CAR_Public/190604.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, June 4, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 111

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Letzkus Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
ABBVIE INC: Cleveland Bakers Fund Sues Over Humira Price-fixing
ABBVIE INC: Reaches Agreement in Principle in Rubinstein Suit
ABC PHONES: Does not Pay Overtime Compensation, Hardney Suit Says
ADOMANI INC: Still Faces Mollik Class Action in California

ADT INC: Bid to Dismiss IPO-Related Suits Underway
ADT INC: Settlement Proceedings in Wireless Encryption Suit Stayed
AGENTRA, LLC: Pascal Sues over Unauthorized Phone Calls
AHERN RENTALS: Faces Bautista Suit Over FCRA Breach
AIRCEL LLC: Headrick Moves for Certification of Class Under FLSA

AIRGAS USA: Lit'l Pepper Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of California
AIRSTREAM, INC: Satterly Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification
ALLERGAN PLC: Dismissal of Generic Drug Pricing Suit Appealed
ALLERGAN PLC: Notice of Appeal Filed in Testosterone Suit
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Greifman Sues Over Confusing Collection Letter

AMAZON.COM.KSDC LLC: Christeson Seeks Prelim. Nod of $61K Accord
AMAZON.COM.KSDC: Court OKs Christeson Conditional Certification
AMERICAN EAGLE: Experian Unit's Objection to Settlement Rebuffed
AMERICAN FEDERATION: Faces Class Action in Illinois Over Fees
ANIMAL FEEDS: Manatt Phelps Attorneys Discuss High Court Ruling

APPLE INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over iPhone 7 "Loop Disease"
APPLE INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Expanded Class Action Lawsuit
APPLE INC: Selling iTunes Listening Data, Class Suit Claims
ARIZONA ACREAGE: Ariz. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Monroe

AVANOS MEDICAL: Appeal in Bahamas Surgery Case Still Pending
AVANOS MEDICAL: Dismissal of Jackson Class Suit Appealed
BANK OF AMERICA: Castillo Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
BARCLAYS: Judge Tosses Debt Collection Class Action
BARTON NINE: Faces Class Action Over Incorrect GST Charges

BCI COCA-COLA: Cohen Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
BOSMAN TRUCKING: Johnson Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
CACERES INTERIOR: Gomez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CALIFORNIA: McClenton Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
CAWLEY & BERGMANN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

CBC RESTAURANT: Pardue et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
CELGENE CORP: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Class Suit Underway
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP: Court Vacates Scheduling Order in Rosenbohm
CENTENE CORPORATION: Dennis Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Harper Sues Over Labor Code Breach

CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Lodge Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing
CHEMOURS COMPANY: Accrues $22MM for Leach Settlement at March 31
CITIGROUP INC: Faces Consolidated VRDO-Related Class Suit
CITY OF CLEVELAND: Laborers International Sues Over Unpaid Wages
CJS SOLUTIONS: Court Refuses to Approve Settlement in Borup

COMMUNITY HEALTH: To Appeal Class Certification Ruling in "Zwick"
COMPASS LENDING: Court Strikes S. Naiman's 1st Amended Complaint
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Sheean Moves to Certify Three Classes
COOK COUNTY, IL: Brown, et al. Seek Class Certification
COOK COUNTY, IL: Howard et al. Seek Class Certification

CUNNINGHAM RESTAURANT: Leslie Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
CVS HEALTH: Court Dismisses Kroessler's FDCA Suit
DEUTSCHE BANK: Questions in L. Lima Suit Certified to Hawaii Ct.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Arbitration Stay in WTU's Suit Affirmed
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Narrows Claims in Guns Seizure Suit

DON VITO: Court Denies Preliminary Approval of Settlement in Camilo
DR PEPPER: Kilpatrick Townsend Atorney Discusses Court Ruling
DXP ENTERPRISES: Warden Seeks Overtime Pay for Safety Consultants
ENCORE CAPITAL: Proposed Board Amendments Misleading, Suit Says
EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Porter Suit Moved to N.D. California

EVANGER'S DOG: Court Dismisses Defamation Counterclaim in Mael
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Harrod Seeks to Certify Class in Record Fees Suit
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Ormaza Sues over Fair Debt Collection
FITBIT INC: Court Orders Post-Distribution Accounting in Robb Suit
FORGE RESTAURANT: Pavon Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees

FRESNO DEPUTY: Court Extends Time to File Response in Campos Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Transmission Problems
GLOBAL TEL: Fifth Circuit Appeal Filed in Alexander RICO Suit
GODIVA CHOCOLATIER: Bradley Arant Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
GRUPO HOTELERO: Mata Files Suit for Unlawful Trafficking

HARNEY & SONS: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
HARVEST RESTAURANT: Underpays Tipped Employees, Reynolds Claims
HEALTHFIRST INC: Lacario Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
HOSOPO CORP: Court Allows TCPA Class Action to Proceed
HOT POT FLUSHING: Chovon Files Suit Over Time-Shaving Practices

HUNTINGTON INGALLS: Herndon Suit Asserts ERISA Violation
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Lieff Cabraser, Baron & Budd File Class Action
IKEA US RETAIL: Miller Suit Asserts Gender Discrimination
INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Class Certification Sought in Slocum Suit
INTUIT INC: Kehiaian Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices

IRONCLAD ENERGY: Certification of Pumpdown Supervisors Class Sought
ITT AEROSPACE: Toribio Hits Unpaid Wages, Missed Breaks
IVY ENTERPRISES: Han Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
JERRY W. BAILEY: Court Decertify Provisional Class in Koch
JIFFY LUBE: Turizo Sues over Unwanted Text Messages

JIMMY JAZZ: Pierre Suit Asserts ADA Violation
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Carter Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Castro Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: DeBoth Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Foster Suit Moved to C.D. California

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Franco Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Grijalva Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Groff Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hagemann Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Love Suit Moved to C.D. California

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Myers Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Newberry Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Nickaloff Suit Moved to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Abbott Suit to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Lane Suit to N.D. California

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Peoples Suit to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Schade Suit to C.D. California
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Tyson Suit Moved to C.D. California
JP MORGAN: Appeals Decision in McShannock Suit to Ninth Circuit
JUST ENERGY: J. Collins' Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court

JVK OPERATIONS: Montiel-Flores Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
KAUFMAN COUNTY, TX: Sued Over High Property Appraisals
KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE: Green Files Suit Over Time-Shaving Practices
KRYPTONITE ENERGY: Gordon Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
LABORATORY CORP: Kawa Orthodontics Sues Over Unsolicited Facsimiles

LABORATORY CORP: Still Defends Feckley Class Suit over Commissions
LABORATORY CORP: Still Defends Haro Suit over Labor Code Breaches
LTD FINANCIAL: Certification of Class Sought in Norton Suit
LVNV FUNDING: Arbitration Ruling in Williams-Hopkins Suit Affirmed
MARRIOTT INC: Davidson Named to Plaintiffs Steering Committee

MATRIX WARRANTY: Geiger Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
MCCALL SERVICE: Technicians Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
MDL 2047: Court Denies Krupnick's Bid for Immediate Fee Disbursal
MDL 2741: Perry v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
MDL 2741: Yeager v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated

MEDELY INC: Hensley Suit Alleges Labor Code Violation
MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Class Action Over Nvidia Acquisition
MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES: Stein Balks at Merger Deal with NVDIA
MERCY HOSPITAL: Loses Bid to Dismiss Minors' Tort Claims
MID-AMERICA APARTMENT: Appeal from Class Status in "Cleven" Pending

MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Renewed Arbitration Bid in J. Lance Suit
MIZUHO BANK: Lack's Class Cert. Bid Denied
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL: Harper Files False Labeling Suit in Calif.
MONOGRAM AEROSPACE: Lopez Sues Over Calif. Labor Code Violations
MONSANTO COMPANY: Armstrong Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Delsucs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Munkres Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Smiths Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Walker Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MORGAN STANLEY: Settles Ex-Financial Advisor's Class Action

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kelly Files Suit for Negligence
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kerns Sues Over Student-Athletes' Injuries
NAVIENT CORP: Still Defends Consolidated Class Suit in New Jersey
NAVIENT CORP: Still Faces Lord Abbett Consolidated Class Lawsuit
NEW MEXICO: Cummings Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari

NEW ORLEANS, LA: Caluda et al. Seek to Certify Class Action
NIAGARA DISTRIBUTORS: Removes Rodriguez Suit to S.D Florida
NORTHLAND GROUP: Johnson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
NUTANIX INC: Maroun Files Class Action Over False Reports
NZONE GUIDANCE: Hiser's Operators and Drillers Classes Certified

OMNICELL INC: Mazya Plaintiff Files Amended Complaint
ONEMAIN HOLDINGS: Executes Settlement for Galestan Securities Suit
OXY USA: Court Won't Review Remand Denial in Cooper Clark's Suit
P&S SELECT: Franco Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
P.F. CHANG'S: Wilson Elser Attorney Discusses Court Ruling

PAN E VINO: Gonzalez Seeks Damages Over Unpaid Wages
PROGRESSIVE SELECT: William South Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
PUPPY MANAGEMENT: Does not Properly Pay Workers, DeRoss Says
RAINBOW NAILS: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Yang Suit
RBC INSURANCE: Faces Class Action Over Vacation, Holiday Pay

RCI HOSPITALITY: Hoffman Sues Over Share Price Drop
RE/MAX HOLDINGS: 3 Antitrust Class Action Complaints Underway
REAL CARE: Mitchell Seeks OT Pay for Home Health Aids
REWALK ROBOTICS: Court Dismisses W. Yan's Securities Suit
RICHMOND, VA: Court Narrows Claims in V. White's FLSA Suit

ROUGE VALLEY: Blaney McMurtry Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
SCANA CORP: KBC Files Damages Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
SCR MEDICAL: Goodlet Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
SEAWORLD: $11.5MM Passes Class Action Settlement Gets Court OK
SHARP REES-STEALY: Nace Seeks Unpaid Wages, Rest Period Premiums

SPARK ENERGY: Appeal in Gillis Class Suit Still Pending
SPARK ENERGY: Confidential Settlement Reached in Richardson Suit
SPARK ENERGY: Discovery Underway in Veilleux Case
SPARK ENERGY: Mediation Ongoing in Jurich Class Action
SPERIAN ENERGY: I. Brady's ICFA Suit Transferred to C.D. Ill.

STANCE, INC: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Olsen Says
STARBUCKS CORP: George Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
STARWOOD: Israeli Bondholders File Class Action
STE-MARTHE-SUR-LE-LAC: Residents Mull Class Action Over Flooding
STONEWATER ROOFING: Coker Sues Over Unpaid Overtime

SUNEDISON INC: June 17 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
SUNPOWER CORP: Tobar Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
SUNRUN INC: Loftus Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
TATE & KIRLIN: Certification of Class Sought in Menear Suit
TFORCE LOGISTICS: Lim Suit Removed to C.D. California

TPUSA INC: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Headspeth Suit Says
TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Rubio et al Sue over Defective Airbag Control Unit
U.S. SOCCER: Motion to Stay Pay Discrimination Class Suit Denied
ULTIMATE SOFTWARE: Kessler Files Suit Over Sale to Hellman
VESCIO THREADING: Sotelo Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations

VISA INC: Appeals Launched in Canadian Merchant Litigation
VOCUS GROUP: Faces Shareholder Class Action
WALMART INC: Haskins Seeks Unpaid Vacation Pay
WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: Court Vacates July 2017 Arbitration Award
WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: District Court Okays Werner Suit Settlement

WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: Underpays Loan Originators, Johnson Claims
WEINERT ENTERPRISES: Anderson Seeks to Certify Opt-out Class
WELLS FARGO: Settlement in Auto Insurance Suit Underway
WELLS FARGO: Still Faces Class Suit over ATM Access Fee
WESTERN REFINING: Removes Hall Suit to Central Dist. of California

WESTERN UNION: Smallen Trust Appeals D. Colo. Ruling to 10th Cir.
WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in James Suit
ZF TRW: Car Owners Sue Over Defective Air Bag Control Units
[*] Missouri Bill Modifies Class Action Joinder, Venue Rules

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Letzkus Sues over Defective Combat Arms Earplugs
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JIMMY LEE LETZKUS, the Plaintiff, vs. 3M COMPANY, AEARO
HOLDINGS, LLC, AEARO INTERMEDIATE, LLC, AEARO, LLC and AEARO
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01540-MCR-EMT
(N.D. Fla., May 24, 2019), seeks to hold 3M liable for hearing loss
or damage Plaintiff allegedly suffered while serving variously in
the U.S. military, including during foreign conflicts. The
Plaintiff contends that Combat Arms TM Earplugs, Version 2
("CAEv2") manufactured and sold by Aearo were defectively designed
and failed to provide adequate hearing protection. 3M denies these
allegations.

CAEv2, designed by Aearo in close collaboration with the U.S.
military, represented a revolutionary breakthrough in hearing
protection for service members. CAEv2 helped servicemembers better
maintain situational awareness (e.g., to hear nearby voice
commands) while also maintaining some protection from gunfire and
other higher decibel sounds. CAEv2 met the U.S. military's
specifications and helped the military provide hearing protection
to service members.

Despite knowing of the dangerous defects in its earplugs, Defendant
sold the Dual-ended Combat ArmsTM earplugs to the branches of the
U.S. military for more than a decade without providing the U.S.
military and/or Plaintiff with any warning of said defects, causing
Plaintiff and other service members similar permanent injuries,
such as hearing loss.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael W. Gaines, esq.
          Tim L. Bowden, esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TIM BOWDEN
          306 Northcreek Blvd., Suite 200
          Goodlettsville, TN 37072
          Telephone: (615) 859-1996
          Facsimile: (615) 859-1921
          E-mail: mwgaines01@gmail.com
                  bowden_law@bellsouth.net
                  bowden1megan@gmail.com


ABBVIE INC: Cleveland Bakers Fund Sues Over Humira Price-fixing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland Bakers and Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, on behalf
of itself and all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Abbvie
Inc., Abbvie Biotechnology Ltd. and Amgen Inc., Defendants, Case
No. 19-cv-03168 (N.D. Ill., May 10, 2019), seeks to recover
overcharges resulting from the anti-competitive actions of the
Defendants over the manufacture and sale of "Humira" pursuant to
the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act.

Humira is a medication used to treat rheumatoid arthritis,
psoriatic arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, Crohn's disease,
ulcerative colitis, psoriasis, hidradenitis suppurativa, uveitis,
and juvenile idiopathic arthritis. AbbVie allegedly used the patent
system to make the costs to any potential competitor so high that
the would-be competitor would not become an actual competitor. It
allegedly entered into deals with manufacturers of "adalimumab,"
Humira's bio-similar and delayed their entry until various dates in
2023.

Cleveland Bakers and Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund is a
multiemployer trust fund established to provide health and welfare
benefits to collectively bargained members. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jason Zweig, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN - NEW YORK OFFICE
     555 Fifth Ave, Suite 1700
     New York, NY 10017
     Tel: (212) 752-5455
     Email: jasonz@hbsslaw.com

            - and -

     Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
     Lauren G. Barnes, Esq.
     Greg Arnold, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
     Cambridge, MA 02142
     Tel: (617) 482-3700
     Fax: (617) 482-3003
     Email: tom@hbsslaw.com
            laurenb@hbsslaw.com

             - and -

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Telephone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

            - and -

     Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
     Terence S. Ziegler, Esq.
     Donna Siegel Moffa, Esq.
     KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
     280 King of Prussia Road
     Radnor, PA 19087
     Tel: (610) 667-7706
     Fax: (610) 667-7056
     Email: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
            tziegler@ktmc.com
            dmoffa@ktmc.com


ABBVIE INC: Reaches Agreement in Principle in Rubinstein Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that parties in the lawsuit styled, Rubinstein, et
al. v Gonzalez, et al., have reached an agreement in principle to
settle this lawsuit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

In November 2014, five individuals filed a putative class action
lawsuit, Rubinstein, et al. v Gonzalez, et al., on behalf of
purchasers and sellers of certain Shire plc (Shire) securities
between June 20 and October 14, 2014, against AbbVie and its chief
executive officer in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that the defendants made
and/or are responsible for material misstatements in violation of
federal securities laws in connection with AbbVie's proposed
transaction with Shire.  In April 2019, the parties reached an
agreement in principle to settle this lawsuit.

AbbVie Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells
pharmaceutical products worldwide. The company offers HUMIRA, a
therapy administered as an injection for autoimmune diseases;
IMBRUVICA, an oral therapy for treating chronic lymphocytic
leukemia; and VIEKIRA PAK, an interferon-free therapy, with or
without ribavirin, to treat adults with genotype 1 chronic
hepatitis C. The company was incorporated in 2012 and is based in
North Chicago, Illinois.


ABC PHONES: Does not Pay Overtime Compensation, Hardney Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RON HARDNEY, MANUEL PANNGASIRI, and MICHELLE SALWAY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ABC
PHONES OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-12722 (D.
N.J., May 20, 2019) is an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA") on behalf themselves and all current and former
non-exempt, hourly-paid Store Managers ("SMs") who work and/or
worked for ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc. ("ABC") within the
United States from the later of May 20, 2016 or the date in which
Defendant reclassified its SM position from exempt to hourly,
non-exempt through the date of final judgment.

ABC violated the FLSA by requiring Plaintiffs and the Collective
Action Members to perform work "off the clock" and failing to pay
them the full extent of their overtime compensation. Plaintiffs and
the Collective Action Members are entitled to unpaid overtime
compensation from ABC for all hours worked by them in excess of 40
hours in a workweek, and are also entitled to liquidated damages
pursuant to the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant and regularly performed work
as SMs for Defendant's benefit.

ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc. is a North Carolina corporation
with its principal place of business located in Raleigh, North
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Palitz, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A
     830 3rd Avenue, 5th Floor
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (800) 616-4000
     Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
     Email: mapalitz@shavitzlaw.com

          - and -

     Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
     Camar R. Jones, Esq.
     Tamra C. Givens, Esq.
     SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
     951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
     Boca Raton, FL 33431
     Phone: (561) 447-8888
     Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
     Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
            cjones@shavitzlaw.com
            tgivens@shavitzlaw.com


ADOMANI INC: Still Faces Mollik Class Action in California
----------------------------------------------------------
ADOMANI, Inc. continues to defend itself against a purported class
action lawsuit captioned M.D. Ariful Mollik v. ADOMANI, Inc. et
al., Case No. RIC 1817493, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

On August 23, 2018, the lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Riverside against us,
certain of our executive officers, and the two underwriters of our
offering of common stock under Regulation A in June 2017.

This complaint alleges that documents related to our offering of
common stock under Regulation A in June 2017 contained materially
false and misleading statements and that all defendants violated
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"Securities Act"), and that we and the individual defendants
violated Section 15 of the Securities Act, in connection
therewith.

The plaintiff seeks on behalf of himself and all class members: (i)
certification of a class under California substantive law and
procedure; (ii) compensatory damages and interest in an amount to
be proven at trial; (iii) reasonable costs and expenses incurred in
this action, including counsel fees and expert fees; (iv) awarding
of rescission or rescissionary damages; and (v) equitable relief at
the discretion of the Court.

On November 9, 2018, in response to a demurrer filed by defendant
Network 1 Financial Securities, Plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint, which was substantially similar to the original
complaint but refined certain allegations regarding the alleged
material omissions that form the basis of the complaint.
Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint.

The court heard defendants' demurrers to the first amended
complaint on January 30, 2019.  At this hearing the court granted
plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.  Plaintiff
filed a second amended complaint on January 31, 2019.  The second
amended complaint attempts to substitute in two putative class
plaintiffs.  Defendants jointly demurred to the second amended
complaint on March 4, 2019.  This demurrer was set for hearing on
May 7, 2019.

ADOMANI said, "We believe that the purported class action lawsuit
is without merit and intend to vigorously defend the action."

ADOMANI, Inc. provides zero-emission electric and hybrid drivetrain
systems for integration in new and existing school buses and medium
to heavy-duty commercial fleet vehicles. ADOMANI, Inc. was founded
in 2012 and is headquartered in Corona, California.


ADT INC: Bid to Dismiss IPO-Related Suits Underway
--------------------------------------------------
ADT Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that the motions to dismiss in the case entitled,
In re ADT Inc. Shareholder Litigation and Perdomo v ADT Inc., are
fully briefed, and defendants have requested argument on the
motions.

Five substantially similar shareholder class action lawsuits
related to the January 2018 initial public offering (IPO) of ADT
Inc. common stock were filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida in March,
April, and May 2018 and have been consolidated for discovery and
trial and entitled In re ADT Inc. Shareholder Litigation.

The lead plaintiffs seek to represent a class of similarly situated
shareholders and assert claims for alleged violations of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended ("Securities Act"). The
plaintiffs allege that the Company defendants violated the
Securities Act because the registration statement and prospectus
used to effectuate the IPO were false and misleading in that they
allegedly misled investors with respect to litigation involving the
Company, the Company's efforts to protect its intellectual
property, and the competitive pressures faced by the Company.

The defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint in
October 2018. The Court has not yet set a date for argument on the
motions.

A similar shareholder class action lawsuit entitled Perdomo v ADT
Inc., also related to the January 2018 IPO was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida in May 2018,
for which the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in January 2019
as directed by the Court. The defendants moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint in March 2019.

The motions are fully briefed, and defendants have requested
argument on the motions.

ADT Inc. provides security and automation solutions for homes and
businesses in the United States and Canada. It provides a range of
fire detection, fire suppression, video surveillance, and access
control systems to residential, commercial, and multi-site
customers. The company was formerly known as Prime Security
Services Parent, Inc. and changed its name to ADT Inc. in September
2017. ADT Inc. was founded in 1874 and is headquartered in Boca
Raton, Florida.


ADT INC: Settlement Proceedings in Wireless Encryption Suit Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
ADT Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that final approval of the settlement in Wireless
Encryption Litigation remains pending as the case has been stayed.


The Company is subject to five class action claims regarding
wireless encryption in certain ADT security systems.
Jurisdictionally, three of the five cases are in Federal Court (in
districts within Illinois, Arizona, and California), and both of
the remaining two cases are in Florida State Court (both in Palm
Beach County Circuit Court).

Each of the five plaintiffs brought a claim under the respective
state's consumer fraud statute alleging that The ADT Corporation
and each of its consolidated subsidiaries prior to the consummation
of the ADT Acquisition made misrepresentations and material
omissions in its advertising regarding the unencrypted wireless
signal pathways in certain security systems monitored by The ADT
Corporation.

The complaints in all five cases further allege that certain
security systems monitored by The ADT Corporation are not secure
because the wireless signal pathways are unencrypted and can be
easily hacked.

In January 2017, the parties agreed to settle all five class action
lawsuits. In October 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California entered an order granting preliminary
approval of the settlement.

Notice to class members was issued in November 2017, and the
settlement is currently in the administration process. A fairness
hearing regarding the settlement was conducted in February 2018.
The Court took the matter under advisement and subsequently stayed
the settlement proceedings pending an appellate ruling on a related
legal issue.

The deadline for filing claims expired in February 2018. Final
approval of the settlement remains pending as a result of the stay.


The settlement administrator will not pay any claims until the
Court enters an order granting final approval of the settlement.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

ADT Inc. provides security and automation solutions for homes and
businesses in the United States and Canada. It provides a range of
fire detection, fire suppression, video surveillance, and access
control systems to residential, commercial, and multi-site
customers. The company was formerly known as Prime Security
Services Parent, Inc. and changed its name to ADT Inc. in September
2017. ADT Inc. was founded in 1874 and is headquartered in Boca
Raton, Florida.


AGENTRA, LLC: Pascal Sues over Unauthorized Phone Calls
-------------------------------------------------------
The case, LAWRENCE PASCAL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AGENTRA, LLC, a Texas
limited liability company, DATA PARTNERSHIP GROUP, LP, a Georgia
limited partnership, HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE SERVICES, a
California corporation, ALEXIS NUNEZ, an individual d/b/a WE BUY IT
ASAP, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-02418-DMR (N.D. Cal., May 3,
2019), seeks to stop Defendants' illegal practice of making
unauthorized calls that play prerecorded voice messages to the
telephones of consumers nationwide, and to obtain redress for all
persons injured by their conduct.

The Defendants are businesses that market to consumers and property
owners. As a primary part of their marketing efforts, the
Defendants and their agents placed thousands of automated calls
employing a prerecorded voice message to cell phones and
residential phones nationwide. Unfortunately, Defendants did not
obtain consent prior to placing these calls and, therefore, are in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, Defendants' use of technological
equipment to spam consumers with its advertising on a grand scale.
By placing the calls at issue, Defendants have violated the privacy
and statutory rights of Plaintiff and the Class. The Plaintiff
therefore seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to stop its
unconsented calling, as well as an award of actual and statutory
fines to the Class members, together with costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff and the Class:

          Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
          JAVITCH LAW OFFICE
          480 S. Ellsworth Ave
          San Mateo, CA 94401
          Telephone: 650-781-8000
          Facsimile: 650-648-0705
          E-mail: mark@javitchlawoffice.com

AHERN RENTALS: Faces Bautista Suit Over FCRA Breach
---------------------------------------------------
JUAN BAUTISTA, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AHERN RENTALS,
INC., a Nevada corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive;
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV17467 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., May 20, 2019) seeks compensatory and punitive damages due to
Defendants' willful or grossly negligent conduct and its systematic
and willful violation of, inter alia, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act ("ICRAA"),
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act ("CCRAA"), and California's
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

The Defendants routinely obtain and use information from background
reports in connection with their hiring processes without complying
with state and federal mandates for doing so, asserts the
complaint. As part of this practice, Defendants provide the
requisite disclosure to applicants in their employment application.
However, the disclosure that Defendants provide to Plaintiff and
each Class Member as part of their hiring process is noncompliant
with state and federal statutes, it adds.

The Defendants have violated the requirements under these statutes
by failing to provide proper disclosures. The procurement of
background reports for employment purposes is subject to strict
disclosure requirements under federal law pursuant to the FCRA and
under California law pursuant to the ICRAA and CCRAA, the complaint
says.

Plaintiff applied for a job with Defendants by completing an online
employment application on about May 3, 2017, in Los Angeles County,
California.

AHERN RENTALS, INC. was and is a Nevada corporation, and was, at
all times relevant to this complaint, engaged in commercial
transactions throughout this county, the State of California and
the various states of the United States of America.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     DOUGLAS HAN, ESQ.
     SHUNT TATAVOS-GHARAJEH, ESQ.
     DANIEL J. PARK, ESQ.
     JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
     751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101
     Pasadena, CA 91103
     Phone: (818) 230-7502
     Facsimile: (818)230-7259


AIRCEL LLC: Headrick Moves for Certification of Class Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned JOSHUA TORREY HEADRICK,
Individually, and on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. AIRCEL, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation,
Case No. 3:18-cv-00389-PLR-HBG (E.D. Tenn.), moves the Court to
issue an order:

   (1) authorizing this action to proceed as an Fair Labor
       Standards Act ("FLSA") collective action for the
       Defendant's overtime compensation violations at their
       Maryville, Tennessee fabricating facility at any time
       during the applicable limitations period covered by the
       Collective Action Complaint (i.e. two (2) years for FLSA
       violations and three (3) years for willful FLSA
       violations) including up to the date of final judgment on
       behalf of the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
       current and former hourly-paid factory employees who join
       this action pursuant to the FLSA;

   (2) directing the Defendant to immediately provide Plaintiff's
       counsel a computer-readable file containing the names
       (last names first), last known physical addresses, last
       known e-mail addresses, social security numbers, dates of
       employment and last known telephone numbers of all
       putative class members during the last three years;

   (3) providing that Court-approved notice be posted at the
       Maryville, Tennessee fabricating facility, enclosed with
       Defendant's currently-employed putative class members'
       next regularly-scheduled paychecks or stubs, and be mailed
       and emailed to Defendant's hourly-paid factory employees
       during the past three years or currently employs so they
       can timely assert their claims as part of this litigation;

   (4) tolling the putative class' statute of limitations as of
       the date this Motion is fully briefed (except for those
       who have already opted into this action); and

   (5) deeming Opt-in the Plaintiffs' Consent Forms to be "filed"
       on the dates they are postmarked (excluding those who
       opted in prior to Court-supervised Notice being sent).[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          James L. Holt, Jr., Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  jholt@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Steven E. Seasly, Esq.
          Ann E. Knuth, Esq.
          HAHN LOESER & PARKS LLP
          200 Public Square, Suite 2800
          Cleveland, OH 44114-2316
          Telephone: (216) 621-0150
          Facsimile: (216) 241-2824
          E-mail: sseasly@hahnlaw.com
                  aknuth@hahnlaw.com

               - and -

          John M. Kizer, Esq.
          GENTRY, TIPTON & McLEMORE, P.C.
          P.O. Box 1990
          Knoxville, TN 37901-1990
          Telephone: (865) 525-5300
          E-mail: jmk@tennlaw.com


AIRGAS USA: Lit'l Pepper Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of California
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Lit'l Pepper Gourmet, Inc. a California corporation,
Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. Airgas USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, the Defendant, Case No. 37-02019-00016827-CU-BT-CTL, was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, to the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (San
Diego) on May 3, 2019. The Southern District of California Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-00837-LAB-AGS to the proceeding.
The suit alleges deceptive trade practices related violation. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Chief Judge Larry Alan Burns.

Airgas USA manufactures and distributes industrial gases, medical
and specialty gases, welding supplies, and related safety products.
It also offers nitrous oxide and supplies dry ice. The company was
incorporated in 2011 and is based in Radnor, Pennsylvania.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          John Kenneth Landay, Esq.
          LANDAY ROBERTS LLP
          450 J. St. No. 5291
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-5712
          E-mail: jlanday@landayroberts.com

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Kanika D. Corley, Esq.
          SEDGWICK DETERT MORAN & ARNOLD LLP
          801 S Figueroa St., 19th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-5556
          Telephone: (213) 426-6900
          Facsimile: (213) 426-6921
          E-mail: kanika.corley@sdma.com

AIRSTREAM, INC: Satterly Suit Wins Conditional Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit MARK SATTERLY, et al., the Plaintiffs,
vs. AIRSTREAM, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00032-WHR
(S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Water H. Rice entered an order:

   1. sustaining Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for conditional
class
      certification and court-supervised notice to potential opt-in

      plaintiffs; and

   2. setting forth procedures governing Plaintiffs' emergency
      motion for a protective, order and the immediate granting of

      Plaintiffs' motion for issuance of notice, additional notice,

      corrective actions, preliminary injunction, and sanctions.
      [CC]


ALLERGAN PLC: Dismissal of Generic Drug Pricing Suit Appealed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that the ERISA plaintiffs have taken an
appeal from the court's decision in granting the company's motion
to dismiss the complaint in the Generic Drug Pricing Securities and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
Litigation to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Putative classes of shareholders and two individual opt-out
plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against the Company and
certain of its current and former officers alleging that defendants
made materially false and misleading statements between February
2014 and November 2016 regarding the Company's internal controls
over its financial reporting and that it failed to disclose that
its former Actavis generics unit had engaged in illegal,
anticompetitive price-fixing with its generic industry peers. These
lawsuits have been consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey. The complaints seek unspecified monetary
damages.

On April 11, 2019, the court heard oral arguments on the Company's
motion to dismiss the complaint.

In addition, class action complaints have been filed premised on
the same alleged underlying conduct that is at issue in the
securities litigation but that assert claims under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). These complaints
have been consolidated in the district court in New Jersey.

The court granted the Company's motion to dismiss this complaint.
The ERISA plaintiffs have appealed this decision to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. The company operates
in three segments: US Specialized Therapeutics, US General
Medicine, and International. The company was formerly known as
Actavis plc and changed its name to Allergan plc in June 2015.
Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ALLERGAN PLC: Notice of Appeal Filed in Testosterone Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Allergan plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that the plaintiffs in the Testosterone
Replacement Therapy class action suit have filed a Notice of Appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from the lower
court's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Subsidiaries of the Company were named in a class action complaint
filed on behalf a putative class of third-party payers in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The suit alleges that the Company's subsidiaries violated various
laws including the federal the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statute and state consumer protection laws in
connection with the sale and marketing of Androderm(R).

The class plaintiffs seek to obtain certain equitable relief,
including injunctive relief and an order requiring restitution
and/or disgorgement, and to recover damages and multiple damages in
an unspecified amount.

While the lawsuit is ongoing, the court has denied plaintiff's
class certification motion. On February 14, 2019, the court granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case in its
entirety.   

On March 19, 2019, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the
Seventh Circuit.  

Allergan plc, a pharmaceutical company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes branded pharmaceutical, device, biologic, surgical,
and regenerative medicine products worldwide. The company operates
in three segments: US Specialized Therapeutics, US General
Medicine, and International. The company was formerly known as
Actavis plc and changed its name to Allergan plc in June 2015.
Allergan plc was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Dublin,
Ireland.


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Greifman Sues Over Confusing Collection Letter
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Greifman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Alltran Financial, LP, Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-04689 (S.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) seeks to recover for
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

In its efforts to collect an alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff by letter ("the Letter") dated June 6, 2018. The Letter
contains multiple addresses for Defendant. Both of these addresses
are located in the coupon meant to be detached and sent, which
makes it even more confusing for the least sophisticated consumer,
as to where the disputes must be sent.

Without clear direction as to where to mail her written dispute,
the least sophisticated consumer would likely not dispute the debt
at all. Without clear direction as to where to mail her written
dispute, the least sophisticated consumer would likely not dispute
the debt at all because she would be frightened of calling the
collection agency where highly trained and aggressive debt
collectors answer calls. The Letter would likely discourage the
least sophisticated consumer from exercising her right to dispute
the debt, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Sarah Greifman is an individual who is a citizen of the
State of New York and is a natural person allegedly obligated to
pay a debt.

Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of
debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


AMAZON.COM.KSDC LLC: Christeson Seeks Prelim. Nod of $61K Accord
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
without Amazon's opposition, the Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled
WYATT CHRISTESON, individually and on behalf of a class of similar
employees v. AMAZON.COM.KSDC, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-02043-KHV-JPO
(D. Kan.), seeks an order from the Court:

   (1) conditionally certifying the Parties' proposed settlement
       class consisting of Christeson and seven other IT Support
       Engineers who worked for Amazon at any time between
       January 25, 2015, and March 31, 2018;

   (2) preliminarily approving the Parties' Settlement Agreement
       and Release; and

   (3) approving the Parties' proposed notice and consent forms
       attached to the Agreement and the means by which the
       Parties propose to send such notice and consent forms to
       the Settlement Class Members.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant reached a settlement of the pending
dispute concerning unpaid overtime claims under the Fair Labor
Standards.

If all of the Settlement Class Members join this lawsuit and become
Participating Plaintiffs, the Defendant has agreed to pay an amount
not to exceed $61,636.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Morgan L. Roach, Esq.
          MCCAULEY & ROACH, LLC
          527 W. 39th St., Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 523-1700
          Facsimile: (816) 523-1708
          E-mail: morgan@mccauleyroach.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Stefanie R. Moll, Esq.
          T. Cullen Wallace, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 890-5000
          E-mail: stefanie.moll@morganlewis.com
                  twallace@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Daniel B. Boatright, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          1201 Walnut Street, Suite 1450
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 627-4401
          E-mail: dboatright@littler.com


AMAZON.COM.KSDC: Court OKs Christeson Conditional Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting in part Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion For Conditional Certification Of Proposed Settlement Class
in the case captioned WYATT CHRISTESON, individually and on behalf
of a class of similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, v.
AMAZON.COM.KSDC, LLC, Defendant. Civil Action No. 18-2043-KHV.(D.
Kan.).

Wyatt Christeson brings suit against Amazon.com.ksdc, LLC on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated, alleging that defendant
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for conditional
certification of the proposed class, preliminary approval of the
amended settlement agreement and release, and approval of the
proposed notice to class members.  

The Plaintiff asks the Court to conditionally certify a collective
action consisting of plaintiff and seven other IT Support Engineers
who worked for defendant.

Under the amended settlement agreement, the defendant agrees to pay
each Settlement Class Member who opts in (Participating Plaintiff)
$250.00 plus approximately $195.00 for each instance in which the
Participating Plaintiff recorded 40, 49 or 55 hours in a workweek.
This entitles each Participating Plaintiff to between $250.00 and
$3,762.00, depending on his or her timesheets. If all seven IT
Support Engineers opt in and become Participating Plaintiffs,
defendant will pay up to $61,636.00, which includes plaintiff's
request for up to $35,000.00 in attorney's fees, up to $2,467.62 in
costs and up to a $5,000.00 service award to plaintiff.  

The FLSA provides that an employee may bring a collective action on
behalf of other employees who are similarly situated. A lawsuit
brought under the FLSA does not become a collective action unless
other plaintiffs opt in by giving written consent.   

For conditional certification at the notice stage, the Court
requires nothing more than substantial allegations that the
putative class members were together the victims of a single
decision, policy, or plan. The standard for certification at the
notice stage is a lenient one that typically results in class
certification.  

Here, the plaintiff asserts that the potential class members are IT
Support Engineers whom defendant informed of the maximum hours they
could record for each week 40, 49 or 55 hours  regardless of
whether their job duties required them to exceed such maximum. He
asserts that on multiple occasions, supervisors required the IT
Support Engineers to adjust their timesheets to reflect only the
maximum hours defendant permitted, and that they were not paid for
overtime work.

Generally, where a defendant employs putative class members in
similar positions, the allegation that defendant engaged in a
pattern or practice of not paying overtime is sufficient to allege
that plaintiffs were together victims of a single decision, policy
or plan.   

The allegations of the complaint suggest that plaintiff and
potential class members are IT Support Engineers whom defendant (1)
employed at any time between January 25, 2015 and March 31, 2018;
(2) required to adjust their timesheets to match the maximum
permitted hours; and (3) did not compensate for overtime work.
Plaintiff has satisfied the low threshold required to demonstrate
at the notice stage that all putative class members are similarly
situated for purposes of conditional collective action
certification under Section 216(b).

Accordingly, the Court conditionally certifies a collective action
consisting of Christeson and seven other IT Support Engineers who
worked for Amazon at any time between January 25, 2015 and March
31, 2018.

When employees sue their employer to recover overtime compensation
under the FLSA, the parties must present any proposed settlement to
the Court for review and a determination whether the settlement is
fair and reasonable.   

To approve an FLSA settlement, the Court must find that (1) the
litigation involves a bona fide dispute (2) the proposed settlement
is fair and equitable to all parties concerned and (3) the proposed
settlement contains an award of reasonable attorney's fees.  

Initially, the parties did not follow the Tenth Circuit's two-step
procedure for obtaining collective action certification. In
anticipation of a renewed motion for settlement approval, however,
the Court reviewed the parties' initial proposed settlement
agreement and found that this litigation involves a bona fide
dispute.  That conclusion still stands.

The Court found that the proposed settlement agreement was not fair
and equitable in light of the history and policy of the FLSA.
Specifically, among other things, the Court advised the parties
that the proposed settlement agreement contained overly-broad
releases, inappropriate confidentiality requirements, an
unenforceable non-disparagement clause and an impermissible
prohibition on plaintiff's future employment. Plaintiff's motion
for conditional certification does not specifically mention a
single one of the deficiencies which the Court highlighted in its
prior order, or explain how the parties claim to have rectified
them.

The Court will not re-write the parties' agreement, and it will not
go hunting like a pig, searching for truffles, inventing arguments
to satisfy its concerns. The Court again notes, however, that the
proposed release goes well beyond the claims alleged in the
complaint. The scope of the proposed release is nothing short of
laughable, and the Court cannot approve it.

The FLSA also requires that a settlement agreement include an award
of a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of the action. In the
instant motion, the parties state that Class Counsel will seek
approval of the attorneys' fees and service award when he or she
files for final settlement approval.

The Court found that because the parties' motion was procedurally
deficient, the proposal for attorney's fees and costs and the
service award was premature. The Court nevertheless warned that it
critically views settlement agreements in which defendants agree
not to object to or oppose a fee request. The Court further noted
that if low plaintiff participation caused a large portion of the
maximum fund to revert to defendant, it would affect the Court's
assessment of the reasonableness of the requested attorney's fees
and service award.

The Court reiterates these words of caution and adds one last word.
In the amended settlement agreement, Class Counsel requests up to
$35,000.00 in attorney's fees, up to $2,467.62 in costs and up to
$5,000.00 for a service award to plaintiff. Even if defendant
distributes all funds to Participating Plaintiffs, fees, expenses
and service awards constitute 222 per cent of the amount which
Participating Plaintiffs will collectively receive. If the parties
seek further approval of a settlement, they must cite specific
cases which authorize costs and fee awards in that order of
magnitude. The Court is skeptical of such high fee requests,
especially where they are not subject to testing through the
adversarial process.

In sum, the Court conditionally certifies a collective action
comprised of Christeson and seven other IT Support Engineers whom
defendant employed at any time between January 25, 2015 and March
31, 2018. The Court otherwise overrules plaintiff's motion.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion For Conditional
Certification Of Proposed Settlement Class And Preliminary Approval
Of the Parties' Settlement Agreement And Release And Notice To
Settlement Class Members is sustained in part. Pursuant to 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b), the Court conditionally certifies a class
comprised of Wyatt Christeson and seven other IT Support Engineers
who worked for Amazon.com.ksdc, LLC at any time between January 25,
2015 and March 31, 2018. In addition, the Court approves Wyatt
Christeson as class representative.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6pcogmw from
Leagle.com.

Wyatt Christeson, individually and on behalf of a class of similar
employees, Plaintiff,
represented by Jeffrey S. Kratofil -- jeff@mccauleyroach.com --
McCauley & Roach, LLC & Morgan L. Roach -- morgan@mccauleyroach.com
-- McCauley & Roach, LLC.

Amazon.com.ksdc, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel B. Boatright
-- dboatright@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, Stefanie R.
Moll -- stefanie.moll@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Cullen Wallace --
cullen.wallace@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice.


AMERICAN EAGLE: Experian Unit's Objection to Settlement Rebuffed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara Grzincic, writing for Reuters, reports that an Experian
subsidiary lacked standing to object to American Eagle Outfitters'
settlement of a junk-text class action even though it may
eventually have to pay the $14.5 million bill, a federal appeals
court held on April 30.

The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Pittsburgh-based
retailer's settlement of the 2014 lawsuit filed in federal court in
Manhattan under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The 2017
settlement covers the owners of more 618,000 cellphones that
received American Eagle's unsolicited marketing texts over a
seven-year period. [GN]


AMERICAN FEDERATION: Faces Class Action in Illinois Over Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gregg Re, writing for Fox News, reports that a massive class-action
lawsuit filed in Illinois on May 1 could force unions to refund
hundreds of millions of dollars in agency fees paid by thousands of
workers nationwide prior to the Supreme Court's landmark ruling
last year in Janus v. AFSCME (American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees).

That June 2018 decision barred public-sector unions from requiring
nonmembers to pay the fees without obtaining their clear consent.
It already has cost unions tens of millions of dollars in dues,
experts say, though the ruling hasn't yet been applied
retroactively to provide refunds to workers.

The new Leitch et al., v. AFSCME litigation again unites the
nonprofit law firms Liberty Justice Center (LJC) and National Right
to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which worked together on the
Janus case, against AFSCME -- the largest public-sector union in
the country. The two legal groups are representing nine government
worker plaintiffs and a class of more than 2,700 workers in the
lawsuit, which aims to set a precedent that could apply to all
public-sector unions.

"We're putting the band back together," Liberty Justice Center
President Patrick Hughes told Fox News. "The argument is once
something is deemed to be unconstitutional [in the civil context]
-- agency fees -- then they're deemed to be retroactively
unconstitutional. . . . We're taking the position that those fees
should be refunded to those nonmembers."

Prior to Janus, Hughes argued, workers were faced with a "false
choice" -- they could pay full membership dues and become a union
member, or pay a substantial amount of those dues and not become a
member. The Supreme Court validated Hughes' reasoning last June,
holding not only that public unions violated the First Amendment by
taking money out of unwilling workers' paychecks to fund collective
bargaining, but also that employees must "clearly and affirmatively
consent" before any fees or dues are collected.

Hughes emphasized that workers should be able to join unions if
they want. But that decision, he said, should be made free from the
external pressures created by mandatory agency fees.

AFSCME and other unions, Hughes acknowledged, can be expected to
fight the lawsuit "tooth and nail," given the amount of money at
stake. He predicted that unions would offer a "good faith" defense,
and assert that they are entitled to retain the dues from before
the Janus decision because they believed their position to be
legally sound.

"The problem is the Supreme Court has never found the good-faith
doctrine applies in this context -- and the more fact-specific
[problem] is that the public sector unions were well aware" that
pending legal challenges to mandatory agency dues had merit, Hughes
said.

The complaint, obtained by Fox News, noted that on Feb. 9, 2015,
then-Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner, a Republican, "issued an executive
order that recognized the State's agency fee requirements were
likely unconstitutional and that called for the fees to be placed
in escrow 'so that each such State Employee will receive the amount
deducted from his or her wages upon the determination by any court
of competent jurisdiction that the Fair Share Contract Provisions
are unconstitutional.'"

However, AFCME did not "agree to have agency fees escrowed while
their constitutionality was resolved," the complaint asserts.

AFCME did not respond to Fox News' request for comment. The
organization has called the Janus case a "blatantly political and
well-funded plot to use the highest court in the land to further
rig the economic rules against everyday working people."

In addition to class certification, the May 1 lawsuit seeks for
"plaintiffs and class members actual damages in the full amount of
fees and any assessments seized from their wages from May 1, 2017
to June 27, 2018, plus interest, for violations of their First
Amendment Rights."

Illinois' statute of limitations prevents the workers from
obtaining a refund going back more than two years, but Hughes told
Fox News that other states have longer statutes of limitations.

The lawsuit was slated to be formally announced on May 1 at a press
conference in Chicago. Mark Janus, the plaintiff in Janus v.
AFSCME, is scheduled to appear. He is seeking a refund of some
$3,000 in agency fees.

"Refusing to return unlawfully seized union fees to these workers
and in a growing number of cases across the country represents a
blatant disregard for the law," said Mark Mix, president of the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. "AFSCME union
officials in this case stand in utter defiance of the Supreme
Court's Janus decision. This case proves, once again, that union
officials will do whatever it takes to keep the coffers brimming
with forced dues and fees at the expense of the workers they claim
to 'represent.' Keeping hundreds of millions of dollars taken from
workers in violation of their First Amendment rights is
outrageous."

While the May 1 lawsuit is the first by LJC to demand a refund for
paid agency fees, and its first class-action case, the group said
it expects to file more litigation given the alleged resistance of
unions to comply with Janus.

According to an April 17, 2019 letter from the National Union of
Healthcare Workers to a California union employee -- provided to
Fox News by LJC -- some employees have been threatened with
termination if they failed to join a union. That letter, while
unrelated to the Illinois litigation, highlights ongoing problems
with Janus enforcement, Hughes said.

In a March lawsuit also handled by LJC, two University of
California system employees claimed they were effectively being
held "against their will" and forced to pay monthly union dues.

On July 25, 2018, "upon learning of the Janus decision of June 27,
2018," one of the plaintiffs resigned from her union by letter and
also wrote to University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)
requesting that it stop deducting union dues from her paycheck.

In response, the plaintiff said, the union informed UCSB that it
should continue withholding money from her paycheck, and the
university complied. The union said that, under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff could eventually opt
out of the fees -- she would just need to wait until around March
31, 2022. [GN]


ANIMAL FEEDS: Manatt Phelps Attorneys Discuss High Court Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Gottlieb, Esq. -- rgottlieb@manatt.com  -- Esra Hudson,
Esq. -- ehudson@manatt.com -- and Alma Pinan, Esq.--
apinan@manatt.com -- of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, in an
article for JDSupra, report that the Supreme Court, in a
sharply-divided 5-4 ruling issued on April 24, ruled that nothing
in the Federal Arbitration Act allows courts to compel class action
arbitration even if the contract is ambiguous in that regard, and
notwithstanding rules that direct courts to interpret such
ambiguities most strongly against the drafter.

What happened

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) broadly favors arbitration and
the parties' ability to contract away their litigation rights
through this alternate dispute resolution process. That said, back
in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l that a court may not compel arbitration on a classwide basis
when an agreement is "silent" on the availability of such
arbitration. Because class arbitration fundamentally changes the
nature of the "traditional individualized arbitration" envisioned
by federal law, the Court concluded in ­Stolt-Nielsen that a party
may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless there is
a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.
In its April 24 ruling, the Court now concludes that federal law
likewise prevents class arbitration, even when the arbitration
agreement is ambiguous on the issue, because the Federal
Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce covered arbitration
agreements according to the terms of those agreements, and an
ambiguous provision cannot be interpreted to compel class action
arbitration.

As a general rule, when a contract is ambiguous, courts will apply,
as a last resort, the rule of contract interpretation known as
contra proferentem, which means that the ambiguous contract
provision at issue will be interpreted against the drafter. In the
decision below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did
precisely that, concluding that the arbitration agreement at issue
was ambiguous on the question of class action arbitration, and must
be resolved in favor of ordering such arbitration. Indeed, this
appeared to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent such as
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (1985) and Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction (1983), holding that
any ambiguities about the scope of an arbitration agreement must be
resolved in favor of arbitration.

But here, the Supreme Court draws the line on class action
arbitration. Citing AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (2011), the Court
concludes that individual parties cannot force class action
arbitration on other similarly situated parties without the
parties' consent because it is inconsistent with the FAA to apply
the more general contra proferentem rule to impose class
arbitration in the absence of the parties' clear consent.

In addition, in one of three dissents, Justice Kagan wrote the
primary opinion and largely agreed with a concurring opinion by
Justice Thomas on the core principle that the dispute should have
been resolved by applying common law contract principles. Those
well-established principles, she wrote, ought to have resolved the
case against Lamps Plus's request for individual arbitration
because, based on those rules of contract interpretation and
Supreme Court precedent requiring contracts to be enforced in
accordance with their terms, the arbitration agreement Lamps Plus
wrote would be "best understood to authorize arbitration on a
classwide basis." Moreover, she wrote, "a plain-vanilla rule of
contract interpretation, applied in California as in every other
State, requires reading it against the drafter -- and so likewise
permits a class proceeding here."

Ultimately, however, that view did not carry the day. The Court
noted the importance of recognizing the fundamental difference
between class arbitration and the individualized form of
arbitration. Class arbitration is slower, more costly and more
likely to generate procedural morass than is individual
arbitration. Thus, silence and ambiguity are not enough to compel
class arbitration. This decision should ensure that parties to an
arbitration agreement are not forced into inefficient class
arbitration proceedings unless the parties expressly agreed to such
proceedings.

Why it matters

This is a major development in arbitration law because courts have
applied the rule of contra proferentem to force class action
arbitration on the parties based on purported ambiguity in
arbitration agreements, even when none exists. With the ruling, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the FAA prohibits the use of
state-law rules of contract interpretation to the extent they seek
to impose classwide arbitration in the absence of an express
agreement to that effect. [GN]


APPLE INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Fraud Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The City of Roseville Employees' Retirement System in April 2019
filed a securities fraud class action lawsuit against Apple that
included Tim Cook and Luca Maestri as defendants.  

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, has announced that they have
filed a similar class action lawsuit against Apple, CEO Tim Cook
and CFO Luca Maestri, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or
otherwise acquired Apple securities between November 2, 2018 and
January 2, 2019, both dates inclusive.  This class action seeks to
recover damages against Defendants for alleged violations of the
federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants made
materially false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose adverse information regarding Apple's business and
prospects. Specifically, defendants failed to disclose that: (a)
the U.S.-China trade war had negatively impacted demand for iPhones
and Apple's pricing power in greater China; (b) due to Apple
discounting the cost of replacement batteries to make up for the
Company's prior conduct of intentionally degrading the performance
of the batteries in older iPhones, the rate at which Apple
customers were replacing their batteries in older iPhones, rather
than purchasing new iPhones, was negatively impacting Apple's
iPhone sales growth; (c) as a result of slowing demand, Apple had
slashed production orders from suppliers for the new 2018 iPhone
models and cut prices to reduce inventory; and (d) defendants'
decision to withhold unit sales for iPhones and other hardware,
which was a metric relevant to investors and their view of the
Company's financial performance, was designed to and would mask
declines in unit sales of the Company's flagship product. As a
result of this information being withheld from the market during
the Class Period, the price of Apple stock was artificially
inflated to more than $209 per share.

Then on January 2, 2019, post-close, Apple disclosed that, for the
first time in over 14 years, Apple would miss its prior quarterly
revenue forecast amid falling iPhone sales in China, its third
largest market after USA and Europe. The Company announced first
quarter fiscal 2019 revenues of only $84 billion, below the
expected range of $89 billion to $93 billion the Company had
announced eight weeks previously on November 1, 2018. The Company
also disclosed that in addition to macroeconomics in the Chinese
market, the price cuts to battery replacements a year earlier to
fix the Company's prior surreptitious conduct had hurt iPhone
sales. This news caused the market price of Apple common stock to
decline more than $15 per share, or more than 9%, from a close of
$157.92 per share on January 2, 2019 to a close of $142.19 per
share on January 3, 2019. [GN]


APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over iPhone 7 "Loop Disease"
----------------------------------------------------------
Julio Cachila, writing for International Business Times, reports
that Apple is facing a class action lawsuit for the so-called "loop
disease" affecting the iPhone 7.

A class action lawsuit was filed against Apple for Audio IC defects
on the iPhone 7, Apple Insider reported. According to the
plaintiffs, their iPhone 7 smartphones don't work the way Apple
promised they would work. What's more, they said Apple wouldn't do
a thing about it.

The lawsuit has three plaintiffs. Two of them said they experienced
a greyed-out "speaker" button on the iPhone's touchscreen. One of
them described talking during calls as if she was "speaking under
water." All of them said Siri doesn't respond to voice commands,
and that other voice response applications are inoperable as well.

All plaintiffs took their iPhones to local Apple Stores for repair
or replacement. One of them was told that the problem was caused by
her cellular provider. Two of them were told that they were past
the warranty period. None of them had their problems fixed.

The three plaintiffs' experiences with the iPhone 7 are not
isolated cases. These are similar to what many iPhone 7 users have
experienced in the previous years. In fact, a quick visit to the
Apple forums and a quick search on the internet will reveal that
this has been going on for quite some time to many users, and Apple
actually knows that.

One certain commenter in the Apple forums said the Cupertino-based
tech giant knows the issue but is not going to do anything about
it. Specifically, the poster quoted Apple as saying,

"We know it's a problem with some devices and we're not going to
replace your phone."

