and WORKFORCE
1, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1200 (ALC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Andrew
L. Carter, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted in part and denied in part the Defendant
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the
Third Amended Complaint ("TAC").

The Named Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against the
Defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), and New York State
Unemployment Insurance Laws.  Additionally, they assert fraud
claims against Corporate Defendants.

Griffin employs and provide flaggers for operations requiring
flaggers such as construction, parking, traffic, and crowd control.
Flaggers protect the public from hazardous conditions and protect
workers from traffic and congestion.  Defendant Edison provides
electric, gas, and steam to New York City and Westchester County.

According to the TAC, Griffin provided flaggers for Edison jobs.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege Griffin and Griffin Security
only had one business partner for flagging operations, which was
Edison.  Edison contracted with Griffin to provide flaggers, and
flaggers would be sent to Edison sites for work.

The Plaintiffs claim that both Edison and Griffin acted as their
employer.  They reported to Griffin at 6:30 a.m. every morning, and
they waited there until they were dispatched to an Edison site for
their daily flagging duties.  They would sign in with Griffin and
sign out with Edison.  The Plaintiffs were required to remain at
Edison worksites under the direction of Edison supervisors until
the replacement shift arrived to relieve them.  The TAC alleges
that both Griffin and Edison had the power to, and did in fact,
terminate employees for a variety of reasons, including
retaliation.

The Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Griffin and Edison required
them to work more than 40 hours per work week (60-70 hours per
week) without properly paying them the overtime rate.  The
Defendants shorted the Plaintiffs' hours and failed to pay them
spread of hours.  The Defendants allegedly failed to pay the
Plaintiffs minimum wage.  The Defendants also failed to furnish the
Plaintiffs with notice of employment documents and failed to
"maintain and preserve" records.

Aside from the FLSA and NYLL claims, the Plaintiffs' TAC alleges
that the Corporate Defendants engaged in fraud.  More specifically,
the Plaintiffs allege that the Corporate Defendants promised them
certain benefits if they joined their union, Local 1430.   They
contend that those promises were empty.  In conjunction with the
alleged fraud, they claim that the Defendants also violated
Articles 18 and 25-B of the New York State Unemployment Insurance
Laws by influencing the New York State Department of Labor's
decisions pertaining to unemployment.

The Plaintiffs initiated the case on Feb. 9, 2018.  They filed
their Complaint on Feb. 22, 2019.  A Pre-Motion Conference was held
by Judge John G. Koeltl on April 17, 2018.  Judge Koeltl granted
the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint, and granted the
Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss.  On April 25, 2018,
the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint ("FAC").  On May
11, 2018, the Defendant Edison filed a Motion to Dismiss along with
supporting documents.  On June 15, 2018, after multiple extensions,
the Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to Edison's Motion.  

After considering multiple Letter Motions from the Parties, the
Court granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend their FAC.
Additionally, the Court denied Defendant Edison's Motion to
Dismiss, without prejudice.  It then granted both Defendant Edison
and Defendant Local 1430 leave to file motions to dismiss following
the Plaintiffs' amendment.  On Aug. 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a
Proposed Amended Complaint.  After a subsequent request to amend
the Complaint was granted, the Plaintiffs filed their TAC on Aug.
15, 2018.

Defendant Edison filed a Motion to Dismiss the TAC on Aug. 29,
2018.  Defendant Edison claims that the Plaintiffs have failed to
plausibly allege that Edison and Defendant Griffin were joint
employers.  In addition, Edison argues that the Plaintiffs' claims
are deficient and do not meet the pleading standards associated
with those claims.  The Plaintiffs opposed the Defendant's Motion
on Sept. 12, 2018.  The Defendant filed a Reply on Sept. 23, 2018.

Judge Carter finds that the Plaintiffs allege that both Edison and
Griffin controlled their employment.  They claim that it was a
joint operation -- they would sign in and report for work at
Griffin, and then they would be assigned to Edison worksites under
the control of Edison supervisors.  They allege that employees were
terminated by both Edison and Griffin.  They allege that they were
paid by both Edison and Griffin.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs
allege that both Edison and Griffin had the responsibility to
maintain employment records for their employees.  At this stage,
the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs' TAC sufficiently alleges that
Edison and Griffin were joint employers.

The Judge denied the Defendant's Motion as to the Plaintiffs' FLSA
and NYLL claims.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden by way of their legally sufficient TAC.  The Plaintiffs
allege that they were paid in a funky, non-IRS approved manner that
paid them $12 per hour with an additional untaxed $2 per hour.  In
terms of overtime, aside from alleging that they were required to
work 60-70 hours per week, the Plaintiffs allege that they were
paid $20 per hour of overtime worked rather than $21 per hour, and
that the Defendants' payment strategy "distorted the Plaintiffs'
paychecks in the Defendants' favor.  The Plaintiffs also claim that
they worked days that began and ended more than 10 hours apart in a
single day in violation of New York State Labor Laws.  More
specifically, they allege they were not paid the agreed upon amount
for travel or work time.  Finally, the TAC alleges that the
Defendants failed to adhere to disclosure and notice requirements.
At this stage, the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden by way of
their legally sufficient TAC.

The Judge granted the Defendant's Motion as to the retaliation
claims alleged by Plaintiffs Morris and Moses.  He denies the
Defendant's Motion as to the retaliation claims alleged by
Plaintiffs Dale, Murray, Jones, and Beacham.  He finds that only
Plaintiffs Dale, Murray, Jones, and Beacham plausibly allege all
three elements required to sustain an FLSA retaliation claim.
Plaintiffs Morris and Moses specifically allege that they were
terminated for leaving their workstations and violating worksite
instructions.

The Judge dismissed the Plaintiffs' fraud claim against Defendant
Edison.  He finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations alone are
insufficient to meet the standard for fraud outlined.  Among other
things, the Plaintiffs mention an "illegal kickback scheme," but
fail to expound or provide a factual explanation of the alleged
"scheme" beyond the fact that they paid $50 to work for the
Defendants and $47 dollars to join their union, Defendant Local
1430.

As to the Plaintiffs' final cause of action alleging that the
Defendants violated Articles 18 and 25-B of the New York State
Unemployment Insurance Laws, the Judge finds that there are no
allegations in the TAC that relate to this claim. Thus, it is
dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Carter granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's Motion.  He granted it as to the
Plaintiffs' claims of fraud and violations of New York insurance
law.  Further, he granted it regarding the retaliation claims
alleged by Plaintiffs Morris and Moses only.  He otherwise denide
the Defendant's Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ngjv1x from Leagle.com.

Raven Moses, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
current and former employees, Staraisha Morris, individually and on
behalf of themselves and all current and former employees, Dwayne
Dale, individually and on behalf of themselves and all current and
former employees, Ismaiyl Jones, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all current and former employees, Ayanna Beacham &
Andre Murray, Plaintiffs, represented by George Theodore Peters --
G.Peters@myattys1.com -- Law Office of George T. Peters.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Adam Jeremy Smiley, Con Edison Law Departmment.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1430,
Defendant, represented by Jordan Alexander El-Hag, El-Hag and
Associates, P.C..


GTX INC: Wheby Balks at Merger Deal with Oncternal Therapeutics
---------------------------------------------------------------
A securities class action complaint has been filed against GTx,
Inc, its board of directors, Oncternal Therapeutics, Inc, and
Grizzly Merger Sub, Inc.  The case is captioned EARL M. WHEBY, JR.,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. GTX, INC., ROBERT J. WILLS, MARC S. HANOVER, J.R.
HYDE, III, MICHAEL G. CARTER, J. KENNETH GLASS, GARRY A. NEIL,
KENNETH S. ROBINSON, ONCTERNAL THERAPEUTICS, INC., and GRIZZLY
MERGER SUB, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00668-UNA (D. Del.,
April 10, 2019). The action stems from a proposed transaction
announced on March 7, 2019, pursuant to which GTx, Inc. will merge
with Oncternal Therapeutics, Inc. On March 6, 2019, GTx's Board of
Directors caused GTx to enter into an agreement and plan of merger
with Oncternal and Grizzly Merger Sub, Inc. The Registration
Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed
Transaction, which renders the Registration Statement false and
misleading. Accordingly, Plaintiff  alleges that defendants
violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the Registration Statement. Plaintiff
alleges that the Registration Statement has omitted information
about the opinion of the GTx Financial Advisor, the background of
the merger, and the recommendation of the GTx Board.

GTx is a biopharmaceutical company dedicated to the discovery,
development, and commercialization of small molecules for the
treatment of muscle-related diseases and other serious medical
conditions. It is a Delaware corporation and maintains its
principal executive offices at 175 Toyota Plaza, 7th Floor,
Memphis, Tennessee 38103. GTx’s common stock is traded on the
NASDAQ Capital Market under the ticker symbol "GTXI." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

       Brian D. Long, Esq.
       Gina M. Serra, Esq.
       300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
       Wilmington, DE 19801
       Telephone: (302) 295-5310
       Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
       E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
               gms@rl-legal.com


HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Gibbs RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARLENE GIBBS, et al., on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HAYNES INVESTMENTS,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:18cv48 (E.D. Va.),
Judge Mary Hannah Lauck of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, denied the Defendants' (i)
Motion to Transfer or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings;
(ii) Motion to Compel Arbitration; and (iii) Motion to Dismiss.

The controversy arises out of the Haynes Defendants' involvement in
an allegedly unlawful lending operation involving two Native
American-owned lending companies6 and multiple alleged
co-conspirators.  The lending operation allegedly offered loans to
the Plaintiffs in amounts ranging from $300 to $3,000, charging
interest rates ranging from 227.92% to 448%.  The Plaintiffs bring
the suit on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly
situated, alleging that the lending operation violates state and
federal lending laws.

The Plaintiffs allege that the lending operation constitutes what
they refer to as a "rent-a-tribe."  Under this improper business
model, actors establish entities to originate internet-based high
interest loans so as to evade state and federal usury and lending
laws.  A non-tribal entity and a Tribe agree to establish a lending
company in the Tribe's name.

According to Plaintiffs, the Native American Tribe nominally
establishes the lending company in order to extend its tribal
sovereign immunity to the newly-formed business entity.  The tribal
company, however, receives capital from a different, non-tribal
person or company who seeks to use the tribal lending companies in
order to cloak the unlawfully high-interest internet loans with
sovereign immunity.  The non-tribal entity retains the vast
majority of the profits and controls the lending tribal entity,
from major business decisions to day-to-day operations.  In
exchange, the Tribe receives only a small percentage of the
revenue.

The Plaintiffs challenge the formation and operation of two lending
entities: Plain Green and Great Plains.  Plain Green seeks immunity
as part of the Chippewa Cree Tribe.  Great Plains would claim
immunity as part of the Otoe-Missouria Tribe.  As to Plain Green,
the Plaintiffs allege that the Haynes Defendants, in conjunction
with other actors and through a web of entities, actually "funded
and partially operated" the so-called "rent-a-tribe" scheme at the
heart of the case.  Once Plain Green originated the loans in its
name, another designated third-party entity "purchased" the loans
from Plain Green.  As part of this "purchase," the third party
entity "refunded back to Haynes Investments 99% of the funds
provided by Haynes Investments, which also received: (1) 5%
interest on the money loaned to the Tribe, and (2) 1% of the
revenue collected on the loans as a 'referral' fee."  The
Plaintiffs allege that Great Plains has a comparable structure,
albeit with different entities.

In this way, although Plain Green and Great Plains executed the
loan agreements, the Haynes Defendants and other non-tribal
entities actually funded and controlled the lending operation.  The
lending operation issued loans to Virginia residents with interest
rates far in excess of Virginia's usury law, which caps interest
rates at 12%, with some exceptions not applicable in the instant
case.  The Haynes Defendants, together with other non-parties,
marketed, initiated, and collected usurious loans in Virginia.

The Plaintiffs in the case all entered into loan agreements with
either Plain Green or Great Plains.  Although some variation in
wording exists among the Contracts, they essentially include the
same terms and the minor differences do not alter the outcome on
the Motions.  

All Contracts purport to be governed by Tribal Law.  They also
include an additional agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from
the Contract.  All Contracts include a severance clause stating
that, should any provision within it -- such as the Arbitration
Agreement-- be found unenforceable, the offensive provision would
be severed, meaning that the remainder of the Contract would remain
in full force and effect.  The Arbitration Agreements require the
application of Tribal law, and limit the Arbitrator's authority to
remedies and legal claims recognized by Tribal law.

The Plaintiffs filed a six-count putative class action Complaint
against eight Defendants, alleging various federal and state
violations associated with the allegedly unlawful loan enterprise.
They pursue the suit on behalf of Virginia residents who entered
into loan agreements with Plain Green or Great Plains, bringing six
class counts as follows:

     a. Count I: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a).  The Plaintiffs allege
that the Haynes Defendants received income derived, directly and
indirectly, through collection of unlawful debt, and used and
reinvested parts of such income to acquire interests in and to
further establish and assist the operations of the enterprise.

     b. Count II: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(b).  The Plaintiffs allege
that the Haynes Defendants acquired and maintained interests in and
control of the enterprise involved in the unlawful collection of
debt.

     c. Count III: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).  The Plaintiffs
allege that the Haynes Defendants associated with the enterprise
and participated in the affairs of the enterprise, which existed
for the purpose of collection of unlawful debt.

     d. Count IV: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d).  The Plaintiffs allege
the Haynes Defendants entered into several agreements to violate
Sections 1962(a)-(c).

     e. Count V: Virginia Usury Laws.  The Plaintiffs allege the
loans violate Virginia's usury laws because the interest rates
exceed 12%.  Theys allege that the Haynes Defendants unlawfully
received revenues generated on the loans.

     f. Count VI: Unjust Enrichment.  The Plaintiffs allege they
conferred a benefit on the Haynes Defendants when they repaid the
allegedly unlawful loans; that the Haynes Defendants knew or should
have known about the benefit; and that the Haynes Defendants have
been unjustly enriched through their receipt of any amounts in
connection with the unlawful loans.

The Plaintiffs seek: (1) class certification; (2) declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages; and, (3) attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.

On April 18, 2018, Defendants Victory Park Capital Advisors, LLC;
Victory Park Management, LLC; Scott Zemnick; Jeffrey Schneider; and
Thomas Welch moved to transfer the case to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.  On April 19,
2018, the Court granted the Motion as to the claims against these
defendants, but retained the claims against the Haynes Defendants.

On July 18, 2018, the Haynes Defendants filed the Motion to
Transfer, the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the Motion to
Dismiss.  The Plaintiffs responded in opposition to the Motions,
and the Haynes Defendants replied.

Judge Lauck denied the Defendants' (i) Motion to Transfer or, in
the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings; (ii) Motion to Compel
Arbitration; and (iii) Motion to Dismiss.  She denied the Motion to
Transfer because the first-to-file doctrine does not commend
transfer and, in the alternative, because special circumstances
would justify proceeding in the Court even if all three elements of
the first-to-file rule were satisfied.  She denied the Motion to
Compel Arbitration because the prospective waiver doctrine renders
the Arbitration Agreements wholly unenforceable.  She denied the
Motion to Dismiss for two reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs properly
served the Haynes Defendants in accordance with binding Fourth
Circuit precedent.  Second, theys plausibly plead facts in support
of each element of each claim they bring against the Haynes
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/UAMq3G from Leagle.com.

Darlene Gibbs, on behalf of themselves and all individuals
similarly situated, Stephanie Edwards, on behalf of themselves and
all individuals similary situated, Lula Williams, on behalf of
themselves and all individuals similarly situated, Patrick Inscho,
on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly situated &
Lawrence Mwethuku, on behalf of themselves and all individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly
-- kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly Guzzo PLC, Andrew Joseph
Guzzo -- aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly Guzzo PLC, Casey
Shannon Nash -- casey@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly Guzzo PLC,
Craig Carley Marchiando -- craig@clalegal.com -- Consumer
Litigation Associates, Elizabeth W. Hanes -- elizabeth@clalegal.com
-- Consumer Litigation Associates, James Wilson Speer --
jay@vplc.org -- Virginia Proverty Law Center & Leonard Anthony
Bennett -- lenbennett@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation
Associates.

Haynes Investments, LLC, L. Stephen Haynes & Sovereign Business
Solutions, LLC, Defendants, represented by David Neal Anthony --
david.anthony@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, David Foster
Herman -- dherman@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP,
pro hac vice, Jonathan Peter Boughrum --
jboughrum@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac
vice, Richard Lawrence Scheff -- rlscheff@armstrongteasdale.com --
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy James St. George ,
Troutman Sanders LLP.


HEALTH-ADE: Settles Beverage Mislabeling Class Action for $4MM
--------------------------------------------------------------
Martín Caballero, writing for BevNET.com, reports that Kombucha
brand Health-Ade and Whole Foods Market have reached a settlement
to conclude a class action lawsuit filed last year by customers who
alleged the company's beverage products were mislabeled as
non-alcoholic.

According to a motion filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, Health-Ade and Whole Foods are seeking to
settle all claims for approximately $4 million ($3,997,500),
including settlement administration, incentive awards, and
attorneys' fees and expenses.

In the complaint, originally filed last March and amended in May,
the plaintiffs, Gabriela Bayol and Bruce Verbeck, alleged that
Health-Ade Kombucha "has passed off its entire line of beverages as
non-alcoholic, when, in fact, the beverages contain more than twice
the alcohol allowed for non-alcoholic beverages." The complaint
also stated that sugar levels have been understated in order to
position the products as healthy alternatives to alcohol, while
contributing to the continued fermentation of the drink in store
coolers.

The suit claimed Whole Foods "materially contributes, controls and
abets the fraud and misleading advertising" by placing the drink on
shelves next to non-alcoholic beverages. The natural retailer was
also part of a similar 2017 class action suit alongside GT's Living
Foods (formerly Millennium Products Inc.) that resulted in an $8.25
million settlement.

However, Whole Foods has no obligation to contribute any funds to
the total financial settlement in the Health-Ade case, according to
court documents.

According to the terms of the settlement, individual class members
will be eligible to receive a cash payment of $4 for each product
purchased during the class period without proof of purchase, up to
$40 in total. Class members with proof of purchase can receive up
to $80 in cash. According to the plaintiffs' attorneys, the
weighted average retail price of Health-Ade kombucha throughout the
class period is $3.83.

The settlement also requires Health-Ade to add a warning to its
package labels stating: "Kombucha should not be consumed if left
unrefrigerated for an extended period of time. Pregnant/breast
feeding? Consult your doctor. Due to natural fermentation, there
may be trace amounts of alcohol and small pieces of culture."

The company also agreed to "effectuate a formulation change" to
control variability of alcohol and sugar content, and to regularly
test its products using a third-party laboratory to ensure
compliance.

Bayol and Verbeck will also each receive a $2,000 incentive award.

According to court documents, plaintiffs in the case deposed a
representative of Health-Ade on a range of subjects, including
alcohol and sugar content, beverage formulation, and the company's
financial health. The plaintiffs also commissioned independent lab
tests for sugar and alcohol, and interviewed a Health-Ade
distributor regarding potential issues related to refrigeration and
cold-chain transportation.

Representatives for Health-Ade declined to comment, citing pending
litigation.

Representatives for Whole Foods did not respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


HI-TECH METALS: Rojas Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
----------------------------------------------------------
Jose Rojas, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Hi-Tech Metals, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
702847/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens Cty., April 4, 2019) is brought
by a class of similarly situated current and former hourly
employees who worked for the Defendant, under the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, asserting that they are entitled to maximum
liquidated damages and interest for being paid overtime wages and
non-overtime wages later than weekly; and entitled to costs and
attorneys' fees, pursuant to the New York Labor Law ("NYLL").

The Defendant had a policy and practice of deducting from the wages
of Plaintiff, payment/time for a daily "meal period." However, due
to the demands of his job, Plaintiff did not receive a bona fide
meal period within the meaning of NYLL during his employment with
Defendant. As a result, Plaintiff is owed non-overtime and overtime
wages for at least 3-4 hours per week, for each week during his
employment with Defendant, notes the complaint.

Plaintiff also worked up to 48 hours a week for Defendant and
likely more, 5-6 days a week, adds the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from on or about October 1,
2015 to on about April 4, 2018.

