CAR_Public/190508.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, May 8, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 92

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Holloway Suit Removed to C.D. California
AIRGAS USA: Lit'l Pepper Sues over Misleading Fuel Surcharge
ALDI INC: Gant Suit Removed to C.D. California
ALLIANCE ONE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
ALLIED INTERSTATE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

ALTA DENA CERTIFIED: Underpays Material Handlers, Padilla Alleges
AMAZING HOME: Rivas Seeks Conditional Class Certification
AMERICAN RENAL: May 28 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
AMERICAN RENAL: Rosen Law Firm Files Suit Over Faulty Accounting
APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Defective Apple Watch Models

AREAS USA LAX: Cazares Suit Removed to C.D. California
ARKANSAS TOTAL: Court Certifies Class of Care Coordinators
AVIS BUDGET: NJ Court Affirms Protective Order in Mendez
BANK OF MONTREAL: Fire Pension Assoc. Appeals Suit Dismissal
BARRIER TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Brown Suit Says

BOSE: Must Face Class Action Over Connect App
BP EXPLORATION: Dismissal With Prejudice of Wiggins Recommended
CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Phoenix Pay System
CANADA: NAN Provides Info on Indian Day School Settlement
CANADA: Plaintiffs' Counsel to Appeal Class Action Against WRPS

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Class Certification Bid in Wolf Case Shelved
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CARD ONE: Fromer Chiropractic Sues Over Unsolicited Advertisements
CHARTER COMMS: Burke Law Named Interim Lead Counsel in Leeb Suit
CITRIX SYSTEMS: Boger Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls

CREDIT PROTECTION: Bid to Certify Class in McRobie Partly Granted
CRUNCH LLC: Eacret Suit Status Conference Continued to July 18
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP: Schenck Moves to Certify Class of Applicants
CVS PHARMACY: Pension Funds Seek to Certify Classes
DALLAS COUNTY ADJUSTERS: Blair Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages

DEITSCH AND WRIGHT: Florida Class Certified in McCray FDCPA Suit
EMPLOYER FLEXIBLE: Faces Lopez Suit over Background Checks
EPIC SYSTEMS: Faegre Baker Discusses Arbitration Ruling
FARM BUREAU: Chavez Seeks to Certify Insurance Agent Class
FELICITY HUFFMAN: To Plead Guilty in College Admissions Case

FLEX LTD: Order Naming Lead Plaintiff/Counsel in Kipling Vacated
GAYLOR ELECTRIC: Hodge Suit Removed to E.D. Washington
GENERAL ATLANTIC: Securities Class Action Dismissal Affirmed
GODADDY.COM: Judge Certifies Class in Telemarketing Lawsuit
GOOGLE INC: Moore & Van Discusses Cy Pres Ruling

GREATBANC TRUST: Settles ERISA Class Action for $2.3MM
HAROLD CLARKE: Court Denies 2nd Motion to Certify Class
HOME DEPOT: Camp Suit Removed to N.D. California
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Status Hearing Set for May 31
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Mustric Suit

HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Hannah Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
INTERCOAST COLLEGES: Court Compels Arbitration in Kourembanas
INTERNATIONAL LASER: Alvarado Seeks Class Cert. Under FLSA, BIPA
KIA MOTORS AMERICA: Faces De Anda Suit over Defective Automobile
LARIO OIL: Hancock Seeks to Conditionally Certify FLSA Class

LEXUS OF NEW ORLEANS: Court Dismisses Kimble Suit With Prejudice
M/A/R/C RESEARCH: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
MANN PACKING: Anguiano Suit Removed to N.D. California
MARTINFEDERAL CONSULTING: Beavers Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
MATRIX MEDICAL: Gasperak Suit Removed to M.D. Florida

MDL 2804: ND Counties Suit Consolidated in Opiate Litigation
MDL 2886: Harmel Suit Consolidated in Allura Fiber Litigation
MERCURY GENERAL: MAO-MSO et al. Seek to Certify Class
MICROCHIP TECH: Schuman et al Seek to Certify Atmel Employees Class
MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

MONSANTO CO: Graves Sues Over Roundup(R)-Related Injuries
MULTIFAMILY INTERNET: Ehrman Suit Removed to C.D. California
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
NATURAL HEALTH: Class Action Law Firm Gets Dozens of Inquiries
NAVIHEALTH INC: Bid to Certify Collective Action Denied

NELSON TREE: Non-Exempt Workers Class Certified in Neville Suit
NESTLE WATERS: Says Poland Spring Class Action Meritless
NIO INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Suit
PACESETTERS, INC: Scantland Seeks to Conditionally Certify Class
PAYCRON INC: Jackson Seeks to Certify Class

PHILIP B WILLETTE: Malik Sues Over Unlawful Debt Collection
R.BERG ENTERPRISES: Underpays Cashiers, Coronado Suit Alleges
RE/MAX HOLDINGS: Antitrust Suit Filed Over Commissions
RESOURCE MARKETING: Baudin et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
RESOURCE MARKETING: Former Employees File FLSA Class Action

RSM US: Ill. App. Reverses Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
SETERUS INC: May 27 Barilla Class Certification Bid Filing Deadline
SEVIER COUNTY, TN: Court Grants Class Certification in "Whitlock"
SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS: Garlick Suit Removed to Mass. Dist. Ct.
SINEMIA: Adds Class Action Waiver Clause to Terms of Service

STAMPS.COM INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Shareholders' Suit
SUNCOKE ENERGY: Faces Marks Suit over Merger Transaction
TERRACE VIEW: Cal. App. Flips $57MM Punitive Damage Award in Bevis
TRADER JOE'S: Calif. Court Strikes Down $1.3MM Tuna Class Action
TRANS WORLD: Spack et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class

TRANSDEV SERVICES: Hakeem Suit Removed to N.D. California
TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Samouris Sues Over Defective Airbag Control Units
TWENTIETH CENTURY: Bid to Certify Class in TS Suit Continued
TYME TECHNOLOGIES: Kuznicki Law Announces Class Action Suits
U.S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE: 4th Cir. Flips $24MM Settlement Approval

UNIFUND CCR: Goldberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices
UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Ct. Suggests Denial of Bid to Dismiss ERISA Suit
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Dismissal of Count I in Kamins Suit Affirmed
UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Muslims' Suit vs. FBI
UNITED STATES: Ackerman Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass

UNITED STATES: Court Nixes Class Claims in Smith Prisoner Suit
UNITED STATES: DHS Ordered to Turn Over Docs in DACA Class Action
UNITED STATES: Oklahoma City NAACP to File Class Action v. DHS
UNITED STATES: Veterans Affairs Responds to NVLSP's Class Action
UTAH: May Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners Suffering From HCV

VALET INC: Underpays Parking Attendants, Lafleur et al. Allege
WALT DISNEY: Faces Gender Pay Gap Class Action in California
WARNER MUSIC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Williams Class Suit
WELLS FARGO: Court Denies McDonald's Class Certification Bid
WYNDHAM VACATON: Underpays Sales Representatives, Pagh Suit Says

XTO ENERGY: Court Certifies Class of Drilling Consultants
[*] Law to Expand Scope for Class Actions in Italy Approved

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Holloway Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned JASON HOLLOWAY, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. 3M COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
CIVDS1907761 was removed from the Superior Court for the State of
California, County of San Bernardino to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California on April 18, 2019, and
assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-00708.

Plaintiff (a current employee at one of the 3M California plants
located in Oak Hills, California), filed this putative class action
complaint alleging that 3M violated his rights protected by the
California Labor Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Maria C. Roberts, Esq.
     Dessi N. Day, Esq.
     GREENE & ROBERTS
     402 West Broadway, Suite 1025
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 398-3400
     Facsimile: (619) 330-4907
     Email: mroberts@greeneroberts.com
            dday@greeneroberts.com


AIRGAS USA: Lit'l Pepper Sues over Misleading Fuel Surcharge
------------------------------------------------------------
LIT'L PEPPER GOURMET, INC., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff vs. AIRGAS USA, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 37-2019-00016827-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super., San
Diego Cty., March 29, 2019) alleges that the Defendant unlawfully
impose "Fuel Surcharge" to its customers.

According to the complaint, the Defendant charges its California
customers for the sale and delivery of its products a fee it calls
a "Fuel Surcharge Flat." The term "Fuel Surcharge" has a specific
and understood meaning. The Defendant uses the term "Fuel
Surcharge" to create the false impression that the fee is a
legitimate charge related to increased fuel costs Airgas USA incurs
in delivering products to its customers.

The Defendant's representations, omissions, and practices in
charging the "Fuel Surcharge" are deceptive and unfair. The "Fuel
Surcharge" bears absolutely no relation to the Defendant's actual
increased fuel costs (or its actual fuel costs) and the Defendant
does not use the proceeds from the "Fuel Surcharge" to offset its
increased fuel costs (or its actual fuel costs). The amount of the
"Fuel Surcharge" generally does not change, despite decreases in
the Defendant's fuel costs. Further, the Defendant includes any
increases in fuel costs it might incur in delivering products in
the standard prices it charges customers.

Airgas USA, LLC manufactures and distributes industrial gases,
medical and specialty gases, welding supplies, and related safety
products. It also offers nitrous oxide and supplies dry ice. The
company was incorporated in 2011 and is based in Radnor,
Pennsylvania. Airgas USA, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Airgas,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John K. Landay, Esq.
          LANDAY ROBERTS LLP
          101 West Broadway, Suite 300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-5712
          E-mail: jlanday@landayroberts.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Licari, Esq.
          SPRINKLE LLOYD & LICARI LLP
          2801 B Street, Suite 556
          San Diego, CA 92102
          Telephone: (858) 717-0013
          E-mail: mike@SL2Law.com


ALDI INC: Gant Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------
The case captioned JEREE GANT, individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
ALDI, INC., a California corporation; AI CALIFORNIA LLC, an unknown
business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV04857 was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles, to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on
April 22, 2019, and assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03109.

The Complaint asserts ten causes of action for: (1) Unpaid
Overtime, (2) Unpaid Meal Period Premiums, (3) Unpaid Rest Period
Premiums, (4) Unpaid Minimum Wages, (5) Final Wages Not Timely
Paid, (6) Wages Not Timely Paid During Employment, (7)
Non-Compliant Wage Statements, (8) Failure To Keep Requisite
Payroll Records, (9) Unreimbursed Business Expenses, and (10)
Violations of California Business & Professions ("Unfair
Competition Law" or "UCL").[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Laura Wilson Shelby, Esq.
     Leo Q. Li, Esq.
     Jennifer R. Nunez, Esq.
     SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
     2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
     Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
     Phone: (310) 277-7200
     Facsimile: (310) 201-5219
     Email: lshelby@seyfarth.com
            lli@seyfarth.com
            jnunez@seyfarth.com


ALLIANCE ONE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JULIAN ROZANI, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
ALLIANCE ONE RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00588 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an
order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff furthers ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

ALLIED INTERSTATE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned PATRICK BILLS, JUMOKA
JOHNSON, DONNA KIJEK, and JODI LUCHETTA, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ALLIED
INTERSTATE, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00557-NJ (E.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order certifying a
class, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

ALTA DENA CERTIFIED: Underpays Material Handlers, Padilla Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BALBINA PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ALTA DENA CERTIFIED DAIRY, LLC; DEAND FOODS
COMPANY; and DOES 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV10846
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., March 29, 2019) is an action
against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime
compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest periods, and
provide itemize wage statements.

The Plaintiff Padilla was employed by the Defendant as a material
handler.

Alta Dena Certified Dairy, LLC produces milk and dairy products.
The company offers white, flavored, and specialty milk; cottage
cheese, sour creams, and butter; and ice creams, juices, and other
beverages. The company was founded in 1945 and is based in City Of
Industry, California. As of 1999 Alta Dena Certified Dairy, LLC
operates as a subsidiary of Dean West II, LLC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
          Edward Kim, Esq.
          Berkeh Alemzadeh, Esq.
          MAHONEY LAW GROUP
          249 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 590-5550
          Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
          E-mail: kmahoney@mahoney-law.net
                  ekim@mahoney-law.net
                  balem@mahoney-law.net


AMAZING HOME: Rivas Seeks Conditional Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RICARDO RIVAS, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, vs. AMAZING HOME
COMMUNITY SERVICES, LLC & ADELA SEGOVIA, the Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-00086-OLG (W.D. Tex.), the Parties ask the Court to grant
conditional certification and notice to Class of:

   "all current and former hourly employees employed by
   Defendants from [three years prior to the date the notice
   is issued] to the present who worked more than forty
   hours in at least one workweek and were not paid an
   overtime premium of one-and-one-half times their hourly
   rate for those hours."

The Plaintiff filed this Fair Labor Standards Act collective action
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Typically,
in collective actions, a plaintiff files a Motion seeking
conditional certification and court authorization to send a notice
to potential plaintiffs informing them of the pending action and
their right to opt into the action if they so desire.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Lawrence Morales II, Esq.
          Allison s. Hartry, Esq.
          THE MORALES FIRM, P.C.
          6243 IH-10 West, Suite 132
          San Antonio, TX 78201
          Telephone No. (210) 225-0811
          Facsimile No. (210) 225-0821
          E-mail: lawrence@themoralesfirm.com
                  ahartry@themoralesfirm.com

Attorneys for the Defendants:

          Stacy H. Bruce, Esq.
          Jennifer Smiley, Esq.
          COBB MARTINEZ WOODWARD PLLC
          1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 3100
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 220-5210
          Facsimile: (214) 250-5260
          E-mail: sbruce@cobbmartinez.com
                  jsmiley@cobbmartinez.com

AMERICAN RENAL: May 28 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C. on April 2 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased
American Renal Associates Holdings, Inc. ("American Renal" or the
"Company") (NYSE: ARA) between August 10, 2016 and March 27, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

American Renal shareholders may, no later than May 28, 2019, move
the Court for appointment as a lead plaintiff of the Class.  If you
purchased shares of American Renal and would like to learn more
about these claims or if you wish to discuss these matters and have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights, contact
Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or to sign
up online, click here.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that defendants made materially false and
misleading statements to investors during the Class Period and
failed to disclose the following:  (i) the Company's financial
statements were false and could not be relied upon; and (ii)
American Renal had material weaknesses in its internal controls
over financial reporting.  The complaint further alleges that, as a
result of the foregoing, investors purchased American Renal's
common stock at artificially inflated prices during the Class
Period and suffered investment losses as a result of the
defendants' conduct.

On March 8, 2019, American Renal disclosed that it was delaying the
filing of its fiscal 2019 Annual Report, and that the Company's
Audit Committee was "examining reserve computations and other
accounting practices that could have an impact on accounts
receivable and revenue for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018,
as well as the previously reported fiscal years…."  Following
this news, shares of the Company's stock declined $2.05 per share,
or over 16% in value, to close on March 8, 2019 at $10.46 per
share, on heavy trading volume.

Subsequently, on March 27, 2019, American Renal disclosed that the
Company's previously issued financial statements for fiscal years
2014 – 2017 "should be restated and should no longer be relied
upon," and that the Company's Chief Financial Officer had
"resigned" effective March 26, 2019.  Following this additional
news, shares of the Company's stock declined a an additional $3.69
per share, or 38% in value, to close on March 28, 2019 at $6.01 per
share, again on heavy trading volume.

If you are a member of the class, you may, no later than May 28,
2019, request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff of the
class.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.  In
order to be appointed lead plaintiff, the Court must determine that
the class member's claim is typical of the claims of other class
members, and that the class member will adequately represent the
class.  Under certain circumstances, one or more class members may
together serve as "lead plaintiff."  Your ability to share in any
recovery is not, however, affected by the decision whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.  You may retain RM LAW, P.C. or other
counsel of your choice, to serve as your counsel in this action.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com or click here.   For more information
about class action cases in general or to learn more about RM LAW,
P.C. please visit our website by clicking here.

RM LAW, P.C. -- http://www.rmclasslaw.com-- is a national
shareholder litigation firm.  RM LAW, P.C. is devoted to protecting
the interests of individual and institutional investors in
shareholder actions in state and federal courts nationwide. [GN]


AMERICAN RENAL: Rosen Law Firm Files Suit Over Faulty Accounting
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of American Renal Associates Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: ARA)
from August 10, 2016 through March 27, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for American Renal
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the American Renal class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1533.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or
email pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information
on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) issues with American
Renal's accounting process for revenue recognition, collections,
and related matters would give rise to a U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigation into the same, and
increased regulatory scrutiny by the SEC; (2) American Renal's
financial statements for the fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017
contained in its Annual Reports for the years ended December 31,
2016 and 2017, and its condensed consolidated financial statements
in quarterly reports from 2016 through 2018 were false and could
not be relied upon; (3) American Renal had material weaknesses in
its internal control over financial reporting; and (4) as a result,
defendants' public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times. When the true details entered the market,
the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than May 28,
2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1533.

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm, on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm/.

View source version on
businesswire.com:https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190328005983/en/

Contact:

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com
[GN]



APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Defective Apple Watch Models
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Rossignol, writing for MacRumors, reports that New Jersey
resident Gina Priano-Keyser has filed a proposed class action
lawsuit against Apple in U.S. district court, accusing the company
of fraudulent business practices and breach of warranty related to
the Apple Watch, according to court documents accessed by
MacRumors.

Priano-Keyser alleges that all Apple Watches up to and including
Series 4 models are prone to a defect that results in the
lithium-ion battery swelling and causing the screen to "crack,
shatter, or detach from the body" of the watch "through no fault of
the wearer, oftentimes only days or weeks after purchase."

The plaintiff believes that Apple either knew or should have known
that the Apple Watch models were defective before selling them,
adding that they pose "a significant safety hazard to consumers" --
a "number" of which have suffered "cuts and burns" as a result of
the scratched, shattered, or detached screens.

Apple has acknowledged the possibility of swollen batteries in
select Apple Watch models in the past, and offered free repairs up
to three years after purchase. However, the complaint alleges that
the company often attributes the issue to "accidental damage" and
thus "refuses to cover repairs" under warranty.

Priano-Keyser states that she purchased an Apple Watch Series 3 in
October 2017. In July 2018, while charging, she alleges that the
screen "unexpectedly detached" from the watch's body and cracked.
Her daughter "pushed the screen back into place," but the Apple
Watch has been "unusable" ever since.

The plaintiff booked a Genius Bar appointment in August 2018, but
upon inspection, she alleges that Apple denied to repair the Apple
Watch free of charge under warranty and instead quoted her an
out-of-warranty fee of $229 for service.
The complaint cites over a dozen similar experiences described by
users on the Apple Support Communities over the past few years.

Priano-Keyser is seeking damages in an amount to be proven at trial
for herself and all others similarly situated. The proposed class
includes all residents of New Jersey who are current and former
owners of all models and sizes of the Apple Watch Series 1, Series
2, and Series 3 purchased in New Jersey.

The complaint was filed by Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP,
the same law firm that filed a nearly identical class action
lawsuit regarding the swollen Apple Watch batteries in California
back in June 2018. That case was tossed by U.S. District Judge Lucy
Koh in January due to being "vague."

"Plaintiff's description of the alleged defect identifies only the
consequences of the alleged defect (i.e., cracking, shattering, or
detaching), but is notably silent on identifying the defect that
causes such consequences," Judge Koh stated.

The lawsuit in New Jersey addresses this by attempting to identify
a cause.

"Upon information and belief, the Defect is caused by aging or
otherwise faulty li-on batteries, or by defective internal
components of the Watches that regulate temperature, electrical
currents, charging, and other mechanisms that could affect the
Watches' li-on batteries," the complaint states.

It remains to be seen if the New Jersey case proceeds to trial or
is also tossed. [GN]


AREAS USA LAX: Cazares Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned JUAN RAMOS CAZARES, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AREAS USA LAX, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company; AREAS SKYVIEW LAX JV, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company; EDUARDO RIOS, AN INDIVIDUAL; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV08209 was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of Los Angeles, to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California on April 19, 2019, and assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-03061.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff, a purported former employee of
Defendants, alleges causes of action against all Defendants for (1)
Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;
(3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods or Compensation in Lieu
Thereof; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Periods or Compensation in
Lieu Thereof; (5) Waiting Time Penalties; (6) Wage Statements
Violations; (7) Violation of Labor Code Section 2802; and (8)
Violation of Business and Professions Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     CARLOS JIMENEZ, ESQ.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     633 West 5th Street, 63rd Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213.443.4300
     Fax: 213.443.4299
     Email: cajimenez@littler.com


ARKANSAS TOTAL: Court Certifies Class of Care Coordinators
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit TAQUILLA HATCH, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ARKANSAS
TOTAL CARE, INC., CENTENE CORPORATION and CENTENE MANAGEMET
COMPANY, LLC, the DEFENDANTS, Case No. 4:18-cv-00580-JM (E.D.
Ark.), the Hon. Judge James M. Moody Jr. entered an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all Care Coordinators for Arkansas Total Care, Inc. and
      Centene Corporation at any time since August 27, 2015";

   2. approving the form of notice proposed by the plaintiff
      appropriate;

   3. directing the Defendant to provide to counsel for the
      plaintiff the names and addresses of all persons who were
      employed by them as Care Coordinators during the specific
      time within 14 days from the entry of this Order;

   4. directing the Defendant to provide information in
      electronic format only if it is currently maintained in
      electronic format;

   5. authorizing a 90-day opt-in period from the date the notice
      is mailed;

   6. authorizing lawyers for the plaintiff to issue notice and
      consent forms by mail, and also authorizing to send a
      reminder postcard 30 days after the initial notice is mailed;

      and

   7. directing the Plaintiff's request to provide notice via
      electronic mailing or text message is denied.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has provided enough information
to establish that she is similarly situated to the putative class
members at this stage of the litigation. Accordingly, the Court
finds that conditional certification is proper under the FLSA for
purposes of notice and discovery, and accordingly, certifies the
class requested by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff claims that she and all putative class members
performed the same or similar job duties which inevitably required
more than 40 hours of work per week. The Plaintiff claims that the
duties performed by her and all of the members of the putative
class included providing various services, to include traveling to
meet clients, assisting clients with day-to-day tasks, scheduling
and accompanying clients to their appointments and related tasks.

The Plaintiff contends that all care coordinators, including
Plaintiff and opt-in Plaintiffs, regularly worked more than 40
hours per week due to the mandatory client note-taking. Plaintiff
claims that all Care Coordinators were paid by the hour by the
Defendants but were not paid any wages for hours spent writing the
mandatory client notes each evening.[CC]

AVIS BUDGET: NJ Court Affirms Protective Order in Mendez
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE MENDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action. No. 11-6537 (JLL) (D. N.J.), Judge Jose
L. Linares of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey affirmed the order of the Magistrate Judge, entered on Dec.
17, 2018, granting the Plaintiff's application pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) for a protective order.

The complaint was filed on Nov. 7, 2011.  The fact discovery period
in the action closed on June 5, 2014, and the expert discovery
period closed on Jan. 30, 2016.  On Nov. 17, 2017, the Court
granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify the action as a class
action for a class period beginning on April 1, 2007 and ending on
Dec. 31, 2015 for a nationwide class, a Florida subclass, and a New
Jersey subclass.

As is relevant to the appeal, the Defendants advised the Plaintiff
on March 13, 2018 that they intended to serve interrogatories upon
between 10,000 and 20,000 members of the class other than the class
representative with the goal of obtaining perhaps hundreds of
responses.  The Interrogatories would have inquired as to whether
the class members: were aware of e-Toll before they rented
automobiles from the Defendants; understood the terms and
conditions contained in the rental confirmations; had their
reservations made by another person; objected when they were billed
on their credit cards for using e-Toll; and were reimbursed by an
employer or anyone else.  However, on April 18,2018, the Plaintiff
filed an application for a protective order to prohibit the
Defendants from serving the Interrogatories, and argued, among
other things, that such discovery would be inappropriate in the
case.

The Magistrate Judge ultimately granted the Application.  In doing
so, the Magistrate Judge found that the proposed discovery being
sought by the Interrogatories was "of dubious relevance," because
the Interrogatories addressed issues that were reserved for the
claims administration phase of this class action, e.g., the
entitlement to damages.  Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge held
that given the small sample size of responses to the
Interrogatories that the defendants expected to receive, the
responses would be functionally useless for the purported purpose
of addressing class-wide questions, as even the Defendants
acknowledged that they are seeking anecdotal evidence, rather than
anything that might be attributable to the class.

In addition, the Magistrate Judge held that even though the
Defendants' request to serve the Interrogatories upon the absent
class members was not motivated by bad faith, the Defendants
already had access to much of the information that they were
seeking, as they possessed customer surveys and other materials
providing similar information.

Judge Linares finds that a finding by the Magistrate Judge is
clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing district court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.   In addition, a
ruling is contrary to law if the Magistrate Judge has
misinterpreted or misapplied the applicable law.

It was not clearly erroneous for the Magistrate Judge to find that
the information sought by the Defendants in the Interrogatories was
of questionable relevance.  It is uncontested that there will be a
class of thousands, and thus the anticipated number of responses,
i.e., hundreds at the most, would do nothing to adequately clarify
the issues in the class action.  It was also not clearly erroneous
for the Magistrate Judge to conclude that the Defendants already
possessed the information that they sought through the
Interrogatories, as the Defendants had surveys from customers who
filed them in closer temporal proximity to when the members were
exposed to e-Toll.

In conclusion, the Judge holds that the Magistrate Judge committed
neither an abuse of discretion nor a clear error of law in making
the determinations set forth in the December 2018 Order.  The
December 2018 Order will, therefore, be affirmed.

Accordingly, Judge Linares affirmed the Order of the Magistrate
Judge, entered on Dec. 17, 2018.  The Clerk of the Court will
designate the appeal as terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/jewa3l from Leagle.com.

JOSE MENDEZ, Individually and On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by JEREMY NATHAN NASH, LITE
DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC, KATRINA CARROLL -- kcarroll@litedepalma.com
-- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC, SUSANA CRUZ HODGE --
scruzhodge@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC & JOSEPH
J. DEPALMA -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG,

LLC.

AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., doing business as, AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM,
LLC & HIGHWAY TOLL ADMINISTRATION, LLC, Defendants, represented by
PAUL J. HALASZ -- phalasz@daypitney.com -- DAY PITNEY LLP.


BANK OF MONTREAL: Fire Pension Assoc. Appeals Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Fire & Police Pension Association of Colorado filed an
appeal from the District Court's order and judgment, both issued on
March 14, 2019, in its lawsuit styled Fire & Police Pension
Association of Colorado v. Bank of Montreal, et al., Case No.
18-cv-342, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

District Court Judge Analisa Torres granted the Foreign Defendants'
motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss is also granted with respect to
the Plaintiff's Sherman Act, Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims.  The
Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to
renewal in state court.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Sherman Act,
Commodity Exchange Act, and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organization Act.

The action arises from Defendants' unlawful conspiracy to increase
the profitability of their derivatives trading business by
manipulating the Canadian Dealer Offered Rate during the period of
at least August 9, 2007 through at least June 30, 2014.

The appellate case is captioned as Fire & Police Pension
Association of Colorado v. Bank of Montreal, et al., Case No.
19-976, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Fire & Police Pension Association of Colorado,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Vincent Briganti, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-0500
          Facsimile: (914) 997-0035
          E-mail: vbriganti@lowey.com

Defendants-Appellees Bank of Montreal, BMO Financial Corp., BMO
Nesbitt Burns Inc. and BMO Capital Markets Corp. are represented
by:

          Adam Selim Hakki, Esq.
          SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
          599 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 848-4924
          E-mail: ahakki@shearman.com

Defendants-Appellees Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc., Bank of America
Corporation, Bank of America, N.A., and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Incorporated are represented by:

          Dana Meredith Seshens, Esq.
          DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP
          450 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 450-4855
          E-mail: dana.seshens@dpw.com

Defendants-Appellees Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank Securities
Inc. and Deutsche Bank Securities Limited are represented by:

          Arianna Markel, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 373-3000
          E-mail: amarkel@paulweiss.com

Defendants-Appellees The Bank of Nova Scotia, Scotia Capital (USA)
Inc. and Scotia Capital Inc. are represented by:

          Daniel Laguardia, Esq.
          SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
          535 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 646-1100
          E-mail: daniel.laguardia@shearman.com

Defendants-Appellees Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, CIBC World
Markets Corp. and CIBC World Markets, Inc., are represented by:

          William E. Walsh, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          233 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 576-8000
          E-mail: william.walsh@dentons.com

Defendants-Appellees HSBC Holdings PLC, HSBC Bank PLC, HSBC North
America Holdings Inc., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., HSBC Bank
Canada, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., and HSBC USA Inc. are represented by:

          Julia C. Webb, Esq.
          LOCKE LORD LLP
          111 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 443-0404
          E-mail: jwebb@lockelord.com

Defendants-Appellees National Bank of Canada, National Bank
Financial, Inc., and National Bank of Canada Financial, Inc., are
represented by:

          Harry S. Davis, Esq.
          SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP
          919 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 756-2222
          E-mail: harry.davis@srz.com

Defendants-Appellees Royal Bank of Canada, RBC Dominion Securities
Inc. and RBC Capital Markets, LLC, are represented by:

          Leah Friedman, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          885 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 906-1200
          E-mail: leah.friedman@lw.com

Defendants-Appellees The Toronto-Dominion Bank, TD Securities Inc.
and TD Securities (USA) LLC are represented by:

          David Sapir Lesser, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 230-8851
          E-mail: david.lesser@wilmerhale.com


BARRIER TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Brown Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR BROWN, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BARRIER TECHNOLOGIES LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company, and MARC GLICKMAN, individually, Defendants, Case No.
0:19-cv-61064-RKA (S.D. Fla., April 26, 2019) is an action brought
by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and other current and former
hourly, non-exempt laborers, production employees, and warehouse
employees of Defendants similarly situated to him, however
variously titled, for unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
and costs and reasonable attorneys' fees of this action under the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week but
Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff time and one-half wages for all
of his actual overtime hours worked each week, with Defendants
instead paying Plaintiff straight-time wages for his overtime
hours, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants between approximately April
2017 and March 2019.

Defendants have owned and operated a business that manufactures
radiation protection equipment for medical, dental, veterinary,
nuclear, and defense industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Keith M. Stern, Esq.
     KEITH M. STERN
     LAW OFFICE OF KEITH M. STERN, P.A.
     80 SW 8th Street, Suite 2000
     Miami, FL 33130
     Phone: (305) 901-1379
     Email: employlaw@keithstern.com


BOSE: Must Face Class Action Over Connect App
---------------------------------------------
Daniel Sanchez, writing for Digital Music News, reports that Bose
may soon have to face the music for sharing users' information to
third-parties.

Several years ago, Kyle Zak purchased a pair of Bose wireless
headphones for $350.

To "get the most out of [his] headphones," the Illinois resident
downloaded the company's Connect app.  Zak then registered the
wireless headphones online by providing the serial numbers, e-mail
addresses, and phone numbers.

Then, two years ago, he took the headphone makers to court.

Representing Zak, Chicago-based consumer privacy law firm Edelson
PC filed a class-action lawsuit against Bose.

The law firm claims that the company has willfully collected and
recorded the details of music and audio files consumers listen to
on the Collect app.  Bose then transmits this information, along
with customers' personal identities, to third-parties, including
data miners.  All the while, the company refuses to make this known
to consumers.

Now, a federal judge has made an important ruling on the
class-action lawsuit.

You can't sue Bose for 'intercepting' data, but the hardware maker
won't get away that easily.

On March 31, US District Court Judge Andrea Wood dismissed Zak's
key wiretapping claim.

He can't claim the Connect app illegally "intercepted" the names
and duration of songs he streamed on Spotify.  Simply put, Wood
found Zak failed to show Bose wasn't a "party" to the
communication.

The company couldn't willfully "intercept" this information.  Thus,
Bose didn't violate federal wiretapping law.  She dismissed Zak's
Illinois Eavesdropping Statute claim.

Yet, Wood refused to drop another key claim.  Bose has allegedly
breached Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act.

The company has reportedly misled consumers about how it collects
and then subsequently shares data.

In a 17-page decision, she noted, "The court finds that Zak has
pleaded an [Illinois Consumer Fraud Act] violation sufficient to
survive the motion to dismiss stage."

According to Zak, Bose uses this data to create a unique and
detailed profile of each user's listening preferences.

Wood notes,

"[The lawsuit] alleges that Bose committed a deceptive act when it
omitted and concealed the fact that the app secretly collects its
users' media information and discloses it to a third-party data
miner called Segment.io, then accesses that data and pairs it to
user identity information to create detailed profiles about users'
listening preferences and habits."

The company had previously defended itself in court, stating the
omissions weren't "material" nor deceptive.  The company had asked
the court two years ago to dismiss the suit.

Labeling the motion to dismiss as premature, Wood ruled,

"These are not issues to resolve on a motion to dismiss." [GN]


BP EXPLORATION: Dismissal With Prejudice of Wiggins Recommended
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHNNY WIGGINS, JR. v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC. ET AL., SECTION "J" (2). Related to: 12-968 BELO in MDL
10-2179, Civil Action No. 19-1425 (E.D. La.), Magistrate Judge
Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana recommended (i) that BP's motion to dismiss
be granted, and (ii) that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed
with prejudice.

Wiggins was employed as a clean-up worker along the Florida Gulf
coast, where he also lived, after the BP/Deepwater Horizon
explosion and oil spill on April 20, 2010.  The Plaintiff filed his
complaint pursuant to the Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO")
provisions of the BP/Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class
Action Settlement Agreement.  As a member of the BELO settlement
class, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and related costs
for later-manifested physical conditions that he allegedly suffered
as a result of exposure to substances released after the oil spill.


Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America
Production Co., filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
complaint.  BP argues that the Plaintiff failed properly to file
his individual BELO lawsuit by the Medical Settlement Agreement's
filing deadline and that the complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice as time-barred.

No opposition to the motion has been filed.  The Plaintiff did not
file his BELO lawsuit until Feb. 15, 2019, four days after the
Medical Settlement Agreement's deadline of Feb. 11, 2019 had
passed.

Magistrate Judge Wilkinson explains that as a condition precedent
to filing a BELO suit, a class member must submit a Notice of
Intent to Sue to the Medical Settlement Agreement Claims
Administrator, who must transmit the notice to BP within 10 days.
BP then has 30 days to decide whether to mediate the claim.  If, as
in the instant case, BP chooses not to mediate, the claimant must
file her BELO lawsuit within six months of being notified by the
Claims Administrator of BP's election not to mediate.

He finds that the requirement to satisfy this condition precedent
is not a mere case management tool, but is required by the
court-approved Medical Settlement Agreement and is not subject to
alteration.  Nothing in either the Medical Settlement Agreement or
the court order adopting it affords the Plaintiff the relief he
seeks.

Wiggins failed to meet the condition precedent to filing a BELO
complaint by timely filing his lawsuit.  No explanation for doing
so has been provided.  No purpose would be served by dismissing
this case without prejudice, when its untimely filing under the
Medical Settlement Agreement clearly means that the claim is barred
and must be dismissed with prejudice.   The Judge therefore
modifies the CMO insofar as it applies to this particular BELO case
to permit filing of the motion to dismiss with prejudice, pursuant
to CMO.