What caused this problem in first place

The lawsuit claims that the Audio IC defect is caused by faulty
design, specifically the "substandard" material used in the iPhone
7's external casing, rendering it unable to protect the internal
parts over prolonged use; and the wrong placement of the audio IC
chip on the iPhone's logic board, leading to loss of connection
with the board itself.

This problem isn't difficult to fix. Independent trained
technicians can fix the problem by soldering the audio IC chip to
the board using thin copper wire.

The plaintiffs accuse Apple of "concealing" the defect from
consumers, engaging in deceptive practives, and refusing to repair
affected iPhones despite knowing the defect. They want Apple to
repair or recall the devices, extend applicable warranties, and pay
for damages and attorney's fees. [GN]


APPLE INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Expanded Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP ("Labaton Sucharow") announces that on May 24,
2019, it filed a securities class action lawsuit, captioned
Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan v. Apple Inc., No. 19-cv-2891
(N.D. Cal.) (the "Action"), on behalf of its client Steamfitters
Local 449 Pension Plan ("Steamfitters") against Apple Inc. (NASDAQ:
AAPL) ("Apple" or the "Company") and certain officers and directors
(collectively, "Defendants").  The Steamfitters Action asserts
claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, on behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise
acquired Apple securities during the period from August 1, 2017
through January 2, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), who were
damaged thereby (the "Class").

The Action expands upon the substantially related cases City of
Roseville Employees Retirement System v. Apple Inc., No. 19-cv-2033
(N.D. Cal.), asserting Exchange Act claims on behalf of all
purchasers of Apple common stock between November 2, 2018 and
January 2, 2019; and Reddy v. Apple Inc., No. 19-cv-2615 (N.D.
Cal.), asserting Exchange Act claims on behalf of all purchasers of
Apple securities between November 2, 2018 and January 2, 2019.
Pursuant to the notice published on April 16, 2019 in connection
with the first-filed case, as required by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, investors wishing to serve as Lead
Plaintiff are required to file a motion for appointment as Lead
Plaintiff by no later than June 17, 2019.

Apple is a multinational technology company headquartered in
Cupertino, California that designs, develops, and sells consumer
electronics, computer software, and online services.  The Company's
most profitable product is the iPhone smartphone, which since 2012
has represented more than 40 percent of the Company's revenue.
China is the Company's third-largest market, and most important
growth market, yet is susceptible to geopolitical and macroeconomic
uncertainty and increased competition from emerging Chinese
smartphone manufacturers.

On January 23, 2017, Apple released a software update which
secretly slowed the performance of certain iPhones with
battery-related issues.  Throughout 2017, these undisclosed
intentional slowdowns led consumers to prematurely believe their
devices had become obsolete, leading them to upgrade their iPhones
at a fast rate.  Specifically, beginning in August 1, 2017, Apple
began to report a record number of iPhone upgrades.  In December
2017, Apple revealed it had been intentionally slowing down certain
iPhones, also disclosing that the problem was battery-related, as
opposed to device-related.  Following this revelation, Apple
offered discounted replacement batteries throughout 2018 in light
of public outrage.

The Steamfitters Action alleges that during the Class Period,
Defendants misled investors by making materially false and
misleading statements as each of the Defendants knew and failed to
disclose or deliberately disregarded that: (1) the intentional
slowdown of certain model iPhones, unsustainably boosted iPhone
sales during 2017 and cannibalized future sales; (2) the Company's
replacement battery program during 2018 (enacted as a direct and
primary response to the Company's intentional phone throttling
during 2017) was negatively impacting iPhone sales; and (3) the
U.S.-China trade war, declining Chinese economy, and strength of
the U.S. dollar had negatively impacted demand for iPhones in
Greater China.

On January 2, 2019, after the close of trading, for the first time
in fifteen years Apple slashed its prior quarterly revenue forecast
for its already complete first fiscal quarter 2019.  On this date,
Defendants disclosed that the Company's revenues for its first
fiscal quarter 2019 were only $84 billion, substantially below the
expected range of $89 billion to $93 billion the Company had
announced eight weeks earlier.  Defendants attributed these results
to declining iPhone sales, in part, due to more consumers
purchasing discounted replacement batteries in lieu of upgrading
their iPhones, and the decelerating Chinese economy and U.S.-China
trade war impacting iPhone demand in Greater China.  On this news,
Apple common stock fell precipitously by more than $15 per share,
or more than 9 percent, to close at $142.19 per share on January 3,
2019.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Apple securities during the
Class Period and were damaged thereby, you are a member of the
"Class" and may be able to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff.
Lead Plaintiff motion papers must be filed with the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California no later than June
17, 2019.  The Lead Plaintiff is a court-appointed representative
for absent members of the Class.  You do not need to seek
appointment as Lead Plaintiff to share in any Class recovery in the
Action.  If you are a Class member and there is a recovery for the
Class, you can share in that recovery as an absent Class member.
You may retain counsel of your choice to represent you in the
Action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit:

         Contact:
         Francis P. McConville, Esq.
         Labaton Sucharow
         Phone: 800-321-0476
         Website: www.labaton.com.
         Email: fmcconville@labaton.com [GN]


APPLE INC: Selling iTunes Listening Data, Class Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chance Miller, writing for 9to5Mac, reports that while Apple is a
strong proponent of user privacy, a new lawsuit accuses the company
of disclosing and selling certain iTunes purchase data. Bloomberg
reports that Apple has been hit with a class action alleging that
it discloses and sells information about iTunes listening habits.

In the lawsuit, customers from Rhode Island and Michigan accuse
Apple of selling personal listening information about its
customers, without consent. The customers say they hope to
represent "hundreds of thousands" of residents in their home states
who are affected by Apple's alleged practice.

The lawsuit alleges that someone can purchase a list of iTunes
customers who meet a certain set of requirements, such as a list of
people who are college-educated and purchase country music from the
iTunes Store:

"For example, any person or entity could rent a list with the names
and addresses of all unmarried, college-educated women over the age
of 70 with a household income of over $80,000 who purchased country
music from Apple via its iTunes Store mobile application," the
customers said. "Such a list is available for sale for
approximately $136 per thousand customers listed."

The lawsuit is seeking $250 for each Rhode Island iTunes customer
whose information was disclosed, and $5,000 for each Michigan
resident affected. These numbers are based on each state's
respective privacy law.

Tim Cook has repeatedly stated that Apple does not believe in the
practice of selling user data. In an interview earlier this year,
Cook said that because Apple does not sell user data, users are
able to "feel that they can trust Apple." Cook has also called on
the FTC to establish a ‘data-broker clearinghouse' so users can
better track what happens with their data.

The case against Apple is Wheaton v Apple Inc and will proceed
forward in the US District Court for the Northern District of
California. [GN]


ARIZONA ACREAGE: Ariz. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Monroe
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, issued an Opinion
affirming the judgment of the Superior Court granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned In re the Matter
of: JEAN M. MONROE, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ARIZONA ACREAGE LLC, et
al., Defendants/Appellants. BOYD FAMILY PARTNERSHIP and JEAN M.
MONROE, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. SUNNY LAKES RANCHOS LLC, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants. Nos. 1 CA-CV 18-0476, 1 CA-CV 18-0478, 1
CA-CV 19-0170 and 1 CA-CV 19-0171 (Consolidated). (Ariz. App.).

The Appellants appeal the superior court's denial of their
cross-motions for partial summary judgment and grant of partial
summary judgment in favor of representative plaintiffs Jean M.
Monroe and Boyd Family Partnership (Appellees).

Sunny Lakes executed a promissory note in favor of multiple lenders
in exchange for $5,000,000. Over one hundred individuals and
entities contributed money to the Sunny Lakes loan, and no lender
contributed more than fourteen percent of the total loan value. The
note was secured by a deed of trust encumbering several acres of
undeveloped land in Mohave County (Plot A). In addition to the note
and deed of trust, Mardian executed a guaranty agreement, promising
to repay the loan in the event Sunny Lakes failed to do so.

Both Sunny Lakes and AZ Acreage made payments on their respective
notes until July 2008, when both companies stopped making payments.
In late June 2014, believing the statute of limitations was just
days from expiration, Appellees filed two class action lawsuits to
foreclose on Plot A and Plot B and recover any resulting
deficiency.

The Appellees moved for partial summary judgment to: (1) establish
the dollar amount due under each note (2) establish that the
classes were entitled to payment under the notes (3) order a
sheriff's sale of Plot A and Plot B and (4) establish liability
against each defendant for payment of any deficiency that may
arise.

Appellants each cross-moved for summary judgment, again arguing the
claims were barred by a four-year statute of limitations and
Appellants had failed to bring the actions in accordance with the
terms of the deeds of trust and controlling Nevada law.  

The court granted the Appellees' motions in part reserving the
issue of Mardian's liability to pay a deficiency until after the
properties were sold and a fair market value hearing could be held.


In its Rule 54(b) order, the court determined Sunny Lakes owed
$13,870,277.75 on its promissory note plus interest, and AZ Acreage
owed $10,933,666.62 on its promissory note plus interest. Sunny
Lakes and AZ.

Appellants and Mardian raise three main arguments on appeal:

   (1) the Appellees' claims are barred by the doctrines of issue
and claim preclusion;

   (2) the Appellees' claims are governed by a four-year statute of
limitations and, accordingly, are untimely; and

   (3) the Appellees' claims are barred because they failed to
obtain written consent of 51% of the lenders before filing the
lawsuits, as required by the deeds of trust and by N.R.S. Section
645B.340.

Issue Preclusion and Claim Preclusion Do Not Apply

The Appellants argue the holding in related litigation, Karayan v.
Mardian, 690 Fed. Appx. 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem. decision), under
the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion bars both class action
lawsuits. Before the superior court, however, Appellants only
argued that the Karayan decision should preclude one class member,
the Karayan Family Trust, from participating in the class.
Appellants never argued that Appellees as class representatives
should be barred from bringing suit, and we will not consider the
argument for the first time on appeal.  

Statutes of Limitations

The Judicial Foreclosure Claims Were Timely Filed

The Appellants failed to make payments on the notes starting in
July 2008. The subject lawsuits were filed on June 27, 2014.
Appellants contend the superior court erred by denying their
cross-motions for summary judgment, arguing that the four-year
limitations period under A.R.S. Section 12-544(3) applies to bar
Appellees' claims.

The Appellees assert the six-year limitations period under A.R.S.
Section 47-3118(A) applies and the claims were timely filed.

Section 12-544(3) provides, there shall be commenced and prosecuted
within four years after the cause of action accrues, an action upon
an instrument in writing executed without the state.

Alternatively, A.R.S. Section 47-3118(A) provides, an action to
enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a
definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date
or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated,
within six years after the accelerated due date.

Both the Appellants and the Appellees rely on the proposition that
where one statute of limitations has general application and
another arguably competing statute of limitations is specific, the
specific statute should prevail. The parties disagree, however, as
to which of these arguably competing statutes is specific and
controlling. Appellants argue Section 12-544(3) is specific because
it applies to instruments created outside this state and is
therefore directly applicable to the promissory notes and deeds of
trust executed in Nevada. In contrast, Appellees argue Section
47-3118(A) is more specific and should prevail because it outlines
the limitations period for particular negotiable instruments
created pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), including
promissory notes.

The Ariz. App.'s conclusion is supported by the fact that Nevada
has also adopted the six-year statute of limitations period
outlined in Article Three. And since Arizona's initial adoption of
the U.C.C. in 1967, this court has interpreted Section 12-544(3)
only in regard to claims brought by a plaintiff seeking to enforce
a foreign judgment. This narrow application of the older
limitations provision further supports our conclusion that the more
recent limitations provision is specific to promissory notes and
should therefore apply in this case.

The Breach of Guaranty Claims Were Timely Filed

Mardian argues Arizona case law establishes that provisions from
the U.C.C., as codified in Arizona, do not apply in any respect to
guaranty agreements regardless of the underlying instrument the
guaranty agreement relates to because the guaranty is a separate
contract.

He therefore contends that the shorter four-year limitations period
of A.R.S. Section 12-544(3) should apply to bar Appellees' claim
against him, irrespective of whether the six-year limitations
period of A.R.S. Section 47-3118(A) applies to the judicial
foreclosure claims against Appellants.

Mardian correctly states that Arizona treats guaranty agreements as
contracts separate from their related instruments. However, we do
not agree that the cases Mardian relies upon broadly prohibit
U.C.C. application to all guaranty agreements.   

Here, Mardian signed specific guaranty agreements, which obligated
him to repay only the debts of the particular promissory notes
related to each loan. Further, in Grimm, this court contemplated
that the U.C.C. could apply to a guaranty agreement in situations
where the borrower under a negotiable instrument is an entity owned
by the guarantor.  The Court determines that this case is such a
case. Accordingly, Section 47-3118(A) applies to Appellees' breach
of guaranty claims against Mardian.

Therefore, the Court concludes Section 47-3118(A) applies and the
superior court did not err in finding that Appellees timely filed a
claim against Mardian.  

The 51% Requirement Under the Default Clause and N.R.S. Section
645B.340

The Appellants argue the claims are barred because Appellees lacked
standing to sue. They assert the Appellees did not comply with
certain terms of the default clause that had to be met before
bringing the foreclosure actions. In the alternative, Appellants
contend Appellees' claims are barred for failure to comply with
N.R.S. Section 645B.340.

Appellees Sufficiently Pled a Declared Default

The Appellants argue Appellees did not have standing to bring these
claims because they did not obtain the agreement of 51% of the
lenders before declaring a default on the deeds of trust.

To initiate a claim in Arizona, a party must have standing, that
is, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.

Here, the Appellees alleged in their complaints that a default
under the deeds of trust had occurred, resulting in the full amount
being due under each note. The Appellees' motions for partial
summary judgment asserted that the Appellants were in default as of
July 1, 2008. The Appellants originally challenged the sufficiency
of a specific declared default date in their 2014 motion to
dismiss, but later abandoned this position and did not contest the
July 1, 2008 date in their response to the motions for partial
summary judgment or their cross-motions for summary judgment. On
this record, Appellees sufficiently established an injury, the July
1, 2008 default giving them standing to bring both lawsuits.

It is undisputed that Appellants failed to make payments on either
note since July 1, 2008. It also is undisputed that each class is
owed money under the notes. Furthermore, Appellants have not
asserted that they were improperly prejudiced or damaged in this
litigation due to the alleged failure to properly declare a
default.   

The Court determines that judicial economy and administration is
promoted by affirming that Appellees have standing to seek recovery
for the money owed under each note.  

The Court affirms the superior court's grant of partial summary
judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees.

A full-text copy of the Ariz. App.'s May 16, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3usj9d3 from Leagle.com.

Lundberg & Elias, PLLC, Bullhead City, By T'shura-Ann Elias,
Gregory & Elias, Plc, 3640 Highway 95 Ste 140, Bullhead City, AZ,
86442-4337, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees.

Johnson & Gubler, P.C., Las Vegas, Nevada, By Matthew L. Johnson,
Russell G. Gubler, Lakes Business Park, 8831 W. Sahara Avenue, Las
Vegas, Nevada 89117, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants.


AVANOS MEDICAL: Appeal in Bahamas Surgery Case Still Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Avanos Medical, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the appeal filed in the
case, Bahamas Surgery Center, LLC v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation and
Halyard Health, Inc., is still pending.

Avanos said, "We have an Indemnification Obligation for the matter
styled Bahamas Surgery Center, LLC v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation
and Halyard Health, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-08390-DMG-SH (C.D. Cal.)
("Bahamas"), filed on October 29, 2014."

In that case, the plaintiff brought a putative class action
asserting claims for common law fraud (affirmative
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment) and violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") in connection with the
company's marketing and sale of MicroCool surgical gowns.

On April 7, 2017, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
finding that Kimberly-Clark was liable for $3.9 million in
compensatory damages (not including prejudgment interest) and
$350.0 million in punitive damages, and that Avanos was liable for
$0.3 million in compensatory damages (not including prejudgment
interest) and $100.0 million in punitive damages.

Subsequently, the court also ruled on the plaintiff's UCL claim and
request for injunctive relief. The court found in favor of the
plaintiff on the UCL claim but denied the plaintiff's request for
restitution. The court also denied the plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief.

On May 25, 2017, the company filed three post-trial motions: a
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law; a motion to
decertify the class; and a motion for new trial, remittitur, or
amendment of the judgment.

On March 30, 2018, the court ruled on the post-trial motions. The
court denied all three, except it granted in part the motion to
reduce the award of punitive damages to a 5 to 1 ratio with
compensatory damages.

On April 11, 2018, the court issued an Amended Judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against us and Kimberly-Clark. The judgment
against the company is $0.3 million in compensatory damages and
pre-judgment interest and $1.3 million in punitive damages. The
judgment against Kimberly-Clark is $3.9 million in compensatory
damages, $1.3 million in pre-judgment interest, and $19.4 million
in punitive damages.

On April 12, 2018, the company filed a notice of appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Avanos said, "We intend to continue our vigorous defense of the
Bahamas matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Avanos Medical, Inc. operates as a medical technology company that
focuses on delivering medical device solutions to improve
patients’ quality of life worldwide. The company was formerly
known as Halyard Health, Inc. and changed its name to Avanos
Medical, Inc. in June 2018. Avanos Medical, Inc. was incorporated
in 2014 and is headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia.


AVANOS MEDICAL: Dismissal of Jackson Class Suit Appealed
--------------------------------------------------------
Avanos Medical, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the plaintiff in the
case, Jackson v. Halyard Health, Inc., Robert E. Abernathy, Steven
E. Voskuil, et al., has appealed the dismissal of the action to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The company was served with a complaint in a matter styled Jackson
v. Halyard Health, Inc., Robert E. Abernathy, Steven E. Voskuil, et
al., No. 1:16-cv-05093-LTS (S. D. N. Y.), filed on June 28, 2016.

In that case, the plaintiff brings a putative class action against
the Company, its former Chief Executive Officer, its Chief
Financial Officer and other defendants, asserting claims for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act, Sections 10(b) and
20(a). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants made
misrepresentations and failed to disclose certain information about
the safety and effectiveness of our MicroCool gowns and thereby
artificially inflated the Company's stock prices during the
respective class periods.

The alleged class period for purchasers of Kimberly-Clark
securities who subsequently received Avanos securities is February
25, 2013 to October 21, 2014, and the alleged class period for
purchasers of Avanos securities is October 21, 2014 to April 29,
2016. On February 16, 2017, we moved to dismiss the case.

On March 30, 2018, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss and entered judgment in the company's favor. On April 27,
2018, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the Judgment and
for Leave to Amend.

On April 1, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff's motion. On May
1, 2019, Jackson appealed the dismissal of the action to the 2nd
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Avanos said, "We intend to continue our vigorous defense of this
matter."

Avanos Medical, Inc. operates as a medical technology company that
focuses on delivering medical device solutions to improve
patients’ quality of life worldwide. The company was formerly
known as Halyard Health, Inc. and changed its name to Avanos
Medical, Inc. in June 2018. Avanos Medical, Inc. was incorporated
in 2014 and is headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia.


BANK OF AMERICA: Castillo Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit CINDY R. CASTILLO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BANK OF
AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a North Carolina Corporation, and
DOES 1-10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case 8:17-cv-00580-DOC-KES
(C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court on July 15, 2019,
for an order:

   1. certifying class and subclass:

      California Class:

      "all hourly-paid, non-managerial call center workers of Bank
      of America, National Association, in the State of California

      within four years prior to the filing of the complaint in
      this action until resolution of this lawsuit";

      Sub-Class 1:

      "all Class Members who are or were employed by Defendants and

      subject to Defendant’s Unfair Business Practices"; and

   2. appointing James Hawkins, APLC, as class counsel.

      Bank of America National Association operates 13 call centers

      in California where, from March 2013 to September 2018, 5,031

      telephone-dedicated employees handled phone calls regarding
      banking and investment services offered by Defendant to its
      customers.

The Defendant maintained a uniform policy and practice that
discouraged employees from accurately recording their work time. An
employee who does not adhere to her scheduled times is subject to
discipline. The Defendant allegedly failed to pay for all time
worked. The Defendant also applied a uniform, written policy that
miscalculated overtime premium wages.[CC]

Attorneys for Cindy R. Castillo individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com

BARCLAYS: Judge Tosses Debt Collection Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Dena Aubin, writing for Reuters, reports that a judge in Boston
federal court has dismissed a proposed class action accusing a
Barclays unit and a Massachusetts law firm of suing borrowers over
credit card debt that was no longer legally enforceable, ruling
that the dispute must be resolved in arbitration.

The named plaintiff, Ellen Christensen of Lawrence, Massachusetts,
had argued that Barclays waived its right to arbitration by making
use of the courts to sue her, but U.S. District Judge Allison
Burroughs on April 30 rejected that argument. Christensen succeeded
in getting Barclays' debt collection lawsuit against her dismissed,
and she will not suffer unfair prejudice if the current case is
sent to arbitration, the judge said. [GN]


BARTON NINE: Faces Class Action Over Incorrect GST Charges
----------------------------------------------------------
The Canberra Times reports that Canberra apartment buyers in a
large double class action have sued some of the city's biggest
developers alleging they incorrectly paid GST on their purchases.

The suit, lodged in the Federal Court, alleges that the buyers
agreed to pay GST as a portion of the purchase price but the
developers were not liable to pay it and so kept the resulting
windfall.

The developers deny the allegations, and the two cases are listed
to be heard in Sydney from
May 1.

The cases concern two separate developments; Barton's Governor
Place, developed by Barton Nine and 13.1 Barton (entities of the
Morris Property Group and the Doma Group), and Belconnen's Altitude
Apartments, developed by Belconnen Lakeview (a subsidiary of
Hindmarsh Group).

According to the respective developments' websites, Governor Place
has 171 apartments and Altitude has 348. Litigation funder IMF
Bentham is behind the class action, and firm Corrs Chambers
Westgarth is acting for the buyers.

Assuming an average contract price of about $450,000, each owner
could expect a refund of $40,000 if successful. The developers
could be ordered to repay millions of dollars.

The case will centre around the interpretation of Australian tax
law and the contracts for sale. The buyers say the developers are
liable to repay the amount equivalent to the GST, and are also
liable for damages for breach of contract and contravention of the
Australian consumer law.

The developers deny the allegations. They say the purchase price
was the amount in the contract, irrespective of GST.

The developers also deny the allegations of breach of contract and
of the consumer law. [GN]


BCI COCA-COLA: Cohen Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Marc Cohen, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling
Company of Los Angeles, Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., The
Coca-Cola Company, Reyes Coca-Cola Bottling, LLC, and Does 1
through 20, inclusive, Defendants, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV08785
(Cal. Super., March 14, 2019), was removed to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California on May 10,
2019 under Case No. 19-cv-04083.

Cohen seeks redress for Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay all overtime wages, meal period violations, wage
statement violations, waiting time penalties and unfair competition
under California Law.[BN]

Cohen is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Phone: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: 866-633-0228
      Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
             abacon@toddflaw.com

             - and -

      Lawrence W. Freiman, Esq.
      FREIMAN LEGAL
      388 Market St., Suite 1300
      San Francisco, CA 94111
      Tel: (415) 213-4880

Defendants are represented by:

     Jennifer Robinson, Esq.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     333 Commerce Street, Suite 1450
     Nashville, TN 37201
     Telephone: (615) 383-3033
     Email: jenrobinson@littler.com

            - and -

     Sophia Behnia, Esq.
     Gal Gressel, Esq.
     LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
     333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94104
     Telephone: (415) 433-1940
     Email: sbehnia@littler.com
            ggressel@littler.com
            sboxer@littler.com


BOSMAN TRUCKING: Johnson Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------------
Martaneze Johnson, James Hannah and Walter Cherry, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. Bosman Trucking,
Inc., and Greg Tlustochowicz, Case No. 1:19-cv-02066 (N.D. Ill.,
March 26, 2019), is brought against the Defendants for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and
the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance.

The Plaintiffs alleged they were improperly classified as
independent contractors and denied time and one half their regular
rates of pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

The Plaintiffs were employed as shuttle drivers and performed
duties for the Defendants related to transporting automobile parts
between different areas of the plant yard via trailer under the
direction of the Defendants' management.

The Defendant Bosman Trucking owns and operates a trucking company
that contracts its services to an automobile assembly plant and
repair service yard located at 12600 S Torrance Ave., Chicago,
Illinois 60633.

The Defendant Tlustochowicz is the owner of Bosman Trucking.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      John William Billhorn, Esq.
      BILLHORN LAW FIRM
      53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 840
      Chicago, IL 60604
      Tel: (312) 853-1450


CACERES INTERIOR: Gomez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
DARWIN ALEXANDER GARCIA GOMEZ and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CACERES INTERIOR PARTITIONS, INC, JORGE E. CACERES
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-22026-KMM (S.D. Fla., May 20, 2019) is
an action arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

It is believed that the Defendant has employed several other
similarly situated employees like Plaintiff who has not been paid
overtime and/or minimum wages for work performed in excess of 40
hours weekly from the filing of this complaint back three years.
Plaintiff worked an average of 58 hours of per week for Defendant
and was paid an average of $19 per hour but was not paid the
half-time overtime rate for the hours worked over 40 hours in a
week as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff
therefore claims the half-time overtime rate based upon the
applicable minimum wage for the hours worked above 40 in a week.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a finisher of interior
construction from on or about May 2017 through on or about
September 20, 2018.

CACERES INTERIOR PARTITIONS, INC, is a corporation that regularly
transacts business within the Southern District of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J.H. Zidell, Esq.
     J.H. Zidell, P.A.
     300 71st Street, Suite 605
     Miami Beach, FL 33141
     Phone: (305) 865-6766
     Fax: (305) 865-7167
     Email: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


CALIFORNIA: McClenton Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOVAN MCCLENTON, the Petitioner, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, the
Respondent, Case No. 18-9123 (U.S.), is an appeal to the Supreme
Court of United States from a decision by the Court of Appeal of
California, Second Appellate District, in Case No. B293648. The
lower court decision date is
November 15, 2018.

The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Response due was June 3,
2019.

Attorneys for the Petitioner:

          Leslie Beth Ringold, Esq.
          LOS ANGELES COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
          19-513 Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center
          210 West Temple Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          E-mail: LRingold@pubdef.lacounty.gov

CAWLEY & BERGMANN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned WENDY UNTERSHINE,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. CAWLEY & BERGMANN, LLP, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00654 (E.D Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com

CBC RESTAURANT: Pardue et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
AMBER PARDUE and JENNIFER VARGAS, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. CBC RESTAURANT
CORP., a Delaware corporation; JU LIANA ZHU, an individual; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC693274
(Filed April 30, 2019), was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles, to the U.S.
Distict Court for the Central District of California on May 3,
2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:19-cv-03920 to the proceeding.

According to the complaint, Corner Bakery have had a consistent
policy or practice of failing to pay overtime wages to Plaintiffs
and other non-exempt employees in the State of California working
at or from the Rancho Cucamonga location in violation of California
state wage and hour laws as a result of, without limitation,
Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees routinely working over
8 hours per day or 40 hours per week without being properly
compensated.

Corner Bakery is an American chain of cafes that specialize in
pastries, breads, breakfast dishes, gourmet sandwiches, homemade
soups, salads, and pasta.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated:

          David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
          Diego Aviles, Esq.
          BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1801 Century Park East, Suite 2600
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (3 10) 438-5555
          Facsimile: (310) 300- 1705
          E-mail: david@tomorrowlaw.com
                  diego@tomorrowlaw.com

CELGENE CORP: Bid to Dismiss NJ Consolidated Class Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Celgene Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 25, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss
filed in a consolidated class action suit pending before the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey remains pending.

On March 29, 2018, the City of Warren General Employees' Retirement
System filed a putative class action against the company and
certain of its officers in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey. The complaint alleges that the defendants violated
federal securities laws by making misstatements and/or omissions
concerning (1) trials of GED-0301, (2) 2020 outlook and projected
sales of OTEZLA(R), and (3) the new drug application for Ozanimod.


On May 3, 2018, a similar putative class action lawsuit against the
company and certain of its officers was filed by Charles H.
Witchcoff in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey.

The complaint alleges that defendants violated federal securities
laws by making material misstatements and/or omissions concerning
(1) trials of GED-0301, (2) 2020 outlook and projected sales of
OTEZLA(R), and (3) the new drug application for Ozanimod.

On September 27, 2018, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed a lead plaintiff, lead counsel, and co-liaison counsel
for the putative class. On October 9, 2018, the court entered a
scheduling order which requires lead plaintiff to file an amended
complaint by December 10, 2018; defendants to file their motion to
dismiss the amended complaint by February 8, 2019; lead plaintiff
to file its opposition to the motion to dismiss by April 9, 2019;
and defendants to file their reply by May 9, 2019. On December 10,
2018, the lead plaintiff filed its amended complaint. On February
8, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended
complaint in full, and the plaintiff filed its opposition on April
9, 2019.

Celgene Corporation, a biopharmaceutical company, discovers,
develops, and commercializes therapies for the treatment of cancer
and inflammatory diseases worldwide. Celgene Corporation was
founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Summit, New Jersey.


CELLCO PARTNERSHIP: Court Vacates Scheduling Order in Rosenbohm
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division issued an Opinion and Order vacating Court's
Scheduling Order in the case captioned NEIL ROSENBOHM, Plaintiff,
v. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, Defendant. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-731.
(S.D. Ohio).

This case arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Revised Code Chapter
(Ohio Act). Plaintiff worked for Defendant Cellco Partnership
(d/b/a "Verizon") as a Solution Specialist. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant engaged in a scheme not to pay Solution Specialists and
similarly-situated employees for the work they performed at Verizon
store locations. Plaintiff alleges that Solution Specialists and
similarly-situated employees were required to work off-the-clock at
the end of shifts and to participate in lengthy unpaid online
training courses.

Random sampling is required to ensure the sample is representative
of the opt-in class
Defendant's Objection centers on the Undersigned's directive in the
Scheduling Order that Second Stage opt-in discovery, and any
potential trial or other testimony from opt-in plaintiffs, will
proceed based upon a randomly selected sample size of 94 opt-in
plaintiffs.

The Defendant contends that limiting opt-in discovery to a random
sample is based on a flawed assumption that the opt-in class is
similarly situated (which is Plaintiff's burden to prove at the
close of Second Stage discovery. Defendant argues that, to account
for the heterogeneity of the opt-in class, the parties must each be
allowed to select, in equal numbers, the identity of those opt-in
plaintiffs to be deposed.

The Defendant's position fails to appreciate fundamental principles
of statistical sampling. The validity of a random sample does not
depend on any pre-conceived assumptions about the characteristics
of the population from which the sample is drawn. On the contrary,
sampling allows a statistician to use data from a sample of a given
population to draw conclusions about the entire population. That
is, sampling, when performed in a statistically sound manner, will
reveal whether there is heterogeneity among the opt-in plaintiffs
such that final certification is or is not appropriate. If, as
Defendant contends, the opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly
situated, those differences will be reflected in the sample.  

But one can draw inferences about the larger population only if the
sample is representative of that larger population. And
representativeness is best ensured using random sampling.  

Conversely, any non-random sampling method increases the likelihood
that the sample will be biased and not accurately represent the
larger population.  

Hand-picking is almost certain to introduce a substantial amount of
selection bias into the sample, such that the Court could not rely
on the representativeness of the sample as to the population of all
3,875 opt-in plaintiffs.  For these reasons, at the in-person
conference and in the Scheduling Order, the Undersigned rejected
the parties' original proposal that they each be permitted to
hand-pick a certain number of opt-in plaintiffs who would be
subject to discovery and instead ordered that 94 opt-in plaintiffs
be selected at random.

Two further points bear mentioning: First, the Defendant has not
argued that it is entitled to take full discovery of all 3,875
opt-in plaintiffs. It has conceded, based on proportionality
concerns under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), that full discovery of all
opt-in plaintiffs is not feasible.

Thus, the Defendant is not opposed to sampling or representative
discovery itself; Defendant merely objects to the method of sample
selection ordered by the Court. As explained supra, however, any
method other than random sampling will introduce bias and decrease
the reliability of the sample.

Second, the Defendant was expressly invited by the Undersigned
during the in-person discovery conference to submit expert
testimony supporting the validity of its hand-picking proposal, and
Defendant declined to do so. Instead, the Defendant's objection to
random sampling is based on its bare assertion, unsupported by any
authority, that the validity of a random sample depends on a flawed
assumption that the opt-in class is similarly situated. As
explained supra, Defendant's understanding is simply incorrect.

The Undersigned therefore sees no reason to revisit the decision
that any sampling of opt-in plaintiffs must be done randomly.

Random sampling does not violate Defendant's due process rights

According to the Defendant, limiting discovery to a random sample
will also deprive Defendant of its due process right to develop
every available defense in the final certification and trial
proceedings. Thus, limiting discovery to a random sample of opt-in
plaintiffs does not inherently impinge upon Defendant's due process
rights.

Courts have recognized, however, that defendants may be entitled to
further discovery if they can demonstrate (not merely assert) that
they cannot sufficiently develop their defenses based on an initial
sample.  

Accordingly, discovery of the FLSA conditionally-certified class at
this juncture remains limited to a random sample of 94 opt-in
plaintiffs. However, the Defendant may, after completion of
discovery with regard to the 94-plaintiff sample, move for leave to
conduct further discovery if it can demonstrate why further
discovery is necessary.

Discovery as to the Putative Rule 23 Ohio Class

The Defendant's Objection further complains that the random sample
ordered by the Court fails to consider the putative Rule 23 Ohio
class. The reason for this is simple: the parties did not ask the
Court to resolve any discovery disputes related to the putative
Rule 23 Ohio class, either in their proposed scheduling order or
during the in-person discovery conference. Defendant raised the
putative Ohio class for the first time in its Objection.

The putative Ohio class, brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, differs
from the conditionally certified FLSA class, brought under the
collective action provisions of 29 U.S.C. Section 216, in important
respects. First, no certification of the Ohio class has yet
occurred. At present, Plaintiff Rosenbohm is the only member of the
putative Ohio class that is currently before the Court. Further,
the absent Ohio class members have not yet been notified of the
potential class action and will not be notified unless and until
the Court certifies a class under Rule 23. And even if they are
notified in the future, they will not be required under Rule 23 to
affirmatively opt in to the Ohio class as were the FLSA class
members; rather, upon class certification, they will automatically
become members of the Rule 23 class unless they affirmatively opt
out.  

In light of the time it has taken the parties and the Court to
address the Defendant's objections and the upcoming deadlines in
the existing Scheduling Order, the Court vacates the April 17, 2019
Scheduling Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2zq7j7q from
Leagle.com.

Neil Rosenbohm, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony J. Lazzaro , Chastity
Lynn Christy, Michael Fradin, Fradin Law Office & Lori M. Griffin,
Lazzaro Law Firm, LLC, 920 Rockefeller Building, 614 W. Superior
Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

Cellco Partnership, doing business as, Verizon Wireless Defendant,
represented by Tonya B. Braun -- tbraun@jonesday.com -- Jones Day &
Stanley Weiner -- sweiner@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


CENTENE CORPORATION: Dennis Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------------
Derrick U Dennis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CENTENE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04659 (S.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) is a civil rights action
against Defendant for the Defendant's failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer.

Defendant operates a commercial website, www.fideliscare.org, which
markets and sells health insurance for individuals and families.
Defendant's website offers consumers the ability to purchase
products and goods through its website for delivery.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
     SHALOM LAW, PLLC
     124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
     Kew Gardens, NY 11415
     Phone: (718) 971-9474
     Facsimile: (718) 865-0943
     Email: Jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Harper Sues Over Labor Code Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
LIONEL HARPER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated and all aggrieved employees, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and DOES 1
through 25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-at-00392 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Shasta Cty., May 17, 2019) is an action brought by Plaintiff
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
employees who performed work for Defendants in California during
the relevant time periods.

On September 14, 2018, Plaintiff complied with the requirements of
Labor Code by providing written notice via online filing to the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), and via certified
mail return receipt requested to Defendants, of the specific
provisions of the Labor Code alleged to have been violated,
including the facts and theories that support the alleged
violations. Plaintiff did not receive notice from the LWDA that it
intended to investigate the violations alleged in Plaintiff's
written notice. Plaintiff therefore has complied with Labor Code's
notice requirements and is authorized to commence a civil action
under the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), says the
complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants in California as a salesperson from
September 2017 to March 2018.

Defendants market and sell various services, including television,
Internet, and phone services, in California and nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.
     SODERSTROM LAW PC
     3 Park Plaza, Suite 100
     Irvine, California 92614
     Phone: (949) 667-4700
     Fax: (949) 424-8091
     Email: jamin@soderstromlawfirm.eom


CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Lodge Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing
--------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT LODGE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN RESTAURANTS, INC. a
Florida Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 9:19-cv-80672-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., May 21, 2019) seeks to secure redress for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

To promote its services, Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process. The
Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm,
including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text
messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his
daily life, says the complaint.

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages
on behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida.

Defendant is a fast-food burger chain restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone (305) 479-2299
     Facsimile (786) 623-0915
     Email: efilings@shamisgentile.com
            gberg@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     Jordan D. Utanski, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, PA
     19495 Biscayne Blvd. #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: (305) 975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
            utanski@edelsberglaw.com

          - and -

     Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
     HIRALDO P.A.
     401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954.400.4713
     Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


CHEMOURS COMPANY: Accrues $22MM for Leach Settlement at March 31
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Chemours Company has accrued US$22 million at March 31, 2019,
for its obligation under the Leach settlement agreement wherein the
Company must continue to provide water treatment designed to reduce
the level of PFOA in water to six area water districts and private
well users, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019.

The obligation was previously assigned to E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company ("DuPont"), but was reassigned to Chemours after the
Company's separation from DuPont on July 1, 2015.

In 2004, DuPont settled a class action captioned Leach v. DuPont,
filed in West Virginia state court, alleging that approximately
80,000 residents living near the Washington Works facility had
suffered, or may suffer, deleterious health effects from exposure
to PFOA in drinking water.  Among the settlement terms, DuPont
funded a series of health studies by an independent science panel
of experts ("C8 Science Panel") to evaluate available scientific
evidence on whether any probable link exists, as defined in the
settlement agreement, between exposure to PFOA and disease.

The C8 Science Panel found probable links, as defined in the
settlement agreement, between exposure to PFOA and
pregnancy-induced hypertension, including preeclampsia, kidney
cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, and
diagnosed high cholesterol.  Under the terms of the settlement,
DuPont is obligated to fund up to US$235 million for a medical
monitoring program for eligible class members and pay the
administrative cost associated with the program, including class
counsel fees.  The court-appointed Director of Medical Monitoring
implemented the program and testing is ongoing with associated
payments to service providers disbursed from an escrow account
which the Company replenishes pursuant to the settlement agreement.
As of March 31, 2019, approximately US$1.6 million has been
disbursed from escrow related to medical monitoring.  While it is
reasonably possible that the Company will incur additional costs
related to the medical monitoring program, such costs cannot be
reasonably estimated due to uncertainties surrounding the level of
participation by eligible class members and the scope of testing.

In addition, under the Leach settlement agreement, DuPont must
continue to provide water treatment designed to reduce the level of
PFOA in water to six area water districts and private well users.
At separation, this obligation was assigned to Chemours and is
included in the US$22 million accrued for these matters at March
31, 2019 and December 31, 2018.

The Chemours Company provides performance chemicals in North
America, the Asia Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America. It operates through three segments: Titanium
Technologies, Fluoroproducts, and Chemical Solutions.  The Chemours
Company was founded in 2014 and is headquartered in Wilmington,
Delaware.


CITIGROUP INC: Faces Consolidated VRDO-Related Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 30, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company has been
named as a defendant in a consolidated class action suit related to
variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs).

In February and March 2019, certain financial institutions that
served as remarketing agents for municipal bonds called variable
rate demand obligations (VRDOs), including Citigroup, Citibank,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (CGMI), Citigroup Global Markets
Limited (CGML_ and numerous other industry participants, were named
as defendants in putative class actions filed by the City of
Philadelphia and the City of Baltimore in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants colluded to set artificially high
VRDO interest rates. The complaints assert violations of the
Sherman Act, as well as claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, and seek damages and injunctive relief.

On April 5, 2019, the two suits were consolidated for pre-trial
purposes.

Additional information concerning these actions is publicly
available in court filings under the docket numbers 19-CV-1608
(S.D.N.Y.) (Furman, J.) and 19-CV-2667 (S.D.N.Y.) (Furman, J.).

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions in North America, Latin
America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The company
operates through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). Citigroup Inc. was founded in
1812 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


CITY OF CLEVELAND: Laborers International Sues Over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 860,
and ROBERT BLATNICA, MARINO BRADY, JOSEPH P. CARDARELLA, DWANE
CLAGGETT, ROBERT CONTE, CHARLES COOK, JOSEPH CORBO, MICHAEL J.
DEL-ZOPPO, ANGELO DINUNZIO, DAVID EATHRIDGE, KURT B. EATON, JOE
GANTOUS, MICHAEL GIAMPAOLO, RON GOLDBERG, HENRY HAIRSTON, MICHAEL
HAYES, MICHAEL ILIANO, MATTHEW LOBUE, ROBERT LAMONICA, ROBERT
MANDATO, JR., ANTHONY PALMISANO, ROBERT PERSINGER, CARMONE PINZONE,
FRANK PEYSER, CHARLES RICE, MALCOM ROBERTSON, GARY STEWART, ROBERT
SVHADOLNIK, ROLAND F. VLIZZI, ANTHONY WARD, AND BRANDON WILLIAMS,
on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, c/o City Manager
Tanisha R. Briley and Law Director James Juliano, 40 Severance
Circle, Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44118, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-01136 (N.D. Ohio, May 17, 2019) is a collective action
challenging Defendant's practices and policies of failing to
include longevity pay in Plaintiffs and similarly situated
employees' ("SSE") regular rates of pay.

The Defendant has willfully failed to pay Plaintiff Employees and
SSEs overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times
their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 in a
workweek, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
Plaintiff Laborers International Union of North America, Local
Union No. 860 ("Local 860") is the exclusive bargaining
representative for Plaintiff Class Representatives and SSEs and, in
that capacity, requests injunctive relief preventing the City of
Cleveland Heights from violating the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Local 860 has, at all times relevant hereto, been a bona
fide organization of labor representing employees of Defendant
working within the Department of Public Works.

The Defendant City of Cleveland Heights, Ohio is a political
subdivision.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Basil W. Mangano, Esq.
     Joseph J. Guarino, Esq.
     MANGANO LAW OFFICES CO., L.P.A.
     2460 Fairmount Blvd., Suite 225
     Cleveland Heights, OH 44106
     Phone: (216) 397-5844
     Fax: (216) 397-5845
     Email: bmangano@bmanganolaw.com
            jguarino@bmanganolaw.com

          - and –

     Ryan K. Hymore, Esq.
     3805 Edwards Road, Suite 550
     Cincinnati, OH 45209
     Phone: (513) 255-5888
     Fax: (216) 397-5845
     Email: rkhymore@bmanganolaw.com


CJS SOLUTIONS: Court Refuses to Approve Settlement in Borup
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued a Memorandum Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Approval
of Settlement in the case captioned Timothy C. Borup, Plaintiff, v.
The CJS Solutions Group, LLC d/b/a The HCI Group, Defendant. Shana
Gray, Plaintiff, v. The CJS Solutions Group, LLC d/b/a The HCI
Group, Defendant. Civ. Nos. 18-1647 (PAM/DTS), 19-1008 (PAM/DTS (D.
Minn.).

This Order pertains to two related FLSA class-action cases
regarding worker classification.  

The Plaintiff's counsel in Gray once again seeks approval of the
parties' February 2019 settlement agreement. Borup argues that the
settlement in Gray was improperly obtained through a reverse
auction, and seeks limited consolidation of these matters to
resolve settlement issues.   

Settlement Approval

The Gray settlement agreement includes some indicia of a reverse
auction: the settlement value for collective action members is low,
the attorney's fee total is high, and the fact that CJS took steps
to cabin off these litigations from each other is at least
indicative evidence of a reverse auction.

Accordingly, additional discovery on the reverse auction issue is
needed before the settlement can be approved. Gray may renew her
Motion for Approval once the outstanding settlement issues have
been resolved.

Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Settlement is denied without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3kqqsbn from
Leagle.com.

Timothy C. Borup, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kelly A. Lelo --
klelo@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP, T. Joseph Snodgrass --
jsnodgrass@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP & Thomas A. Jacobson,
Swenson Lervick Syverson Anderson Trosvig Jacobson, PA, 710
Broadway, P.O. Box 787, Alexandria, MN 56308

The CJS Solutions Group, LLC, doing business as The HCI Group,
Defendant, represented byClaire B. Deason, Littler Mendelson, P.A.,
Corey Christensen -- cchristensen@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson
P.C. & Jacqueline E. Kalk -- jkalk@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, PC.


COMMUNITY HEALTH: To Appeal Class Certification Ruling in "Zwick"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Community Health Systems, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the company has filed a
petition for permission to appeal the court's order granting class
certification with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in the Zwick Partners class action suit.

Zwick Partners, LP and Aparna Rao, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Quorum Health Corporation,
Community Health Systems, Inc., Wayne T. Smith, W. Larry Cash,
Thomas D. Miller, and Michael J. Culotta, was previously filed in
the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee and
amended on April 17, 2017, to include Community Health Systems,
Inc., Wayne T. Smith and W. Larry Cash as additional defendants.

The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of Quorum Health
Corporation (QHC) shareholders and allege that the failure to
record a goodwill and long-lived asset impairment charge against
QHC at the time of the spin-off of QHC violated federal securities
laws. The District Court denied all defendants' motions to dismiss
on April 20, 2018.

The plaintiffs moved for class certification. Plaintiffs also
amended their complaint on September 14, 2018.

The company moved to dismiss the additional claims in the
plaintiffs' September 14, 2018 amended complaint and responded to
plaintiffs' class certification motion.

On March 29, 2019, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss the additional claims. The court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for class certification on that same date.

On April 12, 2019, the company filed a petition for permission to
appeal the court's order granting class certification with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Community Health said, "We believe the claims are without merit and
will vigorously defend the case."

Community Health Systems, Inc. is one of the largest publicly
traded hospital companies in the United States and a leading
operator of general acute care hospitals and outpatient facilities
in communities across the country. The company provide healthcare
services through the hospitals that we own and operate and
affiliated businesses in non-urban and selected urban markets
throughout the United States. The company is based in Franklin,
Tennessee.


COMPASS LENDING: Court Strikes S. Naiman's 1st Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
strikes the Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint in the
case captioned Sidney Naiman, Plaintiff, v. Compass Lending
Corporation, Defendant. No. CV-19-01736-PHX-JJT. (D. Ariz.).

Because the Plaintiff filed the First Amended Class Action
Complaint without requesting leave of Court to do so, the Court
presumes Defendant consented in writing to an amended Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). Local Rule 15.1(b)
provides: "If a party files an amended pleading as a matter of
course or with the opposing party's written consent, the amending
party must file a separate notice of filing the amended pleading.
The notice must attach a copy of the amended pleading that
indicates in what respect it differs from the pleading which it
amends, by bracketing or striking through the text that was deleted
and underlining the text that was added. The amended pleading must
not incorporate by reference any part of the preceding pleading,
including exhibits. If an amended pleading is filed with the
opposing party's written consent, the notice must so certify."

Because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 15.1(b), the
Court will strike the First Amended Class Action Complaint

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2kx7z8z from Leagle.com.

Deborah Schick, individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Trinette G. Kent -- tkent@kentlawpc.com -- Kent Law Offices &
Anthony Paronich -- anthony@paronichlaw.com -- Paronich Law PC.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Sheean Moves to Certify Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled Michael Sheean, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated v. Convergent Outsourcing,
Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-11532-GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich.), asks the Court
to certify these classes:

   a. TCPA class 1: All persons throughout the United States (1)
      to whom Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. placed, or caused to
      be placed, a call, (2) directed to a number assigned to a
      cellular telephone service, but not assigned to the
      intended recipient of Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.'s calls,
      (3) by using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
      artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) from November 11, 2016
      through the date of class certification;

   b. TCPA class 2: All persons throughout the United States (1)
      to whom Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. placed, or caused to
      be placed, a call, (2) directed to a number assigned to a
      cellular telephone service, (3) by using an automatic
      telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
      voice, (4) from November 11, 2016 through the date of class
      certification, (5) after Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. was
      instructed to stop placing calls to his or her telephone
      number; and

   c. FDCPA class: All persons throughout the United States (1)
      to whom Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. placed, or caused to
      be placed, a call, (2) from May 15, 2017 through the date
      of class certification, (3) and in connection with the
      collection of a consumer debt, (4) after Convergent
      Outsourcing, Inc. was instructed to stop placing calls to
      his or her telephone number.

Mr. Sheean also asks the Court to appoint him as the class
representative, and to appoint Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC as
class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          James L. Davidson, Esq.
          Alexander D. Kruzyk, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          7601 N. Federal Highway, Suite. A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com
                  jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com
                  akruzyk@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVISON RADBIL PLLC
          401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 803-1578
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com


COOK COUNTY, IL: Brown, et al. Seek Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit CRYSTAL BROWN, et al., on Behalf of
Themselves and a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, the
Plaintiffs, vs. COOK COUNTY; AMY CAMPANELLI, in her capacity as
Public Defender of Cook County; and THOMAS DART, in his official
capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-08085 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant
their motion for class certification.[CC]

Plaintiffs' Attorneys:

          Robin Potter, Esq.
          M. Nieves Bolanos, Esq.
          POTTER & BOLANOS, P.C.
          111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: 312 861-1800
          E-mail: robin@potterlaw.org
                  nieves@potterlaw.org

COOK COUNTY, IL: Howard et al. Seek Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, SDAHRIE HOWARD, et al., the
Plaintiffs,  vs. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-08146 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs
bring their claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Illinois Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution on behalf of a proposed Class
defined as:

   "all women who have been employed by the CCSO at the Jail, or
as
   Court Services  deputies at the Leighton Courthouse, or by the
   County in positions with Cermak Health Services, at any time
   since April 23, 2015, except women who, during that period, have

   held the positions to Complaint."

The class is represented by all Plaintiffs: Sdahrie Howard, Denise,
Hobbs, Ellenor Altman, Tavi Burroughs, Dominque Freeman, Kimberly
Crawford-Alexander, Esther Jones, Balvina Ranney, Tawanda Wilson,
and Susana Plasencia.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Noelle Brennan, Esq.
          Kristin Carter, Esq.
          Naomi Frischv, Esq.
          NOELLE BRENNAN & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1530
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: 312 422 0001
          E-mail: nbrennan@nbrennan-associates.com
                  kcarter@nbrennan-associates.com
                  nfrisch@nbrennan-associates.com

               - and -

          Caryn Lederer, Esq.
          Kate E. Schwartz, Esq.
          Emily R. Brown, Esq.
          HUGHES SOCOL PIERS
          RESNICK & DYM, LTD.
          70 W. Madison St., Suite 4000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312 604 2630
          E-mail: clederer@hsplegal.com
                  kschwartz@hsplegal.com
                  ebrown@hsplegal.com

               - and -

          Helly B. Kulwin, Esq.
          Jeffrey R. Kulwin, Esq.
          Rachel A. Katz, Esq.
          KULWIN , MASCIOPINTO & KULWIN, LLP
          161 N. Clark Street, Suite 2500
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: 312 641 0300
          E-mail: skulwin@kmklawllp.com
                  jkulwin@kmklawllp.com
                  rkatz@kmklawllp.com

               - and -

          Cyrus Mehri, Esq.
          Ellen Eardley, Esq.
          Michael Lieder, Esq.
          MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC
          1250 Connecticut Ave., NW
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: 202 822 5100
          E-mail: CMehri@findjustice.com
                  EEardley@findjustice.com
                  MLieder@findjustice.com

               - and -

          Marni Willenson, Esq.
          Samantha Kronk, Esq.
          WILLENSON LAW, LLC
          542 S. Dearborn St., Suite 610
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Telephone: 312 508 5380
          E-mail: marni@willensonlaw.com
          skronk@willensonlaw.com

CUNNINGHAM RESTAURANT: Leslie Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
James Leslie, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Cunningham Restaurant Group LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-00221
(S.D. Ohio, March 26, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
and all allowable damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked over 40 hours as a Manager in Training in one
or more workweeks, but did not receive overtime premiums on one or
more regularly scheduled pay dates within the relevant period for
hours worked as MITs in excess of 40 in those workweeks, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff worked as a salary-paid MIT, training to become
validated as a front of house manager at the Bru Burger Bar
location at 41 E. 6th St., Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 approximately
from April 2018 to May 2018.

The Defendant owned and operated approximately 30 restaurant
locations in Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky during the FLSA relevant
period under the various brand names of Bru Burger Bar, Tavern at
the Point, Nesso Coastal Italia, Vida, Stone Creek Dining Company,
Provision, Livery, Rize, Mesh, Union 50, Boulder Creek Dining
Company, Charbonos, Moerlein Lager House, and Cafe 251. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel I. Bryant, Esq.
      BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
      1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
      Columbus, OH 43220
      Tel: (614) 704-0546
      Fax: (614) 573-9826
      E-mail: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com


CVS HEALTH: Court Dismisses Kroessler's FDCA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned JAMES KROESSLER, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CVS HEALTH
CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No. 19-CV-277-CAB-JLB. (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff James Kroessler filed a putative consumer class action
complaint against Defendant CVS Health Corporation alleging false
and misleading advertising of Defendant's CVS Health glucosamine
joint health products. The complaint alleges violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business &
Professions Code Section (UCL); California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code Section 1750, et. seq. (CLRA);
and Breach of Express Warranty.  

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), a party may
bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule
12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as
failing to allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

The Defendant moves to dismiss on the following grounds:

   (1) Plaintiff's CLRA and UCL state law claims are preempted by
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) as amended by the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA);

   (2) Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief;

   (3) Plaintiff only purchased one of the six Products identified
and therefore lacks standing to assert any claims, including any
putative class claims, relating to Products he did not purchase;
and

   (4) the complaint fails to state a claim under the CLRA and UCL
because it is not pled with specificity under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)

Pre-emption under the FDCA as amended by the NLEA

First, the Defendant contends the Plaintiff's state law false
advertising claims are preempted under the FDCA. The NLEA expressly
pre-empts any state law that establishes any requirement respecting
any claim of the type described in section 343(r)(1) of this title
made in the label or labeling of food that is not identical to the
requirement of section 343(r) of this title. The NLEA also provides
that no state may directly or indirectly establish any requirement
for the labeling of food that is not identical" to the federal
requirements.  