Defendant was an architectural manufacturer specializing in all
phases of the fabrication process as well as installation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
     215-28 Hillside Avenue
     Queens Village, NY 11427
     Phone: 718-740-1000
     Fax: 718-355-9668
     Email: abdul@abdulhassan.com


HUNTER WARFIELD: Vasquez Files FDCPA Suit in Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HUNTER WARFIELD, INC.
The case is styled as MARIA VAZQUEZ on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HUNTER WARFIELD, INC., JOHN
DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01486-NIQA (E.D. Pa., April
8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Hunter Warfield, Inc. provides debt collection and asset
investigation services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     ROBERT P. COCCO, ESQ.
     LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. COCCO PC
     1500 WALNUT ST., STE 900
     PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
     Phone: (215) 351-0200
     Fax: (215) 922-3874
     Email: rcocco@rcn.com



HYATT HOTELS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Tichy Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAREN TICHY, Plaintiff, v. HYATT HOTELS CORPORATION,
HILTON DOMESTIC OPERATING COMPANY INC., SIX CONTINENTS HOTELS,
INC., MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., and WYNDHAM HOTEL GROUP, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 18 C 1959 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss counts I
and II of the Plaintiff's complaint.

Tichy, on behalf of herself and a putative class of consumers,
brings two claims against the Defendants, all of which are major
U.S. hotel chains.  The the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
violated the Sherman Act's prohibition on contracts or conspiracies
in restraint of trade.  Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants conspired to stop using certain forms of branded
keyword search advertising on the Internet, thereby increasing the
costs of searching for and booking hotel rooms online.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Clarksville, Virginia.  She used the
Internet to search for, reserve, and purchase hotel rooms from one
or more of the Defendants in the United States in 2015, 2016, and
2017.  She alleges that branded keyword advertising in the hotel
industry facilitated a "robust exchange of competitive marketplace
information" and put downward pressure on hotel room prices.

On "numerous occasions" in 2015, 2016, and 2017, the Plaintiff used
the Defendants' branded keywords to search for hotel rooms on
Google.com.  She "began to notice fewer competitive options being
presented," so "to save time," she "increasingly" navigated
straight to the Marriott website to search for hotel rooms.
Between 2015 and 2017, she reserved and purchased Marriott-branded
rooms on Marriott.com.  She also "reserved and purchased hotel
rooms from other Defendants using their branded websites."  The
Plaintiff alleges that she and the putative class members paid more
for hotel rooms, and "incurred greater costs in time and effort to
locate suitable" rooms, than they would have absent the Defendants'
conspiracy.

The Plaintiff has sued the Defendants on behalf of herself and a
putative class of similarly situated consumers in the United States
who, from Jan. 1, 2015 through the present, "paid for a room
reserved from any OTA or the Defendants' online websites."  In
Count I of her complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendants'
"horizontal bid rigging and group boycott" agreements constitute a
per se violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1.  In Count II of her
complaint, she claims, in the alternative, that the Defendants'
alleged agreements unreasonably restrained trade in violation of 15
U.S.C. Section 1.  The Plaintiff seeks damages and equitable relief
under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.

The Defendants now move to dismiss both counts of the Plaintiff's
complaint.  They argue that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim
because her factual allegations of conspiracy "demonstrate nothing
more than parallel conduct by the Defendants."  In addition, the
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's "theory of injury -- higher
room rates from the alleged suppression of comparative information"
-- is too speculative to confer antitrust standing.  The Defendants
ask the court to dismiss the Plaintiff's case for both reasons.

Judge Pallmeyer recognizes that most of the factual circumstances
alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint do not provide "context
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent
action."  In this regard, she finds that the Plaintiff's
allegations are readily distinguishable from those in cases like In
re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litigation,  and Kleen I, , where courts determined that
detailed allegations concerning numerous "plus factors" plausibly
supported an inference of conspiracy.

But, she also finds that the Plaintiff does plausibly allege that
each Defendant would have acted against its economic interest by
unilaterally restricting branded advertising as alleged.
Specifically, by ceasing to bid on other Defendants' (or OTAs')
branded keywords, the independently-acting the Defendant would
sacrifice opportunities to win direct bookings and decrease the
chance that a consumer searching for it would visit its website.
And by prohibiting OTAs from bidding on its keywords, the
independently-acting Defendant would decrease the likelihood of
winning indirect bookings, yet continue to face just as much
advertising competition from the other Defendants.

The Plaintiff's allegations in this regard are, if not
overwhelming, certainly sufficient to support an inference that the
Defendants reached a preceding agreement to restrict branded
advertising.  So, too, are her allegations that the Defendants
departed from an established advertising pattern, and that search
results reflect the departure.  The Plaintiff's case, therefore, is
also unlike Frantzides v. Northshore University HealthSystem
Faculty Practice Associates, Inc., where the Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' antitrust claims because the complaint presented "a
bare assertion of conspiracy accompanied by a conclusory allegation
of agreement at some unidentified point."  In the instant case, the
Judge is satisfied that the Plaintiff has moved her claims beyond
the "conceivable" to the "plausible."

Having determined that the Plaintiff's complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to plausibly allege a conspiracy, the Judge
addresses the Defendants' argument that the complaint fails for
lack of antitrust standing.  To bring a private antitrust claim, a
plaintiff must establish that she (1) has suffered an antitrust
injury; and (2) has antitrust standing (i.e., that the alleged harm
proximately caused her injury).  The Judge concludes that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded both elements.

She finds that the Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to support
her theory that, but for the Defendants' advertising restrictions,
she and the putative class members would not have suffered the
alleged injuries.  The Plaintiff's complaint contains specific
allegations regarding how the Defendants' alleged conspiracy has
harmed competition, even as OTAs' popularity increases.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Pallmeyer denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Amended Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/PAhGfH from Leagle.com.

Karen Tichy, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth A. Fegan --
beth@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Eugene A. Burrus -- geneb@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Zoran Tasic, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP.

Hyatt Corporation, Defendant, represented by Sean M. Berkowitz --
sean.berkowitz@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Brendan A. McShane
-- brendan.mcshane@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice &
Christopher S. Yates -- chris.yates@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins Llp,
pro hac vice.

Six Continents Hotels, Inc., Defendant, represented by Zachary
Thomas Fardon, King & Spalding, Danielle Chattin, King & Spalding
LLP, pro hac vice, Emily Shoemaker Newton, King & Spalding LLP, pro
hac vice, Jeffrey S. Cashdan, King & Spalding & Lohr A. Beck-Kemp,
King & Spalding LLP, pro hac vice.

Marriott International Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam Glenn
Kelly, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Andrew R. DeVooght, Loeb & Loeb LLP,
Jeffrey L. Poston, Crowell & Moring LLP, pro hac vice, Luke van
Houwelingen, Crowell & Moring LLP, pro hac vice & Shari Ross
Lahlou, Crowell & Moring.

Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Defendant, represented by Paula J.
Morency, Schiff Hardin LLP, Robert J. Wierenga, Schiff Hardin Llp,
Ann H. MacDonald, Schiff Hardin LLP & Michael K. Molzberger, Schiff
Hardin.

Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc., Defendant, represented by
Carrie C. Mahan, Weil, Gotshal & Manges Llp, Brian E. Cohen, Novack
and Macey LLP & Stephen J. Siegel, Novack and Macey LLP.


I PLAY INC: Figueroa Files ADA Class Action in NY
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against I Play, Inc. The case
is styled as Jose Figueroa on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. I Play, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03013 (S.D. N.Y., April 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

I play., Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells natural baby
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


IDAVM GROUP: Bid for Class Certification in Garcia Suit Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Andres Garcia, et al., the Plaintiff, vs. IDAVM Group Enterprises,
Inc., et al., the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03525 (N.D. Ill.),
the Hon. Judge Robert M. Dow Jr. entered an order stricking
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification as superseded, according
to the docket entry made by the Clerk on March 30, 2019.[CC]

IMPERIAL INDUSTRIAL: Fahel Sues Over False "Discounting" Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------------
Raed Fahel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Imperial Industrial Supply Co., Defendants,
Case No. 19-cv-00368, (C.D. Cal., February 26, 2019), seeks redress
for violations of California's Unfair Competition Laws, Business
and Professions Code, False Advertising Laws and Consumer Legal
Remedies Act.

Imperial Industrial Supply operates the commercial website
FACTORYAUTHORIZEDOUTLET.COM. Carrigan claims that the discounts on
merchandise sold through its site are phantom discounts where a
fake regular, original, and/or former reference price is offered at
a "discounted" price, creating an artifical price disparity that
misleads consumers into believing they are receiving a good deal
and induces them into making a purchase.

Fahel purchased a heavy duty DeWalt drill kit from Defendant's site
at $63.28 "sale" price during a purported limited-time "sale
period." However, said product was never offered for sale at the
reference price listed on the price tag within the 90 days
preceding Fahel's purchase, thus giving a false reference price
discount, asserts the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
      Alyshia K. Lord, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 762-1910
      Fax: (619) 756-6991
      Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
             alord@carlsonlynch.com


INOV-8 LLC: Violates ADA, Figueroa Suit Asserts
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Inov-8, LLC. The case
is styled as Jose Figueroa on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Inov-8, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-03012 (S.D. N.Y., Apr. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

iNoV8, LLC engages in developing and licensing new products and
technologies to various companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


INOVALON HOLDINGS: July 12 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Inovalon Securities Settlement:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

YI XIANG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiff,

vs.

INOVALON HOLDINGS, INC., KEITH R. DUNLEAVY, THOMAS R. KLOSTER,
DENISE K. FLETCHER, ANDR‰ S. HOFFMANN, LEE D. ROBERTS, WILLIAM J.
TEUBER JR., GOLDMAN SACHS & CO., MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC,
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &
SMITH, INCORPORATED and UBS SECURITIES LLC,

Defendants.

TO: ALL PERSONS AND ENTITIES THAT PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED
ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 5, 2015, INOVALON HOLDINGS, INC. (INOVALON)
COMMON STOCK (CLASS OR CLASS MEMBERS)

THIS NOTICE WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT. IT IS NOT A LAWYER
SOLICITATION. PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS
ENTIRETY.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a hearing will be held on July 12,
2019, at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Victor Marrero at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street,
New York, NY 10007, to determine whether: (1) the proposed
settlement (the Settlement) of the above-captioned action as set
forth in the Stipulation of Settlement (Stipulation)1 for
$17,000,000 in cash should be approved by the Court as fair,
reasonable and adequate; (2) the Judgment as provided under the
Stipulation should be entered dismissing the Litigation with
prejudice; (3) to award Lead Plaintiffs Counsel attorneys fees and
expenses out of the Settlement Fund (as defined in the Notice of
Proposed Settlement of Class Action (Notice), which is discussed
below) and, if so, in what amount; (4) to make an award to Lead
Plaintiff in connection with its representation of the Class out of
the Settlement Fund and, if so, in what amount; and (5) the Plan of
Allocation should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and
adequate.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED INOVALON COMMON STOCK ON OR BEFORE
AUGUST 5, 2015, YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF
THIS LITIGATION.

To share in the distribution of the Settlement Fund, you must
establish your rights by submitting a Proof of Claim and Release
form (Proof of Claim) by mail (postmarked no later than July 30,
2019) or electronically (no later than July 30, 2019). Your failure
to submit your Proof of Claim by July 30, 2019, will subject your
claim to rejection and preclude your receiving any of the recovery
in connection with the Settlement of this Litigation. If you are a
Member of the Class and do not request exclusion therefrom, you
will be bound by the Settlement and any judgment and release
entered in the Litigation, including, but not limited to, the
Judgment, whether or not you submit a Proof of Claim.

If you have not received a copy of the Notice, which more
completely describes the Settlement and your rights thereunder
(including your right to object to the Settlement), and a Proof of
Claim, you may obtain these documents, as well as a copy of the
Stipulation (which, among other things, contains definitions for
the defined terms used in this Summary Notice) and other settlement
documents, online at www.InovalonSecuritiesSettlement.com, or by
writing to:

Inovalon Securities Settlement c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC P.O. Box
404112 Louisville, KY 40233-4112

Inquiries should NOT be directed to Defendants, the Court, or the
Clerk of the Court.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice or for a Proof of
Claim, may be made to Lead Plaintiffs Counsel:

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP Ellen Gusikoff Stewart 655 West
Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 800/449-4900

IF YOU DESIRE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS, YOU MUST SUBMIT A
REQUEST FOR EXCLUSION SUCH THAT IT IS POSTMARKED BY JUNE 21, 2019,
IN THE MANNER AND FORM EXPLAINED IN THE NOTICE. ALL MEMBERS OF THE
CLASS WHO HAVE NOT REQUESTED EXCLUSION FROM THE CLASS WILL BE BOUND
BY THE SETTLEMENT EVEN IF THEY DO NOT SUBMIT A TIMELY PROOF OF
CLAIM.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE
SETTLEMENT, THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION, THE REQUEST BY LEAD PLAINTIFFS
COUNSEL FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES NOT TO EXCEED 30% OF THE
$17,000,000 SETTLEMENT AMOUNT AND EXPENSES NOT TO EXCEED $850,000,
AND/OR THE PAYMENT TO LEAD PLAINTIFF IN CONNECTION WITH ITS
REPRESENTATION OF THE CLASS NOT TO EXCEED $25,000. ANY OBJECTIONS
MUST BE FILED WITH THE COURT AND SENT TO LEAD COUNSEL AND
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL BY JUNE 21, 2019, IN THE MANNER AND FORM
EXPLAINED IN THE NOTICE.

DATED: March 11, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

The Stipulation can be viewed and/or obtained at
www.InovalonSecuritiesSettlement.com


JBS SA: July 18 Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EDMUND MURPHY III, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

JBS S.A.,

Defendant.

Case No.:  1:17-cv-03084-ILG-RER
Hon. Judge I. Leo Glasser
Hon. Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF:
(1) PENDENCY AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF
CLASS ACTION AND (2) HEARING ON PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

TO:         ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED
AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS ISSUED FOR JBS S.A. SHARES DURING THE
PERIOD FROM JUNE 1, 2013 THROUGH JULY 5, 2017, INCLUSIVE (THE
"CLASS PERIOD").

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above-captioned action has been
certified as a class action for settlement purposes and that the
Lead Plaintiff has reached a proposed settlement with JBS S.A.
("JBS") to resolve all claims in the case for a payment of
$5,466,600 for the benefit of the Class, a payment of $400,000 to
cover certain of the expenses associated with implementing and
administering the Settlement and/or additional Class payments, and
a waiver of payment of any mediation fees and expenses arising out
of mediation that occurred before the Settlement Agreement was
executed.

The settlement Class consists of all persons and entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired American Depositary Receipts
("ADRs") issued for JBS shares during the Class Period (the
"Relevant Securities"), with certain exceptions for persons and
entities affiliated with JBS or persons or entities who settled
Released Class Claims with JBS.

A hearing will be held on July 18, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. ET, before
United States District Judge I. Leo Glasser, at the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, located at 225
Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York 11201, to determine whether
the Court should approve the proposed settlement as fair,
reasonable and adequate, and whether the Court should grant Lead
Counsel's application for attorneys' fees and expenses in an amount
not to exceed $1,966,666.67 and reimbursement of expenses in an
amount not to exceed $50,000, and an incentive award to Lead
Plaintiff in an amount not to exceed $35,000. The Court may change
the date of the hearing without further notice to the Class. If you
intend to attend the hearing, you should confirm the date and time
with Class Counsel or by checking the Settlement website.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THIS
SETTLEMENT, AND YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE SETTLEMENT
MONEY.

If you have not yet received the full notice of the proposed
settlement (the "Notice"), you may obtain it by requesting a copy
(i) by mail, to JBS Securities Litigation, Claims Administrator,
c/o A.B. Data, Ltd., P.O. Box 173067, Milwaukee, WI 53217, (ii) by
telephone, at 800-949-1484, or (iii) by email, at
info@JBSADRSettlement.com. You may also download the Notice from
the following website: www.JBSADRSettlement.com.

To participate in the settlement, you must submit a Claim Form. You
may download the Claim Form from www.JBSADRSettlement.com, or you
may contact the Claims Administrator to request a Claim Form and to
be added to the mailing list. Completed Claim Forms must be
postmarked or received by July 8, 2019, at the Claims
Administrator's address (set out above).

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Relevant Securities during
the Class Period, you will be deemed a Class Member unless you ask
to be excluded from the Class. Any requests for exclusion must be
mailed to the Claims Administrator's address (set out above) and
postmarked or received by the Claims Administrator by June 6, 2019.
The exclusion request must include the following information: (i)
name, (ii) address, (iii) telephone number, (iv) email address, if
available, (v) a statement that the potential Class Member wishes
to request exclusion from the Class in Murphy v. JBS S.A., Case
No.: 1:17-cv-03084-ILG-RER, (vi) the number of Relevant Securities
purchased or otherwise acquired or sold during the Class Period,
(vii) price(s) paid or value at receipt, and, if sold, the sales
price(s), (viii) the date of each transaction involving such
Relevant Securities, (ix) account statements verifying all such
transactions and the number of Relevant Securities still held (if
any) and (x) the reason(s) why the Class Member is requesting
exclusion.

You will be bound by any judgment rendered in the class action
unless you timely request exclusion from the Class as explained in
the Notice, even if you have pending or later file another lawsuit,
arbitration, or other proceeding relating to the claims covered by
this Settlement. If you submit a valid and timely request for
exclusion, you cannot share in the Settlement money, cannot object
to the Settlement and will not be bound by the Settlement or the
Court's rulings.

The Notice also describes how you may object to any aspect of the
Settlement, including the Plan of Allocation, the request for
attorneys' fees and expenses and/or the request for an incentive
award for Lead Plaintiff. All objections must be postmarked or
received by the Court (at the address set out above) and the
lawyers listed below no later than June 6, 2019:

Class Counsel
Nicholas I. Porritt
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
55 Broadway 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
Telephone:  212-363-7500        
Facsimile:   212-363-7171
nporritt@zlk.com

JBS's Counsel
Ralph C. Ferrara, Esq.
Proskauer Rose LLP
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.       
Suite 600 South
Washington, DC  20004
Telephone:  202-416-6800
Facsimile:   202-416-6899
rferrara@proskauer.com

Inquiries, other than requests for copies of the Notice or for
inclusion in the mailing list for future notices, may be directed
to Lead Counsel for the Class. Please do not contact the Court with
your inquiries.

Dated: March 29, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT


JUST ENERGY: 2nd Bid to Decertify Class in Wilkins Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Levonna Wilkins, on Behalf of Herself and All Other
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Just Energy Group Inc., Just
Energy Illinois Corp., Commerce Energy, Inc., and Just Energy
Marketing Corp., Defendants, Case No. 13-CV-5806 (N.D. Ill.), Judge
Joan B. Gottschall of the U.S.  District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied both the Defendants'
(i) second motion to decertify the class, and (ii) motion to
reconsider entry of summary judgment.

In the certified class action, Plaintiff Wilkins claims that the
Defendants misclassified her and the class members as independent
contractors and outside salespersons in violation of the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL").  Following years of discovery, the
Defendants have filed two motions seeking reconsideration of
portions of the Court's March 13, 2015, opinion, Wilkins v. Just
Energy Grp., Inc. ("Wilkins I"), modified in part on
reconsideration ("Wilkins II"), further reconsideration denied
("Wilkins III").  The first motion asks the Court to decertify the
class.  The second, filed approximately five months later, asks the
Court to reconsider the denial of summary judgment in light of
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, and Flood v. Just Energy Mktg.
Corp.

Defendant Just Energy Group hires individuals to go door-to-door on
behalf of affiliated entities.  The primary objective of these
workers is to convince prospects to sign up for Just Energy
Illinois' Natural Gas RateFlex and Just Green programs.  The
customer enrollment process worked as follows.  First the prospect
signed a RateFlex customer agreement and written disclosures
presented by the "door-to-door worker."  The worker then would call
a third-party verifier, using the prospect's phone, and the
verifier, who was not allowed to explain the program, confirmed
that the customer agreed to switch to Just Energy Group.

In the field, door-to-door workers generally wore apparel with
"Just Energy" logos, though the record was not entirely clear on
whether Illinois law required them to wear more than a Just Energy
badge.  A crew coordinator employed by Just Energy Illinois decided
where Wilkins would work and what time she would go home, and
transported Wilkins and other door-to-door workers to and from
their daily work locations in a van.

Wilkins received two days of initial training and further
opportunities to hone her abilities to "close the deal" through
roleplaying.  Workers such as Wilkins were paid commissions based
on how many customers they enrolled, for what services, and on how
long the customer remained enrolled.  They did not receive
commissions for cancelled applications, however.  

Cancellations could occur for a variety of reasons beyond the
worker's control, including cancellation by Just Energy, which
reserved the right to cancel applications at its discretion.  Just
Energy took the position at summary judgment that it generally
cancelled agreements for a specific reason, "such as poor credit."
Summary judgment evidence showed that the Westmont office, out of
which Wilkins was based, had an 8.33% discretionary cancellation
rate in 2012 and a 5.13% discretionary cancellation rate in 2013.

The Defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied because
there were genuine factual disputes material to whether Wilkins
qualified for the IMWL's exemption for an "outside salesperson."
The court also certified a class over numerous objections from the
Defendants.

The Defendants' motion marks the second time they have sought
reconsideration of summary judgment and class certification.  The
Court has the inherent authority to reconsider its interlocutory
orders because such orders may be revised at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.  A motion to
reconsider an interlocutory order serves a limited purpose in
federal litigation; it is not a vehicle to rehash an argument the
Court has already rejected or to present legal arguments that were
not presented earlier.  Rather, a motion to reconsider allows a
party to direct the Court's attention to manifest errors of fact or
law, a significant change in the law or facts, the Court's
misunderstanding of a party's argument, or party's contention that
the Court ruled on an issue that was not properly before it.

The Defendants urge the Court, in the name of "judicial economy,"
to stay their motion to decertify and first decide whether Encino
Motorcars and Flood require entry of summary judgment in their
favor.  By separate order, the Court raised the possibility that
sequencing rulings in this way was at odds with the principles
undergirding the rule against one-way intervention.  It gave the
Plaintiff an opportunity to brief this and other issues raised by
the motion to reconsider.  The Plaintiff filed her response in
which she states that she agrees that the Court should decide the
motion to reconsider summary judgment first.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has waived any objection to deciding the motion to
reconsider before the motion for class certification.

Judge Gottschall finds that Encino Motorcars' principle for
construing FLSA exemptions does not by itself warrant
reconsideration.  Turning to Flood's FLSA analysis, she finds that
it continues to be distinguishable on the facts.  Some of the
genuine factual disputes in the instant case involve questions left
open in Flood.  Notably, the district court in Flood distinguished
Wilkins I without extensive discussion.  Because the fact issues
that precluded summary judgment implicate questions conceded by the
litigants or not argued in Flood, after careful consideration, the
Judge does not believe Flood demonstrates the manifest error
required for reconsideration.  

The Defendants' motion to decertify the class dovetails with their
"outside salesperson" exemption arguments made in their motion to
reconsider the entry of summary judgment.  In an analysis informed
by Encino Motorcars and Flood, they maintain that the testimony of
10 class members expected to be called at trial demonstrates that
common issues do not predominate.  Finally, the Defendants urge the
Court, in the alternative, to decertify the damages class because
the parties have agreed to bifurcate the trial into a liability
phase followed by a damages phase, if any.

The Plaintiffs respond that the differences in testimony are
immaterial and that the relevant issues remain susceptible to
common proof at trial.  They argue that decertification of a
damages class is premature.  Judge Gottschall agrees.  She holds
that neither Encino Motorcars nor Flood alters the elements of the
exemption or the independent contractor defense considered at class
certification.  Consequently, neither case requires
decertification.

The Defendants next highlight several differences in the testimony
of the 10 class members likely to be called at trial.  The Judge
finds that (i) whether the class members here describe their duties
as registering people, sparking curiosity, or selling services,
there is no indication that they diverge on what they did,
functionally, on a day-to-day basis such that common questions do
not predominate; (ii) the class member testimony to which
Defendants point does not change the Court's conclusions on whether
common questions predominate regarding post-flow cancellation
rates; (iii) the Defendants have not tied their three or four
examples of the variations in the practices in various Just Energy
offices the Court considered in 2015 to anything systemic; (iv) the
Defendants' failure to cite authority or develop a typicality
argument in any depth waives the issue; and (v) she continues to
believe that decertification of the class as to damages would be
premature.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Gottschall denied the Defendants'
second motion to decertify the class, and motion to reconsider
entry of summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/UMfTsV from Leagle.com.

Levonna Wilkins, on behalf of HERSELF and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Nicole T. Fiorelli --
nfiorelli@dowrkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.p.a.,
Terrence Buehler, The Law Office of Terrence Buehler,Frank Bartela
-- fbartela@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein, Co., L.p.a.,
James A. Deroche, Seaman Garson, L.l.c., Patrick J. Perotti --
pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.p.a. &
Richard N Selby -- rselby@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein
Co., L.p.a..

Just Energy Group, Inc., a Foreign corporation, Just Energy
Illinois Corp. & Commerce Energy, Inc., Foreign corporations,
Defendants, represented by Amanda Elaine Inskeep --
ainskeep@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Bradley A. Sherman
-- bradley@shermanboseman.com -- Sherman Boseman Legal Group, LLC,
Catherine Sarah Lindemann -- clindemann@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.c., Jennifer L. Schilling -- jschilling@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Shannon Kathleen Patton --
spatton@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice.

Just Energy Marketing Corp., Defendant, represented by Shannon
Kathleen Patton, Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice, Bradley A.
Sherman, Sherman Boseman Legal Group, LLC & Catherine Sarah
Lindemann, Littler Mendelson, P.c.


KINDERCARE LEARNING: Sirousian Remanded to Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, remanded the case, NASTARAN
SIROUSIAN, Plaintiff, v. KINDERCARE LEARNING CENTERS LLC, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00072-TSZ (W.D.
Wash.), to the Superior Court for King County in the State of
Washington.

The Plaintiff commenced the action on Oct. 30, 2018, by filing,
along with three other named Plaintiffs who are no longer parties,
a Class Action Complaint in King County Superior Court, captioned
Sirousian v. KinderCare Learning Centers, LLC, Case No.
18-2-27341-2 SEA.  The Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint was
served on the Defendant on Oct. 31, 2018.

On Nov. 20, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the
State Court Action, on behalf of herself only.  The Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint was served on Defendant on Nov. 26, 2018.

On Jan. 15, 2018, the Defendant filed a Notice of Removal of the
State Court Action to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
1332, based on diversity jurisdiction, attaching the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint in the State Court Action.

In its Minute Order of Feb. 14, 2019, the Court instructed the
Defendant to submit an amended corporate disclosure statement
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1, identifying each of the members
or owners of each of the five foreign partnerships and two Delaware
partnerships that are members of its parent LLC (KC Parent, LLC);
and identify the citizenship of each member or owner of the Seven
Members.  In light of the fact that some members or owners of the
Seven Members are themselves partnerships or LLCs, identifying the
citizenship of these members or owners would necessitate
additional, expanding layers of disclosure, extending to entities
and persons with no connection to this litigation.  As a result,
the Defendant has been unable to determine with certainty the
citizenship of all members or owners of each of the Seven Members
of its parent LLC.

On March 8, 2018, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation to Remand
Removed Action. The parties have agreed and stipulate that the case
should be remanded to King County Superior Court.  

Having reviewed that stipulation, and finding good cause, Judge
Zilly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sectin 1447(c), remanded all further
proceedings in the action, captioned Sirousian v. KinderCare
Learning Centers, LLC, Western District of Washington, Case No.
2:19-cv-00072-TSZ, to the Superior Court for King County in the
State of Washington, without fees or costs to either party.

The Clerk of the Court will send copies of the Order to all the
counsel of record for all parties.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1447(c), the Clerk of the Court will mail a certified copy of the
Order to the Clerk of the Court for King County Superior Court.
The Clerk of the Court will also transmit the record to the Clerk
of the Court for King County Superior Court.

The parties will file nothing further in the matter, and are
instead instructed to seek any further relief to which they believe
they are entitled from the courts of the State of Washington, as
may be appropriate in due course.  The Clerk of the Court will
close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Z6DWp3 from Leagle.com.

Nastaran Sirousian, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Lynn Taren --
jeffreyt@mhb.com -- MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Jordan A. Taren --
lawhelp@shishidotaren.com -- SHISHIDO TAREN PLLC, Katherine C.
Chamberlain -- katherinec@mhb.com -- MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS &
Robin J. Shishido, SHISHIDO TAREN PLLC.

Kindercare Learning Centers LLC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by John S. Devlin, III -- devlinj@lanepowell.com --
LANE POWELL PC & Taylor Washburn -- washburnt@lanepowell.com --
LANE POWELL PC.


KING GEORGE J&J: Denied Workers Breaks, Overtime Pay, Tips, Refunds
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Arturo S. Biag, in a Representative capacity, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated v. King
George J&J Worldwide Services, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
37-2019-00008239 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., February 13,
2019), seeks redress for Defendant's failure to provide required
meal/rest periods, overtime and minimum wages, and all wages due to
discharged and quitting employees; failure to maintain and furnish
accurate itemized wage statements; and failure to indemnify
employees for necessary expenditures incurred in discharge of
duties and improper retention of gratuities or tip-pooling under
California's Unfair Competition Law, California Labor Code and
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

Biag was employed by Defendant from December 2016 through May of
2018. Throughout his employment, he claims to be denied the
benefits and protections of non-exempt employees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Sullivan, Esq.
      Eric K. Yaeckel, Esq.
      Ryan T. Kuhn, Esq.
      SULLIVAN LAW GROUP, APC
      2330 Third Avenue
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 702-6760
      Fax: (619) 702-6761
      Email: helen@sullivanlawgroupapc.com
             yaeckel@sullivanlawgroupapc.com
             ryan@sullivanlawgroupapc.com


L'OREAL: Sells Illegal, Misbranded Skin Care Products, Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nataliya Borchenko, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01427 (C.D. Cal., February 26, 2019),
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the further
unlawful sale of illegal and misbranded drugs, and a full refund of
the purchase price and recovery of the premium paid for such
products pursuant to California's Unfair Competition Law.

L'Oreal USA manufactured, marketed, sold, and distributed several
skin care products under its Revitalift(R) line which claims to be
"anti-wrinkle" treatments. Borchenko asserts that these products
are cosmetics that are marketed as skin structure altering drugs
and do not have approval from the Food and Drug Administration
through the New Drug Application process. [BN]

Arroyo is represented by:

     Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
     Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
     BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
     600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Telephone: (619) 798-4593
     Email: psyverson@bffb.com
            mmuecke@bffb.com

            - and -

     Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
     Carrie A. Laliberte, Esq.
     BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
     2325 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 300
     Phoenix, AZ 85016
     Telephone: (602) 274-1100
     Email: eryan@bffb.com
            claliberte@bffb.com


LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE: Russell Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, JAMES RUSSELL, Plaintiff, vs. EMBRAY EUGENE HALL and
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO., Defendants, Case 3:19-cv-00874-S
(Filed Feb. 9, 2019) was transferred from the 101st Judicial
District Court of Dallas County, Texas to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.
Removal is based on diversity jurisdiction because there is
complete diversity between Plaintiff James Russell and Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. In the
complaint, Russell alleges claims against Liberty for breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
insurance code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, and
declaratory relief with regard to his alleged entitlement to
uninsured motorist benefits.

Based in Stitzer, Wisconsin, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
offers insurance products for farms, homes, renters, vacant
property, and for rental and seasonal dwellings. Liberty asserts
that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Wisconsin, with its principal place of business in Massachusetts.
[BN]

Attorneys for Defendant:

    Mark D. Tillman, Esq.
    Elizabeth D. Knight, Esq.
    TILLMAN BATCHELOR, LLP
    5605 N. MacArthur Blvd., Suite 560
    Irving, TX 75038
    Telephone: (214) 492-5720
    Facsimile: (214) 492-5721
    E-mail: mark.tillman@tb-llp.com
            elizabeth.knight@tb-llp.com


LOWE'S COMPANIES: Dugo Files Consumer Credit Suit in Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lowe's Companies,
Inc. The case is styled as Daniel Dugo, Jr. Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Lowe's
Companies, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00645 (C.D. Cal., Apr.
4, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Consumer Credit.

Lowe's Companies, Inc., doing business as Lowe's, is an American
retail company specializing in home improvement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew M Loker, Esq.
     Kazerouni Law Group APC
     1303 East Grand Avenue Suite 101
     Arroyo Grande, CA 93420
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Fax: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ml@kazlg.com


MAHLE BEHR: U.S. Supreme Court Denies Petition for Certiorari
-------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara Grzincic, writing for Reuters, reports that the U.S.
Supreme Court on March 18 let stand a ruling that allows hundreds
of Ohio residents to proceed as an "issues" class in their
decade-old groundwater-pollution lawsuit against an
automotive-parts manufacturer and a nearby drycleaning operation,
even though the plaintiffs do not have enough in common to
establish liability as a class.

The justices denied without comment a petition for certiorari by
Michigan-based MAHLE Behr USA and its subsidiary, MAHLE Behr
Dayton; Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel Inc; and Old Carco,
formerly known as Chrysler LLC, which manufactured engine heating
and cooling systems on the Behr Dayton site from 1937 until 2002.
[GN]




MCR INVESTORS: Lopez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MCR Investors LLC.
The case is styled as Victor Lopez, On Behalf of Himself And All
Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. MCR Investors LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03125 (S.D. N.Y., Apr. 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

MCR Development LLC operates as a hotel developer. The Company
focuses on hotel acquisition, development, and management
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


MDL 2741: Doty vs Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled BRUCE D. DOTY and WENDY DOTY, the
Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00248 (Filed Feb. 19, 2019), was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on March 29, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-01566-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Doty case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiff alleges that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Megan Myers Arvola, Esq.
          GORI JULIAN
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  marvola@gorijulianlaw.com

MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL: Faces Class Action Over Buyback Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
Montreal Gazette reports that a Montreal law firm is seeking
authorization for a class action suit on behalf of Quebec consumers
who were charged fees by seven leasing companies when they
exercised the "buyback" clause for their vehicles, arguing the fees
were not precisely indicated in their contracts.

The leasing companies and types of vehicles targeted by the suit,
filed by LPC Avocats, are: Mercedes-Benz Financial Services Canada
Corporation (Mercedes-Benz, Smart and Daimler); GM Financial Canada
Leasing Ltd. (Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, General Motors and GMC);
SCI Lease Corp. (Alfa Romeo, Chrysler, Dodge, Fiat, Jeep and Ram);
Compagnie de Gestion Canadian Road / Ford Credit Canada Leasing
(Ford and Lincoln); Honda Canada Finance Inc. (Acura and Honda);
Toyota Credit Canada Inc. (Lexus, Scion and Subaru) and Canadian
Dealer Lease Services Inc. (Hyundai, Jaguar, Kia, Land Rover,
Maserati, Mazda and Volvo).

The suit notes that at least three other leasing companies not
targeted by the suit and dealing respectively in Audis, Nissans and
BMWs "specifically provide for and disclose the fees that consumers
must pay in order to exercise their option to purchase upon lease
termination."

The suit contends that not to do so is a violation on Quebec's
Consumer Protection Act, which calls for all charges claimed from a
consumer to be clearly indicated in a contract and obliges the
leasing companies targeted by the suit to "mention an important
fact in any representation made to a consumer."

The suit contends that consumers who would be part of the action
"have lost millions of dollars due to Defendants' failure and
omission to disclose the fees that are eventually charged to
consumers who wish to exercise their option to purchase their
vehicles at the end of the lease."

The class action would cover "all consumers who had a vehicle lease
agreement with any of the Defendants and, since March 14, 2016,
paid a fee to exercise their option to purchase their vehicle
("buyback") at the end of their lease which was not disclosed in
their lease."

More details on the class action can be obtained at LPC Avocats.
[GN]


MICHIGAN: Ross, et al. Seek to Certify Class of Pre-Trial Detainees
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit DAVONTAE ROSS, et al., the Plaintiffs,
vs. NANCY M. BLOUNT, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-11076-LJM-EAS (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court
for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all pre-trial detainees whose bail is set at arraignments
in
      the 36th District Court and who, as a result of the policies

      and practices followed by Defendants when setting bail, face

      detention because they are unable to pay imposed secured cash

      bail conditions"; and

   2. appointing Plaintiffs' attorneys as class counsel.

The lawsuit challenges Michigan's 36th District Court's
unconstitutional policy and practice of setting unaffordable cash
bail for persons accused of crimes in Detroit, the lawsuit says.

Bail is set by magistrates during video arraignments that typically
last only a few minutes and do not include any of the following:

   (1) the opportunity to be heard, such as the ability to present
       or rebut evidence, on bail;

   (2) an assessment or findings of the arrestees’ ability to
pay;

   (3) the assistance of counsel;

   (4) individualized findings, by clear and convincing evidence,
       whether the arrestees present an unmanageable flight risk or

       an identified and articulable danger to the public; or

   (5) any finding that non-financial conditions of release would
       not sufficiently reduce any risk of flight or danger to the

       public.

The result is that the 36th District Court routinely locks
pre-trial arrestees in jail simply because they cannot afford to
buy their release while similarly situated arrestees with the means
to pay are able to go free until trial.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Philip Mayor, Esq.
          Daniel S. Korobkin, Esq.
          Michael J. Steinberg, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND
             OF MICHIGAN
          2966 Woodward Ave.
          Detroit, MI 48201
          Telephone: (313) 578-6803
          E-mail: pmayor@aclumich.org
                  dkorobkin@aclumich.org
                  msteinberg@aclumich.org

               - and -

          Twyla Carter, Esq.
          Brandon J. Buskey, Esq
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION,
             CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT
          125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 549-2500
          E-mail: tcarter@aclu.org
          bbuskey@aclu.org

               - and -

          Aaron Lewis, Esq.
          Mitchell Kamin, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          1999 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-4643
          Telephone: (424) 332-4800
          E-mail: alewis@cov.com
                  mkamin@cov.com

               - and -

          James Garland, Esq.
          Amia Trigg, Esq.
          Wesley Wintermyer, Esq.
          Marta Cook, Esq.
          Julia Brower, Esq.
          Laura Beth Cohen, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          One CityCenter
          850 Tenth Street NW
          Washington, DC 20001-4656
          Telephone: (202) 662-6000
          E-mail: jgarland@cov.com
                  atrigg@cov.com
                  wwintermyer@cov.com
                  mcook@cov.com
                  jbrower@cov.com
                  lcohen@cov.com

MIDLAND CREDIT: Can't Compel Arbitration in Lance FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACOB LANCE, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC., et al,
Civil Action No. 18-4933 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Mark A. Kearney of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
Midland's motion to compel individual arbitration.

Plaintiff Lance opened a CareCredit Card account with Synchrony
Bank on Dec. 12, 2016.  Mr. Lance used the account for purchases
but did not make payments.  He alleges the account is a debt
incurred for personal, family or household purposes.

Plaintiff Lance signed a credit card account agreement with
Synchrony Bank.  The agreement included a mandatory arbitration
clause and class action waiver.  Mr. Lance also agreed the bank
could sell its rights or duties under the agreement or the
"account", including rights to payments.   Mr. Lance defaulted on
his payments. The bank sold "accounts" (including Mr. Lance's
account) to Midland Funding LLC. The bank did not specifically sell
its "rights or duties" to Midland Funding.  Upon obtaining the
accounts, including rights to payments, Midland Funding's agent
sent Mr. Lance a letter seeking to collect the credit card debt.

Mr. Lance now sues Midland Funding and its agent claiming the
collection letter violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.


Midland moves to compel individual arbitration arguing (1) the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") mandates enforcement of the
arbitration clause; (2) the arbitration clause is valid and
enforceable; (3) Mr. Lance's claims are within the scope of the
arbitration clause; (4) the arbitration clause extends to Midland
Funding as the assignee of the Agreement; and (5) Mr. Lance must
arbitrate his claims individually because he waived his right to a
class action.

Mr. Lance does not contest the validity of the arbitration clause
and class waiver clause in the Agreement with Synchrony Bank.  He
is not disputing Midland's right to seek payment.  He instead
argues Midland cannot enforce the arbitration and class waiver
clauses because the assignment involved only the Account and the
right to collect, not the rights to enforce arbitration.  If the
Court disagrees with him, he argues his claims are outside the
scope of the clause.

Judge Kearney disagrees with Mr. Lance in part.  The Judge finds
that the Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his disputes with the bank
or whomever the bank sold its rights.  But the Court has no basis
to find, as a matter of contract law, the bank sold its rights to
arbitrate.  It sold accounts.  Absent evidence it also sold the
rights to arbitrate, Midland may not compel arbitration.

The Judge finds that Midland fails to provide the Court with law
(including which law may apply) or evidence which could allow it to
find it purchased the right to compel arbitration.  After review of
the presently undisputed facts, the Judge holds Synchrony Bank did
not assign the right to arbitrate to Midland Funding subject to
further argument and possible evidence clarifying possible
ambiguity in the use of the term "account" in the assignment.

