CAR_Public/190613.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, June 13, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 118

                            Headlines

3M: Parchment Among Plaintiffs in PFAS Contamination Lawsuit
AARP INC: Friedman's Bid to Certify Class Taken Under Submission
ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Bid to Dismiss Alexander FDCPA Suit Denied
ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Law Firm Investigates Securities Violations
ADF MIDATLANTIC: Court OKs Production of Subpoena Communications

AETERNA ZENTARIS: 3rd Cir. Affirms Certification in Vizirgianakis
AKAL SECURITY: Class in Smith Labor Suit Conditionally Certified
ALABAMA: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice Cook Traffic Ticket Suit
ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES: Robertson Alleges Breach of FDCPA
ALLTRAN EDUCATION: Zarczynski Moves for Class Certification

ALPHA SERVICES: Sanderlin FLSA Suit Moved From W.D. to S.D. Texas
AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Dismiss NY Consolidated Suit Pending
AMERICAN HONDA: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of H. Singh's TILA Suit
AMERICOLLECT INC: Salvatore Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
AN JU HOME: Yang Files FLSA Suit in E.D. New York

APPLE INC: Awaits Ruling in iPhone Apps Monopoly Class Action
APPLE INC: Class Action Over App Store Monopoly Can Proceed
ART VAN: White Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois
AUSTRALIA: NT Gov't Settles Race Discrimination Class Action
AVALON HEALTH: Removes Williamson FCRA Suit to N.D. California

BEDFORD, OH: Ordered to Pay $41K in Home Inspection Class Action
BERGER EXCAVATING: Court Flips Public Duty Rule Dismissal in Tzakis
BITMAIN: Class Action in the Works in Hong Kong
BOB EVANS: Former Workers File FLSA Class Action
BORDER TRANSFER: Bid for Summary Judgment in DaSilva Suit Denied

CALIFORNIA: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Flores Suit Granted
CAPITAL ONE: Langer Seeks Initial Approval of Class Settlement
CEDAR MANOR: Porter Files Request for Judicial Intervention
CHIQUITA BRANDS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in ATS Suits
CITRIX SYSTEMS: Jackson Sues Over Data Breach

CLL BROTHERS: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
CLOROX COMPANY: Gregorio Moves to Certify Three Customer Classes
CODEFIED INC: Betit Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
COLLECTO INC: Jasinski Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
COLONY MANAGEMENT: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Bishop Says

COMMUNITY HEALTH: Padilla Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Narrows Claims in CCJ Detainees' Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: 2nd Cir. Appeal Filed in Flushable Wipes Suit
CREDIT MANAGEMENT: Certification of Class Sought in Jahnke Suit
CUMBERLAND EXCAVATION: Gill Moves for Certification of FLSA Class

CVS HEALTH: Cachola, et al. Seek Unpaid Wages
DANONE NORTH: Andriulli Sues Over Products' Misleading Packaging
DISH NETWORK: 4th Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Krakauer Suit
ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTING: TCPA Constitutional Challenge Certified
ENTRATA INC: Amaya Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages

EP WRAP-IT: Cisneros Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
FACEBOOK INC: Court OKs Records, Books Inspection in Sec 220 Suit
FAST AUTO LOANS: Maldonaldo Sues Over Unreasonable Interest Rates
FIDELITY CAPITAL: Certification of Class Sought in Johnson Suit
FIRST AMERICAN: Bahnmaier Files Class Action in C.D. California

FLOOR & DECOR: Taylor Sues over Share Price Drop
FOCUS SERVICES: Pretzsch Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
GALEANA CHRYSLER:  Unsolicited Telemarketing Violates TCPA
GEICO GENERAL: A&M Gerber Suit Remanded to Florida State Court
HALL MANAGEMENT: Martinez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

HAWAII: Education Dep't Faces Class Suit Over Title IX Violations
HOMEAWAY.COM INC: World Suit Removed to Northern District of Ohio
INPIRE BRANDS: Doyen Files ADA Suit in Minnesota
INTUIT INC: Cook Sues for Deceptive Ad Over Tax Filing Software
INTUIT INC: Faces Class Action Over "Free to File" Program

IRENE ROLSTON: Dismissal of Menorah Park's Counterclaim Flipped
JAMESTOWN PREMIER: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JANIKING: Judge Commences Settlement Approval Process
JOHN DOE CORP:  Does not Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Silva Says
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Crincoli Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Isa Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Matthey Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Moves Shenefield Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Fla.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Chrisley Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Fla.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Dolby Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Florida

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Lewis Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Florida
JP WHITE PLAINS: Hong Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
JUST SALAD LLC: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KEY LARGO: Honeywell Files ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
KINGSTECH TECHNOLOGIES: Xu Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

KROGER CO: Ark. Affirms Judgment on Pleadings in K. Rhodes' Suit
LENDLEASE: No Takeover Proposal Amid Shareholder Class Action
LEONARDO BROS: Court Certifies Class in Farm Workers' Suit
LIBERTY INSURANCE: Court OKs Dismissal of Horn Insurance Suit
LJC TRADING: Chen Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Compensation

LM INSURANCE: Holmes Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
LONG KEY: Honeywell Files ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
LORD & TAYLOR: Beekman Suit Transferred From Delaware to New York
MACOMB COUNTY, MI: Mich. Reverses Ruling in Retirees' Suit
MARKET AMERICA: Yang Suit Transferred to M.D. North Carolina

MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Class Certification Sought in Voeks Suit
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION: Marett Files ADA Suit in S.D. N.Y.
MEYER NJUS: Serifoski Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
MICHAEL KOEHN: Wins Final Approval of $5K Settlement in Long Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Voeks Suit

MIDLAND CREDIT: Removes Mun FDCPA Class Suit to S.D. New York
MODELL'S SPORTING: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS: Nashville Must Redefine Class Action
MONSANTO COMPANY: Alonzo Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunner Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Dyes Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Hall Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Newble Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ryce Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONTEREY COUNTY, CA: $150K Attys' Fees & Costs Awarded in Hernandez

MOUNTAIN AMERICA: Beaman Sues Over Illegal Overdraft Fees
NATIONAL CREDIT: Alla Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in Football Players Suit
NATIONSTAR: Must Face Class Action Over Flood Insurance
NATORI COMPANY: Bunting Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website

NAVIHEALTH INC: Barbee Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA
NEVRO CORP: Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Suit Ongoing
NEW HAVEN, CT: Health Dep't Faces Lead Poisoning Class Action
NEW MEXICO: Settles Long-Running Jackson I/DD Class Action
NEW YORK SPORTS: Former Members File Class Action Over Fees

NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
NEW YORK: Appeals Judgment in Gulino Racial Discrimination Suit
NEW YORK: Appeals Ruling for Sandoval in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
NEW YORK: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Judgment in Gulino Class Suit

NISSAN: Verdict in Faulty Brakes Class Action Upheld
NOKIA CORP: Securities Action Class Period Expanded
NORTH AMERICAN: Court Flips Doran's Wage & Hour Claims Dismissal
NORTH CAROLINA: Grabarczyk Seeks to Certify Sex Offenders Class
OCEAN BREEZE: DeSimone Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages

OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Frankenreiter Moves for Class Certification
OMEGA FLEX: George Moves to Certify Classes of Yellow CSST Buyers
OMNI FAMILY HEALTH: Ower Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
PARAGON CONTRACTING: Edson Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class
PFIZER: Faces Class Action Over Generic Drug Price Hike

PILLPACK INC: Court Defers Judgment Pending Trial in Turner Suit
QUADRIGACX: New Ernst & Young Report Unveils Financial Situation
RALPH LAUREN: Illinois Court Trims Claims in Hudson TCPA Suit
RAMONA MUNICIPAL: Cal. Affirms Reversal in E. Plantier's Suit
REMLEY & SENSENBRENNER: Collection Letter Breaches FDCPA, Says Suit

ROSS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Morrison
ROY MILLER: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Muller Suit
SAGORA SENIOR: Mickle Suit Transferred From E.D. to S.D. Texas
SAKS INC: Sacklow Suit Moved From M.D. Tenn. to S.D. New York
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Bronson

SANDOZ: Among Defendants in Generic Drug Price Hike Class Action
SEQUIUM ASSET: Howard Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
SIGNATURE FLIGHT: Estrada Files Wage and Hour Suit in Calif.
SPRING NAILS: Chen Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
SRA ASSOCIATES: Court OKs Dismissal Bid in W. Cheng's FDCPA Suit

STARK COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Maloney Suit
SUNPATH LIMITED: Canfield Files Suit Over Automated Calls
SUSHI VILLAGE 53: Hong Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
SVARC PR INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
SWAGAT RESTAURANT: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Naik Suit Says

SWEPI LP: Rogers' Time to File Cert. Petition Moved to June 19
T-SWIRL INTERNATIONAL: Martinez Suit Asserts ADA Violation
TAIWANESE CUISINE: Lin Seeks Pay for Hours Worked Over 40
TELEDYNE DEFENSE: Faces Trinidad Suit in California Super. Court
THOMSON REUTERS: 2nd Cir. Affirms L. Kidd's FCRA Suit Dismissal

UNIFIED PROTECTIVE: Fields Suit Asserts Discrimination, Harassment
UNITED NATIONS: Laventure Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
UNITED PARCEL: 9th Cir. Denies Writ of Mandamus in R. Holl's Suit
UNITED REFRIGERATION: Verduzco Files Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
UNITED STATES: Hernandez Files Suit in N.D. Calif.

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS: Palade Files Civil Rights Suit v. BOT
UTAH: Christensen Suit Class Settlement Wins Final Certification
UTILITY PARTNERS: Pelayo Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
VACATION HUB: Faces Class Action Over Unlawful Contracts
VERMONT: Russell's Bid to Certify Class Denied in Suit vs. DOC

VIKING CRUISES: New Jersey Couple Files Class Action
VIRGINIA COLLEGE: Appeals Decision in Robinson Suit to 11th Cir.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Must Face Class Action Over Exploding Sunroof
WAITR HOLDINGS: Halley Moves for Class Certification and Notice
WASTE MANAGEMENT: Ables Suit Transferred From S.D. to W.D. Tenn.

WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bogden Suit Moved From S.D. Texas to D. Colo.
WOLVERINE WORLD: Henry Suit Moved From Delaware to W.D. Michigan
XPO LOGISTICS: Appeal in Intermodal Drayage Class Suit Denied
ZWICKER AND ASSOCIATES: Kaur's Bid for Class Certification Stayed
[*] Coalition of 40 States Files Suit Against Generic Drug Makers

[*] Non-U.S. issuers Become Targets of Securities Class Actions
[*] SB 551 to Impact Pending Suits Against Condo Associations

                            *********

3M: Parchment Among Plaintiffs in PFAS Contamination Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
John McNeill, writing for WKZO AM/FM, reports that new revelations
suggest that 3M, the giant Minnesota conglomerate that produced
PFOS, knew for decades that it might be toxic, but covered it up.

Documents revealed in a Detroit Free Press story suggest that
internal company tests as far back as the 1950's revealed it was
causing disease in lab animals, that the company kept from the EPA
and the public.

Detroit Attorney Nicholas Coulson, who is representing Parchment
and others in a class action lawsuit against 3M and Georgia Pacific
says its nasty stuff, that can cause cancer, high cholesterol and a
number of other health issues.

He says a paper trail of internal documents found by Minnesota's
Attorney General shows there was a cover-up at 3M.

The chemicals, which do not break-down in the environment, have
been used in everything from Gore-Tex, to Teflon, to Scotch Gard.
It's been used to make everything from shoes to sandwich wraps to
popcorn bags. [GN]


AARP INC: Friedman's Bid to Certify Class Taken Under Submission
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson has taken under submission two
motions filed in the lawsuit styled: Jerald Friedman v. AARP Inc.,
et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-00034-DDP-PLA (C.D. Cal.):

   -- motion to dismiss first amended complaint; and
   -- motion for class certification.

According to the Court's civil minutes, the Court and counsel
confer as reflected on the record.  The matters are taken under
submission.

The parties are to file a supplemental brief, not to exceed 20
pages.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sean Kennedy Collins, Esq.
          Law Offices of Sean K. Collins
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110-3027
          Telephone: (617) 320-8485
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843
          E-mail: sean@neinsurancelaw.com

               - and -

          Dorothy P. Antullis, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          120 E Palmetto Park Rd.
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          Facsimile: (561) 750-3364
          E-mail: dantullis@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Ex Kano S. Sams, II, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park E, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-2722
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: esams@glancylaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Russell, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
          One Metropolitan Square
          211 North Broadway, Suite 3600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 259 2725
          E-mail: jsrussell@bclplaw.com

               - and -

          John W. Amberg, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
          120 Broadway, Suite 300
          Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386
          Telephone: (310) 576-2100
          Facsimile: (310) 576-2200
          E-mail: jwamberg@bclplaw.com

               - and -

          Meaghan VerGow, Esq.
          Jennifer Sokoler, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          1625 Eye Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 383-5504
          E-mail: mvergow@omm.com
                  jsokoler@omm.com


ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Bid to Dismiss Alexander FDCPA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON ALEXANDER, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS CORPORATION;
MARK NAIMAN; LLOYD & MCDANIEL, PLC; and W. ANDERSON WOODFORD,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-CV-3007 (W.D. Ark.), Judge Timothy L.
Brooks of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, Harrison Division, denied the Motion to Dismiss and Brief
in Support filed by Defendants Absolute Resolutions Corp. ("ARC")
and Mark Naiman.

In 2013, Mr. Alexander entered into a retail installment contract
and security agreement to finance his purchase of jewelry from
Harris Jewelry.  At some point, this debt was assigned from Harris
Jewelry to an entity called Consumer Adjustment Corp., USA, and
then to ARC.  On Feb. 18, 2018, ARC filed a civil lawsuit against
Mr. Alexander in the Circuit Court of Baxter County, Arkansas,
alleging that Mr. Alexander had defaulted on his debt, and asking
for judgment against him in the amount of $1,077.67 plus interest.
ARC was initially represented in that case by W. Anderson Woodford,
an attorney for the law firm of Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC.

On July 7, 2018, Mr. Alexander filed a motion for summary judgment
in the Baxter County lawsuit, arguing that ARC had no authority to
file that lawsuit because it had not obtained a license from the
State Board of Collection Agencies ("SBCA") to act as a collection
agency in the state of Arkansas, as required by Ark. Code Ann.
Section 17-24-301.  Five days later, Mr. Woodford and his
co-counsel in that case moved to withdraw from their representation
of ARC.  That same day, ARC mailed an application for a collection
agency license to the SBCA, along with a $10,000 check for the
civil penalty that Ark. Code Ann. Section 17-24-103(a)(3)(A)
imposes on collection agencies who wish for their prior unlicensed
collection activities to be considered retroactively licensed by
the SBCA.

One week later, ARC was provided a collection agency license,
retroactively effective from Aug. 6, 2015 to the present day.  A
month later, new counsel entered their appearance for ARC in the
Baxter County case and filed a response to Mr. Alexander's motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the absence of a collection
agency license is not a defense under Arkansas law against
collection activities, and that in any event, the retroactive
nature of ARC's recently-obtained license mooted the grounds for
Mr. Alexander's motion. T hat summary judgment motion is still
awaiting decision as of today.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 25, 2019, Mr. Alexander filed a class-action
Complaint against ARC, Mr. Woodford, Lloyd & McDaniel, and ARC's
sole member and CEO, Mark Naiman, in the Court.  His Complaint
brings one count against all of these Defendants, alleging that
they violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") by causing the Baxter County lawsuit to be filed against
him before ARC had acquired a collection agency license from the
SBCA.

He seeks to represent a class of all persons in Arkansas who,
within the year prior to the filing of his class-action Complaint,
were served with a debt-collection complaint identifying ARC as the
plaintiff and Lloyd & McDaniel or Mr. Woodford as ARC's attorneys.


ARC and Mr. Naiman have filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr. Alexander's
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for
failure to state a claim.2 Mr. Alexander has responded, and ARC and
Mr. Naiman have replied.  On April 29, 2019, the Court heard oral
argument on the Motion.

Judge Brooks agrees with the Sixth Circuit in Kistner v. Law
Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, and the multitude of
district court cases from around the country that are cited
therein, that whether someone is a "debt collector" within the
meaning of the FDCPA depends on whether they independently satisfy
the statute's definition of that term -- not on formalities of
employment or organizational structure.  That is not to say that he
entirely disagrees with the Seventh Circuit.

He shares the Seventh Circuit's view that merely working for or
owning stock in debt collection companies is not itself sufficient
to satisfy that definition.  But, Mr. Alexander has alleged that
Mr. Naiman is the sole member and CEO of ARC -- as well as of a
chain of other related entities that would appear to engage in
similar activities -- and that ARC represented to the SBCA that Mr.
Naiman is its only employee who collects or solicits accounts.  At
a minimum these allegations are sufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that Mr. Naiman knew of, directly participated in, and
had the authority to control, ARC's actions as described in Mr.
Alexander's Complaint.

Given this, since the Court has already ruled that the Complaint
alleges sufficient facts to state a claim against ARC, it follows
that it has also alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against
Mr. Naiman.  The actual amount of Mr. Naiman's knowledge,
participation, and control over ARC's actions, and whether those
are sufficient to meet the definition of "debt collector" under the
FDCPA are more properly decided at summary judgment or trial.

For these reasons, Judge Brooks denied Defendants ARC's and Mark
Naiman's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/GJCYT0 from Leagle.com.

Jason Alexander, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Corey D. McGaha --
cmcgaha@crowdermcgaha.com -- Crowder McGaha, LLP & William Thomas
Crowder -- wcrowder@crowdermcgaha.com -- CROWDER MCGAHA LLP.

Absolute Resolutions Corporation & Mark Naiman, Defendants,
represented by Judy Simmons Henry -- jhenry@wlj.com -- Wright,
Lindsey & Jennings LLP & Kimberly W. Tucker -- ktucker@wlj.com --
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP.

Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC & W. Anderson Woodford, Defendants,
represented by Donald Howard Bacon -- bacon@fridayfirm.com --
Friday, Eldredge and Clark.


ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Law Firm Investigates Securities Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder Rights Law Firm Johnson Fistel, LLP with the assistance
of former California Deputy Attorney General and Special Counsel,
Tiffany Johnson, Esq., is investigating potential violations of
federal and state laws by Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. (NASDAQ:
ACHC) ("Acadia") and certain of its officers.

Last year a securities class action complaint was filed against
Acadia. Throughout the class period, Acadia allegedly made
materially false and/or misleading statements regarding its
business, operations, and prospects. When the true details entered
the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

If you are a long-term shareholder of Acadia you may have standing
to hold Acadia harmless from the damage the officers and directors
caused by making them personally responsible. You may also be able
to assist in reforming the Company's corporate governance to
prevent future wrongdoing.

If you are interested in learning more about your legal rights and
remedies, please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at
619-814-4471. If you email, please include your phone number.

                     About Johnson Fistel, LLP

Johnson Fistel, LLP -- http://www.johnsonfistel.com-- is a
nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm with offices in
California, New York, and Georgia. The firm represents individual
and institutional investors in shareholder derivative and
securities class action lawsuits. [GN]


ADF MIDATLANTIC: Court OKs Production of Subpoena Communications
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs' Production of Carrier Subpoena Communications in the
case captioned BRIAN KEIM, an individual, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADF MIDATLANTIC, LLC,
a foreign corporation, et al., Defendants. Case No.
12-CV-80577-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN. (S.D. Fla.).

This discovery dispute involves the Defendants' demand that the
Plaintiff produce to the Plaintiff's counsel's email communications
with counsel for the non-party telephone carriers AT&T, Sprint, US
Cellular, Verizon, and T-Mobile (the carriers) regarding the
subpoenas that the Plaintiff had issued to various phone carriers
to identify subscribers and customary users of the cell phone
numbers at issue in this case.  

The Defendants allege that the Plaintiff's counsel has had to
engage in multiple conferrals with counsel for the subpoenaed
non-parties regarding the scope of the subpoenas to the telephone
carriers. Because those conferrals have resulted in the
modification and narrowing of the subpoenas, the Defendants allege
that they should be permitted to review the emails in order to
evaluate the nature of whether and to what extent the carriers will
produce information.

In response, the Plaintiff claims he has already produced to the
Defendants all carrier objections and class data that the Plaintiff
has received from the carriers and argues that the communications
between the Plaintiff's counsel and counsel for the carriers are
protected by the work-product privilege.  

In their Motion, the Defendants ask the Court to order Plaintiff to
produce to Defendants the carrier communications because the
communications pertain to three key issues of ascertainability and
commonality: 1) whether carriers retain subscriber data dating to
2011 2) whether carriers retain data pertaining to users, and 3)
the feasibility of obtaining the data to excise
subscriber-forwarded numbers.

Specifically, Defendants are seeking information pertaining to
Plaintiff's definition of the term user provided to AT&T, and
explanations as to why hundreds of numbers sought by Plaintiff were
not provided by the carriers. Defendants argue that the Court has a
continuing obligation to monitor class actions and to decertify the
class if necessary, and the Court cannot accomplish this without
production of the carrier communications.  Defendants claim that
since they have issued Request for Production 39 to Plaintiff,
which seeks all documents obtained from third-parties relating to
this Action, Plaintiff must produce the communications.

Plaintiff's Response

In Plaintiff's Response, Plaintiff argues that he has shared all
objections and calling records he has received from the telephone
carriers with Defendants and that Plaintiff's counsels' email
communications with the carriers are protected by the work-product
privilege. Plaintiff also refutes Defendants' contention that the
email communications are third party documents as requested by
Defendants in their Request for Production #39 and argues that even
if the emails were subject to the prior discovery requests dating
back to 2012, Plaintiff should not be limited in his capacity to
object to this production.  

Defendants' Reply

Defendants filed a Reply, in which Defendants address Plaintiff's
assertion that the emails are protected work product. Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the work-product privilege applies to the
emails. Defendants point out that emails are not comparable to
witness interviews or notes but instead contain modifications to
subpoenas, which are public matters that the Court must oversee and
approve.  

IN CAMERA REVIEW

At the May 9, 2019 hearing, the Court ordered the ex parte
submission to the Court for in camera review of the emails between
Plaintiff's counsel and counsel for the telephone carriers
regarding the subpoenas to the telephone carriers that are at issue
in Motion to Compel. The Court took this step to ensure that it was
fully informed and made aware of the content of the emails at issue
in the pending motion. The Court directed Plaintiff to submit the
emails at issue. Plaintiff complied and submitted the emails on
Monday, May 13, 2019. The Court has carefully reviewed the emails
which are at the center of this discovery dispute.

Work-Product Doctrine

Plaintiff argues that the withheld emails are protected by the
work-product doctrine. The Court notes that the only privilege
Plaintiff has asserted in the instant dispute is the work-product
privilege. As this is a federal diversity action, federal law
governs work-product doctrine issues.  

The work product doctrine protects from disclosure materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or that
party's representative including its attorney. The doctrine
protects written statements, private memoranda and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in
the course of his legal duties.

Rule 26(b)(3) establishes two tiers of protection: first, work
product prepared in anticipation of litigation by an attorney or
her agent is discoverable only upon a showing of need and hardship;
and second, core or opinion work product that encompasses the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinion, legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation is generally afforded near absolute protection from
discovery.

Whether the Telephone Carrier Communications are Protected by
Work-Product Privilege

Judge McMahon determined that the first category of documents,
emails sent by the non-party to defendants' counsel, were not
protected by the work-product privilege because there is no
confidential relationship between the senders (the subpoenaed
non-parties) and the recipient defendants' counsel.  

As to the second category of documents, Judge McMahon found that
some of the emails sent by defendants' counsel to the subpoenaed
non-party were potentially protected work product to the extent
that the e-mails reflect counsel's strategy for establishing an
affirmative defense as [to] Defendants claim. However, Judge
McMahon determined that whether the emails contained work product
was a moot issue, because defendants' counsel \waived the privilege
by sharing his views or questions with Darringer, an employee of a
non-party witness.

The Court finds Judge McMahon's logic persuasive. The emails in the
instant case between counsel for the telephone carriers and
Plaintiff's counsel ultimately fall into two categories: first,
emails that were sent by various counsel for the carriers at issue
to Plaintiff's counsel, Keith Keogh and Amy Wells; and second,
emails that were sent by Plaintiff's counsel to counsel for the
carriers. The Court will now analyze the two categories of
documents at issue in this case.

Whether the Emails Sent by the Carriers' Counsel to Plaintiff's
counsel are Protected Work Product

Emails sent by the carriers' counsel to Plaintiff's counsel in this
case are simply not protected by the work-product privilege because
there is no confidential relationship between the senders (counsel
for the carriers) and the recipient (Plaintiff's counsel). Although
a confidential relationship exists where the non-party is, for
example, a consultant retained by a party or its lawyer and brought
within the privilege as an agent of the attorney or party, the
carriers are neither parties to this action nor do they have any
interest in the action.  

It is a stretch worthy of a Major League Baseball first baseman for
Plaintiff to argue that correspondence from counsel for non-party,
disinterested, subpoenaed telephone carriers to Plaintiff's counsel
are covered by work-product protection. The work-product doctrine
does not extend so far afield. Thus, the emails sent by counsel for
the subpoenaed telephone carriers to Plaintiff's counsel in this
case are simply not protected by the work product privilege.
Therefore, they shall be produced by Plaintiff to Defendants.

Whether Plaintiff's Counsel's Emails to Counsel for the Carriers is
Work Product Pursuant to Rule 26(b)

Plaintiff's counsel's emails to counsel for the carriers. After
reviewing the disputed emails in camera, on an ex parte basis, the
Court is very reluctant to find that the emails are work product at
all. The tenor and purpose of the emails are in reference to
publicly filed and issued subpoenas in this case.

The undersigned has carefully reviewed the disputed emails. It is
clear that the emails at issue in this case solely refer to the
modification, scope, and execution of the subpoenas issued to the
non-party carriers. Many of the emails contain counsels' arguments
and thoughts on the scope of the subpoena, explain discrepancies
regarding responses to the subpoena, or define terms used in the
subpoena. However, they are not typical work product. The
communications by Plaintiff's counsel are not made to Plaintiff's
own expert or agent, but rather to a third-party who has no
involvement in the case other than to respond to a lawfully issued
subpoena.

The emails at issue are directly relevant to the scope of the
subpoenas sent to the carriers, and indeed the emails seem to
modify the subpoenas via the conferral between the counsel
specified in the emails. The Court notes its ongoing duty to
monitor this class action case.   

Allowing Plaintiff to maintain his work-product privilege would
deny Defendants important information pertaining to the narrowing
of the scope of the subpoena(s) and production by the carriers in
response to the narrowed subpoena(s). It would also undermine the
Court's ability to monitor the subpoenas to the carriers or
effectively evaluate the merits of Plaintiff's subpoena efforts.

In sum, preventing the production of these emails, which do not
constitute work product, would simply be unfair to Defendants.
Defendants have a strong interest in ensuring the validity and
reliability of the documents subpoenaed by Plaintiff from the
non-parties, who are disinterested telephone carriers.

Thus, all of Plaintiff's counsel's email communication with
telephone carriers AT&T, Sprint, US Cellular, Verizon, and T-Mobile
regarding the subpoenas that Plaintiff had issued to various phone
carriers to identify subscribers and customary users of the cell
phone numbers at issue in this case shall be produced to
Defendants.

Production of the Emails is Required Even Assuming Arguendo that
Plaintiff has Asserted a Valid Claim of Work Product

The Defendants have established 1) that the emails are relevant and
proportional to the needs of this case 2) that Defendants have
substantial need for the emails and an inability to obtain the
materials or their substantial equivalent by other means, and 3)
that Plaintiff's counsel has waived work-product privilege by
sharing any allegedly protected work product with counsel for the
subpoenaed non-parties. Thus, even if the emails arguably
constitute fact work product, they still must be produced.

The Court finds that the emails are proportional and relevant to
the needs of this case pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1). Defendants have
further established a substantial need and an inability to obtain
the materials or their substantial equivalent by other means.
Defendants represented at the hearing that they have repeatedly
asked Plaintiff's counsel how the term user was defined in the
subpoenas, and how Plaintiff accounts for numerical discrepancies
regarding the phone numbers, and Defendants assert that they have
received no sufficient response from Plaintiff.  

As to Plaintiff's argument that the emails constitute opinion work
product, the Court rejects this argument. The Court finds that no
such opinion work product exists for all of the reasons stated in
this Order. Further, even if some of the emails arguably
constituted opinion work product, the Court finds that Plaintiff
waived any possible work-product privilege as to information
contained in the emails by Plaintiff's counsel's voluntary
dissemination of the emails to the telephone carrier's counsel and
discussion of the contents of the emails with non-party counsel for
the carriers.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4nmxju7 from Leagle.com.

Brian Keim, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Amy L. Wells, Keogh
Law, LTD, Katherine Bowen, Keogh Law, LTD, pro hac vice,Keith James
Keogh, Keogh Law, Ltd., 55 W. Monroe St #3390, Chicago, IL 60603,
Sean Martin Holas -- sean@scottdowens.com -- Scott D. Owens, P.A. &
Scott David Owens -- scott@ScottDOwens.com -- SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.

ADF Midatlantic, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, American
Huts, Inc., a foreign corporation, ADF Pizza I, LLC, a foreign
limited liability company & ADF PA, LLC, a foreign limited
liability company, Defendants, represented by David S. Almeida --
dalmeida@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff
LLP, Jordan Scott Kosches, GrayRobinson, P.A., 333 SE 2nd Avenue,
Suite 3200, Miami, FL, 33131 & Mark S. Eisen --
meisen@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff,
LLP.

Pizza Hut, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jordan Scott Kosches,
GrayRobinson, P.A. & Mark S. Eisen, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan &
Aronoff, LLP.

T-Mobile, Defendant, represented by Gregg Darrow Thomas, 601 S
Boulevard Tampa, FL 33606-2629, Thomas LoCicero & Debra R. Bernard
– DBernard@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, pro hac vice.


AETERNA ZENTARIS: 3rd Cir. Affirms Certification in Vizirgianakis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an Order
affirming the District Court's judgment granting Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned  GREGORY
VIZIRGIANAKIS; PHONG THOMAS DINH; JAMSHID KHODAVANDI, v. AETERNA
ZENTARIS, INC.; JUERGEN ENGEL; DAVID A. DODD; PAUL BLAKE; NICHOLAS
J. PELLICCIONE, Appellants. No. 18-2474. (3rd Cir.).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), defendants
Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., and its named former employees, appeal the
district court's order granting class certification in this
securities action.  

In 2009, the biopharmaceutical company Aeterna acquired the rights
to AEZS-130, a drug in development it sought to have approved for
commercialization by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). To
this end, Aeterna agreed to continue an ongoing study of the drug
according to the terms of a Special Protocol Assessment (SPA), an
agreement between Aeterna and the FDA regarding how the study
should be completed to show the drug's safety and efficacy.

Aeterna issued numerous press releases and other statements
indicating that the study showed the drug was effective in
accordance with the protocol agreed to by the FDA in the SPA. Based
on the strength of the successful study, Aeterna sold nearly $75
million of its common stock to the investing public.

In reality, says the complaint, AEZS-130 failed to show efficacy.
And in November 2014, the FDA denied Aeterna's application to
market AEZS-130 publicly, because the planned analysis of Aeterna's
pivotal trial did not meet its stated primary efficacy objective as
agreed to in the Special Protocol Assessment agreement letter
between Aeterna and the FDA.

The current action was filed by Aeterna shareholders. The class
action complaint alleges Aeterna violated Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by carrying out a plan to deceive the
investing public and cause class members to purchase Aeterna stock
at artificially inflated prices.  

The Court reviews a class certification order for abuse of
discretion. The Court bears in mind the trial court,
well-positioned to decide which facts and legal arguments are most
important to each Rule 23 requirement, possesses broad discretion
to control proceedings and frame issues for consideration under
Rule 23.

Here, the plaintiffs provided an expert report completed by Dr.
Adam Werner to prove market efficiency; the report relied on four
dates on which information related to the development of AEZS-130
was disseminated to conclude that Aeterna stock reflected publicly
available information.

On appeal, Aeterna does not contest that the plaintiffs raised the
presumption of an efficient market, and therefore class-wide
reliance. It argues the district court erred in finding that it had
not rebutted the presumption.

Aeterna's hired expert, Dr. David Tabak, responded to the
declaration of plaintiffs' expert, pointing out that Dr. Werner had
not proven to a 95% confidence level that the alleged
misrepresentations made on August 30, 2011 impacted the price of
Aeterna's common stock. The district court found this evidence
insufficient to rebut the presumption. It aptly noted that
plaintiffs do not have the burden to prove price impact (or lack
thereof), so it was not surprising that their expert's report did
no such thing. And even were plaintiffs' study attempting to
demonstrate a price impact, the district court reasoned that its
failure to do so is not necessarily proof of the opposite. This
conclusion is consistent with the opinion of Dr. Werner and other
district courts weighing similar event studies, including two in
this circuit.  

Dr. Werner found abnormal stock return to a 95% confidence level
for the other three events in his study, one of which was Aeterna's
June 26, 2012 representation regarding AEZS-130. Dr. Tabak's
contention that plaintiffs' legal theory precludes them from
relying on the 2012 representation is a legal conclusion, which the
district court could reject.  

In sum, the district court considered the expert report tendered by
Aeterna. In light of plaintiffs' expert and caselaw concluding
otherwise, it rejected Dr. Tabak's conclusion that lack of price
impact was proven by Dr. Werner's failure to prove price impact in
his report on market efficiency.

The district court also credited Dr. Werner's conclusion that the
2012 statement conveyed new, valuation-relevant information,
despite Dr. Tabak's concluding the opposite. Weighing conflicting
expert testimony and making factual findings are normal functions
of the district court at this stage. Aeterna has not shown that
either decision was an abuse of discretion.

The Court will affirm.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyjq3ghn from Leagle.com.


AKAL SECURITY: Class in Smith Labor Suit Conditionally Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Roy Smith, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AKAL Security
Incorporated, Defendant, Case No. CV-18-01117-PHX-SMB (D. Ariz.),
Judge Susan M. Brnovich of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Arizona granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Proceed Conditionally
as a Collective Action.

Forty named Plaintiffs bring the action against their former
employer, the Defendant.  The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendant,
a government contractor, as Air Security Officers ("ASOs"), a
position later renamed Aviation Detention Officers ("ADOs"), for
various times between April 2014 and November 2017.  They were all
hourly employees, responsible for the supervision of deportees
while they were in the Defendant's custody and control, including
during their transfer onto an aircraft for deportation and during
the trip to the deportees' home country.  After transferring
deportees to their home countries, the Plaintiffs returned with the
rest of the flight crew to the United States.  The Plaintiffs were
compensated for their time on the return flight, but pursuant to
the Defendant's policy, Plaintiffs were automatically docked one
hour of pay for a meal break on each return flight that lasted more
than ninety minutes.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on April 11, 2018 alleging
violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").  They allege that during the return flights in which
they were docked one hour of pay, they were not given bona fide
meal breaks within the meaning of the FLSA, and to the extent that
the unpaid meal breaks were hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week, they allege that they are entitled to overtime pay for those
hours.

The Plaintiffs now seek conditional certification of a proposed
collective action group defined as all former ADOs or ASOs, or
those who had substantially the same duties and responsibilities as
the Plaintiffs, who were employed by the Defendant between April
11, 2015 and Nov. 30, 2017, were based in Mesa, Arizona, and had
one-hour lunch breaks deducted from their pay, pursuant to the
Defendant's Meal-Period Deduction and Timekeeping Policies.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to (1) compel the Defendant to
furnish the names and contact information of the potential
Plaintiffs; (2) authorize the Plaintiffs to circulate the proposed
Notice and Opt-In Consent Forms; (3) prohibit the Defendant from
engaging in communications or activities that may improperly
influence, mislead or discourage the potential Plaintiffs from
joining the action; and (4) appoint the Plaintiffs' counsel as the
counsel for the members of the collective action.

Judge Brnovich finds that while only one of the three declarations
provides much evidentiary value regarding whether the potential
Plaintiffs were similarly situated, 40 named Plaintiffs signed the
complaint.  For now, the information presented by the Plaintiffs is
adequate to warrant conditional certification for purposes of
notifying the potential Plaintiffs of the suit.

Due to the relative lack of discovery and the lenient standard for
conditional class certification, the Judge will apply the
three-year period to the notice.  Her decision to give notice for
the three-year time period does not indicate a finding of
willfulness.  Should the Defendant file a decertification motion in
the future, the Judge will then, in light of evidence produced
during discovery, reassess whether the two or three-year statute of
limitations should apply to the Plaintiffs' claims.

Finally, the Judge agrees with the Defendant that changes are
needed to the proposed notice.  The Defendant has requested an
order for the parties to confer and agree on the notice terms.
Accordingly, the Judge orders the parties to meet and confer
regarding (1) the language of the notice and (2) the timing and
method of notifying potential collective action members.

In light of this, Judge Brnovich granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Proceed Conditionally as a Collective Action to the extent that she
conditionally certified the collective action of all former ADOs or
ASOs, or those who had substantially the same duties and
responsibilities as Plaintiffs, who were employed by the Defendant
between April 11, 2015 and Nov. 30, 2017, were based in Mesa,
Arizona, and had one-hour lunch breaks deducted from their pay,
pursuant to the Defendant's Meal-Period Deduction and Timekeeping
Policies.

She ordered the Defendant to provide the Plaintiffs with the names
and last known addresses and email addresses of all similarly
situated individuals so that the Plaintiffs may notify them of the
collective action.

The parties will meet and confer to prepare a proposed stipulated
notice, as well as a proposed schedule for sending notice, and
submit the same to the Court no later than 30 days from the date of
the Order for approval prior to circulation of the notice.  If the
parties are unable to reach an agreement regarding the notice
provisions, such disputes may be noted in the filing or the parties
may make separate filings.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Dj5QGo from Leagle.com.

Roy Smith, Juan J Aguilar, Curtis Baughman, Wendell R Bell, Shelly
M Bentley, Donald L Bergeron, Thomas Boyd, Edmond E Breshears,
Yanai Castillo, David Crotchett, James B Curtis, Christy Escapule,
Greg Flores, Anthony Kelsh, Dennis J Kenniker, Tamiko Kuniyuki,
Paul T Lee, David Lopez, Alma D Mata, Tim McGrady, Joseph McMurdy,
Edward G Paprocki, James Piekarz, Timothy R Rice, Bernabe A
Rodriguez, Jr., William L Rudd, Randy Salinas, Cynthia R Sanchez,
Aurelio Sanchez-Cepeda, Eugene L Shimerdla, William M Strong,
Lorraine Varela, Aniano Vega, Joseph Vella, William C Webster,
Robert A White, Karen Willis, Thomas Airington, II, Greg E Gurley &
Danny J Rice, Sr., Plaintiffs, represented by Matthew Seth Sarelson
-- msarelson@kymplaw.com -- Kaplan Young & Moll Parron PLLC &
Nicholas Jason Enoch , Lubin & Enoch PC.

AKAL Security Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Jenna
Rinehart Rassif -- Jenna.Rassif@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
PC, Sonya K. Boun, Jackson Lewis LLP, Tony H. McGrath --
Tony.McGrath@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC & Valerie L.
Hooker -- Valerie.Hooker@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC.


ALABAMA: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice Cook Traffic Ticket Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAKENDRA COOK, SHARON MOTLEY, Plaintiffs, v. HAL
TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law
Enforcement Agency, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-CV-977-WKW (WO) (M.D.
Ala.), Judge W. Keith Watkins of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division, (i) denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction; (ii) denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; (iii) granted the
State's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Cook and Motley, two indigent Alabama residents,
currently have suspended driver's licenses.  Those licenses were
suspended by state courts because the Plaintiffs failed to pay
their traffic tickets.  The Plaintiffs say those suspensions were
unconstitutional because the courts did not consider whether they
were unable to pay through no fault of their own.  The Plaintiffs
filed the lawsuit to get their licenses back.

When they filed suit, the Plaintiffs also had license suspensions
for failing to appear in court for different traffic tickets.  They
do not challenge those suspensions.  And those suspensions mean
that the Court cannot give the Plaintiffs what they want: the
reinstatement of their driver's licenses.  And since the Court
cannot give Plaintiffs what they want, they lack standing to bring
the suit.

The Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to prohibit Defendant
Taylor, head of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency ("ALEA"), from
enforcing an Alabama rule that authorizes state courts to suspend
indigent individuals' driver's licenses without finding that they
willfully refused to pay.  They also seek an order requiring the
State to reinstate licenses suspended under this rule.  Finally,
they move to certify a class of similarly situated individuals.
The State moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds as well as on
the merits.

The Plaintiffs' claim, brought on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, is based on the State's suspension of their driver's
licenses under Rule 26.11(i)(3) without prior notice, the
opportunity to be heard, and an express finding that the individual
is able to pay and willfully failed to do so.

They seek to: (1) enjoin ALEA from suspending licenses under Rule
26.11(i)(3) for nonpayment; (2) require ALEA to reinstate licenses
that were suspended for nonpayment (assuming there is no other
reason for suspension); and (3) require ALEA to provide notice to
the drivers who are eligible to have their licenses reinstated.

Judge Watkins holds that because the Plaintiffs' licenses were also
suspended for failing to appear in court, they lack standing to
challenge the suspensions for nonpayment.  Absent a named Plaintiff
with standing, the class certification is inappropriate.  And
because the Plaintiffs lack standing, the Judge will not consider
the State's alternative grounds for dismissal.

At bottom, Judge Watkins holds that the Plaintiffs cannot get what
they want (the reinstatement of their driver's licenses) because
there are independent, unchallenged legal reasons why those
licenses were suspended (their failures to appear in court in
separate cases).  That means the Plaintiffs lack standing, and the
Judge must dismiss the case without reaching the merits of their
Bearden claim.

Based on this, Judge Watkins (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction; (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification; (iii) granted the State's motion to dismiss.
The case is dismissed without prejudice.  A separate final judgment
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/tZka2U from Leagle.com.

Lakendra Cook, on behalf of herself and those similarily situated &
Sharon Motley, on behalf of herself and those similarily situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Danielle Davis --
danielle.davis@splcenter.org -- pro hac vice, Micah West --
micah.west@splcenter.org -- Southern Poverty Law Center & Sara
Michelle Zampierin -- sara.zampierin@splcenter.org -- Southern
Poverty Law Center.

Hal Taylor, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama
Law Enforcement Agency, Defendant, represented by Brad A.
Chynoweth, Office of the Attorney General, Laura Elizabeth Howell,
Office of the Alabama Attorney General & Meridith Hamilton Barnes,
Alabama Law Enforcement Agency.


ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES: Robertson Alleges Breach of FDCPA
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against AllianceOne
Receivables Management, Inc. The case is styled as Shelly
Robertson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AllianceOne Receivables Management, Inc,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00749-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal., May 29,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

AllianceOne provides debt collection services and contact center
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   George Thomas Martin , III, Esq.
   Martin & Bontrager, APC
   6464 W. Sunset Blvd., Suite 960
   Los Angeles, CA 90028
   Tel: (323) 940-1700
   Fax: (323) 238-8095
   Email: tom@mblawapc.com




ALLTRAN EDUCATION: Zarczynski Moves for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ann Zarczynski moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit titled ANN ZARCZYNSKI, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALLTRAN
EDUCATION, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00721-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant Plaintiff (and Defendant) relief from
the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

According to the Motion, the Plaintiff is obligated to move for
class certification to protect the interests of the putative
class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff avers.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


ALPHA SERVICES: Sanderlin FLSA Suit Moved From W.D. to S.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled LARRY SANDERLIN, on Behalf of
Himself and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALPHA
SERVICES LLC, Case No. 4:19-cv-00013, was transferred on May 13,
2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
(Houston).

The Southern District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-01760
to the proceeding.

According to the complaint, the Defendant required Plaintiff Larry
Sanderlin to work more than 40 hours in a workweek.  The Defendant
misclassified the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees
throughout the United States as exempt from overtime under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.[BN]

Plaintiff Larry Sanderlin, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of
All Other Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Don Foty, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd, Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: dfoty@kennedyhodges.com

Defendant Alpha Services, LLC, is represented by:

          Amber Lea Karns, Esq.
          MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.
          700 Milam Street, Suite 2700
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 222-1470
          E-mail: akarns@munsch.com


AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Dismiss NY Consolidated Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the defendants' motion
to dismiss the consolidated securities class action in New York is
pending.

On January 12, 2018 and January 19, 2018, two putative federal
securities class actions, captioned Hawaii Structural Ironworkers
Pension Trust Fund v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN (the "Hawaii Action"), and Nichols v.
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-00510-AJN (the "Nichols Action," and together with the
Hawaii Action, the "Actions"), respectively, were filed against the
Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.  

The Actions, which name certain of the Company's officers and
directors and, in the case of the Hawaii Action, the underwriters
of the Company's February 8, 2017 secondary public offering, as
defendants, asserted claims under some or all of Sections 11,
12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to
alleged material misstatements and omissions in the registration
statement for the secondary public offering and in certain other
public disclosures.

On May 30, 2018, the court consolidated the Actions and appointed
the International Union of Operating Engineers Pension Fund of
Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware as lead plaintiff.

On August 13, 2018, lead plaintiff and additional named plaintiff
Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund ("Plaintiffs")
filed an Amended Class Action Complaint. On November 21, 2018,
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint. On
January 22, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the Second
Amended Class Action Complaint.

AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., through its subsidiaries,
involved in the theatrical exhibition business. The company owns,
operates, or has interests in theatres. The company was founded in
1920 and is headquartered in Leawood, Kansas. AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc. is a subsidiary of Dalian Wanda Group Co., Ltd.


AMERICAN HONDA: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of H. Singh's TILA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
HARVINDER SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. HARVINDER SINGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SORAYA MOTOR CO.; ARIANNA MOTOR COMPANY
INC.; HOOMAN H. BODAGHI, DBA HINSHAW'S HONDA; HONDA OF AUBURN;
HOOMAN HONDA; HOOMAN MOTORS GROUP; HINSHAW ACURA; HOOMAN ACURA,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-35964, No. 17-35967. (9th Cir.).

Singh brought this suit as a putative class action in Washington
state superior court against AHFC and the Dealership Defendants.
AHFC removed the case to federal court under the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA). Singh moved to remand, but the district court
denied that motion. Singh then amended his complaint to assert a
federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).  After further
motion practice and discovery, the district court granted summary
judgment for the Dealership Defendants and AHFC and dismissed
Singh's claims.

On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment against
Singh on his breach of contract claim because Singh could not show
that AHFC violated any financing terms of the RISC, the only
contract between AHFC and Singh. The district court granted summary
judgment for AHFC on Singh's WCPA claim because AHFC was not
directly involved in the allegedly deceptive practice of displaying
the Dealer Addendum on vehicles. Finally, the district court noted
that Singh had abandoned his TILA claim against AHFC, although he
reserved the right to seek reinstatement.

On appeal, Singh contends that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal and, for that
reason, erred when it denied his motion to remand. Singh also
contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
against him. Finally, Singh contends that the district court did
not permit him sufficient discovery before granting summary
judgment.

The Court review de novo whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment to the Dealership Defendants and AHFC.
The Court reviews the district court's denial of Singh's request
for a continuance of summary judgment pending further discovery for
an abuse of discretion.

The first question is whether Singh preserved his objection to
removal.  

The issue on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed,
but whether the federal district court would have had original
jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in federal court at the
time of final judgment.  

The second question is whether this case had a jurisdictional
defect at the time of removal and, if so, whether that defect was
cured by proper means before the entry of final judgment.

AHFC removed this action from state court under CAFA.  Under CAFA,
a district court has original jurisdiction over a class action
where: (1) there are one-hundred or more putative class members (2)
at least one class member is a citizen of a state different from
the state of any defendant and (3) the aggregated amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of costs and interest.  

CAFA contains several exceptions to its grant of removal
jurisdiction. Relevant here is the so-called home state exception,
which provides that a district court shall decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a class in which two-thirds or more of the
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed.

The parties contest only whether AHFC is a primary defendant, which
would render the home state exception inapplicable; they otherwise
agree that the other requirements are satisfied.

Contrary to the district court's determination, the Court holds
that the foregoing allegations show that the Dealership Defendants
are the primary defendants and AHFC is a secondary defendant.

The Dealership Defendants all of whom are allegedly controlled in
some manner by Hooman Bodaghi are allegedly responsible for the
direct harm to consumers: improperly charging for vehicle add-ons.
AHFC's alleged liability stems from permitting this conduct and
benefitting from it in the form of additional interest payments.

In other words, AHFC's liability depends on a threshold finding
that the Dealership Defendants acted unlawfully, demonstrating that
AHFC is a secondary defendant. Moreover, it appears that the
Dealership Defendants have more exposure to the class because the
alleged benefit to AHFC is interest charged on improper add-ons,
whereas the alleged benefit to the Dealership Defendants is the
full cost of the add-ons.  

In holding that AHFC is a primary defendant, the district court
explained in part that AHFC would be directly liable to the class
for all claims because each claim in the complaint was asserted
against Defendants, without differentiating between them. It was
not enough, however, for the district court to look only at what
claims were asserted against which defendants. Although doing so
can help determine whether a defendant is directly or secondarily
liable to the class and the relative exposure among defendants, a
mechanical review of how many claims are asserted against a
defendant is inappropriate.

Here, although Singh asserts each cause of action against all
defendants, Singh's description of the parties shows that AHFC
benefits from the alleged misconduct of the Dealership Defendants
and is, in that sense, a secondary defendant.

The district court also found that AHFC was a primary defendant
because it has the most resources by which to satisfy a potential
judgment. The Court disagrees that AHFC's ability to satisfy a
potential judgment was a relevant consideration here. Nothing in
the record indicates that the Dealership Defendants would be unable
to satisfy any judgment rendered against them.

Because the Dealership Defendants, the primary defendants, and
two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate are citizens of Washington State, the home state
exception applies.  

The district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
this action at the time of removal.

The Court inquiry into jurisdiction is not at an end, however.
After the district court denied Singh's motion to remand, Singh
voluntarily amended his complaint to assert a federal TILA claim.

The Court have previously held that when a plaintiff voluntarily
amends his or her complaint after removal to assert a federal
claim, that amendment cures any jurisdictional defect and
establishes federal subject-matter jurisdiction.  

The previous holdings are dispositive here. By voluntarily amending
his complaint to assert a federal claim, Singh established federal
subject-matter jurisdiction and cured any jurisdictional defect
that existed at the time of removal.

Singh contends that it does not matter that he amended his
complaint to assert a TILA claim because he abandoned his TILA
claim before summary judgment. Singh misconstrues the record. Even
if Singh abandoned his TILA claim against AHFC, Singh did not
abandon his TILA claim against the Dealership Defendants. The
district court expressly ruled on that claim in its
summary-judgment decision. The district court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 to adjudicate Singh's TILA claim
against the Dealership Defendants, and it had supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a) to adjudicate Singh's
claims against AHFC.  

The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this
case at the time of removal. But the district court had
jurisdiction at the time of final judgment because Singh asserted a
TILA claim after removal. Because the district court resolved all
of Singh's claims on the merits, considerations of finality,
efficiency, and economy counsel against dismissing this case now
and remanding it to Washington state court. The Court therefore
proceed to the merits of Singh's appeal.

On the merits, Singh contends that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment to the Dealership Defendants and AHFC on
his breach of contract and WCPA claims. The Court must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Singh,
any genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether the district
court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy82alal from Leagle.com.

Robert Joseph Gaudet Jr. 7101 N. Mesa, No. 205, El Paso, TX 79912
(argued), Karin Gaudet-Asmus -gaudetasmus@outlook.com -- Seattle,
Washington; Hardeep S. Rekhi and Gregory Wolk, 529 Warren Ave N,
Suite 201, Seattle, WA, 98109; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sean Ashley Commons -- scommons@sidley.com -- (argued), Sidley
Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California; Aaron Paul Riensche, 1601 5th
Ave, Seattle, WA 98101 (argued) and Jeffrey D. Dunbar, 1601 Fifth
Avenue Suite 2100, Seattle, WA, 98101; Bruce Hamlin --
hamlinb@lanepowell.com --  Lane Powell PC, Seattle, Washington;
Michael C. Andolina -- MANDOLINA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP,
Chicago, Illinois; for Defendant-Appellee.


AMERICOLLECT INC: Salvatore Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Americollect, Inc.
The case is styled as Michelle Salvatore On behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Americollect, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00447 (W.D. Wis., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Americollect, Inc. provides debt collection services to healthcare
industry. The company offers hospital collection, radiology
collection, and medical collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Heidi N. Miller, Esq.
     HNM Law, LLC
     PO Box 26273
     Wauwatosa, WI 53226
     Phone: (414) 306-7000
     Email: heidi@hnm-law.com

          - and -

     Stacy Michelle Bardo, Esq.
     Bardo Law, P.C.
     22 West Washington Street, Suite 1500
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Phone: (312) 219-6980
     Fax: (312) 219-6981
     Email: stacy@bardolawpc.com

          - and -

     Zeshan Usman, Esq.
     Usman Law Firm, LLC
     525 Junction Rd., Ste. 8520n
     Madison, WI 53717
     Phone: (608) 829-1112
     Fax: (888) 876-2636
     Email: Z@UsmanLaw.com


AN JU HOME: Yang Files FLSA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against An Ju Home, Inc. The
case is styled as Yongfu Yang, Deliang Fu, Xiaojiang Zuo, Hechao
Chen, Aixiang Liu, Kezheng Zuo, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. An Ju Home, Inc. doing business
as: An Ju Home, Structure Enterprise, Inc. doing business as:
Structure Enterprise, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03236 (E.D.
N.Y., May 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

An Ju Home, Inc. offers home services in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


APPLE INC: Awaits Ruling in iPhone Apps Monopoly Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jacqueline Thomsen, writing for The Hill, reports that Apple has
found itself in the crosshairs of the high court as the justices
debate whether to allow a class-action lawsuit alleging the tech
giant has a monopoly over iPhone apps to move forward.

A group of consumers want to sue the company, claiming that app
developers are artificially inflating the price for apps because
Apple receives 30 percent of each sale made through the App Store.

The court's liberal minority signaled that it backed the consumers'
right to sue the tech giant. But the stance of the conservative
majority was less clear, meaning the court could again be divided
on one of the biggest cases of the term.

Attorneys for Apple and the U.S. government argued that the
developers are the ones responsible for any price increases. But
some of the justices, including Kavanaugh, questioned that
argument.

"How do we know the 30 percent charge is not affecting the price?"
he asked.

If the justices rule in favor of the consumers, it will be a major
blow for Apple. The company is citing a 1977 Supreme Court ruling
that found damages in antitrust battles should only go to those
immediately suffering because of the anticompetitive behavior.