The Defendant contends that the challenged Representations are all
permissible structure/function claims that comply with federal
labeling requirements for dietary supplements, meaning the
Plaintiff's state law false advertising claims are expressly
pre-empted. The Plaintiff counters that (1) the Representations are
not proper structure/function claims because they suggest effects
on characteristic signs and symptoms of osteoarthritis; and (2)
regardless of whether the Representations are structure/function
claims or disease claims, the Representations are false and
misleading and therefore his state law claims are not inconsistent
with the federal requirements.

Although the FDCA requires manufacturers to have substantiation for
their structure/function claims, California law does not allow
private plaintiffs to demand substantiation for advertising claims.


As applied here, the NLEA's pre-emption provision pre-empts the
Plaintiff's CLRA, UCL and breach of express warranty claims. The
Plaintiff alleges the Defendant's Representations are improper
structure/function claims because they suggest effects on
characteristic signs and symptoms of osteoarthritis. The Plaintiff
contends that the FDA noted that reduces joint paint is a disease
claim and the FDA has issued warning letters to advertisers of
glucosamine supplements who advertise their products will do things
like improve joint mobility. However, the Representations do not
purport to reduce or improve anything nor do they mention joint
pain. The Representations do not suggest treatment or prevention of
a disease and satisfy the requirements under the NLEA for
structure/function claims.

Therefore, the Representations are proper structure/function claims
according to the federal requirements.  

The Plaintiff also contends that regardless of whether the
Representations are structure/function claims or disease claims,
the Representations are false and misleading and therefore his
state law claims are not inconsistent with the federal
requirements.  

The Plaintiff does not argue that the Defendant's Representations
are false or misleading because the Defendant fails to reveal
material facts with respect to consequences from taking the
Defendant's Products. While the Plaintiff cites to numerous studies
and clinical trials to demonstrate that glucosamine and other
primary ingredients in the Products are ineffective at supporting
or benefiting joint health, the federal requirements only require
that the manufacturer has substantiation that the statement is
truthful and not misleading.

The FDCA does not define the term substantiation, however FDA
guidance advances a common sense interpretation of substantiation,
as meaning competent and reliable scientific evidence. Plaintiff's
citation to studies does not equate to Defendant lacking competent
and reliable scientific evidence of its own that establishes the
necessary substantiation. Furthermore, California law does not
allow private plaintiffs to demand substantiation for advertising
claims. Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim is premised on
the same theory that the Representations are false and misleading.
However, because Defendant's Representations are proper
structure/function claims as permitted by the federal requirements,
Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim would also seek to
impose state-law requirements that differ from the federal
requirements.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's state law false advertising claims
under the CLRA, UCL, and breach of express warranty are preempted
and therefore are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y26jsmq2 from Leagle.com.

James Kroessler, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Timothy G. Blood --
tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP.

CVS Health Corporation, Defendant, represented by Amy Pesapane
Lally -- alally@sidley.com -- Sidley Austin LLP &Adriane K. Peralta
-- ADRIANE.PERALTA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Questions in L. Lima Suit Certified to Hawaii Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
an Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court in the case
captioned  LIONEL LIMA, JR., et al., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DEUTSCHE BANK
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Defendant, EVELYN JANE GIBO, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant, DAVID
EMORY BALD, et al., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant. Civ. Nos. 12-00509 SOM-WRP, 12-00514 SOM-WRP, 13-00135
SOM-RT (D. Haw.).

This court therefore respectfully asks the Hawai'i Supreme Court to
exercise its discretion to accept and decide the certified
question.

The action arises from alleged conduct relating to the nonjudicial
foreclosure of properties owned by Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Borrowers
alleged that Defendant Banks and Rosen had breached their duties in
selling the properties when they advertised the foreclosure sales
as sales by quitclaim deed and postponed the sales without
publishing notices of new dates and times.

STANDARD FOR CERTIFYING A QUESTION.

The Hawai'i Supreme Court has jurisdiction and power to answer, in
its discretion, any question of law reserved by a circuit court,
the land court, or the tax appeal court, or any question or
proposition of law certified to it by a federal district or
appellate court if the supreme court shall so provide by rule.

When a federal district court or appellate court certifies to the
Hawai'i Supreme Court that there is involved in any proceeding
before it a question concerning the law of Hawai'i that is
determinative of the cause and that there is no clear controlling
precedent in the Hawai'i judicial decisions, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court may answer the certified question by written opinion.

QUESTION OF LAW TO WHICH AN ANSWER IS SOUGHT AND EFFECT OF AN
ANSWER ON THE PROCEEDINGS.

The question to which an answer is sought asks: When (a) a borrower
has indisputably defaulted on a mortgage for real property; (b) a
lender has conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale but has not
strictly complied with the requirements governing such sales; and
(c) the borrower sues the lender over that noncompliance after the
foreclosure sale and, if the property was purchased at foreclosure
by the lender, after any subsequent sale to a third-party
purchaser, may the borrower establish the requisite harm for
liability purposes under the law of wrongful foreclosure and/or
section 480-2 of Hawai'i Revised Statutes by demonstrating the loss
of title, possession, and/or investments in the property without
regard to the effect of the mortgage on those items?

LEGAL CIRCUMSTANCES OUT OF WHICH THE CERTIFIED QUESTION ARISES.

Recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has issued several opinions
relating to wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims, some with factual
allegations similar to those raised in Lima, Gibo, and Bald. The
Ninth Circuit and federal district judges in this jurisdiction have
also applied Hawai'i substantive law to analyze such claims.
However, the case law addressing nonjudicial foreclosures does not
provide a clear answer to the certified question.

This court views as unsettled how the harm issue should be
addressed in the context of both the wrongful foreclosure tort
claims and the UDAP claims before it. Stated in its starkest terms,
resolving the parties' dispute (and answering the certified
question) could leave Plaintiff Borrowers with no recovery or with
a windfall. In other words, in trying to discern where the burdens
lie, this court is not engaging in a purely philosophical exercise.
One might think that everything will sort itself out if this court
simply allows the cases to proceed, and that whether the mortgage
debt is considered as a liability issue or as a setoff issue will
not matter to the final judgments. That would ignore the status of
the three cases, particularly the class action issues. Far from
trying to determine how many angels can dance on the head of a pin,
this court is trying to parse the governing law in a manner that
will allow these cases to proceed in an orderly fashion.

Wrongful Foreclosure Tort Claims

The Hawai'i Supreme Court has not yet identified the elements of a
wrongful foreclosure claim specifically in the nonjudicial
foreclosure context, but it has stated that generally, if a
foreclosure is conducted negligently or in bad faith to the
detriment of the mortgagor, the mortgagor may assert a claim of
wrongful foreclosure by establishing the following elements: (1) a
legal duty owed to the mortgagor by the foreclosing party (2) a
breach of that duty (3) a causal connection between the breach of
that duty and the injury sustained and (4) damages.

It is unclear whether the effect of the mortgage must be considered
when determining whether a borrower has provided evidence of injury
and damages in its prima facie case of wrongful foreclosure. As
stated above, the only evidence of harm provided by Plaintiff
Borrowers is evidence of the loss of title, possession, and
investments in the properties, as if all of these attach to
property owned free and clear.

Generally, tort claims require the plaintiff to show that the harm
would not have occurred' in the absence of that is, but for the
defendant's conduct. It is undisputed that Plaintiff Borrowers
defaulted on their mortgages and were subject to foreclosure. If
Plaintiff Borrowers' harm is the loss of title, possession, and
investments in their properties, that loss might well have occurred
even if Defendant Banks had not engaged in the alleged advertising,
publication, and postponement practices. That is, even if Defendant
Banks had conducted the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
according to all applicable requirements, Plaintiff Borrowers'
properties might still have been sold at foreclosure.

Possibly, the harm to Plaintiff Borrowers should be viewed as the
loss of title, possession, and investments in their properties
earlier than the loss would have occurred with properly conducted
foreclosures. This interpretation recognizes that the foreclosure
sales of the properties were inevitable given Plaintiff Borrowers'
defaults, but that the sales should have been redone to comply with
all requirements governing the manner of foreclosure. In other
words, even if Plaintiff Borrowers' properties would have
eventually been sold (absent evidence that they could have cured
their defaults had the sales been postponed), they suffered harm
from Defendant Banks' premature selling of the properties.

However, even this characterization of harm raises the question of
how to deal with Plaintiff Borrowers' mortgages. If Plaintiff
Borrowers can claim only the loss of something they had in the
first place, then how can they ignore the mortgages, as they never
had unencumbered interests in their properties?

Absent the foreclosure sales, Plaintiff Borrowers would have
continued to be obligated to make their mortgage payments. And
absent any noncompliance with foreclosure requirements, Plaintiff
Borrowers' mortgages would have been taken into account. Under this
line of reasoning, Plaintiff Borrowers themselves arguably must
include evidence of their outstanding mortgage debt in claiming
harm in the form of loss of title, possession, and investments.
That is, they cannot claim as harm the loss of something they never
had.

But this court cannot say that this line of reasoning reflects
Hawai'i law on the appropriate remedy in all wrongful foreclosure
cases. The Hawai'i Supreme Court noted that the classic remedy in
such circumstances would be return of title and possession, but
that money damages may be substituted for title and possession in
certain instances pursuant to the equitable powers of a court in
adjudicating a case arising from a mortgage foreclosure.

That foreclosure price was far below the more than $1.3 million
that the Santiagos had paid just two years earlier. The Hawai'i
Supreme Court appears to have been intent on avoiding a huge
windfall to the lender. The Court did not expressly refer to any
windfall to the victimized borrowers, but the total out-of-pocket
losses of $1,412,790.79 resulting from the wrongful foreclosure
appears to have disregarded any remaining mortgage obligation, and
to have ended up compensating the Santiagos for payments made even
during the years they occupied the property. Thus, the Santiagos
were repaid whatever they had spent, were left with no debts, and
were in effect given rent-free occupancy before losing title.
Plaintiff Borrowers therefore read Santiago as establishing that,
under Hawai'i law, borrowers who have been subjected to wrongful
foreclosures may end up debt-free, and reimbursed for all payments
made relating to the property or to the foreclosure.

If the effect of the mortgage does matter in the harm analysis,
such that a borrower whose debt exceeds the value of the property
does not suffer harm, that of course leaves the question of how to
determine the value of the property. Defendant Banks offer the
foreclosure prices as evidence of value, but this court is not here
adopting that approach or including that issue in the certified
question.  

UDAP Claims

To state a UDAP claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a
violation of section 480-2 (2) injury to the consumer caused by
such a violation and (3) proof of the amount of damages.

The Ninth Circuit said it was not enough for a debtor to simply
list as damages Debtor's loss of equity in her property, the rental
value of the property for the time Debtor was apparently excluded
from possession, and attorneys' fees accrued in the state court
ejectment action.

On remand, to properly narrow the inquiry to the damage caused by
Lenders' deceptive postponement, the bankruptcy court was directed
to determine the difference, if any, between Debtor's situation had
Lenders properly postponed the foreclosure sale and Debtor's actual
situation, given that the sale was improperly postponed.

The Clerk of Court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to
the Hawai'i Supreme Court under official seal of the United States
District Court of the District of Hawaii.  
The court directs the Clerk to administratively close all three
cases while the matter is pending in the Hawai'i Supreme Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2fv9mm4 from Leagle.com.

Lionel Lima, Jr., individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Barbara-Ann Delizo-Lima, individually and on behalf of
all those similarly situated & Calvin Jon Kirby, III, individually
and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by James J. Bickerton -- bickerton@bsds.com --
Bickerton Law Group LLLP, Raymond C. Cho , Affinity Law Group,
Van-Alan H. Shima , Affinity Law Group, 1188 Bishop St.Suite
3408Honolulu, HI 96813, Bridget G. Morgan-Bickerton --
morgan@bsds.com -- Bickerton Law Group LLLP, John F. Perkin –
perkin@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin & Faria & Stanley H. Roehrig , Law
Office of Stanley H. Roehrig, 101 Aupuni St # 124, Hilo, HI 96720

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, identified in the Notice of
Removal as defendant "solely in its trustee capacity", Defendant,
represented by Andrew V. Beaman -- abeaman@chunkerr.com -- Chun
Kerr LLP, Bernard J. Garbutt, III --
bernard.garbutt@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice, Anna S. Goldenhersh -- anna.goldenhersh@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice, Brian M. Jazaeri --
brian.jazaeri@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice, Grant MacQueen -- grant.macqueen@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory T. Fouts --
gregory.fouts@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, pro
hac vice & Megan A. Suehiro -- megan.suehiro@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Arbitration Stay in WTU's Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued an Opinion
affirming the Trial Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to
Stay Arbitration in the captioned WASHINGTON TEACHERS' UNION,
Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Appellee. No.
17-CV-1156. (D.C.).

The Washington Teachers' Union (WTU) filed such a grievance under
its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the District of
Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). In pursuing the group grievance,
WTU was purporting to represent over 180 teachers who had received
less than Effective ratings under the IMPACT evaluation process.
These teachers were placed on different levels of probation, and
some even lost their jobs. Thus, the union citing thirty-two
examples of unfair, arbitrary and capricious implementation and
application" of IMPACT sought arbitration from the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) to rescind the negative consequences
of those evaluations, including restoration of all lost salaries,
benefits, and privileges of employment.

The trial court granted DCPS's motion to permanently stay the
arbitration. The court was persuaded that the group grievance filed
by the Union is not arbitrable because DCPS did not consent to
submitting this type of kitchen-sink grievance to arbitration.

To the extent that the Union is challenging procedures under the
IMPACT process, it is not doing so in a way that the CBA
contemplates. Even though the remedy that WTU was seeking was not
phrased as a challenge to the evaluation judgments themselves, the
court concluded that WTU's carefully worded phrasing was
nonetheless aimed at challenging such judgments, as forbidden by
WTU 1: The remedies sought by the Union in its demand for
arbitration include reinstating fired teachers, restoring all
compensation and benefits, and purging any references to the
evaluation judgments from employment records. These remedies, taken
together, are tantamount to eliminating or rescinding the ratings
themselves.

The fundamental question presented is the extent to which this
court may lawfully determine whether the class/group grievance at
issue here is arbitrable.  

   1. As a matter of law, does the court or an arbitrator determine
whether an alleged class/group grievance is arbitrable under the
CBA?

   2. If the appropriate authority determines that a class/group
grievance is arbitrable under the CBA, does the same authority
define its proper scope?

   3. Once the appropriate authority has determined the proper
scope of a class/group grievance under the CBA, which authority,
court or arbitrator, lawfully determines whether the class/group
grievance is arbitrable in this case?

As a matter of law, does the court or an arbitrator determine
whether a "class/group grievance" is arbitrable under the CBA?

As to the first issue, D.C. Code Section 16-4406(b) (2012 Repl.)
provides: The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate
exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.

The Court concludes, accordingly, that the court, not an
arbitrator, must determine whether WTU may pursue arbitration of a
class/group grievance against DCPS under the CBA. Pursuant to this
authority, the Court further concludes, as did the trial court,
contrary to WTU's lead argument that CBA Article 6.4.3.7 is the
only CBA source authorizing arbitration of a class/group grievance.


If the appropriate authority determines that a group grievance is
arbitrable under the CBA, does the same authority define its proper
scope?

This brings to the Court to the second issue: does the court or an
arbitrator define matter of general application?  Put more
specifically, once the court has concluded that a group grievance
is arbitrable under CBA Article 6.4.3.7, which decision-maker
determines the permitted scope of that arbitration its outside
limit on the arbitrator's authority to decide the case?

Is that authority inherent in the court's threshold (commonly
called a gateway or substantive) determination of arbitrability, or
is it a distinct procedural decision traditionally left to the
arbitrator?.

To avoid fundamentally incompatible results, this court must
therefore answer a second question: at what level of generality
should matter of general application be defined, given no
elaboration of its meaning in the CBA? To say simply that the
matter covers all complaints of employees who are similarly
situated, for example, or all grievances that have a common thread,
as the trial court found wanting here, would seem far too general.

As expressed at oral argument, WTU contends that a group grievance
alleging a matter of general application embraces a commonality
defined merely as an IMPACT process violation. This definition thus
includes all thirty two alleged violations, reflecting a
substantial variety of alleged evaluation lapses, to the detriment
of over 180 teachers, including an indefinite number not identified
in the pleadings.

DCPS, to the contrary, would limit the definition to a common
injury to each individual grievant in the alleged group, meaning an
injury caused by the same kind of alleged IMPACT violation. DCPS
added that WTU failed to allege a single fact applicable to the
entire group of over 180 named grievants," thereby implying that
even if WTU's alleged group of grievants could be divided into
subgroups characterized by common injuries, WTU would have to begin
anew by allocating individual grievants to a very large number of
subgroups for separate arbitrations.

Second, the Court cannot agree with WTU that sufficient commonality
for a matter of general application can be achieved by bundling
together a variety of injuries caused by multiple violations of the
IMPACT process. That would permit arbitration of a single claim
that not even our class action rules, if applicable, would permit.

The Court agrees with DCPS that a grievant's injury is the
essential commonality required for a group arbitration without
further limitation by reference to the evaluator who may have
caused it.  

Third, according to CBA Article 6.4.3.3, the arbitrator may hear
and decide only one grievance in each case, meaning that a group
reflecting one type of injury cannot be joined with arbitration of
another type of injury.

In sum, a matter of general application, as applied here, is a
group grievance defined by reference to injuries that the
individual grievants have in common. Otherwise, the Court can
discern no limiting principle that could justify a collective
definition short of all process violations, as proposed by WTU a
definition that would permit an agglomeration of instances far too
unwieldy for compliance with CBA Article 6.4.3.3, which limits
arbitration including group grievance arbitration to only one
grievance in each case.

Once the appropriate authority has determined the proper scope of a
group grievance under the CBA, which authority, court or
arbitrator, lawfully determines whether the "group grievance" is
arbitrable in this case?

This brings us, finally, to the third issue: should this court, or
an arbitrator, determine whether WTU may pursue arbitration of this
particular group grievance brought against DCPS?
The trial court aptly characterized the thirty-two alleged
violations of IMPACT asserted by WTU as a kitchen-sink group of
grievances, applicable without specification to more than 180
grievants. Thus, WTU has alleged a potpourri of grievances, not
expressly tied to particular individuals, creating an alleged group
grievance far broader than the words matter of general application
could possibly accommodate under the common injury test for
commonality.

As a matter of law, no arbitrator could rationally conclude that
the collection of grievances presented here by WTU could be
structured as a matter of general application arbitrable, as
required, in a single case. For future cases, however, a
substantive determination the arbitral scope has now been
established as the platform from which an arbitrator may address
all procedural issues. Arbitrators will have the uniform guidance
required to decide the threshold question whether a grievance
claimed to be an Article 6.4.3.7 matter of general application
covering multiple individuals is arbitrable.

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court must affirm the trial
court's permanent stay of the particular arbitration WTU seeks
here. On the other hand, this affirmance is without prejudice. It
does not preclude WTU from trying again to present a group
grievance or multiple group grievances each circumscribed by the
required common injury.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, without prejudice as
explained.

A full-text copy of the D.C. App.'s May 16, 2019 Opinion is
available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyr6ppe7 from Leagle.com.

Daniel M. Rosenthal  -- daniel@dbrlawfirm.com -- with whom Lee W.
Jackson -- lwjackson@jamhoff.com -- and Alice C. Hwang --
achwang@jamhoff.com -- were on the brief, for appellant.

Mark J. Murphy -- mark.murphy@huschblackwell.com -- was on the
brief for Teamsters Local Union No. 639 Amicus Curiae, in support
of Washington Teachers' Union, appellant.

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A.
Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L.
AliKhan, Solicitor General, and Stacy L. Anderson, Acting Deputy
Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee District of
Columbia.


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Narrows Claims in Guns Seizure Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned MAGGIE SMITH et
al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. Civil Case No.
15-737. (D.D.C.).

This matter began when D.C. police pulled-over Maggie Smith, a
34-year-old nurse from North Carolina without a criminal record who
visited D.C. in June 2014. During the traffic stop, she told the
officer, as she had been taught to do in her gun ownership class
that she was carrying a handgun licensed in her home state.  So
police arrested her, seized her firearm under Section 22-4517, and
took her to the D.C. jail, where they strip-searched and held her
overnight until the U.S. Attorney charged her. Though the District
dismissed those charge's seven months later, Smith's gun remains in
police custody.

Police arrested one new plaintiff, Cpl. Frederick Rouse, after
housekeeping found two handguns and a scope in his D.C. hotel room.
Both handguns were licensed in Maryland, where Rouse a senior
engineer at the Defense Information Systems Agency resides. After
Rouse spent two nights in jail, the D.C. Attorney General charged
him with violating Sections 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01. The District
eventually dismissed the charges without prejudice at a pre-trial
status conference, though it had earlier successfully opposed
Rouse's motion to dismiss.

Police pulled-over another new plaintiff, Gerard Cassagnol, after
receiving a tip he had a gun in the car. He volunteered the gun's
location to the officers, which was unloaded and properly contained
in a locked gun-safe. But he spent two nights in jail before the
U.S. Attorney charged him with violating Sections 7-2502.01,
7-2506.01, and 22-4504. When the United States dropped the charges
post-Palmer, the D.C. Attorney General reinstated the charges for
Sections 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01, and successfully opposed
Cassagnol's motion to dismiss before nolle pross-ing the charges
without prejudice. Before this incident, Cassagnol had no criminal
record and worked fulltime for a telecommunications company.

Police arrested another new plaintiff, Virginia student Delontay
Davis, after spotting his firearm during a traffic stop. The
District confiscated his car and firearm, strip-searched him, and
jailed him for four nights while the U.S. Attorney charged him with
violating Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504. When the U.S.
Attorney dismissed those charges ten months later, the D.C.
Attorney General recharged him under Sections 7-2502.01 and
7-2506.01, but dropped the case two months later.

Based on these facts, the plaintiffs bring ten claims:

   1. That Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504, which
together prohibited non-D.C. residents from having handguns and
ammunition for self-defense while in the District— violated the
Second Amendment;

   2. That arresting and detaining people under those laws violated
the Fourth Amendment;

   3. That those laws violated the Fifth Amendment's
right-to-travel and equal protection guarantees;

   4. That seizing handguns (under Section 22-4517) and the
vehicles used to convey them (under Section 7-2507.06a) violated
the Second Amendment;

   5. That the same handgun and vehicle seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment;

   6. That continuing to seize plaintiffs' handguns and ammunition
after dismissing their charges violates the Fourth Amendment;

   7. That seizing handguns and ammunition without notice and a
hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's procedural due process
protection;

   8. That seizing cars after searching and processing them for
evidence violated the Fourth Amendment;

   9. That forfeiting cars used to transport guns violates the
Second Amendment; and

  10. That forfeiting cars used to transport guns violates the
Fourth Amendment.

Now, the District moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). First, the
District claims plaintiffs lack standing to challenge vehicle
seizures under Section 7-2507.06a.  Next, the District argues the
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' Second and Fifth
Amendment challenges to Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and
22-4504.

The District further moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It
argues plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenges fail as a matter of
law. It also contends plaintiffs' challenges to Sections 7-2502.01,
7-2506.01, and 22-4504 are not cognizable under Section 1983, and
fail to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment. Next, the District
argues plaintiffs' vehicle-related claims are time-barred.  

Because Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the laws that enabled
the District to seize their cars, take their guns, and subject them
to criminal prosecution, the Court will deny the District's
12(b)(1) motion.

To have standing a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact,
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.

The District's 12(b)(1) motion invokes standing, mootness, and
preclusion. First, the District claims plaintiffs lack the required
injury-in-fact to confer standing to challenge vehicle seizures
under Section 7-2507.06a because the District did not actually
forfeit any plaintiff's car. Next, the District claims two other
cases rejecting challenges to the District's seizure of property
incident to arrest preclude plaintiffs' present challenge to the
District's seizure of guns and ammunition under Section 22-4517.
Finally, the District argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider plaintiffs' Second or Fifth Amendment challenges to
Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504, either because
plaintiffs' lack standing or because their claims are moot.

But the District errs at each step. Plaintiffs have standing to
challenge vehicle seizures under Section 7-2507.06a: by temporarily
seizing Davis's car under color of Section 7-2507.06a, the District
caused him to suffer a redressable injury. Relatedly, because
plaintiffs did not participate in other cases challenging the
District's seizure of property incident to arrest, those cases do
not preclude their challenge to Section 22-4517. Additionally,
plaintiffs have standing to challenge Sections 7-2502.01,
7-2506.01, and 22-4504 because their prosecutions under those
statutes caused them to suffer redressable injuries. And finally,
repealing Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 did not moot
plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief since the superseded laws
still harm one named plaintiff and since plaintiffs seek more than
a declaration concerning the repealed laws' constitutionality.

Because the District intended to forfeit Davis's car under Section
7-2507.06a, plaintiffs can challenge that statute.

The District argues plaintiffs lack standing to pursue Second and
Fourth Amendment challenges to the District's seizure of cars used
to transport guns under its civil forfeiture scheme. As the
District points out, although Davis alleges the District seized his
car to forfeit it, the District ultimately changed its mind,
returning it sixty days later following Davis's Rule 41(g) motion.
So the District narrowly argues that plaintiffs lack the requisite
injury-in-fact to establish standing.

Not so. After all, plaintiffs allege the District seized Davis's
car to forfeit it. In the best case, that seizure might be
temporary if the District gets cold feet); in the worst case, it's
permanent if the District effectuates forfeiture). Here, Davis got
lucky, the District's seizure was temporary. But he suffered an
injury all the same: the temporary dispossession forced him to drop
out of school since he couldn't get to class for half the semester.
And that injury gives him standing to challenge Section
7-2507.06a.

The Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the laws they were prosecuted for violating because those
prosecutions caused them to suffer injuries-in-fact redressable
through damages and injunctive relief.

The District next floats a two-pronged attack on plaintiffs'
standing to challenge Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504.
First, the District claims those laws didn't cause plaintiffs'
exposure to the District's criminal justice system.

But that argument confuses causation with the merits and turns
centuries of civil rights jurisprudence on its head. By the
District's logic, Mildred and Richard Loving could not have
challenged Virginia's antimiscegenation law, Greg Johnson could not
have challenged Texas's flag-burning prohibition, and John Lawrence
could not have challenged Texas's sodomy ban. Simply put, someone
prosecuted under a criminal law can challenge its constitutionality
regardless of whether they consciously committed the offense, and
regardless of whether their prosecution proceeded to conviction.
The District cannot shield those laws from constitutional challenge
by blaming plaintiffs for violating them.

Second, the District argues declaring Sections 7-2502.01,
7-2506.01, and 22-4504 unconstitutional will not redress
plaintiffs' injuries.  

That logic conflates redressability with damages or maybe with
mootness. Either way, the Court does not adopt the District's
cribbed conception of plaintiffs' requested relief. If plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge to Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and
22-4504 prevails and for present purposes, the Court must assume it
will plaintiffs will be entitled to compensatory damages for
physical suffering, for mental anguish, and for reasonable and
necessary expenses like loss of earnings or attorney's fees. They
will also be entitled to nominal damages. They may even be entitled
to declaratory and injunctive relief nullifying their arrests and
sealing any relevant records. But in all events, a favorable
decision will likely redress injuries Sections 7-2502.01,
7-2506.01, and 22-4504 caused.

So plaintiffs can challenge those laws on Second and Fifth
Amendment grounds.

Because plaintiffs state some valid claims and some invalid claims,
the Court will grant-in-part and deny-in-part the District's
12(b)(6) motion.

In its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the District takes several swings at
the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims. Some land. For
instance, plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenges to their arrest,
detention, vehicle seizure, and initial firearm seizure fail as a
matter of law. Additionally, plaintiffs' vehicle-related Second
Amendment challenges are timebarred. And because Rule 41(g)
provides adequate post-deprivation safeguards, plaintiffs'
procedural due process challenge to the District's seizure of guns
and ammunition stumbles from the start.

But none are knockouts. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to
the District's continued seizure of their guns and ammunition after
dismissing their criminal charges may proceed. So too can
plaintiffs' Second and Fifth Amendment challenges to Section
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504: both are cognizable under
Section 1983, and their Fifth Amendment allegations bear out equal
protection and right-to-travel deprivations. And plaintiffs may
continue pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief nullifying
their arrests and sealing related records.

Most of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenges fail as a matter of
law, but their challenge to the District's ongoing seizure of their
guns and ammunition may proceed.

The plaintiffs challenge more than just their arrests. They also
challenge their overnight detentions (the other part of claim two);
the ongoing seizure of their guns and ammunition (claims five and
six); and the two-month seizure of Davis's car (claims eight and
ten). The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures.
So was it unreasonable for the District to seize Smith for one
night, Cpl. Rouse and Cassagnol for two nights, and Davis for four
nights? Was it unreasonable to seize Davis's car for purposes of
civil forfeiture? Or to continue holding it after searching and
processing it for evidence? Was it unreasonable to seize their guns
and ammunition under Section 22-4517? What about after dismissing
the charges against them?

For the first four questions, the Court still answers no. First,
given the ample probable cause that plaintiffs had violated
Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504, the District reasonably
detained them after their arrests. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment
requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. And
this determination must generally occur within 48 hours of arrest.

But here, Davis the only plaintiff detained for more than
forty-eight hours had his initial appearance in Superior Court the
day after his arrest. The Superior Court judge further detained him
for three more nights after determining pursuant to D.C. Code
Section 23-1322(b)(2) that no condition or combination of
conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of [Davis] as
required, and the safety of any other person and the community. Of
course, plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling here. They only ask
whether Davis and the other plaintiffs received a constitutionally
adequate judicial determination of probable cause prior to their
extended detention. And since they did, their challenge to their
overnight detention fails as a matter of law.

Second, the District reasonably retained Davis's car for purposes
of civil forfeiture. Though civil forfeiture statutes raise a
hornets' nest of constitutional questions, the Fourth Amendment
inquiry is simple: are forfeiture proceedings supported by probable
cause?   

Here, Section 7-2507.06a(b) provided for forfeiture of vehicles in
which any person or persons transport, possess, or conceal any
firearm or in any manner use to facilitate a violation of  Section
22-4504. As explained, police had probable cause to believe Davis
violated § 22-4504 by transporting a handgun in his vehicle. And
the District reasonably held the vehicle for two months while
contemplating civil forfeiture: otherwise Davis could have
frustrated the proceedings by selling, destroying, concealing, or
removing the vehicle from the jurisdiction. Thus seizing Davis's
car in contemplation of civil forfeiture complied with the Fourth
Amendment.

Third and for essentially the same reason the District reasonably
retained Davis's car after processing it for evidence. Because
Section 7-2507.06a gave the District authority to hold the car
while contemplating civil forfeiture, and because probable cause
would have supported those forfeiture proceedings, the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit the District from holding the car in
advance of civil forfeiture proceedings, even after processing it
for evidence.

Fourth, the District could seize plaintiffs' guns and ammunition
while their prosecutions were pending. After all, police can seize
weapons found in plain view or following a lawful search incident
to arrest to ensure officer safety and to preserve incriminating
evidence.   

Here, plaintiffs do not dispute the weapons were either in plain
view or found during a lawful search. And at least until the
District dismissed their criminal charges, the District could
justify retaining the guns in order to preserve evidence important
to the ongoing prosecution. So plaintiffs' challenge to the
District's seizure of their guns and ammunition while their
criminal charges were pending fails as a matter of law.

But the Court cannot say whether the District's ongoing seizure of
plaintiffs' guns and ammunition after dismissing the charges
against them complies with the Fourth Amendment. To answer this
question, the Court must balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.

What justification could the District possibly have for still
holding plaintiffs' guns and ammunition, years after dismissing the
charges against them? The District doesn't say. Clearly any need to
preserve evidence for the ongoing prosecutions ended when those
prosecutions were dismissed. So the District must answer this
claim.

In sum, although the Court will dismiss most of plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment challenges (claims two, five, eight, and ten), their
Fourth Amendment challenge to the District's continuing seizure of
their guns and ammunition (claim six) persists.

Plaintiffs' Second and Fifth Amendment Challenges to Sections
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 survive.

Claims one and three of plaintiffs' second amended complaint
challenge Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 on Second and
Fifth Amendment grounds. Specifically, plaintiffs argue the scheme
infringes on their rights to possess a handgun for individual
self-defense, to equal protection, and to travel interstate.

The District counters that these claims aren't cognizable under
Section 1983 since plaintiffs' arrest and prosecutions passed
independent constitutional muster. The District further argues
plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection or right-to-travel
claim.

But the District is wrong. Plaintiffs' Second and Fifth Amendment
claims are cognizable under Section 1983 since plaintiffs allege
Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 afflict substantive
rights beyond their arrests and prosecutions. And plaintiffs
adequately state equal protection and right-to-travel claims since
Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 distinguish between D.C.
and non-D.C. residents in a way that jeopardizes the latter's
fundamental rights.

So claims one and three can proceed.

Because plaintiffs allege Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and
22-4504 violated the Bill of Rights' substantive guarantees, their
Second and Fifth Amendment claims are cognizable under Section
1983.

A law banning law-abiding citizens from having a handgun for
individual self-defense constitutes a classic Second Amendment
injury. A state law treating non-state residents differently on the
basis of a fundamental right presents a paradigmatic equal
protection problem. And a law forcing plaintiffs to surrender a
fundamental right before traveling interstate impacts the right to
travel. So at bottom, plaintiffs claim more than that they had to
defend themselves against unconstitutional laws. They claim the
unconstitutional laws infringed their substantive rights.

Thus they allege constitutional injuries cognizable under Section
1983.

The Plaintiffs' equal protection claim survives because Sections
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 distinguish between D.C.
residents and non-D.C. residents at the expense of the latter's
fundamental rights.

The Fifth Amendment's due process clause forbids the District from
denying equal protection of its laws to anyone in the District.
Essentially, this protects against discrimination: the District
cannot treat people differently without a satisfactory
justification. By extension, it means the District cannot deny some
people a benefit available to others on account of their exercise
of a fundamental right.  

First, Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 treated D.C.
residents different from non-D.C. residents. True enough, the laws
seem generally applicable at first glance. Section 7-2502.01(a)
made it unlawful to possess or control any firearm, unless the
person held a valid registration certificate for the firearm.

But Section 7-2502.02 is the rub. That statute's subsection
(a)(4)(C) decreed that a D.C. registration certificate shall not be
issued for a pistol unless the registrant seeks to register the
pistol for use in self-defense within that person's home. In other
words, Section 7-2502.02 did not provide an avenue for people
without a home in D.C. to register guns in D.C. Indeed, plaintiffs
allege the District required registrants to prove their D.C.
residency before they could obtain a certificate.  

And second, this differential treatment causes more problems than
the District admits. To be sure, a bona fide residence requirement
implicates no suspect classification, and therefore is not subject
to strict scrutiny. But drawing all inferences in the plaintiffs'
favour this de facto residency requirement did restrict plaintiffs'
fundamental right to have a handgun for individual self-defense.  

Outside the equal protection context, courts cleave over what tier
of heightened scrutiny applies to laws burdening the Second
Amendment, and the D.C. Circuit has yet to take sides. So in
addition to the Supreme Court's command to subject
fundamental-right impacting distinctions to strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis, this Circuit's Second Amendment
jurisprudence urges the same result.

In sum, strict scrutiny applies to plaintiffs' equal protection
claim. And to satisfy strict scrutiny, the District must show
Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 are narrowly tailored to
effectively advance a compelling interest. But since the District
bears this burden, it is a question for a later day. For now, the
Court merely concludes that because Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01,
and 22-4504 drew a distinction between D.C. residents and non-D.C.
residents jeopardizing the latter's exercise of their fundamental
right to possess a handgun for individual self-defense, plaintiffs
adequately state an equal protection claim.

The Plaintiffs' right-to-travel claim adequately states a claim for
relief because Sections 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 penalize
plaintiffs for traveling interstate by treating D.C.-resident
gunowners differently from non D.C. resident gunowners.

In addition to challenging plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim on
equal protection grounds, the District separately argues
plaintiffs' right-to-travel argument fails.   

But like in the equal protection context any government impingement
on the fundamental right to move between states would be measured
under a strict scrutiny standard and would be justified only if the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.

Here, the Court concludes plaintiffs plausibly allege Sections
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 impinge on their fundamental
right to travel interstate, and thus merit strict scrutiny. A law
implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel,
when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses `any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right.' Plaintiffs do not argue the laws actually deter or try to
impede interstate travel. But plaintiffs do adequately contend the
laws use a classification gun ownership to penalize exercising the
right.  

As a result, plaintiffs right-to-travel claim goes the distance.
Just as the Court explained for plaintiffs' equal protection claim,
because the District bears the burden under strict scrutiny to
prove the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, the claim cannot be resolved on the District's own
motion to dismiss. Because plaintiffs adequately claim Sections
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 impinge on their fundamental
right to travel interstate, their right-to-travel claim can go
forward.

The Plaintiffs' vehicle-related Second Amendment challenges are
time-barred.

The District next claims plaintiffs' vehicle-related claims all
fall outside D.C. Code Section 12-301's default three-year statute
of limitations.  

Section 12-301(8) imposes a three-year residual statute of
limitations on section 1983 claims. That poses a problem for
plaintiffs. After all, Davis is the only plaintiff to have his car
taken. Police initially seized his car in March 2014; they returned
it in late May 2014. But plaintiffs did not attempt to add Davis
and his vehicle-related claims to the suit until November 2017,
well after three years passed.  

The Plaintiffs try to skirt this time-limit by claiming the
vehicle-related claims relate back to Smith's original complaint
filed in May 2015. True enough, a new plaintiff or claim can relate
back to the date of the original pleading if the amendment asserts
a claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set out or attempted to be set out in the original pleading. But
new plaintiffs and claims do not relate back if they assert a new
ground for relief supported by facts that differ in type from those
the original pleading set forth.

To determine where plaintiffs' claims fall, the Court considers
whether the original complaint adequately notified the defendant of
the basis for liability the plaintiffs would later advance. Even
new claims and plaintiffs sharing some elements and some facts in
common with the original complaint do not relate back if it
operates to fault the defendant for conduct different from that
identified in the original complaint.

So too for Davis and his vehicle-related claims. Taking as true
plaintiffs' contention that the relevant transaction in the
original Complaint is properly understood as Ms. Smith's arrest" in
June 2014, the Court cannot see how claims stemming from Davis's
March 2014 arrest arise out of that conduct, transaction, or
occurrence.

Accordingly, because plaintiffs' vehicle-related Second Amendment
claims assert an unanticipatable ground for relief different in
kind from those in the original complaint, they do not relate back
to Smith's original complaint. And because they do not relate back,
they land outside Section 12-301(8)'s three-year timebar. So claims
four and nine will be dismissed.

Because Rule 41(g) provides adequate post-deprivation process,
plaintiffs' procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law.

In claim seven, plaintiffs argue the District's failure to provide
notice and a hearing regarding their seized handguns and ammunition
violated the Fifth Amendment's procedural due process guarantee.
But the District argues the claim fails as a matter of law, since
Rule 41(g) offers a constitutionally adequate post-seizure
mechanism to challenge the guns' seizure.

To be sure, plaintiffs' right to have a handgun for individual
self-defense is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance. But where police seize those guns incident to arrest,
the risk of erroneous deprivation is negligible. And the
search-incident-to-arrest context further makes pre-deprivation
process impractical, given the ease with which guns can be quickly
and quietly sold, destroyed, concealed, or otherwise removed from
the jurisdiction.  

Accordingly, because seizing plaintiffs' guns and ammunition
without pre-deprivation notice and hearing passed constitutional
muster, plaintiffs' procedural due process challenge fails as a
matter of law. Claim seven will be dismissed.

Plaintiffs may continue pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief
nullifying their arrests and expunging records relating to their
arrests and prosecutions.

The District's final contention can be swiftly felled. The District
claims plaintiffs cannot obtain declaratory and injunctive relief
sealing their arrest and prosecution records and declaring their
arrests legal nullities because that relief is limited to
individuals who can show by clear and convincing evidence' either
that the crime for which she was arrested did not occur, or that
she did not commit it.

Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the laws that allowed the
District to seize their cars, take their guns, and subject them to
arrest and prosecution, and their claims are neither precluded nor
moot. So the Court will deny the District's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Additionally, plaintiffs state some legally sufficient claims under
the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment challenge to the ongoing seizure of their guns and
ammunition; their Second and Fifth Amendment challenges to Sections
7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504; and their pursuit of injunctive
and declaratory relief nullifying their arrests and sealing related
arrest and prosecution records may advance. But their other Fourth
Amendment challenges fail, as do their Second Amendment challenges
to vehicle seizure and forfeiture, and their procedural due process
challenge to the District's seizure of their guns and ammunition.
So the Court will grant-in-part and deny-in-part the District's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Simply put, claims two, four, five, seven, eight, nine, and ten
will be dismissed with prejudice. But all other claims remain. A
separate order follows.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yywv7us8 from
Leagle.com.

MAGGIE SMITH, GERARD CASSAGNOL, ROB & FREDERICK ROUSE, CORNELIUS,
Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph A. Scrofano, SCROFANO LAW PC, 406
5th St NW Suite 100, Washington, DC 20001 & William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, CLAIBORNELAW, 410 E Bay St, Savannah, GA 31401,

DELONTAY DAVIS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, CLAIBORNELAW.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant, represented by
Andrew J. Saindon, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL & Matthew Robert
Blecher , OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.


DON VITO: Court Denies Preliminary Approval of Settlement in Camilo
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement in the
case captioned RODRIGO CAMILO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEVERO C.
OZUNA, et al., Defendants. Case No.18-cv-02842-VKD. (N.D. Cal.).

Presently before the Court is plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement of this action.

Plaintiffs Rodrigo Camilo, Alvaro Camilo, Ricardo Sanchez, and Jose
Lopez bring this hybrid putative class action and collective class
action for alleged wage and hour violations under various
provisions of the California Labor Code and the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).

Class Members, defined in the parties' Joint Stipulation for Class
Action Settlement and Release (Stipulated Settlement) as follows:

     All non-exempt hourly employees who are employed or have been
employed by Defendants as all non-exempt hourly employees involved
in the tortilla and chip manufacturing process who were employed by
Defendants between May 14, 2014 and March 19, 2019 who claim they
were not paid all their overtime at the rate of 1.5 times their
regular rate of pay, and who claim did not receive their breaks.

The proposed settlement is non-reversionary and contemplates a
release of claims in return for a total payment of $375,000 into a
common fund. From that fund, the parties will deduct $112,500 in
attorneys' fees, up to $10,000 in litigation expenses, no more than
$15,000 for settlement administration costs, and service awards of
$5,000 to each named plaintiff. The remaining sum, $217,500,
referred to as the Net Settlement Fund," will then be available for
distribution to each Participating Class Member" based on the
number of weeks he or she worked, with 67% of the fund being
allocated to Rule 23 class claims and 33% being allocated to those
under the FLSA.

Rule 23 Class Certification and FLSA Collective Class
Certification

In a Rule 23 class action, the members of a certified class are
bound by the judgment unless they opt out of the suit. By contrast,
in an FLSA collective action, only those claimants who
affirmatively opt-in by providing a written consent are bound by
the results of the action. The procedures for certification and
approval of settlement for Rule 23 class actions and FLSA
collective actions therefore are significantly different.  

Rule 23 Class Certification

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that class certification is appropriate under Rule
23. Class certification under Rule 23 requires two steps. First,
plaintiffs must satisfy the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a),
namely numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of
representation. Here, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule
23(b)(3) and therefore must show that questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Rule 23(a) Certification

For purposes of resolving the present motion for settlement, the
Court finds that the Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied.

Numerosity

Under Rule 23(a), the class must be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. While there is no fixed number that
satisfies the numerosity requirement, as a general rule, classes of
forty or more are considered sufficiently numerous. Here, the
numerosity requirement is met. Whether this factor is evaluated
under plaintiffs' original or supplemental briefing, all
indications are that there are well over 40 putative class
members.

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires questions of law or fact common to the
class. A question is common where it is capable of class-wide
resolution which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke. However, what matters to class
certification is not the raising of common questions’ even in
droves but rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. A single common question is sufficient to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2).  

Here, the commonality requirement is met because resolution of the
class claims depends on common questions of law and fact about the
class members' employment with defendants. Although plaintiffs have
not identified the particular positions and duties of the putative
class members, plaintiffs contend that every class member was
subject to the same alleged policies, i.e., shaved overtime hours,
the payment of overtime work at the regular rate of pay, and the
failure to provide meal and rest breaks.  

Typicality

Rule 23(a) requires that "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that
the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests
of the class and the test is whether other members have the same or
similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members
have been injured by the same course of conduct. The typicality
requirement is satisfied where representative claims are reasonably
coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be
substantially identical.

Here, plaintiffs' claims meet the typicality requirement because
plaintiffs, like every other class member, worked for defendants as
non-exempt hourly employees and claim that they were subject to the
same alleged unlawful wage and hour practices.  

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a) requires that the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4). In assessing this factor, the Court addresses two legal
issues, i.e., whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel (1)
have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (2)
will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.  

The record does not indicate the presence of any conflicts of
interest. No issues have been raised with respect to plaintiffs'
counsel's competence, and they each aver that they have been
practicing attorneys for nearly 30 years, with considerable
experience litigating employment and wage-and-hour matters. The
Court finds that the adequacy requirement is met.

Rule 23(b)(3) Certification

Plaintiffs seek to certify the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires that the questions of law or fact common to class
member predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation and
asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case
are more prevalent or important than the non-common,
aggregation-defeating, individual issues. In the present case,
plaintiffs have satisfied the predominance factor because the
issues in dispute concern defendants' allegedly unlawful wage and
hour policies, which generally apply to all class members. The
record suggests that the only individual question is the amount of
damages to which each putative class member is entitled. However,
individualized damages alone do not defeat Rule 23(b)(3)
certification.  

In determining whether a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy, courts consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the
class members' interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against the class; (3) the desirability of
concentrating the litigation of the controversy in the particular
forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
managing a class action.   

The Plaintiffs have met the superiority requirement. Whether
evaluated using the numbers provided in plaintiffs' original or
supplemental briefing, the record presented indicates that the
damages at issue likely are not great enough for individual
putative class members to want to litigate separate actions against
the defendants.  

In sum, for purposes of settlement, provisional certification of a
Rule 23 class is appropriate.

Preliminary Settlement Approval

Courts may preliminarily approve a Rule 23 class action settlement
and direct notice to the class if the proposed settlement (1)
appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive
negotiations (2) does not grant improper preferential treatment to
class representatives or other segments of the class (3) falls
within the range of possible approval and (4) has no obvious
deficiencies.  

In the present case, the fact that the parties reached a settlement
after the parties conducted an investigation, exchanged discovery
of the facts of this case, and participated in a full day of
mediation facilitated by a retired judge weighs in favor of
granting preliminary settlement approval. Nevertheless, for the
reasons discussed below, there are several issues that preclude the
preliminary approval of the parties' settlement at this time.

Allocation of Settlement Payments

There are substantial and unexplained inconsistencies between the
terms of the parties' Stipulated Settlement and the settlement
terms for which the parties now appear to seek approval. The most
obvious differences concern the allocation of the settlement funds
and of the payments to be made. As discussed, the parties'
Stipulated Settlement contemplates that (1) 67% of the $217,500
settlement fund would be allocated to the California state claims,
with the remaining 33% reserved for the FLSA claims and (2)
individual payments would comprise 20% wages, 40% penalties, and
40% interest. As described in plaintiffs' supplemental briefing,
however, the $217,500 fund will now be allocated equally between
the California claims and the FLSA claims (with 20% of the fund, or
$43,500, being reserved to each set of claims) and the remaining
60% (i.e., $130,500) to be paid as interest and penalties. Although
plaintiffs seemed to suggest that the Court could make changes to
the parties' Stipulated Settlement, as noted, the Court does not
have the ability to do so.  

The Plaintiffs did not clearly explain how or why the parties
originally agreed to allocate 67% of the Net Settlement Fund to the
California state claims and 33% to the FLSA claims. Nor have they
explained why they have now changed those allocations or how those
proposed modifications are fair. Additionally, plaintiffs'
supplemental calculations indicate, without explanation, that the
$130,500 reserved for the payment of penalties and interest is
really only being allocated to the payment of penalties.

Treatment of Rule 23 class members and FLSA collective class
members

The Stipulated Settlement seems to assume that all individuals
covered by the settlement are members of both the Rule 23 class and
the FLSA collective class, and also appears to contemplate payment
only to those individuals who are, in fact, members of both
classes. The record presented, however, suggests that the two
classes are not one and the same and that the FLSA collective class
is smaller than the Rule 23 class. In other words, the Stipulated
Settlement does not appear to account for members of the Rule 23
class who are not also members of the FLSA collective class.

For example, the Stipulated Settlement seems to require Class
Members to submit a claim form in order to receive any payment,
even though Rule 23 class members are not obliged to submit a claim
form to participate in the settlement. Adding to the confusion are
the Stipulated Settlement's definitions of the terms Settlement
Class Members and Participating Class Member. The term Settlement
Class Members seems to be defined as all Rule 23 class members who
either do not opt out or who timely rescind a request to opt out of
the settlement. The Stipulated Settlement seems to contemplate that
only Participating Class Members will be paid a settlement. Indeed,
the Stipulated Settlement indicates that any Class Member who does
not timely opt out of the Rule 23 settlement will automatically be
deemed a Settlement Class Member who is not entitled to recover
from the Net Settlement Amount.  

Carve-Out Period for FLSA Claims

The Plaintiffs' supplemental briefing clarifies that the FLSA
settlement excludes any claims during the period November 22, 2014
to November 19, 2016 to account for payments made to 35 individuals
as part of the DOL proceeding. Plaintiffs' supplemental
spreadsheet, however, indicates that there are other individuals
who apparently did not receive a DOL settlement and whose FLSA
claims fall entirely within the two-year carved out period.
Plaintiffs do not explain how or why it may be fair to entirely
exclude such claims from the settlement.

Scope of the Release

The parties' Stipulated Settlement provides that the agreed-upon
release of liability encompasses the following: all claims and/or
causes of action alleged in the present action as well as any and
all claims, demands, rights, liabilities and/or cause of action of
any nature and description whatsoever, known or unknown, in law or
in equity, asserted by Plaintiffs on behalf of any Settlement Class
Member relating to any compensation allegedly due or earned as a
result of their employment with Defendants and any other related
claims and/or penalties of any nature whatsoever.

Here, the release language is not so limited and suggests that
class members are more broadly releasing claims that are not based
on the identical factual predicate as the present action. Courts
have held that such overbreadth in a proposed release is an obvious
deficiency that warrants denying preliminary approval.

Defendants' Estimated Exposure

In their original briefing, plaintiffs asserted that if this case
were to proceed to trial, then defendants' total estimated exposure
would be $488,000. They provided only highly generalized
information as to how they calculated that figure, stating that it
was based on records provided to them by Defendants and that
plaintiffs' calculations assumed that every employee worked 14
hours of overtime per pay period. When probed by the Court at oral
argument about the basis for the $488,000 estimate, plaintiffs'
counsel stated only that he took the largest estimate of overtime
hours per week and then calculated the total wage loss using an
Excel spreadsheet.  

In their supplemental briefing, plaintiffs offer no new estimate of
defendants' total potential exposure, and the Court cannot reliably
discern from the record presented whether plaintiffs' $488,000 is
reasonable and, thus, whether the proposed settlement falls within
the range of possible approval. This is particularly true where
plaintiffs' supplemental briefing includes an apparent significant
reevaluation of the claimed damages.

Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Administrative Expenses

In plaintiffs' supplemental briefing, one of plaintiffs' attorneys,
Victoria Booke, avers that she spent nearly 100 hours working on
this matter. She states, on information and belief, that her
co-counsel, James Dal Bon, worked approximately the same number of
hours..Because both attorneys worked at a rate of $500 per hour,
Ms. Booke states that the time they spent litigating this matter
(plus anticipated additional 30 hours going forward) is fairly
close to the 30% of the settlement counsel request in fees.  

Although the Court need not resolve the issue of fees at this
preliminary stage (particularly when there are other issues that
preclude the approval of settlement at this time), the Court has
some concern regarding plaintiffs' request for one-third of the
settlement, in light of the fact that the benchmark is 25%.
Plaintiffs' counsel should bear this in mind if or when they
present a fees motion for final approval.

Additionally, in the event the full amount of fees or litigation
costs is not awarded or the sum reserved for administrative costs
is not depleted, the parties' Stipulated Settlement does not
address what should be done with the excess sums.

Service Awards

Each named plaintiff intends to seek a service award of $5,000.
While service awards are permissible, they must also be reasonable.
Here, each named plaintiff will seek an award that is
approximately three times the average $1,699.22 payment they say
class/collective members may expect to receive. That might not be
an unreasonable ratio, and plaintiffs' counsel has now provided
additional information about the plaintiffs' efforts in this case.
However, in view of plaintiffs' assertion that the settlement
represents a little more than half of defendants' total potential
exposure, and given the range of payments plaintiffs now say that
class/collective members will receive, the Court finds that if or
when plaintiffs formally apply for service awards, the Court would
benefit from additional discussion of the justification and
evidence supporting their request.

The Court conditionally certifies a Rule 23 class and FLSA
collective class, but otherwise denies plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement. The denial is without
prejudice to plaintiffs to file an amended motion for preliminary
approval along with an amended Stipulated Settlement and proposed
Notice by June 17, 2019 that cures the deficiencies outlined in
this order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6gaqrg4 from Leagle.com.

Rodrigo Camilo, an individual, Alvaro Camilo, an individual,
Ricardo Sanchez, an individual & Jose Manuel Lopez, an individual,
Plaintiffs, represented by James Dal Bon -- jdb@wagedefenders.com
-- Law Offices of James Dal Bon & Victoria L.H. Booke  --
vbooke@bookelaw.com -- Law Offices of Booke & Ajlouny, LLP.

Severo C Ozuna, an individual & Don Vito Ozuna Food Corporation, a
California Corporation, Defendants, represented by Julian Pardo De
Zela -- julian.pardo.de.zela@svelf.com -- SV Employment Law Firm PC
& Stacey Ann Zartler -- szartler@svelf.com -- Berliner Cohen.