The Judge concludes that Mr. Lance admittedly agreed Synchrony Bank
could sell all of its "rights and duties" and his account.  Mr.
Lance admittedly agreed to arbitrate a dispute with Synchrony Bank
and, if Synchrony Bank sold all of its "rights", to arbitrate a
dispute with the purchaser of this right.  But the Court has no
basis today to find Synchrony Bank sold its "rights", including the
right to arbitrate, when it sold its "Accounts" to Midland Funding
in a Bill of Sale.

The Judge holds he is not reviewing a question of whether Mr. Lance
agreed to arbitrate.  He is instead reviewing whether Synchrony
Bank's assignment of its "Accounts" includes the separate "rights"
to arbitrate.  Midland needs to show what it purchased.  As of
today, it has not done so.  The Judge will not simply presume the
word "Accounts" includes "rights", including the right to compel
arbitration, when Synchrony Bank used both terms in describing its
ability to assign both "rights" and "Accounts."

Based on the foregoing, Judge Kearney denied Midland's motion to
compel individual arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/Me7bP1 from Leagle.com.

JACOB LANCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED CONSUMERS, Plaintiff, represented by NICHOLAS J. LINKER --
nl@zemellawllc.com -- ZEMEL LAW LLC.

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC. & MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Defendants,
represented by LAUREN M. BURNETTE -- lburnette@messerstrickler.com
-- MESSER STRICKLER LTD.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Count I of Adkins Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE ADKINS and DOUGLAS SHORT, Plaintiffs, v.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
5:17-cv-04107 (S.D. W.Va.), Judge Irene C. Berger of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Beckley
Division, denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the
Complaint.

The named Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of themselves and
a purported class of West Virginia consumers.  They named as
Defendant Midland Credit Management ("MCM").  They allege that MCM
mailed collection letters seeking to collect debt which was beyond
the statute of limitations for filing a legal action for
collection. They list various dates between April 19, 2017 and Aug.
18, 2017, but also allege that letters were sent at other times
better known to MCM. The collection letters advised the Plaintiffs
that because of the age of their debt, MCM will not sue them for it
when, at those times, MCM and the owner of the debt was legally
barred from suing to collect the debt.  

The Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") and of the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act ("WVCCPA").  They seek injunctive relief, actual
damages, statutory penalties, reimbursement of time-barred debt
collected, and attorney fees and costs.

Prior to filing their complaint, the Plaintiffs sent MCM a right to
cure notice as required by the WVCCPA.  The notice asserted that
letters sent by MCM were an attempt to collect a claim from a West
Virginia Consumer in violation of West Virginia Code Section
46A-2-128(f) by sending an initial written communication to each
such individual where the debt sought to be collected was beyond
the statute of limitations for filing a legal action for collection
without providing the disclosures required by West Virginia Code
Section 46A-2-128(f)(1) and (2).  The notice further states that
all subsequent communications with such individuals and the class
of persons they represent violate West Virginia Code Section
46A-2-127(d) as a false representation or implication of the
character, extent or amount of the claim against the consumer, or
of its status in any legal proceeding and also constitute
fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representations in violation of
W. Va. Code Section 46A-2-127 and unfair and unconscionable means
to collect a debt in violation of W.Va. Code Section 46A-2-128.
Finally, the letter alleges that all of the acts complained of are
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce in violation of
West Virginia Code Section 46A-6-104.  The The Plaintiffs attached
five sample letters, the last dated July 19, 2017.1

In their Oct. 3, 2017 complaint, the Plaintiffs proposed a class
definition of all persons with a West Virginia address who were
sent collection letters on or after June 6, 2014, by MCM where the
alleged debt sought to be collected was beyond the applicable
statute of limitations for filing a legal action for collection
when:

     a. The initial letter sent on or after June 6, 2014 did not
contain the disclosures required by the WVCCPA, West Virginia Code
Section 46A-2-128(f); or

     b. Any letter contained the words due to the age of this debt,
we will not sue you; or

     c. Any letter suggests that the claim against the consumer
could be paid in installments without advising the consumer that a
payment could re-start the expired statute of limitations and
otherwise waive a complete defense to any collection action.

On Dec. 7, 2018, the the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify
class.  Therein, they proposed the following class definition: All
persons with West Virginia addresses to whom Midland sent a debt
collection letter on or after July 4, 2017 seeking to collect debt
that Midland's records indicated had passed its statute of
limitations, which letter failed to provide the following
disclosure: The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt.
Because of the age of your debt, Midland cannot sue you for it.

MCM filed its motion to dismiss on Dec. 21, 2018.  MCM argues that
the Plaintiffs' notice and cure letter is inadequate in light of
their current proposed class.  It argues that the notice did not
sufficiently identify the claim that MCM's debt collection letters
sent after July 4, 2017 failed to comply with the amendment to the
WVCCPA that became effective on that date.  It further contends
that failure to comply with the notice requirement contained in the
WVCCPA deprives the Court of jurisdiction.

Judge Berger finds that the pre-suit notice requirement is not
jurisdictional in nature.  Nothing in the language of W.Va. Code
Section 46A-5-108(a) evinces a clear legislative intent to
establish a jurisdictional rule, contrary to similar provisions in
state law that have not been interpreted as jurisdictional
requirements.  Thus, the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
must be denied.

Even if she construes the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), however, it would fail.  The Plaintiffs substantially
complied with the notice and right to cure provision.  Their right
to cure notice tracks the allegations contained in their complaint.
The notice letter contained sufficient information to alert MCM to
an alleged deficiency in its communication with West Virginia
consumers regarding debt outside the statute of limitations.  The
letter even specifically cited Section 46A-2-128(f), the provision
now relied upon.

Finally, because the Plaintiffs' notice of right to cure letter was
legally sufficient, the motion to dismiss must be denied on the
substance.  Where the Plaintiffs are not attempting to offer an
entirely new claim or theory of the case but instead seek to refine
the theory that they have espoused since the initiation of the
case, a change in the class definition does not require an
amendment of the complaint.

Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, Judge
Berger denied the Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Complaint.
She directed the Clerk to send a copy of the Order to the counsel
of record and to any unrepresented party.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/rVxtmg from Leagle.com.

Stephanie Adkins & Douglas Short, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
B. Frost, HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD, Jonathan R. Marshall --
jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER, Patricia M. Kipnis
-- pkipnis@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER & Steven R.
Broadwater, Jr. -- sbroadwater@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON
BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ashley
W. French, DINSMORE & SHOHL, Jason E. Manning --
jason.manning@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS & Megan Elizabeth
Burns -- megan.burns@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Dwyer Suit Moved to Eastern District of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Kaitlin Dwyer, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Midland Credit Management,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 621482/2018, was removed from the
Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Central Islip) on Mar. 29, 2019. The
Eastern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-01806 to the proceeding. The suit demands $501,000 and
alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Midland Credit Management, Inc.:

          Matthew B. Corwin, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: mcorwin@hinshawlaw.com

MIZUNO USA: Figueroa Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mizuno USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Figueroa on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Mizuno USA, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-03014 (S.D. N.Y., Apr. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Mizuno USA, Inc. manufactures and distributes golf, baseball,
softball, running, track and field, soccer, and volleyball
equipment, apparel, and footwear in North America and
internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on March 19
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Mobile TeleSystems PJSC (NYSE: MBT)
from March 19, 2014 through March 7, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Mobile
TeleSystems investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Mobile TeleSystems class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1531.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or
email pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information
on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Mobile TeleSystems
and its subsidiary were involved in a scheme to pay $420 million in
bribes in Uzbekistan; (2) consequently, Mobile TeleSystems knew or
should have known it would be forced to pay substantial fines to
the U.S. government after disclosing in 2014 that the U.S.
Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission were
investigating its Uzbekistan operations; (3) Mobile TeleSystems'
level of cooperation with the U.S. government and remediation was
lacking; (4) due to the aforementioned misconduct, Mobile
TeleSystems would be forced to pay approximately $850 million in
criminal penalties to the U.S. government; and (5) as a result,
defendants' public statements were materially false and/or
misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than May 20,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1531.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free
at 866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm
was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number
of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


NELS HEALTH: Little Seeks Overtime Pay for Home Health Aids
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, TAMMY LITTLE on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NELS HEALTH CARE LLC, and NYONUNFON
NDIKINTUM, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00237-MRB (S.D. Ohio,
March 29, 2019), challenges policies and practices of the
Defendants that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as
the Ohio overtime compensation statute.

The Defendants unlawfully failed to pay overtime compensation to
its Home Health Aids. The Defendants knew, or showed reckless
disregard for whether Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the
Ohio Class was entitled to overtime pay under state and/or federal
law.

According to the complaint, such persons are "similarly situated"
with respect to the Defendants' FLSA violations in that all were
non-exempt employees of the Defendants, all were subjected to and
injured by the Defendants' unlawful practice of failing to pay
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in one, and
all have the same claims against the Defendants for unpaid overtime
compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys' fees,
and costs.

Nels Healthcare is a provider and specialized in personal care
services to elderly, disable and special care patients.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
          Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 West Superior Avenue, Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113-2300
          Telephone: (216) 230-2955
          E-mail: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com
                  jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com

NEWTON RUNNING: Figueroa Files ADA Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Newton Running
Company, Inc. The case is styled as Jose Figueroa on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Newton
Running Company, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03018 (S.D.
N.Y., April 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Newton Running Company, Inc. offers running shoes for men and
women.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


OLIN CORP: Sued over Artificially Inflated Prices for Caustic Soda
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit seeks to recover damages and injunctive
relief arising out of the collusive and concerted restraint of
trade in sodium hydroxide, commonly known as Caustic Soda, by
various manufacturers -- all of whom are direct competitors and
leading manufacturers of Caustic Soda in the United States --
during a period spanning from at least October 1, 2015, to the
present. But for Defendants' and their co-conspirators' alleged
collusive conduct, the Plaintiff and members of the class Plaintiff
seeks to represent would not have paid -- and would not continue to
pay -- artificially inflated prices for Caustic Soda.

Caustic Soda is a commodity chemical sold in solid and liquid forms
that is produced as a co-product of chlorine production from the
electrolysis of brine or salt water. Caustic Soda is consumed by
customers in a variety of industries, including paper, pulp and
cellulose; chemical production; soaps and detergents; aluminum;
food processing; water treatment; textiles; mineral oils;
recycling; and pharmaceuticals. Defendants are estimated to control
at least 90% of the domestic supply of Caustic Soda.

The alleged conspiracy was facilitated by secret co-producer supply
agreements; by exchanges of nonpublic, commercially sensitive
information (including future strategy, supply, capacity, and price
information) between and among Defendants and their agents, both
directly with each other, and indirectly through third parties; by
manipulation of a price index; and by the characteristics of the
industry: high market concentration, high barriers to entry,
interchangeability of Defendants' products, inelastic demand, weak
demand, a larger number of purchasers with limited buying power,
and relatively easy information exchanges among the Defendants.
Defendants, as alleged, have formed a cartel and are cooperating as
an industry, having reached an agreement or understanding to limit
and manage production and supply, maintain and increase already
artificially-inflated prices, and maximize revenues to improve
industry profits, which have soared since the beginning of the
Class Period, the lawsuit says.

The case is captioned as PERRY'S ICE CREAM COMPANY, INC., On Behalf
of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
OLIN CORPORATION; K.A. STEEL CHEMICALS, INC.; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION (D/B/A OXYCHEM);
WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORPORATION; SHIN-ETSU CHEMICAL CO. LTD.;
SHINTECH INCORPORATED; FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION; and FORMOSA
PLASTICS CORPORATION, U.S.A., Case No. 1:19-cv-00403 (W.D.N.Y.,
March 26, 2019).[BN]

Attorneys for Perry's Ice Cream Company, Inc.

          R. Anthony Rupp, Esq.
          Marco Cercone, Esq.
          Arthur N. Bailey, Esq.
          RUPP BAASE PFALZGRAF CUNNINGHAM LLC
          1600 Liberty Building
          424 Main Street
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (716) 854-3400
          Facsimile: (716) 332-0336
          E-mail: rupp@ruppbaase.com
                  cercone@ruppbaase.com
                  bailey@ruppbaase.com

               - and -

          Vincent J. Esades, Esq.
          Renae D. Steiner, Esq.
          HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C.
          310 Clifton Avenue
          Minneapolis, MN 55403
          Telephone: (612) 338-4605
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4692
          E-mail: vesades@heinsmills.com
                  rsteiner@heinsmills.com

OMNICARE INC: June 27 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Omnicare Securities Settlement:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN
DIVISION at COVINGTON

INDIANA STATE DISTRICT COUNCIL OF LABORERS AND HOD CARRIERS PENSION
AND WELFARE FUND, On Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiff,   

vs.

OMNICARE, INC., et al.,   )   

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:06-cv-00026-WOB-CJS
(Consolidated)
CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE

TO:
    
ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED THE COMMON STOCK OF
OMNICARE, INC. ("OMNICARE" OR THE "COMPANY") PURSUANT AND/OR
TRACEABLE TO THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS FOR THE
COMPANY'S DECEMBER 12, 2005 PUBLIC OFFERING

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern
Division, that a hearing will be held on June 27, 2019, at 1:30
p.m., before the Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States
District Judge, at the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, Northern Division, 35 W. 5th Street,
Covington, KY 41011, for the purpose of determining: (1) whether
the proposed Settlement of the Litigation 1 for $20 million should
be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2)
whether a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice
should be entered by the Court; (3) whether the Plan of Allocation
for the Net Settlement Fund is fair, reasonable and adequate and
should be approved; and (4) whether the application of Lead Counsel
for the payment of attorneys' fees and expenses and Plaintiffs'
request for an award pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77z-1(a)(4) in
connection with their representation of the Settlement Class should
be approved.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED THE COMMON STOCK OF OMNICARE
PURSUANT AND/OR TRACEABLE TO THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND
PROSPECTUS FOR THE COMPANY'S DECEMBER 12, 2005 PUBLIC OFFERING,
YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS LITIGATION,
INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF CLAIMS YOU MAY POSSESS RELATING TO YOUR
PURCHASE OR ACQUISITION OF OMNICARE COMMON STOCK PURSUANT AND/OR
TRACEABLE TO THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS FOR THE
COMPANY'S DECEMBER 12, 2005 PUBLIC OFFERING. If you have not
received a detailed Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of
Class Action ("Notice") and a copy of the Proof of Claim and
Release form, you may obtain copies by writing to Omnicare
Securities Settlement, c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC, Claims Administrator,
P.O. Box 404113, Louisville, KY 40233-4113, or on the Internet at
www.OmnicareSecuritiesSettlement.com. If you are a Settlement Class
Member, in order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and Release by mail
(postmarkedno later than July 1, 2019) or online no later thanJuly
1, 2019, establishing that you are entitled to recovery.

If you purchased or acquired Omnicare common stock pursuant and/or
traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus for the
Company's December 12, 2005 public offering but desire to be
excluded from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion so that it is postmarked no later than June 6, 2019, in
the manner and form explained in the detailed Notice referred to
above. All members of the Settlement Class who do not timely and
validly request exclusion from the Settlement Class in the manner
set forth in the Notice will be bound by any judgment entered in
the Litigation pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement.

Any objection to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, Lead
Counsel's request for attorneys' fees and expenses, and Plaintiffs'
request for an award pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 77z-1(a)(4) in
connection with their representation of the Settlement Class must
be received by each of the following recipients no later than June
6,2019:

CLERK OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF
KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
35 W. 5th Street
Covington, KY 41011

Lead Counsel:

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP
HENRY ROSEN
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101

Counsel for Defendants:
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
JOHN E. SCHREIBER
333 S. Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE. If you have any questions about the Settlement, you
may contact Lead Counsel at the address listed above or visit the
website listed above.
            
DATED: March 21, 2019       

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION

1 Capitalized terms herein shall have the same meanings as set
forth in the Stipulation of Settlement available at the website
www.OmnicareSecuritiesSettlement.com.


PAVILION GRAND:  Violates ADA, Young Suit Asserts
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pavilion Grand
Operating LLC. The case is styled as Lawrence Young Individually
And On Behalf Of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v.
Pavilion Grand Operating LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03132
(S.D. N.Y., April 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Pavilion Grand is located in downtown Saratoga Springs and features
48 suite accommodations as well as a full service local restaurant
and a healthy living concept boutique spa.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com



PORT OF EGYPT: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Port of Egypt Marine,
Inc. The case is styled as Lawrence Young Individually And On
Behalf Of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Port
of Egypt Marine, Inc., Port of Egypt Enterprises, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-03124 (S.D. N.Y., April 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Port of Egypt Marine is the world's oldest Grady-White dealer and a
family-owned, full-service marina on the North Fork of Long Island
since 1946.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


QUEENSBURY HOTEL: Young Suit Asserts Disabilities Act Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Queensbury Hotel LLC.
The case is styled as Lawrence Young Individually And On Behalf Of
All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Queensbury Hotel
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03133 (S.D. N.Y., April 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Queensbury Hotel LLC offers 125 rooms and suites, over 12,000 sq.
ft. of event space, refined dining of Park 26 restaurant, casual
Fenimore's Pub, indoor heated pool & Jacuzzi and withing walking
distance of a dozen great dining options, breweries, shops, art and
history.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 228-9795
     Fax: (212) 982-6284
     Email: nyjg@aol.com


RUSHMORE LOAN: Time to File Responsive Pleadings in Sharma Extended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OM SHARMA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RUSHMORE LOAN
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. GJH-18-656
(D. Md.), Judge George J. Hazel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, Southern Division, (i) granted in part and
denied in part Wilmington Savings Fund Society and Rushmore's
Motions to Recover Costs and Fees and to Stay Proceedings; (ii)
denied as moot the U.S. Bank, NA's Motion to Stay Proceedings; and
(iii) granted the Defendants' Motion for an extension of time to
file responsive pleadings.

On March 5, 2018, Plaintiffs Sharma, Vaughn and Diane Riffe,
Virginia Brown, and Susan Geiselman brought the putative class
action against Rushmore, Wilmington, FSB solely as Trustee for BCAT
2014-4TT, and U.S. Bank, solely as Trustee for RMAC 2016-CTT.  The
action follows Brown's voluntary dismissal of a class action
counterclaim filed in a foreclosure action brought by Wilmington
and Rushmore against her in state court.

On Nov. 6, 2015, a foreclosure action was filed in Baltimore County
Circuit Court against Virginia Brown.  Brown and the remaining
Plaintiffs in the case responded with a class action counterclaim
against Defendants Wilmington and Rushmore on Nov. 17, 2015
alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Maryland Collection
Agency Licensing Act ("MCALA"), and the Maryland Mortgage Lender
Law ("MMLL").

In April 2016, Wilmington and Rushmore filed motions to dismiss.
The Plaintiffs responded by amending their counterclaim complaint
in June 2016.  Wilmington and Rushmore again filed motions to
dismiss in July 2016.  A hearing was scheduled for March 24, 2017.

Three days prior to that hearing, Brown filed a notice of
supplemental authority informing the Court that she had secured a
default judgment against Wilmington and Rushmore on the MCALA and
MMLL claims in November 2016 in a separate action filed in
Baltimore City Circuit Court in April 2015.   Wilmington and
Rushmore, previously unaware of the existence of the action, asked
the County Court to stay the proceedings pending a motion to vacate
in Baltimore City.  The County Court agreed, and on May 25, 2017,
the Baltimore City Court vacated the default judgment after finding
that Wilmington and Rushmore had not been properly served.

Meanwhile, Brown had filed a Second Amended Complaint in Baltimore
County Court on April 6, 2017.  On Feb. 13 and 14, 2018, Wilmington
and Rushmore filed motions to dismiss in response to the Second
Amended Complaint.  On Feb. 26, 2018, Brown voluntarily dismissed
her counterclaim.

On March 10, 2018, she and the remaining class action counter
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Court largely echoing the
claims made in her state court Second Amended Complaint.
Wilmington and Rushmore moved for an award of costs and attorneys'
fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d), and, if awarded, for the
Court to stay proceedings until the costs and fees are recovered.

Rushmore and U.S. Bank have also moved to stay proceedings pending
the determination in Blackstone v. Sharma, a MCALA case that was
pending before the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  The Court of
Appeals of Maryland issued its opinion in Blackstone v. Sharma, on
Aug. 2, 2018 and denied reconsideration on Oct. 3, 2018.

The Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Complaint in the Court
advancing new MMLL theories and abandoning the previous MCALA
theories.

Judge Hazel finds that although not explicit from the test of the
Rule, a court may also award attorneys' fees from the prior action
under Rule 41(d) when either (1) the underlying statute at issue
provides for attorneys' fees, or (2) the court finds that the
plaintiff has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.  Because the Defendants have not yet made a
showing of "extraordinary" circumstances, the Judge will not award
attorneys' fees.