And the company argues that only app developers can sue over any
alleged monopoly, not any app purchasers. [GN]


APPLE INC: Class Action Over App Store Monopoly Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
UPI reports that the U.S. Supreme Court returned to the bench on
May 13 to weigh a slate of cases, including the government's push
to add a question about citizenship to the 2020 Census.

In one of its first rulings of the day, justices allowed a
class-action suit against Apple to move forward in a 5-4 decision.
The suit accuses the tech giant of having a monopoly on apps.
Consumer groups want to bring an antitrust suit against Apple for
imposing a 30 percent fee on purchases made in the app store.

The high court cited the Illinois Brick precedent, in which
indirect purchasers two or more steps removed from the original
antitrust violator cannot sue.

"The plaintiffs purchased apps directly from Apple and therefore
are direct purchasers under Illinois Brick," Justice Brett Kavanagh
wrote in his opinion. "At this early pleadings stage of the
litigation, we do not assess the merits of the plaintiffs'
antitrust claims against Apple, nor do we consider any other
defenses Apple might have. We merely hold that the Illinois Brick
direct-purchaser rule does not bar these plaintiffs from suing
Apple under the antitrust laws."

Kavanaugh was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.

Apple has cited a precedent from 1977 that states damages in
antitrust cases only go to people who were actually harmed by
anti-competitive behavior. Apple argues that app developers should
be the only ones who can sue, not consumers. [GN]


ART VAN: White Suit Moved to Northern District of Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
The case, Whitney White, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Art Van Furniture, LLC, a
Pennsylvania corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 19-CH-04671, was
removed fromn the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on May 20, 2019. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-03378 to the proceeding. The suit demands
$9,999,000. The case is  assigned to the Hon. Robert M. Dow, Jr.

Art Van Furniture Inc. is an American furniture retail store chain.
Founded in 1959, the company is headquartered in Warren, Michigan
in Metro Detroit.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F Stephan, Esq.
          Catherine T Mitchell, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  cmitchell@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com

Attorneys for the Art Van Furniture, LLC:

          David S. Almeida, Esq.
          Suzanne Marie Alton de Eraso, Esq.
          BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN & ARONOFF LLP
          333 W. Wacker Dr., Suite 1900
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 212-4954
          E-mail: dalmeida@beneschlaw.com
                  saltondeeraso@beneschlaw.com

AUSTRALIA: NT Gov't Settles Race Discrimination Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Jacqueline Breen and Alexia Attwood, writing for ABC, report that
the Northern Territory Government has settled a class action
brought on behalf of young Aboriginal detainees, who lawyers said
were still being mistreated in the Territory's youth prisons
despite the royal commission.

But it is not clear what -- if anything -- the Government has
conceded or committed to do, with both sides agreeing to keep the
settlement confidential.

The case, filed last August by the Northern Territory Legal Aid
Commission, alleged young people were being subjected to excessive
lockdowns in their cells without adequate access to fresh air,
sunlight, exercise or education.

It also raised concerns about the poor handling of young people who
were mentally unwell or at risk of self-harm.

Last year the Government rejected the lawyers' claim that the
detainees' treatment amounted to a breach of the Racial
Discrimination Act.

Chief Minister Michael Gunner said the lawsuit came "five years too
late, against the wrong government".

But papers filed in the Federal Court show that "the parties have
agreed on terms" to resolve the matter, pending the approval of a
judge.

A key document filed with that notice cannot be inspected by anyone
without the court's leave.

Attorney-General Natasha Fyles would not say whether the agreement
was an admission of any fault.

"These are matters that are before the courts, we will allow [them]
to run their course," she said.

Legal Aid declined to comment beyond a short statement confirming
agreement had been reached and approval was pending.

"Legal Aid continues to visit children in detention and advocate
for their wellbeing and to ensure they have positive opportunities
to turn their lives around," the statement from director Susan Cox
said.

"We will provide more information about the outcome of legal
proceedings at the appropriate time."   

Lawsuit sought to improve conditions or shut centres

The lawsuit did not make a claim for any financial compensation for
the young people involved in the matter.

Instead the claimants asked the court to direct the Government to
improve conditions inside the centres, or force them to be shut
down.

They also wanted declarations from the court that the detainees'
mistreatment had been unlawful.

The agreement was reached in mid-April, shortly after the
Government passed laws that retrospectively eased restrictions on
the use of force and isolation in the detention centres.

Two days after the confidential document was signed, the Territory
Families department published a three-page Statement of Commitments
setting out minimum standards for some of their work in the
facilities.

It includes requirements around minimum hours of recreational and
therapeutic activities, the content of annual refresher training
for youth justice officers and coordination with Aboriginal health
and legal groups. [GN]


AVALON HEALTH: Removes Williamson FCRA Suit to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants removed on May 9, 2019, the class action lawsuit
captioned Lawrence J. Williamson, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated v. Avalon Health Care, Inc. et al., Case
No. RG19013715, from the Alameda County Superior Court of
California to the U.S. District Court for the California Northern
District (San Francisco).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-02507 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.[BN]

Defendants Avalon Health Care, Inc., a Utah corporation; Berryman
Health, Inc., a California corporation; and Avalon Health Care
Management of California, L.L.C., a California limited liability
company, are represented by:

          Warren F. Hodges, Esq.
          KENNADAY LEAVITT OWENSBY PC
          621 Capitol Mall, 25th Floor
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: (916) 732-3067
          Facsimile: (916) 732-3061
          E-mail: whodges@kennadayleavitt.com


BEDFORD, OH: Ordered to Pay $41K in Home Inspection Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge ordered the city of Bedford to pay nearly $41,000
for a class-action lawsuit residents filed over home inspection
laws that the judge ruled allowed the city to perform warrantless
searches. Cleveland.com's Eric Heisig says the order is designed to
reimburse 563 people for 1,208 inspections that were unlawful.
[GN]


BERGER EXCAVATING: Court Flips Public Duty Rule Dismissal in Tzakis
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division,
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part District
Court's judgment granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned DENNIS TZAKIS, ZENON GIL, CATHY PONCE, ZAIA GILIANA,
JULIA CABRALES, and JUAN SOLIS, on Behalf of Themselves and All
Other Persons Similarly Situated, a Proposed Class Action,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BERGER EXCAVATING CONTRACTORS, INC.;
ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION d/b/a Advocate Lutheran
General Hospital; COOK COUNTY; GEWALT HAMILTON ASSOCIATES, INC.;
THE VILLAGE OF GLENVIEW; MAINE TOWNSHIP; THE METROPOLITAN WATER
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO; THE VILLAGE OF NILES; and
THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, Defendants, (The Metropolitan Water
Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, The City of Park Ridge,
and Maine Township, Defendants-Appellees). No. 1-17-0859. (Ill.
App. Ct.).

The Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's judgment dismissing the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs, who reside in Maine Township, allege that
defendant, Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation, which
operates a hospital adjacent to the plaintiffs' neighborhood,
constructed its hospital in such a way that the hospital's storm
water drainage system discharged onto the plaintiffs' properties
and caused flooding. The Plaintiffs further allege that the local
public entities, namely, the Village of Glenview (Glenview), Maine
Township, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater
Chicago (District), the Village of Niles (Niles), and the City of
Park Ridge (Park Ridge), breached a variety of duties owed to the
homeowners with respect to the drainage system.

The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to section 2-615
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
2014)), finding that the public duty rule applied.

However, in 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the public
duty rule in Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District, 2016
IL 117952, and the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider. Six months later, however, the trial court vacated its
order and reinstated the dismissal.

The Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the supreme court's
decision should be applied retroactively and the public duty rule
is not available to defendants, and further arguing that no other
basis existed for dismissing their complaint.

Public Duty Rule

In the case at bar, the trial court's dismissal was based on its
finding that the defendants owed no duties to plaintiffs due to the
public duty rule. Accordingly, it is helpful to begin with an
overview of the public duty rule and the impact of the supreme
court's 2016 decision in Coleman. The common law public duty rule
provides that local governmental entities do not owe any duty to
individual members of the general public to provide adequate
governmental services, such as police and fire protection.

The long-standing public duty rule is grounded in the principle
that the duty of the governmental entity to preserve the well-being
of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to
specific members of the community. An exception to this rule is the
special duty exception, where the local governmental entity owes a
special duty of care to a particular individual that is different
from the duty it owes to the general public.  

In the case at bar, the Coleman court did not expressly address
whether its decision would be prospective only. Plaintiffs claim
that, because the Coleman dissent made reference to a case in which
the court considered the retroactive application of a statutory
amendment, the fact that the Coleman court did not specifically
address the prospective application of the new law buttresses the
conclusion that the Coleman Court intentionally chose not to give
prospective only effect.

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.

First, the case was one of nine cases cited in a string cite to
support the dissenting justice's argument that the supreme court
routinely engaged in an even if approach to decision-making by
deciding dispositive issues first in the interests of judicial
expediency. Additionally, the case cited by the dissent concerned
the retroactive effect of a statute, not a court decision, which is
subject to an entirely different analysis.   

Thus, the Court cannot find that the mere use of the words
prospectively and retroactively in a parenthetical in this string
cite in any way indicates that certainly bells went off in the
minds of the seven justices as to whether prospective only
application of Coleman should be given. The court was silent on the
issue. All that this silence indicates is that the presumption of
retroactivity has not been overcome by an express statement by the
court.

Thus, the Court must consider whether the factors set forth in
Aleckson lead us to give the law announced in Coleman retroactive
effect. As noted, the first factor is whether the decision
established a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past
precedent on which litigants have relied or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.
Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 92.

The Court agrees with defendants that Coleman clearly established a
new principle of law. The court was explicit in the fact that it
was doing so and was overruling past precedent; the lead opinion
contains a discussion of stare decisis and the dissent also focuses
its analysis on that issue. There is no way to read Coleman without
concluding that the supreme court was making new law by overturning
long-standing precedent.

The Plaintiffs argue that Coleman did not announce a new rule
because the Supreme Court had never previously applied the public
duty rule to water-damage litigation and because the supreme court
in Coleman described the jurisprudence concerning the rule to be
muddled and inconsistent, meaning that the past precedent was not
clear.

The Court does not find these arguments persuasive.

First, the question the Court must answer is not whether Coleman
established a new principle of law in the specific context of
water-damage litigation; the question is whether Coleman
established a new principle of law, period. As noted, the Coleman
court clearly and expressly overruled what it termed a
long-standing common-law rule.

Additionally, the fact that the supreme court has not spoken on a
particular issue does not mean that litigants are acting in a
vacuum; appellate court and trial court decisions can provide
guidance as to the current state of the law even in the absence of
a supreme court ruling on a particular factual scenario.

The Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' argument that past
precedent was not clear because the primary opinion in Coleman
referred to the jurisprudence concerning the public duty rule as
muddled and inconsistent. First, the Court notes that the opinion
in which this language appears was joined by only one justice in
addition to the author, meaning that it does not carry the weight
of a majority or even a plurality opinion. Additionally, the reason
the opinion characterized the jurisprudence in that way was based
on the interaction between the public duty rule and statutory
immunities. The opinion did not indicate that the existence of the
public duty rule itself was not clear.

Accordingly, the Court finds that, under the first factor, the
Coleman court established a new principle of law by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants have relied.10
The second factor the Court must consider is whether, given the
purpose and history of the new rule, its operation will be retarded
or promoted by prospective application.

By contrast, the specially concurring opinion reasoned that the
public duty rule should be abolished because it was predicated on
the same basis as the concepts underlying local governmental
immunity and, when the constitution was amended to abolish all
forms of nonstatutory governmental immunity, the judiciary's power
to apply the public duty doctrine ceased to exist as a means of
assessing municipal tort liability.

In the case at bar, defendants argue that, under the facts of the
instant case, a prospective application of the new law set forth in
Coleman would not frustrate the concerns set forth by the Coleman
court.  

The state's supreme court in Aleckson found that where the court
below noted that it was applying the new law prospectively to the
parties because the facts of the instant case and its timing vis a
vis the case establishing the new law are so unique that the
nonretroactive application was expressly limited to the facts of
the case and could not have retarded the future operation of the
new case. Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 93.  

The Defendants further argue that a nonretroactive application of
Coleman in the instant case would also have limited impact due to
the statute of limitations. Under the Tort Immunity Act, any civil
action against a local governmental entity must be commenced within
one year from the date that the cause of action accrued.

However, the Court must also note the existence of Salvi, in which
the Second District applied the new law set forth in Coleman
retroactively. Salvi, 2016 IL App (2d) 150249, ¶ 37. There, the
flooding at issue occurred in 2013, the plaintiff's amended
complaint was filed in 2014 and the defendant village raised the
issue of the public duty rule in a motion to dismiss.

Thus, as in the case at bar, the flooding, the lawsuit, and the
motion to dismiss based on the public duty rule all predated
Coleman. Despite these facts, the Salvi court applied the new law
retroactively.  

The final factor to be considered is whether substantial
inequitable results would be produced if the former decision is
applied retroactively.

In the case at bar, at the time of the flooding, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, and at the time of dismissal of the
amended fifth amended complaint, defendants were operating in a
legal universe that included the availability of the public duty
rule and governed their actions accordingly. Then, the supreme
court overruled long-standing precedent which it had expressly
reaffirmed as recently as 1998 and abolished that rule, shifting
the legal ground on which defendants stood. Local government
officials, like other people, are entitled to rely on existing law
when `making decisions and in shaping their conduct. By applying
the new law retroactively, defendants and their taxpayers would be
forced to incur additional unexpected expenses in litigating this
case, which could prove substantial, as it has been pending for 10
years to date and has yet to proceed beyond the pleading stage.

In considering the three factors, there is no clear-cut answer on
either side. The only clear answer is with respect to the first
factor: Coleman made new law by abolishing the public duty rule.
With respect to the second factor, prospective application of the
new rule would have minimal impact on the rule's future
applicability, as the unique facts of the instant case and the Tort
Immunity Act's statute of limitations necessarily limit the scope
of our holding.  

When a court issues an opinion, its decision is presumed to apply
both retroactively and prospectively, unless that presumption is
overcome by either an express statement by the court or through the
consideration of the factors set forth in Aleckson.  

Here, there is no express statement by the Supreme Court and the
Aleckson factors do not tilt in any one direction. Consequently, we
cannot find that the presumption of retroactivity has been
overcome, and therefore, the new law set forth in Coleman should
have been applied retroactively to the instant case. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in limiting the new law set forth in Coleman
to apply only prospectively to the instant case, and the Court must
reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint based
on the public duty rule.

Tort Immunity Act Counts

With respect to the Tort Immunity Act, plaintiffs set forth causes
of action for statutory duties pursuant to sections 3-102(a) and
3-103 of the Tort Immunity Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants breached a duty to maintain their property in a
reasonably safe condition pursuant to section 3-102(a) and that
defendants breached their duty to correct known unsafe conditions
relating to the design of the Prairie Creek Stormwater System
pursuant to section 3-103 by not compelling Advocate to redesign
its drainage plans.

Section 3-102(a)

Section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act provides: Except as
otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a
reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary
care of people whom the entity intended and permitted to use the
property in a manner in which and at such times as it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be
liable for injury unless it is proven that it has actual or
constructive notice of the existence of such a condition that is
not reasonably safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an injury
to have taken measures to remedy or protect against such
condition.

The Defendants are correct that the Tort Immunity Act does not
create any new duties. The state supreme court has made clear that
the Tort Immunity Act grants only immunities and defenses; it does
not create duties. Instead, the Tort Immunity Act merely codifies
those duties existing at common law, to which the subsequently
delineated immunities apply.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs have styled these counts as arising
under a statutory duty to maintain property, which suggests that
the basis of the duty is the statute, not the common law. It is on
this basis that defendants argue that the counts should be
dismissed. However, our supreme court has emphasized that `the
character of the pleading should be determined from its content,
not its label. Thus, the title of the count does not control over
the substance of its claim.  

Here, the substance of these counts of the complaint can be
interpreted as alleging negligence based on a breach of defendants'
common-law duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe
condition.

However, plaintiffs have foreclosed this interpretation by making
it clear in their reply brief that they are asserting a separate,
independent, stand-alone cause-of-action imposing a duty owing to
individual citizens for [a local public entity] to maintain its
property. This is simply not the case. Even Wagner v. City of
Chicago, 166 Ill.2d 144, 150 (1995), a case relied on by
plaintiffs, makes this clear: The limitation on the scope of the
duty in section 3-102(a) is in keeping with the scope of that duty
as it existed at common law. The Tort Immunity Act creates no new
duties but merely codifies those existing at common law.  At common
law, a municipality had a duty to maintain its property in a safe
condition.

The statutory duty is the common-law duty, simply published in
statutory form. Plaintiffs' insistence otherwise requires us to
affirm the trial court's dismissal of these counts.

Section 3-103

Similarly, counts XXXVII (against the District), LVIII (against
Park Ridge), and LXXV (against Maine Township) were for duty to
remedy a dangerous plan and allege that section 3-103 of the Tort
Immunity Act set forth a duty for a local public entity to correct
known unsafe conditions related to the design and/or engineering of
an approved plan, which defendants did not do.

Again, as with section 3-102(a), section 3-103(a) codifies the
common-law duty of care in the making of public improvements. At
common law, a municipality had a duty to maintain its property in a
safe condition, but this duty did not extend to creating or
erecting public improvements. Once a public improvement was
actually constructed, however, the municipality has a duty to
maintain it in a reasonably safe condition.  

In the case at bar, again, while the substance of these counts
could be interpreted as alleging negligence based on a breach of
defendants' common-law duty in the making of public improvements,
plaintiffs have foreclosed this interpretation in their reply brief
by making clear that they are alleging that section 3-103(a)
declares a separate and independent duty and that this statutory
duty is a separate and independent, individual duty from the common
law.

Accordingly, the Court must affirm the trial court's dismissal of
these counts.

Common Law Counts

Next, the plaintiffs alleged several counts based on common law
negligence.

Dominant Estate Overburdening

Counts XXV (against the District), XLV (against Park Ridge), and
LXIV (against Maine Township) were for negligence: dominant estate
overburdening stormwater and alleged that defendants knew or should
have known of the foreseeable harm of invasive flooding into
plaintiffs' neighborhood given the history of flooding and that
defendants owed nondelegable duties to properly manage the storm
water so as to prevent harm to plaintiffs from excess storm water
overburdening the drainage system.  

Generally, a landowner owes no duty to adjoining landowners for
dangerous natural conditions present on the land, but may owe a
duty if the condition is artificial or where a natural condition is
aggravated by the owner's use of the area. Defendants claim that,
because they were not adjacent landowners, these counts should be
dismissed. The Court agrees.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants are
landowners, much less landowners adjacent to plaintiffs' property.
Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants own the sewers and the
drains, but have not alleged that defendants own the real property
under which those sewers and drains run.  

In the absence of that legal framework, the Court finda no basis
for applying adjacent property owners liability to defendants;
plaintiffs have cited no authority applying such a duty without
first establishing that the defendant was actually a landowner.
Accordingly, the Court must affirm the dismissal of these counts.

Negligent Nuisance

Counts XXXI (against the District), LII (against Park Ridge), and
LXIX (against Maine Township) were for negligent nuisance and
alleged that defendants negligently caused an accumulation of water
from the drainage system to invade and interfere with plaintiffs'
property. A private nuisance is a substantial invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The invasion
must be: substantial, either intentional or negligent, and
unreasonable.

In the case at bar, the complaint alleges that defendants
negligently permitted an accumulation of storm water runoff in
their drainage and sewage systems due to their management of the
systems, which caused flood water to invade and interfere with
plaintiffs' property on September 13, 2008.

The complaint further alleges that such interference was
substantial and unreasonable. These allegations are sufficient to
state a cause of action for negligent nuisance so as to withstand
dismissal pursuant to section 2-615.

Negligent Trespass

Counts XXXII (against the District), LIII (against Park Ridge), and
LXX (against Maine Township) were for negligent trespass and
alleged that, due to defendants' failure to properly manage the
storm water systems, water invaded plaintiffs' property.

A trespass is an invasion in the exclusive possession and physical
condition of real property.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs are not alleging intentional
trespass as they did against Advocate.14 Thus, they are not
required to allege the high degree of certainty required by an
intentional trespass claim. However, the allegations against
Advocate, which we found satisfied such a high bar, also apply in
large part to defendants, as they are alleged to have approved all
of Advocate's plans. Thus, our prior decision is certainly
instructive to the analysis in the instant appeal. In the case at
bar, plaintiffs have alleged that there was an invasion in their
properties due to the excess storm water runoff. Plaintiffs have
further alleged that this invasion was caused by defendants'
negligent design and operation of their drainage and sewer systems.
These allegations adequately set forth causes of action for
negligent trespass against defendants so as to withstand a section
2-615 motion to dismiss.

Section 2-619 Motions to Dismiss

As explained above, we have determined that the counts concerning
negligent nuisance, negligent trespass, and the takings clause (1)
should not have been barred by the public duty rule and (2) are
sufficient to withstand dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code.
However, these counts were also subject to motions to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. Thus, we must consider
whether they should have been dismissed under that section in order
to determine whether there remains an alternate basis for affirming
the trial court's judgment.

On appeal, defendants claim that plaintiffs' causes of action
against them should have been dismissed pursuant to several
sections of the Tort Immunity Act. The Tort Immunity Act was
enacted in 1965 in response to the supreme court's abolition of
sovereign immunity. It protects local public entities and their
employees from liability arising from government operations. The
purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is to prevent the dissipation of
public funds on damage awards in tort cases. Because the immunities
afforded to governmental entities operate as an affirmative
defense, those entities bear the burden of properly raising and
proving their immunity under the Tort Immunity Act. It is only when
the governmental entities have met this burden that a plaintiff's
right to recovery is barred.

Sections 2-109 and 2-201

Defendants first rely on sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Tort
Immunity Act. Section 2-109 provides:

A local public entity is not liable for any injury resulting from
an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not
liable.  

In the case at bar, plaintiffs have alleged a number of actions and
omissions that they claim subject defendants to liability. While
defendants are undoubtedly correct that at least some of these
actions would fall under the purview of section 2-201 immunity, the
Court cannot agree with their position that they are wholly immune
from liability such that dismissal is warranted.

For instance, one of the allegations against defendants is that the
drainage and sewer systems represented a dangerous condition and
that defendants failed to correct that condition by, inter alia,
not pumping down the retention basins prior to the September 2008
storm. Our supreme court has recognized that decisions involving
repairs to public property can be a discretionary matter subject to
immunity under section 2-201. However, a public entity claiming
immunity for an alleged failure to repair a defective condition
must present sufficient evidence that it made a conscious decision
not to perform the repair. The failure to do so is fatal to the
claim. Here, there has been no showing that it was a conscious
decision not to pump down the basins prior to the storm.

Accordingly, that decision would not be subject to section 2-201
immunity.

It is inappropriate to wholly dismiss the counts aimed at
defendants on the basis of that immunity and the cannot find that
section 2-201 immunity serves as an alternate basis for dismissal
of plaintiffs' complaint at this time.

Section 2-105

Defendants next claim that they are immune under section 2-105 of
the Tort Immunity Act, which provides:

A local public entity is not liable for injury caused by its
failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection, of any property, other than its own, to
determine whether the property complies with or violates any
enactment or contains or constitutes a hazard to health or safety.


In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that all three defendants own
and operate various portions of the drainage and sewer systems at
issue. The Court agrees with defendants that, under section 2-105,
each defendant is immune from liability for a failure to inspect
any property that is not determined to belong to that defendant.
However, at this point in the litigation, we must take the
allegations of the complaint as true and therefore must accept
plaintiffs' allegations that defendants own the property at issue.
Accordingly, section 2-105 does not provide an alternate basis for
dismissal of the complaint.

Section 2-104

Next, defendants Park Ridge and the District claim that they are
immune under section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 2-104
provides:

A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the
issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where the
entity or its employee is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied,
suspended or revoked.  

In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that these defendants should
be held liable for plaintiffs' flooding damage in part because they
approved Advocate's plans for its drainage system. The Court agrees
with defendants that, to the extent that plaintiffs claim that
their injury was caused by defendants' approval of Advocate's
plans, the plain language of section 2-104 immunizes defendants
from liability for such claims. However, such immunity is limited
to injuries caused by the approval itself where defendants' actual
actions or omissions are at issue, section 2-104 immunity would not
apply. Therefore, dismissal at this time is not warranted.

Section 3-110

Defendants Maine Township and Park Ridge claim that they are immune
from liability under section 3-110 of the Tort Immunity Act.
Section 3-110 provides:

Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for
any injury occurring on, in, or adjacent to any waterway, lake,
pond, river or stream not owned, supervised, maintained, operated,
managed or controlled by the local public entity.  

In the case at bar, these defendants argue that all injury resulted
from flooding that came from a waterway the Prairie Creek
Stormwater System and that plaintiffs did not allege facts
supporting their claim that Maine Township or Park Ridge owned,
supervised, maintained, operated, managed, or controlled any
component of that system. We do not find this argument persuasive.


The Prairie Creek Stormwater System as a whole would not be
considered a waterway for purposes of section 3-110. As defined in
the complaint, the Prairie Creek Stormwater System is a system of
public improvements consisting of (1) open drains, (2) enclosed
pipes, (3) retention basins, and (4) tributary storm water sewers
that run under the streets. In the case at bar, then, section 3-110
does not serve as an alternate basis for dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint.

The trial court erred in applying Coleman prospectively and,
accordingly, erroneously granted defendants' section 2-615 motion
to dismiss on the basis of the public duty rule. However, the
counts based on violations of the Tort Immunity Act and for
adjacent property owner liability were nevertheless properly
dismissed under section 2-615 because plaintiffs failed to state
causes of action with respect to each of those counts. The counts
based on negligent nuisance, negligent trespass, and the takings
clause were sufficient to withstand dismissal under section 2-615,
and most of defendants' claims of immunity under the Tort Immunity
Act do not provide an alternate basis for dismissal of those counts
under section 2-619. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with respect to defendants Park
Ridge, Maine Township, and the District on those counts.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

A full-text copy of the Ill. App.'s May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyhfgnzf from Leagle.com.


BITMAIN: Class Action in the Works in Hong Kong
-----------------------------------------------
Aakash Athawasya, writing for AMB Crypto, reports that Jihan Wu,
the former CEO of Bitcoin [BTC] mining equipment manufacturer
Bitmain and massive Bitcoin Cash [BCH] proponent has decided to
call it quits with the crypto-camps, opting to make his way into
the institutional fray. In a stark turn of events, Wu has
reportedly established a FinTech start-up Matrix that will veer
away from the retail space.

BTCKING555, a popular figure within the online cryptocurrency
community tweeted that they received a "pitch deck" from an
"insider" for the aforementioned start-up. The tweet detailed that
Matrix, its touted name, would cater specifically to institutions;
this follows Wu's ousting from Bitmain's upper echelons, which
occurred earlier this year.

Jihan Wu, the former CEO of Bitcoin [BTC] mining equipment
manufacturer Bitmain and massive Bitcoin Cash [BCH] proponent has
decided to call it quits with the crypto-camps, opting to make his
way into the institutional fray. In a stark turn of events, Wu has
reportedly established a FinTech start-up Matrix that will veer
away from the retail space.

BTCKING555, a popular figure within the online cryptocurrency
community tweeted that they received a "pitch deck" from an
"insider" for the aforementioned start-up. The tweet detailed that
Matrix, its touted name, would cater specifically to institutions;
this follows Wu's ousting from Bitmain's upper echelons, which
occurred earlier this year.

The latter half of BTCKING555's tweet references another one of the
Twitter handle's accusations against Bitmain. Back in March 2019,
the handle stated that Wu "duped" the mining giant's "Asian
investors" amounting to "$12-$14 bn" on the basis of a "promise of
IPO".

BTCKING555 added that this warning was mentioned earlier in August
2018, with the handle pleading with investors not to pledge their
funds with Bitmain. Citing unconfirmed sources, the handle also
added that a "class action" was "in works in Hong Kong".

In light of Wu backing Bitcoin Cash and Roger Ver, the CEO of
Bitcoin.com and ardent BCH proponent, BTCKING555 finds it curious
that BCH was not mentioned in "the deck".

This follows the January exodus of Jihan Wu from the position of
CEO of Bitmain following his siding with Bitcoin Cash, which proved
to be fatal for the company. When the BCH hardfork ensued in
November 2018, the poor performance led to Wu being demoted from
director to supervisor with further speculation that Wu and Ketuan
Zhan, another co-founder would be removed in December 2018.

Jihan Wu's Matrix news follows the failed prospects of the Bitmain
IPO by the hands of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). Bitmain's
IPO with HKEx surpassed its six-month expiration date in
late-March, based on the exchange's listing rules citing lack of
confirmed reports of a Committee hearing. [GN]


BOB EVANS: Former Workers File FLSA Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Conor Morris, writing for The Athens News, reports that a
class-action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of several former
employees at the Bob Evans restaurants in Athens and Parkersburg,
West Virginia, alleging that the restaurant chain has violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act and other state and federal laws that
concern wages.

Plaintiffs Regina Jensen and Rebecca Bailey live in Athens County,
and plaintiff Vickie Rash lives in Wood County, West Virginia. The
Bob Evans restaurants in Ohio and West Virginia are the targets of
the lawsuit. All of these employees worked at these restaurants for
more than 20 years, the suit states.

The defendant in this case, Bob Evans Farms, LLC, has not yet filed
a response to this suit.

The suit alleges, among other things, that once the plaintiffs and
other servers finished their shifts and were no longer taking
customers, managers told them to "get off my clock!" The lawsuit
alleges that the managers would then clock them out and require
them to finish their non-tipped work (tasks ranging from mopping
the floors to cleaning the kitchen to slicing ingredients to stock
up the salad case) without pay so that the managers could meet Bob
Evans' "labor targets," meaning those servers allegedly regularly
spent 15-30 minutes working without pay each shift.

"Defendants employed a uniform policy whereby plaintiffs and the
members of the classes… were required to regularly work for the
benefit of the defendants while their hours were not being properly
paid, classified or recorded…" the suit alleges. "Plaintiffs and
the members of the classes are entitled to minimum wage for all
hours worked and overtime for hours over 40 in a week. Defendants'
policy required plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals to
work while they were off the clock, and required them to perform
non-tipped work unrelated to their tipped occupation and excessive
amounts of non-tipped work even if related to their tipped
occupation, while being paid the sub-minimum tip credit wage
rate."

The suit was filed by Athens and Chicago-based lawyer Michael
Fradin, who previously filed a similar lawsuit against the company
that owns the Athens Buffalo Wild Wings. That case resulted in a
roughly $1 million settlement for 1,200 current and former
employees of that franchise.

The Bob Evans lawsuit also alleges that the employees were required
to pay from their tips for customer walkouts, which violates the
FLSA.

The suit additionally alleges that the employees were paid a
sub-minimum tip-credit wage of approximately $2.13 to $4.08 per
hour (in Ohio, the minimum tipped wage is $4.30, which amounts to
an average of around $8.55 per hour when tips are included).

All current and former servers who worked at Bob Evans restaurants
in West Virginia or Ohio in the last several years are eligible
members of the class-action lawsuit.

The suit seeks a large number of claims for relief, including a
judgment that the practices complained of in the lawsuit are
"unlawful," and an order enjoining the defendants from continuing
to do so. In addition, it seeks an award of the estimated unpaid
minimum wages and overtime owed to each staffer, in addition to
other compensation, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. [GN]


BORDER TRANSFER: Bid for Summary Judgment in DaSilva Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARCOS DASILVA and MATTEUS FERREIRA, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BORDER
TRANSFER OF MA, INC., and PATRICKMCCLUSKEY, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 16-11205-PBS (D. Mass.), Judge Patti B. Saris of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (i) denied
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment; (ii) allowed in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment on liability; and (iii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs'
motions to strike the testimony of Thomas N. Hubbard.

Plaintiffs DaSilva and Ferreira worked as delivery drivers for
Border Transfer.  They claim Border Transfer improperly treated
them as independent contractors when they were, in fact, employees
and that, as a result, Border Transfer unlawfully deducted certain
business expenses from their pay.

The Plaintiffs bring claims under the Massachusetts Wage Act
against Border Transfer and its former president Patrick McCluskey
on behalf of a certified class of individuals who entered into
contracts with Border Transfer to provide delivery services,
personally provided such services for Border Transfer for at least
forty hours per week, and were classified as independent
contractors.

The Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action complaint on June 23,
2016.  The original complaint named Border Transfer as the sole
defendant and contained claims for violation of the Massachusetts
Wage Act and unjust enrichment.

Border Transfer moved to dismiss both claims.  On Jan. 5, 2017, the
Court held that the Wage Act claim was not preempted by the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"), but
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim because the Wage Act provided
an adequate remedy at law.

The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 1, 2017, which
names Patrick McCluskey as an additional Defendant and contains a
single count for violation of the Wage Act.  In substance, the
Plaintiffs allege that their misclassification as independent
contractors resulted in unlawful deductions from their pay for
uniforms, property damage claims, performance bonds, and No
Billadjustments, as well as unlawful requirements that they pay for
workers' compensation and cargo insurance.

On Nov. 9, 2017, the Court certified the following class for
liability: all individuals who 1) entered into a Contract Carrier
Agreement (or similar agreement) directly or through a business
entity; 2) personally provided delivery services for Border
Transfer on a full-time basis in Massachusetts (at least 40 hours
per week); and 3) who were classified as independent contractors,
at any time since June 23, 2013.

On Oct. 8, 2018, the The Defendants move for summary judgment on
the class claims on the basis that, even if Border Transfer
misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, they are not
entitled to recover the various deductions they seek.  The
Defendants also move for summary judgment on the individual claims
of class member Humberto Chantre.  Finally, on Nov. 20, 2018, the
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on whether Border Transfer
misclassified the class members as independent contractors and
whether McCluskey is individually liable for Border Transfer's
alleged Wage Act violations.

Judge Saris denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
She allowed in part the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment on liability as to the class members subject to the first
CCA, and denied in part the motion as to the class members subject
to the second CCA and as to Defendant McCluskey's individual
liability.  Finally, the Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs'
motions to strike the testimony of Hubbard because resolution of
the motions for summary judgment does not depend on his expert
opinion.

Among other things, the Judge finds the Defendants cannot avoid
liability simply because the CCAs authorize the deductions.  It
also cannot avoid liability for a workplace injury by foisting the
cost of workers' compensation onto its drivers.  The Carmack
Amendment does not preempt the Plaintiffs' claim for property
damage deductions, which does not concern the loss of or damage to
shipped goods and would not increase liability for damaged goods.
As with the claims for property damage deductions, the only
connection between N/B deductions and Border Transfer's prices and
services is the pressure to raise prices that comes from any cost a
service provider bears. Such a tenuous connection does not suffice
to trigger FAAAA preemption.

The Judge also finds that McCluskey's role at Border Transfer is
unclear from the record.  Public filings from 2013, 2015, and 2016
and a declaration signed in October 2018 indicate he was a
director, but in a 2014 public filing and at his May 2017
deposition he stated he was the president.  McCluskey is
individually liable as president, regardless of his actual control
of the corporation.  For the periods in which he has been merely a
director, however, the Plaintiffs must show that he was an agent of
Border Transfer with significant management responsibilities.  The
Plaintiffs point out that McCluskey was involved in a market study
to determine how much to pay drivers, drafted the standard CCAs,
and reviews the company's financials and tracks its performance.
They do not differentiate, however, between his time as director
and president.  They also provide no evidence that McCluskey was an
agent of Border Transfer during the periods in which he served as a
director.  The Plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to summary
judgment on McCluskey's individual liability.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Memorandum and Order is
available at https://is.gd/A0Luvl from Leagle.com.

Marcos DaSilva, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Matteus Ferreira, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin Weber, Esq.
-- and Harold L. Lichten, Esq. -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- LICHTEN &
LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.

Border Transfer of MA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Judith A.
Leggett, Esq. -- judith@leggettlawfirm.com -- LEGGETT LAW FIRM,
LLC;  Adam C. Smedstad, Esq. -- asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- and
Andrew J. Butcher, Esq. -- abutcher@scopelitis.com -- SCOPELITIS,
GARVIN LIGHT HANSON & FEARY, PC, pro hac vice.

Patrick McCluskey, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Butcher,
Scopelitis, Garvin Light Hanson & Feary & Paul D. Root --
PROOT@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
PC.


CALIFORNIA: Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Flores Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSENDA FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
CALIFORNIA CITY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00703-DAD-JLT
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Defendants' (i) motion
to dismiss, (ii) motion for a more definite statement, and (iii)
motion to strike portions of the Plaintiffs' second amended
complaint ("SAC").

On Aug. 13, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and
strike portions of the Plaintiffs' first amended complaint ("FAC").
Judge Drozd referred that motion to the assigned magistrate judge
on Sept. 6, 2018.  On Sept. 25, 2018, the magistrate judge issued
findings and recommendations, recommending that the motion to
dismiss the FAC be granted and that the Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendant City be dismissed with leave to amend.  Finally, the
magistrate judge recommended that the Plaintiffs' request for
dismissal of their class claims be granted.  On Jan. 2, 2019, Judge
Drozd issued an order adopting these recommendations in full.

On Jan. 9, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their SAC.  The SAC alleges
facts and asserts claims that are substantially similar to those in
the FAC.  Like its predecessor, the SAC is drafted in a confusing
fashion, with factual allegations peppered throughout.  Despite
this lack of clarity, however, the gravamen of the SAC appears to
be that, on the night of July 18, 2017, police officers employed by
the City forcefully entered the Plaintiffs' home without a warrant
or authority, seized the Plaintiffs, arrested Plaintiff Ciriaco
Flores, searched the Plaintiffs' home, and employed excessive force
during the entire ordeal.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs assert the following
causes of action: (1) a trespass claim against Defendant Whiting,
the City, and Does 1-10; (2) an equal protection and due process
claim that appears to be asserted against Defendant Huizar and the
City; (3) a Section 1983 claim alleging violations of the
Plaintiffs' Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights that appears to be asserted against defendant Whiting and
Does 1-10; (4) another equal protection and due process claim
against all the individual Defendants; (5) a wrongful arrest claim
against all the Defendants; and (6) a false imprisonment claim
against all the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs seek declaratory
relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys' fees and costs, other costs, and any other relief the
Court deems proper.

On Feb. 15, 2019, the Defendants filed the pending motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' municipal liability claims, as well as a
motion for a more definite statement and a motion to strike
portions of the SAC.  On March 1, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to the pending motions, and on March 26, 2019, the
Defendants filed their reply thereto.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' municipal liability
claims, arguing that these claims fail to state a cognizable claim
for relief.  They also move for more definite statements with
regard to the Plaintiffs' second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of
action.  Finally, they move to strike other portions of the SAC.

The Plaintiffs' opposition, like the SAC, is difficult to decipher.
The filing is devoid of any headings, cites to cases that appear
to be inapplicable to the issues presented in the motion to
dismiss, and is generally difficult to follow.  Nevertheless, it
appears that the Plaintiffs object to the contention that their
municipal liability claims are not sufficiently pled and argue that
the claims for which the Defendants seek more definite statements
are sufficiently alleged.  The Plaintiffs do not object to the
Defendants' motion to strike.

Regarding the motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Monell claims,
Judge Drozd finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to identify an
unlawful City policy in their SAC, nor have they alleged facts
supporting the conclusion that the City maintains unconstitutional
customs or practices that caused the alleged constitutional
violations.  Simply describing allegedly problematic or illegal
behavior and appending the phrase "pursuant to a custom or policy"
to that description is not sufficient to plead municipal liability.


Given the absence of factual allegations in the SAC supporting the
Plaintiffs' claim of an unconstitutional policy, practice, or
custom which caused the constitutional violations alleged, and
because the Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs' FAC with
leave to amend to cure the same deficiency, the Judge concludes
that granting further leave to amend the Monell claims at this
juncture would be futile.  Accordingly, he will dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Monell claims against the City without further leave to
amend.  However, the Plaintiffs' Monell claims will also be
dismissed without prejudice, subject to their filing of a motion to
amend the complaint in the future if facts supporting these claims
are uncovered during the discovery phase of the litigation making
the filing of such a motion appropriate.

Next, as to the motion for a more definite statement, the Judge
will grant the Defendants' motion for a more definite statement.
While the SAC's second and third causes of action refer to various
defendants, the SAC fails to state who these causes of actions are
asserted against with sufficient specificity.  Neither the
Defendants nor the Court should have to parse through the
Plaintiffs' allegations and causes of action to determine which
cause of action is asserted against which named defendant.
Similarly, the Plaintiff's third cause of action is so indefinite
that the defendant[s] cannot ascertain the nature of the claims
being asserted.

The Judge will grant the Defendants' motion for a more definite
statement.  In addition to clearly indicating which the Defendants
each cause of action is asserted against, the Plaintiffs are
directed to consolidate their causes of action if they elect to
file a third amended complaint.  The Plaintiffs should not, for
example, allege three different causes of action alleging
violations of their equal protection and due process rights.
Moreover, in any third amended complaint, the Plaintiffs are
directed to divide their third cause of action, if it is realleged,
into independent causes of action, so that each constitutional
violation is plead separately and not collectively under the
umbrella of "42 U.S.C. Section 1983."  Finally, to the extent
possible, the Plaintiffs are directed to plead all the factual
allegations in one section of their third amended complaint.

Finally, regarding the Defendants' motion to strike, the Judge
finds that the allegations about Defendant Huizar in paragraph 111
of the SAC suffer from the same defects as the allegations
referring to him in the FAC.  The Plaintiffs have failed to offer
any explanation for how facts relating to Defendant Huizar
allegedly discharging a gun from a vehicle while off duty and drunk
are relevant to the alleged violations of their constitutional
rights asserted in their SAC.  Consequently, the allegations
related to Defendant Huizar's prior conviction as well as other
inflammatory material will be stricken from the SAC.  Any third
amended complaint that the Plaintiffs elect to file will not
include any allegations about defendant Huizar that are impertinent
or immaterial to this action.  The Plaintiffs failure to abide by
the Order will likely result in the imposition of sanctions.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Drozd granted the Defendants'
motions in full.  The Plaintiffs' municipal liability claims are
dismissed without leave to amend and without prejudice to the
filing of a future motion seeking further leave to amend if facts
supporting such claims are uncovered during the discovery phase of
the case.  

Their other claims are dismissed with leave to amend and any third
amended complaint the Plaintiffs may elect to file shall: (i)
clearly state which defendant(s) each cause of action is asserted
against; (ii) divide into separate causes of action the
constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983;
(iii) to the extent possible, set forth all factual allegations in
support of their claims in one section; (iv) not include any
reference to a class or class action; (v) not include any
allegations with respect to Defendant Huizar that are impertinent
and immaterial to the action; and (vi) be filed and served within
14 days of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/etrT7c from Leagle.com.

Rosenda Flores, Juan Flores, Jesus Flores, Rosanna Flores & Ciriaco
Flores, Plaintiffs, represented by Olaf Arthur Landsgaard --
Olaf@OlafLegal.com -- Law Offices Of Olaf Landsgaard.

City of California City, Defendant, represented by Daniel J. Dubin,
Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester, LLP & Eugene P. Ramirez --
epr@manningllp.com -- Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP.

Steven Whiting & Frank Garcia Huizar, Defendants, represented by
Eugene P. Ramirez, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Julie
M. Fleming, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP & Daniel J.
Dubin, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester, LLP.


CAPITAL ONE: Langer Seeks Initial Approval of Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled RANDY LANGER and JAMES LANGER
v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE, a division of CAPITAL ONE, N.A., Case
No. 2:16-cv-06130-HB (E.D. Pa.), seek an order:

     (i) preliminarily approving the Parties' proposed settlement
         in the action, as memorialized in the their Class Action
         Settlement and Release;

    (ii) conditionally approving two settlement classes, Class 1
         and Class 2;

   (iii) conditionally appointing the Plaintiffs as class
         representatives of the Classes;

    (iv) conditionally appointing Richard Shenkan, Esq., and
         Shenkan Injury Lawyers, LLC, as class counsel for the
         Classes;

     (v) appointing BrownGreer PLC as the third-party
         administrator of the Settlement;

    (vi) approving the form and method of the class notice
         informing Class members of the Settlement and their
         rights;

   (vii) setting the dates for a hearing as to final approval of
         the Settlement; and

  (viii) setting interim deadlines for the Class members to
         object to or request exclusion from the Classes.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard E. Shenkan, Esq.
          SHENKAN INJURY LAWYERS, LLC
          P.O. Box 7255
          New Castle, PA 16107
          Telephone: (800) 601-0808
          Facsimile: (888) 769-1774
          E-mail: rshenkan@shenkanlaw.com


CEDAR MANOR: Porter Files Request for Judicial Intervention
-----------------------------------------------------------
A request for judicial interference was filed on May 9, 2019, in
the case captioned Brian Porter and Dianne Harris, individually,
and on behalf of themselves and all the other shareholders of Cedar
Manor Mutual Housing Corporation, similarly situated and in the
right of Cedar Manor Mutual Housing Corporation, v. Richard Hogan,
Yvette Miller, Veronica Novy, Gwennell Thomas, and Cedar Manor
Mutual Housing Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 705498/2018, (N.Y.
Sup., April 11, 2019).

Brian Porter and Dianne Harris, own the shares and proprietary
leases appurtenant to apartments 4H in building 116-11 and 1G in
building 116-51, respectively, on 157th Street, Jamaica, New York.


Defendants allegedly prevented Plaintiffs from fulfilling their
fiduciary duty as board members to review corporate documents in
behalf of other shareholders to make sure the building is properly
managed. On January 24, 2018, the Defendants and Plaintiffs entered
into a settlement agreement that provides that in exchange for
Plaintiffs discontinuing their request to access corporate records
as both board members and shareholders, Defendants agreed to
provide access to specific records of Cedar Manor within certain
time periods. Yet, to date, Defendants have not complied with
this.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew Maline, Esq.
     BARRY MALLIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     132 Nassau Street, Suite 522
     New York, NY 10038
     Telephone: (212) 285-1200


CHIQUITA BRANDS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in ATS Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order and Opinion denying New Jersey Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned IN RE:
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL INC. ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
SHAREHOLDERS DERIVATIVE LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: ATS
ACTIONS 08-80421-CIV-MARRA (N.J. Action) (Does 1-11)
18-80248-CIV-MARRA (Ohio Action). Case No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA. (S.D.
Fla.).

The New Jersey Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking
certification of a predominance class under Rule 23(b)(3), or
alternatively, an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4), against the
Defendant Chiquita and various Individual Defendants.

This case involves the claims of thousands of Colombian nationals
who allege that they or their family members were victims of
kidnapping, torture, extrajudicial killings or other human rights
abuses during the Colombian civil war at the hands of a violent
right-wing paramilitary group with financial ties to a United
States-based corporation.

The Plaintiffs contend that Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(Chiquita) funneled approximately 1.7 million dollars to the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Groups of
Colombia, or the AUC).  The AUC is a Colombian terrorist
organization believed to have massacred over 100,000 persons in
Colombia between 1995 and 2006, including over 10,000 civilians
living in the fertile Uraba and Magdalena regions where Chiquita
operated.  The funds provided by Chiquita allegedly enhanced the
AUC's terror capabilities and facilitated its killing campaign in
the regions where Plaintiffs and their families lived.

THE PROPOSED CLASS

The New Jersey Plaintiffs seek certification of a predominance
class under Rule 23(b)(3) consisting of the following individuals:

     All persons who were the victims of (or who are the relatives
and/or legal representatives of decedent victims) of extrajudicial
killing; forced disappearance; torture; cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; kidnapping; rape; forced displacement; crimes
against humanity; or crimes against civilians constituting war
crimes committed by the AUC in the banana-growing regions of Uraba
and Magdalena from 1995 through 2004.

In support of the motion, the Plaintiffs have filed: (1) the
affidavit of counsel Melissa Vahsling, purporting to establish the
proposed class representatives' status as AUC-victims, based on
Attorney Vahsling's asserted personal knowledge and review of
highly confidential documents regarding the proposed class
representatives.

This affidavit, however, does not explain the basis for any
personal knowledge of the facts recited, nor does it specifically
identify the secondary sources on which the statements are
presumably based. It does refer to a review of highly confidential
documents, described by Bates-stamp number, which purportedly show
that Jane Doe 7 and John Doe 7, the proposed class representatives,
have registered as victims of the AUC with the Colombian
authorities under its Justice and Peace Law program, and that the
Colombian authorities "have opened an investigation into the
murders of their respective family members.

CLASS CERTIFICATION ISSUES

The Plaintiffs argue that they meet the four requirements of Rule
23(a). They further assert that this case is maintainable as a
class under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact
predominate over questions affecting individual plaintiffs, and
because the class action mechanism presents a superior method for
resolution of these claims.

They contend that the liability questions involve common questions
of law based on the same set of operative facts (Chiquita's
interface and financial relationship with the AUC), and that
variations in proofs on causation (AUC-link) and individual damages
do not defeat the elements of commonality and predominance.

Chiquita argues that the Plaintiff's motion fails to establish Rule
23's ascertainability, numerosity, predominance and superiority
requirements, in addition to other alleged defects relating to the
timing and scope of the motion.

The Wolf Plaintiffs also challenge the ascertainability of the
proposed class, and further complain that there are conflicts of
interest between proposed class counsel, the putative class
members, and existing named Plaintiffs which impede Rule 23
certification.

This opinion first addresses certification issues pertaining to
ascertainability. Because the New Jersey Plaintiffs do not show an
ascertainable class, the Court does not find that the Plaintiffs'
claims present a viable vehicle for class certification and
concludes that the motion is appropriately denied on this basis
alone.  

ASCERTAINABILITY

In this case, the Defendants contend the class definition proposed
by the Plaintiffs does not allow for an objective, administratively
feasible determination of class membership because it would require
individualized fact-finding on the AUC's responsibility for each
alleged injury or death, as well as an individualized finding on
Chiquita's financial connection to the AUC unit or operative
allegedly involved in each specific crime.

The Plaintiffs counter that identification of AUC victims is
susceptible to determination by reference to objective, reliable
criteria, and propose, first, reliance on government records
generated in Colombian Justice and Peace Law processes as a method
for identifying class membership.  

Chiquita complains that the Kaplan report is pure hearsay, the
repetition of data collected by second or third parties which
should be disregarded in its entirety as incompetent evidence of
the matters asserted. Without ruling upon the admissibility of the
contents of the Kaplan report, the Court recognizes the potential
hearsay problems associated with it.   

Notwithstanding those potential problems, the Court accepts and
considers its substantive content here, recognizing that relaxed
evidentiary standards appropriately apply in this setting where the
court, and not a jury, is resolving disputed factual issues and is
doing so for the very limited purpose of determining whether the
prerequisites to class certification have been satisfied.

The more significant problem with the Kaplan report is its
probative value: Professor Kaplan's theory of geographic
probabilities does not offer an objectively reliable and
administratively feasible method for determining class membership.
After synthesizing historical data on the growth and presence of
the AUC, Kaplan notes the great overlap between the sites of
bellwether victim killings and paramilitary active presence as well
as paramilitary commander testimonies indicating that they operated
in the same areas and municipalities where the bellwether victims
were victimized.

Thus, the optimistic argument that prospective class members could
be counted on to self-identify by reporting the geographic area of
the loss and circumstances attending the disappearance or death of
their loved ones (matching these up to signature AUC methodologies)
vastly oversimplifies the issue and could not reasonably be
expected to produce reliable results on class membership.

Reliance on a self-identifying affidavit using these parameters,
without further indicia of reliability, would deprive Defendants of
their ability to challenge class membership and implicate serious
due process concerns.  

The Plaintiffs additional proposal for reliance on government
records generated in the Colombian Justice and Peace processes
fares no better. Even if the proposed class were redefined to
coincide more narrowly with the limited pool of citizens who have
registered with the Colombian government under this program as AUC
victims, Plaintiffs do not show that these reparation and
reconciliation processes offer a reliable, administratively
feasible way of determining AUC involvement in a specific injury or
death, where they do not explain who made the findings in these
government files, how they made the findings, whether the reporter
was under a legal duty to make the findings, whether the findings
represent the culmination of an official investigation into the
loss, or whether the investigation is ongoing as seemingly is the
case for the proposed class representatives).

Because the ascertainably requirement is not met, the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification is denied on this threshold and
independent basis. Assuming arguendo, that the Plaintiffs' proposed
class definition is adequate, or could be redefined in some way to
satisfy ascertainability, the Court shall proceed to examine the
adequacy of the Plaintiff's showing on other Rule 23 pre-requisites
for certification of a predominance class.

RULE 23(a) FACTORS

Numerosity

The Defendants contend that the proposed class does not satisfy the
numerosity requirement because Plaintiffs do not demonstrate the
impracticability of joinder all class members.

The Court agrees.

The Plaintiffs estimate that there are thousands of putative class
members victimized by the AUC in the Uraba and Magdalena regions of
Colombia who would benefit from the efficiencies of the class
action mechanism, but do not show why it is impractical for them to
proceed as individual claimants, as the thousands of other
individual claimants already subsumed in the member cases to the
MDL proceeding have done over the last ten years of its litigation.
Through a mutually agreed-upon process, those claimants have
structured a bellwether trial selection paradigm, under which 96
representative individual claimants have been identified within the
12 designated bellwether cases now approaching trials scheduled in
October 2019 and February 2020.

The Plaintiffs do not persuasively show why it was impractical for
the putative class members to have joined in those proceedings at
an earlier time, where they may have enjoyed the same litigation
efficiencies achieved via bellwether trial procedures now well
under way. The size of the putative class is not determinative on
the numerosity issue, rather, the central question is whether
joinder would be impractical. Plaintiffs do not make that showing
here, and hence do not satisfy numerosity requirement.

Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3) burdens the Plaintiffs with demonstrating that
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly land
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The Plaintiffs contend
that this requirement is met because one set of operative facts
will determine Defendants' liability for making payments to the AUC
as well as the AUC's status as a foreign terrorist organization.

Assuming the veracity of the Plaintiff's allegations, the
Defendants' conduct would be actionable under the claims remaining
for resolution in this litigation, as this Court has already
determined. However, one set of operative facts regarding the
Defendants' alleged financial and other support of the AUC would
not establish liability as to each individual class claimant. It is
not necessarily the case that every person that was tortured,
killed or went missing in the Uraba and Magdalena regions during
the time frame in question suffered injury at the hands of the AUC.


Instead, a primary issue in each case will be whether the AUC was
involved in each crime, and if so, whether a sufficiently
significant financial tie existed between the AUC operative and
Defendant Chiquita to satisfy proximate cause requirements. This
inquiry is necessary and case specific as to each potential
victim.