DR PEPPER: Kilpatrick Townsend Atorney Discusses Court Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
James Bogan III, Esq. -- jbogan@kilpatricktownsend.com -- of
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an article for JDSupra,
reports that in prior posts, the law firm reported on the
dismissals of putative class actions asserting that the "diet" in
"diet soda" is false or misleading.  See N.D. Cal. sounds the death
knell on "diet" soda class actions (September 11, 2018) and
S.D.N.Y. joins N.D. Cal. in rejecting claim that "diet" soda is
deceptive to a reasonable consumer (July 9, 2018).  The courts
rejecting this theory of deception as implausible have done so
based on two key conclusions:  (1) reasonable consumers understand
that diet soda -- at best -- will help them lose or maintain weight
relative to the consumption of regular (high calorie) soda, and (2)
no scientific study has established that the sweetener used in diet
soda actually causes weight gain.  Less than two weeks ago, the
Second Circuit came to the same conclusion in another such class
action.

In Excevarria v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., --- F.App'x. ---,
No. 18-1492, 2019 WL 1761696 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2019) (Summary
Order), two class representatives alleged that the term "diet" in
"Diet Dr Pepper" was false or misleading, because it supposedly
conveyed to reasonable consumers that consumption of the beverage
would assist in weight loss.  Central to plaintiffs' theory of
deception was the claim that the sweetener in Diet Dr Pepper
(aspartame) "is likely to cause weight gain, does not help in
weight loss or healthy weight management, and . . . increases the
risk of [metabolic] disease such as diabetes."  Id. at *1.  The
Southern District of New York rejected the allegations as
implausible and the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling:  "[E]ven
assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiffs are right that a
reasonable consumer would understand the word 'diet' to convey
promises about weight loss or management, they have still failed to
state a claim here.  None of the studies cited by the Complaint or
the PFAC [proposed first amended complaint] establish a causal
relationship between aspartame and weight gain, as has been
determined by a number of courts in substantially identical cases
involving complaints that cite the same studies."  Id.  In so
ruling, the Second Circuit cited a number of cases discussed in our
September 11, 2018 and July 9, 2018 posts.  Accordingly, the Second
Circuit sustained the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
original complaint and the denial of their motion for leave to file
an amended complaint, ruling:  "neither the Complaint nor the PFAC
state a claim, because Plaintiffs cannot raise a plausible
inference that 'Diet Dr Pepper' as a brand name is false or
misleading."  Id. at 4. [GN]


DXP ENTERPRISES: Warden Seeks Overtime Pay for Safety Consultants
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JOSHUA WAYNE WARDEN, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. DXP ENTERPRISES,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00407 (D.N.M., May 3, 2019),
alleges that DXP has violated and continues to violate the New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act, by failing to pay Plaintiff and other
Class Members overtime at the legally required rate. The Plaintiff,
individually and on behalf of all other Class Members, brings this
class action lawsuit to recover overtime pay and all over available
remedies under the NMMWA.

According to the complaint, DXP Enterprises, Inc. was formerly the
employer of Plaintiff and other Class Members. The Plaintiff worked
as a "Safety Consultant" for DXP from March of 2015 through January
of 2018. While working for DXP, Plaintiff was first classified as
an employee, then as an independent contractor.

During his time with DXP, Plaintiff typically worked approximately
100 hours per week. As both an employee and an independent
contractor, Plaintiff received a day rate regardless of the number
of hours he worked in a given day or week, and never received
overtime pay. There are at minimum dozens of individuals who since
March of 2015 that have, like Plaintiff, been paid day rates and
denied overtime while working for DXP in New Mexico. These pay
practices are referred as the "Day Rate Policy. DXP is a publicly
traded company that offers compliance and consulting services to
clients in, inter alia, the oil and gas industry. DXP contracts
with various oil and gas producers to provide laborers for their
drilling operations, including Plaintiff and the Class Members that
were paid day rates and denied overtime pay.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Josh Borsellino, Esq.
          BORSELLINO, P.C.
          1020 Macon St., Suite 15
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 908-9861
          Facsimile: (817) 394-2412
          E-mail: josh@dfwcounsel.com

ENCORE CAPITAL: Proposed Board Amendments Misleading, Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Turkhan Mirzayev, individually on behalf of himeslf and all other
similarly situated stockholders of ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC., the
Plaintiff, vs. MICHAEL P. MONACO, FRANCIS E. QUINLAN, NORMAN R.
SORENSEN, LAURA NEWMAN OLLE, RICHARD J. SREDNICKI, ASH GUPTA, WENDY
HANNAM, RICHARD P. STOVSKY, ASHISH MASIH, and ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2019-0331 (Del. Ch., May 3, 2019),
balks at the proposal of Encore Capital Group's Board of Directors
to amend the company's Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of
Encore's common stock from 50 million to 75 million.

As disclosed in the Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement that
the Board authorized to be filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission and disseminated on April 29, 2019, the Board
approved and declared advisable the Proposed Amendment on April 11,
2019.  The Proxy states that the Proposed Amendment requires the
approval of just a majority of votes cast: The proposal regarding
an amendment to the Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of common
stock requires the affirmative vote of the majority of shares
voting for or against the amendment at the annual meeting.
Abstentions and broker non-votes will not be counted as votes cast
and will not be counted in determining the number of shares
necessary for approval.

The lawsuit contends that Title 8 of the Delaware Code, otherwise
known as the Delaware General Corporation Law, requires that, to
amend a company's certificate of incorporation, a greater threshold
must be satisfied, to wit: the "the affirmative vote of the holders
of a majority of the stock of the corporation" is required. 8 Del.
C. section 242(b)(1).  Accordingly, the Proposed Threshold for
approval of the Proposed Amendment to the Certificate described in
the 2019 Proxy conflicts with the requirements of the DGCL and the
Proxy fundamentally misstates such requirements and is therefore
materially misleading, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esq.
          ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT & GODDESS, P.A.
          919 N. Market Street, Suite 1401
          P.O. Box 1070
          Wilmington, DE 19899-1070
          Telephone: (302) 656-4433

               - and -

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          Christopher J. Kupka, Esq.
          William J. Fields, Esq.
          Samir Shukurov, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          55 Broadway, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171

EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Porter Suit Moved to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
RENEE PORTER and JOSHUA TOLIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. EQUINOX HOLDINGS,
INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. RG19009052 (Filed 19-_____), was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Alameda, to the U.S. District court for the Northern District of
California on May 3, 2019. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-02426 to the proceeding.

The case is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually, and on
behalf of all other individuals similarly situated who worked for
Equinox Holdings, Inc.

The Plaintiffs allege that they and other aggrieved employees were
not paid their earned overtime wages for all overtime hours worked.
For example, Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and Other
Aggrieved Employees to work off the clock, but did not pay
Plaintiff and Other Aggrieved Employees for that time, nor count
that time in calculating overtime. This often occurred on occasions
when Plaintiffs and Other Aggrieved Employees worked in excess of
eight hours in a day or 40 hours in a week, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Ronald W. Makarem, Esq.
          Samuel D. Almon, Esq.
          MAKAREM & ASSOCIATES APLC
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2440
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-1760
          Telephone: (310) 312-0299
          Facsimile: (310) 312-0296

EVANGER'S DOG: Court Dismisses Defamation Counterclaim in Mael
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, issued an Order granting Plaintiff Mael's
Motion to Dismiss Defendant Evanger's Defamation Counterclaim
Against Her in the case caption NICOLE MAEL, Plaintiff, v.
EVANGER'S DOG CO., INC., Defendant. Case No. C17-5469RBL. (W.D.
Wash.).

This putative class action arises from Mael's claim that her dogs
got sick, and one ultimately died, from eating
pentobarbital-tainted Evanger's Hunk of Beef dog food. Mael's story
was in the news and it at least partly caused Evanger's to initiate
a nationwide recall of its products. Mael sued. Evanger's asserted
defamation counterclaims based on a list of Mael's public
statements about the cause of Talula's death.  

Mael seeks dismissal of the defamation counterclaim. She argues
that her statements do not and cannot support a defamation claim
under the substantially similar defamation law of Illinois where
Evanger's is domiciled or Washington where the comments were made.

Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be based on either the
lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient
facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. A plaintiff's
complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
party seeking relief pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.  

Evanger's Response is a well-written, thorough, scholarly
discussion of defamation law. It argues that Illinois and
Washington law is the same, and that it need not demonstrate actual
malice to succeed (but that it can).

Evanger's core factual allegation in support of Evanger's
defamation claim receives less attention, but it is plain: Mael's
public statements intentionally omitted material information about
how Talula really died. Mael failed to admit that she had Talula
euthanized. Evanger's claims that Mael's incomplete, false story is
more damaging to Evanger's than the one it claims is true and which
it apparently wants to tell a jury; that Mael killed Talula, Mael
decided to end her suffering, because a veterinarian told her the
dog would not recover and then she falsely and maliciously claimed
that her dog died from eating pentobarbital-tainted Hunk of Beef.

It is hard to imagine that this more complete and accurate version
of the story will persuade a jury that the food was not tainted,
that Mael is lying, or that any claimed damages should be reduced
because Mael herself is culpable because she chose to pull the
plug. That is sort of like saying the coyotes technically killed
the bleeding, suffering, dying deer on the highway, not the logging
truck that ran over it. Except the coyotes presumably did not act
in what they thought was the deer's best interest.

Mael's adding to her interview the whole truth that Talula did not
die right away, but because she was so sick Mael was forced to make
the painful decision to euthanize her using pentobarbital would not
have any perceptible effect on the mind of any reasonable listener
about what really happened.

Mael's statements were substantially true, and they reflect Mael's
belief and opinion about what happened to her dogs. Nor do Mael's
statements include any implication that is false: her dogs got
sick, and one died, because they ate tainted dog food. The
concealed truth, Mael was forced to decide to put her dog down
because it was irrevocably damaged by the pentobarbital is not
actionably different than what Mael told the news, as a matter of
law.

Mael's Motion to Dismiss Evanger's Defamation Counterclaim is
granted, and that counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice and
without leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2lxe74p from Leagle.com.

Nicole Mael, Guy Mael, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Tina Wiepert, Nadine Vigliano, Carol Conway,
Angela Bertucci & Britney Morea, Plaintiffs, represented by Beth E.
Terrell -- bterrell@tmdwlaw.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
Jennifer Rust Murray -- jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Jessica J. Sleater --
jessica@andersensleater.com -- ANDERSEN SLEATER SIANNI LLC, pro hac
vice.

Evanger's Dog and Cat Food Co., Inc., Nutripack LLC & Sher Services
Company, Incorporated, Defendants, represented by Brennen Johnson ,
JOHNSON GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, John Coleman Graffe, Jr. ,
JOHNSON GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, Katherine A. Bozzo , JOHNSON
GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, 2115 North 30th StreetSuite 101Tacoma, WA
98403- 3318, Gregory A. Bedell --
gbedell@kkbchicago.com -- KNABE, KRONING & BEDELL, pro hac vice,
William J. Brown, Jr., BROWN WEGNER LLP, pro hac vice & William E.
Wegner, BROWN WEGNER LLP, 2010 Main Street, Suite 1260, Irvine, CA
92614, pro hac vice.

Sher Services Company, Incorporated, Nutripack LLC & Evanger's Dog
and Cat Food Co., Inc., Counter Claimants, represented by Brennen
Johnson, JOHNSON GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, John Coleman Graffe,
Jr., JOHNSON GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, Katherine A. Bozzo, JOHNSON
GRAFFE KEAY MONIZ & WICK, Gregory A. Bedell, KNABE, KRONING &
BEDELL, pro hac vice, William J. Brown, Jr., BROWN WEGNER LLP, pro
hac vice & William E. Wegner, BROWN WEGNER LLP, pro hac vice.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Harrod Seeks to Certify Class in Record Fees Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, CYNTHEA HARROD, Individually and o/b/o
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. EXPRESS SCRIPTS,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-01607-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla.),
the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order:

   1. certifying claims of violation of the Florida Deceptive and
      Unfair Trade Practices Act, breach of contract, breach of the

      covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
      enrichment against Defendant for class treatment on behalf of

      the following proposed class:

      "all persons in Florida who were charged a $75.00
"processing
      "fee to obtain a copy of their health information and/or
      health records from Express Scripts, following a request by a

      third party law firm or records company on their behalf on or

      before January 23, 2018";

   2. formally appointing Cynthea Harrod to serve as Class
      Representative of the Class; and

   3. formally appointing Alex C. Davis of Jones Ward PLC and
      Tiffany M. Yiatras of Consumer Protection Legal, LLC, and
      Jason Whittemore of Wagner McLaughlin, P.A. to serve as to
      serve as Co-Lead Class Counsel.

Excluded from the Class is (1) Defendant, Defendant's agents,
subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in
which Defendant or Defendant's parents have a controlling interest,
and those entities' current and former employees, officers, and
directors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the
Judge's immediate family; (3) Any governmental entities and any
instrumentalities, subdivisions, agencies thereof; (4) any person
who executes and files a timely request for exclusion from the
Class; (5) any person who has had their claims in this matter
finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released; (6) the legal
representatives, successors and assigns of any such excluded
person; (7) Counsel of record.

The Plaintiff originally filed her original Motion for Class
Certification along with her supporting memorandum of law on
February 21, 2019, under seal.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Jason K. Whittemore, Esq.
          WAGNER MCLAUGHLIN, P.A.
          601 Bayshore Blvd., Suite 910
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 225-4000
          E-mail: jason@WagnerLaw.com
                  arelys@wagnerlaw.com

              - and -

          Alex C. Davis, Esq.
          JONES WARD PLC
          The Pointe
          1205 E. Washington St., Suite 111
          Louisville, Kentucky 40206
          Telephone: (502) 882 6000
          Facsimile: (502) 587 2007
          E-mail: alex@jonesward.com

               - and -

          Tiffany M. Yiatras, Esq.
          CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGAL, LLC
          308 Hutchinson Road
          Ellisville, MO 63011-2029
          Telephone: 314-541-0317
          Facsimile: (855) 710-7706
          E-mail: tiffany@consumerprotectionlegal.com

FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Ormaza Sues over Fair Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
Antoinette P. Ormaza, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Firstsource Advantage, LLC,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02632 (E.D.N.Y., May 3, 2019),
seeks to recover damages for Defendant's violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices.

The Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt. The alleged Debt is an
alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes.

In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, the Defendant contacted
Plaintiff by letter dated June 11, 2018. The Letter conveyed
information regarding the alleged Debt. The Letter fails to state
whether the payment must be sent by the consumer, or received by
the Defendant, by the stated deadline. The Letter can be
interpreted to mean that such payment must be mailed to the
Defendant by the stated deadline.

The Letter can also be interpreted to mean that such payment must
be received by Defendant by the stated deadline. As a result of the
foregoing, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, the
Letter is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least
one of which is inaccurate. Because the Letter is open to more than
one reasonable interpretation, it violates 15 U.S.C. section 1692e,
the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: ConsumerRights@BarshaySanders.com

FITBIT INC: Court Orders Post-Distribution Accounting in Robb Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order to File Post Distribution Accounting in
the case captioned BRIAN H. ROBB, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FITBIT
INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 16-cv-00151-SI. (N.D. Cal.).

Class counsel in this securities litigation filed a motion for
distribution of the class settlement funds, which the Court has
approved.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California has published Procedural Guidance for Class Action
Settlement, which can be found at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ClassActionSettlementGuidance.  

The guidance has instructions regarding post-distribution
accounting, due within 21 days after the distribution of the
settlement funds and payment of attorneys' fees. Class counsel is
hereby ORDERED to file a post-distribution accounting at the
appropriate time in accordance with the Northern District of
California's Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyln87ve from Leagle.com.

Brian H. Robb, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Marc Gorrie
-- mgorrie@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP & Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Viet Tran, Plaintiff, represented by Keith R. Lorenze –
klorenze@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, pro hac vice.

Fitbit Inc., James Park, William R. Zerella, Eric N. Friedman,
Jonathan D. Callaghan, Steven Murray & Christopher Paisley,
Defendants, represented by Jordan Eth -- jeth@mofo.com -- Morrison
& Foerster LLP, Anna Erickson White -- awhite@mofo.com -- Morrison
& Foerster LLP, Mark David McPherson -- mmcpherson@mofo.com --
Morrison Foerster LLP & Ryan M. Keats -
rkeats@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. & Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Defendants, represented
by Matthew David Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers
LLP, Jonathan Rosenberg -- jrosenberg@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers
LLP & William Sushon -- wsushon@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers
LLP.


FORGE RESTAURANT: Pavon Seeks Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JUAN CARLOS PAVON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. FORGE RESTAURANT LLC d/b/a
RESTAURANT FORGIONE; MARC FORGIONE; CHRISTOPHER BLUMLO, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04008 (S.D.N.Y., May 3, 2019), seeks
to recover minimum wages, misappropriated tips, call-in pay, and
other damages for Plaintiff and his similarly situated co-workers
-- servers, bussers, food runners, bartenders, and other similarly
situated tipped employees -- who work or have worked at Restaurant
Marc Forgione, located at 134 Reade Street, New York, NY 10013.

Owned and/or operated by Forge Restaurant LLC, Marc Forgione and
Christopher Blumlo, Restaurant Forgione is a high end "New
American" restaurant located in the Tribeca neighborhood of New
York City that has been featured in various publications, and has
received rave reviews over the years.

According to the lawsuit, the Defendants have paid Plaintiff and
similarly situated Tipped Employees at or below the applicable
"tipped" minimum wage rate. The Defendants, however, have not
satisfied the strict requirements under the Fair Labor Standards
Act or the New York Labor Law that would allow them to apply "tip
credit" to Tipped Employees' wages.  The Defendants failed to
provide Tipped Employees with notification of the tipped minimum
wage rate or tip credit provisions of the NYLL, or of their intent
to apply a tip credit to Tipped Employees' wages, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Brian S. Schaffer, Esq.
          Armando A. Ortiz, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

FRESNO DEPUTY: Court Extends Time to File Response in Campos Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California, Fresno Division, issued an Order extending Time to File
Responsive Pleading to First Amended Complaint in the case
captioned CESAR CAMPOS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. FRESNO DEPUTY
SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, COUNTY OF FRESNO; XAVIER BECERRA, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California;
ERIC BANKS, PRISCILLA WINSLOW, ERICH SHINERS, and ARTHUR A. KRANTZ,
in their official capacities as chair and members of the California
Public Employment Relations Board, Defendants. Case No.
1:18-cv-01660 AWI-EPG. (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, the DSA's response to the
FAC is due on May 28, 2019.

The FAC adds two new plaintiffs, deletes the class action
allegations, and adds two new claims, requiring additional time to
respond beyond the two weeks set under Rule 15.

The DSA's counsel will be out of the country between May 17 and
June 4, 2019, and therefore unable to prepare the DSA's response by
the current due date.

The Defendant DSA may have an extension of time within which to
file a response to the FAC, and the date for such response will now
be due June 24, 2019.

This extension of time shall have no effect on the Mandatory Status
Conference presently scheduled for June 11, 2019.

The Court, accordingly, orders that Defendant FRESNO DEPUTY
SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION shall file a response to the First Amended
Complaint on or before June 24, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3t7vzgy from Leagle.com.

Cesar Campos, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Mitchell Law, PLLC, 944 N Main St, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, pro hac
vice, Talcott J. Franklin -- tal@talcottfranklin.com -- Talcott
Franklin P.C., pro hac vice & Bradley A. Benbrook --
brad@benbrooklawgroup.com -- Benbrook Law Group.

Latana M. Chandavong, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan F.
Mitchell, Mitchell Law, PLLC, pro hac vice & Bradley A. Benbrook,
Benbrook Law Group.

Neng Her & Hugh X. Yang, Plaintiffs, represented by Jonathan F.
Mitchell, Mitchell Law, PLLC.

Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association, Defendant, represented by
Monique Alonso -- monique@majlabor.com -- Messing Adam & Jasmine
LLP.

Priscilla Winslow, in official capacity as chair and members of the
California Public Employment Relations Board, Xavier Becerra, in
his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of
California, Eric Banks, in official capacity as chair and members
of the California Public Employment Relations Board, Erich Shiners,
in official capacity as chair and members of the California Public
Employment Relations Board & Arthur A. Krantz, in official capacity
as chair and members of the California Public Employment Relations
Board, Defendants, represented byNatasha Saggar Sheth, California
Department Of Justice.


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Transmission Problems
-------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Havins, writing for Corvette Online, reports that General
Motors is in the news again regarding a possible class action
lawsuit. Autoblog.com recently released an article that talks about
problems associated with 2015-'18 8l90 and 8l45 GM 8-speed
transmissions. According to Autoblog.com, a lawsuit was posted to
ClassAction.org and spotted by GM Authority. A complaint has
already been filled with the National Highway Traffic Saftey
Administration with some reporting damage to their vehicles.

The complaint reads, "These transmissions have a common defect.
Drivers attempting to accelerate or decelerate their cars feel a
hesitation, followed by a significant shake, shudder, jerk, clunk,
or hard shift when the vehicle's automatic transmission changes
gears. Said shudder, shake and hesitation also occurs while the
subject vehicles are accelerated in a single gear, and not actively
shifting gears. Drivers have reported that the shift is sometimes
so violent, they feel as though they have been hit by another
vehicle. In fact, one purchaser reported that the transmission
shifted from reverse to drive so harshly that he almost drove
through his garage door."

On page 2 of the 85-page document talks about that GM has known
about the transmission defect for years and states, "Since 2015, GM
has issued thirteen versions of a technical service bulletin, or
TSB, related to this shifting issue alone. A TSB is an alert to
dealerships, informing them of a potential problem in a GM product
and advising them how to address the problem when customers
complain to GM dealerships. The TSBs related to the transmission
issue have advised dealerships to, among other things: complete the
"clutch drive learn procedure," replace the valve body, replace the
entire transmission, flush the cooler lines and cooler, remove
debris from and clean the transmission pan, replace the
transmission filter, replace the transmission fluid, and flush the
transmission."

A consumer in Middleville, MI states in the document, "The 8-speed
transmission bucks, hesitates, lurches forward, clunks while
starting acceleration or coming to a stop. I try to keep a big gap
between my truck and cars in front of me at stop signs because it
randomly lurches forward and I have almost bumped cars in front of
me. The consumer continues, "I am past my warranty so, the dealer
says any cost is my responsibility."

Here is a list of vehicles that could be affected:

2015-2019 Chevrolet Silverado
2017-2019 Chevrolet Colorado
2015-2019 Chevrolet Corvette
2016-2019 Chevrolet Camaro
2015-2017 Cadillac Escalade and Escalade ESV
2016-2019 Cadillac ATS and ATS-V
2016-2019 Cadillac CTS and CTS-V
2016-2019 Cadillac CT6
2015-2019 GMC Sierra
2015-2019 GMC Yukon and Yukon XL
2015-2017 GMC Yukon Denali and Denali XL
2017-2019 GMC Canyon

While it's pretty obvious that some of the 8-speed transmissions
have problems, an immediate solution is not as apparent. [GN]


GLOBAL TEL: Fifth Circuit Appeal Filed in Alexander RICO Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Elizabeth R. Alexander, John P. Alexander, Patricia
Broussard, Jai Gibson, Sandra Glassmire, Sharon Joseph and Mary
Sessums filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit
entitled Elizabeth Alexander, et al. v. Global Tel Link
Corporation, et al., Case No. 3:17-CV-560, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
asserts claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

The case alleges that Christopher Epps, Sam Waggoner and GTL
knowingly and intentionally conspired to devise schemes using overt
acts, such as bribery, kickbacks, unfair and deceptive trade
practices, misrepresentation, fraud, concealment, money laundering,
fraudulent use of "sole-source" contracts when competitive bidding
was required (for the provision, installation and management of
Inmate Calling Services system), and other wrongful conduct, all
with the intended purpose and effect of overcharging and bilking
the Plaintiffs for inmate calling services.

The appellate case is captioned as Elizabeth Alexander, et al. v.
Global Tel Link Corporation, et al., Case No. 19-60287, in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ELIZABETH R. ALEXANDER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; JOHN P. ALEXANDER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; MARY
SESSUMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; SANDRA GLASSMIRE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; JAI GIBSON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; SHARON JOSEPH, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated; and PATRICIA BROUSSARD
are represented by:

          Bradley S. Clanton, Esq.
          CLANTON LAW FIRM, P.C.
          P.O. Box 4781
          Jackson, MS 39296
          Telephone: (601) 487-1212
          Facsimile: (866) 421-9918
          E-mail: brad@clantonlawms.com

Defendant-Appellee GLOBAL TEL LINK CORPORATION is represented by:

          Patrick Ryan Beckett, Esq.
          BUTLER SNOW, L.L.P.
          1020 Highland Colony Parkway
          Ridgeland, MS 39158
          Telephone: (601) 985-4557
          E-mail: ryan.beckett@butlersnow.com


GODIVA CHOCOLATIER: Bradley Arant Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Goodman, Esq. -- jgoodman@bradley.com -- Michael Pennington,
Esq. -- mpennington@bradley.com -- and J. Thomas Richie, Esq. --
trichie@bradley.com -- of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, in an
article for JDSupra, report that bucking a recent trend and
departing from both the Second Circuit's Katz decision and the
Third Circuit's Kamal decision, the Eleventh Circuit found that a
plaintiff had standing to settle a FACTA claim on behalf of a
class. This decision -- Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. --
signals the continuing debate about what Spokeo means for federal
statutory damages class actions.

As is now familiar, FACTA (the federal "Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act") prohibits merchants from printing more than the
last five digits of a credit or debit card number on any
electronically printed receipt provided to the card holder at the
point of sale. And Spokeo is the United States Supreme Court
decision that holds (among other things) that Congress cannot
create Article III standing merely by creating a cause of action.

Muransky claimed a garden-variety FACTA violation: He alleged that
Godiva printed the first six and last four digits of his credit
card on his receipt. The case mediated, and the parties reached a
class-wide settlement that would create a $6.3 million settlement
fund to pay around $235 to each class member who submitted a claim
form -- with $2.1 million to Muransky's lawyers. About 15% of the
class members who received notice made claims, and there were five
objectors. The objectors primarily focused on the issue of
attorneys' fees and Muransky's $10,000 incentive award for serving
as class representative, but one objector asserted that Muransky
lacked standing. The district court overruled the objections and
approved the settlement. Two objectors appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the settlement approval. It did so
initially on October 3, 2018, but sua sponte vacated its previous
opinion and published a new one on April 22, 2019. The major
changes all came in the court's discussion of the standing issue,
where the Eleventh Circuit took pains to distinguish the Second
Circuit's opinion in Katz v. Donna Karan Co. In particular, the
court disagreed with how Katz allowed evidence that certain FACTA
violations did not pose any real threat of identity theft: "We are
wary of Katz's premise that a federal district court may make
factual finding that override Congress's standard for what harm
constitutes a concrete injury" and "[w]e do not read Spokeo as
giving courts a license to reject the standard set by Congress in
favor of judge-found facts at odds with that standard." Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit accepted that "Congress established the
acceptable level of risk at printing five digits," so a receipt
with too many digits plus an allegation of "a heightened risk of
identity as a result of Godiva's FACTA violation… satisfies
Article III under the principles Spokeo laid down."

The Eleventh Circuit also decided that the plaintiff's standing
could arise from the similarity between a FACTA claim and the
common law tort of breach of confidence. While acknowledging that
"the match is not exact," the court found that the common law tort
was close enough to confer standing. This alternative rationale --
arguably dicta -- could apply outside of the FACTA context, given
the court's broad language: "A consumer provides a merchant with
his credit card number with the expectation that it will remain
secret, not least because of the risk of credit card fraud if the
merchant reveals it." The proposition is not self-evident: Have you
ever followed the restaurant server to see what he or she does with
your credit card when you pay your bill? In any event, how the
Eleventh Circuit might apply this apparently sweeping reasoning in
the context of a data breach, for example, remains to be seen.

This alternative holding also pits the Eleventh Circuit directly
against Kamal from the Third Circuit. That case rejected the
analogy to breach of confidence, noting that the harm addressed in
such a tort is actual disclosure, not the mere risk of disclosure.
We believe Kamal has the better analysis because the disclosure to
a third party is essential to resulting harm. Indeed, the Muransky
rule could reduce Spokeo's injury requirement to a mere pleading
trick, as it is hard to imagine what species of ephemeral harms
could not be reclassified as risk of harms that are recognized to
give rise to standing. Muransky justifies its lax standing rule as
being deferential to Congress, but Spokeo (as we read it) disallows
such deference. If it is true that "where the common law allowed a
cause of action to remedy an injury, Congress can create a
statutory cause of action to remedy the risk of such an injury,"
then standing defenses may come in for rough sledding in the
Eleventh Circuit.

We have two main takeaways:

First, the Supreme Court needs to clarify Spokeo. In particular,
the Supreme Court will likely need to address what it means for an
intangible harm to have a "close relationship" to a traditional
harm. The circuits are already divided on that issue, and it should
be resolved sooner rather than later (even if not this term, as we
hoped).

Second, some of the practical issues of the case may be explained
by its procedural posture. Muransky arose from an objection to a
class settlement, not a traditional motion to dismiss. As Judge
Jordan's concurring opinion notes, the objector's challenge to
Muransky's standing raises its own jurisdictional questions: The
objector "may lack Article III standing to challenge the Article
III challenge of Dr. Muransky." If the objection to standing had
succeeded, the settlement would have been unwound and the
consideration made available to the class would not have been paid.
Given that the defendant did not challenge standing, nearly 50,000
class members made claims as compared to only a handful of
objectors, and given the fact that the objector pressing the
standing issue was himself a class-action plaintiffs' lawyer, the
posture of the case may go a long way to explaining the outcome.
[GN]


GRUPO HOTELERO: Mata Files Suit for Unlawful Trafficking
--------------------------------------------------------
Marisela Mata and Bibiana Hernandez, as individuals and on behalf
of all others similarly situtated v. Grupo Hotelero Gran Caribe,
Corporacion De Comercio Y Turismo Internacional Cubanacan S.A.,
Grupo De Turismo Gaviota S.A., Corporacion Cimex S.A., Raul Doe
1-5, and Mariela Doe 1-5, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22025-JAL
(S.D. Fla., May 20, 2019) seeks to right the Defendants' unlawful
trafficking in their property and for just compensation under the
Liberty Cuban and Democratic Solidarity Act ("LIBERTAD Act").

The complaint asserts that Defendants Gran Caribe, Cubanacan, and
Gaviota, and their Melia Accomplices, entered into joint ventures
for the purpose of trafficking in confiscated properties for use as
hotel or other hospitality venues, including the San Carlos, which
trafficking continues to this day, in violation of Title III of the
LIBERTAD ACT. The Defendants have conducted this trafficking
"without the authorization of any United States national who holds
a claim to the property", says the complaint.

Plaintiffs are United States citizens and are natural persons who
reside in Miami, Florida.

Gran Caribe is an agency or instrumentality og the government of
Cuba.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Andres Rivero, Esq.
     Jorger A. Mestre, Esq.
     Carlos A. Rodriguez, Esq.
     RIVERO MESTRE LLP
     2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Suite 1000
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 445-2500
     Facsimile: (305) 445-2505
     Email: arivero@rivermestre.com
            jmestre@rivermestre.com
            crodriguez@rivermestre.com

          - and -

     MANUEL VASQUEZ, ESQ.
     MANUEL VASQUEZ, P.A.
     2332 Galiano St., Second Floor
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Phone: (305) 445-2344
     Facsimile: (305) 445-4404
     Email: mvaz@mvazlaw.com


HARNEY & SONS: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Fischler, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HARNEY & SONS TEA CORP.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02991 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) is a
civil rights action against Defendant for its failure to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website, www.harney.com, to be
fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff Fischler
and other blind or visually-impaired people.

The Defendant denies full and equal access to its Website, says the
complaint. Plaintiff Fischler asserts claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), New York State Human Rights Law
("NYSHRL"), and New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") against
Defendant. Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction to cause
Defendant to change its corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff Fischler is blind, visually-impaired handicapped person.

Defendant is a retailer of teas and tea drinking accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
     Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
     LIPSKY LOWE LLP
     630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: 212.392.4772
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com
            chris@lipskylowe.com


HARVEST RESTAURANT: Underpays Tipped Employees, Reynolds Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, CHRISTINA MARY REYNOLDS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. DAVE MAGROGAN GROUP, LLC;
HARVEST RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT, LLC; HARVEST CHADDS FORD, LLC;
HARVEST SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY, LLC; HARVEST LANCASTER, LLC; HARVEST
NEWTOWN BUCKS COUNTY, LLC;  ARVEST UNIVERSITY CITY, LLC; HARVEST
RADNOR, LLC; HARVEST MONT AGE, LLC; HARVEST NORTH WALES, LLC;
HARVEST MOORESTOWN, LLC; HARVEST SEASONAL GRILL DELRAY, LLC;
WILLIAM DAVID MAGROGAN; GREG KESHGEGIAN and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,
the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01937-JD (E.D. Pa., May 3, 2019),
is a class and collective action brought on behalf of "Tipped
Employees" who work or have worked at restaurants operating under
the trade name Harvest Seasonal Grill and Wine Bar that are owned,
operated and/or otherwise managed or controlled by the Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employ individuals in a
tipped capacity, namely "servers" ("waiters and "waitresses"),
"bartenders," "bussers," and "food runners", who are and/or were
subjected to Defendants' unlawful pay practices. As Tipped
Employees, these individuals were primarily responsible operating
the ''front of the house" and interacting with customers, including
taking customers' orders, serving them their food/drink, and
removing the used plates/glasses after the customers was done
eating/drinking.

The Defendants systematically and willfully deprived Plaintiff and
other Tipped Employees of minimum wages in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and
the Wage Payment and Collection Law, among other things, allegedly
failing to satisfy the notice requirements of the tip credit
provisions of the FLSA and PMWA, the lawsuit says.

Despite performing this unrelated non-tipped work, the Defendants
paid Plaintiff and current and former Tipped Employees a
sub-minimum wage for performing this work. As a result of these pay
practices, Plaintiff and the members of the Classes were illegally
under-compensated for their work.

Harvest is a restaurant chain that, according to the Company's
website, operates seven restaurants in Pennsylvania (including
locations in North Wales, Radnor, Lancaster, Montage, Newtown,
Glenn Mills, and Harrisburg), one restaurant in Florida (Delray
Beach), and one restaurant in New Jersey (Moorestown).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Classes:

          Robert J. Gray, Esq.
          CONNOLLY WELLS & GRAY LLP
          2200 Renaiss,ance Blvd., Suite· 275
          King of Prussia PA 19406
          Telephone: 610-822-3700
          Facsimile: 610-822-3800
          E-mail: gwells@cwglaw.com
                  rgray@cwglaw.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA
          & CARPENTER,. LLP
          1J33 Penn Ave, 5th floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telepllone: 412-322-9243
          Facsimile: 412·231-0246
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

HEALTHFIRST INC: Lacario Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
MALAAIKA LACARIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HEALTHFIRST, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-04671 (S.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) is an action on behalf of
Plaintiff and similarly situated Care Management Employees who, due
to Defendant's misclassification scheme, were not paid all earned
overtime pay for hours worked over 40 in individual workweeks in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),

The Defendant required Plaintiff to work over 40 hours in one or
more individual workweeks during the last 3 years. In fact,
Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks
for Defendant during the last three (3) years. When Plaintiff
worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay
Plaintiff overtime at one-and-one-half times her regular rate of
pay, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked as a Care Management Employee for Defendant in New
York from approximately September 2015 to April 2018.

Defendant is a health insurance company with more than 1.2 million
members in downstate New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ravi Sattiraju, Esq.
     THE SATTIRAJU LAW FIRM, P.C.
     116 Village Blvd., Suite 200
     Princeton, NJ 08540
     Phone: (609) 799-1266
     Facsimile: (609) 228-5649
     Email: rsattiraju@sattirajulawfirm.com

          - and -

     DOUGLAS M. WERMAN, ESQ.
     MAUREEN A. SALAS, ESQ.
     Werman Salas P.C.
     77 West Washington, Suite 1402
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 419-1008
     Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
            msalas@flsalaw.com

          - and -

     TRAVIS M. HEDGPETH, ESQ.
     THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
     3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510
     Houston, TX 77056
     Phone: (281) 572-0727
     Facsimile: (281) 572-0728
     Email: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

          - and -

     JACK SIEGEL, ESQ.
     Siegel Law Group PLLC
     2820 McKinnon, Suite 5009
     Dallas, TX 75201
     Phone: (214) 790-4454
     Email: www.4overtimelawyer.com


HOSOPO CORP: Court Allows TCPA Class Action to Proceed
------------------------------------------------------
Eric T. Berkman, writing for New England In-House, reports that
attorneys say a recent U.S. District Court decision in
Massachusetts broadly interpreting the definition of "automatic
telephone dialing system" under the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act preserves the ability of consumers to seek redress
against telemarketers that make unsolicited robocalls to their
cellphones.

Under the TCPA, a telemarketer is prohibited from calling or
texting cellphones using an automatic telephone dialing system
without prior written consent of the phone's owner. The law also
allows the person being called to sue for $500 per violation.

The statute defines an automatic telephone dialing system, or ATDS,
as equipment that can "store or produce telephone numbers to be
called, using a random or sequential number generator, and . . . to
dial such numbers."

Some courts across the country have interpreted the definition to
cover devices that can store lists of numbers and dial them
automatically and devices that can generate numbers on their own to
call. Other courts have adopted a narrower definition that includes
only devices that can generate random or sequential numbers.

In the instant matter, the plaintiffs brought a class action
against a solar power vendor and the telemarketing firm it hired to
pitch its products, alleging that they violated the TCPA by
robocalling them using a system that stored and dialed a list of
numbers but did not randomly or sequentially generate the numbers
itself.

The defendants argued that the narrower definition was the correct
one and thus the plaintiffs had no claim under the TCPA.

But Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV disagreed.

"[T]he TCPA is an unusually confusing statute. But considering the
statute as it is written, the Court concludes that the phrase
'using a random or sequential number generator' modifies only the
verb 'produce' and not the verb 'store,'" Saylor wrote in denying
the defendants' motion to dismiss. "Therefore, to qualify as an
ATDS under the TCPA, a device need only have the capacity to do one
of the following: either (1) 'store . . . telephone numbers to be
called' and 'dial such numbers,' or (2) 'produce telephone numbers
to be called, using a random or sequential number generator' and
'dial such numbers.'"

Plaintiffs' counsel Anthony I. Paronich of Hingham lauded the
ruling for giving consumers an opportunity to seek redress against
the type of automated telemarketing conduct at issue in the case.

Margot Saunders of the National Consumer Law Center in Washington,
D.C., agreed.

"If this interpretation becomes the law of the land, as we're
hoping it will, then consumers will continue to be protected from
unwanted robocalls," said Saunders, who testified about
telemarketing and the TCPA before a Senate committee. "If it's not,
then none of the automated dialers in use these days will be
covered."

The 17-page decision is Gonzalez, et al. v. HOSOPO Corporation, et
al.

Alleged violation

Defendant HOSOPO Corp. hired defendant Flowmedia to make
telemarketing calls on its behalf.

In fall 2017, plaintiff Jeremiah Davila-Lynch received on his
cellphone at least five calls from a company he alleges to be "the
same" as Horizon Solar.

He claimed the calls included pre-recorded messages and alleged
that he heard a "click-and-pause" sound upon answering, which
indicated to him that they were made using an automatic telephone
dialing system.

A month later, plaintiff William Gonzalez allegedly received a
number of calls on his cellphone that included scripted pitches on
behalf of Horizon Solar that he claimed were made by an automatic
telephone dialing system. He claimed to receive at least eight more
calls directly from Horizon Solar that spring.

On Jan. 15, 2018, Davila-Lynch filed a putative class action
against Horizon in U.S. District Court on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated alleging violations of the TCPA. He later
added Flowmedia. Gonzalez joined the suit in August.

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
though proceedings against Flowmedia were eventually stayed pending
bankruptcy. According to the defendants, the type of device
allegedly used to place the calls could not generate random or
sequential numbers to be dialed on its own and thus was not an
automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of the
statute.

Broader definition

Saylor rejected the defendants' argument that a telemarketer's
dialing system needs the ability to generate random or sequential
numbers to be considered an automatic telephone dialing system.

In doing so, he rejected the narrow definition espoused in the 3rd
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals' 2018 Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc.
decision in favor of the broader definition adopted by the 9th
Circuit last year in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C. In the
latter case, the 9th Circuit found that a system that simply stores
and automatically dials numbers is an automatic telephone dialing
system as well.

Under the narrower reading, the phrase "using a random or
sequential number generator" applied to both the words "store" and
"produce."

That makes no sense, Saylor said, because though it is easy to
imagine an automatic telephone dialing system that produces numbers
using a number generator, "it is unclear how an ATDS -- or indeed
anything -- could 'store' numbers 'using' a number generator."

Accordingly, Saylor concluded, "to the extent Horizon Solar seeks
dismissal on the basis that the devices at issue do not qualify as
ATDSs under the TCPA, the motion will be denied."

Significant decision

While conceding that, as a District Court ruling, Saylor's decision
does not create binding precedent, Paronich emphasized that it is
important to have a Massachusetts court speak on the issue.

He also said the decision sends a positive signal about the
viability of class actions under the TCPA as a way for consumers to
address unwanted robocalls. He noted that it costs several hundred
dollars for an individual to file a claim in federal court.

"How viable is it for an individual to bring a $500 claim without a
fee-shifting provision?" Paronich said. "The TCPA has no
fee-shifting provision, which is another reason why the class
action device is so particularly important to these claims."

"The TCPA should be updated to address contemporary technology and
business practices, and federal class action practice should be
reformed to eliminate, or at least reduce, the incidence of such
costly litigation in which the only real party in interest is class
counsel."

However, John J. O'Connor of Boston, who represented defendant
Flowmedia, said the TCPA is "far from clear," as are the Federal
Communications Commission rulings and case law interpreting it.

"Reasonable minds can differ over them, as the HOSOPO suit
illustrates," he said.

O'Connor also emphasized that the TCPA is a strict liability
statute, making it virtually impossible for businesses to defend
against suits like HOSOPO. As a result, he said, legitimate
businesses that need to contact consumers for a living face
"ruinous liability" while class action attorneys collect millions
of dollars in fees on behalf of consumers who have suffered no
actual damages and are simply seeking statutory damages for alleged
technical violations.

"In my view, the TCPA should be updated to address contemporary
technology and business practices, and federal class action
practice should be reformed to eliminate, or at least reduce, the
incidence of such costly litigation in which the only real party in
interest is class counsel," O'Connor said.

Matthew P. McCue of Natick, who represents plaintiffs in TCPA cases
across the country, countered that "telemarketing is awful now" and
would be "astronomically worse" if the industry's interpretation of
an automatic telephone dialing system was accepted by the court.

"The judge in this case closely looks at all the case law and
applies a common-sense textual interpretation and recognizes the
remedial purpose of the telemarketing statute, agreeing with the
consumer that the true definition should be broader," McCue said.
"The whole purpose of the TCPA was to strictly regulate mass
telemarketing using computers. If you're going to interpret [ATDS]
narrowly, it gives free reign."

Boston attorney John J. Roddy, who also represents plaintiffs in
consumer class actions, said Saylor "threaded the needle" between
modes of statutory construction that might have resulted in a
narrower interpretation of an ATDS.

"As the conjunctive analysis of these cases makes the word 'store'
superfluous, [Saylor's] conclusion that the 'store' and 'produce'
elements are disjunctive complies with statutory constructive
principles and furthers the TCPA's purpose of eliminating the
uniformly despised robocalls that we all seem to receive," Roddy
said. [GN]


HOT POT FLUSHING: Chovon Files Suit Over Time-Shaving Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
GENARIO CUC CHOVON, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, v. HOT POT FLUSHING LLC d/b/a
LITTLE SHEEP MONGOLIAN HOT POT, HOT POT MANHATTAN 1 LLC d/b/a
LITTLE SHEEP MONGOLIAN HOT POT, JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-23 d/b/a
LITTLE SHEEP MONGOLIAN HOT POT, and MICHAEL PUI LEUNG LUK,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03000 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019)
alleges, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the
New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), that Plaintiff and others similarly
situated are entitled to recover from Defendants unpaid minimum
wage due to time-shaving, unpaid overtime wages, unpaid spread of
hours premium, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, and
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with
a practice of time-shaving and not paying Plaintiff, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members the full amount of wages
for all of their hours worked, in violation of the FLSA and NYLL,
says the complaint. The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated
their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of 40 per workweek at the proper overtime rate of
one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay, in violation of the
FLSA and NYLL. The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated
their business with a policy of not paying the proper minimum wage
and overtime premium to Tipped Subclass members due to an invalid
tip credit allowance, in violation of the FLSA and NYLL, the
complaint adds.

Plaintiff GENARIO CUC CHOVON was employed by Defendants to work as
a dishwasher, from in or around June 2012 until on or about October
24, 2018.

Defendants own and operate a chain of Chinese hot pot restaurants
as a single integrated enterprise under the shared trade name
"Little Sheep Mongolian Hot Pot," with various locations in the
United States, Canada, China, and Japan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Anne Seelig, Esq.
     LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
     148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10011
     Phone: (212) 465-1188
     Fax: (212) 465-1181


HUNTINGTON INGALLS: Herndon Suit Asserts ERISA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Roger A. Herndon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc., the
HII Administrative Committee, and John/Jane Does 1–5, Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00052 (E.D. Va., May 20, 2019) is a class action
against Defendants concerning the failure to pay benefits under the
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. Newport News Operations Pension
Plan for Employees Covered by United Steelworkers Local 8888
Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "Plan") in amounts that are
actuarially equivalent to a single life annuity, as required by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

Under the part of the Plan that covers employees hired before June
7, 2004 ("Legacy Part"), participants accrue a retirement benefit
that is a flat monthly rate for each year of service in the form of
a single life annuity ("SLA"), a payment stream that starts when
they retire and ends when they die. Participants can choose from
several forms of benefits other than an SLA, including joint and
survivor annuities, which offer payment streams for retirees' lives
and their spouse's lives after the retiree dies, and a Social
Security leveling option annuity, which enables early retirees to
collect pension benefits until they begin receiving Social Security
benefits at which point their pension benefits would be lowered
(collectively, "Non-SLA Annuities"). To calculate the benefit
amounts for retirees who receive these Non-SLA Annuities,
Defendants apply actuarial assumptions to calculate the present
value of the future payments. These assumptions are based on a set
of mortality tables to predict how long the participant and
beneficiary will live and interest rates to discount the expected
payments. The mortality table and interest rate together are used
to calculate a "conversion factor" which is used to determine the
amount of the benefit that would be equivalent to the SLA.

Older morality tables predict that people will die at a faster rate
(higher mortality rate) than current mortality tables. As a result,
using an older mortality table to calculate a conversion factor
decreases the present value of the Non-SLA Annuities and interest
rates being equal--the monthly payment that retirees who select
these Non-SLA Annuities receive. The Defendants calculate the
conversion factor (and thus the present value of the Non-SLA
Annuities) for the Legacy Part using the 1971 Group Annuity
Mortality Table ("1971 GAM table"). Using the 1971 GAM table, which
is based on data collected roughly 50 ago, depresses the present
value of Non-SLA Annuities, resulting in monthly payments that are
materially lower than they would be if Defendants used reasonable,
current actuarial assumptions.

By using outdated mortality assumptions to calculate Non-SLA
Annuities under the Legacy Part, Defendants improperly reduce
Plaintiff's benefits. Plaintiff has forfeited his benefits causing
him to receive less than he should each month in violation of
ERISA. By not offering benefits that are actuarially equivalent to
the single life annuity, Huntington Ingalls is causing retirees to
lose part of their vested retirement benefits in violation of
ERISA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Roger A. Herndon is a resident of Hayes, Virginia, and a
Participant in the Legacy Part of the Plan. Mr. Herndon worked for
Huntington Ingalls for approximately 40 years until he retired in
2013.

Huntington Ingalls is a shipbuilding company with its headquarters
in Newport News, Virginia. Huntington Ingalls sponsors the
Plan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
     BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
     1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Suite 540
     Washington, DC 20007
     Phone: (202) 463-2101
     Fax: (202) 463-2103 fax
     Email: gporter@baileyglasser.com

          - and -

     Mark G. Bokyo, Esq.
     BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
     8012 Bonhomme Avenue, Suite 300
     Clayton, MO 63105
     Phone: (314) 863-5446
     Fax: (314) 863-5483
     Email: mboyko@baileyglasser.com

          - and -

     Robert A. Izard, Esq.
     Mark P. Kindall, Esq.
     Seth R. Klein, Esq.
     Douglas P. Needham, Esq.
     Oren Faircloth, Esq.
     IZARD, KINDALL & RAABE LLP
     29 South Main Street, Suite 305
     West Hartford, CT 06107
     Phone: (860) 493-6292
     Fax: (860) 493-6290
     Email: rizard@ikrlaw.com
            mkindall@ikrlaw.com
            sklein@ikrlaw.com
            dneedham@ikrlaw.com
            ofaircloth@ikrlaw.com


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Lieff Cabraser, Baron & Budd File Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
On April 29, 2019, Lieff Cabraser and Baron & Budd filed a class
action lawsuit in federal court in California on behalf of
consumers across the U.S. against Hyundai Motor America, Kia Motor
America, and ZF-TRW Automotive Holding Corp. over defective vehicle
airbags that fail to operate during crashes due to electrical
overstress ("EOS"). As detailed in the Complaint, a defect in the
application-specific integrated circuit ("ASIC") built into the
airbags causes a failure in the Airbag Control Unit that prevents
the airbags and the seat belt pretensioners, both vital to
maximizing safety in a vehicle crash, from deploying. As the
Complaint further alleges, ZF-TRW, Hyundai, and Kia became aware of
the ACU defect as early as 2011, but did nothing to protect
consumers or warn of the product dangers until 2018.

As the Complaint states, "From 2011 through 2015, ZF-TRW, Hyundai,
and Kia investigated airbag non-deployments in several Kia and
Hyundai vehicles but failed to inform NHTSA that there was an issue
until the end of 2015. Even after advising NHTSA in 2015, each of
these companies downplayed the severity and frequency of these
non-deployment crashes. It was not until February and June of 2018
that Hyundai and Kia, respectively, issued product recalls as to a
small segment of their vehicles."

Throughout this nearly decade-long period, unsuspecting U.S.
consumers purchased vehicles with defective ACUs which create a
dangerous condition that gives rise to a clear, substantial, and
unreasonable danger of personal injury, indisputably posing a grave
and wholly unnecessary safety risk.

As the Complaint notes, "ZF-TRW, Hyundai, and Kia put profits ahead
of safety by continuing to equip vehicles with ACUs year after
year, even though they knew or should have known those ACUs were
defective. Despite the number of airbag failures, injuries, and
deaths caused by the ASIC Defect, ZF-TRW, Hyundai, and Kia were
slow to fully investigate the problem and slow to report the danger
to drivers and passengers of all ACU equipped vehicles. Only after
several deaths, injuries, and investigations did Hyundai and Kia
choose to recall a fraction of their vehicles equipped with the
ASIC Defect."

"This is not just fraud but also an astonishing breach of the
public trust," notes Lieff Cabraser partner David Stellings, one of
the lawyers who filed the class action lawsuit. "Airbags and seat
belts exist for only one reason: to protect passengers from being
hurt in a crash. The defective ZF-TRW airbag and seatbelt system
Hyundai and Kia installed in their cars do exactly the opposite --
they stop working when the car crashes. Millions of drivers and
passengers are at risk of being injured or killed."

The Complaint notes that as a result of this misconduct, Plaintiffs
and members of the proposed Classes were harmed and suffered actual
damages; they did not receive the benefit of their bargain, and
instead purchased or leased vehicles that are of a lesser standard,
grade, and quality than represented, and did not receive vehicles
that met ordinary and reasonable consumer expectations regarding
safe and reliable operation. Purchasers or lessees of the affected
vehicles paid more, either through a higher purchase price or
higher lease payments, than they would have had the ASIC defect
been disclosed. Plaintiffs and the Classes were deprived of having
a safe, defect-free airbag installed in their vehicles, and ZF-TRW,
Hyundai, and Kia unjustly benefited from their unconscionable delay
in recalling its defective products, as they avoided incurring the
costs associated with recalls and installing replacement parts for
years.

Vehicles in the Lawsuit

"Class Vehicles" refers to the Kia Forte 2013; Kia Forte Koup 2013;
Kia Optima 2013-2019; Kia Optima Hybrid 2012-2016; Kia Sedona 2014;
Hyundai Sonata 2013-2019; and Hyundai Sonata Hybrid 2013-2019. (The
defective ZF-TRW airbags were also supplied to other vehicle
manufacturers, including Toyota/Acura, Honda,
FiatChrysler/Dodge/Ram/Jeep, and Mitsubishi.)

The class action lawsuit states claims that include fraud,
fraudulent concealment, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, unjust enrichment, violation of the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act for Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability, and violation of the California Unfair Competition
Law. The lawsuit seeks class certification as well as remedies in
the form of an order enjoining Hyundai and Kia from further
deceptive distribution, sales, and lease practices with respect to
the affected vehicles, an award to plaintiffs and the class members
of compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, and an award for
the return of the purchase price of the affected vehicles.

                     About Lieff Cabraser

Recognized as "one of the nation's premier plaintiffs' firms" by
The American Lawyer, Lieff Cabraser is a national plaintiffs' law
firm with offices in San Francisco, New York, and Nashville. We
have successfully prosecuted scores of product defect class action
lawsuits against many of the largest U.S. manufacturers and
corporations. Working with co-counsel, we have achieved judgments
and settlements in these cases in excess of $19 billion for
consumers. Learn more at lieffcabraser.com.

                       About Baron & Budd

Established more than four decades ago to fight for workers injured
by asbestos, Baron & Budd has expanded to confront not only the
asbestos industry but also other societal threats such as water
contamination, unsafe pharmaceutical drugs and devices, financial
industry fraud, and automobile recalls. Baron & Budd has been named
repeatedly to "The Plaintiffs' Hot List" of exemplary plaintiffs'
firms in the United States by The National Law Journal. Legal 500
has repeatedly honored Baron & Budd for being one of the top two
law firms in the U.S. for toxic tort claims. [GN]


IKEA US RETAIL: Miller Suit Asserts Gender Discrimination
---------------------------------------------------------
LORI MILLER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. IKEA US RETAIL, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-00939-GAP-GJK (M.D. Fla., May 20, 2019) brings collective
claims alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") on behalf
of all similarly-situated female visual merchandisers.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has engaged in systematic
gender discrimination against its female visual merchandisers.
Defendant has caused, contributed to, and perpetuated gender-based
pay disparities through common policies, practices, and procedures.
The EPA collective action Plaintiff seeks to represent are all
female visual merchandisers who were paid less than male visual
merchandisers for doing similar work. The systemic gender
discrimination described in this Complaint has been, and is,
continuing in nature, says the complaint.