For all the forgoing reasons, Judge Wilkinson recommended that the
Defendant's motion be granted, and that the Plaintiff's complaint
be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a
copy will bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the
party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Report &
Recommendation Order is available at https://is.gd/eEDn7x from
Leagle.com.

Johnny Wiggins, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Craig Downs --
info@downslawgroup.com -- Downs Law Group, PA, Michael Dewayne
Dunlavy, Downs Law Group, PA & Nathan Lee Nelson, Downs Law Group,
PA.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Catherine Pyune McEldowney
-- CPM@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradley and Anderson LLC,
Devin C. Reid, Liskow & Lewis, Georgia Lee Lucier --
georgialucier@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Kevin
Michael Hodges -- khodges@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly, LLP &
Scott C. Seiler -- scseiler@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Phoenix Pay System
--------------------------------------------------
CBC News reports that faced with an expanding class-action lawsuit
related to the Phoenix pay system, the federal government is taking
steps to preserve records.

Last April, a court in Quebec authorized a class-action lawsuit for
people who had been affected by the failed pay system.

It does not include the majority of public servants who have a
union process for grievances, but does include students, retirees
and occasional workers who aren't covered under collective
agreements.

The law firm Sarailis, which is handling the suit, estimates there
could be between 40,000 and 70,000 claimants.

Julien Fortier, a lawyer with the firm, said the number could grow
because the system isn't fixed yet and more students and more
retirees are being affected.

The lead plaintiff is Ezmie Bouchard, who worked at Passport Canada
between January and August 2016.

She alleges several mistakes were made on her pay and that when she
left, she was owed $4,800. Then she was overpaid.

Keep records
The Department of Justice issued a document, later obtained by
Radio-Canada, saying that pay records, complaints and applications
for fixes to the pay system should all be kept.

The department also wants to ensure documents and memos about the
decisions made around the system are all saved.

Any current policies requiring the documents to be deleted should
be suspended, the document says.

The department is also appointing "guardians" to ensure files are
protected. [GN]


CANADA: NAN Provides Info on Indian Day School Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Perreault, writing for NetNewsLedger, reports that in
response to the many inquiries of the recent Proposed Settlement
reached for survivors of Federal Indian Day schools, NAN put
together a summary to help navigate the information recently
provided by the Class Action Lawyers at Gowling WLG.

A list of all Federal Indian Day schools has been developed which
includes roughly 40 schools in NAN territory alone with over 184
different communities and First Nations in Ontario and many across
Canada. The list, which currently contains over 700 federally-run
Indian Day Schools is an evolving list.  There is a built-in
process to update it as needed.  Anyone who believes there should
be a school added to the list can contact Class Counsel.  They will
be asked to provide whatever information they can about the schools
(for example, school photos or class pictures) You can visit this
link https://is.gd/emPpVq to see if you attended one of these
schools.

You are encouraged to contact Class Action Lawyers at Gowling WLG
to schedule a community visit or ask any question you might have
about the case.

You can do this by calling toll-free at 1.844.539.3815 or email
Vanessa.lessard@gowlingwlg.com

Please keep in mind this settlement is not approved yet and we
understand that there is a court hearing on May 13-15, 2019, in
Winnipeg.

The settlement includes ALL individuals who attended a Federal
Indian Day School, including First Nations, Inuit, and Métis. It's
important for people to understand that the baseline harm for
claims is such that nearly everyone who is eligible for the
settlement will be eligible for at least "level 1" compensation
($10,000).

The NAN Executive Council would like to acknowledge Garry McLean,
who served as lead plaintiff in this class action. Garry was
legally required at the age of seven to attend Dog Creek Day School
at Lake Manitoba First Nation from 1965 to 1975 as per the Indian
Act.

Garry McLean's experience at Dog Creek Day School involved, but was
not limited to being subjected to emotional, mental, physical and
sexual abuse. He did not know how to speak English when he first
started school, and was discouraged from speaking his native
language, Saulteaux

It is with deep sadness that we share the untimely death of our
good friend, Garry McLean. Garry was a fierce advocate for Indian
Day School Survivors and their families. He was tireless on their
behalf. Even in last few days, he remained engaged in the case and
pushed for its progress.  Remaining committed to helping Indian Day
School survivors achieve justice for the harms they experienced.
Garry has taught so much about this work being carried forward to
resolution and reconciliation. His support, friendship, grace and
gentle humour will be missed.

You can download your application, request forms to speak at the
hearing or for further information at indiandayschools.com

If you have a story to tell and would like to share your story, you
can contact us at newsroom@netnewsledger.com [GN]


CANADA: Plaintiffs' Counsel to Appeal Class Action Against WRPS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Phi Doan, writing for Kitchener Today, reports that a lawsuit was
presented on April 2 in front of the Ontario Court of Appeals,
which alleges gender discrimination and sexual harassment within
the Waterloo Regional Police Service.

Douglas Elliot is lead counsel for the plaintiffs' legal team,
representing both former and current officers

He tells Kitchener Today with Brian Bourke on 570 NEWS their legal
team is hoping to appeal their case after it was tossed out by a
judge nine months ago.

The judge reasoned that claims have to go through the proper
channels based on legal precedents.

In this case, the claims should be dealt with through a human
rights tribunal, or through an internal grievance and arbitration
process.

However, Elliot argues that's not feasible.

"Knowing, based on the evidence, that the existing system hasn't
been delivering a solution for the last 40 years and it's no reason
to think it will in the next 40 years unless there's a class
action," Elliot says.

He also references a similar case against the RCMP that went to
court.

"Very, very similar allegations about sexual assault, sexual
harassment, failure of women to get ahead, reprisal against people
who complained, that whole scenario that's very, very similar to
Waterloo Regional Police was resolved through a major class action
settlement," he says.

According to Elliot, Regional police had created an environment
that punished women who came forward, leaving the current police
collective agreement solution unviable.

"The problem here is that there's a lot of evidence that women were
actively discouraged from filing complaints, they were told they'd
be a constable for life, there was retaliation," he says.

Which left them with little choice than to turn to a class action
lawsuit.

Meanwhile, Waterloo Regional Police Chief Bryan Larkin briefly
addressed the lawsuit on 570 NEWS.

"Out of respect for the Ontario Court of Appeals and Process, I
can't speak to that process, but the reality is that when I became
the chief, one of the mandates for the boards around cultural
change. It's been embedded in the board's strategic plan. It's been
embedded in our operational plan and so we been aggressively
looking to look at the culture of policing," Larkin says.

According to him, the WRPS culture has been changing to become more
conscious on gender and racial bias with the workplace.

"Moving forward on many different issues internally, every senior
leader, every mid-leader has been trained and educated in implicit
bias and shifting our culture," Larkin says. "The number of
recruitment nights that we have around targeting not only
gender-balance workforce, but also racialized workforce, those are
strong priorities for me."

He says he would not stand for discrimination or harassment in the
service.

"I continue to use everything within my legal employment framework
to deal with and I also don't want this to define us." [GN]


CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Class Certification Bid in Wolf Case Shelved
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, MARIA WOLF, the Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P., the Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-558 (E.D.
Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin entered an order granting
Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion for
class certification.

The Court said, "The plaintiff filed a class action complaint. At
the same time, the plaintiff filed what the court commonly refers
to as a "protective" motion for class certification. In this motion
the plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the complaint
but also moved the court to stay further proceedings on that
motion. In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir.
2011), the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to
certify the class at the same time that they file their complaint."
Id. "The pendency of that motion protects a putative class from
attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs." However, because parties
are generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."
The plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted. The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c). Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary
that the Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for
classcertification. However, this motion will be regarded as
pending to serve its protective purpose under Damasco."[CC]

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned MARIA WOLF, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LP, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00558-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an
order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff furthers ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

CARD ONE: Fromer Chiropractic Sues Over Unsolicited Advertisements
------------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC B. FROMER CHIROPRACTIC, INC., a California corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. CARD ONE INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a California corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-03462
(C.D. Cal., April 26, 2019) is a case challenging the Defendant's
practice of sending unsolicited advertisements by facsimile.

The Fax promotes the availability and quality of Defendant's
property, goods, or services by way of offering two different
pricing plans for its payment processing services, notes the
complaint. Plaintiff avers that Defendant has sent, and continues
to send, unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in
violation of the TCPA.

According to the complaint, an unsolicited fax wastes the
recipient's valuable time that would have been spent on something
else. A junk fax  also intrudes into the recipient's seclusion and
violates the recipient's right to privacy.

Plaintiff ERIC B. FROMER CHIROPRACTIC, INC. is a California
corporation with its principal place of business located in Los
Angeles, CA.

CARD ONE INTERNATIONA, INC., is a California corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JOHN R. HABASHY, ESQ.
     LEXICON LAW, PC
     633 W. Fifth St., 28th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213-233-5900
     Fax: 888-373-2107
     Email: john@lexiconlaw.com

          - and -

     Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
     ANDERSON + WANCA
     3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
     Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
     Phone: 847-368-1500
     Fax: 847-368-1501
     Email: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


CHARTER COMMS: Burke Law Named Interim Lead Counsel in Leeb Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREG LEEB, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
d/b/a SPECTRUM, Defendant, Case No. 4: 17CV2780 RL W (E.D. Mo.),
Judge Ronnie L. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion for Burke Law Offices, LLC to be Appointed Interim
Class Counsel and Incorporated Memorandum in Support.

The Plaintiff seeks an order appointing his lead counsel, Burke
Law, as the interim lead class counsel.  He notes there is
currently at least one other debt collection call class action
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act against Charter
Communications.  According to him, appointment of the interim lead
counsel is necessary and appropriate to promote efficient use of
resources and to specify which counsel Charter should contact to
coordinate pretrial proceedings and possible class resolution.  The
Plaintiff further notes that Charter, while not conceding that the
proposed class should be certified, did not intend to oppose this
motion and has not done so.

On review of the Plaintiffs motion, legal arguments, and attached
exhibits, Judge White finds that Burke Law will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the proposed class because
it: (1) has adequately identified and demonstrated a commitment to
investigating the potential claims in this action; (2) possesses
experience in handling class actions involving the types of claims
asserted in this action; (3) has knowledge of the applicable law;
and (4) will devote the resources necessary to represent the
proposed class.  

Accordingly, he granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed, and appointed
Burke Law as the interim lead class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/FaD9XT from Leagle.com.

Greg Leeb, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burke --
aburke@burkelawllc.com -- BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC & Nathan D.
Sturycz -- nathan@sturyczlaw.com -- STURYCZ LAW GROUP.

Charter Communications, Inc., doing business as Spectrum,
Defendant, represented by Matthew D. Guletz --
mguletz@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP.


CITRIX SYSTEMS: Boger Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAN L. BOGER, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-01234-PX (E.D. Md., April 26, 2019) seeks to enforce the
consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act ("TCPA").

In violation of the TCPA, the Defendant initiated automated
telemarketing calls to Mr. Boger and other putative class members
without their prior express written consent. Also in violation of
the TCPA, Citrix failed to maintain adequate procedures to maintain
an internal Citrix do not call list, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Dan Boger is a resident of the state of Maryland and this
District.

Citrix Systems, Inc. is a corporation organized in Delaware with
its principal place of business in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stephen H. Ring, Esq.
     STEPHEN H. RING, PC
     9901 Belward Campus Drive, Suite 175
     Rockville, MD 20850
     Phone: (301) 563-9249
     Email: shr@ringlaw.us

          - and -

     Joseph F. Murray, Esq.
     Jonathan Misny, Esq.
     MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP
     1114 Dublin Road
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Phone: 614.488.0400
     Facsimile: 614.488.0401
     Email: tiffany@mmmb.com

          - and -

     Anthony Paronich, Esq.
     PARONICH LAW, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Phone (617) 485-0018
     Facsimile (508) 318-8100
     Email: https://www.paronichlaw.com



CREDIT PROTECTION: Bid to Certify Class in McRobie Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH McROBIE, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT PROTECTION
ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00566 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion to
Certify Class.

The Judge certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class defined as all natural
persons residing in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware to whom
Defendant CPA mailed a postcard, substantially similar to the
Postcard sent to the Plaintiff, in an attempt to collect a debt,
where the postcard was not returned as undeliverable.  The class is
certified only for purposes of resolving the claim under 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692f(8) in Count II of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.


The Judge denied the certification in all other respects.

The Plaintiff is the appointed the Class Representative, and her
counsel of record as the class counsel.

The Judge granted the Defendant's Unopposed Motion for Leave to
File Answer Instanter.  The Answer is deemed filed as of Nov. 14,
2018.  The Clerk of Court will docket Exhibit A to the Motion, as
the Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Plaintiff's
First Amended Class Action Complaint.

The parties will confer and report to the Court their proposed
timeline for further proceedings within 14 days of the date of the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/LUOmwi from Leagle.com.

ELIZABETH MCROBIE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by JOSHUA MARKOVITS, LEMBERG LAW
LLC & SERGEI LEMBERG, LEMBERG LAW LLC.

CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Defendant, represented by JUSTIN M.
PENN -- jpenn@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP, ERICK V.
VIOLAGO -- eviolago@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS
LEDVA & MEYERS, LLP, GEORGE W. VOKOLOS --
gvokolos@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA &
MEYERS & JASON G. WEHRLE -- jwehrle@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER
SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA & MEYERS, LLP.


CRUNCH LLC: Eacret Suit Status Conference Continued to July 18
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DYLAN EACRET and JONATHAN KENT MERRITT, individually
and on behalf of other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CRUNCH,
LLC, and DOES 1-100, inclusive Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-04374-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (i)
continued the status conference set for April 19, 2019 at 1:30
p.m.; and (ii) ordered the hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement for July 18, 2019,
at 2:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as may be heard on the Court's
calendar.

The Parties attended a private mediation with Michael J. Loeb on
March 22, 2019 and have reached a tentative class-wide settlement
as memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding executed by the
Parties and their respective counsel.  They are currently in the
process of drafting a long-form settlement agreement and the
Plaintiff anticipates filing a Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement by June 3, 2019.

The Parties respectfully request that the Court vacates the April
19, 2019 status conference in light of the Parties' class-wide
resolution and pending motion for preliminary approval.  Pursuant
the Court's Jan. 4, 2019 order, a status conference is currently
scheduled for April 19, 2019 at 1:30 p.m.

The Parties stipulated and respectfully jointly requested, and
Judge Tigar approved that the Court (i) continued the status
conference set for April 19, 2019 at 1:30 p.m.; (ii) ordered the
hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement for July 18, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. or as soon
thereafter as may be heard on the Court's calendar.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Pmw1rP from Leagle.com.

Dylan Eacret & Jonathan Kent Merritt, Plaintiffs, represented by
Ashwin Virji Ladva -- aladva@ladvalaw.com -- Attorney at Law.

Crunch, LLC, Defendant, represented by Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi
-- Shannon.Nakabayashi@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.,
Conor John Dale -- Conor.Dale@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C., Mariko Mae Ashley -- Mariko.Ashley@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Mia Farber -- Mia.Farber@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C..


CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP: Schenck Moves to Certify Class of Applicants
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned JUSTIN SCHENCK, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated individuals v.
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, Case No. 2:18-cv-00164-MPK (W.D. Pa.),
asks the Court to enter an order certifying this class:

     All natural persons residing in the United States (including
     territories and other political subdivisions): (1) who
     applied for employment with CWC or any of its subsidiaries;
     (2) about whom CWC obtained a consumer report for employment
     purposes from Sterling InfoSystems, Inc. from September 2015
     to May 2018; (3) where the consumer report contained a score
     of "Complete Report-Consider" at the top; and (4) CWC did
     not send a notice as provided in 15 U.S.C. Section
     1681b(B)(3).

Mr. Schenck also asks the Court to appoint his counsel as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Pietz, Esq.
          Elizabeth Rabenold, Esq.
          Taylor E. Gillan, Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          429 Fourth Avenue
          Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          Facsimile: (412) 281-1007
          E-mail: jpietz@fdpklaw.com
                  erabenold@fdpklaw.com
                  tgillan@fdpklaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Marla N. Presley, Esq.
          Joanna M. Rodriguez, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          1001 Liberty Avenue, Suite 1000
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 338-5148
          E-mail: Marla.Presley@jacksonlewis.com
                  Joanna.Rodriguez@Jacksonlewis.com


CVS PHARMACY: Pension Funds Seek to Certify Classes
---------------------------------------------------
In the two class action lawsuits, the Plaintiffs Sheet Metal
Workers Local No. 20 Welfare and Benefit Fund, Indiana Carpenters
Welfare Fund, and Plumbers Welfare Fund, Local 130, U.A. seek to
certify these classes under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(3):

   -- Nationwide Class:

   "all health plans that, at any time between November 2008 and
   February 1, 2016, (1) had Caremark, L.L.C., Express Scripts,
   Medco, OptumRx, or MedImpact (or any of their predecessors) as
   their pharmacy benefit managers, (2) paid for generic
   prescription drugs purchased from CVS that were included in
   CVS's Health Savings Pass program, and (3) paid for those drugs

   based on a formula containing Usual and Customary price.

   -- Unjust Enrichment Class:

   "all health plans that, at any time between November 2008 and
   February 1, 2016, (1) had Caremark, L.L.C., Express Scripts,
   Medco, OptumRx, or MedImpact (or any of their predecessors) as
   their pharmacy benefit managers, (2) paid for generic
   prescription drugs purchased from CVS that were included in
   CVS's Health Savings Pass program in Arkansas, Colorado,
   Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
   Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and West
   Virginia, and (3) paid for those drugs based on a formula
   containing Usual and Customary price."

The Plaintiff Plumbers Welfare Fund, Local 130, U.A. also seeks to
certify the following classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(3):

   -- Unfair and Deceptive Conduct Consumer Protection Class

   "all health plans that, at any time between November 2008 and
   February 1, 2016, (1) had Caremark, L.L.C., Express Scripts,
   Medco, OptumRx, or MedImpact (or any of their predecessors) as
   their pharmacy benefit managers, (2) paid for generic
   prescription drugs purchased from CVS that were included in
   CVS's Health Savings Pass program in California, Florida,
   Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
   Washington, and (3) paid for those drugs based on a formula
   containing Usual and Customary price"; and

   -- Omissions Consumer Protection Class:

   "all health plans that, at any time between November 2008 and
   February 1, 2016, (1) had Caremark, L.L.C., Express Scripts,
   Medco, OptumRx, or MedImpact (or any of their predecessors) as
   their pharmacy benefit managers, (2) paid for generic
   prescription drugs purchased from CVS that were included in
   CVS's Health Savings Pass program in Illinois, Michigan, Nevada,

   and New Jersey, and (3) paid for those drugs based on a formula

   containing Usual and Customary price".

The following payors are excluded from the proposed Classes: (1)
any governmental payors, including Medicare and Medicaid; (2) any
health plans that served on Caremark's Client Advisory Committee
since January 1, 2008; and (3) any health plans that have had
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate relationships with any pharmacy
benefit manager at any time since January 1, 2008. Also excluded:
(1) CVS, and its management, employees, subsidiaries, and
affiliates; and (2) CVS Caremark and its officers and directors.

The lawsuits are:  

   SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 20 WELFARE AND BENEFIT FUND, and
   INDIANA CARPENTERS WELFARE FUND, on behalf of themselves and
all
   others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CVS PHARMACY INC.

   and CAREMARK, L.L.C., the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00046-S
   (D.R.I.);

        - and -

   PLUMBERS WELFARE FUND, LOCAL 130, U.A., on behalf of itself and

   all others similarly, Plaintiffs, v. CVS PHARMACY INC. and
   CAREMARK, L.L.C., the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00447-S
   (D.R.I.).[CC]

Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class:

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          Barbara Mahoney, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Fegan, Esq.
          Zoran Tasic, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  barbaram@hbsslaw.com
                  beth@hbsslaw.com
                  zorant@hbsslaw.com

Liaison Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Stephen M. Prignano
          MCINTYRE TATE LLP
          321 South Main Street, Suite 400
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 351-7700, Ext. 227
          Facsimile: (401) 331-6095
          E-mail: smp@mtlesq.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 20 Welfare and
Benefit Fund and Indiana Carpenters Welfare Fund:

          William N. Riley
          RILEY WILLIAMS & PIATT, LLC
          301 Massachusetts Ave
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 633-5270
          E-mail: wriley@rwp-law.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Plumbers Welfare Fund, Local 130, U.A.

          Donald F. Harmon, Esq.
          BURKE BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.
          Three First National Plaza Suite 4300
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 541-8600
          E-mail: Dharmon@bbp-Chicago.com

DALLAS COUNTY ADJUSTERS: Blair Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Josh Blair individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY ADJUSTERS, INC. AND KENNETH
BARNES, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00139-JRG (E.D. Tex., April
26, 2019) is a collective action against Defendants who employ
non-exempt employees to directly and indirectly provide Defendants'
vehicle repossession services to Defendants' customers but fail to
provide them proper wages as required under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").

The complaint alleges that all hours worked by Plaintiff on tasks
paid under Defendants' piece rate system were not counted in the
total hours worked each workweek, including weekly hours worked in
excess of 40 ("Overtime Hours"). Because Defendants did not
accurately track and pay for all hours worked, including overtime
hours, Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs'
minimum wages for all hours worked and overtime compensation for
all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Josh Blair is an individual who has worked for Defendants
throughout this District within the last three years.

Defendants have been involved in vehicle repossession services in
various cities throughout Texas over the last three years.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jay Forester, Esq.
     Forester Haynie PLLC
     1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
     Dallas, TX 75202
     Phone: (214) 210-2100
     Fax: (214) 346-5909
     Email: jay@foresterhaynie.com

          - and -

     Corinna Chandler, Esq.
     Chandler Law, P.C.
     3419 Westminster #343G
     Dallas, TX 75205
     Phone: 972-342-8793
     Fax: 972-692-5220
     Email: chandler@chandlerlawpc.com


DEITSCH AND WRIGHT: Florida Class Certified in McCray FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Elizabeth A. Kovachevich grants the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification and Appointment of Class Representative and
Class Counsel in the lawsuit captioned DESSERI MCCRAY, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. DEITSCH AND WRIGHT,
P.A., Case No. 8:18-cv-00731-EAK-SPF (M.D. Fla.).

Pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court certifies a class defined as:

     All individuals in the State of Florida to whom Defendant
     Deitsch and Wright, P.A. sent, between March 27, 2017, and
     March 27, 2018, and in an attempt to collect a debt, a
     collection letter based on the same template used to create
     the collection letter sent to Plaintiff Desseri McCray,
     attached as "Exhibit A" to the complaint, (Doc. 1-1).

Plaintiff Desseri McCray is appointed as lead plaintiff and
representative of the class.  Pursuant to Rule 23(g), attorneys
Amorette Rinkleib, Esq., of Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC, and
Alex D. Weisberg, Esq., of Weisberg Consumer Law Group, PA, are
appointed as lead counsel of the class.

The lawsuit arises from alleged unlawful debt collection letters
from the Defendant, which violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.[CC]


EMPLOYER FLEXIBLE: Faces Lopez Suit over Background Checks
----------------------------------------------------------
RENE LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EMPLOYER FLEXIBLE HR, LLC; EMPLOYER FLEXIBLE
HR INCORPORATED; EMPLOYER FLEXIBLE MANAGEMENT, LLC; and DOES 1 to
10, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02408 (C.D. Cal., March 29, 2019)
alleges violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case is
assigned to Judge Dolly M. Gee and referred to Judge John E.
Mcdermott.

Employer Flexible HR, LLC provides payroll, employee benefits, risk
management, and workers' compensation services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darren M. Cohen, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990-2903
          E-mail: dcohen@kingsleykingsley.com


EPIC SYSTEMS: Faegre Baker Discusses Arbitration Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------
Ehren Fournier, Esq. -- ehren.fournier@FaegreBD.com -- of Faegre
Baker Daniels, in an article for JDSupra, reports that Companies
routinely turn to arbitration as an efficient and cost-effective
means of resolving disputes. Increasingly, these same companies use
arbitration to prohibit consumers and employees from commencing
class actions. While certain courts look with skepticism on
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, it is clear from
the Supreme Court's decisions, beginning with AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion through the Court's most recent decision in Epic Systems
Corporation v. Lewis, that class action arbitration waivers do not
violate the law.

In Epic Systems, employees pointed to the Federal Arbitration Act's
(FAA) "savings clause," which allows courts to refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract," arguing that it allowed
employees to use the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to void
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements. Because the NLRA
guarantees workers "the right to self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection" the employees argued that the NLRA
displaced the FAA.

The Court disagreed. Relying on its prior precedents, the Court
again stated that the savings clause only allows courts to
invalidate arbitration agreements in cases where "generally
applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability" apply. It does not apply when a party seeks to
invalidate an arbitration clause in a way that derives "from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue." The Court also
found that even if the savings clause did apply, the NLRA focuses
on the right to "organize unions and bargain collectively." It
therefore does not prevent class-wide arbitration.

Epic Systems reiterates the Court's deference to arbitration
agreements. In light of that deference, when drafting an
arbitration agreement with a class action waiver, think about
including the following points:

   -- Opt-out Option. Affording the consumer or employee a
meaningful opportunity to opt out of the class action waiver can
increase the chances of the clause being found enforceable.

   -- Conspicuous Language. The more prominent, clear and
understandable a provision is, the more it is likely to be
enforced. Clauses that are buried in lengthy agreements are more
likely to be deemed procedurally unconscionable, as they give rise
to surprise.

   -- Delegation to Arbitrator to Decide Enforcement. Clauses with
clear and express language authorizing the arbitrator to decide
whether the class action waiver is enforceable are enforceable
under United States Supreme Court precedent. For those seeking
enforcement of such clauses, resorting to an arbitrator's
assessment of unconscionability may be preferable. One caveat,
however: arbitrators, particularly those with legal training,
generally attempt to follow governing law and there is no assurance
that more favorable treatment will be provided by an arbitrator if
governing state law suggests the clause is unconscionable.
   -- Authority to Allow Class Action. Under Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds, Int'l Corp., silence on class arbitration is
tantamount to lack of authority to allow a class action to proceed
in arbitration. Incorporating an arbitration association's rules
that permit class arbitration can cloud the issue. Language
expressly limiting such authority, if that is what is desired, not
only clarifies matters, but puts the other party on notice of the
rights it is waiving by agreeing to arbitrate.

   -- Cost and Fee Provisions Beneficial to Consumer/Employee. One
of the purported benefits of class actions is the ability for
litigants to pursue redress of grievances that would be
cost-prohibitive if done on an individual basis. Therefore,
including provisions that ameliorate the cost of arbitration, in
order to make pursuit of claims on an individual basis more
affordable, can influence enforcement.

   -- Severance Language. If one wishes to arbitrate even if one or
two provisions are determined unconscionable, it is best to include
clear severance language that encourages a court to enforce those
aspects of an arbitration agreement that are found valid.

   -- Claimant-Friendly Forum. Another cost of arbitrating is
having to travel for the hearing. Clauses that select a hearing
locale most convenient to claimants can be a factor in determining
enforceability.

If you have questions about class action arbitration waivers in
construction contracts, or arbitration agreements in general, seek
out the advice of an experienced attorney in those industries.
[GN]


FARM BUREAU: Chavez Seeks to Certify Insurance Agent Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, MEDBOR CHAVEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FBL
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., FARM BUREAU PROPERTY &  CASUALTY INS. CO.,
FARM BUREAU LIFE INSURANCE, and WESTERN AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-02393-DDC-ADM (D. Kan.), the
Plaintiff ask the Court for an order:

   1. granting class certification of:

      "all misclassified Kansas Insurance Agents pursuing Kansas
      state law claims"

   2. designating Mr. Chavez as Class Representative; and

   3. designating McInnes Law LLC, Rex A. Sharp, P.A. and Rebein
      Brothers as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for Kansas Wage
Payment Act violations, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

Although Farm Bureau purports to classify its Kansas Insurance
Agents as independent contractors, they are subject to an
incredible amount of supervision, oversight and control, the
lawsuit says.

Farm Bureau offloads the costs associated with selling its products
onto these insurance agents but retains all the benefits of having
a captive workforce. The Plaintiff exposes Defendants' unlawful
practices for what they are: a workplace scheme to defraud Kansas
Insurance Agents by misclassifying them as independent contractors,
while retaining a right to control them as employees.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jack McInnes, Esq.
          MCINNES LAW LLC
          1900 West 75 th Street, Suite 120
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 220-2488
          Facsimile: (913) 273-1671
          E-mail: jack@mcinnes-law.com

               - and -

          Rex. A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ryan Hudson, Esq.
          Larkin Walsh, Esq.
          REX A. SHARP, P.A.
          5301 W. 75 th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
          E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                  rhudson@midwest-law.com
                  lwalsh@midwest-law.com

               - and -

          David J. Rebein, Esq.
          Pablo Mose, Esq.
          REBEIN B ROTHERS
            TRIAL LAWYERS
          810 Frontview, P.O. Box 1147
          Dodge City, KS 67801
          Telephone: 620 227 8126
          E-mail: David@rbr3.com
                  Pablo@rbr3.com

FELICITY HUFFMAN: To Plead Guilty in College Admissions Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Zack Huffman, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the actress Felicity Huffman is among 13 parents in the sweeping
college admissions scandal who will plead guilty to bribery and
fraud charges, federal prosecutors said on April 8.

Along with dozens of other parents, the defendants were arrested
last month and charged with conspiring with William "Rick" Singer
who ran a college admissions program called the Edge College &
Career Network.

Prosecutors say Huffman, who starred on ABC’s "Desperate
Housewives," paid $15,000 to have an agent of Singer correct her
daughter’s SAT test.

Similar charges are believed to still be pending against "Full
House" actress Lori Loughlin and her husband, fashion designer
Mossimo Giannulli. Huffman’s husband, the actor William H. Macy,
was not charged.

Unlike the entrance-exam scheme, Loughlin and Giannnulli are said
to have secured their daughters’ college admissions by having the
girls listed as college athletes, thus lowering the academic
threshold they would face for entry.

Singer also operated a third scheme involving a nonprofit fund that
was allegedly used to launder bribe payments, leaving some parents
facing additional tax-fraud charges.

All of the defendants who improperly took tax deductions for the
bribe payments have agreed to cooperate with the IRS to pay back
taxes, according to a statement from the Department of Justice.

Plea hearings have not yet been scheduled by the court. In addition
to Huffman, the parents pleading guilty are Gregory Abbott, Marcia
Abbott, Jane Buckingham, Gordon Caplan, Robert Flaxman, Agustin
Huneeus, Marjorie Klapper, Peter Jan Sartorio, Stephen Semprevivo,
Devin Sloane, Bruce Isackson and Davina Isackson.

Prosecutors say Michael Center, who was the head coach of men’s
tennis at University of Texas at Austin, also agreed to plead
guilty on April 8.

Mail-fraud and money-laundering conspiracy charges provide for a
maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, plus six-figure fines.


FLEX LTD: Order Naming Lead Plaintiff/Counsel in Kipling Vacated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID KIPLING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FLEX LTD., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-02706-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy
H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, vacated the Court's order appointing
Bristol County Retirement System as the Lead Plaintiff and FDAzar
and Thornton Law Firm as the Lead Counsel.

On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff Kipling filed a securities class action
complaint against Defendant Flex, and published notice to potential
Lead Plaintiffs.  On Oct. 1, 2018, the Court appointed Bristol as
the Lead Plaintiff pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA").  On Nov. 28, 2018, Bristol filed an amended
complaint against Flex.

Judge Koh finds that Kipling's 17-page original complaint framed
the "nature of the action" as arising from Flex's April 26, 2018
disclosure that the company was investigating allegations by an
employee that the Company improperly accounted for obligations in a
customer contract and certain related reserves.  The original
complaint alleged that Flex made misleading statements and failed
to disclose that Flex's internal financial controls were deficient
and that the company had improperly accounted for certain
obligations.  Kipling published notice of its complaint on May 8,
2018.

Bristol's 85-page amended complaint filed on Nov. 28, 2018 focuses
on an entirely different factual scenario and set of
misrepresentations.  The amended complaint states that the action
arises from Flex's misrepresentations about the strength of its
partnership with key customer Nike.  The May 8, 2018 original
complaint never mentioned Nike at all.

In addition, Bristol's amended complaint expands the putative class
to include shareholders who owned "exchange-traded options" on Flex
common stock, whereas Kipling's original complaint (and notice)
defined the class as only those who purchased "Ordinary Shares" of
Flex stock.  Moreover, Bristol's amended complaint extends the
class period by six months.  Together, Bristol's changes to the
amended complaint make it likely that individuals who could now be
considered potential Lead Plaintiffs would have disregarded the
earlier notice.

The Judge also finds that that where changes to a securities class
action complaint make it likely that individuals who could now be
considered potential Lead Plaintiffs would have disregarded the
earlier notice, courts in the district and elsewhere have ordered
lead plaintiffs to republish notice under the PSLRA.  Although
courts typically disfavor republication when a complaint is
amended, an amended complaint with substantial alteration of the
claims can tilt the balance in favor of republication.  Such an
approach accords with the PSLRA's purpose of ensuring that absent
class members and potential lead plaintiffs are aware of their
rights.

Because Bristol's amended complaint substantially alters the
class's allegations against Flex, Judge Koh vacated the Court's
order appointing Bristol as the Lead Plaintiff, and ordered Bristol
to publish notice of its amended complaint to reopen the Lead
Plaintiff appointment process in compliance with the PSLRA by April
12, 2019.

Because the Court will reopen the Lead Plaintiff process, the Judge
denied as moot putative intervenor Iron Workers Local 580 Joint
Funds' motion to intervene, and denied as moot Bristol's motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SjVS43 from Leagle.com.

David Kipling, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Charles
Henry Linehan -- CLINEHAN@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Ex Kano S. Sams, II -- ESAMS@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- LGLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Robert Vincent Prongay --
rprongay@glancylaw.com  -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Ivy T. Ngo
-- ngoi@fdazar.com -- Franklin D. Azar and Associate, P.C.

LEAD PLAINTIFF Bristol County Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by David Bricker, Thornton Law Firm, Ivy T. Ngo,
Franklin D. Azar and Associate, P.C., Guillaume Buell, Thornton Law
Firm LLP & Paul R. Wood, Franklin D. Azar & Associates, P.C., pro
hac vice.

Flex Ltd., Michael M. McNamara, Christopher E. Collier, Michael
Dennison & Kevin Kessel, Defendants, represented by Sara B. Brody
-- SBRODY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Nicole Marie Ryan --
NICOLE.RYAN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Stephen Chang --
STEPHEN.CHANG@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Helene Gryfakis, Movant, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Iron Workers Local 580 Joint Funds, Intervenor, represented by
David Ronald Stickney, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann, Avi
Josefson, Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, Jonathan Daniel
Uslaner, Bernstein Litowitz et al & Michael D. Blatchley, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice.


GAYLOR ELECTRIC: Hodge Suit Removed to E.D. Washington
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as KEVIN HODGE and JOSE VAZQUEZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
GAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendant, Case No.
19201296-32 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
Washington in and for the County of Spokane, to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington on April 24,
2019, and assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-00133.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges damages for failure to provide rest
breaks, unpaid wages, including overtime, and willful refusal to
pay wages. Plaintiff Hodge further alleges disability
discrimination, violation of the tort of wrongful discharge,
violation of public policy, and willful refusal to pay wages.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     RENEA I. SAADE, ESQ.
     WILLIAM J. KIM, ESQ.
     LITTLER MENDELSON
     One Union Square
     600 University Street, Suite 3200
     Seattle, WA 98101.3122
     Phone: 206.623.3300
     Fax: 206.447.6965


GENERAL ATLANTIC: Securities Class Action Dismissal Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
Ambrogio Visconti, writing for Global Legal Chronicle, reports that
Paul, Weiss won the affirmance of the dismissal of a securities
class action against General Atlantic LLC (GA), its portfolio
company TriNet Group, Inc., various TriNet officers and directors,
and various underwriters.