As to costs however, Rule 41(d) clearly contemplates such an award
where, as in the case, the Plaintiffs have filed the same action in
the Court that they had previously dismissed.  And the Plaintiffs'
stated reason for voluntary dismissal -- impatience at the state
court's failure to rule on pending motions -- is thin.  Thus, the
Judge will, pursuant to Rule 41(d), award the Plaintiffs the costs
associated with filing their three motions to dismiss in state
court and stay the matter until such costs are paid.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Hazel (i) granted in part and denied
in part Wilmington and Rushmore's Motions to Recover Costs and Fees
and to Stay Proceedings; (ii) denied as moot U.S. Bank's Motion to
Stay Proceedings; and (iii) granted the Defendants' Motion for an
extension of time to file responsive pleadings.  A separate Order
will issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/xQoytT from Leagle.com.

Om Sharma, On Behalf of Three Classes and One Subclass of Similarly
Situated Persons, Vaughn Riffe, On Behalf of Three Classes and One
Subclass of Similarly Situated Persons, Diane Riffe, On Behalf of
Three Classes and One Subclass of Similarly Situated Persons, Susan
Geiselman, On Behalf of Three Classes and One Subclass of Similarly
Situated Persons & Virginia Brown, On Behalf of Three Classes and
One Subclass of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs, represented
by Phillip R. Robinson, Consumer Law Center LLC & Scott C. Borison
, Legg Law Firm LLP.

Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC & U.S. Bank, National
Association, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Trustee
for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, Defendants, represented by
John Curtis Lynch -- john.lynch@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders
LLP.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, doing business as Christiana
Trust, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Trustee for
BCAT 2014-4TT, Defendant, represented by Andrew Karl Stutzman --
astutzman@stradley.com -- Stradley Ronon Stevens and Young LLP &
Thomas Francis Lucchesi, III -- tlucchesi@stradley.com -- Stradley
Ronon.


SCHIFF, P.C.: Windsor Sues over Debt Collections Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
LAURENE WINDSOR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. LAW OFFICES HOWARD LEE SCHIFF, P.C.,
the Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-02817 (D. Maine, March 29, 2019),
seeks redress for Defendant's use of unfair and unconscionable
means to collect a debt, pursuant to the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act, which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in
false, deceptive or misleading practices.

According to the complaint, some time prior to May 13, 2018, an
obligation was allegedly incurred to Synchrony Bank. The Synchrony
Bank obligation arose out of a transaction in which money,
property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the
transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household
purposes.

On May 13, 2018, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the
Plaintiff a collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged
debt. The Letter stated in part: "Balance Due: $10,280.19". The
Defendant's debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed
towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA,
including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. section 1692e. Pursuant to
1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or
misleading representation in connection with the collection of a
debt. The Defendant violated the section by falsely representing
that the Plaintiff could obtain verification of the debt over the
phone in violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692e(10).

The Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's
conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual
damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys' fees, the lawsuit
says.

The Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff operates as a legal firm. The
company offers attorneys, collections, litigation, and client
services.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Terrie Harman, Esq.
          HARMAN LAW OFFICES
          129 Water Street
          P.O. Box 309
          Exeter, NH 03833
          Telephone: (603) 431-0666
          E-mail: th@tharman.net

               - and -

          Ari Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          E-mail: ari@marcuszelman.com

SCOTT & ASSOCIATES: Williams Balks at Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott & Associates, PC, Midland Funding, LLC,  Mann Bracken, LLP
and Does 1-10 have been named as defendants in a class action for
alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and
the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil
Code 1788, which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in
abusive, deceptive and unfair practices; and California Business
and Professions Code, which prohibits unfair competition, which
includes any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act. The case
is captioned SANDY M. WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT & ASSOCIATES, PC,
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, MANN BRACKEN, LLP and DOES 1 through 10
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02516 (C.D. Cal., April 3,
2019). The complaint assert that Defendants did not have prima
facie evidence to support the claims in the collections lawsuit
filed against the Plaintiff in July 2008, yet persisted with legal
action in an attempt to harass Plaintiff and compel payment of a
debt by means of abuse, harassment and coercion. Accordingly,
Plaintiff Williams seeks redress over the Defendants' unlawful and
unfair debt collection practices.

Scott & Associates, PC is a debt collection law firm located in
Carrollton, Texas. Midland Funding LLC is a creditor located in San
Diego, CA.  Mann Bracken LLC is a debt collection company based in
Concord, CA. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Amir J. Goldstein, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF AMIR J. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
     8032 West Third Street, Suite 201
     Los Angeles, CA 90048
     Telephone: (323) 937-0400
     Facsimile: (866) 288-9194
     E-mail: ajg@consumercounselgroup.com


SELENE FINANCE: New York Court Dismisses D. Werner's FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DIANA WERNER, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SELENE FINANCE, LLC, and FRIEDMAN
VARTOLO, LLP, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-06514 (NSR) (S.D. N.Y.),
Judge Nelson S. Roman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (i) denied Defendant Friedman Vartolo ("FV")'s
motion to dismiss, and (ii) granted Defendant Selene Finance, LLC's
motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Werner brings the putative class action on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section
1692, et. seq, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"),
against the Defendants asserting the following New York law claims:
(1) Breach of contract, (2) deceptive trade practices under New
York General Business Law Section 349, (3) unjust enrichment, (4)
breach of fiduciary duty, (5) misrepresentation, (6) defamation,
(7) bad faith, (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (9)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, (10) tort of outrage,
and (11) unconscionability.

On Feb. 25, 2008, the Plaintiff received a $400,000 loan from
SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., and she executed a note and mortgage on
her property at 11 Weitz Road, East Fishkill, New York as
collateral.  The Mortgage Loan was recorded on April 23, 2008.  The
Mortgage Agreement required her to make installment payments on
specified dates and to pay the entire debt to the debtholder if she
defaulted.  On Oct. 1, 2009, the Plaintiff defaulted on her
obligation to make regular payments.  Thereafter, SunTrust
commenced a mortgage foreclosure action in New York State Supreme
Court, County of Duchess.

Around October 2015, the Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant
Selene, dated Oct. 26, 2015, which indicated that it was about the
Mortgage Loan.  Specifically, the subject line of the Trial
Modification Plan Letter included the loan number and the address
for the Property, and the letter included the date and amount of
the Mortgage Loan on the next page.  In the opening sentence, the
Plaintiff is offered the enclosed Trial Modification Plan as the
first step to retain her home.  Additionally, the Trial
Modification Plan Letter specified that she must comply with all of
the terms to be considered for a modification or other permanent
assistance and that  she should return the "signed and initialed
Agreement" to Defendant Selene by Nov. 9, 2015.  However, the Trial
Modification Plan Letter appeared to propose two different payment
schedules.

On Nov. 9, 2015, the Plaintiff made an initial payment to the
Defendant in the amount of $3,573.76.  The Defendant informed her
that her payment was short because the initial payment due was
actually $5,343.82 which was the required initial payment under the
first schedule.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff sent Defendant
$1,800.07 by check dated Nov. 19, 2016, making her total payment to
that point $5,375.83.  The Plaintiff proceeded to send checks to
the Defendant, which were cashed, for the December 2015 through
April 2016 payments.  After the end of both payment schedules, the
Plaintiff submitted payments for May and June 2016, each for
$2,543.76, which were also cashed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleges that despite "receiving regular payments from
Plaintiff and depositing those checks, the Defendants accused her
of default and threatened her with foreclosure and the prospect of
losing her home.  Defendant Selene then breached the Trial
Modification Plan by reporting Plaintiff to credit reporting
agencies and partnering with Defendant FV to collect on the
Mortgage Loan.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 14, 2016, the debtholder was granted a judgment
of foreclosure and sale in the Foreclosure Action.  Around Oct. 10,
2016, Defendant FV, on behalf of Defendant Selene, attempted to
collect on the Mortgage Loan by sending the Plaintiff a letter on
Defendant FV's letterhead.  The Collection letter began with the
heading "The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act" and informed her
that Defendant FV represented Defendant Selene in connection with
the Mortgage Loan.  The letter included required disclosures under
the FDCPA and informed the Plaintiff that she was in default on her
loan.

The Plaintiff filed the instant action in state court on June 27,
2017.  On Aug. 25, 2017, Defendant Selene removed the action from
state court to federal court.  Defendant Selene filed an amended
notice of removal, adding Defendant FV who consented to the
Removal, on Aug. 30, 2017.

Presently before the Court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12
(b)(6).  Defendant FV, against whom the Plaintiff asserts a claim
for violation of the FDCPA, argues that her FDCPA claim must be
dismissed because that statute does not apply to mortgage
foreclosure proceedings and because, in the alternative, any
inaccuracies in the Collection Letter were immaterial.  Defendant
Selene, against whom she asserts claims under New York statutory
and common law, argues that the Plaintiff's claims are barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel and that, even if the Court
finds that those doctrines do not apply, the Plaintiff fails to
state any claim against Defendant Selene.

Based on the face of the Complaint, (1) there was a debt collection
action, the Collection Letter relating to the mortgage foreclosure;
(2) Defendant FV was a debt collector; and (3) Defendant FVengaged
in an act in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA.  Because the
Complaint established a facially plausible FDCPA claim against
Defendant FV, Judge Roman denied Defendant FV's motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff, according to her Complaint, accepted the
modification on Nov. 9, 2015, before the Foreclosure Judgment was
issued.  She found the Trial Modification Plan Letter to be
confusing, and she requested clarification from Defendant Selene
around Nov. 19, 2015; but she did not raise this issue to the state
court as part of the Foreclosure Action which was at that time
still pending.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff, based on the
face of the Complaint and documents of which the Court may take
judicial notice, did not satisfy the terms proposed in the Trial
Modification Plan Letter,14 the Foreclosure Action proceeded to a
Foreclosure Judgment, and she continued to be in default on her
mortgage through the events alleged in the Complaint.  Thus,
because her claims against Defendant Selene arise from the same
facts as that at issue in the Foreclosure Action and could have
been brought as part of that action, those claims are now barred by
res judicata.

Even if he did not determine that the Plaintiff's claims were
barred by res judicata, the Judge holds that they would still fail
under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff failed to state a
facially plausible claim for relief.  Among other things, he finds
that the Plaintiff fails to establish a facially plausible claim
that there was a valid contract to modify the Mortgage Loan.  

He also finds that because based on the face of the Plaintiff's
Complaint, her unjust enrichment claim is no different than her
breach of contract claim, it would be denied.  Further, although
she alleges that Defendant Selene made "numerous false
representations to her," the Plaintiff fails to claim that
Defendant Selene's allegedly deceptive acts were consumer-oriented,
and there are no facts in the Complaint to permit the Court to
reasonably infer that Defendant Selene's actions were consumer
oriented.  Finally, under the law, Defendant Selene had no
fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff, and the Complaint offers no
unusual circumstances from which the Court can infer creation of a
fiduciary relationship.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Roman (i) denied Defendant FV's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint, and (ii) granted
Defendant Selene's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs Complain.
Defendant FV is directed to file an answer by April 12, 2019, and
the Plaintiff and Defendant FV are directed to confer, complete,
and submit to the Court the attached case management plan by April
19, 2019.  The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to
terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 19 and 27 and remove Defendant
Selene from the caption.  This constitutes the Court's Opinion and
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/2tcGFo from Leagle.com.

Diana Werner, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Edward B. Geller, Edward B.
Geller, Esq., P.C.

Friedman Vartolo, LLP, Defendant, represented by Michael Philip
DeRosa -- MDerosa@FriedmanVartolo.com -- Pullman & Comley, LLC &
Oran Schwager -- oschwager@friedmanvartolo.com -- Friedman Vartolo
LLP.


SELIP & STYLIANOU: Walfish Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Selip & Stylianou,
LLP. The case is styled as Yitty Walfish on behalf of herself and
all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Selip &
Stylianou, LLP, David Cohen, Esq., Midland Funding, LLC, Encore
Capital Group, Inc., MHC Receivables, LLC, Sherman Originator III
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01967 (E.D. N.Y., April 4,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Selip & Stylianou, LLP operates as a law firm. The Firm provides
creditor's rights litigation and consulting services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
     Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
     735 Central Avenue
     Woodmere, NY 11598
     Phone: (516) 668-6945
     Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


SEVENTY SEVEN: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss K. Myers' ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHLEEN J. MYERS, on behalf of the Seventy Seven
Energy Inc. Retirement & Savings Plan and a class of similarly
situated participants of the Plan, Plaintiff, v. ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMITTEE, SEVENTY SEVEN ENERGY, INC. RETIREMENT & SAVINGS PLAN; et
al., Defendants, Case No. CIV-17-200-D (W.D. Okla.), Judge Timothy
D. DeGiusti of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma (i) granted in part the Committee Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Class Action Complaint; and (ii)
granted Defendant Principal Trust Co.'s Motion to Dismiss filed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Myers brings suit under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as a participant in the Seventy
Seven Energy Inc. Retirement & Savings Plan ("Plan"), to obtain
equitable relief and damages to which the Plan and its participants
allegedly are entitled due to the Defendants' breaches of fiduciary
duties.  The Committee Defendants are alleged to be administrators
and fiduciaries of the Plan, and Principal serves as the trustee
under a directed trust agreement of a trust that holds the Plan's
assets.  The Plan is a "defined contribution" or "individual
account" plan as defined by ERISA, established by Seventy Seven
Energy Inc. ("SSE") to provide retirement income for its
employees.

SSE is a spinoff of Chesapeake Energy Corp. formed on June 30,
2014, from a wholly-owned subsidiary, Chesapeake Oilfield
Operating, L.L.C.  The Plan was established on July 1, 2014, as a
spinoff from the Chesapeake Energy Corp. Savings and Incentive
Stock Bonus Plan, and initially was funded by a transfer of assets
from the parent plan that included Chesapeake common stock.  The
Plan allows participants to defer a percentage of their employment
income by making elective contributions (401(k) contributions), and
allows SSE to match a percentage of participants' contributions and
make discretionary contributions to an employee stock ownership
plan ("ESOP") in the form of SSE common stock.

The Plaintiff claims the Committee Defendants breached fiduciary
duties to the Plan and its participants by: 1) allowing the Plan to
buy and hold Chesapeake stock in the ESOP because Chesapeake stock
was not a qualifying employer security so "nclusion of Chesapeake
stock in the ESOP was a per se violation of ERISA; 2) imprudently
investing and maintaining the investment in Chesapeake stock
because they knew or should have known that Chesapeake was not, and
had never been, a suitable and appropriate investment for the Plan;
3) failing to diversify Plan investments; and 4) failing to provide
adequate disclosures concerning the Plan's investments in
Chesapeake.  The Plaintiff claims Principal breached its fiduciary
duties by allowing the alleged ERISA violation to occur and by
imprudently permitting the Plan to own Chesapeake stock.  She
alleges the Plan should have divested itself of Chesapeake stock
immediately following the spin-off and the Defendants' failure to
divest caused a substantial portion of the losses suffered from a
decline in value of the Chesapeake stock.

After the original Complaint was served, the parties agreed on a
case management schedule for identification and joinder of the
proper defendants, amendment of Plaintiff's pleading, and briefing
of responsive motions. In keeping with that schedule, Plaintiff
filed the Amended Complaint, and Dethe fendants filed the instant
Motions challenging the sufficiency of her pleading to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.  No discovery has been
requested, and no motion to certify the proposed class of
participants alleged in the Amended Complaint has been filed.

The Committee Defendants assert: 1) the decision to retain
Chesapeake stock in the Plan is exempt from challenge because the
stock is a "qualifying employer security" as defined by ERISA; 2)
if not exempt from the diversification requirement, the Committee
Defendants cannot be held liable for a failure to diversify because
participants had many investment options and they decided whether
to retain Chesapeake stock in their accounts; 3) the Plaintiff's
factual allegations are based on public information and fail to
show a breach of the duty of prudent investment under Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer; and 4) the alleged facts do not show a
breach of any duty of disclosure because no general duty of
disclosure exists, no material misrepresentation is alleged, and no
specific disclosure obligation under 29 C.F.R. Section 2520.102-2
is implicated.

Principal contends its only duty as a directed trustee was to
follow the reasonable directions of the Committee Defendants so
long as they were (1) in accordance with the Plan, and (2) not
contrary to ERISA.  It asserts that the Plaintiff's action against
it must be dismissed because: 1) the factual allegations on which
liability depends are contradicted by the very documents the
Plaintiff cites in the Amended Complaint; 2) the Chesapeake stock
was a permissible investment under the Plan and the directed trust
agreement, regardless whether it was a qualifying employer
security; and 3) the Plaintiff's contention that holding the
Chesapeake stock in the ESOP component of the Plan violated ERISA
is meritless for at least four reasons, primarily because the
notion that any stock is `held' in the ESOP component is misguided
and wrong and because it simply does not matter where any Plan
investment is held for purposes of ERISA.  Finally, like the
Committee Defendants, Principal argues that the Plaintiff's claim
for breach of the duty of prudence fails under the standard
announced in Dudenhoeffer for investments in publicly traded stock
based on publicly available information.

Based on the express language of the Plan-related documents, Judge
DeGiusti finds that the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendants
violated ERISA by holding Chesapeake Stock, or allowing it to be
held, in the ESOP component of the Plan is unfounded.  Therefore,
although the Court sides with Plaintiff on the question of whether
the Chesapeake stock was an employer security, the Judge finds that
the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim that the
Committee Defendants breached a fiduciary duty by engaging in a
"per se violation of ERISA.

Next, the Judge holds that under the Plaintiff's allegations and
the circumstances of the case, the Amended Complaint fails to state
a breach of fiduciary duty against Principal based on a failure to
diversify assets of the Plan.  The Plaintiff's claim that Principal
should have taken action to divest the Plan of Chesapeake stock and
prevent additional investment seeks to hold Principal liable for
breach of a putative duty that Principal did not owe.  Where a
directed trustee's limited role does not encompass the activities
alleged as a breach of fiduciary duty, the complaint fails to state
a viable claim.

The Judge then finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible claim that Defendants breach their duty of prudence.  The
Court addressed the same issue in Gernandt v. SandRidge Energy,
Inc., and rejected the Plaintiff's position.  Relying on Rinehart
v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and the weight of federal
authority, the Court concluded that the standard announced in
Dudenhoeffer applies equally to risk-based and value-based claims.
The Judge adheres to that conclusion in the instant case.

Under the Court's ruling that the Chesapeake stock was not part of
the ESOP component of the Plan nor held in an ESOP fund, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a breach of
any general duty of disclosure.  The Plaintiff points to the fact
that the prospectus did not list Chesapeake stock as an investment
option or provide historical information for it.  She focuses on
these same allegations in her briefs, relying on an alleged general
duty of plan fiduciaries to disclose material information.

Finally, the Judge that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible claim of co-fiduciary liability against Principal.  The
Plaintiff does not identify any improper instructions that the
Committee Defendants gave Principal.  Just the opposite, she
alleges that the Committee Defendants failed to take any action --
that is, to give Principal any instructions -- that would have
reduced the unreasonable risk to plan participants from the Plan's
large holding of Chesapeake stock.

Based on this, Judge DeGiusti concludes that the Amended Complaint
fails to state any plausible ERISA claim against the directed
trustee, Principal, and fails to state any plausible ERISA claim
against the Committee Defendants except a claim that they breached
a fiduciary duty to diversify the Plan's investments.  Therefore,
he (i) granted in part the Committee Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Class Action Complaint; and (ii) granted
Principal's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/vdDwgT from Leagle.com.

Kathleen J Myers, on behalf of the Seventy Seven Energy Inc.
Retirement & Savings Plan and a class of similarly situated
participants of the Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Bobby L.
Latham, Jr. -- blatham@lwsl-law.com -- Latham Steele Lehman Keele
Ratcliff Freije & Carter, Craig A. Raabe -- craabe@ikrlaw.com --
Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, Douglas P. Needham --
dneedham@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, Gregory Y. Porter
-- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP, Mark P.
Kindall -- mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP, Robert
A. Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP & Ryan
T. Jenny -- rjenny@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP.

Delaware Charter Guarantee and Trust Company, doing business as
Principal Trust Company, Defendant, represented by Leasa M. Stewart
-- lstewart@gablelaw.com -- Gable & Gotwals & Mark B. Blocker --
MBLOCKER@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin.

Cary Baetz, Karl Blanchard, Christin Borden, Linda Clark, Clint
Clover, Gino DeMarco, Lance Haffner & Jerome Loughridge,
Defendants, represented by Spencer F. Smith --
spencer.smith@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft & Tina Q. Nguyen --
tina.nguyen@bakerbotts.com -- Baker & Botts LLP.