Plaintiff began her employment with IKEA working as a Visual
Merchandiser in Orlando, Florida in or around November 2007.

IKEA, is a Foreign Profit Corporation authorized and doing business
in this Judicial District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     GREGORY A. OWENS, ESQ.
     MIGUEL BOUZAS, ESQ.
     FLORIN GRAY BOUZAS OWENS, LLC
     16524 Pointe Village Dr., Suite 100
     Lutz, Florida 33558
     Phone: (727) 254-5255
     Fax: (727) 483-7942
     Email: greg@fgbolaw.com
            miguel@fgbolaw.com


INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Class Certification Sought in Slocum Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brent Jarrell, Elizabeth Simmons, Linda Nunnery, Willie Bickham,
and Herbert Angel, Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled SHIRLEY SLOCUM,
ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, ET AL., Case Nos.
2:16-cv-12563-EEF-JVM, 2:16-cv-12567-EEF-JVM, 2:16-cv-13793-EEF-JVM
and 2:16-cv-13346-EEF-JVM (E.D. La.), move for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs contend that the central question before the Court
is whether or not this case should be managed and tried as a class
action and, if so, how should the class be defined and managed in
order to bring over 2,500 cases to a conclusion.

The case arises from a single incident involving the release on
June 10, 2015, of a chemical substance known as Black Liquor into
the atmosphere and area surrounding the Paper Mill in Bogalusa,
Louisiana, owned and operated by the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs allege this release was entirely preventable had IP
acted with reasonable care.  They argue that this release of the
harmful substances into the environment caused injuries to
individuals and damaged property in the area.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Shawn C. Reed, Esq.
          HOWARD REED & PEDERSEN
          516. N. Columbia Street
          Covington, LA 70433
          Telephone: (985) 893-3607
          Facsimile: (985) 893-3478
          E-mail: sreed@howardandreed.com

               - and -

          D. Douglas Howard, Jr., Esq.
          Jonathan C. Pedersen, Esq.
          HOWARD REED & PEDERSEN
          839 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 306
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-3610
          Facsimile: (504) 581-7509
          E-mail: dhoward@howardandreed.com
                  jcpedersen@howardandreed.com

               - and -

          William H. Arata, Esq.
          ARATA & ARATA
          216 Austin Street
          Bogalusa, LA 70427
          Telephone: (985) 735-1368
          E-mail: aratalaw@bellsouth.net

               - and -

          Thomas M. Discon, Esq.
          Scott G. Discon, Esq.
          DISCON LAW FIRM
          424 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite A
          Mandeville, La 70448
          Telephone: (985) 674-9748
          E-mail: tdiscon@disconlawfirm.com
                  sdiscon@disconlawfirm.com


INTUIT INC: Kehiaian Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS KEHIAIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. INTUIT INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-02742 (N.D. Cal., May 20, 2019) seeks all monetary and
non-monetary relief allowed by law, including restitution of all
profits stemming from Intuit's unfair and fraudulent business
practices; declaratory relief; as well as reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs under California Code of Civil Procedure.

TurboTax is a tax preparation software, owned and manufactured by
Intuit, that is utilized to file more than 35 million tax returns
for American taxpayers every year when filing their income tax
returns with both the United States Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") and individual states. One of the main benefits of using
TurboTax is the ability to electronically file tax returns. This
not only results in convenience at the time of filing, but refunds
for electronic filings are processed more quickly than for hard
copy filings. Pursuant to an agreement with the IRS, TurboTax and
11 other tax preparation providers are required to cumulatively
offer 70% of U.S. taxpayers the option to file their taxes for
free. For the 2018 tax season, any taxpayer whose adjusted gross
income is $66,000 or less is eligible to use tax preparation
software from one of these providers to prepare and file their tax
returns for free.

According to the complaint, TurboTax violated its agreement with
the IRS by intentionally diverting qualified taxpayers away from
its "free filing" program in favor of its paid product offerings.
It did this by segregating its "free file" webpage from its primary
website and then altering the website's code in order to keep it
hidden from search engines like Google so that it would not be
easily accessible to qualified taxpayers. TurboTax also marketed
its paid offerings as "Free Guaranteed", so that qualified
taxpayers believed they were filing their taxes pursuant to the
free-filing program, only to be hit with unexpected charges after
they already spent hours entering information and were getting
ready to file. As a result of this scheme, TurboTax breached its
agreement with the government, took advantage of the U.S. public,
and generated millions of dollars of ill-gotten gains from persons
who least can afford it, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Dennis Kehiaian is a resident and citizen of Clarkton,
North Carolina who paid to file his 2018 tax returns using TurboTax
despite qualifying for the IRS free filing program.

Intuit markets, sells and operates TurboTax, a tax preparation and
filing software product and service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is reprensted by:

     Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
     GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
     505 14th Street, Suite 1110
     Oakland, CA 94612
     Phone: (510) 350-9700
     Fax: (510) 350-9701
     Email: ehg@classlawgroup.com

          - and -

     Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
     STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
     460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     Phone: (816) 714-7100
     Fax: (816) 714-7101
     Email: siegel@stuevesiegel.com

          - and -

     Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
     Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
     Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
     SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
     555 Lancaster Avenue
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Phone: 888.711.9975
     Email: jgs@sstriallawyers.com
            mds@sstriallawyers.com
            jbk@sstriallawyers.com


IRONCLAD ENERGY: Certification of Pumpdown Supervisors Class Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit DEXTER HINES, NICK NOLES, JEREMY
MARTIN, JOSEPH SMITH and REGINALD VANZANDT, Each Individually and
on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plainitff, vs.
IRONCLAD ENERGY, LLC, JAMES C. DONNAN and STEVEN CLOY GANTT, the
DEFENDANTS, Case No. 5:19-cv-00155-OLG (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to conditionally certify a class of:

   "all Pumpdown Supervisors and Operators since February 19,
   2016".

In conjunction with the current Motion, the Plaintiffs filed their
Motion for Approval and Distribution of Notice and for Disclosure
of Contact Information, setting forth Plaintiffs' requests related
to providing notice to putative class members of any class
certified by this Court pursuant to the current Motion.

The Plaintiffs brought this suit on behalf of all hourly-paid
employees of Defendants to recover overtime wages and other damages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040

ITT AEROSPACE: Toribio Hits Unpaid Wages, Missed Breaks
-------------------------------------------------------
ITXEL TORIBIO, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ITT AEROSPACE
CONTROLS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; ITT, INC., an
Indiana corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive; Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV17469 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., May 20,
2019) alleges that Defendants directly or indirectly controlled or
affected the working conditions, wages, working hours, and
conditions of employment of Plaintiff and the other class members.

As a pattern and practice, Defendants failed to pay overtime wages
to Plaintiff and the other class members for all hours worked,
notes the complaint. Plaintiff and other class members were
required to work more than 8 hours per day and/or 40 hours per week
without overtime compensation. The Defendants also failed to
provide the requisite uninterrupted and timely meal and rest
periods to Plaintiff and other class members, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee, from approximately in or about October 2017 to November
2018, in the State of California.

ITT AEROSPACE 6. CONTROLS, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability
company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     DOUGLAS HAN, ESQ.
     SHUNT TATAVOS-GHARAJEH, ESQ.
     DANIEL J. PARK, ESQ.
     JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
     751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101
     Pasadena, CA 91103
     Phone: (818) 230-7502
     Facsimile: (818)230-7259


IVY ENTERPRISES: Han Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------
John Han On behalf of himself and all other Plaintiffs similarly
situated known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. IVY Enterprises, Inc. and
Hans Han, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03023 (E.D. N.Y., May 21,
2019) is a lawsuit arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), for Defendants'
failure to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff.

During the course of his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff
regularly worked over 8 hours per day and over 40 hours per week.
However, the Defendants did not pay him overtime wage and they
never compensated Plaintiff with the spread of hours pay. Plaintiff
further alleges that Defendants' failure to pay overtime wages is
willful and intentional, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants as a delivery driver.

IVY Enterprises, Inc. was at all relevant times hereto engaged in
interstate commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan J. Kim, Esq.
     Ryan Kim Law
     163-10 Northern Blvd. Suite 205
     Flushing, NY 11358
     Email: ryan@RyanKimLaw.com



JERRY W. BAILEY: Court Decertify Provisional Class in Koch
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Decertify Provisional Class and Collective
Actions in the case captioned DANIEL KOCH and JOHNNY RAY WELLS,
JR., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. JERRY W. BAILEY TRUCKING, INC., JERRY W. BAILEY and
LINDA L. BAILEY, Defendants. Cause No. 1:14-CV-72-HAB. (N.D.
Ind.).

Plaintiffs allege that Jerry W. Bailey Trucking, Inc. (JWBT)
violated both federal and state wage laws, the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA)., the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, Ind. Code and the
Indiana Wage Claims Statute, Ind., by failing to pay employees for
certain work performed off-the-clock. Plaintiffs claim that they
are entitled to overtime wages, regular wages, and overtime
premiums.

CERTIFICATION STANDARD

Under Rule 23(a), class certification is permitted only if these
four requirements are met: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

Motions to decertify a class are reviewed using the same standards
as motions to certify a class. Motions to decertify a class are not
subject to the heightened standards of review applied to motions
for reconsideration, even if the class was previously certified by
a different judge.  

Under Section 216(b) of the FLSA, employees may bring a collective
action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated'
employees against employers who violate the Act's minimum wage or
overtime provisions. A collective action under the FLSA is
different from a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.   

Therefore, when deciding whether to decertify a collective action
and a class action in one lawsuit, the court treats them as a
single class action and applies the Rule 23 standards.  

PLAINTIFFS CANNOT DEMONSTRATE SUFFICIENT NUMEROSITY

The Defendants ask this Court to decertify the class and collective
actions on several bases, including an insufficient number of class
members, a lack of typicality and commonality between and among the
class members, alleged misconduct by class counsel, and the claim
that Plaintiff Koch should be removed as representative. If the
numerosity issue were removed from the discussion, the Court would
likely find that the Plaintiffs have continued to meet the standard
for certification and deny the motion. However, the numerosity
issue is before the Court, and it is dispositive.

When this Court originally certified the class and collective
actions, it noted that the potential number of class member was
sixty or more, based upon the affidavits of Plaintiffs. Now,
however, Plaintiffs can identify only sixteen class members and
only fourteen members of the collective action. These numbers,
taken alone, do not support a finding of sufficient numerosity, a
fact that Plaintiffs tacitly admit.  Accordingly, class size alone
will not save the certification.

Nor does the Court find that there are sufficient special
circumstances in this case to support ongoing certification of such
a small class. Cases finding such special circumstances are
instructive. In Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1996), the court certified a class consisting of only eighteen
members. Although there were few potential plaintiffs, class
certification served judicial economy because a single issue
determined liability for all of the class members and they were
dispersed among Illinois, New Jersey, and Tennessee.  

Here, the Plaintiffs cannot identify any such difficulties. The
class members have been identified, by name, in the parties
briefing. All of the class members are residents of this district.
The Plaintiffs have not identified any difficulty, much less
extreme difficulty, in joining the individual members of the class
or collective actions. Common sense compels the Court to find that
the numerosity requirement is no longer met, and that the class and
collective actions must be decertified.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion to Decertify
Provisional Class and Collective Actions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6jhwed4 from
Leagle.com.

Daniel Koch, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated
& Johnny Ray Wells, Jr, on Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Ronald E. Weldy,
Weldy Law, 8383 Craig St, Ste 330, Indianapolis, IN, 46250-3541

Linda L Bailey & Jerry W Bailey Trucking Inc, Defendants,
represented by Theodore T. Storer, Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP, 505
East Washington Boulevard, P.O. Box 11647, Fort Wayne, IN
46859-1647

Jerry W Bailey, Estate Defendant, represented by Theodore T. Storer
, Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP.


JIFFY LUBE: Turizo Sues over Unwanted Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------
The case, BLAKE TURIZO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. JIFFY LUBE INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Delaware corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-61140-XXXX (S.D. Fla., May 5, 2019), contends that the
Defendant, as part of its business practices, would often send text
messages to individuals without their prior consent. These messages
were sent using mass-automated technology through a third-party
company hired by Defendant to send text messages on Defendant's
behalf en masse, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Defendant operates more than 2,000 automobile service across
the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Class Members:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI , PLLC.
          110 SE 6th Street
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com

JIMMY JAZZ: Pierre Suit Asserts ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------
JOCELYN PIERRE, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. JIMMY JAZZ, INC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-02976 (E.D. N.Y., May 20, 2019) asserts injunctive relief,
compensatory relief, and attorney fees and costs pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the New York Human Rights
Law ("NYCHRL"), and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL")
and their implementing regulations, in connection with
accessibility barriers at various properties owned and managed by
Defendant.

Plaintiff, as well as a class consisting of hundreds of thousands
of similarly situated disabled individuals, are functionally
excluded from some or all of the goods, services, and amenities
offered to the general public at each of the Defendant's locations
nationwide and in this District, asserts the complaint.

By this litigation, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the class,
seeks to bring all of Defendant's locations into compliance with
applicable state and federal law, and to recover applicable damages
owed to each member of the class.

Plaintiff Jocelyn Pierre has at all relevant times suffered from a
"qualified disability" under the ADA, because he is a paraplegic
and uses a wheelchair for mobility.

JIMMY JAZZ, INC is a New York domestic business corporation
authorized to conduct and is conducting business within the State
of New York and is the lessor, owner and operator of all nationwide
Jimmy Jazz Facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     BRADLY G. MARKS, ESQ.
     THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
     175 Varick Street, 3rd Fl.
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 770- 2639
     Email: brad@markslawpc.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Carter Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
STELLA CARTER, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC. P/N/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES,
INC.; and IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC.,
the Defendants, Case No. 18CV335259 (Sep. 25, 2018), was removed
from the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, to
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on May
1, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 2:19-cv-03722 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Curtis G. Hoke, Esq.
          THE MILLER FIRM, LLC
          108 Railroad Ave.
          Orange, VA 22960
          Telephone: (540) 672-4224
          Facsimile: (540) 672-3055
          E-mail: choke@millerfirmllc.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Castro Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
KERIJANE CASTRO, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey
corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., a
New Jersey corporation doing business in California; IMERYS TALC
AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of
business in the State of California; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 30-2017-00052045-CU-PL-CXC
(Oct. 31, 2018), was removed from the Superior Court of California,
County of Orange, to U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California on May 1, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03760 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Richard Salkow, Esq.
          SALKOW LAW, APC
          1540 7th Street, Ste. 206
          Santa Monica, CA 90401-3432
          Telephone: (310) 451-8484;
          Facsimile: (310) 451-8486
          E-mail address: rsalkow@salkowlaw.com

               - and -

          James G. Onder, Esq.
          THE ONDER LAW FIRM
          110 East Lockwood
          St. Louis, MO 63119
          Telephone: (314) 963-9000
          Facsimile: (314) 963-1700
          E-mail: onder@onderlaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: DeBoth Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
Ramona DeBoth, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
a New Jersey corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., a New Jersey corporation doing
business in California; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware
Corporation with its principal place of business in the state of
California and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants, Case No.
CV-416760, was removed from the Superior Court of California,
County of Lake, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on April 29, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03541 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark P. Robinson, Jr., Esq.
          Karen L. Karavatos, Esq.
          Cynthia Garber, Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE, INC.
          19 Corporate Plawi Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: 949 720 1288
          Facsimile: 949 720-1292

               - and -

          Gerald J. Diaz, Jr., Esq.
          James R. Segars, III, Esq.
          TILE DIAZ LAW FIRM, PLLC
          208 Waterford Square, Suite 300
          Madison, MS 39110
          Telephone: 601 607-3456
          Facsimile: 601 607-3393

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Foster Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
LOTTIE FOSTER, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
a New Jersey corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES,
INC., a New Jersey corporation doing business in California; IMERYS
TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place
of business in the State of California; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 37-2017-00032641-CU-PL-NC
(Filed Sept. 1, 2017), was removed from the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego, to U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on April 30, 2019. The Central
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03674
to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Ted G. Meadows, Esq.
          BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN,
          PORTIS & MILES, PC
          218 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (800) 898 2034
          E-mail: led.meadows@beasleyallen.com

               - and -

          Helen Zukin, Esq.
          Melanie Meneses Palmer, Esq.
          Cherisse Cleofe
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Willshire Blvd.
          Beverley Hills, CA 90211-2910
          Telephone: 310 854 4444
          Facsimile: 310 354 0812
          E-mail: atkin@lchasellaw
                  paliner@kiesellaw
                  cleofe@kiesellaw




JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Franco Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
JULIE FRANCO, individually, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a
New Jersey corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES,
INC., a New Jersey corporation doing business in California; IMERYS
TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place
of business in the State of California; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. CIVDS1823459 (Filed Sept. 7,
2018), was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of
San Bernadino, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on April 30, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03616 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Brian D. Chase, Esq.
          Tom G. Antunovich, Esq.
          BISNAR CHASE
          1301 Dove Street, Suite 120
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752-2999
          Facsimile: (949) 752-2777
          E-mail: chase@bisnarchase.com
                  tanitenovich@bisnarchase.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Grijalva Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN GRIJALVA, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey
corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., a New Jersey corporation doing business
in California; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation
with its principal place of business in the State of California;
and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants, Case No.
30-2017-000200-CU-PL-CXC (Filed Oct. 31, 2017), was removed from
the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, to U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on April 29,
2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:19-cv-03559 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Richard Salkow, Esq.
          SALKOW LAW, APC
          1540 7th Street, Ste. 206
          Santa Monica, CA 90401-3432
          Telephone: (310) 451-8484;
          Facsimile: (310) 451-8486
          E-mail address: rsalkow@salkowlaw.com

               - and -

          James G. Onder, Esq.
          THE ONDER LAW FIRM
          110 East Lockwood
          St. Louis, MO 63119
          Telephone: (314) 963-9000
          Facsimile: (314) 963-1700
          E-mail: onder@onderlaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Groff Suit Moved to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
SANYETTA GROFF, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON, a New Jersey corporation doing business in California;
JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER
COMPANIES, INC., a New Jersey corporation doing business in
California; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with
its principal place of business in the State of California; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
BCV-18-102223 (Sept. 6, 2018), was removed from the Superior Court
of California, County of Kern, to U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on April 30, 2019. The Central
District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03642
to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Brian D. Chase, Esq.
          Tom G. Antunovich, Esq.
          BISNAR CHASE
          1301 Dove Street, Suite 120
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752-2999
          Facsimile: (949) 752-2777
          E-mail: chase@bisnarchase.com
                  tanitenovich@bisnarchase.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hagemann Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE HAGEMANN; CATHY E. SWEENEY and JOHN SWEENEY; NANCY E.
PANTALONE and STEPHEN PANTALONE; KIMBERLY THORNTON, Individually,
and Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of LINDA SCHWABENLAND,
Deceased, the Plaintiffs, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.,
IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 16CV303989 (Filed Dec. 14, 2016), was removed
from the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, to
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on April
30, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 2:19-cv-03678 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Curtis G. Hoke, Esq.
          THE MILLER FIRM, LLC
          108 Railroad Ave.
          Orange, VA 22960
          Telephone: (540) 672 4224
          Facsimile: (540) 672 3055
          E-mail: choke@millerfirmllc.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Love Suit Moved to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
ERIC LOVE, an individual and as Successor in Interest for JOELANE
LOVE, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.;
IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants,
Case No. 17CV001192 (Oct. 18, 2017), was removed from the Superior
Court of California, Alameda County, to U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on May 3, 2019. The Central District
of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03854 to the
proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Mark P. Robinson, Jr., Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE, INC,
          19 Corporate Plaza Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: 949 720-1288
          Facsimile: 949 720-1292
          E-mail: mrobinson@robinsonfirm.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Myers Suit Moved to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
SYLVIA MYERS, Individually, and as Successor-in-Interest on behalf
of the ESTATE OF NANCY E. MOORE, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC. P/N/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.; and IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A
LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 17CV321201 (Dec.
29, 2017), was removed from the Superior Court of California,
County of Santa Clara, to U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California on May 1, 2019. The Central District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03738 to the
proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Curtis G. Hoke, Esq.
          THE MILLER FIRM, LLC
          108 Railroad Ave.
          Orange, VA 22960
          Telephone: (540) 672-4224
          Facsimile: (540) 672-3055
          E-mail: choke@millerfirmllc.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Newberry Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA D. NEWBERRY, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.; and DOES 1
through 100, the Defendants, Case No. CIVDS1725849 (Dec. 29, 2017),
was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of San
Bernadino, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on May 3, 2019. The Central District of California Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03853 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael L. Baum, Esq.
          Nicole Maldonado, Esq.
          Robert Brent Wisner, Esq.
          BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, P.C.
          12100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 950
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 207-3233
          Facsimile: (310) 820-7444
          E-mail: mbaum@bhlaw.us
                  nmaldonado@bhlaw.us
                  rbwisner@bhlaw.us

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Nickaloff Suit Moved to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND M. NICKALOFF, JR.; CRYSTAL ERICKSON; and JULIA BROWN,
Individually and as Successors-In-Interest of Decedent LANA MARIE
NICKALOFF, the Plaintiffs, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.;
IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, the Defendants,
Case No. HG17878348 (Oct. 10, 2017), was removed from the Superior
Court of California, Alameda County, to U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on May 3, 2019. The Central District
of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03852 to the
proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Helen Zukin, Esq.
          Melanie Meneses Palmer, Esq.
          Cherisse H. Cleofe, Esq.
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Wilshire Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211-29 I 0
          Telephone: 310 854 4444
          Facsimile: 310 854 0812
          E-mail: palmer@kiesel.law
                  zukin@kiesel.law
                  cleofe@lcieseLlaw

               - and -

          Raymond P. Boucher, Esq.
          Shehnaz Bhujwala, Esq.
          BOUCHER LLP
          21600 Oxnard Street, Suite 600
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 818 340-5400
          Facsimile: 818 340-5401
          E-mail: ray@boucher.la
          bhujwala@boucher.la

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Abbott Suit to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson removed the case, DR. RICHARD ABBOTT,
Individually and as Successor-In-Interest of the Estate of CECILIA
ABBOTT, Deceased, the Plaintiff, vs. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY;
JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC., a subsidiary of
JOHNSON & JOHNSON; and DOES 1-450, the Defendants, Case No. JCCP
4674 / BC691327, from the Superior Court of the State of California
for the Los Angeles County, to U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California on April 30, 2019. The Central District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03681 to the
proceeding.

On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two
affiliates, Imerys Talc Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada,
Inc., filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition, commencing a
reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc., et
al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware. Since the Chapter 11 Case was
commenced, the Debtors have remained as debtors in possession under
11 U.S.C. section 1101 and have the rights, powers, and duties set
out in U.S.C. sections 1107 and 1108.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
Inc.:

          Alexander G. Calfo, Esq.
          Julia E. Romano, Esq.
          Amy P. Zumsteg, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 1600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4355
          Facsimile: 213 443 4310
          E-mail: acalfo@kslaw.com
                  jromano@kslaw.com
                  azumsteg@kslaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Lane Suit to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson removed the case, ARDYS LANE, an individual, the
Plaintiff, vs. ALBERTSONS COMPANIES INC., individually and as
successor in interest to SAV-ON DRUG STORES, INC., et al., the
Defendants, Case No. RG18915870, from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the Alameda County, to U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California on April 30, 2019. The
Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-2334 to the proceeding.

On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two
affiliates, Imerys Talc Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada,
Inc., filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition, commencing a
reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc., et
al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware. Since the Chapter 11 Case was
commenced, the Debtors have remained as debtors in possession under
11 U.S.C. section 1101 and have the rights, powers, and duties set
out in U.S.C. sections 1107 and 1108.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
Inc.:

          Alexander G. Calfo, Esq.
          Julia E. Romano, Esq.
          Amy P. Zumsteg, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 1600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4355
          Facsimile: 213 443 4310
          E-mail: acalfo@kslaw.com
                  jromano@kslaw.com
                  azumsteg@kslaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Peoples Suit to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson removed the case, BARBARA PEOPLES, Individually
and as Anticipated Representative of the Estate of JANET MASON,
Deceased, GLEN MASON and JEFFREY MASON, the Plaintiffs, vs. AMCORD,
INC. (sued individually and as successor-in-interest to RIVERSIDE
CEMENT CO., et al., the Defendants, Case No. JCCP 4674 / BC687010,
from the Superior Court of the State of California for the Los
Angeles County, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on April 30, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03684 to the proceeding.

On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two
affiliates, Imerys Talc Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada,
Inc., filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition, commencing a
reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc., et
al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware. Since the Chapter 11 Case was
commenced, the Debtors have remained as debtors in possession under
11 U.S.C. section 1101 and have the rights, powers, and duties set
out in U.S.C. sections 1107 and 1108.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
Inc.:

          Alexander G. Calfo, Esq.
          Julia E. Romano, Esq.
          Amy P. Zumsteg, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 1600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4355
          Facsimile: 213 443 4310
          E-mail: acalfo@kslaw.com
                  jromano@kslaw.com
                  azumsteg@kslaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Schade Suit to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson removed the case, NATASHA A. SCHADE, Individually
and as Successor-in-interest to ERIKA M. REETZ, deceased; ERIKA M.
CANTRELL; ALEXA M. MATTHIS, the Plaintiffs, vs. COTY, INC.; CYPRUS
AMAX MINIERALS COMPANY, Individually and as Successor-in-interest
to INTO TALC COMPANY, SIERRA TALC COMPANY, UNITED SIERRA DIVISION
OF CYPRUS MINES, CYPRUS INDUSTRIAL MINERALS COMPANY and PAUL WOOD
COMPANY; WHITTAKER, CLARK & DANIELS, INC., and DOES 1-100, the
Defendants, Case No. JCCP 4674 / BC640850 (Filed Nov. 17, 2016),
from the Superior Court of the State of California for the Los
Angeles County, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on April 30, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03662 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer,
Inc.:

          Alexander G. Calfo, Esq.
          Julia E. Romano, Esq.
          Amy P. Zumsteg, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          633 West 5th Street, Suite 1600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4355
          Facsimile: 213 443 4310
          E-mail: acalfo@kslaw.com
                  jromano@kslaw.com
                  azumsteg@kslaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Tyson Suit Moved to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH S. TYSON; DEBRA BLAIR; RITA S. YOUNG; SCOTT BRODY,
Individually, and as Successor-In-Interest to the Estate of LISA
RETTIG-BRODY, Deceased, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New
Jersey corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., a
New Jersey corporation doing business in California; IMERYS TALC
AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of
business in the State of California; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 17CV304790 (Filed Jan. 1,
2017), was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of
Santa Clara, to U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on April 29, 2019. The Central District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03578 to the proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages as a result of the Defendants'
negligent failure to warn and the design defect of their
talcum-based products.

Johnson & Johnson designed, developed, manufactured, tested,
packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and
sold the products to consumers, and Imerys mined, extracted,
sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated,
packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the
products to Johnson & Johnson.

Despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc
use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades,
none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing
informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the
Products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Curtis G. Hoke, Esq.
          THE MILLER FIRM, LLC
          108 Railroad Ave.
          Orange, VA 22960
          Telephone: (540) 672 4224
          Facsimile: (540) 672 3055
          E-mail: choke@millerfirmllc.com

JP MORGAN: Appeals Decision in McShannock Suit to Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Susan McShannock, et al. v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA, Case No. 3:18-cv-01873-EMC, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco.

The appellate case is captioned as Susan McShannock, et al. v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA, Case No. 19-15899, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 2, 2019, Chase
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate
case is styled Susan McShannock, et al. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA,
Case No. 19-80030.

Judge Edward M. Chen previously denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss and denied as moot its motion to stay.

Plaintiffs Monica Chandler, McShannock, and Meky, filed suit
against Chase on behalf of a putative class.  The Plaintiffs assert
claims under the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") based on
Chase's alleged violation of a California law requiring mortgage
lenders to pay interest to mortgagors on funds held in escrow
accounts for residential mortgages.

The Consolidated Class Action Complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs
took out mortgage-secured loans from Washington Mutual Bank
("WaMu"), a federal savings bank, between 2005 and the end of 2007.
When WaMu failed in 2008, its assets, including the Plaintiffs'
mortgages, were acquired by Chase via the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. ("FDIC").

The mortgage agreements at issue required the Plaintiffs to make
payments into escrow accounts held by the lender, in order to cover
any potential taxes and assessments, leasehold payments, and
insurance premiums on the property.  The Plaintiffs have each made
payments into the escrow accounts as required, but have never
received any interest on the escrow funds from Chase.  The mortgage
agreement contains a provision addressing interest on escrow
accounts.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on June 24, 2019;

   -- Appellant JP Morgan Chase Bank NA's opening brief is due on
      August 5, 2019;

   -- Appellees Monica Chandler, Susan McShannock and Mohamed
      Meky's answering brief is due on September 5, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees SUSAN MCSHANNOCK, as Executrix of the Estate
of Patricia Blaskower, on behalf of the Estate of Patricia
Blaskower and all others similarly situated; MONICA CHANDLER, as
Trustee of the Chandler Family Trust, and all others similarly
situated; and MOHAMED MEKY, and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Glenn A. Danas, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 229-5410
          E-mail: gdanas@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Michael Ram, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          2440 W. El Camino Real, Suite 100
          Mountain View, CA 94040
          Telephone: (650) 784-4006
          E-mail: mram@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Harold M. Jaffe, Esq.
          11700 Dublin Boulevard, Suite 250
          Dublin, CA 94568
          Telephone: (510) 452-2610
          Facsimile: (925) 587-1737
          E-mail: hmjaffe@gmail.com

Defendant-Appellant JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA, doing business as
Chase Bank, is represented by:

          Alexander J. Gershen, Esq.
          David C. Powell, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          Two Embarcadero Center, Suite 1300
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 844-9944
          E-mail: agershen@mcguirewoods.com
                  dpowell@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Brian David Schmalzbach, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          800 East Canal Street
          Gateway Plaza
          Richmond, VA 23219-3916
          Telephone: (804) 775-4746
          E-mail: bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com


JUST ENERGY: J. Collins' Suit Remanded to Calif. Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Remand in the case captioned JEREMY COLLINS and DANIEL
EVANGELISTA, on behalf of themselves and other aggrieved employees,
Plaintiffs, v. JUST ENERGY MARKETING CORP., JUST ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. SACV
19-00601-CJC (SSx). (C.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Jeremy Collins and Daniel Evangelista bring this
representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (PAGA) against their purportedly joint former employers, Just
Energy Marketing Corp. (JEMC) and Just Energy Solutions, Inc.
(JES), asserting various wage and hour violations under the
California Labor Code.  

A civil action brought in state court, but over which a federal
court may exercise original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant to a federal district court The burden of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction falls on the defendant, and the removal
statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.  

Here, the Defendants assert subject matter jurisdiction based on
diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction exists where the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the citizenship of each
plaintiff is different from that of each defendant.  

The Plaintiffs seek recovery for violations of the California Labor
Code under PAGA. Under PAGA, current or former aggrieved employees
are deputized to bring a civil action against any person to recover
civil penalties for Labor Code violations. An aggrieved employee is
any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against
whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed. Thus,
Plaintiffs have standing to bring a PAGA claim only against their
former or current employers. Although JEMC was Plaintiffs' employer
in name, Plaintiffs allege that JEMC and JES operated as
Plaintiffs' joint employers in practice.

Under California law, an employer is any person or entity who
directly or indirectly, or through an agent or any other person,
employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working
conditions of an employee.

The Defendants have not carried their burden of showing that
Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action against JES. The
Plaintiffs allege that (1) JES controlled certain day-to-day
operations of Just Energy's employees, including the employees'
work hours, (2) that Plaintiffs and the class of employees they
seek to represent were selling JES's products and services, and (3)
that JEMC is simply the marketing arm for JES's sales efforts in
California.  

The Defendants assert that this Court's prior ruling in a related
action supports finding that JES is a sham defendant. In
Evangelista v. Just Energy Marketing Corp., Daniel Evangelista, one
of the named plaintiffs here, filed a putative class action against
JEMC, JES, and other Just Energy affiliates, asserting various
violations of the California Labor Code. The defendants in that
case removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).

The Court's denial of the motion to remand in Evangelista does not
change the analysis here. In Evangelista, the Court found that the
plaintiff had not met the local controversy exception under CAFA,
to which no anti-removal presumption applies. The plaintiff had the
burden of showing the allegations against JES formed a significant
that is, important and notable basis of the allegations in that
complaint. The issue here, by contrast, is whether Defendants have
shown that there is no possibility that Plaintiffs have stated a
claim as to JES.

And the presumption here, by contrast, is against removal
jurisdiction. Defendants have the burden of proving that Plaintiffs
have obviously failed to state any theory of liability as to JES.
This burden is high. For the reasons already stated, Defendants
have failed to meet it. Because the fraudulent joinder exception to
the diversity requirement does not apply, the parties in this
action are not completely diverse.

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the
action must be remanded.  
Plaintiffs' motion to remand is granted.  This action is hereby
remanded to Orange County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5x7j4mg from Leagle.com.

Jeremy Collins, an individual, on behalf of themselves and other
aggrieved employees & Daniel Evangelista, an individual, on behalf
of themselves and other aggrieved employees, Plaintiffs,
represented by Asha Dhillon -- adhillon@jonesbell.com -- Jones Bell
Abbott Fleming and Fitzgerald LLP, Francisco Cabada --
cisco@cabadahameed.com -- Cabada and Hameed LLP, Sayema Javed
Hameed -- sayema@cabadahameed.com -, Cabada and Hameed LLP, William
M. Turner -- wmturner@jonesbell.com -- Jones Bell Abbott Fleming &
Fitzgerald & Craig R. Bockman -- crbockman@jonesbell.com -- Jones
Bell Abbott Fleming and Fitzgerald LLP.

Just Energy Marketing Corp., a Delaware corporation & Just Energy
Solutions, Inc., a California corporation, Defendants, represented
by Edward H. Chyun -- echyun@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC,
pro hac vice, Timothy S. Anderson -- tanderson@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson PC, pro hac vice & Rachael Sarah Lavi --
rlavi@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


JVK OPERATIONS: Montiel-Flores Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-------------------------------------------------------------
KENIA MONTIEL-FLORES and ALMANELLY RIVERA ZUNIGA, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JVK
OPERATIONS LIMITED and VINOD SAMUEL, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03005 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) is an action seeking
equitable and legal relief for Defendants' violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA") and the New York Labor Law
(the "NYLL").

Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, yet
Defendants failed to compensate them at a rate of one and one-half
times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week. The Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiffs overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours per week. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not receive, with each
wage payment, statements accurately listing their regular and
overtime rates of pay, the number of regular and overtime hours
worked, gross wages, deductions, and anything otherwise required by
NYLL. The Defendants knew or should have known that their failure
to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees minimum wages
and overtime compensation owed to them was a violation of the FLSA
and NYLL and/or they acted in reckless disregard of the federal and
state wage and hour laws, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs Montiel-Flores and Zuniga worked as clothing sorters at
JVK.

JVK is a laundromat that provides dry cleaning and laundry services
to hospitals and hotels in the Suffolk County area.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Adam Sackowitz, Esq.
     Katz Melinger PLLC
     280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 460-0047
     Facsimile: (212) 428-6811
     Email: ajsackowitz@katzmelinger.com



KAUFMAN COUNTY, TX: Sued Over High Property Appraisals
------------------------------------------------------
CBSDFW.COM reports that Forney Mayor Rick Wilson has filed a class
action lawsuit against the Kaufman County Chief Appraiser Sarah
Curtis on behalf of tens of thousands of property owners, many of
whom who have just received devastating property appraisals,
raising their property taxes hundreds, thousands and even tens of
thousands of dollars, according to Mayor Wilson.

"Kaufman County property owners are facing the possible loss of
their businesses, loss of their homes and buyers are cancelling
purchases as a result of this unprecedented and unconstitutional
valuation upsurge," according to the lawsuit filed on May 1.

The lawsuit states, "The District's flawed valuation methods
resulted in 2019 appraised property values that exceed the
appraised value required by law.  The Chief Appraiser refuses to
conduct reappraisal that complies with Texas constitutional and
statutory mandates -- preferring, instead, to saddle property
owners with the burden of doing what she was required to do by law
in the first place."

When asked for comment by CBS 11, the Kaufman County Appraiser's
Office said, "We do not comment on pending litigation." [GN]


KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE: Green Files Suit Over Time-Shaving Practices
------------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY GREEN, Individually, and on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE USA, INC.,
KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE MANCHESTER, INC., KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE DALLAS,
INC., KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE WAVERLY, INC., KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE
TECUMSEH, INC., and KIRCHHOFF AUTOMOTIVE LANSING, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-11471-DPH-APP (E.D. Tenn., May 20, 2019) is a
collective action for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") brought on behalf of all current and former hourly-paid
factory/production employees of Defendants within the United States
for "off-the-clock" and "edited-out/shaved" unpaid straight time
and overtime compensation against Defendants.

The Defendants have had a common policy, practice and plan of
inducing, expecting, and suffering and permitting Plaintiff and
similarly situated hourly-paid factory/production employees to work
"off-the-clock", during all relevant times herein. Plaintiff and
similarly situated hourly-paid factory/production employees were
expected, induced, and suffered and permitted, to perform work
duties before being "clocked-in" to Defendants' timekeeping system
prior to their scheduled starting times, without being compensated
for such "off-the-clock" work during weekly pay periods, during all
times material, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Green was a resident of Tennessee and worked as
an hourly-paid factory/production employee while employed by
Defendant.

Kirchhoff Automotive USA, Inc. is a subsidiary of Kirchhoff
Automotive GmbH, a manufacturing group that owns 30 production
plants worldwide with several of such plants in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
     J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
     Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
     JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
     262 German Oak Drive
     Memphis, TN 38018
     Phone: (901) 754-8001
     Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
     Email: gjackson@jsyc.com
            rbryant@jsyc.com
            rturner@jsyc.com


KRYPTONITE ENERGY: Gordon Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRADFORD GORDON, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. KRYPTONITE ENERGY SERVICES, LLC
and JODY KENNON Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00594-AJS (W.D. Pa.,
May 20, 2019) seeks to recover unpaid wages and overtime
compensation for Plaintiff and other similarly situated co-workers
who work or have worked for Defendants under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards ("OMFWSA"), of the Ohio Constitution, and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA").

Consistent with Defendants' policy, pattern, and/or practice,
Plaintiff and the Hourly Field Employees regularly worked in excess
of 40 hours per workweek without being paid wages for all hours
worked and without being paid overtime wages, in violation of the
FLSA, Ohio law, and Pennsylvania law, asserts the complaint. The
Defendants' failure to comply with the FLSA and Ohio and
Pennsylvania state laws has caused Plaintiff and the Collective
Members to suffer lost wages and interest therein, the complaint
adds.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, including from approximately
early January 2018 until in and around August 2018.

Kryptonite Energy Services is a Limited Liability Company with its
principal place of business at 1174 Findlay Street, Washington,
Pennsylvania 15301.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     D. Aaron Rihn, Esq.
     Robert Peirce & Associates, P.C.
     707 Grant Street, Suite 2500
     Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1918
     Phone: 412-281-7229
     Email: arihn@peircelaw.com

          - and -

     Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
     Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
     Migliaccio & Rathod LLP
     412 H Street N.E., Suite 302
     Washington, DC 20002
     Phone: (202) 470-3520



LABORATORY CORP: Kawa Orthodontics Sues Over Unsolicited Facsimiles
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings said in its Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that on April 22, 2019, it
was served with a putative class action lawsuit styled, Kawa
Orthodontics LLP, et al. v. Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings, et al., filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

The lawsuit alleges that on or about February 6, 2019, the
defendants violated the U.S. Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) by sending unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and at least
40 other recipients without the recipients' prior express
invitation or permission.  The lawsuit seeks the greater of actual
damages or the sum of US$0.0005 million for each violation, subject
to trebling under the TCPA, and injunctive relief.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LABORATORY CORP: Still Defends Feckley Class Suit over Commissions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings continues to face the
putative class action lawsuit styled, Feckley v. Covance Inc., et
al., according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019.

On December 20, 2018, the Company was served with a putative class
action lawsuit, Feckley v. Covance Inc., et al., filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of Orange.  The complaint
alleges that Covance Inc. violated the California Labor Code and
California Business & Professions Code by failing to properly pay
commissions to employees under a sales incentive compensation plan
upon their termination of employment.  The lawsuit seeks monetary
damages, civil penalties, punitive damages, and recovery of
attorney's fees and costs.

On January 22, 2018, the case was removed to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LABORATORY CORP: Still Defends Haro Suit over Labor Code Breaches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings is still facing
a putative class action lawsuit entitled, Alma Haro v. Laboratory
Corporation of America et al., according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

On September 21, 2018, the Company was served with a putative class
action lawsuit, Alma Haro v. Laboratory Corporation of America, et
al., which was filed in the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles.

Plaintiff alleges that employees were not properly paid overtime
compensation, minimum wages, meal and rest break premiums, did not
receive compliant wage statements, and were not properly paid wages
upon termination of employment.  Plaintiff asserts these actions
violate various Labor Code provisions and constitute an unfair
competition practice under California law.  The lawsuit seeks
monetary damages, civil penalties, and recovery of attorney's fees
and costs.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LTD FINANCIAL: Certification of Class Sought in Norton Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Troy Norton moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled TROY NORTON, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES
LP and LTD ACQUISITIONS LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00630 (E.D. Wisc.),
and further  asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendants)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


LVNV FUNDING: Arbitration Ruling in Williams-Hopkins Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSA M. WILLIAMS-HOPKINS, on behalf of herself and
those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LVNV FUNDING,
LLC, Defendant-Respondent, Case No. A-5325-17T2 (N.J. Super. App.
Div.), the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
affirmed the trial court's June 8, 2018 order compelling
arbitration and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiff Williams-Hopkins appeals from a June 8, 2018 order
compelling arbitration and dismissing her complaint with prejudice.
In 2003, the Plaintiff acquired a credit card from First Premier
Bank.  To be issued a credit card, she was required to sign a
Credit Card Contract and Initial Disclosure Agreement, indicating
her assent to the terms and conditions in the document.  The
Plaintiff did not deny signing the Agreement.  Nor did she disavow
her use of the credit card for three years before defaulting on her
payment obligations.

Defendant LVNV purchased the Plaintiff's credit card account debt
from the Bank.  The Plaintiff did not dispute that the Defendant
purchased her debt related to the credit card.

On Oct. 18, 2017, the Plaintiff commenced a class action lawsuit
against the Defendant.  The Defendant moved to dismiss her
complaint and compel arbitration in accordance with the Agreement.
After hearing the arguments of the counsel, the motion judge
granted the Defendant's motion and dismissed the Plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice.  The judge concluded that the Plaintiff
signed the Agreement and, consistent with the terms and conditions
in the Agreement, her claims were required to be resolved through
arbitration.

On appeal, the Plaintiff argues the Defendant failed to prove it
had a valid assignment of the Agreement from the Bank.  Absent
evidence of a valid assignment, she claims the Defendant cannot
compel arbitration.

The Court finds that the Agreement states any claim including, but
not limited to the validity, enforceability or scope of the
arbitration provision or the contract will be settled by binding
arbitration.  The Agreement applies to plaintiff and "any purchaser
of a credit account.  The Agreement also provides any claim will be
adjudicated by an arbitrator.  The United States Supreme Court has
held a court may not decide an arbitrability question that the
parties have delegated to an arbitrator.

The Plaintiff's claim relates to the Bank's assignment of the
Agreement to the Defendant.  The issue, as well as other issues
raised by the Plaintiff, must be submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.  During oral argument
before the panel, the Defendant conceded the arbitrator should
determine whether the Bank assigned to the Defendant all rights
under the Agreement, including the right to compel arbitration.

While the Court affirms the order compelling arbitration of the
Plaintiff's claims, the judge improvidently dismissed the
Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.  The Uniform Arbitration Act
provides for stays, rather than dismissals, of matters pending
arbitration.  Therefore, the Court remands the matter to the trial
court to enter an amended order staying the action pending
arbitration or, in the alternative, dismissing the complaint
without prejudice.

The Court affirmed as to compelling arbitration.  It remanded for
the entry of an amended order consistent with its Opinion.  The
Court does not retain jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 26, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/ku6AtE from Leagle.com.

Scott C. Borison, (Legg Law Firm, LLP), of the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and California bars, admitted pro hac vice,
argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm, LLC, and Scott C.
Borison, attorneys; Yongmoon Kim -- jhk@thekimlawfirm.com -- and
Scott Borison, of counsel and on the briefs).

Michael A. Iannucci -- iannucci@blankrome.com -- argued the cause
for respondent (Blank Rome, LLP, attorneys; Michael A. Iannucci, on
the brief).


MARRIOTT INC: Davidson Named to Plaintiffs Steering Committee
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that
Boca Raton attorney Stuart Davidson has been named to the
plaintiffs steering committee for financial institutions suing
Marriott Inc. over its giant data breach.

The Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd partner is a veteran of breach
class actions, serving on the executive committee in the Yahoo case
that settled for $117.5 million and the team leading plaintiffs in
more than 40 cases alleging security flaws in Intel Corp.'s
microprocessor chips.

U.S. District Judge Paul Grimm in Greenbelt, Maryland, appointed
the leadership team after a hearing on April 29. A consumer class
will be led by 14 lawyers, and others are in charge of the banking,
shareholder and derivative shareholder groups.

Davidson said by email on April 30 that he was grateful for the
appointment. He is on the banking steering committee and will be
the coordinating discovery counsel for the financial institution
track to coordinate discovery with the other plaintiffs groups.

"I am looking forward to getting this case to trial as swiftly as
possible so that our clients and class members can obtain justice
for the harm Marriott caused them," he said.

Financial institutions claim they were harmed in a variety of ways,
Davidson said. They had to cancel or reissue credit and debit cards
affected by the breach, close affected accounts, issue refunds or
credits for the cost of unauthorized transactions blamed on the
breach and respond to a higher volume of cardholder complaints,
confusion and concern.

Rather than accepting proposed attorney slates to lead the
plaintiffs case in the multidistrict litigation, Grimm used a
mix-and-match approach when assembling the teams, picking and
choosing attorneys from more than 30 applications submitted earlier
in April.

"The court's job is obviously to look out for the best interests of
the class members," Davidson said. In this case, Grimm
cherry-picked the attorneys.

"Sometimes individual lawyers are put together in a way that the
court feels is complimentary," the attorney said. "Luckily, nearly
all of the lawyers often competing for a leadership appointment in
MDLs in general, and data breach cases in particular, have worked
very well with the other applicants in other cases, so no matter
who the court selects, the plaintiffs' leadership is sure to be
comprised of lawyers with exceptional talent and impeccable
credentials."

More than 80 lawsuits were filed over the breach announced last
November by Marriott International Inc. The company initially said
the personal data of 500 million guests at its Starwood Hotels and
Resorts Worldwide properties was lost but later narrowed the count
to fewer than 383 million.

Three veteran data breach lawyers were named co-lead counsel for
the consumer class: Andrew Friedman, a partner at Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll in Washington; Amy Keller of Chicago's DiCello
Levit; and James Pizzirusso, a partner at Hausfeld in Washington.

Both Pizzirusso and Friedman were on the steering committees in the
data breach cases against Equifax and Home Depot. Keller was
co-lead counsel in Equifax, and Friedman was co-lead counsel in the
Anthem data breach case that settled for $115 million.

Grimm also appointed Labaton Sucharow in New York to lead the
shareholder class actions and attorneys from The Brown Law Firm in
Oyster Bay, New York, New York's Gainey McKenna & Egleston and
Maryland's Thomas & Libowitz to lead the derivative shareholder
cases. [GN]


MATRIX WARRANTY: Geiger Suit Asserts TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
JASON GEIGER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. MATRIX WARRANTY SOLUTIONS, INC., DOES,
Defendants, Case No. 8:19-cv-00971 (C.D. Cal., May 21, 2019) is a
Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the
illegal actions of Defendant in negligently and/or intentionally
contacting Plaintiff on his cellular telephone, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), thereby invading
Plaintiff's privacy.

There are online complaints about Defendant's calling practices,
including numerous complaints that Defendant placed unsolicited
recorded message calls even to people who were on the National
Do-Not Call Registry. Plaintiff did not have a business
relationship with MATRIX. Plaintiff's telephone number was on the
National Do-Not-Call Registry. Plaintiff was personally affected by
Defendant's aforementioned conduct because Plaintiff was frustrated
and annoyed that Defendant annoyed Plaintiff with an unwanted
prerecorded voice message without his prior express consent, in an
effort to solicit the purchase of Defendant's warranty products,
says the complaint.

Mr. Geiger is, and at all times relevant was, a citizen and
resident of the State of California, County of Orange.

Matrix Warranty Solutions, Inc. operates business under it's own
name, as well as "Element Protection Plans", "Matrix Protection"
and "everythingbreaks.com", among others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alex S. Madar, Esq.
     MADAR LAW CORPORATION
     14410 Via Venezia # 1404,
     San Diego, CA 92129-1666
     Phone: (858) 299-5879
     Fax: (619) 354-7281
     Email: alex@madarlaw.net


MCCALL SERVICE: Technicians Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
OSVALDO PADILLA and JUAN TORRES, on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MCCALL
SERVICE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-01232-CEH-SPF (M.D.
Fla., May 20, 2019) is an action for damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") for failure to pay overtime wages.

Plaintiffs and the Class worked hours in excess of 40 hours within
a work week for Defendant, and they were entitled to be compensated
for these overtime hours at a rate equal to one and one-half times
their individual regular hourly rates. However, the Defendant
failed to pay Plaintiffs and Members of the Class an overtime
premium for all of the overtime hours that they worked, in
violation of the FLSA. The Defendant's actions were willful, and
showed reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs worked for Defendant as pest control technicians.

MCCALL SERVICE, INC. operates a residential pest control service
business across the state of Florida with a location in Tampa, in
Hillsborough County, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     LUIS A. CABASSA, ESQ.
     Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, P.A.
     1110 N. Florida Avenue, Suite 300
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Main Number: 813-224-0431
     Direct Dial: (813) 379-2565
     Facsimile: 813-229-8712
     Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
            twells@wfclaw.com


MDL 2047: Court Denies Krupnick's Bid for Immediate Fee Disbursal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying Krupnick Campbell's
Motion for the Immediate Disbursement of Attorneys' Fees in the
case captioned IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL LOUISIANA
AMORIN CASES, Section L (5). Civil Action MDL No. 2047. (E.D.
La.).

These homeowners began to file suit in various state and federal
courts against homebuilders, developers, installers, realtors,
brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors, and
manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  

The Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' Liaison counsel entered into a
second settlement agreement addressing claims filed after December
9, 2011.

Under the terms of the settlements, the claimants with KPT Chinese
drywall were offered several options.  

As part of the Knauf remediation settlement, the Defendants also
agreed to pay reasonable costs, including the cost of administering
the program and an additional amount for attorneys' fees, which
includes both the fees for contract counsel and those for common
benefit counsel.  

The claimants having received their appropriate portion of the
settlement funds, the Court endeavored to allocate attorneys' fees
to contract counsel and common benefit counsel pursuant to
Pre-Trial Order 28 (PTO 28).  

The Movant filed a motion seeking the immediate disbursement of
attorneys' fees pursuant to the Court's Final Judgment.

In its Motion, the Movant argues the Knauf Settlement Agreements
made clear this Court would consider and rule upon the allocation
of all attorneys' fees and that any right of appeal as to the
Court's determination of attorneys' fee allocation was waived.

The Movant contends that, pursuant to this language, to which no
counsel nor individual the Plaintiff objected, the Appealing
Parties have waived their ability to raise the allocation of any
attorneys' fees on appeal. As a result, the Movant argues, by the
very terms of the Settlement Agreements to which these Appealing
Firms agreed and from which they have the opportunity to obtain any
attorneys' fees, the Appealing Firms specifically waived any right
to contest the allocation of attorneys' fees once determined by
this Court.

The Movant also argues that, even if the Appealing Parties did not
waive their right to appeal based on the Settlement Agreements'
waiver language, no party has sought a stay of the Court's final
judgment, nor should a stay be issued. Therefore, the Movant
contends, notwithstanding the Appealing Parties' appeal pending
before the Fifth Circuit, this Court should disburse the funds to
the parties immediately.

In opposition, Anderson Kill, P.C. (Anderson) contends the
immediate disbursement of all attorneys' fees to all counsel would
result in great hardship to the Court and to all counsel should any
of the several appeals be successful in any way and a clawback
become necessary.

Whether the Court Has the Authority to Order the Disbursal of the
Funds

The Movant asks the Court to immediately disburse the attorneys'
fees awarded pursuant to the Court's February 5, 2019 Final
Judgment.  The Appealing Parties having appealed that Final
Judgment, the Court first considers whether it has the authority to
disburse the fees before considering the judiciousness of
disbursing the fees prior to the Fifth Circuit's ruling on the
pending appeals.

Whether the Court Has the Authority to Distribute the Funds
Notwithstanding Appeal

In its brief, the Movant points to several cases in which the
district court ordered the disbursal of attorneys' fees, despite an
appeal having been lodged on the judgment allocating those fees.  

In this case, the judgment currently on appeal was issued on
February 5, 2019. R. Doc. 22092.

Thus, pursuant to Rule 62(a), the automatic stay on the Court's
judgment allocating attorneys' fees was lifted on March 7, 2019.
Since that time, no party has moved for an extension of the
automatic stay, and neither has the Fifth Circuit ordered this
Court's judgment be stayed pending the appeal.  

Whether Disbursal is Appropriate

To obtain a stay pending appeal, the moving party must demonstrate:
(1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits (2) that it would
suffer irreparable injury if the stay were not granted (3) that
granting the stay would not substantially harm the other parties
and (4) that granting the stay would serve the public interest.  

First, although this Court has been divested of the authority to
find the Appealing Parties have waived their right to appeal, the
waiver language in the Settlement Agreements is clear. Moreover,
this Court has undergone painstakingly careful procedures to
allocate the fees and allowed for the parties' input at every turn.
As a result, the Appealing Parties' likelihood of success on the
merits is slim.