The complaint, filed in 2015 in the Northern District of California
on behalf of a putative class of shareholders in TriNet, a human
resources outsourcing company, alleged that TriNet's offering
materials and other filings misrepresented TriNet's risk assessment
and data analytics capabilities and its exposure to medical and
workers compensation insurance claims. The TriNet shareholders
alleged that the misrepresentations inflated Trinet's share value,
which subsequently sank following a number of adverse disclosures
concerning such claims.

In affirming the district court's dismissal of all claims, the
Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had failed to allege a false
statement of material fact. The court held that at least one of the
challenged statements was an opinion regarding which the plaintiff
had failed to allege subjective falsity, and that the plaintiff had
not made a sufficient case that the other statements were false
when made.

The Paul, Weiss team included litigation partner Allan Arffa --
aarffa@paulweiss.com -- who argued the appeal, and of counsel
Charles Davidow. [GN]


GODADDY.COM: Judge Certifies Class in Telemarketing Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge certified a
class of people who received telemarketing calls on their
cellphones from GoDaddy.com from Nov. 4, 2014 through Oct. 19,
2016.

A copy of the Sealed Order is available at:

         https://is.gd/OHIX03


GOOGLE INC: Moore & Van Discusses Cy Pres Ruling
------------------------------------------------
Tony Lathrop, Esq. -- tonylathrop@mvalaw.com -- of Moore & Van
Allen PLLC, in an article for JDSupra, reports that the Frank v.
Gaos, 586 U. S. __ (2019) class action case resented an opportunity
for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the limits on the use of
the cy pres doctrine in the context of class action settlements to
distribute damages paid by a defendant company to entities other
than the plaintiff class. On March 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court
halted Gaos in its tracks, vacating the Ninth Circuit's decision
approving the contested cy pres settlement and remanding the case
for further proceedings to determine whether any named plaintiffs
had sufficient standing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016). Spokeo established
that statutory violations alone, without concrete injury, cannot
support Article III standing. The question in Gaos is whether the
named plaintiffs' allegations that Google violated the federal
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (SCA) by disclosing
their search terms to third-party websites through a particular
mechanism known as referral headers is sufficient. The SCA
prohibits disclosure of electronic communications being stored by a
person or entity providing electronic communication services to the
public and creates a private right of action, allowing statutory
damages of at least $1,000 per violation. The potential class in
Gaos consisted of more than 129 million individuals and covered a
period of eight years. Companies facing class action litigation are
under enormous pressure and often choose to settle even meritless
cases early in the litigation to mitigate risk. The Supreme Court
clarified in Gaos that if class action plaintiffs have no standing
to sue in the first instance, there is no mechanism for settling
the case. This threshold question must be answered before
plaintiffs can extract a settlement from defendants.   

How It Got This Far
Prior to reaching a settlement agreement, Google moved to dismiss
this case in the District Court for lack of standing several times.
The company ultimately abandoned the challenge because the Supreme
Court dismissed its review of the Ninth Circuit case the District
Court had relied upon in finding standing sufficient. The Supreme
Court then decided Spokeo and, despite Google bringing Spokeo to
its attention, the Ninth Circuit did not address the decision when
upholding the District Court's settlement approval. So, Gaos
reached the Supreme Court without consideration of how Spokeo
affects the analysis of plaintiffs' standing and without any
objection to standing by the parties. Google articulated the
difficulty of its position and the utility of class settlements in
its brief opposing the petition for certiorari:

As the standards of the courts of appeals reflect, parties should
have the flexibility to compromise cases like this one that limp
past the pleadings stage yet still pose a risk of huge liability
based on uncertain substantive law at the time of settlement….
given a class size of 129 million individuals and statutory damages
of $1,000 (18 U.S.C. § 2707(c)), even the highly remote
possibility of class-wide liability in a litigated class action at
the time of settlement justified a compromise resolution of the
case.

The United States raised the question of standing before the
Supreme Court in an amicus brief in support of neither party. After
probing the issue during oral arguments, the Supreme Court ordered
the parties to file supplemental briefing on standing to aid in its
determination of whether to reach the merits of this case.

Clearing the Standing Hurdle
A class action case differs from the more common one-on-one lawsuit
in a lot of respects, particularly when it comes to reaching a
settlement. In essence, a settlement is an agreement for the
plaintiff to accept some form of remediation from a defendant in
exchange for giving up a defined scope of further legal claims
against the defendant related to that issue. In one-on-one
lawsuits, the parties can agree to settlement terms without the
intervention of the courts as the rights they are affecting are
solely their own. In the class action context, however, a small
number of named plaintiffs and class counsel purport to represent
the interests of a larger class of absent individuals. And a
settlement will be binding on all class members if they do not
opt-out, given notice and the opportunity. Therefore, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require court supervision over the class
action settlement process to ensure that any settlement reached
between the named plaintiffs and defendants is "fair, reasonable,
and adequate," and members of the class have an opportunity to
object to the settlement terms prior to court approval.

What does not differ in the class action context is the requirement
that a plaintiff have standing in order to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court to preside over the dispute. The Supreme Court cited
to a footnote in its 1976 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welf. Rights
Org. case, which explained "[t]hat a suit may be a class
action…adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named
plaintiffs who represent a class 'must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and
which they purport to represent.'" Simon did not address the
standing requirement in relation to class action settlement
approval though. Citing to the Simon footnote, the Supreme Court
stated the logic simply in Gaos: "A court is powerless to approve a
proposed class settlement if it lacks jurisdiction over the
dispute, and federal courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff
has standing." Given the breadth of new legal and factual issues
proffered in the supplemental briefs filed with the Supreme Court,
it remanded the case for resolution of the standing question in the
District Court or Ninth Circuit. The majority stated that
"[n]othing in our opinion should be interpreted as expressing a
view on any particular resolution of the standing question."

Rejecting the Cy Pres Settlement
A Supreme Court decision regarding the propriety of the cy pres
settlement will have to wait for another day or another case.
Justice Thomas, however, asserted that the Gaos plaintiffs had
standing and the Court should have rejected the cy pres settlement
in this case. In the Dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his
position that "a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a private right
need only allege an invasion of that right to establish standing,"
and the SCA and state laws plaintiffs relied upon created such
private rights. With respect to the settlement terms, Justice
Thomas took the position that cy pres payments are not to be
considered a form of relief for class members:

Whatever role cy pres may permissibly play in disposing of
unclaimed or undistributable class funds, cy pres payments are not
a form of relief to the absent class members and should not be
treated as such (including when calculating attorney's fees). And
the settlement agreement here provided no other form of meaningful
relief to the class.

(citation omitted). Justice Thomas pointed out several shortcomings
of the settlement. The fact that class counsel and named plaintiffs
received compensation while the class received nothing, strongly
suggested to him that the class was not adequately represented, as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. He rejected the
notion that the settlement was fair or reasonable, as required,
when there was no benefit to the class members. And he raised the
overarching question of whether or not the class action mechanism
was the superior method in a case like this: "I question whether a
class action is 'superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy' when it serves only as a
vehicle through which to extinguish the absent class members'
claims without providing them any relief."

Is Justice Thomas' opinion on the propriety of the cy pres
settlement representative of the Court's position on the merits? We
may never hear the Court's view if the Gaos class plaintiffs cannot
overcome the standing hurdles erected by Spokeo. But, as class
respondents noted in their supplemental briefing, "[t]hat question,
if important, will recur." We will keep you posted. [GN]


GREATBANC TRUST: Settles ERISA Class Action for $2.3MM
------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that Greatbanc Trust Co. has agreed to pay nearly
$2.3 million to current and former workers of a home care company
to settle an Employee Retirement Income Security Act class action.
[GN]


HAROLD CLARKE: Court Denies 2nd Motion to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit TERRY A. RIGGLEMAN, the Plaintiff, v.
HAROLD CLARKE AND MARK AMONETTE, the Defendants, Case No.
5:17-cv-00063 (W.D.Va.), the Hon. Judge Norman K. Moon entered an
order denying Plaintiff's second motion to certify class.[CC]

HOME DEPOT: Camp Suit Removed to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as DELMER CAMP, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; and, ADRIANA CORREA, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. HOME
DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware corporation; and, DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19CV344872 was removed from the
Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California on
April 24, 2019, and assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-02240.

Plaintiffs seek to bring this action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons employed by Home Depot as non-exempt
employees in California between March 20, 2015 and the present
"whose aggregate work time for purposes of calculating payroll was
lower after application of time rounding . . . than the aggregate
work time captured by the timekeeping system before applying
rounding to daily total time worked".[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     DONNA M. MEZIAS, ESQ.
     LIZ K. BERTKO, ESQ.
     AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
     580 California Street, Suite 1500
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Phone: 415-765-9500
     Facsimile: 415-765-9501
     Email: dmezias@akingump.com
            lbertko@akingump.com


HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Status Hearing Set for May 31
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, William Hannah, the Plaintiff, vs.
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-07564 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Andrea R. Wood  granted a
joint motion for entry of agreed protective order.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk, the Plaintiff's
motion to proceed as a collective action and memorandum of law is
entered and continued to the next status hearing. Another status
hearing is set for May 31, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.[CC]

HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Mustric Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS O. MUSTRIC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HUNTINGTON
NATIONAL BANK, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-1279 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge George C. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted Huntington's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff filed the case against Huntington and the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency on Oct. 22, 2018.  The case is based on
underlying litigation before the Franklin County Common Pleas
Court, Division of Domestic Relations involving his former spouse
Marcellina Mustric and a foreclosure proceeding also in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  The foreclosure action
resulted in certain property being sold at auction.  As a result of
the sale, the Franklin County Sheriff issued a check in the amount
of $86,475.99 made payable to the Plaintiff as trustee of the Helen
L. Mustric Revocable Trust.  

Marcellina Mustric filed a motion to have the check deposited into
the Plaintiff's guardian ad litem's trust account and the Domestic
Court ordered the Sheriff to release the check to the Plaintiff's
guardian ad litem.  The Plaintiff seeks to recover $86,475.99 that
he claims was fraudulently paid into his guardian ad litem account.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  

Huntington filed a motion to dismiss on Nov. 11, 2018.  Huntington
argues that the Plaintiff cannot rely on CAFA to establish
jurisdiction because he cannot maintain his claims as a class
action.  The Plaintiff has not filed a response to Huntington's
Motion and the time to do so has now expired.

Judge Smith finds that the Plaintiff is pro se and a non-attorney.
As a result, he cannot adequately represent a class.  Because a he
must satisfy all requirements of Rule 23(a) to maintain a class
action, the failure of the adequacy requirement is by itself fatal
and further analyses of the requirements set forth by Rule 23 are
unnecessary.  Thus, it is clear from the face of the Complaint that
the Plaintiff cannot maintain a class action, and therefore CAFA
does not provide this Court with subject-matter jurisdiction.

Next, the Judge finds that the only specified damages alleged by
the Plaintiff are $86,475.99.  He also does not assert that an
aggregate class damages would exceed $5 million.  Therefore, the
Plaintiff is unable to establish jurisdiction because the amount in
controversy is not met.

Huntington also argues that dismissal is required by the "home
rule" and "local controversy" exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction.
However, because the Plaintiff cannot establish the required amount
in controversy, the Judge need not consider or resolve those
issues.

Finally, Huntington argues in the alternative that the Plaintiff's
Complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).  However, because he has already concluded it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims, the Judge
need not consider or resolve these arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith granted Huntington's Motion
to Dismiss.  Because the Court's lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction applies equally to the remaining defendant, Director
Larry Hattix of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Plaintiff's claims against Hattix are also dismissed.

The Clerk will remove Document 7 from the Court's pending motions
list and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/cEpgRj from Leagle.com.

Thomas Owen Mustric, Trustee Helen L. Mustric Trust, Plaintiff, pro
se.

Thomas Owen Mustric, Individual, Plaintiff, pro se.

Huntington National Bank, Defendant, represented by Kevin L. Murch
-- kmurch@perez-morris.com -- Perez & Morris, LLC.


HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Hannah Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit WILLIAM HANNAH, Individually, and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED d/b/a THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL
BANK, the Defendant, Case: 1:18-cv-07564 (N.D. Ill), the Plaintiff
moves the Court to conditionally certify a collective action and to
issue notice to similarly situated mortgage loan officers of the
pending Fair Labor Standards Act claims so that all affected
current and former employees will have the opportunity to join the
collective action and exercise their rights under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff and the putative collective were and are non-exempt
employees indisputably entitled to overtime pay at a rate of
time-and-a-half their regular rates of pay. HNB's MLOs uniformly
shared the same job duties, compensation plan, and terms and
conditions of employment, and all were subject to HNB’s policies
and practices which precluded overtime pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 in any given workweek.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class and Collective:

          Anna M. Ceragioli, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          Anna M. Ceragioli, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  aceragioli@stephanzouras.com

INTERCOAST COLLEGES: Court Compels Arbitration in Kourembanas
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maine issued
an Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned STEPHANIE KOUREMBANAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
INTERCOAST COLLEGES, Defendant. No. 2:17-cv-00331-JAW. (D. Me.).

The defendant moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the
lawsuit.

The plaintiffs are four former students who signed enrollment
agreements with the defendant, a for-profit college; the enrollment
agreements contained arbitration provisions. The students filed a
suit against the defendant alleging unfair and deceptive trade
practices, breach of contract, fraudulent inducement to contract,
as well as intentional and negligent misrepresentation.

InterCoast argues that the Enrollment Agreements are covered under
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and that the Court should compel
arbitration because: (1) there is an enforceable written agreement
to arbitrate (2) the disputed issues between InterCoast and the
Plaintiffs fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and
(3) InterCoast has not waived its right to arbitrate these disputed
issues.

InterCoast says that when each Plaintiff reviewed, signed, and
initialed the Enrollment Agreement, they entered into a contract
which contained an agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising from
enrollment, other than grades and no matter how described, pleaded,
or styled.

As to the second point, InterCoast argues the issues in this case
fall within the arbitration agreement since the clause is broadly
worded in stating any dispute arising from enrollment at InterCoast
Career Institute, other than grades and no matter how described,
pleaded, or styled.

Lastly, InterCoast asserts that it has not waived its right to
arbitrate and that the Plaintiffs do not assert otherwise.
InterCoast argues consequently that because the issues before the
Court are arbitrable, the Court should dismiss the case and that
dismissal is advantageous on various grounds.

The Plaintiffs argue the Court should deny InterCoast's motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss the case, because (1) the
arbitration clauses are not enforceable as ICCI is not a legally
organized entity and lacked any capacity to contract with the
Plaintiffs and (2) the arbitration clauses are unconscionable. At
oral argument, the Plaintiffs also asserted InterCoast engaged in
fraud and fraudulently induced them to enter their Enrollment
Agreements.

The Plaintiffs claim that the arbitration provisions in their
Enrollment Agreements are unenforceable under common law principles
of corporate and contract law. Specifically, the Plaintiffs aver
that the arbitration clauses are not enforceable because there is
no evidence that either InterCoast Career Institute or the entity
for which it claims to have been a d/b/a, InterCoast Colleges ever
has been validly organized as a corporation" and consequently,
InterCoast is not a legal entity capable of enforcing rights under
a contract it purports to have entered with Plaintiffs.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs contend that the arbitration clauses are
unconscionable. The Plaintiffs claim the issue of whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists is to be decided with reference to
state contract law principles. Under Maine law, the Plaintiffs
assert, the central issue is whether there was a mutual
understanding by both parties to arbitrate.

Existence of Enrollment Agreements and the Validity of the
Agreements to Arbitrate

Here, the Plaintiffs claim InterCoast engaged in fraud in its
representations of its corporate existence and it fraudulently
induced them to enter their Enrollment Agreements:

InterCoast, to induce Plaintiffs to enter into contracts to enroll
in the InterCoast LPN Program, made positive statements of fact
regarding the quality and content of the education it would
provide, and the accreditation status of the program, that were
false, material to the contract, and relied upon by Plaintiffs in
deciding to enroll [and] InterCoast knew that its statements
regarding the quality and content of the education it promised to
provide to Plaintiffs, and the program's accreditation status, were
false at the time they were made and did not intend to satisfy the
statements at the time they were made.

At oral argument, the Plaintiffs claimed that InterCoast was hiding
the ball as to its corporate identity. Because the Plaintiffs'
allegations of fraud pertain to the contract as a whole, not the
arbitration clause specifically, whether InterCoast fraudulently
induced the Plaintiffs into entering the contracts is for an
arbitrator to decide.
  
The Enrollment Agreements' arbitration clauses provide, any dispute
arising from enrollment at InterCoast Career Institute, other than
grades and no matter how described, pleaded, or styled, shall be
resolved by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
The Plaintiffs have not otherwise argued that the clause is
ambiguous as to whether it covers their claims or that their claims
falls outside its scope.

Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs' claim of fraudulent inducement
concerns the validity of the contract in its entirety, this is a
question for an arbitrator, not this Court, to determine.

Existence of the Enrollment Agreements and Unconscionability

In contrast to the Plaintiffs' first argument, the Plaintiffs' two
remaining arguments are proper for this Court to resolve because
one questions the existence of the contract itself and the other
contends the arbitration clause is unconscionable.

Nonregistered Legal Entity and Enforceability of Contracts

Whether an unregistered entity, which serves as a d/b/a of
registered and incorporated corporation, may enforce a contract
concerns whether there was the requisite mutual assent necessary
for a contract to be formed. Although there is limited authority on
this question, the Court concludes that under Maine law an
unregistered legal entity may enforce a contract.

The Parties' Positions

The Plaintiffs claim that there is no evidence that either
InterCoast Career Institute or the entity for which it claims to
have been a d/b/a, InterCoast Colleges'  ever has been validly
organized as a corporation and that it cannot enforce the
Enrollment Agreements.  

InterCoast replies that the fact that it signed the Enrollment
Agreements under its trade name InterCoast Career Institute rather
than its corporate name Inter-Coast Internal Training Inc. does not
undermine the validity of the Enrollment Agreements because a party
may be sued under its own name or the name it chooses to use in
transactions, and the use of such a name does not invalidate a
contract.  InterCoast says while the Plaintiffs may have
incorrectly named InterCoast Colleges and not Inter-Coast
International Training, Inc. as the Defendant, they understood that
they were dealing with a corporate entity and that InterCoast
Career Institute" was its trade name.  
InterCoast's Prior Corporate Disclosures and Inter-Coast
International Training, Inc.'s Registration

The Plaintiffs sued InterCoast Colleges, d/b/a InterCoast Career
Institute. The Plaintiffs allege that InterCoast Colleges is a
California corporation that operates for-profit. In Maine,
InterCoast did business under the name of InterCoast Career
Institute.

1. It does not have a parent corporation; 2. There is no publicly
held corporation owning 10% or more of the stock of Defendant
Intercoast Career Institute.

Standing to Enforce Enrollment Agreements

Under Maine law, mutual assent means the parties agree to be bound
by all its material terms, the assent is either expressly or
impliedly manifested in the contract, and the contract is
sufficiently definite to enable the court to ascertain its exact
meaning and fix exactly the legal liabilities of each party.

It is not clear whether InterCoast properly registered its trade
name to conduct business in Maine before its authority to operate
as a foreign corporation was revoked in August 2016. However, even
assuming InterCoast did not, its noncompliance does not mean the
contract between InterCoast Career Institute/InterCoast Colleges
(neither of which was formally registered or incorporated in Maine)
and the Plaintiffs is unenforceable as a matter of law.

Unconscionability

The Plaintiffs argue the arbitration clauses in the Enrollment
Agreements are unconscionable because: (1) of being inconspicuously
split between page 5 and the top of page 6 of the Enrollment
Agreements (2) the lack of notice to the material terms and waiver
of rights within the arbitration provision (3) the clauses
incorporate arbitration provisions from other enrollment materials
not brought to the attention of the Plaintiffs.  

While it is InterCoast's burden to compel arbitration, the
Plaintiffs have the burden to establish unconscionability. There
are two different types of unconscionability: procedural and
substantive.

The former looks at the circumstances in which the contract was
entered into and generally concerns unequal bargaining power
between the parties. The latter looks at the terms of the contract
and inequity to one party.  

Here, the Plaintiffs primarily make a substantive unconscionability
challenge as they complain about the terms or the lack thereof and
the location of the arbitration clause within the Enrollment
Agreements. However, at oral argument, the Plaintiffs also argued
that the clauses are procedurally unconscionable.

Substantive Unconscionability

In contrast, here, the Plaintiffs have the burden to show
unconscionability.

Under Maine law, parties to a contract are deemed to have read the
contract and are bound by its terms.

As to the placement of the arbitration clause, in some of the
Enrollment Agreements, the arbitration clause is split between the
fifth and sixth pages, the first half of the clause appears right
above where each Plaintiff placed initials. The exception is the
second Cathy Mande Enrollment Agreement, where the arbitration
clause appears in full on the fifth page. The fact that the
arbitration clauses lack language about waiving rights and about
costs associated with arbitration, and does not define disputes to
include legal disputes or claims does not render the clauses
unconscionable. These omissions do not shock the conscience. The
fact that the arbitration clause also incorporates the Arbitration
provision found elsewhere in InterCoast Career Institute enrollment
materials, does not show the clause is grossly oppressive. While
the Plaintiffs say InterCoast has not demonstrated that it made
them aware of this additional information, it is the Plaintiffs'
burden to show unconscionability.

The Court concludes the arbitration clause contained in the
Enrollment Agreements is not substantively unconscionable.

Procedural Unconscionability

The Court also concludes the arbitration clause contained in the
Enrollment Agreements is not procedurally unconscionable.
Procedural unconscionability is analyzed based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the contract was adopted.

The Plaintiffs say the arbitrations clauses are procedurally
unconscionable because for some of the Plaintiffs, English is their
second language, InterCoast targeted them, and there was unequal
bargaining power between the parties. They say the clauses are
unconscionable in light of the totality of the circumstances.

Given that it is the Plaintiffs' burden to show unconscionability,
on the record before it, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs
have not sustained their burden. Looking at the time and
circumstances when the Enrollment Agreements were entered into, the
record lacks sufficient indicia to show that the Enrollment
Agreements were the result of exploitation or undue influence.

While the Plaintiffs say they were targeted, only one Plaintiff,
Catherine Valley, learned of InterCoast through its advertising
campaign soliciting students. The remaining Plaintiffs either
learned of InterCoast on their own initiative or a friend referred
them to InterCoast.

Although as a corporation, InterCoast likely had more bargaining
power, that is not enough by itself to constitute procedural
unconscionable. To the degree the Plaintiffs are arguing that the
arbitration clauses were adhesion agreements, this argument is
belied by the fact that the Court has not been presented with some
element of overreaching by a party who exploits a vastly unequal
bargaining position.

The Court concludes that the arbitration clauses are not
procedurally unconscionable.
Remaining Factors for a Motion to Compel Arbitration

The Plaintiffs do not contend that their claims against InterCoast
fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause or that InterCoast
waived its right to arbitrate. The Court therefore concludes that
InterCoast has met the two remaining factors in deciding whether to
grant a motion to compel arbitration. The Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs claims against InterCoast are arbitrable and grants
InterCoast's motion to compel arbitration.

The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Dismiss the Case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 28, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxawhnvw from Leagle.com.

STEPHANIE KOUREMBANAS, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, CARIDAD JEAN BAPTISTE, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, CATHY MANDE, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated & CATHARINE VALLEY, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by ANDREW P. COTTER , CLIFFORD & CLIFFORD, LLC, JAMES A. CLIFFORD ,
CLIFFORD & CLIFFORD, LLC & RICHARD L. O'MEARA, MURRAY PLUMB &
MURRAY.

INTERCOAST COLLEGES, doing business as INTERCOAST CAREER INSTITUTE,
Defendant, represented by GEORGE T. DILWORTH , DRUMMOND WOODSUM,
JEFFREY R. FINK, THOMPSON COBURN LLP, WILLIAM R. BAY, THOMPSON
COBURN LLP, pro hac vice & JULIA G. PITNEY, DRUMMOND WOODSUM.


INTERNATIONAL LASER: Alvarado Seeks Class Cert. Under FLSA, BIPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled JOSUE ALVARADO, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown
v. INTERNATIONAL LASER PRODUCTS, INC., INTERNATIONAL TONER CORP.,
and CRAIG FUNK, individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-07756 (N.D. Ill.),
files with the Court his Motion to Authorize Notice Pursuant to
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and for Class
Certification of his Illinois Minimum Wage Law and Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3).

Mr. Alvarado asks the Court to enter an order:

   A. authorizing the sending of notice to each putative class
      member and requiring the Defendants to provide the names
      and last known addresses of all class members;

   B. granting Motion for Class Certification and certifying
      Plaintiff's Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL") and Illinois
      Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") claims as a
      class action;

   C. appointing him as Class Representative; and

   D. appointing Douglas M. Werman, Esq., Maureen A. Salas, Esq.,
      and Sarah J. Arendt, Esq., as Class Counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 W. Washington St., Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com
                  sarendt@flsalaw.com


KIA MOTORS AMERICA: Faces De Anda Suit over Defective Automobile
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action complaint has been filed against Kia Motors America,
Inc. (KMA) for violations of statutory obligations in connection
with a defective KIA Optima vehicle. The case is captioned MALLELA
DE ANDA, Plaintiff, vs. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19STCV13360 (Cal. Super., Cty.
of Los Angeles, April 17, 2019). Plaintiff Mallela De Anda alleges
that KMA failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to Civil
Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); and Civil Code section
1793.1, subdivision (a)(2). KMA allegedly failed to make available
to its authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service
literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the
express warranty period. Defendant committed fraud by allowing the
Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the
Subject Vehicle and its 2.4L GDI engine was defective and
susceptible to sudden and catastrophic failure. Accordingly,
Plaintiff is entitled to a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff's
actual damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision
(c).

KMA is an automobile design, manufacturing, distribution, and/or
service corporation doing business within the United States. It is
headquartered in the state of California with its principal place
of business at 111 Peters Canyon Road, Irvine, California. It
distributes Kia vehicles and sells these vehicles through its
network of more than 700 dealerships. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Tionna Dolin, Esq.
     Sean Crandall, Esq.
     STRATEGIC LEGAL PRACTICES
     A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
     1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Telephone: (310) 929-4900
     Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
     E-mail: tdolin@slpattorney.com
             scrandall@slpattorney.com


LARIO OIL: Hancock Seeks to Conditionally Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATHAN HANCOCK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LARIO OIL & GAS
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02140-JAR-KGG (D. Kan.),
Hancock seeks conditional certification under the Fair Labor
Standards Act -- and authorization to send notice to other putative
plaintiffs, so they have opportunity to learn of and join the case
before their statutes of limitations expire -- on behalf of:

   "all oilfield workers who were or are employed as a
   Wellsite/Drill Site Manager or "company man" by Lario Oil
   & Gas Company classified as independent contractors and
   paid a day rate at any time within the three years
   preceding the present date".

Because Lario Oil denied Hancock and the Putative Class Members
overtime under its uniform classification and compensation policy,
these workers are similarly situated. The Court should therefore
allow Hancock to send Court-authorized notice of this action to the
Putative Class Members, informing them of their rights and
providing them the opportunity to make a claim for unpaid wages.

According to the complaint, Hancock regularly worked for the
Defendant more than 12-hour days, for seven days a week, typically
for two weeks at a time. To avoid paying Hancock and the other
company men overtime, Lario misclassified them as independent
contractors and paid them on a day rate basis, the lawsuit says.

Hancock's claims are straightforward: Lario's classification and
compensation plan for its company men violated the FLSA because it
failed to pay these workers overtime.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Eric L. Dirks, Esq.
          WILLIAMS DIRKS DAMERON, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
          Kansas City, MI 64105
          Telephone: (816) 945-7110
          Facsimile: (816) 945-7118
          E-mail: dirks@willamsdirks.com

                - and -

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          William R. Liles, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 325-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 325-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  wliles@mybackwages.com

LEXUS OF NEW ORLEANS: Court Dismisses Kimble Suit With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed with prejudice the case,
RAYMOND H. KIMBLE, III v. LEXUS OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL, Civil Action
No. 18-7918 (E.D. La.).

Having considered the complaint, the record, the applicable law,
the original and supplemental Reports and Recommendations of the
United States Magistrate Judge, as well as the Plaintiff's
objections to the Magistrate Judge's Reports and Recommendations,
the Judge approved the Reports and Recommendations of the United
States Magistrate Judge and adopted it as the Court's opinion in
the matter.  

Therefore, having also considered the dismissal order of the court
in the Middle District of Louisiana, he denied the Plaintiff's
motions to appoint a special monitor and for class action status,
and dismissed with prejudice the complaint as legally frivolous
and/or for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(c)(1).

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/nEGLHk from Leagle.com.

Raymond H. Kimble, III, Plaintiff, pro se.


M/A/R/C RESEARCH: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, EXCLUSIVELY CATS VETERINARY HOSPITAL,
P.C., a Michigan professional corporation, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. M/A/R/C RESEARCH, LLC, a Texas limited liability
company, the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-11228-RHC-SDD (E.D.
Mich.), the Plaintiff files a "placeholder" motion for class
certification in order to prevent against a "buy-off" attempt, a
tactic class-action Defendants sometimes use to attempt to prevent
a case from proceeding to a decision on class certification by
attempting to "moot" the named plaintiff's claims by tendering the
plaintiff individual (but not classwide) relief.

The Plaintiff also asks the Court to certify a class, appoint
Plaintiff as the class representative, and appoint its attorneys as
class counsel.

The Plaintiff proposes the following class definition:

   "all persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
   filing of this action (2) were sent telephone facsimile
   messages the same or similar to the Fax, (3) from whom
   Defendant did not obtain “prior express invitation or
   permission” to send fax advertisements, and (4) where
   the fax advertisements did not include as opt-out notice
   compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)."

In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016), the
Supreme Court held "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of
judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case," and "a would-be class
representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair
opportunity to show that certification is warranted." The Sixth
Circuit applied Campbell-Ewald in an unreported opinion in Family
Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. MD On-Line Sols., Inc., No. 15-3508,
2016 WL 384823, (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016).

In Wilson v. Gordon, F.3d 934, 949-50 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth
Circuit held that, even where "[t]he parties [did] not dispute that
all eleven named plaintiffs' individual claims became moot before
the district court certified the class," the "picking-off"
exception applied and allowed the named plaintiffs with moot
individual claims to pursue class certification, which would
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint, applying Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The Sixth
Circuit held this ruling was consistent with Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.
Ct. at 672, which refused to put defendants "in the driver's seat"
on class certification.[CC]

Attorneys for Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hospital, P.C.,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com

MANN PACKING: Anguiano Suit Removed to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned MARIA ANGUIANO, as an individual and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MANN PACKING CO.,
INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19CV001178 was removed from the Superior Court
of the State of California, in and for the County of Monterey to
the United States District Court for the Nothern District of
California on April 19, 2019, and assigned Case No.
5:19-cv-02133-VKD.

Plaintiff's Complaint purports to assert six causes of action
against Defendant, as follows: failure to pay overtime in violation
of California Labor Code; failure to provide meal periods in
violation of California Labor Code; failure to provide rest periods
in violation of California Labor Code; failure to provide itemized
wage statements in violation of California Labor Code; violation of
California Business and Professions Code; and violation of
California Labor Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Jeffrey B. Maltzman, Esq.
     MALTZMAN & PARTNERS, P.A.
     679 Encinitas Blvd., Suite 201
     Encinitas, CA 92024-3761
     Phone: (305) 992-6555
     Facsimile: (305) 779-5664
     Email: jeffreym@maltzmanpartners.com


MARTINFEDERAL CONSULTING: Beavers Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kimberly Beavers, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. MartinFederal Consulting, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00302-SWW (E.D. Ark., April 26, 2019) is a
collective action brought by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, against Defendant for violations
of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act ("AMWA").

Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees worked in excess of 40
hours per week in at least one workweek during the time period
relevant to this Complaint. However, the Defendant did not pay
Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees overtime wages at a rate
of one and 1.5 times their regular rate for their hours worked over
40 per week, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid employee.

Defendant is a company that provides government contracting
services both nationally and internationally, primarily in the
areas of IT systems, laboratory and technical support, and training
and development, as well as other areas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Stacy Gibson, Esq.
     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
            stacy@sanfordlawfirm.com


MATRIX MEDICAL: Gasperak Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as DOUGLAS GASPERAK, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MATRIX MEDICAL NETWORK OF
FLORIDA, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, and DPN USA,
LLC., a Florida Limited Liability Company, d/b/a Healthfair,
Defendants, was removed from the Circuit Court of the Fifth
Judicial District in and for Citrus County, Florida to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on April
24, 2019, and assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-00206.

Plaintiff seeks to recover overtime pay under the FLSA for himself
and other similarly situated employees of Defendants.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     John A. Schifino, Esq.
     Eduardo A. Suarez-Solar, Esq.
     Jounice L. Nealy-Brown, Esq.
     Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A.
     401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 2500
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Phone: (813) 739-6962
     Fax: (813) 228-6739
     Primary E-mail: jschifino@gunster.com
                     esuarez@gunster.com
                     jnealy-brown@gunster.com
     Secondary E-mail: adavis@gunster.com
                       tkennedy@gunster.com
                       eservice@gunster.com


MDL 2804: ND Counties Suit Consolidated in Opiate Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit entitled CASS COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA and CITY OF GRAND
FORKS, NORTH DAKOTA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P., et al., Case No.
3:19-cv-00055, was transferred on April 17, 2019, from the U.S.
District Court for the District of North Dakota to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland).

The Ohio District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-op-45276-DAP
to the proceeding.

The lawsuit is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation styled
In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No.
1:17-md-02804-DAP (Hon. Dan A. Polster).

North Dakota, like many states across the country, is facing an
unprecedented opioid addiction epidemic, the Plaintiffs allege.
They contend that the drug manufacturers' deceptive marketing and
sale of opioids to treat chronic pain is one of the main drivers of
the opioid epidemic.

Historically, prescription opioids had been used for short-term,
post-surgical and trauma-related pain, and for palliative
end-of-life care primarily in cancer patients.  Because opioids are
highly addictive and dangerous, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") has generally regulated them as Schedule II
Controlled Substances, i.e., drugs that have a high potential for
abuse and that may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence.[BN]

Plaintiffs Cass County, North Dakota, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated; and City of Grand Forks, North
Dakota, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, are represented by:

          Joseph A. Wetch, Jr., Esq.
          SERKLAND, LUNDBERG, ERICKSON, MARCIL & MCLEAN, LTD.
          P.O. Box 6017
          Fargo, ND 58108-6017
          Telephone: (701) 232-8957
          E-mail: jwetch@serklandlaw.com


MDL 2886: Harmel Suit Consolidated in Allura Fiber Litigation
-------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit titled ANDREW HARMEL, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals v. PLYCEM USA, LLC, PLYCEM USA,
INC., ELEMENTIA USA, INC., ELEMENTIA, S.A.B. DE C.V., Case No.
1:19-cv-01476 was transferred on April 17, 2019, from the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina (Charleston).