So too, in this case, proof that Chiquita and any one or more of
the named Individual Defendants engaged in the misconduct alleged
will be relevant in each case, but it cannot establish liability as
to any individual plaintiff without proof that they were injured by
an AUC bloc or AUC operative that had some financial connection to
the Defendant Chiquita.  

The Plaintiffs do not describe how they would confront their burden
of showing causation in a class action trial, and this is no small
obstacle where they propose a class defined by a multiplicity of
events spanning a nine-year period of time and two large geographic
regions. No one set of operative facts will establish liability
where the identity of the principal perpetrator of each underlying
attack in dispute.

The Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the ascertainability of
the proposed class. The Plaintiffs have also failed to carry their
burden of demonstrating that common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual ones. Finally, the Plaintiffs fail to
establish that the class action mechanism is a superior method of
adjudication and hence fail to establish a premise for
certification of a common issues class under Rule 23(c)(4).

The New Jersey Plaintiffs' motion to certify a predominance class
against the Defendants under Rule 23(b)(3) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2cznqm2 from
Leagle.com.

Antonio Gonzalez Carrizosa, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley L.
Arnett -- aarnett@elllaw.com -- Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack PC, pro
hac vice, William J. Wichmann, 888 SE 3rd Ave #400, Fort
Lauderdale, FL 33316, James Kellogg Green, James K. Green, 222
Lakeview Avenue, Suite 1650, West Palm Beach, FL 33401- 6100, John
Scarola, Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, Towle House, 517
N. Calhoun St., Tallahassee, FL 32301-1231, Sigrid Stone McCawley
-- smccawley@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller & Flexner &William
Bennett King, Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley. Towle
House, 517 N. Calhoun St., Tallahassee, FL 32301-1231

Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam
V. Orlacchio -- orlacchio@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac
vice, Aseem Padukone --
apadukone@cov.com -- Covington & Buling, LLP, pro hac vice, Cyril
Djoukeng -- cdjoukeng@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac
vice, Emily R. Freeman, Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac vice,
Eric Hellerman -- ehellerman@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP,
Frank A. Dante -- dante@blankrome.com --  Blank Rome, pro hac vice,
Jaclyn E. Martinez Resly, Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac vice,
James M. Garland -- jgarland@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP,
John E. Hall -- jhall@cov.com -- Covington & Burline LLP, Jonathan
M. Sperling -- jsperling@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, Kevin
M. Bandy -- kbandy@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac vice,
Ligia M. Markman -- lmarkman@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP,
pro hac vice, Louis D. Abrams -- abrams-l@blankrome.com -- Blank
Rome LLP, pro hac vice.


CITRIX SYSTEMS: Jackson Sues Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------
Kristi Jackson and Brandon Sargent on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Citrix Systems, Inc. a
Delaware Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61350-WPD (S.D.
Fla., May 30, 2019) brought this class action against Defendant
Citrix Systems, Inc. ("Citrix" or "Defendant") seeking equitable
relief and damages failure to secure personally identifiable
information ("PII").

Citrix represented to their employees through their data policy
that they would protect their personally identifiable information
("PII"). Plaintiffs relying on that representation gave Citrix
their PII, only for Citrix to have no security measures in place to
protect it. Citrix describes itself as focusing "on a single
driving principle: making the world's apps and data secure and easy
to access." However, they failed to implement even the most basic
security measures for their own employees. Citrix, unfortunately,
did not respect their employees' rights to the security of their
own data.

On March 8, 2019 Citrix posted a statement to their blog that they
were contacted on March 6, 2019 by the FBI "to advise they had
reason to believe that international cyber criminals gained access
to the internal Citrix network." Citrix acknowledged they had been
attacked in a letter dated April 29, 2019. Citrix allowed hackers
to have intermittent access to their systems from October 13, 2018
to March 8, 2019. Citrix would not have discovered this breach but
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation informing them that they
had been attacked. Plaintiffs and Class members are at risk for
identity theft in a myriad of forms, potentially for the remainder
of their lives, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant. During this time Defendant
collected, stored and used Plaintiffs' PII.

Citrix Systems Inc., is a Delaware corporation who aims to "power a
world where people, organizations and things are securely connected
and accessible to make the extraordinary possible".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     David S. Casey, Jr., Esq.
     Gayle M. Blatt, Esq.
     CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA BLATT & PENFIELD, LLP
     Email: dcasey@cglaw.com
            gmb@cglaw.com

          - and -

     Herman J. Russomanno, Esq.
     Robert J. Borrello, Esq.
     Herman J. Russomanno III, Esq.
     RUSSOMANNO & BORRELLO, P.A.
     Museum Tower – Penthouse 2800
     150 West Flagler Street
     Miami, FL 33130
     Phone: (305) 373-2101
     Facsimile: (305) 373-2103
     Email: hrussomanno@russomanno.com
            rborrello@russomanno.com
            herman2@russomanno.com


CLL BROTHERS: Wang Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
ZHENGJIAN WANG, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. CLL BROTHERS, INC. d/b/a Fuji Sushi; QING
CHEN, HORNG BIAU LEE, and "JOHN" LIU, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05145 (S.D. N.Y., June 2, 2019) is an action brought by the
Plaintiff on behalf of himself as well as other employees similarly
situated, against the Defendants for alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"),
arising from Defendants' unlawful employment policies, patterns and
practices.

The complaint asserts that Defendants have willfully and
intentionally committed widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL
by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to pay its
employees, including Plaintiff, minimum wage for each hour worked
and overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each
workweek.

Plaintiff ZHENGJIAN WANG was employed by Defendants to work as a
deliveryman from January 5, 2018 to September 16, 2018.

CLL BROTHERS, INC. d/b/a Fuji Sushi purchased and handled goods
moved in interstate commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     TROY LAW, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard, Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324


CLOROX COMPANY: Gregorio Moves to Certify Three Customer Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled JOSEPH GREGORIO, PATRICK
QUIROZ, and ADAM COOPER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. THE CLOROX COMPANY, Case No.
4:17-cv-03824-PJH (N.D. Cal.), move for certification of these
Classes and, in the alternative, Subclasses:

   -- California Class:

      All persons in California who purchased any Green Works
      product labeled "naturally derived" from January 1, 2017
      through the date that class notice is disseminated;

      * California Subclass:

        All persons in California who purchased (1) Green Works
        Multi-Surface Cleaner, (2) Green Works Multi-Surface
        Cleaner Lemon Scent, (3) Green Works Dishwashing Liquid,
        (4) Green Works Dishwashing Liquid Water-Lily Scent or
        (5) Green Works Laundry Detergent Original, labeled
        "naturally derived" from January 1, 2017 through the date
        that class notice is disseminated;

   -- New York Class:

      All persons in New York who purchased any Green Works
      product labeled "naturally derived" from January 1, 2017
      through the date that class notice is disseminated; and

      * New York Subclass:

        All persons in New York who purchased (1) Green Works
        Multi-Surface Cleaner, (2) Green Works Multi-Surface
        Cleaner Lemon Scent, (3) Green Works Dishwashing Liquid,
        (4) Green Works Dishwashing Liquid Water-Lily Scent or
        (5) Green Works Laundry Detergent Original, labeled
        "naturally derived" from January 1, 2017 through the date
        that class notice is disseminated.

The Plaintiffs also propose an injunctive relief class pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to enter an order (i) appointing
Plaintiffs Quiroz and Cooper as Class Representatives for the
California Class and Subclass, (ii) appointing Plaintiff Gregorio
as Class Representative for the New York Class and Subclass, and
(iii) appointing Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Richman Law Group and
Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP as class
counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on August 14, 2019, at 9:00 a.m.,
to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          L.Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          Neal J. Deckant, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
                  jsmith@bursor.com
                  ndeckant@bursor.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          Joshua D. Arisohn, Esq.
          Alec Leslie, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 989-9113
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com
                  jarisohn@bursor.com
                  aleslie@bursor.com

               - and -

          Kim E. Richman, Esq.
          Jaimie Mak, Esq.
          RICHMAN LAW GROUP
          535 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 259-5688
          Facsimile: (718) 228-8522
          E-mail: krichman@richmanlawgroup.com
                  jmak@richmanlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          Bradley F. Silverman, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3283
          E-mail: tgarber@fbfglaw.com
                  bsilverman@fbfglaw.com


CODEFIED INC: Betit Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------
AMY BETIT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CODEFIED, INC., d/b/a Housecall Pro, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-61363-RNS (S.D.
Fla., May 31, 2019) is a putative class action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

As part of its business practices, Defendant would often send text
messages to individuals without their prior consent. These messages
were sent using mass-automated technology through a third-party
company hired by Defendant to send text messages on Defendant's
behalf en masse.

The complaint asserts that Defendant knowingly and willfully
violated the TCPA, causing injuries to Plaintiff and members of the
putative class, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation,
annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.

Through this putative class action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Broward County,
Florida.

Defendant is an application developer that owns and operates an app
called "Housecall Pro." "Housecall Pro is the all-in-one software
to run your home services business".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC.
     110 SE 6th Street
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 907-1136
     Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
     Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com


COLLECTO INC: Jasinski Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
--------------------------------------------------------------
Timothy Jasinski moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit captioned TIMOTHY JASINSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
COLLECTO, INC. d/b/a EOS CCA, Case No. 2:19-cv-00726 (E.D. Wisc.),
and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


COLONY MANAGEMENT: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Bishop Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gina Bishop, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Colony Management Corporation d/b/a Colony Apartment
Homes, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00410 (E.D. Va., May 31, 2019)
asserts a claim for unpaid overtime in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per week. Defendant was aware
of this but did not properly pay Plaintiff for all of her hours
worked, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Bishop was initially hired by Defendant in June 2016 and
was a Property Manager for CMC at its Forest Ridge apartment
property in the City of Richmond, Virginia.

The Colony Management Corporation d/b/a Colony Apartment Homes is
engaged in the business of apartment ownership and management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig Juraj Curwood, Esq.
     Curwood Law Firm
     530 E. Main Street, Suite 710
     Richmond, VA 23219
     Phone: (804) 788-0808
     Fax: (804) 767-6777
     Email: ccurwood@curwoodlaw.com


COMMUNITY HEALTH: Padilla Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------------
CALEB PADILLA, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., WAYNE T.
SMITH, LARRY CASH, and THOMAS J. AARON. Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-00461 (M.D. Tenn., May 30, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of persons and entities that acquired Community Health
securities between February 20, 2017 and February 27, 2018,
inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

On February 27, 2018, the Company announced its full year 2017
financial results and reported a $591 million increase to
contractual allowances and bad debt provision. On this news, the
Company's share price fell $1.06 per share, more than 17%, to close
at $5.12 per share on February 28, 2018, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

The complaint asserts that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors: (1) that the Company had
understated its contractual allowances; (2) that the Company had
understated its provision for bad debts; (3) that, as a result, the
Company had overstated its net operating revenue; (4) that, as a
result, the Company had understated its net loss; and (5) that, as
a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff Caleb Padilla purchased Community Health securities
during the Class Period.

Community Health purports to be a leading operator of general acute
care hospitals.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
     Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq.
     BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
     The Freedom Center
     223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
     Nashville, TN 37203
     Phone: (615) 254-8801
     Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
     Email: gerards@bsjfirm.com
            beng@bsjfirm.com

          - and -

     Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
     Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
     Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
     Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
     Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
     GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
     1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Phone: (310) 201-9150
     Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

          - and -

     Howard G. Smith, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
     3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
     Bensalem, PA 19020
     Phone: (215) 638-4847
     Facsimile: (215) 638-4867


COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Narrows Claims in CCJ Detainees' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned MICHAEL PARISH, CURTIS L. OATS,
LEILA KHOURY, SEAN DRISCOLL, CARLA LOFTON, ROY CLEAVES, LISA BROWN,
DAN TAYLOR, DEAN MILLER, KEVIN SANDERS, STACEY CLARK and CARLOTTE
WILSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, Defendants.
No. 07 C 4369. (N.D. Ill.).

A certified class of pretrial detainees at the Cook County Jail
(CCJ) has sued the Sheriff of Cook County, as well as Cook County
itself, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the Defendants'
intake practices at CCJ were deliberately indifferent to the
Plaintiffs' serious medical needs in violation of their due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that intake screeners were
allowed to prohibit detainees from receiving medication that had
been prescribed to them prior to their admission, without the
benefit of an in-person evaluation by a licensed medical
professional. According to the Plaintiffs, this practice delayed
them from receiving treatment for serious health needs.

Second, the Plaintiffs claim that, even on those occasions that an
intake screener did refer a detainee for a medical evaluation and
medication was prescribed as a result, CCJ did not dispense the
medication in a timely manner.

Third, the Plaintiffs claim that CCJ employed a twenty-one day
methadone tapering program that caused unnecessary pain to
detainees who needed methadone treatment.

Sheriff of Cook County

The Sheriff raises two primary arguments in support of his motion.


First, the Sheriff argues that summary judgment should be granted
in his favor because he is entitled to rely on Cermak's medical
staff to meet the medical needs of CCJ detainees. Put another way,
the Sheriff contends that he should not be held responsible because
the challenged intake policies were not his policies, but those of
CCJ's medical provider, Cermak.

Under Illinois law, the sheriff shall be responsible for the hiring
and training of all personnel necessary to operate and maintain the
jail.

Sheriff is correct that Cermak is the entity that provides medical
care to detainees at CCJ. But the constitutional duty under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to provide adequate health care
rests on the custodian here, the Sheriff.  

Furthermore, to the extent that the Sheriff relies completely upon
Cermak's policies, customs, and practices in these matters, he has
delegated his final decision-making authority to Cermak for the
provision of medical services, thereby adopting them as his own.  

Second, the Sheriff argues in a similar vein that no reasonable
jury could find him liable because, according to Cermak's policies,
the sole discretion as to medical care rests with the responsible
physician, not him.  

But this argument misunderstands the issues raised in this
litigation. Plaintiffs' position is that Cermak's intake practices
(as adopted by the Sheriff) unreasonably denied and delayed the
dispensation of prescription medication necessary to treat the
serious medical needs of the class members, without regard to the
medical judgment of Cermak's physicians. Accordingly, the Sheriff's
motion for summary judgment is denied.

Cook County

Turning to Cook County, the Plaintiffs assert that the county also
should be held liable for CCJ's allegedly unconstitutional intake
policies and practices. As noted, however, the Sheriff has final
policymaking authority over jail operations and the provision of
medical services to detainees.

Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiffs contend that Cook County
is directly liable for the allegedly unconstitutional intake
policies, practices, and customs at CCJ, the Court grants summary
judgment in favor of Cook County as a matter of law.

Deliberate Indifference Claim8

To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiffs must
establish that: (1) each of them had an objectively serious medical
condition that posed a substantial risk (2) the defendant knew of
the risk; (3) the defendant failed to act in disregard of that risk
and (4) the defendant's indifference caused some injury.  

Objectively Serious Medical Conditions That Pose a Substantial
Risk

In support of their motion, the Plaintiffs argue that they have
established an objectively serious medical need. An objectively
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.

A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious.
Instead, courts consider various factors, including: (1) whether
the failure to treat the condition could result in further
significant injury (2) whether it was a condition that a reasonable
doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or
treatment (3) whether the condition significantly affected an
individual's daily activities (4) whether the condition involves
chronic and substantial pain.

In response, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed
to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether asthma, diabetes,
high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal,
seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression,
and schizophrenia are objectively serious health needs.

But the Plaintiffs have presented evidence that (1) the medical
professionals at CCJ found these conditions worthy of treatment (2)
the conditions significantly affected the daily life activities of
detainees and (3) the failure to treat the particular condition
could have resulted in further significant injury. What is more,
the Plaintiffs have offered the opinions of Dr. King and Dr.
Stewart that these conditions constitute objectively serious health
needs.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of
establishing a triable issue of fact as to whether asthma,
diabetes, high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate
withdrawal, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder,
depression, and schizophrenia constitute objectively serious health
needs.

Whether the Sheriff Was Subjectively Aware of the Risk

Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in
the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence,
and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.

To prove knowledge, a plaintiff may adduce evidence that a
substantial risk was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have
known about it. Here, the Plaintiffs contend that the Sheriff knew
of the risk based upon a number of events, beginning in 1996.

A reasonable jury could conclude that the DOJ Report provided the
Sheriff with notice that CCJ's medication dispensation practices at
intake posed a pervasive and substantial risk to the serious
medical conditions of detainees.  

For their part, the Defendants do not argue that the DOJ Report
failed to provide the Sheriff notice or that the Sheriff was
subjectively unaware of the substantial risks outlined therein.
Instead, the Defendants object to the admissibility of the DOJ
Report. But, because the DOJ Report is being offered to prove
notice and not to establish the truth of the matter asserted
therein, it does not fall within the rule against hearsay.
Furthermore, as noted, to the extent it is hearsay, it is
admissible under Rule 803(8)(A)(iii).  

The Defendants are correct that the mere fact that the DOJ Report
was sent to the Sheriff is not conclusive proof of his subjective
knowledge that CCJ's intake practices posed a substantial risk of
serious harm to detainees. But it is certainly sufficient to create
a triable issue of fact as to the extent of his knowledge starting
in July 11, 2008. On the other hand, to the extent that Plaintiffs'
claims are based on events that took place prior to that date, they
have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the extent of the Sheriff's knowledge of the risks at issue.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's summary judgment motion is denied, and
the Defendants' cross-motions are granted to the extent that
Plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon the Sheriff for the period
prior to July 11, 2008.

As for what this ruling means for the class, a certified class has
a legal status separate from and independent of the interest
asserted by the named plaintiff. Inasmuch as any of the named
Plaintiffs cannot assert deliberative indifference claims based on
the above-identified medical conditions after July 11, 2008, their
claims are dismissed. As for the others, they may remain as named
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs may seek leave to designate other
members of the class as named Plaintiffs to the extent necessary
under Rule 23.9

Whether the Sheriff Failed to Act in Disregard of the Risk

Prison officials must provide inmates with medical care that is
adequate in light of the severity of the condition and professional
norms. In a class action, deliberate indifference can be
demonstrated by proving there are such systemic and gross
deficiencies in procedures that the inmate population is
effectively denied access to adequate medical care.

Intake Screening Practices

CCJ's intake procedures during the class period required that a new
detainee be evaluated in-person by a licensed medical professional
before receiving prescription medication. And, to receive an
in-person evaluation, the detainee first must receive a referral
from the CMT or MHS, neither of whom is a licensed medical
professional. Plaintiffs cite to the experience of a number of
class members to demonstrate that this procedure was grossly
deficient. For the reasons stated above, the relevant examples are
those that took place after July 11, 2008.

Daniel Gerl and Nicholas Morris told a CMT that they were taking
methadone for opiate withdrawal, but neither was referred to a PA
for an in-person evaluation, and neither received a prescription
for methadone while at CCJ.  

Teria Beasley and Yvette Lee told an MHS at intake that they were
taking medication for bipolar disorder. Lee also stated that she
was taking medication for depression. But, again, neither were
referred for further evaluation by a psychiatrist, and neither
received any psychotropic medication.

The Plaintiffs also rely on the DOJ's findings that CCJ's medical
screening process was grossly inadequate and the mental health
screening was completely inadequate. This report is admissible for
the reasons already discussed.  

The Sheriff also points to Dr. Hart's opinion that CCJ's intake
system during the class period was adequate to meet the medical and
mental health needs of detainees entering CCJ. Defendants also rely
on Dr. Sander's conclusion that the treatment of detainees during
this time comported with the community standard of care.  

In the end, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants have presented
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether CCJ's screening practices delayed or denied necessary
treatment of the serious health needs faced by new detainees at
CCJ.

Delayed Dispensation of Medication Prescribed at Intake

In addition, the Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, even when
a PA prescribed medication at intake, detainees experienced
substantial delays in receiving it or did not receive it at all.
The record includes the following examples that occurred after July
11, 2008.

At intake, a PA prescribed John Hendrix, Lance Woodard, and Terry
Tharpe albuterol to treat their asthma, but none of them received
an inhaler before they were released from CCJ.  Hendrix was
incarcerated for six weeks, Woodard for four days, and Tharp for
eight days Veronica Stuckey and LaDon Pilcher received
prescriptions for HIV medication at intake. But Stuckey did not
receive the medication until twenty-one days later, and Pilcher did
not receive it until three days later.  

Jess Mason was prescribed hypertension medication, but there is no
record that he received the medication before he was released
twenty-three days later.
  
Rodney Bailey was prescribed seizure medication upon intake, but
the medication was not dispensed. He suffered a seizure three days
after he arrived at CCJ.  

John Holmes was prescribed medication to treat depression at intake
on October 25, 2010, but there is no indication that the medication
was ever dispensed.  

In response, Defendants rely upon the opinions offered by Dr.
Sander and Dr. Hart. Both expressed the opinion that the treatment
of the detainees met the community standards of care, and that
CCJ's intake systems, policies, and procedures were adequate to
meet the medical and mental health needs of the detainees
throughout the class period.  

Such contradictory evidence create a genuine issue as to whether
CCJ's intake practices significantly delayed the dispensation of
medications that were prescribed to detainees during intake.

Methadone Tapering Policy

To support their claim that CCJ's methadone tapering policy was
grossly deficient after July 11, 2008, Plaintiffs refer to the
experience of Driscoll, who was admitted to CCJ on January 26,
2009, and placed in CCJ's twenty-one-day methadone tapering
program. Driscoll received his first dose of methadone within
twenty-four hours of admission, and lower dosages until the dosage
was eventually decreased to zero. According to Driscoll, as a
result, he experienced aching in his legs, sweating, chills,
vomiting, and hallucinations.  

In addition to Dr. Whitman's statistical analysis, Plaintiffs rely
on the opinions of Dr. King and Dr. Stewart, both of whom
determined that CCJ's methadone tapering policy caused gratuitous
pain to enrolled detainees.  However, Defendant's expert, Dr.
Sander, determined that Driscoll's treatment met the community
standards of care. This competing evidence again creates a genuine
issue of fact for trial regarding the constitutionality of CCJ's
methadone tapering policy.

Whether the Delay in Treatment Caused Harm

A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if it
exacerbates an injury or prolongs the detainee's pain, depending on
the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing
treatment. In cases where prison officials delayed rather than
denied medical assistance to an inmate, courts have required the
plaintiff to offer verifying medical evidence' that the delay
rather than the inmate's underlying condition caused some degree of
harm. That is, a plaintiff must offer medical evidence that tends
to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay was detrimental.

Cook County contends that the Plaintiffs have failed to create a
genuine issue regarding whether any delay resulting from CCJ's
intake practices proximately caused harm to any particular
detainee. The Detainees, however, have either testified or declared
under the penalty of perjury that the delay in receiving their
prescribed medications did harm them. For example, asthma sufferers
describe the pain and discomfort of not being able to breathe
without albuterol  HIV sufferers indicate that they contracted
mouth infections because they did not receive their HIV
medications.  

The Plaintiffs' experts corroborate these testimonials. According
to Dr. King, interruption in taking any of the non-psychotropic
medications analyzed by Dr. Whitman, even for a few days, can pose
a serious health risk for some patients. These include acute
exacerbation of asthma, acute coronary syndrome, myocardial
infarction, life-threatening infections, epileptic and withdrawal
seizures with associated injuries, uncontrolled diabetes, diabetic
ketoacidosis, hypertension, and stroke.

Dr. Holland confirmed the types of adverse symptoms the detainees
experienced when their psychotropic medications were discontinued.
From this, a jury could reasonably conclude that CCJ's intake
policies caused Plaintiffs harm.

The Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and Cook
County's and the Sheriff's cross-motions are granted in part and
denied in part.

Cook County's motion is granted with regard to its direct
liability, but is denied to the extent that Cook County is an
indispensable party that must fund any judgment against the
Sheriff. The Sheriff's motion is granted as to (1) claims asserting
constitutional violations occurring prior to July 11, 2008 and (2)
claims based on medical conditions other than asthma, diabetes,
high cholesterol, HIV infection, hypertension, opiate withdrawal,
seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, depression,
and schizophrenia.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2anguyn from
Leagle.com.

Michael Parish, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey,
Thomas G. Morrissey, 10249 South Western Avenue Chicago, IL 60643-
1917, Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C., Kenneth N. Flaxman,
Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C., 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 01,
Chicago, Illinois 60604& Patrick William Morrissey, Thomas G.
Morrissey, Ltd, 10249 South Western Avenue Chicago, IL 60643- 1917

Curtis L. Oats, Leila Khoury, Sean Driscoll, Carla Lofton, Roy
Cleaves, Lisa Brown, Dan Taylor, Dean Miller, Stacey Clark, Kevin
Sanders & Carlotte Wilson, Plaintiffs, represented by Joel A.
Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. & Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N.
Flaxman, P.C.

Sheriff of Cook County & Cook County, Defendants, represented by
Francis J. Catania, Cook County State's Attorney.

Calvin E Lomax, Movant, pro se.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: 2nd Cir. Appeal Filed in Flushable Wipes Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff The Preserve at Connetquot Homeowners Association, Inc.,
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in its lawsuit styled The
Preserve at Connetquot Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Costco
Wholesale Corporation, et al., Case No. 17-cv-7050, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Central
Islip).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated
entities that own and/or operate sewage or wastewater treatment
plants or facilities, filed this action against the Defendants,
alleging that the defendants' products labeled as flushable have
caused and will continue to cause injury under strict products
liability, nuisance, trespass, negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation tort theories, breach of express warranty, and
breach of implied merchantability contract theories, and that the
advertising of such products as flushable violates Sections 349 of
the New York General Business Law (NYGBL).

The appellate case is captioned as The Preserve at Connetquot
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, et
al., Case No. 19-1407, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant The Preserve at Connetquot Homeowners
Association, Inc., Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Mark S. Reich, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          E-mail: mreich@rgrdlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation is represented by:

          Michael Ruttinger, Esq.
          TUCKER ELLIS LLP
          950 Main Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 592-5000
          E-mail: michael.ruttinger@tuckerellis.com

Defendant-Appellee CVS Health Corporation is represented by:

          Rebecca Flynn Briggs, Esq.
          HINCKLEY, ALLEN & SNYDER, LLP
          100 Westminster Street
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 274-2000
          E-mail: rbriggs@hinckleyallen.com

Defendant-Appellee Kimberly-Clark Corporation is represented by:

          Eamon Paul Joyce, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          787 7th Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 839-8555
          E-mail: ejoyce@sidley.com

Defendant-Appellee The Procter & Gamble Company is represented by:

          Henry Liu, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          1 CityCenter
          850 10th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 662-5536
          E-mail: hliu@cov.com

Defendant-Appellee Target Corporation is represented by:

          Denise Dickerson, Esq.
          SUTTER O'CONNELL
          3600 Erieview Tower
          1301 East 9th Street
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 928-2200
          E-mail: ddickerson@sutter-law.com

Defendant-Appellee Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., is represented
by:

          Michael Mezzacappa, Esq.
          KAUFMAN, BORGEEST & RYAN LLP
          200 Summit Lake Drive
          Valhalla, NY 10595
          Telephone: (914) 449-1028
          E-mail: mmezzacappa@kbrny.com

Defendant-Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is represented by:

          Steven R. Kramer, Esq.
          ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC
          10 Bank Street
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 949-3760
          E-mail: skramer@eckertseamans.com


CREDIT MANAGEMENT: Certification of Class Sought in Jahnke Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Jahnke moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit styled ROBERT JAHNKE, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CREDIT MANAGEMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Case No. 2:19-cv-00718-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

Further, the Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification
to protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


CUMBERLAND EXCAVATION: Gill Moves for Certification of FLSA Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff moves the Court, without opposition, to conditionally
certify the case titled MICHAEL GILL, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. CUMBERLAND EXCAVATION, LLC, BRYAN
KRABOUSANOS, and FRANK BELCHER, Case No. 3:18-cv-01302 (M.D.
Tenn.), authorizing it to proceed as a collective action for
overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of: all persons who have worked
for Defendants as laborers, construction workers, and equipment
operators (or those who performed similar duties, however titled)
from November 20, 2015, through the present (the "Class Members").

The Plaintiff represents to the Court that the parties are
currently scheduled for private mediation with wage and hour
mediator Michael Russell on June 5, 2019.  The Plaintiff further
represents to the Court that on February 4, 201,9 the parties
entered into a Tolling Agreement in order to protect the Class
Members' statute of limitations.  As a result, the parties have
agreed to postpone issuance of Notice until after the mediation.
The parties will participate in mediation on June 5, 2019, and will
notify the Court by June 19, 2019, whether the case has settled.
If the case is not settled the parties will meet and confer on the
content of the Notice and the method of distribution and will file
a joint motion for approval of Class Notice by June 19, 2019.

If the parties are unable to agree upon either the content of the
Notice or the method of distribution then the Plaintiff will file
his motion for approval of Notice and method of distribution on or
before June 19, 2019.  The Defendants will file their response
within 14 days of the filing of Plaintiff's motion.

Defendants Cumberland Excavation, LLC, Bryan Krabousanos and Frank
Belcher do not oppose Conditional Certification and do not oppose
this motion and the procedures and deadlines set forth herein.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter F. Klett, Esq.
          Autumn L. Gentry, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          424 Church Street, Suite 800
          Nashville, TN 37219-2392
          Telephone: (615) 244-6538
          E-mail: agentry@dickinsonwright.com
                  pklett@dickinsonwright.com

               - and -

          Trevor Howell, Esq.
          HOWELL LAW, PLLC
          P. O Box 158511
          Nashville, TN 37205
          Telephone: (615) 406-1416
          E-mail: Trevor@howelllawfirmllc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Reed, Esq.
          HUDSON, REED & MCCREARY, PLLC
          16 Public Square North
          PO Box 884
          Murfreesboro, TN 37133
          Telephone: (615) 893-5522
          E-mail: jreed@mborolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew S. Naylor, Esq.
          WALLER, LANSDEN, DORTCH & DAVIS, LLP
          Nashville City Center
          511 Union Street, Suite 2700
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-6380
          E-mail: andy.naylor@wallerlaw.com


CVS HEALTH: Cachola, et al. Seek Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit against CVS Health Corporation and related
entities seeks to recover unpaid wages under the California Labor
Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants violated numerous
provisions of the California Labor Code, including failure to
compensate for all hours worked; failure to timely provide
duty-free ten minute rest break for every four hours worked or a
major fraction thereof; failure to timely provide  duty free meal
break period for every five hours of labor performed for shifts of
longer than six hours; failure to pay premium pay wages for such
missed and or untimely non-compliant rest and meal breaks, failure
to pay all earned wages when due; failure to provide written notice
of paid sick leave, failure to furnish accurate paystubs showing,
among other things accurate number of hours accurately worked and
properly itemized eamings and deductions for the total hours worked
during each pay period, failure to track and record all hours
worked and failed to reimburse class for expenses necessarily
incurred in the discharge of their work-related duties including
personal cell phone expenses and mileage reimbursement; and failure
to pay all wages to employees due at the time of their termination
or discharge those Members who have separated from Defendants'
employ during the Class Period.

The case is captioned ABEL CACHOLA, HARDEEP DHILLON, MISTY BAILY,
SHIVJOT PABLA, DEVONNA GILMORE, MICHAEL MANZONE, PAULINE MIKHAIL,
FELICIA IVY, RANDALL RADKE, DAYNA BOWLES, MELANIE JIPP, LORNA RUSE,
MARISOL BAEZ, WILLIAM SHAFER, RACHEL GOFF, BRE MICHAELS, MARGEE MAE
DELA CRUZ, TANGERINE PONCHIONE, SONAL SEHGAL, MAIKEL NAGIB, JOHN
HADI, JEANNY KEOTA, SHARIKA WILLIAMS, SHAINA LARMORE, TINA
RODRIGUEZ, DEBBIE SCHULTZ, KIM M. ROSE, MARY ALBANA, JESSICA XE,
DANIEL RIVERA II, RAFAELITA ADJEI, SAMANTHA ANDREWS, ARYAN RABBANI,
BRIANNA BERTRAND, CELIA CARTON, JOSE L. DELGADO, LIZ BENNETT,
MICHELLE PEREZ, MICHELLE DIAS, DIANE KIM, KYROLLOS MEKAIL, SARAVIE
YOU, ELISHA N. PENNINGTON, DION R. LORUSSO, MARIA M. LORUSSO,
KAITLYN HOLDREN, AMARIS B. LANE, JOE MARTINEZ, NIKKOLAE V. JACINTO,
JESSICA HERNANDEZ, ERIN RIFFLE, CRAIG JENSEN, ROBERT M. WILSON,
DANIEL SETIAWAN, YVONNE MARTINEZ, AHMED HEGAZY, LEILA VANDERWERFF,
ROXANNA HERNANDEZ, NICOLE KOTECKI, MITCHELL WOOTHEN, STEVEN
CHALKER, MAISHA CHERRY, LYNA LE, AND MAHRAN IZOLI, each
individually, and on behalf all of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. CVS HEALTH CORPORATION, a Rhode Island corporation,
CVS RX SERVICES, INC., a New York corporation; CVS PHARMACY, INC.,
a Rhode Island corporation; Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, a Califomia
limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00256809 (Cal. Super., May 20, 2019),

CVS Health Corporation is an American retail pharmacy and Pharmacy
Benefit Manager headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs:

          Jacob N. Whitehead, Esq.
          WHITEHEAD EMPLOYMENT LAW
          15615 Alton Pkwy, Suite 175
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 936-4001
          Facsimile: (949) 450-1588
          E-mail: jacob@jnwpc.com

DANONE NORTH: Andriulli Sues Over Products' Misleading Packaging
----------------------------------------------------------------
Theresa Andriulli, Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiffs v. Danone North America, LLC
Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-05165 (S.D. N.Y., June 2, 2019) seeks
an order requiring Defendant to remove and/or refrain from making
misleading representations on its products' packaging.

Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, labels and sells
yogurt products labeled as vanilla yogurt to consumers from
third-party retailers, including brick-and-mortar stores and
online, and directly from defendant's website (the "Products").

The Products are uniformly marketed as Vanilla-based yogurts on the
labels, point-of-sale marketing, retailers' display ads and
promotion, websites, television and radio ads. The Products are
misleading because despite being labeled as "Vanilla," they have
less vanilla flavor derived from vanilla beans than their name
suggests, says the complaint.

Plaintiff and the Class did not know, and had no reason to know,
that the Product did not contain real vanilla. Had Plaintiff and
Class members known Defendant's Product did not contain real
vanilla, they would not have bought the Product, the complaint
asserts.

Plaintiffs purchased the Products based upon the representations on
the packaging.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
     Sheehan & Associates, P.C.
     505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
     Great Neck, NY 11021
     Phone: (516) 303-0552
     Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


DISH NETWORK: 4th Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Krakauer Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
THOMAS H. KRAKAUER, on behalf of a class of persons,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DISH NETWORK, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant.
DRI-THE VOICE OF THE DEFENSE BAR; PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY
COUNCIL, INCORPORATED, Amici Supporting Appellants. No. 18-1518.
(4th Cir.).

Dr. Thomas Krakauer brought suit against Dish Network, alleging
that its sales representative, Satellite Systems Network (SSN),
routinely flouted this prohibition. He sought to pursue his claim
on behalf of all persons who, like him, had received calls on
numbers listed in the Do-Not-Call registry.

Dish's contentions on appeal come in three varieties. First, it
challenges the class certification on the grounds that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the class under Article III.  Second, it
raises various objections to the district court's certification of
the class as a matter of civil procedure.  And third, it challenges
its own liability for the improper calls placed by SSN.

Turning to the standing question alone, the class certified by the
district court is entirely consonant with Article III's
requirements. The class definition hewed tightly to the language of
the TCPA's cause of action, and that statute itself recognizes a
cognizable constitutional injury. There is therefore no untold
number of class members who lack standing here, and the Court need
not expound on what it would mean if there were.

To fall within the class certified, a person had to receive two
calls within one year to a number that was listed on the
Do-Not-Call registry, just as the TCPA provides. The question for
the Court is whether this class definition, by its terms, stated an
injury that is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.  

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136
S.Ct. 1540 (2016), provides the answer. First, the traditional
requirements of standing injury-in-fact, redressability, and
traceability apply to causes of action created by statute.
Congress's determination that a cause of action exists does not
displace this irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.

Second, for an injury-in-fact to be cognizable under the
Constitution, it must be both concrete and particularized. And
third, in determining whether a given injury meets the
constitutional threshold, we look to both historic practice and the
judgment of Congress.  

Taken together, this guidance helps to preserve the traditional
core of standing, which is a personal stake in the case. Private
litigation, even if authorized by statute to serve a range of
public ends, must vindicate the plaintiffs' interests, rather than
serve solely a vehicle for ensuring legal compliance.  

The arguments to the contrary, made by both the appellant and its
amici, deploy Spokeo in ways that go well beyond its holding and
rationale. Rather than paying heed to Congress's judgment of what
sort of particular and concrete harms ought to count, the
appellants ask that we import the elements of common law torts,
piece by piece, into any scheme Congress may devise. As they see
it, Article III's injury-in-fact requirement is not met until the
plaintiff's alleged harm has risen to a level that would support a
common law cause of action. This sort of judicial grafting is not
what Spokeo had in mind.  

The plaintiffs here do not seek redress for a procedural
shortcoming, such as the defendant's failure to keep accurate
Do-Not-Call records. Their claim under § 227(c)(5) accrues only
once a telemarketer disregards the registry and actually places
multiple calls. Since that harm is both particular to each person
and imposes a concrete burden on his privacy, it is sufficient to
confer standing.

The appellant's suggestion otherwise is nothing more than an
attempt to dismember the TCPA, converting a simple remedial scheme
into a fact-intensive quarrel over how long a party was on the line
or how irritated it felt when the phone rang. Obviously, Congress
could have created such a cumbersome scheme if it wanted to. It
instead opted for a more straightforward and manageable way of
protecting personal privacy, and the Constitution in no way bars it
from doing so.

At the time of the trial, the class was defined to include:

     [1] All persons throughout the United States whose telephone
numbers were listed on the federal Do Not Call registry for at
least 30 days, but [2] who received telemarketing calls from SSN to
promote the sale of Dish satellite television subscriptions [3]
from May 1, 2010 to August 1, 2011.

Rule 23 begins with a list of threshold requirements applicable to
all class actions, commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. These four requirements effectively limit
the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiff's claims.

To obtain certification under 23(b)(3), the plaintiff must show
both that [1] questions of law and fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual class
members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
The two requirements are unsurprisingly labeled predominance and
superiority. Since claims aggregated under Rule 23(b)(3) can be
resolved without the class mechanism, these requirements ensure
that a class action is only used when it makes sense.

Since the TCPA clearly supports class-wide resolution in the
abstract, we now consider whether the statute supports this class
in particular. Once again, the district court certified a class
definition that hewed closely to the TCPA's text, allowing Krakauer
to sue on behalf of all persons who received violative calls during
the class period.  

Dish nonetheless asserts that this definition is overbroad. Despite
the fact that the relevant definition of the class is pulled
directly from the statute, Dish argues that the class necessarily
includes a large number of people who have no statutory claim at
all. As Dish sees it, the TCPA's private cause of action for
violations of the Do-Not-Call registry can only be brought by
telephone subscribers, meaning chiefly the individuals who are
responsible for the payment of the telephone bill, rather than any
person who received an improper call.

With the statute properly in view, the appellant's challenge to
this class falls away. Appellant's core argument seems to be that
this class includes a large number of uninjured persons. Other
courts to address the question of uninjured plaintiffs have done so
through the lens of predominance, asking whether the differences
among the class members are so great that individual adjudication
subsumes the class-wide issues.  

For its part, the district court took up the issue through the lens
of ascertainability.

Regardless of which approach is used, the issue has no bearing on
this case. Because the private right of action is not as narrow as
Dish and its amici suggest, there is simply not a large number of
uninjured persons included within the plaintiffs' class.

With this red herring cast aside, the class certified by the
district court easily meets the demands of Rule 23. First, the
class members are ascertainable. Class litigation should not move
forward when a court cannot identify class members without
extensive and individualized fact-finding or mini-trials.  The goal
is not to identify every class member at the time of certification,
but to define a class in such a way as to ensure that there will be
some administratively feasible way for the court to determine
whether a particular individual is a member at some point.  

The class-wide data obviated any concern on this score. The records
in this case clearly showed when calls were placed and whether the
call went through. The court was presented with data showing
whether a number was residential and connecting the number to
particular names and addresses. The class members could therefore
be identified on a large-scale basis, and notified of the class
action accordingly.

Second, the issues common to the plaintiffs clearly predominated
over individual issues. The predominance inquiry calls upon courts
to give careful scrutiny to the relation between common and
individual questions in the case. The entire notion of predominance
implies that the plaintiffs' claims need not be identical, and, as
the Supreme Court has noted, a class can meet this requirement
"even though other important matters will have to be tried
separately.

As the trial court thoroughly documented when certifying the class,
all of the major issues in the case could be shown through
aggregate records. As the above discussion demonstrates, class-wide
records were produced regarding when calls were made, whether they
went through to the residence, and to which numbers they were
directed. The facts that were relevant to Dish's liability were
also common to the class. The plaintiffs argued that SSN was acting
as Dish's agent at the time it made the improper calls. This was a
question that in all likelihood was common to the class. And
perhaps most significantly, the plaintiffs sought a statutory
damages award, preventing the need to measure individual
compensatory damages.  

While Dish objected to various aspects of the plaintiffs' proposed
data and argued that individual fact-finding would be required, the
district court considered these arguments and found them
unpersuasive.  For some of these issues, such as whether a phone
number was residential or commercial, Dish was unable to show any
significant error in the aggregate data offered by the plaintiffs.
For other issues, such as whether the telemarketer had an existing
business relationship with the person who was called, it would be
reasonable to expect Dish to keep business records, which would
themselves be relevant to the entire class.

At bottom, the advantages of class resolution follow directly from
the statute. The statute creates a simple scheme for determining if
a violation occurred, whether a defense is available, and what the
damages ought to be. The district court faithfully applied the
statute when certifying this class. Because its determinations were
reasonable, there is no error for us to correct.

The final thrust of Dish's appeal concerns its own liability. Dish
does not contest that widespread violations of the TCPA occurred,
nor does it dispute that these violations were made for the sole
purpose of selling Dish services. Dish does not even seriously
contest that it knew of the violative conduct. Instead, it
challenges both the jury's finding that it is liable for SSN's
conduct and the district court's separate determination that Dish's
violations of the law were knowing and willful.

Both arguments fail, and for the same reason: Dish characterizes
what are essentially factual disagreements as questions of law,
thereby failing to appreciate the substantial deference owed to the
careful findings made in the proceeding below.

The jury concluded that it was because SSN was acting as Dish's
agent when the calls were made. By its plain language, the TCPA's
private right of action contemplates that a company can be held
liable for calls made on its behalf, even if not placed by the
company directly. While we have no clear definition of on behalf of
in the TCPA, we may, at a minimum, assume that federal statutes are
written with familiar common law agency principles in mind.  

This settled law was clearly spelled out in the jury instructions.
The jury was asked to find whether or not SSN was Dish's agent at
the time it made the calls relevant to this case. If the jury had
answered that question in the negative, that would have ended the
matter. The court carefully explained that Krakauer had the burden
of showing such a relationship, and that the relationship required
mutual assent and control by Dish.

The court also instructed the jury on the scope of authority.
Specifically, the court instructed the jury how to assess a
situation, as we have here, wherein the principal's guidance to the
agent may not be explicit, but instead arises from the principal's
acquiescence to a course of conduct. As the district court
explained, to decide whether the principal acquiesced or consented,
you must find that the principal knew of prior similar activities
and consented or did not object to them.

In sum, the district court interpreted the statute to apply
standard legal principles. The question was then presented to the
jury, which ultimately held Dish liable. Despite Dish's assertions
that the district court somehow engaged in legal errors on this
point, its challenges bottom out on no more than a disagreement
about the facts.

And to prevail on the facts, Dish must show that the jury's
conclusion lacks any meaningful support, viewing the trial evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Dish has
fallen far short of clearing that bar. The evidence supporting an
agency relationship between Dish and SSN is considerable.

First, there are the many provisions of the contract between Dish
and SSN affording Dish broad authority over SSN's business,
including what technology it used and what records it retained.

Second, SSN was authorized to use Dish's name and logo in carrying
out its operation.

Third, the jury had before it the Voluntary Compliance Agreement
that Dish entered into with 46 state attorneys general, wherein
Dish clearly stated its authority over SSN with regard to TCPA
compliance. And on the issue of whether SSN was acting within the
scope of its authority, an array of witnesses testified that Dish
was aware of SSN's legal violations, took no meaningful action to
ensure compliance, and profited from SSN's actions. Faced with this
evidence, it was entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude both
that SSN was acting as Dish's agent, and that SSN was acting
pursuant to its authority when making the calls at issue in this
case.

Dish offers two arguments in response.

First, it contends that its contract with SSN, which expressly
defined the relationship between the parties, ought to outweigh the
evidence on the ground. It is a familiar rule of agency, however,
that parties cannot avoid the legal obligations of agency by simply
contracting out of them.  

Second, Dish argues that because it occasionally instructed SSN to
follow the law, no reasonable jury could conclude that SSN's
improper telemarketing calls were done within the scope of SSN's
authority as Dish's agent. Dish does not dispute that a principal
can be liable for the illegal acts of an agent. Nor does it dispute
that the acts of an agent can be within the scope of authority even
when no express direction is given by the principal. The jury was
properly instructed on these points and presented with evidence
showing that Dish knew of SSN's statutory violations and its
failure to comply with Dish's purported instructions. The evidence
also showed that Dish failed to respond to these concerns in any
serious way and was profiting handsomely from SSN's sales tactics.
It may be that Dish believes that its warnings and admonitions
should have been given greater weight by the jury. Because the jury
resolved this question and had extensive evidentiary support for
its conclusion, it does not matter whether Dish now believes its
argument to be convincing. Dish had its chance to persuade the
jury, and it lost.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4t4tbws from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: E. Joshua Rosenkranz -- jrosenkranz@orrick.com -- ORRICK,
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellant.

John William Barrett – jbarrett@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY &
GLASSER LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Peter A. Bicks  -- pbicks@orrick.com --  Elyse D. Echtman
-- eechtman@orrick.com -- John L. Ewald -- jewald@orrick.com --
Christopher J. Cariello -- ccariello@orrick.com -- New York, New
York, Eric A. Shumsky -- eshumsky@orrick.com -- Kelsi Brown Corkran
-- kcorkran@orrick.com -- Jeremy R. Peterman --
jpeterman@orrick.com -- Washington, D.C., Paul David Meyer
pmeyer@orrick.com -- ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Appellant.

Brian A. Glasser – bglasser@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER
LLP, Charleston, West Virginia; Deepak Gupta --
deepak@guptawessler.com -- Jonathan E. Taylor --
jon@guptawessler.com -- GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.


ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTING: TCPA Constitutional Challenge Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order
certifying a TCPA constitutional challenge in the case captioned
MICHAEL SEEFELDT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTING
INTERNATIONAL, LLC., OUTFIELD BREW HOUSE, LLC. d/b/a BUDWEISER BREW
HOUSE, Defendants. Case No. 4:19-cv-00188-SNLJ. (E.D. Mo.).

In response to a putative class-action brought by plaintiff Michael
Seefeldt, defendants Entertainment Consulting International, LLC.
and Outfield Brew House, LLC. have challenged the constitutionality
of a portion of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which
regulates the use of automated telephone dialing systems.
Defendants argue the TCPA violates both the First and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2403(a) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.1(b), this Court hereby certifies the constitutional
challenge to 47 U.S.C. Section 227 to the Attorney General of the
United States. The United States is granted leave to intervene in
the present action for purposes of presenting evidence and argument
on the constitutional challenge. Per this Court's prior Order, the
United States shall have until July 13, 2019, to decide whether it
will intervene.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxp3mkkf from
Leagle.com.

Michael Seefeldt, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony L. DeWitt,
BARTIMUS AND FRICKLETON, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS AND
FRICKLETON, 109B E. High Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101,
Aristotle N. Rodopoulos -- ari@woodlaw.com -- WOOD LAW FIRM, LLC,
pro hac vice & Kelly Clare Frickleton, BARTIMUS AND FRICKLETON,
109B E. High Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor, represented by Joshua Charles
Abbuhl, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE -- CIVIL DIVISION.

Entertainment Consulting International, LLC & Outfield Brew House,
LLC, doing business as Budweiser Brew House, Defendants,
represented by Geoffrey W. Castello -- gcastello@kelleydrye.com --
KELLEY AND DRYE, LLP, Lauri A. Mazzuchetti --
lmazzuchetti@KelleyDrye.com -- KELLEY AND DRYE, LLP, pro hac vice,
Glenn T. Graham – ggraham@kelleydrye.com -- KELLEY AND DRYE, LLP,
pro hac vice, Jacqueline M. Sexton -- jsexton@fwpclaw.com -- FOLAND
WICKENS, P.C., Whitney M. Smith, KELLEY AND DRYE, LLP & Zachary T.
Bowles, FOLAND WICKENS, P.C..


ENTRATA INC: Amaya Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------
RAPHAEL AMAYA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ENTRATA, INC., a Delaware Company, and CA
STUDENT LIVING HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22227-XXXX (S.D. Fla., May
31, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive
relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies,
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendants, in negligently or
willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"),
thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy.

This lawsuit challenges Defendants' alleged systematic violation of
the TCPA by sending unsolicited text message advertisements to
Plaintiff and others. Defendant CA Student promotes the rental of
apartments at Identity Miami, a fifteen-story apartment building in
Miami which it owns, to students at Florida International
University, in part by sending unsolicited text messages to
Plaintiff and others. Plaintiff was at no time given an option to
"opt-out" of receiving future unsolicited text messages from
Entrata. At no time did Plaintiff provide Plaintiff's cellular
phone number to Defendants through any medium, nor did Plaintiff
consent to receive such unsolicited text messages. Plaintiff has
never signed-up for, and has never used, Defendants' services, and
has never had any form of business relationship with Defendants,
says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Florida.

Entrata, Inc, is a Delaware Company and citizen of the state of
Utah. Entrata serves real property owners, property managers and
residents by providing property management software solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
     EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
     425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954-524-2820
     Facsimile: 954-524-2822
     Email: seth@epllc.com


EP WRAP-IT: Cisneros Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages, Damages
---------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Cisneros and Albert Estrada on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EP WRAP-IT INSULATION,
LLC; CYNTHIA LUCERO; AND ABRAM LUCERO, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-00500-GBW-GJF (D. N.M., May 31, 2019) is an action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and New Mexico Statutes to
recover unpaid overtime compensation, an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs from
Defendant.

Employees of EP Wrap-It are consistently required to work over 40
hours in a seven-day workweek. All hours worked over 40 hours in a
work week is required to be compensated at no less than 1 and 1/2
the employee's regular wage. As a result, Plaintiffs and others
similarly situated, were not adequately compensated in violation of
the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act as EP Wrap-It has willfully and
intentionally failed to provide employees with overtime
compensation owed for the three years prior to the filing of this
suit, says the complaint.

Plaintiffs Abram Lucero and Cynthia Lucero are Officers of
Defendant EP Wrap-It and regulate the payment of wages to EP
Wrap-It employees.

EP Wrap-It has been a Texas Limited Liability Corporation. It has
been engaged in construction activities of installing insulation in
the El Paso area and the adjacent areas of New Mexico.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     James Montalbano, Esq.
     YOUTZ & VALDEZ, P.C.
     900 Gold Avenue, S.W.
     Albuquerque, NM 87102
     Phone: 505-244-1200
     Fax: 505-244-9700

          - and -

     Anne I. Yen, Esq.
     WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD
     1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200
     Alameda, CA 94501-1091
     Phone 510.337.1001
     Fax 510.337.1023


FACEBOOK INC: Court OKs Records, Books Inspection in Sec 220 Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Chancery of Delaware issued a Memorandum Opinion
directing Facebook Inc. to allow inspection of the books and
records designated in the case captioned IN RE FACEBOOK, INC.
SECTION 220 LITIGATION, Consolidated C.A. No. 2018-0661-JRS. (Del.
Ch.)

Plaintiff, Construction and General Building Laborers' Local No. 79
General Fund (Local No. 79), served a demand to inspect Facebook's
books and records (Demand) under Section 220 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law (Section 220).

After The Guardian and The New York Times published articles on the
Cambridge Analytica breach, the Company received inspection demands
from multiple Facebook stockholders under Section 220, including
each of the three plaintiffs in this consolidated action.

Plaintiff Local No. 79 sent its Demand to Facebook's Board. The
Demand focused on Facebook's failure to secure its users' private
data and specified three purposes for inspection of Facebook's
books and records: (1) to investigate and assess the actual and
potential wrongdoing, mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty
by members of the Company's Board (2) to assess the ability of the
Company's Board to impartially consider a demand for action
(including for the filing of a derivative lawsuit on the Company's
behalf and (3) to take appropriate action in the event the members
of the Company's Board did not discharge their fiduciary duties,
including the preparation and filing of a shareholder derivative
lawsuit, if appropriate.

Local No. 79 stated that its purpose for inspection was to
investigate and assess the actual and potential wrongdoing,
mismanagement, and breaches of fiduciary duties by the members of
the Company's Board in connection with the data privacy breaches
and to investigate the independence and disinterestedness" of the
Company's directors.

When discussions between the parties regarding the scope of
Facebook's production broke down, Local No. 79 filed its Verified
Complaint to Compel Inspection.

In its answer to that Complaint, Facebook denied the Plaintiff had
stated a proper purpose for inspection and maintained that, even if
a proper purpose had been stated, the Plaintiff was not entitled to
inspect any documents beyond those already produced.

Specifically, Facebook asserted the Complaint failed to plead a
credible basis to infer that Facebook's directors breached their
duty of oversight, or any other aspect of their fiduciary duties,
because the Cambridge Analytica breach resulted from the
unanticipated acts of third parties who had managed to compromise
Facebook's existing (and adequate) data privacy systems.

The Plaintiffs argue the evidence presented at trial provides a
credible basis from which the court can infer that mismanagement,
waste or wrongdoing may have occurred. Specifically, they contend
they have presented some evidence that members of the Board and
Facebook senior management knowingly implemented policies that
placed user data at risk of misappropriation and failed to monitor
Facebook's compliance with the Consent Decree and, more generally,
its efforts to protect its users' private information. The books
and records identified in the Demand, say Plaintiffs, are necessary
and proper to investigate this potential wrongdoing.

Facebook responds that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a
credible basis to infer Facebook's directors breached their
Caremark obligations. Even if a credible basis to infer wrongdoing
has been demonstrated, Facebook argues Plaintiffs' inspection
requests are not circumscribed with requisite precision because
they are not] limited to those documents that are necessary,
essential and sufficient to the stockholder's purpose.