Next, the Court notes Parker has moved the Court repeatedly to
immediately disburse the fees. Moreover, Mere injuries, however
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily
expended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility
that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation,
weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.  

Here, in the absence of a stay, the appealing parties would receive
funds, just not the total amount of funds to which they believe
they are entitled. Specifically, the Court ordered Parker receive a
common benefit fee of $2,037,038.98 plus held costs and the
remaining assessment for a total of $2,316,197.07; the Court
ordered Anderson receive a common benefit fee of $111,388.91 plus
held costs for a total of $132,016.48; the Court ordered Alters
receive a common benefit fee of $177,577.00 plus a return of the
remaining assessment for a total of $187,577.00.  Receiving these
funds can hardly be considered harmful.

Third, although it cannot be considered irreparable, granting a
stay would be highly inequitable to the other parties in this case.
As Parker notes in its motion seeking disbursement of
eighty-percent of the funds, making the attorneys in this case
"wait any longer for at least some fee award [after ten years of
litigation] would be grossly unfair.

Alternative Relief Agreed to by the Parties

In its reply, the Movant notes that all firms, including the
Appealing Parties, agree that an eighty-percent disbursement in
this case is appropriate. Parker filed its own Motion for Partial
Disbursement of Fees Awarded seeking an Order disbursing
eighty-percent of the total available attorneys' fees.  

In seeking or supporting relief from this Court in the form of
immediate disbursement of attorneys' fees, albeit in the
alternative or at differing amounts, all of those who have appealed
concede the jurisdiction and authority of this Court to enter an
order disbursing funds, notwithstanding their respective notices of
appeal.

Although the equities way in favor of disbursal and all parties
agree that at least a limited disbursal is appropriate, the Court
finds taking such an action would be imprudent. There are a
significant number of attorneys and firms in this case, and in the
admittedly unlikely event the Fifth Circuit reverses or alters this
Court's fee disbursal order, a claw back of the distributed funds
would prove disastrous, highly time consuming, and in some cases
infeasible. Moreover, the cost of a claw back in that type of
situation would be tremendous. Given this potential catastrophe,
the Court will exercise its discretion to deny the motion.

Accordingly, the Motion for the Immediate Disbursement of
Attorneys' Fees filed by Krupnick Campbell is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6tcmed9 from
Leagle.com.

Lynn C Greer, Special Master, pro se.

Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Russ M. Herman --
rherman@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC & Leonard A.
Davis -- ldavis@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC.

Homebuilders and Installers Steering Committee, Defendant,
represented by Phillip A. Wittmann – pwittman@stonepigman.com --
Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann, LLC.

Insurer Steering Committee, Defendant, represented by Judy Y.
Barrasso -- jbarrasso@barrassousdin.com -- Barrasso, Usdin,
Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver, LLC.

Defendant, Defendant, represented by Kerry James Miller , Fishman
Haygood, LLP,
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 4600, New Orleans, LA 70170-4600 &
Andrew J. Brien -- brien@carverdarden.com -- Carver, Darden,
Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux.

Defendant, Liaison Counsel for Taishan, BNMB entities, and CNBM
entities, Defendant, represented by Harry Rosenberg --
harry.rosenberg@phelps.com -- Phelps Dunbar, LLP.


MDL 2741: Perry v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA L. PERRY, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00281 (Filed Feb. 21, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on May 1, 2019. The Northern District
of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-02366-V to the
proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. the
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Perry case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiff alleges that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MDL 2741: Yeager v. Monsanto over Roundup Sales Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND J. YEAGER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00286 (Filed Feb. 22, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (San Francisco) on May 1, 2019. The Northern District
of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-02368-VC to the
proceeding.

The suit seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Yeager case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The
Plaintiff alleges that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiff also alleges that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MEDELY INC: Hensley Suit Alleges Labor Code Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Jean Hensley, on behalf of similarly situated members of the
general public v. Medely, Inc., Does 1 through 20, inclusive, Case
No. 19STCVl0238 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., March 26,
2019), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the
California Labor Code under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004.

The Defendants violated PAGA by denying their employees, including
the Plaintiff, meal and rest periods, reimbursements for business
expenses, itemized wage statements, and timely payment of wages due
upon separation of employment, notes the complaint.

The Plaintiff performed services for the Defendants as a registered
nurse and was classified by Defendants as an independent
contractor.

The Defendants are providers of healthcare staffing services with
operations throughout the State of California. The Defendant Does 1
through 20 are/or were its partners, agents, owners, shareholders,
managers or employees. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Fawn F. Bekam, Esq.
      Kashif Haque, Esq.
      AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC
      9811 Irvine Center Drive Suite 100
      Irvine, CA 92618
      Tel: (949) 379-6250
      Fax: (949) 379-6251


MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Class Action Over Nvidia Acquisition
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shiri Habib-Valdhorn, writing for Globes, reports that a
shareholder in Israeli big data connectivity chipmaker Mellanox
Technologies Ltd. (Nasdaq:MLNX) has filed a proposed class action
in a California federal court seeking to block the company's
impending $7.36 billion acquisition by Nvidia Corp., US legal
website Law360 reports.

The plaintiff, Marc Henzel, claims that Mellanox violated several
federal laws because it did not give enough details to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about the deal to be
acquired by Nvidia. In particular, he cites that investment bank JP
Morgan, which was Mellanox's financial advisor in the deal, did not
provide data about Mellanox's rate vof growth as part of its
analysis about the transaction.

Law360 quotes Henzel, "When a bank presents an analysis on the
fairness of a deal to shareholders, it must present the methodology
of the value and the main figures that it used for the analysis."
The plaintiff is demanding that the deal be halted until a report
is published that will include up to date analyses.

Nvidia is expected to complete the acquisition of Mellanox for $125
per share by the end of the year.

Mellanox declined to comment on the matter. [GN]


MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES: Stein Balks at Merger Deal with NVDIA
------------------------------------------------------------
LEWIS STEIN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.  MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES, LTD., IRWIN
FEDERMAN, JON A. OLSON, GLENDA DORCHAK, AMAL M. JOHNSON, JACK R.
LAZAR, UMESH PADVAL, DAVID PERLMUTTER, STEVE SANGHI, EYAL WALDMAN,
and GREGORY L. WATERS, NVIDIA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC., TEAL
BARVAZ LTD., AND NVIDIA CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-02428 (N.D. Cal., May 3, 2019), is a class action brought
by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
public shareholders of Mellanox Technologies, LTD. against the
Defendants, including Mellanox and the members of the Company's
board of directors, for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, in connection with the proposed
acquisition of Mellanox by NVDIA International Holdings Inc.

On March 10, 2019, Mellanox, NVDIA International Holdings Inc.,
Teal 15 Barvaz Ltd., and NVDIA Corporation entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement (i)
the Merger Sub will merge with and into Mellanox with Mellanox
surviving the merger and (ii) following this merger Mellanox will
be a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent (the Proposed Transaction).

On April 22, 2019 in order to convince the Company's public common
shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, Mellanox
filed a materially incomplete and misleading Preliminary Proxy
Statement on Form PREM 14A with the SEC, in violation of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  According to the complaint,
the Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the valuation analyses prepared by the Company's
financial advisors, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC and Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC's, in support of its fairness opinion.
Additionally, although the Proxy does not yet set the date for the
special meeting of Mellanox's shareholders to vote on the Proposed
Transaction, their joint press release does state the merger
parties' intention to conclude this merger by the end of the
calendar year of 2019. It is therefore imperative that the material
information that has been omitted from the Proxy is disclosed prior
to the Stockholder Vote so Mellanox shareholders can properly
exercise their corporate suffrage rights.

The Defendants were obligated to carefully review the Proxy before
it was filed with the SEC and disseminated to the Company's
shareholders to ensure that it did not contain any material
misrepresentations or omissions. The Proxy describes the fairness
opinion of the Company's financial advisor, J.P. Morgan, and the
various valuation analyses it performed in support of its opinion.
However, the description of J.P. Morgan's fairness opinion and
analyses fails to include key inputs and assumptions underlying
these analyses. Without this information, the Company's
shareholders are unable to fully understand these analyses and,
thus, are unable to determine what weight, if any, to place on J.P.
Morgan's fairness opinion in determining whether to vote their
shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction. This omitted
information, if disclosed, would significantly alter the total mix
of information available to the Company's common shareholders.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff:

          Jon A. Tostrud, Esq.
          TOSTRUD LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1925 Century Park East, Ste. 2100
          Los Angeles, CA. 90067
          Telephone: (310) 278-2600
          Facsimile: (310) 278-2640
          E-mail: jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
          Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
          GAINEY McKENNA & EGLESTON
          440 Park Avenue South, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 983-1300
          Facsimile: (212) 983-0383
          E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                  gegleston@gme-law.com

MERCY HOSPITAL: Loses Bid to Dismiss Minors' Tort Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Western Division, issued an Order granting in part
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings in the case
captioned K.A., BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT FRIEND B.W. INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; Plaintiff, v.
CHILDREN'S MERCY HOSPITAL, Defendant. Case No. 4:18-00514-CV-RK.
(W.D. Mo.).

Plaintiff K.A., a minor, by her next friend and mother, B.W.,
brings this putative class action for damages against Defendant
Children's Mercy Hospital. Plaintiff then filed suit in Missouri
state court on behalf of a putative class asserting the following
claims against Defendant: violation of Missouri's Merchandising
Practices Act (MMPA) (Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count
II), breach of contract (Count III), negligent training, hiring,
and supervision (Count IV), and negligence (Count V).   

In this case, the issue implicated by the parties' briefs is
whether Plaintiff suffered an injury in fact. A plaintiff who has
produced facts indicating it was a party to a breached contract'
has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes,
regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.

Here, in accordance with Eighth Circuit case law, Plaintiff's
allegations are sufficient to confer Article III standing regarding
her breach of contract claim. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's
notice constitutes an agreement with its patients. Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant breached its agreement with Plaintiff when
it failed to implement security measures to fulfill its agreement,
which resulted in Plaintiff suffering the diminished value of her
bargain. Although the allegations contained in the Complaint are
broad and conclusory, facts establishing the legal conclusion of a
valid, enforceable contract are not required to assert standing in
a breach-of-contract claim.  

The Court further concludes that Plaintiff has standing to bring
her other claims. As to the claim brought under the MMPA, the
statute provides a private right of action to any person who
sustains ascertainable loss in connection with the purchase or
lease of merchandise as a result of certain practices declared
unlawful. Here, Plaintiff alleges she overpaid for health care
services from Defendant due to the inadequate protection of her
medical records, and she therefore has standing to bring her claim
under the MMPA. The Court now turns to the instant motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

Breach of Contract Claim (Count III)

A breach of contract action includes the following essential
elements: (1) the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that
plaintiff performed or tendered performance pursuant to the
contract (3) breach of the contract by the defendant and (4)
damages suffered by the plaintiff.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim
fails because the Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the existence
of a contract. The Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that
the online notice of privacy practices posted on Defendant's
website constitutes a contract between her and Defendant. The
Plaintiff pleads no facts to show that statements in the notice
created a contractual relationship. The Plaintiff pleads no facts
to show offer, acceptance, or consideration. Apart from the notice,
Plaintiff does not attach or plead the existence of a contract. The
Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which the Court can reasonably
infer the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.


In responding to the Defendant's motion, the Plaintiff asserts that
a contract was formed when Plaintiff submitted patient data to the
Defendant, but fails to provide authority or discussion of the
required contract elements to support this position. Accepting the
well-pled allegations as true and viewing them in Plaintiff's
favor, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the existence of a
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.

MMPA Claim (Count I)

The MMPA provides a private right of action to any person who
sustains ascertainable loss in connection with the purchase or
lease of merchandise as a result of certain practices declared
unlawful. The MMPA requires plaintiffs to prove that they suffered
an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of an act
declared unlawful under RSMo.  

Defendant raises two arguments for why Plaintiff's MMPA claim
fails: (1) because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an
ascertainable pecuniary loss, and (2) because Plaintiff fails
connect any such loss to an actionable misrepresentation or
practice. Neither argument is sufficiently supported.

First, to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an
ascertainable loss, Missouri courts apply the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule. Under the benefit of the bargain rule
as applied to MMPA claims, a plaintiff can recover damages for the
difference between the actual value of the property and what its
value would have been if it had been as represented..

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's privacy practices posted
on its website stated that efforts to maintain the privacy and
confidentiality of medical records are part of the healthcare
services and that as a result of Defendant's unlawful practices,
she suffered by paying more for of state laws, the door to federal
court is not available in lawsuits where the plaintiff does not
have Article III standing. medical record privacy protections than
she otherwise would have and by paying for medical record privacy
protections that she did not receive.   Accepting the wellpled
allegations as true and viewing them in Plaintiff's favor, as it
must, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an
ascertainable loss.  

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff's MMPA claim fails
because the Plaintiff has not connected a pecuniary loss to any
actionable practice. Based on the authority and discussion
presented, Defendant does not persuasively support this argument.


Therefore, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is denied.

Common Law Tort Claims (Counts II, IV, and V)

Any action for negligence requires the plaintiff to establish that
the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the defendant's
failure. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's tort claims fail because
Plaintiff has not alleged a compensable injury under Missouri law
for two reasons.

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's damages theory of
heightened future risk of identity theft fails as a matter of law.
This argument is now moot because the argument is merits-based,
however, the Court has determined that the Complaint's allegations
of heightened risk of identity theft are insufficient to confer
standing on Plaintiff. See supra note 3. Therefore, Plaintiff
cannot pursue this relief.

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's damages theory of lost
benefit of the bargain is barred by Missouri's economic loss
doctrine. However, Defendant's economic loss doctrine argument is
inapplicable because as determined above in section II.B, Plaintiff
has not plausibly pled a breach of contract claim. The Court notes
that were the economic loss doctrine to apply, Defendant does not
address the exception to the economic loss doctrine relied on by
Plaintiff.  

Moreover, regarding Plaintiff's tort claims, Plaintiff has also
pleaded that she has suffered other damages including
embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life.
Defendant does not address or challenge these alleged damages.
Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's tort claims in
Counts II, IV, and V is denied.

The Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore
granted in part. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint
fails to state a claim for breach of contract in Count III.
Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend the Complaint that
complies with Local Rule 15.1 within thirty days from the date of
this Order. If Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in Count III
by an amended complaint, Count III will be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyvwmbmz from Leagle.com.

K.A., by and through her Next Friend B.W. individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Anne W. Schiavone, Holman Schiavone, LLC, 4600 Madison Avenue,
Suite 810, Kansas City, MO 64112, Lucy McShane, McShane & Brady
LLC, Maureen M. Brady, McShane & Brady LLC, 1656 Washington St
Suite 120, Kansas City, MO 64108, Brandon L. Corl, Holman
Schiavone, LLC & Wade A. Schilling, Holman Schiavone, LLC, 4600
Madison AvenueSuite 810Kansas City, MO 64112

Children's Mercy Hospital, Defendant, represented by Casie D.
Collignon -- ccollignon@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro
hac vice, Matthew C. Baisley -- mbaisley@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Thomas Raupp --
michael.raupp@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP & Martin M.
Loring -- martin.loring@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP.


MID-AMERICA APARTMENT: Appeal from Class Status in "Cleven" Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc. is awaiting the review of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals over the District Court's order
granting class certification in the Cleven and Cleven lawsuit,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019.  The Company also said that it intends to appeal
the District Court's order granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment to the Fifth Circuit if permission to appeal is granted.

In June 2016, plaintiffs Cathi Cleven and Tara Cleven, on behalf of
a purported class of plaintiffs, filed a complaint against MAA and
the Operating Partnership in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas, Austin Division.  In January 2017,
Areli Arellano and Joe L. Martinez joined the lawsuit as additional
plaintiffs.

The lawsuit alleges that the Company (but not Post Properties)
charged late fees at its Texas properties that violate Section
92.019 of the Texas Property Code, or Section 92.019, which
provides that a landlord may not charge a tenant a late fee for
failing to pay rent unless, among other things, the fee is a
reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord that are
incapable of precise calculation and result from the late payment
of rent.  The plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages and
attorneys' fees and costs.

In September 2018, the District Court certified a class proposed by
the plaintiffs.  Additionally, in September 2018, the District
Court denied the Company's motion for summary judgment and granted
the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.  Because the
District Court certified a class prior to granting the plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment, the District Court's ruling
applies to the entire class.  In October 2018, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the Company's petition to review the
District Court's order granting class certification.

The Company said, "We intend to appeal the District Court's order
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals if permission to appeal is granted.  We
will continue to vigorously defend the action and pursue such
appeals."



MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Renewed Arbitration Bid in J. Lance Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Memorandum granting Defendant's Renewed
Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration in the case captioned JACOB
LANCE, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC., et al. Civil Action No.
18-4933. (E.D. Pa.).

Jacob Lance opened a CareCredit Card account with Synchrony Bank on
December 12, 20161 by signing a CareCredit Card Account Agreement
(Credit Card Agreement). Mr. Lance used the account for purchases
but did not make payments. The Credit Card Agreement contains three
provisions material to the motion to compel arbitration: (1) an
assignment clause (2) an arbitration clause and (3) a class action
waiver.

Synchrony Bank and Midland Funding LLC signed a Forward Flow
Accounts Purchase Agreement (Purchase Agreement). The parties
represented Synchrony Bank desires to sell to Midland Funding,
during the Transfer period, delinquent charged-off credit card
Accounts, on the terms and conditions herein set forth, as such
Accounts exist as of the applicable Cut-Off Date.

Midland renewed its motion to compel individual arbitration and
stay our further progress.
Midland argues Section 2.1 of the Purchase Agreement shows it
bought all right to Mr. Lance's Account, which we know is a
charged-off credit card account owned by Synchrony Bank and sold to
Midland under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. Midland argues
all means all and when Synchrony Bank sold Mr. Lance's Account to
Midland, it sold all rights, including the right to arbitration in
the Credit Card Agreement.

In response, Mr. Lance argues Midland fails to show it acquired the
right to arbitrate. He contends Section 2.1 of the Purchase
Agreement particularly the language Midland shall buy all right
including the right to legally enforce, file suit, collect, settle
or take any similar action with respect to such account, title and
interest in and to the Accounts identified in a Notification File
shows only Midland bought the Account not the rights under the
Credit Card Agreement including the arbitration clause.  

The Court concludes under the plain language of the Purchase
Agreement Midland bought all rights to Mr. Lance's Account which
includes the right to arbitration, Mr. Lance's Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claim is within the scope of the arbitration clause,
and Midland did not waive its right to compel arbitration as it
purchased.

The Court applies a Rule 56 standard

The Court applied a Rule 12(b)(6) standard to Midland's first
motion to compel arbitration. The Court denied the motion and,
anticipating Midland may renew its efforts to compel arbitration
and the parties' possible need to explore the terms of the
assignment between Synchrony Bank and Midland, the Court extended
filing deadlines on Phase I motions for summary judgment on Mr.
Lance's claims or for class certification.

Midland purchased Synchrony Bank's right to arbitrate and Mr.
Lance's claims are within the scope of the arbitration clause

There is no genuine issue of fact regarding Midland's purchase of
Synchrony Bank's right to arbitration.

In opposition to Midland's first motion to compel arbitration, Mr.
Lance argued he did not agree to arbitrate with Midland and
Synchrony Bank did not assign its right to arbitration to Midland.
He argued there is no evidence Midland assumed all rights under the
Credit Card Agreement, including the right to arbitration.

Midland argues the plain language of the Purchase Agreement shows
by buying all right, title and interest in and to the Accounts,
including Mr. Lance's Account, it acquired all rights ,including
the right to arbitration, held by Synchrony Bank. It focuses on all
right, arguing the Court must give effect to this clear and
unambiguous language. Midland points out there is no exclusion or
words of limitation creating any ambiguity as to what it bought
from Synchrony Bank; it bought all right in Mr. Lance's Account,
not just the receivables or the right to collect receivables.  
The court focused on the language of the agreement providing
separate definitions for Account and Receivable to find while the
agreement passed the Receivables' and associated rights it did not
transfer all of the rights associated with Plaintiff's account to
Midland.

Here, the Purchase Agreement between Synchrony Bank and Midland
Funding does not have separate definitions for Account and
Receivable.

Mr. Lance now argues Midland demonstrates it bought only the
account but not the Credit Card Agreement and all the rights
associated with it. He points the distinction between the account
and the rights associated with his Credit Card Agreement with
Synchrony Bank is found in the Agreement itself. He argues the
assignment clause provision we may sell, assign or transfer any or
all of our rights or duties under this Agreement or your account
shows Synchrony Bank separated the rights under the Credit Card
Agreement including arbitration from the rights to the account and
there is no language in the Purchase Agreement transferring any
rights created by the Credit Card Agreement, only the rights
associated with the collection Account.

The Court concludes there is no genuine issue of fact Midland
bought Synchrony Bank's right to arbitration and will grant
Midland's motion to compel individual arbitration and stay the
matter pending arbitration.  

Mr. Lance does not address the class action waiver also contained
in the Credit Card Agreement. Mr. Lance agreed not to participate
in a class, representative or private attorney general action
against us in court or arbitration and agreed he may not bring
claims against us on behalf of any accountholder who is not an
accountholder on your account. There is no genuine issue of fact on
the class action waiver and the Court will compel Mr. Lance to
individual arbitration.
There is no genuine issue of fact Mr. Lance's claims are within the
scope of the arbitration clause.

The Court grants Midland's renewed motion to compel individual
arbitration and stay of the action pending arbitration in the
accompanying order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6r6f7zq from Leagle.com.

JACOB LANCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY
SITUATED CONSUMERS, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL ZEMEL, ZEMEL
LAW LLC, ELIZABETH EASLEY APOSTOLA, ZEMEL LAW LLC & NICHOLAS J.
LINKER, ZEMEL LAW LLC, 70 Clinton Avenue, Newark, NJ 07114- 2012.

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC. & MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Defendants,
represented by LAUREN M. BURNETTE -- lburnette@messerstrickler.com
-- MESSER STRICKLER LTD & DAVID MARC SCHWADRON --
dschwadron@messerstrickler.com -- MESSER STRICKLER, LTD.


MIZUHO BANK: Lack's Class Cert. Bid Denied
------------------------------------------
The Honorable R. Gary Klausner denies the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the lawsuit entitled Joseph Lack v. Mizuho
Bank, Ltd., et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-00617-RGK-GJS (C.D. Cal.).

Judge Klausner opines that the Plaintiff has failed to show that
common questions will predominate in resolving his claim as a class
action.  Because both predominance and superiority are required
under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court need not consider whether the Plaintiff has met the second
"superiority" requirement, Judge Klausner notes.  Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden under
Rule 23(b)(3).

Moreover, because the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements, the Plaintiff's Motion fails
on this ground alone, according to the Court's Civil Minutes.  The
Court, thus, need not address whether the Plaintiff has satisfied
Rule 23(a)'s requirements.

On January 24, 2018, Joseph Lack filed a putative class action
Complaint on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
against Mizuho Bank and Mark Karpeles.  In the Complaint, the
Plaintiff alleges claims arising out of the 2014 collapse of the
Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange.  On June 19, 2018, the Court dismissed
the Plaintiffs claim against Mizuho for unjust enrichment.  The
Plaintiff's remaining claim against Mizuho alleges fraudulent
concealment under California common law.  Additionally, the
Plaintiff alleges negligence and fraud against Karpeles.

The Plaintiff seeks to ultimately certify two classes: (1) the Mt.
Gox Class, encompassing all U.S. consumers who had Bitcoins or fiat
currency stored with Mt. Gox on the day the exchange went dark, and
(2) the Deposit Subclass, encompassing all members of the Mt. Gox
Class who made a deposit to Mizuho's Mt. Gox account after Mizuho
stopped processing withdrawals.  However, the Plaintiff seeks to
certify only the Deposit Subclass in the instant Motion.  The
Deposit Subclass is defined as follows: "All California residents
who wired money to Mt. Gox KK's bank account at Mizuho Bank, Ltd.,
between June 20, 2013 and February 24, 2014."[CC]


MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL: Harper Files False Labeling Suit in Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------------
RUBEN HARPER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MONDELEZ
GLOBAL LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-02747 (N.D. Cal., May 20, 2019) gives rise to a nationwide
class claims for fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of express
warranty due to Defendants' representations that are false,
misleading, unfair, unlawful, and are likely to deceive members of
the public.

MONDELEZ manufactures, distributes, and packages several brands,
including, but not limited to Oreo, Cadbury, Chips Ahoy, and
Trident. On its website, MONDELEZ states that "people don't want to
have to choose between snacking and eating right" and its products
are "made the right way," indicating that it exudes transparency in
representations on its labeling and statements it makes on its
packaging to its consumers. Consistent with Defendants'
self-promotion as a leader in snack foods, the front of the
packaging of the Products state in prominent, lettering that
contains "ALWAYS MADE WITH REAL COCOA" and "REAL COCOA." To
reinforce the message that the Products contain 'REAL COCOA'
MONDELEZ uses imagery and coloring on the front packaging,
including the use of smaller font for other words, "MADE WITH" to
ensure its consumers know Oreo's are made with "REAL COCOA."

However, Defendants' representations that the Oreo Products are
made with "REAL COCOA" are false, misleading, and deceptive. This
labeling deceives consumers into believing that they are eating
products with "REAL COCOA," but Defendants' Products do not live up
to these claims. Contrary to the labeling, it is alleged that each
of the Products is not made with 'REAL COCOA,' but instead is
processed with alkali. The Defendants' practices violate
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California's
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California's False Advertising Law,
("FAL"), says the complaint.

Plaintiff Mr. Harper made several purchases of the Products from
various stores in and near San Francisco County and San Joaquin
County, California.

Mondelez International, Inc. and Mondelez Global LLC is an American
multinational food and beverage company based in Deerfield,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Reuben D. Nathan, Esq.
     NATHAN & ASSOCIATES, APC
     2901 W. Coast Highway, Suite 200
     Newport Beach, CA 92663
     Phone: (949) 270-2798
     Fax: (949) 209-0303
     Email: rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com

          - and -

     Matthew Righetti, Esq.
     John Glugoski, Esq.
     RIGHETTI GLUGOSKI, P.C.
     456 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400
     San Francisco, CA 94101
     Phone: (415) 983-0900
     Facsimile: (415) 397-9005
     Email: matt@righettilaw.com
            jglugoski@righettilaw.com


MONOGRAM AEROSPACE: Lopez Sues Over Calif. Labor Code Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARCELA LOPEZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MONOGRAM AEROSPACE FASTENERS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive;
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV17433 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., May 20, 2019) is an action against Defendants for California
Labor Code violations and unfair business practices stemming from
Defendants' failure to pay minimum and regular rate wages, failure
to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
authorize and permit rest periods, failure to maintain accurate
records of hours worked and meal periods, failure to timely pay all
wages to terminated employees, and failure to furnish accurate wage
statements.

At all times, Defendants classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from
California's overtime requirements. During the statutory time
period, Plaintiff was typically scheduled to work 6 to 7 days in a
workweek, and typically 10 to 16 hours in a single workday.
Throughout the statutory period, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff
for all hours worked (including minimum wages, overtime, and
double-time compensation), failed to provide Plaintiff with
uninterrupted meal periods, failed to authorize and permit
Plaintiff to take uninterrupted rest periods, failed to maintain
accurate records of the hours Plaintiff worked, failed to timely
pay all final wages to Plaintiff when Defendants terminated
Plaintiffs employment, and failed to furnish accurate wage
statements to Plaintiff, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a California resident who worked for Defendants in Los
Angeles County, California as a packer from approximately 1995 to
the present.

Defendants own/owned and operate/operated an industry, business,
and establishment within the State of California, including Los
Angeles County.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Kane Moon, Esq.
     H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
     Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan, Esq.
     MOON & YANG, APC
     1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Phone: (213) 232-3128      
     Facsimile: (213) 232-3125      
     Email: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com             
            scott.leviant@moonyanglaw.com             
            lilit@moonyanglaw.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Armstrong Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marvin Armstrong, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01172-HEA (E.D. Mo., May 3, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Delsucs Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
LAURENT DELSUC AND CAROL LEANN DELSUC, husband and wife and their
marital community, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00461 (W.D. Wash., March 28, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful
conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture,
testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Both
Plaintiffs' injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Corrie J. Yackulic, Esq.
          CORRIE YACKULIC LAW FIRM, PLLC
          705 Second Avenue, #1300
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: 206 787 1915
          Facsimile: 206 299 9725
          E-mail: Corrie@cjylaw.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Munkres Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
Terrill J. Munkres, Individually and as Anticipated Executor of the
Estate of Billy G. Munkres, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and
and JOHN DOES 1-50., the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01174 (E.D.
Mo., May 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the
Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Billy G.
Munkres's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone. 314 241-8111
          Facsimile 314-241-5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Melanie H. Muhlstock, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723-4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723-4727
          E-mail: mmuhlstock@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Smiths Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
RENE M. SMITH and DAVID B. SMITH, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY and and JOHN DOES 1-50., the Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-01175-JAR (E.D. Mo., May 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages
suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the
Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Irene M.
Smith's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone. 314 241-8111
          Facsimile 314-241-5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Melanie H. Muhlstock, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723-4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723-4727
          E-mail: mmuhlstock@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Walker Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Walker, Individually and as Anticipated Executor of the
Estate of Billy G. Munkres, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and
and JOHN DOES 1-50., the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-01173 (E.D.
Mo., May 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages suffered by the
Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451-3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839-0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com

MORGAN STANLEY: Settles Ex-Financial Advisor's Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alex Padalka, writing for Financial AdvisorIQ, reports that Morgan
Stanley has agreed to a $10.2 million settlement of a class action
lawsuit brought by a former financial advisor who accused the
wirehouse of failing to cover the wirehouse advisors' work-related
expenses, including business travel, client entertainment,
licensing fees and phone and internet services, according to news
reports.

Filed last year by Brandon Harvey, who was with the wirehouse from
2013 until 2018, the suit alleges Morgan Stanley "had a policy and
practice of not reimbursing class members" for business expenses.

The settlement would cover around 2,800 California-based financial
advisors and private wealth advisors employed by the wirehouse from
2013 until now, according to Law360.com, which cites a proposed
settlement filed on April 29 in California federal court.

Morgan Stanley would offer $8.5 million in cash and agree to around
$1.7 million in future payments under the proposed settlement, the
legal news publication writes.

Harvey tells Law360.com that the settlement only represents less
than 7% of what he sought but that the benefits "substantially
outweigh the risk and that settlement at this juncture is in the
best interests of the class, aggrieved employees, and the State of
California." California's Labor Workforce Development Agency would
get $450,000 from the cash fund, according to the website. Harvey's
lawyers, the Wynne Law Firm and Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton,
have asked for around $2.5 million from the cash fund as well,
Law360.com writes. The roughly 2,800 advisors that are part of the
settlement would therefore receive around $3,600 each, according to
the website.

Harvey also tells Law360.com that he tried to arrange for a global
settlement that would settle the claims in Chen v. Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney, a similar pending suit, but that he wasn't able to do
so. The website didn't get a response from either party.

Last year, Finra was particularly tough on one of Morgan Stanley's
former advisors who allegedly improperly expensed the firm a mere
$273. The industry's self-regulator barred John Baldeck from the
industry in November for refusing to complete his testimony in the
case related to his voluntary resignation from the wirehouse in
2016 following allegations that he had expensed personal meals as
client meals. [GN]


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kelly Files Suit for Negligence
----------------------------------------------------
Corey Kelley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No.
1:19-cv-01218 (S.D. Ind., March 26, 2019), is brought against the
Defendants for negligence, breach of express contract, and
fraudulent concealment.

The Defendant breached its duties to student football players,
including the Plaintiff, by failing to disclose and/or failing to
recognize and/or being willfully non-observant of material
information regarding the long-term risks and effects of repetitive
head trauma they possessed or should have possessed, the dangers of
concussive and sub-concussive injuries, and the proper ways to
evaluate, treat, and avoid concussive and sub-concussive trauma to
football players, asserts the complaint.

The Plaintiff played football at University of Central Missouri
from 1994 to 1999, as a running back. While playing at UCM, the
Plaintiff suffered from numerous concussions, as well as countless
sub-concussive hits as part of routine practice and game play.

The Defendant is an unincorporated association with its principal
place of business located at 700 West Washington Street,
Indianapolis, Indiana 46206. The NCAA is the governing body of
collegiate athletics that oversees twenty-three college sports and
over 400,000 students who participate in intercollegiate athletics,
including the football program at UCM.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeff Raizner, Esq.
      RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
      2402 Dunlavy Street
      Houston, TX 77006
      Tel: (713) 554-9099
      Fax: (713) 554-9098
      E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Kerns Sues Over Student-Athletes' Injuries
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tobi Kerns, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No.
1:19-cv-02046 (S.D. Ind., February 15, 2019), is brought against
the Defendant for negligence, breach of express contract and
fraudulent concealment.

The Plaintiff brings this class action to obtain redress for
injuries sustained a result of Defendant's reckless disregard for
the health and safety of generations of Indiana University,
Bloomington student-athletes.

The Plaintiff alleged that for decades, the Defendant NCAA knew
about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
Indiana. The Plaintiff played football at IUB from 1990 to 1992, as
a fullback and has suffered from numerous concussions, as well as
countless sub-concussive hits as part of routine practice and game
play.

The Defendant NCAA is an unincorporated association with its
principal place of business located at 700 West Washington Street,
Indianapolis, Indiana 46206. The Defendant is the governing body of
collegiate athletics that oversees twenty-three college sports and
over 400,000 students who participate in intercollegiate athletics,
including the football program at IUB.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeff Raizner, Esq.
      RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
      2402 Dunlavy Street
      Houston, TX 77006
      Tel: (713) 554-9099
      Fax: (713) 554-9098
      E-mail: efile@raiznerlaw.com


NAVIENT CORP: Still Defends Consolidated Class Suit in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019, that it intends to "vigorously defend" itself
against the consolidated class lawsuit in New Jersey.

Two putative class actions have been filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey captioned Eli Pope v. Navient
Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak Chivavibul and Christian Lown,
and Melvin Gross v. Navient Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak
Chivavibul and Christian M. Lown, both of which allege violations
of the federal securities laws under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  These cases were consolidated
by the Court in February 2018, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated
amended complaint in April 2018 and the Company filed a motion to
dismiss in June 2018.  The Company has denied the allegations.


NAVIENT CORP: Still Faces Lord Abbett Consolidated Class Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation continues to defend itself against the
consolidated case captioned, Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., et
al. v. Navient Corporation, et al., according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.  The Court has
previously granted-in-part and denied-in-part the Navient
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

During the first quarter of 2016, Navient Corporation, certain
Navient officers and directors, and the underwriters of certain
Navient securities offerings were sued in three putative securities
class action lawsuits filed on behalf of certain investors in
Navient stock or Navient unsecured debt.  These three cases, which
were filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware,
were consolidated by the District Court, with Lord Abbett Funds
appointed as Lead Plaintiff.

The plaintiffs filed their amended and consolidated complaint in
September 2016.  In September 2017, the Court granted the Navient
defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety with
leave to amend.

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with the court in
November 2017 and the Navient defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the second amended complaint in January 2018.  In January 2019, the
Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the Navient defendants'
motion to dismiss.

The Navient defendants deny the allegations and intend to
vigorously defend against the allegation in this lawsuit.


NEW MEXICO: Cummings Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Randy Cummings, et al., filed with the Supreme Court of
United States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
titled RANDY CUMMINGS, ET AL. v. CELINA BUSSEY, SECRETARY OF THE
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, AND JASON DEAN, AS
THE DIRECTOR OF THE LABOR RELATIONS DIVISION OF THE NEW MEXICO
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,
Case No. 18-1357.

Response was due May 29, 2019.

The questions presented by the Petition are:

   1. Whether a federal court interpreting a state statute can
      conclude that it grants the state agency discretion such
      that the "ministerial exception" to immunity does not
      apply, where the highest court of the state concluded that
      the statute in question imposed a "mandatory,
      non-discretionary duty" on the agency to follow its
      mandates and that doing so was purely a ministerial act?

   2. Whether a federal court interpreting a state statute can
      find that the law governing employees' property right --
      defined by state law -- in prevailing wages was not
      "clearly established" at the time of the violation where
      the highest court of the state concluded that it was?

The Lower Court Case is entitled Randy Cummings, et al. v. Celina
Bussey, et al., Case Nos.  17-2072 and 17-2079, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the nature of
suit is stated as other civil rights.

Celina Bussey is the Secretary of the New Mexico Department of
Workforce Solutions.

The District Court case is styled Cummings, et al. v. Bussey, et
al., Case No. 1:16-CV-00951-JAP-KK, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico - Albuquerque.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Randy Cummings, et al., are represented by:

          James Marshall Piotrowski, Esq.
          PIOTROWSKI DURAND, PLLC
          P.O. Box 2864
          1020 W. Main Street, Suite 440
          Boise, ID 83701
          Telephone: (208) 331-9200
          E-mail: james@idunionlaw.com

               - and -

          Shane Youtz, Esq.
          Stephen Curtice, Esq.
          James A. Montalbano, Esq.
          YOUTZ & VALDEZ, P.C.
          900 Gold Avenue S.W.
          Albuquerque, NM 87102
          Telephone: (505) 244-1200
          E-mail: shane@youtzvaldez.com
                  stephen@youtzvaldez.com
                  james@youtzvaldez.com


NEW ORLEANS, LA: Caluda et al. Seek to Certify Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit, ROBERT J. CALUDA, APLC AND NEW ORLEANS
PRIVATE PATROL SERVICE, INC., the Plaintiffs, vs. THE CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS, LINEBARGER, GOGGAN, BLAIR & SAMPSON, L.L.P. AND UNITED
GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES OF Case No. 2:19-cv-02497-SM-JCW (E.D. La.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order certifying their case as
a class action.

The Plaintiffs are members of the proposed class and represent
those persons and entities similarly situated, who reside in and/or
owned movable property in the City of New Orleans, Parish of
Orleans, State of Louisiana, who paid a 30% or other collection
penalty and 3% late payment penalty to the defendant, City of New
Orleans. The 30% penalty was paid to a private debt collector,
United Governmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. and Heard,
Linebarger, Graham, Goggan, Blair, Pena & Sampson, L.L.P. pursuant
to Ordinance No. 18637 of the City of New Orleans adopted on March
6, 1998.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

          Allain F. Hardin, Esq.
          ALLAIN F. HARDIN, APLC
          807 Howard Avenue
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 522-1188
          Facsimile: (504) 524-8317
          E-mail: fransenandhardin@aol.com
                  afhardin@aol.com

NIAGARA DISTRIBUTORS: Removes Rodriguez Suit to S.D Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------
Niagara Distributors, Inc. and Janet Lucci filed a notice to remove
the case, ELBA RODRIGUEZ, and other similarly Situated individuals,
the Plaintiffs, v. NIAGARA DISTRIBUTORS, INC. and JANET LUCCI, the
Defendants, Case No. CACE19005888 (Filed March 15, 2019), from the
Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for
Broward County, Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on May 3, 2019.  The Southern District
of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No, 0:19-cv-61133-XXXX to the
proceeding.

Niagara Distributors is a full line bakery and food service
distributor. Niagara was founded in 1979 by Mr. Pat Lucci, the
Chairman of the Board.

The complaint assert claims pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants:

          Peter J. Bober, Esq.
          Samara Robbins Bober, Esq.
          BOBER & BOBER, P.A.
          2699 Stirling Road, Suite A-304
          Hollywood, FL 33312
          Telephone: (954) 922-2298
          Facsimile: (954) 922-5455
          E-mail: Peter@boberlaw.com
                  Samara@boberlaw.com

NORTHLAND GROUP: Johnson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Malika R. Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Northland Group, Inc. and
Radius Global Solutions, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-02630 (E.D.N.Y., May 3, 2019), seeks to recover damages for
Defendants' violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a natural person
allegedly obligated to pay a debt. The Defendants regularly collect
or attempt to collect debts asserted to be owed to owed by
consumers. The Defendants are regularly engaged, for profit, in the
collection of debts allegedly others. The Defendants use the mails
in their debt collection business.

The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of the Plaintiff to pay
money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.  The alleged
Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of the Plaintiff.
In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendants contacted
the Plaintiff by letter dated May 6, 2018. The Letter conveyed
information regarding the alleged Debt. The Letter is a
"communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(2).  The
Letter is on letterhead indicating the debt collector is "Northland
Group." Northland Group was a Minnesota limited liability company
formed on April 28, 2017. Northland Group ceased to exist on April
20, 2018, when it changed its name to "Radius Global Solutions,
LLC." Despite the above, Defendants sent the Letters using the name
"Northland Group". The Defendants used a false name.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: ConsumerRights@BarshaySanders.com

NUTANIX INC: Maroun Files Class Action Over False Reports
----------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH S. MAROUN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. NUTANIX, INC., DHEERAJ PANDEY and
DUSTON M. WILLIAMS, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02744 (N.D. Cal.,
May 20, 2019) is a securities class action on behalf of all those
who purchased or sold Nutanix publicly traded securities during the
period from March 2, 2018 through February 28, 2019, inclusive (the
"Class Period"), who were damaged (the "Class") and thereby seek
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

The Defendants made repeated statements that Nutanix was investing
heavily in growth and was increasing sales and marketing activities
while improving upon gross margins due to changes being made to the
Company's business model, including the shift from hardware to
software and the change from licensing to subscription platforms.
Contrary to these statements, and as revealed by the Defendants on
February 28, 2019, starting with the fourth fiscal quarter of 2017
(beginning May 1, 2017) through the third fiscal quarter of 2018
(ending April 30, 2018), Defendants did not increase Nutanix's lead
generation spending, but rather held lead generation spending, an
admitted "key component to building pipeline," flat. Further,
starting with the fourth fiscal quarter of 2018 (beginning May 1,
2018) through the second fiscal quarter of 2019 (ending January 31,
2019), rather than either increasing lead generation spending or
holding that spending flat, Defendants actually decreased Nutanix's
lead generation spending. Additionally, on this same date
Defendants revealed that
Nutanix had fallen behind in its sales hiring goals.

By misrepresenting the magnitude of Nutanix's marketing spending,
and failing to disclose Nutanix was pulling back on lead generation
spending, Defendants were able to misrepresent that Nutanix had
improved its gross margins through changes to its business model
rather than the truth--that Nutanix was skimping on important
drivers of revenue growth. As a result of Nutanix's lower lead
generation spending and failure to keep pace with its sales hiring
goals, Nutanix's pipeline of new business was severely negatively
impacted, resulting in significantly lower forecasted earnings
starting in the third fiscal quarter of 2019 (ending April 30,
2019), says the complaint.

Plaintiff purchased Nutanix securities in reliance on Defendants'
materially false and misleading statements and omissions of
material facts, and on the integrity of the market for Nutanix
securities, at artificially inflated prices during the Class
Period.

Nutanix, Inc. is an enterprise cloud platform provider. Nutanix
common stock trades under the ticker "NTNX" on the NASDAQ, an
efficient market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James M. Wagstaffe, Esq.
     Frank Busch, Esq.
     WAGSTAFFE, VON LOEWENFELDT, BUSCH & RADWICK LLP
     100 Pine Street, Suite 725
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Phone: (415) 357-8900
     Facsimile: (415) 357-8910
     Email: wagstaffe@wvbrlaw.com
            busch@wvbrlaw.com


NZONE GUIDANCE: Hiser's Operators and Drillers Classes Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Robert Pitman granted in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification and Court-Authorized Notice in the
lawsuit entitled STEPHEN HISER and DANA ACE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. NZONE GUIDANCE, LLC,
Case No. 1:18-cv-01056-RP (W.D. Tex.).

The Court conditionally certifies these classes under the Fair
Labor Standards Act:

   * All MWD Operators employed by, or working on behalf of,
     NZone while classified as independent contractors and paid a
     day rate at any time during the last three years; and

   * All Directional Drillers employed by, or working on behalf
     of, NZone while classified as independent contractors and
     paid a day rate at any time during the last three years.

The Court directs the parties to confer and attempt to reach a
consensus regarding the form and substance of the notice to be
provided to putative class members.  If the parties are unable to
reach an agreement, the Plaintiffs shall submit a renewed motion
for court-authorized notice.[CC]


OMNICELL INC: Mazya Plaintiff Files Amended Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the "Yana Mazya" class-action lawsuit has filed an
amended complaint, which adds a new named plaintiff and an
additional defendant, according to Omnicell, Inc.'s Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.

On June 6, 2018, a class-action lawsuit was filed against a
customer of the Company, the customer's parent company and two
vendors of medication dispensing systems, one of which is the
Company, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Chancery
Division, captioned Yana Mazya, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Northwestern Lake Forest Hospital,
Northwestern Memorial Healthcare, Omnicell, Inc. and Becton
Dickinson, Case No. 2018-CH-07161.

The complaint sought class certification, monetary damages in the
form of statutory damages for willful and/or reckless or, in the
alternative, negligent violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), and certain declaratory,
injunctive, and other relief based on causes of action directed to
allegations of violation of BIPA and of negligence by the
defendants.  The complaint was served on the Company on June 15,
2018.

The Company's obligation to respond to the complaint was held in
abeyance pending a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in a
separate case involving BIPA issues.  The Illinois Supreme Court
issued its decision in that case on January 25, 2019.

On April 10, 2019, subsequent to the court's issuance of an order
granting the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a second named
plaintiff and an affiliate of the Company's customer as an
additional defendant and, in addition to making other modifications
to the complaint, removing the separate cause of action directed to
negligence.

The court established a deadline of May 13, 2019 for the defendants
to answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint.

The Company intends to defend the lawsuit vigorously.

Omnicell, Inc. provides automation and business analytics software
solutions for medication and supply management in healthcare
worldwide.  The Company operates through two segments, Automation
and Analytics, and Medication Adherence.  The Company was formerly
known as Omnicell Technologies, Inc. and changed its name to
Omnicell, Inc. in 2001. Omnicell, Inc. was founded in 1992 and is
headquartered in Mountain View, California.


ONEMAIN HOLDINGS: Executes Settlement for Galestan Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
OneMain Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that parties in the putative class action
lawsuit styled, Galestan v. OneMain Holdings, Inc., et al., has
executed a settlement agreement, which is subject to Court
approval.

The Company also said that papers in support of approval of the
settlement have been filed with the Court.  The settlement
agreement provides for the dismissal of the action with prejudice.
The amount incurred by the Company is immaterial and has been
properly accrued, including the related insurance proceeds, as of
March 31, 2019.  The settlement contains no admission of liability
by the Company and the other defendants.

On February 10, 2017, the federal securities class action was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
naming as defendants the Company and two of its officers.

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Exchange Act for allegedly
making materially misleading statements and/or omitting material
information concerning alleged integration issues after the OneMain
Acquisition in November 2015, and was filed on behalf of a putative
class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
common stock between February 25, 2016 and November 7, 2016.  The
complaint seeks an award of unspecified compensatory damages, an
award of interest, reasonable attorney's fees, expert fees and
other costs, and equitable relief as the court may deem just and
proper.

On March 23, 2017, the court appointed a lead plaintiff for the
putative class and approved the lead plaintiff's selection of
counsel.  The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 13, 2017
challenging statements regarding the Company's projections of
future financial performance and certain statements regarding
integration after the OneMain Acquisition.

On September 29, 2017, pursuant to the Court's Individual Rules and
Practices, the Company sought permission to file a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint and on December 12, 2018, the Court
denied that motion.  On January 4, 2019, the Company requested
permission to reargue the motion to dismiss decision with respect
to the challenged statements from February 2016.

On April 23, 2019, the parties executed the settlement agreement.

OneMain Holdings, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides consumer
finance and insurance products and services. The company operates
in two segments, Consumer and Insurance, and Acquisitions and
Servicing. OneMain Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1920 and is based
in Evansville, Indiana.


OXY USA: Court Won't Review Remand Denial in Cooper Clark's Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider in
the case captioned COOPER CLARK FOUNDATION, On behalf of itself and
All others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OXY USA INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 18-1222-JWB. (D. Kan.).

This court entered an order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand this action to state court. The detailed history of the
consolidated state court action is set forth in that order and will
not be restated here. The pertinent question in that decision was
whether a consolidated class action was merged into a single action
under Kansas state law. If so, the amount in controversy was
established in this case. In the prior order, the undersigned
conducted a review of Kansas and federal law and determined that
when a plaintiff obtains consolidation under K.S.A. 60-242(a)(2) of
putative class actions with overlapping claims, classes, and
defendants, consolidation results in merger and CAFA jurisdiction
is therefore evaluated based on the amount in controversy in the
merged case.

Therefore, CAFA jurisdiction was established and the motion to
remand was denied.

Plaintiffs have now moved for reconsideration of this court's
decision.

Plaintiffs argue that the court erred by interpreting the state
court judge's consolidation order as a consolidation under
60-242(a)(2) and that the court erred by not following federal law.


First, K.S.A. 60-242(a) provides as follows: "(a) Consolidation. If
actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court in the same or different counties in the judicial
district, the court may: (1) Join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions or (3)
issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay."

In the order denying remand, the court reviewed the underlying
state court judge's decision granting the motion to consolidate the
three class actions and the record in that consolidated action. The
court concluded that the order of consolidation was an order under
K.S.A. 60-242(a)(2) based on the language in the order.  

The Plaintiff contends that this court erred construing the order
for consolidation as an order under section 60-242(a)(2) because
the state court did not specifically identify the subpart in the
order. The Plaintiff, however, fails to identify how this court's
decision was erroneous. The state court judge did not specifically
identify the basis for the consolidation. But, the Plaintiff makes
no argument that this case was consolidated under a different
subpart.

The state court order stated that the Plaintiff is requesting that
all three (3) actions, currently in the 26th Judicial District, be
consolidated into one action. The order clearly consolidates the
matter into one action, as indicated by 60-242(a)(2). The Plaintiff
makes no attempt at a colorable argument as to why the state court
order was a consolidation under a different subpart.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs have not shown the court erred in
construing the order as an order to consolidate under
60-242(a)(2).

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxdz2d8j from
Leagle.com.

Cooper Clark Foundation, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Barbara C. Frankland
-- bfrankland@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Rex A. Sharp --
rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson --
rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA & Scott B. Goodger --
sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA.

OXY USA Inc., Defendant, represented by Aurra Fellows --
afellows@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, pro hac vice, James M.
Armstrong -- jarmstrong@foulston.com -- Foulston Siefkin LLP, Mark
C. Rodriguez -- mrodriguez@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, pro
hac vice & Mikel L. Stout -- mstout@foulston.com -- Foulston
Siefkin LLP.


P&S SELECT: Franco Seeks Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
LUIS ALBERTO RIVAS FRANCO, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. P&S SELECT FOODS INC. (D/B/A
P & S SELECT FOODS INC.), RAY MILLAN , GARY LANGSAM , ANTHONY
MILLAN , and RAY MILLAN JR., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04009
(S.D.N.Y., May 3, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a supply company, located
at 355 Food Center Drive, Bronx, NY 10474 under the name "P & S
Select Foods Inc." The Plaintiff was employed as a driver's helper
at the supply company located at 355 Food Center Drive, Bronx, NY
10474.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage and
overtime compensation for the hours that he worked. Rather, the
Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours
worked and failed to pay Plaintiff appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium. Defendants' conduct extended beyond Plaintiff
Rivas to all other similarly situated employees.

The Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiff and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per
week without providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation
required by federal and state law and regulations, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

P.F. CHANG'S: Wilson Elser Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------
Kara Thorvaldsen, Esq. -- kara.thorvaldsen@wilsonelser.com -- and
Tracy Waugh, Esq. -- tracy.waugh@wilsonelser.com -- of Wilson Elser
Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, in an article for The National Law
Review, report that in Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.,
Massachusetts's highest court, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC),
has weighed in on several recurring class action litigation issues,
providing much needed guidance in an area where there is limited
precedential case law in this jurisdiction. The decision also
highlighted some important and somewhat subtle distinctions between
class action practice in Massachusetts state court versus federal
court.

   * First, the court addressed the standard for certifying a class
action brought under the Massachusetts Wage Act or the minimum fair
wage law. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that a more
lenient class certification standard should be inferred from the
wage laws, holding that Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 provides the correct
framework for analyzing certification.

  * Next, the court clarified the standard for determining whether
the numerosity requirement for class certification has been met
and, in the process, provided a reminder of why "fail-safe" classes
are not permissible.

  * Finally, the court signaled that attempts to moot a putative
class action with a Rule 68 offer of judgment or tender of
"complete relief" are unlikely to gain traction in Massachusetts
state proceedings.

Background
The factual underpinning of the Gammella case is uncomplicated.
Under regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts Department of
Occupational Safety, if an hourly employee scheduled to work for
three hours or more reports for duty at the time set by the
employer but is involuntarily dismissed before having worked three
hours, the employee must nonetheless be paid for at least three
hours at no less than the basic minimum wage. This is known as
"show up" or "reporting" pay.

The plaintiff in Gammella had worked for P.F. Chang's for
approximately seven years and testified that on numerous occasions
he was cut from his shift after reporting for work and was not paid
reporting pay as required by law. In discovery, the defendant
produced reports confirming the plaintiff's testimony on this
point, and identifying approximately 7,000 similar instances
involving hundreds of other employees who had worked shifts of
fewer than three hours without receiving reporting pay. The
plaintiff moved for certification of a class made up of hourly
employees in Massachusetts who were scheduled to work for at least
three hours but worked fewer hours and were not paid three hours of
reporting pay.

The defendant asserted that it had no way of knowing whether the
hundreds of employees identified had been involuntarily dismissed
early from their shifts or whether their shifts had been cut short
at the employees' own requests. Based on an opinion letter from the
Executive Office of Labor and Workforce, which stated that no
reporting pay was required where an employee voluntarily chose to
leave a shift early, the motion judge redefined the plaintiff's
proposed class. The redefined class included only those employees
who had been involuntarily cut or whose choice to leave early was
not free from pressure from the employer. The trial judge then took
the unusual step of denying certification for failure to
sufficiently establish numerosity. The numerosity requirement for
class certification is usually the easiest element to establish,
and classes of as few as 40 members have been certified. Here,
however, despite the hundreds of other employees identified as
putative class members, the trial judge concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of numerosity
to certify the class. The trial judge did not assess the remaining
Rule 23 factors.