The South Carolina District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-01126-DCN to the proceeding.

The lawsuit is consolidated in the lawsuit litigation titled IN RE:
ALLURA FIBER CEMENT SIDING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No.
2:19-mn-02886-DCN.

The lawsuit is a consumer class action brought on behalf of all
persons and entities, who own homes, residences or other structures
physically located in Georgia, on which the Defendants' Allura
fiber cement exterior siding is or was installed.  The Plaintiff
alleges that the Siding of his and Class Members' homes suffers
from an inherent defect resulting in the Siding cracking,
splitting, warping, and breakage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harper T. Segui, Esq.
          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP
          900 W Morgan St.
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: harper@wbmllp.com
                  dan@wbmllp.com
                  scott@wbmllp.com


MERCURY GENERAL: MAO-MSO et al. Seek to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------
MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC a CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware entity;
MSPA CLAIMS 1, LLC, a Florida entity, the Plaintiffs, vs. MERCURY
GENERAL, a California company, its subsidiaries and affiliates, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02525-AB (C.D. Cal.), Case No.
2:17-cv-02557-AB, the Plaintiff will move the Court on June 28,
2019, for an order:

   1. certifying these classes:

      No-Fault Class:

      "all non-governmental organizations that provided
      benefits under Medicare Part C, in the United States
      of America and its territories, which made payments or
      where financially responsible for medical items and
      services on behalf of their beneficiaries at any time
      between March 31, 2011 and the present, for which the
      defendant had provided no-fault insurance coverage, but
      failed to make primary payment or failed to reimburse";

      The Class also includes all assignees that have been
      assigned rights of recovery from those Medicare Part C
      providers. The class definition excludes (a) Defendant,
      its officers, directors, management, employees,
      subsidiaries, and affiliates; and (b) any judges or
      justices involved in this action and any members of
      their immediate families.

      Settlement Class:

      "all non-governmental organizations that provided
      benefits under Medicare Part C, in the United States
      of America and its territories, who made payments for
      medical items and services on behalf of their
      beneficiaries between March 31, 2011 and the present,
      for which Defendant has not reimbursed in full or part
      after Defendant entered into settlements with Medicare
      beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicare Advantage Plan";

      The class definition excludes (a) Defendant, its
      officers, directors, management, employees,
      subsidiaries, and affiliates; and (b) any judges or
      justices involved in this action and any members of
      their immediate families.

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as the class representatives; and

   3. appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel as class counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Michael L. Baum, Esq.
          R. Brent Wisner, Esq.
          Adam M. Foster, Esq.
          BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, P.C.
          10940 Wilshire Blvd., 17th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 207-3233
          Facsimile: (310) 820-7444
          E-mail: mbaum@baumhedlundlaw.com
                  rbwisner@baumhedlundlaw.com
                  afoster@baumhedlundlaw.com

MICROCHIP TECH: Schuman et al Seek to Certify Atmel Employees Class
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit PETER SCHUMAN, an individual, and
WILLIAM COPLIN, an individual, on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MICROCHIP
TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED, a corporation; ATMEL CORPORATION, a
corporation; and CORPORATION U.S. SEVERANCE GUARANTEE BENEFIT
PROGRAM, an employee benefit plan, the Defendants, Case No.
4:16-CV-05544-HSG (N.D. Cal., Filed Sept. 29, 2016), the Plaintiffs
will move the Court for an order on June 27, 2019:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "al former U.S.-based employees of defendant Atmel
      Corporation who were employed as of the April 4, 2016 closing

      date of the Atmel-Microchip merger and who were terminated by

      defendant Microchip Technology Incorporated without cause
      between April 4, 2016 and March 19, 2017";

      The class excludes the plaintiffs in the companion case (also

      pending before this Court) of Berman v. Microchip et al.,
      Case No. 4:17-cv-01864-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

   2. appointing themselves as Class Representatives; and

   3. apointing McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, Altshuler Berzon LLP,

      and the Law Office of William Reilly as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of two claims for relief:
equitable relief and improper denial of benefits under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent approximately 200 former employees
of defendant Atmel Corporation, which in July 2015 created the
"Atmel Corporation U.S. Severance Guarantee Benefit Program" (the
"Atmel Plan," or "Plan"), an ERISA plan that guaranteed all United
States-based Atmel employees generous severance benefits if they:
(1) kept working for Atmel while it searched for an appropriate
merger partner; and (2) were later terminated without cause by the
new company between April 4, 2016 (the merger close date) and March
19, 2017. As this Court recently concluded in Berman v. Microchip
et al., Case No. 4:17-cv-01864-HSG (N.D. 10 Cal), all eligibility
conditions for receiving these ERISA severance plan benefits were
fully satisfied.

The Plaintiffs continued to work for Atmel from July 12, 2015, when
the Plan was created, through early April 2016, when Atmel
completed its merger with defendant Microchip Technology Inc.
("Microchip"). Yet once Microchip completed the merger and began
laying off scores of former Atmel employees without cause,
Microchip reneged on its contractual and statutory obligations and
refused to pay plaintiffs or class members the severance benefits
they had been promised and were clearly entitled to be paid.
Instead, as the Court found in Berman, in a flagrant breach of
Microchip's fiduciary duty and obligations under ERISA and the
Atmel Plan, it falsely stated that the Atmel Plan had "expired"
months earlier and that terminated employees were not entitled to
any Plan benefits. Microchip then demanded, based on these false
and misleading assertions, that the plaintiffs and class members
must sign written releases of all severance-related and other
claims they had against Microchip in order to receive payments upon
termination that were far lower than those employees were actually
entitled to under the Plan.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Rubin, Esq.
          Andrew Kushner, Esq.
          ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
          177 Post Street, Suite 300
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 421-7151
          Facsimile: (415) 362-8064
          E-mail: mrubin@altber.com
                  akushner@altber.com

               - and -

          Cliff Palefsky, Esq.
          Keith Ehrman, Esq.
          MCGUINN, HILLSMAN & PALEFSKY
          535 Pacific Avenue
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 421-9292
          Facsimile: (415) 403-0202
          E-mail: cp@mhpsf.com
                  keith@mhpsf.com

               - and -

          William Reilly, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM REILLY
          86 Molino Avenue
          Mill Valley, CA 94941
          Telephone: (415) 225-6215
          Facsimile: (415) 634-2897
          E-mail: bill@williambreilly.com

MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JULIE VOEKS, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC. and MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00584-JPS (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order certifying a class, appointing the
Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly,
LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the
Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff furthers ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

MONSANTO CO: Graves Sues Over Roundup(R)-Related Injuries
---------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD GRAVES, LOIS E. GRAVES v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Case No.
1:19-cv-00107 (E.D. Tenn., April 17, 2019), seeks to recover
damages for the injuries sustained by the Plaintiffs as the direct
and proximate result of the wrongful conduct and negligence of the
Defendant in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distributing, labeling, and selling of the herbicide Roundup(R),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup(R) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use.

Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation with a principal place
of business in St. Louis, Missouri.  Monsanto is a multinational
agricultural biotechnology corporation and the world's leading
producer of glyphosate.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel V. Parish, Esq.
          WOLFF ARDIS, P.C.
          5810 Shelby Oaks Drive
          Memphis, TN 38134
          Telephone: (901) 763-3336
          Facsimile: (901) 763-3376
          E-mail: dparish@wolffardis.com

               - and -

          Jason Edward Ochs, Esq.
          OCHS LAW FIRM, PC
          690 US 89, Suite 206
          PO Box 10944
          Jackson, WY 83001
          Telephone: (307) 739-3959
          Facsimile: (307) 235-6910
          E-mail: Jason@ochslawfirm.com


MULTIFAMILY INTERNET: Ehrman Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as DAVID EHRMAN, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. MULTIFAMILY INTERNET VENTURES, LLC, and DOES 1 through 25,
Defendants, Case No. 30-2019-01058863-CU-OE-CXC was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Orange to the United States District Court for the Central District
of California on April 26, 2019, and assigned Case No.
8:19-cv-00770.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, past and
future lost wages and job benefits, overtime, penalties, statutory
damages, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Christopher W. Decker, Esq.
     OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
     400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213-239-9800
     Facsimile: 213-239-9045
     Email: christopher.decker@ogletree.com

          - and -

     Caroline C. Dickey, Esq.
     OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
     Park Tower, Fifteenth Floor
     695 Town Center Drive
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: 714-800-7900
     Facsimile: 714-754-1298
     Email: caroline.dickey@ogletree.com


NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned BARBARA MOLLBERG,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00618-LA (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com



NATURAL HEALTH: Class Action Law Firm Gets Dozens of Inquiries
--------------------------------------------------------------
Yolande Cole, writing for Calgary Herald, reports that since filing
a proposed class action lawsuit against Natural Health Services
Ltd. and parent company Sunniva Inc., law firm Diamond and Diamond
has received "dozens" of inquiries.

Darryl Singer, lead counsel on the lawsuit, said his office started
to get calls from people concerned about a data breach of Natural
Health Services patient information immediately after the lawsuit
was announced.

"Everybody's concerns are fairly similar, and at the end of the
day, everybody that's called us is quite happy to be part of the
class action," Singer said.

Natural Health Services, which operates seven clinics in Canada for
patients seeking medical cannabis, identified there was a data
breach in their electronic medical record system between Dec. 4,
2018 and Jan. 7, 2019. During that time period, records containing
personal health information of about 34,000 patients were accessed
without authorization, Sunniva said. The breach did not involve any
financial, credit card or social insurance number information.

"NHS has notified the patients whose data was accessed, provided
details about the breach and its investigation to date, and
guidance for other steps that patients can take to protect
themselves," Sunniva said in a news release.

Dr. Mark Kimmins, president of NHS, said the company is taking the
situation "very seriously" and taking "the necessary steps to
prevent a situation like this from happening again."

"In addition, we are working with law enforcement and the Office of
the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta to investigate
this matter," he said.

Singer said the lawsuit is structured as a national class action,
so the Toronto law firm is taking clients from across the country.

"A health services provider, which is what this company is, has an
obligation to safeguard the most sensitive, personal health
information of its patients, and that's set out in legislation,"
Singer said.

Information disclosed as part of the breach includes diagnostic
results, health-care numbers, addresses, phone numbers and medical
information such as referrals and completed questionnaires,
according to Diamond and Diamond Lawyers.

Natural Health Services and Sunniva have not yet filed a statement
of defence. [GN]


NAVIHEALTH INC: Bid to Certify Collective Action Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit MAE BARBEE and DONNA TRONE, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs,
vs. NAVIHEALTH, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00119 (M.D.
Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, JR. entered an order:

   1. granting naviHealth's motion to withdraw its previously
filed
      motion to dismiss;

   2. denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' motion to certify
      collective action and for expedited notice to refiling to
      comport with the allegations in the recently filed amended
      complaint; and

   3. denying as moot joint motion for extension of time to
      respond.[CC]

NELSON TREE: Non-Exempt Workers Class Certified in Neville Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Walter H. Rice entered a decision sustaining in part and
overruling in part the motion to conditionally certify an FLSA
collective action and to authorize notice in the lawsuit titled
JOSEPH NEVILLE, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. NELSON TREE SERVICE, LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00368-WHR
(S.D. Ohio).

The lawsuit alleges certain violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act due to the Defendant's alleged failure to pay its employees for
time spent traveling to jobsites in which an overnight stay was
required when such travel resulted in overtime.

Judge Rice ruled that this collective is conditionally certified:

     all current or former hourly non-exempt employees of
     Defendant who (1) were required, due to the distance from
     their home community to a jobsite, to stay overnight; (2)
     have not been paid for time spent traveling to jobsites; (3)
     are not subject to a collective bargaining agreement that
     addresses payment of travel time; and (4) as a result of the
     travel time to the remote job, worked over 40 hours in any
     workweek beginning November 8, 2015, and continuing through
     the date of the final disposition of this case.

The Defendant shall provide to the Plaintiff's counsel, within 14
days of the date of this Decision and Entry, a list, in electronic
and importable format, of the names, job titles, last known
addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and dates of
employment, of the all putative collective members.

Counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defendant shall
submit to the Court, within 21 days of this Decision and Entry, a
detailed proposed Notice of Collective Action for judicial
approval, with a consent form, and specifying all methods for
communication of the Notice and consent form to the putative
class.[CC]


NESTLE WATERS: Says Poland Spring Class Action Meritless
--------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a judge has given new life to a
class-action lawsuit accusing Poland Spring of selling water that's
sourced from wells, not springs.

The same federal judge in Connecticut last year dismissed the
lawsuit, but he ruled that an amended complaint can proceed with
claims in eight states: Maine, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.

Poland Spring's corporate parent, Connecticut-based Nestle Waters
North America, reiterated on April 2 that it's a "meritless
lawsuit" and said the judge's decision doesn't undermine its
confidence.

Nestle Waters says Poland Spring meets Food and Drug
Administration's guidelines that allow "spring water" labels if the
water is drawn from the same source as a natural spring and meets
certain requirements for chemical composition. [GN]


NIO INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP announces that a federal
securities class action lawsuit has been filed against NIO Inc.
(NYSE: NIO) in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on behalf of those who purchased or acquired
the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) of NIO between September
12, 2018 and March 5, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors who purchased ADRs of NIO Inc. are urged to contact the
firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or
(212) 545-4774. You may obtain additional information concerning
the action on our website www.whafh.com

If you have incurred losses in the ADRs of NIO Inc., you may, no
later than May 13, 2019, request that the Court appoint you lead
plaintiff of the proposed class. Please contact Wolf Haldenstein to
learn more about your rights as an investor in NIO Inc.

The filed Complaint alleges Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that:

NIO would not be building its own manufacturing plant and would
instead continue to rely on a little-known Chinese state-owned auto
manufacturer, JAC Auto, to manufacture its electric vehicles;
reductions in government subsidies for electric cars would
materially impact NIO's sales; and as a result, Defendants'
statements about NIO's business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On March 6, 2019, NIO's ADRs declined from a closing price on March
5, 2019 of$10.19 per ADR to close at $8.01 per ADR, a decline of
$2.01 per ADR or over 21%.

On March 7, 2019, NIO's ADRs declined an additional $0.92 per ADR
or over 11% to close at $7.09 per ADR.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please

         Contact:
         Kevin Cooper, Esq.
         Gregory Stone
         Director of Case and Financial Analysis       
         Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
         Telephone: (800) 575-0735
                    (212) 545-4774
         Website: www.whafh.com.
         Email: gstone@whafh.com
                kcooper@whafh.com
                classmember@whafh.com [GN]


PACESETTERS, INC: Scantland Seeks to Conditionally Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, SHELLY MARIE SCANTLAND, Individually,
on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other similarly situated
current and former employees, the Plaintiff, vs. PACESETTERS,
INCORPORATED, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation, the Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00095 (M.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiff moves the Court
for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all current and former hourly-paid employees who were
      classified by Defendant as Direct Support Professionals at
      its facilities throughout Middle Tennessee at any time during

      the applicable limitations period covered by the collective
      action complaint"

   2. authorizing Court-supervised notice to those individuals, in

      accordance with Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
      Act, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

   3. directing Defendant to immediately provide Plaintiff's
      counsel a computer-readable file containing the names (last
      names first), last known physical addresses, last known email

      addresses, social security numbers, dates of employment, and

      last known telephone numbers of all putative class members
      during the last three years;

   4. tolling putative class' statute of limitations as of the date

      the motion is fully briefed (except for those who have
      already opted into this action); and

   5. deeming Opt-in Plaintiffs' Consent Forms to be "filed" on the

      dates they are postmarked (excluding those who opted in prior

      to Court-supervised Notice being sent).

The Plaintiff commenced a collective action for Defendant's wage
and overtime compensation violations at any time during the
applicable limitations period covered by the Complaint (i.e. two
years for FLSA violations and three years for willful FLSA
violations).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, Esq.
          Nathan A. Bishop, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Mary Dee Allen, Esq.
          Edward H. Trent, Esq.
          WIMBERLY LAWSON WRIGHT
          DAVES & JONES, PLLC
          1420 Neal Street, Suite 201
          P.O. Box 655
          Cookeville, TN 38503-0655
          Telephone: (931) 372-9123
          E-mail: mallen@wimberlylawson.com
                  etrent@wimberlylawson.com

PAYCRON INC: Jackson Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JEREMY JACKSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PAYCRON
INC., a Florida company, the Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-00609-WFJ-AAS (M.D. Fla., March 11, 2019), the Plaintiff
asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying two Classes:

      Autodialed Class:

      "all persons in the United States who from four years prior
      to the filing of this action: (1) Defendant (or an agent
      acting on behalf of Defendant) called, (2) using the same
      dialing equipment used to call Plaintiff, (3) for
      substantially the same reason Defendant called Plaintiff, and

      (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express
      written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it
      obtained prior express written consent to call Plaintiff, or
      (b) Defendant does not claim to have obtained prior express
      written consent"; and

      Do Not Call Registry Class:

      "all persons in the United States who from four years prior
      to the filing of this action: (1) Defendant (or an agent
      acting on behalf of Defendant) called more than one time, (2)

      within any 12-month period, (3) where the person's phone
      number had been listed on the national Do Not Call registry
      for at least thirty days, (4) for substantially the same
      reason Defendant called Plaintiff, and (5) for whom Defendant

      claims (a) it obtained prior express written consent in the
      same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express
      written consent to call the Plaintiff, or (b) Defendant does

      not claim to have obtained prior express written consent."

   2. granting Plaintiff leave to take discovery to identify
      members of the Classes and determining amount of damages they

      are entitled to prior to entry of final judgment.

The Plaintiff asserts two claims under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act. The first is for violation of the TCPA's
prohibition against making autodialed solicitations to cellular
telephone numbers. The second claim is for violation of the TCPA's
prohibition against making 2 or more solicitation calls in a
12-month period to telephone numbers registered on the national Do
Not Call registry for more than 30 days.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

PHILIP B WILLETTE: Malik Sues Over Unlawful Debt Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------
AREEB MALIK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PHILIP B. WILLETTE CO., LPA, Case No. 0:19-cv-60987-WPD
(S.D. Fla., April 17, 2019), alleges violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has dispatched thousands
of consumer debt collection letters to Florida consumers without
first obtaining a license to collect consumer debts in the state of
Florida as mandated by the Florida Consumer Collection Practices
Act.

PBW is an Ohio corporation, with its principal place of business
located in Pickerington, Ohio.  PBW engages in interstate commerce
by regularly using telephone and mail in a business whose principal
purpose is the collection of debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com


R.BERG ENTERPRISES: Underpays Cashiers, Coronado Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER CORONADO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. R. BERG ENTERPRISES, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 25, Defendants, Case No. 19STCV10841 (Cal. Super.,
Los Angeles Cty., March 29, 2019) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage
statements, and reimburse necessary business expenses.

Jennifer Coronado was employed by Defendants as a cashier.

R. Berg Enterprises, Inc. operate a 7-Eleven retail location in Los
Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael H. Boyamian, Esq.
          Armand R. Kizirian, Esq.
          BOYAMIAN LAW, INC.
          550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 547-5300 |
          Facsimile: (818) 547-5678
          E-mail: michael@boyamianlaw.com
                  armand@boyamianlaw.com

               - and -

          Hirad D. Dadgostar, Esq.
          DADGOSTAR LAW LLP
          12400 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-1030
          Telephone: (310) 820-1022
          Facsimile: (310) 820-1088
          E-mail: hirad@dadgostarlaw.com


RE/MAX HOLDINGS: Antitrust Suit Filed Over Commissions
------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth R. Harney, writing for The Real Deal, reports that in what
could be the most far-reaching antitrust lawsuit for the real
estate market in decades, the National Association of Realtors and
four of the largest realty companies have been accused of a
conspiracy to systematically overcharge home sellers by forcing
them to pay commissions to the agents who represent the buyers of
their homes.

The class-action suit, filed in federal district court in Chicago,
focuses on a rule it says has been imposed by the NAR. The rule
requires brokers who list sellers' properties on local multiple
listing services (MLSs) to include a "non-negotiable offer" of
compensation to buyer agents. That is, once a home seller agrees in
a listing to a specific split of the commission, buyers cannot
later negotiate their agents' split to a lower rate. That
requirement, the suit alleges, "saddle(s) home sellers with a cost
that would be borne by the buyer in a competitive market," where
buyers pay directly for the services rendered by their agents.

In overseas markets where there is no such mandatory compensation
rule for buyer agents, total commission costs tend to be lower --
averaging 1 percent to 3 percent in the United Kingdom, for example
-- versus the 5 percent to 6 percent commonplace here. The suit
alleges that if buyers in the U.S. could negotiate fees directly
with the agents they choose to represent them, fees would be more
competitive and lower. Today many American buyers are unaware of
their agent's commission split.

Sellers typically know the percentage because they agree to it in
the listing contract. But they may wonder: Why am I required to pay
the fee of the buyer's agent, who may be negotiating against my
interests in the transaction? Also, at a time when buyers often
search for and find the house they want to buy online, shouldn't
compensation for a buyer's agents be decreasing, rather than stuck
in the 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent range?

Besides NAR, the suit names RE/MAX Holdings Inc., Keller Williams
Realty Inc., HomeServices of America Inc. and Realogy Holdings
Corp. as co-defendants. NAR, with 1.3 million members, is the
largest trade group in the industry. The four realty companies
named as defendants are behemoths: franchisor Keller Williams has
approximately 180,000 agents in the U.S. and Canada; RE/MAX has
120,000 agents; Realogy includes among its brands Better Homes and
Gardens, Century 21, Coldwell Banker Real Estate and ERA;
HomeServices of America is a Berkshire Hathaway affiliate and
includes among its companies regional powers such as Long and
Foster Real Estate and Edina Realty.

The plaintiff in the case is Christopher Moehrl, who sold a home in
2017 using a RE/MAX broker to list the property; the buyer was
represented by Keller Williams. Moehrl paid a total commission of 6
percent. Just under half of that, 2.7 percent, went to the buyer's
agent. If Moehrl's case is certified as a class action, the
potential number of sellers affected would be massive. It includes
sellers who have paid a broker commission during the past four
years in connection with a home listed by an MLS in these
metropolitan areas: Washington D.C.; Baltimore; Cleveland; Dallas;
Denver; Detroit; Houston; Las Vegas; Miami; Philadelphia; Phoenix;
Salt Lake City; Richmond, Virginia; Tampa, Orlando, Sarasota and
Ft. Myers, Florida; Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina; Austin
and San Antonio, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; and Colorado Springs,
Colorado.

NAR Vice President Mantill Williams called the suit "baseless" and
said it "contains an abundance of false claims," but he provided no
specifics. Representatives of the four realty companies declined
comment. But some Realtors say the suit could dismantle the
compensation system as it now exists. Anthony Lamacchia,
broker-owner of Lamacchia Realty in Waltham, Massachusetts, says if
the suit is successful "it would basically destroy buyer agency,
which would not be in the best interests of buyers or sellers."
Lamacchia argues that even in an era where buyers frequently find
homes online, buyer agents have important functions in managing
contract negotiations, providing strategic advice and guiding
clients through the process to closing.

Some brokers challenged allegations in the suit, such as buyer
agents refusing to show homes with low commission splits. Alexis
Eldorrado, managing broker of Eldorrado Chicago Real Estate, told
me that "in reality, if the buyers have found the place they want
and are interested in seeing it, NAR's code of ethics requires the
agent to show it."[GN]


RESOURCE MARKETING: Baudin et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit JERRY BAUDIN, JOSEPHINE DUFFNEY and
KARISHMA PERSAUD, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiffs, v. RESOURCE MARKETING CORP.,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00386-MAD-CFH (N.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiffs move the Court pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying proposed collective FLSA class;

   2. implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
      Plaintiffs' FLSA claims is sent (via U.S. Mail, e-mail and
      text message) to:

      "all current and former brick-and-mortar and/or at-home
      Account Representatives or Transfer Agents who worked for
      Defendant at any time on or after April 1, 2016 through
      judgment"; and

   3. requiring Defendant to identify all putative collective
      action members by providing a list of their names, last known

      addresses, dates and location of employment, phone numbers,
      and email addresses in electronic and importable format
      within 10 days of the  entry of the order.

Resource Marketing Corp., LLC  is a nationwide marketing call
center that "specializes in providing extremely targeted, high
quality leads to businesses by way of live call transfers."  The
Defendant "offers live consumer transfers for mortgage lending,
solar energy, home security, credit repair and tax relief".  In
order to carry out its business model, Defendant employs non-exempt
hourly call center employees, hereinafter referred to as account
representatives or transfer agents, to verify and prescreen inbound
customer leads over the telephone and then delivery them via hot
call transfer to a sales person.

Like countless other call center employers, the Defendant maintains
a common policy and practice of failing to pay its Agents for all
hours worked; instead, the Defendant only pays the Agents after
they have completed the timely process of loading several essential
software programs and applications -- essential to fulfilling their
job duties -- on their computers.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the putative Class/Collective action
members:

          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          Rod M. Johnston, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, MH 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355-0300
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                  rjohnston@sommerspc.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
          JTB LAW GROUP, LLC
          155 2nd Street, Suite 600
          Jersey City, NJ 07302
          Telephone: (877) 561-0000
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
                  nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com

RESOURCE MARKETING: Former Employees File FLSA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Diego Mendoza-Moyers, writing for Times Union, reports that a
Clifton Park marketing call center shorted workers' pay by refusing
to cover overtime or pre- and post-shift activities, like logging
on and off work computers, and at times required employees to work
during lunch breaks, a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S.
District Court in Albany claims.

The lawsuit filed on April 1 was brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act by three former Resource Marketing Corporation
employees on behalf of themselves and other affected workers,
according to court filings.

The filings showed attorneys in the case are seeking at least $5
million for over 100 plaintiffs.

Court records show some employees were deducted up to four to six
hours of pay over some pay periods.

One plaintiff, Karishma Persaud, worked at the call center from
November 2017 to this March. One timesheet included in the filings
indicated Persaud worked 82 hours from Jan. 26 to Feb. 8, but her
payroll report for that pay period showed she was paid for just
77.34 hours of work.

"Because (Resource Marketing Corporation) trains and instructs its
Agents not to record time spent performing pre-shift, mid-shift and
post-shift work tasks, (RMC's) compensation system fails to
properly account for and compensate Agents for all time worked,
including their overtime hours, during each day and during each
workweek," the suit says.

Resource Marketing workers also were required to work through lunch
if, at that time, there were not enough workers to manage the
phones. But the suit claims workers were not paid for working
through their lunch break, and employees who reported working that
time on their timesheet were not compensated for it.

The lawsuit alleges that the "hours reflected on the Agents'
timesheets are not accurate, are contrived by (RMC), and are not
related to the hours the Agents actually worked for (RMC)."

Employees at the call center use an automatic dialing software to
call customer leads, and employees use a series of scripted
questions to determine whether to qualify the customer as a "hot
lead." If qualified, that customer would then be transferred to a
sales person, according to the court filing.

Workers are assigned to different call campaigns involving things
like mortgage lending, solar energy, debt resolution and others.
Weekly hours are typically 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. Mondays through
Thursdays, and 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Fridays.

But the lawsuit states that employees are required to arrive at
work five to 10 minutes early so that they can start their computer
and log in to the company's auto-dialer program before their 9 a.m.
start time.

Employees were not paid for that time, but would be penalized if
they were late to log on, even if technical problems forced a late
start, according to the lawsuit.

The lawsuit also alleges that employees would be penalized for
spending "dead time" logged on to the dialer program, but not on a
live call -- though a lack of live calls out of the control of
employees could still cause them to face disciplinary action.

Resource Marketing Center did not respond to a request for comment.
The office is located off Route 146, just west of Clifton Park
Center.

Jason Brown, with the Jersey City-based law firm Brown LLC, filed
the lawsuit on behalf of the plaintiffs. He could not be reached
for comment on April 2. [GN]


RSM US: Ill. App. Reverses Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division,
issued an Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned RS INVESTMENTS
LIMITED, CORRADO INVESTMENTS LIMITED, EDEN ROCK FINANCE MASTER
LIMITED, EDEN ROCK ASSET BASED LENDING MASTER LIMITED, EDEN ROCK
UNLEVERAGED FINANCE MASTER LIMITED, and SOLID ROCK SPECIAL
SITUATIONS 2 LIMITED D, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RSM US, LLP; RSM
CAYMAN, LTD.; and SIMON LESSER, Defendants-Appellees. No.
1-17-2410. (Ill. App.).

In this action, the shareholders sued the fund's auditors1 for
apparently performing no real audits while issuing unqualified
annual opinions upon which the plaintiffs relied when they
initially invested $1.25 million in the fund in November 2004,
increased their shares in each subsequent year, and maintained
their $79 million holdings until the fund's downfall in 2008. The
shareholders alleged that auditing in conformance with generally
accepted accounting principles in the United States would have
readily detected that the fund was lending money to a business that
was conducting entirely fictitious transactions.

The shareholders sought the return of their invested dollars and
punitive damages due to the accountants' common law fraud and
fraudulent inducement in issuing clean audit reports (count I), as
well as negligent misrepresentations (count II), and professional
negligence (count III).

The judge found that the suit concerned an issue of corporate
governance of a Cayman Islands' entity, the plaintiffs' standing
was governed by Cayman Islands' reflective loss doctrine, and they
lacked standing to sue for an injury that was merely derivative or
reflective of the company's injury.

The shareholders argue for reversal on grounds that they sued for
their own direct injuries from financial statements that portrayed
the fabricated enterprise as a legitimate business, were addressed
to them, and were foreseeably relied upon by potential and existing
investors.

They also contend that in a choice of law analysis, Illinois, not
Cayman Islands, has the most significant relationship to the
parties and the dispute because the principal auditors were in
Illinois and their fraudulent reporting also occurred in this
jurisdiction.

On appeal from the section 2-619 dismissal, the plaintiff
shareholders argue that the trial court erred in applying the
internal affairs doctrine and, thus, Cayman Islands law, to a suit
that does not concern misconduct or negligence of the offshore
hedge fund. The plaintiffs emphasize that they did not complain of
general corporate mismanagement at Lancelot Offshore, waste of
corporate assets, or diminution in the value of their shares.
Furthermore, they did not seek damages (on behalf of the
corporation) based on their pro rata losses as shareholders when
the price of Lancelot Offshore's shares plummeted in 2008.

Instead of taking issue with the fund's corporate governance, these
shareholders brought direct claims against the fund's outside
accountants on grounds that their fraud and misrepresentation about
the fund is what led the investors to turn money over to a Ponzi
scheme. Instead of attempting to restore the fund's coffers, the
plaintiffs sought the dollars they were fraudulently induced to
invest and keep invested in reliance on the Illinois accountants'
series of materially false and misleading audit opinions regarding
the fund.

In response, RSM US and Lesser argue the shareholders did seek
their pro rata share of the fund's Ponzi-scheme losses and, thus,
their suit concerns the internal affairs of Lancelot Offshore and
is subject to Cayman Islands law. The accountants argue the trial
court followed hornbook law and a uniform line of Illinois cases in
deciding that matters pertaining to the internal affairs of a
corporation are, almost without exception, to be determined by the
law of the state of incorporation. They contend that only in the
unusual case will a court disregard the doctrine and apply local
law rather than the law of the place where the company was
initially incorporated and that this suit does not qualify as that
extremely rare instance. They argue that applying the law of the
place of incorporation, rather than the law where the plaintiffs
chose to file suit, results in uniform treatment of the competing
claims of the company, its shareholders, and its creditors,
particularly when Lancelot Offshore is bankrupt.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether the substantive law of
Illinois or Cayman Islands is controlling of the plaintiffs'
standing. This is an issue the Court address de novo.

A choice-of-law analysis presupposes there is a conflict in the
relevant law of two jurisdictions.  Therefore, before engaging in
the analysis, a court must be assured that a conflict exists. The
accountants, as the litigants seeking a choice-of-law
determination, had the burden of demonstrating to the trial court
that a difference between the laws of Illinois and the laws of
Cayman Islands would have made a difference in the outcome of the
complaint against them. That is, unless the accountants
demonstrated that the laws of the two jurisdictions conflicted,
then it would not be appropriate for the court to perform a
choice-of-law analysis.

The accountants ultimately argue, however, that shareholders who
claim a devaluation of their shares lack standing under the laws of
both jurisdictions. Thus, instead of demonstrating there was a
conflict of laws that required judicial resolution, the accountants
have argued that judicial analysis would be pointless. Accordingly,
the Court need not delve into the parties' disagreement as to
whether the most significant relationship test is the appropriate
test in this conflict-of-laws dispute, and the Court will not
examine the contacts in the two jurisdictions in order to determine
whether Cayman Islands law should be invoked instead of our own
forum's principles.

The Court finds that the accountants' failure to demonstrate a
choice-of-law issue means that Illinois law is controlling. The
Court also finds that the trial court erred by assuming that the
issue of standing was governed by the internal affairs doctrine and
then choosing to apply Cayman Islands law.

Based on the Court's reading of the two jurisdictions' legal
principles, if the plaintiff shareholders alleged an indirect or
reflective claim regarding a loss suffered by Lancelot Offshore,
then under both Illinois and Cayman Islands law, the plaintiffs
lack standing to sue. However, if they have alleged a claim that is
direct and different from the fund's claims, then under the laws of
both jurisdictions, the plaintiffs have standing to sue. The Court
concluded above that Illinois law is controlling because the
accountants failed to show there was a conflict between the laws of
Illinois and Cayman Islands, but based upon our de novo review, the
Court also concludes there is no conflict between the shareholder
standing principles of the two jurisdictions.

The gravamen or essence of this complaint is that the plaintiffs
were injured as early as 2004 because they invested and continued
to invest in a Ponzi scheme between 2004 and 2008 in direct
reliance on the defendants' audit opinions. These are allegations
that the plaintiffs' funds were lost when they were transmitted to
Lancelot Offshore between 2004 and 2008, as the inevitable fate of
a Ponzi scheme is its implosion. At the risk of stating the
obvious, Ponzi schemes are phony investment plans in which monies
paid by later investors are used to pay artificially high returns
to the initial investors, with the goal of attracting more
investors. Ponzi schemes have also been described as any sort of
fraudulent arrangement that uses later acquired funds or products
to pay off previous investors.

The term Ponzi scheme is derived from Charles Ponzi, a famous
Boston swindler. With a capital of $150, Ponzi began to borrow
money on his own promissory notes at a 50% rate of interest payable
in 90 days. Ponzi collected nearly $10 million in 8 months
beginning in 1919, using the funds of new investors to pay off
those whose notes had come due.

Allegations that the plaintiffs were misled by the defendants'
opinions to give money to a Ponzi scheme between 2004 and 2008 are
not allegations that implicate any decisions in the hedge fund's
corporate governance. When this court considers who suffered the
alleged harm and who would receive the benefit of any recovery or
other remedy.