Administrative Committee Seventy Seven Energy Inc Retirement and
Savings Plan, Defendant, represented by Brandon P. Long, McAfee &
Taft, Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft, Patrick L. Stein,
McAfee & Taft, Spencer F. Smith, McAfee & Taft, Tina Q. Nguyen,
Baker & Botts LLP & Travis J. Sales, Baker & Botts LLP.


SKULLCANDY INC: Figueroa Sues over Website Accessibility
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Skullcandy, Inc.
for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The case is captioned JOSE FIGUEROA, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SKULLCANDY, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03202-RA (S.D.N.Y., April 10, 2019).
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against Defendant for its
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website to
be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and
other blind or visually-impaired people.  Plaintiff seeks a
permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate
policies, practices, and procedures so that Defendant's website
will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired
consumers.

Skullcandy, Inc. is an electronics accessories company that markets
headphones and related products. It owns and operates the website,
www.skullcandy.com, which offers products and services for online
sale and general delivery to the public. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
     COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Telephone: (929) 575-4175
     E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

           - and -

     Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
     GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
     150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
     New York, NY 10003-2461
     Telephone: (212) 228-9795
     E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
             danalgottlieb@aol.com


SOCIAL 8TH: $24K Settlement in Ramirez FLSA Suit Has Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York approved the parties' settlement
agreement in the case, RAUL RAMIREZ, on behalf of himself, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, et al., Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL
8TH AVE CORP., d/b/a SOCIAL BAR & GRILL et al., Defendants, Case
No. 18-CV-2061 (OTW) (S.D. N.Y.).

Ramirez brought the action in accordance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), for
allegedly unpaid overtime premium pay, alleged failure to receive
spread of hours premiums, alleged violations of the applicable
minimum wage laws, and for the Defendants' alleged failure to
provide certain statements and notices required by the NYLL.
Plaintiff brought this action as a collective and class action.

The Plaintiffs allege that they worked at the Defendants'
restaurant for varying periods of time between March 2012 until
March 2017.  The Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' allegations.  They
assert that the Plaintiffs are owed significantly less than they
are claiming, if anything.

The parties have agreed to resolve the matter for $24,000,
inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs, as set forth in the
settlement agreement.  Plaintiff Ramirez would receive $15,000 and
Plaintiff Ibrahim would receive $1,000, in return for the release
of their FLSA claims.  The Plaintiffs' FLSA claims would be
dismissed with prejudice, while all other claims would be dismissed
without prejudice.  The Plaintiffs' counsel would receive $8,000 in
fees and costs, representing one-third of the settlement amount.

The parties submitted a joint letter seeking approval of their
settlement agreement, explaining in detail the parties' positions,
with a description of the method used to calculate the settlement
amounts and an explanation of the hours the Plaintiffs worked and
the wage at which they worked them.

Magistrate Judge Wang approved the parties' proposed settlement
agreement as fair and reasonable.  She dismissed with prejudice and
without costs Plaintiff Ramirez's and Plaintiff Ibrahim's FLSA
claims provided, however, that the Court retains jurisdiction
pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.  Plaintiff
Ramirez's and Plaintiff Ibrahim's NYLL claims are dismissed without
prejudice.  The Judge approved Plaintiff Norma Melendez's and
Plaintiff Nicholas Iraci's stipulation of dismissal without
prejudice.  Any pending motions are to be terminated as moot and
all conferences are cancelled.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/YUctdy from Leagle.com.

Raul Ramirez, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig --
anne@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC, Taimur
Alamgir -- taimur@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC &
C.K. Lee -- cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Ahmed Ibrahim & Mohamed Ibrahim, Plaintiffs, represented by C.K.
Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC & Taimur Alamgir, Lee Litigation
Group, PLLC.

Social 8th Ave Corp., doing business as Social Bar & Grill,
Westside TM Corp., doing business as West End Bar & Grill, Westside
Pub Corp., doing business as Latitude Bar & Lounge, TM 568 Corp.,
doing business as Ivy Bar & Grill, TM 358 Corp., doing business as
Juniper Bar, TM 701 Corp., doing business as Smith's Bar &
Restaurant, Tara Maguire, Michael Molloy, Michael Gilligan, Robert
Mckee, James Casey Mckee & Shamus Barnes, Defendants, represented
by Andrew Sal Hoffmann, Hoffmann & Associates & Tram Dao Lopresto,
Hoffmann & Associates.

Thomas Murphy, Defendant, represented by Andrew Sal Hoffmann,
Hoffmann & Associates, Nathan M. Ferst, Nathan M. Ferst & Tram Dao
Lopresto, Hoffmann & Associates.


SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Peltz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southwest Credit
Systems, L.P. The case is styled as Susan Peltz individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Southwest
Credit Systems, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02018 (E.D. N.Y.,
April 8, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Southwest Credit Systems, L.P. was founded in 2003. The Company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


SPREEMO INC: Kelley Drye Discusses Mauthe TCPA Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------
John D.S. Gilmour, Esq. -- jgilmour@kelleydrye.com -- Talat Ansari,
Esq. -- tansari@kelleydrye.com -- David A. Hartquist, Esq. --
dhartquist@kelleydrye.com -- James F. Jacobus, Esq., Philip D.
Robben, Esq., John L. Hagan, Esq., Lee S. Brenner, Esq., Andrew E.
Minkiewicz, Esq., and John M. Herrmann II, Esq., of Kelley Drye &
Warren, in an article for Lexology, report that in a recent
decision, Judge Chad F. Kenney of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissed a TCPA putative class action finding that
the fax at issue was not an unsolicited advertisement on its face,
as well as a pendant state claim for conversion of plaintiff's fax
machine.  Mauthe v. Spreemo, Inc., et al., No. 18-1902-CFK, slip
op. (E.D. Pa. Jan 28, 2019).  Plaintiff Robert W. Mauthe, M.D.,
P.C., filed suit against Defendants Spreemo, Inc. and the Hartford
Financial Services Group, alleging that defendants sent unsolicited
faxes to him and a purported class of similarly-situated persons.
At issue in the lawsuit was a single one-page fax sent in December
2016 which stated that defendant Spreemo was the "Primary
Diagnostic Vendor" for Hartford.   Plaintiff contended that the
advertisement promoted "the availability and quality of Spreemo's
services," a contention that defendants refuted.  

Finding that on its face the fax in question did not promote any
goods or services, the Court careful reviewed the fax to determine
whether it contained a "pretext for a larger advertising scheme"
which would violate the TCPA.  The Court cited plaintiff's own
argument to demonstrate that the purpose of the fax was to inform
its intended recipients, such as medical providers like plaintiff,
that Spreemo is the primary diagnostic provider for any patients
covered by Hartford insurance policies.  The fax communicated that
patients covered by Hartford insurance policies should submit
requests for any diagnostic tests to Spreemo.  The Court also
looked beyond the language actually included in the fax to examine
what language was not included in the fax, namely information on
comparative pricing for services, information "touting" the quality
of services, or information describing the ease of making an
appointment or arrangements for services offered by Spreemo.  The
Court stated that the inclusion of such additional information
"would take the fax beyond the realm of advertisement."  Holding
that the fax was not an unsolicited advertisement on its face and
did not contain and pretext for a larger advertising scheme, the
Court determined that the fax was informational and therefore did
not violate the TCPA, and dismissed plaintiff's claims. [GN]


SUN LOAN: Sued by De Los Santos Over Erroneous Collection Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
Adan De Los Santos, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Sun Loan Company, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00190 (W.D. Tex., February 26, 2019),
seeks statutory damages, permanent injunction to enjoin Defendants'
and their agents' violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this action, statutory
prejudgment interest and such other relief.

De Los Santos claims to have received numerous collection calls
intended for a certain "Jesse Ramos." Despite numerous attempts to
deny their claims, he still receives such calls, notes the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
      GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
      106 East Sixth Street, Suite 913
      Austin, TX 78701
      Telephone: (512) 322-3912
      Fax: (561) 961-5684
      Email: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
      KOZONIS LAW, LTD
      4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
      Chicago, IL 60630
      Phone: (773) 545-9607
      Fax: (773) 496-8617
      Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


TEMPERATURE EQUIPMENT: Chavez Hits Illegal Use of Biometrics Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Chavez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Temperature Equipment Corp. (TEC), Case No.
2019CH02538 (Ill. Cir., February 26, 2019), seeks an injunction
requiring Defendants to cease all unlawful activity related to the
capture, collection, storage and use of biometrics; and statutory
damages together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for
violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

TEC is a supplier of residential and commercial Carrier, Bryant,
and Payne heating, air conditioning, air purification and
refrigeration equipment where Chavez worked at its Cook County,
Illinois facility. He was required to "clock-in" and "clock-out"
using a timeclock that scanned fingerprints. He alleges that TEC
improperly disclosed employees' fingerprint data to an out-of-state
payroll services provider without their informed consent. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
      KOZONIS LAW, LTD
      4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
      Chicago, IL 60630
      Phone: (773) 545-9607
      Fax: (773) 496-8617
      Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


TOTAL AIRPORT: Cummings Hits Employees' Biometrics Data Sharing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jashawna Cummings, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Total Airport Services, LLC, Case
No. 2019CH02513 (Ill. Cir., February 26, 2019), seeks an injunction
requiring Defendants to cease all unlawful activity related to the
capture, collection, storage and use of biometrics, statutory
damages together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for
violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Total Airport assigned Cummings to O'Hare International Airport in
Chicago, Illinois. He was required to "clock-in" and "clock-out"
using a timeclock that scanned fingerprints. He alleges that Total
Airport improperly disclosed employees' fingerprint data to an
out-of-state payroll services provider without their informed
consent. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Frank Castiglione, Esq.
      Kasif Khowaja, Esq.
      The Khowaja Law Firm, LLC
      70 East Lake Street, Suite 1220
      Chicago, IL 60601 58402
      Tel: (312) 356-3200
      Fax: (312) 386-5800
      Email: fcastiglione@khowajalaw.com
             kasif@khowajalaw.com

             - and -

      James X. Bormes, Esq.
      Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
      8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Tel: (312) 201-0575


TOWER VALET: Herrera-Zambrano Sues Over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------
PORFIRIO HERRERA-ZAMBRANO, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. TOWER VALET PARKING,
INC., a California corporation aka LIBERTY PARK MANAGEMENT; LIBERTY
PARK MANAGEMENT, INC., a California corporation aka TOWER VALET
PARKING; MEDET ZIRA, an individual and dba TOWER VALET PARKING and
dba LIBERTY PARK MANAGEMENT; NURULLAH ZIRA, an individual and dba
LIBERTY PARK MANAGEMENT and dba VALET TOWER PARKING; and DOES 1
through 100, all inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-19-575027
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., April 4, 2019) is a class
action in its first eight causes of action, brought against the
DEFENDANTS under California Labor Code, applicable Wage Orders of
the California Industrial Welfare Commission.

According to the complaint, the DEFENDANTS have repeatedly,
continually and willfully refused to pay to ATTENDANTS the legally
mandated base rate wages and overtime compensation due to them
pursuant to Labor Code and the applicable I.W.C. Wage Orders,
instead paying them a fixed rate.

The DEFENDANTS have repeatedly, continually and willfully refused
to pay the required minimum wage rates, as a result of a concerted
scheme and plan for underpaying for hours and wages, whereby the
paid wage rates operatively fell below the relevant minimum wage
rates required by law, says the complaint.

PLAINTIFF was an employee of DEFENDANTS, and each of them, from at
least 2004 though at least January 15, 2019.

VPI, LPMI and DOES 1-50 were and are doing business in association
with and under the joint operation, management and control of
Defendants M.ZIRA, N.ZJRA and DOES 51-100.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     KENNETH W. RALIDIS, ESQ.
     LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH W. RALIDIS, A.P.L.C.
     3435 Wilshire Blvd., 27th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Phone: (213}251-5480
     Fax: (323) 953-1171

          - and -

     RICARDO Y. MERLUZA, ESQ.
     MERLUZA LAW OFFICES, a professional corporation
     3435 Wilshire Blvd., 27th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Phone: (213} 380-9888
     Fax: (323) 380-5397


TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION: Can Compel Arbitration in Garcia Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE GARCIA, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION
CO., INC., an Arizona corporation; TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., which will do business in California as J.M.W. TRUSS &
COMPONENTS, an Arizona corporation; and DOES 1 through 50
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1214 JLS (WVG) (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff's individual claims.

The Plaintiff worked as a construction worker, carpenter, and
safety coordinator for the Defendants from March through August of
2017, at a work site in Hollywood, California.  During the
Plaintiff's in-processing on his first day of work, the Defendants
required the Plaintiff to complete and sign several documents,
including an acknowledgement of Defendant Trademark Construction's
handbook; an Employee Acknowledgment and Arbitration Agreement with
Trademark Construction; and an application to join the Southwest
Regional Council of Carpenters of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America.  The Plaintiff also believes he
was provided a copy of the collective bargaining agreement for the
Union when he filled out the Union application during his
in-processing.  Several months later, the Plaintiff received a
Union card in the mail from the Carpenters International Training
Fund; the card included his name and the number U-7552-7631.

The Defendants have been members of the Residential Contractors
Association ("RCA") since April 2007.  The Union and the RCA
entered into a collective bargaining agreement entitled the
"Residential Master Labor Agreement," which became effective on
Jan. 1, 2015.  The RCA and the Union later agreed to a Memorandum
of Understanding ("MOU") on June 15, 2017, which became effective
retroactively on Jan. 1, 2015.  Article X of the Labor Agreement
outlines the grievance and arbitration process for any disputes.
The MOU adds an additional section concerning the scope and details
of the arbitration outlined in the Labor Agreement.  Together, the
Labor Agreement and the MOU (the Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA")) applies to all employees employed by members of the RCA
during the Plaintiff's employment and contains specific grievance
procedures, including arbitration, that apply to the Plaintiff's
claims.

The Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action in San
Diego County Superior Court on April 2, 2018.  On June 5, 2018, he
filed the First Amended Complaint ("FAC).  The Plaintiff alleges
nine claims against the Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum
wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide
meal periods; (4) failure to provide rest periods; (5) failure to
reimburse necessary business expenses; (6) violation of Labor Code
§ 226(a) (inaccurate wage statements); (7) violation of Labor Code
Section 221 (deductions from wages); (8) violation of Labor Code
Section 203 (waiting time penalties); and (9) violation of
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.  The
Plaintiff also seeks penalties under California's Private Attorneys
General Act ("PAGA").

The Defendants removed the action to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act on June 8, 2018, and filed an answer to the
complaint on the same day.  The Defendants then filed the instant
Motion requesting the Court compel arbitration.  They argue that
the Court must compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's individual
claims, dismiss the Plaintiff's class action claims, and stay his
PAGA claims.  According to them, arbitration of the Plaintiff's
claims is mandatory under the FAA because at all times during his
employment, the Plaintiff was a member of the Union, and, as such,
the CBA governs the terms of his employment and mandates
arbitration of the dispute.

The Plaintiff counters that arbitration is not appropriate because
his Union membership status is "questionable" and, therefore, he
may not be subject to the CBA.  The Plaintiff also argues that the
CBA should not apply because he signed the Trademark Arbitration
Agreement which supersedes the CBA.  Finally, the Plaintiff
contends that even, if the Court finds that the CBA controls, the
Court should not enforce the CBA's arbitration clause because it is
permeated with procedural and substantive unconscionability.

Judge Sammartino concludes that the arbitration clause contained in
the CBA is enforceable and encompasses the Plaintiff's claims pled
in his FAC, with the exception of his PAGA claims.  She finds that,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the Plaintiff was a member of
the Union during his employment with the Defendants.  
She further finds that both the Trademark Arbitration Agreement and
the CBA require the Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims.  The two
agreements conflict, however, in that the CBA expressly waives the
right to bring claims on a class-wide basis, while the Trademark
Arbitration Agreement does not.  Because the agreements conflict,
the CBA supersedes the Trademark Arbitration Agreement.

Accordingly, the Judge (1) granted the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration of the Plaintiff's individual claims; (2) dismissed the
Plaintiff's class claims; and (3) stayed the Plaintiff's PAGA
claims pending resolution of the arbitration of his individual
claims pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 3.  She ordered the parties to
file a status update on arbitration proceedings every 120 days and
within 15 days of completion of the arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/n8D2Dp from Leagle.com.

Jose Garcia, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Harmik Yeremian
-- david@yeremianlaw.com -- David Yeremian & Associates, Inc.

Trademark Construction Co., Inc., an Arizona Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C. & Nikolas Trpe Djordjevski , Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC.

Trademark Construction Co., Inc., an Arizona Corporation; which
will do Business in California as J.M.W. Truss and Components,
Defendant, represented by Raymond Joseph Decker -- rjd@tsyslaw.com
-- Taubman, Simpson, Young and Sulentor, Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C. & Nikolas Trpe Djordjevski --
nikolas.djordjevski@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, PC.


TRANS UNION: Faces Skaist Suit Over Inaccurate Credit Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shmuel Skaist a/k/a Eli Skaist, and Shaindy Skaist, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v.
Trans Union, LLC, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., Bank of America, N.A. and John Does
1-25, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01965 (E.D. N.Y., April 4, 2019)
seeks damages arising from the Defendant's violations the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs received a trial
modification on a mortgage beginning in April of 2017 and made
payments during the months of May, June, and July.  However, these
are still being labeled as 120 days past due. The Defendants have
been reporting this inaccurate information through the issuance of
false and inaccurate credit information and consumer reports that
they have disseminated to various persons and credit grantors, both
known and unknown. Plaintiffs notified Equifax that they disputed
the accuracy of the information Equifax was reporting, in separate
letters, on or around December 2018, specifically explaining the
history of the account and that all payments were made during these
months in question, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are residents of the State of New York, County of
Kings.

Trans Union, LLC is a consumer reporting agency.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Dov Mittelman, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500
     Fax: (201) 282-6501


TRANS UNION: Faces Solomon Suit over Erroneous Credit Report
------------------------------------------------------------
A consumer class action has been filed against Trans Union, LLC for
alleged violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case is
captioned SARAH SOLOMON, on behalf of herself and all individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRANS UNION, LLC, SERVE:
Corporation Service Company, Registered Agent Bank of America
Center, 16th Floor 1111 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00255-JAG (E.D. Va., April 10, 2019).
The complaint challenges the uniform policies and procedures of
Defendant Trans Union, LLC regarding debts discharged through
Bankruptcy cases that are converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.
Defendant has failed to implement any policies or procedures for
ensuring that it properly reports these post-petition,
pre-conversion debts as discharged, and Defendant erroneously and
systematically reports these discharged debts as due and owing
and/or past due. Defendant's practices deprive consumers of their
important statutory right under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681e(b) to have
only maximally accurate information reported on their credit.

Trans Union, LLC is a limited liability company authorized to do
business in the Commonwealth of Virginia through its registered
offices in Richmond, VA. Trans Union is a consumer reporting agency
that engages in the business of assembling, evaluating, and
disbursing information concerning consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

Emily Connor Kennedy, Esq.
Mark C. Leffler, Esq.
Stephen F. Relyea, Esq.
BOLEMAN LAW FIRM, P.C.
2104 W. Laburnum Ave, Suite 201
Richmond, VA 23227
Telephone: (804) 358-9900
Facsimile: (804) 358-8704
Email: eckennedy@bolemanlaw.com
       mcleffler@bolemanlaw.com
       sfrelyea@bolemanlaw.com

           - and -

Leonard A. Bennett, Esq.
Elizabeth W. Hanes, Esq.
Craig C. Marchiando, Esq.
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C.
763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1-A
Newport News, VA 23601
Telephone: (757) 930-3660
Facsimile: (757) 930-3662
Email: elizabeth@clalegal.com
       lenbennett@clalegal.com
       craig@clalegal.com


TRINET GROUP: Dismissal of Amended Welgus Securities Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HOWARD WELGUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRINET GROUP,
INC.; BURTON M. GOLDFIELD; WILLIAM PORTER; MARTIN BABINEC; H.
RAYMOND BINGHAM; DAVID C. HODGSON; GENERAL ATLANTIC, LLC; KATHERINE
AUGUST-DEWILDE; KENNETH GOLDMAN; JOHN KISPERT; WAYNE LOWELL; J.P.
MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC; MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC; DEUTSCHE BANK
SECURITIES, INC.; JEFFERIES, LLC; STIFEL, NICOLAUS & COMPANY,
INCORPORATED; WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, LLC, Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 18-15084 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of this
putative class action under Rule 12(b)(6).