Section 220's Minimal Burden of Proof

A stockholder of a Delaware corporation may inspect the
corporation's books and records for any proper purpose rationally
related to the stockholder's interest as a stockholder. An intent
to investigate mismanagement or wrongdoing is a proper purpose if
supported by the requisite evidentiary showing.

To demonstrate that an investigative purpose is proper, the
stockholder must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
credible basis from which the court can infer that mismanagement,
waste or wrongdoing may have occurred. The credible basis standard
is the lowest burden of proof known in our law; it requires merely
that the plaintiff put forward some evidence of wrongdoing. After
demonstrating a proper purpose, a plaintiff seeking inspection must
next demonstrate that `each category of books and records requested
is essential and sufficient to its stated purpose.

Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated Proper Purposes for Inspection

The preponderance of the evidence presented at trial provides a
credible basis to infer the Board and Facebook senior executives
failed to oversee Facebook's compliance with the Consent Decree and
its broader efforts to protect the private data of its users.  

First, the Plaintiffs presented the Parliamentary Report where,
after summarizing emails, meeting minutes, witness interviews and
other evidence, the Parliamentary Committee concluded the Cambridge
Analytica Scandal was facilitated by Facebook's policies and the
incident displays the fundamental weakness of Facebook in managing
its responsibilities to the people whose data is used for its own
Commercial purposes.

According to the Parliamentary Report, if Facebook had fully
complied with the Consent Decree, the Cambridge Analatica scandal
would not have happened.

Second, the Consent Decree demonstrates that an enforceable
regulatory order mandated that the Company's management and its
Board implement and monitor Facebook's compliance with specifically
identified and detailed data privacy procedures.

The Consent Decree was an affirmative obligation imposed on the
Company much like positive law. The legal academy has observed that
Delaware courts are more inclined to find Caremarkoversight
liability at the board level when the company operates in the midst
of obligations imposed upon it by positive law yet fails to
implement compliance systems, or fails to monitor existing
compliance systems, such that a violation of law and resulting
liability occurs.

The Plaintiffs have presented a credible basis to infer that the
Board acted with disobedience by allowing Facebook to violate the
Consent Decree. They are entitled to inspect books and records to
investigate that potential wrongdoing.

Third, the Plaintiffs point to information released to the public
sphere since they initiated their Demand indicating that a key
component of Facebook's business plan was to monetize access to
user data through agreements with partners based on reciprocity,
even after entering into the Consent Decree. Facebook's long-term
business model was to go with full reciprocity and access to app
friends, permitting business partners to obtain full information
from users, including users' Facebook friends. here is some
evidence Facebook whitelisted these business partners, giving them
unauthorized access to the Facebook platform and Facebook's user
data for a substantial fee. All the while, its users were left in
the dark.

Fourth, the Plaintiffs presented a credible basis to infer the
Board knew the Company was allowing unauthorized third-party access
to user data. The New York Times reported Erskine Bowles, chairman
of the Audit Committee, received a report from Stamos, then Chief
Information Security Officer, and Colin Stretch, Facebook's General
Counsel, about Russian interference with the Facebook platform and
potential data privacy violations. On the same day, Bowles
questioned Zuckerberg and Sandberg at a full Board meeting
regarding the extent to which they, and other Facebook senior
management, had been transparent with the Board regarding data
privacy issues.

Fifth, the Plaintiffs have provided evidence that multiple
regulatory authorities have opened investigations into Facebook's
data privacy lapses. Perhaps most troubling, following the
Cambridge Analytica breach, the FTC opened an investigation to
determine the extent to which Facebook violated the Consent Decree.
News outlets have recently reported the investigation could result
in a multibillion dollar fine against Facebook, the largest fine
ever imposed by the FTC.

After the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the ICO fined Facebook the
maximum fine permitted under British law, GBP500,000, for
permitting third party developers to access user information
without sufficient consent. In addition, the Parliamentary Report
revealed the ICO concluded that Facebook's business practices and
the way applications interact with data on the platform have
contravened data protections law.

Finally, Facebook is subject to numerous lawsuits based on the same
underlying misconduct.
These complaints further support Plaintiffs' credible basis to
infer wrongdoing.

In light of the low Section 220 evidentiary threshold, the Court is
satisfied the Plaintiffs have proven legitimate issues of
wrongdoing."  Stated differently, the Plaintiffs have presented
some evidence that Facebook's directors and officers may have
breached their Caremark duties, particularly in light of the
Consent Decree in place at the time of most of the data privacy
breaches alleged in this action.  Accordingly, they have
demonstrated a proper purpose to inspect certain documents related
to this potential wrongdoing.

Having demonstrated a credible basis to investigate wrongdoing in
connection with Facebook's protection of data privacy, the
Plaintiffs have also supported their Demand to inspect books and
records relating to director independence.  

Scope of Production

The Plaintiffs seek to inspect seven categories of books and
records they claim address the crux of their stated purposes. Some
of these materials are necessary and essentia; others are not.

Specifically, the Court is satisfied that the following categories
of non-privileged documents relating to the following topics
(Ordered Documents) are necessary and essential to pursue
Plaintiffs' proper purposes and should be produced:

   (1) Hard-copy documents provided to, or generated by, the Board
relating to investigations conducted by the FTC, DOJ, SEC, FBI and
ICO regarding Facebook's data privacy practices (Investigation
Documents);

   (2) Facebook's formally adopted policies and procedures
respecting data privacy and access to user data, including those
promulgated following the entry of the Consent Decree (Policies and
Procedures);

   (3) Facebook's Atlas (SOC1 & SOC 2/3), Custom Audience (SOC 2/3)
and Workplace (SOC 2/3) audits performed on behalf of the Company,
and any other formal internal audits performed regarding compliance
with Facebook formal data privacy policies and procedures or with
the Consent Decree (Audit Documents);

   (4) documents concerning the independence of Facebook's
directors and committees of the Board, particularly the Board
disclosure questionnaires (Independence Documents); and

   (5) electronic communications, if coming from, directed to or
copied to a member of the Board, concerning Facebook's post-Consent
Decree whitelist practices, post-Consent Decree government
investigations into Facebook's data privacy practices and
compliance with the Consent Decree, to be collected from the
following custodians: Erskine B. Bowles, Sheryl Sandberg, Alex
Stamos, and Mark Zuckerberg (Communication Documents).

Because many of the Plaintiffs' document demands landed with the
precision of buckshot, the Court have tailored the inspection award
to the purposes articulated in their inspection Demand.

Thus, the Court have denied the Plaintiffs' request for
correspondence with the FTC at or near the time the Consent Decree
was entered because those documents are far removed from what the
Plaintiffs seek to investigate now. The Court have similarly denied
the Plaintiffs' request for documents relating to third party
access to and handling of Facebook user data, including agreements
with other companies regarding the same" beyond any such documents
that might be within the Ordered Documents.  

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's May 30, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2lbc5ou from
Leagle.com.

Samuel L. Closic -- slclosic@prickett.com -- Esquire, of Prickett,
Jones & Elliott, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware and Frank R. Schirripa
-- fschirripa@hrsclaw.com -- Esquire, and Daniel B. Rehns --
drehns@hrsclaw.com -- Esquire, of Hach Rose Schirripa & Cheverie
LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff Construction and
General Building Laborers' Local Union No. 79 General Fund and
Co-Lead Counsel.

David E. Ross --  dross@ramllp.com -- Esquire, and R. Garrett Rice
-- grice@ramllp.com --  Esquire, of Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Orin Snyder -- osnyder@gibsondunn.com --
Esquire, of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York, New York;
Kristin A. Linsley -- klinsley@gibsondunn.com -- Esquire, and Brian
M. Lutz -- blutz@gibsondunn.com --  Esquire, of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; Paul J. Collins --
pcollins@gibsondunn.com --  Esquire, of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Palo Alto, California; and Joshua S. Lipshutz --
jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- Esquire, of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendant Facebook, Inc.


FAST AUTO LOANS: Maldonaldo Sues Over Unreasonable Interest Rates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOE MALDONADO, ALFREDO MENDEZ, J. PETER TUMA, JONABETTE MICHELLE
TUMA, ROBERTO MATEOS SALMERON, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. FAST AUTO LOANS, INC. DBA
RPM LENDERS, a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 300,
Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 30-2019-01073154-CU-BT -CXC (Cal.
Super Ct., Orange Cty., May 30, 2019) is brought by Plaintiffs for
themselves and all other similarly-situated California consumers
who take out personal loans from Defendant.

The complaint asserts that the Defendant Fast Auto Loans'
pernicious loan terms create a scenario where most consumers take
out a loan in times of emergency or financial stress only to find
later that the loan is unable to be repaid within any reasonable
time period or payment which impairs their ability to comply with
other financial obligations, resulting in the need to re-borrow. In
many cases, consumers are unable to simply avoid default. As the
loans progresses, Fast Auto Loans reaps significant profits from
its exorbitant interest and fees, while consumers are unable to
tangibly decrease the principal balance, or are forced to take out
additional loans at usurious rates. Once consumers fall into
default, Fast Auto Loans compounds its profits by adding default
interest and penalties, says the complaint.

The Defendant's business model is to charge exorbitantly high,
usurious, and unconscionable interest rates, in direct violation of
California law. Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of ill-gotten profits,
statutory damages, punitive damages, public injunctive relief, and
attorney's fees and costs.

Plaintiffs are individual citizens and residents of the United
States of America, State of California who entered into a Loan
Agreement with Defendant.

Fast Auto Loan's primary business is offering short-term loans
across the nation to low income borrowers with extreme and
unconscionable interest rates, at times as high as 180% APR.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Isam C. Khoury, Esq.
     Michael D. Singer, Esq.
     Kristina De La Rosa, Esq.
     COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER
     605 C Street, Suite 200
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 595-3001
     Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
     Email: ikhoury@ckslaw.com
            msinger@ckslaw.com
            kdelarosa@ckslaw.com

          - and -

     Rodney Mesriani, Esq.
     MESRIANI LAW GROUP, APLC
     5723 Melrose Avenue
     Los Angeles, CA 9003 8
     Phone: (310) 826-6300
     Facsimile: (310) 820-1258
     Email: rodney@mesriani.com

FIDELITY CAPITAL: Certification of Class Sought in Johnson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Pielarz Johnson moves the Court to certify the class
described in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned ELIZABETH
PIELARZ JOHNSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. FIDELITY CAPITAL HOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a FIDELITY
INFORMATION CORPORATION, Case No. 2:19-cv-00722-PP (E.D. Wisc.),
and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


FIRST AMERICAN: Bahnmaier Files Class Action in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First American
Financial Corporation. The case is styled as Donald J Bahnmaier,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. First American Financial Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 8:19-cv-01040 (C.D. Cal., May 29, 2019).

First American Financial Corporation is a United States financial
services company and is a leading provider of title insurance and
settlement services to the real estate and mortgage
industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Tina Wolfson, Esq.
   Ahdoot and Wolfson PC
   10728 Lindbrook Drive
   Los Angeles, CA 90024
   Tel: (310) 474-9111
   Fax: (310) 474-8585
   Email: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com



FLOOR & DECOR: Taylor Sues over Share Price Drop
------------------------------------------------
GRANT TAYLOR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. FLOOR & DECOR HOLDINGS, INC., THOMAS
V. TAYLOR, JR., TREVOR S. LANG, ARES CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES FUND
III, L.P., FS CAPITAL PARTNERS VI, LLC, FS EQUITY PARTNERS VI,
L.P., FS AFFILIATES VI, L.P. and FREEMAN SPOGLI MANAGEMENT CO.,
L.P., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02270-SCJ (N.D. Ga., May 20,
2019), seeks remedies for Defendants' violations of sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a securities class action on behalf of all persons or
entities who purchased the common stock of Floor & Decor Holdings,
Inc. between May 23, 2018 and August 1, 2018, inclusive.

The Company purports to offer the industry's broadest in-stock
assortment of tile, wood, laminate and natural stone flooring,
along with decorative and installation accessories, at everyday low
prices, which positions it as the one-stop destination for its
customers' entire hard surface flooring needs. One of the Company's
key differentiating factors is its large warehouse-format stores,
which carry a high inventory of hard surface flooring and tools and
accessories in order to offer customers immediate availability on
everything needed to complete entire flooring or remodeling
projects.

The Company conducted its initial public offering ("IPO") on May 2,
2017, raising gross proceeds of $213 million. Floor & Decor stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange under Ticker symbol "FND."
The Company, since its IPO, has reported strong sales growth and
product demand from its customers. The Company has also
aggressively opened new stores in both semi-rural and more densely
populated geographies. In addition, the Company has begun to
compete more directly with larger retailers that sell flooring
products, including Lowes, Home Depot and Lumber Liquidators.

On November 15, 2017, the Company conducted a secondary offering of
6.5 million shares of its common stock at $36.00 per share to be
sold by certain stockholders of the Company. The November 15, 2017
secondary offering closed on or around November 20, 2017.

On May 3, 2018, the Company issued a press release announcing its
financial results for the first quarter of fiscal 2018, ended March
29, 2018. The financial results beat the Company's reported revenue
and earnings expectations and the Company also increased its
financial projections for the remainder of fiscal 2018:

As a result of these disclosures and the significant reduction in
the Company's fiscal year 2018 sales and EPS outlook, Floor &
Decor's stock price declined more than 21%, from a close of $47.71
per share on August 1, 2018 to a close of $37.50 per share on
August 3, 2018.

Floor & Decor describes itself as a high-growth differentiated
multi-channel specialty retailer of hard surface flooring and
related accessories, with warehouse-format stores across 21
states.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

          John C. Herman, Esq.
          Shawn A. Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          Monarch Tower, Suite 1650
          3424 Peachtree Road, N.E.
          Atlanta, GA 30326
          Telephone: 404 504-6500
          Facsimile: 404 504-6501
          E-mail: shawnw@rgrdlaw.com
                  jherman@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael I. Fistel, Jr.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: 470 632-6000
          Facsimile: 770 200-3101
          E-mail: michaelf@johnsonfistel.com

FOCUS SERVICES: Pretzsch Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
MIKAYLA PRETZSCH, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. FOCUS SERVICES, LLC, AND FOCUS
SERVICES ILLINOIS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03599 (N.D.
Ill., May 30, 2019) is a class and collective action brought by
Plaintiff on her own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated
current and/or former Customer Service Representative employees
("CSRs") of Defendants to recover for Defendants' willful violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law ("IMWL"), Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA),
alleged contractual obligations (or unjust enrichment if no
contract is found), and other appropriate rules, regulations,
statutes, and ordinances.

Throughout Plaintiff's employments with Defendants, she regularly
worked at least 40 hours per workweek. In reckless disregard of the
FLSA, the IMWL, and the IWPCA protections afforded to Plaintiff and
similarly situated individuals, Defendants adopted and then adhered
to its policy and plan that denied payment of overtime premiums at
one-and-one half times the regular rate for hours worked in excess
of 40 in a workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly employee from
approximately December 2017 through December 2018 as a Customer
Service Representative.

FOCUS SERVICES, LLC, AND FOCUS SERVICES ILLINOIS, LLC., offer
customer service solutions that includes, but is not limited to,
telephone calls, email, and chat services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter J. Flowers, Esq.
     MEYERS & FLOWERS, LLC
     3 North Second Street, Suite 300
     St. Charles, IL 60174
     Phone: (630) 232-6333
     Fax: (630) 845-8982
     Email: pjf@meyers-flowers.com

          - and -

     Jacob R. Rusch, Esq.
     JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
     444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
     Saint Paul, MN 55101
     Phone: (612) 436-1800
     Fax: (612) 436-1801
     Email: jrusch@johnsonbecker.com


GALEANA CHRYSLER:  Unsolicited Telemarketing Violates TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------
PEGGY BENSTINE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GALEANA CHRYSLER JEEP, INC., a Florida
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00366-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla.,
May 31, 2019) is an action against the Defendant to secure redress
for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

To gain an advantage over its competitors and increase its revenue,
Defendant engages in unsolicited telemarketing, with no regard for
consumers' privacy rights, asserts the complaint. This case arises
from Defendant's transmission of prerecorded messages to the
cellular telephones of Plaintiff and others, promoting Defendant's
services and goods.

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the invasion of
privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life
of thousands of individuals.

Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this
action, was a resident of Lee County, Florida.

Defendant is an automotive dealership that sells vehicles for
individuals and businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
     SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
     14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
     Miami, FL 33132
     Phone: 305-479-2299
     Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

          - and -

     Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
     EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
     19495 Biscayne Blvd #607
     Aventura, FL 33180
     Phone: 305-975-3320
     Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


GEICO GENERAL: A&M Gerber Suit Remanded to Florida State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the judgment of the District Court granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned A&M
GERBER CHIROPRACTIC LLC, as assignee of Conor Carruthers, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-15606.
(11th Cir.).

Conor Carruthers was involved in a car accident on March 18, 2015,
after which he sought medical services from A&M Gerber Chiropractic
LLC. At the time, Carruthers was covered under an automobile
insurance policy issued by GEICO General Insurance Company.
Pursuant to Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, the policy
provided him with $10,000 in personal injury protection It is
undisputed that Carruthers was not diagnosed with an EMC at the
time this case was filed. It is also undisputed that, despite the
lack of an Emergency Medical Condition (EMC) finding, GEICO paid
Carruthers/Gerber $7,311 in PIP benefits pre-suit, well in excess
of the $2,500 cap.

Even though Carruthers received almost triple the amount in PIP
benefits that he was entitled to, Gerber believed that GEICO had
misinterpreted certain language in its automobile policies and that
this misinterpretation resulted in GEICO consistently underpaying
PIP benefits as a general business practice.

GEICO has taken the position that the policy is an 80/20 policy
pursuant to which it was required to pay the lower of 80% of the
fee schedule amount or 80% of the charged amount, while insureds
are required to pay the remaining 20% as co-insurance.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

FEE SCHEDULE ENDORSEMENT

It provides in relevant part that in no event will the Company pay
more than 80 percent of properly billed medical expenses. GEICO
asserts that M608 (01-13) is an endorsement and, thus, part of the
policy. Gerber has argued that M608 (01-13) is not an
endorsement/part of the policy, and it further argues that FLPIP
(01-13) provides that when a health care provider bills for
services at an amount less than 200% of the fee schedule, GEICO
must pay the charge as billed, that is, in the amount of the charge
submitted, without the 20% reduction.

Carruthers assigned his rights to his treating chiropractic clinic,
Gerber, which later filed a declaratory judgment class action suit
in Florida state court in September 2016. The complaint sought
certification of a class (with Gerber as the class representative)
along with a declaration (a) that GEICO's interpretation of its
policy language was wrong, and (b) that the misinterpretation
constitutes a breach of the insurance Policy.  

GEICO removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in November 2016, pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act, and Gerber filed an unsuccessful motion
to remand the case for lack of Article III standing.  

Shortly after the action was removed to federal court, and while
its motion to remand was pending, Gerber filed an amended
complaint. The amended complaint was largely the same as the
original complaint, but it added another sentence to re-emphasize
that "this action does not assert a claim for any monetary relief,"
and it deleted the request for a declaration that GEICO's
misinterpretation of the disputed policy language constitutes a
breach of the insurance Policy.

On cross motions for summary judgment, GEICO argued, inter alia,
that Gerber lacked standing at the outset of the lawsuit because it
was undisputed that GEICO had paid Gerber more than $2,500 before
the case was filed, even though he had not been diagnosed with an
EMC at that time. By order dated November 17, 2017, the District
Court disagreed with GEICO and found there was standing. It also
ruled that M608 (01-13) was not an endorsement but rather was
merely a notice and, thus, it was not part of the policy.

Applying a textual interpretation of the FLPIP (01-13) endorsement,
the District Court granted summary judgment for Gerber and held
that, under the disputed provision, when a health care provider
bills for covered services in an amount less than 200% of the fee
schedule, GEICO is required to pay the charge as billed without any
reduction.

GEICO now appeals, arguing that Gerber lacked standing to bring
this case.

It further argues that the District Court erred in certifying the
class; in limiting the documents that comprise the policy (that is,
in failing to treat M608 (01-13) as an endorsement); and in ruling
for Gerber on the merits as to the policy interpretation question.

The Court must begin with the question of standing. If there is no
standing, the Court must end there, too.

In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues. The party who invokes a federal court's
authority must show, at an irreducible minimum, that at the time
the complaint was filed, he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct, that the injury
fairly can be traced to the challenged action, and that the injury
is likely to be redressed by favorable court disposition.

In this case, Gerber, as assignee, stands in Carruthers' shoes.  An
assignee stands in the same position as its assignor had stood. It
necessarily follows, then, that if Carruthers had no standing to
file this case against GEICO, Gerber has no standing either.  

It is well-settled that if none of the named plaintiffs purporting
to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or
controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of
himself or any other member of the class.

Importantly, Article III standing must be determined as of the time
that the plaintiff's complaint is filed.  

GEICO argues on appeal that Carruthers was only entitled to $2,500
in PIP benefits under the policy because there was no EMC diagnosis
at the time the complaint was filed. Consequently, Gerber, as
Carruthers' assignee, was not entitled to benefits beyond $2,500.
Because GEICO paid much more than that amount, Carruthers/Gerber
didn't suffer harm as a result of GEICO's alleged misapplication of
its policy.

According to GEICO, no matter how the Court interpret the disputed
policy language, Gerber will not be able to recover anything from
GEICO, i.e., there was no injury to Carruthers resulting from
GEICO's conduct that can be fairly traced to the challenged action
and redressed by a favorable court ruling), thereby eliminating the
existence of a case or controversy. GEICO is correct.

In finding that Gerber had standing in the order under review, the
District Court relied on a single case: Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
511 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2008). Based on that case, the District
Court held that GEICO's pre-suit (and pre-EMC) payment in excess of
the statutory cap didn't implicate standing, but, rather, it was an
exhaustion of benefits affirmative defense. The District Court's
reliance on Mills was misplaced.

The plaintiffs in that case, Dale and Diane Mills, owned a mobile
home that was insured under a policy issued by the defendant,
Foremost Insurance Company. They filed a class action alleging that
Foremost had failed to pay them and other insureds for overhead,
profit, and taxes after they sustained hurricane-damaged losses,
and they sought compensation for those Withheld Payments.

Notably and in contrast to this action, the plaintiffs in Mills
were seeking both declaratory relief and damages for breach of
contract. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had failed to
satisfy certain preconditions in the policy that allegedly required
them to complete repair or replacement of their damaged property
first and then submit a repair or replacement cost claim to the
insurance company before entitling them to the Withheld Payments.
Foremost argued that the Millses' failure to do so deprived them of
standing, and the District Court agreed.

In reversing, the Court began by holding the District Court erred
in interpreting the policy to require that the Millses jump through
the aforementioned hoops.  

Therefore, Mills was not, as here, an exhaustion of benefits case.
Rather, it was a coverage dispute that included a breach of
contract claim seeking damages arising out of that dispute. This
distinction is critical because if the plaintiffs had prevailed in
Mills, they would have been entitled to the Withheld Payments.
Thus, we found there that the Millses clearly had standing to sue
for damages under the Policy because the plaintiffs alleged that
the insurer paid them less on the claim than they contend they are
owed, and a ruling in their favor on that point would entitle them
to the money owed.  

Gerber now argues directly contrary to what it previously argued
that there is a risk of future injury here. Specifically, Gerber
argues that the dispute about the policy language will continue or
be repeated in the future, and it will injure Gerber and other
chiropractors insofar as they don't know whether to tell their
patients that GEICO is responsible for the full 100% of the
relevant charges, or whether the patients are responsible for 20%.

  
This is significant, Gerber's counsel noted during oral argument,
as evidenced by the fact that GEICO had indirectly accused Gerber
of insurance fraud in this case for not attempting to collect the
20% from Carruthers, and such accusations could adversely impact
its license in the future.  

Whether and to what extent Gerber might be injured is beside the
point because the proper inquiry in this case must focus on the
potential future injury to Carruthers, not to Gerber or other
members of the class. And the Court can see no potential future
threat to Carruthers, other than the possibility that he may
someday be in another car accident; sustain an injury entitling him
to PIP benefits; and still be insured by GEICO under the same or a
similar policy being interpreted the same way, thereby having this
issue present itself again. But, that is too contingent to
constitute a substantial likelihood of future injury.  

In the absence of a claim for money damages or substantial
likelihood that Carruthers will suffer a future injury, both of
which Gerber was careful to avoid alleging here, Gerber has no
standing to pursue this case.

The Court recognizes that this appeal raises an important issue for
GEICO's Florida PIP policyholders and for medical providers
treating them. And the Court recognizes, too, that the lawsuit has
been pending for several years and has consumed a lot of both
judicial and attorney resources. If we could, we would reach the
merits and give finality to the questions presented. But the Court
cannot. In the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine in
an advisory capacity about the merits of a plaintiff's claims.
Again, standing is perhaps the most important' jurisdictional
doctrine, and, as with any jurisdictional requisite, we are
powerless to hear a case when it is lacking.

Because the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this
suit, the Court vacates its judgment. The District Court is
instructed to enter an order remanding the case to the Circuit
Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward
County, Florida.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yxs2xo4f from Leagle.com.

Mark S. Fistos, 110 Southeast 6th Street, Suite 2150, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL 33301, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Edward H. Zebersky -- ezebersky@zpllp.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Todd S. Payne -- tpayne@zpllp.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bryan Scott Gowdy, 865 May Street, Jacksonville, FL  32204  for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Steven R. Jaffe -- sjaffe@uww-adr.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gary M. Farmer, Sr., 425 North Andrews, Avenue #2Ft., Lauderdale,
FL 33301, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas L. Hunker -- thomas.hunker@csklegal.com --  for
Defendant-Appellant.

Michael Trent Lewenz, 110 Southeast 6th Street, Suite 2150, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL 33301, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Peter D. Weinstein -- peter.weinstein@entralta.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.


HALL MANAGEMENT: Martinez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HALL MANAGEMENT
CORP., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. The case is styled as ERIKA
MARTINEZ, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff v. HALL MANAGEMENT CORP., A CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION, HALL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,
Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-101497 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., May
30, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Hall Management Corporation was founded in 2001. The Company's line
of business includes providing management services on a contract
and fee basis. Hall Management operates in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by PAUL K HAINES, ESQ.
     


HAWAII: Education Dep't Faces Class Suit Over Title IX Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mika Miyashima, writing for KITV4, reports that a local civil
rights group is still pushing to put boys and girls on equal
playing fields. Last December, the American Civil Liberties Union
of Hawaii filed a federal lawsuit against the State Department of
Education, alleging Title IX violations. Now, it's trying to
officially classify this as a class action lawsuit.

This federal law requires boys and girls to have equal
opportunities in sports. Any institution that accepts federal money
is required to comply with Title IX.

ACLU attorney Wookie Kim is a member of the legal team that filed
the lawsuit. He explains the case: "This lawsuit is filed on behalf
of two female athletes at Campbell High School."

The lawsuit is filed as a class action, "which means those two
girls are trying to represent all present and future female
athletes or female students at Campbell High School," he
continues.

The ACLU of Hawaii filed its latest motion for Class Certification.
Kim explains that's "basically the formal request with the court to
approve the lawsuit as a formal class action."

"Part of the process is getting the class of plaintiffs certified.
We're now formally asking the court - as part of the class action
procedures - to certify that the two individual plaintiffs can
represent a broader 'class' of female athletes," adds ACLU of
Hawaii executive director Josh Wisch.

Until the court or judge formally "certifies" a lawsuit as a class
action, it technically is not a class action. The technical legal
term to refer to a class action lawsuit before it is certified is
"putative class action" - so that's what was filed last December.

If approved, the lawsuit would combine individual lawsuits of many
different people into one. "There is a reason why we're filing this
as a class action lawsuit, because this is not the first time the
ACLU has been involved in Title IX issues and DOE schools."

Part of the lawsuit states that facilities weren't booked on time:
equipment wasn't up to regulation and posed safety hazards, and the
coaching for females was inconsistent.

The next step is a hearing on the motion. Kim details, "The
Department of Education and the Oahu Interscholastic Association
will have an opportunity to oppose our motion and make arguments
that this lawsuit should not proceed as a class action."

Supporting the motion are five declarations from the plaintiff
families. A mother of one of the plantiffs, identified anonymously
as "K.T.," was quoted as saying, I have seen that Campbell does not
treat female athletes equally.  The experience of the girls' on the
swim team and water polo team shows how Campbell has treated female
athletes unequally . . . For at least the past three years,
Campbell failed to timely secure a facility for the girls' swimming
and water polo teams.  Every year, the pool facility is addressed
at the last minute or even after the start of the season. The
coaches at Kapolei High School do not have these same problems with
securing facilities."

KT's daughter is a water polo player and swimmer. KT says she met
with Campbell administrators to address this issue, but found them
"hostile." She and her daughter left the meeting in tears,
according to the declaration. She says she's "disgusted" with the
situation and accuses the school of "discrimination." All five
declarations carry a similar tone.

The hearing is scheduled for July 5.

KITV4 Island News reached out to the Department of Education on
this latest turn, but has not yet heard back. In previous stories
on the issue, the DOE has repeatedly stated it cannot comment on
pending legal issues. [GN]


HOMEAWAY.COM INC: World Suit Removed to Northern District of Ohio
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit entitled World, LLC, Individually and as
Representative Plaintiff on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
v. HomeAway.com, Inc., et al., Case No. CV 19 913545, was removed
on May 9, 2019, from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
(Cleveland).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01048 to the
proceeding.

In its complaint, the Plaintiff alleges violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[BN]

Defendant HomeAway.com, Inc., is represented by:

          Michael J. Zbiegien, Jr., Esq.
          TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER
          3500 BP Tower
          200 Public Square
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 241-2838
          Facsimile: (216) 241-3707
          E-mail: mzbiegien@taftlaw.com


INPIRE BRANDS: Doyen Files ADA Suit in Minnesota
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Inspire Brands, Inc.
The case is styled as Gerald Doyen individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Inspire Brands, Inc.,
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
0:19-cv-01441-JNE-BRT (D. Minn., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Inspire Brands, Inc., formerly Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., is
the owner of the Arby's restaurant chain, Buffalo Wild Wings, Rusty
Taco and Sonic Drive-In.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Chad Throndset, Esq.
     Patrick W Michenfelder, Esq.
     Throndset Michenfelder, LLC
     One Central Avenue West, Suite 203
     St. Michael, MN 55376
     Phone: (763) 515-6110
     Email: chad@throndsetlaw.com
            pat@throndsetlaw.com


INTUIT INC: Cook Sues for Deceptive Ad Over Tax Filing Software
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAKESIA COOK, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. INTUIT, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-01011 (C.D. Cal., June 2, 2019) is a Class Action Complaint
to challenge the deceptive advertising and business practices of
Defendant, with regard to Defendant's tax filing software commonly
known as "Turbo Tax," by which Intuit used to promote/advertise
purportedly "Free" tax filing services to millions of low earning
Americans, only to deliberately divert them to their paid software
services despite the consumers being eligible to obtain such tax
filing services at no cost at all.

Intuit and other electronic tax filing service providers entered
into an agreement with the Internal Revenue Service to service
millions of low-income earning taxpayers. The initiative that
sprung from this agreement came to be known as the "Free File
Program". The Free File Program requires all the tax filing service
providers that are a party to the agreement to provide online tax
preparation and electronic filing at no cost to those taxpayers who
make less than $66,000 or less in gross annual income. However, due
to the manner in which Intuit's markets the Turbo Tax software
online through search engines such as Google, more often than not
consumers like the Plaintiff and others are intentionally lead to
paid versions of the tax filing software of the Defendant, or a
very limited "free" version of tax filing that helps only the most
basic of tax returns before prompting the individual to pay for
extra services if your tax return is not the simplest.

Although Defendant does have a software program that complies with
the Free File Program ("Turbo Tax Freedom Edition") that was
initiated in partnership with the IRS, Defendant employs practices
that make this particular program difficult to find online by using
certain coding tactics that segregate the true Free File Program
compliant program that includes numerous tax file forms from the
very limited "free" edition. The Turbo Tax Free File Program
compliance software is not even accessible on Intuit's main Turbo
Tax website. Instead, consumers have to type in the specific phrase
in the search engine to ensure they got the right link to pop up
during the search. These kinds of deceptive practices are a direct
breach of the agreement that
Intuit entered into via the Free File Program and result in the
exploitation of millions of consumers paying for services that
should have been truly free as advertised and per the
qualifications set by the Free File Program, says the complaint.

The Defendant's nationwide sale and advertising of deceptively
marketed electronic tax filing products are violations of: (1)
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) California's
False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (3) California's Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL"); and constitute (4) negligent misrepresentation; and
(5) intentional misrepresentation, the Plaintiff says.

Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
California.

Defendant has manufactured and/or distributed various products,
including Turbo Tax, a widely used electronic tax preparation and
filing software product and service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
     Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
     Nick Barthel, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ak@kazlg.com
            jason@kazlg.com
            nicholas@kazlg.com


INTUIT INC: Faces Class Action Over "Free to File" Program
----------------------------------------------------------
Gibbs Law Group LLP and Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP have filed the
first nationwide class action lawsuit on behalf of low-income
taxpayers who were tricked into paying for tax-filing services that
should have been free to them through a government-mandated
agreement between TurboTax and the IRS. The lawsuit alleges that
TurboTax's parent Intuit, Inc. created a large-scale marketing
campaign to promote its "Free Guaranteed" tax-filing program but
then intentionally hid those services from qualified taxpayers, and
purposely diverted them to its paid product offerings. This scheme
resulted in TurboTax collecting millions of dollars in revenue from
low-income taxpayers who should have been able to file their taxes
at no cost, according to the lawsuit. Attorneys at Gibbs Law Group
and Stueve Siegel Hanson are reviewing potential claims on behalf
of additional taxpayers throughout the country who were affected by
the TurboTax "free to file" scheme.

The victims assert that TurboTax violated an agreement with the
IRS, which required TurboTax and several other tax preparation
providers to cumulatively offer 70% of U.S. taxpayers the option to
file their taxes for free based on their income level. According to
the lawsuit, TurboTax intentionally violated that agreement and
broke the law by hiding its free file webpage from the TurboTax
website, preventing the free-filing services from being found by
consumers through Google and other search engines, and only
alerting customers that they would be charged money at the very end
of the filing process after they had spent hours inputting their
personal information on the platform.

Intuit also tries to advance its scheme by imposing forced
arbitration on consumers. In prior cases, TurboTax has utilized a
forced arbitration clause in its online Terms of Service to prevent
customers from joining together as part of a class action and suing
in court.

"The victims of this scheme were intentionally misled and deprived
of the opportunity to make an informed decision about their
tax-filing service," said Eric Gibbs of Gibbs Law Group LLP.

"Given the significant number of low-income taxpayers who were
affected by TurboTax's conduct, we call upon TurboTax to join tech
companies like Google, Facebook, and Apple and disclaim the use of
forced arbitration in customer contracts affecting our country's
most vulnerable citizens," added Norman Siegel of Stueve Siegel
Hanson LLP.

Taxpayers who believe they were wrongfully charged for TurboTax
tax-filing services and would like to learn more about their legal
rights in the Turbo Tax Free-to-File Class Action Lawsuit may
contact our team at 866-344-1901.

                      About Gibbs Law Group

Gibbs Law Group is a national litigation firm representing
consumers in lawsuits in state and federal courts. The firm serves
individuals in cases involving financial fraud and consumer
protection laws. Gibbs Law Group's attorneys have been named among
the Best Lawyers in America © and have been recognized among the
Titans of the Plaintiffs Bar and Top Plaintiff Lawyers in
California.

                  About Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP

Stueve Siegel Hanson represents individuals and businesses
nationwide on a contingency basis. The firm has recovered over $1
billion for its clients, and has appeared back-to-back years in the
National Law Journal's list of Top 100 Jury Verdicts for its work
representing victims of corporate fraud. [GN]


IRENE ROLSTON: Dismissal of Menorah Park's Counterclaim Flipped
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County,
issued an Opinion reversing the judgment of the Municipal Court
granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim
in the case captioned MENORAH PARK CENTER FOR SENIOR LIVING,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRENE ROLSTON, Defendant-Appellant. No.
107615. (Ohio App.).

Appellant Irene Rolston appeals the decision of the Shaker Heights
Municipal Court that granted appellee Menorah Park Center for
Senior Living's motion to dismiss the counterclaim.  

Menorah Park Center for Senior Living (Menorah Park) filed a small
claims complaint against Irene Rolston (Rolston) to recover on a
debt related to health care services. The statement of claim
alleged that Rolston owes the outstanding balance for therapy
services that were provided by Menorah Park when Irene Rolston was
at Menorah Park for rehabilitation at Menorah Park.

Rolston filed an answer and class-action counterclaim. The
counterclaim raised a common-law claim for breach of confidence for
the unauthorized disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical
information learned within a physician-patient relationship.  

Menorah Park filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Menorah Park argued that it could not be held liable on the
counterclaim because the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) permits the disclosure of
protected health information for the purpose of obtaining payment
of medical bills.

Menorah Park also asserted that it had released account
information, as opposed to actual medical records, in attempting to
obtain payment for services rendered. Menorah Park argued that its
actions were entirely within HIPAA and that HIPAA does not allow a
private right of action for alleged violations.

In opposing the motion to dismiss, Rolston reiterated that she was
making a common-law claim, and that she was not raising a claim
under HIPAA. In response to Menorah Park's argument, Rolston argued
that the disclosure was not protected under HIPAA because, pursuant
to 45 C.F.R. 164.502(b), Menorah Park was required, but failed, to
make reasonable efforts to limit disclosure of protected health
information to the minimum necessary for the purpose of collecting
payment on medical bills.

Rolston maintained that all that is required to collect on a debt
is written confirmation of the amount of the debt owed and the name
of the debtor, and she argued that Menorah Park made no effort to
redact any information on her account statements.

After additional briefing by the parties, the trial court granted
Menorah Park's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The trial court
determined that Rolston's claim does not fall under the tort law
claim.

Rolston appealed the trial court's ruling, which was corrected nunc
pro tunc to include no just cause for delay language under Civ.R.
54(B). The matter is now before us on review.
Rolston's sole assignment of error challenges the trial court's
decision to grant Menorah Park's motion to dismiss the counterclaim
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the
complaint. A court may grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss
only when the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and presuming all the factual allegations in the
complaint are true, demonstrates that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts entitling him to relief.

Rolston argues that her counterclaim asserts a valid claim under
common law and that her claim is not precluded by HIPAA. In support
of her argument, she argues that Ohio law recognizes an independent
common-law tort for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a
third party of nonpublic medical information.

In moving to dismiss the counterclaim, Menorah Park raised the
contention that the disclosure in this case was permitted under
HIPAA, which does not provide for a private right of action for
violations of its provisions. HIPAA protects the disclosure of
health information except in certain specific circumstances.
However, when using or disclosing protected health information
under HIPAA, a minimum necessary standard is applied pursuant to
which covered entities must make reasonable efforts to limit
protected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish
the intended purpose of the use, disclosure or request.

In response to Menorah Park's argument, Rolston contends Menorah
Park's disclosure was not permitted by HIPAA since Menorah Park
attached unredacted account statements to its complaint and did not
make any reasonable effort to limit the disclosure of her protected
health information to the minimum necessary to collect on the
account.

In considering the disclosure of the minimum health information as
is necessary in attempting to collect on a debt, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that debt verification requires only a
written confirmation that the debt collector is demanding what the
creditor claims is owed, and that details of the alleged debt are
not required.  

In Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, 40 N.E.3d
661 (2d Dist.), the Second District recognized that the absence of
a private right of action under HIPAA does not foreclose an Ohio
common-law tort claim based on the wrongful release of confidential
information, which is still viable after HIPAA. The Sheldon court
held as follows:

The Court determines that a Biddle claim is not preempted because
we fail to see how such a claim conflicts with HIPAA unless the
alleged claim asserts recovery for release of information that
HIPAA specifically allows. We do not find it impossible to comply
with HIPAA and with state law to the extent the Court have
indicated, and state law is not an obstacle to the accomplishment
of HIPAA's purposes. The Court believe a Biddle claim enhances the
protection of confidentiality of medical information.

Under the circumstances in Sheldon, it was determined that the
plaintiffs had alleged common-law claims against a healthcare
network for the actions of an administrator whose actions were not
within the scope of employment such that there could be no
vicarious liability.  

Likewise, courts in other states have found that HIPAA does not
preempt state-law causes of action for the wrongful disclosure of
health information.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court looks to whether the
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon
review, the Court finds Rolston's common-law tort claim for the
unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic
medical information is not preempted by HIPAA.  

A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s May 30, 2019 Entry and Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5cvkn77 from Leagle.com.

Ciano, & Goldwasser, L.L.P., Sarah E. Katz -- skatz@c-g-law.com --
Robert A. West, and Andrew S. Goldwasser -- asg@c-g-law.com --
Powers, Friedman Linn, P.L.L., and Robert G. Friedman, 23240
Chagrin Blvd, Ste. 180 Cleveland OH 44122, for appellant.

Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Bret C. Perry --
bperry@bsphlaw.com -- and Brian F. Lange -- blange@bsphlaw.com --
for appellee.


JAMESTOWN PREMIER: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JAMESTOWN PREMIER
CHELSEA MARKET, L.P. The case is styled as EUGENE DUNCAN AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v.
JAMESTOWN PREMIER CHELSEA MARKET, L.P., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05084 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

JAMESTOWN PREMIER CHELSEA MARKET, L.P. operates retail store
services featuring the sale of dry goods, home goods and grocery
store products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


JANIKING: Judge Commences Settlement Approval Process
-----------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reports that
a federal judge has set into motion the settlement approval process
in a class action filed against a janitorial company over its
classification of workers.

The plaintiffs, janitors, claimed they were misclassified by the
defendant company JaniKing as independent contractors. [GN]


JOHN DOE CORP:  Does not Pay Minimum, Overtime Wages, Silva Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO CESAR SILVA (A/K/A MARIO), individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE CORP. (D/B/A
WESTCHESTER TIRE & WHEELS CENTER) and LUIS POLANCO, Defendants,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05138 (S.D. N.Y., May 31, 2019) seeks unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"), and for violations of the N.Y. Labor Law (the
"NYLL"), and the "spread of hours" and overtime wage orders of the
New York Commissioner of Labor, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a tire shop, located at 826
Westchester Avenue, Bronx, New York 10455 under the name
"Westchester Tire & Wheels Center". Plaintiff Cesar was employed as
a tire repairman, general assistant and supervisor at the tire
shop.

The Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring
Plaintiff Cesar and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours
per week without providing the minimum wage and overtime
compensation required by federal and state law and regulations,
says the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Faillace, Esq.
     MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
     New York, NY 10165
     Phone: (212) 317-1200
     Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Crincoli Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit captioned LOUISE CRINCOLI and
EMILIO CRINCOLI, her husband v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., Case No.
2017-CA-011121-O, from the 9th Circuit in and for Orange County to
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(Orlando).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 6:19-cv-00884-GAP-LRH to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs seek an award of damages as a result of injuries
from the Defendants' products, including Johnson & Johnson Baby
Powder and Johnson & Johnson Shower to Shower.  The Plaintiffs
allege that in August 2017, Plaintiff Louise Crincoli was diagnosed
with and develop ovarian cancer in Florida, which was directly and
proximately caused by her regular and prolonged exposure to talc
contained in the products.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David A. Jagolinzer, Esq.
          James L. Ferraro, Jr., Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: DAJ@ferrarolaw.com
                  JJR@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.,
formerly known as: Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are
represented by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP
          100 N Tampa St., Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602-5810
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Isa Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit entitled BRYAN A. ISA,
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of TAMI
D. ISA v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., Case No. 17-CA-010979, from
the 13th Circuit in and for Hillsborough to the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida (Tampa).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01115-VMC-JSS to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks an award of damages for the alleged wrongful
death of his wife, Decedent, under the Florida Wrongful Death
Statute, on behalf of Decedent's estate and as surviving spouse.
The Plaintiff contends that in 2011, the Decedent was diagnosed
with ovarian cancer, which was directly and proximately caused by
her regular and prolonged exposure to talcum powder, contained in
the products, including Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Johnson &
Johnson Shower to Shower.[BN]

Plaintiff Bryan A. Isa, Individually and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Tami D. Isa, is represented by:

          James L. Ferraro, Jr., Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: JJR@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.,
formerly known as: Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are
represented by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP
          100 N Tampa St., Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602-5810
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Matthey Talc Injury Suit Removed to M.D. Fla.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit captioned PATRICIA A. MATTHEY v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC., f/k/a JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER
COMPANIES, INC., IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. f/k/a LUZENAC AMERICA,
INC., AND PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., was removed on May 13, 2019,
from the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in and for
Sarasota County, Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01143 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges that exposure to the Defendants' talc caused
the Plaintiff's injuries.  Talc is the main ingredient in Johnson &
Johnson's products, including Shower to Shower body powder and Baby
Powder.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hutch Pinder, Esq.
          THE WHITTEMORE LAW GROUP, P.A.
          100 Second Avenue South, Suite 304-S
          St. Petersburg, FL 33701
          Telephone: (727) 821-8752
          E-mail: hpinder@wherejusticematters.com

               - and -

          Lance V. Oliver, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Boulevard
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 216-9000
          Facsimile: (843) 216-9450
          E-mail: loliver@motleyrice.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Moves Shenefield Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Fla.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit styled GEORGE SHENEFIELD,
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
JACQUELYN SHENEFIELD v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., Case No.
17-CA-010980, from the Thirteenth Circuit in and for Hillsborough
to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(Tampa).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01119-MSS-CPT to
the proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks an award of damages for the wrongful death of
his wife, Decedent, under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute, on
behalf of Decedent's estate and as surviving spouse.  The Plaintiff
alleges that in November 2015, the Decedent was diagnosed with
ovarian cancer, which was directly and proximately caused by her
regular and prolonged exposure to talcum powder, contained in the
Defendants' products, including Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and
Johnson & Johnson Shower to Shower.[BN]

Plaintiff George Shenefield, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Jacqueline Shenefield, is
represented by:

          James L. Ferraro, Jr., Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: JJR@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.,
formerly known as: Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are
represented by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP
          100 N Tampa St., Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602-5810
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Chrisley Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Fla.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit titled DANUS CHRISLEY,
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
PATRICIA CHRISLEY v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., Case No.
2017-CA-003148PL, from the 9th Circuit in and for Osceola County,
Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida (Orlando).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 6:19-cv-00879 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks an award for damages for the wrongful death of
his wife, the Decedent, under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Decedent was diagnosed with ovarian
cancer, which was directly and proximately caused by her regular
and prolonged exposure to talcum powder, contained in Johnson &
Johnson's products, including Shower to Shower body powder and Baby
Powder.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Jagolinzer, Esq.
          James L. Ferraro, Jr., Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: DAJ@ferrarolaw.com
                  JJR@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.,
formerly known as: Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are
represented by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP
          100 N Tampa St., Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602-5810
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Dolby Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit entitled DEBRA DOLBY v. JOHNSON
& JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC., f/k/a JOHNSON &
JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., f/k/a
LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., f/k/a RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC.; PUBLIX SUPER
MARKETS, INC., Case No. 19-000220, from the Circuit Court of the
Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pasco County, Florida, to the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01113-SCB-CPT to
the proceeding.

On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two
affiliates, Imerys Talc Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada, Inc.
(collectively, the "Debtors"), filed a voluntary chapter 11
petition, commencing a reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys
Talc America, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Chapter
11 Case").

Because the Debtors have historically been J&J's sole supplier of
cosmetic talc, the Debtors are routinely named as a co-defendant in
the actions in which the Talc Claims arise.  Even where the Debtors
are not so named as co-defendants, however, the Talc Claims are
related to the Debtors' bankruptcy.

The State Court Talc Claims against J&J center on allegations that
exposure to asbestos, contained in, the Debtors' talc caused the
Plaintiff's injuries -- specifically, ovarian cancer.  J&J disputes
these allegations.

The Complaint generally alleges that exposure to the Debtors' talc,
through the habitual use of J&J cosmetic talcum powder products,
caused the Plaintiff personal injury and/or wrongful death.

On April 18, 2019, J&J filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware a Motion to Fix Venue for Claims
Related to Imerys's Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C. Sections 157(b)(5)
and 1334(b).  The State Court Talc Claims are among those that J&J
seeks to consolidate in the District of Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Jagolinzer, Esq.
          James L. Ferraro, Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: daj@ferrarolaw.com
                  jlf@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson, and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.,
f/k/a Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are represented
by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
          100 N. Tampa Street, Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com

               - and -

          Hildy M. Sastre, Esq.
          Jennifer A. McLoone, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, L.L.P.
          Miami Center, Suite 3200
          201 South Biscayne Blvd.
          Miami, FL 33131-4332
          Telephone: (305) 358-5171
          Facsimile: (305) 358-7470
          E-mail: hsastre@shb.com
                  jmcloone@shb.com

Defendant Publix Super Markets, Inc., is represented by:

          Andrea Cox, Esq.
          SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
          200 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3600
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 428-4500
          Facsimile: (305) 374-4744
          E-mail: Andie.cox@saul.com

Defendant-Debtor Imerys Talc America, Inc., is represented by:

          Jeffrey E. Bjork, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Posin Esq.
          Amy Christine Quartarolo, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560
          Telephone: (213) 891-8872
          E-mail: jeff.bjork@lw.com
                  kim.posin@lw.com
                  amy.quartarolo@lw.com

               - and -

          George A. Davis, Esq.
          Jeffrey T. Mispagel, Esq.
          Annemarie V. Reilly, Esq.
          Keith A. Simon, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          885 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 906-1200
          E-mail: george.davis@lw.com
                  jeffrey.mispagel@lw.com
                  annemarie.reilly@lw.com
                  keith.simon@lw.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Levy, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          330 North Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 876-7700
          E-mail: richard.levy@lw.com

               - and -

          Mark D. Collins, Esq.
          Marcos Alexis Ramos, Esq.
          Sarah Silveira, Esq.
          Amanda R. Steele, Esq.
          RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
          One Rodney Square
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7700
          E-mail: collins@rlf.com
                  ramos@rlf.com
                  silveira@rlf.com
                  steele@rlf.com

               - and -

          Angela R. Elbert, Esq.
          NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP
          Two North LaSalle Street, Suite 1700
          Chicago, Illinois 60602-3801
          Telephone: (312) 269-8000
          E-mail: aelbert@nge.com

               - and -

          Brett Michael Haywood, Esq.
          RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
          Obe Rodney Square
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7700
          E-mail: haywood@rlf.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Removes Lewis Talc Injury Suit to M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
removed on May 9, 2019, the lawsuit styled JOSEPH P. LEWIS,
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of JULIA
LEWIS v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC., f/k/a
JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.; IMERYS TALC AMERICA,
INC., f/k/a LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., f/k/a RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC.;
PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., Case No. 18-002282, from the Circuit
Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Marion County,
Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-00230 to the
proceeding.

On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two
affiliates, Imerys Talc Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada, Inc.
(collectively, the "Debtors"), filed a voluntary chapter 11
petition, commencing a reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys
Talc America, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Chapter
11 Case").

Because the Debtors have historically been J&J's sole supplier of
cosmetic talc, the Debtors are routinely named as a co-defendant in
the actions in which the Talc Claims arise.  Even where the Debtors
are not so named as co-defendants, however, the Talc Claims are
related to the Debtors' bankruptcy.

The State Court Talc Claims against J&J center on allegations that
exposure to asbestos, contained in, the Debtors' talc caused the
Decedent's injuries -- specifically, ovarian cancer.  J&J disputes
these allegations.

The Complaint generally alleges that exposure to asbestos,
contained in, the Debtors' talc, through the habitual use of J&J
cosmetic talcum powder products, caused the Decedent personal
injury and/or wrongful death.

On April 18, 2019, J&J filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware a Motion to Fix Venue for Claims
Related to Imerys's Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C. Sections 157(b)(5)
and 1334(b).  The State Court Talc Claims are among those that J&J
seeks to consolidate in the District of Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Jagolinzer, Esq.
          James L. Ferraro, Esq.
          THE FERRARO LAW FIRM, P.A.
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 375-0111
          Facsimile: (305) 379-6222
          E-mail: daj@ferrarolaw.com
                  jlf@ferrarolaw.com

Defendants Johnson & Johnson, and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.,
f/k/a Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., are represented
by:

          Brian T. Guthrie, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
          100 N. Tampa Street, Suite 2900
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 202-7100
          Facsimile: (813) 221-8837
          E-mail: bguthrie@shb.com

               - and -

          Hildy M. Sastre, Esq.
          Jennifer A. McLoone, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, L.L.P.
          Miami Center, Suite 3200
          201 South Biscayne Blvd.
          Miami, FL 33131-4332
          Telephone: (305) 358-5171
          Facsimile: (305) 358-7470
          E-mail: hsastre@shb.com
                  jmcloone@shb.com

Defendant Publix Super Markets, Inc., is represented by:

          Andrea Cox, Esq.
          SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
          200 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3600
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 428-4500
          Facsimile: (305) 374-4744
          E-mail: Andie.cox@saul.com

Defendant-Debtor Imerys Talc America, Inc., is represented by:

          Jeffrey E. Bjork, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Posin Esq.
          Amy Christine Quartarolo, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560
          Telephone: (213) 891-8872
          E-mail: jeff.bjork@lw.com
                  kim.posin@lw.com
                  amy.quartarolo@lw.com

               - and -

          George A. Davis, Esq.
          Jeffrey T. Mispagel, Esq.
          Annemarie V. Reilly, Esq.
          Keith A. Simon, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          885 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 906-1200
          E-mail: george.davis@lw.com
                  jeffrey.mispagel@lw.com
                  annemarie.reilly@lw.com
                  keith.simon@lw.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Levy, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          330 North Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 876-7700
          E-mail: richard.levy@lw.com

               - and -

          Mark D. Collins, Esq.
          Marcos Alexis Ramos, Esq.
          Sarah Silveira, Esq.
          Amanda R. Steele, Esq.
          RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
          One Rodney Square
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7700
          E-mail: collins@rlf.com
                  ramos@rlf.com
                  silveira@rlf.com
                  steele@rlf.com

               - and -

          Angela R. Elbert, Esq.
          NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP
          Two North LaSalle Street, Suite 1700
          Chicago, Illinois 60602-3801
          Telephone: (312) 269-8000
          E-mail: aelbert@nge.com

               - and -

          Brett Michael Haywood, Esq.
          RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
          Obe Rodney Square
          920 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7700
          E-mail: haywood@rlf.com


JP WHITE PLAINS: Hong Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
YINGCAI HONG, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. JP WHITE PLAINS, INC. d/b/a Haiku Asian
Bistro White Plains; HAIKU @ WP INC. d/b/a Haiku Asian Bistro White
Plains; JP BRONXVILLE INC. d/b/a Haiku Asian Bistro Bronxville; and
JP SCARSDALE INC. d/b/a Haiku Asian Bistro Scarsdale; SOONWAH LEE
a/k/a/ Michael Lee, PIETRO DIANA a/k/a Peter Diana, HSINGYA CHANG
a/k/a/ John Chang, and JIE ZHANG a/k/a/ Jack Zhang Defendants, Case
No. 7:19-cv-05018-NSR (S.D. N.Y., May 31, 2019) is an action
brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself as well as other
employees similarly situated, against the Defendants for alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA") and New York
Labor Law ("NYLL"), arising from Defendants' various willfully and
unlawful employment policies, patterns and practices.

The Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed
widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in pattern
and practice of failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiff,
minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime compensation for all
hours worked over 40 each workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff YINGCAI HONG was employed by Defendants to work as a
deliveryman from on or about November 2015 to August 2016 and again
from February 2017 to May 20, 2018.

JP WHITE PLAINS INC. d/b/a Haiku Asian Bistro White Plains is a
domestic business corporation organized under the laws of the State
of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     TROY LAW, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324


JUST SALAD LLC: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Just Salad LLC. The
case is styled as EUGENE DUNCAN AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. Just Salad LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05083 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Just Salad is a chain of fast casual restaurants that serves
salads, wraps, smoothies, soups, grain bowls, market plates, and
toast boxes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


KEY LARGO: Honeywell Files ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KEY LARGO HOSPITALITY
GROUP, LLC. The case is styled as Cheri Honeywell, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KEY LARGO
HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC a Florida limited liability company,
Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-10086-JEM (S.D. Fla., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

KEY LARGO HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC offers Resort hotel services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
     Jessica L.Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
     200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 282-1858
     Fax: (844) 786-3694
     Email: service@advocacypa.com


KINGSTECH TECHNOLOGIES: Xu Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kingstech
Technologies, LLC. The case is styled as Fengyu Xu on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kingstech
Technologies, LLC. doing business as: MS-Compu Tech doing business
as: EZ Mart, Qi Dong also known as: Jason Dong, Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-03266 (E.D. N.Y., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Kingstech Technologies, LLC supply numerous high-profile
manufacturers in the telecommunication, electronic and medical care
fields.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


KROGER CO: Ark. Affirms Judgment on Pleadings in K. Rhodes' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Arkansas issued an Opinion affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court granting Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned KYLE RHODES, WESLEY ATWOOD,
AND SAMANTHA HUDON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PLAINTIFF CLASS
REPRESENTATIVES, Appellants, v. THE KROGER CO.; ANDREA TYSON; AND
PATRICK SCHERREY, Appellees. No. CV-18-63. (Ark.).

Kyle Rhodes, Wesley Atwood, and Samantha Hudon (Rhodes),
individually and as class representatives, appeal from a Pulaski
County Circuit Court order granting judgment on the pleadings and
dismissing their cause of action against the Kroger Company, Andrea
Tyson, and Patrick Scherrey (Kroger).

On appeal, Rhodes argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section
4-75-501 provides them with a vested right to equal pricing; the
exceptions added by Act 850 of 2017 do not apply retroactively; and
the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Kroger's motion
for judgment on the pleadings when questions of fact remained.  

Rhodes filed a class-action complaint alleging that Kroger1 had
violated section 4-75-501(a)(2) through its Kroger Plus Card
policies and procedures. Kroger answered and moved to dismiss.  

Kroger moved for judgment on the pleadings. In large part, Kroger
relied on the passage of Act 850 to assert that its
Kroger-Plus-Card program and its senior-citizen discount were
explicitly exempted by the amended statute.

However, it further asserted that it did not violate section
4-75-501 because it did not willfully refuse to give Rhodes
discounts and had not willfully failed to allow [Rhodes] from
getting discounts through the Kroger Plus Card. It claimed that the
plaintiffs were repeatedly invited to obtain a Kroger Plus Card.
Kroger urged the circuit court to apply the functional-availability
doctrine which is recognized in federal court and routinely applied
to Robinson-Patman Act cases.

The circuit court, having considered the pleadings, motion, briefs,
and arguments of the parties, granted Kroger's motion to dismiss.
The circuit court made no written findings. Rhodes timely filed a
notice of appeal.

Motions for judgments on the pleadings are not favored by the
courts. However, it is appropriate if the pleadings show on their
face that there is no merit to the suit.   

When the Court review the granting of judgment on the pleadings,
the Court view the facts alleged in the complaint as true and in
the light most favorable to the party seeking relief.  

Rhodes argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-75-501 creates
a vested right to equal pricing. Consequently, the changes to the
statute made by Act 850, which he contends is substantive law, can
only be applied prospectively.

In support of his argument, Rhodes directs us to English v.
Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566, in which the Court
discussed the distinction between substantive law and procedural
law. The English court noted that the plain language of an act is
not the only consideration in determining whether a statute can be
applied retroactively even express language that a statute is to be
applied retroactively must still be scrutinized to determine
whether it impairs or disturbs a contractual or vested right or
creates a new obligation.  

The Court rejects Rhodes's argument that the original version of
section 4-75-501 created a vested right to fair pricing. This
argument misinterprets the nature of penal statutes.  

Accordingly, the focus of section 4-75-501 is not to bestow a right
on the public, but to prevent injurious conduct. Thus, Rhodes's
reliance on English is misplaced. The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), which was at issue in English is not a
penal statute.

Furthermore, although Act 116 of 2013 was titled AN ACT TO CLARIFY
THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, in
effect it redefined the meaning of joint and several liability. In
so doing, UCATA altered an injured person's right to collect the
whole judgment from any of the multiple tortfeasors whose actions
combined to injure the plaintiff.  

Rhodes next argues that the alternative basis for the circuit
court's granting Kroger's motion to dismiss, application of the
functional availability doctrine as advocated by Kroger in its
brief also constituted an abuse of discretion. Rhodes asserts that
the functional-availability doctrine, which is associated with the
Robinson-Patman Act, which is an antitrust statute, does not cross
over to section 4-75-501 cases.

He asserts that the object of section 4-75-501 is consumer
protection, whereas the object of Robinson-Patman is protecting
competition. The Court do not find this argument persuasive.
The functional-availability doctrine provides that a plaintiff
cannot recover for price discrimination when the plaintiff failed
to take advantage of a price concession which was realistically and
functionally available. The rationale underlying the
functional-availability doctrine is that it negates essential
elements of a price discrimination claim. Simply stated, the
functional-availability doctrine operates to keep the focus of an
anti-price-discrimination statute on the actions of the seller-not
the result that may be affected by the conduct of the buyer.

The Court declines to reverse the circuit's order of dismissal with
regard to Kroger's senior-citizen discount. As noted previously,
the purpose of statutes that are penal in nature is to prevent
conduct that is deemed by the General Assembly to be injurious to
the public. In pertinent part, section 4-75-501 is violated when
sellers willfully refuse or fail to allow to any person,
corporation, or company making purchases all rebates and discounts
that are granted by them to other purchasers.

When the Court strictly construe a penal statute, as the Court
must, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and
nothing may be taken as intended which is not clearly expressed.
While Rhodes's complaint asserts that purchasers effectively paid a
different price for certain manufactured goods, completely absent
is any allegation that these purchasers asserted that they wished
to receive the senior-citizen discount and that Kroger, through its
employees or agents willfully refused or failed to allow the
discount. Because the focus of section 4-75-501 is on the conduct
of Kroger, the absence of any factual allegation regarding the mens
rea is fatal to this cause of action. Accordingly, the Court hold
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting
judgment on the pleadings.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's May 30, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxfau7cv from Leagle.com.

Ludwig Law Firm, PLC by: Gene A. Ludwig, Kale L. Ludwig, and Kyle
P. Ludwig, 1 Three Rivers Dr, Little Rock, AR 72223, for
appellants.

Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC by: Bruce A.
McMullen -- bmcmullen@bakerdonelson.com -- and Friday Eldredge &
Clark LLP by: James M. Simpson -- simpson@fridayfirm.com -- for
appellees.


LENDLEASE: No Takeover Proposal Amid Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carolyn Cummins, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports
that the prospect that Lendlease may be a takeover target has been
swiftly shot down both by the property giant and its purported
Japanese suitor Mitsui & Co.

Lendlease shares lifted 9 per cent in early trade on May 13 before
settling slightly to close up 8.7 at $13.85 after a report in The
Australian suggested the company was the subject of a potential
takeover.

The report said Mitsui was eyeing off the $7.2 billion global
property giant with the intention of breaking it up and selling off
various divisions to other suitors.

Lendlease told investors shortly after trading resumed that it had
"not received any such approach".

A spokesman for Mitsui & Co also denied the speculation telling The
Sydney Morning Herald and The Age that the company was "not
involved in any deliberations concerning a takeover of Lendlease".

Maquarie Equities' analyst Rob Freeman said in a note to clients on
May 13 that Lendlease had low debt and "lucrative property assets .
. . that would no doubt be attractive to suitors at a time
commercial real estate remains in strong demand".

The speculation comes at a time when Lendlease, led by chief
executive Steve McCann, is facing a raft of pressures and trying to
sell its troubled engineering and services business after it was
forced to take a $350 million provision last November from the
delay of infrastructure projects.

That has seen the share price slump from its recent high of $21.08
in August

In April, law firm Maurice Blackburn, lodged a shareholder class
action in the NSW Supreme Court over allegations Lendlease failed
to adequately disclose problems in its engineering business.

Lendlease has engaged Morgan Stanley and boutique advisory firm
Gresham Partners to sell the division and there are suggestions
other Japanese groups are looking at the operations.

Macquarie Equities' analysts said a sale was unlikely before the
end of the financial year.

"The business may be treated as available for sale at balance date
but will need to meet accounting criteria here." a recent Macquarie
Equities research paper says.

"Consistent with our result note, services is considered more
saleable . . . and could be sold separately or the carrot for a
package deal with engineering."

After the February results, Macquarie said the rest of business is
"firing along nicely" notwithstanding some weakness in the
Australian housing market.

"Assets under management across the platform increased about 20 per
cent to $34 billion and the development backlog now stands at a
staggering $74 billion. Once engineering issues are resolved, this
will continue to drive the profit and loss and cash flow forward,"
they said.

The Australian was contacted for comment and a spokesperson said
"we do stand by the story". [GN]


LEONARDO BROS: Court Certifies Class in Farm Workers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned SANDRA GARYBO, et al.,
Plaintiff, v. LEONARDO BROS., Defendant. No. 1:15-cv-01487-DAD-JLT.
(E.D. Cal.).

This matter is before the court on the motion for class
certification filed on behalf of plaintiffs Sandra Garybo and
Agustin Vega.

According to the plaintiffs, Golden West Labor and Leonardo Bros.
were joint employers of plaintiffs and the prospective class. The
complaint asserts the following causes of action, inter alia: (1)
violation of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act  (2) failure
to pay minimum wage under California Labor Code Sections 510, 1194,
1194.2, 1197 and Wage Orders 8, 13, 14; (3) failure to pay overtime
wages under California Labor Code Sections 510, 1194, 1194.2, and
Wage Orders 8, 13, 14; (4) failure to provide timely and complete
rest periods or pay additional wages in lieu thereof under
California Labor Code Section 226.7, 512 and Wage Orders 8, 13,
14.

The Plaintiffs now seek certification of a class related to the
alleged rest break violations under state labor law and described
as follows:

Unpaid Rest Break Class 1: All non-exempt farmworkers jointly
employed by Golden West Labor and Leonardo Bros. who earned a
piece-rate during the 2015 harvest season and worked at least one
shift greater than 3.5 hours but did not receive a paid rest
break.

Numerosity

A proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
Here, plaintiffs aver that eighty-three non-exempt agricultural
workers did not receive separate compensation for rest breaks or
rest break premiums from Leonardo Bros. after working at least one
shift greater than 3.5 hours during the 2015 harvest season. This
number is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23's numerosity requirement.


Commonality

Rule 23 requires there be questions of law or fact common to the
class.

To satisfy Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement, a class claim must
depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is capable
of class-wide resolution which means that determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

The wage order states the specific requirements to which an
employer of agricultural workers must adhere: "Every employer shall
authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which
insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period.
The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours
worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four
(4) hours or major fraction thereof. However, a rest period need
not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less
than three and one-half (3 1/2) hours. Authorized rest period time
shall be counted as hours worked for which there shall be no
deduction from wages."

Here, the proposed class is composed solely of non-exempt
agricultural workers who were jointly employed by Golden West Labor
and Leonard Bros. and earned wages on a piece-rate basis during the
2015 harvest season. Expert analysis of the timekeeping and payroll
data produced by Golden West Labor establishes that prospective
class members, including the named plaintiffs, worked 305
piece-rate shifts that were 3.5 hours or greater with no separate
compensation for rest breaks or rest break premiums.

Thus, the proposed class is premised on the claim that Leonardo
Bros. failed to provide workers with paid rest periods for shifts
greater than 3.5 hours. The common issue of whether Leonardo Bros.
maintained an unlawful rest period policy of not authorizing paid
rest periods for shifts greater than 3.5 hours is common to this
class.  

Commonality is therefore satisfied here.

Typicality

The claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be]
typical of the claims and defenses of the class. They need not be
clones; rather, all that is required is that the claims or defenses
be reasonably co-extensive. The test of typicality is whether other
members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is
based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and
whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
conduct.

Here, plaintiffs worked as field workers at various fields and
ranches for Leonardo Bros., picking and packing grapes on a
piece-rate basis. Plaintiffs did not receive separate compensation
for rest breaks or a rest break premium associated with the
thirteen piece-rate shifts they worked. Plaintiffs' claims are
typical of the claims of the class which are based on Leonardo
Bros.' failure to appropriately provide paid rest break periods in
accordance with state law.
   
Typicality is therefore satisfied here.

Adequacy of Representation

The Plaintiffs seeking class certification must show that they will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. To
determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately represent a
class, courts must resolve two questions: (1) do the named
plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with
other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their
counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?

Here, the plaintiffs assert that their claims are based on their
personal experience and that they would competently testify in
support of the allegations against Leonardo Bros. Plaintiffs also
have no known conflicts. These representations are sufficient to
meet the general criteria for serving as class plaintiffs.
Therefore, plaintiffs will be confirmed as the class
representatives for the unpaid rest break class.

The Plaintiffs' counsel, Mallison & Martinez and Martinez,
Aguilasocho, and Lynch, APLC, entered into a co-counsel agreement
to represent plaintiffs' with respect to their claims. In his
declaration, attorney Joseph D. Sutton sets out his and Mallison &
Martinez's qualifications to serve as co-class counsel.  In
addition to attorney Sutton, Stan Mallison, Hector Martinez, Marco
A. Palau, and Eric S. Trabucco are also attorneys at that firm.
Attorney Sutton notes that Mallison & Martinez has handled
extensive class action wage and hour cases since 2005. Illustrating
the firm's extensive success litigating class action wage and hour
cases, attorney Sutton has listed nearly two dozen class actions
the firm is currently litigating or has resolved.

The declarations of plaintiffs' counsel establish that they have
extensive experience in class action litigation.   Absent any
demonstrated conflict of interest, and given the qualifications of
class counsel, the court is satisfied that they will vigorously and
adequately pursue representation of the class. The court will
therefore find the firms of Mallison & Martinez and Martinez
Aguilasocho & Lynch APLC to be appropriate co-class counsel.
Adequacy of representation is also satisfied in this case.

Rule 23(b) Requirements

Once the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, at the second step
plaintiffs must satisfy at least one of Rule 23(b)'s provisions.
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is permitted when the questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members and a class action is
deemed to be superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Predominance

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation, whereas the superiority requirement demands courts
assess the relative advantages of alternative procedures for
handling the total controversy in order to determine that a class
action is the superior method of resolution.

Here, common issues predominate over individual ones within this
unpaid rest breaks class. The unpaid rest break claim presented in
this action stems from Leonardo Bros.' alleged uniform policy not
to separately compensate piece-rate employees who worked shifts
greater than 3.5 hours for paid rest periods. The Plaintiffs' claim
will therefore succeed or fail based on the ultimate determination
of whether Leonardo Bros.' policy was lawful under California law.
Although individual class members have worked varying numbers of
piece-rate shifts and are therefore each entitled to a different
damages award if they prevail, the payroll records as provided by
Golden West Labor in discovery and as analyzed by plaintiffs' data
expert will enable a determination of each class member's recovery
without difficulty.  

As such, the issue of damages can be resolved based on timekeeping
and payroll records and can be conducted on a class-wide basis. The
court concludes that class-wide issues predominate with respect to
this class.

Superiority

Rule 23 provides that, aside from predominance, a court must find
that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Here, there is no contention or suggestion that class members would
be interested in controlling their own litigation, nor has any
party advised the court of other pending litigation filed by
putative class members concerning the claim at issue. Concentrating
this litigation in a class action would clearly be a more efficient
use of judicial resources given that much of the same evidence will
be involved in each claim. Accordingly, the court concludes that a
class action is a superior method for adjudicating this case and
that the requirements of Rule 23(b) have been met.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2mykbrm from Leagle.com.

Sandra Garybo, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Agustin Vega, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Mario Martinez --
mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch, APLC A
Law Corporation, Hector Rodriguez Martinez --
hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez & Stanley Mallison
-- stanm@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez.


LIBERTY INSURANCE: Court OKs Dismissal of Horn Insurance Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned JACOB HORN and ROBERT VETTER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as
assignees of iCan Benefit Group, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company, Plaintiffs, v. LIBERTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC.,
Defendant. Case No. 9:18-CV-80762-ROSENBERG/REINHART. (S.D. Fla.).

On or about September 13, 2017, an amended class action, styled
Jacob Horn et al v. iCAN, Case No. 9:17-cv-81027-RLR, was filed
against Liberty's insured, iCan Benefit Group, LLC (iCan). The
Class Action asserted violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) against iCan. iCan is a "national direct
response marketer and seller of insurance products.

Liberty issued a Private Advantage Insurance Policy to iCan Holding
LLC, as a named insured.  

After reviewing the initial complaint in the Class Action, Liberty
denied coverage to iCan. Liberty later denied coverage again after
reviewing the amended Class Action complaint on the same bases as
set forth in the original Denial Letter.  

In this amended declaratory and breach of contract action, the
Plaintiffs, as assignees of the insured iCan, seek recovery of the
consent judgment. In order to enforce the consent judgment, the
Plaintiffs must first establish coverage and a wrongful refusal to
defend, which are the issues currently before the Court on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on their argument
that four exclusions did not apply: Exclusion B.4 (Invasion of
Privacy Exclusion), Exclusion B.6 (Unfair Trade Practices
Exclusion), Exclusion A.6/Endorsement 13 (Willful Violation of Law
Exclusion), and Exclusion A.7/Endorsement 15 (Profit Exclusion).
Plaintiffs argues they are entitled to summary judgment and a
determination of a wrongful denial of coverage.

Liberty in turn moved for summary judgment on the Invasion of
Privacy Exclusion as well as Exclusion B.3 (Professional Services
Exclusion). Liberty argues that the iCan Action is excluded from
coverage entirely, entitling it to summary judgment.  

INSURANCE CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES

Florida law requires that insurance contracts be given their clear
and plain meaning and prohibits courts from rewriting contracts,
adding meaning that is not present, or otherwise reaching results
contrary to the intentions of the parties.  

The Liberty Policy

The Liberty policy provides, in pertinent part: The Insurer shall
pay on behalf of the Company Loss which the Company becomes legally
obligated to pay by reason of any Claim first made against the
Company during the Policy Period or the Discovery Period, if
exercised, for any Wrongful Acts by the Company taking place prior
to the end of the Policy Period.

The Policy also specifically defines Claim as a written demand
against any Insured for monetary damages or other relief or a civil
proceeding against any Insured commenced by the service of a
complaint or similar pleading. A loss is defined as the amount
which the Insureds become legally obligated to pay on account of
any Claims made against them for Wrongful Acts for which coverage
applies, including but not limited to damages, and Defense Costs.

A wrongful act is defined as any error, misstatement, misleading
statement, act, omission, neglect, or breach of duty actually or
allegedly committed or attempted by any of the Insured Persons in
their capacity as such, or, with respect to Clause C, by the
Company.

The disputed exclusions to the policy are as follows:

"EXCLUSIONS B. The Insurer shall not be liable under Insuring
Clause C for Loss on account of any Claim made against the Company:


   3. based upon, arising out of, or attributable to the rendering
of, or failure to render, any professional services for others,
including, without limitation, services performed by the Insureds
for or on behalf of a customer or client;

   4. based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or
alleged defamation, invasion of privacy, wrongful entry and
eviction, false arrest or imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, assault, battery or loss of consortium;

   6. based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or
alleged price fixing, restraint of trade, monopolization, unfair
trade practices or any violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Clayton Act, or any similar law
regulating anti-trust, monopoly, price fixing, price
discrimination, predatory pricing or restraint of trade
activities;

The policy also contains the following pertinent endorsements:

ENDORSEMENT 13. Section IV Exclusions A.6. is deleted in its
entirety and replaced with the following:Based upon, or arising out
of, . . . any deliberately fraudulent or criminal act or omission
or any willful violation of law by such insured if a judgment or
other final adjudication in the underlying action in such Claim or
another proceeding establishes that such act, omission or violation
occurred;. . .ENDORSEMENT 15. . .In consideration of the premium
charged it is agreed and understood that EXCLUSION A. 7 of the
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND COMPANY LIABILITY COVERAGE PART is deleted
in its entirety and replaced with the following:

7. based upon, arising out of, or attributable to such Insured
gaining in fact any profit, remuneration or financial advantage to
which such Insured was not legally entitled if a judgment or other
final adjudication in such Claim or other proceeding establishes
that an Insured obtained such improper profit."

The Invasion of Privacy Exclusion (Exclusion B.4)

Liberty argues that since its policy broadly defines Claim as a
civil proceeding and the Class Action alleged TCPA violations which
caused actual harm to the class members in the form of invasions of
privacy, among other harms, the entire lawsuit arises out of an
invasion of privacy.

The Plaintiffs contend that Exclusion B.4 is inapplicable, because
there were other allegations, in addition to invasion of privacy,
contained within the iCan Action's Complaint.

In other words, the allegations of invasions of privacy were just
one component of the underlying case. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend
that they did not have to prove invasion of privacy in order to
prevail in the Class Action since it is not an element of the TCPA
cause of action.

The Court begins by analyzing whether a violation of the TCPA
should be construed as an invasion of privacy, and therefore
excluded from coverage. Although Plaintiff points out that invasion
of privacy is not an element of a TCPA violation, the Court finds
that a violation of the TCPA may in some circumstances be
considered an invasion of privacy for the purposes of analyzing
coverage in an insurance policy.

The Court first looks to the Florida Supreme Court's analysis of
the nexus between the TCPA and invasion of privacy in Penzer v.
Transportation Insurance Company. 29 So.3d 1000 (2010). The Penzer
court considered whether an insurance policy providing coverage for
injuries arising out of "oral or written publication[s] of material
that violates a person's right of privacy would provide coverage
when the insured was sued for TCPA violations.  

This question was certified from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Penzer court acknowledged that the source of the right
of privacy is the TCPA, which provides the privacy right to
seclusion. The court included a string citation, illustrating that
the TCPA's purpose is grounded in protecting individuals' right to
privacy: The receipt of an unsolicited fax advertisement implicates
a person's right of privacy insofar as it violates a person's
seclusion Courts have consistently held the TCPA protects a species
of privacy interest. The harm occasioned by unsolicited faces
involves protection of some sort of privacy. The stated purpose of
the TCPA is to protect the privacy of individuals.

The court stated that the policy provision provides coverage for a
written publication of material that violates a person's right of
privacy and concluded that the insurance policy provides coverage
for sending unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the
TCPA. While the policy language analyzed in Penzer differs from the
precise language here, and the Penzer court analyzed a policy
provision providing coverage as opposed to limiting coverage, the
Florida Supreme Court's analysis nevertheless provides support for
reading the B.4 Exclusion in the instant case to exclude TCPA
violations, as a form of invasion of privacy, from coverage.

Coupling the case law cited above that interprets TCPA violations
as invasions of privacy with Florida's broad interpretation of
arising out of, the Court finds that the TCPA violations at issue
here arise out of an invasion of privacy and therefore are excluded
from coverage under Exclusion B.4.

Here, the underlying complaint in the iCan Action explicitly states
that the class action plaintiffs' privacy was invaded by the
violative texts, so the Court need not determine whether TCPA
violations are per se invasions of privacy, but instead concludes
that on the facts before this Court, the Invasion of Privacy
Exclusion would apply. Accordingly, there are at least some parts
of the underlying class action that are excluded from coverage by
virtue of the B.4 Exclusion.

The Court must next consider whether the entire iCan Action is
excluded from coverage or whether just those aspects of the
underlying case that involve invasion of privacy are excluded.

Here, Claim is specifically defined by the Policy as a civil
proceeding against any Insured commenced by the service of a
complaint or similar pleading. Liberty argues that the defined term
Claim is thus the entire underlying civil proceeding, not to be
confused with the undefined word claim, or its common-use
derivatives, such as harm, damages, causes of action or the
separate allegations of wrongful conduct in a complaint. Regardless
of whether the Court interprets Claim as referring to the entire
action or just to individual counts contained within the Complaint,
the Claim(s) all arise out of TCPA violations that invaded the
class action plaintiffs' privacy.   

Thus, the Claim, however defined, includes allegations that the
iCan plaintiffs suffered the harm of invasion of privacy.

The Court concludes that the Policy's broad exclusion barring
coverage for Claims arising out of an actual or alleged invasion of
privacy precludes coverage here entirely. This is true regardless
of whether Claim is viewed as the entire iCan Action as a whole or
as separate Claims for each cause of action. As a result, the
Liberty Policy provides no coverage for the iCan settlement
agreement, for which Plaintiffs seek indemnification.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that there is no coverage
in the Liberty Policy over the iCan Action, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover the settlement or defense costs of that action. The iCan
Action is excluded from coverage by virtue of the invasion of
privacy exclusion in Exclusion B.4. This exclusion bars coverage
for the entire action based on the expansive definition of "Claim"
in the Policy, and in the alternative, based on the Plaintiffs'
failure to allocate the underlying settlement agreement. In light
of the Court's findings above, the Court need not reach Liberty's
additional arguments regarding the B.3 Exclusion. Nor must the
Court reach Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, as the Court
has concluded that there is no coverage for the iCan Action.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied
and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yysn9d4r from Leagle.com.

Jacob Horn, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated as assignes of Ican Benefit Group LLC, a Florida Limited
Libility company & Robert Vetter, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated as assignees of Ican Benefit Group LLC, a
Florida limited liability company, Plaintiffs, represented by Ellen
Novoseletsky, Law Offices of Ellen Novoseletsky, P.A., 770
Claughton Island Dr, Miami, FL 33131, Ignacio Javier Hiraldo, IJH
Law, 1200 Brickell Ave Ste 1950. Miami, FL 33131-3298, Randy Marc
Weber, Weber Law Firm, 9350 S Dixie Hwy Ste 1200, Miami, FL,
331562945, Stefan Louis Coleman, Law Offices of Stefan Coleman,
P.A., 201 S Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor, Miami, FL, 33131, Yelena
Shneyderman, Yelena Shneyderman, P.A. 440 Hollywood Blvd #415,
Hollywood, FL 33021 & Manuel Santiago Hiraldo --
mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com -- Hiraldo P.A.

Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., Defendant, represented by
John Cody German -- cody.german@csklegal.com -- Cole Scott Kissane
PA, Steven Lane Ehrlich -- Steven.Ehrlich@csklegal.com -- Cole,
Scott and Kissane, Daniel J. Layden -- dlayden@hangley.com --
Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice, John S.
Stapleton -- jstapleton@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal
Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice, Mia S. Rosati  --
mrosati@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller &
Ronald P. Schiller -- rschiller@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick
Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice.


LJC TRADING: Chen Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------------
KUANYU CHEN, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. LJC TRADING NEW YORK INC. d/b/a LJC Trading;
ZHONG ZHANG, LIHUI ZHANG, and JIAN CHEN LIU Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-03276 (E.D. N.Y., June 1, 2019) is an action brought by the
Plaintiff on behalf of himself as well as other employees similarly
situated, against the Defendants for alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"),
arising from Defendants' unlawful employment policies, patterns and
practices.

The Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed
widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in pattern
and practice of failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiff,
minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime compensation for all
hours worked over 40 each workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff KUANYU CHEN was employed by Defendants to work as a
salesperson from May 1, 2017 to February 28, 2019.

LJC TRADING NEW YORK INC. d/b/a LJC Trading is a domestic business
corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     TROY LAW, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324


LM INSURANCE: Holmes Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LM Insurance
Corporation. The case is styled as Marvin Holmes, Patricia Holmes
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. LM Insurance Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-00466 (M.D. Tenn., May 31, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Breach of Contract.

Lm Insurance Corporation provides property and casualty insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Emily Alcorn, Esq.
     J. Brandon McWherter, Esq.
     Gilbert McWherter Scott & Bobbitt PLC (Franklin TN Office)
     341 Cool Springs Boulevard, Suite 230
     Franklin, TN 37067
     Phone: (615) 354-1144
     Email: ealcorn@gilbertfirm.com
            bmcwherter@gilbertfirm.com


LONG KEY: Honeywell Files ADA Suit in S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LONG KEY SUNSET
LODGE, LLC. The case is styled as Cheri Honeywell, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LONG KEY
SUNSET LODGE, LLC a Florida limited liability company, Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-10085-XXXX (S.D. Fla., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

LONG KEY SUNSET LODGE, LLC is a beach resort located at 6700 Nw
37th Ct, Miami, FL.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
     Jessica L.Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
     200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 282-1858
     Fax: (844) 786-3694
     Email: service@advocacypa.com


LORD & TAYLOR: Beekman Suit Transferred From Delaware to New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned BERNADETTE BEEKMAN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. LORD & TAYLOR,
LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-00521, was transferred on May 9, 2019, from
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley
Square).

The New York District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-04199-UA to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings the class action against Lord & Taylor for its
alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in securing and
safeguarding its customers' personal financial data -- in
particular, credit and debit card records including cardholder
name, card number, expiration date, and internal verification code
("Private Information").

On March 28, 2018, a criminal syndicate known as "JokerStash"
announced the release for sale on the dark web of over five million
stolen credit and debit card records.  The cybersecurity firm
Gemini Advisory determined that the cards were misappropriated in a
breach involving Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks OFF 5TH, and Lord & Taylor
retail stores during the period between no later than May 2017 and
late-March 2018 ("Security Breach").[BN]

Plaintiff Bernadette Beekman, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Janine Pollack, Esq.
          Daniel Tepper, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 686-0114
          E-mail: pollack@whafh.com
                  tepper@whafh.com

               - and -

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Erich P. Schork, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One North LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  e.schork@barnowlaw.com

Plaintiffs Bernadette Beekman, Mark Wade, Cassandra Meduri, Julia
A. Harris, Debbie Carthan, Kelly McGurn, Georgina Meduri, Greta
Moss, John Cona, Larry Payne and Leslie Levitt-Raschella are
represented by:

          Ralph Nicholas Sianni, Esq.
          ANDERSEN SLEATER SIANNI L.L.C.
          2 Mill Road, Suite 202
          Wilmington, DE 19806
          Telephone: (302) 510-8528
          Facsimile: (302) 595-9321
          E-mail: rsianni@andersensleater.com

Defendant Lord & Taylor L.L.C. is represented by:

          Jody Barillare, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1007 Orange Street, Suite 501
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 574-3000
          Facsimile: (302) 574-3001
          E-mail: jody.barillare@morganlewis.com


MACOMB COUNTY, MI: Mich. Reverses Ruling in Retirees' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Michigan issued an Opinion reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals granting plaintiffs a vested right
to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits in the
case captioned RITA KENDZIERSKI, BONNIE HAINES, GREG DENNIS, LOUISE
BERTOLINI, JOHN BARKER, JAMES COWAN, VINCENT POWIERSKI, ROBERT
STANLEY, ALAN MOROSCHAN, and GAER GUERBER, on Behalf of Themselves
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MACOMB
COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant. Docket No. 156086. (Mich.)

This is a class action brought on behalf of approximately 1600
unionized Macomb County employee retirees who worked for the
defendant under various CBAs dating back to 1989. The Plaintiffs
claim that in 2009 and 2010 defendant breached these agreements by
reducing and altering their healthcare benefits; plaintiffs now
seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief.

The issue here is whether the plaintiffs' collective-bargaining
agreements (CBAs) with the defendant, Macomb County, granted the
plaintiffs a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement
healthcare benefits.

The trial court held that while the plaintiffs are entitled to
lifetime healthcare benefits, the defendant can make reasonable
modifications to those benefits. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime and unalterable
healthcare benefits and that such benefits cannot be modified
absent the plaintiffs' consent.

Retirees: The Employer will provide fully paid Blue Cross/Blue
Shield Hospital-Medical coverage to the employee and the employee's
spouse, after eight (8) years of service with the Employer, for the
employee who leaves employment because of retirement and is
eligible for and receives benefits under the Macomb County
Employees' Retirement Ordinance.

Coverage shall be limited to the current spouse of the retiree, at
the time of retirement, provided such employee shall retire on or
after January 1, 1974. Coverage for the eligible spouse will
terminate upon the death of the retiree unless the retiree elects
to exercise a retirement option whereby the eligible current spouse
receives applicable retirement benefits following the death of the
retiree.Coverage shall be limited to Blue Cross/Blue Shield MVF1
Master Medical with ML Rider, or its substantial equivalence.

Retired employees and/or their current spouse, upon reaching age
65, shall apply if eligible, and participate in the Medicare
Program at their expense as required by the Federal Insurance
Contribution Act, a part of the Social Security Program, at which
time the Employer's obligation shall be only to provide over 65
supplemental hospital-medical benefit coverage. Failure to
participate in the aforementioned Medicare Program, shall be cause
for termination of Employer paid coverage of applicable
hospital-medical benefits, as outlined herein for employees who
retire and/or their current spouse. Employees who retire under the
provisions of the Macomb County Employees' Retirement Ordinance,
and/or their current spouse, who subsequently are gainfully
employed, shall not be eligible for hospital-medical benefits,
during such period of gainful employment.

The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted
in this Agreement each had the unlimited right and opportunity to
make demands and proposals with respect to all subjects of
collective bargaining and that all agreements and understandings,
expressed, implied, written or oral, are set forth in this
Agreement. This Agreement expresses the complete understanding of
the Parties on the subject of wages, working conditions, hours of
work, benefits and conditions of employment.

The trial court here found that the CBAs are not ambiguous and that
defendant did not promise or otherwise obligate itself under the
clear language to provide a certain duration or level of retiree
healthcare coverage beyond the term of each CBA. Indeed, it held
that plaintiffs have not pointed to any specific CBA language
explicitly conferring lifetime or unalterable healthcare benefits
on retirees.

Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiffs are entitled to
lifetime healthcare benefits because plaintiffs have proffered
unrefuted evidence that defendant has acknowledged that retiree
healthcare coverage is a lifetime benefit. Finally, the trial court
held that these lifetime benefits are not unalterable because
plaintiffs have not established that defendant has unequivocally
acknowledged that it is obligated to provide unalterable retiree
healthcare coverage.

The court concluded that while "retirees have lifetime healthcare
benefits, defendant "may reasonably modify the scope and level of
benefits from those that existed when the retirees retired.

While the trial court correctly held that the CBAs are not
ambiguous and that they do not provide for unalterable lifetime
healthcare benefits, it nonetheless relied on extrinsic evidence to
conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to lifetime benefits that can
be reasonably modified. However, since the CBAs are not ambiguous,
the trial court should not have considered extrinsic evidence
because the parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic
evidence to interpret unambiguous language within a document.

Although the Court of Appeals recognized that the CBAs do not
expressly state whether the benefits were promised indefinitely or
only for the duration of the CBA, it concluded that other contract
language creates a latent ambiguity regarding whether the
healthcare benefits are vested. Given this latent ambiguity, the
Court held that the trial court properly examined extrinsic
evidence to determine the meaning of the CBAs and properly
concluded on this basis that the retirees are entitled to lifetime
healthcare benefits.  However, the appellate court held that the
trial court erred by holding that these benefits could be modified
absent plaintiffs' consent because a party may not unilaterally
alter vested rights.  

Respectfully, the Court of Appeals erred by finding a latent
ambiguity. A latent ambiguity is one that does not readily appear
in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral
matter when the document's terms are applied or executed.

Here, the Court of Appeals relied on language within the contract
itself to find an ambiguity. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
actually found a patent ambiguity, not a latent ambiguity, because
the former arises from the face of the document. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals erred by finding even a patent ambiguity. As the
trial court correctly held, the CBAs here are unambiguous.

The Court of Appeals rested its ambiguity conclusion on three
provisions of the CBAs: (a) the CBAs contain a survivor option
permitting continuation of a surviving spouse's healthcare coverage
following the death of the retiree, (b) the CBAs provide that the
agreement may be terminated if the retiree fails to enroll in
Medicare at age 65 and (c) the CBAs provide that healthcare
coverage is suspended while the retiree has coverage through
another employer but then states that coverage through the CBA
recommences once the coverage through the other employer ends.

On the basis of these provisions, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the CBAs were ambiguous as to whether the parties intended for
the retiree benefits to vest.

The Court does not agree that these provisions render the CBAs
ambiguous.  

The Court of Appeals concluded that because the provision
contemplates that coverage will continue until, and even after, the
death of the retiree, it indicates that the parties intended that
the healthcare coverage would last beyond the three-year term of
the individual CBAs.

In the Court's judgment, however, the text of the provision does
not warrant this conclusion because it only speaks to the
disposition of retiree benefits upon the death of the retiree,
which could occur within the three-year duration of the CBAs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
considering a similar surviving-spouse provision, stated as
follows:

     The retirees argue that the collective-bargaining insurance
agreement is implicitly extended beyond its three-year term by a
clause that provides benefits for surviving spouses until their
death or remarriage. This provision, however, refers to the
eligibility of individuals to receive benefits under the agreement,
not to the duration of the agreement.  Surviving spouses were
eligible to receive benefits only so long as the
collective-bargaining insurance agreement was in place.  

Similarly, the surviving-spouse provision of the CBAs in this case
governs the eligibility of the spouse upon the death of the
retiree; it does not set the duration of either the retiree's or
the spouse's benefits.

Therefore, the provision does not evidence an intention that the
benefits continue beyond the term provided in the durational clause
of the CBAs.

The Court of Appeals identified in this provision an implication
that the retirees will receive healthcare benefits far beyond the
three-year term of the CBAs. This is not a necessary implication,
however, because a retiree might alternatively obtain coverage
through another employer before the three-year term of the CBA
expires.  

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' analysis, none of these
provisions gives rise to an ambiguity.

Each of the events addressed in these provisions could occur during
the three-year duration of the CBAs. That each of these events
could occur beyond that period does not indicate that the parties
intended coverage to last beyond the term of the CBAs. Moreover,
reading these provisions as encompassing events beyond the duration
of the CBAs would obviously give rise to what we view as an
altogether unnecessary conflict between these provisions and the
general durational provision of the CBAs, when both a more
reasonable and a more harmonious understanding can be achieved
using the interpretive analysis previously set forth in this
opinion.  

Therefore, simply because these events could occur beyond the
duration of the CBAs does not lead us to conclude that the parties
intended such coverage to last in perpetuity. Accordingly, these
provisions do not render the CBAs ambiguous.

The CBAs contain a general three-year durational clause, and no
provision specifies that the benefits in dispute are subject to any
different duration. If the parties meant to vest healthcare
benefits for life, they easily could have said so in the CBAs, but
they did not. The CBAs specify that all agreements and
understandings, expressed, implied, written or oral, are set forth
in this Agreement and that this Agreement expresses the complete
understanding of the Parties on the subject of benefits.

Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the CBAs is that
the contractual right to healthcare benefits expired when the CBAs
expired.

Because the Court concludes that the CBAs did not grant plaintiffs
a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare
benefits, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reverses
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Macomb
Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary disposition to
defendant consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's May 30, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxa8tguc from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER P. LEGGHIO, 306 South Washington Avenue, Suite 600,
Royal Oak, MI 48067, for RITA KENDZIERSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

SUSAN HEALY ZITTERMAN -- sue.zitterman@kitch.com -- for COUNTY OF
MACOMB, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant.


MARKET AMERICA: Yang Suit Transferred to M.D. North Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled CHUANJIE YANG, an individual; OLLIE
LAN, an individual; and all those similarly situated v. MARKET
AMERICA, INC., a North Carolina Corporation; MARKET AMERICA
WORLDWIDE, INC., a North Carolina Corporation; JAMES HOWARD
RIDINGER, an individual; LOREN RIDINGER, an individual; MARC
ASHLEY, an individual; and DOES 1-100, Case No. 2:17-cv-04012, was
transferred on May 13, 2019, from the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina.

The North Carolina District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00502 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants run an illegal pyramid
scheme.  The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants take money in
return for the right to sell products that they do not even
manufacture, and reward for recruiting other participants into the
pyramid.[BN]

Plaintiffs CHUANJIE YANG, an individual and all those similarly
situated; OLLIE LAN, also known as: RUONING LAN, an individual and
all those similarly situated; and LIU LIU, an individual and all
those similarly situated, are represented by:

          Blake J. Lindemann, Esq.
          LINDEMANN LAW FIRM, APC
          433 N. Camden Drive, 4th Floor
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 279-5269
          Facsimile: (310) 300-0267
          E-mail: blake@lawbl.com

               - and -

          Daren M. Schlecter, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DAREN SCHLECTER
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 830
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 553-5747
          Facsimile: (310) 553-5487
          E-mail: daren@schlecterlaw.com

Defendants MARKET AMERICA, INC., a North Carolina Corporation;
MARKET AMERICA WORLDWIDE INC., a North Carolina Corporation; JAMES
HOWARD RIDINGER, an individual; LOREN RIDINGER, an individual; and
MARC ASHLEY, an individual, are represented by:

          Jonathon D. Townsend, Esq.
          Pressly M. Millen, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
          555 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1100
          P.O. Box 831
          Raleigh, NC 27601
          Telephone: (919) 755-2175
          Facsimile: (919) 755-6173
          E-mail: Jonathon.Townsend@wbd-us.com
                  press.millen@wbd-us.com

               - and -

          Lawrence B. Steinberg, Esq.
          BUCHALTER APC
          1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-2457
          Telephone: (213) 891-0700
          Facsimile: (213) 896-0400
          E-mail: lsteinberg@buchalter.com


MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Class Certification Sought in Voeks Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Voeks moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled MEGAN VOEKS, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT
BUREAU, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00725 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks
that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to
grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules
setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and
supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, according to the
Motion.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION: Marett Files ADA Suit in S.D. N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Metropolitan
Transportation Authority. The case is styled as Lucia Marett on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transit
Authority, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05144 (S.D. N.Y., May 31,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Inc. provides subway, bus,
and commuter railroad transportation services to customers with
disabilities in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C.K. Lee, Esq.
     Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
     73 West Monroe Street
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: (212) 465-1188
     Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


MEYER NJUS: Serifoski Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mefail Serifoski moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit entitled MEFAIL SERIFOSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
MEYER, NJUS, TANICK, PA, Case No. 2:19-cv-00723-PP (E.D. Wisc.),
and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


MICHAEL KOEHN: Wins Final Approval of $5K Settlement in Long Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William C. Griesbach issued final approval order and
judgment on the Parties' request for approval of their Class
Settlement Agreement resolving the lawsuit styled BRUCE LONG,
individually on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. MICHAEL C. KOEHN and, JOHN AND JANE DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 10,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00943-WCG (E.D. Wisc.).

The Settlement Class is certified, for settlement purposes only,
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All persons to whom Michael C. Koehn mailed an initial
     written communication to an address in the State of
     Wisconsin, between June 21, 2017 and July 12, 2018, which
     stated a static amount as being the amount due even though
     the debts were accruing interest.

In his complaint, Mr. Long alleges that the Defendants violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by mailing consumers initial
collection letters to collect defaulted medical debts, which stated
a static amount as being the amount due even though the debts were
accruing interest, and which were allegedly mailed without
meaningful attorney involvement.

The Court approved a form of notice for mailing to the Settlement
Class.  The Court is informed that actual notice was sent by first
class mail to 738 Class Members by Class-Settlement.com, the
third-party settlement administrator.  A total of 45 envelopes were
returned by the United States Postal Service, 18 of which were
returned with forwarding addresses and successfully re-mailed.  No
Class Members requested exclusion from, or objected to, the
Settlement.

Upon the Effective Date, as that term is defined in the Agreement,
Koehn shall:

   (a) create a class settlement fund of $5,000, which Class
       Counsel through the Settlement Administrator will
       distribute pro rata to each Class Member whose Class
       Notice was not returned as undeliverable and who did not
       him/herself from the Settlement.  Class Members will
       receive their share of the Class Recovery by check, which
       shall become void sixty (60) days from the date of
       issuance.  Any checks that have not been cashed by the
       void date, along with any unclaimed funds remaining in the
       Class Recovery will be disbursed in the following order:

        (i) to pay the costs associated with providing notice to
            Class Members and administering the Class Recovery;
            and

       (ii) any remainder donated as a cy pres award to Legal
            Action of Wisconsin;

   (b) pay the Plaintiff $1,500; and

   (c) pay Class Counsel $20,315 for their attorneys' fees and
       costs incurred in the action, which is based on their
       reasonable hourly rates and time expended in the
       litigation. Class Counsel shall not request additional
       fees or costs from Koehn or the Class Members.[CC]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Certification of Class Sought in Voeks Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Megan Voeks moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned MEGAN VOEKS, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00715-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Removes Mun FDCPA Class Suit to S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., removed on May 9, 2019,
the class action lawsuit entitled Mindy Mun, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Midland Credit Management,
Inc., Case No. 70331/2018, from the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Westchester to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (White Plains).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 7:19-cv-04206 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.[BN]

Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc., is represented by:

          Matthew Blake Corwin, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 471-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 935-1166
          E-mail: mcorwin@hinshawlaw.com


MODELL'S SPORTING: Duncan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Modell's Sporting
Goods, Inc. The case is styled as EUGENE DUNCAN AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. Modell's
Sporting Goods, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05082 (S.D. N.Y.,
May 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Modell's Sporting Goods is a sporting goods retailer with locations
in the Northeastern United States. Modell's carries both sporting
goods and related apparel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
     The Marks Law Firm PC
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 770-3775
     Fax: (646) 867-2639
     Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com



MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS: Nashville Must Redefine Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class in the lawsuit titled THE
HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND
DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, d/b/a NASHVILLE GENERAL HOSPITAL and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37 HEALTH & SECURITY PLAN v. MOMENTA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and SANDOZ INC., Case No. 3:15-cv-01100 (M.D.
Tenn.).

The Plaintiffs will file a motion to amend class action definition,
and the Defendants will file a response.  No reply shall be
necessary, according to the Order.

Judge Crenshaw also denied as moot the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude Report and Opinions of Dr. Russell L. Lamb.

If the Court allows the suit to go forward under the Plaintiffs'
new class definition, the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification shall be filed on or before June 18, 2019.  Any
supplemental expert report shall be filed on that same date.  The
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' class certification motion
shall be filed on or before July 2, 2019.  Similarly, any
supplemental expert report from the Defendants shall be filed on
that same date.  Any reply shall be filed on or before July 5, 2019
and any expert report in support shall be filed on that same date.

At the evidentiary hearing, the parties represented that they have
agreed to mediation.  In order to facilitate such efforts, the
parties shall file a Mediation Notice setting forth: (1) the agreed
mediator; and (2) the date or dates of the mediation. This
mediation shall take place on or before August 1, 2019.  The
January 7, 2020 trial date, as set by the Court's Trial Management
Order, remains in effect, Judge Crenshaw further ruled.[CC]


MONSANTO COMPANY: Alonzo Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
MARY H. ALONZO, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02767-VC (E.D. Mo., May 23, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Brunner Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS BRUNNER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02766-VC (E.D. Mo., May 23, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Dyes Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
O. D. DYES, JR., the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02761-VC (S.D.N.Y., April 11, 2019),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul D. Rheingold, Esq.
          RHEINGOLD GIUFFRA
            RUFFO & PLOTKIN LLP
          551 Fifth Avenue, 29 th Floor
          New York, NY 10176
          Telephone: (212) 684-1880


MONSANTO COMPANY: Hall Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
MARK HALL, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-02764-VC (E.D. Mo., April 19, 2019), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joe McGreevy, Esq.
          KUHLMAN & LUCAS, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2550
          Kansas City, MO 64104
          Telephone: (816) 548-3187
          Facsimile: (816) 799-0336
          E-mail: joe@kuhlmanlucas.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Newble Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
JUANITA NEWBLE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02765-VC (E.D. Mo., April 19, 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joe McGreevy, Esq.
          KUHLMAN & LUCAS, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2550
          Kansas City, MO 64104
          Telephone: (816) 548-3187
          Facsimile: (816) 799-0336
          E-mail: joe@kuhlmanlucas.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ryce Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
MICHON RYCE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-cv-02797-VC (E.D. Mo., April 23 2019), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. Plaintiff's
injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly situated
victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com



MONTEREY COUNTY, CA: $150K Attys' Fees & Costs Awarded in Hernandez
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSE HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF
MONTEREY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-02354-BLF (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses in
the amount of $150,000 for the period May 27, 2017 through May 26,
2018; and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' request for post-judgment
interest.

The class action was filed in May 2013 on behalf of inmates housed
at the Monterey County Jail, challenging the medical care, mental
health care, safety, and disability access provided at the Jail.
After substantial discovery, motion practice, and issuance of a
preliminary injunction, the parties entered into a Settlement
Agreement which required changes to Jail policies and practices.
Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal, then assigned to the case, granted
final approval of the class action settlement in an order issued
Aug. 18, 2015.

Among other things, the Settlement Agreement required the
Defendants to develop implementation plans in specific subject
areas for improvement of care, services, programs, and activities
at the Jail.  Judge Grewal approved those plans in large part,
although he required some modifications.

The Settlement Agreement contemplates that the Plaintiffs may incur
fees and expenses in monitoring and enforcing the Defendants'
compliance.  Under Paragraph 63 of the Settlement Agreement, the
Plaintiffs may petition the Court for: (a) no more than $250,000
per year in fees and expenses arising from monitoring work,
inspections of the Jail, meet-and-confer, and the like, and (b) no
more than $150,000 per year in fees and expenses arising from
motions to enforce the Settlement Agreement.  The parties agree
that for purposes of these provisions, the first monitoring year
ran from May 27, 2016 through May 26, 2017.  The second monitoring
year -- the year at issue -- ran from May 27, 2017 through May 26,
2018.

On July 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the
Settlement Agreement, asserting that: (a) CFMG had not complied
with its staffing obligations under the Settlement Agreement; (b)
CFMG's proposed Telepsychiatry Policy did not contain the standards
required by Judge Grewal's order; and (c) the County had denied the
Class Counsel and court-appointed monitors access to inmates'
records of treatment at Natividad Medical Center which were
necessary to confirm the Defendants' compliance with the Settlement
Agreement and related court orders.  A number of issues were
resolved on the record, and the Court indicated that it would refer
certain outstanding issues to Magistrate Judge Cousins for
resolution.

The Court issued a written order on Nov. 1, 2017.  It found that as
of the filing of the Plaintiffs' motion to enforce, CFMG was not in
compliance with its obligation to employ a psychiatrist on-site at
the Jail for forty hours per week. The Court noted that after the
motion to enforce was filed, CFMG hired Dr. Paul Francisco to work
as a full-time on-site psychiatrist.  It accepted the oral
representations of CFMG's counsel that there were substitute
psychiatrists available to cover any absences of Dr. Francisco.
Thus, the Court concluded that the portions of the motion to
enforce directed to CFMG's staffing obligations were moot.

The Court observed that the parties had "agreed to work together"
and had "reached tentative agreement" on the bulk of the
telepsychiatry issues.  It referred the remaining telepsychiatry
issues to Judge Cousins.  The proceedings before Judge Cousins
resulted in stipulated resolution of the remaining telepsychiatry
issues.

Finally, the Court granted the requested access in inmates'
Natividad medical records subject to the Plaintiffs' submission of
particularized requests to the Court by means of stipulation and
proposed order or administrative motion.

The Plaintiffs now seek attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in
litigating the issues described.  They claim that they incurred
$335,648 in fees and $12,594 in expenses, but they limit their
request to the $150,000 annual cap on fees and expenses set forth
in the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Freeman has no difficulty finding that the requisite
standards are met with respect to the portions of the motion to
enforce directed to CFMG's obligations.  CFMG's arguments to the
contrary are unpersuasive.  She finds that (i) the Plaintiffs'
motion to enforce was necessary to enforce substantial class
rights; (ii) the Plaintiffs attempted to reach resolution through
meet and confer efforts, and through presentation of the issues to
Judge Cousins; and (iii) the Plaintiffs' motion to enforce was not
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; rather was the catalyst
for, or otherwise resulted in, CFMG's compliance with its
obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge concludes that fees and expenses for litigating access to
inmates' medical records are not recoverable as fees and expenses
incurred in seeking to "enforce" the Settlement Agreement.  The
Plaintiffs' showing is more than adequate to warrant an award of
$150,000 in fees and expenses, which is the maximum permitted under
the Settlement Agreement but less than half of the counsel's
lodestar.  Hence, the Plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys'
fees and expenses in the amount of $150,000 for the period May 27,
2017 through May 26, 2018 will be granted.  Having concluded that
the Plaintiffs are entitled to $150,000 in fees and expenses under
the Settlement Agreement, the Judge need not reach the Plaintiffs'
alternative arguments that they are entitled to attorneys' fees
under various federal and state statutes.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' entitlement to the $150,000 in fees and
expenses was not "secured" until the issuance of the present order.
The Plaintiffs have cited no legal authority supporting an award
of interest on the contractual fees and expenses awarded in the
case.  Accordingly, the Judge will deny the Plaintiffs' request for
post-judgment interest.

Based on the Foregoing, Judge Freeman (i) granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount
of $150,000 for the period May 27, 2017 through May 26, 2018; and
(ii) denied the Plaintiffs' request for post-judgment interest.  He
(i) vacated the May 16, 2016 hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4IlDvB from Leagle.com.