Accordingly, the suit is not fairly characterized as a
shareholders' claim for indirect or reflective losses resulting
from losses the fund incurred when it eventually collapsed in 2008.
Regardless of the language the defendant auditors focus upon in
paragraph 11 of the pleading, the complaint does not indicate the
plaintiffs were attempting to recover the company's losses that
occurred in 2008 or that their claims were indirect claims
regarding a diminution of the value of their shares in 2008.

Based on the Ill. App.'s reading of the complaint in light of the
concepts of the internal affairs doctrine and the standing rule
that generally prevents shareholders from bringing claims that are
merely indirect or reflective of the company's own losses, the
Court finds that the trial court erroneously concluded that the
complaint presented issues related to the corporate governance of
Lancelot Offshore.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the trial court erred in
dismissing the shareholders' complaint with prejudice on the basis
of section 2-619. The trial court granted the motion without
requiring the defendant accountants to demonstrate a conflict
between the laws of Illinois and Cayman Islands as to shareholder
standing, and without properly assessing the gravamen of the
shareholders' allegations. The Court reverses the dismissal order
and remand for further proceedings consistent with our reasoning.

A full-text copy of the Ill. App.'s February 28, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5ldl5gx from Leagle.com.


SETERUS INC: May 27 Barilla Class Certification Bid Filing Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICOLE BARILLA, Plaintiff, v. SETERUS, INC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-46-FtM-99UAM (M.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Douglas
N. Frazier of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Fort Myers Division, granted in part the Joint Motion and
Proposed Order Regarding L.R. 3.05 Case Management Conference and
Extending Plaintiff's Deadline for Moving for Class Certification
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law.

The parties request the Court's permission to hold their Case
Management Conference ("CMC") by telephone and request that the
Court extend the class certification motion deadline pending the
parties' proposal in their Case Management Report ("CMR").  The
Plaintiff's class certification motion is currently due April 25,
2019.  The parties request to extend the class certification motion
deadline to a date to be determined by the Court after the parties
file their CMR, stating that the parties need to take discovery
before filing the class certification motion.

As it is the parties' first request to extend the class
certification motion deadline and discovery has not yet commenced,
Magistrate Judge Frazier finds good cause to grant the extension,
but not to the indefinite extent requested.  Instead, the will
grant an extension of 30 days for the motion for class
certification at this time, but the parties may propose an
alternative deadline in their CMR, which the undersigned will take
under advisement.  Finally, he finds good cause to allow the
parties to conduct their CMC by telephone.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge granted in part the Joint Motion
and Proposed Order Regarding L.R. 3.05 Case Management Conference
and Extending Plaintiff's Deadline for Moving for Class
Certification and Incorporated Memorandum of Law.  The Plaintiff
will have up to and including May 27, 2019 to file her motion for
class certification, but the parties may propose an alternative
deadline in their CMR.  The parties may conduct their CMC by
telephone.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/C4XaME from Leagle.com.

Nicole Barilla, Plaintiff, represented by Asa C. Edwards --
info@maginnislaw.com -- Maginnis Law PLLC, Edward H. Maginnis,
Maginnis Law PLLC, pro hac vice, Karl S. Gwaltney, Maginnis Law
PLLC, pro hac vice & Scott C. Harris -- scott@wbmllp.com --
Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Seterus, Inc, Defendant, represented by Brittney Lauren Difato --
bdifato@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP & Sara F.
Holladay-Tobias -- stobias@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP.


SEVIER COUNTY, TN: Court Grants Class Certification in "Whitlock"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit,LARRY WHITLOCK, et al., the Plaintiffs,
v. SEVIER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, the Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-00233-HSM-HBG (E.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Harry S.
Mattice, Jr. entered an ordered:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification;

   2. directing Defendant within seven days of this order to
      provide Plaintiffs' Counsel a "computer-readable file"
      containing the names (last name first), last known physical
      addresses, email address, telephone number, and dates of
      employment of:

      "all current and former Paramedics and EMTs who worked
      between June 12, 2015 to June 12, 2018";

   3. directing Plaintiff to amend his proposed notice form to
      include the following sentence at the end of the second to
      last paragraph on the second page: "If the lawsuit is
      unsuccessful, there is a possibility that you may be liable
      for the payment of Defendant's costs in defending the
      lawsuit." The Plaintiff will deliver the amended notice form

      to the Defendant and file it in the record within seven days

      of this order; and

   4. after receiving Plaintiff’s amended notice form, directing

      Defendant to prominently post or display the amended notice
      form at any and all of its EMS Department facilities where
      Paramedics and EMTs typically congregate (e.g. the break room

      at ambulance stations, administrative offices, et cetera),
      preferably at, on, near or otherwise in viewing distance of
      timeclocks or other "clock-in" computers used by Defendant's

      Paramedics and EMTs.[CC]

SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS: Garlick Suit Removed to Mass. Dist. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as MATTHEW S. GARLICK, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SHAW'S
SUPERMARKETS, INC., NEW ALBERTSONS, INC., ALBERTSONS COMPANIES,
INC., STANDARD INSURANCE CO., and CONDUENT HUMAN RESOURCE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1984CV01017 was removed from
the Superior Court in Suffolk County, State of Massachusetts to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on
April 26, 2019, and assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-10987-WGY.

Plaintiff in his Complaint alleges he participated in an employer
sponsored group welfare benefit plan (the "Plan"). Plaintiff
further alleges that a group insurance policy (the "Group Policy")
issued by Standard funds benefits under the Plan.  The Group Policy
is part of (1) a plan, fund, or program (2) established or
maintained (3) by an employer (4) for the purpose of providing
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death
(5) to participant employees or their beneficiaries. Thus, the
Group Policy is part of an employee welfare benefit plan as defined
by ERISA. Plaintiff claims entitlement to ERISA-regulated benefits
in that he seeks to recover life insurance benefits allegedly owed
to him under the Plan and Group Policy.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     Brooks R. Magratten, Esq.
     PIERCE ATWOOD LLP
     One Financial Plaza, 26th Floor
     Providence, RI 02903
     Phone: (401) 588.5166
     Email: bmagratten@pierceatwood.com

          - and -

     Joshua D. Dunlap, Esq.
     PIERCE ATWOOD LLP
     Merrill's Wharf
     254 Commercial Street
     Portland, ME 04101
     Phone: (207) 791-1100
     Email: jdunlap@pierceatwood.com

          - and -

     Jonathan R. Shank, Esq.
     JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
     75 Park Plaza, 4th Fl.
     Boston, MA 02116
     Phone: (617) 367-0025
     Email: jonathan.shank@jacksonlewis.com

          - and -

     Stephen D. Rosenberg, Esq.
     Katherine Brustowicz, Esq.
     THE WAGNER LAW GROUP
     99 Summer Street, 13th Fl.
     Boston, MA 02110
     Phone: (617) 357-5200
     Email: srosenberg@wagnerlawgroup.com


SINEMIA: Adds Class Action Waiver Clause to Terms of Service
------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan McAlone, writing for Business Insider, reports that
MoviePass competitor Sinemia is trying to prevent subscribers from
suing.

In late March, the movie-ticket subscription service added a clause
to its terms of service that says the user waives any rights to
"bring or participate in a class action whether brought in
arbitration or in any state court." The terms also say the
subscriber waives the right "to bring a lawsuit in court."

Being sued by subscribers isn't a theoretical scenario for Sinemia.
The company is the subject of an ongoing class-action lawsuit --
filed in November and amended in February -- that alleges that the
service "essentially become a bait-and-switch scheme" because of a
new fee.

The firm that brought the case, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner &
Donaldson-Smith LLP, said it's unconcerned about the new clause,
however.

"Courts have repeatedly held that these types of unilateral,
one-sided changes to contracts are not enforceable," Benjamin F.
Johns, a partner at the firm, told Business Insider. "We are not
concerned about it."

"The arbitration and governing law provisions were recently added
as part of a normal review of Sinemia's Terms of Use," Sinemia said
in a statement. "The term at issue is consistent with US law and is
enforceable. Similar terms are routinely used by other companies
within the ticket industry space."

The crux of the class-action lawsuit is a $1.80 per-movie
"processing fee" introduced by Sinemia in October to subscribers,
including those who had prepaid for a yearly subscription. The suit
alleges that the new fee "dramatically changes the value
proposition that customers thought they were getting."

The suit claims Sinemia's conduct includes "fraud, breaches of
contract, violations of state consumer protection laws, and unjust
enrichment."

"While nobody enjoys fees, there are certain costs related to
booking and processing outside of the price of the movie ticket,"
Sinemia said last month in a statement to Business Insider in
response to the amended lawsuit. "As our customers are already
aware, the processing fee is a requisite part of Sinemia
subscriptions. This allows Sinemia to maintain being the only movie
ticket subscription service to provide access to all showtimes for
all movies in all theaters without restrictions."

In addition to the processing fee, Sinemia has faced criticism from
customers on topics ranging from unfair account terminations, to
"misuse" fees, to demands for ID verification. [GN]


STAMPS.COM INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Shareholders' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Stamps.com, Inc. (NASDAQ: STMP) and certain of its officers
and directors.  The class action, filed in United States District
Court, Central District of California, and indexed under
19-cv-01828, is on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities, other than Defendants and their affiliates, who
purchased, or otherwise acquired, Stamps.com securities between May
3, 2017 and February 21, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").
This action is brought on behalf of the Class (as defined below)
for violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Stamps securities between
May 3, 2017, and February 21, 2019, you have until April 29, 2019,
to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A
copy of the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To
discuss this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Stamps.com is a provider of Internet-based mailing and shipping
solutions in the United States.  Under the Stamps.com and Endicia
brands, Stamps.com customers use United States Postal Service
("USPS") solutions to mail and ship a variety of mail pieces and
packages through the USPS.  Customers using Stamps.com solutions
receive discounted postage rates compared to USPS.com and USPS
retail locations on certain mail pieces.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.  Specifically, Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(i) the Company's financial results depended on the manipulation of
a USPS reseller program that cost USPS an estimated $235 million
per year; and (ii) as a result, the Company's business was
unsustainable, and its financial results were highly misleading.

The truth emerged on February 21, 2019, after the market closed,
when Stamps.com held a conference call to discuss its financial
results from the fourth quarter of 2018 and fiscal year 2018 as
well as its business outlook and "certain strategic items . . .
that impact our business outlook for 2019."  On the call, the
Company's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), Kenneth
McBride ("McBride"), inexplicably stated that the Company was
discontinuing its shipping partnership with USPS—despite the fact
that USPS-related business accounts for 87% of the Company's
revenue.  The Company further announced that, contrary to previous
expectations of strong growth, 2019 revenue was expected to decline
5.4%.  On this news, the Company's stock plummeted to a close price
of $83.65 on February 21, 2019, a decline of over 57% from the
previous close price of $198.08.

On February 26, 2019, it was reported that, contrary to McBride's
representations, USPS itself had decided to terminate its
relationship with Stamps.com in the face of the Company's
increasing demands and abuse of the USPS's reseller program.

         Contact:
         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


SUNCOKE ENERGY: Faces Marks Suit over Merger Transaction
--------------------------------------------------------
A securities class action is brought by Plaintiff Arthur Marks, on
behalf of himself and the other public holders of the common units
of SunCoke Energy Partners, L.P. (SXCP) against the company and the
members of the company's board of directors for their violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-9, 17 Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) 240.14a-9, and Regulation G, 17 C.F.R.
Sec. 244.100 in connection with the proposed merger between SXCP
and SunCoke Energy, Inc. The case is captioned ARTHUR MARKS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. SUNCOKE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P., MICHAEL G. RIPPEY, P.
MICHAEL HARDESTY, JOHN W. SOMERHALDER II, ALVIN BLEDSOE, FAY WEST,
KATHERINE T. GATES, and MARTHA CARNES, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00693-UNA (D. Del., April 17, 2019).

On Feb. 5, 2019, the board of directors caused the SunCoke Energy
Partners to enter into an agreement and plan of merger pursuant to
which the company's unitholders stand to receive 1.40 shares of
common stock of SunCoke for each SXCP unit they own plus a fraction
of a share of SunCoke common stock equal to the product of the
number of days, beginning with the first day of the most recent
full calendar quarter with respect to which an SXCP unitholder
distribution record date has not occurred and ending on the day
immediately prior to the closing of the merger, multiplied by a
daily distribution rate equal to the quotient of the most recent
regular quarterly cash distribution paid by SXCP divided by 90,
whose product is then divided by $10.91, the closing price of
SunCoke common stock as of Feb. 1, 2019. On March 8, 2019, in order
to convince SXCP unitholders to vote in favor of the proposed
merger, the board authorized the filing of a materially incomplete
and misleading Form S-4 Registration Statement with the SEC, in
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. While
touting the fairness of the merger consideration to the company's
unitholders in the S-4/A, Defendants have failed to disclose
certain material information that is necessary for unitholders to
properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Merger, thereby
violating SEC rules and regulations and rendering certain
statements in the S-4/A materially incomplete and misleading.

In particular, the S-4/A contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning the financial projections for the
company that were prepared by the company and relied on by
Defendants in recommending that SXCP unitholders vote in favor of
the proposed merger. The financial projections were also utilized
by SXCP's financial advisor, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., in
conducting certain valuation analyses in support of its fairness
opinion.

SXCP is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal
executive offices at 1011 Warrenville Road, Suite 600, Lisle,
Illinois 60532. The company's common units trade on the NYSE under
the ticker symbol SXCP. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     3828 Kennett Pike, Suite 201
     Wilmington, DE 19807
     Telephone: (302) 482-3182
     E-mail: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

     Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
     James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
     New York, NY 10017
     Telephone: (212) 983-9330
     E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
             jwilson@faruqilaw.com


TERRACE VIEW: Cal. App. Flips $57MM Punitive Damage Award in Bevis
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One,
issued an Opinion reversing the jury award for compensatory and
punitive damages in the cases captioned DAVID BEVIS et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TERRACE VIEW PARTNERS, LP et al.,
Defendants and Appellants; DAVID BEVIS et al., Plaintiffs and
Respondents, v. TERRACE VIEW PARTNERS, LP et al., Defendants and
Appellants. Nos. D071849, D072825. (Cal. App.).

The Defendants appeal from the judgment and post-judgment order
awarding the plaintiffs' attorney fees and the plaintiffs appeal
from the post-judgment order reducing the jury's award of punitive
damages.

Sixty-nine current and former residents of mobilehome park Terrace
View Mobile Home Estates (Terrace View or the park) filed the
present lawsuit against the Defendants. The operative first amended
complaint, styled as a class action, included 12 causes of action
based on allegations that defendants' failure to maintain the park
in good working order and condition created a nuisance that, along
with unreasonably high space rent increases, made it difficult or
impossible for park residents to sell their mobilehomes.  

The jury awarded the individual plaintiffs economic, noneconomic,
and punitive damages in varying amounts. The total amounts awarded
were $1,289,000 in compensatory damages ($759,000 in economic
damages and $530,000 in noneconomic damages) and $57 million in
punitive damages.

After the jury was discharged, the court issued an order on
plaintiffs' cause of action alleging defendants violated Business
and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., commonly referred to as
the unfair competition law (UCL).

The Defendants contend:

   (1) the amount of rent they charged plaintiffs under their lease
and month-to-month rental agreements cannot be restricted in the
absence of a rent control ordinance;

   (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on
plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional interference with
property rights;

   (3) the court prejudicially erred by giving an erroneous special
instruction on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;


   (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on
plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing under the correct legal standards;

   (5) the court abused its discretion in denying defendants'
request to bifurcate the trial of plaintiffs' equitable cause of
action for violation of the UCL;

   (6) the court prejudicially erred by changing its ruling on the
legality of the catch-up provision in defendants' lease after
trial;

   (7) the court erred in ruling the catch-up provision was unfair
under the UCL;

   (8) the court's ruling that defendants violated the UCL cannot
be upheld under the fraud prong of the UCL;

   (9) the court erred in denying Terrace View's motion for new
trial on the ground of irregularity of the proceedings based on
plaintiffs' counsel's improper opening and closing argument;

  (10) the jury's award of economic damages of $750,000 for
diminution of property value, overpayment of rent, and/or
interference with use and enjoyment of homes was not sufficiently
supported by the evidence;

  (11) the award of punitive damages was not sufficiently supported
by evidence of malice, oppression, or fraud; and

  (12) the court abused its discretion by awarding plaintiffs' full
recovery of attorney fees despite their failure to prevail on some
of their claims and the unavailability of attorney fees for their
UCL cause of action, and by not reducing plaintiffs' fee award by
the amount they billed for unadjudicated medical treatment claims
and their unsuccessful class certification motion; and

  (13) the court erred in awarding an enhancement to the lodestar
amount of plaintiffs' attorney fees.

Defendants Cannot Be Held Liable for Charging Rental Rates That the
Parties' Leases and Rental Agreements Allowed

In their 12th cause of action for rescission and declaratory and
injunctive relief, the homeowners requested that defendants return
all rents they were forced to pay in excess of the fair market
value of their spaces. The homeowners further sought consequential
damages caused by the unconscionable rent terms, including
interference with the sale of their homes, loss of their homes,
and, emotional distress. In their allegations of an actual
controversy for purposes of declaratory relief, the homeowners
alleged their right to continued tenancies in the Park at a rent
level that corresponds to the reasonable worth of their tenancies.

At trial, the plaintiffs testified about high rent and the effect
it had on their lives, as noted in our statement of facts above.
Plaintiffs' main damages expert, commercial appraiser Robert
Caringella, testified regarding his comparison of the rent charged
at Terrace View to the rent charged at 10 comparable parks in the
Lakeside area. He showed the jury a chart that listed rents paid in
other parks in the area, and testified that the average rent in
nine of the parks he visited (plus four or five other parks) was
$850. He further testified that market rent for Terrace View was
$900 to $1,000, and that this assumes Terrace View is well-managed,
there's no problems with maintenance, there's•no issues with
water, sewer, electrical, that this is a nice place to live.
Caringella did not offer any opinion on damages that plaintiffs
suffered as a result of defendants' alleged failure to maintain the
park in good working order and condition.

In closing argument to the jury, plaintiffs' counsel focused mainly
on defendants' rent increase practices. He argued, When you have
the right to set the rent and you're•the only one that does it,
you have to set a fair rent, and you don't put illegal language in
the contract or make people sign illegal documents, and if they
refuse to do it you charge them or gouge them money.

The Court recognizes that overpayment of rent could refer to a
rented property not being worth the amount of rent being paid
because a nuisance created by defendant negatively affects the
property's habitability or the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the
premises. However, plaintiffs' primary nuisance theory was that
defendants failed to maintain the park in good working order and
condition and the jury expressly rejected that theory on the
special verdict forms. Although the jury found in favor of
plaintiffs on their secondary nuisance theory based on defendants'
failure to follow their own park rules that required them to
maintain their park-owned vacant mobilehomes in good condition, and
presumably some percentage of the jury's award is attributable to
that claim, it is inconceivable that this secondary nuisance claim
was the main basis for the jury's award of $1,289,000 in
compensatory damages and $57 million in punitive damages.

The twofold gravamen of plaintiffs' case clearly was that: (1)
defendants' failure to maintain the park in good working order and
condition created a nuisance that caused them compensable harm and
(2) defendants imposed unreasonably high space rent increases that
some plaintiffs could not afford and that made it difficult or
impossible for plaintiffs to sell their mobilehomes. In light of
the jury's rejection of plaintiffs' primary nuisance claim based on
failure to maintain the park, it is reasonable to conclude that the
main basis for the jury's awards of compensatory and punitive
damages was the high rental rates plaintiffs had paid or were
paying.

Rent May Not Be Limited to a Lower Rate Than a Rental Agreement
Allows in the Absence of a Rent-control Ordinance

In jurisdictions not subject to local rent controls, landlords have
virtually unlimited discretion in setting the amount of rent for
new tenants, regardless of the reason the particular rental unit
was vacated. Likewise, except as otherwise stated in a tenant's
lease, and provided proper statutory notice is given, there is
generally no limit on the amount by which rents on existing
tenancies may be increased.

Accordingly, where rented property is not subject to a rent control
ordinance, as a general rule the property owner cannot be held
civilly liable for charging an amount of rent that is expressly
allowed under the parties' written lease agreement or is not
precluded by law under a month-to-month rental agreement.11 With
this principle in mind, we consider the various theories under
which the jury was instructed that it could award overpayment of
rent as economic damages.

Intentional Interference with Property Rights

Plaintiffs' position is that defendants' charging unreasonably high
rent subjects them to liability in tort for intentional
interference with property rights. There is not a clearly defined
cause of action in tort in California for intentional interference
with property rights.  

In summary, California case law has recognized a tort cause of
action for wrongful eviction, including breaches of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment that compel a tenant to vacate, whereas breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment that does not result in a wrongful
constructive or actual eviction is a breach of contract.

Although under California law there is no clearly defined cause of
action for intentional interference with property rights absent a
constructive eviction, the jury received a special instruction at
trial that specified the elements of plaintiffs' interference cause
of action as follows: 1. Plaintiffs had a property right or
privilege with respect to the use, enjoyment or sale of their
property. 2. Defendants wrongfully interfered with plaintiffs'
right. 3. Defendants' conduct caused damage to plaintiffs.

Defendants essentially argue there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict on plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional
interference with property rights because the only evidence
supporting that verdict was evidence that plaintiffs' rent was
above market rent and, as a matter of law, plaintiffs' high rent
cannot constitute interference with their property rights because
the rental agreements allowed defendants to charge that rent.

Plaintiffs argue the tort of intentional interference with property
rights lies when a mobilehome park owner interferes with tenants'
right to sell their mobilehomes by raising rent to levels that
render the homes unsalable. They argue that evidence of
interference included evidence that defendants purposely sabotaged
plaintiffs' fundamental property right to sell their homes through
prohibitively high rent, unreasonable discretionary rent
assignments, lower rent rates for defendants' buyers, high vacancy
rates, blighted homes, and unlawful rights of first refusal.

The Court agrees that the high rental rates plaintiffs paid cannot
constitute tortious interference with their property rights. The
Court is aware of no authority that allows an award of tort and
punitive damages against a landlord for charging above-market
rental rates that are expressly allowed by the parties' lease
agreement or by law applicable to month-to-month tenancies.
Regarding high vacancy rates, blighted homes, and unlawful first
rights of refusal, defendants correctly observe that no evidence
was presented at trial that these circumstances interfered with the
plaintiffs' attempt to sell their homes. Nor was there any evidence
that defendants prevented a sale by refusing to allow it to go
forward. The only reason cited in various plaintiffs' testimony for
their inability to sell their homes in place was the high rent the
prospective buyers would have to pay.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendants contend the court gave an erroneous special instruction
regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that
allowed the jury to find the implied covenant was breached if a
plaintiff's lease agreement was not a good deal. Defendants further
contend the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict on
plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing under the correct legal standards.

The Court concludes the jury instructions, evidence presented at
trial, and plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument allowed the jury
to improperly award amounts the plaintiffs paid above Caringella's
market rent figure of $850 per month as damages for defendants'
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the parties' rental agreements.

It is well settled that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot contradict the express terms of a contract. The
general rule regarding the covenant of good faith is plainly
subject to the exception that the parties may, by express
provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in the very
acts and conduct which would otherwise have been forbidden by an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
  
Accordingly, defendants here cannot be held liable for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by implementing
rent increases that the parties' written lease agreements expressly
authorized.

The Court concludes there was no evidence that defendants breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in setting
rental rates for month-to-month tenants.In other words, it is
unnecessary to invoke the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to limit a contracting party's discretion affecting the
contractual rights of the other party if that discretion is subject
to other prescribed or implied limitations, such as being in
proportion to an objectively determined base.

Here, defendants did not impose unpredictable, arbitrary rent
increases on their month-to-month tenants; they followed the rent
increase formula in the long-term written leases with the exception
that the annual increase for a month-to-month tenant was 5 percent
above the CPI instead of the 4 percent charged under the leases.
Thus, the month-to-month rent increases were subject to the implied
limitation of 5 percent above CPI and were in proportion to that
objectively determinable base formula. Because they were subject to
an implied limitation and an objectively determined base, the
annual rent increases defendants imposed cannot be deemed to have
breached any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
parties' month-to-month rental agreements.

Nuisance

As we discussed, the jury rejected plaintiffs' primary nuisance
claim that defendants failed to maintain the park in good working
order and condition, but found in favor of plaintiffs on their
nuisance claim based on defendants' failure to follow their own
park rules that required them to maintain their park-owned vacant
mobilehomes in good condition. Although some percentage of the
jury's award presumably is attributable to the jury's nuisance
finding, the Court cannot presume the nuisance finding was the main
basis for the jury's award of $1,289,000 in compensatory damages
and $57 million in punitive damages. Because the jury rejected
plaintiffs' primary nuisance claim based on defendants' alleged
failure to maintain the park, it is reasonable to conclude that the
main basis for the jury's awards of compensatory and punitive
damages was the high rental rates plaintiffs had paid or were
paying.

Accordingly, the Court cannot sustain the jury's unsegregated
compensatory damage award on the ground the entire award could be
reasonably viewed as compensation on plaintiffs' secondary nuisance
claim.

Negligence

A lessor's charging rental rates that are authorized by contract or
law cannot constitute negligence. In a contract for services, a
contracting party may be liable for negligence in the performance
of those services or failure to perform. But outside that context,
where a contract calls for the payment of money in exchange for use
of property or other consideration not involving the provision of
services, we are aware of no authority for the proposition that the
contracting party receiving payment of money can be held liable on
a negligence theory for charging a price that the contract
expressly allows. The jury's compensatory damage award based
primarily on high rent is not sustainable as damages that the jury
could properly have awarded under plaintiffs' negligence theory.

Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

The factual bases for plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are somewhat unclear, but
high rent is one of them. In the second cause of action for breach
of contract in plaintiffs' first amended complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that although the form of contract varied between
defendants and each plaintiff, the essential common provisions are
that Plaintiffs agreed to pay rent in exchange for Defendants'
promise to: (1) provide and maintain the Park's common areas,
facilities, services and physical improvements in good working
order and condition; (2) provide a lot in safe, habitable
condition; (3) enforce Park rules regulations consistent with the
requirements of Civil Code section 798.15; (4) deal with Plaintiffs
in good faith; and, (5) preserve Plaintiffs' quiet enjoyment of
their premises. The second cause of action then alleges that
defendants breached the contracts as set forth herein and in
paragraphs 12 and 13.

In their 10th cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment plaintiffs alleged: Defendants have breached the covenant
by failing to maintain the Park as set forth herein in paragraphs
12 and 13, by interfering with Plaintiffs' ability to sell their
mobilehomes in place, including by raising rents to unreasonably
high levels, by illegally changing the use of the Park, and by
Defendants' other actions and conduct alleged in this Complaint.

The jury's finding that defendants breached their rental agreements
with plaintiffs and breached the covenants of quiet enjoyment
included in those agreements was likely based in part on its
finding under plaintiffs' nuisance claim that defendants failed to
enforce or follow the park's own rules and regulations, since the
jury rejected the other theory for nuisance and breach of contract
that defendants failed to maintain the park in good working order
and condition. As with the nuisance theory, however, the Court
cannot reasonably conclude the jury based its damage awards
primarily on its finding that defendants failed to enforce park
rules and regulations. Given the above-noted jury instructions and
argument of counsel, it is more likely that the jury based its
verdict and damage award under plaintiffs’ breach of
contract/breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment theory primarily
on the high rent defendants charged plaintiffs. It needs no
citation to authority to state that a contracting party's
performance of a contract in accordance with its express terms or
the law cannot constitute a breach of the contract.

Defendants cannot be held liable for breach of contract or the
covenant of quiet enjoyment by charging rent expressly authorized
by a written lease or allowed by law.

Unsegregated Verdict Form

Plaintiffs argue that because the special verdict form did not
segregate the jury's award of damages by causes of action,
defendants cannot establish prejudice from Special Instruction No.
66.  

In the present case, neither the instructions nor verdict form
directed the jury to segregate economic damages by category, i.e.,
to specify the type of damages it was awarding (e.g., diminution of
value and overpayment of rent) and the verdict form did not require
the jury to segregate any compensatory damages by cause of action
or legal theory. This rendered the verdict ambiguous because the
Court cannot determine what portion of the jury's compensatory
damage award is based on the condition of the park as a result of
defendants' failure to follow park rules and what portion is based
on high rent.

However, as the Court discussed, it is clear from the record that
any damages based on defendants' failure to follow park rules are
substantially dwarfed by improper compensatory damages based on
high rent. Because the Court is unable to resolve the ambiguity in
the verdict form and cannot conclude the entire award of
compensatory damages reasonably could have been based on a viable
legal theory other than overpayment of rent, reversal is
appropriate.

In summary, the jury instructions, testimony of plaintiffs and
Caringella, and argument of counsel allowed the jury to incorrectly
conclude it could properly award, under multiple theories, the
difference between what plaintiffs paid in rent and what they would
have paid had their rent been in the fair market range that
Caringella quoted, and that it could also hold defendants liable in
tort and award punitive damages against them for charging
plaintiffs such overpayment of rent and for the diminution in the
value of their homes the high rent caused.  

Unconscionability and Plaintiffs' UCL Claim

The Court's conclusion that plaintiffs' compensatory damages cannot
properly be based on high rent that is authorized under the
parties' rental agreements raises the question of what, if any,
remedy exists for a mobilehome park tenant who is trapped in a
lease or month-to-month rental agreement that has resulted in high
monthly space rent that renders the tenant's mobilehome unsalable.
One appellate court has observed that a party to a commercial lease
who is trapped in a bad bargain has only one escape route left: to
invoke the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability. The Court
believes the same is true for a party to a mobilehome park lease
who is trapped in a bad bargain. The trial court's ruling that the
subject leases are not unconscionable and its adjudication of
plaintiffs' cause of action for violation of the UCL are not
severable from the portion of the judgment we are reversing.

Consequently, the Court will vacate the order addressing
unconscionability and the portion of the judgment adjudicating the
UCL claim.

The portions of the judgment awarding plaintiffs compensatory and
punitive damages are reversed. The portion of the judgment ruling
that the catch-up provision in defendants' leases violates Business
and Professions Code section 17200 and ordering injunctive relief
regarding the catch-up provision is reversed. The June 9, 2017 and
July 24, 2017 orders awarding attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs
and the portion of the judgment reflecting the June 9 order are
reversed.

The portions of the judgment ruling that the lease provisions
concerning the right of first refusal, release, and the arbitration
provision violate the MRL and that paragraphs 56.1, 56.2 and 34 of
the lease and paragraphs 5.1 and 9.1 of the lease amendment are
unlawful are affirmed. The February 21, 2017 order awarding
punitive damages to plaintiffs is reversed. Defendants' appeal from
the June 9, 2017 order awarding attorney fees and costs and the
July 24, 2017 order correcting the award of attorney fees, and
plaintiffs' appeal from the February 12, 2017 order reducing the
jury's award of punitive damages are dismissed as moot. Defendants
are awarded their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s February 28, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2fq3xcn from Leagle.com.

Cooksey, Toolen, Gage, Duffy, & Woog, Phil Woog --
pwoog@cookseylaw.com -- Matthew R. Pahl -- mpahl@cookseylaw.com --
DENTONS, Charles A. Bird -- Charles.Bird@dentons.com -- Manning,
Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, and James E. Gibbons for Defendants and
Appellants in D071849 and D072825.

Allen, Semelsberger & Kaelin, James C. Allen , and Jessica S.
Taylor,  600 B St, Ste 2400, San Diego, CA 92101, for Plaintiffs
and Appellants in D071849 and for Plaintiffs and Respondents in
D072825.


TRADER JOE'S: Calif. Court Strikes Down $1.3MM Tuna Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
IntraFish reports that a California court has struck down a $1.3
million tuna class action against Trader Joe's.

"California law may only be used on a classwide basis if the
interests of other states are not found to outweigh California's
interest in having its law applied," the judge wrote. [GN]


TRANS WORLD: Spack et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the two class action lawsuits, the Plaintiffs will move the
Court on May 24, 2019, for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the cases as a Fair Labor
      Standards Act colleective action; and

   2. authorizing the Plaintiffs to send notice of pendency
      to the putative Senior Assistant  Managers ("SAMs)
      collective action members.

The lawsuits are:

"CAROL SPACK, TABITHA SCHMIDT, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, as Collective representative, the
Plaintiff, vs. TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, CORPORATION and RECORD
TOWN, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01335-TJM-CFH
(N.D.N.Y.)";

     - and -

"NATASHA ROPER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, as Collective representative, the Plaintiff, vs. TRANS
WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, CORPORATION and RECORD TOWN, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00553-TJM-CFH (N.D.N.Y.)".[CC]

Attorneys for ther Plaintiffs:

          Stephan T. Mashel, Esq.
          MASHELL LAW, LLC
          500 Campus Dr., Suite 303
          Morganville, NJ 07751
          Telephone: 732 385-8448
          E-mail: mashellawllc.com

TRANSDEV SERVICES: Hakeem Suit Removed to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned CHAUENGA M. HAKEEM on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC.;
TRANSDEV NORTH AMERICA, INC.; TRANSDEV; TRANSDEV, INC.; and DOES
1-100, Defendants, Case No. RG 19009094 was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California in the County of Alameda,
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California on April 22, 2019, and assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-02161-DMR.

The Complaint asserts seven causes of action for: (1) Failure to
Pay Wages for All Hours of Work at the Legal Minimum Wage Rate in
Violation of Labor Code Sections 1194, 1194.2, & 1197 And the Wage
Orders; (2) Failure to Pay Wages for All Time Worked at Overtime
Rate in Violation of Labor Code Sections 510, & 1194 and the Wage
Orders; (3) Failure to Provide Rest Periods and Rest Period Premium
Wages in Violation of Labor Code Section 226.7 and the Wage Orders;
(4) Failure to Pay All Accrued and Vested Vacation/PTO Wages in
Violation of Labor Code Section 227.3; (5) Failure to Provide
Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code Section 226 and
the Wage Orders; (6) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages in Violation
of Labor Code Sections 201 & 202; and (7) Unfair Competition in
Violation of Business & Professions Code Section 17200.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     PAUL M. GLEASON, ESQ.
     TOREY J. FA V AROTE, ESQ.
     JING TONG, Esq.
     GLEASON & FA V AROTE, LLP
     4014 Long Beach Blvd., Suite 300
     Long Beach, CA 90807
     Phone: (213) 452-0510
     Facsimile: (213) 452-0514
     Email: pgleason@gleasonfavarote.com
            tfavarote@gleasonfavarote.com
            jtong@gleasonfavarote.com


TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Samouris Sues Over Defective Airbag Control Units
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Samouris and Nida Edith Samson, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZF-TRW Automotive
Holdings Corp., TRW Automotive U.S. LLC, American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-11215-MAG-EAS (E.D. Mich., April 26, 2019) is an action
concerning defective airbag control units (ACUs) manufactured by
Defendants.

Airbags are a critical safety component in virtually every motor
vehicle sold in the United States and throughout the world. Drivers
and passengers reasonably expect that airbags will properly deploy
if their vehicles are involved in an accident. When functioning
properly, an airbag can mean the difference between life and death.
ACUs are designed and manufactured to sense a vehicle crash,
determine whether airbag deployment is necessary, and deploy
appropriate airbags and other supplemental restraints where needed.
The ACU contains an electronic component--an application specific
integrated circuit ("ASIC")--which monitors signals from other
crash sensors located in the vehicles subject to the lawsuit (Class
Vehicles). If the ASIC fails, the ACU will not operate properly.