The operative second amended complaint alleged that TriNet, its
officers, directors, majority shareholder, and underwriters, made
false or misleading statements in connection with an initial public
offering ("IPO") and a secondary public offering ("SPO").

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal for failure to state a
claim de novo.  Applying the heightened pleading standards of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), it
affirmed.

The Court finds that the operative complaint failed to plausibly
allege that TriNet made materially false or misleading statements.
At least one statement claimed to be false, that TriNet's "risk
management is a core competency," is an opinion, and thus only
actionable for "subjective falsity."  But rather than citing
"contemporaneous" evidence that TriNet did not believe the
statement to be true when made, the operative complaint refers only
to subsequent evidence casting doubt on whether TriNet's subsequent
risk management was competent.  Those allegations do not suffice to
plausibly allege subjective falsity.

To the extent the operative complaint alleges that statements of
fact were untrue when made, it also does not meet the PSLRA
heightened pleading standards.  Contrary to Welgus' assertions,
TriNet did not state that it had access to data for all its claims;
rather it stated that it received "claims data" and had access to
analytics on claims.  

Similarly, the Court finds that the IPO and SPO disclosures state
only that TriNet assesses risk on an individual client (employer)
basis, not, as Welgus claims, for each individual claim.  TriNet's
statements that it offered "fully-insured" plans were not
misleading, because both disclosures expressly described TriNet's
risk exposure.  Nor were TriNet's later statements that it did not
have aggregate stop losses in place enough to suggest that TriNet
did not previously have any stop losses in place, so as to render
its earlier statements misleading.  Finally, TriNet's CFO's
statement that "we are able to predict pretty accurately exactly
how we are going to do" was explicitly described as a consequence
of "the law of large numbers," and did not suggest that TriNet
employed unusual risk management practices.

Because the operative complaint failed to plausibly allege any
materially false or misleading statements or omissions, the
district court did not err in dismissing each of its claims.  The
Court therefore need not consider whether the complaint adequately
pleaded scienter or whether the claims against the underwriters
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/MqsepG from Leagle.com.


TWENTY FIRST: Wiggins Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TWENTY FIRST CENTURY
ASSOCIATES et al. The case is styled as LATISHA WIGGINS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. TWENTY FIRST CENTURY ASSOCIATES, John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-09293 (D. N.J., Apr. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Twenty-First Century Associates is a commercial and consumer
collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Yaakov Saks, Esq.
     Stein Saks, PLLC
     285 Passaic Street
     Hackensack, NJ 07601
     Phone: (201) 282-6500 ext 101
     Fax: (201) 282-6501
     Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


U-LINE CORP: Settlement in Watts FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL WAITS, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. U-LINE CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-771-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the
parties' joint motion for preliminary approval of class and
collective action settlement.

On Jan. 11, 2019, the parties filed their joint motion.  They also
applied the Rule 23(a) and (b) standards to the proposed Rule 23
class of all hourly employees employed by the Defendant between May
21, 2016 and Nov. 14, 2018.

Judge Pepper finds that the settlement agreement appears to be
fair, reasonable and adequate.  She granted the joint motion for
preliminary approval of class and collective action settlement, and
approved the parties' joint stipulation to certify a collective
action under 29 U.S.C. Sections 216(b) and to certify a class
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Judge appointed Michael Waits as the class representative; and
Hawks Quindel, S.C. as the class counsel.

The Class counsel will mail the Notice of Class Action Settlement
to the class members within seven days of the order.  The Putative
Collective Class members may file a consent form within thirty days
of the notice's mailing.  Any individual who wishes to exclude
himself or herself must opt out per the instructions set forth in
the Notice within 30 days of the mailing of the Notice.  Any
individual who wishes to exclude himself or herself from the Rule
23 settlement will be bound by any court order granting final
approval of settlement.  Any Rule 23 Class member who wishes to
object in any way to the proposed Settlement Agreement must file
and serve those objections in writing -- following the instructions
in the Notice of Class Action Settlement -- together with copies of
all papers in support of his or her position, no later than 30 days
after the mailing of the Notice of Class Action Settlement.

Judge Pepper ordered the parties to appear for a fairness hearing
on May 8, 2019 at 1:30 p.m.  The Class Counsel will file a motion
for approval of attorneys' fees on or before a date at least 21
days prior to the fairness hearing.  Any supplemental brief in
support of final approval of the settlement agreement or in
response to any objections to the application for attorneys' fees
will be filed at least seven days prior to the fairness hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ShLlou from Leagle.com.

Michael Waits, Plaintiff, represented by Claire G. Roehre --
croehre@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC, Larry A. Johnson, Hawks
Quindel SC, Summer H. Murshid, Hawks Quindel SC & Timothy P.
Maynard, Hawks Quindel SC.

U-Line Corporation, Defendant, represented by Colton D. Long --
clong@Seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Noah A. Finkel --
nfinkel@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


U.S. XPRESS: May 10 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against purchasers U.S. Xpress
Enterprises, Inc. ("U.S. Xpress" or the "Company") (NYSE: USX) and
its directors, on behalf of shareholders who purchased U.S. Xpress
securities pursuant and/or traceable to the company's initial
public offering completed in June 2018 (the "IPO" or the
"Offering"). Such investors are encouraged to join this case by
visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/usx.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

The complaint alleges that defendants made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose that:  (1) a shortage of trucks
was negatively impacting U.S. Xpress's dedicated division; (2)
certain shipping patterns had been performing differently than
expected, negatively impacting utilization and driver retention and
hiring, as well as U.S. Xpress's dedicated accounts; (3)
consequently, U.S. Xpress's OTR division was providing continued
support to its dedicated division; (4) U.S. Xpress failed to stay
informed regarding two large liability events, resulting in an
understatement of insurance claim expense; and (5) U.S. Xpress's
cost per mile for driver wages and independent contractors was
exceeding the company's internal expectations. When the true
details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

On November 1, 2018, U.S. Xpress issued a press release announcing
the Company's financial and operating results for the third fiscal
quarter and nine months ending September 30, 2018.  Therein, and in
a conference call discussing the results, U.S. Xpress disclosed how
unusual shipping patterns were impacting its segments and how
market challenges for drivers resulted in a year-to-year tractor
count decrease.  The Company and its executives further disclosed
higher driver wages and independent contractor costs, lower than
expected recruitment levels, and a higher insurance expense.  On
this news, U.S. Xpress's stock price fell $3.04 per share, or
nearly 30%, to close at $7.10 per share on November 2, 2018.

If you wish to review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the
firm's site: www.bgandg.com/usx or you may contact Peretz
Bronstein, Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered
a loss in U.S. Xpress you have until May 10, 2019 to request that
the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in
any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique.  Its primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients.  In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Common Ground Amends Suit Over CSR Payments
----------------------------------------------------------
Inside Health Policy reports that the class action lawsuit
spearheaded by Wisconsin-based Common Ground Health Cooperative and
involving about 90 other exchange issuers has filed an amended
complaint with the Federal Court of Claims and now seeks to collect
cost-sharing reduction reimbursements owed for plan years 2017,
2018 and 2019. Meanwhile, the federal appeals court has agreed to
combine three other key CSR cases so that they can be heard by the
same panel of judges.

Plaintiff Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative contends, for itself
and on behalf of those similarly situated, that the federal
government ceased making the cost-sharing reduction payments to
which it and other insurers are entitled under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Affordable Care Act"), Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and its implementing
regulations.

The case is COMMON GROUND HEALTHCARE COOPERATIVE, Plaintiff, v. THE
UNITED STATES Defendants, No. 17-877C (Fed. Cl.).

COMMON GROUND HEALTHCARE COOPERATIVE, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen Andrew
Swedlow , Quinn, Emanuel, et al., LLP.

USA, Defendant, represented by Christopher James Carney , United
States Department of Justice. [GN]


UNITED STUDENT: Summary Judgment in Henderson TCPA Suit Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHYRIAA HENDERSON, on behalf of herself, and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STUDENT
AID FUNDS, INC., DBA USA Funds, Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
17-55373 (9th Cir.), Judge Dorothy Wright Nelson of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district's order
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee.

Henderson applied for and received a loan to attend university
through the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP").  After
experiencing some financial difficulty, she stopped paying back her
loans. Then, five different debt collection companies started
calling her about the money she had not paid back.  Henderson
received prerecorded messages many times in short intervals on a
phone number she neither provided in connection with her student
loans nor consented to be called on.  She contends this pattern
shows that the companies were combining the use of skip tracers and
auto dialers.

Navient Solutions, Inc., a servicer of student loans, hired these
debt collectors to collect on unpaid loans on behalf of USA Funds,
which owned Henderson's loans.  USA Funds operates under a
government program by which it guarantees student loans made by
private lenders and then takes ownership of those loans if a
student-borrower defaults.

Although USA Funds owns billions of dollars in student loan debt,
it does not interact with the borrowers directly once they stop
paying back their loans.  Instead, it hires companies, like
Navient, to service its loans, including debt collection.  In turn,
Navient hires debt collectors to collect on defaulted loans.  The
debt collectors handle many aspects of collecting and repayment,
including making calls to borrowers, setting up payment plans,
granting temporary delays, and accepting loan payments.

While USA Funds did not have a contractual relationship with the
debt collectors or any day-to-day dealings with them, USA Funds had
access to Navient's daily, weekly, and monthly reports tracking the
debt collectors' performance.  Similarly, USA Funds could, and did,
review debt collectors' calling notes when it had "an issue" with a
debt collector's calling practices.  USA Funds also regularly
reviewed Navient's operations and performance, including its
regulatory compliance, or lack thereof. Though USA Funds' service
agreement with Navient did not give USA Funds the ability to fire
debt collectors, USA Funds could ask Navient to replace
underperforming collectors and could have fired Navient if it did
not comply.

USA Funds also conducted an annual audit of the debt collectors.
The audit focused on the various repayment programs that borrowers
had a right to use in the FFELP.  Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") compliance was not one of the FFELP audit parameters.
However, during each of USA Funds' audits from 2000, 2009, and
2010, debt collectors called borrowers on phone numbers that they
did not consent to be called on, prompting USA Funds to note
"improper collection practices" and to recommend "corrective
action."  Navient, however, continued to use these debt collectors,
and USA Funds did not object when the same debt collectors were
used in the following years.  Moreover, USA Funds was aware that
debt collectors handling USA Funds' loans had been sued regarding
their calling practices but USA Funds did nothing to ensure TCPA
compliance.

Henderson sued USA Funds for alleged TCPA violations related to the
collection of her student loan debt.  Though Henderson also sued
Navient and several debt collectors, those Defendants were
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Henderson appeals the district's order granting summary judgment in
favor of USA Funds.  She challenges the district court order
granting USA Funds' summary judgment motion on two grounds.  First,
Henderson argues that under an FCC order, USA Funds is per se
vicariously liable for the debt collectors' TCPA violations.
Second, she argues that USA Funds is similarly liable under the
federal common law agency principles of ratification and implied
actual authority.  Henderson's theory of liability is that USA
Funds has a principal-agent relationship with the debt collectors
and that a court may hold it liable for their TCPA violations.

Judge Nelson agrees.  She finds that there is evidence that USA
Funds communicated consent to the debt collectors through
acquiescence in their calling practices that allegedly violated the
TCPA.  In other words, a reasonable jury could find that USA Funds
ratified the debt collectors' calling practices by remaining silent
and continuing to accept the benefits of the collectors' tortious
conduct despite knowing what the collectors were doing or, at the
very least, knowing of facts that would have led a reasonable
person to investigate further.  She therefore holds she need not
address whether the debt collectors acted with implied actual
authority.

For these reasons, the Judge reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee, and remanded
for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/cpFpAO from Leagle.com.

Alexander Glenn Tievsky -- atievsky@edelson.com -- (argued), Roger
Perlstadt -- rperlstadt@edelson.com -- and Ryan D. Andrews --
randrews@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Chicago, Illinois; Kas
Gallucci, Alexis Wood, and Ronald A. Marron --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, San
Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lisa Marie Simonetti -- lsimonetti@vedderprice.com -- (argued),
Vedder Price (CA) LLP, Los Angeles, California; Bryan K. Clark --
bclark@vedderprice.com -- Vedder Price P.C., Chicago, Illinois; for
Defendant-Appellee.


US CORRECTIONS: Dana White Seeks Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
U.S. Corrections, LLC, US Corrections, LLC and South East Employee
Leasing, Inc. for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). The case is captioned DANA WHITE, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, U.S.
CORRECTIONS, LLC, US CORRECTIONS, LLC and SOUTH EAST EMPLOYEE
LEASING, INC., Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01206 (W.D. Tex., April
3, 2019). The complaint notes that the defendants have violated the
FLSA by employing Plaintiff and other similarly situated nonexempt
employees for a workweek longer than 40 hours but refusing to
compensate them for their employment in excess of 40 hours at a
rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which
they are or were employed. It also asserts that the defendants have
violated the FLSA by failing to maintain accurate time and pay
records for Plaintiff and other similarly situated nonexempt
employees as required by 29 U.S.C. Section 211(c) and 29 C.F.R. pt.
516. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
from the Defendants.

US Corrections LLC is a fully licensed and fully insured armed
security service, providing a wide range of correctional and
security services to government agencies. Meanwhile, South East
Personnel Leasing, Inc., founded in 1986, is headquartered in the
Tampa Bay area. The company provides payroll and workers'
compensation solutions to small and medium-sized businesses. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Melissa Moore, Esq.
     Curt Hesse, Esq.
     MOORE & ASSOCIATES
     440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
     Houston, TX 77002
     Telephone: (713) 222-6775
     Facsimile: (713) 222-6739


VENATOR MATERIALS: Gonzalez Files Securities Class Action in Texas
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Oscar Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VENATOR MATERIALS PLC et al,
Defendant, Case No. DC-1 9-03709 (Tex. Dist, Dallas County, March
13, 2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act of 1933. Plaintiff Gonzalez brings this
action, individually and on behalf of all persons or entities other
than defendants who purchased ordinary shares issued by Venator
Materials PLC pursuant to or traceable to the company's Initial
Public Offering (IPO) that commenced on or about Aug. 3, 2017 and
closed on Aug. 8, 2017. Venator has conducted its IPO whereby
Huntsman, through its wholly-owned subsidiaries Huntsman
International and HHN, sold 22,700,000 ordinary shares of Venator
at an offering price of $20.00 per share.

Moreover, Gonzalez alleges that the Registration Statement and
Prospectus incorporated therein contained materially untrue
statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts
required to make the statements in the Registration Statement not
misleading. In its Registration Statement, Venator failed to
disclose to its investors that, inter alia, increasing prices of
titanium dioxide across the globe would result in the company's
rapid depletion of the insurance funds allocated to compensate for
the loss of business and reconstruction of company's critical Pori,
Finland production facility, thus rendering it economically
inefficient to reopen the plant, as the company claimed it would do
in the Registration Statement, and forcing the company to expend
significant amounts in unplanned capital expenditures until the
decision to close the facility all together, which itself triggered
hundreds of millions of additional capital expenditures for the
future.

At the time of the offering, Defendant Venator was incorporated
under the laws of England and Wales as a public limited company,
with its operations conducted across two offices: one located at
Titanium House, Hanzard Drive, Wynyard park, Stockton-On-Tees, T822
SFD, United Kingdom and the other at 10001 Woodloch Forest Drive,
Suite 600, the Woodlands, Texas, USA 77380. Venator describes each
site in the Prospectus as its headquarters & administrative
offices. Venator's ordinary shares trade on the New York Stock
Exchange under the ticker symbol VNTR. Venator may be served at
Titanium House, Hanzard Drive, Wynyard Park, Stockton-On-Tees, T822
5FD United Kingdom. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     R. Dean Gresham, Esq.
     12720 Hillcrest Rd., Suite 1045
     Dallas, TX 75230
     Telephone: (972) 387-4040
     Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
     E-mail: dean@stecklerlaw.com

          - and -

     Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
     Sebastiano Tomatore, Esq.
     LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
     1111 Summer Street, Suite 403
     Stamford, CT 06905
     Telephone: (203) 992-4523
     Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
     E-mail: shopkins@zlk.com
             stomatore@zlk.com

          - and -

     Marion C. Passmore, Esq.
     BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
     885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
     New York, NY 10022
     Telephone: 212-308-5858
     E-mail: passmore@bespc.com


VERATIP CORP: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Sarikaputar Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PARANEE SARIKAPUTAR, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. VERATIP CORP. ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-814 (ALC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Andrew L. Carter, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the Defendant Michael P. Bronstein's
Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings.

Plaintiffs, Sarikaputar, Phouviengsone Sysouvong, Supunnee
Sukasawett, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, and Vinai Patan and Wipaporn Sittidej, bring the putative
class action against Veratip, J. Akira LLC, ThaiNY Restaurant LLC,
Ninety-Nine Plus Corp., Perapong Chotimanenophan, Shue-Lee Cheng
Li, Chardenpong Oonapanyo, 9999 Midtown Corp., and Mr. Bronstein,
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New
York Labor Law ("NYLL"), and New York General Business Law.  

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on Feb. 2, 2017.  The
Plaintiffs are a group of individuals who were employed by the
Defendants in various capacities between Nov. 1, 2011 and Dec. 25,
2016.  Plaintiffs Sarikaputar and Sysouvong were primarily employed
as chefs.

The Defendants are a group of restaurants, corporations, and
individuals.  In the Complaint, Defendants are broken down into two
categories: "Corporate Defendants" and "Owner/Operator Defendants."
Allegedly, Mr. Bornstein was an "Owner/Operator Defendant."  The
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bronstein, along with this co-owners,
shared employees, assigned work and work stations to employees on a
weekly basis, paid employees through a corporate Defendant, and
participated in the restaurant industry as partners and a unified
operation.

The Plaintiffs allege that, during the period of their employment,
Mr. Bronstein and his fellow employers failed to pay the Plaintiffs
a spread of hours, failed to provide employees with time of hire
notices and paystubs, and retaliated against the Plaintiffs when
they complained of their inadequate pay.  Furthermore, the
Complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to compensate the
Plaintiffs for overtime, failed to consistently provide breaks to
the Plaintiffs, and required the Plaintiffs to work during the
breaks that were provided.

On Sept. 7, 2017, Mr. Bronstein filed his Answer to the Complaint.
Mediation held on Oct. 25, 2017 proved to be unsuccessful because
multiple Defendants had yet to appear or respond.  On Dec. 12,
2017, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron.
The Parties engaged in discussions regarding discovery with Judge
Aaron.

On July 25, 2018, after considering letter motions from the
Parties, the Court granted Mr. Bronstein leave to file his Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.  On Aug. 8, 2018, the Defendant
filed his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a dismissal of
all charges levied against him, along with a Declaration and
Memorandum of Law.  The Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the
Defendant's Motion on Oct. 22, 2018.  On Oct. 29, 2018, Defendant
filed his Reply to the Plaintiffs' Opposition.

Judge Carter finds that while much of the language is
"boilerplate," at this stage the allegations in the Plaintiffs
complaint need only be plausible and the Court must be able to make
a reasonable inference that Mr. Bronstein was one of the
Plaintiffs' employers.  It may be the case that documents exist
bolstering Mr. Bornstein's claims, but neither the Complaint nor
the Answer was accompanied by exhibits shedding light on the issues
presented in the Motion.  Based on the information presented and
the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs have done enough to satisfy their burden.

At this stage in the proceedings, the Judge concludes that the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that allows the Court to
draw reasonable inferences that Defendant Bronstein is liable for
the FLSA and NYLL violations alleged in the Complaint.  For these
reasons, he denied the Defendant's Motion for Judgement on the
Pleadings.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/aWzQZS from Leagle.com.

Paranee Sarikaputar, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Phouviengsone Sysouvong, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Supunnee Sukasawett, Vinai Patan &
Wipaporn Sittidej, Plaintiffs, represented by Aaron B. Schweitzer
-- troylaw@troypllc.com -- Troy Law, PLLC & John Troy, Troy Law,
PLLC.

J Akira LLC, doing business as ThaiNY, M-Thai, Thai Rice, Tom Yum &
Michael P Bronstein, Defendants, represented by Bingchen Li --
eric.li@ncny-law.com -- Law Office of Z. Tan PLLC.


VIGO COUNTY, IN: Settles Inmates' Class Action Over Lockup
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard Greninger, writing for Tribune-Star, reports that attorneys
for Vigo County and for its jail inmates agreed to a settlement to
pay five remaining inmates listed in a federal lawsuit alleging
unconstitutional conditions at the county lockup.