Jesse Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld
-- ggrunfeld@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld LLP, Krista
Michelle Stone-Manista -- KStone-Manista@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien
Galvan and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of
Northern California, Inc., Andrew Glenn Spore -- aspore@rbgg.com --
Rosen Bien Galvan Grunfeld, Eric Balaban, American Civil Liberties
Union, Ernest James Galvan -- egalvan@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan
& Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien --
mbien@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen
-- vswearingen@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP.

Robert Yancey, Richard Murphy, Sarab Sarabi, Glenda Hunter, on
behalf of themselves and all others similary situated, Cain
Aguilar, Dennis Guyot, Albert Key, Cobb (Tran) Ha, Jeff Nichols,
George Greim, Wesley Miller, Susan Dilley, Connie Dobbs, Sean
Esquivel, Ramona Gist, Martha Gomez, Jason Hobbs, Brandon Mefford,
Angel Perez & Clyde Whitfield, Plaintiffs, represented by Gay
Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld LLP, Krista
Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld, Alan
Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc.,
Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Micaela
Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van
Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP.

County of Monterey, Defendant, represented by Susan K. Blitch,
County Counsel, Anne Kristen Brereton, Monterey County Counsel,
Janet L. Holmes, County Counsel's Office, Mary Leeann Hapte --
Leeann.Habte@bbklaw.com -- Best, Best & Krieger LLP & Michael
Rudolph Philippi, County of Monterey.

Monterey County Sheriff's Office, Defendant, represented by Susan
K. Blitch, Office of the County Counsel, County of Monterey, Anne
Kristen Brereton, Monterey County Counsel, Mary Leeann Hapte, Best,
Best & Krieger LLP & Michael Rudolph Philippi, County of Monterey
County Counsel.

California Forensic Medical Group, Defendant, represented by Jemma
Allison Parker Saunders -- jps@bertling-clausen.com -- Bertling and
Clausen, LLP, Paul David Singer -- pds@bertling-clausen.com --
Bertling and Clausen LLP & Peter George Bertling -- pgb@bertling-
clausen.com -- Bertling and Clausen, LLP.

Mark Vasquez Pajas, Sr., Movant, represented by Cindy Panuco,
Hadsell Stormer and Renick LLP.


MOUNTAIN AMERICA: Beaman Sues Over Illegal Overdraft Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
CHAS BEAMAN, an individual on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION dba MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION, a Federal Credit Union,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00053-PMW (D. Utah, May 31, 2019) is an
action on behalf of Plaintiff and the class of all similarly
situated consumers against Defendant, Mountain America Federal
Credit Union ("MACU"), arising from its routine practice of
assessing overdraft fees ("OD Fees") on debit card transactions
that did not actually overdraw a checking account.

This is a civil action seeking monetary damages, restitution, and
declaratory and injunctive relief. MACU's improper scheme to
extract funds from accountholders has victimized Mr. Beaman and
thousands of other accountholders. Unless enjoined, MACU will
continue to engage in these schemes and cause substantial injury to
accountholders, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Mr. Beaman is an individual and resident of Weber County,
Utah.

MACU is a federally regulated credit union with its principal place
of business located in Salt Lake County, Utah.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     JASON R. HULL, ESQ.
     TREVOR C. LANG, ESQ.
     MARSHALL OLSON & HULL, PC
     NEWHOUSE BUILDING
     TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 350
     SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
     Phone: 801.456.7655
     Email: JHULL@MOHTRIAL.COM
            TLANG@MOHTRIAL.COM

          - and -

     KELLY A. HYMAN, ESQ.
     FRANKLIN D. AZAR AND ASSOCIATES, PC
     14426 EAST EVANS AVE
     AURORA, CO 80014
     Phone: 303.757.3300
     Email: HYMANK@FDAZAR.COM

          - and -

     JEFFREY KALIEL, ESQ.
     SOPHIA GOLD, ESQ.
     KALIEL, PLLC
     1875 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW, 10TH FLOOR
     WASHINGTON, DC 20009
     Phone: 202.250.4783
     Email: JKALIEL@KALIELPLLC.COM
            SGOLD@KALIELPLLC.COM


NATIONAL CREDIT: Alla Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Seit Alla moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned SEIT ALLA, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. NATIONAL CREDIT
SERVICES, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-00730-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in Football Players Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Richard Dent, et al., filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in their lawsuit entitled Richard Dent, et al. v. National
Football League, Case No. 3:14-cv-02324-WHA, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against National Football League by former professional
football players.  Dent and nine other retired players filed a
putative class action suit against the NFL seeking to represent a
class of more than 1,000 former players.

The Plaintiffs alleged that since 1969, the NFL has distributed
controlled substances and prescription drugs to its players in
violation of both state and federal laws, and that the manner in
which these drugs were administered left the players with permanent
injuries and chronic medical conditions.

The Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of plaintiffs who had
received or were administered drugs by anyone affiliated with the
NFL or an NFL team.  They filed claims for negligence per se,
negligent hiring and retention, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent concealment, fraud, and loss of consortium.  They sought
relief including damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
and medical monitoring.

The appellate case is captioned as Richard Dent, et al. v. National
Football League, Case No. 19-16017, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by June 13, 2019;

   -- Transcript is due on July 15, 2019;

   -- Appellants Richard Dent, Roy Green, J. D. Hill, James
      McMahon, Jeremy Newberry, Ron Pritchard, Ron Stone, Keith
      Van Horne and Marcellus Wiley's opening brief is due on
      August 22, 2019;

   -- Appellee National Football League's answering brief is due
      on September 23, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants RICHARD DENT, et al., are represented by:

          Phillip J. Closius, Esq.
          Joseph F. Murphy, Esq.
          Steven D. Silverman, Esq.
          William N. Sinclair, Esq.
          Andrew G. Slutkin, Esq.
          SILVERMAN THOMPSON SLUTKIN & WHITE LLC
          201 N. Charles Street
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 385-2786
          E-mail: pclosius@mdattorney.com
                  JosephMurphy@mdattorney.com
                  ssilverman@mdattorney.com
                  bsinclair@mdattorney.com
                  aslutkin@mdattorney.com

               - and -

          Stuart Andrew Davidson, Esq.
          Mark J. Dearman, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          120 E. Palmetto Park Road
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          E-mail: SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com
                  mdearman@rgrdlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, a New York
unincorporated association, is represented by:

          Jack P. DiCanio, Esq.
          Allen J. Ruby, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP
          525 University Avenue
          Palo Alto, CA 94301
          Telephone: (650) 470-4500
          E-mail: jack.dicanio@skadden.com
                  allen.ruby@skadden.com

               - and -

          Karen Hoffman Lent, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          4 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 735-3000
          E-mail: karen.lent@skadden.com

               - and -

          Stacey Recht Eisenstein, Esq.
          Daniel L. Nash, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          2001 K Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 887-4427
          E-mail: seisenstein@akingump.com
                  dnash@akingump.com


NATIONSTAR: Must Face Class Action Over Flood Insurance
-------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Guerin, writing for Housing Wire, reports that a federal
appeals court in Florida overturned a previous ruling that will
mean Nationstar will now have to face allegations that it violated
Florida law by charging homeowners for unnecessary flood
insurance.

In a unanimous decision, judges in the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals revived part of a Florida condo owner's claims against
Nationstar, accusing the servicer of ripping off borrowers by
unnecessarily placing flood insurance on their properties for which
they were charged thousands of dollars.

The case was brought by Sarah Alhassid, who took a reverse mortgage
on her Aventura, Florida, condo through Seattle Mortgage Company in
2007. The loan rights were then transferred to Bank of America, and
the servicing rights were transferred to Nationstar.

Alhassid's condo association had a flood insurance policy in place,
meaning she was exempt from the requirement to purchase her own per
the terms of the HECM loan.

But despite having knowledge of this, Nationstar purchased flood
insurance on Alhassid's property and charged her for the premiums,
which bumped up her monthly interest and mortgage insurance
payments.

Alhassid pursued Nationstar under claims that it violated the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection
Protection Act and two provisions of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act. She also sought compensation for unjust
enrichment.

While a district court previously shut down those claims, an
appeals court is upholding one of them, asserting that Nationstar
must face the allegation that it violated the state's act against
deceptive and unfair trade practices with the "improper" placement
floor insurance.

"No state or federal statute, as best as we can tell, compels a
servicer to purchase force-placed flood insurance when doing so
would be unnecessary or duplicative," the judges stated.

"In fact, in the analogous context of hazard insurance, federal law
expressly prohibits the purchase of force-placed insurance
‘unless the servicer has a reasonable basis to believe that the
borrower has failed to comply with the mortgage loan contract's
requirement to maintain hazard insurance,'" they continued.

The appeals court therefore reversed an earlier judgment by a
district court to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on this ground,
and it could unleash a wave of trouble for the servicer, who now
must face the possibility that the class-action suit will bring
other such stories to light. [GN]


NATORI COMPANY: Bunting Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------------
RASHETA BUNTING, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. THE NATORI COMPANY
INCORPORATED, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03239 (E.D. N.Y., May 31,
2019) is a civil rights action against Natori for its failure to
design, construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually-impaired persons.

The Defendant is denying blind and visually impaired persons
throughout the United States with equal access to the goods and
services Natori provides to their non-disabled customers through
their website http//:www.Natori.com. Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its website, and therefore denial of its products
and services offered, and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, asserts the complaint.

Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen reading software to read website content using her
computer.

Defendant Natori.com is a commercial website that offers products
and services for online sale.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Dan Shaked, Esq.
     SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
     44 Court Street, Suite 1217
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 373-9128
     Email: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com


NAVIHEALTH INC: Barbee Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned MAE BARBEE, DONNA TRONE,
ANITA TABOH, MARY BETH HERWALD, SHEREE MONTGOMERY, and all others
similarly situated v. NAVIHEALTH, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-00119
(M.D. Tenn.), moves for conditional certification and notice
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant their motion and authorize
their counsel to notify the Defendant's current and former
non-supervisory employees who worked over forty (40) hours in at
least one workweek over the past three years; who received pay on a
salary basis; worked under a job title in its "Clinical" job family
containing the term Coordinator, Care Coordinator, Case Manager, or
Care Manager; and whose job duties included Care Management Work
(collectively, "Collective Action Members").

According to the Motion, the Defendant must provide, within
fourteen (14) days, the names, mailing addresses, cell phone
numbers, and e-mail addresses of all current and former naviHealth
employees who, at any time since February 6, 2016, worked as
non-supervisory employees who worked over forty (40) hours in at
least one workweek over the past three years; who received pay on a
salary basis; worked under a job title in its "Clinical" job family
containing the term Coordinator, Care Coordinator, Case Manager, or
Care Manager; and whose job duties included Care Management Work.

All such present and former employees similarly situated to the
Plaintiffs shall have 90 days from the date the Defendant provides
their names and address to the Plaintiffs' counsel to mail an
opt-in form to the Plaintiffs' counsel for filing in the
Court.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Molly A. Elkin, Esq.
          Hillary D. Lebeau, Esq.
          MCGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 833-8855
          Facsimile: (202) 452-1090
          E-mail: mae@mselaborlaw.com
                  hdl@mselaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles P. Yezbak, III, Esq.
          N. Chase Teeples, Esq.
          YEZBAK LAW OFFICES PLLC
          2002 Richard Jones Road, Suite B-200
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: (615) 250-2000
          Facsimile: (615) 250-2020
          E-mail: yezbak@yezbaklaw.com
                  teeples@yezbaklaw.com

               - and -

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          2820 McKinnon, Suite 5009
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 790-4454
          E-mail: jack@siegellawgroup.biz

               - and -

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (281) 572-0727
          Facsimile: (281) 572-0728
          E-mail: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

               - and -

          J. Derek Braziel, Esq.
          Elizabeth Beck, Esq.
          LEE & BRAZIEL, L.L.P.
          1801 N. Lamar Street, Suite 325
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 749-1400
          E-mail: jdbraziel@l-b-law.com
                  ebeck@scopelitis.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert W. Horton, Esq.
          Mary Leigh Pirtle, Esq.
          BASS, BERRY & SIMS
          150 Third Avenue South, Suite 2800
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: (615) 742-6232
          Facsimile: (615) 742-2806
          E-mail: rhorton@bassberry.com
                  mpirtle@bassberry.com


NEVRO CORP: Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nevro Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2019, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
putative securities class action suit initiated by the Oklahoma
Police Pension and Retirement System.

On August 23, 2018, the Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement
System filed a putative securities class action complaint against
the Company and certain individual officers alleging violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act.  

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, seeks unspecified damages and attorneys'
fees based on alleged misleading statements or omissions by the
Company and the individual officers regarding the Company's rights
in technology underlying the Senza SCS systems and the termination
of the Company's former Vice President of Worldwide Sales.

On November 3, 2018, a related shareholder derivative lawsuit was
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California seeking unspecified damages, injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees based on alleged violations of Section 14(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, breach of fiduciary duties,
unjust enrichment and waste of corporate assets.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Nevro Corp., a medical device company, provides products for the
patients suffering from chronic pain in the United States and
internationally. Nevro Corp. was founded in 2006 and is
headquartered in Redwood City, California.


NEW HAVEN, CT: Health Dep't Faces Lead Poisoning Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mary E. O'Leary, writing for New Haven Register, reports that a
class-action suit over the city's new protocols that wait for a
child's blood lead level to increase three to four times what now
triggers a home inspection and abatement order, has been filed
against the mayor, public health director and director of
environmental health.

The plaintiffs, two children whose blood lead levels remained high
as the city allegedly failed to inspect their apartments for toxic
levels of lead paint, are representative of a class of some 300
children as estimated by New Haven Legal Assistance Association
attorney Amy Marx.

Both plaintiffs now are exhibiting developmental delays, the suit
states.

A child under age 6 is considered lead poisoned if he or she has a
blood lead level equal to or greater than 5 micrograms per
deciliter of blood, according to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.

Lead is particularly dangerous for young children whose brains are
rapidly developing. The result can be a lower IQ, inattentiveness,
anti-social behavior and hearing and speech problems, the CDC has
reported.

The 5 micrograms standard is the level at which health department
inspectors would go in and test lead paint levels under the city's
ordinance. This would set off a tight time frame to abate, a
process for which city officials say they do not have enough
inspectors.

There are about a dozen new positions in the proposed 2019-20
budget, but no additional lead inspectors.

The city has been advised by attorney Nancy Mendel that it can wait
to check the lead conditions in an apartment until a child under
age 6 shows two blood lead levels of 15 micrograms per deciliter
over a three-month period, or until the level reaches 20 micrograms
per deciliter.

The suit charges Mayor Toni Harp, Public Health Director Byron
Kennedy and Paul Kowalski, city director of environmental health,
with violating the city ordinance that mandates earlier
intervention in a policy that dates back to 1990.

Mayoral spokesman Laurence Grotheer said the city does not comment
on pending litigation.

The suit seeks a preliminary injunction and an order from the court
to immediately give proper notice to the families and inspect their
Fair Haven apartments for toxic levels of lead in paint chips and
dust and then issue an abatement order, if necessary.

The mayor has also been accused in the suit of violating the
separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the legislative
authority of the Board of Alders to make and change laws, which is
not within her purview.

The suit claims that Kowalski and Kennedy "overstepped their
regulatory authority" when they enacted a new rule to no longer
conduct a full lead hazard risk assessment for children previously
covered.

A third claim alleges that the actions of the three officials
violate federal and state due process rights as there was no public
notice or comment on the changes.

Kennedy has said the department only has two lead inspectors, down
from a high of six when the policy was first initiated. New Haven
has the strictest intervention level in Connecticut.

"We have not changed our policy in terms of what we tried to do
when we had more resources, more capacity. When we have more and
had more we obviously were able to do more with that," he said in
an interview.

He said his department lost an inspector when state funds were cut
and more when other funding dropped. "Obviously you prioritize what
you actually have on your plate," he said, referring to meeting the
state's less-strict mandate.

Asked, as a physician, did he think it was a good idea to wait for
a child to be much sicker before moving toward abatement of the
apartment where they live?

"I think the issue that we have, and other experts have talked
about this already, we know we have some of the oldest housing
stock in this country, and so the resources should actually be
focused on addressing that comprehensively," he said. "As a
community and a country, what do we want to do to address that?
It's a housing issue."

He said around the country, tapping other resources, such as
philanthropists and foundations who would add to the pot to defray
the cost of abatements, has proven beneficial. California sued
paint manufacturers and won $1.1 billion for cleanup in 2014. That
was reduced to $400 million when it was limited to homes built
before 1951 in an Appellate Court ruling.

Would he recommend such action here?

Kennedy said maybe a suit involving New England, which has the
largest percentage of homes built before 1978 when lead paint was
banned. A total of 83 percent of New Haven's housing units were
built before that date. Abating them all would cost more than the
city's budget, he estimated.

Marx said she agrees that the cost issue should be addressed, but
"the city can't make a responsible decision if it doesn't have an
open conversation" that involves the families whose children have
been hurt, and experts who know how to reach improved outcomes.

She said court cases she has brought showed the health department
has not done a good job on lead and the city should fix those
shortcomings, rather than throw out the ordinance.

"This is an opportunity for New Haven to be a leader and come up
with best practices. It is not for the mayor and any department
head to unilaterally change the law. The city is going in the wrong
direction," she said, at a time when researchers are discovering
how increasingly smaller amounts of lead are dangerous to young
children.

She views it as a moral issue as the children impacted are usually
from lower-income neighborhoods. As for saving money, Marx said
society should consider the cost of special education needed for
those who have been hurt.

Marx has brought five suits on behalf of families who need their
apartments abated. Several have been in hotels for an extended
period as obtaining federal Housing and Urban Development funds for
a landlord is a long process. The attorney feels it could be done
more efficiently.

Kowalski said the cost to the city, so far, has been more than
$60,000 when the court ordered New Haven to abate a property and
relocate the family while the work was underway. But that money was
quickly repaid when the home recently sold and a lien was removed.
A request has been made for records on the cost of relocating
families and if that was covered by the landlords or the city.

City officials have evaded questions as to when it would switch to
using the state standard. Marx, however, said city records indicate
inspections have been curtailed since November. Also, a city
attorney told Marx in April that no inspections were currently
anticipated for either the Lombard or Wolcott street properties
where the two plaintiffs live.

Kennedy estimated the new policy would kick in this summer, but
said to check with Dakibu Muley, head of the city's Community
Services Administration. Muley has been directed to find additional
resources to deal with the lead cases and to look for efficiences.

Muley said he is working on putting a lead abatement advisory group
together as required by ordinance.

The CSA director, who is now Kennedy's boss, on May 6 said he would
have to check his notes on the switch. He did not answer an email
seeking a clarification on May 7.

Nyriel Smith, 2, first showed she was poisoned by lead starting in
July 2018, according to the suit, four months after she and her
mother, Nichelle Hobby, moved into their Lombard Street home. Her
levels were normal prior to living in the Fair Haven house.

Nyriel's blood lead level was 8 micrograms per deciliter of blood
in July 2018; it was six micrograms on Aug. 27, 2018; 11 micrograms
in December 2018; 9 micrograms in January 2019; and 9 micrograms in
February 2019.

The health department on Sept. 7 and 18 called Hobby to schedule an
inspection, according to records. Not reaching her, it took no
further action to set up an inspection. Marx said it was shortly
after that that the city changed its policy with no public notice.

The suit says Nyriel now "suffers from developmental delays and
intellectual disabilities, which emerged with regression and loss
of language at the age of two when her blood lead levels first
tested at a dangerously high level. She presently receives services
from the Birth to Three Program regarding speech delay."

"Nyriel suffers irreparable harm from continuing to live in a unit
with unabated lead hazards, " the suit reads.

Each time she had a blood test, the results were sent to the city's
Health Department.

Muhawenimana Sara, now 5, lives on Wolcott Street with her parents
-- refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo -- and three
siblings.

Both apartments show signs of chipping and flaking paint on door
frames, window frames and window sills. It appears to extend to the
front porch railings and columns, as well as the exterior front
door at Hobby's home. At the Wolcott apartment, chipping is present
on the floor boards, and in the bedrooms "within reach of the small
children in the family," the suit reads.

The Health Department was notified in February 2018 that
then-3-year-old Muhawenimana, whom they call Sara, had a blood lead
level of 8 micrograms per deciliter in February 2018. An inspector,
in an unannounced home visit, made one attempt to schedule a lead
hazard inspection, according to the suit.

He left a business card with a note and education materials that
were in English. Prior to the visit, the suit said he was in touch
with the Yale Lead Clinic and was told the family spoke Swahili.
The case was closed on April 5, 2018, because he had not heard back
from them. In June, Sara had an elevated blood level of 10. The
case was reopened but the inspector did not reach out to the
family. Her blood lead level was 9 in October 2018 and 10 in
February and April 2019. Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Services
had offered to translate.

The case was brought to the attention of advocates by church
members who know the family. Marx said Sara's teachers were upset
to see her regression when she was back in school after the
summer.

Sara suffers from "significant development and intellectual
disabilities" and has regressed on language and pediatric
milestones. She requires special education services, the suit
states. [GN]


NEW MEXICO: Settles Long-Running Jackson I/DD Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Openminds reports that on April 18, 2019, the State of New Mexico
settled a lawsuit filed in 1987 over services for people with
intellectual/developmental disability (I/DD). The settlement in
Jackson, et al., vs. the Los Lunas Center for Persons with
Developmental Disabilities, et al., calls for the state Department
of Health (DOH) to demonstrate full compliance with the settlement,
but the state will be permitted to operate under its current
policies and rules without outside oversight or direction. The
state will continue to be responsible for meeting the health and
safety needs of individuals with I/DD. [GN]


NEW YORK SPORTS: Former Members File Class Action Over Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
Janon Fisher and Michael Gartland, writing for New York Daily News,
report that New York Sports Club is giving a whole new meaning to
the term "gym rat."

Former members filed a class action lawsuit on May 13 against the
chain, charging management is sweating them for fees even after
cancelling their memberships.

The lawsuit, which names New York Sports Club and its parent
company Town Sports International as defendants, accuses the two of
turning membership cancellations into an onerous, "Herculean task"
that forces members into continuing payment long after they've
abandoned their gym regimens.

"It is not hyperbole to say that TSI engages in deceptive,
dishonest and fraudulent conduct that amounts to stealing from the
pockets of its customers," the lawsuit states. "Despite both a
legal and ethical obligation to be candid in the way it conducts
business, TSI rips-off its gym members when they attempt to
cancel."

The class action lawsuit, which lists ten plaintiffs, is at least
the second class action brought against Town Sports International
and its subsidiaries, which also include chains in Boston,
Philadelphia and Washington D.C.

[More New York] Mayor de Blasio receives 0% support in latest Iowa
poll as Joe Biden leads crowded Democratic field »
To illustrate the breadth of people's displeasure with NYSC, the
plaintiffs' lawyers included more than a dozen negative reviews
posted on Yelp.

"This place has told me twice that my membership was canceled but
they continue to charge me monthly (it's been four months now),"
said one of the reviews included in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit claims that members "are never informed" of the "vast
majority" of contractual obligations they're being held to.

"New Yorkers have put up with this fraudulent conduct for long
enough," said David Gottlieb, one of the attorneys representing the
plaintiffs and a partner at Wigdor Law. "Through the class action
we intend to send a message to TSI and all New York companies that
such deceptive business practices simply will not be tolerated."

Representatives from TSI and New York Sports Club did not return
calls.

Former NYSC members not listed on the latest class action suit
against the gym are considering joining. One displeased former
member is Michael Dowd, a teacher at Midwood High School now on
sabbatical.

In one email exchange with management at a Park Slope gym branch
earlier in May, Dowd rails against the branch's cancellation policy
and practices. Dowd filed a formal complaint with the state
Attorney General on May 1.

"I blocked the credit card charges to keep NYSC from stealing from
me through random, unannounced overcharges, and stopped going to
the club once my prepaid months ran out," he wrote in a heated
exchange with branch general manager Dominique Crisden. "I have
made a fraud complaint with the NYS Attorney General's office,
spoken with an attorney at Wigdor, and alerted the NY Daily News to
NYSC's systematic fraud."

Crisden did not return a message. [GN]


NEW YORK: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
entered on April 2, 2019, in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
originally filed a class action complaint on Nov. 8, 1996, alleging
that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.  The Plaintiffs, a group
of African-American and Latino teachers in the New York City public
school system, alleged that the Defendant, the Board of Education
of the City School District of the City of New York, violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass certain racially
discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a license to
teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1326, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Dalys Torres is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Appeals Judgment in Gulino Racial Discrimination Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 2, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
originally filed a class action complaint on Nov. 8, 1996, alleging
that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.  The Plaintiffs, a group
of African-American and Latino teachers in the New York City public
school system, alleged that the Defendant, the Board of Education
of the City School District of the City of New York, violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass certain racially
discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a license to
teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1332, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Melissa Torres is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Appeals Ruling for Sandoval in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
for Carmen Sandoval issued on April 2, 2019, in the lawsuit titled
Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
originally filed a class action complaint on Nov. 8, 1996, alleging
that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.  The Plaintiffs, a group
of African-American and Latino teachers in the New York City public
school system, alleged that the Defendant, the Board of Education
of the City School District of the City of New York, violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass certain racially
discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a license to
teach in New York City public schools.[BN]

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1316, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellee Carmen R. Sandoval is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Discrimination Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 2, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
originally filed a class action complaint on Nov. 8, 1996, alleging
that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.  The Plaintiffs, a group
of African-American and Latino teachers in the New York City public
school system, alleged that the Defendant, the Board of Education
of the City School District of the City of New York, violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass certain racially
discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a license to
teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1334, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Margaret Manning is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Judgment in Gulino Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's judgment
issued on April 2, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Gulino, et al. v.
Board of Education, et al., Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
originally filed a class action complaint on Nov. 8, 1996, alleging
that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.  The Plaintiffs, a group
of African-American and Latino teachers in the New York City public
school system, alleged that the Defendant, the Board of Education
of the City School District of the City of New York, violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass certain racially
discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a license to
teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate case is captioned as Gulino, et al. v. Board of
Education, et al., Case No. 19-1325, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Antonia Caraballo is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          Zachary W. Carter, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-1000
          E-mail: zcarter@law.nyc.gov


NISSAN: Verdict in Faulty Brakes Class Action Upheld
----------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a $25
million lawsuit blames Nissan brake problems on a deadly crash
involving a 2004 Infiniti QX56 and the deaths of a mother and her
two children.

The lawsuit says the 2004 QX56 that was involved in the crash had
been purchased by 74-year-old Solomon Mathenge in August 2012.
Although previous owners hadn't complained about brake problems,
the SUV needed repairs caused by previous crashes.

Mathenge had it towed to a body shop that repaired the damage and
serviced the car, receiving a certificate the vehicle had been
inspected and was in working condition. However, no software
updates were performed related to the braking system.

On August 29, 2012, Mathenge was traveling about 40 miles per hour
in Hollywood, California, when he saw the signal had turned red and
cars were stopped ahead of him. He put his foot on the brake pedal
to slow down but the pedal allegedly didn't work correctly. He
pushed the brake pedal to the floor but the Infiniti didn't stop,
causing the driver to panic and pump the brakes.

The lawsuit alleges Mathenge changed from the far right lane to the
center lane then to the far left lane as he continued to pump the
brake pedal, but the brakes allegedly still didn't work. To avoid
the car stopped at the light in front of him, he pulled into the
oncoming southbound lanes and honked his horn to alert that he was
in trouble.

Mathenge crashed into the side of a van driven by Saida Mendez who
had two of her daughters with her. Mendez and her children died in
the crash while Mathenge's body lodged under the dashboard on the
passenger side of his SUV.

According to the lawsuit, the 2004 Infiniti QX56 uses a vacuum
booster and a hydraulic pump to supplement braking power. The
primary method is through the vacuum booster where the brake pedal
pushes a lever which pushes the booster. The booster uses vacuum to
increase the force applied to the brake pedal to provide additional
power to compress the hydraulic fluid in the brake system.

In the event of a loss of vacuum to the brake booster, Nissan's
"optimized hydraulic braking" (OHB) system uses the hydraulic pump
to provide brake pressure. But when OHB is triggered, the hydraulic
pump is the primary source of hydraulic pressure in the system
rather than the force applied to the brake pedal.

OHB is an emergency system, so Nissan did not adjust the feel of
the brake pedal when OHB was used. And when OHB is activated, the
driver often hears the "grinding" sound of the hydraulic pump
starting and the brake pedal will travel a greater distance than
normal.

The delta stroke sensor (DSS) is part of the OHB system and
measures the stroke in the vacuum booster. If the delta stroke
sensor detects data that it interprets as a loss of vacuum through
the stroke, or the delta stroke sensor fails, the software sends a
C1179 fault code to the electronic control unit.

In vehicles manufactured by other companies using Continental
Automotive Systems braking components, a C1179 code triggered a
warning light to have the brakes checked. However, Nissan chose to
have a C1179 code activate the optimized hydraulic braking system.

Nissan received complaints from customers who said their brake
pedals were going to the floors or having very long pedal travel in
OHB mode after a C1179 code. Nissan and Continental determined the
delta stroke sensor was mistakenly detecting a loss of vacuum in
some cases and sending false C1179 codes that triggered OHB.

The problem was so widespread Nissan received 37,184 warranty
claims related to false C1179 codes that unexpectedly triggered OHB
mode, and 4,527 of the customers said their brake pedals went to
the floors. Restarting the vehicle did clear the C1179 code but
only until the sensor started sending more false codes.

The problem continued to happen until the sensor was replaced or
the calibrating software was reprogrammed.

In 2005, Nissan told Continental to create a fix for the delta
stroke sensor software that would force the sensor to calibrate
itself each time the vehicle was started. While Nissan could have
ordered a recall to repair all affected vehicles, the automaker
instead chose to issue a technical service bulletin to dealerships
in 2006.

The bulletin told technicians how to fix the problem if a customer
complained, but customers who didn't take their vehicles in for
repairs didn't know about what was going on.

The jury awarded $25 million to Mathenge and the families involved,
but Nissan appealed by arguing the trial court shouldn't have
admitted evidence gathered from other incidents, and there was not
enough evidence to support anything other than the crash was caused
by Mathenge.

In addition, Nissan said there was no substantial evidence a brake
problem caused the crash, and there was no failure to recall the
SUVs because everything is preempted by federal law.

The appeals court concluded the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing evidence of similar incidents and "there was
substantial evidence to support the jury's findings on causation
and the statute of limitations." In addition, Nissan "did not
establish that the claim for failure-to-recall is preempted by
federal law."

The trial was held in the Superior Court of California for Los
Angeles County - Cruz v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.

The plaintiffs are represented by Cory Watson Attorneys, Kiesel Law
LLP, Carter Wolden, Claudia C. Bohorquez and Vicki I. Sarmiento.

Nissan has faced, and settled, a separate class action over
defective delta stroke sensors in 2004-2008 Nissan Titans, Nissan
Armadas and Infiniti QX56s. That lawsuit alleged defective delta
stroke sensors could cause a complete inability to stop the
vehicle.

CarComplaints.com has owner-reported complaints about Infiniti QX56
SUVs. [GN]


NOKIA CORP: Securities Action Class Period Expanded
---------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP (www.blockesq.com), a securities litigation
firm representing investors nationwide, informs investors that the
class period for a securities class action lawsuit filed against
Nokia Corporation ("Nokia" or the "Company") (NYSE: NOK) and
certain of its officers was recently expanded to include additional
shareholders. Shareholders who lost money on their Nokia investment
are encouraged to contact Block & Leviton LLP to learn more.

The lawsuit alleges that (i) Alcatel (whom Nokia acquired)
maintained insufficient internal controls and was non-compliant in
its business practices; (ii) Nokia failed to conduct adequate due
diligence into Alcatel prior to its acquisition; and (iii) Nokia
maintained insufficient internal controls over the integration of
Alcatel's business following the acquisition.

If you have purchased or otherwise acquired Nokia securities
between April 15, 2015 and March 21, 2019, and have questions about
your legal rights, or possess information relevant to this
investigation, you are encouraged to contact Block & Leviton LLP at
(888) 868-2385, by email at info@blockesq.com or by visiting
http://shareholder.law/nokia Additionally, those interested in
serving as lead Plaintiff must apply to do so before the June 18,
2019, lead plaintiff deadline.

Block & Leviton LLP was recently ranked 4th among securities
litigation firms by ISS for recoveries in 2017. The firm represents
many of the nation's largest institutional investors and numerous
individual investors in securities litigation throughout the
country. Indeed, its lawyers have recovered billions of dollars for
its clients. [GN]


NORTH AMERICAN: Court Flips Doran's Wage & Hour Claims Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, issued an
Opinion reversing the trial court's judgment dismissing the
Plaintiff Doran's claims in the case captioned CAROLYN CORTINA et
al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. NORTH AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY,
INC., Defendant and Appellant. No. F074938. (Cal. App.).

Defendant North American Title Company, Inc. (NATC), appeals from a
posttrial order dismissing the claims of plaintiff Janet Doran
without prejudice.

Carolyn Cortina filed a putative class action complaint against
NATC alleging wage and hour violations under California law. In
2009, the complaint was amended to add four plaintiffs: Kimberly
Baker, Judith Bates, Janet Doran, and Tina Texeira.

Doran was one of several people who asserted causes of action
against NATC individually and as class representatives' in a class
action lawsuit. Nine of the class representatives testified at
trial. Doran was one of three named plaintiffs who did not testify.
The trial court ordered entry of judgment against two of the
nontestifying plaintiffs but not Doran, the only distinction being
Doran had supposedly opted out of the litigation before trial.

The narrow issue in this appeal is whether a class representative
in a class action lawsuit can unilaterally withdraw from the case.


The trial court issued a minute order with an attached statement of
decision. The statement of decision reads, in pertinent part: There
are several named plaintiffs, two of whom (Carolyn Cortina and
Kimberly Baker) did not testify. Judgment against Ms. Cortina and
Ms. Baker is to be entered on their individual claims. The parties
have advised the Court that another woman, Janet Dornan, was
originally a named class representative, but withdrew herself from
that position, and also opted out of the class.

Her claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

NATC filed a motion to correct clerical mistakes in the Court's
Statement of Decision. The motion requested the misspelling of
Doran's name be corrected and the order of dismissal be made with
prejudice because she never filed a request to be dismissed as a
named plaintiff, and did not appear at trial. In reliance on Code
of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (d), NATC argued
Doran's failure to participate in the trial constituted abandonment
of her claims.

While its motion was pending, NATC filed a notice of appeal. The
trial court subsequently agreed to correct the misspelling of
Doran's name but maintained its position regarding her dismissal.
Characterizing her as a former class representative, the court
stated, Doran did not abandon her case. She opted not to have her
case decided as part of this case. The dismissal without prejudice
merely recognizes her status as an opt-out.

On appeal, the plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion to dismiss on
procedural grounds. The motion was granted as to two specific
issues, but it was denied with regard to the posttrial dismissal of
Doran's claims.  

One or more class representatives litigate on behalf of many absent
class members, and those class members are bound by the outcome of
the representative's litigation. All class actions begin as
lawsuits filed by parties whose claims are purported to be typical
or otherwise representative of those of a larger group of people.


Strictly speaking, there is no class action until the trial court
certifies a class. Upon certification, the court may require either
party to notify the class of the action.

Non-named plaintiffs have the ability to opt out of a class action.
The representative parties not only make the decision to bring the
case in the first place, but even after class certification and
notice, they are the ones responsible for trying the case,
appearing in court, and working with class counsel on behalf of
absent members.

Because the named plaintiffs in a certified class action owe
fiduciary duties to the classes they represent, such individuals
cannot unilaterally withdraw from the lawsuit. This principle is
implicit in the language of rule 3.770 of the California Rules of
Court (rule 3.770): A dismissal of an entire class action, or of
any party or cause of action in a class action, requires court
approval. Requests for dismissal must be accompanied by a
declaration setting forth the facts on which the party relies.

According to its statement of decision, the trial court dismissed
plaintiff Doran's claims without prejudice because it believed she
was originally a named class representative, but withdrew herself
from that position, and also opted out of the class. As the Court
have explained, the only way for a named plaintiff to voluntarily
withdraw from a certified class action is to comply with rule
3.770. When NATC argued this point, the trial court maintained
Doran had chosen to opt-out of the class action and cited case law
on the subject of former class representatives. The authorities
upon which the trial court relied are inapposite for several
reasons, but mainly because Doran was not a former class
representative.

In summary, it was not possible for plaintiff Doran to withdraw
from the case as a class representative without obtaining court
approval pursuant to rule 3.770. Therefore, she remained a named
plaintiff throughout trial. Her status in that regard appears
indistinguishable from that of Carolyn Cortina and Kimberly Baker,
i.e., the plaintiffs against whom the trial court deemed it
appropriate to enter judgment in favor of NATC.

Since the trial court's dismissal of Doran's claims without
prejudice was based on an erroneous legal assumption regarding her
power to unilaterally cease to act as a class representative, we
will reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. On
remand, the trial court shall reconsider NATC's request for entry
of judgment against Doran for failure  

The order dismissing the claims of Janet Doran without prejudice is
reversed.  

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3d4soyx from Leagle.com.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, and Deborah E. Quick --
deborah.quick@morganlewis.com -- for Defendant and Appellant.


NORTH CAROLINA: Grabarczyk Seeks to Certify Sex Offenders Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled KENNETH S. GRABARCZYK, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. JOSHUA STEIN,
Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, in his official
capacity; BOB SCHURMEIER, Director of the North Carolina State
Bureau of Investigation, in his official capacity; SEAN BOONE,
District Attorney of Alamance County, North Carolina, in his
official capacity, Case No. 5:19-cv-00048-D (E.D.N.C.), seeks
certification of this class:

     All persons placed on the North Carolina Sex Offender
     Registry solely on the basis of an offense committed in a
     state other than North Carolina and who both committed the
     predicate offense prior to December 1st, 2006 and moved into
     the state of North Carolina prior to December 1st, 2006.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul M. Dubbeling, Esq.
          P.M. DUBBELING, PLLC
          210 North Columbia Street
          Chapel Hill, NC 27514
          Telephone: (919) 635-6005
          Facsimile: (919) 404-7074
          E-mail: paul.dubbeling@pmdubbeling.com

Defendants JOSHUA STEIN and BOB SCHURMEIER are represented by:

          Jason Paul Caccamo, Esq.
          Tammera Hill, Esq.
          NC DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          114 W. Edenton St.
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 716-6628
          Facsimile: (919) 716-6553
          E-mail: jcaccamo@ncdoj.gov
                  thill@ncdoj.gov

Defendant SEAN BOONE is represented by:

          Anna Davis, Esq.
          NC DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          114 W. Edenton St.
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 716-0091
          Facsimile: (919) 716-6755
          E-mail: amdavis@ncdoj.gov


OCEAN BREEZE: DeSimone Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN DESIMONE, MELISSA PAPANDREA, and DAVID SAMUELS, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. OCEAN
BREEZE PHARMACY, INC. and SUKETU PATEL, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-03257 (E.D. N.Y., May 31, 2019) is an action on behalf of
Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees who have worked
for the Defendants pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
New York Labor Law, and the New York Commissioner of Labor's Wage
Orders based on the Defendants' failure to pay overtime
compensation required by federal and state law and regulations.

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs and others who are and/or
have been similarly situated, were paid by Defendants in similar
ways, and have been subject to Defendants' common practices,
policies, programs, procedures, protocols and plans of willfully
failing and refusing to pay them the statutorily required overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says
the complaint.

Plaintiffs were hired by Defendants as pharmacists in their Staten
Island Ocean Breeze store.

Defendant Ocean Breeze operates a pharmacy named Ocean Breeze
located at 1817 Hylan Blvd., Staten Island, NY 10305.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
     FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
     225 Broadway, Suite 1700
     New York, NY 10007
     Phone: (212) 571-0700
     Facsimile: (212) 505-2001


OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Frankenreiter Moves for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rudolf Frankenreiter moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit styled RUDOLF FRANKENREITER,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
OLIPHANT FINANCIAL LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00724 (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

According to the Motion, the Plaintiff is obligated to move for
class certification to protect the interests of the putative
class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


OMEGA FLEX: George Moves to Certify Classes of Yellow CSST Buyers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned BONNIE GEORGE, ED MCKINZIE,
TIM WORSTELL, CEDAR DERAPS, CASEY WASSER, TAMMY VOLKART, JAMES
REHM, RON METZGAR, BOBBIE LEE, BRIAN IMMEKUS, and AMAZING GRACE
COMMUNITY CHURCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. OMEGA FLEX, INC., WARD MANUFACTURING, LLC, and TITEFLEX
CORPORATION, Case No. 6:17-cv-03114-MDH (W.D. Mo.), move the Court
for an order granting certification of these classes:

   1. The Missouri Class defined as:

      All persons who purchased for personal, family or household
      purposes yellow CSST or a structure with yellow CSST in the
      State of Missouri between October 1, 2007 and the date of
      class certification ("Missouri Class");

   2. The Nationwide Class defined as:

      All persons who purchased for personal, family or household
      purposes yellow CSST or a structure with yellow CSST in the
      United States between October 1, 2007 and the date of class
      certification ("Nationwide Class");

   3. The Rule 23(c)(4) Class, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion
      to Bifurcate and defined as:

      (1) Did Defendants make misrepresentations or omit material
          facts regarding the inherent dangers of yellow CSST in
          promoting the product as safe to transport natural gas;

      (2) Did Defendants make misrepresentations or omit material
          facts pertaining to testing validation or the effect of
          bonding and grounding on the safety of yellow CSST; and

      (3) Did Defendants comply with public policy and/or code
          requirements in the promotion of yellow CSST as safe
          for the transportation of natural gas; and

   4. The Rule 23(b)(2) Class, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion
      to Bifurcate and defined as:

      (1) Declarations as to Defendants' representations
          regarding the effectiveness of bonding and grounding on
          the safety of yellow CSST;

      (2) Cessation of the sale, marketing, distribution or
          product licensing of a flexible fuel gas piping system
          involving tubing not classified as conductive-jacketed
          corrugated stainless-steel tubing (CJ-CSST) listed in
          accordance with ANSI LC 1/CSA 6.26; and

      (3) Cessation of support or sponsorship of bonding and
          grounding as a safety solution for legacy installations
          of yellow CSST.

Excluded from any proposed Class are: (a) federal, state, and/or
local governments, including, but not limited to, their
departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections,
groups, counsels, and/or subdivisions; (b) any entity in which
Defendants have a controlling interest, to include, but not limited
to, their legal representative, heirs, and successors; (c) any
member of the law firms or the Court or their respective staff or
employees; (d) persons who timely opt out of this proceeding using
the correct protocol for opting out that will be formally
established by this Court; and (e) persons whose homes were damaged
or destroyed because of CSST related fires or explosions, inclusive
of subrogated carriers.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to (1) appoint them as
representatives of the Classes; (2) appoint David L. Steelman,
Esq., of Steelman & Gaunt, Scott A. Kamber, Esq., of KamberLaw,
LLC, Naomi B. Spector, Esq., of KamberLaw LLP, N. Scott Carpenter,
Esq., and Rebecca Bell-Stanton, Esq., of Carpenter & Schumacher,
P.C., as Class Counsel; and (3) order the parties to meet and
confer regarding the form of the proposed notice to potential Class
members.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Naomi B. Spector, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLP
          9404 Genesee Avenue, Suite 340
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (310) 400-1053
          Facsimile: (858) 800-4277
          E-mail: nspector@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Kamber, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLC
          201 Milwaukee Street, Ste. 200
          Denver, CO 80206
          Telephone: (646) 964-9600
          Facsimile: (212) 202-6364
          E-mail: skamber@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          Deborah Kravitz, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLP
          401 Center Street Suite 111
          Healdsburg, CA 95448
          Telephone: (707) 820-4247
          Facsimile: (858) 800-4277
          E-mail: dkravitz@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          David Steelman, Esq.
          Stephen F. Gaunt, Esq.
          STEELMAN & GAUNT
          901 N. Pine Street, Suite 110
          P.O. Box 1257
          Rolla, MO 65402
          Telephone: (573) 341-8336
          Facsimile: (573) 341-8548
          E-mail: dsteelman@steelmanandgaunt.com
                  sgaunt@steelmanandgaunt.com

               - and -

          N. Scott Carpenter, Esq.
          Craig Schumacher, Esq.
          Rebecca Bell-Stanton, Esq.
          CARPENTER & SCHUMACHER
          2701 N. Dallas Parkway, Suite 570
          Plano, TX 75093
          Telephone: (972) 403-1133
          E-mail: scarpenter@cstriallaw.com
                  cschumacher@cstriallaw.com
                  rstanton@cstriallaw.com

               - and -

          Marquette W. Wolf, Esq.
          TED B. LYON & ASSOCIATES
          18601 LBJ Freeway, Suite 525
          Mesquite, TX 75150
          Telephone: (972) 279-6571
          E-mail: mwolf@tedlyon.com


OMNI FAMILY HEALTH: Ower Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against OMNI FAMILY HEALTH.
The case is styled as MARILOU OWER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff
v. OMNI FAMILY HEALTH, Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-101512 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Kern Cty., May 31, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Omni Family Health provides healthcare services throughout Kern
County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by DOUGLAS HAN, ESQ.



PARAGON CONTRACTING: Edson Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled WAYNE FRANCIS EDSON, ON BEHALF
OF HIMSELF AND SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS v. PARAGON CONTRACTING
SERVICES, LLC; SOUTHWEST FLORIDA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, LLC; TEAM
HEALTH, LLC; TEAM HEALTH BILLING SERVICES, L.P.; and TEAM FINANCE,
LLC, Case No. 0:18-cv-61807-RKA (S.D. Fla.), seeks to certify a
class defined as:

     All Florida residents who had "workers' compensation,"
     "workers' comp," workers' compensation insurance, or the
     like referenced in electronic or physical records under the
     custody and/or control of Paragon Contracting Services, LLC
     ("Paragon"), Southwest Florida Emergency Management, LLC
     ("Southwest"), and/or one of their agents and/or billing
     companies (including HCFS Health Care Financial Services,
     Inc., but excluding Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC),
     when, on or after August 3, 2016, Paragon and/or Southwest
     sent them -- or caused to be sent to them by an agent and/or
     billing company (including HCFS Health Care Financial
     Services, Inc., but excluding Healthcare Revenue Recovery
     Group, LLC) -- a bill, invoice, or debt collection letter
     for medical services.

Mr. Edson also asks the Court to appoint him as Class
representative and to appoint Steven F. Grover, Esq., and Joel A.
Brown, Esq., as Class counsel.

The Plaintiff has brought suit under the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and its Florida counterpart, the Florida
Consumer Collection Practices Act.  Under both the FDCPA and the
FCCPA, it is unlawful to bill a consumer for an unenforceable
debt.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven F. Grover, Esq.
          STEVEN F. GROVER, P.A.
          507 S.E. 11 Ct.
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 290-8826
          E-mail: stevenfgrover@gmail.com

Defendants Paragon Contracting Services, LLC and Southwest Florida
Emergency Management, LLC are represented by:

          Peter R. Goldman, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS BROAD & CASSEL
          100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 2700
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394
          Telephone: (954) 764-7060
          E-mail: pgoldman@broadandcassel.com

               - and -

          John P. Gaset, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS BROAD & CASSEL
          100 North Tampa St., Suite 3500
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 225-3020
          E-mail: jgaset@broadandcassel.com


PFIZER: Faces Class Action Over Generic Drug Price Hike
-------------------------------------------------------
John McNeill, writing for WKZO AM/FM, reports that Attorney General
Dana Nessel has joined a lawsuit with 44 other states charging the
nation's biggest Generic Drug firms, including Pfizer, and their
subsidiary, Greenstone, with conspiring to jack up prices on more
than 100 drugs, some as high as 1,000%.

The suit also names 15 high ranking executives in the firms as
co-defendants.

"Each day, people across the U.S. turn to generic drugs as an
affordable alternative to name-brand medication," Nessel said.
"Michigan patients count on drug manufacturers to keep their prices
affordable for life-saving medications. And when they don't, when
they collude to raise prices and line their pockets at the expense
of the health and well-being of our residents, my office will hold
them accountable."

Pfizer issued a statement denying any wrongdoing and saying they
will vigorously defend against the claims.

Allegan based generic drug maker Perrigo was not among the firms
named in the suit.

The class-action lawsuit alleges the firms have cost patients and
insurers billions. [GN]


PILLPACK INC: Court Defers Judgment Pending Trial in Turner Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Paducah Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
deferring ruling on the pending motions until the conclusion of the
trial in the case captioned CHRISTINA TURNER, on behalf of herself,
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PILLPACK, INC.,
Defendant. Civil Action No. 5:18-CV-66-TBR. (W.D. Ky.).

This matter comes before the Court upon two motions by Defendant,
PillPack, Inc. (PillPack), and one motion by Plaintiff, Christina
Turner (Turner). Turner moves the Court for leave to amend her
complaint. PillPack moves the Court to compel arbitration and stay
litigation.   

Christina Turner, a resident of Paducah, Kentucky, brings this
action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and
claims that PillPack negligently and/or willfully contacted her
through text messages on her cellular telephone, in violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. PillPack is a pharmacy
business with its place of business located in Manchester, New
Hampshire.  

PillPack claims that Turner has agreed to arbitrate her claims.
More specifically, PillPack alleges that Turner registered online
to participate in a rewards program operated by Fluent, Inc.,
through its wholly owned subsidiaries Fluent, LLC and RZU and that
Turner agreed to a mandatory arbitration provision as a necessary
step of the registration process.  

PillPack argues that Turner visited a reward website,
www.consumersrvyvnter.com, on June 6, 2016, where she registered
for the RZU promotion. As part of this registration process,
PillPack alleges that Turner manifested assent to terms and
conditions through a click-wrap agreement containing the following
provision:

Turner denies that she ever typed www.consumersrvycnter.com into a
web browser, denies ever entering a promotion or sweepstake to win
a Michael Kors bag, and affirmatively states that she has never
received a Michael kors bag from Fluent LLC or RZU.  

Because PillPack's motion to compel arbitration presents a
threshold issue, the Court shall address that motion before
addressing any other aspect of this litigation including Turner's
motion to amend her complaint.  

PillPack argues that Turner agreed to arbitrate her claims when she
registered to participate in an online promotion provided by RZU
and/or Fluent. Turner responds that she did not enter into an
agreement to arbitrate her claims and, even if she had entered into
such an agreement, PillPack cannot enforce it against her.

Because there is a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether Turner
entered into an arbitration agreement, this Court cannot compel
arbitration at this time. Arbitration is strictly a matter of
consent and thus is a way to resolve those disputes but only those
disputes that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.

Thus, this Court cannot compel Turner to arbitrate her claims
without first determining that an agreement to arbitrate exists. In
performing its task, the Court approaches factual questions as it
would at the summary judgment stage. Under Kentucky law, the party
seeking to enforce an agreement has the burden of establishing its
existence.

PillPack alleges that Turner entered into the arbitration agreement
when she visited a reward website and signed up to participate in a
RZU promotion on June 6, 2016. The promotion that Turner allegedly
participated in displays the following headline: Monday's EXCLUSIVE
Offer Collect 100 points & ger a Michael Kors Designer Bag, $500.

The promotion website has fields for the user to input personal
information and the following statement: I understand and agree to
the Terms & Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration and
privacy policy. A user can read the terms of the agreement by
clicking on the Terms & Conditions hyperlink. Immediately below
this sentence, is a large button labeled "Continue."

PillPack alleges that Turner occupied the fields with her personal
information and then clicked the "Continue" button on June 6, 2016
thereby assenting to the arbitration agreement contained in the
Terms & Conditions.

Turner denies ever entering into a promotion or sweepstake to win a
Michael Kors bag.  Furthermore, Turner disputes the veracity of
PillPack's evidence. Turner argues that the IP address that
PillPack relies on to link Turner to the website visits is suspect.
Turner argues Fluent has only produced a suspect IP Address that
according to its declarant originated from either Nashville,
Tennessee or Paducah, Kentucky and that although it is common
knowledge that IP Addresses are fluid and change based on device
and location Fluent claims it obtained same IP address from two
different website visits, despite Turner allegedly providing two
different home addresses.

PillPack has provided the affidavit of a Fluent employee who claims
Turner entered into the Michael Kors Bag promotion. Turner has
provided a declaration in which she denies entering into the
Michael Kors Bag promotion. Thus, there is a genuine dispute of
fact regarding whether Turner entered into the Michael Kors
promotion and thereby entered into an arbitration agreement.
Because PillPack has not met its initial burden of establishing the
existence of an arbitration agreement, the Court cannot compel
arbitration at this time. Instead, the Court finds that whether
Turner assented to the alleged arbitration agreement is in issue
and therefore the Court shall proceed to a trial to resolve the
question pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 4.  

The only issue that will be decided at the jury trial is whether
Turner entered into the arbitration agreement.3 If the jury finds
that Turner did not enter into an arbitration agreement, then this
Court cannot compel her to arbitrate her claims. If the jury finds
that Turner did enter into the arbitration agreement, on the other
hand, then the Court must enforce the Delegation Clause contained
in the alleged agreement.

A Delegation Clause is an agreement whereby the parties to a
contract agree to arbitrate the arbitrability of any dispute
arising out of the contract. In other words, parties may agree by
contract that an arbitrator, rather than a court, will resolve
threshold arbitrability questions as well as underlying merits
disputes.

If Turner assented to the arbitration agreement as PillPack
alleges, then she also assented to the Delegation Clause contained
therein. When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability
question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract.

Therefore, if the jury trial finds that Turner assented to the
contract, then all of the remaining issues raised in PillPack's
motion to compel arbitration, Turner's response, and the reply will
be decided by the arbitrator. This includes the issue of whether
PillPack, who is a nonsignatory to the alleged agreement, can
nevertheless enforce the arbitration agreement under an estoppel
theory or as a third-party beneficiary.  

The Court will set this matter for trial during a telephonic
conference.  The Court shall defer ruling on the pending motions in
this case until the conclusion of the trial, and all other
litigation in this matter is stayed until such time. The parties
may only conduct discovery on the issue of the formation of the
alleged arbitration agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2aken22 from
Leagle.com.

Christina Turner, on behalf of herself, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexis Marie Wood, Law Offices
of Ronald A. Marron, APLC, Kas LaRene Gallucci, Law Offices of
Ronald A. Marron, APLC & Ronald Albert Marron, Law Offices of
Ronald A. Marron, APLC, 651 Arroyo Drive, San Diego, CA 92103

Pillpack, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bridget M. Bush, Landrum
& Shouse, LLP, STREET, SUITE 800 LEXINGTON, KY 40507, Kenneth E.
Payson -- kenpayson@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, R. Kent
Westberry, Landrum & Shouse, LLP, 106 WEST VINE STREET, SUITE 800,
LEXINGTON, KY 40507 & Sara Anne Fairchild -- sarafairchild@dwt.com
-- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.