According to the complaint, as a result of an electrical overstress
("EOS") condition that causes the malfunction of the ASIC in the
ACUs manufactured by TRW (the "ACU Defect"), the airbags equipped
in the Class Vehicles do not properly deploy during a crash. The
ACU Defect exposes Plaintiffs and Class members to the serious and
life-threatening safety risk that their Class Vehicle airbags could
fail to deploy during an accident, resulting in injury or death.
Numerous personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits have been
filed against TRW and/or the Vehicle Manufacturers alleging that
airbags failed to deploy in accidents as a result of the ACU
Defect. Despite knowledge of the ACU Defect, TRW has continued to
manufacture and sell the defective ACUs, resulting to numerous
injuries and deaths. In addition, the Vehicle Manufacturers have
continued to equip the Class Vehicles with airbag systems
containing the ACU Defect and sell and lease the Class Vehicles,
without disclosing the ACU Defect and its corresponding safety
risks to Plaintiffs and Class members.

Notwithstanding this knowledge, TRW continued selling defective
ACUs and the Vehicle Manufacturers continued selling Class Vehicles
equipped with airbag systems containing the ACU Defect, Defendants
failed to disclose the existence of the ACU Defect to Plaintiffs
and members of the Classes, and have not remedied the ACU Defect
and/or compensated Plaintiffs or members of the Classes for this
material defect, asserts the complaint. In addition, the Vehicle
Manufacturer Defendants have not issued recalls for the Class
Vehicles containing the ACU Defect. Rather, Defendants wrongfully
and intentionally concealed the ACU Defect from Plaintiffs and
members of the Classes.

Plaintiffs purchased a 2012 Honda CR-V and a 2018 Toyota Tacoma for
personal, family, or household purposes.

Defendants design, manufacture, and sell automotive systems,
modules, and components to automotive original equipment
manufacturers, including airbag systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David J. Shea, Esq.
     SHEA AIELLO, PLLC
     26100 American Drive, 2nd Floor
     Southfield, MI 48034
     Phone: (248) 354-0224
     Email: david.shea@sadplaw.com

          - and -

     Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
     Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
     Natalie Lesser, Esq.
     KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
     280 King of Prussia Road
     Radnor, PA 19087
     Phone: (610) 667-7706
     Fax: (610) 667-7056
     Email: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
            mtroutner@ktmc.com
            nlesser@ktmc.com

          - and -

     James E. Cecchi, Esq.
     Caroline F. Bartlett, Esq.
     CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
     5 Becker Farm Road
     Roseland, NJ 07068
     Phone: (973) 994-1700
     Email: jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
            cbartlett@carellabyrne.com

          - and -

     Paul J. Geller, Esq.
     Mark J. Dearman, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
     120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500
     Boca Raton, FL 33432
     Phone: (561) 750-3000
     Fax: (561) 750-3364
     Email: pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
            mdearman@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     Christopher A. Seeger, Esq.
     SEEGER WEISS LLP
     55 Challenger Road, 6th Floor
     Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660
     Email: cseeger@seegerweiss.com


TWENTIETH CENTURY: Bid to Certify Class in TS Suit Continued
------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on April 18, 2019, in the case
entitled T.S., et al. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, et al.,
Case No. 1:16−cv−08303 N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held
before the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Plaintiffs' cross−motion for class certification is
entered
      and continued for briefing;

   -- Response to be filed by or on June 18, 2019;

   -- reply to be filed by or on July 9, 2019;

   -- Motion for leave to file excess pages and for leave to file
      under seal are granted;

   -- Within seven days, the Plaintiff to provide documents
      relevant to May 6, 2019 depositions;

   -- Also within seven days, the Defendant to furnish
      information regarding schedules within the detention
      facility; and

   -- Status hearing set for May 9, 2019, is stricken and re−set
      to May 16, 2019, at 9:00 a.m.[CC]


TYME TECHNOLOGIES: Kuznicki Law Announces Class Action Suits
------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Kuznicki Law PLLC issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders of the following
publicly traded companies. Shareholders who purchased shares in
these companies during the dates listed below are encouraged to
contact the firm regarding possible appointment as lead plaintiff
and a preliminary estimate of their recoverable losses.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court. The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action. The lead plaintiff will be
selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in the respective securities during the class periods.
Members of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and
counsel chosen by the lead plaintiff. No classes have yet been
certified in the actions below. Appointment as lead plaintiff is
not required to partake in any recovery.

Tyme Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQCM: TYME)
Investors Affected: March 14, 2018 - January 18, 2019

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Tyme Technologies, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Tyme had not adequately designed the Phase II
Study to present reliable results on the efficacy of SM-88 on
pancreatic cancer; (ii) Tyme had failed to include an appropriate
control group in its open-label Phase II clinical trial for SM-88;
(iii) the omission of an appropriate control group distorted the
reliability of data showing the efficacy of SM-88 in the Phase II
Study; and (iv) as a result, Tyme's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at:
https://kseclaw.com/securities/tyme-technologies-inc/?wire=3

ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures (NYSEArca: SVXY)
Investors Affected: Investors in ProShares Short VIX Short-Term
Futures ETF pursuant to the May 15, 2017 Registration Statement
and/or between May 15, 2017 and February 5, 2018

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures. According to the complaint
in the Registration Statement and during the Class Period,
defendants made false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose adverse information regarding the risks of investing in
the Fund. Specifically, the Registration Statement failed to
disclose that the Fund was threatened with catastrophic losses as a
result of the Fund's flawed design and the low-volatility
environment and acute liquidity risks that existed during the Class
Period. In addition, during the Class Period defendants made
similar false and misleading statements in numerous financial
reports and draft prospectuses and registration statements filed
with the SEC.

Alta Mesa Resources, Inc. (AMR) f/k/a Silver Run Acquisition
Corporation II (NASDAQCM: AMR)

Investors Affected: Purchasers of Silver Run II securities March
24, 2017-February 25, 2019 and investors who held Silver Run II
Class A common stock as of January 22, 2018 and were entitled to
vote concerning Silver Run II's acquisition of Alta Mesa and
Kingfisher Midstream LLC

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Alta Mesa Resources, Inc (AMR) f/k/a Silver Run Acquisition
Corporation II. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Alta Mesa and Kingfisher did not possess
"superior quality" and "[w]orld [c]lass" assets as compared to
other operators in the oil and gas industry; (2) Alta Mesa faced
significant operational setbacks; (3) several major oil producers
had steered assets away from production in the region in which Alta
Mesa operates; and (4) Kingfisher and Alta Mesa were not on track
to achieve the earnings and production estimates provided in the
Proxy and Defendants had no reasonable basis to believe and did not
believe that Kingfisher and Alta Mesa would achieve these
estimates.

Mobile TeleSystems PJSC (NYSE: MBT)
Investors Affected: March 19, 2014 - March 7, 2019

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Mobile TeleSystems PJSC. The filed complaint alleges that
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) MTS and its subsidiary were
involved in a scheme to pay $420 million in bribes in Uzbekistan;
(2) consequently, MTS knew or should have known it would be forced
to pay substantial fines to the U.S. government after disclosing in
2014 that the U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission were investigating its Uzbekistan operations;
(3) MTS' level of cooperation with the U.S. government and
remediation was lacking; (4) due to the aforementioned misconduct,
MTS would be forced to pay approximately $850 million in criminal
penalties to the U.S. government; and (5) as a result, defendants'
public statements were materially false and/or misleading at all
relevant times.

         Contact:
         Daniel Kuznicki, Esq.
         Kuznicki Law PLLC
         445 Central Avenue, Suite 334
         Cedarhurst, NY 11516
         Phone: (347) 696-1134
         Cell: (347) 690-0692
         Fax: (347) 348-0967
         Email: dk@kclasslaw.com [GN]


U.S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE: 4th Cir. Flips $24MM Settlement Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming in part and reversing the District Court's
judgment approving Class Settlement Agreement in the case captioned
SHARP FARMS; ROBERT W. MAY; TUCKER FARMS INC.; WORTHINGTON FARMS,
Inc., Objectors-Appellants, v. TERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN
SMITH; EDDIE BROWN; ROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK;
ALEX SHUGART; H. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a
Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee. DAN LEWIS, Potential Intervenor-Appellant, v.
TERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN; ROBERT
POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART; H. RANDLE
WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U.
S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative
Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Nos. 18-1316,
18-1325. (4th Cir.).

Before this Court are the Objectors-Appellants Fisher-Lewis class
members who objected to the Speaks settlement.

This appeal of a class-action settlement concerns a longstanding
dispute between U.S. Tobacco Cooperative, Inc., an agricultural
cooperative of flue-cured tobacco growers in North Carolina, and a
class of plaintiffs consisting of current and former Cooperative
members. From its inception in 1946, the Cooperative administered a
federal price-support program designed to stabilize tobacco prices
for member growers through purchasing their unsold tobacco at a
guaranteed minimum price and marketing the tobacco to buyers.

With a mixed record of success, the price-support program
ultimately came to an end in 2004, when Congress enacted the Fair
and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act (FETRA). By this point, the
Cooperative had accumulated a capital reserve fund of hundreds of
millions of dollars generated from the tobacco the members
delivered or the fee assessments they paid to the Cooperative as
members participating in the price-support program.

The plaintiffs (Speaks plaintiffs) filed a class-action complaint
against the Cooperative, seeking a declaratory judgment,
distribution of the reserve funds to members, and judicial
dissolution of the Cooperative as an alternative form of relief.
They argued that after Congress enacted FETRA and the price-support
program ended, the Cooperative's primary purpose ceased to exist,
and it should be forced to distribute the reserve funds and be
judicially dissolved. The parties eventually mediated the case in
May 2017 and moved for the district court to certify the class and
approve their $24 million settlement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate for the class members.

The district court did so.

The Objectors claim, at bottom, that they got a raw deal. They
first contend that the district court abused its discretion in
certifying the Speaks settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a), arguing that the Speaks class counsel and class
representatives cannot and did not adequately protect their
interests in this case.

The Objectors also challenge the district court's final approval of
the $24 million settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate under
Rule 23(e). Finally, they argue that the district court erred in
denying certain Fisher-Lewis class members' attempts to opt out the
entire Fisher-Lewis certified class from Speaks.

Speaks Settlement Approval

Under the terms of the settlement, the Cooperative will pay into
the settlement fund $24 million less attorneys' fees, costs, and
incentive awards, capped at $2 million over a five-year period to
be held in escrow on behalf of the class. The final settlement
class encompasses the following:

     all individuals, proprietorships, partnerships, corporations,
and other entities that are or were shareholders and/or members of
[the Cooperative] at any time during the Class Period [i.e., June
1, 1946, through the effective date of the settlement in 2018],
without any exclusion, including any heirs, representatives,
executors, powers-of-attorney, successors, assigns, or others
purporting to act for or on their behalf with respect to the
Cooperative and/or the Settled Claims.

Adequacy of Class Counsel

First, the Objectors contend that the district court abused its
discretion in certifying the class because Speaks class counsel
Shipman and Wright did not adequately and fairly represent the
Fisher-Lewis class members who became members of the Speaks
settlement class. The Objectors argue in particular that the
district court erroneously refused to consider the Fisher-Lewis
state court's findings that counsel in Speaks colluded to exclude
Fisher-Lewisclass counsel from participating in the settlement
mediation and to mislead the Fisher-Lewisclass members into
believing that any Speaks settlement would not preclude the
Fisher-Lewisclass claims.

The Court agrees.

In its order approving the settlement, the district court concluded
that Speaks class counsel fully and adequately represents the
settlement class primarily because counsel has over twenty-years
experience litigating class actions and has expended significant
resources investigating and pursuing the claims in this action.
Addressing the collusion argument, the court stated that the
Objectors essentially suggest that Judge Bullock was too blind to
see collusion at the tip of his nose during the mediation, or that
Judge Bullock was part of the collusion, arguments that the court
rejected as insulting and baseless.  

The district court's reasoning in rejecting the Objectors'
collusion argument rests on two flawed premises. First, the court
appears to have regarded the allegations of collusion as an attack
on the mediator himself and his integrity and intelligence. The
extent of the district court's comments defending the mediator's
character suggests that this mistaken assumption was a driving
force in the court's rejection of the serious collusion
allegations.

Second, the district court's analysis erroneously assumes that the
mediator had all the relevant information on the collusion
allegations at the time he presided over and facilitated the
mediation in May 2017. As an initial matter, and as counsel for the
Speaks plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument, the mediator did
not have the benefit of the state court's January 2018 order
extensively documenting what it deemed counsel's improper and
unethical conduct, some of which allegedly occurred after the
mediation, during the summer and fall of 2017.   Without the state
court's order, the mediator could not consider in his assessment
the full extent of the collusion allegations and necessarily relied
only on information that the parties conveyed before and during the
mediation about events preceding the mediation. That the mediator
was present during the settlement negotiations thus cannot provide
the sole basis on which to reject the Objectors' charges of
collusion.

Even if the Court could look past the fact that the mediator could
not assess the extensive state court findings at the time of the
mediation, the record reveals little about the extent to which the
mediator understood and evaluated the Fisher-Lewis class members'
concerns about collusion. Unlike in the cases the Cooperative
cites, for example, the mediator did not testify by affidavit or at
the fairness hearing in this case.  And the primary evidence the
Cooperative marshals in support of its position consists of an
email from May 10, the evening before the mediation, in which
Cooperative counsel notified the mediator of the parallel
proceedings, indicated that Fisher-Lewis counsel had sent a letter
to Speaks class counsel voicing some concern over the upcoming
mediation, and explained that neither Speaks class counsel nor
Cooperative counsel shared those concerns. On this record, the
Cooperative cannot successfully argue that the mediator's presence
ensured that there was no collusion or other improper conduct
during the settlement of this case.

In approving the settlement, the district court acknowledged the
state court's order but did not meaningfully grapple with the
court's extensive findings or its conclusions that the
Speaksparties had engaged in collusive conduct to the detriment of
the Fisher-Lewis class members and violated Rules 4.1 and 4.2.
Instead, the district court downplayed the state court's order,
asserting that the state court did not have the benefit of the
extensive record that this court has to assess the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement. The
district court also emphasized that the state court's order is a
collateral interlocutory order that is not binding, and that the
order includes no analysis of the merits of the underlying federal
case, which is the most important factor in considering the
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement.
Addressing the state court's finding that the class notice was
misleading, the district court stated in a footnote that it
disagrees without elaborating.  

The district court, in failing to engage sufficiently with the
merits of the state court's findings, did not act as a fiduciary of
the class and thus abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks
settlement class under Rule 23(a).  

In arguing that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
the Cooperative asserts that the state court's findings are not
dispositive on collusion. As the Objectors point out, however, the
issue here is not whether the district court was bound by the
findings of collusion by the state court but whether the district
court failed to require closer scrutiny especially given those
findings and given its duty as a fiduciary to the absent class
members. The Cooperative further argues that, in any event, the
district court "expressly considered the state court's decision,
properly found it both legally and factually deficient, and rightly
declined to follow it. To the contrary, the district court's
rejection of the state court's order consisted largely of
conclusory statements and evinced little sustained evaluation of
the serious charges of collusion.

The Cooperative also challenges the state court's order on the
merits, arguing that the order is misconceived in multiple
respects. None of these asserted deficiencies, however, undermines
our core conclusion that the district court improperly rejected the
collusion argument based on the mere presence of the mediator and
without adequately addressing the state court's findings.

Under these circumstances, the Court holds that the district court
abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks settlement class
under Rule 23(a).

Adequacy of Class Representation

The Objectors also argue that the district court abused its
discretion because the Speaks class representatives cannot
adequately represent the class given certain conflicts of interest
between the Speaks class representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class
members.

This argument also has merit.

Under the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), a district court
may certify a class only if the class representative will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The Objectors first contend that conflicts of interest exist
between the Speaks class representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class
members because the Fisher-Lewis members' interest in the
Cooperative's reserve is tied and traceable to their patronage
gains" while in the Speaks class all members are entitled to a
portion of the reserve funds irrespective of whether they
contributed to the reserve through their patronage.  

The Objectors thus argue that a conflict exists because the legal
theory in the Speaks case is not tied to each member's patronage
interest and would provide broader relief to the settlement class
at the expense of the Fisher-Lewis class members with identifiable
patronage interests in the reserve. The Objectors separately argue
that a conflict exists because the members' legal claims are
different. Unlike the Fisher-Lewisclass, the Speaks class seeks
recovery based on two weak statutory claims, and these weaknesses,
say the Objectors, prejudice the Fisher-Lewis class members given
their much stronger claims.

The Court agrees with the Objectors, and conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks settlement
class given the fundamental conflicts between the Speaks class
representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members. These conflicts
stem from the Cooperative's structure, the manner in which the
reserve was established, and the divergent legal theories in which
the Fisher-Lewis class and the Speaks class ground their respective
claims.

This patronage interest in the reserve fund serves as the
Fisher-Lewis class members' theory of their case. Their patronage
resulted in profits for the Cooperative, they contend, and their
corresponding patronage interest was unlawfully extinguished in
violation of statutory cooperative legal principles as well as
common law principles like breach of contract when the Cooperative
undertook the membership purge in 2004-2005. The members' patronage
interests in fact provided the basis on which the state court in
Fisher-Lewis concluded that there were no conflicts of interest
within the class.  

The Speaks class representatives, by contrast, represent a class
consisting of all Cooperative members from 1946-2018 irrespective
of whether the members produced any profits for the
Cooperative—and thus irrespective of whether they contributed to
the reserve fund. The Speaks settlement indeed proposes to
distribute the reserve money to all members based merely on the
number of pounds of tobacco each member marketed to the Cooperative
and the number of years the member marketed and sold tobacco.  

The Cooperative suggests, and the district court found, that no
conflict exists because both classes seek to recover excess
reserves. But this reasoning obscures the key distinction between
the two classes, the Fisher-Lewis class members have taken the
position that the Speaks class can claim no legal entitlement or
recognized interest in any excess reserves because they have no
earned patronage interest in the reserve based on any profit
contribution. The Fisher-Lewis class members indeed assert a
fundamentally different interest and a different injury from the
Speaks class representatives: they claim an interest in the reserve
tied specifically to the profits they produced for the Cooperative,
and an injury tied directly to the deprivation of their patronage
interest as a result of the 2004-2005 membership purge. A
settlement involving all Cooperative members would vitiate this
interest through awarding to noncontributing members a portion of
the reserve funds that the Fisher-Lewis class members created.

That the Fisher-Lewis class members and the Speaks representatives
are pursuing different legal claims only underscores the conflict
of interest between the two. The different claims of the Speaks
representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members reflect their
different theories of the case, and these theories are in tension.
The Speaks class members are pursuing claims for voluntary
distribution or, alternatively, dissolution precisely because
unlike the Fisher-Lewis class members they can likely claim no
legal entitlement to the reserve funds on common law and statutory
theories that are grounded in the notion that members' patronage
gives them an interest in all profit that the Cooperative has kept
as reserves and that the Cooperative has deprived them of this
interest.

The Court holds that the district court abused its discretion in
certifying the Speaks settlement class in this respect as well.

Fisher-Lewis Classwide Opt-Out

The Objectors contend that the district court abused its discretion
when it certified the class after rejecting the attempts of certain
Fisher-Lewis class representatives to opt out the entire
Fisher-Lewis class from this case. Finding no merit to this
argument, we affirm the district court's denial of the class
opt-out.

The Objectors cite no authority for the proposition that the
Fisher-Lewis members' status as a certified class creates an
exception to the settled rule that the Due Process Clause reposes
only in individual class members. the right to intelligently and
individually choose whether to continue in a suit as class members.
Even though the Fisher-Lewis class is certified, the policy
concerns that militate against permitting group opt-outs in the
putative class context are present here as well allowing
representatives to opt out a group of class members would deprive
those members of their due-process right to make that choice for
themselves and would completely gut the class action mechanism as
objectors could dismantle any class action by removing groups of
plaintiffs.

In the absence of any authority or policy justification, we see no
basis on which to conclude that the representatives of the
Fisher-Lewis certified class can opt out of the Speaks case on
behalf of the absent Fisher-Lewis class members. As the Cooperative
notes, moreover, the Objectors' position presents an unworkable
scenario because four of the Fisher-Lewis class representatives
declined to opt out of Speaks.   Certain Fisher-Lewis
representatives thus attempted to opt out the entire Fisher-Lewis
class from Speaks even while other representatives elected to
remain in Speaks.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the
Fisher-Lewis representatives' efforts to opt out the entire
Fisher-Lewis class from this case.

Final Settlement Approval Under Rule 23(e)

The Objectors challenge the district court's approval of the $24
million Speaks class settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.
This Court affords the district court's decision substantial
deference, reversing only 'upon a clear showing that the district
court abused its discretion in approving the settlement.'

The Court agrees with the Objectors that the district court abused
its discretion under these circumstances. The Court therefore also
reverse that part of the district court's order approving the
Speaks class settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

In evaluating the adequacy of the $24 million settlement, the
district court concluded that the Speaks claims were weak for the
following reasons. First, the Speaks plaintiffs provided no
authority for the proposition that Section 55A-13-02(c) a statute
authorizing distributions requires or forces the Cooperative to
make distributions to members.
  
Second, FETRA does not provide the plaintiffs with a basis for
relief because the statute's plain language makes clear that the
Cooperative was entitled to retain the proceeds from the sale of
the loan tobacco" and because the statute does not create a private
right of action.  

Third, without statutory or contractual entitlement to relief,
plaintiffs' claim concerning unreasonable reserves amounts to a
claim that the Cooperative's Board breached their fiduciary duties
in failing to distribute reserves. The plaintiffs have not shown
that a fiduciary relationship existed between them and the Board,
the court indicated, but even if they could make such a showing,
the claim would fall within North Carolina's business-judgment
rule.
  
In concluding that the $24 million settlement was adequate, the
district court also indicated that the Cooperative's defenses were
strong, noting in particular that the statute of limitations is a
substantial barrier to large swaths of plaintiffs' claims. Again,
this reasoning applies with less force to the Fisher-Lewis claims.
Those plaintiffs filed suit in early 2005, shortly after being
notified in late 2004 of the Cooperative's plan to terminate most
of its members and retain their accrued patronage interests. The
claims indeed arose precisely because of the Cooperative's
2004-2005 membership purge the moment when the expelled members
lost their interest and the reserve increased to an unreasonable
$365,000 per member -- and the claims substantially survived a
motion to dismiss.  

The district court, in approving the $24 million settlement as
reasonable, also relied on several faulty premises concerning the
proposed $76 million settlement.

First, the court asserted that the state court did not find that
the proposed settlement was unreasonable but rather denied
preliminary approval without prejudice based on certain plaintiffs'
objection that discovery on the merits of the settlement was
necessary.  

Second, the district court, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 408
and our decision in Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d
652 (4th Cir. 1988), concluded that a settlement offer does not
reflect the relative strength of the plaintiffs' claims on the
merits, and that such an offer cannot establish the Cooperative's
liability at trial. But the $76 million figure was not merely a
settlement offer made in the course of the parties' negotiations.
The figure instead was the basis on which the court, after briefing
and argument, denied preliminary approval for the settlement as not
fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members. Neither the
district court nor the Cooperative points to any authority
suggesting that this Court cannot consider the state court's denial
in our review of the Speaks settlement.

Third, the district court deemed the $76 million proposed
settlement from 2005-2006 outdated and irrelevant and thus an
improper benchmark by which to gauge the reasonableness of the
Speaks settlement both because the Cooperative's business strategy
from 2005 to 2017 has proven reasonable and beneficial  to members
and because the litigation risks have substantially changed in the
Cooperative's favor since 2005.

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the district
court abused its discretion in approving the $24 million settlement
as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's February 28, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyejae2l from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Charles Alan Runyan -- arunyan@runyanplatte.com -- RUNYAN &
PLATTE, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellants.

Gary K. Shipman, SHIPMAN & WRIGHT, LLP, for Appellees Teresa
Speaks, et al.

Derek L. Shaffer -- derekshaffer@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL
URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United
States Tobacco Cooperative Inc.

ON BRIEF: Andrew S. Platte, RUNYAN & PLATTE, for Appellants Sharp
Farms, Robert W. May, Tucker Farms, Inc., and Worthington Farms,
Inc.

John L. Coble -- jlc@mwglaw.com -- MARSHALL, WILLIAMS & GORHAM,
LLP, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant Dan Lewis.

William G. Wright, SHIPMAN & WRIGHT, LLP.

Namon Leo Daughtry, DAUGHTRY, WOODARD, LAWRENCE & STARLING, for
Appellees Teresa Speaks, et al.

Lee M. Whitman -- lwhitman@wyrick.com -- Tobias S. Hampson --  --
WYRICK ROBBINS, Raleigh, North Carolina; Jonathan Cooper --
jonathancooper@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United States Tobacco
Cooperative Inc.


UNIFUND CCR: Goldberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------
BASHEVA GOLDBERG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UNIFUND CCR, LLC; MULLOOY,
JEFFREY; ROONEY & FLYNN, LLP; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case
No. 7:19-CV-02826-CS (S.D.N.Y., March 29, 2019) seeks to stop the
Defendants' unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Judge Cathy Seibel.

Unifund CCR Partners, Inc. purchases, sells, and manages
under-performing and distressed consumer receivables in the United
States. It offers debt sales of distressed debts, such as future
home liens(guaranteed debtor home ownership), future
garnishments(guaranteed debtor employment), judgments and liens,
and litigation-ready accounts for law firms, distressed asset
investors, collection agencies, financial institutions, real
estate/mortgage firms, resellers, and title companies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dov Micahel Mittelman, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: mittelmandov@yahoo.com


UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Ct. Suggests Denial of Bid to Dismiss ERISA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California issued a Report and
Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned DAVID WIT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH, Defendant, GARY ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, Defendant. Case No. 14-cv-02346-JCS, Related
Case No. 14-cv-05337 JCS. (N.D. Cal.).

The Court conducted a 10-day bench trial and now makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

Defendant United Behavioral Health (UBH), which also operates as
OptumHealth Behavioral Solutions, administers mental health and
substance use disorder benefits for commercial welfare benefit
plans. In that capacity, it has developed Level of Care Guidelines
and Coverage Determination Guidelines (Guidelines) that it uses for
making coverage determinations. Plaintiffs in these related class
actions assert claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), alleging that they were improperly denied
benefits for treatment of mental health and substance use disorders
because UBH's Guidelines do not comply with the terms of their
insurance plans and/or state law.

The Plaintiffs assert two claims: 1) breach of fiduciary duty
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim) and 2) arbitrary and capricious
denial of benefits (Denial of Benefits Claim). Plaintiffs assert
the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(1)(B) (Count I in all of the operative complaints) and, to
the extent the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is unavailable
under that section, they assert the claim under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(3)(A) (Count III in all of the operative complaints).

Whether the UBH Guidelines Adhere to Generally Accepted Standards
of Care

Sources of Generally Accepted Standards of Care

In the context of this case, generally accepted standards of care
are the standards that have achieved widespread acceptance among
behavioral health professionals. There is no single source of
generally accepted standards of care. Rather, they can be gleaned
from multiple sources, including peer-reviewed studies in academic
journals, consensus guidelines from professional organizations, and
guidelines and materials distributed by government agencies.   

In this case, expert witnesses for both Plaintiffs and UBH offered
opinions about generally accepted standards of care. While they
relied on a variety of sources in support of their opinions, the
resources that all of the experts agreed reflect generally accepted
standards of care include the following: 1) the American Society of
Addiction Medicine Criteria (ASAM Criteria); 2) the American
Association of Community Psychiatrist's (AACP) Level of Care
Utilization System (LOCUS) 3) the Child and Adolescent Level of
Care Utilization System (CALOCUS) developed by AACP and the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP), and
the Child and Adolescent Service Intensity Instrument (CASII),
which was developed by AACAP in 2001 as a refinement of CALOCUS and
4) the Medicare benefit policy manual issued by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS Manual). Other sources that the
parties' witnesses relied upon and which the Court finds reflect
generally accepted standards of care are: 1) the APA Practice
Guidelines for the Treatment of Patients with Substance Use
Disorders, Second Edition; 2) the APA Practice Guidelines for the
Treatment of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder; and 3)
AACAP's Principles of Care for Treatment of Children and
Adolescents with Mental Illnesses in Residential Treatment
Centers.

Generally Accepted Standards of Care Relevant to the Guidelines
Challenged in this Action

   a. It is a generally accepted standard of care that effective
treatment requires treatment of the individual's underlying
condition and is not limited to alleviation of the individual's
current symptoms

Many mental health and substance use disorders are long-term and
chronic. While current symptoms are typically related to a
patient's chronic condition, it is generally accepted in the
behavioral health community that effective treatment of individuals
with mental health or substance use disorders is not limited to the
alleviation of the current symptoms. Rather, effective treatment
requires treatment of the chronic underlying condition as well.
Thus, ASAM recommends that practitioners develop an individualized
plan [that is] based on a comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment
of the patient" and explains that "[a]ddiction treatment services
have as their goal not simply stabilizing the patient's condition
but altering the course of the patient's disease toward wellness.

Likewise, Dr. Plakun testified that mental health treatment that
only manages crises is not effective, as "you wind up in a recipe
that is sadly all too familiar in the world these days; that is, of
people going in and out of hospital, rotating back and forth
between trying to make outpatient treatment work, failing in it,
having chronic ongoing crises that need to be managed, winding up
in an inpatient unit. Analogizing a chronic mental health condition
to a pot of water over a flame, Dr. Plakun testified, it's optimal
to try to find a way to turn the flame down and not simply feed the
recurrent loop of crisis.

   b. It is a generally accepted standard of care that effective
treatment requires treatment of co-occuring behavioral health
disorders and/or medical conditions in a coordinated manner that
considers the interactions of the disorders and conditions and
their implications for determining the appropriate level of care

Many individuals with a behavioral health diagnosis have multiple,
co-occurring disorders. Similarly, the presence of a co-occurring
medical condition is an aggravating factor that may necessitate a
more intensive level of care for the patient to be effectively
treated.  
The ASAM Criteria and the LOCUS both reflect the importance of a
comprehensive approach to treating co-occurring disorders in
determining the appropriate level of care. For example, ASAM
Dimension 2 assesses the need for physical health services,
including whether there are needs for acute stabilization and/or
ongoing disease management for a chronic physical health condition.


ASAM Dimension 3 assesses the need for mental health services and
specifically references mental health conditions, including
trauma-related issues and conditions such as posttraumatic stress,
cognitive conditions and developmental disorders, and substance
related mental health conditions.

   c. It is a generally accepted standard of care that patients
should receive treatment for mental health and substance use
disorders at the least intensive and restrictive level of care that
is safe and effective

In order to treat patients with mental health or substance use
disorders effectively, it is important for providers to "match"
them to the appropriate level of care. The evidence presented at
trial supports the conclusion that under generally accepted
standards, the driving factors in determining the appropriate
treatment level should be safety and effectiveness; however, where
the clinician determines that more than one service level will meet
both of these requirements, the least intensive and/or restrictive
setting should be selected.  

The evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that under
generally accepted standards of care, there is a balancing of
effectiveness against the restrictiveness or intensity factor; in
other words, the fact that a lower level of care is less
restrictive or intensive does not justify selecting that level if
it is also expected to be less effective. Placement in a less
restrictive environment is appropriate only if it is likely to be
safe and just as effective as treatment at a higher level of care
in addressing a patient's overall condition, including underlying
and co-occurring conditions.

   d. It is a generally accepted standard of care that when there
is ambiguity as to the appropriate level of care, the practitioner
should err on the side of caution by placing the patient in a
higher level of care

Research has demonstrated that patients with mental health and
substance use disorders who receive treatment at a lower level of
care than is clinically appropriate face worse outcomes than those
who are treated at the appropriate level of care. On the other
hand, there is no research that establishes that placement at a
higher level of care than is appropriate results in an increase in
adverse outcomes. Consequently, it is a generally accepted standard
of care that where there is uncertainty as to the likely
effectiveness of different proposed levels of care, practitioners
treating patients for mental health and substance use disorders
should exercise caution by selecting the higher level of service
intensity.  

   e. It is a generally accepted standard of care that effective
treatment of mental health and substance use disorders includes
services needed to maintain functioning or prevent deterioration

While effective treatment may result in improvement in the
patient's level of functioning, it is well-established that
effective treatment also includes treatment aimed at preventing
relapse or deterioration of the patient's condition and maintaining
the patient's level of functioning. Thus, for example, the CMS
Manual provides that services satisfy the reasonable expectation of
improvement" requirement for Medicare coverage where there is a
reasonable expectation that if treatment services were withdrawn
the patient's condition would deteriorate, relapse further, or
require hospitalization. The CMS Manual explains, for many
psychiatric patients, particularly those with long-term, chronic
conditions, control of symptoms and maintenance of a functional
level to avoid further deterioration or hospitalization is an
acceptable expectation of improvement.

Similarly, ASAM cautions that treatment successes such as a period
of abstinence or improvement in function sometimes are
misinterpreted as indicating that treatment is completed. Instead,
treatment of substance use disorders should continue so long as
there is a risk of relapse.  

   f. It is a generally accepted standard of care that the
appropriate duration of treatment for behavioral health disorders
is based on the individual needs of the patient; there is no
specific limit on the duration of such treatment

As the CMS Manual explains, there are no specific limits on the
length of time that services may be covered. Rather, in determining
whether to continue treatment, practitioners consider such factors
as the nature of the illness, prior history, the goals of
treatment, and the patient's response.

   g. It is a generally accepted standard of care that the unique
needs of children and adolescents must be taken into account when
making level of care decisions involving their treatment for mental
health or substance use disorders

One of the primary differences between adults, on the one hand, and
children and adolescents, on the other, is that children and
adolescents are not fully developed, in the psychiatric sense.
Clinicians recognize that a child or adolescent's level of
development is an important consideration in making level of care
determinations.  

One of the ways practitioners take into account the developmental
level of a child or adolescent in making treatment decisions is by
relaxing the threshold requirements for admission and continued
service at a given level of care. Thus, under the ASAM Criteria,
placement at a given level of care might be appropriate for a child
or adolescent with a lower level of severity in Dimension 1 than
would be required to warrant the same placement for an adult.
Similarly, the ASAM Criteria apply a more lenient standard to
children and adolescents by not requiring a showing in as many
dimensions as is required for adults to warrant the same level of
care. For example, for an adult to meet criteria for level 3.1
residential treatment, the patient must meet specifications in each
of the six dimensions, whereas an adolescent need only meet
specifications in at least two of the six dimensions. As a
corollary of these more lenient standards, children and adolescents
are likely to need longer duration of treatment than adults.  

   h. It is a generally accepted standard of care that the
determination of the appropriate level of care for patients with
mental health and/or substance use disorders should be made on the
basis of a multidimensional assessment that takes into account a
wide variety of information about the patient

Individuals with mental and substance use disorders can be viewed
as suffering from biopsychosocial illnesses that, to varying
degrees, have biological and medical, psychological and
psychiatric, and sociocultural origins and clinical features.
Consequently, except in acute situations that require
hospitalization, where safety alone may necessitate the highest
level of care, decisions about the level of care at which a patient
should receive treatment should be made based upon a holistic,
biopsychosocial assessment that involves consideration of multiple
dimensions.  