As an aside, it is worth noting the plaintiff did not attempt an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of class certification,
presumably because such discretionary review is rarely granted
under Massachusetts law, even less frequently than in federal
court. Only about 1% of all appeals in Massachusetts are
interlocutory; in contrast, by some counts up to 25% of Federal
Rule 23(f) petitions seeking review of class certification orders
are granted.

After denial of certification, the defendant made two offers of
settlement. The first was a formal Rule 68 offer of judgment, which
under its own terms and under the provisions of Rule 68 was deemed
withdrawn when the plaintiff failed to accept it. The second was a
"tender of complete relief," a letter accompanied by a certified
check in an amount that would render "complete relief" on the
individual plaintiff's claims, with an offer of reasonable
attorneys' fees, costs and interest. The letter advised that if the
offer was not accepted, the defendant would move to dismiss the
action on grounds of mootness. Upon expiration of the tender, the
defendant sought dismissal and the trial court granted it, holding
that complete relief had been offered and the claims were
accordingly moot. Both parties and the court recognized that upon
dismissal, the plaintiff would be able to appeal the ruling on
class certification.

Appeal
Massachusetts's highest court took up the appeal sua sponte. The
plaintiff argued before the SJC that class certification should be
decided not with reference to the requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P.
23, but under a more lenient standard inferred from provisions of
the wage laws, which authorize a private right of action, including
the right to bring a class action. The SJC rejected this argument,
comparing the provisions of the wage laws to the language of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (known as chapter 93A), which
contains "highly detailed language" specifying the standard to be
applied to class actions brought under its provisions. In contrast,
the wage laws contain no such language. Accordingly, the court
definitively stated that a class action brought under the wage laws
must be analyzed using the Rule 23 standard, not a more lenient
approach such as that available under chapter 93A.

On the issue of numerosity, the SJC held that the trial judge had
required too strict a standard of proof at the class certification
stage. All that is needed to certify a class is evidence
"sufficient to enable the motion judge to form a reasonable
judgment that the class meets the requirements of Rule 23."
Moreover, the court explained that the numerosity requirement "is
less about the number of class members than it is about the
impracticability of joinder" of all the members. One of the
traditional rationales for permitting class claims is to allow
aggregation of multiple small claims into an action that has value
such that it becomes worth pursuing. Thus, where the plaintiff had
identified hundreds of employees who had in more than 7,000
instances worked fewer than three hours without receiving reporting
pay, and the defendant's own poor record keeping prevented the
parties and court from determining the reasons for nonpayment, it
was reasonable to infer that the class was numerous and joinder
would be impracticable.

Analysis
Open questions remain as to whether the defendant can defeat class
certification on remand, based on commonality and typicality. In
ruling on the class certification motion, the trial judge noted
that the defendant had not identified a single instance from 2011
to 2015 when it had provided any Massachusetts employee with
reporting pay. However, there are almost certainly instances within
that set of data where a failure to pay reporting pay was not a
violation because the employees voluntarily left their shift early.
The question will then become whether "common questions of law and
fact" do indeed predominate over individual issues, as contemplated
by Mass. R. Civ. P. 23. The SJC signaled that these hurdles could
be overcome, referencing another wage class action in which it had
held that the possible presence of some uninjured class members did
not defeat certification, and noting that the defendant's poor
record keeping could not be used to defeat class certification.

The court also pointed out that by attempting to redefine the class
as only those workers who had improperly been denied reporting pay,
the motion judge had created an impermissible "fail-safe class,"
meaning a class defined as only those who had a valid claim. A
fail-safe class is impermissible because any putative class member
to whom the defendant is not found liable is defined out of the
class, is not bound by the judgment, and may continue to litigate,
contrary to the purpose of class actions.

Finally, on the issue of mootness, the SJC held that the tender of
"complete relief," under the circumstances, had not mooted the
class representative's individual claims and had not deprived the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. The idea of mooting a "case
or controversy" by offering or tendering complete relief to a
plaintiff is a strategy that holds great appeal for defendants.
However, as the SJC noted, the United States Supreme Court rejected
this tactic in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S.Ct. 663 (2016),
holding that an unaccepted settlement offer − in the form of a
Rule 68 offer of judgment − does not moot a claim. Here, even the
"tender of complete relief," which included delivering a certified
check in an amount exceeding the dollar value of the plaintiff's
individual claim, could not moot the claim. The SJC also emphasized
that unlike federal courts, where jurisdiction is limited by the
Article III "case or controversy requirement," standing in state
courts is governed by different considerations.

In this particular case, the mootness argument was made even weaker
because by the time the SJC heard this case the plaintiff's motion
for class certification had been denied and was under appeal. The
viability of the class claims was therefore still very much at
issue. Moreover, the SJC reasoned that permitting a defendant to
employ this tactic to moot a putative class action would
effectively render the denial of class certification unreviewable,
an unacceptable outcome.

Conclusion
It is clear that the parties and the court had an interest in
seeing a final judgment entered so that the class certification
ruling could be reviewed. Had the trial court not dismissed the
claim on mootness grounds, no appeal would have been possible until
the putative class representative's individual claim was tried to
judgment. This ruling highlights the critical importance of the
class certification determination and demonstrates that even where
certification is initially denied, the potential for reversal on
appeal must be considered. In any event, the SJC's ruling in
Gammella provides useful guidance to class action litigants and the
Massachusetts trial courts. [GN]


PAN E VINO: Gonzalez Seeks Damages Over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------
MANUEL SARABIA GONZALEZ, MARTIN PEREZ MORALES, RICARDO PALILLERO,
JOSE TORRES MIGUEL, MAYNOR RIGOBERTO TOC PABLO, AUCAY PESANTEZ
SEGUNDO VICTORIANO, DEIVIS DAVILA MELENDEZ AND EDWIN GUARDADO
GARCIA individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ERVIN ROSENFELD AND PANE E VINO RESTAURANT INC.,
Defendants, Case No. CV19-3015 (E.D. N.Y., May 21, 2019) is a civil
action for damages and equitable relief based on willful violations
of the Defendants.

The Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiffs and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per
week without providing the minimum wage and overtime compensation
required by federal and state law and regulations, notes the
complaint. Defendants further failed to pay Plaintiffs the required
"spread of hours" pay for any day in which they had to work over 10
hours a day, the complaint adds.

Plaintiffs are current employees of Defendants. They were
ostensibly employed as bussers, servers, runners, cooks and
dishwashers.

Pane E Vino Restaurant, Inc. is a domestic corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of New York and operates a
restaurant and bar called Pane E Vino.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Robert J. Renna, Esq.
     Robert J. Renna, P.C.
     26 Court Street, Suite 303
     Brooklyn, NY 11242
     Phone: (718) 422-1003
     Fax: (718) 422-1156


PROGRESSIVE SELECT: William South Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, William South, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Progressive Select Insurance
Company, the Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-02567, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(Miami) on May 3, 2019. The Southern District of Florida Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-21760-MGC to the proceeding. The
suit alleges insurance-related violation. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Marcia G. Cooke.

Progressive Select Insurance Company operates as an insurance
company. The Company offers auto, trailers, motorcycles, boats,
renters, condos, flood, life, and health insurance services.
Progressive Select Insurance serves customers in the United
States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Casim Adam Neff, Esq.
          NEFF INSURANCE LAW, PLLC
          4051 27th Ave North
          Saint Petersburg, FL 33713
          Telephone: (727) 342-0617

               - and -

          Craig Evan Rothburd, Esq.
          CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, P.A.
          320 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 251-8800
          Facsimile: 251-5042
          E-mail: craig@rothburdpa.com

               - and -

          Scott Jeeves, Esq.
          954 1st Avenue North
          Saint Petersburg, FL 33705
          Telephone: (727) 894-2929
          Facsimile: (727) 822-1499

Attorneys for Progressive Select Insurance Company:

          Irene Bassel Frick, Esq.
          Jason L. Margolin, Esq.
          Marcy Levine Aldrich, Esq.
          Bryan Thomas West, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 1700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-7333
          Facsimile: (813) 223-2837
          E-mail: Irene.Bassel@akerman.com
                  jason.margolin@akerman.com
                  marcy.aldrich@akerman.com
                  bryan.west@akerman.com

PUPPY MANAGEMENT: Does not Properly Pay Workers, DeRoss Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER DeROSS, Plaintiff, v. PUPPY MANAGEMENT, INC., A/K/A
EXECUTIVE IQ MANAGEMENTSTAFFING, INC, JAMES WRIGHT, JR., WGC
SPORTS, LLC, ANTONIO BRYANT, G5IVE, LLC and BLACKACRE, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 89837588 (11th Judicial Circuit Ct.,
Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., May 21, 2019) is an action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated current and former tipped employees ("Servers")
who work and/or worked for Defendants ("Employer") for minimum wage
violations of the FLSA and for owed wages/tips.

According to the complaint, the Employer paid Plaintiff and Servers
nothing for an hourly wage despite being required to do so pursuant
to the FLSA's minimum wage provisions; refused to pay Plaintiff and
the Servers all and/or any of their tips and/or extra tips paid by
G5ive's customers; required that Plaintiff and the Servers work for
free; required that Plaintiff and Servers purchase and maintain
work uniforms at their own cost; and failed to pay Plaintiff and
the Servers for any and/or all of their actual work time in
violation of the FLSA.

Plaintiff and the Servers work and/or worked for the Employer in
Miami-Dade County, Florida in its Adult entertainment nightclub/bar
called "G5ive."

Defendant is an "enterprise" as defined by the FLSA and is subject
to the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Lawrence J. McGuinness, Esq.
     MG LEGAL GROUP
     3126 Center St.
     Coconut Grove, FL 33133
     Phone: (305) 448-9557
     Fax: (305) 448-9557
     Email: ljm@ljmpalaw.com


RAINBOW NAILS: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Yang Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification in the case captioned  JUN HUA YANG, on
behalf of herself and all other employees similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. RAINBOW NAILS SALON IV INC., doing business as
Rainbow Nails IV, GINA DANG, Defendants. No. 18-CV-4970-DLI-SJB.
(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Jun Hua Yang (Yang), a nail technician, commenced this
wage-and-hour and employment discrimination litigation against
Rainbow Nails Salon IV Inc. (Rainbow Nails) and Gina Dang (Dang)
(Defendants) based on alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), the New York Labor Law (NYLL), the New York
State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights
Law (NYCHRL).

Conditional Certification of Collective Action

Yang seeks conditional certification of a collective action of all
nail technicians who are or were formerly employed by Defendants to
the present. Yang must demonstrate that she is similarly situated
to the potential opt-in plaintiffs all the nail technicians at
Rainbow Nails for the three years prior to the filing of the
initial complaint and that such individuals were subject to the
same unlawful policy.  

Yang has established through her affidavit and her Amended
Complaint that she was subject to three policies that run afoul of
FLSA: Defendants' practice of (1) paying employees fixed daily
amounts that, when divided by the numbers of hours actually worked,
do not pay the required hourly minimum wage (2) failing to
compensate employees for overtime hours they worked and (3) forcing
employees to pay for the equipment needed to perform their job
duties. Yang attests that she was subject to all three practices.

The Defendants acknowledge that, although they dispute Yang's
allegations, the Court cannot determine factual issues that reach
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims because doing so is
inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding.

Yang's affidavit on its own warrants conditional certification of a
collective action. At the conditional certification stage the
burden is so low that even one or two affidavits establishing the
common plan may suffice.

The crux of the Defendants' second opposition to Yang's motion is
what they allege is the startling contradiction between her two
affidavits. Chiefly, they point to the fact that in Yang's first
affidavit, she states she did not know the exact wage rates of
other nail technicians, but in her second one, Yang states that she
found out through conversations with various coworkers their
approximate wage ranges.

The Defendants' position is without merit. In the first affidavit,
Yang claims not to know the exact wages of the nail technicians
with whom she had discussions. In the second affidavit, she does
not provide exact wages, but rather the possible ranges of their
pay.

Yang describes in her second affidavit the circumstances by which
she came to have conversations with other nail technicians and
provides substantially more detail of those conversations than she
did in her first. The additional specificity is not a direct
contradiction. And because Yang attests only to the approximate
fixed daily rates and the approximate hours worked, her second
affidavit does not contain the exact wages of her fellow employees.
At best, dividing an estimate of the fixed daily rate by an
estimate of hours worked in a day leads only to an approximate, not
an exact, wage.

Now that Yang has provided significantly more detail in her second
affidavit than in her first with regard to the conversations she
had, with whom, and under what circumstances. Yang has met her
minimal burden. The evidence in Yang's affidavit is sufficient to
demonstrate that Yang is similarly situated to nail technicians at
Rainbow Nails and that all of them were subject to a common wage
policy of being paid at a fixed rate that, when averaged over the
hours they actually worked, did not compensate them for minimum
wage or overtime, and a common policy of not reimbursing employees
for tools of the trade.  

The Defendants contend that some of the nail technicians Yang
claims to have had conversations with may not have been employed
during the relevant time period. This is not a barrier to
conditional certification. Even if some of the conversations took
place prior to the collective action period that the Court
authorizes, they still provide probative information about whether
a common policy existed. Nor does the fact that conversations took
place prior to the period mean that they were not employed in later
years. In any event, there is a sufficient number of coworkers
identified who worked during the relevant period to justify
conditional certification.

The collective Yang proposes is limited in terms of type of
employees and the workplace location—namely, she seeks to certify
a collective that includes only other nail technicians who worked
at Rainbow Nails in Astoria for the three years prior to the filing
of the Complaint, which amounts to approximately 20 employees.
These factors weigh in favor of granting collective certification.


Any possible differences between Yang and other employees, such as
the number of hours worked or the fixed daily rate, are to be
analyzed at subsequent stages of the case. The Court therefore
finds it appropriate to conditionally certify a collective of
current and former nail technicians employed by Defendants in the
three years prior to the filing of the original Complaint.

Accordingly, the motion for conditional certification of a
collective action is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
Order is available at   https://tinyurl.com/y39uj2se from
Leagle.com.

Jun Hua Yang, On behalf of herself and all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jian Hang --
jhang@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC & Rui Ma --
rma@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC.

Rainbow Nails Salon IV Inc., d/b/a Rainbow Nails IV & Gina Dang,
Defendants, represented by Andrew Brian Stoll --
astoll@stollglickman.com -- Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP.


RBC INSURANCE: Faces Class Action Over Vacation, Holiday Pay
------------------------------------------------------------
Canadian Employment Law Today reports that a law firm has filed for
certification of a class action lawsuit against RBC Insurance and
Aviva General Insurance.

The $80-million lawsuit alleges the company's practice of
calculating vacation and public holiday pay for commissioned
salespeople violated the Employment Standards Act.

The class action was filed by Monkhouse Law in Toronto on behalf of
plaintiff Kabir Singh, an RBC advisor from 2016 to April 2019.

The suit alleges that commissioned salespeople were shortchanged
because the vacation and public holiday pay that was paid to
employees was based solely on their base salary, rather than total
compensation. As a result, those employees are owed substantial
back pay.

"This practice undercompensates these employees and deprives them
of having real vacations," said Andrew Monkhouse --
andrew@monkhouselaw.com -- founder of Monkhouse Law.

"These actions undermine the rationale behind providing paid
vacation pay in the first place."

Allegations have not yet been proven in court.

The employee class action dates back to 1993, when RBC Insurance
was founded, according to Monkhouse Law. Aviva purchased that
company in January 2016.

If this class action is certified, all employees who fall under the
suit's definition will be members unless they opt out. [GN]


RCI HOSPITALITY: Hoffman Sues Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------
ARI HOFFMAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. RCI HOSPITALITY HOLDINGS, INC., and ERIC S.
LANGAN, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01841 (S.D. Tex., May 21,
2019) is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that
acquired RCI securities between February 14, 2018 and May 10, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to pursue remedies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").

On December 11, 2018, the Company filed a Form 12b-25 with the SEC
stating it could not timely file its annual report due to "delays
in completing the audit of its financial statements for the year
ended September 30, 2018." On this news, the Company's share price
fell $1.37, or approximately 6%, to close at $22.33 per share on
December 12, 2018, on unusually heavy trading volume. On May 10,
2019, RCI stated that it could not timely file its quarterly report
with the SEC for the period ended March 31, 2019 due to pending
investigations concerning negative articles published about the
company in mid- and late 2018. On this news, the Company's share
price fell $1.67, or over 7%, to close at $20.48 per share on May
13, 2019, on unusually heavy trading volume.

The complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company engaged in numerous transactions
with the CEO, including lending him significant sums of money; (2)
that these practices were reasonably likely to lead to regulatory
scrutiny of the Company; (3) that, as a result of investigations
into the Company's governance, the Company would be unable to
timely file its financial statements; and (4) that, as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially false and/or
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. As a result of
Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff
and other Class members have suffered significant losses and
damages, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Ari Hoffman purchased RCI securities during the Class
Period.

RCI is a holding company that operates live adult entertainment
and/or restaurant and bar operations through its subsidiaries. It
has two principal reportable segments: Nightclubs and
Bombshells.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joe Kendall, Esq.
     KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
     3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Phone: 214-744-3000
     Facsimile: 214-744-3015
     Email: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com

          - and -

     Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
     Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
     Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
     Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
     Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
     GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
     1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 201-9150
     Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


RE/MAX HOLDINGS: 3 Antitrust Class Action Complaints Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
RE/MAX Holdings, Inc. is facing three putative class action
complaints over alleged violations of federal antitrust law,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2019.

In March and April of 2019, three putative class action complaints
were filed against National Association of Realtors ("NAR"),
Realogy Holdings Corp., HomeServices of America, Inc, RE/MAX
Holdings, and Keller Williams Realty, Inc.

The first was filed on March 6, 2019, by plaintiff Christopher
Moehrl in the Northern District of Illinois.  The second was filed
on April 15, 2019, by plaintiff Sawbill Strategies, Inc., also in
the Northern District of Illinois.  The third was filed on April
29, 2019, by plaintiffs Joshua Sitzer and Amy Winger in the Western
District of Missouri.

The three complaints make substantially similar allegations and
seek substantially similar relief.  The plaintiffs in all three
cases allege that a NAR rule requires brokers to make a blanket,
non-negotiable offer of buyer broker compensation when listing a
property, resulting in inflated costs to sellers in violation of
federal antitrust law.  They further allege that the defendant
franchisors use their agreements with franchisees to require
adherence to the NAR rule in violation of federal antitrust law.

Additionally, plaintiffs Joshua Sitzer and Amy Winger allege
violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.  Among
other requested relief, plaintiffs seek damages against the
defendants and an injunction enjoining defendants from requiring
sellers to pay the buyer broker.

The Company said, "We intend to vigorously defend against all
claims."

RE/MAX Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: RMAX) is one of the world's leading
franchisors in the real estate industry, franchising real estate
brokerages globally under the RE/MAX(R) brand, and mortgage
brokerages within the U.S. under the Motto Mortgage(R) brand.
RE/MAX is a global franchisor of real estate brokerage services
with more than 125,000 agents operating in over 110 countries and
territories.


REAL CARE: Mitchell Seeks OT Pay for Home Health Aids
-----------------------------------------------------
The case, ANNETTE MITCHELL on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. REAL CARE HOME CARE LLC, and
ANISSA HILL, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01006 (N.D. Ohio, May
3, 2019), contends that the Defendants' policies and practices
violate the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as the Ohio overtime
compensation statute.

The Plaintiff worked as a caregiver in people's homes as an
employee of Defendants. The Plaintiff performed personal care
services including bathing, cooking, cleaning, dish washing and
other such activities that were customary and usual at each and
every home she worked at. These activities took up the better part
of her day, on a daily basis. Defendants' principal place of
business is located at 29 Jackson Street, Hubbard, OH 44425.

The FLSA, and Ohio law required Defendants to pay overtime
compensation to its Home Health Aids. The Defendants unlawfully
failed to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. The
Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether,
Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class was entitled
to overtime pay under state and/or federal law, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 W. Superior Ave., Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: 216 230 2955
          E-mail: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com
                  hans@ohlaborlaw.com

REWALK ROBOTICS: Court Dismisses W. Yan's Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned WANG YAN, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated parties, Plaintiff, v. REWALK
ROBOTICS LTD., LARRY JASINSKI, AMI KRAFT, AMIT GOFFER, JEFF DYKAN,
HADAR RON, ASAF SHINAR, WAYNE B. WEISMAN, YASUSHI ICHIKI, ARYEH
DAN, GLENN MUIR, BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., JEFFERIES LLC, and
CANACCORD GENUITY INC., Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-10169-FDS.
(D. Mass.).

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).

This is a putative class action alleging violations of Sections 11
and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act of 1934. The consolidated amended complaint
alleges that ReWalk, its officers and directors, and the IPO
underwriters concealed material information in its IPO registration
statement about ReWalk's failure to comply with FDA regulations in
violation of the Securities Act. It also alleges that after the
IPO, ReWalk and certain officers continued to make material false
statements after the initial offering in  violation of the Exchange
Act.  

It is undisputed that Yan purchased his shares on September 15 and
17, 2014. The statements alleged to have violated the Exchange Act
were made between February 12, 2015, and February 25, 2016. The
only statements, therefore, that Yan could have relied on were
those made on or before September 17, 2014, that is, those in the
registration statement, which the Court has found did not violate
the Securities Act.

Normally, that would be sufficient to dispose of the Exchange Act
claims for lack of standing.  

Yan contends, however, that he should remain the lead plaintiff in
the litigation because his claims are based on a common scheme with
the claims of the class. He further contends that the PSLRA does
not require that he have standing to assert the Exchange Act
claims. And he has moved to amend the complaint, contending that
Geller should be added as a named plaintiff because (1) she has
standing to pursue the Exchange Act claims (2) her claims are not
barred by the statute of limitations and (3) she satisfies Rule 23
requirements of typicality and adequacy.

Yan does not have standing to assert claims under the Exchange Act,
and cannot cure the deficiency by adding Geller as a named
plaintiff. The Exchange Act claims (and the complaint) will
therefore be dismissed.

Whether Lead Plaintiff Has Standing Based on a Common Scheme

The first issue is whether Yan has standing to assert claims under
the Exchange Act based on a common scheme to defraud.

Yan purchased his shares before, not after, the relevant statements
were made and therefore could not have relied on the alleged
misstatements. Nonetheless, there is authority providing that class
representatives may have standing to assert Exchange Act claims
arising from statements made after the share purchase date as long
as the statements allegedly made were in furtherance of a common
scheme to defraud.

The applicability of that principle here, however, is entirely
undercut by the manner in which plaintiff structured his complaint.
The complaint clearly alleges that the Securities Act claims and
the Exchange Act claims are based on different theories: the
Securities Act claims are based on an alleged failure to disclose
the reason the FDA required the post-market surveillance study, and
the Exchange Act claims are based on an alleged failure to disclose
the company's difficulties in meeting that requirement.  

The alleged omissions are not sufficiently similar to constitute a
single common scheme extending from September 12, 2014, through
February 29, 2016.  

Whether the PSLRA Permits Yan to Assert Exchange Act Claims

Yan further contends that the PSLRA permits him, as a lead
plaintiff, to assert claims as to which he does not personally have
standing. There is authority holding that a lead plaintiff in an
action subject to the PSLRA need not have standing to bring every
available claim asserted under the securities laws.  

The problem here is that Yan does not simply lack standing to sue
on every claim; he lacks standing to sue on any remaining claim.
Furthermore, standing is not merely an issue of statutory
interpretation, but is a constitutional requirement, as well.

Yan has cited no case in which a PSLRA lead plaintiff was able to
represent the class despite having no standing as to any of the
asserted claims. Under the circumstances, the PSLRA cannot confer
statutory standing on Yan, and it certainly cannot confer
constitutional standing. Accordingly, to the extent that the
complaint asserts claims by Yan for violations of the Exchange Act,
it will be dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Exchange Act
claims is deemed renewed, and is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy9kubt5 from Leagle.com.

Qian Deng, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Narbeh Nathan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP.

David Hershlikovitz, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Jackie888, Inc., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Michael C. Kemmerling, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Paul Sislin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Jason M. Leviton -- jason@blockesq.com
--  Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice & Jeffrey C. Block, Block &
Leviton LLP.

ReWalk Robotics Ltd., Larry Jasinski, Wayne B. Weisman & Glenn
Muir, Defendants, represented by Douglas P. Baumstein --
dbaumstein@whitecase.com -- White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Susan
L. Grace -- susan.grace@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice & Samuel R. Feldman -- samuel.feldman@whitecase.com -- White &
Case, LLP.

Ami Kraft, Amit Goffer, Jeff Dykan, Hadar Ron, Asaf Shinar, Yasushi
Ichiki, Aryeh Dan & Kevin Hershberger, Defendants, represented by
Susan L. Grace, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,Douglas P.
Baumstein, White & Case, LLP & Samuel R. Feldman, White & Case,
LLP.


RICHMOND, VA: Court Narrows Claims in V. White's FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond Division, issued an Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned VINCENT WHITE, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA,
Defendant. Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-504-JAG. (E. D. Va.).

In this class action, the plaintiffs allege that the City of
Richmond (City) Department of Social Services (DSS) failed to pay
them overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). The plaintiffs, current and former family service workers,
contend that their supervisors discouraged them from reporting
overtime hours, that they worked through lunch, and that they
worked nights and weekends to manage their caseloads.  

Summary Judgment

Unpaid Overtime Wages

To establish a claim for unpaid overtime wages, the plaintiffs must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that they worked
overtime hours without compensation (2) the amount and extent' of
the work as a matter of just and reasonable inference and (3) that
the City knew of the uncompensated overtime.

The City says that the plaintiffs cannot establish that they worked
overtime without pay, citing its detailed timekeeping records. But
multiple plaintiffs testified that they stopped submitting overtime
requests because their supervisors expressed discomfort with or
frowned upon overtime hours.

Other plaintiffs reported regularly working through lunch. The
City's timekeeping records would not reflect those unreported
hours. Moreover, summary judgment is not warranted simply because
the plaintiffs did not record all of their alleged overtime hours
pursuant to the City's official time keeping system.

Accordingly, material factual disputes exist as to whether the
plaintiffs worked overtime without pay, precluding summary
judgment.

Second, the plaintiffs present evidence showing the 'amount and
extent' of the work 'as a matter of just and reasonable inference.'
Multiple plaintiffs report working approximately one to two hours
of overtime per week and working during lunch. The plaintiffs'
estimates, while certainly subject to dispute and not conclusive,
set forth specific facts from which a just and reasonable inference
could be drawn.

The same factual disputes regarding the City's knowledge of the
uncompensated overtime also preclude summary judgment on the issue
of the City's willfulness. The plaintiffs say that reporting
overtime resulted in a verbal battle with administration to even
get paid for it. They also contend that their supervisors and other
DSS officials were on notice of their legal obligations, pointing
to two previous lawsuits against the City for FLSA violations
involving family service workers.   

Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the City "showed
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the FLSA.

On-Call Time

The plaintiffs assert that the City owes them compensation for
on-call time. To determine whether on-call time constitutes
compensable work, courts consider whether the employee was 'engaged
to wait, which would qualify on-call time as compensable, or waited
to be engaged, in which case on-call time would not be
compensable.'

Courts consider four factors when weighing the level of
interference with the employee's private life: (1) whether the
employee may carry a beeper or leave home (2) the frequency of
calls and the nature of the employer's demands (3) the employee's
ability to maintain a flexible `on call' schedule and switch on
call shifts and (4) whether the employee actually engaged in
personal activities during `on call' time.

In this case, the workers' on-call time does not constitute
compensable work. The first factor weighs against compensability
because the City gives on-call workers cell phones, allowing them
to leave home. The second factor weighs slightly against
compensability. Scott testified that some days workers may not even
get a call, and that the frequency of the calls varies depending on
the shift. Similarly, Johnson testified that she did not receive
any calls on some nights and that she received between seven and
ten calls on weekends. The record does not indicate whether on-call
workers may switch shifts or maintain flexible schedules, so the
third factor weighs in neither direction.

Because workers may engage in personal activities during on-call
time, the fourth factor weighs against compensability. The
plaintiffs say that on-call time restricts their freedom, but the
test is not whether the employee has substantially the same
flexibility or freedom she would have if not on call. Because the
restrictions placed on the employee do not preclude using the time
for personal pursuits, the plaintiffs' on-call time does not
constitute compensable work.

Thus, the Court dismisses the plaintiffs' claim for on-call
overtime wages. Because Campbell and Jordan only assert on-call
claims, the Court dismisses them as opt-in plaintiffs.  

The Court grants in part and denies in part the City's motion for
summary judgment. The Court grants the motion as to the plaintiffs'
claims for on-call overtime, but denies the motion as to all other
claims.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6d6usyl from Leagle.com.

Vincent White, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Blackwell Nixon Shelley, Jr.,
Shelley & Schulte PC, & Tim Schulte, Shelley & Schulte PC, 1951-D
Evelyn Byrd Avenue Harrisonburg VA 22801

City of Richmond, Virginia, Defendant, represented by Richard Earl
Hill, Jr., Office of the City Attorney & Wirt P. Marks, IV, Office
of the City Attorney.


ROUGE VALLEY: Blaney McMurtry Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
David Mackenzie, Esq., and Dominic Clarke, Esq., of Blaney McMurtry
LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that the Canadian insurance
market is awakening to the need for cyberinsurance against data
loss and privacy breach events. Although there is clearly room for
this market to grow, Canadian insurers are routinely issuing cyber
coverage to protect against these risks. While insurers have
developed loss-experience with first party data breach expense,
ransomware and business interruption claims in recent years,
knowledge and understanding of third-party risks caused by covered
breaches remains limited. This article reviews the status of
emerging third-party claim experience.

Class actions seeking damages arising out of data loss and privacy
breaches are becoming increasingly common. However, all of the
actions to date either remain at the certification stage or have
been resolved through settlements. As a result, we have yet to see
judicial analysis at a common issues trial of the causes of action
being advanced and a final determination of damages. Nevertheless,
three recent cases are instructive about the potential indemnity
obligations of Canadian insurers under the cyber policies they have
issued: Condon v. Canada (Condon); 1 Tucci v. Peoples Trust Company
(Tucci); 2 and Broutzas v. Rouge Valley Health System (Broutzas).3

1. Litigation and Causes of Action
The decisions in Condon, Tucci, and Broutzas provide insight into
various potential causes of action, because each arises out of a
distinct set of circumstances. Condon pertains to the loss of a
hard drive on which personal and financial information of hundreds
of thousands of Canadian student loan recipients was stored. Tucci
arose out of the hacking of a bank by a malicious third party.
Broutzas concerns alleged misappropriation of personal health
information by hospital employees and the subsequent sale of that
information to vendors of certain financial services (particularly
Registered Educational Savings Plans, or "RESPs").

Each of these claims was made the subject of a putative class
action (Broutzas was the subject of two distinct class actions). As
a result, Canadian courts have been asked to certify causes of
action in each set of circumstances. Condon is the subject of a
negotiated settlement, which the Federal Court of Canada has
approved. The consideration given to the various causes of action
in the course of certification -- and in the case of Condon, appeal
and settlement as well -- provides insight into the difficulties
that class counsel and defence counsel (together with their
instructing insurers) face in prosecuting and defending privacy and
data breach class actions.

The putative class actions advanced many theories of liability:
negligence; breach of contract; Intrusion upon Seclusion; Breach of
Confidence; waiver of tort/unjust enrichment; and statutory
theories of liability. Only three of these, however, have met with
a measure of success at the certification stage: negligence; breach
of contract; and intrusion upon seclusion.

In Canada, in order for certification to be granted, it must merely
not be "plain and obvious that the cause of action will fail".4
Provided that there is "some basis in fact" for the existence of a
common issue to be tried on behalf of all class members, the action
can proceed as a class action.5 These are low threshold standards.
Judicial consideration of each of these at the certification stage,
however, has highlighted potential weaknesses in each theory and
given rise to cautions from the bench with regard to their relative
chances of success at trial. This article focuses on the strengths
and weaknesses of each of these causes of action.

Review of these decisions also highlights the increased importance
of "nominal damages" in the context of data/privacy breach class
actions. As is outlined below, it is apparent that class counsel
will in many, but not all, cases have difficulty in proving
class-wide compensatory damages. While success at trial is far from
assured, certain causes of action, if proved, can result in awards
of nominal damages even in the absence of proven compensable
injury. To better understand the exposure facing defendants and
their insurers, we will also examine the meaning of "nominal
damages" in the Canadian context.

2. Negligence
In each of the proceedings the putative class alleged that the
defendants were negligent, arguing that they owed a duty of care to
class members and failed to meet that duty by falling below the
standard of care owed. More particularly, they failed to have
adequate safeguards in place to protect the information of class
members. Each of the actions asserted that the class members had
suffered actual damages as a result.

There are three primary pitfalls with respect to the allegations
advanced. First, the theory of liability being advanced against
many defendants is novel, in that it is not well established in
Canada that a plaintiff can sue many defendants for what amounts to
pure economic loss in the circumstances of a data/privacy breach.
Second, proving actual damages on a class wide basis, as is
required in negligence, may be an insurmountable challenge,
particularly where the risks involved are primarily prospective
identity theft. Finally, even if a negligence cause of action is
certified, class counsel must still prove the claim.

In Broutzas, the RESP dealer defendants were allegedly negligent
for not properly supervising their employees who were allegedly
buying confidential personal information of new mothers from
hospital employees. That information was used to market RESP
investments to those mothers. While the hospital acknowledged that
it was in a relationship of proximity to its patients, the RESP
dealers argued that the relationship between them and the class
members was not sufficiently proximate to give rise to a duty of
care. Perell J. characterised that element of the claim as novel
and undertook the three-step analysis established in Anns v. Merton
London Borough Council6 – foreseeability, proximity, and policy
considerations. He determined that there was no duty of care on the
part of the RESP defendants as the privacy breach was perpetrated
by hospital employees. In the Court's view it was nonsensical to
suggest that the RESP dealers could have supervised hospital
employees.

While commenting primarily on the breach of contract claim, Perrell
J. also expressed concerns that the negligence cause of action as
proposed, merely mirrored existing statutory obligations and the
emerging tort of intrusion on seclusion. He was reluctant to
certify any novel negligence action in circumstances where a
statute already spoke to the issue. He also expressed concern that
the negligence theory was being used as a "backstop" to the
intrusion on seclusion claim that was also being advanced. He
refused to certify the negligence claim against the RESP dealers
and their employees and, as seen below, the entirety of the claim.

Standing in contrast to that analysis is the decision in Tucci.
There, the defendants provided financial services to members of the
putative class and required those members to provide sensitive
personal and financial information. The information at issue could
clearly be used to harm the class members if lost (foreseeability)
and those people were in a direct commercial relationship with the
defendants (proximity). Masuhara J. did express concerns regarding
the public policy stage of the Anns test, providing: 1) negligence
ought not to step in where statutes already govern; and 2) a duty
of care should not be imposed that creates indeterminate liability.
He found that the theory of liability advanced did not arise
because of statutory obligations but out of privacy and security
policies the defendant itself had created. Similarly, liability was
not indeterminate because it could only be owned to those who were
customers of the Defendant and whose information was stolen. This
latter conclusion appears controversial, as liability could still
be regarded as temporally indeterminate, in that damages for the
future risk of identity theft clearly seek to compensate for an
indeterminate period of time and amount. While this risk may be
real, the law of negligence has rarely been used to impose damages
for a potentially perpetual risk.

The novel nature of the negligence claims is not the only issue
standing in the way of succeeding on a negligence claim. A
plaintiff must prove actual loss resulting from the negligence of
the defendant. The fact that the claim is being advanced through a
class action only complicates matters, as actual damage must be
demonstrated on a class-wide basis.

Tucci and Condon considered the loss of control over financial
information, not personal health information as was the case in
Broutzas. This is a critical distinction. In Tucci, it was not
plain and obvious that damage to credit reputation cannot
constitute a compensable harm. Similarly, out of pocket expenses
including credit monitoring and wasted time and inconvenience
related to preventing identity theft could constitute a class-wide
harm.

These concerns were raised at the certification stage in Condon.
There the court acknowledged that the allegations advanced against
the government could support findings of a duty of care and of a
breach of the standard of care, but questioned whether claims for
compensable damages were advanced. It concluded they were not:

. . . The Plaintiffs have not been victims of fraud or identity
theft, they have spent at most some four hours over the phone
seeking status updates from the Minister, they have not availed
themselves of any credit monitoring services offered by the credit
monitoring agencies nor have they availed themselves of the Credit
Flag service offered by the Defendant.

The certification court held that damages cannot be awarded for
merely speculative injuries and declined to certify the negligence
issue for trial. Class counsel appealed that decision and it was
overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that "costs
incurred in preventing identity theft" and "out of pocket expenses"
could satisfy the damages requirement. While such damages may be
capable of proof, actually marshalling this evidence on a classwide
basis appears to require judicial approval of some form of
aggregate model. Whether this is possible or will be accepted by
the courts is unclear.

Finally, in many circumstances, actually proving negligence may be
difficult. Attacks by hackers, theft of large amounts of data by
employees, and even lost laptops are relatively new phenomena. The
fact that courts are still grappling with the law of negligence in
this context is not surprising. When a person slips and falls, when
one car hits another or when professional services fall below the
expected standard, the act, error or omission is relatively
straightforward and the resulting damages are reasonably
identifiable. In data breach cases, numerous questions arise that
are not so easily answered. If an organisation has handling and
security protocols and an employee breaches those protocols, has
the organisation fallen below the required standard? If that same
organisation suffers a criminal attack that defeats the
cyber-security in place, has it failed to fulfil its obligations?
If a stolen laptop is password protected and the data encrypted,
has the organisation been negligent? These are all considerable
hurdles.

3. Breach of Contract
Breach of Contract allegations have met with some success, being
certified in both Condon and Tucci. Condon involved contracts in
the form of Student Loan Agreements. Multiple sections expressly
pertained to the Minister's collection, protection and use of the
information provided. The certification court acknowledged that
these terms could potentially be relied upon to establish a breach
of contract such that it was not plain and obvious that the claim
would fail.

Similarly, in Tucci there were express contractual terms between
the bank and its customers. The exact terms of the contract,
however, needed to be determined, as the pleadings asserted that
the contract included the defendant's "Website Terms & Conditions"
and other terms. Those included statements that the defendant would
comply with Federal and provincial privacy legislation, as well as
express or implied terms that the defendant would keep information
confidential and secure from loss and theft and would not use it
except for purposes expressly authorised.

The defendant disputed that the contract included all such terms.
It further argued that there was no allegation that those terms had
been breached; it had promised to take reasonable steps to protect
the information and had done so. The fact that a security breach
had occurred did not mean that reasonable steps to protect the
information had not been taken. Masuhara J. acknowledged these
arguments but held that they should be determined at trial. The
Court did not accept the defendant's argument that all forms of
damages claimed were too remote, on the basis that, even if no
actual damages were proved, nominal damages could be awarded if a
breach of contract had occurred.

An interesting discussion pertained to a limitation of liability
clause which the defendant said precluded the claim. The Court
found that the limitation of liability clause did not preclude the
claims per se; and that its effect was an issue for trial.

In Broutzas, the court refused to certify the breach of contract
claims advanced. They were premised on the existence of a contract
between the patients and the hospitals, which allegedly included
terms governing the protection and use of personal information and
promising peace of mind. Perell J. ruled that it was "plain and
obvious that the putative Class Members [did] not have a claim for
breach of contract and warranty". The judge agreed with Rouge
Valley's submission that this claim was an artifice by which to sue
for breach of statutory obligations. The pleadings simply alleged
the duties that the hospitals owed under the Personal Health
Information Protection Act, 2004. 8 Moreover, the admission forms
and information forms provided to the incoming patients were not
contractual in nature, and there was no bargaining between patients
and the hospital about preserving the confidentiality and privacy
of patient information, which the hospitals were statutorily
obliged to do. In short, there was no contract into which terms
could be implied and if there had been, those terms were already
the subject of non-contractual legal duties.

Where a commercial relationship is present, any contract is likely
to either be silent on privacy issues or to favour the corporate
entity. Commercial contracts, particularly consumer contracts,
increasingly feature arbitration, venue and jurisdiction clauses
that may restrict the ability of individuals to bring claims before
Canadian courts – especially those claims seeking to enforce
express or implied terms of the contract itself. While the Supreme
Court of Canada, together with lower courts, has questioned the
validity of onerous terms (see Douez v. Facebook9 and Heller v.
Uber Technologies Inc. 10), reasonable terms may still be enforced.
Where that existing contract considers the gathering of information
by the organisation, a contract claim will likely be easier to have
certified than a negligence claim because there is no requirement
to show actual damages. A breach alone should be sufficient to
result in nominal damages at minimum. However, a breach of
contractual terms must still be shown, and those terms will not
necessarily create an obligation to prevent security breaches or
misuse of information altogether. As the Defendant in Tucci pointed
out, the fact that a security breach has occurred does not mean
that reasonable steps to protect the information have not been
taken.

Like potential class members, organisations that have been hacked
are victims of a crime. The standard likely to be imposed by
contract is not strict liability. If express contractual terms
drafted by the organisation set the standard, that standard is not
likely to be high. Again, certification is a low bar, but proving
contractual terms existed and were breached may be a significant
challenge. On the other hand, there is arguably an important
benefit to breach of contract claims: they can result in an award
of nominal damages even if no actual loss is proved. However, a
passage in Condon suggests the availability of an award of nominal
damages may not be a certainty in the class action context:11

[The Defendant] further argues that nominal damages should never be
awarded in a class action as it would not favour the plaintiffs but
rather their counsel, since the latter would be the only ones
effectively standing to benefit financially from the outcome.

The Defendant advances an interesting and strong argument on this
point but the Plaintiffs' position, although novel in the context
of a class proceeding is supported by sufficient authorities that
this cause of action should be considered on the merit of the
action. In other words, it is not plain and obvious that the cause
of action in contract would fail. As to any disproportionate
advantages in favour of the Plaintiffs' counsel, the Court will
also be better positioned to rule on that issue when it hears it on
the merit.

Although it must be acknowledged that the court in Tucci certified
the question as to whether wasted time could be the basis for
awarding aggregate damages, it is open to question whether such
damages are "nominal" in nature, or simply a form of compensatory
damages arising out of economic loss. In short, like negligence
claims, it is not clear that breach of contract claims offer a
direct path to recovery for class members in the data and privacy
breach context. [GN]


SCANA CORP: KBC Files Damages Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
------------------------------------------------------------------
KBC ASSET MANAGEMENT NV, on Behalf of Itself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN MARSH, GREGORY E. ALIFF,
JAMES A. BENNETT, JOHN F.A.V. CECIL, SHARON A. DECKER, D. MAYBANK
HAGOOD, LYNNE M. MILLER, JAMES W. ROQUEMORE, MACEO K. SLOAN, and
ALFREDO TRUJILLO, JIMMY ADDISON, and STEVEN BRYNE, Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-01457-MBS, filed in the 5th Judicial Circuit Court of
Richland County, South Carolina on May 20, 2019, asserts claims for
damages on behalf of former SCANA shareholders as a result of the
breaches of fiduciary duties, gross mismanagement, and unjust
enrichment perpetrated by the officers and Board members of SCANA
Corporation (the "Original Derivative Defendants") in connection
with the construction of two nuclear reactors in Fairfield County,
South Carolina (the "Nuclear Project").

The Original Derivative Defendants mismanaged the construction
project and proceeded to systematically mislead the investing
public by concealing the truth surrounding the construction and
financing of the Nuclear Project. As a direct and proximate result
of their misdeeds, SCANA's value and goodwill suffered
substantially, as the Company's management confronted
investigations by state and federal authorities, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and massive civil
litigation. On January 2, 2019, SCANA was merged into Dominion
Energy, Inc. ("Dominion"), and the shares of SCANA shareholders
were exchanged for 0.669 shares of Dominion common stock (the
"Merger"). Following the closing of the Merger, the Original
Derivative Defendants moved to dismiss the derivative claims filed
against them on the grounds that the original plaintiffs in that
action lost standing to pursue those claims.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Merger does not deprive SCANA
shareholders of the right to pursue their original breach of
fiduciary duty and related claims as direct claims on behalf of the
SCANA shareholders at the time of the Merger, because the
pre-Merger conduct of the original Defendants made the Merger with
Dominion a fait accompli. The extent of the Original Derivative
Defendants' wrongdoing, fraudulent conduct, and breaches of
fiduciary duties by failing to loyally oversee the Nuclear Project
and by concealing the truth concerning the Nuclear Project's
completion, necessitated a corporate rescue, and individual legal
protection. A merger was one of the available alternatives that met
both those objectives after the Board's allegedly fraudulent
schemes. South Carolina law recognizes a single, inseparable fraud
when directors cover massive wrongdoing with an otherwise
permissible merger. Moreover, Dominion will not pursue the
derivative claims because of provisions in the Merger Agreement
providing for indemnification of the Original Derivative
Defendants. As a result, in these circumstances, Plaintiff's
derivative claims survive the Merger and may be pursued as direct
class claims as asserted herein, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff KBC Asset Management NV is a former shareholder of SCANA
Corporation.

Marsh served as CEO and Chairman of the Board of SCANA from
December 2011 through December 2017.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark D. Chappell, Esq.
     Graham L. Newman, Esq.
     CHAPPELL SMITH & ARDEN, P.A.
     2801 Devine Street, Suite 300
     Columbia, SC 29205
     Phone: (803) 929-3600
     Facsimile: (803) 929-3604
     Email: mchappel@csa-law.com
            gnewman@csa-law.com

          - and -

     Lawrence P. Eagel, Esq.
     Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
     BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
     885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
     New York, NY 10022
     Phone: (212) 308-5858
     Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
     Email: eagel@bespc.com
            fortunato@bespc.com

          - and -

     Deborah Sturman, Esq.
     STURMAN LLC
     600 Third Avenue, Suite 2101
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 367-7017
     Facsimile: (917) 546-2544
     Email: sturman@sturman.ch


SCR MEDICAL: Goodlet Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
TOM GOODLET, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. SCR MEDICAL
TRANSPORTATION, INC. Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03389 (N.D. Ill.,
May 20, 2019) is an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), and the
Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance ("CMWO") of the Municipal Code of
Chicago.

Plaintiff, and members of the Plaintiff Class, on a regular basis
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek without pay at a rate of
time and one-half for all such hours pursuant to the requirements
of the federal and state statutes. The Defendant has both in the
past and presently, willfully employed members of the Plaintiff
Class, including the named Plaintiff, requiring work to be
performed during their lunch break without pay for that time.
During unpaid meal breaks, Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff
class at times performed work, again to the benefit of the
employer, without pay for that time, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, TOM GOODLET is an employee driver who performs
para-transit driving duties in the Chicagoland area for Defendant.

SCR MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., is a company that serves as a
contractor of para-transportation services for private and public
entities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John William Billhorn, Esq.
     BILLHORN LAW FIRM
     53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
     Chicago, IL 60604
     Phone: (312) 853-1450


SEAWORLD: $11.5MM Passes Class Action Settlement Gets Court OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gabrielle Russon, writing for Orlando Sentinel, reports that a
federal judge gave final approval to a $11.5 million class action
settlement agreement after a group sued when their SeaWorld passes
were automatically renewed without their permission.

"The Settlement was entered into in good faith, is fair, reasonable
and adequate," wrote U.S. District Judge Mary Scriven of the Middle
District of Florida in her order approving it after four years of
litigation.

Out of the $11.5 million, about $2.88 million is marked for
attorney costs, and the three plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit will
receive $10,000 each.

Nearly 132,000 people who purchased one-year E-Z Pay annual passes
at SeaWorld's theme parks in Florida, Texas, Virginia and
California are eligible, court documents have said.

People will receive at least $31.75 for each EZ Pay pass purchased,
a court filing said, noting the checks will be automatically sent
out and people are not required to do anything to receive the
money.

An estimated 38,000 people who made an EZ Pay pass payment with
their debit cards after December 2013 could also get about $13
each, court documents said.

The payments could be sent out as soon as 40 days after the final
settlement date.

SeaWorld denied any wrongdoing but agreed to the settlement to
avoid an expensive trial, court documents said.

One of the plaintiffs, Jason Herman, of Pinellas County, had bought
annual passes for SeaWorld Orlando and Busch Gardens Tampa,
according to the lawsuit.

Herman paid $35.40 for an initial payment in March 2013 and then
was charged 11 monthly payments of $35.40.

The pass was paid off in February 2014, but SeaWorld kept charging
Herman's credit card until September 2014.

The theme park company wouldn't reimburse him for the additional
payments when he asked in October 2014, the lawsuit said.

SeaWorld and Herman's attorney were not immediately available for
comment. [GN]


SHARP REES-STEALY: Nace Seeks Unpaid Wages, Rest Period Premiums
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL NACE and JEFFREY LOVEALL, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SHARP REES-STEALY MEDICAL
GROUP, INC.; SHARP HEALTHCARE; and DOES 1-10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 37-2019-00026223-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct.,
San Diego Cty., May 21, 2019) seek relief on behalf of Plaintiffs
and putative Class Members for unpaid wages, meal and rest period
premium wages, statutory penalties, interest, and attorneys' fees
and costs, pursuant to Labor Code; Industrial Welfare Commission
("IWC"); and Code of Civil Procedure.

For at least four years prior to the filing of this action and
continuing until the present ("Class Period"), SHARP has had a
policy and practice of failing to pay its mid-level medical
providers for performing pre- and post-shift duties as required by
law. Furthermore, during the Class Period, SHARP has had a policy
and practice of failing to provide off-duty meal periods and rest
periods to its mid-level medical providers as required by law.
SHARP also has not provided Plaintiffs and Class Members with
adequate itemized wage statements. The wage statements provided by
SHARP fail to state the corresponding number of hours worked at
each hourly rate, correct gross and net wages earned, and meal and
rest period premium wages, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs work as non-exempt mid-level medical providers for
SHARP's Urgent Care Practice Group ("UC Group") in California.

SHARP REES-STEALY MEDICAL GROUP, INC. and SHARP HEALTHCARE
("SHARP") provide medical services in the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     HUNTER PYLE, ESQ.
     VINCENT CHEN, ESQ.
     HUNTER PYLE LAW
     428 Thirteenth Street, Eleventh Floor
     Oakland, CA 94612
     Phone: (510) 444-4400
     Facsimile: (510) 444-4410
     Email: hunter@hunterpylelaw.com;
            vchen@hunterpylelaw.com


SPARK ENERGY: Appeal in Gillis Class Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------
Spark Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet ruled on the appeal made
in the case, Gillis et al. v. Respond Power, LLC.  

Gillis et al. v. Respond Power, LLC is a purported class action
lawsuit that was originally filed on May 21, 2014 in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas but was later removed to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

On September 15, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the disclosure
statement contained in Respond Power, LLC's variable rate contracts
with Pennsylvania consumers limited the variable rate that could be
charged to no more than the monthly rate charged by the consumers'
local utility company and alleged claims of deceptive conduct in
violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, and breach of contract and of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by charging rates above the utility.

The amount of damages sought is not specified. By order dated
August 31, 2015, the district court denied class certification. The
plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial of class
certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit and that court vacated the district court's denial of class
certification and remanded the matter to the district court for
further proceedings.

On July 16, 2018, the district court granted Respond Power LLC's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's class action claims. Plaintiffs
filed their notice of appeal to the Third Circuit Court on August
7, 2018. The Third Circuit has declined to hear oral arguments on
this matter but has not yet ruled on this appeal.

The Company believes it has full indemnity coverage for any actual
exposure in this case at this time.

Spark Energy, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as an
independent retail energy services company in the United States. It
operates through two segments, Retail Electricity and Retail
Natural Gas. The company engages in the retail distribution of
electricity and natural gas to residential and commercial
customers. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in
Houston, Texas.


SPARK ENERGY: Confidential Settlement Reached in Richardson Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Spark Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that a confidential
settlement has been reached in Richardson et. al. v. Verde Energy
USA, Inc.

Richardson et. al. v. Verde Energy USA, Inc. is a purported class
action filed on November 25, 2015 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that the
Verde Companies violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") by placing marketing calls using an automatic telephone
dialing system ("ATDS") or a prerecorded voice to the purported
class members' cellular phones without prior express consent and by
continuing to make such calls after receiving requests for the
calls to cease.

Following discovery and dispositive motions, the Verde Companies
received a favorable ruling on summary judgment with the court
agreeing with the Verde Companies that the call system used in this
case was not an ATDS as defined by the TCPA.

Plaintiffs subsequently amended their petition eliminating theirs
ATDS claim and including a class based on failure to comply with
the National Do Not Call registry.

As part of an agreement in connection with the acquisition of the
Verde Companies, the original owners of the Verde Companies are
handling this matter. The parties have reached a confidential
settlement in this matter that will be paid in the second quarter
of 2019.

The Company believes it has full indemnity coverage for the
settlement exposure in this case.

Spark Energy, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as an
independent retail energy services company in the United States. It
operates through two segments, Retail Electricity and Retail
Natural Gas. The company engages in the retail distribution of
electricity and natural gas to residential and commercial
customers. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in
Houston, Texas.


SPARK ENERGY: Discovery Underway in Veilleux Case
-------------------------------------------------
Spark Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that discovery is still
ongoing in the class action suit entitled, Katherine Veilleux, et
al. v. Electricity Maine LLC, Provider Power, LLC, Spark HoldCo,
LLC, Kevin Dean, and Emile Clavet.

Katherine Veilleux, et. al. v. Electricity Maine LLC, Provider
Power, LLC, Spark HoldCo, LLC, Kevin Dean, and Emile Clavet is a
purported class action lawsuit filed on November 18, 2016 in the
United States District Court of Maine, alleging that Electricity
Maine, LLC ("Electricity Maine"), an entity acquired by Spark
Holdco in mid-2016, enrolled and re-enrolled customers through
fraudulent and misleading advertising, promotions, and other
communications prior to and following the acquisition.

Plaintiffs allege claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO), the Maine Unfair Trade Practice Act, civil
conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment and
breach of contract. Plaintiffs seek damages for themselves and the
purported class, rescission of contracts with Electricity Maine,
injunctive relief, restitution, and attorney's fees.

Discovery is ongoing in this matter.

Spark HoldCo and Electricity Maine intend to vigorously defend this
matter and the allegations asserted therein, including the request
to certify a class. Electricity Maine and Spark HoldCo have also
filed a motion to compel arbitration of certain Plaintiffs' claims
as some of the applicable Terms of Service contain an arbitration
provision and class action waiver. The Company believes it has full
indemnity coverage for any actual exposure in this case at this
time.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Spark Energy, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as an
independent retail energy services company in the United States. It
operates through two segments, Retail Electricity and Retail
Natural Gas. The company engages in the retail distribution of
electricity and natural gas to residential and commercial
customers. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in
Houston, Texas.