QUADRIGACX: New Ernst & Young Report Unveils Financial Situation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Francis, writing for Micky, reports that a new report by Ernst
& Young has shed some new light on the true financial situation of
now-defunct Canadian cryptocurrency exchange QuadrigaCX.

The court-appointed monitor reports that the exchange has US$21
million in assets while owing creditors US$160 million.

An unexpected death brings chaos
Once Canada's largest cryptocurrency exchange, QuadrigaCX found
itself thrown into turmoil when its founder, Gerald Cotten, died
unexpectedly.

Cotten was in India reportedly to help build an orphanage when he
died of complications from Crohn's disease.

His death led to the exchange essentially shutting down as it was
realized he was the only person with access to the private keys of
the platform's users' cold wallets.

Apparently, Cotten ran the entire exchange from his laptop, which
was encrypted.

QuadrigaCX filed for legal protection from class action lawsuits,
which was granted by the court, as attempts were made to bypass the
laptop's encryption.

At the time, it was estimated that 115,000 users were cut off from
their wallets, although the latest report now pegs that number to
76,319.

Eventually, the court appointed a monitor, Ernst & Young, to
oversee affairs, and the monitor recommended that QuadrigaCX enter
bankruptcy proceedings, which it did early in April.

Findings by Ernst & Young
The accounting firm's latest report lists the names of three
companies associated with the exchange: Quadriga Fintech Solutions
Corp., Whiteside Capital Corporation, and 0984750 B.C. Ltd.
(QuadrigaCX).

The exchange is a subsidiary of Whiteside, and Whiteside is a
subsidiary of Quadriga Fintech.

Ernst & Young reports that there is a "material discrepancy"
between the reported fiat and cryptocurrency obligations.

The court-appointed monitor did a breakdown of the assets and
obligations for each business entity, each of which are in
bankruptcy.

It also notes that the assets and liabilities of the three
companies may overlap due to their relationship with each other.

The breakdown is as follows:

   -- 0984750 B.C. Ltd. (QuadrigaCX) owes US$160,688,982 while
having assets worth US$21,343,192.
   -- Whiteside Capital Corporation owes US$159,875,011 while
having zero assets.
   -- Quadriga Fintech Solutions Corp. owes US$160,051,461 while
having assets worth US$189,345.

Missing funds
Ernst & Young examined the addresses of the cold wallets that
QuadrigaCX provided, but found them to be empty.

It did find 104 bitcoins that had been accidentally transferred
from the exchange's hot wallet to cold wallets.

Ernst & Young are holding cryptocurrencies worth a total of
$500,000 that it had found in the exchange's other wallets and from
"other sources" in the following amounts:

   -- 61 Bitcoin (BTC)
   -- 33 Bitcoin Cash (BCH)
   -- 2,661 Bitcoin Gold (BTG)
   -- 851 Llitecoin (LTC)
   -- 960 Ether (ETH)

George Kinsman, the Ernst & Young employee acting as the monitor
and trustee, discussed the difficulty of trying to find the
exchange's missing cryptocurrency.

"[The] Trustee continues to investigate various independent crypto
currency exchanges where Quadriga crypto currency may be stored.
The Trustee has been unable to identify a Quadriga account at a
third party exchange holding crypto currency that has not yet been
recovered. However, as noted many of the crypto currency exchanges
have not cooperated with the Monitor's requests to date. The
Trustee intends to continue to pursue information requests from the
exchanges and may seek the assistance of regulatory or law
enforcement agencies if necessary," he wrote.

The legal proceedings will go on as Ernst & Young will continue to
look for the missing cryptocurrency, but the discrepancy between
the amount owed and tangible assets is huge. [GN]


RALPH LAUREN: Illinois Court Trims Claims in Hudson TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICK HUDSON, on behalf of himself and other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, RALPH
LAUREN RETAIL, INC., and VIBES MEDIA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 18
C 4620 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in
part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the first
amended complaint.

Plaintiff Hudson received approximately 188 text messages from
Defendants Ralph Lauren Corp. and Ralph Lauren Retail, Inc., and
Ralph Lauren's marketing company, Vibes Media, LLC.  Hudson
thereafter filed the putative class action lawsuit against the
Defendants for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA"), claiming that the Defendants violated the TCPA by sending
him text messages using an automatic telephone dialing system
("ATDS") without his express consent and by failing to include
opt-out instructions in each message.

The Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  They argue that Hudson's claim
fails because he admits that he provided prior express consent for
Defendants to contact him and that the message to which he replied
did not limit the consent in any way.  They also argue that Hudson
has failed to plausibly allege that they used an ATDS to send text
messages to his phone.

Because Hudson's first amended complaint does not preclude a
finding that he did not consent to all the messages the Defendants
sent, Judge Ellis cannot dismiss Hudson's TCPA claim on the basis
of prior express consent at this stage.  Also, at this stage, she
finds that Hudson has sufficiently alleged that the device the
Defendants used had the required capacity.  The Defendants can
renew their challenge to the use of an ATDS after the parties have
engaged in discovery.

Hudson also brings a claim for the Defendants' failure to include
instructions on how to stop receiving Ralph Lauren advertisements
in every text message that tge Defendants sent, allegedly violating
47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(1) and 47 C.F.R. Seciton 64.1200(b)(3).
The Judge finds that because the plain language of Section
64.1200(b)(3) encompasses only voice telephone messages and Hudson
identifies no other basis for imposing an opt-out requirement with
respect to every text message the Defendants sent Hudson, he cannot
pursue a claim for violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(1) and 47
C.F.R. section 64.1200(b)(3) based on the lack of such information
in each text message he received.

Judge Ellis concludes that the first amended complaint does not
conclusively establish the existence of prior express consent to
receive the number of messages Defendants sent Hudson and that
Hudson has sufficiently alleged the use of an ATDS.  But because
the TCPA and its regulations do not provide a basis for Hudson's
claim for failure to include opt-out instructions in each text
message, Hudson cannot pursue this aspect of his TCPA claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  She dismissed with
prejudice Hudson's TCPA claim based on the Defendants' failure to
include opt-out instructions in each text message sent to Hudson.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/X9cZjf from Leagle.com.

Patrick Hudson, on behalf of himself and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Roberto Luis Costales, Beaumont
Costales, Jonathan Mille Kirkland, Beaumont Costales LLC & William
Henry Beaumont -- whb@beaumontcostales.com -- Beaumont Costales
LLC.

Ralph Lauren Corporation & Ralph Lauren Retail, Inc., Defendants,
represented by George James Tzanetopoulos --
gtzanetopoulos@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler & Paul G. Karlsgodt,
Baker & Hostetler LLP.

Vibes Media, LLC, Defendant, represented by Amy Elizabeth
Richardson -- arichardson@hwglaw.com -- Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis
LLP, pro hac vice, Basileios Katris, Horwood Marcus & Berk
Chartered, Hilary P. Gerzhoy, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, LLP, pro
hac vice, Jennifer P. Bagg -- jbagg@hwglaw.com -- Harris, Wiltshire
& Grannis LLP, pro hac vice & Katherine H. Oblak, Horwood Marcus &
Berk Chartered.


RAMONA MUNICIPAL: Cal. Affirms Reversal in E. Plantier's Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of California issued an Order affirming the Court
of Appeals' judgment reversing the Decision of the District Court
contending the suit is barred because the plaintiffs failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by raising their challenge at
public hearings in the case captioned EUGENE G. PLANTIER, as
Trustee, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RAMONA
MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. No. S243360.
(Cal.).

The District contends the suit is barred because the plaintiffs
failed to exhaust administrative remedies by raising their
challenge at public hearings on proposed increases to the rate
charged for services. The trial court agreed with the District but
the Court of Appeal reversed and allowed the action to proceed.

The representative plaintiffs in this class action are commercial
property owners seeking to invalidate a wastewater service charge
imposed by the Ramona Municipal Water District (the District). They
claim the District's method for calculating the charge violates one
of the substantive requirements of Proposition 218.

Plantier and the two other commercial property owners (plaintiffs)
sued the District in a putative class action. Plaintiffs allege the
Equivalent Dwelling Unit (EDU) assignment method violates
Proposition 218 because the charge is imposed without regard to the
proportional cost of providing a property with wastewater service.
They seek declaratory relief and a refund of unlawful charges.

The trial court certified a class consisting of District customers
who paid a sewer charge on or after November 22, 2012.

The court bifurcated the bench trial. The first phase addressed the
potentially dispositive issue of whether plaintiffs had exhausted
their available administrative remedies before suing. The District
conceded that the plaintiffs exhausted one remedy by submitting
their November 2013 claim.

The only remaining question was whether Proposition 218 imposes yet
another exhaustion requirement that plaintiffs had not satisfied.

Plaintiffs' counsel urged that any protest at these Proposition 218
hearings would have been futile. Counsel cited the District's
repeated rejection of the EDU assignment challenge at various
meetings and in response to plaintiffs' administrative claim. The
trial court rejected the futility argument because District
witnesses testified that any challenge to the EDU assignment method
would have received careful consideration at the Proposition 218
hearings.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that plaintiffs' class action
is not barred by their failure to participate in the hearings. The
appellate court reasoned that a challenge to a fee on the ground it
violates one of the substantive requirements of article XIII D,
section 6, subdivision (b) exceeds the scope of a Proposition 218
hearing limited to protests over whether a proposed fee should be
imposed or increased.  

Further, even if plaintiffs' challenge did come within the scope of
a hearing, any remedy it afforded is inadequate. According to the
appellate court, it is implausible that a majority of parcel owners
would submit written protests under the circumstances presented
here to trigger the majority protest remedy of article XIII D,
section 6, and invalidate a proposed fee or fee increase.

Addressing Proposition 218's requirement that an agency consider
all protests' at the public meeting, the court stated that merely
having an agency consider a protest without moreis insufficient to
create a mandatory exhaustion requirement.

The Court granted review to resolve whether a fee payor seeking to
challenge an agency's method of calculating a property-related fee
must first participate in a Proposition 218 public hearing at which
the agency considers a proposed rate increase. Review is de novo.

Proposition 218

Proposition 218, approved by voters in 1996, is one of a series of
voter initiatives restricting the ability of state and local
governments to impose taxes and fees. The first of these measures
was Proposition 13, adopted in 1978, which limited ad valorem7
property taxes to 1 percent of a property's assessed valuation and
limited annual increases in valuation to 2 percent without a change
in ownership.

To address these and related concerns, voters approved Proposition
218, known as the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, which added articles
XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. Article XIII C
concerns voter approval for many types of local taxes other than
property taxes. Article XIII D addresses property-based taxes and
fees.

Article XIII D allows only four types of local property taxes: (1)
an ad valorem tax (2) a special tax (3) an assessment and (4) a
property-related fee. Proposition 218 supplements Proposition 13's
limitations on ad valorem and special taxes by placing similar
restrictions on assessments and property-related fees.  

Even when an agency is generally authorized to impose or modify
fees, so long as it complies with the notice and hearing
requirements, Proposition 218 places other substantive limitations
on the agency. Those substantive limitations on property-related
fees appear in subdivision (b) of article XIII D, section 6.

Under these limitations: (1) revenues derived from the fee may not
exceed the cost of providing the property-related service (2) those
revenues may not be used for any purpose other than the one for
which the fee was impose (3) the amount of the fee shall not exceed
the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel (4)
a fee may not be imposed for a service unless that service is
available to the property owner and (5) a fee may not be imposed
upon property owners for a general governmental service, like fire
protection, if the service is available to the general public in
substantially the same manner as it is to property owners.

The Plaintiffs' complaint here turns on the substantive
proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6,
subdivision (b)(3), italicized above. The requirement ensures that
the aggregate fee collected on all parcels is distributed among
those parcels in proportion to the cost of service for each parcel.
The proportionality requirement concerns the method used to
allocate a property-related service's aggregate cost among fee
payors. It is separate from an agency's obligation not to collect
more revenue than necessary to provide that service to all
identified parcels.

The Plaintiffs' complaint here is that the EDU assignment method
does not properly allocate costs among parcels served.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Generally, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts. Under this rule, an administrative remedy
is exhausted only upon termination of all available, nonduplicative
administrative review procedures.

The exhaustion doctrine is primarily grounded on policy concerns
related to administrative autonomy and judicial efficiency. The
doctrine favors administrative autonomy by allowing an agency to
reach a final decision without interference from the courts. Unless
circumstances warrant judicial involvement, allowing a court to
intervene before an agency has fully resolved the matter would
constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of another
tribunal.

Here, the District claims a Proposition 218 rate hearing is an
administrative remedy plaintiffs were required to exhaust. Before
considering whether exhaustion is required under these particular
circumstances, the Court pause to narrow the inquiry.

Even when a procedure is considered an administrative remedy, a
party may be excused from exhausting it if an exception applies One
recognized exception arises if the remedy is inadequate to resolve
a challenger's dispute.

As a general matter, a remedy is not adequate unless it establishes
clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and
resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.

The primary procedural remedy afforded by article XIII D, section
6, subdivision (a) is that a majority of fee payors may reject a
new or increased fee by submitting written protests. But a single
written protest would seldom, if ever, determine whether a proposed
fee would be rejected. That is particularly true here, where
thousands of individual property owners would have to protest in
writing to meet the rejection threshold.

Further, the District only gave notice that it sought to raise the
rate for all parcels serviced. It gave no notice that it was
proposing to change the EDU assignment method. Accordingly,
whatever the result of the public hearings on rates, the board
essentially would have been without authority to modify the
assignment method.

This is so because a change to the method for calculating a fee is
considered an increase in the fee for purposes of Proposition 218
if it results in an increased amount being levied on any person or
parcel. A methodological change in the allocation of costs among
fee payors will almost always result in some parcels paying a
higher fee to offset those that will now be required to pay less.


Here, the plaintiffs objected to the sewer charge by urging that
the EDU assignment method itself violates Proposition 218's
proportionality requirement. They fully adjudicated their challenge
using the District's own administrative procedures. They now seek
judicial intervention to challenge the District's rejection of
their request for a change. The noticed Proposition 218 hearings
did not offer them the possibility of any effective relief. If a
majority of property owners had rejected a proposed fee increase,
the District would lose the authority to adopt the increase. The
existing charge would have remained in place, with the same rate
structure, and plaintiffs' proportionality objection would have
remained unresolved.

Even in the absence of a majority protest, the agency is still
required to consider all protests against the proposed fee or
charge" at the public hearing. There is some dispute over whether
considering all protests is a requirement separate from the
majority protest procedure.

While Proposition 218 arguably provides a framework to hear
relevant challenges, a fee payor has little control over when or
even if its complaints may be heard. Here, it was purely
coincidental that the District held Proposition 218 rate increase
hearings around the same time plaintiffs pursued a proportionality
challenge to the existing fee structure. The District did so
because of the conclusion it needed to increase its fees to cover
costs. If the District had chosen to delay increasing its rates,
there would have been no need for a Proposition 218 hearing.
Alternatively, the District could have dispensed with a Proposition
218 hearing if it limited any fee increases to an adjustment for
inflation in compliance with Government Code section 53756. In
either case, plaintiffs would have had no opportunity to have their
methodology challenge heard at a Proposition 218 hearing until the
District ultimately decided to make such a change and notice a
hearing to consider it.

The District argues that consideration necessarily entails
resolving any protests, presumably because objections are impliedly
either accepted or rejected when an agency's board ultimately votes
on a proposed fee. The contention fails. Adoption of a proposed fee
increase does not resolve a proportionality challenge to a fee's
calculation because the agency is not empowered to change the
method by which a fee is calculated when considering whether to
increase a preexisting fee. An agency's ultimate decision to adopt
or reject a proposed rate increase cannot be interpreted as a
resolution of all issues presented to it.

The District falls back on the principle that exhaustion of
remedies is required even if an administrative remedy does not
dispose of the entire dispute or afford the precise relief sought.


When a party challenges the method used to calculate a fee, a
Proposition 218 hearing limited to a proposed fee increase does not
simply offer incomplete relief, it offers no relief at all.

Moreover, the purpose for applying the exhaustion rule even when
complete relief is unavailable is that exhaustion of remedies
serves to ensure administrative autonomy and promote judicial
efficiency. But the purposes of the exhaustion rule are not served
by the public hearing here.

That process does not narrow the scope of the claims and relieve
the burden on the courts. It does not promote the development of a
factual record for review. And, it does not give the administrative
agency a meaningful opportunity to apply its expertise because the
agency will typically have no power to modify a proposed fee to
address a valid methodological challenge.

For the reasons, a party may challenge the method used to calculate
a fee without first having participated in a Proposition 218
hearing called to consider a rate increase. Such a hearing does not
provide an adequate remedy for a methodological challenge. The
Court do not decide and express no view on the broader question of
whether a Proposition 218 hearing could ever be considered an
administrative remedy that must be exhausted before challenging the
substantive propriety of a fee in court.

The Plaintiffs here seek judicial review of their claim that the
method used to allocate fees among parcels violates a substantive
limitation imposed by the state Constitution. It would serve no
purpose and make little sense to require that, in order to do so,
they must participate in a hearing convened to consider a different
question and at which they could not secure relief.

Under appropriate circumstances, the exhaustion doctrine
appropriately provides a defensive shield for administrative
agencies to insulate their actions from judicial intervention until
a challenger gives the agency an opportunity to resolve the dispute
in the first instance. Here, however, the District seeks to strike
down claims not properly encompassed in the Proposition 218 rate
increase hearings. In effect, it seeks to use the exhaustion
doctrine as a sword rather than a shield. That it cannot do.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's May 30, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4rbafw6 from Leagle.com.

Patterson Law Group, James R. Patterson --
jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Allison H. Goddard --
ali@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Catherine S. Wicker --
cwicker@health-law.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter
and Todd D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Trevor A. Grimm, 621 S Westmoreland Ave, Los Angeles, CA
90005-3902, Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle and Laura E.
Murray, 921 Eleventh Street, Suite 121, Sacramento, CA 95814 for
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall --
kendra.hall@procopio.com -- Gregory V. Moser --
greg.moser@procopio.com -- John D. Alessio --
john.alessio@procopio.com -- and Adriana R. Ochoa --
adriana.ochoa@procopio.com -for Defendant and Respondent.

Daniel S. Hentschke -- dhentschke@santabarbaraca.gov -- Colantuono,
Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono -- mcolantuono@chwlaw.us
-- and Eduardo Jansen -ejansen@quadc.org --  for League of
California Cities, California State Association of Counties,
California Association of Sanitation Agencies, California Special
Districts Association and Association of California Water Agencies
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Mary R. Casey ; Bertrand, Fox, Elliot, Osman & Wenzel and Thomas F.
Bertrand, 2749 Hyde StreetSan Francisco, CA 94109, for Main
Municipal Water District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant
and Respondent.


REMLEY & SENSENBRENNER: Collection Letter Breaches FDCPA, Says Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOEL KOEHNKE, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. REMLEY & SENSENBRENNER, S.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00809-WCG (E.D. Wis., May 30, 2019) is
brought for the illegal practices of Defendant when attempting to
collect an alleged debt in violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA").

In attempting to collect debts, REMLEY uses the mails, telephone,
the Internet, and other instruments of interstate commerce. REMLEY
mailed, or caused to be mailed, a letter dated September 11, 2018,
to KOEHNKE. The 9/11/18 Letter did not contain any statement or
otherwise give notice that the Debt had been, or would be,
increasing due to accruing interest. The failure to disclose
interest is accruing is misleading to an unsophisticated consumer
who would otherwise believe that the payment of the amount stated
would satisfy the debt. However, the Letter fails to state when, in
what amount, or in what manner, interest will be added to the Debt.
The Letter's failure to give notice that the amount alleged to be
owed was increasing periodically due to accruing interest is
materially false, deceptive, and misleading to an unsophisticated
consumer, says the complaint.

Plaintiff KOEHNKE was a citizen of, and resided in, the City of
Menasha, Winnebago County, Wisconsin.

REMLEY was a for-profit service corporation who regularly engages
in the collection of defaulted consumer debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Francis R. Greene, Esq.
     Philip D. Stern, Esq.
     Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
     STERN•THOMASSON LLP
     3010 South Appleton Road
     Menasha, WI 54952
     Phone (973) 379-7500
     Email: Philip@SternThomasson.com
            Andrew@SternThomasson.com
            Francis@SternThomasson.com


ROSS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Morrison
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DOMINIQUE
MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. ROSS STORES, INC., ET AL., Defendants. Case
No. 18-cv-02671-YGR. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint alleging claims
for: violation of the Magnusson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) (Count 1);
fraud (Count 2); violation of the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA), (Count 3) violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) Cal. Business & Professions Code section
17200 et seq. under its unlawful prong (Count Four), unfair prong
(Count Five), and fraudulent prong (Count Six); (5) California
False Advertising Law (FAL) Cal. Business & Professions Code
section 17500 et seq.(Count Seven) breach of express warranty
(Count Eight) breach of warranty of merchantability (Count Nine)
negligent misrepresentation (Count Ten) violation of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA)   (Count Eleven); and a newly
added claim for unjust enrichment (Count Twelve).

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings
in this action, the motion is:

   (1) granted without leave as to Count One, the MMWA claim, for
failure to allege a claim covered by the statute;

   (2) granted without leave as to Count Twelve for unjust
enrichment. Plaintiff stated no opposition to the motion to dismiss
on this claim. Further, the leave to amend granted by the prior
order did not include adding a new claim not contemplated by the
prior pleading or argument on the motion, nor has good cause been
shown for permitting addition of this claim at this time;

   (3) denied on all other grounds stated. First, plaintiff has
alleged the claims based upon fraudulent conduct with sufficient
particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b), which requires the
circumstances constituting the fraudulent conduct to be stated in
detail, while malice, intent, knowledge, and other" states of mind
can be alleged generally.  

Second, the plaintiffs' claims under California statutes need not
be dismissed due to her Missouri residence. Ross conflates the
application of California law to an out-of-state plaintiff, which
courts permit when defendant's conduct allegedly emanates from
California, with the choice-of-law analysis necessary to determine
whether California law should apply to a nationwide class.

The Plaintiff has provided sufficient factual allegations to state
a plausible claim that the conduct at issue emanated from
California. The choice-of-law question is one that must be answered
in the context of class certification.

Third, and similarly, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
from which the Court could find plaintiff has standing to pursue
claims on behalf of purchasers of other bed linens alleged to be
substantially similar to those she purchased. Any issues related to
typicality and adequacy of plaintiff as a class representative for
purchasers of other bed linens may be raised in the context of
class certification.

Finally, the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish
her common law breach of warranty claims, as well as that her
pre-litigation notice satisfied the reasonable notice requirements
for purposes of those claims and her CLRA claims. The breach of
warranty claim likewise appears to be timely.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2tv8drr from Leagle.com.

Dominique Morrison, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situtated, Plaintiff, represented by S. Clinton Woods --
cwoods@audetlaw.com -- Audet & Partners, LLP., Charles E. Schaffer
-- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac vice,
Gwendolyn R. Giblin -- ggiblin@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre &
McCarthy LLP, Ling Yue Kuang -- lkuang@audetlaw.com -- Audet &
Partners, LLP, Michael Andrew McShane -- mmcshane@audetlaw.com --
Audet & Partners LLP & Stuart Cochran -- stuart@stecklerlaw.com --
Steckler Gresham Cochran.

Ross Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Brian
Margulies -- jeff.margulies@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP, Andrew Leigh Rodenbough --
brodenbough@brookspierce.com -- Brooks Pierce, Andy Guo --
andy.guo@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright, Jennifer
K. Van Zant  -- jvanzant@brookspierce.com -- Brooks Pierce McLendon
Humphrey and Leonard LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren A. Shoor --
lauren.shoor@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP & Ryan Clifford Fairchild -- rfairchild@brookspierce.com --
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey, pro hac vice.


ROY MILLER: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Muller Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM MULLER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROY
MILLER FREIGHT LINES, LLC, Defendant and Appellant, Case No.
G055053 (Cal. App.), Judge Richard M. Aronson of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Fourth District, Division Three,
affirmed the trail court's order granting in part and denying in
part RMFL's motion to compel Muller to arbitrate his wage and hour
claims under the arbitration provision in his employment
agreement.

The trial court granted RMFL's motion on all but one cause of
action, Muller's claim for unpaid wages, and stayed the prosecution
of that remaining claim pending the completion of the arbitration.

RMFL is a licensed motor carrier company that employs truck drivers
to transfer freight to and from various destinations from its six
California terminals.  Muller worked as an RMFL truck driver for
less than a year.

At RMFL's request, Muller signed a two-page written agreement
requiring him to utilize binding arbitration to resolve all
disputes that may arise out of the employment context.  The
agreement required any claim Muller has against RMFL arising out of
his employment to be submitted to and determined exclusively by
binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, in
conformity with the procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The agreement also stated Muller and RMFL both give up
their right to trial by jury of any claim against one another.

Muller's employment with RMFL ended in September 2014.  Two years
later, he filed a putative class action complaint against RMFL,
asserting causes of action for unpaid wages, unpaid rest breaks,
incomplete wage statements, missed meal periods, waiting time
penalties, and unfair competition.

RMFL moved to compel individual arbitration.  Muller opposed the
motion, but he did not dispute his delivery work for RMFL was
entirely intrastate.

After hearing oral argument and taking the matter under submission,
the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying in
part RMFL's motion to compel in the manner noted.  RMFL timely
appealed the order.

The crux of the appeal is whether the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") applies, and more specifically, whether Muller is a
transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce under 9 U.S.C.
Section 1 (section 1) and thus exempt from FAA coverage.  If he is
exempt from FAA coverage, as the trial court held, Muller does not
have to arbitrate his cause of action for unpaid wages because
Labor Code section 229 authorizes lawsuits for unpaid wages
notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate.  If the FAA applies, as
RMFL contends, the FAA preempts section 229, and Muller must submit
his cause of action for unpaid wages to arbitration, along with his
five other causes of action.

Judge Aronson affirmed the trial court's order.  He holds that the
trial court correctly concluded Muller is exempt from FAA coverage
under section 1.  Even though Muller did not physically transport
goods across state lines, his employer is in the transportation
industry, and the vast majority of the goods he transported
originated outside California.  Thus, section 229 requires staying
the prosecution of his cause of action for unpaid wages while the
other five causes of action proceed to arbitration.  The trial
court also correctly concluded the arbitrator, not the Court, must
determine whether to conduct the arbitration on an individual or
classwide basis.

Muller will recover his costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 1, 2019 Opinion is available at
https://is.gd/yLRumA from Leagle.com.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Rafael G. Nendel-Flores
and Nardo J. Catahan -- nardo.catahan@ogletree.com -- for Defendant
and Appellant.

Ackerman & Tilajef, Craig J. Ackerman and Sam Vahedi; Melmed Law
Group and Jonathan Melmed, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


SAGORA SENIOR: Mickle Suit Transferred From E.D. to S.D. Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit entitled CATRISHA MICKLE, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SAGORA SENIOR LIVING,
INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-00044, was transferred on May 13, 2019, from
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Houston).

The Southern District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-01761
to the proceeding.

The lawsuit is a collective action to recover overtime wages and
liquidated damages brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
and a Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure class action
pursuant to the law of the state of Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com

Defendant Sagora Senior Living, Inc., is represented by:

          Gregory Christopher Rota, Esq.
          HORNE ROTA MOOS LLP
          2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 1200
          Houston, TX 77019
          Telephone: (713) 333-4500
          Facsimile: (713) 333-4600
          E-mail: grota@hrmlawyers.com

               - and -

          Greg S. Gober, Esq.
          BLAIES & HIGHTOWER LLP
          421 W 3rd St., Suite 900
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 334-0800
          E-mail: greggober@bhilaw.com


SAKS INC: Sacklow Suit Moved From M.D. Tenn. to S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled Sacklow, et al. v. Saks
Incorporated, Case No. 3:18-cv-00360, was transferred on May 9,
2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee to the Southern District of New York (Foley Square).

The New York District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-04186-UA to the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as contract: other.[BN]

Plaintiffs Jeanne Sacklow, et al., are represented by:

          Anthony Parkhill, Esq.
          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Erich P. Schork, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One North LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: aparkhill@barnowlaw.com
                  b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  e.schork@barnowlaw.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN FISHBEIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel Tepper, Esq.
          WOLF, HALDENSTEIN, ADLER, FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 686-0114
          E-mail: tepper@whafh.com

               - and -

          David A. Straite, Esq.
          Ralph E. Labaton, Esq.
          KAPLAN KILSHEIMER & FOX, LLP
          850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 687-1980
          Facsimile: (212) 687-1144
          E-mail: dstraite@kaplanFox.com
                  rlabaton@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 429-2290
          Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
          E-mail: gmason@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Howard T. Longman, Esq.
          Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
          E-mail: hlongman@ssbny.com
                  memert@ssbny.com

               - and -

          Janine Pollack, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP, PC
          351 W. 54 St., Suite 1C
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 969-7810
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: pollackj@thesultzerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Jean Sutton Martin, Esq.
          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Ryan McGee, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 221-7366
          E-mail: jean@jsmlawoffice.com
                  jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                  rmcgee@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA
          One West Fourth Street, 18th Floor
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 345-8297
          Facsimile: (513) 345-8294
          E-mail: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com

               - and -

          Kevin H. Sharp, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          611 Commerce Street, Suite 3100
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 434-7001
          Facsimile: (615) 434-7020
          E-mail: ksharp@sanfordheisler.com

               - and -

          Lynda S. Grant, Esq.
          THE GRANT LAW FIRM, PLLC
          521 Fifth Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10175
          Telephone: (212) 292-4441
          E-mail: lgrant@grantfirm.com

Defendant Saks Incorporated is represented by:

          Elizabeth O. Gonser, Esq.
          Keane A. Barger, Esq.
          RILEY WARNOCK & JACOBSON, PLC
          1906 West End Avenue
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 320-3700
          Facsimile: (615) 320-3737
          E-mail: egonser@rwjplc.com
                  kbarger@rwjplc.com

               - and -

          Ezra Church, Esq.
          Gregory T. Parks, Esq.
          Kristin Hadgis, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-5000
          Facsimile: (215) 963-5001
          E-mail: ezra.church@morganlewis.com
                  gparks@morganlewis.com
                  kristin.hadgis@morganlewis.com


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Bronson
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned ALEXIS BRONSON and CRYSTAL HARDIN,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. and SAMSUNG
ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., Defendants. No. C 3:18-cv-02300-WHA. (N.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Alexis Bronson purchased a Samsung 51-inch plasma Smart
3D HDTV television. The television turned out to have two defects.
First, it displayed colored-lines on the screen.
Second, it randomly turned on-and-off. Plaintiff Bronson called
Samsung about the colored-lines. Samsung twice replaced the
offending part under warranty. In August 2015, plaintiff Bronson
called Samsung about the on-and-off defect. At that point, however,
the express warranty had run.  

Plaintiff Bronson filed this putative class action against
defendants Samsung Electronics America Inc. and Samsung Electronics
Co. Plaintiff Bronson subsequently amended the complaint. Both the
original and amended complaints alleged violations of various
California statutory consumer protection statutes stemming from
both defects.

That is, whether Section 1793.03(b) requires plaintiff Bronson to
physically present his television to the authorized service and
repair facility for repair. If the statute so requires, plaintiff
Bronson would lose.  

This order construes the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The
Act regulates warranty terms, imposes service and repair
obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who make
express warranties, requires disclosure of specified information in
express warranties, and broadens a buyer's remedies to include
costs, attorney's fees, and civil penalties.

The California Court of Appeal has held that in order to prevail in
a claim under the Song-Beverly Act, one of the elements a plaintiff
must prove is that the good was presented to an authorized
representative of the manufactures for repair. This requirement
does not stem from the aforementioned section of the Act (Section
1793.03). Rather, the requirement stems from a different section
(Section 1793.2).

Specifically, the presentation requirement is based on subdivision
(c) of Section 1793.2. Section 1793.2(c) provides: the buyer shall
deliver nonconforming goods to the manufacturer's service and
repair facility within this state, unless, due to reasons of size
and weight, or method of attachment, or method of installation, or
nature of the nonconformity, delivery cannot reasonably be
accomplished.

As before, Samsung urges this requirement be imposed on buyers who
bring claims because service literature and parts had not been made
available pursuant to Section 1793.03 of the Act.

The plain language of the Song-Beverly Act does not support
Samsung's proposed construction. A court may not change the scope
of a statute by reading into it language it does not contain or by
reading out of it language it does. Samsung's construction does
both.

First, Samsung reads language into Section 1793.03. The plain
language of Section 1793.03 solely imposes an obligation on
manufacturers. Neither subsection imposes any obligation on buyers
or even refers to buyers at all.

The California legislature could have (as it did in a trio of
sections) included language which imposes an obligation on the
buyer. Section 1793.03 has no such buyer provision. The Court may
not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that
does not appear in its language.

Second, Samsung reads language out of the Act. The presentation
requirement solely applies during the express warranty. This is
evident by its express application to nonconforming goods, which
the California Supreme Court has interpreted to refer to Section
1793.2(b) which, in turn, applies to goods that do not conform with
the applicable express warranties.

The Act contains an express purpose that it be read in favor of the
consumer. The Song-Beverly Act is manifestly a remedial measure,
intended for the protection of the consumer; it should be given a
construction calculated to bring its benefits into action.

Samsung argues it would be absurd for the California legislature to
make it easier for out-of-warranty plaintiffs to bring suit than
in-warranty plaintiffs. But we are talking about two different
provisions the warranty provisions versus the spare parts
provisions. The differences are spelled out above, namely that the
spare parts provisions live on long after the warranty has expired
and protects consumers by facilitating repairs at their own
expense. The warranty provisions have their own spare parts
requirement.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyqzklkv from Leagle.com.

Alexis Bronson, Plaintiff, represented by Kyla V. Alexande, 626 NE
1st St., Gainesville, FL 32601-5305, pro hac vice, Paul Rothstein,
626 NE 1st Street Gainesville, FL 32601, pro hac vice & Alan J.
Sherwood -- alansherwood@earthlink.net -- Law Office of of Alan J.
Sherwood.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc. & Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.,
Defendants, represented by Shannon Suzanne Broome --
sbroome@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Beth Sharon
Coplowitz -- bcoplowitz@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP,
Michael J. Mueller -- mmueller@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth
LLP & Thomas Richard Waskom -- twaskom@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP.


SANDOZ: Among Defendants in Generic Drug Price Hike Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Swissinfo.ch reports that the Germany-based subsidiary of Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Novartis is one of 20 companies in the United
States targeted in a 44-state class action suit for breaching rules
on fair competition.

The names of the companies were revealed on May 12 by Connecticut
Attorney General William Tong. The lawsuit accuses the companies of
inflating the prices of more than 100 different drugs.

"Sandoz's name appears in a court case, which concerns virtually
the entire pharmaceutical generics industry," Novartis told the
Swiss news agency AWP. According to the Basel-based parent company,
the accusations are unfounded and will be contested vigorously.

The American prosecutor mentioned that "Teva, Sandoz, Mylan, Pfizer
and 16 other generic producers" are accused of conspiring among
themselves to set prices, allocate markets and distort offers of
more than 100 generic products. In some cases, the price of some
substances increased more than tenfold. In addition to Sandoz, a
former vice president at the company, Armando Kellum, was named as
an individual defendant in the case.

"We have hard evidence that shows the generic drug industry
perpetrated a multi-billion-dollar fraud on the American people,"
said Tong. "We have emails, text messages, telephone records, and
former company insiders that we believe will prove a multi-year
conspiracy to fix prices and divide market share for huge numbers
of generic drugs. [GN]


SEQUIUM ASSET: Howard Seeks Class Certification Under Damasco
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Howard moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled CAROL HOWARD, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. SEQUIUM ASSET SOLUTIONS,
LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00719-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that
the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant
the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules
setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and
supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

According to the Motion, the Plaintiff is obligated to move for
class certification to protect the interests of the putative
class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


SIGNATURE FLIGHT: Estrada Files Wage and Hour Suit in Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE ESTRADA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT CORPORATION, a
corporation; and DOES 1-20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
198TCV18728 (Cal. Super Ct., Los Angeles Cty., May 30, 2019) is a
representative action to remedy wage-and-hour violations by
Defendant.

According to the complaint, the Defendants engaged in a uniform
policy and systematic scheme of wage abuse against Plaintiff and
other non-exempt employees of Defendants in violation of applicable
California laws, including, without limitation, failing to provide
meal and rest breaks, failing to pay minimum and overtime wages,
failing to furnish Plaintiff and other employees with accurate,
itemized wage statements, and failing to reimburse for all
necessary business-related expenses. As a result of these
violations, Defendants are liable for civil penalties under the
California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Jose Estrada was employed by Defendants as a line service
technician from approximately February 2008 to February 2017 and
from approximately December 2017 to December 2018.

Signature Flight Support Corporation operates the world's largest
network of airport service locations with facilities throughout the
world. They offer such services as refueling, hangarage,
maintenance, repair, and overhaul of jet planes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Vache A. Thomassian, Esq.
     Caspar Jivalagian, Esq.
     KJTI AW GROUP LLP
     230 N. Maryland Avenue, Suite 306
     Glendale, CA 91206
     Phone: 818-507-8525
     Facsimile: 818-507-8588
     Email: vache@kjtlawgroup.com
            caspar@kjtlawgroup.com

          - and -

     Christopher A. Adams, Esq.
     ADAMS EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL
     4740 Calle Carga
     Camarillo, CA 93012
     Phone: 818-425-1437
     Email: ca@AdamsEmploymentCounsel.com


SPRING NAILS: Chen Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spring Nails & Spa
Westchester, Inc. et al. The case is styled as Jin Chun Chen on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Spring Nails & Spa Westchester, Inc. doing business as: Spring
Nails & Spa, Qi Jiang, Ying Wu Cui, Laura "Doe", Defendants, Case
No. 7:19-cv-05074 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Spring Nails & Spa Westchester, Inc. is a nail salon located at in
Yorktown Heights, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     Troy Law, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Blvd. Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324
     Fax: (718) 762-1342
     Email: johntroy@troypllc.com


SRA ASSOCIATES: Court OKs Dismissal Bid in W. Cheng's FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned WILSON CHENG, STANISLAW GRISHIN, AND MARITZA
ALVARADO, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SRA ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a SRA Associates
of New Jersey, Defendant. Civil No. 18-13705 (RBK/JS). (D.N.J.).

This is a case about alleged violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiffs
Wilson Cheng, Stanislaw Grishin, and Maritza Alvarado (Plaintiffs)
are consumers under the FDCPA and received letters from a
third-party debt collector, Defendant SRA Associates, Inc.

The Plaintiffs argue that the letters violate two provisions of the
FDCPA. Specifically, they allege that the notices do not make it
explicitly clear that a dispute of the debt must be submitted in
writing, and that as such, the letters violate sections 1692g(a)(3)
and 1692e(10). The Plaintiffs assert that inclusion of the
Defendant's contact information in the header of the letter creates
confusion under the least sophisticated debtor standard.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the
collection letters is bizarre and idiosyncratic, that the letters
adequately instruct debtors on procedures to dispute a debt, and
that the letters are neither false nor deceptive. Defendant
therefore contends that their collection letter contains the
requisite information pursuant to the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(3)

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant's collection letter
violates section 1692g(a)(3) by failing to clearly convey the
requirement that all disputes be made in writing. Plaintiffs allege
that the letter discourages written disputes by only providing a
mailing address for payments. The Plaintiffs contend that this
text, coupled with Defendant's conspicuous inclusion of a toll-free
telephone number in the letter's header, encourages the Plaintiffs
to call the Defendant, causing the least sophisticated consumer to
be confused as to what she must do to effectively dispute the
alleged debt.

This Court is not convinced by the Plaintiffs' arguments that the
inclusion of a toll-free number and invitation to use the
Defendant's mailing address for payments overshadows or contradicts
the language in the consumer notice such that the least
sophisticated consumer would be confused about her right to dispute
the validity of the debt in writing. The FDCPA requires that debt
collectors inform a debtor of her right to dispute the validity of
any debt for at least thirty days.   

The Third Circuit has held that for a dispute to be valid, it must
be in writing.  Therefore, the first question this Court must
answer is whether the validation notice in the debt collection
letter at hand satisfies the requirement that collectors notify the
debtor of the writing requirement to dispute a debt.

A plain reading of the disputed paragraph of text is enough to show
that Defendant effectively conveyed the writing requirement for
disputing a debt. The Court recognizes that the validation notice
could be clearer by qualifying the first sentence, about dispute of
debt, with an additional in writing clause. Instead, Defendant's
verification notice mirrors FDCPA sections 1692g(a)(3)-(5),
including 1692g(a)(3)'s silence on the method of dispute.

Having determined that the Defendant's validation notice met the
Third Circuit's requirement that collectors effectively convey the
writing requirement to dispute a debt, the next question this Court
must face is whether the collection letter's inclusion of a
toll-free telephone number and invitation to use the Defendant's
listed address for submission of payments overshadowed or
contradicted the writing requirement.

The Plaintiffs contend that these features might result in
confusion for the least sophisticated consumer as to the writing
requirement.

This Court does not agree that these features overshadow or
contradict the writing requirement.

While the Defendant included a toll-free telephone number in the
letter's header, it was not conspicuously displayed as the
Plaintiffs' allege. It was neither in larger font, nor was it
accompanied by an explicit invitation to call Defendant to dispute
a debt or for any other purpose. Even if this Court accepted which
it does not that the telephone number was conspicuous and
implicitly encouraged Plaintiffs to call the Defendant, this Court
finds compelling Judge Wolfson's recent opinion explaining that
encouragement to call the collector, with no connection to dispute
of the debt, is not improper under section 1692g(a).  

Even if the debtor were confused by the inclusion of the telephone
number in conjunction with the reference to send payments to
Defendant's above-posted address, it would become obvious upon
reading the validation notice that disputes must be in writing. It
would require a bizarre and idiosyncratic interpretation of the
letter as a whole to conclude that the header's telephone number
and instructions for mailing payment overrode the validation
notice's explicit rules governing a dispute.  

Sufficient procedures for dispute of debt are those explicitly
established by the FDCPA and prescribed by the Defendant's letter;
neither this Court nor the least sophisticated debtor is at liberty
to read other required procedures into the letter. Therefore, the
letter's inclusion of Defendant's telephone number and instructions
for sending payment to Defendant's mailing address do not
impermissibly contradict or overshadow the writing requirement.

This Court finds that Defendant's collection letter sufficiently
met the Third Circuit's requirement that Defendant inform
Plaintiffs of the writing requirement for disputes, and that the
language contained in the remainder of the letter neither
overshadowed nor contradicted the writing requirement.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under section 1692g(a)(3).

Section 1692e

The Plaintiffs contend that because of the uncertainty outlined in
the allegations under section 1692g(a)(3), the least sophisticated
consumer would be uncertain of her right to dispute the debt.
Plaintiffs assert that because Defendant's letter creates this
uncertainty, it is deceptive and thus violates section 1692e(10).


Even if this Court were to find that the section 1692g(a)(3) was
not dispositive for the section 1692e(10) analysis, the letters
here are neither false nor deceptive because the disputed language
cannot be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings,
one of which is inaccurate.

The collection letter's inclusion of the Defendant's telephone
number and instructions for sending payment to the Defendant's
mailing address did not impermissibly contradict or overshadow the
writing requirement. The Defendant's validation notice concisely
laid out the requirements for making a dispute, and neither the
inclusion of the telephone number nor the instructions for sending
payment to the Defendant's mailing address could be understood as
creating a second, alternative meaning upon which a debtor could
rely.

The Plaintiffs have failed to argue any additional grounds with
respect to their section 1692e(10) claim, and the disputed portions
of the Defendant's letter are neither false nor deceptive. As such,
this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2z2cb4o from Leagle.com.

WILSON CHENG, STANISLAW GRISHIN & MARITZA ALVARADO, Plaintiffs,
represented by CRAIG B. SANDERS --
ConsumerRights@BarshaySanders.com -- BARSHAY SANDERS PLLC.

SRA ASSOCIATES, INC., doing business as SRA ASSOCIATES OF NEW
JERSEY, Defendant, represented by ANDREW MICHAEL SCHWARTZ --
amschwartz@mdwcg.com -- MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN,
PC.


STARK COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Maloney Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Debra Maloney moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit entitled DEBRA MALONEY, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. THE STARK COLLECTION
AGENCY INC., and EDUCATORS CREDIT UNION, Case No. 2:19-cv-00716-PP
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


SUNPATH LIMITED: Canfield Files Suit Over Automated Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL CANFIELD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. SUNPATH LIMITED CORP, a Delaware
corporation, NORTHCOAST WARRANTY SERVICES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, VAD d/b/a CM AUTO, an unknown business entity,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01025-LAB-WVG (S.D. Cal., May 31,
2019) is a Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against
Defendants to stop their illegal practice of making unauthorized
calls that play prerecorded voice messages to the cellular
telephones of consumers nationwide, and to obtain redress for all
persons injured by their conduct.

As a primary part of marketing their products and services,
Defendants and their agents placed thousands of automated calls
employing a prerecorded voice message to consumers' cell phones
nationwide. Unfortunately, Defendants did not obtain prior express
written consent to place these calls and, therefore, are in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to stop clogging
consumers' cell phones with unwanted prerecorded messages, as well
as an award of actual and  statutory damages to the Class members,
together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff Daniel Canfield is a natural person and is a citizen of
the District of Minnesota.

Defendants sell and provide aftermarket extended auto
warranties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
     Javitch Law Office
     480 S. Ellsworth Ave
     San Mateo, CA 94401
     Phone: 650-781-8000
     Facsimile: 650-648-0705
     Email: mark@javitchlawoffice.com


SUSHI VILLAGE 53: Hong Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sushi Village 53,
Inc. et al. The case is styled as Xiaofeng Hong on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sushi Village
53, Inc. doing business as: Seafood Village, Sushi Village 52, Inc.
doing business as: Sushi Village, Xuejuan Lin, Mei Rong Lin, Yun
Jin Ren, Defendants, Case No. 7:19-cv-05073 (S.D. N.Y., May 30,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Sushi Village is a Japanese restaurant offering Japanese cuisine
located at Flushing, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     Troy Law, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Blvd. Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Phone: (718) 762-1324
     Fax: (718) 762-1342
     Email: johntroy@troypllc.com



SVARC PR INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Svarc PR Inc.
Corporation. The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Svarc PR Inc. Corporation doing business as: Naked & Famous Denim,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03272 (E.D. N.Y., May 31, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Svarc PR Inc is a company registered in Canada and manufactures
scratch-and-sniff jeans for men.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue
     New York, NY 10017-6705
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


SWAGAT RESTAURANT: Does not Pay Overtime Wages, Naik Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kishore Naik, Harish Chand, Mohamed Kahlid Newaz, Abduel Baten
Rocky, B. GouriShankar, and Mohamad M. Abbasi, each individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Swagat Restaurant, Inc. d/b/a Sapphire Indian Cuisine, Satis
Chandra Aurora, in his official and individual capacity, Sandip
Dashi, in his official and individual capacity, and Does 1–50,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05025 (S.D. N.Y., May 30, 2019) is an
action on Plaintiffs' own behalf and on behalf of the proposed
collective and Rule 23 class against Defendants for violations of
the minimum wage and overtime requirements under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"); the minimum wage and overtime requirements
under New York Labor Law ("Labor Law" or "NYLL"); the spread of
hours or split shift requirement under New York Rules and
Regulation ("NYCRR"); the wage statement and notice requirements of
NYLL; and any other claim(s) that can be fairly inferred from the
facts set forth herein.

The complaint alleges that Defendants required their employees to
work Five and One-Half days a week. The One-Half Day was due to the
Defendants' half day Sunday hours. Plaintiffs each had a unique day
which they were 'Off.' The Defendants required Plaintiffs who were
assigned to the "Opening" shifts to work in excess of 40 hours per
week. The Defendants also required Plaintiffs who were assigned to
the "Closing" shifts to work in excess of 40 hours per week.
Plaintiffs were often times required to work before and after an
assigned shift started without the Defendants' recoding their time
for the purposes of counting it towards their hours worked in any
given workweek. Plaintiffs were not paid for every hour worked and
not paid the correct overtime compensation for every overtime hour
worked during the week, the complaint adds.

Plaintiffs are current and/or former non-exempt employees employed
by Defendants.

Swagat Restaurant, Inc. d/b/a Sapphire Indian Cuisine is a business
operating in the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Benjamin D. Weisenberg, Esq.
     THE OTTINGER FIRM, P.C.
     450 Lexington Ave., 4th Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (917) 747-5303
     Fax: (212) 571-0505
     Email: benjamin@ottingerlaw.com


SWEPI LP: Rogers' Time to File Cert. Petition Moved to June 19
--------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Sonia Sotomayor granted Matt A. Rogers' application to
extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from
May 20, 2019, to June 19, 2019, in the matter titled MATT A.
ROGERS, INDIVIDUALLY ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Applicant v. SWEPI LP AND SHELL ENERGY HOLDING GP, LLC,
Respondents, Case No. 18A1169, in the Supreme Court of United
States.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Sixth
Circuit, issued an Opinion reversing the judgment of the District
Court denying Defendant Shell's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case entitled MATT A. ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SWEPI LP, et
al., Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 18-3229, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Matt A. Rogers and Shell entered into a lease agreement governing
extraction of oil and gas from Rogers's five-acre property located
in Guernsey County, Ohio. Important to Rogers, the agreement
provides a signing bonus of $5,000 per acre, contingent upon
Shell's timely verification that Rogers possesses good title to the
property.  Important to Shell, the lease contains a broad
arbitration clause, providing that any dispute under the lease be
resolved by binding arbitration.

Mr. Rogers has sued for breach of contract, individually and on
behalf of other landowners having similar contracts with Shell,
alleging that Shell failed to pay the signing bonuses.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner Matt A. Rogers is represented by:

          Andres Christopher Healy, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 505-3843
          E-mail: ahealy@susmangodfrey.com


T-SWIRL INTERNATIONAL: Martinez Suit Asserts ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
T-Swirl International, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Pedro Martinez, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. T-Swirl
International, Inc. and T-Swirl Crepe, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-03173 (E.D. N.Y., May 29, 2019).

T-Swirl Crepe is a New York-based crepe shop that serves Japanese
crepes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11217
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


TAIWANESE CUISINE: Lin Seeks Pay for Hours Worked Over 40
---------------------------------------------------------
SHANGGUANG LIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER EMPLOYEES
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. TAIWANESE CUISINE INC. d/b/a
"Taiwanese Gourmet", VIVIAN CHEN and XUEZHANG CHEN Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-03228 (E.D. N.Y., May 30, 2019) is an action brought by
Plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated
employees, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law, arising from Defendants'
various willful and unlawful employment policies, patterns and/or
practices.

The Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed
widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in a pattern
and practice of failing to pay their employees, including
Plaintiff, compensation for all hours worked and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Lin is a resident of Queens and was employed as a cook by
Taiwanese Cuisine Inc.

Taiwanese Cuisine Inc. d/b/a "Taiwanese Gourmet" owns and operates
a restaurant located at 84-02 Broadway, Elmhurst, NY 11373.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jiajing Fan, Esq.
     HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC.
     136-20 38th Ave., Suite 10G
     Flushing, NY 11354
     Phone: 718.353.8588
     Email: jfan@hanglaw.com



TELEDYNE DEFENSE: Faces Trinidad Suit in California Super. Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Teledyne Defense
Electronics LLC. The case is captioned Remilto Trinidad, on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Teledyne
Defense Electronics LLC and Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
34-2019-00256914-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., May 21, 2019). The suit
alleges violation of labor laws.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff:

          Larry W Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 S Figueroa St Ste 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3316
          Telephone: (213) 488 6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488 6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

THOMSON REUTERS: 2nd Cir. Affirms L. Kidd's FCRA Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued Opinion
affirming the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned LINDSEY A. KIDD,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-3550. (2nd Cir.).

Plaintiff-Appellant Lindsey A. Kidd was the subject of a background
check as part of an employment application process with the state
of Georgia Department of Health. The background check was performed
using Defendant-Appellee Thomson Reuters' subscription-based
internet platform, CLEAR.

The CLEAR report obtained by the Department falsely showed that
Kidd had been previously convicted of theft. Believing the report
to be correct, the Department rejected Kidd's application.

Kidd then filed this action in the Southern District of New York,
alleging that Thomson Reuters is a consumer reporting agency
subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and that it violated that
act by providing the false report.

After the conclusion of discovery, the district court (Furman, J.)
granted Thomson Reuters' motion for summary judgment, concluding
that because Thomson Reuters is not a consumer reporting agency, it
is not subject to the Act.  

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) regulates, among other things,
the circumstances in which a consumer reporting agency may furnish
consumer reports to third parties, and the information contained in
those reports.  

Thomson Reuters operates an online research platform named
Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting, or CLEAR, that provides
its subscribers summary reports of motor vehicle records, court
records, aliases, the status of professional licenses, real
property transactions, and similar information. CLEAR subscribers
are principally government agencies and law enforcement entities,
but also include financial institutions, corporate security
offices, and insurance claims departments. The platform receives
approximately 100,000 search queries each day and is designed to
help combat fraud and assist public agencies in criminal
investigations.

Thomson Reuters also investigates reports of CLEAR misuse through
its in-house compliance office. If the office determines misuse has
occurred it will remind the subscriber that FCRA use of CLEAR is
prohibited and require[] the subscriber to provide a written
`attestation' of its authorized uses of CLEAR and its intent to
enforce the subscriber's contractual obligation not to use CLEAR
for any FCRA purpose.

This case involves one of those 46 reports of misuse. In November
2014, Plaintiff-Appellant Lindsey Kidd was the leading candidate
for a position as an Immunization Program Consultant with the
Georgia Department of Public Health, a CLEAR subscriber. The
Department received Kidd's authorization to obtain a background
check during the application process.

Using the CLEAR platform, the Department discovered that Kidd had a
prior state conviction for theft. Although the Department regarded
Kidd as the top candidate for the position, the report led the
Department not to hire her. But Kidd had not been convicted of
theft; the CLEAR report contained false information. Kidd was not
able to correct the mistake in the report in time to obtain the
position.

After the conclusion of discovery, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Thomson Reuters. Starting with the
text of the FCRA, the district court determined that an entity is a
consumer reporting agency under the Act if it regularly assembles
consumer information with a particular purpose or subjective
intention namely, of providing it to third parties for use actual
or expected in connection with an FCRA-regulated end, such as
employment eligibility.