Under the ASAM Criteria, for example, the six dimensions that
clinicians should consider are as follows: 1) Acute Intoxication
and/or Withdrawal Potential 2) Biomedical Conditions and
Complications 3) Emotional, Behavioral, or Cognitive Conditions and
Complications; 4) Readiness to Change 5) Relapse, Continued Use, or
Continued Problem Potential and 6) Recovery/Living Environment.
These criteria are not rigid requirements for making level of care
determinations. Instead, each of the six dimensions is assessed
independently and receives its own risk rating. These scores are
then combined, so that lower scores in one dimension can be offset
by higher scores in another. Further, ASAM instructs that
cross-dimensional interactions should be considered, as these may
increase or decrease the level of risk.  

LOCUS has a similar set of dimensions, instructing clinicians to
consider: (1) Risk of Harm, (2) Functional Status, (3) Medical,
Addictive, and Psychiatric Co-Morbidity, (4) Recovery Environment,
(5) Treatment and Recovery History, and (6) Engagement and Recovery
Status. As is the case under the ASAM Criteria, placements using
LOCUS are based on consideration of all of the dimensions, and a
low score in one dimension may be offset by a higher score in
another, with the result that different combinations of factors
within the LOCUS dimensions may point toward the same placement
determination.  

Whether UBH Guidelines are Consistent with Generally Accepted
Standards of Care

   a. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by placing excessive emphasis on acuity and
crisis stabilization

Having reviewed all of the versions of the Guidelines that
Plaintiffs challenge in this case and considered the testimony of
the witnesses addressing the meaning of the Guidelines, the Court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that in every version of
the Guidelines in the class period, and at every level of care that
is at issue in this case, there is an excessive emphasis on
addressing acute symptoms and stabilizing crises while ignoring the
effective treatment of members' underlying conditions. While the
particular form this focus on acuity takes varies somewhat between
the versions, in each version of the Guidelines at issue in this
case the defect is pervasive and results in a significantly
narrower scope of coverage than is consistent with generally
accepted standards of care.

   b. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by failing to address the effective treatment of
co-occurring conditions

UBH witnesses testified that the Guidelines are consistent with
generally accepted standards of care with respect to treatment of
co-occurring conditions because they instruct that a member should
be placed at a level of care where the member's current condition
can be treated both safely and effectively, and the term current
condition encompasses co-occurring conditions. That testimony was
not credible because the plain language of the Guidelines supports
a contrary conclusion; instead, the Court finds that these
witnesses were simply offering post hoc rationalizations for
Guidelines that transparently fail to provide for the effective
treatment of co-occurring conditions. This is particularly obvious
in the 2015 through 2017 versions of the Guidelines, which contain
a list of requirements for admission in the Common Criteria that
uses different words to describe the treatment of the member's
current condition and the member's co-occurring conditions. In
particular, while the list requires that a member's current
condition can be safely, efficiently, and effectively assessed
and/or treated in the proposed level of care, the very next
requirement is that co-occurring behavioral health and medical
conditions can be safely managed.

   c. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by failing to err on the side of caution in favor
of higher levels of care when there is ambiguity and pushing
patients to lower levels of care where such a transition is safe
even if the lower level of care is likely to be less effective

It is a generally accepted standard of care that patients should be
placed at the least restrictive level of care that is both safe and
effective and that practitioners should err on the side of caution
when there is uncertainty by placing patients at the higher level
of care. Further, the fact that a lower level of care may be less
restrictive does not justify moving the patient to that level of
care if it is also likely to be less effective in treating the
patient's overall condition including the underlying condition and
any co-occurring conditions even if movement to the lower level of
care may be safe. UBH's Guidelines do not adhere to these
principles. Instead, they actively seek to move patients to the
least restrictive level of care at which they can be safely
treated, even if a lower level of care may be less effective for
that patient.

   d. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by precluding coverage for treatment to maintain
level of function

The Court does not find credible the testimony offered by Dr.
Martorana that the Improvement Criteria set forth two separate
definitions of improvement in the sections that were eventually
numbered Under this interpretation, only the first definition
(found in Par. 1.8.1) measures improvement with reference to acute
symptoms whereas the second (alternative) definition (found in
paragrpah 1.8.2) defines improvement with reference to the
likelihood of deterioration in the member's overall condition. In
support of this interpretation, UBH points to the last sentence of
paragraph 1.8.2, which instructs that improvement must also be
understood within the broader framework of the member's recovery
and/or resiliency goals. Yet this interpretation is not consistent
with the modifier in this context" in paragraph 1.8.2. The most
reasonable interpretation of this language is that it refers to the
preceding sentence, found in paragraph 1.8.1 in the later versions
of the Guidelines, which states that improvement is indicated by
the reduction or control of the acute symptoms that necessitated
treatment in a level of care.

That reading is also consistent with the Guidelines as whole, which
repeatedly emphasize that treatment must be aimed at reduction or
control of acute signs and symptoms. The last sentence of paragraph
1.8.2, instructing clinicians that improvement must also be
understood within the broader framework of the member's recovery,
resiliency and wellbeing merely pays lip service to generally
accepted standards of care without offering any concrete guideline
for incorporating them into the Improvement Criteria. The use of
the word also in that sentence further makes clear that the
sentence is merely an add-on that is not intended modify the
requirements that precede it in the Improvement Criteria provision.
In sum, the Court concludes that the Improvement Criteria provision
in the UBH Guidelines for all versions of the Guidelines that are
at issue in this case set forth a unified standard that is
inconsistent with generally accepted standards of care.

   e. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by precluding coverage based on lack of
motivation

Plaintiffs contend UBH' Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by requiring discharge as soon as a patient
becomes unwilling or unable to participate in treatment. The Court
finds that the Guidelines for 2011 through 2013 are consistent with
generally accepted standards of care with respect to consideration
of a patient's motivation in determining the appropriate level of
care but that the Guidelines for 2014 through 2017 deviate from
those standards.

The parties' experts appear to be in agreement that for all levels
of care that are at issue in this case, it is not appropriate under
generally accepted standards of care to expect patients to be
motivated to participate when they initially seek treatment;
instead, there should be attempts to motivate a patient to
participate in treatment before treatment at that level of care is
discontinued.  

   f. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by failing to address the unique needs of
children and adolescents

One of the most troubling aspects of UBH's Guidelines is their
failure to address in any meaningful way the different standards
that apply to children and adolescents with respect to the
treatment of mental health and substance use disorders. Throughout
the Class Period, UBH failed to adopt separate level-of-care
criteria tailored to the unique needs of children and adolescents.
Nor do the Guidelines instruct decision-makers to apply the
criteria contained in the Guidelines differently when the member is
a child or adolescent.

While the clinical Best Practices provisions of the Guidelines
contain specific things that are very pertinent to children and
adolescents, these provisions are aimed at treatment providers
rather than UBH staff who make coverage determinations. The
criteria in the Guidelines that must be satisfied to obtain
coverage, that is, the actual rules that govern coverage
determinations, make no distinctions based on the unique needs of
children and adolescents. In fact, as Dr. Triana testified, UBH has
never adopted any special set of rules for children and
adolescents.

   g. Whether UBH deviates from generally accepted standards of
care by using an overly broad definition of "custodial care" in its
Guidelines, coupled with an overly narrow definition of "active"
treatment and "improvement"

At trial, a UBH witness testified that the definition of custodial
care used in the Guidelines was based on custodial care exclusions
in class members' plans. A review of the custodial care definitions
in the plans of the Claim Sample reflects that 25 members of the
Claim Sample had benefit plans that used the three-part definition
of custodial care that UBH began using in 2015 in its Custodial
Care CDGs and in its residential treatment LOCGs. The court has
reviewed the Plans of these Claim Sample members, however, and does
not find that any of them include the overly restrictive
definitions of active treatment and improvement that significantly
expand the concept of custodial care in UBH's CDGs and LOCGs.
Further, even if the inclusion of this language in some class
members' Plans might limit coverage for those class members to
exclude even some services that are consistent with generally
accepted standards of care a question the Court does not address
here it does not justify the application of standards that do not
reflect generally accepted standards of care to class members whose
plans do not contain this language.

   h. Whether UBH Guidelines deviate from generally accepted
standards of care by imposing mandatory prerequisites rather than a
multidimensional approach

Decisions about the level of care at which a patient should receive
treatment must be multi-dimensional, taking into account a wide
variety of information about the patient and allowing clinicians to
weigh the dimensions against one another. Plaintiffs contend the
very structure of UBH's Guidelines, containing a list of Common
Criteria that are mandatory, is inconsistent with the holistic
approach that is required under generally accepted standards of
care. While a list of required criteria does not necessarily
deviate from generally accepted standards of care, UBH's Guidelines
are nonetheless flawed to the extent that they instruct clinicians
to collect a wide array of information under their Best Practices
provisions but do not allow for adequate consideration of this
information in the rules and requirements that govern coverage
determinations. This flaw results in many of the deviations from
generally accepted standards of care that are discussed above.

   i. Whether UBH Guidelines are Consistent With ASAM

ASAM is a recognized source of generally accepted standards of care
and reflects, inter alia, the following generally accepted
standards of care: 1) treatment should not be limited to crisis
stabilization and the treatment of acute presenting symptoms but
rather, should be aimed at providing effective treatment of the
patient's overall condition, including chronic and co-occurring
medical and behavioral health conditions 2) patients should treated
at the least restrictive level of care that is both safe and
effective and should be moved to a lower level of care only where
the lower level is likely to be safe and just as effective as
treatment at the higher level of care in addressing a patient's
overall and co-occurring conditions 3) clinicians should err on the
side of caution by placing the patient in a higher level of care
when there is ambiguity or uncertainty as to the appropriate level
of care 4) treatment services should be provided to maintain
functioning or prevent deterioration 5) determination of the
appropriate level of care must take into account the unique needs
of children and adolescents and 6) placement determinations should
be based on a holistic, multidimensional approach that allows a
wide variety of factors to be taken into account and weighed
against one another.

UBH's Guidelines deviate from these standards in a multitude of
ways, as set forth above. This has been the case throughout the
Class Period, including before and after the 2013 publication of
the ASAM third edition. Indeed, in an internal UBH email exchange
in 2012 with the subject line  Use of ASAM criteria poll, one of
UBH's regional medical directors opined that the ASAM Criteria
usually will result in more authorization as they are more
subjective and broader than our LOCG/CDGs.

   j. Whether UBH Guidelines Complied With State Laws

Illinois

Effective August 18, 2011, Illinois law mandated that all medical
necessity determinations for substance use disorders shall be made
in accordance with appropriate patient placement criteria
established by the American Society of Addiction Medicine. In 2015,
Illinois amended the provision that contained this requirement by
adding the following sentence: No additional criteria may be used
to make medical necessity determinations for substance use
disorders. The Court finds that the plain language of the original
provision required that UBH use the ASAM Criteria rather than its
own Guidelines to make coverage determinations for treatment of
substance abuse disorders.  

To the extent that the Illinois statute as originally enacted was
in any way unclear, the circumstances surrounding the amendment of
the provision in 2015 support the conclusion that the amendment was
meant to clarify rather than modify the original provision. It is
particularly significant that the 2015 amendment merely adds a
sentence; it does not change the language used with respect to the
actual requirement that ASAM Criteria must be used. Further, the
only mention of the provision in the transcript of the Illinois
Senate session in which the bill was addressed was a passing
reference describing it as a provision that specifies that ASAM
Criteria are to be used for making medical necessity
determinations. This reference was made in the context of a
discussion of an unrelated issue and there was no suggestion that
the ASAM requirement was new. Nor has the Court found anything in
the legislative history suggesting that the amendment was intended
to modify the original ASAM requirement.

UBH did not start using the ASAM Criteria for Illinois substance
use disorder claims until January 2016. Because it was required to
use ASAM Criteria to make medical necessity determinations for
claims governed by Illinois law as of August 18, 2011, its use of
its own Guidelines as to those claims violated Illinois law.
Further, even if the original 2011 version of the law permitted UBH
to use its own Guidelines so long as they were consistent with the
ASAM Criteria, at least until the law was amended in 2015, UBH's
Guidelines did not comply with Illinois law because they were not
consistent with ASAM Criteria, as discussed above.

Connecticut

Connecticut has required insurers to use the ASAM Criteria, or a
set of criteria that UBH demonstrates to the Insurance Department
is consistent with the ASAM Criteria, since October 1, 2013. UBH
concedes that it has never used the ASAM Criteria in Connecticut.
To establish compliance with Connecticut law, UBH points to the
crosswalks it submitted to Connecticut regulators in 2013 and 2015.
The Court finds that UBH has failed to comply with Connecticut law
throughout the class period because its Guidelines are not
consistent with" the ASAM Criteria for the reasons discussed above.
Moreover, in the crosswalks UBH submitted to Connecticut regulators
in 2013 and 2015, it materially mischaracterized the UBH Guidelines
by stating that the criteria from all 3 ASAM levels [3.1, 3.3 and
3.5] are included in the admission criteria for Residential
Rehabilitation. At the time these statements were made to
Connecticut regulators, UBH knew them to be false, as reflected in
the Shulman Report, discussed above.

Rhode Island

Since July 10, 2015, Rhode Island has required that payors such as
UBH rely upon the criteria of the American Society of Addiction
Medicine when developing coverage for levels of care for
substance-use disorder treatment. While the law does not preclude
UBH from developing its own guidelines to make coverage
determinations, it requires that those guidelines must be
consistent with ASAM Criteria; merely listing ASAM as a reference
or borrowing a definition is not sufficient to meet this
requirement. For the reasons discussed above, UBH's Guidelines are
not consistent with ASAM Criteria and therefore UBH has failed to
comply with Rhode Island law.

Texas

For the entire class period, insurance companies were required to
apply criteria issued by the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI
Criteria or TCADA Guidelines) in making medical necessity
determinations with respect to claims for substance use disorder
treatment when an individual's plan was governed by Texas law and
treatment was sought from a provider or facility in Texas.

Throughout the class period, UBH's Guideline Applicability Tool,
used by UBH's Care Advocates and Peer Reviewers to determine which
guidelines to apply to a member's benefit request, consistently
shows that Texas guidelines were to be applied to coverage requests
for substance use disorder treatment in Texas under plans governed
by Texas law. In addition, three UBH witnesses testified that
throughout the class period UBH has used TDI Criteria to make
coverage determinations with respect to claims governed by Texas
law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Plaintiffs bring their Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim under 29
U.S.C. Sections 1132(a)(1)(B), which allows participants of ERISA
plans to bring a civil action to enforce their rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan and under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(3)(A), which allows ERISA participants to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan. As stated above, the parties have stipulated
that all of the named Plaintiffs were participants in plans
governed by ERISA at the time of their noncoverage determination.

Therefore, Plaintiffs are participants within the meaning of these
sections.
UBH was a plan fiduciary with respect to Plaintiffs' Plans by
virtue of its designation as administrator of mental health and
substance use benefits under their Plans. Further, Plaintiffs'
Plans delegated discretionary authority to UBH to interpret and
apply plan terms, and UBH exercises that authority when it makes
coverage determinations and more broadly, when it adopts Guidelines
to standardize its coverage determinations and to ensure that those
determinations are consistent with generally accepted standards of
care. Thus, when it adopts and applies its Guidelines to coverage
determinations, UBH is required to act in a manner that is
consistent with the fiduciary duties set forth above, that is, the
duty of loyalty, the duty of due care and the duty to comply with
plan terms.  

The evidence introduced at trial supports the conclusion that
significant skepticism is warranted in determining whether UBH
abused its discretion when it adopted the Guidelines that are
challenged in this case. First, the evidence shows that UBH had a
structural conflict of interest throughout the class period because
a large portion of its revenues came from fully insured plans.
Moreover, the evidence shows that even as to the self-funded plans,
UBH felt pressure to keep benefit expenses down so that it could
offer competitive rates to employers. Second, regardless of whether
the financial incentive to keep benefit expenses down was stronger
with respect to the fully insured plans or the self-funded plans,
the conflict of interest affected all members equally, regardless
of which type of plan they were insured under, because UBH used a
single set of Guidelines to make coverage determinations. Third,
UBH did not ensure that the internal process it set up for adopting
and revising the Guidelines insulated the individuals who developed
the Guidelines from financial considerations.

To the contrary, UBH included administrators from its Finance and
Affordability Departments on the committees that ultimately had to
approve the Guidelines. Further, as to those individuals who were
involved in the Guideline development process who were not in those
Departments, such as Mr. Niewenhous, UBH made sure that on a
regular basis they received detailed financial information about
"utilization," including whether targets set by UBH in particular
categories of services were being met. Finally, the evidence at
trial established that the emphasis on cost-cutting that was
embedded in UBH's Guideline development process actually tainted
the process, causing UBH to make decisions about Guidelines based
as much or more on its own bottom line as on the interests of the
plan members, to whom it owes a fiduciary duty. This was apparent
from UBH's handling of TMS and ABA benefits, discussed above. Most
striking, however, was the obvious impact of financial
considerations on UBH's decision making as to the adoption of the
ASAM Criteria. UBH's refusal to adopt the ASAM Criteria was not
based on any clinical justification. Indeed, all of its clinicians
recommended that the ASAM Criteria be adopted. The only reason UBH
declined to adopt the ASAM Criteria was that its Finance Department
wouldn't sign off on the change. In other words, UBH's Finance
Department had veto power with respect to the Guidelines and used
it to prohibit even a change in the Guidelines that all of its
clinicians had recommended. This evidence establishes that UBH has
a conflict of interest that has had a significant impact on
decision-making as to the development of the Guidelines. Therefore,
in applying the abuse of discretion standard to Plaintiffs' Breach
of Fiduciary Duty Claim, the Court views UBH's decision making with
significant skepticism.

UBH argues that to the extent that the Denial of Benefits Claim is
asserted under both 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B) and Section
1132(a)(3)(A), the Court should dismiss the latter claim on the
basis that the former claim provides adequate relief. UBH relies on
the rule that equitable relief under Section 1132(a)(3) is not
available if Section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides an adequate remedy. It
is well-established, however, that under Varity, claims asserted
under Section 1132(a)(1)(B) and Section 1132(a)(3) may proceed
simultaneously so long as there is no double recovery. As the Court
has not yet addressed the question of remedies, UBH's request that
the Court dismiss the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim asserted under
Section 1132(a)(3)(A) is premature.

The Court finds that UBH is liable with respect to the Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claim.
Denial of Benefits Claim

Plaintiffs assert the Denial of Benefits Claim under 29 U.S.C.
Sectioon 1132(a)(1)(B) and 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3)(B).  

To prevail on their Denial of Benefits Claim, Plaintiffs must
establish by the preponderance of the evidence that: 1) one
condition of coverage under the class members' Plans was that the
requested treatment was consistent with generally accepted
standards of care and/or the standards mandated by state law 2)
when determining whether a request for coverage satisfied its
Guidelines,

UBH was interpreting and applying those plan terms 3) UBH's
Guidelines were not consistent with generally accepted standards or
the standards mandated by state law and 4) UBH denied Plaintiffs'
requests for coverage for outpatient, intensive outpatient, or
residential treatment based in whole or in part on UBH's
Guidelines.

UBH denied Plaintiffs' requests for coverage for outpatient,
intensive outpatient, or residential treatment based in whole or in
part on UBH's Guidelines.

UBH argues that to the extent that the Denial of Benefits Claim is
asserted under both 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B) and Section
1132(a)(3)(B), the Court should dismiss the latter claim on the
basis that the former claim provides adequate relief, again relying
on Varity. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that
UBH's request is premature.

The Court finds that UBH is liable with respect to the Denial of
Benefits Claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 28, 2019 Findings
and Conclusions is available at http://tinyurl.com/y4vgold4from
Leagle.com.

David Wit, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Natasha Wit, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Brian Muir, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Brandt Pfeifer, on behalf of the Estate of his
deceased wife, Lauralee Pfeifer, and all others similarly situated,
Lori Flanzraich, on behalf of her daughter Casey Flanzraich and all
others similarly situated, Cecilia Holdnak, on behalf of herself,
her daughter Emily Holdnak, and all others similarly situated, Gary
Alexander, on his own behalf and on behalf of his beneficiary son,
Jordan Alexander, and all others similarly situated, Corinna Klein,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated & David
Haffner, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Meiram Bendat, Psych-Appeal, Inc.,  8560
Sunset Blvd, Suite 500 • West Hollywood, CA 90069, Adam Abelson,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Aitan Goelman, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,Andrew Nathan Goldfarb, Zuckerman Spaeder
LLP,  100 E Pratt St, Ste 2440, Baltimore, MD 21202-1031, Anthony
F. Maul -afmaul@maulfirm.com -- The Maul Firm, P.C., Carl Spencer
Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline E. Reynolds,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, D. Brian Hufford, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
Daniel Patrick Moylan, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Jason
S. Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Martin Stanley Himeles, Jr.,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Sara Louise Alpert Lawson,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP &Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, 100
E Pratt St, Ste 2440, Baltimore, MD 21202-1031

Linda Tillitt, Intervenor Pla, represented by Caroline E. Reynolds,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, D. Brian Hufford, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
Jason S. Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Adam Abelson, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Aitan Goelman, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Andrew Nathan Goldfarb, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Carl
Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel
Patrick Moylan, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Stanley
Himeles, Jr., Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Sara Louise
Alpert Lawson, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP.

United Behavioral Health, doing business as OptumHealth Behavioral
Solutions Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher Flynn --
cflynn@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring LLP, Jeffrey Howard
Rutherford -- jrutherford@kbkfirm.com -- Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP,
Andrew John William Holmer -- aholmer@crowell.com -- Crowell and
Moring LLP, April Nelson Ross -- aross@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP, Jennifer Salzman Romano -- jromano@crowell.com --
Crowell & Moring LLP, Joseph V. Bui, Crowell and Moring LLP,
Katharine Fiedler Barach -- kbarach@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring
LLP, Kelly T. Currie -- kcurrie@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring,
Mana Elihu Lombardo -- melombardo@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring
LLP, Nathaniel Philip Bualat  -- nbualat@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP & Thomas Francis Koegel -- tkoegel@crowell.com --
Crowell & Moring LLP.
David Wit, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Natasha Wit, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Brian Muir, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Brandt Pfeifer, on behalf of the Estate of his
deceased wife, Lauralee Pfeifer, and all others similarly situated,
Lori Flanzraich, on behalf of her daughter Casey Flanzraich and all
others similarly situated, Cecilia Holdnak, on behalf of herself,
her daughter Emily Holdnak, and all others similarly situated, Gary
Alexander, on his own behalf and on behalf of his beneficiary son,
Jordan Alexander, and all others similarly situated, Corinna Klein,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated & David
Haffner, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Meiram Bendat, Psych-Appeal, Inc.,  8560
Sunset Blvd, Suite 500 • West Hollywood, CA 90069, Adam Abelson,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Aitan Goelman, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,Andrew Nathan Goldfarb, Zuckerman Spaeder
LLP,  100 E Pratt St, Ste 2440, Baltimore, MD 21202-1031, Anthony
F. Maul -afmaul@maulfirm.com -- The Maul Firm, P.C., Carl Spencer
Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline E. Reynolds,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, D. Brian Hufford, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
Daniel Patrick Moylan, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Jason
S. Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Martin Stanley Himeles, Jr.,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Sara Louise Alpert Lawson,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP &Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, 100
E Pratt St, Ste 2440, Baltimore, MD 21202-1031

Linda Tillitt, Intervenor Pla, represented by Caroline E. Reynolds,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, D. Brian Hufford, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
Jason S. Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Adam Abelson, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Aitan Goelman, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Andrew Nathan Goldfarb, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Carl
Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel
Patrick Moylan, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Stanley
Himeles, Jr., Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Sara Louise
Alpert Lawson, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP.

United Behavioral Health, doing business as OptumHealth Behavioral
Solutions Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher Flynn --
cflynn@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring LLP, Jeffrey Howard
Rutherford -- jrutherford@kbkfirm.com -- Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP,
Andrew John William Holmer -- aholmer@crowell.com -- Crowell and
Moring LLP, April Nelson Ross -- aross@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP, Jennifer Salzman Romano -- jromano@crowell.com --
Crowell & Moring LLP, Joseph V. Bui, Crowell and Moring LLP,
Katharine Fiedler Barach -- kbarach@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring
LLP, Kelly T. Currie -- kcurrie@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring,
Mana Elihu Lombardo -- melombardo@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring
LLP, Nathaniel Philip Bualat  -- nbualat@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP & Thomas Francis Koegel -- tkoegel@crowell.com --
Crowell & Moring LLP.


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Dismissal of Count I in Kamins Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL A. KAMINS, ETC., Appellant-Respondent, v.
UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellants, Case 2016-03429, Index No. 64276/14 (N.Y.
App. Div.), Judge Cheryl E. Chambers of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, affirmed the
dismissal of the first cause of action in the amended complaint.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for violations of
Insurance Law Sections 3221(l)(5) and 4303(g) and (h), the
Plaintiff appeals, and the Defendants cross-appeal, from an order
of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jerry Garguilo, J.), dated
March 7, 2016.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that
branch of the Defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of action in the amended
complaint.

The Plaintiff is an employee of the State of New York.  During the
time period relevant to the action, the Plaintiff received health
insurance benefits for himself and his family members through a
health insurance plan that was insured and administered by the
Defendants.

He commenced the putative class action challenging the Defendants'
denial of mental health benefits allegedly owed to his adult son
and similarly situated subscribers of the Plaintiff's health
insurance plan.  The first cause of action in the amended complaint
alleged violations of New York's mental health parity law, also
known as Timothy's Law.  Specifically, he alleged that the
Defendants applied a definition of medical necessity and
utilization review requirements to coverage of mental health care
claims that were far more restrictive than those imposed on general
medical claims.

The Defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to
dismiss the first cause of action in the amended complaint.  In an
order dated March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted
that branch of the motion.  

The Plaintiff appeals from that portion of the order.  The
Defendants filed a notice of cross appeal from the order dated
March 7, 2011, but, in their brief, do not ask for reversal or
modification of the order.  Accordingly, the Defendants' cross
appeal must be dismissed as abandoned.

Judge Chambers explains that after the order appealed from was
issued, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
determined that no intent to create a private right of action can
fairly be implied from the statutory language and legislative
history of Timothy's Law.  In so finding, the District Court found
relevant an amicus brief filed by the New York State Department of
Financial Services ("DFS") in Doe v Oxford Health Insurance, Inc.
The District Court stated that, in that amicus brief, DFS took the
position that Timothy's Law did not create a private right of
action, and that a private right of action would "upend" the
legislative enforcement scheme.  DFS reasoned that determinations
of whether the law had been violated required complex, fact-based
determinations about medical necessity, and DFS had implemented a
comprehensive system to evaluate appeals following denials of
coverage.

The Judge agrees with the District Court that allowing people to
litigate these issues in court might yield duplicative or
inconsistent results.  Accordingly, she holds that Timothy's Law
lacks a private right of action and, thus, agrees with the Supreme
Court's determination granting that branch of the Defendants'
motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first
cause of action in the amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 3, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/KbeSCb from Leagle.com.

The Maul Firm, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Anthony F. Maul of counsel), for
appellant-respondent.

Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, NY (Richard H. Silberberg --
silberberg.richard@dorsey.com -- of counsel), for
respondents-appellants.


UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Muslims' Suit vs. FBI
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the
District Court's order dismissing the majority of the Plaintiffs'
claims in the cases captioned YASSIR FAZAGA; ALI UDDIN MALIK;
YASSER ABDELRAHIM, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, in his official capacity; PAUL DELACOURT,
Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Los
Angeles Division, in his official capacity; PAT ROSE; KEVIN
ARMSTRONG; PAUL ALLEN, Defendants, and BARBARA WALLS; J. STEPHEN
TIDWELL, Defendants-Appellants. YASSIR FAZAGA; ALI UDDIN MALIK;
YASSER ABDELRAHIM, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, in his official capacity; PAUL DELACOURT,
Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Los
Angeles Division, in his official capacity; J. STEPHEN TIDWELL;
BARBARA WALLS, Defendants, and PAT ROSE; KEVIN ARMSTRONG; PAUL
ALLEN, Defendants-Appellants. YASSIR FAZAGA; ALI UDDIN MALIK;
YASSER ABDELRAHIM, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, in his official capacity; PAUL DELACOURT,
Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Los
Angeles Division, in his official capacity; J. STEPHEN TIDWELL;
BARBARA WALLS; PAT ROSE; KEVIN ARMSTRONG; PAUL ALLEN; UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 12-56867, 12-56874,
13-55017. (9th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of the majority of their claims
and the Agent Defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity on
the FISA claim.

Three Muslim residents of Southern California allege that, for more
than a year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) paid a
confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program
that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their
religious identity. The three plaintiffs filed a putative class
action against the United States, the FBI, and two FBI officers in
their official capacities (Government Defendants) and against five
FBI agents in their individual capacities (Agent Defendants).
Alleging that the investigation involved unlawful searches and
anti-Muslim discrimination, they pleaded eleven constitutional and
statutory causes of action.

The Attorney General of the United States asserted the state
secrets privilege with respect to three categories of evidence
assertedly at issue in the case, and the Government moved to
dismiss the discrimination claims pursuant to that privilege. The
Government expressly did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) unlawful search
claims based on the privilege. Both the Government and the Agent
Defendants additionally moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' discrimination
and unlawful search claims based on arguments other than the
privilege.

The district court dismissed all but one of Plaintiffs' claims on
the basis of the state secrets privilege including the Fourth
Amendment claim, although the Government Defendants had not sought
its dismissal on privilege grounds. The district court allowed only
the FISA claim against the Agent Defendants to proceed.

The FISA Claim Against the Agent Defendant

Section 110 of FISA, codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 1810, creates a
private right of action for an individual subjected to electronic
surveillance in violation of FISA's procedures. It provides, in
pertinent part:

An aggrieved person, who has been subjected to an electronic
surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic
surveillance of such person has been disclosed or used in violation
of section 1809 of this title shall have a cause of action against
any person who committed such violation.

To determine whether Plaintiffs plausibly allege a cause of action
under Section 1810, the Court must decide (1) whether Plaintiffs
are aggrieved persons within the meaning of the statute (2) whether
the surveillance to which they were subjected qualifies as
electronic surveillance and (3) whether the complaint plausibly
alleges a violation of 50 U.S.C. Section 1809.

An aggrieved person is defined as a person who is the target of an
electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or
activities were subject to electronic surveillance.

The key question as to the presence of electronic surveillance
under this definition is whether the surveillance detailed in the
complaint was undertaken in circumstances in which (1) Plaintiffs
had a reasonable expectation of privacy and (2) a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes. If, as the complaint
alleges, no warrant was in fact obtained, such electronic
surveillance would constitute a violation of Section 1809.

To properly approach this inquiry, the Court considers separately
three categories of audio and video surveillance alleged in the
complaint: (1) recordings made by Monteilh of conversations to
which he was a party (2) recordings made by Monteilh of
conversations to which he was not a party (i.e., the recordings of
conversations in the mosque prayer hall) and (3) recordings made by
devices planted by FBI agents in Fazaga's office and AbdelRahim's
house, car, and phone.

The Court concludes that the Agent Defendants are entitled to
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds of Plaintiffs' Section 1810
claim as to the first two categories of surveillance. As to the
third category of surveillance, conducted via devices planted in
AbdelRahim's house and Fazaga's office, Allen and Armstrong are not
entitled to qualified immunity. But Tidwell, Walls, and Rose are
entitled to dismissal as to this category, because Plaintiffs do
not plausibly allege their involvement in this category of
surveillance, and so have not pleaded facts showing that those
officials violated a statutory or constitutional right.

Recordings of Conversations to Which Monteilh Was a Party

A reasonable expectation of privacy exists where a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
`reasonable. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the invited informer
doctrine does not apply to the recordings made by Monteilh of
conversations to which he was a party because the surveillance was
conducted with discriminatory purpose and therefore in bad faith.

Under the appropriate Fourth Amendment precepts, undercover
operations, in which the agent is a so-called invited informer, are
not searches under the Fourth Amendment. In other words, use of a
government informant under the invited informer doctrine even if
not in good faith in the First Amendment sense does not implicate
the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Because our inquiry under FISA is confined to whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy was violated and whether a warrant was
therefore required, the First Amendment-grounded good-faith
limitation does not apply to our current inquiry.

Under the invited informer doctrine, Plaintiffs lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the conversations recorded by Monteilh to
which he was a party. The Agent Defendants are therefore not liable
under FISA for this category of surveillance.

Recordings of Conversations in the Mosque Prayer Hall to Which
Monteilh Was Not a Party
Plaintiffs did have a privacy-grounded reasonable expectation that
their conversations in the mosque prayer hall would not be covertly
recorded by an individual who was not present where Plaintiffs were
physically located and was not known to be listening in. The Agent
Defendants are, however, entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to this category of surveillance under the second prong of
the qualified immunity standard whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.

The mosque prayer hall is not an ordinary public place. It is a
site of religious worship, a place for Muslims to come together for
prayer, learning, and fellowship. Plaintiffs allege that the prayer
hall is a sacred space where particular rules and expectations
apply. Shoes are prohibited, one must be in a state of ablution,
discussing worldly matters is discouraged, and the moral standards
and codes of conduct are at their strongest. Notably, gossiping,
eavesdropping, or talebearing (namima -- revealing anything where
disclosure is resented) is forbidden. And ICOI, which Malik and
AbdelRahim attended, specifically prohibited audio and video
recording in the mosque without permission. When, on a rare
occasion, an outside entity did record an event or a speaker, ICOI
put up signs to notify congregants. Furthermore, Plaintiffs explain
in their complaint that halaqas, which are small group meetings
during which participants discuss theology or matters related to
the practice of Islam, are understood by mosque attendees to be
environments that ensure some measure of confidentiality among
participants.

The sacred and private nature of the houses of worship Plaintiffs
attended distinguishes them from the types of commercial and public
spaces in which courts have held that individuals lack a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The mosque prayer halls in this case, by
contrast, have no characteristics similarly evidencing diminished
expectations of privacy or rendering such expectations
unreasonable. There are no urgent health or safety needs justifying
surveillance. And the use of surveillance equipment at ICOI is not
only uncommon, but expressly forbidden.

Our constitutional protection of religious observance supports
finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a sacred space,
where privacy concerns are acknowledged and protected, especially
during worship and other religious observance. Thus, Plaintiffs'
expectation that their conversations in the mosque prayer hall
would be confidential among participants (unless shared by one of
them with others), and so would not be intercepted by recording
devices planted by absent government agents was objectively
reasonable.

Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation
of privacy that their conversations in the mosque prayer hall would
not be covertly recorded by a government agent not party to the
conversations.

As of 2006 and 2007, however, no federal or state court decision
had held that individuals generally have a reasonable expectation
of privacy from surveillance in places of worship. The Agent
Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity as to this
category of surveillance.

Recordings Made by Planted Devices

Plaintiffs offer sufficient well-pleaded facts to substantiate
their allegation that some of the Agent Defendants Allen and
Armstrong were responsible for planting devices in AbdelRahim's
house. Specifically, the complaint details one occasion on which
Allen and Armstrong asked Monteilh about something that had
happened in AbdelRahim's house that Monteilh had not yet
communicated to them, and explained that they knew about it because
they had audio surveillance in the house.