SPARK ENERGY: Mediation Ongoing in Jurich Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Spark Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 7, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the parties in the
class action suit entitled, Jurich v. Verde Energy USA, Inc., are
participating in mediation.

Jurich v. Verde Energy USA, Inc., is a class action originally
filed on March 3, 2015 in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut and subsequently re-filed on October 8,
2015 in the Superior Court of Judicial District of Hartford, State
of Connecticut.

The Amended Complaint asserts that the Verde Companies charged
rates in violation of its contracts with Connecticut customers and
alleges (i) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 42-110a et seq., and (ii) breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Plaintiffs are seeking unspecified actual and punitive damages for
the class and injunctive relief. The parties have exchanged initial
discovery.

On December 6, 2017, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ class
certification motion. Mediation is scheduled in May 2019.

Spark Energy said, "As part of an agreement in connection with the
acquisition of the Verde Companies, the original owners of the
Verde Companies are handling this matter. The Company believes it
has full indemnity coverage for any actual exposure in this case at
this time."

Spark Energy, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as an
independent retail energy services company in the United States. It
operates through two segments, Retail Electricity and Retail
Natural Gas. The company engages in the retail distribution of
electricity and natural gas to residential and commercial
customers. The company was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in
Houston, Texas.


SPERIAN ENERGY: I. Brady's ICFA Suit Transferred to C.D. Ill.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer Suit in the case captioned
INTIRA BRADY and ROBERT LUKASZYK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SPERIAN ENERGY
CORPORATION, Defendant. No. 18 C 6968. (N.D. Ill.).

Sperian moves under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) to transfer the suit
to the Central District of Illinois.

In this diversity suit on behalf of themselves and a putative
statewide class, Intira Brady and Robert Lukaszyk allege that
Sperian Energy Corporation violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA), and state common law in
connection with its sale of electricity to them.  

The Plaintiffs allege that Sperian failed to disclose that it would
roll them over to a variable rate plan that is more expensive than
public utilities' electricity service. Plaintiffs claim that
Sperian's misleading disclosures about its pricing and the
transition from the fixed rate plan to the variable rate plan
violate the ICFA and constitute common law fraud and unjust
enrichment.

The Plaintiffs brought a breach of contract claim in their original
complaint but abandoned it in the operative complaint.

Sperian moves under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) to transfer this case
to the Central District of Illinois pursuant to the Customer
Agreement's forum selection clause.The forum selection clause
provides: This Agreement shall be governed by and construed,
enforced and performed in accordance with the laws of Illinois and
venue shall be in Sangamon County, Illinois, which is located in
the Central District.  

Section 1404(a) states: For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which
all parties have consented. Where a valid forum selection clause
governs a suit, the clause should be given controlling weight in
all but the most exceptional cases and the party defying the
forum-selection clause bears the burden of establishing that
transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is
unwarranted.  

Accordingly, the court first determines whether the Customer
Agreement's forum selection clause governs this suit and then,
applying the standard that follows from that determination,
evaluates whether transfer is warranted.

Whether the Forum Selection Clause Applies to This Suit

Determining whether the forum selection clause applies to this suit
requires interpreting the clause under the law designated in the
Customer Agreement's] choice of law clause. The Customer Agreement
selects Illinois law, so Illinois law governs interpretation of the
clause.

Illinois law honors straightforward terms with understandable
meanings in a forum selection clause. Put somewhat differently,
forum selection clauses apply not merely to contract claims
involving the terms of the contract in which the clause appears,
but also to other claims that are otherwise connected to the
contract, such as tort claims arising from the contract.

The Plaintiffs' ICFA, fraud, and unjust enrichment claims require
interpretation of the Customer Agreement to determine, for example,
whether and how Sperian could transfer fixed rate customers into
variable rate plans, and whether Sperian had unlimited discretion
to set the variable rate.

The Plaintiffs' abandonment of their contract claim has no bearing
on whether the forum selection clause applies, for where the
relationship between the parties is contractual, the pleading of
alternative non-contractual theories of liability should not
prevent enforcement of such bargain as to the appropriate forum for
litigation. Indeed, the operative complaint's extensive focus on
the Customer Agreement's terms, confirms that interpretation of the
Agreement is central to Plaintiffs' claims and therefore that those
claims fall within the forum selection clause's ambit.  

The Plaintiffs respond that the forum selection clause no longer
applies because the Customer Agreement expired along with their
initial fixed rate plan and their claims concern only the variable
rate plan. The court need not decide when the Agreement expired
because the forum selection clause applies to Plaintiffs' claims
even if the Agreement expired before Sperian completed its
allegedly tortious conduct. As a result, the forum selection clause
applies even if the Agreement expired along with the expiration of
Plaintiffs' fixed rate plan.

In sum, because the Customer Agreement's expiration does not render
the forum selection clause ineffective, and because the court must
construe the Agreement to resolve Plaintiffs' claims, the forum
selection clause applies to those claims.

Whether Transfer Is Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a)

The conclusion that the Customer Agreement's forum selection clause
applies to Plaintiffs' claims does not end the analysis, for even
where a forum selection clause governs, the court must consider
whether it is overridden by the public interest factors that
ordinarily apply under Section 1404(a). The public interest factors
are the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
the local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home; and the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the law, as well as the avoidance of
unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws or in the application of
foreign law and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an
unrelated forum with jury duty. Because those factors are rarely
strong enough to override the parties' preselected forum, the
practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control
except in unusual cases.

The Plaintiffs' sole argument against transfer to the Central
District of Illinois is that the forum selection clause does not
apply to their claims, so they have forfeited any argument that the
Section 1404(a) public interest factors preclude transfer. Because
Plaintiffs have not identified a single public interest to justify
overriding the contractual choice of forum, transfer to the Central
District of Illinois under Section 1404(a) is appropriate.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 16, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2htoemt from
Leagle.com.

Intira Brady, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jamie Elisabeth Weiss, Quantum
Legal LLC, 513 Cental Avenue, Suite 300, Highland Park, IL 60035,
Jonathan Shub -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.,
Richard J. Burke, Quantum Legal LLC, Zachary A. Jacobs, Quantum
Legal LLC, 513 Cental Avenue, Suite 300, Highland Park, IL 60035&
Kevin Laukaitis -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com -- Kohn, Swift & Graf,
P.C.

Robert Lukaszyk, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Richard J. Burke, Quantum Legal
LLC.

Sperian Energy Corporation, Defendant, represented by Todd Philip
Stelter -- tstelter@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


STANCE, INC: Website not Accessible to Blind People, Olsen Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS J. OLSEN, Individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. STANCE, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02643 (E.D.N.Y., May 5, 2019), the
Plaintiff, who is legally blind, brings this civil rights action
against Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain,
and operate its website, www.stance.com, to be fully accessible to
and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant is an online retailer of clothing for men and women.
Through its Website, it sells socks and under garments for men,
women and children. Defendant also provides an online subscription
service that allows consumers to subscribe to monthly shipments of
socks or underwear. It also sells its products through third party
retailers throughout the country.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 0017-6705
          Telephone: 212 392 4772
          E-mail: chris@lipskylowe.com
                  doug@lipskylowe.com

STARBUCKS CORP: George Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher George, Jessica Chandra, Lisa Jame, Chelsea Maley,
April Boddie, Mickael Louis, Eduardo Leach, Josh Folan, Logan
Vairo, and Basma Attieh, on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION (Lb/a STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
653015/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty., May 21, 2019) seek
redress in their individual capacities and on behalf of a Class
consisting of similarly situated consumers, who were exposed to the
toxic chemicals.

Starbucks has built itself into one of the most recognizable brands
in the world by selling an image of a company that cares about its
products and its customers--and it asks its customers to pay a
hefty premium for its products as a result. The reality is a far
different story. Starbucks stores throughout Manhattan have for
many years been permeated with a toxic pesticide called Dichlorvos
(2,2-dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate or "DDVP"), which is highly
poisonous and completely unfit for use in proximity to food,
beverages and people. Starbucks knows about the poisonous qualities
of DDVP and knows that it has been used in Starbucks' stores
throughout Manhattan, but has neither taken appropriate action to
stop its use nor informed customers about the dangerous conditions
to which they have been unwittingly being exposed. In doing so,
Starbucks has knowingly put its customers' well-being at risk, says
the complaint.

DDVP is an active ingredient emitted into the air by products
called "No-Pest Strips," which are only intended to be used in
unoccupied structures to rid such structures of vermin, bugs and
insects. However, they are explicitly not to be used anywhere human
beings are present, and especially in situations where the
pesticide could come into contact with food and/or drinks. On
numerous occasions over the last several years, Starbucks'
employees and third-party exterminators have informed regional and
district management, both verbally and in writing, about the
improper and dangerous use of No-Pest Strips throughout stores in
Manhattan. Nonetheless, despite these complaints, Starbucks has
continued to allow No-Pest Strips to be used in its Manhattan
stores - left to contaminate the food and beverages that Starbucks
sells to consumers as the most premium products available. Needless
to say, Starbucks has closely held this information and has not
disclosed to the public that DDVP has poisoned the environment in
its stores.

Similarly, Plaintiffs were aware of the statements and
advertisements from the Company equating the Starbucks experience
with a safe and clean environment in which its customers could
spend time enjoying these so-called premium products. As a result
of these statements and advertisements, Plaintiffs expected that
they were purchasing premium products in a safe, clean environment;
but Starbucks concealed that that was not what they were actually
selling. Plaintiffs did not get what they bargained for. What
Plaintiffs did not, and could not know, however, is that Starbucks'
statements about its so-called premium products were knowingly
false and misleading. Contrary to what Starbucks' advertising
claimed, the Company allowed its employees to use a poisonous
pesticide in its stores knowing DDVP was toxic, and potentially
lethal, to its customers. As a result of Starbucks' misleading
conduct, upon information and belief, Plaintiffs were exposed to a
dangerous amount of a poison in the air they breathed throughout
their time in the Company's stores in Manhattan, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs all purchased Starbucks products at Starbucks stores in
Manhattan throughout the relevant time period.

Starbucks owns and operates a global chain of coffee shops
comprising over 13,000 stores in more than 70 countries.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Douglas H. Wigdor, Esq.
     David E. Gottlieb, Esq.
     Renan F. Varghese, Esq.
     WIGDOR LLP
     85 Fifth Avenue
     New York, NY 10003
     Phone: (212) 257-6800
     Facsimile: (212) 257-6845
     Email: dwigdor@wigdorlaw.com
            dgottlieb@wigdorlaw.com
            rvarghese@wigdorlaw.com


STARWOOD: Israeli Bondholders File Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
Keith Larsen, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reports that
Starwood Capital Group is facing allegations that it misled
investors about the risks of its Israeli bonds that backed
struggling shopping centers in the U.S.

The lawsuit stems from the struggles facing Starwood's mall
portfolio, where vacancy rates have increased and net operating
income dipped, according to Wall Street Journal. It also adds to
the challenges facing investors who bought debt in the once booming
Israeli-bond market as the market has now soured.

Two groups of bond investors, known as Oporto Securities
Distribution, filed the class-action lawsuit on March 24, alleging
Starwood failed to properly disclose risks involved in the debt,
according to the Journal. The lawsuit claims the damages total 74
million shekels or $21 million.

The bonds, which are backed by seven malls and trade in Tel Aviv,
have fallen almost 50 percent in price since they were first
offered in March 2018.

The investors are also suing S&P Global Ratings' Israeli
subsidiary, where it alleges that a ratings report failed to state
that Starwood might not be able to repay certain debtors, according
to the Journal.

Miami Beach-based Starwood bought a portfolio of malls in
California, Indiana, Ohio and Washington state from Westfield Group
in 2013. It then refinanced the portfolio by raising 910 million
shekels (about $250 million) on the Israeli bond market.

Starwood said in a statement that the allegations are without
merit, according to the Journal.

A number of real estate firms such as Extell Development, Delshah
Capital and GFI Real Estate Limited turned to the Israeli bond
market, where financing was cheaper than in the U.S. In recent
months, that market has taken a turn, and bonds issued by American
companies in Israeli have seen values fall at unprecedented rates.
[GN]


STE-MARTHE-SUR-LE-LAC: Residents Mull Class Action Over Flooding
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Curtis, writing for Montreal Gazette, reports that
before the breach, Brossard was on the front lines, stacking
sandbags to reinforce the dike at the end of his street. He says he
noticed the structure felt waterlogged.

"My feet sank into the mud," said Brossard. "I mean, it didn't feel
steady at all. You could tell something was wrong, you could tell
it might not hold for much longer."

He was right.

As waves from the Lake of Two Mountains crashed against the
structure Saturday, April 27, a small breach in the dike quickly
turned into a 70-foot hole, flooding one-third of the city.

For at least 18 months, the city of Ste-Marthe-sur-le-Lac has known
its dikes needed major repairs. Mayor Sonia Paulus requested
funding to modernize the 43-year-old structure in 2015, but work
was only scheduled to start next fall.

And reports suggest the city may have known of serious problems
with the dike as early as 10 years ago.

Frustrated citizens say they want to sue the city for negligence.
Brossard said he might join a class-action lawsuit against the
city.

His neighbour, Martin Lachapelle, says the lawsuit isn't just about
recouping the homes that were lost in the flood.

"People could have died because someone didn't do their job," said
Lachapelle. "The water was ice cold, it's a miracle no one got
caught in it and froze to death.

"Had it breached at 3 a.m., when everyone was asleep, this would be
a much more tragic story."

Lachapelle says he would join a class-action suit if one is filed.

On the night of the flood, Jason Meunier drove his bulldozer down
22nd Ave., putting people in the vehicle's steel shovel and
hoisting it above the water as he drove to safety.

"One woman, she must have been 70, was in ice water up to her
chest," he said. "Her little dog was swimming next to her. It could
have been tragic."

Meunier says the water came so fast, some people had to crawl out
of their car windows and swim to safety.

Mayor Paulus said on April 30 that the dike had been inspected by
city engineers just before the water started to rise.

"There was no negligence . . . we did everything we could," the
mayor said. "We had asked the government to approve work on the
dike in 2015 and we were about to start that work."

Paulus said she tried to expedite repairs on the structure, but the
process of getting government approvals and opening the project to
public bids takes time.

If there's a silver lining, it's that water levels in the area are
stabilizing and could soon start to fall back.

Though the mayor didn't want to look too far ahead, she says the
city will seek federal aid dollars in hopes of bringing some relief
to the embattled town.

But that's cold comfort for some residents.

Lyne Gervais lives in a trailer park in the low-lying part of town.
Like so many of her neighbours, her mobile home was hit hard by the
flood.

"(The city) knew about this for 10 years and did nothing," Gervais
said. "Insurance won't cover an act of God, but this is no act of
God. It's human error. The dike failed."

After building two emergency dikes and beginning work on a third,
first-responders started ferrying people to their homes to grab
personal effects on April 30.

Aside from the 125 homes under water, about 880 homes were flooded
and another 1,400 evacuated Saturday, April 27.

Deux-Montagnes—Sainte-Marthe-sur-le-Lac fire chief Norbert
Vendette said none of those 2,400 homes will have electricity,
running water or garbage pickup for the foreseeable future.

Anyone whose home was evacuated but didn't get flooded will have to
have it inspected by a master electrician and the fire department,
Vendette said.

Public health officials say any running water in the lakeside area
is considered contaminated. Sewers are backing up and waste water
has seeped into people's basements, yards and into the lake.

Darlene Ratelle says it feels like she's trapped in a nightmare.

Her mobile home is submerged, her husband -- who has multiple
sclerosis -- is in long-term care, and even when the floodwater
recedes, she probably won't be able to sleep in her own bed for
months.

"If this is a bad dream, I'm anxious to wake up," said Ratelle, who
is staying with loved ones.

"I don't know if my home is a total loss, my partner can't help me
and I'm probably going to have to start all over. That isn't easy
at my age." [GN]


STONEWATER ROOFING: Coker Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------
Jason Coker, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. Stonewater Roofing, Ltd. Co., Case No. No. 19-cv-00211, (E.D.
Tex., May 10, 2019) seeks recovery of unpaid overtime wages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Stonewater Roofing is a residential and commercial roofing company
doing business in Tyler, Longview and Plano, Texas where Coker
worked as a Project Manager. He claims to be misclassified as an
independent contractor, thus denied overtime compensation for hours
worked over 40 in a work week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      William S. Hommel, Jr.
      HOMMEL LAW FIRM
      1404 Rice, Road, Suite 200
      Tyler, TX 75703
      Tel: (903) 596-7100
      Fax: (469) 533-1618
      Email: bhommel@hommelfirm.com


SUNEDISON INC: June 17 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: SunEdison, Inc. Securities Litigation

This Document Relates To:

Horowitz et al. v. SunEdison, Inc. et al.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-07917-PKC
Civil Action No. 1:16-md-2742-PKC

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION

To:

(1) all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
shares of SunEdison, Inc. ("SunEdison") common stock between
September 2, 2015 and April 4, 2016, and were damaged thereby (the
"Exchange Act Subclass"); and

(2) all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
shares of SunEdison preferred stock between August 18, 2015 and
November 9, 2015, inclusive, pursuant or traceable to the
registered public offering on or about August 18, 2015, and were
damaged thereby (the "Securities Act Subclass," and together with
the Exchange Act Subclass, the "Class").

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") that the
above-captioned action (the "Action") has been certified to proceed
as a class action on behalf of the Class consisting of two distinct
subclasses, as defined above, except for certain persons and
entities who are excluded from the Class by definition as set forth
in the full printed Notice of Pendency of Class Action (the
"Notice"). Please note:  at this time, there is no judgment,
settlement, or monetary recovery.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THIS ACTION. The full printed Notice is currently being mailed to
known potential members of the Class ("Class Members"). If you have
not yet received the full printed Notice, you may obtain a copy of
the Notice by downloading it from
www.SunEdisonSecuritiesLitigation.com, or by contacting the
Administrator by toll-free phone at 1‑866-887-2962, by email at
info@SunEdisonSecuritiesLitigation.com, or in writing at:

         In re SunEdison, Inc. Securities Litigation
         c/o Analytics Consulting
         P.O. Box 2007
         Chanhassen, MN 55317-2007

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice, may be made to the
following representative of Class Counsel:

         Adam Hollander, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
         & GROSSMANN LLP
         1251 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10020
         1-800-380-8496

If you are a Class Member, you have the right to decide whether to
remain a member of the Class. If you want to remain a member of the
Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than to
retain your documentation reflecting your transactions and holdings
in SunEdison common stock and SunEdison preferred stock. If you are
a Class Member and do not exclude yourself from the Class, you will
be bound by the proceedings in this Action, including all past,
present, and future orders and judgments of the Court, whether
favorable or unfavorable. If you move, or if the Notice was mailed
to an old or incorrect address, please send the Administrator
written notification of your new address.

If you ask to be excluded from the Class or one of the subclasses,
you will not be bound by any order or judgment of this Court in
this Action as pertains to the Class or the subclass from which you
choose to be excluded; however, you will not be eligible to receive
a share of any money which might be recovered for the benefit of
the Class or the subclass from which you request exclusion. Please
note, if you decide to exclude yourself from the Class or one of
the subclasses, you may be time-barred from asserting the claims
covered by the Action by a statute of repose and your claims could
be dismissed. To exclude yourself from the Class or one of the
subclasses, you must submit a written request for exclusion
postmarked no later than June 17, 2019, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the full printed Notice. Pursuant to Rule
23(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within the
Court's discretion as to whether a second opportunity to request
exclusion from the Class or one of the subclasses will be allowed
in the event there is a settlement or judgment in the Action.

Further information regarding this notice may be obtained by
writing to the Administrator at the address provided above.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York [GN]


SUNPOWER CORP: Tobar Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
-------------------------------------------------
Manuel Tobar and Christopher Heard, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. Sunpower Corporation and Does 1-20,
inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-02328 (C.D. Calif., March 27, 2019), is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to provide rest and meal
periods, pay minimum wage, overtime wages and all hours worked and
reimburse business expenses, says the complaint. Additionally, the
Defendants have also failed to provide accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff Tobar worked for the Defendant as a non-exempt
installer technician from April 2016 until about April 2018, and
worked as operation and maintenance worker for the Defendant from
April 2018 until his separation in May 2018.

The Plaintiff Heard worked for the Defendant first as a non-exempt
installer technician and then as a non-exempt inspection
coordinator from May 2016 until September 2018.

The Defendant designs, manufactures, and installs, among other
things, solar panels inside California and across the United
States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ashkan Shakouri, Esq.
      SHAKOURI LAW FIRM
      11601 Wilshire Blvd., Fifth Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90025
      Tel: (310) 575-1827
      Fax: (310) 575-1890
      E-mail: ash@shakourilawfirm.com


SUNRUN INC: Loftus Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------
William Loftus and Sidney Naiman, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Sunrun Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-01608
(N.D. Calif., March 27, 2019), is brought against the Defendant for
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant is liable for TCPA violation by making unsolicited
calls to the Plaintiffs using an automatic telephone dialing system
causing interruption, invasion of privacy, annoyance, harassment
and waste of both the cellular telephones' battery and the
Plaintiffs' time.

The Plaintiff Loftus is an individual residing in Ventura County,
California.

The Plaintiff Naiman is an individual residing in Maricopa County,
Arizona.

The Plaintiffs never consented to receive calls from Defendant.

The Defendant sells goods and services related to solar energy and
do marketing through Automatic Telephone Dialing. Its principal
place of business is 595 Market Street, 29th Floor, San Francisco,
California 94105. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Jon B. Fougner Esq.
      600 California Street, 11th Floor
      San Francisco, CA 94108
      Tel: (415) 577-5829
      Fax: (206) 338-0783
      E-mail: jon@fougnerlaw.com


TATE & KIRLIN: Certification of Class Sought in Menear Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JAMES MENEAR, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. TATE & KIRLIN
ASSOCIATES INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00633 (E.D. Wisc.), moves the
Court to certify the class described in the complaint, and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff asserts that he is obligated to move for class
certification to protect the interests of the putative class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff avers.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


TFORCE LOGISTICS: Lim Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned SANTIAGO LIM individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TFORCE LOGISTICS, LLC;
TFORCE FINAL MILE WEST, LLC; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 19STCV05701 was removed from the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, California, to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California on May 21, 2019, and assigned
Case No. 2:19-cv-04390.

The State Action Complaint alleges twelve causes of action: (1)
Failure to pay overtime compensation; (2) Reimbursement of business
expenses; (3) Unlawful deductions from wages; (4) Failure to
provide off duty and complaint meal periods or compensation in lieu
thereof; (5) Failure to provide paid, off duty or complaint rest
periods, and/or compensation in lieu thereof; (6) Failure to pay
regular rates for all hours worked; (7) Failure to keep accurate
payroll records; (8) failure to provide accurate, itemized wage
statements; (9) Waiting time penalties; (10) Unfair competition and
unlawful business practices; (11) Violation of California Business
and Professions Code; and (12) Violations of California Labor
Code.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Paul J. Marron, Esq.
     Paul B. Arenas, Esq.
     Alexander T. Marx, Esq.
     MARRON LAWYERS, APC
     3711 Long Beach Blvd., Suite 601
     Long Beach, CA 90807
     Phone: (562) 432-7422
     Facsimile: (562) 683-2721
     Email: pmarron@marronlaw.com
            parenas@marronlaw.com
            amarx@marronlaw.com


TPUSA INC: Does not Properly Pay Workers, Headspeth Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chantel Headspeth and Kaylee McBride, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TPUSA, Inc. dba
Teleperformance USA, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02062-ALM-CMV
(S.D. Ohio, May 20, 2019) is a "collective action" instituted by
Named Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant's  practices and policies
of not paying its hourly, non-exempt employees, including
Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees, for all hours
worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). This
action also seeks relief pursuant to the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, ("the Ohio Wage Act"); and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act
("OPPA").

Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees routinely worked
40 or more hours per workweek but were not paid overtime
compensation. The Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve
records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiffs and other
similarly-situated employees before clocking in each day, in
violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Named Plaintiffs worked as support associates for Defendant in
Columbus, Ohio.

TPUSA, Inc., which operates and does business as Teleperformance
USA, provides call center services to its company customers in a
variety of industries.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
     Peter Contreras, Esq.
     COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
     1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
     Columbus, OH 43220
     Phone: 614-949-1181
     Fax: 614-386-9964
     Email: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
            peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com


TRW AUTOMOTIVE: Rubio et al Sue over Defective Airbag Control Unit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, Sigfredo Rubio, Andrea Shields, Xin Wang, Jami S. Oliver,
Laura Shimko, and Margaret Rizzo, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ZF-TRW Automotive
Holdings Corp., TRW Automotive U.S. LLC, FCA US LLC, American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-11295-LVP-RSW (E.D. Mich., May 3,
2019), alleges that an airbag manufacturer and automakers concealed
a deadly airbag performance defect.

The Defendants knowingly, actively, and affirmatively omitted
and/or concealed the existence of the ACU Defect from Plaintiffs
and the other members of the Classes. Knowledge and information
regarding the ACU Defect and the associated safety risk was in the
exclusive and superior possession of Defendants, and was not
disclosed to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Classes, who
could not reasonably discover the defect through due diligence.
Through pre-production testing, design failure mode analysis,
wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits, post-collision
inspections, vehicle owner questionnaires, and NHTSA
investigations, inter alia, the Defendants were aware of the ACU
Defect and fraudulently concealed the defect from Plaintiffs and
the other members of the Classes.

Airbags are a safety component whose failure affects occupant
safety. Drivers and passengers reasonably expect airbag deployment
in collisions. When functioning properly, airbags are designed to
save lives.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
estimates some 12.5 million vehicles may contain a defective Airbag
Control Unit ("ACU") designed and manufactured by the Defendants.
The defect in the ACU occurs because the application-specific
integrated circuit ("ASIC") breaks down by excess electrical energy
generated during the crash. This ASIC defect then causes a failure
in the ACU preventing deployment of the airbags and seat belt
pretensioners.  ACUs are designed and manufactured to sense a
vehicle crash, determine whether airbag deployment is necessary,
and deploy appropriate airbags and other supplemental restraints
where needed. The ACU contains an electronic component—an
application specific integrated circuit ("ASIC") -- which monitors
signals from other crash sensors located in the Class Vehicles. If
the ASIC fails, the ACU will not operate properly, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes:

          Gregory D. Hanley, Esq.
          Jamie K. Warrow, Esq.
          Edward F. Kickham Jr., Esq.
          KICKHAM HANLEY PLLC
          32121 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
          Royal Oak, MH 48073
          Telephone: 248-544-1500
          E-mail: ghanley@kickhamhanley.com

               - and -

          W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III, Esq.
          H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          Christopher D. Baldwin, Esq.
          BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW,
          METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C.
          272 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: 334-269-2343
          E-mail: Dee.Miles@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Clay.Barnett@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Chris.Baldwin@BeasleyAllen.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          John E. Tangren, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312-214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  jtangren@dicellolevitt.com
                  dferri@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Benjamin L. Bailey, Esq.
          Jonathan D. Boggs, Esq.
          Eric B. Snyder, Esq.
          BAILEY GLASSER LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, W.V. 25301
          Telephone: 304-345-6555
          E-mail: bbailey@baileyglasser.com
                  jboggs@baileyglasser.com
                  esnyder@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
          SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: 888-711-9975
          E-mail: jgs@sstriallawyers.com
                  mds@sstriallawyers.com
                  jbk@sstriallawyers.com

U.S. SOCCER: Motion to Stay Pay Discrimination Class Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Porter Wells, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Alex Morgan's
pay discrimination class action against U.S. Soccer Federation Inc.
will keep moving even as a separate panel decides whether to fold
in a separate case filed by goalie Hope Solo.

But that decision from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation could take months, Judge Gary Klausner said April 30 for
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. He
denied U.S. Soccer's motion to stay the proceedings while they wait
"in the interest of justice. [GN]


ULTIMATE SOFTWARE: Kessler Files Suit Over Sale to Hellman
----------------------------------------------------------
Penni Kessler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. The Ultimate Software Group, Inc., Scott Scherr, Mark
D. Scherr, James A. Fitzpatrick, Rick A. Wilber, Al Leiter,
Jonathan Mariner, and Jason Dorsey., Case No. 1:19-cv-02677 (S.D.
N.Y., March 26, 2019), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act, in connection with the
proposed sale of the Company to an investor group led by Hellman &
Friedman Capital Partners.

The Plaintiff alleges that on March 11, 2019, in order to convince
Ultimate Software’s stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, the Board authorized the filing of a materially
incomplete and misleading proxy statement with the SEC.

The complaint says the Proxy Statement misrepresents and/or omits
material information that is necessary for the Company’s
shareholders to make informed decisions concerning whether to vote
in favor of the Proposed Transaction, in violation of the Exchange
Act.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Ultimate Software common stock.

The Defendant Ultimate Software is a Delaware corporation with its
principal executive offices located at 2000 Ultimate Way, Weston,
Florida 33326. Ultimate Software is a leading provider of
cloud-based human capital management solutions, often referred to
as human capital management and employee experience solutions.

The Individual Defendants are Ultimate Software's Board of
Directors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
      LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
      821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
      Garden City, NY 11530
      Tel: (516) 493-9780
      Fax: (516) 280-7376
      E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com


VESCIO THREADING: Sotelo Suit Alleges Labor Code Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mario Sotelo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Vescio Threading Co. and Does 1-20, inclusive, Case No.
19STCV10332 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., March 27, 2019), is
brought against the Defendants for violation of the California
Labor Code.

The Defendants failed to provide meal and rest periods; failed to
pay overtime wages; failed to timely furnish accurate itemized wage
statements; and failed to reimburse business expenses and has
conducted unfair business practices, asserts the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of California and worked
for the Defendants from approximately November 2011 to September
28, 2018.

The Defendant is a California corporation and the owner and
operator of an industry, business, and facility licensed to do
business and actually doing business in the State of California
manufacturing industrial machinery. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sam Kim, Esq.
      Yoonis Han, Esq.
      VERUM LAW GROUP, APC
      841 Apollo Street, Suite 340
      El Segundo, CA 90245
      Tel: (424) 320-2000
      Fax: (424) 221-5010
      E-mail: skim@verumlg.com


VISA INC: Appeals Launched in Canadian Merchant Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------
Visa Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 26, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that Wal-Mart Canada and/or Home Depot of
Canada Inc. have filed notices of appeal of the decisions approving
settlements of litigation in British Columbia, Ontario,
Saskatchewan, Quebec and Alberta courts.

Beginning in December 2010, a number of class action lawsuits were
filed in Quebec, British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan and
Alberta against Visa Canada, MasterCard and ten financial
institutions on behalf of merchants that accept payment by Visa
and/or MasterCard credit cards.  The actions allege a violation of
Canada's price-fixing law and various common law claims based on
separate Visa and MasterCard conspiracies in respect of default
interchange and certain of the networks' rules.

In 2015 and 2016, four financial institutions settled with the
plaintiffs. In June 2017, Visa, MasterCard and a fifth financial
institution also reached settlements with the plaintiffs.

Settlement approval hearings were held in 2018 and courts in each
of the five provinces approved the settlements.

Wal-Mart Canada and/or Home Depot of Canada Inc. have filed notices
of appeal of the British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Quebec
and Alberta decisions approving the settlements.

Visa Inc. operates as a payments technology company worldwide. The
company facilitates commerce through the transfer of value and
information among consumers, merchants, financial institutions,
businesses, strategic partners, and government entities. Visa Inc.
was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California.


VOCUS GROUP: Faces Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------
Tom Richarson, writing for The Motley Fool, reports that one cloud
on the horizon with regard to The Vocus Group Ltd's balance sheet
is the receipt of a class action claim being launched by aggrieved
investors who bought shares in the business between 29 November
2016 and 2 May 2017.

It's being alleged that over this period the company misled
investors with erroneous earnings guidance and failed to meet its
continuous disclosure obligations as to its operating performance.

Ironically the accusations are being made by the textbook example
on the ASX of how to blow up billions of dollars in shareholder
capital through egregious behaviour in next to no time -- Slater &
Gordon Limited (ASX: SGH).

Vocus intends to defend the proceedings, but for shareholders the
question to consider is the size of any potential compensation due
in the event the claims are upheld in court.

Quantum awarded is normally a fixed percentage of actual losses
suffered assuming causation (i.e. the investors relied on the
misconduct in making their decisions) is proven. So to get a rough
idea you'd need to know the size of share price falls (around $3
per share) over the period multiplied by the number of shares owned
by claimants.

The claim is not likely to be for a materially large amount, but
Vocus's balance sheet is a problem as it is less able to absorb any
payouts due to its perilous leverage. [GN]


WALMART INC: Haskins Seeks Unpaid Vacation Pay
----------------------------------------------
Justin Haskins, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Walmart Inc., a Delaware corporation;
Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. a Delaware corporation; and Does 1
through 25, Defendants, Case No. 37-2019-00020149-CU-OE-NC (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego Cty., May 20, 2019) seeks to recover from
Defendants unpaid accrued vested vacation pay, at any time within
the four years prior to the initiation of this action until the
date that the class is certified, plus interest thereon, and
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants maintained a vacation policy which explicitly
violated the Labor Code section 227.3 in that it required that
salaried employees forfeit all but five days of vested vacation pay
at separation, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a store manager at a
Wal-Mart store in Escondido, California from May 2007 until
February of 2019.

Walmart Inc. is a Delaware corporation organized under the laws of
the state of Delaware and authorized to do business in
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Aaron C. Gundzik, Esq.
     Rebecca G. Gundzik, Esq.
     GARTENBERG GELAND HAYTON LLP
     15260 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1920
     Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
     Phone: (213) 542-2100
     Fax: (213) 542-2101

          - and -

     Marshall A. Caskey, Esq.
     Daniel M. Holzman, Esq.
     N. Cory Barari, Esq.
     CASKEY & HOLZMAN
     24025 Park Sorrento, Ste. 400
     Calabasas, CA 91302
     Phone: (818) 657-1070
     Fax: (818) 297-1775


WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: Court Vacates July 2017 Arbitration Award
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin has
vacated the July 5, 2017 arbitration award in its entirety in the
case styled, Herrington et al. v. Waterstone Mortgage Corporation,
according to Waterstone Financial, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019.  The Court also closed the case and held that
Plaintiff's claims must be resolved through single-plaintiff
arbitration.

Waterstone Mortgage Corporation is a defendant in a class action
lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin and subsequently compelled to
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association.  The
plaintiff class alleged that Waterstone Mortgage Corporation
violated certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and failed to pay loan officers consistent with their employment
agreements.

On July 5, 2017, the arbitrator issued a Final Award finding
Waterstone Mortgage Corporation liable for unpaid minimum wages,
overtime, unreimbursed business expenses, and liquidated damages
under the FLSA.  On December 8, 2017, the District Court confirmed
the award in large part, and entered a judgment against Waterstone
in the amount of US$7,267,919 in damages to Claimants, US$3,298,851
in attorney fees and costs, and a US$20,000 incentive fee to
Plaintiff Herrington, plus post-judgment interest.

On February 12, 2018, the District Court awarded post-arbitration
fees and costs of approximately US$98,000.  The judgment was
appealed by Waterstone to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
where oral argument was held on May 29, 2018.  On October 22, 2018,
the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling vacating the District Court's
order enforcing the arbitration award.  If the District Court
determines the agreement only allows for individual arbitration,
the award would be vacated and the case sent to individual
arbitration for a new proceeding.  If the District Court determines
the arbitration agreement nevertheless allows for collective
arbitration, the District Court could confirm the prior award.

On December 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a post-remand brief.  In it,
Plaintiff asks the District Court to reaffirm the arbitration award
entered by the arbitrator in full.  Alternatively, she asked the
Court to affirm her individual damage award and the awards of 123
other opt-ins whose arbitration agreements permit joinder or class
actions.  Lastly, Plaintiff asked the District Court to have 154
opt-ins intervene and file an amended complaint for individual
relief in court.  Waterstone opposed the motion on January 28,
2019, and asked the District Court to vacate the prior Final Award
in full because Herrington's arbitration agreement only allows for
individual arbitration.  Plaintiff filed its reply on February 14,
2019.

On April 25, 2019, the District Court held that Plaintiff's claims
must be resolved through single-plaintiff arbitration.  As a
result, it vacated the July 5, 2017 arbitration award in its
entirety, and closed the case.

The Company said, "Given these recent developments, and since the
award has been vacated, Waterstone does not believe a loss is
probable at this time.  Accordingly, in accordance with the
authoritative guidance in the evaluation of contingencies, the
Company has not recorded an accrual related to this matter.  The
Company does not yet know whether Plaintiff, or other claimants who
were part of the prior arbitration will seek to re-assert their
claims in arbitration.  As a result, it cannot offer an opinion on
the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome on the issue of liability
or estimate the range of any possible loss at this time."

Waterstone Financial, Inc. operates as a bank holding company for
WaterStone Bank SSB that provides various financial services to
customers in southeastern Wisconsin, the United States. It operates
through two segments, Community Banking and Mortgage Banking. The
company was formerly known as Wauwatosa Holdings, Inc. and changed
its name to Waterstone Financial, Inc. in August 2008. Waterstone
Financial, Inc. was founded in 1921 and is based in Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin.


WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: District Court Okays Werner Suit Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin has
approved the settlement in the case styled Werner et al. v.
Waterstone Mortgage Corporation, according to Waterstone Financial,
Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2019.  The
Court has also dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims.

Waterstone Mortgage Corporation is a defendant in a putative
collection action lawsuit that was filed on August 4, 2017 in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
Werner et al. v. Waterstone Mortgage Corporation.  Plaintiffs
allege that Waterstone Mortgage Corporation violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay loan officers minimum and
overtime wages.

On October 26, 2017, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification
and to provide notice to the putative class.  On February 9, 2018,
the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
and notice.

On July 23, 2018, Waterstone filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the claims.  It sought to (1) dismiss the time-barred
claims of four opt-ins and (2) dismiss all other opt-ins due to the
denial of conditional certification.  In response, all but Werner
and Wiesneski filed motions to withdraw their consents to join the
case.  The Court denied the summary judgment motion on the basis
that it was moot due to the opt-in plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissing their case.

On October 17, 2018, Werner and Wiesneski asked the Court to send
their claims to arbitration.  On December 13, 2018, the Court
denied the request, finding they had waived their right to
arbitrate based on litigating the case in Court for over a year.
Thus, the case remained in Court as a two-Plaintiff case.

In April 2019, the parties finalized a settlement in principle to
resolve the claims.  The Court granted approval of the settlement
and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims.

The Company said, "The amount of the settlement would not have a
material impact to the financial statements."

Waterstone Financial, Inc. operates as a bank holding company for
WaterStone Bank SSB that provides various financial services to
customers in southeastern Wisconsin, the United States. It operates
through two segments, Community Banking and Mortgage Banking. The
company was formerly known as Wauwatosa Holdings, Inc. and changed
its name to Waterstone Financial, Inc. in August 2008. Waterstone
Financial, Inc. was founded in 1921 and is based in Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin.


WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: Underpays Loan Originators, Johnson Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit alleges that Waterstone Mortgage Corporation
failed to pay the Plaintiffs minimum wages and overtime premium pay
as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, and by Waterstone's
promise to pay them minimum wage and overtime premium pay as
required by the common law of contract and quasi-contract.  The
Plaintiffs are mortgage loan originators for Waterstone. Like loan
originators throughout the mortgage industry, they work very long
hours. Prior to August 1, 2010, Waterstone treated its loan
originators as exempt from the FLSA and failed to record their
hours of work. On March 24, 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor
issued an administrative Interpretation of the FLSA declaring that
loan originators were not administratively exempt from the FLSA and
withdrawing a prior Wage Hour Opinion Letter to the contrary.

Waterstone was aware of the change, which was well publicized in
the mortgage industry. Nevertheless, Waterstone did not begin to
record loan originators' hours of work and did not move to pay loan
originators overtime for hours over 40 in a work week, the lawsuit
says.

The case is captioned as RAELEEN JOHNSON, individually and on
behalf of the class and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. DAVID BIZOUSKY, NATHAN BRACK, MICHAEL CHILDS,
KENDEL DEBLIECK, DAVID EGERTON, PATRICIA GAGNON, TRACEY KEYES, NICK
KNABE, RIC KOHLBECK, JAMES KOPHAMEL, MARTIN KUZEL, THOMAS LOVELL,
DAVID MILLER, AARON MOE, BRANDAN MOFFETT, ERNEST NWAJUOBI, RICK
PALANDRI, DINO PARDUCCI, ANTHONY PORTINCASO, SONNY ROCK, TROY
SAINSBURY, MARK SCHELLHAMMER, GREG SCHLIESMANN MATTHEW SCHULTEIS,
MICHAEL SCHWARZ, JOHN WHITE, PATRICK WIESE, AND DAVID ZEGUNIS, the
Plaintiffs, v. WATERSTONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-00652-NJ (E.D. Wisc., May 3, 2019).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Dan Getman, Esq.
          GETMAN, SWEENEY & DUNN, PLLC
          260 Fair Street
          Kingston, New York 12401
          Telephone: (845) 255-9370
          Facsimile: (845) 255-8649
          E-mail: dgetman@getmansweeney.com


WEINERT ENTERPRISES: Anderson Seeks to Certify Opt-out Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled Richard J. Anderson, On behalf
of Himself and all others similarly situated v. Weinert
Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-00901-WCG (E.D. Wisc.), seeks
certification of this opt-out class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and
(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All hourly employees who worked on the jobsite for the
     Defendant on or after June 14, 2016.

Mr. Anderson also moves the Court to certify him as class
representative.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM, S.C.
          310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271-4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271-6308
          E-mail: yh@previant.com


WELLS FARGO: Settlement in Auto Insurance Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Wells Fargo & Company disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that it has reached an agreement in principle
to resolve the multi-district litigation related to automobile
collateral protection insurance (CPI) matters. A preliminary
approval hearing for the settlement was scheduled for June 3, 2019,
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

On April 20, 2018, the Company entered into consent orders with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to resolve, among other things,
investigations by the agencies into the Company's compliance risk
management program and its past practices involving certain
automobile collateral protection insurance (CPI) policies and
certain mortgage interest rate lock extensions.

The consent orders require remediation to customers and the payment
of a total of US$1.0 billion in civil money penalties to the
agencies.  In July 2017, the Company announced a plan to remediate
customers who may have been financially harmed due to issues
related to automobile CPI policies purchased through a third-party
vendor on their behalf.

Multiple putative class action cases alleging, among other things,
unfair and deceptive practices relating to these CPI policies, have
been filed against the Company and consolidated into one
multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.

The Company has reached an agreement in principle to resolve the
multi-district litigation pursuant to which the Company has agreed
to pay, consistent with its remediation obligations under the
consent orders, approximately US$415 million in remediation to
customers with CPI policies placed between October 15, 2005, and
September 30, 2016.  The settlement amount is not incremental to
the Company's remediation obligations under the consent orders, but
instead encompasses those obligations, including remediation
payments to date.  The settlement amount is subject to change as
the Company finalizes its remediation activity under the consent
orders.  In addition, the Company has agreed to contribute US$1
million to a common fund for the class.  The district court has set
a preliminary approval hearing for June 3, 2019.  The US$415
million amount of the agreement in principle was fully accrued as
of March 31, 2019.

A putative class of shareholders also filed a securities fraud
class action against the Company and its executive officers
alleging material misstatements and omissions of CPI-related
information in the Company's public disclosures.  Former team
members have also alleged retaliation for raising concerns
regarding automobile lending practices.

In addition, the Company has identified certain issues related to
the unused portion of guaranteed automobile protection (GAP) waiver
or insurance agreements between the customer and dealer and, by
assignment, the lender, which will result in remediation to
customers in certain states.  The Company is subject to a class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California alleging that customers are entitled to
refunds in all states.

Allegations related to the CPI and GAP programs are among the
subjects of shareholder derivative lawsuits pending in federal and
state court in California.  The court dismissed the state court
action in September 2018, but plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
in November 2018.  Subject to court approval, the parties to the
state court action have entered into an agreement to resolve the
action pursuant to which the Company will pay plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and undertake certain business and governance
practices.  These and other issues related to the origination,
servicing, and collection of consumer automobile loans, including
related insurance products, have also subjected the Company to
formal or informal inquiries, investigations, or examinations from
federal and state government agencies.

In December 2018, the Company entered into an agreement with all 50
state Attorneys General and the District of Columbia to resolve an
investigation into the Company's retail sales practices, CPI and
GAP, and mortgage interest rate lock matters, pursuant to which the
Company paid US$575 million.

Wells Fargo & Company, a diversified financial services company,
provides retail, commercial, and corporate banking services to
individuals, businesses, and institutions. The company's Community
Banking segment offers checking and savings accounts; credit and
debit cards; and automobile, student, mortgage, home equity, and
small business loans.  Wells Fargo & Company was founded in 1852
and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


WELLS FARGO: Still Faces Class Suit over ATM Access Fee
-------------------------------------------------------
Wells Fargo & Company continues to defend against a class action
suit related to ATM Access Fee in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2019.  

In October 2011, plaintiffs filed a putative class action, Mackmin,
et al. v. Visa, Inc. et al., against Wells Fargo & Company, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Visa, MasterCard, and several other banks in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs allege that the Visa and MasterCard requirement that if
an ATM operator charges an access fee on Visa and MasterCard
transactions, then that fee cannot be greater than the access fee
charged for transactions on other networks, violates antitrust
rules.  Plaintiffs seek treble damages, restitution, injunctive
relief, and attorneys' fees where available under federal and state
law.

Two other antitrust cases that make similar allegations were filed
in the same court, but these cases did not name Wells Fargo as a
defendant.

On February 13, 2013, the district court granted defendants'
motions to dismiss the three actions.  Plaintiffs appealed the
dismissals and, on August 4, 2015, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the district
court's decisions and remanded the three cases to the district
court for further proceedings.

On June 28, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted
defendants' petitions for writ of certiorari to review the
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.  On November 17, 2016, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed the petitions as improvidently granted, and the three
cases returned to the district court for further proceedings.

Wells Fargo & Company, a diversified financial services company,
provides retail, commercial, and corporate banking services to
individuals, businesses, and institutions. The company's Community
Banking segment offers checking and savings accounts; credit and
debit cards; and automobile, student, mortgage, home equity, and
small business loans.  Wells Fargo & Company was founded in 1852
and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


WESTERN REFINING: Removes Hall Suit to Central Dist. of California
------------------------------------------------------------------
Western Refining Retail removed case ELIZABETH HALL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,, the Plaintiff, v.
WESTERN REFINING RETAIL, LLC; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. RIC 1902042 (Filed March 22, 2019), from the
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Riverside, to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California on May 3, 2019. The Central District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-03919 to the
proceeding.

The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to provide meal
periods, failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and
failed to timely pay all final wages in violation of Labor
Code.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Timothy M. Rusche, Esq.
          Christina Pacudan, Esq.
          William J. Dritsas, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3300
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-5793
          Telephone: (213) 270-9600
          Facsimile: (213) 270-9601
          E-mail: trusche@seyfarth.com
                  cpacudan@seyfarth.com
                  wdritsas@seyfarth.com

WESTERN UNION: Smallen Trust Appeals D. Colo. Ruling to 10th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Lawrence Henry Smallen and Laura Anne Smallen Revocable
Living Trust filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit
titled Smallen Revocable Living Trust, et al. v. Western Union
Company, et al., Case No. 1:17-CV-00474-KLM, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado - Denver.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Amended
Complaint asserts claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Securities and Exchange Commission, and alleges that, during
the purported class period of February 24, 2012, through May 2,
2017, the Defendants made false or misleading statements or failed
to disclose purported adverse material facts regarding, among other
things, the Company's compliance with AML and anti-fraud
regulations, the status and likely outcome of certain governmental
investigations targeting the Company, the reasons behind the
Company's decisions to make certain regulatory enhancements, and
the Company's premium pricing.

The appellate case is captioned as Smallen Revocable Living Trust,
et al. v. Western Union Company, et al., Case No. 19-1154, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LAWRENCE HENRY SMALLEN AND LAURA ANNE SMALLEN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60303
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc I. Gross, Esq.
          Michael Grunfeld, Esq.
          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          E-mail: migross@pomlaw.com
                  mgrunfeld@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com

Plaintiff UA LOCAL 13 PENSION FUND, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Rusty Glenn, Esq.
          SHUMAN LAW FIRM
          600 17th Street, Suite 2800 South
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 861-3003
          E-mail: rusty@shumanlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Kip Brian Shuman, Esq.
          SHUMAN LAW FIRM
          One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (303) 861-3003
          E-mail: kip@shumanlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Henry Rosen, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: henryr@rgrdlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY, HIKMET ERSEK, SCOTT
T. SCHEIRMAN, RAJESH K. AGRAWAL and BARRY KOCH are represented by:

          David F. Graham, Esq.
          Hille R. Sheppard, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          One South Dearborn Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 853-7000
          E-mail: dgraham@sidley.com
                  hsheppard@sidley.com

               - and -

          Holly Stein Sollod, Esq.
          Claire Elizabeth Wells Hanson, Esq.
          HOLLAND & HART LLP
          555 17th Street, Suite 3200
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 295-8000
          E-mail: hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com
                  cehanson@hollandhart.com


WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in James Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Melissa James filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Melissa James v. Windham Professionals Inc., et al.,
Case No. 2-18-cv-01865, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to stop the Defendant's alleged unfair and unconscionable
means to collect a debt.

Windham Professionals provides accounts receivable management and
customer care services.

The appellate case is captioned as Melissa James v. Windham
Professionals Inc., et al., Case No. 19-1964, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MELISSA JAMES, On behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          Facsimile: (973) 244-0019
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com
                  bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS INC. is represented by:

          Christian M. Scheuerman, Esq.
          MARKS O'NEILL O'BRIEN DOHERTY & KELLY, P.C.
          535 Route 38 East, Suite 501
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
          Telephone: (856) 663-4300
          E-mail: cscheuerman@moodklaw.com


ZF TRW: Car Owners Sue Over Defective Air Bag Control Units
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Thomas Copley, Marvin Coyner, and Elizabeth
Evans, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp., Hyundai Motor
America, Inc. and Kia Motor America, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-00707 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2019), Plaintiffs are Kia and
Hyundai car owners with defective Airbag Control Units. The defect
manifests only when an accident occurs, that is, an integrated
circuit defect prevents deployment of the airbags and seatbelt
pre-tensioners.

The Plaintiffs seek compensatory, exemplary and punitive remedies
and damages and statutory penalties, including interest, injunctive
and equitable relief in the form of a recall and program to repair,
modify, and/or buy back all defective vehicles and to fully
reimburse all costs and economic losses, disgorgement of all or
part of the ill-gotten profits they received from their sale or
lease of the concerned vehicles, all applicable statutory and civil
penalties, award of costs and attorneys' fees and such other or
further relief in breach of warranty and in violation of various
state consumer protection acts.

ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp. is a major automotive parts
supplier while Hyundai Motor America is a manufacturer and
distributor of new motor vehicles under the Hyundai brand.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
      Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
      Ryan McDevitt, Esq.
      Erika Keech, Esq.
      KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
      1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
      Seattle, WA 98101-3052
      Tel (206) 623-1900
      Fax (206) 623-3384
      Email: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com
             gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
             rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.com
             ekeech@kellerrohrback.com


[*] Missouri Bill Modifies Class Action Joinder, Venue Rules
------------------------------------------------------------
Caitly Rosen, writing for Missourian, reports that people will have
a harder time bringing class-action lawsuits and lawsuits including
out-of-state plaintiffs in Missouri courts under a bill that
received final House approval on May 1.

The bill now goes to the governor, who strongly supports the
measure.

Sen. Ed Emery, R-Lamar, sponsored the bill that modifies lawsuit
provisions regarding joinder and venue rules. Currently, if a group
of plaintiffs are filing a case over the same alleged wrongdoing,
they can join their cases in one suit. These plaintiffs can also
currently file suit in any Missouri court as long as at least one
of them lives there, the incident occurred there or the company is
based there.

Emery's legislation looks to change that. It lines up with a recent
ruling by the Missouri Supreme Court -- State ex rel. Johnson &
Johnson v. Burlison -- where the court determined that plaintiffs
cannot join cases unless they have standing, such as living in or
being injured in, a particular jurisdiction.

The current joinder rules have been used to violate restrictions
related to venue, Emery said, referring to where a case can be
heard.

Supporters of the bill, including Rep. Glen Kolkmeyer, R-Odessa,
said the legislation is necessary because it would reduce the
number of cases in Missouri involving out-of-state litigants,
thereby reducing cost for taxpayers.

"This bill would reduce cost and increase access for Missouri
residents to our court system by reducing the number of cases filed
in Missouri courts by plaintiffs with no connection to this state
whatsoever," Kolkmeyer said. "So why should we care? Because it
costs every taxpayer in this state. We are having judges from all
over the state travel to St. Louis to cover their overcrowded
docket."

He said the current venue law makes businesses not want to come to
the state.

"Last year, Amazon announced they were building a second
headquarters in the United States, and guess what? Kansas City, St.
Louis, Missouri didn't even make the top 20," Kolkmeyer said. "Why
would a company want to come to Missouri and do business in this
state or expand their business here in the first place?"

Rep. Mark Ellebracht, D-Liberty, said that this legislation
undermines a lawyer's ability to consolidate plaintiffs, and as a
result, it undermines a plaintiff's right to a trial by jury of
their peers.

"We are undermining constitutional rights of our constituents with
this," Ellebracht said. "We have been, and consistently will be,
taking away their rights every time we tell them that they cannot
take their claim to a jury."

Others took issue with a provision of the bill that would restrict
the ability to file lawsuits against sellers that don't have any
role in manufacturing a product. Rep. Gina Mitten, D-St.Louis, said
this would make it harder for Missourians to sue for product
related wrongdoing.

Supporters of the bill, however, said the restriction prevents
excessive lawsuits.

Kolkmeyer said plaintiffs file suit against as many defendants as
they can, and the ability to sue such sellers only increases that.

"This puts a hook in, and that's what we're trying to remove, is
the hook," he said.

The legislation now just awaits the governor's signature before
becoming active law in August.

"Passing venue and joinder reform is a huge win and will provide
long overdue relief to Missouri businesses that have been taken
advantage of by rampant abuse of our state's legal system," Gov.
Mike Parson said in a media release. "The passage of SB 7 will soon
deliver a significant economic boost and create a better business
environment all across Missouri." [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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