Applying that definition to Thomson Reuters, the district court
determined that the company does not qualify as a consumer
reporting agency because Thomson Reuters did not intend to furnish
consumer reports through the CLEAR platform. The court explained
that Thomson Reuters took affirmative steps at every stage of the
customer acquisition, application, contracting, and support
processes to ensure that subscribers are not using CLEAR for
FCRA-regulated purposes, thereby establishing that it did not
intend to furnish reports for FCRA purposes. Thus, its reports
would not constitute consumer reports.

Kidd timely appealed from the district court's judgment.

The review a district court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.

Kidd's appeal presents a question of first impression for us:
Whether, to qualify as a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA,
an entity must specifically intend to furnish a consumer report.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it must have such an
intent, and we affirm the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Thomson Reuters.

Under the Act, a consumer reporting agency is: "any person which,
for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling
or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate
commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer
reports."

The Act defines a consumer report as: "any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency
bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected
in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for -- (A) credit or
insurance to be used primarily for personal, family or household
purposes (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose
authorized under section 1681b of this title."

The meaning of for the purpose of in Section 1681a(f) is therefore
plain: A consumer reporting agency is an entity that intends the
information it furnishes to constitute a consumer report.  When
Congress uses in a statute a term of art with a long history of
judicial interpretation, the Court must presume that Congress
intends to use the word in its technical sense. Such purpose can,
of course, be established in all the ways intent can be found in
our law, including explicit attestation, concrete evidence, or, in
some circumstances, inference from the foreseeable and logical
consequences of a course of conduct.

The Court’s interpretation of the FCRA accords with 2010 guidance
provided by the Federal Trade Commission.  In examples meant to
illustrate the meaning of for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties, the FTC guidance indicates that an entity
is not a consumer reporting agency unless it possesses the specific
intent to provide a consumer report. Although the FTC's guidance is
given no more than persuasive deference, the Court finds that it is
helpful and, as it tracks the language of the statute, persuasive.

In sum, the statute says what it says, a consumer reporting agency
is an entity that assembles consumer information for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties.

Kidd's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Starting with the
text, she argues that an entity qualifies as a consumer reporting
agency if it assembles consumer information in order to sell
reports which satisfy the statutory definition of consumer report,'
whether or not the entity actually intended to furnish a "consumer
report.

Kidd suggests section 1681a(f) imposes something akin to a general
intent requirement, an entity need not specifically intend to
furnish a consumer report to be a consumer reporting agency.
Rather, in Kidd's view, the Act merely requires that an entity
intend to furnish a report consumer or otherwise that ultimately
constitutes a consumer report.

Kidd's interpretation, however, finds no support in the text. As
explained above, the long-standing meaning of for the purpose of,
which the Court presumes Congress understood when it drafted the
FCRA, requires specific intent to provide a statutorily-defined
consumer report.

Next, Kidd warns that if the Court adopts Thomson Reuters'
interpretation the Court would permit a company to purposely gather
consumer information and intentionally sell person-specific reports
to third parties, which in all ways meet the statutory definition
of consumer report, yet avoid the reach of the FCRA by making a
strategic decision to include disclaimers in its contractual and
promotional language.

However, an entity may not escape regulation as a consumer
reporting agency by merely disclaiming an intent to furnish
consumer reports. For the purposes of the FCRA, indeed for any
scienter determination, the totality of a defendant's actions is
the determining factor, not the defendant's mere disclaimer of the
requisite intent.

Finally, Kidd argues that our analysis renders part of the Act's
definition of consumer report, specifically its focus on the use of
the report by the subscriber to make credit, insurance, and
employment decisions irrelevant.

Not so.

Even if a court were to conclude that an entity is a consumer
reporting agency because it specifically intended to furnish a
consumer report, a court must still consider whether the report
qualifies as such a consumer report. In doing so, the court must
give meaning to each of section 1681a(f)'s terms, including its
focus on the conduct of the end-user.

Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by Kidd's proposed
interpretation of the FCRA's definition of consumer reporting
agency.

Having concluded that to qualify as a consumer reporting agency an
entity must intend to furnish a  consumer report under the FCRA,
the Court must now determine whether the district court was correct
in concluding at summary judgment that Thomson Reuters did not
intend that information provided by its CLEAR platform would
constitute consumer reports.

Like the district court, the Court concludes that because it is
undisputed that Thomson Reuters took numerous and effective
measures to prevent CLEAR reports from being utilized as consumer
reports, no reasonable juror could conclude that Thomson Reuters
intended to furnish such reports, and therefore it is not a
consumer reporting agency under the FCRA.

At each gateway to the CLEAR platform, Thomson Reuters instructed
users and potential subscribers that the platform was not to be
used for FCRA purposes and required them to affirm their
understanding of that restriction. Marketing material sent to
prospective subscribers explained that CLEAR is meant to be used
for law enforcement, fraud prevention, and identity verification
(non-FCRA) purposes only, and when potential subscribers apply for
access to the platform, Thomson Reuters requires them to indicate
how they intend to use CLEAR to ensure compliance with the
company's restrictions. When a Thomson Reuters employee suspects an
applicant of misrepresenting its reasons, the applicant's
application will be reviewed again by a special Thomson Reuters
committee established for that purpose. If a customer is granted
access to the platform, she is required to sign a contract
promising to not use CLEAR in a manner prohibited by Thomson
Reuters. Thomson Reuters also periodically requires its CLEAR
subscribers to reaffirm that commitment, and each time a user
enters a search she must affirm her reason for using CLEAR complies
with Thomson Reuters' requirements.

In the event these controls fail, Thomson Reuters also employs
additional measures to prevent further misuse of the CLEAR
platform.  

These numerous, undisputed controls are sufficient to establish at
summary judgment that Thomson Reuters aimed to prevent users from
putting CLEAR reports to uses covered by the FCRA. This negates any
inferences that Thomson Reuters intended to provide reports for
FCRA purposes. Hence, the reports it provided do not qualify as
consumer reports.

The Court agrees with the district court that the undisputed
summary judgment record shows that Thomson Reuters did not intend
its CLEAR platform to furnish consumer reports. The Court
concludes, therefore, that the district court was correct in
deciding that Thomson Reuters does not qualify as a consumer
reporting agency under the FCRA and in granting summary judgment on
that basis.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2oxwcbo from Leagle.com.

JAMES A. FRANCIS -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis &
Mailman, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

KEVIN KING -- kking@cov.com -- (Eric C. Bosset & Neil K. Roman, on
the brief), Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.


UNIFIED PROTECTIVE: Fields Suit Asserts Discrimination, Harassment
------------------------------------------------------------------
DELANO FIELDS, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
INC., a California Corporation; AMEER ANTOON, an individual; SHERIF
ANTOON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV19013 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., May 31, 2019) seeks to enforce Plaintiff's rights and the
rights of current and former employees (i.e. aggrieved employees)
pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Plaintiff
also seeks penalties under California Labor Code.

UPS provides nationwide private security guard services for
individuals and business including patrol services, on-site
services, and surveillance. Plaintiff began working for UPS in
April 2008 and was hired for the position of Sales Manager in UPS's
Sales Department.

In the early stages of Plaintiff's employment with UPS, Plaintiff
worked in the Sales Department under the supervision of A. Antoon.
Throughout Plaintiff's time working in the Sales Department with A.
Antoon, Plaintiff often found A. Antoon to be hostile and difficult
to work with. Anytime another employee of UPS disagreed with A.
Antoon, Plaintiff would observe A. Antoon become irate and
physically violent. On occasion, Plaintiff was directly subjected
to A. Antoon's violent behavior when A. Antoon shoved Plaintiff in
the chest. A. Antoon had to be physically restrained. Plaintiff
reported this attack to UPS's CEO, S. Antoon, who is A. Antoon's
brother; however, no investigation or corrective action was ever
taken.

Soon after, Plaintiff began experiencing more discrimination,
retaliation, and harassment from A. Antoon and Nikki Bossonis
(another supervisor at UPS). Plaintiff had no choice but to resign,
since along with this, among other things, Plaintiff began being
followed and contacted by the federal authorities concerning a
murder investigation linked to someone working for UPS. When
Plaintiff complained about A. Antoon's harassing and discriminatory
conduct, began speaking up about the inequity in pay, and when
Plaintiff refused to corroborate false statements about his alleged
involvement in someone's termination, Plaintiff was retaliated
against in a number of ways including, but not limited to, being
demeaned and mistreated in the workplace and being subjected to
intolerable working conditions. Plaintiff was constructively
terminated on or around June 7, 2018. Plaintiff has duly complied
with the requirements of the Fair Employment and Housing Act by
filing charges of discrimination with the DFEH and obtaining the
requisite "Right to Sue" notice.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Twila S. White, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF TWILA S. WHITE
     6033 West Century Boulevard
     Los Angeles, CA 90045
     Phone: (213) 381-8749
     Facsimile: (213) 381-8799


UNITED NATIONS: Laventure Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Marie Laventure, et al., filed with the Supreme Court of
United States their petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
styled Marie Laventure, et al., Petitioners v. United Nations, et
al., Case No. 18-1427.

Response is due on June 13, 2019.

The Lower Court Case is titled Marie Laventure, each individually
and on behalf of the Estate of Cherylusse Laventure, and the Estate
of MARIE THERESE FLEURICIANE DELINAIS, and the additional persons
and their representatives listed, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. United Nations, United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti, BAN KI-MOON, Secretary-General of the United
Nations, EDMOND MULET, former Under Secretary-General for the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, CHANDRA SRIVASTAVA,
former Chief Engineer for the United Nations Mission to Haiti, PAUL
AGHADJANIAN, Chief of Mission Support for the United Nations
Mission to Haiti, PEDRO MEDRANO, Assistant United Nations Secretary
General, MIGUEL DE SERPA, Under Secretary for Legal Affairs, Case
No. 17-2908, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
asked a 45-day extension of time, to and including May 13, 2019,
within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment of the Second Circuit in this case.

The Petitioners have not previously sought an extension of time
from the Supreme Court.  The decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was issued on December 28, 2018.

The Petitioners are American citizens, Haitian citizens residing in
the United States, as well as Haitian citizens in Haiti, all of
whom were damaged as a result of the UN's tortious conduct, either
directly or as surviving family members of those who have been
killed.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Marie Laventure, et al., are represented
by:

          James F. Haggerty, Esq.
          45 Broadway, Suite 3140
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 480-0700
          E-mail: jamesfhaggerty@gmail.com

Defendants-Respondents United Nations, et al., are represented by:

          Noel J. Francisco, Esq.
          SOLICITOR GENERAL
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20530-0001
          Telephone: (202) 514-2203
          E-mail: SupremeCtBriefs@USDOJ.gov


UNITED PARCEL: 9th Cir. Denies Writ of Mandamus in R. Holl's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion
denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Mandamus in the case captioned IN
RE RANDALL HOLL. RANDALL HOLL, individually, on behalf of others
similarly situated, and as a representative of the class,
Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OAKLAND, Respondent, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
INC., Real Party in Interest. No. 18-70568. (9th Cir.).

Randall Holl employs the extraordinary writ of mandamus to test the
district court's conclusion that United Parcel Service, Inc.'s
(UPS's) arbitration provision passed muster.  

Holl shipped a package from the UPS Store in Healdsburg, California
to Big Lake, Minnesota. The store charged an additional fee of
$5.92 based on the shipment's remote destination (Delivery Area
Surcharge). According to Holl, the Delivery Area Surcharge for this
shipment should have been $3.15 as advertised in UPS's Retail
Rates. Based on the rate discrepancy, Holl filed a putative class
action complaint against UPS, alleging that the company
systematically overcharges retail customers shipping packages
through third-party facilities by applying Delivery Surcharge Rates
higher than the rates UPS advertised.

UPS moved to compel arbitration of Holl's individual claims under
the Federal Arbitration Act.

UPS argued that, before making the shipment that gives rise to his
claims in this litigation, Holl enrolled in the UPS My Choice
program, a free, optional program that allows UPS customers to
track and manage deliveries -- and, in doing so, agreed to
arbitrate all claims relating to UPS's shipping services.

Here is the path a user like Holl would take to get to the
arbitration clause while enrolling in the UPS My Choice program.
The user first encounters the following enrollment page: "All users
have to click on the box, affirmatively indicating assent to the
UPS Technology Agreement and the UPS My Choice Service Terms, in
order to continue the enrollment process. Although Holl has no
memory of reading any of UPS's terms in the course of signing up"
for My Choice, the blue UPS Technology Agreement and UPS My Choice
Service Terms text depicted above hyperlinks to the controlling
versions of the agreements."

The UPS Technology Agreement hyperlink directs the user to a
96-page document that grants the My Choice user, a limited,
revocable, non-sublicenseable, non-exclusive, non-transferable,
license to use the UPS Technology and associated Technical
Documentation in the Permitted Territory for such UPS Technology.

Section 12.6 of that Agreement, entitled Governing Law;
Jurisdiction and Language, provides:
"The exclusive jurisdiction for any claim, case, or controversy
arising out of or relating to this Agreement (whether for breach of
contract, tort or otherwise) shall be a federal or state court in
Atlanta, Georgia, and the parties hereby consent to such exclusive
jurisdiction and irrevocably waive and shall not assert any
defenses based on lack of in personam jurisdiction, improper venue
or inconvenient forum."

Exhibit B to the Agreement, however, specifies that for customers
in Middle Eastern Countries all disputes arising out of or in
connection with the Agreement shall be referred to and finally
resolved by arbitration. Otherwise, the UPS Technology Agreement
does not contain a generally applicable arbitration clause.

Before the district court, Holl conceded that he checked the box
indicating his agreement to the UPS My Choice Service Terms and the
UPS Technology Agreement when enrolling in the My Choice program.
Nevertheless, he contended that he could not be bound by the
arbitration clause contained therein for two primary reasons: (1)
the arbitration provision was so inconspicuous that no reasonable
user would be on notice of its existence, and (2) the arbitration
provision conflicted with the jurisdictional provision of the UPS
Technology Agreement such that there could not have been a meeting
of the minds as to a dispute resolution process.

The district court disagreed and granted UPS's motion to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings. Holl then filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus asking our court to vacate the order compelling
arbitration.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and only exceptional
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a
clear abuse of discretion will justify the invocation of this
remedy.

To determine whether mandamus is warranted, the Court weigh five
non-exhaustive factors assessing whether: (1) The party seeking the
writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to
attain the relief he or she desires (2) The petitioner will be
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal  (3) The
district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4)
The district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a
persistent disregard of the federal rules and (5) The district
court's order raises new and important problems, or issues  of
first impression.

As the district court recognized, locating the arbitration clause
at issue here requires several steps and a fair amount of
web-browsing intuition. The user must access the UPS My Choice
Service Terms via the enrollment page's hyperlink, potentially
after following the first hyperlink to the 96-page Technology
Agreement. The user must then read the UPS My Choice Service Terms
and understand that they incorporate the UPS Tariff/Terms and
Conditions of Service.

Because the My Choice Service Terms do not include hyperlinks to
the incorporated documents, the user must visit the full ups.com
website, intuitively find the Service Terms and Conditions link at
the bottom of the webpage, select it, and locate yet another link
to the UPS Tariff/Terms and Conditions of Service. Then, the user
must read the UPS Tariff/Terms and Conditions of Service to find
the arbitration clause.

The task of the district court below, and the Court's task in these
mandamus proceedings, would be much easier if we were reviewing the
current My Choice Service Terms. The My Choice Service Terms now
include a hyperlink to the UPS Tariff/Terms and Conditions of
Service and expressly inform the user that the incorporated
document contains an agreement to arbitrate. But, even under the
version of the My Choice Service Terms in effect at the time of
Holl's enrollment, the district court's determination regarding the
arbitration provision's validity does not warrant the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus.

Here, there is no question Holl affirmatively assented to the UPS
My Choice Service Terms. He checked a box acknowledging as much.
So, if the UPS My Choice Service Terms validly incorporate the UPS
Tariff/Terms and Conditions of Service, his assent encompassed the
arbitration clause.  

In the context of paper transactions, California courts have deemed
analogous incorporations by reference valid and the incorporated
terms binding.  

Federal courts likewise have recognized the general enforceability
of similar online agreements that require affirmative user assent.


Despite Holl's urging, the characteristics of the UPS Technology
Agreement its length; incorporation of rules, regulations, and
documents by reference; and inclusion of a jurisdictional provision
do not alter our assessment of the district court's holding. The
UPS Technology Agreement grants licenses for the use of certain
technology and sets forth terms and conditions that apply to each
UPS Technology a UPS My Choice member] may use.

According to the Technology Agreement's plain language, its
jurisdictional clause applies only to claims arising out of or
relating to the Technology Agreement itself. The use of UPS
services remains governed by any agreement the user enters with UPS
in connection with those services, including for example, the
applicable UPS Terms and Conditions of Carriage/Service.

Given the expressly stated scope of the Technology Agreement, the
district court did not clearly err by determining that the
Technology Agreement's jurisdictional clause and the My Choice
Service Terms' incorporated arbitration clause cover different
subject matters and thus are not in conflict.

Because Holl unequivocally assented to the My Choice Service Terms
and those terms clearly incorporated the document containing the
arbitration clause in question, we are not left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court erred in a manner
sufficient to justify mandamus.

Faced with the heavy burden of showing a clear and indisputable
right to the extraordinary remedy he seeks, Holl fails to establish
the type of judicial usurpation of power or clear abuse of
discretion that might justify issuance of the writ.

Therefore, the Court denies his petition.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's May 30, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y2xqs5ln from Leagle.com.

Adam W. Hansen  -- adam@apollo-law.com -- (argued), Apollo Law LLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Matthew C. Helland -- helland@nka.com --
Nichols Kaster LLP, San Francisco, California; Brock J. Specht --
bspecht@nka.com -- and Kai H. Richter -- krichter@nka.com --
Nichols Kaster LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; for Petitioner.

Deanne E. Maynard -- dmaynard@mofo.com -- (argued), Morrison &
Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.; Benjamin J. Fox -- bfox@mofo.com -,
and Gregory B. Koltun -- gkoltun@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Los Angeles, California; Joel Jacinto Ramirez ,James R. Sigel
--
jsigel@mofo.com -- and Stacey M. Sprenkel -- ssprenkel@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, California; for Real Party
in Interest.

Anne Richardson, and Magdalena Reyes Bordeaux, Public Counsel, Los
Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Public Counsel, Public Good
Law Center, and Public Law Center.


UNITED REFRIGERATION: Verduzco Files Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------------
LUIS STEVEN VERDUZCO, an individual, Plaintiff, v. UNITED
REFRIGERATION, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, and DOES 1 through
20, Inclusive,, Defendants, Case No. 198TCV18720 (Cal. Super Ct.,
Los Angeles Cty., May 30, 2019) is a class action on behalf of
Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former
non-exempt hourly wage earners employed as salesperson in the State
of California by Defendants, for violations of the California Labor
Code. Plaintiff reserves the right to name additional class
representatives.

According to the complaint, during Plaintiff's employment, he
generally worked from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday,
and Saturdays from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Thus, working
approximately 49 hours per week. However, approximately half of the
overtime hours he worked were omitted from each paycheck, and his
pay stubs did not match with his timesheets. The Defendant masked
this scheme via inaccurate pay stubs and effectively forced
Plaintiff and class members to work approximately half their
overtime hours for no pay at all, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was employed as a salesman for Defendant from
approximately February of 2016 through July 3, 2018.

Defendant distributes and sells refrigeration, air conditioning,
and heating parts and equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     A. Jacob Nalbandyan, Esq.
     Tanganica Turner. Esq.
     LEVIN & NALBANDYAN, LLP
     811 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 800
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Phone: (213) 232-4848
     Fax:(213) 232-4849
     Email: jnalbandyan@lntriallawyers.com
            tturner@lntriallawyers.com


UNITED STATES: Hernandez Files Suit in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against US government
officials. The case is styled as Xochitl Hernandez, Cesar Matias
for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated
individuals, Plaintiffs v. William P. Barr, United States, Attorney
General, Juan P. Osuna Director, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Jeh Johnson Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,
Sarah Saldana Director, Immigration and Customs enforcement (ICE),
David Jennings Los Angeles Field Office Director of ICE, James
Janecka Warden, Adelanto Detention Facility, Christina Holland Jail
Administrator, Santa Ana City Jail, Carlos Roja Chief, Santa Ana
City Department, Jon Briggs Captain, Orange County Sheriff's
Department, Mike Kreuger Captain, Orange County Sheriff's
Department, Sandra Hutchens Sheriff, Orange County, Defendants,
Case No. 3:19-mc-80145-LB (N.D. Cal., May 31, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

William Pelham Barr is a two-time United States Attorney General.
He was appointed by Donald Trump as the 85th Attorney General, and
has served in that role since February 14, 2019.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Ahilan Thevanesan Arulanantham, Esq.
     Michael Bryan Kaufman, Esq.
     ACLU of Southern California
     1313 West 8th Street
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Phone: (213) 977-5211
     Fax: (213) 977-5297
     Email: aarulanantham@aclusocal.org
            mkaufman@aclusocal.org

          - and -

     Matthew Eric Sloan, Esq.
     Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP
     300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3400
     Los Angeles, CA 90071-3144
     Phone: (213) 687-5276
     Email: Matthew.Sloan@skadden.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Gisela Ann Westwater, Esq.
     Joseph D. Hardy , Jr., Esq.
     Office of Immigration Litigation
     P.O. Box 868
     Ben Franklin Station
     Washington, DC 20044
     Phone: (202) 532-4174
     Fax: (202) 616-8962
     Email: gisela.westwater@usdoj.gov
            joseph.hardy@usdoj.gov


UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS: Palade Files Civil Rights Suit v. BOT
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the Board of Trustees
University of Arkansas System. The case is styled as Philip Palade,
Gregory Borse, J Thomas Sullivan, On Behalf of Themselves and all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. Board of Trustees
University of Arkansas System, Ed Fryar Ph.D., in his Official
Capacity as Trustee, Steve Cox In his Official Capacity as Trustee,
Tommy Boyer In his Official Capacity as  Trustee, Sheffield Nelson
In his Official Capacity as Trustee, C C Gibson In his Official
Capacity as Trustee, Stephen Broughton M.D., in his Official
Capacity as Trustee, Kelly Eichler In her Official Capacity as
Trustee, Morril Harriman In his Official Capacity as Trustee, Mark
Waldrip In his Official Capacity as Trustee, John Goodson In his
Official Capacity as Trustee, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00379-JM
(E.D. Ark., May 31, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas is the
institution's governing body.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Brittany S. Ford, Esq.
     Joseph Wayne Price, II, Esq.
     Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC
     111 Center Street, Suite 1900
     Little Rock, AR 72201-3325
     Phone: (501) 379-1700
     Email: bford@qgtlaw.com
            jprice@qgtb.com


UTAH: Christensen Suit Class Settlement Wins Final Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Dale A. Kimball grants the unopposed motion for
certification of settlement class in the lawsuit styled STACI
CHRISTENSEN, an individual; RYAN WEAKLY, an individual; AND
DISABILITY LAW CENTER, a Utah nonprofit corporation, and others
similarly situated v. Joseph Miner, Executive Director of the Utah
State Department of Health; Nathan Checketts, Director of Utah
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing; Ann Williamson,
Executive Director of Utah State Department of Human Services;
Angie Pinna, Director of Utah Division of Services for People with
Disabilities; Utah Department of Health; Utah Division of Medicaid
and Health Financing; Utah Department of Human Services; and Utah
Division of Service for People with Disabilities, Case No.
2:18-cv-00037-DAK-EJF (D. Utah).

The Court finally certifies the action for purposes of settlement
as a class action on behalf of:

     all persons with an intellectual and/or developmental
     disability who are eligible for Medicaid, reside in a
     private ICF in Utah on or after January 12, 2018 and prior
     to the termination of this lawsuit, has "expressed an
     interest" in living in the community, and is capable of
     living in the community.

The Plaintiffs are approved as representatives of the Class.
Parsons Behle & Latimer and the Disability Law Center are approved
as counsel to the Class.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          David N. Wolf, Esq.
          Laura K. Thompson, Esq.
          Tony Patterson, Esq.
          Andrew Dymek, Esq.
          UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, LITIGATION UNIT
          160 E 300 S, 6th Floor
          PO Box 140856
          Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
          Telephone: (801) 366-0100
          E-mail: dnwolf@utah.gov
                  wthompson@utah.gov
                  adymek@agutah.gov


UTILITY PARTNERS: Pelayo Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Utility Partners of
America, LLC. The case is styled as David Pelayo, Roberto
Hernandez, Edmond Andre, Brian Medeiros, OBO: the general public
for all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Utility Partners of
America, LLC, City of Santa Rosa, Defendants, Case No. SCV-264530
(Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma Cty., May 30, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Other Employment".

Utility Partners of America, LLC provides water, gas, and electric
utility solutions in the United States and Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by Richard Earl Donahoo, Esq.




VACATION HUB: Faces Class Action Over Unlawful Contracts
--------------------------------------------------------
Angelique Arde, writing for Sowetan Live, reports that a firm of
attorneys specialising in consumer law is seeking to bring a case
against Vacation Hub International (VHI) on behalf of clients who
have been refused refunds after cancelling contracts within the
cooling-off period.

This comes as the National Consumer Commission (NCC) plans to
prosecute VHI following its investigation into the privately owned
Somerset West-based company, which has been the subject of 219
complaints to the NCC over the past two years.

The commission is finalising its application to file with the
National Consumer Tribunal, NCC spokesperson Trevor Hattingh told
Money.

VHI is mentioned in a report released by the NCC late last year on
the misdeeds of the holiday ownership and timeshare industry.

The report was commissioned after years of abuse of consumers who
complained mostly of their inability to cancel contracts with
holiday clubs; the unavailability of accommodation; unacceptable
alternative accommodation; and misrepresentations made during sales
presentations, among other things.

Though VHI does not sell timeshare or points, complainants on Hello
Peter claim that its agents use some of the same unsavoury sales
tactics as those employed by the timeshare industry's worst
elements.

Describing VHI as "more of a travel club", Trudie Broekmann of
Trudie Broekmann Attorneys says one of her clients reported to her
that he was charged an upfront fee of R14,399, as well as a monthly
service fee of R2,333 payable for 24 months and a monthly "reliance
benefit contribution" of R710 payable for 120 months. "The reliance
benefit contribution is supposed to give you the right to cash-back
rewards after 10 years," she says.

Several clients have engaged Broekmann, alleging illegal practices
by VHI, including the refusal to honour the applicable cooling-off
period, and the refusal to refund clients who have exercised their
right to cancel in the cooling-off period.

Trudie Broekmann Attorneys has released a video aimed at helping
aggrieved VHI clients enforce their rights.

"We will apply to the tribunal for the maximum fine under the
Consumer Protection Act to be imposed on VHI on account of their
illegal practices. The maximum fine is R1m or 10% of turnover for
the past financial year, whichever is higher," says Trudie
Broekmann.

"We sent VHI cancellation letters on behalf of eight clients.
Initially we received no response, but after putting out a press
release in November, we received an offer of cancellation but
without a refund for these clients."

VHI's Esti Forbes told Money that Broekmann's clients' matters had
each been dealt with on their merits and in terms of the agreements
they signed. "These matters are currently the subject of litigation
and we will therefore not discuss individual cases in the press,"
said Forbes.

In terms of the Consumer Protection Act, if you have entered into a
contract as a result of direct marketing you're entitled to cancel
the contract without any penalty provided you cancel it within a
cooling-off period.

"Let's say the supplier approaches you in person, telephonically or
using an electronic method of communication, such as e-mail, and
markets their product or service. As a result, you sign a contract
with them. But before five business days have passed after you
signed the contract, or received the goods you bought, you cancel
the contract by notifying the supplier," says Broekmann.

"Your cancellation has to be in some recorded form. In other words,
by e-mail, fax, letter, SMS, WhatsApp or a recorded phone call. It
need not be by registered mail.

"The cancellation notice must clearly state that you are cancelling
the contract with the supplier and must reach the supplier before
the five business days is up."

The supplier must, within 15 business days, pay you back whatever
you've paid. If you received goods from the supplier, you must
return them at your own cost.

You do not need to pay a cancellation penalty in such an instance.

Broekmann says she already has two other law firms who want their
clients to join her group of VHI claimants. "Consumers who are keen
to join the group claiming back money they paid VHI are encouraged
to contact us. The more claimants, the less it will cost each
individual in legal fees."

Broekmann says she has discovered that the VHI contracts are
unlawful and consequently invalid, so consumers who have signed
with VHI can rely on this even if they missed the cooling-off
period's deadline.

Misleading marketing has been reported to her by her clients,
including the promise that discounts on flights are available.

"Consumers need to know that that is specifically excluded in the
contract," she says. [GN]


VERMONT: Russell's Bid to Certify Class Denied in Suit vs. DOC
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Geoffrey W. Crawford adopts in full the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation issued in the lawsuit entitled JUSTIN
RUSSELL v. ANDREW PALLITO, CYNTHIA MASON, RICHARD BILODEAU, and
LISA MENARD, Case No. 5:15-cv-00126-gwc-jmc (D. Vt.).

Accordingly, Justin Russell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is denied.  Defendants Menard and Pallito's Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.  Defendants Mason and Bilodeau's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.  Plaintiff Russell's Motion for
Reconsideration is granted.  Plaintiff Russell's Renewed Motion to
Certify Class and Motion to Reopen Discovery is denied.

Plaintiff Justin Russell, an inmate of the Vermont Department of
Corrections ("DOC"), brought this civil-rights lawsuit against four
officials and employees of the DOC: Andrew Pallito, the former
Commissioner; Lisa Menard, the current Commissioner; Cynthia Mason,
a Correctional Officer; and Richard Bilodeau, a Correctional
Facility Shift Supervisor.  Mr. Russell alleges that Pallito
violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment when he instituted a policy that Muslim prisoners would
be provided with kosher meals rather than halal meals.  Mr. Russell
alleges that Menard has continued this policy during her time as
Commissioner.

On January 7, 2019, the United States Magistrate Judge issued his
Report and Recommendation on the pending motions.  The Magistrate
Judge recommended granting Mason and Bilodeau's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Russell's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
March 23, 2017 Opinion and Order.  He recommended denying the rest
of the pending motions.

Russell's objections were filed on January 19, 2019, challenging
the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny class certification
and additional discovery, deny Russell's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on his free exercise claim against Pallito, and grant
Mason's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Pallito and Menard's objections were filed on March 6, 2019,
challenging the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny their
Motion for Summary Judgment.[CC]


VIKING CRUISES: New Jersey Couple Files Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
WPVI reports that a New Jersey couple filed a class-action lawsuit
against Viking Cruises over the harrowing ship evacuation off the
coast of Norway.

Hundreds of passengers had to be rescued from the Viking Sky by
helicopter in March after its engines shut down and the ship was
stranded in choppy seas in a rocky area.

Among those onboard was retired Swedesboro School Superintendent
Charles Ivory and his wife.

"The water breached the dining room area where we were located,
knocking people to their feet, blowing furniture all around," said
Ivory in an exclusive interview with Action News in March.

Ivory suffered a minor injury in the incident. [GN]


VIRGINIA COLLEGE: Appeals Decision in Robinson Suit to 11th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Virginia College, LLC and Education Corporation of
America filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit entitled
Keven Robinson v. Virginia College, LLC, et al., Case No.
2:19-cv-00064-RDP, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama.

The nature of suit is stated as other personal injury.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
(assigned Case No. 18-90888) was removed from the Jefferson County
Circuit Court to the District Court.

Virginia College operates as an educational institution.  The
College offers bachelor degree in animation, business
administration, criminal justice, health service management,
management information systems, and network management, as well as
master degree in paralegal, health care, and information
technology.

The appellate case is captioned as Keven Robinson v. Virginia
College, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-11864, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before June 24, 2019;

   -- The appendix is due no later than seven days from the
      filing of the appellant's brief; and

   -- The Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on
      or before June 11, 2019, as to Appellee Keven Robinson.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee KEVEN ROBINSON, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Taylor Bartlett, Esq.
          William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq.
          HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC
          2224 1st Avenue N
          Birmingham, AL 35203-4204
          Telephone: (205) 326-3336
          Facsimile: (205) 380-8085
          E-mail: taylor@hgdlawfirm.com
                  wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellants VIRGINIA COLLEGE, LLC and EDUCATION
CORPORATION OF AMERICA are represented by:

          Ollie A. Cleveland, III, Esq.
          Brandt P. Hill, Esq.
          MAYNARD COOPER & GALE, PC
          1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 2400
          Birmingham, AL 35203-2618
          Telephone: (205) 254-1000
          Facsimile: (205) 254-1999
          E-mail: tcleveland@maynardcooper.com
                  bhill@maynardcooper.com


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Must Face Class Action Over Exploding Sunroof
---------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a
Volkswagen exploding sunroof class action lawsuit will continue for
California customers after a federal judge refused to dismiss the
complaint.

The lawsuit alleges Volkswagen failed to warn consumers about
sunroofs that spontaneously shatter due to defects in the
sunroofs.

The VW class action lawsuit includes California customers who
purchased or leased these vehicles if they were equipped with
factory-installed sunroofs:

   -- 2005-2017 Volkswagen Jetta
   -- 2015-2017 Volkswagen Golf
   -- 2006-2015 Volkswagen GTI
   -- 2009-2010 Volkswagen CC
   -- 2007-2016 Volkswagen Eos
   -- 2006-2009 Volkswagen Rabbit
   -- 2012-2017 Volkswagen Passat
   -- 2004-2006 Volkswagen Touareg
   -- 2011-2017 Volkswagen Touareg
   -- 2008 Volkswagen R32
   -- 2009-2017 Volkswagen Tiguan

According to the class action lawsuit, owners get stuck paying for
sunroof repairs and replacements because the automaker blames
incidents of broken glass on outside objects hitting the glass.

The sunroofs allegedly don't need to be hit with outside objects,
say the plaintiffs, and the proof is found in the angle of the
broken glass which points outward. The lawsuit says this should
convince anyone the glass wasn't forced downward such as what would
happen if a rock hit the sunroof from the outside.

The plaintiffs claim even when the vehicles are still under
warranties, Volkswagen refuses to cover the expenses and throws the
cost back onto the customer.

Volkswagen also allegedly didn't meet the engineering levels needed
to install safe sunroofs in vehicles and decided to sell the
vehicles without being honest with consumers.

According to the lawsuit, VW knew about the dangers of exploding
sunroofs because in 2012, the South Korean government's auto safety
and testing arm called KATRI opened an investigation into exploding
sunroofs.

The probe included multiple manufacturers and VW was allegedly
updated about the results which found panoramic sunroofs were prone
to shatter.

"At a hearing in November 2013 before Korea's Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, and Transport ("MOLIT"), KATRI presented its
findings and allowed automakers to respond. Representatives from VW
as well as other manufacturers were present at this meeting."

The judge denied a motion to dismiss implied warranty claims in the
first amended lawsuit but did dismiss unjust enrichment claims with
prejudice.

Also dismissed were claims concerning unfair competition law,
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act and fraud by omission after
the judge concluded the lawsuit did not adequately "allege that VW
had knowledge of the alleged defect at the time of sale or lease."

However, the judge gave the plaintiffs a chance to amend those
claims and file a second amended lawsuit.

The plaintiffs claim Volkswagen must have known about shattering
sunroof dangers based on 57 complaints filed with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

But the judge ruled he didn't find that argument persuasive because
it's not "an unusually high number of complaints" relative to the
"potentially hundreds of thousands or more" affected vehicles.

"Standing alone, the allegations of consumer complaints are
therefore insufficient to allege knowledge."

But the plaintiffs also allege the automaker knew the sunroofs
could explode because VW recalled Beetles for the problem, although
Volkswagen says the recall was issued due to a very specific
manufacturing defect for just those models.

The judge ruled that recall, in addition to previous Audi sunroof
recalls, is enough to at least allege the automaker may have known
about problems with the sunroofs.

The Volkswagen exploding sunroof class action lawsuit was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California -
Deras, et. al., v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

The plaintiffs are represented by the Law Office of Robert L.
Starr, APC, and the Law Office of Stephen M. Harris, APC. [GN]


WAITR HOLDINGS: Halley Moves for Class Certification and Notice
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled JUALEIA HALLEY and HEATHER
GONGAWARE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WAITR HOLDINGS, INC., LANDCADIA HOLDINGS, INC. and
WAITR INCORPORATED, Case No. 2:19-cv-01800-EEF-JCW (E.D. La.),
moves the Court for certification of collective action and request
for notice to putative class members.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com

               - and -

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Ables Suit Transferred From S.D. to W.D. Tenn.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit entitled MARK ABLES, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.
OF TENNESSEE, Case No. 4:19-cv-00199, was transferred on May 13,
2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee (Jackson).

The Western District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01090-STA-jay to the proceeding.

The lawsuit is a collective action to recover overtime wages and
liquidated damages brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.  The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are those
persons, who are current and former non-exempt employees of Waste
Management, who have worked as Waste Disposal Drivers and were
responsible for hauling waste and garbage to the appropriate
facilities -- such as landfill and transfer facilities --
throughout Tennessee at any time during the relevant statutes of
limitations through the final disposition of this matter and have
not been paid minimum wage in violation of federal law.[BN]

Plaintiff Mark Ables is represented by:

          William Clifton Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com

Defendant WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF TENNESSEE is represented by:

          Matthew J. Ruza, Esq.
          Abby L. Bochenek, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          321 N. Clark Street, Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 795-3274
          E-mail: mruza@littler.com
                  abochenek@littler.com

               - and -

          Allison C. Williams, Esq.
          Leila Camille Clewis, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          1301 McKinney Street, Suite 1900
          Houston, TX 77010
          Telephone: (713) 951-9400
          Facsimile: (713) 951-9212
          E-mail: acwilliams@littler.com
                  lclewis@littler.com

               - and -

          John A. Ybarra, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          200 North La Salle Street, Suite 2900
          Chicago, IL 60601-1014
          Telephone: (312) 372-5520
          Facsimile: (312) 372-7880
          E-mail: jybarra@littler.com


WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bogden Suit Moved From S.D. Texas to D. Colo.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled JAMES BOGDEN, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF
COLORADO, INC., Case No. 4:19-cv-00198, was transferred on May 13,
2019, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
(Denver).

The Colorado District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-01366-PAB to the proceeding.

The lawsuit seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, the Colorado Wage Claim Act and the Colorado Minimum Wage
Act, as implemented by the Colorado Minimum Wage Order.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Clifton Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          George Schimmel, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com
                  cgordon@a2xlaw.com
                  carter@a2xlaw.com
                  geordie@a2xlaw.com


WOLVERINE WORLD: Henry Suit Moved From Delaware to W.D. Michigan
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled SUSAN HENRY, for herself and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; and THE 3M COMPANY, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-01924,
was transferred on May 13, 2019, from the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan (Southern Division).

The Michigan District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-00379-PLM-RSK to the proceeding.

Wolverine has manufacturing and disposal facilities in Kent County,
Michigan.  For decades, unknown to the Plaintiff or Class Members,
3M provided toxic chemicals to Wolverine for use and disposal in
these facilities, the Plaintiff alleges.  Among these toxic
chemicals were Per- and Poly-FluoroCarbons (collectively, "PFC's"
or "fluorocarbons"), including per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances
("PFAS's"), including perfluorooctane sulfonate ("PFOS") and
perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA").

The PFC's leached into ground water surrounding these sites,
contaminating the environment, including: lakes, rivers, ponds,
creeks, and their banks; beaches; other land; ground and surface
water; sewer systems; and municipal and private well drinking water
supplies; including animals (further including fish and deer)
living in or on them, and exposing Plaintiff and Class Members to
dangerously high levels of PFC's, including PFAS's, PFOS, and PFOA,
the Plaintiff asserts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Joseph Hrubiec, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, P.L.L.C.
          919 North Market Street, Suite 1801
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 330-8025
          E-mail: rhrubiec@napolilaw.com

               - and -

          Paul J. Napoli, Esq.
          Tate Kunkle, Esq.
          NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, P.L.L.C.
          360 Lexington Avenue, Eleventh Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 397-1000
          E-mail: tkunkle@napolilaw.com
                  pnapoli@napolilaw.com

Defendant Wolverine World Wide Inc., a Delaware Corporation, is
represented by:

          John Anderson Sensing, Esq.
          Jesse Leon Noa, Esq.
          POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP
          1313 N. Market St., Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
          P.O. Box 951
          Wilmington, DE 19899-0951
          Telephone: (302) 984-6093
          Facsimile: (302) 778-6093
          E-mail: jsensing@potteranderson.com
                  jnoa@potteranderson.com

Defendant 3M Company, formerly known as: Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co., a Delaware Corporation, is represented by:

          Kelly E. Farnan, Esq.
          RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, PA
          One Rodney Square, Suite 600
          920 N. King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 651-7705
          E-mail: farnan@rlf.com

Defendant Waste Management of Michigan, Inc., is represented by:

          Brian Tome, Esq.
          REILLY, MCDEVITT & HENRICH, P.C.
          Delle Donne Corporate Center
          1013 Centre Road, Suite 210
          Wilmington, DE 19805
          Telephone: (302) 777-1700
          Facsimile: (302) 777-1705
          E-mail: btome@rmh-law.com


XPO LOGISTICS: Appeal in Intermodal Drayage Class Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
XPO Logistics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2019, that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declined to consider the
appeal in the intermodal drayage-related suit, on technical
grounds.  

Certain of the Company's intermodal drayage subsidiaries received
notices from the California Labor Commissioner, Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement (the "DLSE"), that a total of approximately
150 owner-operators contracted with these subsidiaries filed claims
in 2012 with the DLSE in which they assert that they should be
classified as employees, rather than independent contractors.

These claims seek reimbursement for the owner-operators' business
expenses, including fuel, tractor maintenance and tractor lease
payments.

Decisions were rendered in June 2015 by a DLSE hearing officer with
respect to claims of five plaintiffs, resulting in awards in an
aggregate amount of approximately $1 million, following which the
Company appealed the decisions in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California ("Central District Court").

On May 16, 2017, the Central District Court issued judgment finding
that the five claimants were employees rather than independent
contractors and awarding an aggregate of approximately $1 million
plus post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees to the claimants.

The Company appealed this judgment, but on February 20, 2019, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to
consider the appeal on technical grounds.

In addition, separate decisions were rendered in April 2017 by a
DLSE hearing officer in claims involving four additional
plaintiffs, resulting in an award for the plaintiffs in an
aggregate amount of approximately $1 million, which the Company has
appealed to the California Superior Court, Long Beach.

The remaining DLSE claims (the "Pending DLSE Claims") were
transferred to California Superior Court in three separate actions
involving approximately 170 claimants, including the claimants
mentioned above who originally filed claims in 2012.

The Company has reached an agreement to settle the majority of the
Pending DLSE Claims, the settlement payment has been made, and
dismissals are pending.

In addition, certain of the Company's intermodal drayage
subsidiaries are party to putative class action litigations and
other administrative claims in California brought by independent
contract carriers who contracted with these subsidiaries. In these
litigations, the contract carriers assert that they should be
classified as employees, rather than independent contractors.

The Company believes that it has adequately accrued for the
potential impact of loss contingencies that are probable and
reasonably estimable relating to the claims referenced above.

The Company is unable at this time to estimate the amount of the
possible loss or range of loss, if any, in excess of its accrued
liability that it may incur as a result of these claims given,
among other reasons, that the range of potential loss could be
impacted substantially by future rulings by the courts involved,
including on the merits of the claims.

XPO Logistics, Inc. provides transportation and logistics services
in the United States, North America, France, the United Kingdom,
Europe, and internationally. XPO Logistics, Inc. was founded in
1996 and is based in Greenwich, Connecticut.


ZWICKER AND ASSOCIATES: Kaur's Bid for Class Certification Stayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William E. Duffin granted the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification filed in
the lawsuit titled KULDEEP KAUR v. ZWICKER AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00679-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

The parties are relieved from the automatic briefing schedule set
forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).  Moreover, for
administrative purposes, it is necessary that the Clerk terminate
the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.  However, this
motion will be regarded as pending to serve its protective purpose
under Damasco, Judge Duffin notes.

On May 10, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint.  At
the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the Court commonly refers
to as a "protective" motion for class certification.  In this
motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class described in the
complaint but also moved the court to stay further proceedings on
that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class‐action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."  However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or
investigation."[CC]


[*] Coalition of 40 States Files Suit Against Generic Drug Makers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Whitaker, writing for 60 Minutes, reports that it might be the
biggest price-fixing scheme in U.S. history. On May 10, Connecticut
and a coalition of more than 40 states filed a 500-page lawsuit
accusing the biggest generic drug makers of a massive, systematic
conspiracy to bilk consumers out of billions of dollars. It's a
more sweeping version of a similar lawsuit the states filed in 2016
that's still being litigated. The generic industry vehemently
denies the allegations.

Congress established the current generic industry in 1984 to push
prices down. The idea was that once patents on brand name drugs
expired, generic makers would compete to make drugs more
affordable. But 1,215 generics, many of them the most prescribed
drugs, jumped on average more than 400 percent in a single year.

Connecticut has been examining the generic drug industry for almost
five years. Tonight, we'll take you inside its investigation and
show you how two dogged attorneys built the cases the state
attorney general calls the most egregious examples of corporate
greed he has ever seen.


[*] Non-U.S. issuers Become Targets of Securities Class Actions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Hazel Bradford, writing for Pension & Investments, reports that
institutional investors in the U.S. may have lost their ability to
sue foreign stock issuers in U.S. courts after a pivotal 2010
Supreme Court decision, but they are finding some success with
American depository receipts, and a case now up for Supreme Court
review could potentially expand their legal recovery options well
beyond ADRs.

"ADRs give plaintiffs a hook in the U.S. Institutional investors
seem to be pretty active in these cases," said David Kistenbroker
-- david.kistenbroker@dechert.com -- global co-leader of Dechert
LLP's white collar and securities litigation practice in Chicago.

U.S. institutional investors pursued all types of investment
litigation cases against foreign companies in U.S. courts until
June 2010, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Morrison vs.
National Australia Bank that lawsuits against companies involving
foreign-bought securities could not be brought in U.S. courts.

The Morrison decision might have had a chilling effect on lawsuits
against non-U.S. issuers for a while, but they have increasingly
become targets in securities class actions filed in the U.S.,
regardless of where the allegations occur, Mr. Kistenbroker said.
His firm's analysis of cases filed in 2018 found 13% of securities
fraud class actions were brought against non-U.S. issuers in 2018.

A Securities and Exchange Commission rule change in 2008 made
"unsponsored" ADRs -- opposed to ones sponsored by their overseas
issuers that can trade on exchanges -- highly attractive to major
U.S. banks, which reported a 766% growth from 2008 through the
third quarter of 2018, when $31 billion were traded.

More litigation
The growth in popularity of both kinds of ADRs has also brought
more litigation by investors when things don't work out.

Just ask officials at Petroleo Brasileiro SA-Petrobras, which in
January 2018 agreed to pay $2.95 billion to settle a class-action
suit led by the GBP64 billion ($82.6 billion) Universities
Superannuation Scheme, London, and joined by North Carolina's
treasurer on behalf of the North Carolina Retirement Systems and
the Hawaii Employees' Retirement System.

The largest U.S. class-action settlement in 2018 also gave
Petrobras the dubious distinction of being the largest non-U.S.
company ever to settle with shareholders that held the company's
ADRs.

ADR investors led by the $1.4 billion Arkansas State Highway
Employees' Retirement System, Little Rock, and the $1.6 billion
Miami Police Relief and Pension Fund expected final approval May 10
of a $48 million settlement with Volkswagen AG over its emissions
testing scandal. While the award pales in comparison to that of
Petrobras, plaintiffs were pleased that the District Court judge
rejected the company's central argument that the shares were beyond
the territorial reach of U.S. securities law because of the
Morrison decision.

Things got more interesting when the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco reinstated a case brought by purchasers of
unsponsored Toshiba Corp. ADRs not related to the company but
instead issued by banks and sold on over-the-counter markets. In
its July 2018 order to reverse and remand the case led at this
point by its plaintiffs, the $1.2 billion Automotive Industries
Pension Trust Fund and the $2.9 billion New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, the 9th Circuit said the ADR
purchases met the conditions set by the Morrison decision, and that
the Exchange Act could only apply to "transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities."

The Toshiba ADRs were purchased in the U.S. by U.S. investors from
U.S. banks, making it a domestic transaction, the court said.

The case, Toshiba Corp. vs. Automotive Industries Pension Trust
Fund, is now on hold, thanks to a perceived circuit split that led
Toshiba to petition the Supreme Court for review.

Toshiba's argument
In its petition, Toshiba argued that the 9th Circuit rejected a
2014 ruling by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in New York in
Parkcentral Global Hub vs. Porsche Automobile Holdings that relied
on Morrison to hold that a domestic transaction was not sufficient
to have a domestic claim against foreign interests.

By departing from the Porsche ruling, Toshiba's lawyers argued,
"the Ninth Circuit in effect has opened a new forum for U.S.
class-action litigation against any foreign issuer in the world.

"Merely by transacting in a foreign issuer's securities (or a
derivative thereof) in the U.S., third parties can manufacture
rights under the Exchange Act not available to parties that
transact in the same securities abroad," they argued.

The repercussion of letting the 9th Circuit prevail will go far
beyond the $12 billion market in unsponsored ADRs and negatively
impact the multitrillion-dollar derivatives market as well, warned
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's brief, while the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association and its European counterparts, as
well as officials from Japan and the U.K., warned that it would
seriously harm worldwide securities markets and put the U.S. in
direct conflict with foreign jurisdictions.

"The issuer community is really looking at the implications of the
Toshiba case beyond just its impact on ADRs," said Daniel S.
Sommers, partner with the Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC law
firm in Washington, who views the appellate ruling in Toshiba as
legally sound and "fully faithful to the Supreme Court's bright
line approach in Morrison."

He cautions that the high court might take a pass on the case in
part because the 2nd Circuit's Porsche opinion upon which Toshiba
relies "is extremely fact-bound" and specific to that case, he
said.

If the Supreme Court hears the case and favors the 2nd Circuit's
approach in Porsche, "there will be a much more narrow view of the
kinds of securities cases that can take place here in the U.S.,"
Mr. Sommers said. [GN]


[*] SB 551 to Impact Pending Suits Against Condo Associations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Blaze Lovell, writing for Honolulu Civil Beat, reports that
condominium associations sued by disgruntled tenants may slip away
unscathed after the Legislature passed a bill this session that
clarifies the powers the associations have to foreclose on
properties.

Senate Bill 551 would clear up the legislative intent behind
statutes enacted since the 1990s regarding condo associations'
right to foreclose on owners who failed to pay their fees without
going through the courts. Tenants -- supported by a recent ruling
of  the Intermediate Court of Appeals -- argued the associations
need to spell out in their bylaws that they can foreclose on
noncompliant owners.

By passing SB 551, the Legislature is saying that is not the case,
and is also retroactively applying that standard to cases still
pending in the courts.

The bill's fate is now in the hands of Gov. David Ige.

At the center of the lawsuits is an argument over whether or not
condo associations should be required to state that they have the
power to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures in their governing
documents. Those types of foreclosures allow associations to
collect liens from maintenance fees without having to wade through
a lengthy court process.

Opponents of the measure contended lawmakers never intended to give
the associations authority to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures.
They complained it was pushed by law firms and association boards
named in a class action lawsuit from 2016.

Proponents of the measure say that they need the power of
nonjudicial foreclosure to collect unpaid fees from owners.
Otherwise, the unpaid fees that typically go to common expenses
would need to be picked up by other residents.

"The bill is very important to confirm and clarify legislative
intent," Anne Anderson, an attorney at Anderson Lahne & Fujisaki,
said on May 10. "Hopefully, Hawaii's courts will take notice of
that while evaluating their rulings."

The bill would add provisions to laws governing foreclosures and
condos that say the associations don't need to have a clause in
their own bylaws since foreclosure power is already granted by the
state.

The issue of legislative intent that lawmakers want to address
stems from a 2015 case between Christian Sakal and the condo
association for the Hawaiian Monarch condo complex in Waikiki.

Last July, ICA judges ruled that the power of foreclosure must be
spelled out in an association's bylaws.

"Nothing in the legislation or legislative history of Hawaii
condominium law supports a conclusion that, at any time, the
Legislature enacted or intended to enact a statute granting powers
of sale over all condominiums in the State to their respective
associations," Judge Katherine Leonard wrote in a footnote of the
court opinion.

But lawmakers contend in the preamble to SB 551 that it was always
the Legislature's intent to give associations the power to
foreclose. They noted a 1999 committee report on a bill that
granted that power.

The state Supreme Court is considering the Sakal case now. Attorney
Frederick Arensmeyer, who represents Sakal in the case, did not
respond to a request for comment on May 10.

In written testimony to lawmakers, Arensmeyer said that without a
power of foreclosure clause in governing documents, such
foreclosures would be an "unconstitutional regulatory taking of
private property without just compensation to the impacted
homeowners."

SB 551 could also affect two lawsuits pending in District Court
from 2016. One is a class action in which more than 160 parties are
suing more than 70 condo associations and the law firms
representing them, including Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow and
Ekimoto & Morris.

The class action suit, brought by the law firm Imanaka Asato, also
relies on the argument that the Legislature did not intend for
associations to have the power to foreclose.

Steven Chung, the attorney for the plaintiffs, did not respond to a
request for comment.

Chung also represented a military couple in Ewa who won a minor
victory in a lawsuit against their condo association. In 2017, U.S.
District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi ruled that the association
did not have the power to pursue nonjudicial foreclosures under
state law.

The parties in both of the pending cases have been meeting in
status conferences, according to the court record.

Chung opposed SB 551 in written testimony, maintaining nonjudicial
foreclosures were unlawful because of the apparent lack of a clear
legislative intent.

Laree McGuire, a partner in one of the law firms being sued, said
that the Legislature had to apply SB 551 retroactively.

"The court would look at it as a new statute, and not one that
addresses everything that came before," she said.

McGuire worked with Anderson to propose amendments giving condo
owners more protections from the associations.

Many of them made it into the bill's final version, including a
protection from associations attempting to foreclose for collection
of legal fees or late fees and an exemption for active duty
military deployed out of state. Associations need to file the
foreclosure with a court if they are going after deployed military
personnel.

McGuire said that one of the most important protections was a new
section that requires mediation between the associations and the
people they are trying to foreclose on.

If the owner requests mediation within 30 days after a notice of
intent to foreclose, the association would not be able to
immediately pursue nonjudicial foreclosure. If the mediation wasn't
completed within 60 days after that, then the foreclosure could
proceed. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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                   *** End of Transmission ***