As to Tidwell, Walls, and Rose, however, the complaint does not
plausibly allege their personal involvement with respect to the
planted devices. The complaint details Tidwell, Walls, and Rose's
oversight of Monteilh, including that they read his daily notes and
were apprised, through Allen and Armstrong, of the information he
collected. But the complaint never alleges that Monteilh was
involved in planting devices in AbdelRahim's house, car, or phone,
or in Fazaga's office; those actions are attributed only to unnamed
FBI agents.

The complaint also offers general statements that Tidwell, Walls,
and Rose supervised Allen and Armstrong. But government officials
may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution. Plaintiffs have not done so as to this category of
surveillance with regard to Tidwell, Walls, and Rose. The complaint
does not allege that the supervisors knew of, much less ordered or
arranged for, the planting of the recording devices in AbdelRahim's
home or Fazaga's office, so the supervisors are entitled to
qualified immunity as to that surveillance.  

In sum, Plaintiffs allege a FISA claim against Allen and Armstrong
for recordings made by devices planted by FBI agents in
AbdelRahim's house and Fazaga's office. As to all other categories
of surveillance, the Agent Defendants either did not violate FISA;
are entitled to qualified immunity on the FISA claim because
Plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy was not clearly
established; or were not plausibly alleged in the complaint to have
committed any FISA violation that may have occurred.

The State Secrets Privilege and FISA Preemption

The initial question as to Plaintiffs' second argument is whether
the procedures established under FISA for adjudicating the legality
of challenged electronic surveillance replace the common law state
secrets privilege with respect to such surveillance to the extent
that privilege allows the categorical dismissal of causes of
action. The question is a fairly novel one. The Court is the first
federal court of appeals to address it. Only two district courts,
both in our circuit, have considered the issue. Those courts both
held that FISA displaces federal common law rules such as the state
secrets privilege with regard to matters within FISA's purview. The
Court rely on similar reasoning to that in those district court
decisions, but reach a narrower holding as to the scope of FISA
preemption.

Plaintiffs' religion claims will not go forward under the open and
transparent processes to which litigants are normally entitled.
Instead, in the interest of protecting national security, the
stringent FISA procedures require severe curtailment of the usual
protections afforded by the adversarial process and due process.
As it is Plaintiffs who have invoked the FISA procedures, the Court
proceed on the understanding that they are willing to accept those
restrictions to the degree they are applicable as an alternative to
dismissal, and so may not later seek to contest them.

The District Court's Dismissal of the Search Claims Based on the
State Secrets Privilege
As a threshold matter, before determining whether FISA displaces
the state secrets privilege with regard to electronic surveillance,
the Court first considers which of Plaintiffs' claims might
otherwise be subject to dismissal under the state secrets
privilege. Although the Government expressly did not request
dismissal of the Fourth Amendment and FISA claims based on the
privilege, the district court nonetheless dismissed the Fourth
Amendment claim on that basis. That was error.

The Agent Defendants note that the Government focuses on the public
disclosure of recordings collected by Monteilh, and point out that
Plaintiffs also challenge surveillance conducted without Monteilh's
involvement -- namely, the planting of recording devices by FBI
agents in Fazaga's office and AbdelRahim's home, car, and phone.
Allegations concerning the planting of recording devices by FBI
agents other than Monteilh, the Agent Defendants argue, are the
sources and methods discussed in the Attorney General's invocation
of the privilege. The Agent Defendants thus maintain that because
the Government's reasons for not asserting the privilege over the
search claims do not apply to all of the surveillance encompassed
by the search claims, dismissal as to the search claims is in fact
necessary.

The Agent Defendants, however, are not uniquely subject to
liability for the planted devices. The Fourth Amendment claim
against the Government Defendants likewise applies to that category
of surveillance. The Agent Defendants, officials sued in their
individual capacities are not the protectors of the state secrets
evidence; the Government is. Accordingly, and because the Agent
Defendants have not identified a reason they specifically require
dismissal to protect against the harmful disclosure of state
secrets where the Government does not, the Court declines to accept
their argument that the Government's dismissal defense must be
expanded beyond the religion claims.

In short, in determining sua sponte that particular claims warrant
dismissal under the state secrets privilege, the district court
erred. For these reasons, we will not extend FISA's procedures to
challenges to the lawfulness of electronic surveillance to the
degree the Government agrees that such challenges may be litigated
in accordance with ordinary adversarial procedures without
compromising national security.

FISA Displacement of the State Secrets Privilege

Before the enactment of FISA in 1978, foreign intelligence
surveillance and the treatment of evidence implicating state
secrets were governed purely by federal common law. Federal courts
develop common law in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.
Federal common law is, however, a 'necessary expedient' and when
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision
rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise
of lawmaking by federal courts disappears. Once the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized
administrative standards, federal common law no longer applies.  

Applicability of FISA's Section 1806(f) Procedures to Affirmative
Legal Challenges to Electronic Surveillance

Fourth Amendment Injunctive Relief Claim Against the
Official-Capacity Defendants
The Government's primary argument for dismissal of the
constitutional claims brought against the official-capacity
defendants, including the Fourth Amendment claim, is that the
injunctive relief sought -- the expungement of all records
unconstitutionally obtained and maintained is unavailable under the
Constitution.

Not so.

We have repeatedly and consistently recognized that federal courts
can order expungement of records, criminal and otherwise, to
vindicate constitutional rights. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section
552a, which (1) establishes a set of practices governing the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information
about individuals maintained in records systems by federal
agencies, and (2) creates federal claims for relief for violations
of the Act's substantive provisions, does not displace the
availability of expungement relief under the Constitution.

Previous cases involving claims brought under both the Privacy Act
and the Constitution did not treat the Privacy Act as displacing a
constitutional claim, but instead analyzed the claims separately.
And the circuits that have directly considered whether the Privacy
Act displaces parallel constitutional remedies have all concluded
that a plaintiff may pursue a remedy under both the Constitution
and the Privacy Act.

In short, expungement relief is available under the Constitution to
remedy the alleged constitutional violations. Because the
Government raises no other argument for dismissal of the Fourth
Amendment injunctive relief claim, it should not have been
dismissed.

Fourth Amendment Bivens Claim Against the Agent Defendants

Alleging that the Agent Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment,
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages directly under the Constitution
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court
recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's
constitutional rights.

Here, the substance of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Bivens claim is
identical to the allegations raised in their FISA Section 1810
claim. Under our rulings regarding the reach of the Section 1806(f)
procedures, almost all of the search-and-seizure allegations will
be subject to those procedures. Thus, regardless of whether a
Bivens remedy is available, Plaintiffs' underlying claim that the
Agent Defendants engaged in unlawful electronic surveillance
violative of the Fourth Amendment would proceed in the same way.

Religion Claims

First Amendment and Fifth Amendment Injunctive Relief Claims
Against the Official-Capacity Defendants

Plaintiffs maintain that it violates the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
for the Government to target them for surveillance because of their
adherence to and practice of Islam. The Government does not
challenge the First and Fifth Amendment claims substantively. It
argues only that injunctive relief is unavailable and that
litigating the claims is not possible without risking the
disclosure of state secrets. The Court have already concluded that
injunctive relief, including expungement, is available under the
Constitution where there is a substantively viable challenge to
government action, see supra Part III.A, and that dismissal because
of the state secrets concern was improper because of the
availability of the Section 1806(f) procedures.

Accordingly, considering only the arguments put forward by the
Government, we conclude that the First and Fifth Amendment claims
against the official-capacity defendants may go forward.

First Amendment and Fifth Amendment Bivens Claims Against the Agent
Defendants

Plaintiffs seek monetary damages directly under the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.

Here, many of Plaintiffs' allegations relate not to neutral and
generally applicable government action, but to conduct motivated by
intentional discrimination against Plaintiffs because of their
Muslim faith. Regardless of the magnitude of the burden imposed, if
the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and
is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. It is the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment -- not Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) that imposes this requirement.

The Court concludes that the Privacy Act and RFRA, taken together,
function as an alternative remedial scheme for protecting some, but
not all, of the interests Plaintiffs seek to vindicate via their
First and Fifth Amendment Bivens claims. The district court never
addressed whether a Bivensremedy is available for any of the
religion claims because it dismissed the claims in their entirety
based on the state secrets privilege. In addition, Abbasi has now
clarified the standard for determining when a Bivens remedy is
available for a particular alleged constitutional violation. And,
as we have explained, the scope of the religion claims to which a
Bivens remedy might apply is considerably narrower than those
alleged, given the partial displacement by the Privacy Act and
RFRA. If asked, the district court should determine on remand,
applying Abbasi, whether a Bivens remedy is available to the degree
the damages remedy is not displaced by the Privacy Act and RFRA.

42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3) Claims Against the Agent Defendants

Plaintiffs allege that the Agent Defendants conspired to deprive
Plaintiffs of their rights under the First Amendment's
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and the due process
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section
1985(3).

To state a violation of Section 1985(3), Plaintiffs must allege and
prove four elements:
(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4)
whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or
deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.

The Defendants attack these claims on various grounds, but the
Court reach only one whether Section 1985(3) conspiracies among
employees of the same government entity are barred by the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

Abbasi makes clear that intracorporate liability was not clearly
established at the time of the events in this case and that the
Agent Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from
liability under Section 1985(3).  

The dispositive issue here, as in Abbasi, is whether the Agent
Defendants could reasonably have known that agreements entered into
or agreed-upon policies devised with other employees of the FBI
could subject them to conspiracy liability under Section 1985(3).
At the time the Plaintiffs allege they were surveilled, neither
this court nor the Supreme Court had held that an intracorporate
agreement could subject federal officials to liability under
Section 1985(3), and the circuits that had decided the issue were
split.41 There was therefore, as in Abbasi, no clearly established
law on the question. As the Agent Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on the Section 1985(3) allegations in the
complaint, we affirm their dismissal on that ground.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claim Against the Agent
Defendants and Government Defendants

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000bb, by substantially
burdening Plaintiffs' exercise of religion, and did so neither in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest nor by adopting
the least restrictive means of furthering any such interest. The
Government Defendants offer no argument for dismissal of the RFRA
claim other than the state secrets privilege. The Agent Defendants,
however, contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
the RFRA claim because Plaintiffs failed to plead a substantial
burden on their religion, and if they did so plead, no clearly
established law supported that conclusion at the relevant time.

To establish a prima facie claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must
present evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact rationally to
find the existence of two elements. First, the activities the
plaintiff claims are burdened by the government action must be an
exercise of religion. Second, the government action must
`substantially burden' the plaintiff's exercise of religion. Once a
plaintiff has established those elements, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the government to prove that the challenged government
action is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and
is implemented by `the least restrictive means.

Plaintiffs do allege that they altered their religious practices as
a result of the FBI's surveillance: Malik trimmed his beard,
stopped regularly wearing a skull cap, decreased his attendance at
the mosque, and became less welcoming to newcomers than he believes
his religion requires. AbdelRahim significantly decreased his
attendance to mosque,  limited his donations to mosque
institutions, and became less welcoming to newcomers than he
believes his religion requires. Fazaga, who provided counseling at
the mosque as an imam and an intern therapist, stopped counseling
congregants at the mosque because he feared the conversations would
be monitored and thus not confidential.

As to the Agent Defendants, therefore, the Court affirms the
dismissal of the RFRA claim. But because the Government Defendants
are not subject to the same qualified immunity analysis and made no
arguments in support of dismissing the RFRA claim other than the
state secrets privilege, the Court holds that the complaint
substantively states a RFRA claim against the Government
Defendants.

Privacy Act Claim Against the FBI

The Plaintiffs allege that the FBI violated the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. Section 552a(e)(7), by collecting and maintaining records
describing how Plaintiffs exercised their First Amendment rights.
As a remedy, Plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief ordering the
destruction or return of unlawfully obtained information. Cell
Associates, Inc. v. National Institutes of Health, 579 F.2d 1155
(9th Cir. 1978), which interpreted the scope of Privacy Act
remedies, precludes such injunctive relief.

A violation of Section 552a(e)(7) falls within the catch-all remedy
provision, applicable if the agency fails to comply with any other
provision of the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(g)(1)(D). As
the statute does not expressly provide for injunctive relief for a
violation of this catch-all provision, Cell Associates precludes
injunctive relief for a violation of Section 552a(e)(7).

The Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the precedential impact of Cell
Associates on the ground that it nowhere mentions Section
552a(e)(7). That is so, but the holding of Cell Associates
nonetheless applies directly to this case. The Privacy Act
specifies that injunctive relief isavailable for violations of some
provisions of the Act, but not for a violation of Section
552a(e)(7). Under Cell Associates, Plaintiffs cannot obtain
injunctive relief except for violations as to which such relief is
specifically permitted.

The Plaintiffs' complaint expressly provides that the FBI is sued
for injunctive relief only. Accordingly, because their sole
requested remedy is unavailable, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
under the Privacy Act.

FTCA Claims

The FTCA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred. State substantive law applies"
in FTCA actions.   If an individual federal employee is sued, the
United States shall, given certain conditions are satisfied, be
substituted as the party defendant.

Plaintiffs allege that the United States is liable under the FTCA
for invasion of privacy under California law, violation of the
California constitutional right to privacy, violation of California
Civil Code Section 52.1, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Court first consider Defendants' jurisdictional
arguments, and then discuss their implications for the substantive
FTCA claims.

FTCA Judgment Bar

The FTCA's judgment bar provides that the judgment in an action
under the FTCA shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the
claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim. The judgment bar provision has no application here.

The judgment bar provision precludes claims against individual
defendants in two circumstances: (1) where a plaintiff brings an
FTCA claim against the government and non-FTCA claims against
individual defendants in the same action and obtains a judgment
against the government, and (2) where the plaintiff brings an FTCA
claim against the government, judgment is entered in favor of
either party, and the plaintiff then brings a subsequent non-FTCA
action against individual defendants,  

Neither of those two circumstances, nor their attendant risks, is
present here. Plaintiffs brought their FTCA claim, necessarily,
against the United States, and their non-FTCA claims against the
Agent Defendants, in the same action.  

The FTCA's judgment bar does not operate to preclude Plaintiffs'
claims against the Agent Defendants.

FTCA Discretionary Function Exception

The Court cannot determine the applicability of the discretionary
function exception at this stage in the litigation. If, on remand,
the district court determines that Defendants did not violate any
federal constitutional or statutory directives, the discretionary
function exception will bar Plaintiffs' FTCA claims. But if the
district court instead determines that Defendants did violate a
nondiscretionary federal constitutional or statutory directive, the
FTCA claims may be able to proceed to that degree.

Because applicability of the discretionary function will largely
turn on the district court's ultimate resolution of the merits of
Plaintiffs' various federal constitutional and statutory claims,
discussing whether Plaintiffs substantively state claims as to the
state laws underlying the FTCA claim would be premature. We
therefore decline to do so at this juncture.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's February 28, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6cputet from Leagle.com.

Carl J. Nichols -- CARL.NICHOLS@WILMERHALE.COM -- (argued) and
Howard M. Shapiro -- HOWARD.SHAPIRO@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C.; Katie Moran --
KATIE.MORAN@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, Los Angeles, California; for
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Barbara Walls and J. Stephen
Tidwell.

Alexander H. Cote  acote@scheperkim.com  (argued), Amos A. Lowder
-- alowder@scheperkim.com -Angela M. Machala --
amachala@scheperkim.com -- David C. Scheper  --
dscheper@scheperkim.com -- Scheper Kim & Harris LLP, Los Angeles,
California, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Pat Rose,
Paul Allen, and Kevin Armstrong.

Douglas N. Letter (argued), Daniel Tenny, and Mark B. Stern,
Appellate Staff; Stephanie Yonekura, Acting United States Attorney;
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., for Defendants-Appellees Federal. Bureau of Investigation,
Christopher A. Wray, and Paul Delacourt.

Richard R. Wiebe, Law Office of Richard R. Wiebe, 44 Montgomery St,
Ste 650, CA 94104-4605 San Francisco, California; Thomas E. Moore
III -- tmoore@rroyselaw.com, Royse Law Firm PC, Palo Alto,
California; David Greene -- davidg@eff.org -- Andrew Crockner  --
andrew@eff.org -- Mark Rumold, James S. Tyre -- jstyre@eff.org --
Kurt Opsahl -- kurt@eff.org -- Electronic Frontier Foundation, San
Francisco, California; for Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier
Foundation.


UNITED STATES: Ackerman Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit ACKERMAN & SON LLC; ACKERMAN BROTHERS
FARMS, LLC; BACK ROAD FARMING, INC., et al.; individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiffs,
vs. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RISK MANAGEMENT
AGENCY, and FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORPORATION, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-11779-TLL-PTM (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiffs move
the Court to certify a class consisting of:

   "all policyholders of 2015 Dry Bean Revenue Endorsement (DBRE)
   policies insuring pea (navy) beans and/or small red beans in
   Michigan, and who farmed in the Eastern District of Michigan
   in 2015."

In the event that the court prefers to certify subclasses, the
Plaintiffs move to certify three subclasses consisting of persons
meeting these criteria:

     i. All policyholders of 2015 DBRE policies insuring pea (navy)
beans in Michigan, grown in the Eastern District of Michigan in
2015.

    ii. All policyholders of 2015 DBRE policies insuring small red
beans in Michigan, grown in the Eastern District of Michigan in
2015.

   iii. All policyholders of 2015 DBRE policies insuring both pea
(navy) beans and small red beans in Michigan, grown in the Eastern
District of Michigan in 2015.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          John D. Tallman, Esq.
          JOHN D. TALLMAN, PLC
          4020 East Beltline Ave, N.E. – Suite 101
          Grand Rapids, MI 49525
          Telephone: (616) 361-8850

Attorney for the Defendants:

          Sarah Karpinen, Esq.
          ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY
          211 W. Fort Street – Suite 2001
          Detroit, MI 48226
          Telephone: (313) 226-9595


UNITED STATES: Court Nixes Class Claims in Smith Prisoner Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an
order in the lawsuit titled GARY LEE SMITH v. HUGH J. HURWITZ, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00548-RDM (D.D.C.), ruling that:

   -- Plaintiff's individual claims shall proceed;
   -- Plaintiff's class action claims are dismissed;
   -- Plaintiff's motion to certify class is denied;
   -- Plaintiff's motion for service is denied as moot; and
   -- the Clerk of Court shall assign this action randomly to a
      judge for further proceedings.

Hugh J. Hurwitz is the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.

The Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed suit
alleging that the Bureau of Prisons has failed to distribute his
health care services fees as restitution to victims.  He also
attempts to bring a class action lawsuit on behalf of other
prisoners.

The Court finds that while the Plaintiff's individual claims may
proceed, he may not bring a class action.  As a general rule,
applicable here, a pro se litigant can represent only himself or
herself in federal court.[CC]


UNITED STATES: DHS Ordered to Turn Over Docs in DACA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge has ordered
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to either turn over
documents regarding its decision to terminate protections for
children of immigrants -- known as Dreamers -- or submit a
privilege log ahead of the summary judgment portion of a class
action over the termination of DACA.

A copy of the Order is available at:

         https://is.gd/um91b6


UNITED STATES: Oklahoma City NAACP to File Class Action v. DHS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dana Hertneky, writing for News9, reports that the NAACP says they
will be working with a local attorney to file a class action
lawsuit against the Department of Human Services. They say they
represent dozens of families and DHS caseworkers.

The plaintiffs in the case are seeking monetary damages and change
in the system, they say, not only fails to protect children but
also puts them in harm's way.

The DHS caseworkers who told News 9 in a 2017 investigation about
high caseloads and the danger that puts kids in, will be part of
the lawsuit. As will Dahn Gregg who spoke to News 9 the day she was
fired after she raised concerns about dangerous foster homes.


"As workers, they should be able to go and say this is a problem,
and someone should listen to them and take care of it," said Gregg.
"These are children, we are responsible for the safety of these
children."

Gregg's attorney Rachel Bussett says she has also heard from
several families whose children were harmed while in DHS care.

The NAACP says they also have had many families reach out to them
saying the same thing.

"We have family after family with the same problem, and you can't
have the same problem with different families that have no
connection," said Dana Brockway with the Oklahoma City branch of
the NAACP.

In a statement DHS said, "We have met with Oklahoma City NAACP
representatives numerous times over the past year regarding these
allegations. Thorough reviews of the few cases presented to us
found no evidence of improprieties. In fact, the courts have been
involved in each of these matters and have issued the orders
governing the Department's ongoing efforts to work with those
families and the families' responsibilities for regaining custody
of their children.  We are quite confident our actions have been
justifiable, in the best interests of the children involved, and
these allegations are without merit."

Brockway and Bussett, however, say they are also taking their
concerns to state lawmakers and have scheduled a meeting with
Governor Stitt.

"Unless he makes a systemic change in DHS from top to bottom a
lawsuit can't be avoided at this point," said Bussett. "Because we
have been shaking the trees for two years and they aren't
listening."

Bussett says the lawsuit should be filed by the end of the month.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: Veterans Affairs Responds to NVLSP's Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
The National Veterans Legal Services Program on April 1 issued the
following news release:

In response to the National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP)
class action lawsuit, Wolfe and Boerschinger v. Wilkie, the U.S.
Dept. of Veterans Affairs (VA) admitted that it misled tens of
thousands of veterans who had applied for reimbursement of the
emergency -care expenses they incurred at non-VA facilities. The
admission came in VA's March 15, 2019 court-ordered response to the
lawsuit that NVLSP filed on behalf of Peter E. Boerschinger. Mr.
Boerschinger seeks to represent the tens of thousands of other
veterans who, like him, received VA correspondence inaccurately
informing them that they could not qualify for reimbursement if
their expenses were partially covered by private insurance. Under
the law, veterans can qualify for reimbursement even if their
emergency medical expenses are partially covered by private
insurance. As part of Mr. Boerschinger's lawsuit, NVLSP seeks to
compel the VA to provide corrected information to all veterans who
received the inaccurate communications and to reinstate their
reimbursement claims.

"NVLSP is gratified that our class action lawsuit has forced the VA
to admit to the widespread systematic errors in its emergency-care
reimbursement system and to provide corrected information to tens
of thousands of veterans who received the false information," said
NVLSP Executive Director Bart Stichman. "NVLSP's fight for veterans
is far from over. NVLSP will continue to pursue our class action
lawsuit with full vigor to correct the other claim in our lawsuit
-- VA's continued policy of denying reimbursement for the
deductibles and co-insurance payments they are required to pay to
their private insurer."

According to the VA, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) will
begin to take several steps to remedy the false information that
was sent to veterans. VHA stated that on Feb. 8, 2019, it stopped
adjudication of all emergency-care reimbursement claims that were
missing needed information or that did not meet criteria for
reimbursement. The VHA announced a three-tiered corrective action
plan that involves corrected notice letters, new adjudications, and
renewed appellate rights to all veterans whose claims are denied
after they are re-adjudicated. The VHA's three categories of
corrective actions are:

* Category A veterans are those whose claims were denied based on
the presence of other health insurance. VHA will advise them by
letter of the erroneous adjudication and notify them that their
claims will be reopened and re-adjudicated. VHA stated that these
letters will be issued beginning in April 2019, but did not address
when it will complete these mailings. Nor did VHA address when
these cases will be redecided. Once decided, Category A veterans
will ultimately be informed via letter of the re-adjudication
results and the new one-year period to appeal any adverse
decision.

* Category B veterans are those whose claims were denied for
reasons other than the presence of other health insurance. They
will be treated similarly to Category A veterans. VHA stated that
it will begin to send letters notifying them that their claims will
be reopened and redecided in May 2019.

* Category C veterans are those whose claims were rejected as
incomplete. VHA will begin to mail corrected notices in May 2019.
These corrected notices will advise Category C veterans of the
correct eligibility criteria for reimbursement.

Additionally, VHA will also institute some global organizational
changes for its reimbursement claims system. This includes revising
all of its letter templates to remove the erroneous
other-health-insurance criterion.

Background

On Jan. 1, 2019, NVLSP amended the class action lawsuit it filed
two months earlier in the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(CAVC) to accuse the VA of sending false information throughout
2018 to tens of thousands of veterans who had applied for VA
reimbursement of emergency medical expenses they incurred at non-VA
facilities. The lawsuit, filed with the pro bono assistance of
Sidley Austin LLP, asserts that the VA has a practice and policy of
informing these veterans - falsely - that they cannot qualify for
any reimbursement if they have partial coverage for their emergency
medical expenses under a health plan contract. This VA
representation is inaccurate, according to NVLSP, because it
directly violates the binding decision issued by the CAVC in 2016
in Staab v. Shulkin, which invalidated a VA regulation precisely
because it prohibited reimbursement if the veteran had partial
coverage under a health care plan.

NVLSP has filed suit three times over VA's failure to comply with
the Emergency Care Fairness Act of 2010 (ECFA). NVLSP represented
veteran Richard Staab (Staab v. Shulkin) in the first landmark case
filed in 2014 after the VA declined to reimburse him for any of the
$48,000 he incurred for emergency open heart surgery purely because
secondary insurance covered part of the emergency care bill. In
that lawsuit, the CAVC nullified the VA regulation that prohibited
reimbursement for any of the veteran's emergency medical expenses
merely because some, but not all of those expenses were covered by
the veteran's insurance. In that watershed ruling in 2016, the CAVC
ruled that Congress intended the VA to step in as a "secondary
payer" where other health care insurers cover only a portion of the
cost of the veteran's emergency treatment and invalidated VA's
regulation.

Twenty-one months later, the VA issued a new regulation in an
effort to comply with the Staab decision. According to the second
class action lawsuit filed at the CAVC in October 2018 by NVLSP on
behalf of Ms. Amanda Wolfe (Wolfe v. Wilkie), the new regulation
violates the ECFA because it takes the narrow provision in the ECFA
allowing VA not to reimburse veterans for copayments or "similar
payments," and adds deductibles and co-insurance payments to the
list of non-reimbursable expenses, which are not similar to
copayments at all.

                         About NVLSP

The National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP) --
http://www.nvlsp.org-- is an independent, nonprofit veterans
service organization that has served active duty military personnel
and veterans since 1981. NVLSP strives to ensure that our nation
honors its commitment to its 22 million veterans and active duty
personnel by ensuring they have the benefits they have earned
through their service to our country. NVLSP has represented
veterans in lawsuits that compelled enforcement of the law where
the VA or other military services denied benefits to veterans in
violation of the law. NVLSP's success in these lawsuits has
resulted in more than $5.2 billion dollars being awarded in
disability, death and medical benefits to hundreds of thousands of
veterans and their survivors. NVLSP offers training for attorneys
and other advocates; connects veterans and active duty personnel
with pro bono legal help when seeking disability benefits;
publishes the nation's definitive guide on veteran benefits; and
represents and litigates for veterans and their families before the
VA, military discharge review agencies and federal courts. [GN]


UTAH: May Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners Suffering From HCV
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled RONALD MAY, et al. v. UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-00854-RJS-BCW
(D. Utah), ask the Court to certify a class defined as:

     All current and future prisoners in UDOC custody who have
     been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic HCV ("the
     "Plaintiff Class").

The Named Plaintiffs are prisoners incarcerated by the Utah
Department of Corrections ("UDOC") who suffer from chronic
hepatitis C ("HCV") and have been allegedly denied treatment with
direct-acting antiviral ("DAA") that is ninety-five percent (95%)
effective in preventing serious and potentially fatal outcomes,
citing HCV Guidance: Recommendations for Testing, Managing, and
Treating Hepatitis C, published by The American Association for the
Study of Liver Disease and the Infectious Disease Society of
America, 2018.

Treatment with DAA drugs is the medically accepted standard of care
for HCV patients, the Plaintiffs contend.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stewart Gollan, Esq.
          RICKS & GOLLAN, PLLC
          75 East 400 South, Suite 300
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (801) 413-3406
          E-mail: sgollanlaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          William L. Schmidt, Esq.
          WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
          P.O. Box 25001
          Fresno, CA 93729
          Telephone: (559) 261-2222
          E-mail: legal.schmidt@gmail.com

               - and -

          R. Shane Johnson, Esq.
          R. SHANE JOHNSON, PLLC
          24 D Street
          Salt Lake City, UT 84103
          Telephone: (801) 364-2222
          E-mail: shane@utahdefense.com

The State Defendants are represented by:

          Michael J. Teter, Esq.
          Diana F. Bradley, Esq.
          Sean D. Reyes, Esq.
          UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
          160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
          P.O. Box 140856
          Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
          Telephone: (801) 366-0100
          E-mail: mteter@agutah.gov
                  dbradley@agutah.gov
                  seanreyes@agutah.gov


VALET INC: Underpays Parking Attendants, Lafleur et al. Allege
--------------------------------------------------------------
MIKKEL LAFLEUR; and DIMITRI LAFLEUR, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BOSTON VALET, INC.; and
JOHN MANSFIELD, Defendants, Case No. 19-1098A (Mass. Super.,
Suffolk Cty., March 19, 2019) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as parking
attendant.

Boston Valet, Inc. is a valet parking company in Massachusetts.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Bace, Esq.
          BACE LAW GROUP, LLC
          PO Box 9316
          Boston, MA 02114
          Telephone: (508) 922-8328
          E-mail: mjb@bacelaw.com


WALT DISNEY: Faces Gender Pay Gap Class Action in California
------------------------------------------------------------
Gene Maddaus, writing for Variety, reports that a class action law
firm sued the Walt Disney Co. on April 2, alleging that the company
systematically underpays its female employees.

The firm of Andrus Anderson LLP, based in San Francisco, seeks to
represent all women employed by the Walt Disney Studios in
California since 2015. The suit claims that corporate policies --
including setting a new hire's salary based on her salary at
previous employers -- has a discriminatory effect on women.

The suit also alleges that Disney does not have an internal
mechanism to ensure that women are not paid less than their male
counterparts for the same work.

"Like other companies that operate without transparency,
consistency, and accountability, Disney's leadership tends to value
male workers more than female workers," the suit alleges. "Taken
together, Disney's compensation policies, procedures and practices
are not valid, job-related, or justified by business necessity."

A class action law firm sued the Walt Disney Co. on April 2,
alleging that the company systematically underpays its female
employees.

The firm of Andrus Anderson LLP, based in San Francisco, seeks to
represent all women employed by the Walt Disney Studios in
California since 2015. The suit claims that corporate policies
--including setting a new hire's salary based on her salary at
previous employers -- has a discriminatory effect on women.

The suit also alleges that Disney does not have an internal
mechanism to ensure that women are not paid less than their male
counterparts for the same work.

"Like other companies that operate without transparency,
consistency, and accountability, Disney's leadership tends to value
male workers more than female workers," the suit alleges. "Taken
together, Disney's compensation policies, procedures and practices
are not valid, job-related, or justified by business necessity."
[GN]


WARNER MUSIC: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in Williams Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Warner Music Group Corporation and Warner Bros. Records,
Inc., filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit styled
Leonard Williams, et al. v. Warner Music Group Corporation, et al.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-09691-RGK-PJW, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Leonard Williams, et al. v.
Warner Music Group Corporation, et al., Case No. 19-80052, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents LEONARD WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; and THE LENNY WILLIAMS PRODUCTION
COMPANY, a California corporation, are represented by:

          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Neville Johnson, Esq.
          JOHNSON & JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975-1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975-1095
          E-mail: djohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  njohnson@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Paul R. Kiesel, Esq.
          Jeffrey Alan Koncius, Esq.
          Nicole Ramirez, Esq.
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Wilshire Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 854-4444
          Facsimile: (310) 854-0812
          E-mail: kiesel@kiesel.law
                  koncius@kiesel.law
                  ramirez@kiesel.law

               - and -

          Clifford Harris Pearson, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          Daniel Leon Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON WARSHAW & PENNEY, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: cpearson@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com
                  dwarshaw@pswlaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation, and WARNER BROS. RECORDS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, are represented by:

          Sean Ashley Commons, Esq.
          Rollin Ransom, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6010
          Facsimile: (213) 896-6600
          E-mail: scommons@sidley.com
                  rransom@sidley.com


WELLS FARGO: Court Denies McDonald's Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Liane McDonald, the Plaintiff, vs.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., the Defendant, Case No 2:16-cv-00264-MAK
(W.D. Pa.), the Hon Judge J. Kearney entered an order denying
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company
headquartered in San Francisco, California, with central offices
throughout the United States.[CC]

WYNDHAM VACATON: Underpays Sales Representatives, Pagh Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDERS PAGH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WYNDHAM VACATON OWNERSHIP, INC.; and DOES 1
through 100, Defendants, Case No. 30-2019-01060077-CU-OE-CXC (Cal.
Super., Orange Cty., March 29, 2019) is an action against the
Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages,
wages for missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiff Pagh worked for the Defendants as a sales
representative.

Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. develops and markets flexible,
points-based vacation ownership products. The company owns and
operates vacation ownership resorts throughout United States,
Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific that represent
more than 23,000 individual vacation ownership units. Wyndham
Vacation Ownership, Inc. was formerly known as Cendant Timeshare
Resort Group, Inc. and changed its name to Wyndham Vacation
Ownership, Inc. in May, 2006. The company was incorporated in 2003
and is based in Orlando, Florida. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Wyndham Worldwide Corporation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory P. Wong, Esq.
          BARKHORDARIAN LAW FIRM, PLC
          6047 Bristol Parkway, Second Floor
          Culver City, CA 90230
          Telephone: (323) 450-2777
          Facsimile: (310) 215-3416
          E-mail: greg@barklawfirm.com

               - and –

          Sandeep J. Shah, Esq.
          SHAH SHETH LLP
          650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1400
          Telephone: (714) 955-4551
          Facsimile: (714) 966-0663
          E-mail: sandeep@shahshethlaw.com


XTO ENERGY: Court Certifies Class of Drilling Consultants
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit GARY McCOLLUM, et al., the Plaintiffs,
vs. XTO ENERGY, INC., the Defendant, Case no. 5:18-cv-00080-HE
(W.D. Okla.), the Hon. Judge John Eaton entered an order
conditionally certifying a Fair Labor Standards Act class defined
as:

   "all Drilling Consultants and Completions Consultants who
   provided services to XTO Energy, Inc., in the United States and

   were paid a day-rate instead of time and one-half for hours
   worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in the last three
   years";

The Court said, "Defendant has objected to plaintiffs' proposed
notice and forms. Accordingly, the parties are directed to confer
in an effort to reach agreement on a form of notice, consent form,
necessary deadlines, and methodology for providing notice to
potential plaintiffs, and to submit, within 14 days from the filing
of this order, a joint statement reflecting their agreement or, if
an agreement cannot be reached, their respective positions as to
same. Further, having reviewed plaintiff’s proposed notice and
methodology, the parties are advised that to provide accurate and
fair notice to potential plaintiffs, the notice must also inform
putative class members that they may be required to testify in
court in Oklahoma and that plaintiffs, if they lose the case, could
be responsible for paying court costs and expenses, not including
Attorney's fees."[CC]

[*] Law to Expand Scope for Class Actions in Italy Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANSA reports that the Senate on April 3 gave definitive approval to
a law expanding the scope for class-action lawsuits in Italy.

The legislation was approved by the Upper House with 206 votes in
favour, 44 abstentions and just one vote against. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***