The agreement calls for each inmate to receive $25 per day served
in the jail. The total settlement is $10,725 for the inmates
listed. It breaks down as:

   -- Durand Randle, who served 55 days, is to receive $1,375.
   -- Carl Scherb, who served 49 days, is to receive $1,225.
   -- Derrick Hicks, who served 13 days, is to receive $325.
   -- Curtis Gillery, with 169 days, is to receive $4,225.
   -- Thomas Bolton Jr., with 143 days, is to receive $3,575.

The federal judge said the plaintiffs were to appear in court.
However, two have not done so. Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson gave
plaintiffs' attorney Michael Sutherlin 30 days to contact Scherb
and Hicks or she will drop their judgments from the agreement.

Settlements earlier this year were reached with two of the
plaintiffs, Jauston Huerta and Lloyd Thomas. Huerta's settlement is
for $12,500 with the county's insurer.

Thomas' settlement for $29,750 is with the company that provides
medical care to Vigo County jail inmates.

After the hearing, attorney for the county David P. Friedrich said
the financial settlements removes the need for a jury that had been
scheduled for April 15. Remedying conditions at the jail remains
part the class-action litigation, however.

"The focus now for the court is when will you build a new jail?" he
said. "The class action remains, but we will move now to a
monitoring phase. We are doing what we are supposed to as far as
all of the things in place in the summary judgment in October. That
includes are we giving the wellness checks, the recreation time per
week and is it [the jail] staffed appropriately."

The judge had previously questioned Sheriff John Plasse on the
number of new correctional officers hired per the parties
agreements and the courts instructions.

Plasse said the county still remains at least 13 people short of
the required number of correctional officers but it continues to
try to fill those positions.

In October 2016, attorney Michael Sutherlin filed a class action
lawsuit against Vigo County, the Vigo County Council and Vigo
County sheriff on behalf of inmate Huerta and all current and
future inmates of the jail, claiming the jail population regularly
exceeds a 268-inmate cap set in 2002 to settle another class-action
complaint regarding overcrowding.

Sutherlin -- later joined by Kenneth Falk, lead attorney for the
ACLU in Indiana -- alleged unconstitutional conditions in the jail
such as lack of inmates meeting privately with attorneys on regular
basis; substandard inmate classification and segregation;
inadequate space for recreation; lack of educational programs; and
denial of psychiatric and mental health services.

The county conceded the existence of unconstitutional conditions,
and it and the inmates' attorneys agreed on remedies, with
Magnus-Stinson entering formalizing those remedies in a court order
in late February. The federal court retains jurisdiction, with
Magnus-Stinson monitoring Vigo County's progress. [GN]


VIVINT SOLAR: Court Dismisses T. Bank's Amended TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD C. BANK, Plaintiff, v. VIVINT SOLAR, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-2555 (MKB) (RLM) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Margo
K. Brodie of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint.

On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff Bank, proceeding pro se, commenced the
putative class action against the Defendant, alleging that it
placed or directed to be placed unauthorized "robocalls" in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), and
New York General Business Law ("GBL").  On June 27, 2018, the
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, asserting claims under
section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA and section 399 of the GBL.

On March 17, 2018, the Plaintiff received an unsolicited telephone
call on his cellular telephone and, upon answering, a prerecorded
voice on the caller's end promoted residential solar-energy
services.  Following the Prerecorded Call, he was transferred to a
live person.  The Plaintiff provided the Transferee with an alias
and the Transferee told him that an unspecified person would call
him in approximately 30 minutes.

Approximately 30 minutes later, the Plaintiff received another call
on the same cellular telephone from Joshua Lilly, an employee of
the Defendant, asking to speak with a person by the name of the
alias that the Plaintiff had provided to the Transferee.  During
the conversation between Lilly and the Plaintiff, Lilly stated that
the Defendant regularly utilizes telephone calls in which, upon
being answered, prerecorded material advertises its services.
Lilly did not know how the Plaintiff's telephone number was
obtained, and the Plaintiff did not consent to receive the
Prerecorded Call.  The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant
placed, or directed to be placed, the Prerecorded Call.

On Aug. 10, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the TCPA claim
for failure to state a claim, the GBL state law claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the class claims on non-New York
residents for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The Plaintiff opposed
Defendant's motion.  He also filed a separate memorandum of law
opposing the Defendant's request to dismiss the putative class
action claims.

On Oct. 9, 2018, the Court referred the Defendant's motion to
Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann for a report and recommendation.
By report and recommendation dated Feb. 25, 2019, Judge Mann
recommended that the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the Amended Complaint ("R&R").

On March 1, 2019, the Plaintiff timely filed an objection to the
R&R.  He objects to Judge Mann's conclusion that he fails to allege
vicarious liability under a theory of apparent authority, arguing
that Judge Mann erred in her interpretation of case law and that
the facts in his Amended Complaint support a claim pursuant to
section 227(b)(1).  He also objects to Judge Mann's recommendation
that the Court deny his request for sanctions.

The Plaintiff did not object to Judge Mann's recommendation that
(1) he fails to state a claim for direct liability under section
227(b)(1) of the TCPA, and (2) he fails to state a claim for
vicarious liability under theories of ratification and aiding and
abetting.  Judge Brodie has reviewed the unopposed portions of the
R&R and, finding no clear error, adopts the recommendations
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

The Plaintiff argues that his Amended Complaint contains sufficient
allegations to state a claim that the Defendant is vicariously
liable under section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA for the acts of its
purported agent under a theory of apparent authority.  Consistent
with Judge Mann's recommendation, the Judge holds that the
Plaintiff fails to state a TCPA claim and dismisses this claim.
She finds that the Plaintiff only alleges that the Prerecorded Call
promoted residential solar-energy services, not that the
Prerecorded Call promoted the Defendant's goods and services.  Nor
does the Plaintiff identify the purported agent.  

In his opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiff requested sanctions and argued that it "fragrantly"
deceived the Court by mischaracterizing case law.  The Judge holds
that the Plaintiff failed to follow the procedural requirements of
Rule 11.  She finds that the Plaintiff does not point to any
specific errors in the R&R.  Notwithstanding the Plaintiff's
failure to point to any specific errors in the R&R, the Judge finds
that the Defendant's arguments, including its characterization of
case law, are not deceptive, especially in light of the fact that
she grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, she
denies the Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.

Having dismissed Plaintiff's sole federal claim, the Judge declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's state
law claim for violations of the GBL.  Accordingly, she dismisses
the Plaintiff's state law claim without prejudice.

Finally, because the proposed amendments to the Amended Complaint
do not cure the deficiencies, the amendment would be futile.  The
Judge therefore denies the Plaintiff's request for leave to file a
second amended complaint based on the proposed factual allegations.
However, she grants the Plaintiff leave to file a proposed,
corrected second amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
her Memorandum and Order.  The proposed second amended complaint
must contain sufficient allegations to plausible plead agency
liability under the TCPA.  The Plaintiff may replead any state law
claim in the second amended complaint.

The Judge will review the proposed, corrected second amended
complaint to determine whether it sufficiently states a claim.  If
she determines that the Plaintiff's proposed, corrected second
amended complaint fails to state a claim, she will not allow its
filing and will direct the Clerk of Court to close the case.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Brodie adopted the R&R, granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure
to state a claim, and denied the Plaintiff's request for sanctions.
She granted the Plaintiff leave to file a corrected, proposed
second amended complaint within 30 days of the Memorandum and Order
for the Court's review.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/igA2mq from Leagle.com.

Todd C. Bank, Plaintiff, pro se.

Vivint Solar, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kelly Jones Howell --
khowell@harrisbeach.com -- Harris Beach PLLC & Ross B. Hofherr --
rhofherr@harrisbeach.com -- Harris Beach PLLC.


WARNER CHILCOTT: Court Dismisses MSP Recovery's Racketeering Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WARNER CHILCOTT PLC et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
18-cv-10274-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Plaintiffs assert that they are the holders, by assignment, of
the right to recover for damages that certain Medicare Advantage
Organizations, Independent Practice Associations, Management
Service Organizations, Health Maintenance Organizations, and other
entities suffered as a result of the Defendants' schemes to
increase prescriptions for their pharmaceuticals by bribing
doctors, making false efficacy claims, and manipulating the process
for obtaining prior authorizations.

They bring claims on behalf of two putative classes of entities
that allegedly incurred costs as a result of the Defendants'
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") (Count I), and violations of the consumer protection
laws of Idaho, Texas, North Carolina, West Virginia, New York,
Massachusetts, Indiana, Florida, Minnesota, and New Jersey (Count
II), as well as for acts of common law fraud (Count III), and based
on unjust enrichment (Count IV).

The Plaintiffs filed the action on Feb. 12, 2018.  On July 25,
2018, they filed the Second Amended Complaint, which acknowledges
that the third amended qui tam complaint filed by Relators Goan and
Alexander on Aug. 22, 2013 alleged essentially the same allegations
and actions as those alleged in the instant case.

On Aug. 24, 2018, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss.  They advance six arguments in support of their motion to
dismiss: (1) that the Plaintiffs' RICO claim and most of their
state law claims are barred by statutes of limitation, (2) that the
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, (3) that the Plaintiffs fail
to state a civil RICO claim, (4) that the Plaintiffs have not
stated a claim under consumer protection laws, (5) that the
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for common law fraud, and (6)
that the Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for unjust enrichment.
Because the Plaintiffs' RICO claim is barred by the statute of
limitations, Judge Burroughs does not reach the Defendants' other
arguments.

Because the Plaintiffs' RICO count is nearly entirely based on
facts alleged in publicly disclosed qui tam complaints that were
filed more than four years prior to the filing of the action, the
Judge concludes that the statute of limitations bars the Plaintiffs
from bringing a RICO claim that is a mere repackaging of those qui
tam complaints.

In addition, the Judge finds that the case is still in the early
stages of litigation.  The Complaint has been amended twice, but
there has been no discovery.  The remaining claims turn on
questions of state law that have not been extensively briefed to
the Court given the parties' focus on the RICO claim.  Even to the
extent that the parties have indicated that the tolling rules of
several states are broadly similar to the federal rule for RICO
claims, those representations were made prior to the First
Circuit's ruling in Celexa & Lexapro.

The Judge holds that if the Plaintiffs have claims that are not
time-barred, there may be close questions of state law related to
the assignability of the claims at issue and the scope of state
consumer protection laws.  Further, he likely would require further
amendment of the complaint before he could resolve all of the state
law claims, were the Court to retain jurisdiction.  The Judge will
therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims.

Accordingly, Judge Burroughs granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.  He dismissed the RICO claim with prejudice.  He declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and
dismissed them without prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may refile those
claims in courts of appropriate jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://is.gd/NvpeGB from Leagle.com.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, a Delaware entity, Plaintiff,
represented by Christopher L. Coffin -- ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com --
Pendley, Baudin & Coffin, LLP, Enrique G. Serna --
enrique@serna-associates.com -- Serna & Associates PLLC. & Marilyn
T. McGoldrick -- mmcgoldrick@tenlaw.com -- Thornton & Naumes, LLP.

MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, a Delaware entity & MSPA Claims 1 LLC, a
Florida entity, Plaintiffs, represented by Marilyn T. McGoldrick,
Thornton & Naumes, LLP.

Warner Chilcott PLL, Allergan USA, Inc., Allergan Sales, LLC &
Allergan GI, Corp., Defendants, represented by Andrew D. Lazerow --
alazerow@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice & Matthew
J. O'Connor -- moconnor@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP.

Allergan plc, Defendant, represented by Andrew D. Lazerow,
Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice.


WILMINGTON TRUST: $29.7MM Judgment for ESOP Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIM P. BRUNDLE, on behalf of the Constellis Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, Plaintiff-Appellee, and ANDREW HALLDORSON, on
behalf of the Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and on
behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as successor to Wilmington
Trust Retirement and Institutional Services Company,
Defendant-Appellant. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS, Amicus
Supporting Appellant, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, Amicus Supporting Appellee. TIM P. BRUNDLE, on behalf of the
Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
ANDREW HALLDORSON, on behalf of the Constellis Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as
successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement and Institutional Services
Company, Defendant-Appellee. SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Amicus Supporting Appellant, AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF APPRAISERS, Amicus Supporting Appellee. TIM P. BRUNDLE, on
behalf of the Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan,
Plaintiff-Appellee, and ANDREW HALLDORSON, on behalf of the
Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, CONSTELLIS
GROUP, INC., Party-in-Interest, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as
successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement and Institutional Services
Company, Defendant-Appellant. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS,
Amicus Supporting Appellant, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Amicus Supporting Appellee. TIM P. BRUNDLE, on
behalf of the Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan,
Plaintiff-Appellee, and ANDREW HALLDORSON, on behalf of the
Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CONSTELLIS
GROUP, INC., Party-in-Interest-Appellant, and WILMINGTON TRUST,
N.A., as successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement and Institutional
Services Company, Defendant. TIM P. BRUNDLE, on behalf of the
Constellis Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
ANDREW HALLDORSON, on behalf of the Constellis Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as
successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement and Institutional Services
Company, Defendant-Appellee, CONSTELLIS GROUP, INC.,
Party-in-Interest, Case Nos. 17-1873, 17-2224, 17-2323, 17-2324,
18-1029 (Case Nos. 17-1873, 17-2224, 17-2323, 17-2324, 18-1029),
Judge Dianna Gribbon Motz of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's (i) judgment for the
Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") in the amount of $29,773,250
and (i) award of attorneys' fees to the participant's counsel.

After owners of a closely held corporation sold the company to its
ESOP, a participant in the ESOP brought the action.  The
participant contended that the trustee chosen for the ESOP by the
corporation breached its fiduciary duties to the ESOP and overpaid
for the stock -- improperly enriching the corporation's owners at
the expense of its employees.

Since its inception, Constellis Group, Inc., the closely held
parent company of a group of private security subsidiaries, has
offered some form of deferred compensation to its employees, who
are primarily retired members of the U.S. Armed Forces.  After
initially offering a stock option program, Constellis replaced that
program with a profit-sharing plan in 2010.  In mid-2013, looking
for an "exit strategy" after having twice tried and failed to
effectuate a sale of the company, the owners of Constellis
("Sellers") began exploring the possibility of creating an ESOP to
purchase Constellis.

To that end, Constellis retained CSG International, an investment
banking firm.  CSG reported that sale of Constellis to an ESOP
would not only enable the Sellers to liquidate their shares but
would save them 23.8% in federal capital gains taxes.  CSG
suggested that Constellis create what several trial witnesses
characterized as a "unique" ESOP structure to effectuate the sale.
To fund the ESOP's purchase, Constellis would contribute 24% of the
purchase price and the ESOP would borrow the remainder from
Constellis and the Sellers themselves.  In late September 2013,
Constellis decided to move forward with CSG's proposal to create
this unique ESOP.  To maximize the Sellers' tax savings, Constellis
had to complete the sale by the end of the calendar year

On the recommendation of CSG, Constellis engaged Wilmington Trust,
N.A., to serve as trustee for the ESOP. In its role as trustee,
Wilmington hired Stout Risius Ross ("SRR") to be the financial
advisor on the ESOP's purchase of Constellis.  On Nov. 12, 2013,
SRR submitted a draft valuation of Constellis stock to Wilmington,
concluding that the fair market value for a single share of
Constellis stock lay between $3,865 and $4,600 -- resulting in a
rounded median price per share of $4,235.

At the meeting's conclusion, Wilmington set out to negotiate the
ESOP's purchase of Constellis with authorization to offer a share
price of $3,900 to $4,235.  The next day, Wilmington submitted an
opening bid on behalf of the ESOP for $3,900 per share.  The ESOP
issued a tender offer for the shares on November 18 with a closing
date of December 20.  The parties finalized the term sheet on
November 22.  On December 19, after meeting with SRR for half an
hour to discuss SRR's valuation, Wilmington approved the purchase.
On December 20, the ESOP's purchase of Constellis closed for a per
share price of $4,235.

Subsequently, Tim P. Brundle, a former Constellis employee and ESOP
participant, brought the action contending that Wilmington caused
the ESOP to enter into a transaction prohibited under ERISA Section
1106.4 Brundle alleged that the $4,235 per share paid by the ESOP
for Constellis was too high and resulted in the ESOP overpaying the
Sellers for the stock.  The district court initially held that the
2013 purchase of Constellis by the ESOP constituted a prohibited
transaction under Section 1106(a)(1).  Wilmington conceded as much
before the district court but raised the adequate-consideration
affirmative defense available under Section 1108(e)(1).

Following a bench trial, the district court issued meticulous
factual findings and concluded on the basis of those findings that
Wilmington had not established the Section 1108(e) affirmative
defense.  Rather, the court found that Wilmington had violated its
fiduciary duty to the ESOP.  It concluded that Wilmington's
fiduciary failures resulted in the ESOP overpaying for the
Constellis stock by $29,773,250, and so awarded that amount to the
ESOP as damages.

Brundle then moved for attorneys' fees.  The court first ordered
Wilmington to pay attorneys' fees pursuant to ERISA's fee-shifting
provision in the amount of $1,819,631.  It subsequently awarded an
additional $1.5 million in fees from the damages award.

On appeal, Wilmington challenges the court's liability and damages
determinations and its award of $1.5 million in non-statutory
attorneys' fees.  Brundle cross-appeals, challenging as inadequate
the same portion of the attorneys' fees award.

Judge Motz finds that (i) in light of the limited rights provided
to the ESOP, she cannot conclude that the district court erred in
finding that Wilmington should have done more to challenge the use
of any control premium; (ii) Wilmington fails to identify any
evidence that demonstrates the district court clearly erred in
finding that the value of Stock Appreciation Rights ("SARs") issued
in connection with the ESOP's purchase of Constellis should have
been deducted from Constellis' equity value for purposes of SRR's
valuation; and (iii) despite paying more for Constellis stock, the
ESOP did not obtain nearly the level of control that ACADEMI, LLC
acquired.

Having rejected all of Wilmington's challenges to the district
court's findings as to its liability, the Judge turns to the
court's damages award.  The district court concluded that
Wilmington's fiduciary failures inflated the price the ESOP paid
for Constellis stock by $29,773,250.  

The Judge finds no error in the district court's damages award.
She finds that (i) Wilmington's principal basis for urging reversal
of the damages award consists of a repetition of its challenge to
the district court's liability findings; (ii) although the ESOP
benefited despite the breach, it would have benefited at least as
much -- but ended in a far better position -- without the breach;
and (iii) Wilmington does not even argue that the Sellers'
write-off here was meant to remedy the ESOP's overpayment.

Finally, Judge Motz examines the district court's award of
attorneys' fees.  The district court awarded Brundle's counsel
$1,819,631.11 in statutory fees and an additional $1.5 million in
fees from the ESOP's damages judgment.  She finds that the district
court retained discretion to award supplemental attorneys' fees
from the common fund.  The district court properly weighed B&G's
efforts on behalf of the ESOP -- including contingency risk --
against the objections from ESOP participants to determine a proper
common fund award.  Because she cannot say this balancing was
clearly wrong, the Judge affirms the court's fee award in full.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Motz affirmed the judgment of the
district court in all respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 22, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/pykoUy from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Carter Glasgow Phillips, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Wilmington Trust, N.A.

Gregory Y. Porter -- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Robin Springberg Parry, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Secretary of Labor.

ON BRIEF: James P. McElligott, Jr. -- jmcelligott@mcguirewoods.com
-- Summer L. Speight, Richmond, Virginia, Stephen W. Robinson --
srobinson@mcguirewoods.com -- McGUIRE WOODS LLP, Tysons, Virginia;
Jacqueline G. Cooper, Kurt A. Johnson, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Wilmington Trust,
N.A.

Edward Lee Isler, Micah E. Ticatch, ISLER DARE, P.C., Vienna,
Virginia, for Appellant Constellis Group, Inc.

Tillman J. Breckenridge -- tbreckenridge@baileyglasser.com -- Ryan
T. Jenny -- rjenny@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

J. Christian Nemeth, Chicago, Illinois, Sophia A. Luby, Washington,
D.C.; Eliot T. Burriss, Erin Turle, Calli Turner, McDERMOTT WILL &
EMERY LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Amicus American Society of
Appraisers.

Kate S. O'Scannlain, Solicitor of Labor, G. William Scott,
Associate Solicitor for Plan Benefits Security, Thomas Tso, Counsel
for Appellate and Special Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Secretary of Labor.


YELLOW PAGES: Court Okays Class Action Over Terms of Contracts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hayley Woodin, writing for BIV, reports that a Quebec court has
authorized a class action against Yellow Pages Ltd. (TSX:Y) over
the terms of its contracts.

Why it matters: While the case specifics are only relevant in
Quebec, small business owners across Canada have complained about
Yellow Pages' business practices, which will be under scrutiny.
[GN]





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